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p As the point of departure of his philosophy Cassirer, the major representative of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, took the Kantian critique of pure reason. Philosophy, according to Kant, studies not being, but knowledge, which itself constructs the object of knowledge. Kant’s “critique” is the study of the synthesizing (creative) activity of a priori forms of knowledge (sensory perceptions, categories of reason, ideas of reason) in the sphere of scientific knowledge-mathematics and the natural sciences. The two main premises of Kant’s transcendental idealism-the idealistkally interpreted conception of philosophy as a methodology of knowledge and apriorism-lay at the basis of Cassirer’s idealistic system.

p Cassirer’s development of Kant’s theory moved in two directions. On the one hand, the Marburg school announced the necessity to purify Kant’s philosophy of the dualism created by his theory of the “thing in itself" as an object affixing the human senses, in other words, to purify it of elements of materialism. On the other hand, they announced the necessity to bring Kant’s philosophy into line with modern science. In accordance with the first requirement Cassirer refused to interpret the concepts “subject” and “object” in an ontological sense, for him they only have methodological meaning. These are not two different essences, but two elements, two factors of knowledge (8). The division into “ subject" and “object” is only meaningful within the framework of knowledge. Within these limits the object of knowledge and the act of cognition itself are correlatively connected with 122 one another and complement one another. An object does not exist prior to and besides synthesis but is merely stated by such synthesis, it does not thrust itself on the consciousness and does not leave its mark on it, but comes as a result obtained with the help of consciousness itself, with the help of contemplation and pure thought. From the positions of the logico-cogni’tive view of the unity of subject and object Cassirer argues against their ontological interpretation, declaring this to be “metaphysics”. He counts as the latter spiritualist theories (of Hegel and Schelling), the realistic theory of “primary data" and materialism. In accordance with the Marburg tradition the German philosopher occupies a markedly anti-psychological position.  [122•1 

p By distinguishing between the subjective and the objective in cognition Cassirer is decisively rejecting subjectivism. However, he was incapable of justifying his “decisive” position. Nowhere does he define the criteria for his distinction between subjective and objective, and his rejection of the Kantian concept of the “thing in itself" required a substantiation of the object in the very subject. As a result, Cassirer’s attempt, as well as that of the entire Marburg school as a whole, to construct an “objectless” epistemological theory of human activity turned out to be yet another variety of subjectivism. This was one of the lamentable results of the “ development" of Kant’s philosophy “from the right".

p Let us now see in which direction Cassirer answered another requirement of the Marburg school-to bring Kant’s philosophy into line with modern science and above all with natural science. First, Cassirer was one of the founders of the semantic direction in philosophy, and properly emphasized the immense significance for philosophy of the problems of the analysis of symbolism, highlighted by the development of science at the turn of the century. As we shall see below, 123 the German philosopher interpreted these problems in an idealistic way. Secondly, Cassirer was one of the few bourgeois philosophers who turned their attention at an early stage to such a characteristic and important property of science in general, and in particular of the natural sciences, of the 20th century-Cassirer refers to studies in the fields of physics, biology (the work of Bertalanffy), psychology (the analyses of Gestalt-psychology) and art criticism (the wi iting of W6lfflin)-as systemic structural analysis. He regarded the characteristic features of this analysis to be the promotion as leading principles of scientific analysis of such concepts as {unction (relation) and structure (the whole). In the study of culture he also names Wet’den-Analyse (9, 90-96).  [123•1  Correctly pointing out the value of the above-named concepts both for the natural sciences and for the humanities, Cassirer the neo-Kantian interprets the latter as he does the problems of symbolism, from the positions of idealism.

p The main theme of Cassirer’s writings is the philosophical interpretation of the problems of symbolism. The “symbol” (“the symbolic”) is given a fairly traditional definition: it embraces all those phenomena which in some form or other reveal the meaning in what is sensory, when the sensory is represented as something special and as the embodiment and revelation of sense (meaning) (3, III, 109). In contrast to signals, for symbols it is essential not that they be part of the physical world of being (since they have physical or substantial being), but that they enter the “human world of meaning" and have only a “functional value" (10, 32). The material essence of a -symbol is absorbed by its function of meaning. The spiritual meaning and the material bearer form an indivisible unity in the symbol. As the paradigm, the exemplary instance of such unity we can take the connection between the body and the soul. The meaning of the spirit may only be revealed in its expression; the ideal (that which is 124 designated) becomes known only within the system of sensory signs through which it is expressed (3, I, 18, 42).

p Insofar as the spiritual imperatively demands material expression, the process of cognition, according to Cassirer, has a symbolic character, independently of the level at which it takes place.  [124•1  The true import of this premise will become clear when it is understood what role (function) Cassirer accords the iSymbol in cognition. This role naturally follows from the basic Kantian premise of Cassirer’s epistemology, namely, that cognition itself creates its own object. Cassirer refines this premise in the sense that cognition functions in an inseparable connection with sensory expression, and not as the activity of pure consciousness. In other words, the object of cognition is created by symbols.

