229

p The international situation after the victory over fascism, and the new correlation of forces in the world created favorable opportunities for the working class to achieve unity. Between 1944 and 1947, the bourgeoisie of France, Italy, Belgium and other countries in Europe was forced to share power with the Communist parties. Communists were included in the governments of twelve capitalist countries. They worked to democratize the political system and bring about radical social and economic reforms. In this they scored considerable successes, among them the adoption of a democratic constitution in Italy, the nationalization of certain industries in France, and the enactment of a number of laws in these countries in the interests of the working people. During this period, the working class made great strides toward unity.

p The bourgeoisie could not reconcile itself to the new developments in the international labor movement. From the outset it tried to take away from the working people the fruits of their victory over fascism, and assiduously prepared for a decisive battle to maintain its dominance. Weakened and discredited during the war, the European bourgeoisie counted heavily on the ruling circles of the USA to help it carry out its postwar plans. US support consiste’d not only of the presence of Anglo-American troops in Europe, but also of broad financial aid given to the governments of a number of countries. The imperialist circles of the United States did not conceal their aspirations to world dominance. The main thrust of this course was directed against the Soviet Union and the 230 international labor and Communist movement, whose enhanced influence and prestige were becoming more and more of an obstacle to the plans of the American imperialists. In the struggle against these forces, the imperialists found themselves some ready allies: the rightist labor leaders. It was with their help that the State Department sought to turn US labor unions “into servile instruments of Government war policies".  [230•1 

p The American labor leaders willingly cooperated with the ruling circles. Lenin in his time stressed that “the idea of class collaboration is opportunism’s main feature. The war [World War I—Ed.] has brought this idea to its logical conclusion, and has augmented its usual factors and stimuli with a number of extraordinary ones; through the operation of special threats and coercion it has compelled the philistine and disunited masses to collaborate with the bourgeoisie."  [230•2 

p In the conditions of the cold war, the opportunist theory and practice of class collaboration logically put the American trade union leaders into the same camp with the most aggressive representatives of monopoly capital. Their common ideology and objectives in the struggle against the left forces in the labor movement formed the basis on which they combined their efforts.

p The American rightist labor leaders sought to exploit the prejudices against the Soviet Union and communism which they themselves had been implanting in the working class for many decades. In their pro-imperialist propaganda they spread fabrications that the Soviet Union had aggressive intentions and aspired to world dominance. Characterizing the policies of the American labor leaders, Foster wrote: “These labor imperialists are now busily peddling to the workers the monstrous falsehood that the United States is being attacked by an aggressive Soviet Union; they are ardent champions, too, of the criminal absurdity that the monopoly-dominated Truman government with its fascist allies is fighting everywhere to defend world democracy."  [230•3 

p The impact of war propaganda on the more backward 231 sections of the working class was increased also by the passiveness of the American working class in questions of foreign policy. This passiveness had been cultivated by the reactionary labor bureaucrats from the AFL over many decades. At the same time, however, they themselves were very active in the international arena.

p Representatives of business and political circles noted with satisfaction the wide possibilities that the use of trade union leaders in the diplomatic field afforded them. Eric Johnston, a big industrialist and formerly president of the US Chamber of Commerce, wrote that “American labor leaders should be US ambassadors because when they talk about our democracy to folks abroad, they are likely to be believed".  [231•1  At the 10th convention of the CIO, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas spoke with alarm about the fact that many in Europe were distrustful of American policies and were afraid that their countries would become dependent upon the United States. But American labor, he said, carried good credentials to Western Europe. In this connection, he expressed the hope that “door tightly closed to all others may open at its knock".  [231•2 

p With the proclamation of the Marshall Plan, the labor leaders offered their services to the American government. The President included them in committees set up to work out and implement the plan. James Carey, for example, was very active on William Averell Harriman’s committee, which was engaged in drafting the law that would put the Marshall Plan into effect.

p The anti-Communist orientation of the Marshall Plan suited the conservative US labor leaders. They deluded themselves and the workers with the hope that this program would help overcome the internal difficulties of American capitalism. They also considered it their job to promote the plan abroad and to convince the workers of Europe and the whole world that the United States was offering disinterested aid. Said Carey: “Because of their closeness to the people, American labor leaders have been more helpful in getting popular support for the Marshall Plan than all the crumpet eating, 232 tea-drinking diplomats."  [232•1  Green seconded this statement when he assured the government that “the American Federation of Labor has an indispensable service to perform. The wage-earners of this country can convince the wage-earners of Europe that our government does not seek power over their lives or want to possess their lands."  [232•2  As they went about the business of trying to convince European workers that the United States was offering disinterested aid, the rightist labor leaders themselves regarded this aid above all as a means of fighting communism.

