AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT,
1945-1965
p The Second World Congress of Trade Unions was held in June and July 1949, its delegates representing 72 million organized workers from 48 countries. The composition of the congress and its decisions reaffirmed the desire of progressive forces for greater unity. The World Federation of Trade Unions, despite the withdrawal from it of a number of organizations, had even more members in 1949 than on the eve of the split. It remained a democratic organization, encompassing unions of various political orientations.
p Nonetheless, the split of the WFTU and serious internal struggle in a number of national trade union centers between 1947 and 1949 had considerably weakened the forces of the working class. The labor movement was going through a difficult and complex period. Reaction was continuing its onslaught. The American imperialists, having launched the cold war, sought to suppress or weaken the forces of socialism and the international working class, and on more than one occasion during this period they brought the world to the brink of war. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Korean war, the remilitarization of West Germany—these were the dangerous actions of this period.
p The peace movement which came into being in the early postwar years and in which the working class played a prominent role had achieved considerable strength. The Second World Congress of Trade Unions called upon all working people to struggle against the arms race. The leading organizations of the WFTU, especially the trade unions of Europe, were very active in the fight for peace.
383p In the upper echelons of the American trade unions, however, chauvinistic sentiments, bordering on a call for the establishment of US hegemony over the whole world, manifested themselves with increasing frequency. William Hutcheson, president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, wrote in 1948: “With American Labor, like America itself, dedicated to world leadership, a tremendous responsibility devolves upon every union officer and every union member." [383•1 Because of their adherence to bourgeois ideology most of the rightist trade union leaders were ready to accept the idea of world dominance. All the actions of the ruling circles of the country connected with the cold war found support not only in the AFL leadership but in the CIO leadership as well.
p During the years of the cold war, the trade union bureaucracy supported the State Department not only through resolutions but by vigorous actions. And these actions were most often carried out behind the backs of the organized workers. Most of the unions did not even touch on foreign affairs problems at their conventions, and conducted no mass referendums, remaining passive in areas that had no direct bearing on the economic interests of the workers. In the early 1950s, the adverse consequences of militarization had not yet manifested themselves as strongly as they would later. Moreover, a certain section of the American labor force enjoyed high-paying jobs and a number of other benefits that the development of war production gave them.
p The picture, however, was different in other countries whose workers the American imperialists sought to harness to the cold war chariot. The working class of Western Europe felt the full force of the consequences of the arms race—the freezing of wages, cutbacks in allocations for social needs, inflation, soaring prices, and the intensification of internal reaction. The cold war policy, the arms race, the danger of a new war—to all this the European working people responded with active protest. Despite the split in the labor movement which existed in a number of European countries at the end of 384 the 1940s, the Communist parties and progressive trade union centers of Europe constituted an impressive force. Their influence was felt in the unceasing struggle of the European proletariat. A prominent role in organizing resistance to the policy of militarization and the arms race was played by the WFTU. That was why the American labor leaders were bent on impeding its activities at whatever cost.
p After the split of the WFTU, the American labor leaders intensified their campaign to create a new international organization. Meetings of European labor representatives were held, and disagreements over the tactics of struggle against the WFTU were now noticeably ironed out. Green and his associates felt that their line of rejecting the possibility of any relations with the WFTU had proved to be correct. They had been working from the very outset for the creation of a new international trade union center to counterbalance the WFTU, and redoubled their efforts after the British TUG and the CIO withdrew from the WFTU. A decisive step along this road was made in June 1949, when an international conference of US and West European trade unions and a number of organizations from Asian, African and Latin American countries was held in Geneva. Taking part in the conference were 127 delegates from 38 trade union centers and 12 trade secretariats. [384•1 At the end of July, a Preparatory Committee [384•2 that had been created in Geneva met in London to discuss a draft constitution prepared by the TUG. [384•3
p The Committee acknowledged the CIO’s right to representation on an equal footing with the AFL—something the CIO had fought for from its very inception. The AFL went along with the Committee’s decision, taking into account the changes that had taken place in the character of the CIO. Another factor was the position taken by the British, who wanted, by cooperating with the CIO, to strengthen their own positions and prevent the AFL from dominating the new organization. During talks between the AFL and TUC in the spring of 1949, 385 they declared that they could not imagine an international trade union organization without the CIO! [385•1 At the ninth convention of the CIO in November 1949, there was already no left-wing opposition, so that now the rightist leaders easily won the approval of their international policies, particularly with respect to the break with the WFTU and the creation of a new international organization.
p The draft constitution was sharply criticized by the American delegation. It did not like the fact that the draft referred only vaguely to struggle against communism. [385•2 In the end, the Americans succeeded in getting some of the wording they did not like deleted. Many bourgeois writers (L. Lorwin, A. Steinbach) have noted that it was thanks to the efforts of the AFL that “the statement adopted by the London Congress was free from traditional socialist doctrines". [385•3
p On November 28, 1949, a constitutional conference convened in London. Present were 261 trade union delegates from 59 countries, representing 48 million trade union members. [385•4 On December 7, the conference adopted the constitution of a new organization, which was to be called the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The Americans’ desire to dominate the ICFTU showed itself at the conference. They sent a large delegation at the highest level, including Green, Meany, Dubinsky, Woll and others from the AFL, and Reuther, McDonald, Haywood, Ross and others from the CIO. The representatives of US labor praised the American economy and the “independent” role of their unions, and promised to help the unions of other countries. [385•5 But behind all these phrases lay the wish to convert the new organization into an instrument of struggle against communism.
386p Having succeeded in creating another international organization to counterbalance the WFTU, the American labor leaders ran into considerable difficulties almost immediately. The WFTU not only continued to exist, but actually strengthened its positions. On more than one occasion, the working class of Europe moved to block the military plans of the USA. The American leaders attempted through the ICFTU to make the European workers reconcile themselves to the arms race and the cold war. In April 1951, the official organ of the ICFTU carried an article by Meany in which he said: “Our defense program must be based on an international approach. In formulating policy or in providing machinery for its execution, we must never lose sight of America’s position of international leadership.” [386•1 Later, at the second congress of the ICFTU in 1951, the American delegates continued to insist on the need to increase the anti-Communist activity of the confederation. [386•2
p However, many European union figures did not support this demand, a fact reflected in the decisions of a session of the ICFTU executive committee, also held in 1951. After that session, the AFL leaders did not conceal their displeasure with the European sections of the ICFTU for being “too soft" on communism. [386•3 They demanded of the ICFTU and its president, Vincent Tewson, a more determined struggle against the communist danger.
p The ICFTU affiliates from Europe and underdeveloped countries took a different position from that of the American unions on a number of questions. Afraid that they might lose control over the ICFTU, the American labor leaders stepped up their activity in the confederation and intensified their drive to split the international labor movement. Even after the ICFTU was set up, the AFL and CIO retained their independent missions in Europe. Particularly extensive subversive work in other countries was done by the Free Trade Union Committee which was founded by the AFL leaders [386•4 and 387 operated both in Europe and in America. On the basis of the Inter-American Confederation of Unions, which they had established in 1949, an Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) was formed in 1951. While ORIT was formally a branch of the ICFTU, it was in fact under the control of the American labor unions.
p The leaders of the AFL and CIO supported such organizations created in Europe in the late 1940s, as the Force Ouvriere in France, [387•1 the Italian Labor Union (Unione Italiana del Lavoro), which was under the influence of the SocialDemocrats, and the Italian Conference of Labor Unions (Confederazione Italiana dei Sindicati Nazionali dei Lavoratori), which collaborated with the Christian Democrats. The American trade union leaders rendered great assistance to such organizations, seeing in them a weapon of struggle against the Communists. [387•2
p Despite all their efforts, the American labor leaders failed to win the support of the broad masses of European working people for the foreign policy course of American imperialism. “It is becoming clearer each day that the basic objectives of Western foreign policy which came into being with the Marshall Plan in 1947 are not being achieved and perhaps never will be." [387•3 This became particularly obvious in 1954, in connection with the failure of the American “positions of strength" policy. After the Geneva Summit Conference of Great Powers in 1954 there was a noticeable relaxation of international tension, which was an important success for the peace forces.
p But the relaxation of tension was given a hostile reception by the more zealous advocates of cold war in the American trade unions. Thus, at the AFL convention in 1954, Meany accused Britain and France of seeking what he called to “make a deal" with the Soviet Union and China. [387•4 He described the relaxation of international tension that followed the conference as a defeat for the foreign policy of the United States. “I am sure 388 that all will agree that the international situation has deteriorated in the last few months and that our position of leadership ... had been somewhat toned down. We find anti-American sentiment in various parts of the world.” [388•1
p In the mid-1950s, the similarity between the foreign policy position of the American labor leaders and that of the most reactionary circles of the bourgeoisie became increasingly clear. It was not surprising that in 1954 American labor leaders rebuked the British Labour Party for sending a delegation to the USSR and China. [388•2 Also that year, in Los Angeles, the 16th convention of the CIO adopted resolutions expressing basic adherence to the Wall Street war program, support of West German rearmament, and slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union. [388•3
p While expressing their opposition to the domestic policies of Dwight Eisenhower, the unions voiced no opposition to the government’s foreign policy. But even during that difficult period of the cold war, especially between 1952 and 1955, voices were raised in protest against the frankly imperialist line pursued by the top labor leaders. The Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, for example, expressed apprehension lest this line lead to another world war, and the United Auto Workers spoke out, albeit timidly, for negotiations between the USSR and the USA. Compared with the actions of the working people of other countries, the movement of protest against the cold war was very weak in the United States, but it should not be underestimated.
