711

p Appendix II

p The question is again being raised in our literature: what path will the economic development of Russia follow? It is being discussed lengthily and passionately, so passionately that people who are known in common parlance as sensible minds are even perturbed by what would seem the excessive heat of the contending parties. Why, the sensible ones say, get excited and hurl proud challenges and bitter reproaches at your opponents? Why jeer at them? Would it not be better to examine dispassionately a question which is indeed of immense importance to our country, but which, just because of its immense importance, calls for dispassionate examination?

p As always, the sensible minds are right and wrong at one and the same time. Why, indeed, such excitement and passion on the part of writers belonging to two different camps each of which— whatever its opponents might say—is striving to the best of its understanding, strength and ability to uphold the most important and most essential interests of the people? Evidently, the question has only to be put to have it answered immediately and once and for all with the help of two or three platitudes which might find a place in any copybook, such as: tolerance is a good thing; respect the opinions of others even if they radically differ from your own, and so on. All this is very true, and it has been "told the world" a very long time now. But it is no less true that human beings were, are, and will be inclined to get passionate wherever the issue affected, affects, or will affect their vital interests. Such is human nature—we might have said, if we did not know how often and how greatly this expression has been abused. Nor is this the whole matter. The chief thing is that we human beings have no reason to regret that such is our “nature”. No great step in history has ever been taken without the aid of passion, which, multiplying as it does the moral strength and sharpening the intellectual faculties of people, is itself a great force of progress. Only such social questions are discussed dispassionately as are quite unimportant in themselves, or have not yet become immediate questions for the 712 given country and the given period, and are therefore of interest only to a handful of arm-chair thinkers. But once a big social question has become an immediate question, it will infallibly arouse strong passions, no matter how earnestly the advocates of moderation may call for calmness.

p The question of the economic development of our country is precisely that great social question which we cannot now discuss with moderation for the simple reason that it has become an immediate question. This of course does not mean that economics has only now acquired decisive importance in our social development. It has always and everywhere been of such importance. But in our country—as everywhere else—this importance has not always been consciously recognised by people interested in social matters, and their passion was therefore concentrated on questions that had only the most remote relation to economics. Recall, for instance, the 40s in our country. Not so now. Now the great and fundamental importance of economics is realised in our country even by those who passionately revolt against Marx’s “narrow” theory of history. Now all thinking people realise that our whole future will be shaped by the way the question of our economic development is answered. That indeed is why even thinkers who are anything but “narrow” concentrate all their passion on this question. But if we cannot now discuss this question with moderation, we can and should see to it even now that there is no licence either in the defining of our own thoughts or in our polemical methods. This is a demand to which no objection can possibly be offered. Westerners know very well that earnest passion precludes all licence. In our country, to be sure, it is still sometimes believed that passion and licence are kin sisters, but it is time we too became civilised.

p As far as the literary decencies are concerned, it is apparent that we are already civilised to quite a considerable degree—so considerable that our “progressive”, Mr. Mikhailovsky, lectures the Germans (Marx, Engels, Diihring) because in their controversies one may allegedly find things "that are absolutely fruitless, or which distort things and repel by their rudeness”. Mr. Mikhailovsky recalls Borne’s remark that the Germans "have always been rude in controversy"! "And I am afraid,” he adds, "that together with other German influences, this traditional German rudeness has also penetrated into our country, aggravated moreover by our own barbarousness, so that controversy becomes the tirade against Potok-Bogatyr which Count A. Tolstoy puts into the mouth of his princess:

p ҉۪You cadger, mumper, ignorant sot!
Plague on your entrails, may you rot!

713

p You calf, pig, swine, you Ethiop,
You devil’s spawn, you dirty snob!
Were it not that my virginal shame
Forbids me stronger words to name,
’Tis not such oaths, you insolent cad,
I’d shower down upon your head.”~’  [713•* ~^^490^^

p This is not the first time Mr. Mikhailovsky alludes to Tolstoy’s coarse-mouthed princess. He has on many a previous occasion advised Russian writers not to resemble her in their controversies. Excellent advice, there’s no denying. ’Tis only a pity that our author does not always follow it himself. We know, for example, that he called one of his opponents a louse, and another a literary acrobat. He ornamented his controversy with M. de la Cerda with the following remark: "Of all the European languages, it is only in the Spanish that the word la cerda has a definite signification, meaning in Russian pig.” Why the author had to say this, it is hard to imagine.

p “Nice, is it not? " M. dc la Cerda observed in this connection. Yes, very nice, and quite in the spirit of Tolstoy’s princess. But the princess was blunter, and when she felt like swearing she shouted simply: calf, pig, swine, etc., and did not do violence to foreign languages in order to say a rude word to her opponent.

p Comparing Mr. Mikhailovsky with Tolstoy’s princess, we find that he scorns such words as “Ethiop”, "devil’s spawn" and so on, and concentrates, if we may say so, on rude epithets. We find him using “swine” and “pig”, and pigs moreover of the most different kinds: Hamletiscd, green, etc. Very forcible this, if rather monotonous. Generally speaking, if we turn from the vituperative vocabulary of Tolstoy’s princess to that of our subjective sociologist, we sec that the living charms bloom in different pattern, but in power and expressiveness they are in no way inferior to the polemical charms of the lively princess. "Est modus in rebus (there is a measure in all things.—Ed.) or, as the Russian has it, you must know where to stop,” says Mr. Mikhailovsky. Nothing could be truer, and we heartily regret that our worthy sociologist often forgets it. He might tragically exclaim:

p Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor!   [713•** ~^^491^^

p However, it is to be hoped that in time Mr. Mikhailovsky too will become civilised, that in the end his good intentions will prevail over "our own barbarousness”, and he will cease hurling 714 “swine” and “pig” at his opponents. Mr. Mikhailovsky himself rightly thinks that la raison finit toujours par avoir raison. ( Reason always triumphs in the end.—Ed.)

p Our reading public no longer approves of virulent controversy. But, in its disapproval, it confuses virulence with rudeness, when they arc very far from being the same. The vast difference between virulence and rudeness was explained by Pushkin:

p Abuse at times, of course, is quite unseemly.
You must not write, say: "This old dodderer’s
A goat in spectacles, a wretched slanderer,
Vicious and vile. "—These are personalities.
But you may write and print, if so you will,
That "this Parnassian Old Believer is
(In his articles) a senseless jabberer,
For ever languorous, for ever tedious,
Ponderous, and even quite a dullard”.
For here there is no person, only an author.^^492^^

p If, like Tolstoy’s princess or Mr. Mikhailovsky, you should think of calling your opponent a “swine” or a “louse”, these "are personalities”; but if you should argue that such and such a sociological or historical-sophistical or economic Old Believer is, in his articles, “works” or “essays”, "for ever languorous, for ever tedious, ponderous and even" ... dull-witted, well "here there is no person, only an author”, and it will be virulence, not rudeness. Your verdict, of course, may be mistaken, and your opponents will be doing well if they disclose your mistake. But they will have the right to accuse you only ol a mistake, not of virulence, for without such virulence literature cannot develop. If literature should attempt to get along without virulence, it would at once become, as Belinsky expressed it, a flattering rciterator of stale platitudes, which only its enemies can wish it.

p Mr. Mikhailovsky’s observation regarding the traditional German rudeness and our own barbarousness was provoked by Mr. N. Beltov’s "interesting book”, The Development of the Monist View of History. Many have accused Mr. Beltov of unnecessary virulence. For instance, a Russkaya Mysl reviewer has written in reference to his book: "Without sharing the, in our opinion one-sided, theory of economic materialism, we would be prepared in the interest of science and our social life to welcome the exponents of this theory, if some of them (Messrs. Struve and Beltov) did not introduce far too much virulence into their polemics, if they did not jeer at writers whose works are worthy of respect! "^^493^^

p This was written in the selfsame Russkaya Mysl which only a little while ago was calling the advocates of “economic” materialism “numskulls” and asserting that Mr. P. Struve’s book was a 715 product of undigested erudition and a total incapacity for logical thinking. Russkaya Mysl does not like excessive virulence and therefore, as the reader sees, spoke of the advocates of economic materialism in the mildest terms. Now it is prepared, in the interest of science and our social life, to welcome the exponents of this theory. But why? Can much be done for our social life by numskulls? Can science gain much from undigested erudition and a total incapacity for logical thinking? It seems to us that fear of excessive virulence is leading Russkaya Mysl too far and compelling it to say things that might induce the reader to suspect it itself of being incapable of digesting something, and of a certain incapacity for logical thinking.