p To facilitate the propaganda work of the union leaders, special posts for “labor representatives" were established in the machinery set up to administer the Marshall Plan. On April 3, 1948, a twelve-member Public Advisory Board was created within the Marshall Plan administration.  [232•3  Sitting on this board side by side with representatives of capital were George Meany from the AFL, James Carey from the CIO, and A. E. Lyon from the Railroad Brotherhoods. Bert M.Jewell, formerly head of the Railway Employees Department of the AFL, and Clinton S. Golden from the CIO were labor advisors in the Washington-based US Economic Cooperation Administration (EGA), headed by Paul Gray Hoffman, a big industrialist.

p Union officers were also appointed to serve as labor advisers in the European coordinating body, headed by Harriman, with headquarters in Paris. At first, the ruling circles preferred to use people from the AFL in the various committees established to carry out the Marshall Plan. But they could not completely ignore the CIO, and consequently CIO representatives were included in the EGA Advisory Board. However, in selecting people for the job of promoting the American “economic assistance" plan among European workers, preference was most often given to people from the AFL, since the leaders of the Federation had long had closer ties with the government apparatus than did the CIO leadership. The reason was that for a whole decade CIO policy had been largely determined by 233 progressive elements. This made the ruling circles distrustful of the CIO, particularly since it was still a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the latter had condemned the Marshall Plan as a scheme for the economic enslavement of Europe. Conferring with the AFL executive council in June 1948, Paul Gray Hoffman, head of the ECA, was told that “no posts in ECA should be allotted to the CIO so long as the latter group remained a part of the anti-Marshall Plan, Communistcontrolled World Federation of Trade Unions".  [233•1 

p With the aim of organizing publicity for the Marshall Plan among European workers, Murray and Carey sent Harry Martin, president of the American Newspaper Guild, to Europe in June 1948. In August, Martin was appointed director of the Office of Public European Information, European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), in Paris. His men travelled to the big European countries, where they created a network of information agencies. A great deal of work was also done by missions sent to various countries. In February 1949, it was decided to send three representatives of the labor press on such a trip. Their tasks included holding talks with trade union officials and publishers of labor newspapers with the aim of improving publicity for the Marshall Plan.

p The zeal of the top labor leaders received plaudits from government officials and representatives of American monopoly capital. Hoffman declared at one point that “since the beginning of the European Recovery Program no group in the United States has given it more wholehearted support, has worked harder for it, or understood it better than the labor organizations of America".  [233•2  On the other hand, Averell Harriman described trade unionists in Europe as men “who have come forward not only to support, but also to further actively the Marshall Plan".  [233•3 

p However, the ruling circles could not achieve their ultimate objectives by propaganda alone. The bourgeoisie’s arsenal also included such tested weapons as bribery and divisive tactics. 234 Congress and the administration did not stint when it came to fighting progressive forces in other countries. The Marshall Plan administration had sufficient funds and plenty of opportunities for using them against opposition. The conservative labor leaders of the USA who had harnessed themselves to the foreign policy wagon of American imperialism could not now stop half-way; they not only continued their propaganda work, but also embarked on subversive activity in the labor movements of other countries.

p The AFL leaders began to pay close attention to France in the very first postwar years. At the AFL convention in 1946, Irving Brown said: “I think that France is the most important problem that the American government faces, and that the American labor movement faces.... I say the Communist danger in France is not over.”   [234•1  The turn toward cold war against the countries of socialism had already begun, and Brown felt that under these circumstances France was the key to Europe. The labor movement in France was on the upswing: the political activity of the working class had grown sharply, jeopardizing the plans of the American imperialists. Under the cover of pronouncements about saving France from communism, the AFL trade union leaders began their subversive work in the French labor movement.

p They found willing accomplices in France, namely, the leaders of the Socialist Party of France (Section Francaise de l’Internationale Ouvrière) and trade union figures grouped around the weekly Force ouvriere. The Force Ouvriere group, which maintained close ties with SFIO, belonged to the General Confederation of Labor (Confederation Generate du Travail) of France, which had been revived during the war, and the group’s leader, Leon Jouhaux, was CGT secretary. At the AFL convention in 1946, Irving Brown called him “a free trade unionist and old friend of ours".  [234•2 

p During the war, labor figures of this type had cooperated with the Communists, but their views on fundamental questions of class struggle did not change. With the end of the 235 struggle against fascism they reverted to a policy hostile to the Communists.

p Irving Brown showed up in France again in early 1947. By that time the Socialist Party had set up a special Trade Union Bureau, which, with the help of Brown and the leaders of Force Ouvriere, was now promoting the creation of so-called autonomous trade unions outside the CGT and opposition groups within the CGT unions.

