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p At the beginning of 1944 transport ships carrying troops and munitions in growing numbers left Atlantic ports for Great Britain. Millions of Americans were under arms, many, in cooperation with the armies of the United Nations, soon to join battle against the fascists in Europe. In his 1943 Christmas message to the American people, the President said that of the more than 10 million men in the US armed forces 3,800,000 were overseas and that by the summer of 1944 their number would exceed 5,000,000.  [127•1 

p The core of the US armed forces was made up of workers. Among them, organized workers alone numbered 3,250,000, of which 1,500,000 were from the AFL, 1,250,000 from the CIO and 500,000 from independent unions.  [127•2  This great body of mobilized union members included 250,000 from the United Auto Workers,  [127•3  200,000 from the United Steelworkers of America,  [127•4  130,000 (250,000 by the end of 1944) from the United Mine Workers,  [127•5  and 110,000 from the United Electrical Workers.  [127•6  By April 1944, over 25,000 members of the Textile Workers Union (AFL) were in the armed forces.  [127•7  The Fur and 128 Leather Workers Union had 15,000 of its members in uniform,  [128•1  and the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union gave 8,000 of its members to the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Merchant Marine.  [128•2  There were 15,000 Communists in the armed forces, more than half of them members of the party’s New York state organization.  [128•3 

p The final stage of the war was approaching. The decisive blow to the fascist, war machine was dealt by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s prestige had grown immeasurably. The United States and Great Britain were compelled by the events on the Eastern Front to finally fulfil their Allied duty and begin military operations in Western Europe. The power elite in the United States and Britain did not want Germany liberated by the Soviet forces, which were now capable of finishing off Hitler without Allied help. Roosevelt and Churchill gave the go-ahead for crossing the English Channel.

p On June 6, 1944, the world learned of the successful invasion of Europe by Anglo-American and Canadian forces on 4,000 transport ships and men-of-war, not counting several thousand smaller craft, under an air cover of 11,000 airplanes. The second front was opened at last. American workers hailed this news. The fifth war bond drive was launched at all places of work, large and small.

p A noticeable shift took place in the thinking of Americans fighting on the war fronts. Numerous letters sent home bore witness to this. Ordinary Americans wrote of their hatred of the fascists and sincere reelings for the Allies. Their common goal drew Soviet and American soldiers closer together, and many among them exchanged letters. American workers also sent many letters to the Soviet Union. The labor unions responded to the call of the National Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship. A committee was formed to lead a campaign of solidarity with the Soviet Union. Well-known public and trade union figures and even some industrialists took part in it; among them were Wendell Willkie, Eleanor Roosevelt, Thomas Lament, the head of the banking house of Morgan, 129 Philip Murray and A. Whitney. Two thousand local Russian War Relief Committees joined this mass campaign.

p Cooperation between Soviet and American workers was being forged in military actions on the fronts and in the struggle for greater productivity at home. US labor unions, especially the CIO unions, exchanged delegations with Soviet trade unions. Meetings with CIO representatives took place in Moscow, London, Paris and New York. Step by step the foundations were being laid for the future World Federation of Trade Unions. The CIO played a prominent role in the work involved in creating the WFTU; its members showed themselves to be sincere advocates of international solidarity. Philip Murray, Sidney Hillman, Walter Reuther, Harry Bridges, Albert Fitzgerald, Julius Emspak, Ben Gold, R.J.Thomas, Joseph Curran, and Emil Rieve were among those who contributed much to this effort. Sidney Hillman, who was particularly active, became one of its vice-presidents.

p As mentioned earlier, Green and other top leaders of the AFL held the view that any cooperation with Soviet trade unions was tantamount to “aiding and abetting communism in the United States”. But not only were they opposed to cooperation with the Soviet working class and its trade unions but they were also against unity with the CIO, even during the war when the task of uniting labor’s forces for the anti-fascist struggle was of utmost importance.

p It may be recalled that after Pearl Harbor, AFL and CIO actions were coordinated by a Combined Labor War Board, created in February 1942. Since not only the working class but the nation as a whole had a stake in this kind of coordination, Green had to yield to outside pressure. However, in the spring of 1943, the AFL leadership turned thumbs down on joint actions with the CIO. At the end of March, the Board was dissolved, and the decision was ratified by the 63rd AFL convention in the autumn of 1943.

p Many letters came into Green’s office at the time expressing disagreement with the leadership’s position. One such letter was sent to Green on March 20, 1944 by E. Paskell, J. O’Malley, J.Parker, W.J.Barrow, and A.J.Biggins, members of the Political Action Committee of Typographical Union No. 53 in Cleveland, Ohio. The letter noted that collaboration with the 130 CIO had reached large proportions and produced good results. It stressed that under the given circumstances unity of action was the best way for the working class to protect its interests. “We hope to continue such activity, and think it is only right and proper that we urge other unions to join us in this most worthy cause. We believe in this way we can best maintain the prestige, the traditions and the vital principles and policies of the American Federation of Labor.”   [130•1 

p In another letter to Green, Robert Sinclair, secretarytreasurer of the Vermont State Federation of Labor, pointed to the need “to get behind the right men for our State and National elections, and elect our friends and defeat our enemies. This can only be accomplished if we combine the efforts of the three labor organizations in Vermont, namely American Federation of Labor, CIO and Railroad Brotherhoods."  [130•2 

p William Green responded: “I cannot accept the reasons offered in your letter dated April 14th as valid reasons for collaborating with the CIO. This organization is raiding our unions everywhere. How can any branch of the American Federation of Labor collaborate with an organization whose avowed purpose is the destruction of the American Federation of Labor....” He said further that to collaborate with the CIO “would mean to give it a recognition which as a dual organization cannot be extended to it by the American Federation of Labor”. In an effort to impose his will upon local organizations. Green wrote that “your own American Federation of Labor organization should shape and formulate its own political policy, free from collaboration with the CIO.

p “It was the decision of the Executive Council that State Federations of Labor and Central Labor Unions should cease and desist from collaborating with the CIO.... We hope and trust the Vermont State Federation of Labor will carry out the instructions of the Executive Council and conform to its decision."   [130•3 

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p Even such a conservative AFL leader as Matthew Woll was unhappy with the AFL refusal to take part in the upcoming national conference of industry, finance, business and labor. The reason for the refusal was that AFL representatives would have to participate on an equal footing with the CIO. In a letter dated October 3, 1944, Woll underscored the folly of Green’s decision, noting that 23 other organizations would take part in the conference and that the CIO could only gain from the position taken by the AFL.  [131•1  In his reply to Woll, Green said: “The reports which reach me every day of the raiding tactics and policy of the CIO convince me clearly that they are fighting for supremacy and for the destruction of the American Federation of Labor."  [131•2  Obsessed with animosity to the CIO Green was ready to accept any proposal so long as it did not involve joint actions with this “insurgent” organization. The above letters showed Green as an irreconcilable foe of the CIO and a man with no interest in labor unity. But there was more to it than the position taken by one man. Green was only one of many in the big clique of the Federation’s officialdom who adhered to this hostile line.

