p In preparation for overrunning other countries, Hitler attached paramount importance, notably, to his diplomatic stock-in-trade. The Nazi foreign service was charged with the business of forestalling concerted action by the USSR, France and Britain as that would have virtually made German aggression impossible. Ribbentrop, who was appointed ambassador to Britain in 1936, lost no time in brainwashing the British ruling element, banking, above all, on their anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. For example, talking to Winston Churchill, he sought to prove that Germany was striving for friendship with Britain. She would even "stand guard for the British Empire in all its greateness and extent,” but "what was required was that Britain should give Germany a free hand in the East of Europe." ^^6^^

p Ribbentrop’s assurances that Germany was seeking an understanding with Britain were, naturally, sheer fraud. In one of his secret documents, Ribbentrop wrote that the task before German diplomacy with regard to German-British 144 relations was to "foster England’s belief that a settlement and an understanding between Germany and England are still possible eventually”, along with "quiet but determined establishment of alliances against England".^^7^^

p Ribbentrop had the full understanding and confidence of many members of the British government because his assurances were consonant with their hopes that the Nazi aggressors would turn East, first of all.

p Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister since late May 1937, was the most consistent champion of an accommodation with Germany. Chamberlain had intestinal hatred for everything progressive. Communism was his "Enemy No. 1" and the Soviet Union an object of vicious hatred. Even British historians who have studied Chamberlain’s policies could not fail to admit it. Eor example, Robert Sencourt stated that Soviet Russia was Chamberlain’s "declared enemy”, ^^8^^

p Chamberlain’s political sympathies were with the extreme reactionary forces both in Britain and elsewhere. He saw Hitler and Mussolini as his class allies, first and foremost.

p Chamberlain took it into his head that he was destined lo carry through a two-fold plan: strangle the Soviet Union with Nazi hands and wear out the forces of Germany as Britain’s imperialist rival. "Neville believes that he is a man with a mission to come to terms with the dictators”,^^9^^ Anthony Eden pointed out in his memoirs. He believed that one could come to terms with the aggressors, and do so under conditions that would not affect the basic interests of the British Empire. Chamberlain thought, as Churchill aptly said about him, that one "can ride the tiger".

p The position of Anthony Eden, as the Britain’s Foreign Secretary, differed from Chamberlain’s by methods of exercising foreign policy rather than by substance. Beck wrote, commenting on the pronouncements of the British Foreign Secretary in a conversation with him, that Eden had revealed an intention "to come to terms with Germany" but showed his "typical restraint" with regard to Russia.^^10^^

p The policy of France was no less short-sighted. There was no doubt that the French government perfectly realised the full gravity of an impending hurricane. That meant that France should not have allowed the Nazi Reich to overrun other nations and so strengthen itself. She could have relied in that policy on her Treaty of Mutual Assistance 145 with the USSR, yet the French ruling circles did not wish to co-operate with the Soviet Union.

p With the Popular Front government in office in 1930, it was the domestic political considerations that came to play a growing role in foreign policy options of the bourgeois parties. Whereas in earlier days, many of their leaders had favoured a firm independent foreign policy with a view to strengthening the security of the nation and, in that context, promoting co-operation with the USSR, after the victory of the Popular Front in the elections, the fear of the "Red menace" prompted most of them to collude with the aggressors "at any price”, that is to betray the national interests. The same considerations had a growing influence on the right wing of the Radical Socialist Party which formed part of the Popular Front. That was true, in particular, of such leaders as Edouard Daladier, Georges Bonnet, to mention just these two, who were playing a major role in framing France’s foreign policy.

p The class motives behind the policies pursued by Britain as well as by France were brought out by Litvinov in his conversation with the French Ambassador to the USSR, Robert Coulondre. The People’s Commissar pointed out that Britain would have sought a closer relationship with the USSR, if there had been no social hostility of Britain’s dominant classes towards the Soviet Union in the way. The same can well be said about France where there are quite a few influential personalities (like Flandin) who are openly advocating a Four Power Pact. ^^11^^ The Soviet Ambassador to France, Surits, wrote that there was a declining intention in that country to impart an effective character to the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance and to treat it from the standpoint of its "original designation”. This treaty, like relations with the USSR in general, was being seen in France "not in the sense of general opposition to the German threat, not in the positive sense, but rather in negative: there is a prevalent desire to keep the USSR as far away from Germany as possible, and to prevent and obstruct German-Soviet rapprochement".^^12^^

p D. Lloyd George considered the French government’s repudiation of the Franco-Soviet pact to have been an act of sheer folly. Referring to the question of who could save France in the event of war, he rightfully pointed out: "Not Britain, but the USSR alone ... A victory over Germany 146 can be decided only by a large land army. It is the USSR alone that has such an army.” ^^13^^

p Nevertheless, the ruling circles of France proceeded from the assumption that Britain was her most important ally. Yet those were utterly baseless illusions. Here is a note, made by British General Ironside, in his diary on February 6, 1938, that is particularly indicative in this respect. "Our government appears to recognise,” he wrote, "that if we again land an Army in France, it must mean a repetition of the 1914-1918 struggle under more difficult circumstances. ... The present Government has rightly made up its mind not to do this, even in the face of the danger that France may be overwhelmed." ^^14^^