p But these plans did not work out. The workers met the idea of such organizations with suspicion. The enemies of unity decided to change their tactics, especially now that the Marshall Plan had appeared and reaction had gone over to the offensive. In May 1947, the reactionaries succeeded in ousting the Communists from the French government. In an effort to isolate the Communists from the working class, the right-wing Socialists and reformist trade union leaders now actually steered a course toward splitting it.

p In October 1947, at the initiative of Secretary of State Marshall, a meeting of AFL leaders and representatives of reformist groups in Europe was held. The French were represented by Jouhaux. The participants sought ways and means of overcoming opposition to the Marshall Plan on the part of the working people of Europe. Attention was still focussed primarily on France. As reported in the press, Brown’s project of setting up autonomous unions was criticized. It had cost too much and produced no tangible results.  [235•1  It was decided to begin “combatting communism" within the CGT itself.

p The splitters decided to use the Marshall Plan to achieve their purpose. If they could get the CGT to approve the plan this would make it possible to change the policy of the organization and to isolate the Communists in it. After his return from the USA, Jouhaux voiced his approval of the American “aid” plan. On November 12, 1947, at a meeting of the Comite Confederal National of the CGT, Jouhaux’s group tried to push through a resolution approving the Marshall Plan.

p The National Committee of the CGT, however, was not 236 taken in by Jouhaux’s talk about the USA’s “disinterestedness”. It rejected his resolution by a vote of 857 to 127, and denounced the aims pursued by the American imperialists.  [236•1  But the reformist leaders did not give up; they merely changed their tactics. Playing up the slogan of “trade union independence of political parties" they now declared that the trade unions should not engage in politics.

p At the same meeting, Jouhaux demanded the return of the trade unions to “pure syndicalism”. Who was directing and financing Jouhaux and his group was clear to everyone present. Committee members cited many facts pointing to the connections the splitters had not only with the right-wing Socialists and the government, but also with AFL agents operating in Europe and trying to bribe trade union functionaries.  [236•2  By that time Jouhaux’s group had already received $5,000 from the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and $25,000 from the AFL.  [236•3 

p In November 1947, a general strike in France demonstrated the strength of the working class and its high level of political awareness. During the struggle it became even clearer that the hopes of the reformists to isolate the Communists and undermine the influence of the CGT in the working class were futile. But the reformist labor leaders stopped at nothing in their efforts to split the CGT and bring about the formation of a new organization.

p At the height of the strike struggle, John Foster Dulles came to Paris from London. On the eve of his arrival there he had spoken of the necessity of “eliminating the Communists from the political life of France”, which was a direct call to intensify the anti-Communist hysteria. In Paris, Dulles met with de Gaulle, Schuman, Blum and, finally, with Jouhaux. Assessing the results of the talks, the progressive press reported: “Soon after Dulles left for London, where he helped bury the principle of reparations from Germany, Jouhaux launched the secessionist movement which today threatens to 237 split the French labor unions.”  [237•1  And Dulles himself, upon returning to the US, said: “Everything that is happening in France is incomparably more important than what is happening in London"  [237•2  (where a conference of foreign ministers was taking place at the time). Soon Carey, too, hastened to Paris to the aid of the splitters. Following all these voyages, Jouhaux’s group set about openly to split the Confederation.

p On December 19, 1947, the Force Ouvriere group held a conference. On the same day, the leaders of this group, Leon Jouhaux, Robert Bothereau, Georges Delamarre and Pierre Neumeyer, who were all secretaries of the CGT, resigned from the CGT executive board.  [237•3  The Force Ouvriere group quit the CGT. Conservative leaders in the USA welcomed the news of the split. Brown was soon to write: “The great positive achievement on the democratic side was that on December 19 the de facto split in the CGT became a de jure reality."   [237•4  In the same article he outlined a program of aid to the splitters. It envisaged, in the first place, recognition of their group as a legal trade union organization and, in the second place, the rendering of financial and moral support to it.

p Most of the CGT unions did not follow this group, so that its existence largely depended on material assistance from the government, the right-wing Socialists and the AFL. In return, the group was supposed to promote the Marshall Plan, and as early as January 17, 1948, the Force Ouvriere group published a “manifest on the Marshall Plan”. On the next day, the newspaper L’Humanite asked: “Is not approval of the Marshall Plan the condition on which Irving Brown is donating $1,000,000?"  [237•5 

p At a Force Ouvriere convention in Paris in April 1948, the splitters decided to form their own organization. But the organizations that went along with them and sent representatives to the convention were concerned about the sources of the Force Ouvriere’s financial backing. The convention’s 238 organizers had to make an accounting. In a report on the tasks of the Force Ouvriere, Bothereau admitted that 40 million francs had come from the government. Somewhat later, at a meeting of the AFL executive council in August 1948, Green announced that the council had authorized a loan to the Force Ouvriere and that the sum would probably be $20,000 or $25,000.  [238•1 