p By the mid-1950s, a new relationship of world forces had come about. Capitalism entered a new stage of its general crisis. The colonial system was undergoing intensive disintegration. Imperialism had already lost its power over the greater part of mankind, while the world socialist system was exerting increasing influence on the course of events.
p As a result of these developments the ruling circles of the USA encountered greater and greater difficulties in 389 implementing their foreign policy, and, consequently, resorted to more vigorous ideological campaigns. Although they had their own powerful machinery for carrying on ideological work, US power elite assigned no small role in this field to conservative labor leaders who supported the foreign policy line of the monopolies. In this connection, the American bourgeoisie took special cognizance of the fact that the labor movement had become a leading force in the capitalist countries and was acquiring increasing importance in the developing countries. That is why it gave US labor figures the job of establishing contacts with their counterparts abroad with the idea of persuading them to side with the United States.
p In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the rank-and-file American unionists exerted increasing influence on their leaders on domestic issues, forcing them to criticize certain defects of capitalism. At the same time, the labor leaders were still given a free hand in foreign relations, as a result of which the more conservative elements headed by Meany set the tone. Even before the merger of the AFL and CIO, the rightist leaders of the two organizations found a basis for cooperation first of all in the field of international affairs. After the merger, in Meany’s words, “all policy statements, decisions and proposals relating to international affairs have been unanimously adopted by appropriate organs of the AFL-CIO". [389•1
p In the first years after the merger there was indeed a unity of views in this area between the leaders of the former AFL and CIO. At that time, most American labor leaders were strongly influenced by the idea of America’s “world leadership”. This idea was supported then even by such generally progressive leaders as A. Philip Randolph, who felt that, just as America filled this role in the world as a whole, the AFL-CIO was the leader of the international labor movement. And K. F. Feller, US labor representative at the TUC convention in 1961, told the British unionists that the United States had inherited “a fair portion of the obligation of world leadership, which you in Great Britain bore almost alone". [389•2
390p The American labor leaders’ objectives in their international activities were to ensure for themselves a dominating position in the international labor movement and to undermine the WFTU and the trade unions of the socialist countries. These activities were permeated with the spirit of anti-communism, and in most cases carried on in contact with government organizations, especially in cooperation with the State Department. In particular, wide use was made of such diplomatic posts as the labor attaches in the US embassies in most countries. As a rule, appointments as labor attaches went to people who were connected with the labor movement and had experience in US trade union work. The leaders of the AFL-CIO had the deciding voice in their selection and appointment.
p With the help of these people, the AFL-CIO executive council and the State Department were kept informed about the situation in the labor movements of other countries. In the spring of 1962, at a meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, the then Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg expressed confidence that “US unions will continue to play a vital role in preventing Communist infiltration of the international labor movement”, and stressed that it was imperative to accelerate the US labor attache and labor information services in all parts of the world. [390•1
p The AFL-CIO international affairs department maintained close ties with foreign embassies in the USA, especially with those which also had labor attaches.
p The US labor leaders pinned great hopes on the Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE). Established back in 1946, it sponsored the sending of parcels to American relatives and friends in Europe in the first postwar years. In the mid-50s, CARE already encompassed 23 organizations and spread its actions to many countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Its board of directors included Matthew Woll, Victor Reuther and other leading union officials. Every year, CARE sent food parcels to various countries, but the recipients were not so much people in need as people whom Americans needed. In 1959, over 4,000 391 parcels went to South Korea, and another 3,000 to Hong Kong. No smaller numbers were sent to other countries.
p In the early 1960s, American labor leaders got a chance to make use of the Peace Corps that was established in 1961 as an agency under the US State Department. The AFL-CIO leadership well understood that the chief unofficial aim of this corps was to combat communism. Even in Congress, the AFL-CIO leaders more than once stressed the necessity of giving careful political training to the corps members, explaining to them the character of American democracy and the capitalist system. [391•1 The AFL-CIO leadership gave the Peace Corps administration much assistance in recruiting and training corps candidates. Many union figures acted as consultants in this connection.
p In urging union members to join in the work of the Peace Corps, the top labor leaders were fully aware that besides philanthropic tasks, the corps members carried out assignments of a purely political nature, and not infrequently conducted intelligence and subversive work. This fact was brought out by labor representatives of a number of developing countries in which the corps operated.
p The American labor leaders sought to exploit not only national but also international organizations, especially the International Labor Organization (ILO), whose annual conferences the American delegates used for propaganda purposes. With the growth of the international labor and national liberation movements, however, the balance of forces in the ILO began to shift in a direction unfavorable to the US unions, which provoked the displeasure of leaders like Meany.
p But the rightist labor leaders in the USA pinned their biggest hopes on the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which they themselves had created. To be sure, they were to run into certain difficulties here as well.
p From its very inception, the ICFTU showed signs of internal discord. Many of the Americans’ actions drew criticism from ICFTU affiliates from other countries. The Americans aroused displeasure by their attempts to build relations with 392 unions of other countries from a position of superiority. The US labor leaders hoped that the merger of the AFL and CIO would strengthen their position in the ICFTU. But serious difficulties awaited them.
p The ICFTU was not a homogeneous organization. It included long-established US and European unions as well as young labor organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The latter group criticized the positions taken by the ICFTU leaders on issues relating to the national liberation struggle. The ICFTU leaders displayed timidity in anything having to do with the liberation of peoples from the colonial yoke. Their caution and inaction drew protests from the working people of colonial and dependent countries.
p The Americans in the ICFTU were gambling on the fact that the USA had no large possessions and had itself, in the past, struggled against British colonialism. Hundreds of books were written in the United States about the so-called anti-colonial tradition of the New World. In their speeches, many statesmen and trade union leaders claimed that the anti-colonial revolution of the mid-twentieth century was “a continuation of the American Revolution of 1776”. [392•1 But this propaganda put them at odds with their British colleagues, who, moreover, were unhappy about the American leaders’ claims to dominance in the ICFTU.
p For their part, the US labor leaders usually spoke with disapproval of the strong influence of socialist traditions in the labor movements of Europe. They were also displeased with the political nature of the trade union movements in Europe, and bragged about not following the example of European trade unions that ranked themselves with political parties.
p There was no unanimity among the Americans on the question of how their relations with the European trade unions should be built. Meany’s supporters stuck to the cruder methods of frightening the Europeans with the communist bogey, and went out of their way to emphasize the role and “successes” of American unions in the struggle against communism. “France, Italy and Germany today would be under the domination of Communist unions if not for the hard 393 work and actual dollars contributed by American trade unionists,” George Meany said. [393•1
p But not all American leaders were in agreement with this line. There were leaders in the AFL-CIO (Walter Reuther, David Dubinsky and others) who had a long history of close ties with European right-wing Social-Democrats. They operated in a more flexible and refined way, laying emphasis on the common goals of US and European labor organizations and advocating closer cooperation with the socialist parties of Europe.
p These leaders began speaking more and more about the Social-Democratic organizations of Europe having broken with Marxism, and the need to distinguish between democratic socialism and “communist totalitarianism”. This is just what the official organ of the AFL called for in 1962 when it said: “One need not accept the doctrines of democratic socialism to realize that its adherents are true democrats who are uncompromising enemies of communism and all other forms of dictatorship." [393•2
p After the AFL-CIO merger, the Americans felt much more self-confident in the ICFTU and continued to work for dominance in it. Back in 1953, they had succeeded in getting their supporter, Omer Becu, into the presidency. However, the main figure in the ICFTU leadership was the General Secretary, which post was held for a long time by J. H. Oldenbrock, a protege of the British. His functions were sharply weakened by the creation in 1955, at the insistence of the Americans, of the post of organizational director, who was to be in charge of all ICFTU activity in the developing countries. This important part of the work was thus taken out of the General Secretary’s domain. The struggle lasted almost a year, and finally in June 1956, at a meeting of the executive bureau, C.H.Millard, a US-oriented Canadian, was appointed to the director’s post. Even after that, however, the American and British press continued to report on the “titanic internecine struggle for power" in the ICFTU. [393•3
394p On March 18, 1957, the London Times pointed to the “internal dissension" that was hampering the ICFTU. Indeed, in October 1956, the international affairs department of the AFL-CIO had prepared a set of nine proposals aimed at reorganizing the ICFTU leadership. Meany tried to show that they were designed to improve the work of the ICFTU, [394•1 but subsequent events showed that they were really an instrument in the struggle for power.