p Mr. P. Struve never resorts to virulence (to say nothing of excessive virulence), and if Mr. Beltov does, it is only to the kind of which Pushkin would probably have said that it refers only to authors and is therefore quite permissible. The Russkaya Mysl reviewer maintains that the works of the writers Mr. Beltov derides are worthy of respect. If Mr. Beltov shared this opinion, it would of course be wrong of him to deride them. But what if he is convinced of the contrary? What if the “works” of these gentlemen seem to him tedious and ponderous, and quite vacuous, and even pernicious in our day, when social life has become so complicated and demands a new mental effort on the part of those who are not in the habit, to use Gogol’s expression, of "picking their noses" as they look on the world. To the Russkaya Mysl reviewer these writers may probably seem regular torches of light, beacons of salvation. But, what if Mr. Beltov considers them extinguishers and mind-druggers? The reviewer will say that Mr. Beltov is mistaken. That is his right; but he has to prove his opinion, and not content himself with simply condemning "excessive virulence”. What is the reviewer’s opinion of Grech and Bulgarin? We are confident that if he were to express it, a certain section of our press would consider it excessively virulent. Would that mean that the Russkaya Mysl reviewer is not entitled to say frankly what he thinks of the literary activities of Grech and Bulgarin? We do not of course bracket the people with whom Messrs. P. Struve and N. Beltov are disputing in the same category as Grech and Bulgarin. But we would ask the Russkaya Mysl reviewer why literary decency permits one to speak virulently of Grech and Bulgarin, but forbids one to do so of Messrs. Mikhailovsky and Kareyev? The reviewer evidently thinks that there is no beast stronger than the cat,^^494^^ and that the cat, therefore, in distinction to other beasts, deserves particularly respectful treatment. But, after all, one has the right to doubt that. We, for instance, think that the subjective cat is not only a beast that is not very strong, but even one that has quite 716 considerably degenerated, and is therefore not deserving of any particular respect. We are prepared to argue with the reviewer if he does not agree with us, but before entering into argument we would request him to ponder well on the difference which undoubtedly exists between virulence of judgement and rudeness of literary expression. Messrs. Struve and Beltov have expressed judgements which to very many may seem virulent. But has either of them ever resorted, in defence of his opinions, to such coarse abuse as that which has been resorted to time and again in his literary skirmishes by Mr. Mikhailovsky, that veritable Miles Gloriosus (Glorious Warrior.—Ed.) of our “progressive” literature? Neither of them has done so, and the Russkaya Mysl reviewer would himself give them credit for this if he were to reflect on the difference we have indicated between virulence of judgement and coarseness of expression.

p Incidentally, this Russkaya Mysl reviewer says: "Mr. Beltov unceremoniously, to say the least, scatters accusations to the effect that such and such a writer talks of Marx without having read his works, condemns the Hegelian philosophy without having acquainted himself with it personally, etc. It would be well, of course, if he did not at the same time commit blunders himself, especially on most essential points. Yet precisely about Hegel Mr. Beltov talks the wildest nonsense: ’If modern natural science,’ we read on p. 86 of the book in question (p. 557 of this edition.—Ed.), ’confirms at every step the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into quality, can we say that it has nothing in common with Hegelianism?’ But the misfortune is, Mr. Beltov, that Hegel did not affirm this and argued the very opposite: with him, ’quality passes into quantity’."

p If we were to say what we thought of the reviewer’s notion of Hegel’s philosophy, our judgement would probably seem to him "excessively virulent”. But the blame would not be ours. We can assure the reviewer that very virulent judgements of his philosophical knowledge were passed by all who read his review and have any acquaintance at all with the history of philosophy.

p One cannot, of course, insist that every reviewer must have a thorough philosophical education, but one can insist that he does not take the liberty of arguing about matters of which he has no knowledge. Otherwise, very “virulent” things will be said of him by people who are acquainted with the subject.

p In Part I of his Encyclopaedia, in an addendum to § 108, on Measure, Hegel says: "to the extent that quality and quantity are still differentiated and are not altogether identical, these two definitions are to some degree independent of each other, so that, on the one hand, the quantity may change without the quality of the object changing, but, on the other, its increase or decrease, to 717 which the object is at first indifferent, has a limit beyond which the quality changes. Thus, for example, alterations in the temperature of water at first do not affect its liquid state, but if the temperature is further increased or decreased, there comes a point when this state of cohesion undergoes a qualitative change and the water is transformed into steam or into ice. It seems at first that the quantitative change has no effect whatever on the essential nature of the object, but there is something else behind it, and this apparently simple change of quantity has the effect of changing the quality."^^495^^

p “The misfortune is, Mr. Beltov, that Hegel did not affirm this and argued the very opposite! " Do you still think that this is the misfortune, Mr. Reviewer?   [717•*  Or perhaps you have now changed your opinion on this matter? And if you have, what is really the misfortune? We could tell you if we were not afraid that you would accuse us of excessive virulence.

p We repeat that one cannot insist that every reviewer must be acquainted with the history of philosophy. The misfortune of the Russkaya Mysl reviewer is therefore not as great as might appear at first glance. But "the misfortune is" that this misfortune is not the reviewer’s last. There is a second which is the main and worse than the first: he did not take the trouble to read the book he was reviewing.

p On pp. 75-76 of his book (p. 548 of this edition.—Ed.) Mr. Beltov gives a rather long excerpt from Hegel’s Greater Logic ( Wissenschaft der Logik) (The Science of Logic.—Ed. ). Here is the beginning of the excerpt: "Changes in being consist not only in the fact that one quantity passes into another quantity, but also that quality passes into quantity, and vice versa, etc.” (p. 75).

p If the reviewer had at least read this excerpt he would not have fallen into misfortune, because then he would not have “affirmed” that "Hegel did not affirm this and argued the very opposite".

p We know how the majority of reviews are written in Russia—and not only Russia, unfortunately. The reviewer runs through the book, rapidly scanning, say, every tenth or twentieth page and marking the passages which seem to him most characteristic. He then writes out these passages and accompanies them with expressions of censure or approval: he "is perplexed”, he "very much regrets”, or he "heartily welcomes"-and, hey presto! the review is ready. One can imagine how much nonsense is printed as a result, especially if (as not infrequently happens) the reviewer 718 has no knowledge whatever of the subject discussed in the book he is examining!

p It would not enter our heads to recommend reviewers to rid themselves of this bad habit completely: only the grave can cure the hunchback. All the same, they ought at least to take their business a little more seriously when—as in the dispute on Russia’s economic development, for example—the vital interests of our country are concerned. Do they really propose to go on misleading the reading public on this subject, too, with their frivolous reviews? After all—as Mr. Mikhailovsky rightly says—one must know when to stop.

p Mr. Mikhailovsky is likewise displeased with Mr. Beltov’s polemical methods. "Mr. Beltov,” he says, "is a man of talent and is not devoid of wit, but with him unfortunately it often passes into unpleasant buffoonery."^^496^^ Why buffoonery? And to whom, indeed, is Mr. Beltov’s alleged buffoonery unpleasant?

p When, in the 60s, Sovremennik scoffed at Pogodin, say, it probably seemed to Pogodin that the journal was guilty of unpleasant buffoonery. And it seemed so not only to Pogodin alone, but to all who were accustomed to respect the Moscow historian. Was there any lack of attacks in those days on "the knights of the whistle"^^497^^ ? Was there any lack of people who were outraged by the "schoolboyish pranks of the whistlers"? Well, in our opinion, the brilliant wit of the “whistlers” never passed into unpleasant buffoonery; and if the people they scoffed at thought otherwise, it was only because of that human weakness which led Amos Fyodorovich Lyapkin-Tyapkin^^498^^ to consider "far too long" the letter in which he was described as "very much of a boor".

p “So that’s it! You mean to suggest that Mr. Beltov possesses the wit of Dobrolyubov and his fellow-contributors to The Whistle? Well, that’s the limit! "—will exclaim those who find Mr. Beltov’s polemical methods "not nice".

p But wait a moment, sirs! We are not comparing Mr. Beltov with the “whistlers” of the 60s; we are only saying that it is not for Mr. Mikhailovsky to judge whether, and where exactly, Mr. Beltov’s wit passes into unpleasant buffoonery. Who can be a judge in his own case?

p But Mr. Mikhailovsky not only accuses Mr. Beltov of " unpleasant buffoonery”. He levels a very serious charge against him. To make it easier for the reader to understand what it is all about, we shall allow Mr. Mikhailovsky to formulate his charge in his own words:

p “In one of my articles in Russkaya Mysl I recalled my acquaintance with the late N. I. Sieber and incidentally said that when discussing the future of capitalism that worthy savant ’used all possible arguments, but at the least danger hid behind 719 the authority of the immutable and unquestionable tripartite dialectical development’. Citing these words of mine, Mr. Beltov writes: ’We had more than once to converse with the deceased, and never did we hear from him references to dialectical development; he himself said more than once that he was quite ignorant of the significance of Hegel in the development of modern economics. Of course, everything can be blamed on the dead, and therefore Mr. Mikhailovsky’s evidence is irrefutable! ’ I would put it differently: everything cannot always be blamed on the dead, and Mr. Beltov’s evidence is fully refutable....