p The creation of the splitting organization was greeted not only by the AFL leadership but by the rightist leaders of the CIO as well. On April 12, 1948, the CIO executive board sent a cable to Jouhaux expressing confidence that he, Jouhaux, was “continuing to strive for the traditional goals of good and free trade unionism".  [238•2  In December 1948, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Force Ouvriere’s withdrawal from the CGT, Murray wrote: “We offer you the gratitude of the free American labor movement for your struggle and your success in preserving a free labor movement in France.... We look forward to an ever closer and ever more fruitful collaboration of our unions and yours in the great recovery effort of the Marshal] Plan."  [238•3 

p The split dealt a heavy blow to the labor movement of France, but those who engineered the intrigues found that it was fruitless to try to isolate the Communists and set the workers against them. The Communists continued to enjoy the working people’s confidence. The reactionaries’ hopes of destroying the CGT also collapsed. It was weakened by the split, but it did not cease its struggle against reaction.

p In 1944, in the Italian trade union movement, the Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats achieved unity. This immediately put American trade union figures on guard. The AFL leaders regarded unity with the Communists, wherever it might occur, as a blow aimed personally at them. Of course, the Italian bourgeoisie took an even more negative view of such unity; however, in the first postwar years, the balance of forces in the country was not favorable to the reactionaries, and they had to put up with the existence of a united trade union 239 movement. The situation changed in 1947. The ruling circles of Italy openly approved a course toward cold war, while reactionaries inside and outside the country united in a common effort to regain lost positions, take away the fruits of victory from the people, and isolate the Communist Party.

p As early as in 1944, an AFL envoy, Luigi Antonini, secretary of Local 89 of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, was sent to Italy. He took $250,000 with him. The purpose of his trip, as the American Communists pointed out, was “(1) to break up the unity of the trade union movement which is made up of Socialists, Communists and Catholic workers; and (2) to destroy the united front of the Communists and Socialists”.  [239•1  The money was meant for those Italian trade union leaders who were ready to help Antonini impair the unity of the Italian working class.

p The American labor leaders pinned great hopes on alliance with right-wing elements of the Italian Socialist Party (ISP). Although, on the whole, the ISP collaborated with, the Communist Party during and after the war, the right-wing Socialists were even then against unity. It was with them that Antonini established contact in 1946. Shortly thereafter, in December 1946, the new US Ambassador to Italy, James Dunn, announced that his country was prepared to support those in the ISP and the unions who opposed communism.

p The ISP held its 25th convention in January 1947. Among those present was one Angelica Balabanoff, who came as a representative of American trade unions. In addressing the convention, she read a letter that abounded in attacks against unity of actions of Socialists and Communists. It was this kind of support that encouraged the right-wing Socialists to split away and found a new party, the Italian Socialist Workers’ Party.

p It was no secret that the AFL leaders were involved in these developments. British Labour Party leader Harold Laski, for one, acknowledged in an article that the Americans had played a big role in the split of the Italian Socialist Party. The Americans never denied this fact. Speaking before members of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union in the 240 United States, Antonini bluntly declared that the success so far achieved called for additional sums of money for further work in Italy.

p Agreeing with Antonini’s argument, the union leadership allocated $150,000 for the purpose of “saving Italy”. Dubinsky himself sent one of the leaders of the new party a letter explaining his union’s position with respect to the new Socialist Party. Through a blunder committed by the addressee the contents of the letter became widely known.

p Meanwhile, an offensive was launched against the unity of the trade union movement and against the Italian General Confederation of Labor where Communists, Catholics and Socialists collaborated. Both the Italian reactionaries and the US labor leaders were counting on support from the Catholic faction of the IGCL, but they were unable to get it at first because it was headed by advocates of unity, whose leader was Achille Grandi. But in early 1947, Giulio Pastore, a right-wing labor leader and rabid foe of unity with the Communists, became the Catholic leader in the IGCL. On the eve of the IGCL convention in June of that year in Florence, Pastore and his group launched an open struggle against the trade union policy of acting jointly with political parties, above all with the Communists.

p In November 1947, Irving Brown listed the Pastore faction among the groups in the Italian labor movement which the AFL could count on to take part in the struggle against the Communists.  [240•1  Dubinsky, too, spoke of the need to support it when, at the 66th convention of the AFL, he urged that active use be made of the Italian-American Labor Council that had been created in the United States in 1941. The support that the splitters of the Italian trade union movement received from their government and from Americans inspired them to more vigorous action. As was the case in France, it was the question of the Marshall Plan that served as the basis for their next move.