p At the sixth congress of the ICFTU in 1959, the US delegates came out against Oldenbrock and demanded the reorganization of the confederation’s governing bodies. The British press in an attempt to analyze the reasons for the dissension within the ICFTU noted that the Americans’ position was extremely anti-communist and “negative”, while other delegations wanted to see some “positive” activity too.
p The AFL-CIO delegates submitted an anti-Communist resolution for the consideration of the congress. One British delegate called it an “and” document. [394•2 It was not, of course, that the British reformists had a better liking for Communists. It was merely that the Communist parties had considerable influence in the West European labor movement, and in the course of the class struggle working people with differing political views often acted jointly. Hence the differences between the tactics of the European and the American labor leaders. When the internal contradictions and struggle for supremacy within the ICFTU are borne in mind, the nuances in tactics become more understandable.
p The AFL-CIO leaders won a partial victory at the sixth congress. Although Oldenbrock was re-elected General Secretary, a resolution acknowledged the need to reorganize the ICFTU. [394•3 Before another year had passed, the Americans succeeded in removing Oldenbrock and putting Omer Becu in his place. “The Oldenbrock resignation foreshadows a sweeping reorganization of the ICFTU structure,” the AFL-CIO newspaper predicted. In describing Becu, it noted especially that he was a “bitter anti-communist". [394•4
395p Events unfolded rapidly after that. In November 1960, Meany was elected to replace Tewson as chairman of the international Solidarity Fund, on which the activity of the ICFTU in the developing countries largely depended. In December, at a meeting of the ICFTU executive bureau, Meany urged that the reorganization be accelerated. And finally, that same month, the AFL-CIO leaders resorted to blackmail and diktat to achieve their ends, for it was then that their executive council withheld the AFL-CIO contributions to the Solidarity Fund with the aim of forcing the ICFTU to reorganize and to appoint an American, Irving Brown, as assistant to the General Secretary. [395•1
p While pressing on for dominance in the ICFTU, the Americans had no intention of stopping their independent activities in various parts of the world. But this line displeased the TUC. It was not without reason that in tendering his resignation Oldenbrock expressed the hope that “the international activities of affiliated national centers would be carried out through the ICFTU". [395•2 But in January 1961, Meany let it be known that the AFL-CIO “would continue independent activities in the world labor field". [395•3
p Subsequent events showed that although the American labor leaders gained a dominant position in the ICFTU, the confederation was still far from working the way they wanted. On the eve of its eighth congress in July 1965, the situation became very tense as representatives of the European unions again raised objections to the independent activities of the American trade unions.
p Differences within the ICFTU increased, especially in connection with the expansion of the national liberation and labor movements. The trade unions of Asian, African, Latin American countries judged the sincerity of the ICFTU by its deeds, and were unhappy about the fact that the confederation’s leadership often remained inactive when it should have been doing something to assist the national liberation struggle. Especially sharp criticism was voiced at the sixth congress of 396 the confederation as delegates warned that if the situation did not change, the ICFTU would suffer losses. There were good grounds for this warning, and at the seventh congress (1962), the president of the ICFTU had to report a tendency toward a weakening of the confederation’s activity. A number of delegations again levelled sharp criticism at the leadership, some saying that they would withdraw from the ICFTU if the leadership did not change its policy. And indeed, after 1962, the trade unions of Cameroon, Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya and Tanganyika did withdraw.
p The late 1950s saw a new upsurge of the labor movement in the capitalist countries. Under these circumstances, the leaders of the European reformist trade union centers found it considerably harder to justify the course imposed upon the ICFTU by the American labor leaders. Therein lay the reason for the growing discontent within the confederation, and especially in its national trade union centers, with the proAmerican policies of the leadership. Delegates speaking at the sixth congress of the ICFTU in 1959 demanded that greater attention be paid to the struggle for the vital interests of the workers, rather than concentrating solely on the struggle against communism. And even one of the American representatives, Walter Reuther, admitted that “too often the free world, yes, and the free labor movement of the free world, tends to shape its policies and its programs in the image of our fears and our hatreds, in a kind of negative anti-communism". [396•1 Criticism of the confederation’s anti-communist course was again heard at the seventh congress of the ICFTU.
p Back in late 1955, the executive bureau of the ICFTU had banned contacts with the trade unions of the socialist countries and with the WFTU. A resolution on this question repeated a resolution passed by the unity convention of the AFL and CIO, [396•2 a “coincidence” that the American press pointed out frankly. [396•3 American trade union figures were apprehensive of any unity between Socialists and Communists, or unity of labor movement. This was especially clear with respect to the events 397 in France in 1956, when a government of the Socialists came to power for the first time since 1947. As soon .as this happened, an AFL-CIO representative went to see the leader of the Force Ouyriere, Bothereau, but the latter reassured his colleagues, saying that he would oppose a popular front. [397•1 As concerns the situation in Italy, the Americans were pleased with the fact that in 1956 the leadership of the Italian Socialist Party rejected unity of actions with the Communist Party. But later, they had doubts about ISP declarations, since the Socialist and Communist unity in the labor movement was preserved.
p On more than one occasion the ICFTU rejected WFTU proposals for joint action on urgent problems in labor’s struggle. This position drew criticism from within the ICFTU itself, for a number of its affiliated organizations were desirous of unity. At congresses of the TUC, delegates from local organizations pressed for contacts between the TUC and unions of the socialist countries, as well as between the ICFTU and the WFTU.
p This trend disturbed the AFL-CIO leaders. They insisted on continuing the cold war in the international trade union movement, but this position met with disapproval in other ICFTU affiliates. As General Secretary of the WFTU Louis Saillant said, “the ICFTU and its leadership now face this dilemma—to pursue their policy of cold war in the trade union movement and isolate themselves from the trade union movement, or, on the contrary, to tone down the cold war policy in the trade union movement so as not to be isolated themselves". [397•2
p In the late 1950s, differences increased within the ICFTU also on the question of war and peace. The urge for peace was growing stronger among working people everywhere, although, as mentioned earlier, it found weaker expression in the United States, and the rightist leaders there simply ignored it. But in other capitalist countries, reformist figures could not disregard the sentiments of the working people. The AFL-CIO leaders were unhappy with the anti-war position of the TUC. In 1960, 1962 and 1964, British Trades Union Congresses 398 rejected the Conservatives’ foreign policy based on nuclear arms race. The congresses also condemned the policy of providing bases on British soil for American submarines carrying Polaris missiles.
p Little wonder that the American labor leaders, who supported the foreign policy of their government, were indignant over any attempt by labor leaders in other capitalist countries to pursue policies that did not coincide with their views. But such attempts became more and more frequent. During its winter session in 1965, the executive council of the AFL-CIO stated irritably that the ICFTU was going downhill. The rightist American labor leaders had real cause for dissatisfaction, for in 1965 they ran into serious difficulties in connection with the US policy in Vietnam: they approved of that policy, but many ICFTU organizations, following the example of the 97th British Trades Union Congress, were demanding an end to the hostilities. [398•1
p At an American Legion convention, the AFL-CIO leadership admitted that there was growing dissatisfaction with US policy within the ICFTU, but tried to explain it as stemming from “misinformation” in the European trade unions.
p In creating the ICFTU, American labor leaders had hoped to see the WFTU isolated and destroyed. But the Sixth Congress of the WFTU in 1965 not only showed that the Federation was growing numerically, but also demonstrated its growing maturity and determination to stand up for the interests of the working people.
p In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the national liberation movement became truly worldwide, now embracing the colonial countries of Asia and Africa and the economically dependent countries of Latin America. The imperialists had no intentions whatever of giving up voluntarily and without struggle those advantages and profits which the possession of colonies and the control of their economies gave them. Mindful of the scope of the struggle and the new balance of forces in the world, the imperialist powers sought new methods 399 by which to perpetuate their exploitation of peoples. The chief aim of their policy was to keep the developing countries, both colonial and newly free, within their sphere of influence.
p The changes that had taken place in the world during the postwar period made the American ruling circles pay very close attention to the labor movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. “It is vitally important,” Vice-President Nixon said in his report on a trip he made to Africa, “that the United States government follow closely trade union developments in the continent of Africa." [399•1
p What did the American trade union leaders take to these countries? What kind of ideological baggage did they bring with them?
p The rightist union leaders understood that the age of colonialism was over. They were compelled to declare that an end had to be put to colonialism. Year after year, resolutions condemning colonialism and declaring the right of peoples to independence were adopted at conventions of American trade unions. But it was only the 19th century colonialism that was condemned, that is, traditional forms of colonialism, the most vivid expression of which were the policies of such colonial powers as England, France, Portugal, Belgium, etc. The American labor leaders laid particular emphasis on the right to independence of the peoples of Africa, particularly those that were under the dominance of European colonial powers.
p By focussing its criticism on the old traditional forms of colonialism, the trade union leadership of the USA distracted the attention of the people of underdeveloped countries from new forms of enslavement, or neocolonialism. Whenever Meany criticized the British and the French, it was not without purpose that he always painted an ideal picture of US relations with the Latin American countries.
p While they were compelled, under existing circumstances, to speak of the right of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to independence, the American labor leaders at the same time never entertained the notion that these peoples should in future determine their own destinies, much less that they should choose a non-capitalist way of development.
