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p In the previous section we showed that art in Cassirer’s interpretation consists of the process of creating symbolic form characterized by unity of the sensuous matter and mental meaning, a unity in which, moreover, meaning has pride of place.

p Let us now consider in more detail Cassirer’s understanding of the concept of meaning in art. Cassirer as a neo-Kantian did not accept the “metaphysical” interpretation of meaning in art as an “infinity” (Schelling), an “absolute” (Hegel), etc. Art is indeed symbolism, but this symbolism must be understood in an immanent, not a transcendental sense. This means that “the real subject of art" should be sought “in certain fundamental structural elements of our sense experience itself-in lines, design, in architectural, musical forms" 134 (10, 157). This position taken by Cassirer meant that he recognized that “in art ‘meaning’ is form" (15, 21).

p For Cassirer the immanent character of symbolism in art meant that sensuous form as the bearer of meaning does not refer to any other objects than itself. Cassirer’s writings do, admittedly, contain statements about art which cannot be accommodated in the concept of immanent symbolism. Thus, for example, he says of music that is reveals to the listener the range of human emotions, that the comic poet and the tragic poet reveal to us their views of human life as a whole, etc. It is perfectly obvious that these emotions and views take us beyond the limits of sensuous form, and are transcendental in relation to it. Cassirer’s inconsistency in this matter is connected with his attempts to give a comprehensive interpretation of “meaning” in art, going beyond the bounds of his formalist conception, according to which the essence of art consists of the “meanings” of form or formal meanings.

p The immanent character of symbolism in art means at the level of perception that “meaning” converges with its sensuous bearer until they are indistinguishable and the meaning is intuited, and not derived. Art “gives us the intuition of the form of things" (10, 143). Symbolism in art, in Cassirer’s interpretation, could in consequence be called “intuitive symbolism”, although the philosopher himself does not use this term.  [134•1 

p The merger of “bearer” and “meaning” at the level of perception does not, however, acquire the full identity inherent in the mythological consciousness. At the level of thought the “polar” distinction between the sign (sensuous matter) and ideal meaning in art can be seen with full clarity. Thus it is not sensuous, but ideal form, or Gestalt, which is taken to 135 be meaning in art in Cassirer’s aesthetics. Arising in the process of formative cognitive acts-condensation and concentration, intensification and concretization-form has a cognitive structure, which implies its rational character. For this reason the factor of purposefulness, “teleological structure”, is essential for linguistic and artistic expression. A gesture is no more a fact of art than an exclamation, a fact of speech. Both the one and the other are spontaneous and instinctive reactions, and not rational forms of expression inherent to art. In the rational structure of artistic form each separate element must be felt to be a part of the whole. Since the rationality of art is the rationality of form, and not of the things and phenomena themselves, art has the ability to go beyond the bounds of the natural canons of form-creation (i.e. has the property of transcendence). The latter is also connected with the fact that a decisive role is played in art by the process of imagination, alongside the cognitive acts we have pointed out.

p According to Cassirer “meaning” in art functions in two forms.- 1) gegenstdndlich-darstellenden and 2) personlichaufgedriickten. The former constitutes the objective aspect of meaning, the latter the subjective aspect. Art, like language, constantly fluctuates between two poles: the objective and the subjective. No theory of art can afford to ignore either one of these poles, although the accent may be placed on one or the other. If the accent is placed on the objective, art and language will fall under the general heading of imitation, and their primary function will be mimetic (e.g., as in Aristotle). When the subjective aspect is accented the main function is declared to be expression (as in Rousseau). Cassirer holds that if by expression we understand the spontaneous expression of feelings, then instead of the reproduction of things we will have the reproduction of inner life. And although the accent here is placed on the subjective pole in its essence art remains reproductive. Making an analogy with the theory of language, continues the German philosopher, it is possible to say in this case that the place of the onomatopoetic theory of art is taken by the theory of exclamations (or interjections).

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p Criticizing the one-sidedness of these theories Cassirer points out that in art, as in the other symbolic forms of culture, there is no simple opposition of “I” and the “world”, no alternative of object and subject. These two poles interpenetrate into one another. No expression of “I” in art is possible without something concrete, appearing before us in its full objectivity and plasticity (9, 31). For example, in Cassirer’s opinion it is doubtful whether we can ascribe a more subjective character to such a subjective art-form as lyric poetry than to all other forms. Admittedly, by comparison to other forms of culture, and particularly science, which eschews all personal and anthropomorphic elements, the factor of original, individual creation is prevalent in art. Despite its peculiar tendency, inherent in language, too, to preserve old forms, passing them on from generation to generation, returning to the same motifs, every great artist to a certain extent ushers in a new epoch. His imagination creates a unique system of forms. Every great work of art has its own idiom, which makes it impossible to achieve an exact “ translation".

p Whilst proclaiming the objectivity and universality of forms (i.e. of “meanings”) in art Cassirer does not give any explanation or indication of whence this objectivity and universality arises. Of course the philosopher’s references to Kant’s theory of aesthetic universality cannot function as scientific proof. It is only possible to reject subjectivism in aesthetics from scientific, materialistic positions, or from the non-scientific positions of objective idealism. Cassirer the neo-Kantian, by rejecting the materialistic explanation of art as a reflection of reality, was left with only one alternative-objective idealism.