p In March 1948, a conference of trade unions from the European countries that had accepted the Marshall Plan was held in London, sponsored and financed by the AFL. The 241 leaders of the IGCL declared that they were not against aid per se, but condemned the conditions on which it was offered.

p Pastore, however, accepted the invitation to the London conference, saying before he left that he would seek an IGCL split if the majority did not change its attitude to the Marshall Plan. The AFL leadership urged other organizations and groups in Italy to take the same stance. So did the right-wing leaders of the CIO. When he was in Italy in 1948, Carey tried to dictate his conditions to the leadership of the IGCL. At one news conference he said that Communist leaders of the IGCL would have to support US policy or be removed from office. He said bluntly that the CIO was in the WFTU to combat Communism in the European labor movement.  [241•1 

p From July 1948, a Marshall Plan administration mission operated in Italy. The labor adviser in it—an AFL representative—entered into close contact with the leaders of the SocialDemocratic Party and the Catholic trade unions. The combined support of the Christian Democratic government and the Americans, their advice and financial aid, made it possible for the splitters to work against the unity of the Italian working people. Events unfolded rapidly. On July 14, 1948, the reactionaries organized an assassination attempt on the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti. The working people responded with a general strike embracing the entire country. The Pastore group felt that the moment was appropriate, and on July 15 demanded a halt to the strike on the ground that it was political in character. Just a few days after these events, Dubinsky went to Italy and held a series of talks with reformist labor leaders there.

p On July 22, eleven Christian Democrats in the leadership of the IGCL opted for direct alliance with Catholic labor organizations outside the confederation. The split was now a fact. But the goal was not fully achieved because most of the Catholic unionists stayed in the IGCL at that time. This forced the splitters to delay the formation of a new organization for a while, and it was only in late 1948 that they finally founded it under the name of the Free General Confederation of Italian Workers.

242

p The events in France and Italy in the first postwar years were part of the general offensive against the democratic forces that the reactionaries had launched in 1947. The circumstances surrounding the split of the labor movements in the two European countries proved that there was a reactionary conspiracy against the unity of the international working class, and that not the least part in it was played by the right-wing labor leaders of the United States. The latter operated in other countries besides France and Italy, but the struggle against the CGT of France and IGCL in Italy was of special importance to them because these two organizations belonged to the WFTU and played an active role in it.

p The leaders of the AFL and CIO began their maneuvers against the WFTU, which united about 70,000,000 workers, from its very inception. Both groups of leaders were frightened by the growth of the progressive forces in the international labor movement and were in no way pleased with the WFTU policies. The AFL leaders pursued a hostile line with respect to the WFTU and sought the creation of a new international organization. The rightist leaders of the CIO felt the same animosity to the WFTU, but at the same time they were afraid that the AFL would slam the door on them in any new organization. Therefore they tried to gain a dominant position within the WFTU with the idea of gradually changing its policies. However, they ran into serious difficulties both within the CIO itself, where the influence of the left forces was strong, and in the WFTU. For two years after the war, therefore, the CIO still cooperated with the WFTU on a number of issues. During that time the significance and contributions of the WFTU received praise in CIO executive board and convention documents. A resolution of the 9th convention of the CIO in October 1947, for example, said that “the WFTU has firmly established its position as the authoritative spokesman for the working people of the world. It has steadfastly defended the trade union rights and liberties of the workers.”  [242•1 

p But this was perhaps the last document in which the CIO 243 leaders noted the positive role of the WFTU. Serious changes were taking place at that time within the CIO itself as the right-wing elements stepped up their activities. Less than a month after the convention, the rightist leaders of the CIO set about carrying out the plan they had hatched long ago—to gain a dominant position in the WFTU and alter its policies.

p On November 12, 1947, before his departure for a session of the executive bureau of the WFTU, Carey said at a press conference that, on behalf of the CIO, he would put the question of the Marshall Plan before the WFTU. At the same time it was rumored that if the executive bureau did not make a positive decision, the CIO would withdraw from the WFTU. Publicly, however, the CIO executive board, and James Carey in particular, refrained from saying anything about the conditions for the approval of the Marshall Plan.

p The meeting of the executive bureau opened on November 18, in Paris. From the outset, the CIO delegation proposed to include on the agenda an additional point on the American “aid” plan. The majority on the executive bureau rejected the proposal. Even the British delegates were indecisive, although they, Jouhaux and other reformist leaders insisted that the bureau should simply hear the report on the CIO’s position without debating the issue. Carey, however, disregarded this condition and tried not only to express the CIO’s point of view but to impose it upon the bureau. But he failed. Even the leaders of the British TUC did not support him. Nevertheless, immediately after the executive bureau meeting, the Americans began to apply pressure on the British representatives with the aim of compelling the TUC to accept the American European economic recovery plan.