p Concentrating their efforts on the struggle against fascism, unions connected with the war industry took an active part in solving problems of increasing arms production, improving quality, transporting troops, munitions and food, and so forth. American merchant seamen, for example, made a big contribution. On the eve of the war, the National Maritime Union (CIO) was relatively small and weak and had to fight long and hard with the shipowners for recognition. But now, during the war, it was a strong organization with over 100,000 members working on troop transports, fuel tankers and supply ships. American and Soviet merchant seamen provided a remarkable example of wartime cooperation. In a letter of greetings to the National Maritime Union (CIO), the Central Committee of the Soviet seamen’s union said: “During the war with fascist Germany the merchant seamen of America and the Soviet Union selflessly carried out their wartime duty in transporting arms and foodstuffs. They often fought side by side against 132 enemy planes, submarines and destroyers. More than 5,000 seamen gave their lives in those years. The friendship between the seamen of the USA and the USSR has been tempered in batdes.”   [132•1 

p Not only men but also American women-workers contributed greatly to the defeat of the enemy. Millions of women went to work in industry. American workers, both men and women, contributed to the American Red Cross and bought war savings bonds.

p While the country was at war, American workers of Slavic, Italian, French, and Spanish descent manifested strong internationalist sentiments. Many Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Slovak workers joined the US Armed Forces, organized and participated in mass movements to give support and material aid to the countries fighting against fascism, and joined the movement for opening the second front.

p The International Workers Order, a large insurance organization with 160,000 members during the war, was well known among working people. Although the Order was a mutualassistance and not a political organization, it was a democratic, anti-fascist association and played a big role in rallying Americans for the cause of rendering aid to the nations fighting fascism.

p Functioning within the IWO structure were many sections organized along nationality lines. The New York-based Russian-American section, with over 16,000 members, was very active. The IWO’s fund grew from $81,018 in 1930 to $1,887,678 in 1943. Benefits paid out over those years grew from $10,720 to $903,000.  [132•2  The Order served the interests of its members, who retained an attachment to the land of their fathers. The activity of the Order among foreign-born Americans has not received much attention from historians, but what little is known shows that it made a noticeable contribution to the American struggle against fascism.

p Thus, the labor unions and numerous ethnic organizations of workers like the IWO, for example, played an important 133 role in mobilizing the efforts of the American working class for the struggle against fascism and strengthening the wartime cooperation between the American and Soviet peoples. A newspaper published by Americans of Russian origin wrote: “If asked, what have you done for victory, everyone will be able to mention his contributions with pride: I served in the armed forces; I gave blood and purchased savings bonds; I contributed to aid to the USSR and the United Nations; I supported our Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt, and worked for his re-election to a fourth term.”  [133•1 

p The 1944 wartime elections were important from both the political and the military standpoints. The labor unions were deeply concerned with their outcome. As before, organized workers predominantly supported Roosevelt and the Democratic Party.

p On July 7, 1943, the executive board of the CIO formed a Political Action Committee (PAC), composed of leaders of major CIO unions: Sidney Hillman (chairman), R.J.Thomas, Sherman Dalrymple, Albert J.Fitzgerald, Emil Rieve, John Green, David J. McDonald and Van A. Bittner. The committee functioned much the same as the Labor’s Non-Partisan League, and its aim was to turn the CIO into an auxiliary of the Democratic Party in its campaign among the electorate. In a letter to Roosevelt, Hillman wrote: “As you have perhaps noted from the press, the Executive Board of the CIO has established a committee for political action, of which I am the chairman. It is the purpose of this committee to unite the forces of labor and mobilize them for active and effective participation in the political campaigns of 1943 and 1944. The core of our program is unity for the election of those candidates, regardless of party affiliation, who have given you consistent and unequivocal support on all major issues, domestic and foreign."  [133•2 

p Hillman assured the President that 14 million organized workers, together with farmer, consumer and other 134 progressive groups, would support his political program of struggle for victory and progress.

p AFL and CIO unions were still opposed to the creation of Farmer-Labor parties. By 1944, the few such organizations left over from the movement in the 1930s had ceased to exist. The last of these, in the state of Minnesota, merged with the Democratic Party in early 1944. The labor unions did not put up their own candidates. They were content with Democratic nominees.

p The Republican Party held its convention in June 1944, in Chicago. Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, and Governor John Bricker of Ohio became the Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates. In their election platform the Republicans promised to pursue the war in cooperation with the United Nations to final and total victory. The convention showed dissatisfaction over the government’s increased role in industry, and came out for abolition of government ownership of major war plants. It also pointed out, perforce, the danger of growing unemployment after the war when war production would be curtailed.

p On July 13, Roosevelt agreed to run for a fourth term, and on July 19 the Democratic convention nominated him for president, choosing Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri as his running mate.

p The Democrats also received support from the American Labor Party of New York. Since its foundation in 1936 the latter became increasingly influential- in the state and played a positive role both on the eve of and during the war. However, by the end of the war, its progressive wing was locked in struggle with David Dubinsky’s right-wing group of conservatives which eventually managed to seize the reins of the party.

p As mentioned earlier, the ALP relied mainly on the CIO unions in the city and state of New York that were group members of the party. But in 1940, Dubinsky pulled his union out of the CIO and into the AFL, where there were strong pro-Republican sentiments promoted by such leaders as Hutcheson, Woll and Lewis, the latter having returned to the AFL for a time. Therefore, Dewey enjoyed a certain amount of union support. Dubinsky’s return to the AFL was interpreted by the Republicans as a possible change of political heart.

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p In January 1944, Hillman proposed that all labor unions in the state of New York be allowed to join the ALP and that their representation in the party leadership be proportional to their membership rolls.

p Dubinsky and his supporters rejected this on the pretext that it would lead to a “communist take-over" of the ALP. Hillman called this a stupid and groundless argument. There were over a million CIO union members in the state at the time, including steelworkers, textile workers, retail sales clerks and clothing workers. Hillman pointed out that there were no grounds for stating that these unions were communist-controlled. Those who favored expanding the party and giving it a more democratic leadership proved to be stronger than Dubinsky’s group. The unions became involved in vigorous preparations to elect a new ALP leadership.

p On March 28, 1944, primary elections were held in 150 electoral districts of the state. Of the 750 delegates elected to the ALP convention, 625 supported the democratization and renewal of the party leadership. Taking part in the voting were 100,000 of the total of 196,000 persons registered to vote in the primaries. A new ALP committee met in April and elected Hillman to head the party. Thus Hillman was now leader of both the CIO Political Action Committee and the ALP. The concerted actions of these organizations helped strengthen Roosevelt’s position in the state and in New York City.

p Vito Marcantonio, a member of the House of Representatives from the state of New York and supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal, enjoyed considerable influence in the ALP. His voice was often heard ringing out in defense of democracy in the House of Representatives, at meetings in New York, and in organizations of the American Labor Party. He carried on a lively correspondence with government and labor officials and constituents from the ranks of labor. Working people considered him a bold fighter, an impassioned speaker, and staunch defender of their rights and interests. In speeches both inside and outside Congress he exposed the plans and actions of reaction. Marcantonio was highly respected by organized labor. In 1944, he was nominated for re-election to the House of Representatives.

p In the meantime, the Republicans planned a number of 136 anti-Roosevelt strategies in Congress, and these included attacks on the CIO Political Action Committee. Roosevelt’s foes raised a row about how the PAC was a bed of communist agents and its chairman was, if not a Communist, surely a Socialist, and maybe even an “agent of Moscow”. To expand its election campaign and ward off Republican attacks against it, the CIO Political Action Committee decided at a conference on June 18 to establish a National Civil Political Action Committee (NCPAC), which would include, besides union representatives, prominent progressives outside the ranks of organized labor.