p “In 1879 an article of Sieber’s was printed in the magazine Slovo, entitled: ’The Application of Dialectics to Science’.^^499^^ This (unfinished) article was a paraphrase, even almost entirely a translation, of Engels’ Herrn Diihrings Umwalzung der Wissenscha/t.  [719•*  Well, to remain, after having translated this book, ’quite ignorant of the significance of Hegel in the development of modern economies’ would have been fairly difficult not only for Sieber but even for Potok-Bogatyr in the princess’s polemical description quoted above. This, I think, must be clear to Mr. Beltov himself. In any case, I shall quote a few words from Sieber’s brief foreword: ’Engels’ book deserves particular attention both because of the consistency and aptness of the philosophical and socioeconomic concepts it expounds, and because, in order to explain the practical application of the method of dialectical contradictions, it gives several new illustrations and factual examples which in no little degree facilitate a close acquaintance with this so strongly praised and at the same time so strongly deprecated method of investigating the truth. One might probably say that this is the first time in the existence of what is called dialectics that it is presented to the eyes of the reader in so realistic a light.’

p “Hence Sieber was acquainted with the significance of Hegel in the development of modern economics; he was greatly interested in ’the method of dialectical contradictions’. Such is the truth, documentarily certified, and it fully decides the piquant question of who is lying for two."  [719•** 

p The truth, especially when documentarily certified, is an excellent thing! Also in the interest of truth we shall carry on just a little further the quotation given by Mr. Mikhailovsky from Sieber’s article, "The Application of Dialectics to Science".

p Right after the words that conclude the passage Mr. Mikhailovsky quoted, Sieber makes the following remark: "However, we for our part shall refrain from passing judgement as to the worth of this method in application to the various branches of science, 720 and also as to whether it represents or does not represent—to the extent that actual significance may be attached to it—a mere variation or even prototype of the method of the theory of evolution or universal development. It is precisely in this latter sense that the author regards it; or, at least, he endeavours to indicate a confirmation of it with the help of the truths obtained by the theory of evolution—and it must be confessed that in a certain respect quite a considerable resemblance is here revealed."

p We thus see that the late Russian economist, even after having translated Engels’ Herr Eugen Diihring’s Revolution in Science, still remained in ignorance of the significance of Hegel in the development of modern economics, and even, generally, whether dialectics could be suitably applied to the various branches of science. At all events, he was unwilling to pass judgement on it. And so we ask: is it likely that this selfsame Sieber, who did not venture to judge of the suitability of dialectics generally, yet in his disputes with Mr. Mikhailovsky "at the least danger hid behind the authority of the immutable and unquestionable dialectical development"? Why was it only in these cases that Sieber changed his usually irresolute opinion of dialectics? Was it because he stood in too great a “danger” of being demolished by his terrible opponent? Scarcely! Sieber, with his very weighty fund of knowledge, was the last person to whom such an opponent could have been “dangerous”.

p Yes, indeed, an excellent thing is truth documentarily certified! Mr. Mikhailovsky is absolutely right when he says that it fully decides the piquant question of who is lying for two!

p But if the "Russian soul”, having incarnated itself in the person of a certain individual, undoubtedly resorts to distorting the truth, it is not content with distorting it for two only once; for the late Sieber alone it distorts it twice: once when it asserts that Sieber hid behind the authority of the triad, and again, when, with astonishing presumption, it cites the very statement that proves up to the hilt that Mr. Beltov is right.

p Fie, fie, Mr. Mikhailovsky!

p “It would be difficult to remain in ignorance of the significance of Hegel in the development of modern economics after having translated Engels’ Duhring’s Revolution,” Mr. Mikhailovsky exclaims. Is it really so difficult? Not at all, in our opinion. It would really have been difficult for Sieber, having translated the said book, to remain in ignorance of Engels’ (and, of course, Marx’s) opinion of the significance of Hegel in the development of the said science. Of that opinion, Sieber was not ignorant, as is self-evident and as follows from his foreword. But Sieber might not be content with the opinion of others. As a serious scientist who does not rely on the opinion of others but is accustomed to 721 studying a subject first-hand, he, though he knew Engels’ opinion of Hegel, did not consider himself for all that entitled to say: "I am acquainted with Hegel and his role in the history of development of scientific concepts.” This modesty of a scientist may perhaps be incomprehensible to Mr. Mikhailovsky; he himself tells us that he "does not claim" to be acquainted with Hegel’s philosophy, yet he has the presumption to discuss it very freely. But quod licet bovi, non licet Jovi. Having all his life been nothing but a smart journalist, Mr. Mikhailovsky possesses the presumption natural to members of this calling. But he has forgotten the difference between him and men of science. Thanks to this forgetfulness, he ventured to say things that make it quite clear that the “soul” is certainly "lying for two”.

p Fie, fie, Mr. Mikhailovsky!

p But is it only for two that the worthy “soul” is distorting the truth? The reader will perhaps remember the incident of Mr. Mikhailovsky’s “omission” of the "moment of flowering”. The omission of this “flowering” is of "vast significance”; it shows that he has distorted the truth also for Engels. Why has not Mr. Mikhailovsky said a single word about this instructive episode?

p Fie, fie, Mr. Mikhailovsky!

But do you know what? Perhaps the "Russian soul" is not distorting the truth; perhaps, poor thing, it is telling the sheerest truth. Its veracity will be above all suspicion if we only assume that Sieber was just playing a joke on the young writer, was trying to frighten him with the “triad”.  Indeed, that looks like the truth: Mr. Mikhailovsky assures us that Sieber was familiar with the dialectical method; being familiar with this method, Sieber must have known very well that the celebrated triad never did play the role of an argument with Hegel. On the other hand, Mr. Mikhailovsky, not being familiar with Hegel, might in conversation with Sieber have expressed the thought—which later he expressed time and again—that the whole argumentation of Hegel and the Hegelians consisted in invoking the triad. This must have been amusing to Sieber, so he began calling in the triad to tease the excitable but ill-informed young man. Of course, if Sieber had foreseen into what a deplorable position his interlocutor would in time land as a result of his joke, he certainly would have refrained from it. But this he could not foresee, and so he allowed himself to joke at Mr. Mikhailovsky’s expense. The latter’s veracity is beyond all doubt if our assumption is correct. Let Mr. Mikhailovsky dig down into his memory: perhaps he will recall some circumstance which shows that our assumption is not altogether unfounded. We, for our part, would be heartily glad to hear of some such circumstance that would save the honour of the "Russian soul”. Mr. Beltov would be glad too, of course.

46-755 722

p Mr. Mikhailovsky is a very amusing fellow. He is much annoyed with Mr. Beltov for having said that in the “discoveries” of our subjective sociologist the "Russian mind and Russian soul repeats old stuff and lies for two”. Mr. Mikhailovsky believes that, while Mr. Beltov is not responsible for the substance of the quotation, he may nevertheless be held responsible for choosing it. Only the rudeness of our polemical manners compels our worthy sociologist to admit that to level this rebuke at Mr. Beltov would be too much of a subtlety. But where did Mr. Beltov borrow this “quotation”? He borrowed it from Pushkin. Eugene Onegin was of the opinion that in all our journalism the Russian mind and Russian soul repeats old stuff and lies for two. Can Pushkin be held responsible for his hero’s virulent opinion? Till now, as we know, nobody has ever thought—although it is very likely—that Onegin was expressing the opinion of the great poet himself. But now Mr. Mikhailovsky would like to hold Mr. Beltov responsible for not finding anything in his, Mr. Mikhailovsky’s, writings save a repetition of old stuff and "lying for two”. Why so? Why must this “quotation” not be applied to the “works” of our sociologist? Probably because these works, in the eyes of this sociologist, deserve far more respectful treatment. But, in Mr. Mikhailovsky’s own words, "this is debatable".

p “The fact is,” says Mr. Mikhailovsky, "that in this passage Mr. Beltov has not convicted me of any lies; he just blethered, to make it sound hotter, and used the quotation as a fig leaf" (p. 140). Why “blethered”, and not "expressed his firm conviction"? What is the meaning of the sentence: Mr. Mikhailovsky in his articles repeats old stuff and lies for two? It means that Mr. Mikhailovsky is only pronouncing old opinions that have long been refuted in the West, and in doing so, adds to the errors of Westerners his own, home-grown errors. Is it really absolutely necessary to use "a fig leaf when expressing such an opinion of Mr. Mikhailovsky’s literary activities? Mr. Mikhailovsky is convinced that such an opinion can only be “blether”, and not the fruit of a serious and thoughtful evaluation. But—again to use his own words—this is debatable.