p The AFL leaders were particularly active at that time as they conducted their subversive work in the European labor centers, seeking to bring them over to their side. In November, AFL representatives Irving Brown and Henry Rutz went to Europe.

p Brown sought to convince Meany of the need to call a trade union conference of the sixteen Marshall Plan countries. He felt that cooperation with the TUC was indispensable if such a conference was to succeed.  [243•1  Negotiations with the TUC 244 leadership began on November 20. The AFL representatives urged the British leaders to take the initiative in calling a conference of European trade unions. The conservative British press whipped up rumors that the trade unions of the Western countries were all primed to withdraw from the WFTU, but would not do so until the TUC set the example.  [244•1 

p On December. 17, 1947, the TUC general council approved the Marshall Plan. Two days later, Brown arrived in Britain again and began talks with the TUC leaders, as a result of which emerged their ultimatum to the WFTU.

p In November, the executive bureau decided to debate the Marshall Plan question, but the date for the next session was not set. On January 28, 1948, the TUC general council presented the WFTU with an ultimatum demanding that the executive bureau meet in mid-February. Otherwise, the document said, the general council would consider itself free to participate in, or take the initiative in organizing, whatever meetings may be necessary for the purpose of discussing with other national centers the question of US aid to Europe.

p The Americans and British had been making preparations for a conference even before the ultimatum was issued. On January 3,1948, Irving Brown urged all the anti-Communist trade unions and Socialist parties of the sixteen Marshall Plan countries to pool their forces in Europe. He gave assurances that within two months such trade unions would convene a congress in Brussels and create a new international organization. Brown’s statement threw light on the true aims of the AFL leaders. From the very beginning they had sought the creation of an international organization to counterbalance the WFTU, and now the conference of trade unions from the Marshall Plan countries was designed to set the stage for the formation of such an organization. In these circumstances, the purpose of the ultimatum was to place the responsibility for the divisive act of calling a conference onto the WFTU, alleging that it forced the American and British labor leaders into making this move by its refusal to discuss the Marshall Plan question.

p Formally, it was British, Belgian and Dutch trade union 245 figures who took the initiative in convening the conference, but behind them stood the AFL leadership and AFL financing. Green admitted this on February 19, 1948 in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he said that delegates from the trade unions of non-communist countries that had accepted the Marshall Plan would gather in Brussels at the end of the next month, and the AFL would foot all the bills.

p The British handled the preparations for the conference, but they kept in close contact with the leaders of the AFL, consulting with them on virtually every step. The British themselves did not conceal this fact.  [245•1  In the meantime, the CIO was still hoping to win WFTU approval of the American plan or to cause various trade union centers to clash with each other, thereby clearing the way to CIO control of the WFTU. On February 4, 1948, James Carey and Michael Ross, head of the CIO’s international department, went to Europe. In talks with the TUC general council and Force Ouvriere, they proposed a plan of action against the WFTU. It envisaged changing the character of the Federation’s entire activity and a total reshuffle of its leading personnel. Their plan would affect the basic framework and constitution of the WFTU and would hamstring the democratic methods adopted at the inaugural congress.  [245•2 

p As it continued its trip through Europe, the CIO delegation hoped to incline European workers toward approving American “aid”, and feel out the attitude to it in the main trade union centers of the WFTU. From Paris, Carey and Ross went to Moscow. The Ail-Union Central Council of Trade Unions examined the Marshall Plan question and handed Carey and Ross a declaration saying that this plan was a direct threat to the sovereignty and independence of European countries. It also noted that the Marshall Plan embraced the field of state, political relations between the USA and European countries and that in deciding such questions each state and each trade union center had the sovereign right to determine its own position. Further, it stressed that trade unions, which are not 246 political organizations, must not be turned into an arena for political gamble and machinations.

p After this rebuke, the CIO leaders felt that they would be unable to use the Marshall Plan question for the purpose of altering WFTU policy, and hence actively joined in the preparations for the conference of trade unions from the Marshall Plan countries. And when on March 9, 1948 this conference began its work in London, sitting next to the AFL delegates were CIO representatives James Carey, Michael Ross and Elmer Cope.  [246•1  The conference declared its support of the Marshall Plan and adopted a resolution to create a Union Consultative Committee on the Marshall Plan. The leaders of the AFL were counting on using this committee as an instrument for forming a new international trade union organization.

p The London conference was part of the drive against the unity of the international labor movement. Although its organizers failed to draw other large trade union centers to their side and get their support for the Marshall Plan, nonetheless the conference led to serious consequences. It was the first open action to mobilize trade union centers in the Western countries in opposition to the WFTU.