p On July 15, eighty leading liberals joined union officials to form a broadly representative body. George W. Norris (Dem., Nebraska), co-author of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, was elected honorary chairman, and Sidney Hillman, chairman. The labor unions were represented by A. F. Whitney, Albert Fitzgerald, Philip Murray, R. J. Thomas, James Carey, Joseph Curran, Sherman Dalrymple, Emil Rieve, John Green, and Van Bittner. Among the other Committee members were representatives of the liberal bourgeois press, including Freda Kirchwey, editor of the Nation magazine, and also James Patton, director of the National Farmers Union, Leo Krzycki, president of the American Slav Congress, and former governors of Minnesota and Pennsylvania Elmer Benson and Gifford Pinchot.

p The Committee also included representatives of certain liberal business circles, Charles McGill, president of the McGill Manufacturing Company, for example.

p Politically, the NCPAC adhered to the basic propositions of the Democratic Party. Its function was to combine the efforts of labor and other sections of the public to re-elect Roosevelt. The Committee subordinated all its actions to strengthening national unity and achieving complete victory over Germany and Japan.

p The CIO Political Action Committee was not eclipsed by the NCPAC. Being a member of the NCPAC, it could now take part in fund-raising drives to support Roosevelt and its favored candidates to Congress.  [136•1 

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p Progressive forces within the labor unions renewed the struggle for broader voting privileges. To include millions of Negroes in the ranks of voters it was necessary to abolish the humiliating poll tax in the South. The Geyer anti-poll tax bill had been introduced in Congress back in 1940, and the labor unions, primarily the CIO, supported it. A drive was launched to collect signatures demanding the repeal of poll tax laws. In September 1942, the House of Representatives began debate on the bill, and passed it on October 16. The Senate, however, defeated it on November 26.

p The labor unions tried to put pressure on Congress, and in this, Vito Marcantonio became their spokesman. In January

p 1943, he introduced a new bill to outlaw the poll tax.

p A National Committee for the Repeal of Poll Tax was organized in Washington. It included Eleanor Roosevelt, Vito Marcantonio, A. F. Whitney, Philip Murray and William Green. Labor, especially the CIO unions, where anti-racist feelings were very strong, played an active role in the Committee’s work. The AFL leaders refrained from active participation in the protest campaign.

p On May 24, 1943, the House of Representatives passed the Marcantonio bill by a vote of 265 to 105. The bill then went to the Senate judiciary committee, where it was discussed until November 12, 1943, but it was brought before the Senate for debate only a year later. Despite a stubborn struggle for its passage waged by a group of liberal senators led by James M.Mead (Dem., New York), the bill was defeated on May 15, 1944, by a vote of 44 to 36.  [137•1 

p Negroes in the South, including industrial workers, continued to pay the poll tax or, more often, denied themselves the right to vote. As the Catholic Worker noted, six million poor whites and four million poor Blacks in eight Southern states could not pay the poll tax, which deprived them of the right to take part in elections or juries.  [137•2 

p Another bill that failed to pass was the Lucas-Green bill, which would have granted the right to vote to over ten million servicemen. Legal experts opposing the bill maintained that servicemen should remain outside of politics and therefore 138 should neither vote nor run for office. The labor unions called this an infringement upon basic civil liberties.

p The Senate began consideration of this bill, submitted by Scott Lucas (Illinois) and Theodore Green (Rhode Island), in 1942. The bill would grant the right to vote to servicemen in the land and naval forces and also to merchant seamen stationed abroad or at sea.  [138•1  After lengthy debate, the bill was shelved until January 1944.

p Roosevelt’s opponents realized what it would mean to grant voting privileges to more than ten million Americans in uniform. Therefore they did everything possible to defeat the Lucas-Green bill. Not accidentally, a new one soon appeared, the Eastland-Rankin bill, which would leave it up to the states themselves to decide the question. The opponents of the Lucas-Green bill were banking on the conservatism of state authorities.

p In his State of the Union Message of January 26, 1944, Roosevelt urged Congress to pass the Lucas-Green bill. He also noted that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces he was expressing the resentment felt by servicemen because of the discrimination practised against them. In response to this, Republican Senator Robert Taft stated that the President’s message was an affront to the members of Congress, and did not fail to add that pressure in favor of passing the Lucas-Green bill came from Communists and liberals.

p After lengthy debates and obstruction, the Lucas-Green bill was defeated.

p Although a considerable part of the citizenry was deprived of the right to participate in the elections, Roosevelt nonetheless had more supporters than Dewey. On November 7, 1944, Roosevelt and most other Democratic candidates won. Over 48 million votes were cast. Roosevelt received 25.6 million popular votes and 432 electoral votes, carrying 36 states. Dewey received 22 million popular votes and 99 electoral votes, winning a majority in only 12 states.  [138•2  The American Labor Party achieved considerable success in the state of New York, where nearly half a million votes were cast for its candidates.

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p As a result of the 1944 elections, Roosevelt became President for a fourth term, and Truman became Vice-President. The Democrats won 242 seats in the House of Representatives, a gain of 20, while the Republicans won only 190, which was 19 less than they held in the preceding Congress. In the Senate, where one-third of the members were up for election, the Democratic majority remained about the same: 56 to 38.  [139•1 

p On February 6, 1945, the World Trade Union Conference, representing 60 million organized workers from 40 countries, began its work in London. It was organized by a Preparatory Committee which included representatives of Soviet, American and British trade unions. One of the main points on the agenda concerned the principles of the contemplated new international trade union organization. This became the subject of heated debate. It brought out two differing points of view, reflecting the two trends in the international labor movement, the conservative and the progressive.

p The reformists, headed by leaders of the British TUC, sought to revive the Amsterdam International. To be sure, they were willing to have it reorganized somewhat, taking into account the changed situation. The progressive forces, expressing the interests of the bulk of the working people, sought to create an entirely new association, fundamentally different from the Amsterdam International. They felt that the working class needed a genuinely international, mass organization that would unite working people regardless of their political views, nationality, race or religion.

p The position of the CIO delegation at the London Conference was not very consistent due to a number of factors, mainly the struggle between progressive and conservative elements within the CIO itself. On the whole, the CIO’s policies during the war were determined by the progressive forces, but this did not mean that the conservatives were without influence in certain questions. The CIO delegation to London included men like Sidney Hillman, who at that period advocated cooperation with Soviet trade unions, and others like James Carey, with strong anti-communist views. On some issues they 140 took a united stand. The entire CIO delegation, for instance, unanimously rejected the British proposal to revive the Amsterdam International, inasmuch as its constitution allowed membership to only one trade union center from each country. The member from the USA, it will be recalled, was the AFL. Understandably, therefore, the CIO leaders favored the idea of creating a new organization to which they, too, would have access.

p But there was no such unanimity among the CIO delegates regarding the character and tasks of this new organization. The rightist leaders of the CIO were not interested in a really militant and powerful democratic organization in which the reformists would not be predominant. Here the views of the rightist CIO leaders coincided with those of the TUC leaders. Both, for example, were concerned about the balance of forces in the future association, and had therefore opposed the Preparatory Committee’s proposal to invite to the conference trade union representatives from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, where the war had brought about conditions in which new, democratic trade unions could be established.