p The writer of these lines declares quite calmly and deliberately, and without feeling the need for any fig leaf, that in his conviction ; not very high opinion of Mr. Mikhailovsky’s “works” is the beginning of all wisdom

p But if, when speaking of the "Russian soul”, Mr. Beltov did not convict Mr. Mikhailovsky of any lie, why did our “sociologist” pick precisely on this “quotation” to start the luckless conflict over Sieber? Probably in order to make it sound “hotter”. In reality, there is nothing hot at all about methods like these, but there are people to whom they seem very hot indeed. In one of 723 G. I. Uspensky’s sketches an official’s wife is quarrelling with a janitor. The janitor happens to use the word podlye (near.—Ed.). "What,” cries the official’s wife, "I’m podlaya (vile.—Ed.), am I? I’ll show you! I have a son serving in Poland”, etc., etc. Like the official’s wife, Mr. Mikhailovsky pounces upon an individual word, and heatedly cries: "I’m lying for two, am I? You dare to doubt my veracity? Well, now I’ll convict you of lying for many. Just look what you said about Sieber!" We look at what Mr. Beltov said about Sieber, and find that he spoke the honest truth. Die Moral von der Geschichte (the moral of the story.—Ed.) is that excessive heat can lead to no good either for officials’ wives or for Mr. Mikhailovsky.

p “Mr. Beltov undertook to prove that the final triumph of materialist monism was established by the so-called theory of economic materialism in history, which theory is held to stand in the closest connection with ’general philosophical materialism’. With this end in view, Mr. Beltov made an excursion into the history of philosophy. How desultory and incomplete this excursion is may be judged even from the titles of the chapters devoted to it: ’French Materialism of the Eighteenth Century’, ’French Historians of the Restoration’, ’Utopians’, ’Idealist German Philosophy’, ’Modern Materialism’" (p. 146). Again Mr. Mikhailovsky gets heated without any need, and again his heatedness leads him to no good. If Mr. Beltov had been writing even a brief sketch of the history of philosophy, an excursion in which he passed from French materialism of the eighteenth century to the French historians of the Restoration, from these historians to the Utopia/is, from the Utopians to the German idealists, etc., would indeed be desultory and incomprehensible. But the whole point is that it was not a history of philosophy that Mr. Beltov was writing. On the very first page of his book he said that he intended to give a brief sketch of the theory that is wrongly called economic materialism. He found some faint rudiments of this theory among the French materialists and showed that these rudiments were considerably developed by the French historical specialists of the Restoration; then he turned to men who were not historians by profession, but who nevertheless had to give much thought to cardinal problems of man’s historical development, that is, the Utopians and the German philosophers. He did not by a long way enumerate all the eighteenth-century materialists, Restoration historians, Utopians, or dialectical idealists. But he mentioned the chief of them, those who had contributed more than others to the question that interested him. He showed that’ all these richly endowed and highly informed men got themselves entangled in contradictions from which the only logical way out was Marx’s theory of history. In a word, il prenait son bien ou il le trouvait. 724 (He took his goods wherever he found them.—Ed.) What objection can be raised to this method? And why doesn’t Mr. Mikhailovsky like it?

p If Mr. Mikhailovsky has not only read Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach and Duhring’s Revolution in Science, but also—which is more important—understood them, he knows for himself what importance the views of the French materialists of the last century, the French historians of the Restoration, the Utopians and the dialectical idealists had in the development of the ideas of Marx and Engels. Mr. Beltov underscored this importance by giving a brief description of what in this respect was most essential in the views of the first, the second, the third, and the fourth. Mr. Mikhailovsky contemptuously shrugs his shoulders at this description; he does not like Mr. Beltov’s plan. To which we rejoin that every plan is a good plan if it helps its author to attain his end. And that Mr. Beltov’s end was attained, is not, as far as we know, denied even by his opponents.

p Mr. Mikhailovsky continues:

p “Mr. Beltov speaks both of the French historians and the French ’Utopians’, and measures both by the extent of their understanding or non-understanding of economics as the foundation of the social edifice. But strangely enough, he makes no mention whatever of Louis Blanc, although the introduction to the Histoire de dix ans^^500^^ {History of Ten Years’} is in itself enough to give him a place of honour in the ranks of the first teachers of so-called economic materialism. In it, of course, there is much with which Mr. Beltov cannot agree, but in it there is the struggle of classes, and a description of their economic earmarks, and economics as the hidden mainspring of politics, and much, generally, that was later incorporated into the doctrine which Mr. Beltov defends so ardently. I mention this omission because, firstly, it is astonishing in itself and hints at certain parallel aims which have nothing in common with impartiality" (p. 150).

p Mr. Beltov spoke of Marx’s predecessors.  Louis Blanc was rather his contemporary.  To be sure, the Histoire de dix ans appeared at a time when Marx’s historical views had not yet finally evolved. But the book could not have had any decisive influence upon them, if only for the reason that Louis Blanc’s views regarding the inner springs of social development contained absolutely nothing new compared, say, with the views of Augustin Thierry or Guizot. It is quite true that "in it there is the struggle of classes, and a description of their economic earmarks, and economics”, etc. But all this was already in Thierry and Guizot and Mignet, as Mr. Beltov irrefutably showed. Guizot, who viewed things from the angle of the struggle of classes, sympathised with the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the 725 aristocracy, but was very hostile to the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie, which had just begun in his time. Louis Blanc did sympathise with this struggle.  [725•*  [In this he differed from Guizot. But the difference was not of an essential nature. It contributed nothing new to Louis Blanc’s view of "economics as the hidden mainspring of politics".!  [725•** 

p Louis Blanc, like Guizot, would have said that political constitutions are rooted in the social being of a nation, and that social being is determined in the final analysis by property relations; but where these property relations spring from was as little known to Louis Blanc as to Guizot. That is why, despite his “economics”, Louis Blanc, like Guizot, was compelled to revert to idealism.  That he was an idealist in his views of philosophy and history is known to everyone, even if he has not attended a seminary.  [725•*** 

p At the time the Histoire de dix ans appeared, the immediate problem of social science was the problem, solved “later” by Marx, where property relations spring from. On this question Louis Blanc had nothing new to say. It is natural to assume that it is precisely for this reason that Mr. Beltov said nothing about Louis Blanc. But Mr. Mikhailovsky prefers to make insinuations about parallel aims. Chacun a son gout! (Each has his own taste.—Ed.)

p In the opinion of Mr. Mikhailovsky, Mr. Beltov’s excursion into the history of philosophy "is even weaker than might have been thought from these (above-enumerated) chapter heads”. Why so? Why, because Mr. Beltov said that "Hegel called metaphysical the point of view of those thinkers—irrespective of whether they were idealists or materialists—who, not being able to understand the process of development of phenomena, willy-nilly represent them to themselves and others as petrified, disconnected, incapable of passing one into another. To this point ot view he opposed dialectics, which studies phenomena precisely in their development and, consequently, in their mutual connection”. To this, Mr. Mikhailovsky slyly observes: "Mr. Beltov considers himself an expert in the philosophy of Hegel. I should be glad to learn from him, as from any well-informed person, and for a beginning I would request Mr. Beltov to name the place in Hegel’s work from which he took this supposedly Hegelian definition of the ‘meta- 726 physical point of view’. I make bold to affirm that he will not be able to name it. To Hegel, metaphysics was the doctrine of the absolute essence of things, lying beyond the limits of experience and observation, of the innermost substratum of phenomena.... Mr. Beltov borrowed his supposedly Hegelian definition not from Hegel but from Engels (all in the same polemical work against Diihring), who quite arbitrarily divided metaphysics from dialectics by the earmark of immobility or fluidity" (p. 147 ).

p We do not know what Mr. Beltov will say in reply to this. But, "for a beginning”, we shall take the liberty, without awaiting his explanation, to reply to the worthy subjectivist ourselves.

p We turn to Part I of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, and there, in the addendum to § 31 (p. 57 of Mr. V. Chizhov’s Russian translation), we read: "The thinking of this metaphysics was not free and true in the objective sense, as it did not leave it to the object to develop freely out of itself and itself find its definitions, but took it as something ready-made.... This metaphysics is dogmatism, because, in accordance with the nature of final definitions, it had to assume that, of two antithetical assertions... one was necessarily true, and the other necessarily false" (§32, p. 58, of the same transla- tion).^^502^^

p Hegel is referring here to the old pre-Kantian metaphysics which, he observes, "has been torn out by the roots, has vanished from the ranks of science" “(ist sozusagen, mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet worden, aus der Reihe der Wissenschaften verschwunden! ”).  [726•*  To this metaphysics Hegel opposed his dialectical philosophy, which examines all phenomena in their development and in their interconnection, not as ready-made and separated from one another by a veritable gulf. "Only the whole is the truth,” he says, "but the whole reveals itself in all its fullness only through its development" “(Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwickelung sich vollendende Wesen”).  [726•**  Mr. Mikhailovsky asserts that Hegel fused metaphysics with dialectics, but the person he heard this from did not explain the thing to him properly. With Hegel, the dialectical factor is supplemented by the speculative factor, owing to which his philosophy becomes an idealist philosophy. As an idealist, Hegel did what all other idealists do: he attached particular philosophical importance to such “results” (concepts) as the old “metaphysics” also prized. But with him, thanks to the "dialectical factor”, these concepts (the Absolute in the various aspects of its development) appeared precisely as results, and not as original data. He dissolved metaphysics in logic, and for that reason he would have been very surprised to 727 hear that he, a speculative thinker, was being called a metaphysician ohne Weiteres. He would have said that people who called him that "lassen sich mit Thieren vergleichen, welche alle Tone einer Musik mit durchgehort haben, an deren Sinn aber das Eine, die Harmonic dieser Tone, nicht gekommen ist" ["might be compared to beasts who have heard all the sounds of a given piece of music, but have npt grasped the whole, the harmony of these sounds"] (the expression he himself used to brand learned pedants).

