p Nazi Germany’s expansionist ambitions were an enormous danger to the people of all European nations. So it was a matter of vital concern for them to curb the fascist aggressors and thwart their man-hating plans. The ruling circles of the Western powers held different views, however.

p The course of events in Europe and in the world largely depended on the position of Britain. The British Empire, just like many other nations, was in danger of attack by the Nazi Reich. Had Britain been resolved to resist aggression together with the Soviet Union, France and other countries, the aggressive action by the Nazi powers could have been checked and peace safeguarded. But it was not the peace-keeping, but their own far-reaching imperialist plans that were uppermost in the minds of the reactionary politicians who ruled Britain at the time.

p Fascism by itself did not worry the City tycoons. On the contrary, the British reactionaries hailed the fascist dictatorships in Italy and Germany. They saw those regimes as props to shore up capitalism and barriers to stem the rising tide of revolutionary struggle of the working class in Europe. At the same time, the British ruling circles hoped to use Hitler Germany as a weapon to fight the USSR with. Their basic principle was that "if Britain is to live Bolshevism must die!"^^25^^ So the ruling circles of Britain regarded Hitler Germany, above all, as a potential class ally in action against the Soviet Union rather than as a dangerous imperialist rival. The British government looked for an accommodation with the Nazi Reich in the hope of stabilising the situation in Western Europe by making some concessions to it, and canalising German aggression eastward, against the USSR.

p That is to say that the reactionary ruling circles of 17 Britain were th inking, first and foremost, not of how to resist fascist aggression, hut of how to stop the wheel of history, check the worsening general crisis of capitalism and prevent progressive social change gaining ground in the world and, above all, destroy the first socialist state.

p British imperialism’s policy on the "legitimacy of wars" did not differ from Hitler’s and Mussolini’s views. References to this issue in British historical literature usually mention Maurice Hankey who had been the British Government’s secretary for 20 years (1919-1938) and, therefore, embodies the continuity of its policies. Hankey said that war was "the right and proper process by which things move in this world”. And it would be naive to expect, he pointed out, that imperialism could pursue an unimperialist policy. ^^26^^-^^27^^

p Describing the position of Britain’s ruling circles, the Soviet Embassy in London reported to Moscow on April 25, 1933, that in recent months they had increasingly "tended to galvanise the idea of creating an anti-Soviet front. These trends were arising . .. from the triumph of Hitlerism in Germany and the mounting aggressiveness of Japan in the Far East”. Britain’s policy was to "pound her fist in the Russian issue". That was the policy of setting up a "holy alliance" by which to smash the Soviet Union.

p It was rightfully pointed out in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Bolsheviks) to the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934 that invectives in Britain against the USSR could not be considered accidental.

p The Nazis, intent on removing all obstacles to Germany’s rearmament and to the preparations for war, encouraged British reactionaries in their hope that their aggressive designs were against the East alone.

p A. Rosenberg, one of the ringleaders of nazism, told the British government in May 1933 that Germany was agreeable to relinquish her claims in the West but demanded that in return she should be given the right to rearm, to annex Austria and “adjust” her frontiers with Czechoslovakia and Poland to Germany’s advantage, and to capture the Baltic states. Rosenberg pointed out that Germany would eventually direct her forces against the USSR.

p Germany’s Minister of the Economy A. Hugenberg produced a memorandum at the economic conference in London in June 1933 outlining an explicit demand for Germany 18 to be given some "living space" in the East, partly at the expense of the USSR. A letter from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, dated Juno 27, 1933, regarding that unprecedented document, pointed out that "the German government is prepared to join a military coalition against us ... and demands only two things in exchange—the freedom to rearm and compensation at the expense of the USSR. The German government found that the present moment with the possibility of Japan attacking us still not ruled out and with relations with Britain still very strained ... is propitious enough for it to offer its services for the struggle against us.” It is clear from the foregoing that Germany’s plans included "a war against us and that the present situation is no more than a temporary breathing space.” ^^28^^

p The policy of the British ruling circles in seeking an anti-Soviet collusion with the Nazis was abundantly demonstrated by the talks which went on between Britain, France, Germany and Italy to conclude a "pact of understanding and co-operation" (Four Power Pact). The Four Power Pact had been proposed by the Italian fascist leader Mussolini in order to make Italy—on a par with Britain, France and Germany—a full member of the European four-power directorate. At the same time, the Italian fascists expected to compel a revision of the treaties of the Versailles system which arose from the First World War, undermine the positions of France in Europe and, above all, her links with the countries of Southeast Europe and transform the Danubian and the Balkan countries into Italy’s "sphere of influence".