400p The objective of the propaganda the American trade unions carried out in those countries was to help the imperialists keep the former colonial countries within the capitalist system.
p The American labor leaders have a long history of interfering in the labor movement of Latin America and seeking to implant so-called “free trade unionism" there.
p In the second half of the 1950s, the national liberation movement rose to a new level in Latin America. Encountering growing resistance from organized workers there, the American imperialists tried to weaken it by means of splitting and subverting the labor movement. As in other parts of the world, this job was carried out by the rightist labor leaders from the USA.
p The American trade unions put their main stakes on the Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT) of the ICFTU. ORIT vigorously implanted anti-communism in the minds of Latin American working people, at the same time extolling the “progressive” role of the USA. One ORIT message said, for example, that “it is impossible to imagine, at least with any degree of realism, any development of Latin America without United States assistance". [400•1
p The Americans did not conceal their aims. Thus, AFL-CIO Latin American representative Serafino Romualdi once said that the work of his trade unions in this region “mainly consists in efforts to prevent totalitarian forces, especially Communists, from controlling unions from where they could sabotage production and transportation of raw materials". [400•2
p The AFL-CIO leaders portrayed Yankee imperialism as a disinterested neighbor looking after the welfare of the peoples of the southern continent. They declared that capitalism, in the sense it is understood abroad, no longer existed in the United States. [400•3 In 1956, a delegation headed by Meany visited Latin America. [400•4 The US embassies there gave receptions in honor of the delegation, paying lip service to “cooperation among the American family of nations". [400•5
401p The AFL-CIO stepped up its work in Latin America, exploiting for this purpose its dominant position in ORIT. But at the very same time, the ICFTU also became active in Latin America. In 1957, it sent its representative to a session of the ORIT execudve committee and, to the displeasure of Meany and Romualdi, the ICFTU took an active part in its work. The representative of the American unions at that session, William F. Schnitzler, declared that “our Latin American brothers ... are very proud of their achievements and capabilities" and that “most of them are reluctant to admit the need for outside direction or supervision". [401•1 By “outside direction" he had in mind interference by the ICFTU, and criticized “the tendency to relegate the US affiliates to a secondary position" in ORIT. [401•2
p Using a “trade union variety" of the Monroe Doctrine, the US labor leaders in 1958 undertook steps to gain complete dominance of ORIT. They demanded larger representation in its executive bodies and sought to alter its program of activities. [401•3 They were worried about the political actions the masses were taking against reactionary dictatorships. In the second half of the 1950s, the peoples of some Latin American countries overthrew their caudillos (Venezuela, Colombia). A big role in this struggle was played by the working class and its Communist parties, which inevitably heightened their influence.
p The demagogy of labor leaders who asserted that dictators and Communists were equally unacceptable to them showed itself most clearly in the case of Cuba. The Confederation of Cuban Workers (CCW) was a member of ORIT. Eusebio Mujal, who headed it at the time, supported Batista’s dictatorship. Although the North American “democrats” condemned his regime in word, they sided with the position taken by Mujal and the CCW in deed. In 1958, an AFL-CIO delegation, including among others Paul Phillips, Serafino Romualdi and Emil Rieve, visited Cuba and expressed 402 satisfaction with the conciliatory position of the Cuban trade union leaders. The latter had declared that their unions would not take part in political struggle, that is, they would not fight against Batista’s dictatorship. Playing on the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other countries, Meany said in 1958 that the AFL-CIO was “reluctant to pass individual judgment" on Mujal’s position or to assume that it knew better than the CCW how to protect the interests of the Cuban workers. [402•1 However, after the revolution in Cuba the US labor leaders abruptly changed their line and openly interfered in the internal affairs of the Cuban trade unions. They were frightened by the radicalism of the popular masses, in which they saw a threat to capitalism in Latin America.
p In November 1959, the AFL-CIO executive council sent a telegram to the tenth congress of the Cuban trade unions, in which it welcomed the overthrow of Batista, at the same time expressing alarm over the consequences of that act. It promised to help the Cuban trade unions, but on the condition that they retain their ties with ORIT and the ICFTU and keep up the struggle against Communist influence.
p When it became clear that the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship was leading to radical changes in the country, the American labor leaders condemned the Cuban revolution, raising a hue and cry about “Castro’s Communist advisors”, [402•2 a “personal dictatorship”, etc. The Cuban unions, having now become mass organizations of working people, were subjected to slanderous attacks.
p The AFL-CIO supported the US government in the Cuban question. In January 1961, the AFL-CIO leadership allocated $10,000 for assistance to the Cuban counter-revolutionaries, [402•3 and a month and a half later called upon the Organization of American States (OAS) to take decisive measures against Cuba. [402•4 The AFL-CIO and ORIT repudiated the revolutionary trade unions of Cuba, declaring that they were illegal, while at the same time proclaiming the fugitive reactionaries from the 403 executive committee of the former CCW the “only legal" representatives of the Cuban working people. [403•1
p Struggle against the Cuban revolution constituted one of the main tasks the leadership of the American trade unions took upon themselves. In 1962, the AFL-CIO executive council called upon all labor organizations of the Western Hemisphere to urge their governments to suspend trade with Cuba, while the leadership of the National Maritime Union pressed Congress to halt aid to any country that furnished its ships for delivery of Soviet goods to Cuba. Union President Joseph Curran went as far as calling on maritime workers of all countries to boycott cargo ships bound for Cuba. The American labor leaders’ hostile attitude toward Cuba manifested itself even more during the Caribbean crisis in October 1962.
p The victory of the Cuban revolution had a great impact on the anti-imperialist and labor movements of the Latin American countries. After 1959, ORIT’s influence fell considerably. The example of the Cuban trade unions, which had broken with it and the ICFTU, had considerable repercussions. That same year, the Third Congress of the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor also voted to break with the ICFTU. The US labor unions declared this decision to be the result of “political blackmail" by the Communists. [403•2
p Some ICFTU and ORIT organizations expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of the headquarters in Latin America. A. Diaz, president of the Union of Colombian Workers, said at the Sixth Congress of the ICFTU: “In the case of Latin America, our people want to see ORIT playing a part in their conflicts, and in their economic and social problems.... If this does not happen, then the ICFTU will have lost for ever the opportunity not only of increasing its affiliates, but also of retaining those which it has at present in Latin America." [403•3
p In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a trend became discernible within the Latin American labor movement toward the creation of a continental organization, independent of ORIT 404 and the ICFTU. The executive committee of ORIT qualified this as being the result of Communist intrigues,, and called upon all organizations to launch a systematic counteroffensive. In the meantime, the executive council of the AFL-CIO decided that, henceforth, 30 per cent of its contribution to the ICFTU’s Solidarity Fund should be used only for financing activities in Latin America.
p The AFL-CIO did, however, draw some definite conclusions for itself after the victory of the Cuban revolution, and was now trying to work out a more flexible approach to struggle against the growing national liberation movement. In one of his articles, Romualdi observed that “trade unionism in Latin America was founded upon the concept of ‘class struggle’ imported from Europe at the close of the last century". [404•1 In his words, the AFL-CIO’s “chief concern is the promotion in every country of a constructive type of non-political trade unionism". [404•2
p Many American leaders felt that anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutions were inevitable, their beginning just a matter of time. “Revolutions are under way,” said Stanley Ruttenberg, head of the AFL-CIO research department. “The question becomes, what kind of revolution and why?" [404•3 It was to this that the US trade unions were ready with an answer. If changes were bound to occur, let them be reduced to a minimum and not affect the foundations of US dominance in Latin America.
p US labor leaders often talked about the plight of the working people in Latin America, the reason for which they saw not in capitalism, but in the “inefficient use" of the foreign capital invested in their economies. Wrote Ruttenberg: “Experience shows that the misdirection of private and public capital, not capitalism, caused problems." [404•4 They conceded that, theretofore, private foreign capital had been used in Latin America only to develop certain industries, mainly extractive. The victory of the Cuban revolution and the growth of the anti-imperialist movement now forced them to speak of the 405 need to develop the infrastructure (the building of roads, ports, electric power stations, hospitals, schools, etc.) and to carry out social measures.