p We repeat, this speculative thinker, who despised the metaphysics of common sense (his own expression again), was an idealist, and in this sense had his own metaphysics of the reason. But did Mr. Beltov forget this or fail to mention it in his book? He neither forgot it, nor did he fail to mention it. He quoted from Die heilige Familie of Marx and Engels long passages in which Hegel’s “speculative” results are very mordantly criticised. We believe that these quoted passages bring out quite distinctly that dialectics must not be fused with what Mr. Mikhailovsky calls Hegel’s metaphysics.  Hence if Mr. Beltov forgot anything, it was only that, in view of the astonishing “indifference” of our “advanced” people to the history of philosophy, he should have taken care to explain how sharp was the distinction made in Hegel’s time between metaphysics and speculative philosophy.  [727•*  From all of which it follows that Mr. Mikhailovsky "makes bold to affirm" what cannot possibly be affirmed.

p Mr. Beltov says that Hegel called metaphysical even the point of view of those materialists who were unable to examine phenomena in their interconnection. Is this true or not? Well, take the trouble to read this page of §27, Part I of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia: "We find the fullest application of this point of view to philosophy in the old metaphysics, as expounded before Kant. However, the days of this metaphysics have passed only in respect to the history of philosophy; in itself, it continues to exist as always, representing the common sense view of objects.” What is this common sense view of objects? It is the old metaphysical view of objects, as opposed to the dialectical. All the materialist philosophy of the eighteenth century was essentially "common sense" philosophy: it was able to examine phenomena solely from the standpoint of final definitions. That Hegel was very well aware of this weak side of French materialism, as of eighteenth-century French philosophy generally, anyone can convince himself who takes the 728 trouble to read the pertinent passages in Part III of his Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophic. (Lectures on the History of Philosophy.—Ed.} Hence he could not but regard the view-point of the French materialists also as the old metaphysical view-point.  [728•*  Well then, is Mr. Beltov right or not? It is clear, we think, that he is absolutely right. Yet Mr. Mikhailovsky "makes bold to affirm".... However, neither Mr. Beltov nor the writer of these lines can do anything about that. Mr. Mikhailovsky’s trouble is that, having entered into a controversy with the "Russian disciples" of Marx, he "made bold" to discuss things about which he knows absolutely nothing.

p O, man of much experience, thy boldness is thy undoing!

p Anyone acquainted with philosophy will have had no difficulty in observing that when Mr. Beltov expounds the philosophical views of Hegel or Schelling he nearly always uses these thinkers’ own words. For example, his description of dialectical thinking is almost a word-for-word translation of the note and first addendum to § 81, Part I of the Encyclopaedia; next, he quotes almost word for word certain passages from the preface to the Philosophic des Rechts and from the Philosophic der Geschichte. But this author, who so very accurately quotes men like Helvetius, Enfantin, Oscar Peschel and so on, hardly ever indicates precisely which works of Schelling or Hegel, or which passages in these works, he is referring to in his exposition. Why, in this instance, did he depart from his general rule? It seems to us that Mr. Beltov was resorting to a military stratagem. His line of thought, we believe, was as follows: our subjectivists proclaim German idealist philosophy metaphysical, and rest content at that; they have not studied it, as the author of the comments on Mill, for instance, did. When I refer to certain remarkable thoughts of the German idealists, the subjectivist gentlemen, seeing no references to the works of these thinkers, will imagine that I invented these thoughts myself or borrowed them from Engels, and will cry: "That is debatable”, "I make bold to affirm”, etc. That’s where I’ll bring their ignorance into the light of day; that’s where the fun will begin! If Mr. Beltov really did resort in his polemic to this little military stratagem, it must be confessed that it has eminently succeeded: there has indeed been a lot of fun!

729

p But let us proceed. "Any philosophical system which, with Mr. Beltov, declares that ’the rights of reason are as boundless and unlimited as its powers’, and hence that it has disclosed the absolute essence of things—be it matter or spirit—is a metaphysical system.... Whether it has, or has not, arrived at the idea that its presumed essence of things develops, and, if it has, whether it ascribes to this development the dialectical or any other way, is of course very important in defining its place in the history of philosophy, but does not alter its metaphysical character" (Russkoye Bogatstvo, January 1895, p. 148). As far as can be gathered from these words, Mr. Mikhailovsky, shunning metaphysical thinking, docs not believe that the rights of reason are unlimited. It is to be hoped that this will earn him the praises of Prince Meshchersky. Nor, apparently, does Mr. Mikhailovsky believe that the powers of reason are unlimited and unbounded either. This may seem astonishing in a man who has so often assured his readers that la raison finit toujours par avoir raison: with the powers (and even the rights! ) of reason limited, this assurance seems hardly appropriate. But Mr. Mikhailovsky will say that he is assured of the ultimate triumph of reason only as far as practical affairs are concerned, but doubts its powers when it comes to cognising the absolute essence of things “(be it matter or spirit”). Excellent! But what is this absolute essence of things?

p It is, is it not, what Kant called the thing in itself (Ding an sich)? If so, then we categorically declare that we do know what the "thing in itself" is, and that it is to Hegel that we owe the knowledge. “(Flelp! " the "sober-minded philosophers" will cry, but we beg them not to get excited.)

p “The thing in itself ... is the object from which knowledge, everything that can be definitely felt and thought about it, has been abstracted. It is easy to see what remains—a pure abstraction, a sheer emptiness, and that carried beyond the bounds of knowledge; the negation of all idea, feeling, definite thought, etc. But it is just as easy to judge that this caput mortuum (worthless residium.—Ed.) is itself but a product of the thought which made this pure abstraction, of the empty I which makes an object of its abstract identity. The negative definition which holds this abstract identity as an object is likewise included among the Kantian categories, and is just as well known. It is therefore surprising to read so often that it is not known [what the thing in itself isl, when nothing is easier to know."  [729•* 

p We therefore repeat that we know very well what the absolute essence of things, or the thing in itself, is. It is a sheer abstraction. And Mr. Mikhailovsky wants to use this sheer abstraction to 730 frighten people who follow Hegel in proudly saying: "Von der Grosse und Macht seines Geistes kann der Mensch nicht gross genug denken! " “(Men cannot think highly enough of the greatness and power of his mind."—Ed.)  [730•*  The song is an old one, Mr. Mikhailovsky! Sie sind zu spat gekommen! (You have come too late! —Ed.)

p We are certain that the lines we have just written will seem sheer sophistry to Mr. Mikhailovsky. "But pardon me,” he will say, "what in that case do you mean by the materialist interpretation of nature and history? " This is what we mean.

p When Schelling said that magnetism is the introduction of the subjective into the objective, that was an idealist interpretation of nature; but when magnetism is explained from the view-point of modern physics, its phenomena are given a materialist interpretation. When Hegel, or even our Slavophiles, attributed certain historical phjenomena to the properties of the national spirit, they were regarding these phenomena from an idealist view-point, but when Marx attributed, say, the events of 1848-50 in France to the class struggle in French society, he was giving these events a materialist interpretation. Is that clear? We should say so! So clear, that it requires a considerable dose of obstinacy not to understand this.

p “But there’s something wrong here,” Mr. Mikhailovsky conceives, his thoughts darting hither and thither (c’est bien le moment!). "Lange says....” But we shall take the liberty of interrupting Mr. Mikhailovsky. We know very well what Lange says, but we can assure Mr. Mikhailovsky that his authority is very much mistaken. In his History of Materialism, Lange forgot to cite, for example, the following characteristic remark of one of the most prominent of the French materialists: Nous ne connaissons que 1’ecorce des phenomenes (we only know the skin of phenomena.—Ed.) Other, and no less prominent, French materialists expressed themselves time and again in a similar vein. So you see, Mr. Mikhailovsky, the French materialists did not yet know that the thing in itself is only the caput mortuum of an abstraction, and held precisely to the view-point which is now called by many the view-point of critical philosophy.

