p The Soviet Union’s consistent anti-colonial stand during the Italo-Ethiopian war" of 1935-36 evoked a broad response in Africa and played an important role in promoting Soviet-African rapprochement.

p Italy prepared and carried out its aggression against Ethiopia with direct or indirect encouragement by other imperialist states. Just before the war, in January 1935, French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval signed a secret agreement with Mussolini which gave Italy freedom of action in Ethiopia. Italian aggression against Ethiopia was backed by nazi Germany and militarist Japan. The British Government put an embargo on Ethiopian purchases of British weapons, and US Congress passed a neutrality act in 1935 which prohibited the delivery of arms and materiel to the belligerents. By taking this step the USA put the aggressor and its victim on the same plane.

p The policy of the Soviet Union was in direct contrast to the actions of the Western powers. It took Ethiopia’s side from the first days of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, upholding its right to national independence and working for the introduction of effective measures to curb the fascist aggressor. In December’ 1934 Pravda warned that "the Italian policy towards Abyssinia is once again turning to methods of direct aggression”.  [42•47  At the same time the Soviet public condemned the tactic of concessions to fascist Italy on the part of Britain and France.

p The Soviet people firmly and consistently urged the consolidation of the world’s anti-fascist and anti-war forces. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern which met in Moscow in July-August 1935 drew up a programme for a united front of the working class and all democratic forces against fascism and war. The speakers at the Congress angrily protested against imperialist encroachments on the independence of the Ethiopian people and called upon all peace- 43 loving and anti-fascist forces in the world to bar the way to the Italian colonialists.

p Soviet diplomats defended the interests of Ethiopia in the League of Nations when fascist Italy was making preparations to assault that country and in the course of the war. As soon as hostilities began the USSR delegation in the League of Nations demanded that Italy should be immediately qualified as an aggressor and subjected to sanctions envisaged in the League’s Covenant. It emphasised that the partial economic sanctions established by the League in October 1935 (in effect they were introduced only at the end of the year) were inadequate,  [43•48  and insisted on the adoption of oil sanctions. Speaking on 19 October Litvinov told the League’s Coordination Committee which was set up for the purpose of formulating sanctions that the Committee "had not exhausted all possible economic sanctions".  [43•49 

p Taking up the problem of sanctions, the Soviet Union emphatically condemned the pretensions of the Italian imperialists that were based on a racial doctrine and their claims that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not extend to the Italo-Ethiopian war. "The Soviet Government,” stated the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in a note to the Italian Government of 22 November 1935, "regards as incorrect the premise that Abyssinia should be an exception, and should not avail itself of the same rights that are granted by the League of Nations to its other members. From the point of view of the Soviet Government, all members of the League irrespective of racial or other distinctions should enjoy full equality in the event of an attack.”  [43•50 

p Just as vigorously the USSR condemned the HoareLaval plan  [43•51  which was drawn up in December 1935 to counterpose the idea of broader sanctions. According to this plan, the main condition for ending the war in Africa was annexation of nearly a half of Ethiopia and its transformation in an Italian colony (either directly, or as a zone 44 of Italian economic expansion and colonisation). In effect this was tantamount to complete liquidation of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. The Soviet representative in the League V. P. Potemkin was instructed to turn down the HoaroLaval plan as incompatible with the League’s Covenant. On 19 December Potemkin told a closed meeting of the League’s Council that the Soviet delegation could under no circumstances endorse the Western powers’ draft as basically unsound.  [44•52 

p The Soviet Union’s resolute attitude doomed the scheme hatched by the proponents of abetting aggression from the very beginning. The Hoare-Laval plan was turned down by Ethiopia and condemned by progressive public opinion in other countries, including Britain and France. But the stand of the Western powers towards the Italo-Ethiopian war remained basically unchanged and they continued to refrain from imposing oil sanctions. As regards the British Government, it flatly refused to close the Suez Canal, Italy’s key link with the theatre of military operations. "We could not do that: it would mean that Mussolini would fall!" declared John Simon, one of the leaders of the British Government.  [44•53 

p The Soviet Union alone continued to uphold the independence of the Ethiopian people, furnishing them diplomatic and moral support and material assistance through the Soviet Red Cross. The Second Session of the USSR Central Executive Committee in January 1936 extensively discussed the Italo-Ethiopian war and sharply criticised the attitude of the Western powers and the League of Nations, which took no steps to avert the war. The Soviet Government reiterated its resolute opposition to the imperialists’ colonial policy and firm determination to uphold Ethiopia’s equality and independence.

p Committed to the principle of self-determination of nations, the Soviet Government emphatically refused to recognise the colonial annexation of Ethiopia proclaimed by Italy on 9 May 1936. The Soviet press noted that the Ethiopian people had not reconciled themselves to colonial slavery and that the country was in the grip of a guerrilla 45 war against the invaders. The Soviet public held up to shame the policy of the fascist colonialists who were subjecting the Ethiopian patriots to bloody repressions which became especially brutal after an attempt on the life of Italy’s Viceroy of Ethiopia Rodolfo Graziani on 19 February 1937.  [45•54  Pointing to the importance of these statements which mobilised world public opinion against the domination of Italian fascists in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Herald wrote on 8 July 1944 that the Ethiopian people had not forgotten the protests and feelings of indignation which were expressed by the press and the leaders of the Soviet Union during the terrible slaughter committed on Graziani’s orders in 1937.

p The Soviet public severely censured the British-Italian "gentleman‘s” agreement of 1938, under which Britain promised to obtain the League of Nation’s recognition of Italian rule in Ethiopia. Pravda wrote that the British Government assumed the unsavory mission of legalising the Italian seizure of Abyssinia, and that in general the agreement was "a striking manifestation of Britain’s capitulatory policy".  [45•55 

p The Soviet delegation in the League of Nations resolutely countered the attempts to prevent the Ethiopian delegation from taking part in discussing the question of recognising the seizure of Ethiopia which was submitted by Britain in May 1938. The Soviet representative Maxim Litvinov also opposed the proposal that the Ethiopian delegation should only "be present at the meeting" of the League Council but without voting rights. As a result of this firm stand the Ethiopian delegate was invited to take part in discussing the question submitted by the British Government.

p In view of the demand of the Ethiopian delegation not to recognise annexation, the undeviating stand of the Soviet Union and the sweeping wave of opposition to the British project by progressive world public opinion, its official approval became impossible. In these circumstances the Western powers did not put the British proposal to a vote and the discussion ended in a closing resume by the Chairman of the League Council Vilhelms Munters who suggested 46 that the League members should decide for themselves whether or not to recognise the annexation of Ethiopia.

p This formula in effect untied the hands of those who favoured a deal with fascist Italy and was justly qualified hy the USSR as yet another concession by the League to the aggressors.  [46•56 

The efforts of the Soviet Union in the League and elsewhere to uphold Ethiopia’s right to be free and independent, strengthened the confidence of the Ethiopian patriots in the righteousness of their cause.