p The AFL-CIO increased its brainwashing operations among Latin American unionists. A program for training labor leaders was worked out in 1961, [405•1 and in April 1962 it was put into practice when the American Institute for Free Labor Development began to function in Washington. [405•2 Schnitzler declared that \he main purpose of the institute was to teach Latin Americans how to combat Communist penetration of their unions. [405•3 The AFL-CIO News said: “The Institute for Free Labor Development is financed jointly by labor and industry to help Latin American Unions meet the Reds by training their leaders." [405•4 To be sure, the money on which the institute operated came not only and not so much from the unions as from the government and from monopolies that had investments in Latin America.
p The rightist American labor leaders did not restrict themselves to ideological activity alone. They also engaged in splitting activities. Although they tried to conceal this aspect of their work from the public and the union membership, a few facts that came to the surface give a clear picture of the methods used.
p As soon as a danger to US dominance arose anywhere in Latin America, AFL-CIO agents were sent to the trouble spot. In late 1961 and early 1962, for example, a sharp struggle between left and right elements began in the labor movement of the Dominican Republic, and almost immediately John McLellan from the AFL-CIO was on the scene. With his help, the rightists brought about a split in the labor movement. In February 1962, workers organized a demonstration in Santo Domingo, during which an American flag and effigies of McLellan and Fred Somerford (a labor relations expert with the US Embassy) were burned near the US Consulate; the two were accused of interfering in Dominican labor affairs. [405•5
406p Another clear example of American interference in the affairs of Latin American trade unions was seen in British Guyana. After the elections of 1961, when the government of Cheddi Jagan came to power, more AFL-CIO representatives came to British Guyana in a matter of 18 months than had been there in the preceding 18 years. And all with one main objective—to organize active opposition to the progressive government which the labor leaders of the USA immediately christened Communist.
p Their interference in the affairs of the trade unions of British Guyana took various forms—from efforts to set local unionists against the left-wing leadership, for which purpose the Americans arranged special seminars, to open support of anti-government actions.
p Actively engaged in splitting activities in Latin American labor movements were graduates of the Washington-based American Institute for Free Labor and of an institute run by ORIT in Mexico. The American labor leaders themselves said that the graduates of their institute distinguished themselves in Venezuela, Honduras, Bolivia, British Guyana and Brazil. The institute operated on an annual budget of $1,000,000, [406•1 a significant portion of this sum serving the purpose of containing the struggle of the working class of Latin America for independence and against American imperialism.
p Similar methods were used against progressive labor movements in other parts of the world, including Asian countries.
p The Americans did not regard Asia as a favorable field of combat with communism. Because the national liberation movement there had already reached impressive proportions in the early postwar years, the rightist US labor leaders saw that they could not achieve their ends by operating on their own, as they did in Latin America. They staked their main hopes on the ICFTU, and on its Asian regional organization created in 1951 and the Asian Trade Union College founded by the ICFTU in 1952. The college was, in fact, financed by the ICFTU Solidarity Fund, the main part of which consisted of AFL-CIO contributions. Among the instructors there were many specialists in problems of the American labor movement, 407 and American literature on the labor question was the main source used in the training program. The students were fed the theory of class collaboration and had apolitical and neutral attitudes to the national liberation movement cultivated in them. The working committee of the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), an affiliate of the ICFTU, had good reasons to point out in its resolution that “the training imparted by the college has been superfluous and devoid of ideological fervor which is the essence of the trade union education program suited to the genius of Asian countries and particularly India". [407•1
p The Americans sought not only to impose their own ideology on the students, but through them to effectuate American policy in that country. They had, in the opinion of the leaders of INTUC, turned the college in Calcutta into a center of cold war propaganda. [407•2 According to the Indian Blitz magazine, “in the name of anti-communism what the college wanted to achieve was to train American agents and infuse them into the trade union movements of different countries in the region to strengthen American influence in a vital section of these countries’ economy". [407•3
p Many of the graduates did, in fact, become agents of the American trade union leaders in the labor movement of Asia. At the bidding of the latter, they conducted subversive work aimed at splitting organizations and creating new unions under their own leadership. Moreover, these actions were often taken even against organizations affiliated with the ICFTU, in particular against INTUC.
p The Indian progressive press cited facts showing that many of the graduates “had been found to be working under extraneous directions with money provided to them, the sources of which they could not satisfactorily explain". [407•4 Such students started organizing trade unions independent of INTUC, and sought their affiliation with the International Trade Secretariats, known to be US dominated organizations. [407•5 408 Blitz wrote: “Substantial sums are provided by the US government through the American Federation of Labour to buy people in the trade union movements of the countries covered by the college.” [408•1
p In cases where the ICFTU had discredited itself and could not be used to good advantage any more, the US labor leaders turned to the International Trade Secretariats, which were officially independent of the ICFTU, as a vehicle for their subversive work.
p The AFL-CIO leadership urged its unions to play an active role in the trade secretariats, and between 1959 to 1961, another seventeen American unions became members of trade secretariats in their fields. Through these secretariats, the US unions sought to establish direct contacts with the industrial organizations of India, over the head of the national centers. An INTUC report said: “This method of working in foreign countries without a proper coordination between the national centre and the ITSs is bound to lead to unnecessary misunderstanding which ultimately will harm the very cause of solidarity of the workers which the ITS claims to stand for." [408•2
p The US labor leaders sought ties with Indian labor organizations. Indian trade union leaders were invited to visit the United States, where they were given the usual ideological brainwashing treatment. Also drawn into the orbit of American influence were people whom the Indian government sent to the United States to study American industrial production methods. For example, a group of young engineers from India came to the United States for this purpose in 1958, whereupon the steelworkers’ union arranged a three-day seminar for them in Washington. This was part of a program the union had worked out with the help of some companies, universities and technical colleges. [408•3 One of the sponsors and lecturers at the seminar was the legal counsel of the steelworkers’ union, Arthur Goldberg, soon to become Secretary of Labor.
p Considerable work in inculcating the “American concept" was also conducted by US trade union figures who made trips 409 to Asian countries. [409•1 In 1958, for example, Joseph D. Keenan, secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and Harry H. Pollak, a member of the AFL-CIO international affairs department, were sent to act as “unofficial ambassadors" of American trade unions at a trade fair held in New Delhi. With their help a brochure was distributed among Indian workers describing “the constructive views of the. US worker and his union regarding productivity, standards of workmanship, cooperation in labor-management relations". [409•2 This was the same old sermon of “business trade unionism" which the leadership of the US trade unions was preaching in many countries. But the AFL-CIO leaders attached greater importance to it in Asia than elsewhere.
p A combination of factors was causing alarm in the American ruling circles. First, the labor movement in Asia had become a major factor of political life. Second, the communist movement had grown. And third, the national bourgeoisie had decided it was to its advantage to follow a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. All this also made the US trade union leaders uneasy. As early as December 1955, Meany criticized Nehru’s neutrality, holding that it played into the hands of the Communists. [409•3 At that particular time, the executive bureau of the ICFTU was meeting in New York, and a representative of the Indian National Trade Union Congress was there. At a press conference, he expressed indignation over the position taken by Meany in criticizing INTUC for supporting Nehru’s foreign policy. In a letter to Meany, he lodged a protest against this kind of AFL-CIO interference in the affairs of INTUC and threatened INTUC’s withdrawal from the ICFTU.
p This conflict was very significant. Usually, the AFL-CIO leadership declared all progressive organizations to be its enemies, labelling them Communist. The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), against which the AFL-CIO leaders conducted subversive work, was an example. But Meany also levelled sharp criticism at INTUC, an affiliate of the ICFTU, for supporting Nehru’s foreign policy.
410p Meany’s gross interference in the internal affairs of the foreign trade union center met with disapproval even within the AFL-CIO leadership itself. Walter Reuther, for example, expressed disagreement with Meany’s actions and demonstratively accepted an invitation from Nehru to visit India.
p The American labor leaders were always delighted with any trade union in Asia that was apolitical. Their magazines and newspapers carried articles written by figures in those trade unions in Asia that pursued a policy of class collaboration.
p The Americans were quite concerned about the trade union movement in Japan, where the US military administration, with the help of the US labor leaders, was taking energetic steps to undermine progressive organizations. A General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO) had been created in 1950, and the Americans looked forward to making it their mainstay in the Japanese labor movement. But instead, SOHYO became a progressive trade union center, and the Japanese labor movement as a whole took on a militant political character. This disturbed the Americans, who realized that their hopes had not justified themselves. So they altered their plans and threw their support behind the Japanese Trade Union Congress (ZENRO), an organization which the AFL leaders played no small role in creating in 1953.
p But, despite all their efforts, year after year the Japanese labor movement became more politically active, its main thrust directed against American imperialism and its policy with respect to Japan. This naturally worried the AFL-CIO leadership. In the view of AFL-CIO vice-president Joseph Keenan, “the Marxist orientation of some of its [SOHYO’s] leaders ... has helped block the development of trade unions in the sense the term is used in the United States, Canada and most of Europe". [410•1
p The Americans’ sympathies were with ZENRO, which turned out to be more inclined toward economic rather than political actions and apparently intended to pattern itself after American trade unions. As they did in India, the American labor leaders used every means they could to influence the thinking of labor figures in Japan.