p All this, it need not be said, will seem to Mr. Mikhailovsky very novel and absolutely incredible. But we shall not te.l him for the present to which French materialists and to which of their works we are referring. Let him first "make bold to affirm”, and then we shall have a word with him.

p If Mr. Mikhailovsky is willing to know how we understand the relation between our sensations and external objects, we would 731 refer him to the article of Mr. Sechenov, "Objective Thought and Reality”, in the book Aid to the Hungry. We presume that Mr. Beltov and all other disciples of Marx, Russian and non- Russian, will fully agree with our celebrated physiologist. And this is what Mr. Sechenov says: "Whatever the external objects may be in themselves, independently of our consciousness—even if it be granted that our impressions of them are only conventional signs— the fact remains that the similarity or difference of the signs we perceive corresponds with a real similarity or difference. In other words: the similarities or differences man finds in the objects he perceives are real similarities or differences."  [731•* 

p When Mr. Mikhailovsky refutes Mr. Sechenov, we shall agree to recognise the limitation not only of the powers, but also of the rights of human reason.  [731•** 

p Mr. Beltov said that in the second half of our century there triumphed in science—with which meanwhile philosophy had been completely fused—materialistic monism. "I am afraid he is mistaken,” Mr. Mikhailovsky observes. In justification of his fear, he appeals to Lange, in whose opinion "die griindliche Naturforschung durch ihre eignen Consequenzen iiber den Materialismus hinausfiihrt”. “(Sound natural research, by its own findings, transcends materialism."—Ed.) If Mr. Beltov is mistaken, the materialistic monism has not triumphed in science. So, then, scientists to this day explain nature by means of the introduction of the subjective into the objective and the other subtleties of idealist natural philosophy? We are afraid he would be “mistaken” who assumed this, and the more afraid for the fact that a man of very great renown in science, the English naturalist Huxley, reasons as follows.

p “Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous system. What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity."  [731•***  This, note, is said by a man who is what is known in England as an agnostic.  He believes that the view he expresses on the activity of the mind is fully compatible with pure idealism. But we, who are familiar with the interpretations of natural phenomena consistent idealism is capable of 732 giving, and who understand the reasons for the shamefacedness of the worthy Englishman, repeat with Mr. Beltov that in the second half of the nineteenth century materialistic monism triumphed in science.

p Mr. Mikhailovsky is probably acquainted with Sechenov’s psychological researches. This scientist’s views were at one time passionately controverted by Kavelin. We are afraid that the now deceased Liberal was very much mistaken. But perhaps Mr. Mikhailovsky agrees with Kavelin? Or perhaps he needs some further explanations on the point? Well, we withhold them for the event that he again begins to “affirm”.

p Mr. Beltov says that the point of view of "human nature" that prevailed in social science before Marx led to "an abuse of biological analogies which even up to the present day makes itself strongly felt in Western sociological, and particularly in Russian quasi-sociological, literature”. This induces Mr. Mikhailovsky to accuse the author of the book on historical monism of outrageous injustice and once again to suspect the integrity of his polemical methods.

p “I appeal to the reader, even though he be quite ill-disposed towards me but has some acquaintance with my writings—if not with all, at least with one article, say, ’The Analogical Method in Social Science’ or ’What Is Progress? ’ It is not true that Russian literature particularly abuses biological analogies: in Europe, thanks to the good offices of Spencer, this stuff is far more extensive, to say nothing of the times of the comical analogies of Bluntschli and his fraternity. And if in our country the matter has gone no further than the analogical exercises of the late Stronin (’History and Method’, ’Polities as a Science’), Mr. Lilienfeld (’The Social Science of the Future’), and a few newspaper articles, a little of the credit presumably belongs to me. For nobody has spent as much effort combating biological analogies as I have. And at one time I suffered no little for this at the hands of the ’Spencerian lads’. I shall hope that the present storm will also pass in time....” (pp. 145-46). This peroration bears such an air of sincerity that indeed even a reader ill-disposed towards Mr. Mikhailovsky might think: "It does look as if Mr. Beltov has gone too far in his polemical ardour.” But this is not so, and Mr. Mikhailovsky himself knows that it is not: if he pathetically appeals to the reader, it is solely for the same reason that Plautus’ Tranion said to himself: "Pergam turbare porro: ita haec res postulat.” “(I shall go on being riotous, for the case demands it."—Ed.)

p What did Mr. Beltov really say? He said: "If the explanation of all historical social progress is to be sought in the nature of man, and if, as Saint-Simon himself justly remarks, society 733 consists of individuals, then the nature of the individual has to provide the key to the explanation of history. The nature of the individual is the subject of physiology in the broad sense of the word, i.e., of a science which also covers psychological phenomena. That is why physiology, in the eyes of Saint-Simon and his followers, was the basis of sociology, which they called social physics. In the Opinions philosophiques, litteraires et industrielles published during Saint-Simon’s lifetime and with his active participation, there was printed an extremely interesting but unfortunately unfinished article of an anomymous doctor of medicine, entitled: ’On Physiology Applied to the Improvement of Social Institutions’. The author considered the science of society to be a component part of ’general physiology’, which, enriched by the observations and experiments of special physiology of the individual, devotes itself to considerations of a ’higher order’. Individuals are for it only ’organs of the social body’, the functions of which it studies, ’just as special physiology studies the functions of individuals’. General physiology studies (the author writes: ’expresses’) the laws of social existence, with which the written laws should be accordingly co-ordinated. Later on the bourgeois sociologists, as for example Spencer, made use of the doctrine of the social organism to draw the most conservative conclusions. But the doctor of medicine whom we quote was first of all a reformer.  He studied the social body with the object of social reconstruction, since only social physiology and the hygiene closely bound up with it provided the positive foundations on which it is possible to build the system of social organisation required by the present state of the civilised world."

p From these words alone it is apparent that, in Mr. Beltov’s opinion, biological analogies may be abused not only in the sense of Spencer’s bourgeois conservatism, but also in the sense ofutopian plans of social reform. Here the likening of society to an organism is absolutely of second-rate, if not of tenth-rate, significance: the important thing is not the likening of society to an organism, but the desire to found “sociology” on biological conclusions. Mr. Mikhailovsky has passionately objected against likening society to an organism; in the struggle against this tendency "a little of the credit" does undoubtedly belong to him.  But that is not of essential importance. The essentially important question is, did, or did not, Mr. Mikhailovsky believe that sociology could be founded on biological conclusions? And on this point ho doubt is possible, as anyone can see by reading, for example, the article "The Darwinian Theory and Social Science”. In this article Mr. Mikhailovsky says, in part: "Under the general heading ’The Darwinian Theory and Social Science’, we shall speak of various questions dealt with, settled or resettled by the Darwinian theory 734 or by one or another of its supporters, whose numbers are swelling from day to day. Our chief task, however, will consist in determining, from the standpoint of the Darwinian theory, the interrelation between physiological division of labour, i.e., division of labour between the organs of one indivisible whole, and economic division of labour, i.e., division of labour between whole indivisible species, races, peoples or societies. In our view, this task resolves itself into a search for the basic laws of co-operation, i.e., the foundation of social science."  [734•*  To search for the basic laws of co-operation, i.e., the foundation of social science, in biology is to adopt the view-point of the French Saint-Simonists of the 20s—in other words, "to repeat old stuff and lie for two".

p Here Mr. Mikhailovsky might exclaim: "But, you know, the Darwinian theory didn’t exist in the 20s.” The reader, however, will understand that the point here is not the Darwinian theory, but the Utopian tendency—common to Mr. Mikhailovsky and the Saint-Simonists—to apply physiology to the improvement of social institutions. In the article referred to Mr. Mikhailovsky entirely agrees with Haeckel “(Haeckel is absolutely right”) when he says that future statesmen, economists and historians will have to turn their attention chiefly to comparative zoology, that is, to the comparative morphology and physiology of animals, if they want to have a true conception of their special subject. Say what you like, but if Haeckel is "absolutely right”, that is, if sociologists (and even historians! ) must turn their attention “chiefly” to the morphology and physiology of animals, then there is bound to be abuse of biological analogies in one direction or another. And is it not clear that Mr. Mikhailovsky’s view of sociology is the old Saint-Simonist view?

p Well, that is all Mr. Beltov said, and it is in vain that Mr. Mikhailovsky tries, so to speak, to disavow responsibility for the sociological ideas of Bukhartsev-Nozhin. In his own sociological inquiries he has not retreated very far from the views of his late friend and teacher. Mr. Mikhailovsky has not grasped what Marx’s discovery consists in, and he has therefore remained an incorrigible Utopian. That is a very deplorable situation, but our author might escape from it only by another effort of thought; fearful appeals to the reader, even the quite ill-disposed reader, will not help our poor “sociologist” at all.