p To begin with, Mussolini concerted his proposal with the Nazis. On March 14, 1933, he communicated his draft pact to Berlin and on the following day received a blessing from Germany’s Foreign Minister von Neurath who called this proposal an "inspired conception".^^29^^ That position of Germany was quite understandable. Such an act was to elevate a "vanquished and injured" Germany to a status of equality with Britain and France.^^30^^

p Mussolini’s proposal called for revising the peace treaties and for Germany to be granted the right to rearm. Eventually, Germany hoped to use the Four Power Pact in order to carry out her aggressive plans in the East.

p Mussolini handed the draft Four Power Pact he had 19 concerted with Hitler to Prime Minister of Britain R. MacDonald who arrived in Rome on March 18 for talks with the Italian government. The British government gave its full backing to that proposal.

p The four-power talks ended on July 15, 1933, in the signing of a Four Power Pact in Rome.

p The full danger of the plans behind the Four Power Pact was perfectly clear to the Soviet Union. Izvestia wrote on March 30, 1933, that the USSR could not stand by watching with indifference the "attempts at setting up a so- called ’four-power concert’ arrogating the right to decide the destinies of the nations”. During his meeting with the German Ambassador in Moscow von Dirksen on April 3, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov pointed out that it was quite natural for the states outside the pact to view it negatively.^^31^^ The Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign affairs N. N. Krestinsky declared on June 4, 1933, in a conversation with the Italian Ambassador B. Attolico that "since the four powers concluding this pact have very many points of divergence, it naturally seems that the only point they do not diverge on is their common hostility for communism. The failure to invite us to join in discussing this pact confirms that it is objectively directed against us." ^^32^^

p The plans of British imperialism, connected with the conclusion of the Four Power Pact, was demonstrated best of all by yet another rumpus stage-managed in Britain as part of an anti-Soviet campaign during the negotiations about the pact. Back in October 1932 the British government terminated its trade agreement with the USSR and on April 19, 1933, imposed an embargo on the import of all major Soviet export goods into Britain. That amounted, in point of fact, to declaring a trade war on the Soviet Union. At the same time the British Foreign Secretary John Simon declared that the Soviet trade delegation in London was divested of its right of diplomatic immunity. The Soviet Embassy in London had every reason to qualify those acts of the British government as an attempt to pursue a "big stick" policy with regard to the USSR.^^33^^ The British government’s position came under criticism even in a number of British newspapers. The Daily Herald, for example, described the government’s action as a cynical political game without precedent in history.^^34^^

p The signing of the Four Power Pact brought fortii sonic serious misgivings not only in the USSR but in a number of other countries which could be an object of the four- power deal. That applied, above all, to the countries of Eastern Europe, including the allies of France. In France, too, incidentally, the pact came up against strong opposition. For example, in a memorandum of March 18, 1933, the French Foreign Ministry expressed its apprehension lest the pact should torpedo the League of Nations, destroy the whole system of France’s alliances with a number of small nations and also cause her to lose her leading role in Europe since the decisions of the four-power "European directorate" would most often be directed against the interests of France because "Great Britain, Italy and Germany are interested in limiting France’s role in Europe." ^^35^^

p The plotting of the Four Power Pact aroused extreme anxiety of the small nations of Europe. They realised, A. V. Lunacharsky, member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, pointed out, that in the event of the four powers uniting, they "will be shared between cruel shepherds like a flock of sheep".^^36^^ Even the French press noted that to conclude the pact would mean that France was ignoring the interests of her East European allies. Opposing this "holy alliance" of the Great Powers, the French newspaper Le Journal wrote that before cutting off the left leg of Poland, the right arm of Czechoslovakia and both legs of Romania and the limbs of Yugoslavia, it is necessary, at least, as custom would have it, to seek the patients’ consent for it. The Four Power Pact came to be quite rightfully called a "pact of butchers".

p The serious apprehension of a number of countries over the Four Power Pact stopped it from ever coming into force. The French government did not find it possible to bring it before parliament for ratification.