411p In Washington, they racked their brains over how to weaken the influence of SOHYO and bring about a change in the policies of its leadership. In 1961, a group of SOHYO functionaries was invited to the United States. It spent two months there and in Europe to study the influence of automation and technological changes on the status of the workers and on the labor movement.
p At that time the Americans were still counting on a change in SOHYO’s policies, saying that “although the SOHYO leadership continues to advocate a pro-communist ‘neutralism’ it has tended in recent years to place greater emphasis on trade union and economic activities". [411•1 What had to be done to please the US labor leaders was to give up political activity, particularly if it impeded the foreign policy plans of the American government. To achieve these aims, the Americans exploited the natural desire of Japanese working people for unity. From the beginning of 1962 the objective was to unite the two main Japanese trade union centers, SOHYO and ZENRO, with SOHYO rejecting any cooperation with the Communists and the policy of active neutralism.
p SOHYO came under pressure from various directions. In late 1961, ICFTU general secretary Becu tried to get SOHYO to abandon its policy of neutralism, struggle for peace, opposition to the Japanese-American treaty, and cooperation with the WFTU. On November 10, 1961, Becu wrote a letter to SOHYO rebuking it for cooperation with the WFTU and the trade unions of the socialist countries. The letter was prompted by the participation of a SOHYO representative in an international trade union conference on the Berlin question. In a second letter, dated January 25, 1962, Becu brought up the question again, this time accusing SOHYO of abandoning the principle of positive neutralism in international affairs, on the grounds that its position on the Berlin problem was close to that of the Communists. [411•2
p By now, the US labor leaders were busy working to undermine and split the organization. Taking advantage of the fact that SOHYO affiliates were free to join the ICFTU if they 412 so chose, even though SOHYO itself did not belong to any international trade union center, they shifted the focus of their subversive work to individual trade unions. With this aim, the AFL-CIO leadership undertook energetic steps to strengthen ties between the American steelworkers’, automobile workers’, and electrical and machine workers’ unions on the one hand, and the corresponding Japanese trade unions on the other.
p Seeing the futility of their efforts to alter SOHYO’s position or get it to join the ICFTU, the US labor leaders decided to work in a roundabout way. As in India, they went over the head of the national centers and sought to encourage Japanese industrial unions to join the International Trade Secretariats, in which American industrial unions played a leading role. This was what George Collins of the International Association of Metal Workers and James Carey of the Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers spoke about at a convention of the Japanese electrical workers’ union in 1962. [412•1 And UAW president Walter Reuther was carrying out the same mission when he visited Japan in November 1962. But his visit pursued other aims as well.
p At that time, Reuther was already criticizing the line George Meany was following in international affairs, and his union had begun to engage in independent international activities. Reuther himself was very active. Unlike Meany’s behavior, which was ruled by anti-communism alone, Reuther’s actions were dictated by other considerations, which corresponded to the interests of his union’s membership. The point is that this militant union confronted large corporations that had subsidiary companies abroad, and the fight against such giants required unity of actions. Therefore the union leadership came out for establishing contacts with labor in the countries where there were subsidiaries of US corporations. Reuther’s visit to Japan was partially prompted by such considerations.
p Having given up hopes of bringing about a change in SOHYO’s policies and its merger with ZENRO, the American labor leaders decided in 1962 to work for a unification of all conservative organizations in Japan so as to confront SOHYO with a united front of rightist trade unions. With their help, 413 three trade union centers—ZENRO, Sodomei (Japanese Federation of Trade Unions) and Zenkanko (National Council of Government and Public Corporation Workers’ Unions) —united in 1962 into a federation called Domei Kaigi, in which, for the time being, each organization retained its independence. [413•1 A constitutional convention was scheduled for November 1964 for the purpose of creating a new organization. Long before the convention, a Domei Kaigi delegation made a trip to Washington where it held talks with the AFL-CIO leadership. Statements by both sides said that the AFL-CIO welcomed the creation of a new organization, pledged its full support, and was counting on its cooperation. The aims of joint actions outlined in the talks included “combatting communism" and strengthening the “influence of the ICFTU in Asia". [413•2
p The AFL-CIO attached such great importance to the unification of the rightist Japanese trade unions that Meany himself went to their convention. He was accompanied by David Dubinsky, James Suffridge, George Harrison, and head of the AFL-CIO international affairs department Jay Lovestone. [413•3 After the convention, at which a new organization—DOMEI (Japanese Federation of Trade Unions)—was created, Meany met with two SOHYO leaders, SecretaryGeneral Akira Iwai and President Ohta. [413•4 However, the meeting did not justify the hopes of the American labor leaders, and soon thereafter they again lashed out against SOHYO, this time in the form of an open letter from Lovestone to Secretary-General Akira Iwai.
p Actually, it is hard to call that document a letter; it was rather a lecture to the Japanese trade union leaders. It touched on SOHYO’s political activities, its relations with the Communists, international ties and attitude to US policies. Lovestone expressed displeasure with SOHYO’s political activity: “Why must a trade union federation—whose first task is the protection and promotion of the workers’ interests—lend itself 414 so much to furthering political aims...?" He urged that SOHYO put up a vigorous struggle against Communists in every trade union. “...In order to combat Communist Party control of unions one must fight against the activities of the individual Communists in the unions.” He was also unhappy about SOH YO’s ties with the WFTU and the trade unions of socialist countries. And, finally “we find it hard to understand the consistently unfriendly attitude of the top SOHYO leadership towards the United States". [414•1
p That document was not only further evidence of interference by American trade unions in the internal affairs of labor organizations in other countries, but also proof of the failure of the whole preceding line that the leadership of the US labor unions followed with respect to the Japanese labor movement and its major organization, SOHYO. Particularly so since the SOHYO leadership administered a stinging rebuke to the American labor leaders in its reply to Lovestone’s letter. [414•2
p It was not only in Japan that the American rightist labor leaders suffered serious failures. The state of affairs in Africa did not make them particularly happy either.
p Even prior to the AFL-CIO merger, American trade unions, and especially the AFL, devoted a great deal of attention to developments in Africa. However, the positions of the old colonial powers were still strong there at the time, and the US labor leaders had to content themselves with the ICFTU’s activities in that area. Indeed, the ICFTU, having created regional organizations in Europe, Asia and Latin America, had decided to extend its influence to Africa as well. But matters progressed with great difficulty. At the beginning of the 1950s, its leaders relied basically on the trade union organizations of the British colonies, especially those in Ghana. This was understandable, considering the fact that the British were still dominant in the ICFTU.
p While they supported the ICFTU, the Americans nonetheless undertook independent steps in North Africa. At the AFL convention in 1955, it was noted that the US trade unions had done a lot “in preventing the Communists from perverting 415 and distorting these great anti-colonial movements into Communist channels". [415•1 American propaganda in Africa was demagogic. Here too the US labor leaders tried to capitalize on the fact that the USA had never had any possessions in Africa and that it had itself once waged a war of liberation against England. They had advantages over their European colleagues, who were too closely linked with their governments to make a decisive stand in favor of the liberation of the colonial peoples.
p While hailing the role of African trade unions in the national liberation movement, the US labor leaders carefully worked to bring about a change in the orientation of African labor figures. To this end, a project for organizing the training of African trade union figures in the USA appeared in 1957. At its August 1957 meeting, the executive council of the AFL-CIO allocated $50,000 for training ten or twelve “promising young labor leaders from Central Africa". [415•2
p Despite all the effort put into it, the policy pursued by the Americans in the labor movement failed in a number of African countries. Their actions and support of US foreign policy were strongly criticized by prominent figures in the African trade unions. Such criticism was contained, for example, in a speech delivered by Tom Mboya at a press conference in the United States in 1959, [415•3 and in a speech by the representative of the General Union of Algerian Workers at the third convention of the AFL-CIO during that same year. George Meany, Jay Lovestone and other leaders were worried about the declining prestige of the American labor unions in Africa, and this problem was frequently discussed at meetings of the AFL-CIO executive council. In view of the sweep of the national liberation struggle, the AFL-CIO leaders had to acknowledge the right of the peoples of Africa to independence. They saw the inevitability of decolonization and were ready to accept it, but only within the framework of the capitalist system, which meant the granting of formal independence while preserving the economic dominance of imperialism in new forms.