p Mr. Beltov said a couple of words in defence of Mr. P. Struve. This induced Messrs. Mikhailovsky and N.—on to say that Beltov had taken Mr. Struve under his “protection”.  We have said a great deal in defence of Mr. Beltov. What will Mr. Mikhailovsky 735 and Mr. N.—on say about us? They will probably consider Mr. Beltov our vassal. Apologising in advance to Mr. Beltov for anticipating his retort to Messrs, the subjectivists, we shall ask the latter: does agreeing with an author necessarily mean taking him under one’s protection? Mr. Mikhailovsky is in agreement with Mr. N.—on on certain current questions of Russian life. Must we understand their agreement to mean that Mr. Mikhailovsky has taken Mr. N.—on under his protection? Or, perhaps, that Mr. N.—on is the protector of Mr. Mikhailovsky? What would the late Dobrolyubov have said on hearing this strange language of our present-day “progressive” literature?

p It seems to Mr. Mikhailovsky that Mr. Beltov has misrepresented his doctrine of heroes and the crowd. Again we think that Mr. Beltov is quite right and that, in controverting him, Mr. Mikhailovsky is playing the role of Tranion. But before supporting this opinion of ours, we think it necessary to say a few words about Mr. N.—on’s contribution—"What Does Economic Necessity Really Mean? "—in the March issue of Russkoye Bogatstvo.

p In this note Mr. N.—on sets up two batteries against Mr. Beltov. We shall consider them one by one.

p The target of the first battery is Mr. Beltov’s statement that "in order to reply to the question—will Russia follow the path of capitalist development, or not?—one must turn to a study of the actual position of the country, to an analysis of its present-day internal life. On the basis of such an analysis, the Russian disciples of Marx say: there are no data allowing one to hope that Russia will soon leave the path of capitalist development”. Mr. N.—on slyly repeats: "There is no such analysis.” Really not, Mr. N.—on? First of all, let us agree on terminology. What do you call an analysis? Does an analysis provide new data for forming a judgement on a subject, or does it operate with already existing data, obtained in other ways? At the risk of incurring the charge of being “metaphysical”, we adhere to the old definition which holds that an analysis does not provide new data for forming a judgement on a subject, but operates with ready-made data. From this definition it follows that the Russian disciples of Marx, in their analysis of Russian internal life, might not offer any independent observations of that life, but content themselves with material collected, say, in Narodist literature. If from this material they drew a new conclusion, that in itself implies that they subjected these data to a new analysis. Hence the question arises: what data on the development of capitalism are to be found in Narodist literature, and did the Russian disciples of Marx really draw a new conclusion from these data? In order to answer this question we shall take, if only for one, Mr. Dementyev’s book, The Factory, What It Gives to, and What It Takes from, the Population. In this 736 book (pp. 241 et seq.) we read: "Our industry, before it assumed the form of capitalist factory production in which we find it now, passed through all the same stages of development as in the West.... One of the strongest reasons why we are now lagging behind the West was serfdom. Because of it, our industry passed through a far longer period of handicraft and home production. It was only in 1861 that capital acquired the possibility of instituting that form of production to which, in the West, it had passed nearly a century and a half earlier, and only from that year on did there begin a more rapid decline of handicraft and home production and their conversion into factory production.... But in the thirty years (since the abolition of serfdom) everything has changed. Having embarked on the same path of economic development as Western Europe our industry had inevitably, fatally to assume—and did assume—the form into which it had evolved in the West. The possession of land by the popular masses, to which there is such a fondness to refer in proof of the impossibility in our country of a special class of workers who are free from everything—a class that is an inevitable concomitant of the modern form of industry—undoubtedly has been, and still is, a strong retarding factor, but by no means so strong as is usually thought. The very frequent inadequacy of the land allotment and the complete decline of agriculture, on the one hand, and the deep concern of the government to develop the manufacturing industries as an essential element in maintaining the economic equilibrium of the country, on the other, are conditions that eminently tended, and still tend, to detract from the importance of land possession. We have seen the result of this state of things: the formation of a special class of factory workers, a class which continues to bear the name of ’peasant’, but which has practically nothing in common with the peasant tillers, has retained to only an insignificant degree its association with the land, and half of which, already in the third generation, never quits the factory and has no property whatever in the countryside, save a legal and practically almost unrealisable right to land."

p The objective data given by Mr. Dementyev show very eloquently that capitalism, with all its consequences, is developing fast in Russia. These data Mr. Dementyev supplements with reflections which would imply that the further advance of capitalist production can be halted, and that to do so, all that is necessary is to recall the maxim: gouverner—c’est prevoir (to govern is to foresee.—Ed.) (p. 246). The Russian disciples of Marx subject this conclusion of Mr. Dementyev’s to their own analysis, and find that in this matter nothing can be halted, that Mr. Dementyev is mistaken, like the whole crowd of Narodniks who, in their researches, communicate a whole mass of objective data quite similar to those 737 he, Mr. Dementyev, communicates.  [737•*  Mr. N.—on asks where this analysis is to be found. What he apparently wants to say is, when, and where, did such an analysis appear in the Russian press. To this question we can give him at least two answers.

p First, in the book of Mr. Struve which he finds so disagreeable there is a competent discussion of the limits to which government interference in the economic life of Russia is possible at this time. This discussion is already, in part, the analysis which Mr. N.—on demands, and against this analysis Mr. N.—on has nothing competent to offer.

p Second, does Mr. N.-on remember the dispute which took place in the 40s between the Slavophiles and the Westerners? In this dispute, too, an "analysis of internal Russian life" played a very important part, but in the press this analysis was applied almost exclusively to purely literary themes. For this there were historical reasons, which Mr. N-on must certainly take into account if he does not want to be reputed a ridiculous pedant. Will Mr. N—on say that these reasons have no bearing today on the analysis of the "Russian disciples"? ^^504^^

p So far the “disciples” have not published any independent investigations of Russian economic life. The explanation is that the trend to which they belong is extremely new in Russia. It is the Narodist trend that has until now predominated in Russian literature, thanks to which investigators, when communicating objective data testifying to the crumbling of the ancient " foundations”, have always drowned them in the waters of their " subjective" hopes. But it is precisely the abundance of the data communicated by the Narodniks that has impelled the appearance of a new view of Russian life. This new view will unquestionably become the basis of new, independent observations. Even now we can draw Mr. N.—on’s attention, for example, to the writings of Mr. Kharizomenov, which strongly contradict the Narodist catechism, as was duly sensed by Mr. V. V., who tried often and vainly 738 to refute the worthy investigator. The author of The South- Russian Peasant Economy is anything but a Marxist, but Mr. N.—on will scarcely say that Mr. Postnikov’s views on the present state of the village commune, and peasant land tenure generally, in Novorossia agree with the customary views of our Narodniks.

p Then there is Mr. Borodin, the author of a remarkable investigation of the Urals Cossack organisation, who already stands foursquare on the point of view which we uphold and which has the misfortune of not being agreeable to Mr. N.—on. Our Narodist publicists paid no attention to this investigation, not because it is devoid of intrinsic value, but solely because these publicists are imbued with a specific “subjective” spirit.^^505^^ And there will be more of them, Mr. N.—on, as time goes on: the era of Marxist research is only beginning in Russia.  [738•* 

p Mr. N.—on also considers himself a Marxist. He is mistaken. He is nothing but an illicit offspring of the great thinker. His world outlook is the fruit of an illegitimate cohabitation of the Marxian theory with Mr. V. V. From “Miitterchen” Mr. N.—on derived his terminology and several economic theorems which, incidentally, he understands very abstractly and therefore incorrectly. From “Vaterchen” he inherited a Utopian attitude to social reform, and it is with its help that he set up his second battery against Mr. Beltov.

p Mr. Beltov says that social relations, by the very logic of their development, bring man to a realisation of the causes of his enslavement by economic necessity. "Having realised that the cause of his enslavement lies in the anarchy of production, the producer (’social man’) organises that production and thereby subjects it to his will. Then terminates the kingdom of necessity, and there begins the reign of freedom, which itself proves a necessity.” In the opinion of Mr. N.—on, all this is quite true. But to Mr. Beltov’s true words he adds the following remark: "Consequently, the task is that society, instead of passively observing the manifestation of the given law which retards the development of its productive forces, should, with the help of the existing material economic conditions, find a means of bringing this law under its power, by surrounding its manifestation with such conditions as would not only not retard, but facilitate the development of the 739 productive forces of labour [forces of labour! ] of all society taken as a whole."^^506^^

p Without himself noticing it, Mr. N.—on has drawn from the "quite true" words of Mr. Beltov an extremely confused conclusion.

p Mr. Beltov is talking of social man, of the sum-total of producers, before whom there really does lie the task of vanquishing economic necessity. But for the producers Mr. N.—on substitutes society, which, "as a producing whole, cannot look on indifferently, ’objectively’, at the development of such social and economic relations as condemn the majority of its members to progressive impoverishment".

