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p The range of ideas mainly responsible for engendering Langer’s symbolism comprise: Cassirer’s philosophy of “symbolic forms" (her book Feeling and Form is dedicated to him), the realist theory of “meanings” of Whitehead (in dedicating Philosophy in a New Key to him Langer calls him a “great teacher and friend”) and Russell, Wittgenstein’s early theory of “reflection”, Richards’ neo-positivist conception of symbolism, the semiotics of Peirce and Charles Morris. Moreover, as already stated, her writings bear the stamp of phenomenalism (originated from Cassirer’s version of neo-Kantianism, strengthened by the influence of 147 Husserl’s views and by the conceptions of Gestalt psychology), of pragmatism (Dewey et al.) and of genetic psychology. It should be noted that this range of ideas does not go beyond the bounds of the idealistic world-view, but within these bounds it contains contradictory positions. These contradictions could not but tell on Langer’s views. It is perfectly obvious that, armed with such a philosophical “key”, Langer could not count on a scientific interpretation of symbolism in general, and, in particular, with application to art. All the less so since real difficulties arise in the interpretation of art, connected with the extremely complex and refined nature of symbolism in art. But we will not make any premature general assessment and turn instead to an analysis of Langer’s understanding of symbolism.

p The most general and basic idea of her conception of symbolism is the idea of “symbolic transformation”. Following Cassirer she believes that all human activity has an essentially symbolic character as well as all the activity of the human mind. “All conscious experience is symbolically conceived experience" (10, 100). In her explanation of the origin of “symbolic transformation" Langer relies on genetic psychology. Thus in the New Key the author writes that “the symbolic transformation of experience" which takes place in the brain creates a biological need for this process to be completed in external activity. Speech, art, and ritual are all an active completion of a symbolic transformation of experience, connected with the needs of the mind. Thus “minds of certain species, at certain stages of their development and communion, naturally produce" symbolic transformations (3, 49). Symbols such as speech, sacrifices and art are just as natural as birdsong. Langer’s conception of the mind can be seen therefore to have a naturalistic character. In essence the explanation of the emergence of symbolism is also “naturalistic”.

p In accordance with Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms Langer sees the main function of the symbol in the creation of the object of cognition, the articulation of the perceived experience, and making it epistemologically relevant. With Cassirer this thesis has a consistently idealistic 148 character. The objective world is not given man per se. The symbolic forms which create the objects of cognition are not a reflection of something actually existing, they are the autonomous products of the mind. Langer tries to connect this thesis with an interpretation of symbolism in the spirit of Russell’s neo-realistic epistemology and Wittgenstein’s theory of reflection. It should be said that, first, such an amalgam of the two interpretations is contradictory, and, secondly, that Langer’s interpretation is in essence also idealistic.

p In contrast to Cassirer Langer explains the process of symbolization as a reflection of the logical structural features of perceived reality. In the spirit of Wittgenstein’s theory of reflection Langer asserts that “formal analogy, or congruence of logical structures, is the prime requisite for the relation between a symbol and whatever it is to mean. The symbol and the object symbolized must have some common logical form" (5, 27). Since the expression of one and the same logical form in different embodiments forms the basis of the process of projection, the symbol itself is often called the “projection” of that which is symbolized. One of the projections which is most easily perceived is used as a symbol tor anything unclear or which eludes analysis. Like all projection symbolic projection does not copy the designated torm, the similarity having an isomorphic nature. It follows from the very treatment of the symbol as projection that it symbolizes something else, to which it is similar, some other whole, whose elements have analogous relationships.

p Another important function of the symbol-communicating (as a result of articulation) an idea, a concept-is considered in close connection with the creative (“instrumental”) function. The symbol is always the “projection” of an idea (10, 75-76). In contrast to the signal, which is directly connected to things, the symbol is directly connected to ideas, concepts, and only via them to things. Whereas the general scheme of the sign situation in the case of the signal includes three elements: subject-signal-referent, in the case of the symbol a fourth is added: the concept (idea). The 149 relation of the symbol to the object or referent is designated by the term “denotation”, the relation to the concept by “ connotation”. The essential link with “ideas” and “concepts” makes the symbol an instrument of the rational mind. The sphere of the symbol is the sphere of logics, semantics, of meaning and not of psychology.

p The process in the course of which an idea is articulated Langer calls a “transformation”. Each symbolic proiection is a transformation. The most important of the transformational processes is abstraction. The most important function of the symbol is to be an instrument of abstraction. “A symbol is any device whereby we are enabled to make an abstraction" (5, xi).

p The semantic neo-positivists traditionally hold that only the method of expression inherent in everyday language and the lancmage of science relates to symbolism. This svmbolism has been called “discursive”. Its most characteristic feature, in Lancrer’s ooinion, consists in its being based “on one dominant oroiertion”. The main peculiarity of this projection is its “linearity”:  [149•1  expression is situated in a spatial and temporal “chain”.

p The essence of lancmaae as discursive symbolism is “ statement" (10, 102). All the other means of expression accompany the main system. The “line” of this symbolism is the propositional construction, and all other forms-interrogatory, imperative, vocative-are auxiliary. Here too we can see the principle of dominant proiection. Lanaer also calls “logic” in the traditional sense as reflected in different grammatical systems of particular languages the fundamental principle of this symbolism.