p Despite Carey’s support of the reformists, the balance of forces at the conference was clearly not in their favor. This determined both the outcome of the conference and the nature of the resolutions adopted. The TUC leaders failed in their plan to revive the Amsterdam International, although, as Schevenels admits, both he and Citrine “made a serious attempt to convince the majority of the Conference that it was in the interest of the new world organization to make use of the 40 years experience 141 and of the machinery that was available through the IFTU”.  [141•1 

p Considering the balance of forces at the Conference and the sentiments of the rank-and-file trade union members the leaders of the TUC and the Amsterdam International felt compelled to vote along with the rest of the delegates for the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. However, it was not only at the London Conference that a struggle was going on against the creation of a truly international and democratic labor organization.

p Having refused to take part in the London Conference, the AFL leaders stepped up their anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. The Daily Worker pointed this out as follows: “In an obvious desire to create ‘dissension’ at London, Green waved the bogey of Soviet ‘domination’ and pictured the move as revival of the Prof intern, an international trade union organization with headquarters at Moscow."  [141•2 

p Seeing the success of the London Conference and realizing its significance in activating the progressive forces, the AFL leaders undertook measures to counter the results of the Conference and strengthen their own positions in the labor movements of other countries. While the Conference was still in session, the AFL executive council met and worked out a detailed plan of action against the future federation. The Daily Worker commented: “On the very day that delegates of 50,000,000  [141•3  organized workers at London discussed plans for a new international, William Green at Miami defiantly restated AFL plans to intervene in European countries to build a disruptive, rival movement.... Green raised an alarm of ’Communist domination’ in Europe’s trade unions. He declared that ’it will be the task of the AFL to avert any such calamity’ through ’moral and financial support’ to those who meet with AFL approval."  [141•4 

p At the same meeting, Green announced that the AFL executive council had taken up the drive, then being conducted 142 by a special Free Unions Committee headed by Matthew Woll, to set up a $ 1,000,000 fund for aid to trade unions abroad. The AFL leadership hoped to use this as a bribery fund to establish ties with reactionary trade union leaders in Europe and with their support to produce a rift among progressive organizations there.

p The position taken by the AFL leaders on the eve of and during the London Conference caused great discontent among the AFL rank and file. Many members of AFL local organizations had approved of the preparatory work for creating an international federation. The labor press reported that there was opposition in some AFL unions to the leadership’s boycott of the Conference. For instance, District 76 of the International Association of Machinists in Buffalo passed a resolution stating that it believed “that the American Federation of Labor has, by its action of refusing to send a representative to the World Trade Union Congress, to be held in London this coming February, failed in its duty to properly represent its affiliated internationals and their members”.  [142•1  The union adopted a resolution to send its own delegate to London. Other AFL districts and locals made similar statements.

p The opposition of local organizations was clearly manifested in a referendum held by the painters and decorators union in 1944. Over 300 locals, representing nearly 200,000 AFL members, voted for participation in the new international center. The union sent Courtney Ward, secretary-treasurer of the Painters District Council 6 (Cleveland, Ohio), to the London Conference as an official observer. This gave the Conference a chance to learn of the opinion of rank-and-file AFL members. A message of greetings from many AFL union officials presented by Ward to the London Conference said: “We are convinced that it is the duty of the entire American labor movement to be represented. We regret that the AFL decided for non-participation. We hope that this will be changed in the near future."  [142•2 

p Some AFL organizations sent greetings to the Conference. 143 One cable said: “The formation of a new all-inclusive world trade union federation will be hailed by labor throughout the world....

p “It is, indeed, regrettable that the executive council of the AFL did not take into consideration the sentiments nor did they consult our great membership before they rejected the invitation of your historic conference. The overwhelming majority of the members of the AFL, like those of the CIO favor allied labor unity just as strongly as we support the unity of the United Nations.”   [143•1 

p The AFL leadership tried to impede unity and conducted its entire ideological work among rank-and-file workers in such a way as to discredit the idea of proletarian internationalism, unacceptable to the reformist labor leaders.

p This propaganda was aimed at cultivating political aloofness and isolationist sentiments. This was the AFL leaders’ reply as it were, to the London Conference, whose delegates were emphasizing that the international working class should have a say in the structure of the postwar world, and that the working class in each country should exert an influence on foreign policy.

p After the London Conference, the AFL leaders supplemented their ideological campaign with practical work in gathering and organizing all divisive and reactionary elements in the labor movements of various countries, particularly in Europe. They worked through the Free Unions Committee and various government agencies. In 1945, one AFL figure, Irving Brown, went to work in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). His main job was to influence the ideological orientation of the working people of Europe. AFL representatives worked in close contact with the American military command. Both were interested in weakening progressive European labor organizations such as, for example, the Confederation Generate du Travail in France.

p The London Conference adopted a resolution to convene a constituent Congress of World Trade Unions in Paris in September 1945. Courtney Ward upon his return from the London Conference published a report in which he said that 144 whatever the position of the executive council, the great majority of the AFL membership favored international cooperation, and that his organization felt the AFL leaders would be making a mistake if they did not send delegates to the Paris Congress.

p Many rank-and-file AFL members applauded Ward’s report. The campaign for AFL participation in a World Trade Union Federation mounted on the eve of the Paris Congress. On July 22, 1945, 40 leading officials of AFL unions held a meeting in Cleveland at which they formed a Committee for AFL participation in a World Trade Union Federation. The meeting adopted the following resolution:

p “Resolved, that we assembled officials of unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, urge the coming meeting of the Executive Council to re-examine its position and take its rightful place of leadership in the organization and establishment of world trade union unity by participating in the coming Congress of World Trade Unions to take place in Paris, September, 1945, and let it further be

p “Resolved, that we delegates assembled in Cleveland set up a committee and urge International unions, district and local organizations to join in our effort in combatting the organized effort of the enemies of labor unity and help to bring about the American Federation of Labor’s participation in the World Trade Union movement, and be it further

p “Resolved, that a delegation be constituted to appear before the officers and Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor and urge the reconsideration of our position toward the World Trade Union Conference, and be it further

p “Resolved, that there be no doubt as to the position of the membership of the American Federation of Labor on the question of our becoming part of the World Trade Union movement, that a referendum be initiated either by the Executive Council or by their respective International Unions.”  [144•1 

p The top AFL leaders went out of their way to suppress the protest movement. They refused to allow Ward, the chairman 145 of the Cleveland Committee, to speak at a meeting of the executive council. Further, they expelled him from the Federation. In response, Ward said that the Committee would continue to press for AFL participation in the new world labor organisation.  [145•1  A number of such committees arose in several other cities and states. In the spring of 1945, locals of the Metal Workers Union spoke out in favor of the AFL’s participation in the new international organization. Such support made it possible for the Cleveland Committee to send its representatives Nick Lasari and Charles Collins to the Paris Congress as observers.

p The Congress of World Trade Unions, at which a World Federation of Trade Unions was to be created, opened in Paris on September 25, 1945. Historic events had taken place during the seven months that separated the London and Paris conferences: German fascism and Japanese militarism had been defeated and the long-awaited peace had come.

p The Paris Congress was a significant event. In the first place, the victory over Hitler Germany did not yet mean that fascism had been eradicated. Still ahead was a strenuous struggle to democratize the entire socio-political life of Europe and root out Nazism in all its manifestations. Moreover, the ruling circles sought to shift all the burdens connected with the consequences of the war onto the working people. To protect the economic interests and political rights of the working people it was necessary to consolidate labor’s ranks throughout the world. That is why it was so important to have a single international working-class organization.