p After the London conference, the British and Americans continued their activities against the WFTU. This time they took advantage of a session of the executive bureau and executive committee of the WFTU in Rome, in April-May 1948. The CIO delegates did not conceal their antagonism to the WFTU and its leadership. Throwing the blame for the situation in the WFTU on its leadership, James Carey and his British partners did everything to impede the normal activity of the WFTU, and demanded a change in its policies. This is exactly what Carey’s statement at a meeting of the executive bureau looked like. The Americans and British continued the same line at the meeting of the executive committee. On May 5, 1948, they tried to denigrate the leading WFTU figures. In addition, they tried to divert the executive committee from urgent questions of the WFTU’s activity, again using for this purpose the allegation that the Soviet trade unions dominated the WFTU. The CIO and the TUC demanded a reshuffle in 247 the leading personnel of the Federation and a change in its policies.

p But the splitters did not achieve their goal. The progressive trade union centers of the USSR, France, Italy and Latin American countries seeking to preserve the unity of the Federation submitted a resolution to the executive committee outlining measures to straighten out the situation in the WFTU. Its seven points provided a good basis for agreement. The resolution formulated the attitude of the WFTU to the Marshall Plan, and stressed the right of each trade union center to determine its own position on the question.

p In the meantime, the AFL leaders were busy trying to found a new international organization. As mentioned earlier, they had created a European center for such an organization in early 1948—the Union Consultative Committee on the Marshall Plan. Almost simultaneously, they formed another regional association, which they also hoped to use for the purpose of creating a splitting organization. This center was set up in Latin America. To carry out subversive work in the labor movement in Latin America, the AFL sent to Mexico “Brown No. 2"—Serafino Romualdi. He was a skilled secret service man who had worked for a number of years in the Office of Strategic Services.  [247•1 

p The AFL leaders were out to create a new Latin American trade union organization to counterbalance the progressive Latin American Federation of Labor (CTAL). Romualdi, acting in cooperation with American intelligence, rallied around himself enemies of the CTAL. Back in December 1946, at a session of the WFTU executive committee, the leader of the CTAL, Lombardo Toledano, had exposed the subversive activities of the American trade union leaders in the Latin American union movement. At that time he read for the record a letter, dated June 27, sent by Matthew Woll to an AFL agent in the Cuban trade union movement. Woll wrote: “I was ’delighted to receive your letter and report of your meeting Romualdi and of developments having taken place in Haiti. I will be pleased to hear from you later regarding interview with the captain of the Military Intelligence Service and likewise of 248 your visit to Port au Prince and to British Jamaica.... I will also await further word from you regarding the Dominican Republic."  [248•1 

p In January 1948, through efforts of the leaders of the AFL a conference of representatives of various groups opposing the CTAL was convened in Lima, Peru. The result was the creation of an organization called the Inter-American Labor Confederation (CIAT). It represented only a small part of the organized workers of Latin America. For example, the Chilean unions participating in the conference had a total membership of only 20,000 workers, compared with the 230,000 in the Chilean Federation of Labor.  [248•2  Heated arguments broke out at the conference when Mexican delegate Luis Morones accused the AFL of financing the conference and subsidizing the delegations of Latin American countries.  [248•3 

p The leaders of the AFL reckoned that the new organization, together with the European committee, could become the nucleus of the international association they were planning. A statement made by Green a few days after the conference made this explicit. They hoped that the question of creating such an organization would be settled at the second conference of the unions of the Marshall Plan countries, scheduled for July 1948. Even before then, however, the AFL leadership made an attempt to talk the CIO into withdrawing from the WFTU. In June 1948, Woll wrote to Murray that the CIO should “prove its respectability by withdrawing from the World Federation of Trade Unions—after which the AFL might be glad to get together with the CIO".  [248•4 

p The CIO leaders, who a month earlier had signed the resolution of the Rome session of the WFTU executive committee, now showed, by their refusal to give rebuff to such demands, their unwillingness to work toward better cooperation with the other trade union centers in the WFTU. From Murray’s reply it became even more apparent how few differences, actually, only tactical ones, remained 249 between the leaders of the AFL and the CIO at that time.

p The second conference of the unions of Marshall Plan countries opened in London on July 30, 1948. It was attended by 45 delegates, including 15 representing the AFL and CIO.  [249•1  The conference considered the prospects of the activity of the above-mentioned Union Consultative Committee. The AFL delegates sought to turn the committee into a permanent body of the future international organization. The majority, however, felt this proposal to be premature. It was decided to form a permanent secretariat of the conference. The TUC leaders, meanwhile, assailed the WFTU, alleging that it was dominated by the Soviet trade unions and had become an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

p At the session of the executive bureau in September 1948, the leaders of the TUC and CIO refused to abide by the WFTU resolution, and in October the general council of the TUC issued an ultimatum demanding that either the Federation suspend its activity for one year, or else the TUC would withdraw. The CIO leaders took part in preparing the ultimatum. Not accidentally, they made statements at that time about their intention to submit a resolution at the next CIO convention, proposing CIO withdrawal from the WFTU and the creation of a new international organization.