p According to Langer, in addition to discursive symbolism there also exists non-discursive symbolism. For this reason 150 the inexpressibility of feelings in language-and Langer fully agrees with this thesis of the semanticists-does not auite mean that they are entirely inaccessible to symbolic ( logical) expression. The premise for this statement is the view that feelinos have a morphology, structure, logical form. She bases this thesis on the Gestalt theory of isomorphism, according to which the physiological processes in the brain and psychological processes have a common dynamic structure. On the basis of this theorv the view was expressed that isomorphism is also maintained between the structure of feelings and the structure of the outer expression of these feelings-in gestures, movements, intonations and music.  [150•1  Relying on these studies many musicologists (Hoeslin, Hauptman, Carrer et al.), followed by Langer, point to the isomorphism of the structure of feelings and the structure of the expression of these feelings in music. It is precisely this phenomenon, given a detailed analysis in the book Philosophy in a New Key, which served as the author’s point of deoarture in her conception of art as a whole-a conception which, in the author’s own words, is a generalization of the theory of music (5, 32).  [150•2 

p Langer’s theory of non-discursive symbolism is based on philosophical statements about the symbolic processes which 151 lie beyond language, and particularly in art, about the symbolic expression of feelings in art, the Gestaltists’ theory of the morphology of feelings and attempts to identify an isomorphic reflection of this morphology in music. And although Langer worked from the art of music to reach her theory she realizes that this symbolism is not only employed in art. “I have always,” writes the author in Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, “called its characteristic symbolic mode simply ’non-discursive’; but there are other non-discursive symbols, such as maps and plans" (10, 104). Non-discursive symbolism is called “intuitive”, “presentational” or “implicit” in Langer’s works. It is first mentioned in her The Practice of Philosophy, given its most detailed treatment in Philosophy in a New Key as “presentational”, and additional features are described in Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling.

p Like every symbolic projection presentational symbolism must have a common logical form with the thing it designates. But this is not discursive form. This means that although it may be articulated it does not constitute a system of discrete elements with a fixed meaning, or a system of separate symbols. Therefore, if we are to understand by the term “symbolism” a system of such elements, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as presentational symbolism, but only isolated presentational symbols. Langer -takes the picture as an example of such symbols.

p Presentational symbolism is also studied by Langer in music. In her opinion music satisfies the basic requirements of symbolism. What exactly are these? Basing her arguments on the theories of the Gestaltists Langer maintains that musical structures reflect a certain dynamic system of human experience, a morphology of feelings, projecting feelings onto tones. Moreover, these feelings are not simply symptomatically expressed in music (“self-expression”). Music articulates, forming a logical projection of feelings, an idea of the feelings. Insofar as the general forms of feelings are reflected (an algebra of feelings) a process of abstraction is taking place. According to Langer all this characterizes music as symbolism, but a presentational, and not discursive, symbolism with all its innate features.

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p Langer’s theory of presentational symbolism as a symbolism characteristic for art became the subject of lively discussion in semantic aesthetics. In the view of the Italian Renato Barilli this theory “is a problem of the first order in modern aesthetics" (12, 234). A critical analysis of this theory can proceed in three directions. First, if we are to recognize the distinction between discursive and presentational symbolism, it follows that Langer draws this distinction too sharply (21; 22). As a result her application of this principle of distinction is not always appropriate in practice, and in particular with respect to art. Thus, for example, the feature of “ linearity”, characteristic of discursive symbolism, is fully inherent in musical symbolism as well. Neither can we deny the possibility of segmenting a discrete non-discursive form (15, 496).  [152•1 

p The second critical direction is connected with the ambiguitv and conseeruently the vaoneness of the term “ presentational symbolism”. Thus, P. Welsh identifies three basic meanings of this term in Langer’s usage: 1) a means of abstract forming, of modelling the “raw” material of experience; 2) an “image”, whose referent is our inner life; 3) a “figure” in figurative representational art, an artistic representation as a whole (35, 192-93). The first meaning of the term-any means of abstraction-is too general and therefore unsatisfactory. The second meaning, which emphasizes similarity, is also vague. Even if there is a morphological similarity between the structure of feelings and the artistic structure of a work of art, this is still insufficient for a work of art to function as a symbol of feelings. A subjective process of interpretation is necessary here. In addition, the view of the similarity, of the isomorphism between the arrangement of feelings and the structure of a work of art should be denned much more exactly. A similarity between a picture and an object is one thing, and one between musical structures and 153 a feeling quite another. In the first case the similarity is at the level of likeness, in the second it is a more general instance of similarity—isomorphism. This difference should also be fixed terminologically, which, as we shall see below, is what Langer does. Artistic form, which reflects feelings, she calls “expressive form”. The first meaning of the term “ presentational symbol" is connected with Cassirer’s interpretation of symbolic forms as creating objects of cognition, and not reflecting them. The second meaning proceeds directly from the theory of reflection of the early Wittgenstein. The fusing of these two interpretations in Langer’s conception of symbolism is, as we have noted, fraught with inner contradiction. The third meaning offers essentially nothing more than Peirce’s and Morris’ iconic sign.

p The third direction in criticizing presentational symbolism oan essentially be reduced to the argument that, if we are to subsume music or other works of art under presentational symbolism, then it is not symbolism at all, since it lacks the essential features of symbolism. Namely, every symbol has a meaning, i.e. it refers to something else outside itself. But the work of art, according to Langer, refers to nothing but itself. The meaning of a symbol is usually cognized indirectly, through mediation, and it is connected by association with a transmitter-sign, there being a transition from a sign to its meaning. However, Langer maintains that the artistic “ meaning" of a work of art is cognized directly, without mediation, in the process of perception, through intuition; she does not see any transition here from the sign to its meaning. She does not regard artistic meaning as a function, but as a quality of the work of art. It is clear that, by calling a work of art a presentational symbol, Langer, as Ernest Nagel is quite right to point out, is using the term “symbol” in a radically new and previously unencountered meaning.

In her subsequent works the American aesthetician describes a new variant of her theory of presentational symbolism^the theory of expressive form.