p Attending the conference were delegates from 65 national trade union organizations representing over 67 million organized workers in 56 countries. There was a big upsurge in working-class activity throughout the world at the time, and this determined the correlation of forces at the conference. There was an even greater preponderance of progressive, democratic elements here than at the London Conference. This to a great extent hampered the undermining efforts of the reformists, but did not prevent them altogether. Not venturing to reject the idea of a World Federation of Trade 146 Unions outright, the reformist trade union figures, mainly the British, tried to get the final decision postponed. When this did not work, they changed their tactics. Debate was opened on a draft constitution drawn up by the Administrative Committee of the London Conference. The advocates of reviving the Amsterdam International wanted to make the WFTU constitution a copy of the constitution of the outworn trade union International. There was a struggle over every point, but the reformists from the British unions did not succeed in making any substantial gains. The amendments they proposed were rejected. As in London, despite vacillations, the CIO representatives on the whole sided with the delegates of the progressive unions of other countries on basic questions.

p On October 3, 1945, the conference adopted the WFTU constitution and continued its work as the First Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions.

p The American Federation of Labor was the only major trade union association that did not become part of the WFTU. But opposition to this policy by the AFL rank and file did not cease after the formal creation of the WFTU. It entered a new phase, a phase of struggle for establishing ties with the new international organization and affiliation with it. As early as December 6, 1945, a meeting was called in Manhattan by the Cleveland Committee to hear Collins’ and Lasari’s reports on the Paris Congress. Lasari called on AFL members to insist that the leadership heed the voice of the seven million members. On January 25, 1946, a meeting of the AFL executive council received a proposal from the Cleveland Committee to poll all members on the question of joining the WFTU. A referendum would have given a clear picture of the wishes of the AFL membership. But this is just what the leadership was afraid of most of all. True to form, it rejected the proposal, and not only refused to enter into contact with the WFTU but intensified its efforts to split its ranks.

p At the price of great effort and sacrifice made by the peoples of the United Nations and above all the Soviet Union, the historic victory over fascism was won, and the international working class played a prominent role in this struggle. A direct result of the heightened political activity and awareness of the masses of working people was the consolidation of the 147 international working class and the creation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The creation of the WFTU, in turn, helped strengthen international solidarity.

p In the United States these wartime sentiments were shared by many members of the AFL unions as well as by those in labor unions outside the federation. Therefore it was not surprising that the attempts of the AFL conservatives to impede international labor unity met with a rebuff, so rare in the AFL, from the rank-and-file membership.

p For years, bureaucratic labor leaders, pursuing their own interests, had been implanting the notion that the international affairs and relations with labor organizations of other countries should be their exclusive monopoly. Although during the war this tradition, as well as the passiveness of the rank and file in matters of foreign policy, was seriously shaken, nothing had been done to alter this state of affairs. The progressive forces could not make the leaders heed their voice. George Morris wrote in 1945: “The top leaders speak for the A.F. of L. membership simply by default; the members have not yet developed an interest in those problems to a point of even seriously examining the statements issued in their name by the William Greens and Matthew Wolls.... The meaning of international trade union unity has not yet been driven home to the millions.”  [147•1  In this sense, despite its size and scope, the labor movement in the United States lagged behind the European labor movement politically.

p Toward the end of the war, the Communist Party of the United States endured severe trials in its struggle with the enemies of Marxism-Leninism. The emergence in the Party of a right-opportunist faction headed by Earl Browder was a reflection of complex processes of the class struggle in the country. The ideological crisis of 1944-1945 was similar to the crisis in the Party in the late 1920s. During the war the right-opportunist elements increased their efforts, trying to turn the Party onto the track of bourgeois reformism. Back in 1915, during World War I, Lenin observed: “The war has clearly proved that at a moment of crisis ... a sizable mass of 148 opportunists, supported and often directly guided by the bourgeoisie (this is of particular importance!) go over to the latter’s camp, betray socialism, damage the workers’ cause, and attempt to ruin it."  [148•1  Browder and his followers proved to be deserters of this kind. They betrayed socialism and damaged the cause of the American working class.

p During the years of neutrality, the CP was subjected to harsh repression. Some of its functionaries and members active in labor unions were imprisoned on crudely trumped-up charges. Browder, too, was subjected to repression. On March 27, 1941, he was arrested and sentenced to four years in jail. After 14 months, Roosevelt ordered his release on May 16, 1942. The White House statement said that Browder’s release would “have a tendency to promote national unity and allay any feeling which may exist in some minds that the unusually long sentence was by way of penalty imposed upon him because of his political views".  [148•2 

p After his release, Browder devoted himself to strengthening “national unity”, but in a way that met only the interests of the bourgeoisie, and thereby justified the hopes of the White House. The Browderist slogan of national unity did serious damage to the CP, causing a sharp deterioration of its ideological positions. In September 1942, Browder published a pamphlet in which he developed the idea of class collaboration not only during but also after the war.

p At the end of 1943, Browder began to act openly against the Communist Party. At that time, he was responsible for the demise of the Young Communist League, which had existed since 1934. In mid-October 1943, the League held a convention in New York, with 314 delegates in attendance. Under pressure from Browder, the convention decided to dissolve the youth organization. After adopting the resolution, the convention announced the creation of a new, non-partisan organization with the high-sounding name of American Youth for Democracy.

p Browder went the route of Jay Lovestone, propagating the slogans of strengthening “national unity" and class 149 collaboration. This was especially obvious in his speech at Bridgeport, Connecticut, delivered on December 12, 1943.  [149•1  There, he argued the need and feasibility of strong and lasting cooperation between the monopolies and the workers in the struggle for unity of action. At a plenary meeting of the Party’s National Committee in January-February 1944, he succeeded in winning a majority of the committee members to his side. At the January 4 session he repeated the call to support the monopolies which he had made at Bridgeport, when, referring to the Anglo-Soviet coalition, he had said: “We must be prepared to give the hand of cooperation and fellowship to everyone who fights for the realization of this coalition. If J. P. Morgan supports this coalition and goes down the line for it, I as a Communist am prepared to clasp his hand on that and join with him to realize it. Class divisions or political groupings have no significance now."  [149•2 

p Passing off this conciliatory mish-mash as the only way to “national unity”, Browder came to accept class collaboration on the basis of a program of free enterprise, that is, capitalism.

p Browder and his supporters gave speeches over the radio, at meetings and rallies, and at sessions of the National Committee. They published articles in the Daily Worker, printed pamphlets and virtually held complete control over the Party press, which was now propagandizing capitulatory, liquidationist sentiments.

p At the January 7 session Browder delivered a lengthy speech on the Teheran Conference, and on January 10, this time to a large audience in Madison Square Garden, a speech entitled “Unity for Victory, Post-War Order".  [149•3 

In both speeches he outlined his capitulatory position. Announcing his abandonment of the struggle for socialism, he asserted that this was necessary because the American people were not ready for profound social changes. Repeating the thesis of the right capitulators of the 1920s alleging the progressive nature of American capitalism, Browder came to deny the need to struggle against it.