416p The AFL-CIO executive council was disturbed not only by its own failures in Africa, but also by a similar fall in the prestige of the ICFTU. There was a great deal of African dissatisfaction over the confederation’s passiveness in the matter of supporting the national liberation movement. African trade unions showed an increasing desire for autonomy and the creation of a continental trade union organization, independent of the ICFTU.
p A conference for the purpose of creating such an organization was slated for May 1960. On the eve of its opening, representatives of the AFL-CIO stepped up their subversive work in Africa. They focussed on Nigeria.
p In Nigeria, in early 1959, two trade union centers had agreed to merge on the condition that one of them withdraw from the ICFTU. The result was a new organization, called the Trades Union Congress of Nigeria. A struggle developed between the right and the left trends within it. The rightists wanted the organization to affiliate with the ICFTU. Counting on their support, the American labor leaders launched a propaganda campaign in Nigeria. In April I960, shortly before the above-mentioned African trade union conference was to open, a representative of the ICFTU, MacDonald Moses, went there. The actions of the rightists brought about a new split in the trade union movement and the formation of two trade union centers.
p ICFTU agents were busy trying to get Nigerian trade unions to affiliate with the ICFTU. However, many union members were dubious about that organization.
p Preparations for the All-African Trade Union Conference in May continued. The preparatory committee included representatives of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Tunisia and Uganda. The ICFTU and the AFL-CIO were bent on thwarting the conference. Simultaneously with the above split in the Nigerian trade union movement in April 1960, pressure was applied to the trade unions of Morocco, Uganda and Tunisia, and a press campaign of slander was launched against the unions of Ghana and Guinea. Previously, the Americans had put high hopes on the trade union movement of Ghana, expecting to keep it among their supporters. Now, however, they came down on 417 the Ghanaian leaders. Articles appeared in the American labor press accusing the labor leaders of both Guinea and Ghana of interfering in the trade unions of other countries. [417•1 The purpose of all this was to defame the local labor leaders and prevent the African trade union conference from taking place. As a result of their combined efforts, the ICFTU and AFL-CIO succeeded in getting the conference put off for a year. In the meantime, they took advantage of the postponement to work on creating their own regional organization in Africa.
p An ICFTU African regional organization (AFRO) was created in November 1960 at a conference of ICFTU-affiliated African unions. It was a divisive move, since it was made just when the progressive labor organizations were preparing to hold the All-African Trade Union Conference. That conference opened in Casablanca in May 1961.
p The rightists now faced the problem of what attitude to take to it. The ICFTU and the Americans resorted to an old and tested tactic: they accepted an invitation to the conference, but while there, tried to frustrate its work. Stepping to the forestage again was Irving Brown; as head of a delegation of observers from the ICFTU, he launched into vigorous activity. What the Americans were after in particular was to make sure the African trade unions retained their affiliation with the ICFTU. But their plans failed. Most of the conference delegates insisted on breaking with the ICFTU and creating an All-African Federation of Trade Unions. Their position precarious, the Americans walked out of the meeting even before a vote was taken, and set about working for a new conference and the creation of a second African center.
p But the urge for unity in Africa was so strong that the Western leaders found it hard to use their old methods. Instead of taking the initiative towards creating a splitting organization, as they had done before, they had to work through African leaders who had not yet broken with the ICFTU.
p Soon after the close of the Casablanca conference, a meeting took place in Geneva of representatives of some African unions 418 who had come there for a session of the International Labor Organization. [418•1 The leaders of the General Union of Senegalese Workers were entrusted with the initiative of calling a conference. A sharp protest came from major African trade union centers, but the conference was nonetheless convened in Dakar in January 1962. Although the Dakar conference itself did not go as smoothly as its organizers would have liked and most of the delegates actively supported the idea of unity, the Americans and the ICFTU managed to achieve their goal: a second African trade union center, the African Trade Union Confederation, was established.
p The creation of this center increased the dissatisfaction of the African working people with the activities of the ICFTU. The ICFTU was even subjected to sharp criticism at a congress of its own regional organization (AFRO) in early 1964. And early next year, the executive council of the AFL-CIO had to admit the failure of the ICFTU’s activities in Africa as it called insistently for steps “to improve the effectiveness of African affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions". [418•2 The best evidence of the failure of the American labor leaders’ policy in Africa was the fact that a number of African countries embarked on a path of non-capitalist development despite the enormous efforts the Americans had expended to persuade them to follow the capitalist road and the example of the West.
p For a long time the international activities of American trade unions and their position on foreign policy issues were wholly determined by a small group of leaders headed by George Meany. This group had assumed the monopoly right to speak on behalf of the American workers in matters relating to important international problems. This was facilitated by the traditional indifference of the rank and file in such matters.
p True, in the early postwar years (especially between 1945 and 1949) there were more than just isolated cases of discontent among the rank and file and local organisations with the foreign policy line of the top trade union leadership. 419 Later on, however, the rightist leaders managed to suppress such criticism.
p The situation began to change by the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Among the causes that brought about the change were the shift in the balance of forces between the capitalist and socialist systems, the United States’ weakened positions in the capitalist world, and also difficulties in the country’s economy, finance and foreign trade balance.
p Of course, this was still a time when the expression of protest was hampered by the anti-communist hysteria and the persecution of progressive forces. Nonetheless, it was during this period that some functionaries began to break with Meany’s line. At the beginning of the cold war, nearly all the conservative leaders had supported his line, but now some began to change their position. As early as 1956, the Communist Party noted that several groups could be identified within the AFL-CIO leadership according to their attitude to foreign affairs issues. Meany’s group occupied an extreme rightist position and reflected the policies of big business. Reuther’s group was hostile to communism but recognized negotiations. The Potofsky-Gorman group took a “positive attitude to disarmament”, advocated “rejection of the policy of negotiation from positions of strength”, and voiced “opposition to colonialism". [419•1
p Of particular interest in this respect was Walter Reuther’s group, which had previously given its full support to the cold war course. In the mid-1950s it began to dissociate itself from Meany, mainly on foreign policy questions. Under the changed conditions, Reuther felt that a more flexible course was needed. His position was influenced, of course, by old differences that had existed between the CIO and AFL, as well as by his connection with European Social-Democrats and the fact that his views on a number of questions were close to theirs. For example, at congresses of the ICFTU he sided with representatives of European trade unions who were shocked by Meany’s blatantly imperialist position.
p No small role in altering Reuther’s views was played by 420 pressure from below. From 1953 on, his union passed resolutions at nearly every one of its conventions underscoring the necessity of negotiation, universal disarmament, an end to atomic tests, etc.
p By 1960 an impressive group of leaders opposed to the Meany group had taken shape. It included, among others, Walter Reuther, Victor Reuther, Emil Mazey, Frank Rosenblum and P. Gorman, and its criticism of Meany’s foreign policy course became increasingly sharp.
p As time went on the contradictions were further aggravated. Meany stuck to his primitive anti-Soviet tactics. Resolutions of the fourth convention of the AFL-CIO in 1961 approved, as before, a policy from position of strength. However, there were delegates at the convention who disagreed with this course; they insisted on negotiations, expressed apprehension with respect to the remilitarization of West Germany, and called for universal disarmament.
p The new approach to questions of war and peace came out more clearly at the fifth AFL-CIO convention in 1963. The AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department headed by Walter Reuther was very active at the convention. Most of the resolutions touching on problems of disarmament, the restructuring of the war industry for peaceful purposes and the Moscow agreement on a limited nuclear test ban were introduced by Walter Reuther.
p The US aggression in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic increased the opposition to Meany’s line. The Meany group continued to support the policies of the ruling circles. But while previously they had been able to create an atmosphere of war hysteria in the labor unions, a different situation took shape from the outset of open US interference in Vietnamese affairs. As the Communist Party magazine wrote, “public opinion in the United States is more suspicious of—and much of it, hostile to—the present Administration’s policy in Vietnam than such opinion has been on any occasion since 1945”. [420•1
p The changes in the sentiments of broad sections of the public were bound to influence the nation’s labor organizations as well. In these conditions, a considerable number of trade union 421 leaders came out openly against Meany’s line. The sentiment in favor of peace was felt clearly not only in the small independent unions but even in the big AFL-CIO unions. The executive committee of the United Auto Workers criticized President Johnson’s policy in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic, and urged that the parties concerned enter into peaceful negotiations through the UN. [421•1
p In May 1966, conventions of the United Auto Workers, the packinghouse workers’ union and the clothing workers’ union passed resolutions demanding an end to the aggression in Vietnam. Delegates at the UAW convention spoke of the need to reach mutual understanding with the socialist countries. The union’s leadership accused Meany and Lovestone of acting without taking the other members of the AFL-CIO executive council into account.
p Although these objections were not enough to alter the position of the AFL-CIO leadership on foreign policy issues they nonetheless testified to the existence of serious disagreements.
p However, the strongest rebuff to the rightist labor leaders came not from American progressive circles but from the progressive forces of the international labor movement.
p A fresh upsurge of the labor movement in the capitalist world began at the close of the 1950s. By that time, the prestige and influence of the international communist movement had risen sharply, and progressive trade unions had considerably strengthened their positions.