p The German philosopher gives a special place in this to linguistic symbols. Language is situated at the focal point of spiritual existence, and lines lead from it to all the areas of the mind. Criticism or study of language is in fact criticism of knowledge (3, I, 1-41; III, 143). Cassirer was one of those modern philosophers who saw “the full significance of the relations of problems of language to problems of philosophy and, therefore, the first also to develop a philosophy of language in the full sense of the word”. Wilbur M. Urban, author of these words and a follower of Cassirer’s philosophy, in clarifying his characterization, correctly points to the “ idealistic" nature of Cassirer’s philosophy of language, linking him with Kantian “critical idealism”. Pointing out that for Cassirer language does not by a long way exhaust all the riches of the forms of symbols, he remarks astutely that Cassirer’s “philosophy of language leads directly to a philosophy of symbolism" (16, 403, 412, 420). In the light of all that has been said the semantic orientation of the German philosopher and its idealistic character should be unmistakably apparent.

p Cassirer cannot be reproached with having emphasized 125 the fact that language and symbols are not only the “ bearers" of, and means of communication for “meanings”, but also function as the tools for the formation of the meanings themselves. This notion is correct, but Cassirer carried it to an absurd idealistic extreme. He has symbols transform into organs of reality, since it is only thanks to their action that any reality can become the object of intellectual cognition and as such be visible to us. The question of what precisely reality consists of, considered independently of these symbols, and of what its independent attributes are like is seen to be inappropriate (4, 8). With the help of symbols man creates the object of cognition, and it is only this object, and not in any way objective reality, which is accessible to cognition. Insofar as cognition, according to Cassirer, has a symbolic character (in the sense of the word indicated above) at all stages, including that of sensation and perception, it follows that we must reject the direct character of knowledgethe knowledge of things themselves. “Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself" (10, 25). No detailed explanation is required to reveal the Kantian agnosticism manifested by this position.

p For Kant sensory contemplation, the categories of understanding and the ideas of reason are forms, superimposed on empirical content and therefore synthesizing nature as an object of scientific cognition. The main function of symbols in Cassirer is also a formative and constructive function of structuring experience. In order to emphasize this function Cassirer prefers to call symbols “symbolic forms" and his philosophy the “philosophy of symbolic forms”. The Kantian approach can also be felt in his interpreting “symbolic forms" as a priori structures integrating experience. To sum up, the main Kantian characteristic of knowledge-the function of synthesis, of structuring the object of cognition, and apriorism are also the main features of Cassirer’s symbolic forms.  [125•1 

p In addition to Kant’s transcendental idealism, the 126 functional and structural (systems) approaches mainly taken by Cassirer-as noted above-from the natural sciences, also had a profound influence on his treatment of symbolic forms. In particular we should -single out Gestalt psychology with its interpretation of the structures of cognition. “Modern Gestalt psychology .. . has shown,” writes Cassirer in his An Essay on Man, “that the very ’Simplest perceptual processes imply fundamental structural elements, certain patterns or configurations" (10, 38). The idea of Gestalt can by no means be reduced to the mere assertion of wholeness and a structural character of perception: Gestalt psychology does away with the dependence of perception on the object. The characteristics of mental structures as closed phenomenal fields was extremely close to Cassirer’s treatment of symbolic forms as a priori structures. Gestalt psychology developed in the philosophical stream of Husserl’s ideas, and a similarity with these can also be observed in the philosophy of symbolic forms, as we shall show in an analysis of Cassirer’s interpretation of artistic form. Thus, taking as his point of departure Kant’s critique of reason, Cassirer the neo-Kantian directed his philosophy along a -semantic channel-the study of symbolism.

While moving in this direction Cassirer made one important step to the side. Kant had analysed only scientific knowledge, proceeding from the fact of the existence of knowledge (of mathematics and natural sciences) and asking the question: how was this fact possible. This approach left one question open, namely, does pre-iscientific knowledge exist, and if so in what form, and is knowledge in forms other than scientific possible? Cassirer tried to avoid the speculative and unhistorical method of analysis used by Kant. He proceeds from the fact of the existence of culture, to which he assigns, alongside ’Science, such forms as language, myth, religion and art. All these forms he considers forms of knowledge. The critique of reason becomes a critique of culture.  [126•1  As a 127 semanticist Cassirer believes that “reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man’s cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms" (10, 26). The philosophy of symbolic forms is therefore transformed into the philosophy of cultural forms, within which a symbolic function is performed. To understand culture, for Cassirer, is to understand the essence of man. As a result the philosophy of symbolic forms becomes the “philosophy of man" or philosophical anthropology. It is in the light of the above-indicated three factors of the idealistic philosophy of “symbolic forms"—the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of culture and of man that Cassirer’s views on art should be examined. As Harry Slochower correctly remarks, Cassirer’s analysis of art is the most characteristic application of his method and system.