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p Browder called for an end to opposition to the two bourgeois political parties. He regarded them simply as coalitions of various political groups during election campaigns. He said that since the lines of distinction between the two leading bourgeois parties were fading, the question arose of dissolving the Communist Party in the composition of these amorphous coalitions of voters. Communists, he said, would not join either of the major parties, but at the same time would no longer oppose them politically. He recommended that the Party change its name to reflect the role which in his view would be more in line with American political traditions. In his January 10 speech, he announced that a Party convention would be held in May 1944 with the aim of reorganizing it into a so-called American Communist Political Association.

p However, many rank-and-file Communists in the Party’s state organizations did not agree with Browder and his supporters. And although they were unable to get their bearings immediately in the complex situation, Browder still could not be sure of their support. Realizing that time was working against him, he hastened to impose upon the leadership and the local organizations a decision to dissolve the Marxist-Leninist Party. He was afraid of a free discussion involving Communists at the local level.

p Browder proved to be a skilful politician. He picked a convenient moment for carrying out his strategy. His 151 apparently sudden maneuver stunned many Party members, giving them no chance to understand the situation and react quickly. The war against fascism was going on, and people were possessed with but one idea: victory. Browder decided to take advantage of this and acted with lightning speed. On January 11, he convinced the National Committee to send a letter, signed by him, to all state and district organizations, proposing that preparations begin for a convention to be held for the purpose of dissolving the Party and replacing it with a non-partisan association.

p Finding himself almost a minority of one, William Z. Foster made a statement to the National Committee, condemning Browder’s action. This was followed by another statement on February 8, in which Foster subjected Browder’s position to sharp criticism and spoke with alarm about the fate of the Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States. He emphasized that it was intolerable for a Marxist to accept the reactionary theory that American imperialism was progressive, and exposed the falsehood in the Browderist interpretation of the “national unity" slogan, the basic premise of which was acknowledgement of the leading role of the bourgeoisie in socio-historical development. He severely criticized Browder’s views as right-opportunist and called on Communists to unite in the struggle against non-Marxist ideas.

p Foster also exposed Browder’s distortion of the decisions of the Teheran Conference. He lauded the agreement reached at Teheran, stressing its great importance to the cause of destroying fascism. He strongly condemned the false thesis that the agreement had come about through compromise and was the result of a class collaboration on an international scale. Further, he categorically rejected Browder’s assertions that the Teheran Conference showed that the Soviet Union was abandoning its struggle against imperialism in general, that class peace would now be established between the countries of socialism and capitalism, and that American finance capital would play a progressive role for many long years after the war.

p At the February 8 session of the National Committee, most of the members sided with Browder against Foster, Many of these were prominent CIO union officials, including Ruth Young (head of the education department of the United 152 Electrical Workers), William McMahon (president of Local 100 of the Auto Transport Workers Union in New York), Frederick Myers (vice-president of the National Maritime Union), Lewis Merrill (president of the United Office and Professional Workers of America and member of the CIO executive board), Ben Gold (president of the Fur and Leather Workers Union and member of the CIO executive board). These and other members of the National Committee judged Foster’s defense of a Marxist-Leninist party as sectarian and supported Browder’s line in toto.

p The situation in the party leadership was now the most serious since the crisis precipitated by the right-opportunist stance of Jay Lovestone and his supporters in 1927. Many prominent Communist trade union leaders believed Browder’s arguments and supported his liquidationist proposal. Among those speaking at the plenary session, many sided with Browder out of conviction, while others were temporarily swayed because of their inadequate understanding of the complex problems in the theory and practice of the communist movement, and also as a result of the almost dictatorial behavior of Browder himself, who held a key post in the Party.

p Browder and his supporters were set on dissolving the Party at the 12th convention, which opened on May 20, 1944 in New York. Four hundred delegates and over a thousand guests took part in its proceedings. As soon as the convention was opened, Earl Browder introduced a proposal to dissolve the Party, citing the decision of the National Committee of January 11 of that year. To reinforce his proposal, Browder stated that it was already approved by state and district conferences. Without realizing the full implications of Browder’s anti-party actions, the participants adopted a resolution to cease the activity of the Marxist-Leninist Party and create in its stead a non-partisan American Communist Political Association. The convention concluded its work with the adoption of this anti-Marxist resolution, and the first convention of the new organization—the American Communist Political Association—was immediately declared open. At the Association convention, Browder delivered the keynote address, in which he sought to substantiate the need for dissolving the Party. In his book, Teheran. Our Path in War and Peace, he outlined in 153 more detail than in the speech his views on the country’s future development and the tasks of the labor movement. The book essentially undertook a revision of Marxism-Leninism and argued in favor of abandoning the struggle against imperialism and hence capitulation before the forces of reaction.  [153•1 

p The Association convention adopted the declaration and constitution of the new organization. Both documents were composed in the spirit of bourgeois democracy and right revisionism. The preamble to the constitution said that the Communist Political Association was a non-partisan organization of Americans, which, relying on the support of the working class, continued the traditions of Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Jackson and Lincoln under the conditions of a modern industrial society. It also affirmed that the Association upheld the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. As concerns Marxism, the constitution merely said that the Association adhered to its principles.

p The ideological and organizational crisis in the party continued for almost a year and a half. Gradually, however, the stalwarts in its ranks developed a struggle to re-establish the party. It took a certain amount of time for the Communists to comprehend what had really happened. Party veterans, who had entered the ranks from the left wing of the Socialist movement and from large industries and had participated in the movement for many years, were speaking out in favor of voiding the decision of the 12th convention. Most of those who had supported the dissolution in haste now realized their own mistake. Considerable educational work was being done by party press organs, especially the Daily Worker, which had rid itself of Browderist influence.

p The American Communists received a great deal of help in re-establishing their party from sister Communist parties. Important developments followed in the wake of a letter they received from the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, signed by Jacques Duclos. In April 1945, Duclos published an article in Cahiers du communisme, the French Party’s theoretical journal, concerning the dissolution of the 154 Communist Party of the USA, in which he elaborated on the points made in that letter.

p On May 20, 1945, the Political Committee of the Association discussed Duclos’ article, whereupon it unanimously condemned Browder’s line, and adopted a resolution calling for the reconstitution of the Communist Party.  [154•1 

p On May 24, in accordance with a decision of the Political Committee, Duclos’ article was published in the Daily Worker. The article sharply criticized Browder’s interpretation of the decisions of the Teheran Conference, which was the basis for his argument that it was necessary to change the course of the American Communist Party. According to Browder, Duclos wrote, Teheran marked the beginning of peaceful coexistence and collaboration between capitalism and socialism. Further, Browder felt that the internal political problems of the United States should be solved exclusively by means of reforms, and that Europe too should be rebuilt solely on the foundations of capitalism.

p Duclos also subjected Browder’s other anti-Marxist propositions to devastating criticism, in particular his revisionist forecast of postwar developments in the United States. American capitalism, in Browder’s view, would adjust to the new conditions and develop in a spirit of cooperation with the democratic and progressively-inclined majority of the American people.

p Pointing out that the dissolution of the US Communist Party contravened fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles relating to working-class parties, Duclos emphasized the importance of the struggle to reconstitute the Party, the struggle that was headed by William Foster.