p While bourgeois sociologists were working hard in an effort to demonstrate that class boundaries in capitalist society were being erased, that the class struggle was dying out, and that the strike movement was withering away, the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries gave the lie to these assertions. The new upsurge of the labor movement man* ifested itself in the growth of the strike struggle. The number of workers involved in strikes’in the capitalist countries grew from 25 to 27 million in 1958 to 55 to 57 million in 1964. [421•2 Nor did the intensity of the strike struggle slacken in the following 422 two years. In the decisive battles fought during those years, new features of the labor movement became manifest. The economic situation at the time was favorable to capitalism, and because of this, labor’s actions were more offensive than defensive in character. The strike movement grew considerably in scope and in its social base, with more countries and new social strata becoming involved in it. Actively joining in the struggle were white-collar workers, engineers and technicians, and skilled and better-paid categories of workers who had long been passive.
p The nature of their demands also changed. The struggle frequendy took on a political coloration as workers demanded broader trade union rights, defended democracy, and came out against the arms race. Intensified oppression by the monopolies and the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution also gave rise to new demands, among which the demand for broader trade union rights at enterprises was pressed with particular persistence.
p The struggle of the working class in the late 1950s and early 1960s became more effective and demonstrated the working people’s growing desire for unity.
p The proletariat was becoming an increasingly influential social and political force on all continents. Its vanguard, the international communist movement, had grown considerably in size and strength. The ranks of labor organizations were reinforced by new detachments of workers in Asian, African and Latin American countries. Progressive labor organizations in the advanced capitalist countries also grew, and they were the main force in the struggle against the monopolies. Trade unions grew stronger in the socialist countries, too, where they expanded their functions considerably.
p All this was conducive to a change in the balance of forces in the international labor movement in favor of those who stood on class positions. The prestige of the World Federation of Trade Unions, which the American rightist labor bosses had tried so hard to destroy throughout the postwar period, had risen sharply. The WFTU celebrated its 20th anniversary in October 1965 with a membership that had grown from 67 million in 1945 to 137.9 million by that time. [422•1
423p The WFTU had done much toward establishing and developing bilateral ties with the trade unions of other associations. The US labor leaders and the leaders of the ICFTU failed in their attempts to ban contacts with the trade unions of the socialist countries. Bilateral ties created favorable conditions for the struggle for unity, and frustrated the plans of the splitters. By the beginning of the 1960s, not only the WFTU but also labor organizations unaffiliated with it were coming out in support of international unity.
The rightist American labor leaders tried to hamper the struggle of the international working class, to undermine its unity, and to create obstacles in the way of progressive labor organizations. But many of their plans failed. They were unable to stop the ever-growing activation of the international revolutionary movement.
Notes
[383•1] Quote from: Maxwell C. Raddock, Portrait of an American Labor Leader: William L. Hutcheson, New York, 1955, p. 319.
[384•1] Lewis L. Lorwin, The International Labor Movement. History, Policies, Outlook, New York, 1953, p. 264.
[384•2] Eric L. Wigham, Trade Unions. New York, Toronto, 1958, p. 223.
[384•3] Philip Taft, The A. F. of L. from the Death of Campers to the Merger, p. 387.
[385•1] Philip Taft, Op. cit, p. 386.
[385•2] Ibid., p. 388.
[385•3] Lewis L. Lorwin, Op. cit., p. 269; National Labor Movements in the Postwar World, ed. by E. M. Kassalow, Northwestern University Press, 1963, p. 40.
[385•4] John P. Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement 1940 to 1953, New York, 1954, p. 157.
[385•5] See ICFTU. Official Report of the Free World Labour Conference and the First Congress, London, 1949, p. 89.
[386•1] Free Labour World, April 1951, p. 5.
[386•2] See ICFTU. Report of the Second World Congress, Milan, 1951, pp. 410-11.
[386•3] George Morris, American Labor: Which Way?, New York, 1961, p. 96.
[386•4] AFL, Proceedings, 1951, p. 12.
[387•1] Ibid., 1954, p. 9.
[387•2] Ibid., 1955, p. 294.
[387•3] Irving Brown, “A. F. of L. Representative in Europe”. The American Federationist, September 1953, p. 32.
[387•4] AFL, Proceedings, 1954, p. 204.
[388•1] AFL, Proceedings, 1954, p. 8.
[388•2] Ibid., p. 459.
[388•3] See Political Affairs, January 1955, p. 14.
[389•1] International Free Trade Union News, June 1957, p. 5.
[389•2] Report of the Proceedings at the 93rd Annual Trades Union Congress, Portsmouth, 1961, p. 398.
[390•1] AFL-CIO News, May 12, 1962.
[391•1] Ibid., August 19, 1961.
[392•1] Political Affairs, February 1965, p. 26.
[393•1] AFL-CIO News, September 20, 1958.
[393•2] The American Federationial, February 1962, p. 3.
[393•3] Free Labour World, No. 85, July 1957, p. 1.
[394•1] See International Free Trade Union News, June 1957, p. 5.
[394•2] ICFTU. Report of the Sixth World Congress, Brussels, I960, p. 431.
[394•3] Ibid., p. 623.
[394•4] AFL-CIO News, July 2, 1960.
[395•1] Ibid., January 28, 1961.
[395•2] Information Bulletin, Nos. 13-14, July 1-15, 1960, p. 79.
[395•3] AFL-CIO News, January 28, 1961.
[396•1] ICFTU. Report of the Sixth World Congress, p. 308.
[396•2] Free Labour World, No. 107, May 1959, p. 208.
[396•3] AFL-CIO News, December 24, 1955.
[397•1] Ibid., February 18, 1956.
[397•2] World Trade Union Movement, No. 1, January 1965.
[398•1] See Labour Research, October 1965, p. 159.
[399•1] International Free Trade Union News, June 1957, p. 1.
[400•1] Free Labour World, No. 57, March 1955, p. 39.
[400•2] AFL-CIO News, January 28, 1956.
[400•3] Ibid., March 3, 1956.
[400•4] See The American Federationist, January 1957, p. 13.
[400•5] AFL-CIO News, December 15, J956.
[401•1] The American Federationist, April 1957, p. 21.
[401•2] Ibid., p. 20.
[401•3] Ibid., May 1958, p. 23.
[402•1] The American Federationist, May 1958, p. 25.
[402•2] AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, January I960, p. 6.
[402•3] AFL-CIO News, January 14, 1961.
[402•4] Ibid., March 4, 1961.
[403•1] Ibid.
[403•2] AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, January 1960, p. 1.
[403•3] ICFTU. Report of the Sixth World Congress, p. 315.
[404•1] The American Federationist, November 1959, p. 20.
[404•2] Ibid., p. 21.
[404•3] AFL-CIO Free Trade Unim News, June 1962, p. 7.
[404•4] Ibid.
[405•1] AFL-CIO News, May 20, 1961.
[405•2] Ibid., September 22, 1962.
[405•3] Ibid., January 26, 1963.
[405•4] Ibid.
[405•5] Ibid., March 17, 1962.
[406•1] AFL-CIO News, August 17, 1963.
[407•1] Link (Delhi), April 22, 1962.
[407•2] Ibid.
[407•3] Quote from: Forward (Colombo), May 4, 1962.
[407•4] Ibid.
[407•5] Ibid.
[408•1] Forward, May 4, 1962.
[408•2] The Indian Worker, June 11, 1962.
[408•3] The American Federationist, January 1959, p. 24.
[409•1] AFL-CIO News, December 20, 1958.
[409•2] Ibid.
[409•3] Ibid, February 18, 1956.
[410•1] AFL-CIO News, July 2, 1960.
[411•1] The Indian Worker, August 15, 1962.
[411•2] See SOHYO News. February 10, 1962.
[412•1] AFL-CIO News, June 9, 1962.
[413•1] Ibid., November 21, 1964.
[413•2] AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, August 1964, p. 8.
[413•3] AFL-CIO News, November 14, 1964.
[413•4] AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, January 1965, p. 4.
[414•1] AFL-CIO. Free Trade Union News, January 1965, pp. 4, 5.
[414•2] Ibid., April 1965, p. 4.
[415•1] AFL. Proceedings, 1955, p. 295.
[415•2] AFL-CIO News, August 17, 1957.
[415•3] Ibid., April 18, 1959.
[417•1] See AFL-CIO News, July 30, August 6, 1960.
[418•1] Afrique nouvelle, December 12, 1961.
[418•2] AFL-CIO News, March 6, 1965.
[419•1] Political Affairs, January 1956, pp. 15-16.
[420•1] Political Affairs, April 1965, p. 31.
[421•1] Ibid., October 1965, p. 37.
[421•2] World Marxist Review, No. 5, May 1969, p. 29.
[422•1] World Trade Union Movement, No. 6, 1965, p. 32.
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CHAPTER XIII
-- REACTIONARY ENCROACHMENTS
ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES |
CHAPTER XV -- THE VITAL ISSUES OF THE EARLY 1960s | >>> |