p When Cassirer talks of a new area of pure forms which do not concur either with the world of physical objects, or with the sphere of the individual, when he maintains that forms in art are not invented arbitrarily but shown in their “true shape" (10, 145), he is moving in the direction of the Husserlian, phenomenological theory of “pure essences”. In the Philosophic der symbolischen Formen the author states in no uncertain terms that the spread of Husserl’s phenomenological 137 method from the sphere of logic to that of ethics and art would be one of the most fruitful developments of contemporary thought.  [137•1 

p Analysing pure form as meaning in art Cassirer gives special attention to the problem of space in art. This question is specially studied by him in his paper “Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum".  [137•2  Cassirer believes that the problem of form can only be cleared up if the question of the essence of space and spatial representations is first posed and decided. He expresses the hope that the problem of space might become the point of departure for an understanding of the specific laws of form to which art is subject. At the same time he correctly argues that in resolving this question aesthetics must rely on certain epistemological preconditions. “It is impossible,” he writes, “to exaggerate the self-sufficiency, autarchy of aesthetics with regard to metaphysics and the laws of the scientific study of the world" (7, 26).

p Let us now consider the interpretation of space which he proposes. As stated above, Cassirer correctly pointed to the importance of such concepts as “system” and “relation” for contemporary science, and in the given instance for a scientific explanation of space. However, this advance in the study of space was interpreted by him in a pronouncedly subjective idealistic way. The subordination of the concept “substance” to the concept “system” is interpreted by him to mean that the substance or matter which constitutes the substratum 138 of spatial relations disappears. The essence of space and time, asserts the neo-Kantian Cassirer, is not “an unknown something which hovers before consciousness, but is comprised and rooted in consciousness itself" (7, 21). In other words spatial structure and spatial relations are interpreted as something created by the mind and contained within it. Cassirer is effectively talking not about objective space and time, but about the system of spatio-temporal representations construed by consciousness. This is the only space that the neo-Kantian is concerned with: he simply does not know “objective” space and time, independent of the consciousness. It is this idealistic basic error which determined those idealistic aberrations which characterize Cassirer’s interpretation of the systems (structural) approach to the problem of space and time.

p It is well known that systems analysis played an important role in the acceptance of the “organized complexity”, instead of the “organized simplicity" of the world of classical mechanics, as the object of scientific investigation in the 20th century. As Ludwig von Bertalanffy points out, 20th century science promotes the idea of the world as a mass of heterogeneous and irreducible spheres of reality. Cassirer also pointed to this phenomenon, noting that systems analysis marks the victory of pluralism over abstract monism, that the concept of system includes difference, polymorphism, multi-qualitativeness, etc. But for Cassirer the neo-Kantian pluralism did not in any way mean the organized complexity and polymorphism of objective reality, but the possibility of “spiritual formations of different types and different principles of form" (7, 26). He is effectively concerned with the polymorphism not of being, but of the cognizing mind, and derives the latter, furthermore, not from the “complexity” of objective reality, but by means of the differentiation of the spirit in itself (9, 19). It is precisely this which he uses to explain the existence of different sorts of space: mythical, aesthetic and theoretical.

p All these types of space have their own definite form ( Gestalt) and their own connections, which are determined by a Sinn-Ordnung within which they are formed. Depending on whether the mythical, aesthetic or theoretical system of 139 meanings is under consideration the form of space also changes. This moreover applies not to a part, but to the whole, principle structure. “The function of meaning is primary and determining, the structure of space a secondary and dependent factor" (7, 29). Thus mythical space is connected with the mythical form of thought and a specific lite intuition, with magic, etc.

p The sphere of meanings in art is the sphere of pure representation, of pure form. Aesthetic space corresponds to the peculiarity and origination of this form in art. In contrast to the abstract geometrism of scientific space aesthetic space is concrete. “Aesthetic space is the true ’space of life’, in contrast to theoretical space, which is constructed with the help of pure thought, it is formed on the basis of pure feeling and imagination" (7, 31). Space in art is filled and pervaded with an intensive expressive value, it is “enlivened” thanks to the strong dynamic oppositions it contains. In each form of art a particular direction of the “meaning” of the representation operates, and it is this which determines the specifics of space and time (3, II, 35).

p Cassirer’s characterization of aesthetic space includes the astute notion that all forms of spatial presentation-mythical, aesthetic, and scientific-are subjective images. As such they are dependent on the subject, and, in particular, on his worldview. Cassirer stressed this dependence and engaged in a specific study of one of the spaces-the mythical, in connection with the mythical mode of thinking. The idea of the connection between space in art and the world-view (the direction of the “meaning”), although it was not specifically elaborated by Cassirer, influenced the subsequent study of pictorial art.

p A serious flaw in Cassirer’s conception of aesthetic space was the way he completely disqualified the study of the connection between aesthetic space in art and the properties of objective space and the laws of its perception, by virtue of his one-sided idealistic orientation to the mind and its differentiation in itself. No special proof is needed to show that this aspect of the analysis rejected on principle is of considerable importance for an understanding of the nature of aesthetic space.

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From a philosophical point of view it is also important to stress that since objective space does not exist for Cassirer he lacks any measure of objectivity for the different systems of views of space. For this reason all the types of space—the mythical, aesthetic and the scientific-all have equal rights in his mind, all forming their own phenomenal worlds. The scientific picture of the world is placed on a par with the mythological and the artistic conceptions of space, which are characterized by a considerable degree of subjectivity and conventionality.