p The rapprochement between Poland and Nazi Germany was yet another factor essentially influencing the alignment of forces in Europe. Germany’s Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who was in Geneva in April 1933 at the Disarmement Conference, proposed the following terms for a settlement of German-Polish relations to Poland’s Foreign Minister J. Beck: Poland would cede the so-called corridor, that is, the Polish Maritime strip, to Germany while getting an outlet to the sea at the expense of Lithuania and 21 Latvia. Thereupon, the two countries would go to war against the USSR and, with the Ukraine captured, Poland would also obtain an outlet to the Black Sea, including Odessa.^^37^^ The talks on these questions were continued during another Goebbels-Beck meeting in September.

p Being well informed of the aggressive intentions of Polish reactionaries under Pilsudski, the Nazis decided to use them in their own interests, making Poland their “ally” for a while. By whetting the appetites of Polish imperialist elements, the Nazis were trying to convince them that, together, they would be in a position to overpower the USSR. Although Poland herself was in danger of being overpowered by Nazi aggressors who were dreaming of seizing her territory and exterminating her population, Poland’s governing quarters would not give up their own plans for grabbing foreign lands. The Seventh World Congress of the , Communist International stated that "German imperialism has found an ally in Europe—fascist Poland, which is also striving to extend its territory at the expense of Czechoslovakia, the Baltic countries and the Soviet Union.”^^38^^

p The Polish ruling quarters wanted to time the realisation of their plans for capturnig more of Soviet land to coincide with a Japanese invasion of the USSR. The Chief of the Eastern Department of Poland’s Foreign Ministry T. Schaetzel said in a conversation with the Bulgarian Charge d’ Affaires in July 1934 that Poland "expects that should a war break out in the Far East, Russia will be crushed, and then Poland will include Kiev and some of the Ukraine within her borders."^^39^^ The Polish Ambassador to Japan did not even find it necessary to conceal that he had received a lot of money from his government to work towards pushing Japan into a war against the USSR so that this war could be "used by Poland and Germany for an offensive against the Ukraine".^^40^^ The British Foreign Office had some information to the effect that Poland’s policy was "to divide \ Russia into a group of separate states independent of Mos- cow". ^^41^^ The governments and, more particularly, the military quarters of Poland and Japan established the closest ever co-operation against the Soviet Union.

p The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov, speaking with American diplomat W. Bullitt, spelled out the apprehensions the Soviet Union had on that account. The People’s Commissar pointed out that the Soviet 22 government considered "an attack by Japan so probable" that it was giving serious attention to the question of her possible allies. Reporting his conversation with the People’s Commissar, Bullitt wrote to Washington that Litvinov "knew that conversations had taken place between Germany and Poland looking forward toward an eventual attack on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union should become embroiled in a long war with Japan; that he feared that a war with Japan might drag on for years and that after a couple of j years Germany and Poland combined might attack the So- ! viet Union”. ^^42^^

p Even the British Embassy in Tokyo found it necessary to communicate to London that the Polish and Romanian diplomatic representatives in Japan "are openly saying . . . that they would welcome a clash between Russia and Japan". ^^43^^

p Yet another grave danger to the Soviet Union arose from the possibility of Hitler’s influence spreading to the Baltic countries and those countries being turned into a bridgehead for attacking the USSR. Litvinov pointed out on April 10, 1933, that the Soviet government would not be likely to view with indifference a "redrawing of the frontiers of the Baltic states”. "Polish expansion in the Baltic countries is just as unwelcome for us as Germany”,^^44^^ he said in a conversation with the French Ambassador Francois Dejean.

p The Soviet Union had to fear an act of aggression from Finland, too, in the event of a war with Germany, Poland and Japan. Litvinov wrote that, in all probability, " Germany will be looking for a way to give vent to the military energy she is building up in the direction of the Baltic countries, the USSR. . .” In that case, she "can well count on support, at least, from Japan, Poland and Finland." ^^45^^

p The ruling circles of Finland maintained an extremely hostile and aggressive stand with regard to the USSR. They were planning to capture Soviet Karelia. This was no secret to foreign diplomats in close contact with the ruling elements of Finland. The Polish Minister in Helsinki F. Charwat communicated to Warsaw on December 29, 1933, that Finland’s policy was "aggressive against Russia...”. Char- j wat called Finland the "most bellicose state in Europe".^^46^^ ; The Latvian Minister in Finland, in his turn, informed Riga on June 16, 1934: "The Karelian issue has gripped the minds of Finnish activists. These elements are impatiently 23 waiting for Russia to come into conflict with any of the Great Powers, first with Poland and now with Germany or Japan, in order to carry out their programme. This movement ... may one day serve as the spark that will set the powder keg alight."^^47^^ The former President of Finland P. Svinhufvud said that "any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland".^^48^^ So the Finnish ruling quarters went on by that guideline.