p Indeed, at the 10th convention of the CIO in Portland shortly thereafter, the CIO leaders won freedom of action with respect to the WFTU. A convention resolution authorized them to act without restrictions. The resolution said that “the CIO officers and Executive Board are authorized, in consultation with the British TUC and other free trade union centers, to take whatever action in relation to the WFTU and the international labor movement as will best accomplish CIO policies and objectives".  [249•2 

p The British ultimatum was greeted with even greater enthusiasm by the AFL leaders, who saw in it hope for the withdrawal of the TUC and CIO from the WFTU and the subsequent creation by the three organizations of a new international trade union center.

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p The progressive forces in the WFTU made a decisive stand against the attempt of the British and American union leaders to dictate their conditions to the Federation. Many national centers in the WFTU issued protests and condemned the attempts to destroy the WFTU. After discussing the British ultimatum, the administrative commission and secretariat of the CGT of France stated that they felt “that there is no valid reason to put the WFTU to sleep.... That if difficulties actually exist it is perfectly possible to iron them out in an atmosphere of good will and through the development of friendly relations among the various affiliated trade union centers.”  [250•1 

p The CIO leadership met with resistance also from its own membership. The resolution of the 10th CIO convention quoted above drew organized opposition from the delegates of progressive unions, who introduced their own resolution, which said: “Despite the fact that differences exist today between governments of various nations, it is possible for working people, through their unions, to find grounds for common action and mutual cooperation."  [250•2  In line with this, the resolution proposed that the convention reaffirm its support of the WFTU.

p The WFTU enjoyed prestige among the working people. It was not surprising, therefore, that, in preparing their blow against the WFTU, those who were organizing its split set themselves the task of suppressing any internal resistance. The general council of the TUG, for instance, mobilized a huge mass of its supporters to combat the Communists and other progressive elements in the labor movement of Great Britain. The CIO leaders, having already begun harassment of progressive unions, did not lag behind their British colleagues.

p In January 1949, a CIO delegation came to London to discuss a plan for joint action with the leaders of the TUC. In an interview with the newspaper Le Fig<iro, Brown declared that the WFTU was “dead”, adding: “It is necessary to bury it completely by laying the foundations of a new international organization of free trade unions."  [250•3  This was the main topic of 251 discussion between the CIO delegation and the TUC. During the talks they worked out the common line to follow at the meeting of the WFTU executive bureau scheduled for January 1949, in Paris.

p The first question to arise at that meeting was that of the TUC ultimatum of October 27, 1948, on the temporary suspension of the WFTU’s activities. On the eve of the session, the general council of the TUC stated that if the executive bureau rejected the ultimatum, the British trade unions would withdraw from the WFTU.

p The progressive forces did everything they could to prevent the split of the WFTU. A resolution proposed by WFTU General Secretary Louis Saillant could have become the basis for settling disputes and the subsequent democratic solution of all issues. But this was just what the British and American union leaders did not want. Arthur Deakin, then President of the WFTU and chairman of that meeting of the executive bureau, refused to put Saillant’s resolution to a vote. Instead, he declared the meeting closed and walked out, accompanied by his colleague Vincent Tewson, CIO representative Carey and Dutch representative Evert Kupers.

p This walkout was the final move in a long series of stubborn attempts by the Americans to turn the WFTU into a vehicle for implementing US expansionist foreign policy plans Failing in this, they opted for an open split of the international labor movement.

p The anti-Communist campaign and subversive actions of the American union leaders in the international labor movement caused little protest in the ranks of the American working class. The overwhelming mass of American unionists, who in those years showed sound organization, high activity and persistence in the economic struggle, were passive with respect to policy questions connected with the international labor movement. In its mass, the American working class was unconcerned about the fate of the World Federation of Trade Unions, letting its union leaders enjoy a monopoly in this field. Only individual progressive CIO unions and local AFL organizations were able to make a correct assessment of the top leaders’ conduct and realized the whole negative significance of the split in the WFTU.

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On the other hand, the splitters met with serious rebuff within the WFTU itself and its major national centers. The British and Americans expected most of the European organizations to follow them in the split, and hoped that the international labor movement would thereby be weakened and the WFTU destroyed. But they miscalculated. The European working class had learned through the hard experience of the war all the consequences of division and the vital importance of the struggle for unity. This was the main reason why the major union centers of Europe remained in the ranks of the WFTU. The withdrawal of the British and Americans did not kill the WFTU, although, naturally, it did weaken working-class resistance to imperialism considerably. This was one of the heavy consequences of the divisive actions of the American trade union leaders.