p However, the military doctrine of the French themselves corresponded to the British one in principle. The Frencli Vice Premier Daladier believed that France must show concern for her lines of communication with her North African colonies; for the rest she "would be able to live safely behind the Maginot Line no matter what might happen in Central and Eastern Europe".^^15^^

p The government of the United States had also been informed of the aggressive plans of Nazi Germany. Assistant Secretary of State Messersmith wrote on October 11, 1937, that the plans of Nazis boiled down to the following: seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; establishment of Germany’s domination of Southeast Europe, capture of the Ukraine; isolation of Russia; weakening of France through breaking off her alliance with Russia; gradual dismemberment of the British Empire; finally, action against the United States.^^16^^

p Nevertheless, the United States, far from intending to lake any steps whatsoever against the aggressors, went on encouraging the policy of accommodation with them which was pursued by the ruling establishment of Britain and France. The French Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, did not even conceal during his meeting with Maxim Litvinov on November 6, 1938, that the United States was pushing France into an accommodation with Germany. " The reason behind that position of the United States, was, as Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles admitted in his memoirs, the prevalent view in the United States in the autumn of 1937 that Hitler would not go to war against the Western powers unless and until he had destroyed his true enemy—the USSR.^^18^^

p American historian Frederick L. Schuman, describing the policies of Britain, Franco and tho United Slates, wrote that the propertied classes of the Western powers "admired fascism and supposed that their own interests would be served by maintaining and extending fascist power”. Moreover, many of the political leaders oF those countries " fondly hoped and Fervently believed that a Free hand for the Fascist Triplice . . . would eventuate in a German-Japanese attack on the Soviet Union”, that "civilisation would thereby be saved from Bolshevism, and that France, Britain and America could remain neutral while fascism and communism destroyed one another". ^^19^^

p Striving for an understanding with the Nazis, the British government decided to send one of its most influential members, the Lord President of the Council, Lord Halifax ( former Viceroy of India) to Germany. A conversation between Lord Halifax and Hitler took place on November 10, 1937. Halifax praised Hitler for having "achieved a great deal .. . by destroying Communism" in Germany which meant she "could rightly be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism”. He intimated that should there be a "general settlement" whereby Germany would have undertaken to respect the integrity of the British Empire, the British government was prepared to give her a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe. Halifax said this applied to Germany’s designs on Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig. He qualified his statement by saying that Germany must expand without resorting to armed force.^^20^^

p The reservation was due, in part, to the fact that, taking into account the existence of a military alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, the British govermnent feared that the invasion of Czechoslovakia by German forces could have led to an armed conflict which would have involved Britain next to France. And that war would have dashed all hopes of British reactionary quarters for a war between Germany and the USSR.

p On November 24, Halifax reported to a British Cabinet meeting about his visit to Hitler. On hearing him, Chamberlain pointed out that the object of his tour had been to find out the German position with regard to the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement and expressed his profound satisfaction with the outcome. ^^21^^

p The French Premier, Chautemps, and the French Foreign 148 Minister, Delbos, were invited to London late in November 1937 to concert the subsequent plans of the two Powers regarding the negotiations with the Reich. They seized the occasion, to specify their position in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain firmly declared that Britain must not he involved in the war over Czechoslovakia. Delbos, setting out the position of France, noted that her treaty with Czechoslovakia would come into effect if there was an act of armed intervention by Germany but should Germany annex the Sudetenland without a direct "act of aggression”, the treaty "would not come into operation".^^22^^

p That statement showed France prepared to see her ally broken up without, however, certain "rules of the game" being broken. As we shall yet see, Chamberlain would make every effort to let Germany commit all her acts of aggression without a gross violation of those “rules”.

p During unofficial meetings of British and French leaders, their policy was being discussed even more frankly. Delbos, on arrival in Warsaw after his visit to London, described the mood prevalent in Britain: "Chamberlain is convinced that there is no other way to follow and that it is worthwhile coming to terms on co-operation with Germany and Italy.” It was clear from the talks with the British, the French Minister said, that "London lias turned sour on the USSR" and that "Britain has no objection to the USSR staying outside the Pact and, even more, to a conflict erupting between Germany and the USSR." ^^23^^

p The talks which took place in London made it clear that neither Britain nor France were going to afford any help and support to Czechoslovakia if Germany sought to carry through her plans without resorting to outright aggression. Still less did they mean to oppose Germany’s take-over of Austria.

p When the results of the Anglo-French negotiations came up for consideration at a British Cabinet meeting, Chamberlain reported that "an understanding was reached to continue the effort to seek a general settlement with Germa- ny". ^^24^^ The items to be thrashed out in an Anglo-German agreement were examined in detail at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on January 24 and February 3, 1938. The question of the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance was 149 also taken up. The Cabinet members who attended the meeting did not conceal that they found those treaties to be hindrance to an accommodation with Germany. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Nevile Henderson, who was taking part in the discussion, said point-blank that "it would first be necessary for Czechoslovakia to escape from the arrangements she had made with Soviet Russia".^^25^^

Nor did Hitler have any reason to be concerned over the position of the ruling circles of the United States. Soviet Ambassador A. A. Troyanovsky stated on March 2, 1938, that "the fate of Austria is not arousing any particular anxiety over here. Isolationists of all stripes are generally prepared to put up with all fascist annexations".^^26^^