p The article condemned the dissolution of the Communist Party and the creation of the non-partisan political association, and exposed Browder’s reliance on bourgeois democracy, in the spirit of which the Association’s constitution was drawn up. Duclos stated: “The course applied under Browder’s leadership ended in practice in liquidation of the independent political party of the working class in the US. Despite declarations regarding recognition of the principles of 155 Marxism, one is witnessing a notorious revision of Marxism on the part of Browder and his supporters, a revision which is expressed in the concept of a long-term class peace in the United States, of the possibility of the suppression of the class struggle in the post-war period and of establishment of harmony between labor and capital."  [155•1  In conclusion, the article emphasized that the Communist parties of most countries, including France, did not agree with the Browderist course.

p The National Bureau of the Association initiated a discussion in local organizations and the press. Basically, the discussion revolved around the Bureau’s resolution of June 2, 1945, entitled “The Present Situation and Next Tasks”,  [155•2  William Foster’s speeches and letters, and Duclos’ article. The resolution consisted of two parts. The first analyzed the struggle against fascism and its results, and exposed the self-seeking conduct of American monopoly big business. It showed the role of the Communists in defeating Hitler and set forth the tasks still ahead to completely eradicate fascism. In the second part. Browder’s revisionism and the opportunist errors of those who still followed him were criticized and condemned. The resolution approved the political line taken by the leadership and welcomed the letter from the French Communist Party. In the course of the discussion, the overwhelming majority of the local organizations and rank-and-file Communists came to support the resolution.

p On June 18-20, 1945, a plenary session of the National Committee discussed the situation in the Association’s organizations. It approved the basic line of the National Bureau’s resolution, welcomed the French Communist Party’s letter and agreed with the criticism it contained. Further, the session denounced the decision of the 1944 convention to dissolve the Communist Party of the USA, found Browder guilty of implanting revisionism in the Party, and adopted a resolution to hold an extraordinary convention in New York for the purpose of reconstituting the Communist Party. A convention committee was named and given the task of studying the 156 problem of forming a new leadership. The secretariat of the committee included William Foster, Eugene Dennis and John Williamson.

p At Party meetings and conferences held on the state level, the decisions of the 12th convention were voided and resolutions adopted calling for re-establishment of Party organizations.  [156•1  The one thousand delegates to the convention of the New York state association on July 23 voted unanimously to support the National Committee resolution.

p The Communist Party of the USA was reconstituted at the 13th extraordinary convention, which opened in New York on July 26, 1945. The keynote address was delivered by Foster. In presenting the National Bureau’s resolution, he commented: “The Party must recover its political initiative and communist boldness—even though reactionary members of the Truman Administration, of the AFL executive council and the NAM [the National Association of Manufacturers] may not like it."  [156•2  He gave a comprehensive analysis of Browder’s anti-Marxist views and actions, and showed how his sabotage and the subsequent dissolution of the Party became possible. Foster emphasized the inadequate ideological level of many Party leaders who had not taken a stand against Browder’s sophistic revisionism.

p The convention denounced Browderism as a reactionary current in the working class, a capitulation before imperialism and a betrayal of the vital interests of the American workers, and called on all Communists to work to strengthen the Party on Marxist-Leninist principles. The 93 delegates to the convention unanimously adopted the resolution to reconstitute the Communist Party of the USA.  [156•3  They also adopted the basic principles of the new Party constitution, which was ratified later. The convention elected a 55-member National Committee, which included 16 trade union officials. A plenary session of the NC elected William Foster as Party chairman, formed an 11-member executive committee, and a Secretariat, including Foster, Dennis, Williamson and Robert Thompson.

157

p In his speech at the convention, Browder tried to defend his anti-Marxist position, saying that it would be naive to think that discussion of these issues would end after the convention. However, after a decisive rebuff from the convention delegates, he declared his acceptance of the decisions of the convention.

Thus, during World War II the American Communists had to go through a hard struggle against revisionism and for the preservation of a Communist Party in the United States. Revisionism did great damage to the Party, weakening its influence in the trade unions, where workingmen were confused and ideologically disoriented by the new proposition on class collaboration and bright prospects for American capitalism. Many workers who had previously heeded the Communists came to distrust them because of the Browderist deviation. The Communists’ positions in the CIO, particularly in its central leadership, were weakened.

p The Party did not lose heart, however. After the war, its progressive forces continued to fight for ideological and organizational unity.

p Not long before his death, the well-known progressive writer Theodore Dreiser sent a letter to the National Committee of the Communist Party asking to be accepted as a member of the Party. Explaining his request he wrote: “I have believed intensely that the common people, and first of all the workers—of the United States and of the world—are the guardians of their own destiny and the creators of their own future. I have endeavored to live by this faith, to clothe it in words and symbols, to explore its full meaning in the lives of men and women.”   [157•1 

158

p The days of Hitler’s Reich were counted. The efforts of the United Nations, and above all the USSR, were bringing closer the long-awaited end of World War II.

p The American working class supported all major measures of the government and Congress for achieving victory, and approved of the military and political decisions of the Teheran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in 1945.

p On November 20-24, 1944, the CIO held its seventh national convention in Chicago, at which the political line of this mass working-class organization was formulated. Attending the convention were 503 delegates from 38 national and international unions and organizing committees, including delegates from 34 state labor councils, 117 city labor councils, and 103 local industrial unions. The convention adopted a resolution on “International Security and Complete Destruction of Nazism and Japanese Militarism”, which said: “There can and must not be any negotiated or soft peace. With the military defeat of Nazi Germany there will arise the all-important question of guaranteeing to the people of the world that every phase of Nazism shall be wiped off the face of the earth.... The full and stern punishment of war criminals must be assured.”  [158•1  The CIO supported the demand for nothing short of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender and urged that a plan be drawn up for the postwar structure of the world.

p The convention endorsed the CIO’s no-strike policy in labor disputes. Despite the negative position taken by the AFL at its 63rd convention in late 1943, the CIO reaffirmed its policy of seeking unity of action. The convention addressed a call to the leadership of the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhoods for closer unity with the CIO in future election campaigns within the framework of the two-party system. One of the convention resolutions said: “The experience of this election campaign (in November 1944—Auth.) has fully confirmed the correctness of our decision to abstain from and discourage any move in the direction of a third party. We reaffirm that decision and reject any and all proposals for a third party."  [158•2  Here, on the question 159 of a third party, the CIO convention was in full accord with the AFL.

p However, while the CIO adhered to its former line toward strengthening unity of actions with the AFL, the latter was still openly hostile to the idea and declared that it did not wish to have any relations with the “splitters” from the CIO. At another point in the proceedings, the convention again demanded that the Little Steel formula be discarded.

p The delegates expressed great concern over the forthcoming reconversion, that is, the transition of the economy from war to peace. The character and substance of reconversion will be discussed in the next chapter, but here it is appropriate to point out how much this problem disturbed labor as the war was drawing to a close. There were feelings of alarm over production cutbacks already begun and the resultant rise in unemployment. Expressing the sentiments of the workers, delegates spoke of the need to maintain the existing level of employment after the war, to further increase wages and improve working conditions.

p In 1944-1945, the country was faced with the problem of determining the direction the economy should take. Big business, quite naturally, was interested in maintaining the wartime level of profits at any cost. The workers’ objectives, however, were to maintain and raise the employment and wage levels reached during the war.

p The AFL leaders were as concerned as everyone else about postwar development. As early as December 1942 Green had appointed a committee headed by Matthew Woll to draw up measures for the economy’s transition from war to peace. A report of the executive council to the AFL convention in 1944 outlined the basic provisions, which included: demobilization and conversion of war production to peacetime production; measures to ensure full employment; unconditional acceptance of the free collective bargaining system; increases in the hourly wage rates; elimination of all controls in industry and agriculture; public works for the unemployed right after the war, financed by federal and state agencies.