p The so-called activist wing of the Finnish bourgeoisie (Lapuans and others) counted on the implementation of Japan’s and Germany’s aggressive plans against the USSR creating the conditions for carrying out a programme for a "Greater Finland”. On January 11, 1934, Litvinov wrote, with reference to that issue, that "the Lapuans would have Finland extend all the way up to the Urals... and the craziest of them would see the frontier of Finnish lands stretching as far as Altai. Lapuans and activists are pinning great hopes on Japan as well . .. Finland is the most anti-Soviet of all the Baltic states."^^49^^ The former Prime Minister V. Tanner also admitted in a conversation with the Soviet Minister B. Y. Stein that in the event of war in the Far East, the USSR must consider the possibility of a " repetition of the Karelian venture of 1922”. No wonder, therefore, that the Japanese aggressors devoted a great deal of attention to Finland. So, the Japanese Charge d’Affaires in Finland pointed out during a meeting with Soviet Minister B. Y. Stein that the Japanese mission in Finland existed at the demand of the country’s military circles to meet "the contingency of a Japanese-Soviet war".^^50^^

p Considering that Finland’s position in respect to the USSR was growing increasingly hostile, the Soviet government found it necessary to draw the attention of the Finnish government to the abnormal situation shaping up. B. S. Stomonyakov told the Finnish Minister in Moscow A. Yrjo-Koskinen on January 15, 1934, that fairly wide circles arid influential organisations in Finland were engaged in aggressive activities against the USSR. These circles, he said, are out to create "Greater Finland" by annexing some of Soviet land. Some of them are "proposing to annex Eastern Karelia and Ingermanland to Finland" while others are circulating maps of a "Greater Finland" with borders stretching as far as the Urals.^^51^^ On his arrival in Helsinki in September, Yrjo-Koskinen could not fail to admit in a 24 conversation with B. Y. Stein that the ambition to have Karelia and Ingermanland incorporated in Finland at the time of a possible Soviet-Japanese conflict had "become a common judgement in Finland."^^52^^

p For all the verbal peaceful assurance of the Finnish government, the aggressive trends in the behaviour of Finland’s ruling establishment with regard to the USSR, far from declining, were showing themselves up afresh. Under the circumstances, Litvinov stated in a conversation with the Finnish Minister: "In no country is the press conducting so systematic a campaign of hostility against us as it does in Finland. In no country is there such an open propaganda drive on about an attack against the USSR and a seizure of some of its territory, as in Finland." ^^53^^

p Describing the state of Soviet-Finnish relations, the British Minister in Helsinki G. Grant-Watson pointed out that the Soviet Union had recognised the independence of Finland at its own free will, and turned over to her a vast area in the North which had never before formed part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. "Acting in a generous fashion, they doubtless expected to enjoy goodneighbourly relations with Finland, but in this they have been disappointed."^^54^^

p The German Minister in Finland W. von Bliicher also reported to Berlin on many occasions that the Soviet Union was honestly striving for friendly relations with Finland, but to no avail. Pronouncements of vehement hostility against the USSR are being made in Finland time and again.^^55^^

That was how the clouds of war were gathering over the Eastern and Western Soviet borders. Japanese and German imperialists, bent on aggression and war, were turning their eyes to the Soviet lands. The other imperialist powers had enough individuals who were prepared to bless them for a "holy war" against the Soviet state. In certain smaller countries, adjacent to the USSR, there were some influential forces that were ready to join the German and Japanese aggressors in the event of such a war. The Soviet Union—the world’s only socialist country at the time—was in a hostile encirclement of capitalist states. It had to rely on its own forces, first and foremost, to defend its socialist gains, its freedom and independence.