p “Society as a producing whole....” Marx’s “analysis”, to which Mr. N.—on allegedly adheres, did not stop at the idea of society being a producing whole.  It divided society, in accordance with its true nature, into separate classes, each of which has its own economic interest and its own special task. Why does not Mr. N.—on’s “analysis” do likewise? Why, instead of speaking of the task of the Russian producers, does Mr. N.—on speak of the task of society as a whole? This society, taken as a whole, is usually, and not without reason, contrasted to the people, and it then turns out to be, despite its “wholeness”, only a small part, only an insignificant minority of the Russian population. When Mr. N.—on assures us that this tiny minority will organise production, we can only shrug our shoulders and say: it is not from Marx Mr. N.—on has taken this; he has inherited it from his “Vaterchen”, from Mr. V. V.

p According to Marx, organisation of production presumes a conscious attitude to it on the part of the producers, whose economic emancipation must therefore be the work of their own hands. With Mr. N.—on, organisation of production presumes a conscious attitude to it on the part of society. If this is Marxism, then surely Marx was never a Marxist. But let us assume that society does really act as the organiser of production. In what relation does it then stand to the producers? It organises them. Society is the hero; the producers are the crowd.

p We ask Mr. Mikhailovsky, who “affirms” that Mr. Beltov has misrepresented his doctrine of heroes and the crowd, does he, like Mr. N.—on, think that society can organise production? If he does, then he in fact holds to the view that society, the "’ intelligentsia”’, is the hero, the demiurge of our future historical development, while the millions of producers are the crowd, out of which the hero will mould whatever he considers necessary in accordance with his ideals. Now let the impartial reader say: was Mr. Beltov right when he said that the “subjective” view regarded the people as a crowd?

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p Mr. Mikhailovsky declares that he, too, and those who think like him are not opposed to the development of the self-consciousness of the producers. "It only seems to me,” he says, "that for so simple and clear a programme there was no need to rise above the clouds of the Hegelian philosophy and sink down to a hotch-potch of the subjective and objective.” But the fact of the matter is, Mr. Mikhailovsky, that in the eyes of people of your type of thought the self-consciousness of the producers cannot have the same meaning as it has in the eyes of your opponents. From your point of view production can be organised by “society”; from the point of view of your opponents it can be organised only by the producers themselves. From your point of view “society” acts, and the producer assists. From the point of view of your opponents the producers do not assist, they just act. It stands to reason that assistants need a smaller degree of consciousness than actors, for it has been said long ago and very justly: "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory.” Your attitude to the producers is that of the French and German Utopians of the 30s and 40s. Your opponents condemn any and every Utopian attitude to the producers. If you were better acquainted with the history of economic literature, Mr. Mikhailovsky, you would have known that in order to get rid of the Utopian attitude to the producers, it was indeed necessary to rise to the clouds of the Hegelian philosophy and then sink down to the prose of political economy.

p Mr. Mikhailovsky does not like the word “producer”: it smacks, don’t you see, of the stable.  [740•*  Well, all we can say is that he is welcome to the best we have. The word “producer”, as far as we know, was first used by Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonists. Since the existence of the journal Le Producteur, that is, since 1825, it has been used in Western Europe countless numbers of times, and has never reminded anyone of the stables. Then the Russian repentant nobleman began to speak of producers, and the stables came to his mind at once. To what are we to attribute this strange phenomenon? Evidently, to the memories and traditions of the repentant nobleman.

p Mr. N.—on, with an air of deep slyness, cites the following words of Mr. Beltov: "Of course one of them" Ithe Russian disciples of Marxl "may have greater and another less extensive economic knowledge, but what matters here is not the amount of knowledge of individual persons, but the point of view itself.” Mr. N.—on asks: "What has become of all the demands to adhere to the ground of reality, of the necessity for a detailed study of the 741 course of economic development? " “(Demands of the necessity for a detailed study"—that doesn’t sound very lucid, Mr. N.—on.) Now it appears that all this is something secondary, that "what matters is not the amount of knowledge but the point of view”. Mr. N.—on, as we see, likes to say something funny every now and again. But we would advise him, when he wants to make people laugh, not to forget common sense. Otherwise the laugh will not be on his side.

p Mr. N.—on has not understood Mr. Beltov. Let us try to rescue him from his difficulty. In the same issue of Russkoye Bogatstvo in which Mr. N.—on’s contribution appeared, we find in an article by Mr. Mokievsky called "What Is an Educated Man? " (p. 33, note) some lines that might be very instructive to Mr. N.—on: "An Arab savant once said to his disciples: ’If anyone should tell you that the laws of mathematics are erroneous and, in proof, should transform a stick into a snake, do not regard such a proof as convincing.’ This is a typical example. An educated man will reject such proof, even if (unlike the savant) he is not acquainted with the laws of mathematics. He will say that the transformation of a stick into a snake is an extraordinary miracle, but it does not follow from it that the laws of mathematics are erroneous. On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that uneducated people would at once lay all their convictions and beliefs at the feet of the miracle-workers.” One of the disciples of the wise Arab may have had greater and another less extensive mathematical knowledge, but neither of them, probably, would have fallen at the feet of the miracleworker. Why? Because both had had a good schooling; because what matters here is not the amount of knowledge, but that point of view from which the transformation of a stick into a snake cannot serve as a refutation of mathematical truths. Is that clear to you, Mr. N.—on? We hope so, for it is so very simple, quite elementary in fact. Well, then, if it is clear, you should now see yourself that what Mr. Beltov says about the point of view, etc., does not do away with what he also says about the necessity of adhering to the ground of reality.

p But we are afraid you are not clear on the matter, after all. Let us give another example. God knows, you haven’t much economic knowledge, but you do have more than Mr. V. V. That, however, does not prevent you from holding to the same point of view. You are both Utopians. And when anyone undertakes to describe your common views, he will leave aside the amount of your respective knowledge, and will say: What matters is these people’s point of view, which they have borrowed from the Utopians of the days of Old King Cole.

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p Now it should be quite clear to you, Mr. N.—on, that you were quite off the mark when you implied that Mr. Beltov had resorted to the subjective method, that you blundered egregiously.

p At all events, let us put the same thing in different words. However much the Russian followers of Marx may differ in the extent of their knowledge, not one of them, if he remains true to himself, will believe you, or Mr. V. V., when you assert that " society"—whatever that is—will organise our production. Their point of view will prevent them from laying their convictions at the feet of social miracle-workers.  [742•* 

p Enough of this. But once we have touched upon the subjective method, let us remark how contemptuously Mr. N.—on treats it. It follows from what he says that this method did not have the slightest grain of science in it, but was only furnished with a sort of cloak that "lent it the mere tinge of a ’scientific’ exterior”. Excellent, Mr. N.—on! But what will your “protector”, Mr. Mikhailovsky, say of you?

p Generally speaking, Mr. N.—on deals very discourteously with his subjectivist “protectors”. His article, "Apologia of the Power of Money as the Sign of the Times”,^^507^^ bears the epigraph: "L’ ignorance est moins eloignee de la verite que le prejuge. ’ Elgnorance is less far from the truth than prejudice."] The Truth is undoubtedly Mr. N.—on himself. He says as much: "If anybody should really follow the subjective method of investigation unswervingly, one may be quite certain that he would arrive at conclusions akin to, if not identical with, those we have arrived at.” (Russkoye Bogatstvo, March, p. 54). Prejudice is of course Mr. Struve, against whom Truth directs the sting of its “analysis”. And who is Ignorance, which is nearer to Truth (i.e., Mr. N.—on) than Prejudice, i.e., Mr. Struve? Ignorance, evidently, is Mr. N.—on’s present subjectivist allies. Excellent, Mr. N.—on! You have hit the weak spot of your allies to a nicety. But again, what will Mr. Mikhailovsky say of you? He will surely recall the moral of the well-known fable:

p Though help in time of need we highly prize,
Not everyone knows how to give it.... ^^508^^

p But enough of argument! We think we have left none of our opponents’ objections unanswered. And if we have by chance lost sight of any of them, we shall certainly have plenty of occasion to return to the dispute. So we may lay down the pen. But before parting with it, we should like to say another word or two to our opponents.

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Now you, sirs, are always "exerting yourselves" to do away with capitalism. But just see what comes of it: capitalism goes sweetly on and does not even notice your “exertions”, while you, with your “ideals” and your splendid intentions, keep marking time in one spot. And to what purpose? Neither you benefit, nor anyone else! What can be the reason? The reason is that you are Utopians, you nourish utopian plans of social reform and fail to see those direct and urgent tasks which, excuse the expression, lie under your very noses. Ponder well on it. Then, perhaps, you will say yourselves that we are right. However, on this subject we shall talk to you on another occasion. Meanwhile—Dominus vobiscum.