p In March 1945, President Roosevelt invited the AFL and CIO to participate in a meeting with representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers and the US Chamber of 160 Commerce. They discussed the coming reconversion and drew up a code of principles called the New Charter for Labor and Management. This document stipulated the need for cooperation between labor and management. The basis for this partnership was outlined in seven points listed in the concluding part. They included far-reaching promises that would guarantee business prosperity, reasonable profits, the immutability of private property and free competition, and non-interference by the government in the economy. The Charter also recognized the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, and reaffirmed the independence and dignity of the individual.  [160•1 

p It would seem that such a declaration, so bourgeois in content and demagogic in form, should have fully satisfied the representatives of business. In fact, however, the NAM representatives refused to sign this New Charter, apparently deciding to hold off until the forthcoming national conference of industry, labor and the government. The stumbling block was the point about the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. The monopolies were more interested in depriving the unions of this powerful weapon.

p Members of Congress, too, were concerned with problems of the postwar period. As early as October 13, 1943, Senator Ferguson (Republican, Michigan) sent Philip Murray a letter saying that some of his friends from the business world had discussed with him certain phases of postwar planning which he thought might be of interest to organized labor. He suggested certain fields of collaboration between organized labor, financial institutions and business management. In conclusion he offered to meet with Murray at the Pittsburgh headquarters of the United Steelworkers to discuss this question.  [160•2  On October 18, Murray sent Ferguson an affirmative reply, agreeing on the importance of the question. He also advised that the CIO had already created a special Committee on Post-War Planning.  [160•3  The executive board of the CIO 161 instructed Raymond Walsh, director of the research department, to draw up a plan outlining preparations for reconversion.

p Letters similar in tone to Ferguson’s were sent by other members of Congress to leaders of the AFL and Railroad Brotherhoods.

p Congress was becoming more and more involved in problems of reconversion. On March 29, 1944, Senator Harley Kilgore (Dem., West Virginia) introduced a bill providing for certain measures connected with the transition of the economy to a peacetime footing. It called for the creation of a Program Bureau, whose job would include maintaining the existing levels of production and employment in the post-war period. The bill provided for job placement of demobilized servicemen, and the same plus severance pay and dependents’ allowances for workers thrown out of work at closed-down war plants. It proposed that the government and employers should bear the expense of retraining former servicemen and the jobless who needed new trades.

p The AFL, CIO and Railroad Brotherhoods backed this bill. But while it suited the labor unions it did not meet with the goals and interests of big business and the government. Setting aside the Kilgore bill, Congress debated a number of other bills relating to reconversion that they felt were more acceptable. Following a debate on one such bill, Congress passed two laws on October 3, 1944. One of these amended the Social Security Act to provide a national program for mobilization and reconversion.  [161•1  The other, Surplus Property Act, was to aid the reconversion from a war to a peace economy through the distribution of government surplus property.  [161•2  It was on the basis of the latter act that the government undertook the selling of war plants built during the war. This is something the big business lobbyists worked hard for.

p The capitalists were disturbed by the fact that the government had acquired a vast amount of property during the war in the form of war plants. The big industrialists were not averse to laying their hands on this property on advantageous terms. 162 The war in Germany was still raging, yet the corporations were trying to speed up the liquidation of government property. They called government ownership a “dangerous experiment" leading to the “socialization” of the free society. The sale of war surpluses began essentially in late 1945, but the ideological preparation for reconversion took place during the last two years of the war as the relevant legislation was being worked out.

p In the spring of 1945, the Axis powers were on the brink of utter defeat, and the American people played an active role in bringing this about.

p From December 7, 1941 to August 14, 1945, the American armed forces suffered 1.1 million casualties in dead and wounded, including 407,800 killed or mortally wounded.  [162•1 

p The participation of the working people of America differed in many ways from the role played by the peoples of the Soviet Union, Britain, China and the occupied countries. But the American contribution to the cause of crushing fascism was nonetheless substantial.

p Although American losses were relatively small compared with those suffered by other countries, particularly the USSR (20 million), the efforts of American working men and women in the production of arms and other materials were significant. Also, they displayed solidarity with the workers of all the Allied nations. In 1941, when the US was still neutral, they campaigned for rendering aid with arms and strategic materials to the Soviet Union, Britain and China. Progressive workers took an active part in the movement for opening the second front in Europe in 1942-1943. And when the second front was finally opened, American workers in uniform fought on that front together with British and Canadian forces and shook hands with the Soviet troops on the Elbe.

p On April 12, 1945, on the very eve of the Allied victory, President Roosevelt died. In a speech he had prepared shortly before his death he expressed the desire of the American people to see a world without wars. In accordance with the Constitution, Vice-President Harry Truman became President of the United States. Upon entering the White House he 163 assured the American people that he would continue Roosevelt’s political course. Later events, however, showed that the new president embarked on a different road, one fraught with danger for the cause of peace.

p During the last months of the war friendly relations between the American and Soviet peoples progressed. Leaders and many rank-and-file members of American and Soviet trade unions were exchanging letters, and the AUCCTU and the CIO maintained a lively correspondence. Many unions of the two countries exchanged messages, especially on May Day and Labor Day. On May 1, 1944, the members of Local 6 of the Building Service Employees Union of Seattle, Washington, expressed confidence that the United States and the Soviet Union would continue their united efforts after victory was achieved to guarantee a prosperous world and lasting peace.  [163•1 

p In a letter dated November 17, 1944, the AUCCTU greeted the delegates to the seventh CIO convention and expressed confidence in an early victory over the common enemy.  [163•2  On Labor Day 1944, the AUCCTU congratulated the members of the AFL unions on the occasion of the national holiday, and added: “We are confident that the post-war years will be put to maximum use for a speedy elimination of the consequences of the war, for strengthening peace and establishing fraternal international working-class concord."  [163•3  However, Green thought along different lines and did not bother to reply.

p Speaking for the CIO, Murray wrote to the AUCCTU on May 29, 1945, proposing that the two organizations exchange delegations. In July and August of that year, an AUCCTU delegation visited New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia and saw many manifestations of the friendly attitude of American workers to the Soviet Union. This kind of relationship was one of the important political results of the cooperation of the two nations in the dramatic years of World War II. A CIO delegation including Carey, Haywood, Curran and Rieve paid a return visit to the Soviet Union in October, at the time when Soviet and British trade unions and CIO 164 organizations were deeply involved in creating the World Federation of Trade Unions.

p On November 23, 1945, in a reply to the AUCCTU proposal that an American-Soviet Trade Union Committee be established, Murray wrote that the executive board of the CIO endorsed the proposal and had appointed a committee composed of himself, Hillman, R.J.Thomas, Fitzgerald and Lee Pressman.  [164•1  The CIO unions responded favorably to this decision and many of them wrote to Moscow expressing their hopes for strengthening cooperation in the postwar years.

The Soviet trade unions expressed similar sentiments. A typical letter was one from the Soviet aircraft and automobile workers’ unions to the delegates of a convention of their American counterparts. It said: “We hope that the friendship of the workers of the democratic countries that was born in the trying days of the war will be instrumental in further uniting the efforts of the freedom-loving peoples in postwar reconstruction."  [164•2