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p The important changes modifying the woman’s role in society, her increasing involvement in professional and socio-political activity naturally make themselves felt in her status in the family. But in the field of family relations both morality and right have proved to be much more conservative. Deep-rooted traditions, behavioural patterns which are handed down by one generation to another, the example of the parents and religious influences seriously hinder progressive changes in the nature of family relations which have evolved through the centuries. The persisting inequality of women in the economic, 148 political and cultural fields is even more pronounced in family relations.

p The employment of women in low-paid and relatively unskilled jobs, discrimination in payment for work and difficulties inhibiting their promotion also help preserve a situation where the husband remains the head of family and the wife is obliged to submit to his will. The tendency to prepare women chiefly for domestic work which still exists in the system of upbringing and education in the capitalist countries, and the notion that a woman’s ideal is a happy marriage and a happy family which is widely advertised in bourgeois literature and mass media likewise keep alive the conservative tradition of restricting the woman’s world to her family.

p It is indicative that laws granting women political rights were adopted long in advance of legislation repealing the more obvious and humiliating aspects of the woman’s dependent status in the family. In some countries women were unable independently to exercise the political rights accorded to them. For example, Irene Joliot-Curie who had been offered the post of Minister of Social Security in the Popular Front Government in 1936 had to present a written consent from her husband in order to occupy it. We could cite many more examples of women whose talent, abilities, and hard work had won them fairly high positions in social life but who had to submit to the humiliating demands of the family code in performing the most elementary daily functions.

p The woman’s inferior position in the family is rooted in the very nature of bourgeois society. Karl Marx observed in his time that the bourgeoisie had torn away from the family its 149 sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relations to mere money relations. And since over the centuries man has been the central figure in the economic life of capitalist society, the woman has always been in a subordinate position in married life, the weaker partner in the deal. The unequal status of women was glaringly manifest in Code Napoleon, the French Civil Code, which served as a model for legislation passed in some European and Latin American countries and the State of Luisiana in the USA. The original version of Code Napoleon deprived the woman of almost all civil rights; she had to obey the will of her husband in all matters concerning the family, she had no right to dispose of even property that belonged to her prior to marriage and had no say in matters relating to her own children. The husband was in a privileged position even in petitioning for divorce, for the grounds on which he could demand a formal dissolution of marriage could far from always serve as grounds for a woman to obtain a divorce.

p The Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, a German Civil Code, which was adopted almost a century later, legalised the subordinate status of the woman with practically the same degree of harshness. Article 1356 of the Code stipulated that the woman attended to housework and could engage in professional activity only to the extent compatible with her conjugal and family duties.

p The unequal status of women in the family was legalised not only in laws governing family relations and rights and duties of a married woman, but also in inheritance laws. In the overwhelming majority of capitalist states the wife as a rule did not inherit the title to the estate if her deceased husband had living 150 relatives even distant ones such as first cousins hoth male and female, and even more remote ones. They inherited the title to the estate while the wife was entitled to a life tenancy of specified types of property (usufruct), an estate, or a sum of money.

p As a result of growing employment of female labour, and the involvement of women in social activity, and after a long and bitter struggle, laws began to appear in the 20th century amending the rules which openly relegated the woman to the status of a slave in the family. In 1935, a law was adopted in England with the promising title Tort-feasors and Married Women Act which gave married women formal legal capacity. In 1938, a similar act was passed in France. Laws were adopted which extended women’s rights in the fields of inheritance, disposal of property, and exercise of their parental rights, facilitated conditions for obtaining a divorce and ensured their right to engage in professional activity. But this proved to be a fairly long process, particularly in countries with fascist regimes. Italy, for example, only lately began to reform civil and family legislation with the view to abolishing the most odious provisions legalising the women’s unequal status in the family.

p It should be noted that in no capitalist country does the new legislation on the status of the woman in the family comprise a finished, comprehensive system of statutes ensuring her equality. The laws which are adopted bear upon individual provisions of the civil code, marriage and divorce proceedings and so forth. And inasmuch as these questions are resolved in separate acts, which frequently are 151 inadequately harmonised with each other, there is plenty of latitude for interpreting and applying these laws so that the traditionally established inequality of women is not, affected. Moreover legislation of this sort is not always fully applied and has numerous loopholes. It should likewise be borne in mind that on many issues, precisely those directly connected with everyday life and which in effect determine the atmosphere in the family, the husband as head of the family still has the advantage over his wife.

p In all capitalist countries a woman must take her husband’s name upon marriage and their children bear their father’s name. Under the laws of most capitalist countries the marriage of a woman to a foreigner deprives her of her citizenship and she automatically becomes a citizen of her husband’s country. The official domicile of a wife is that of her husband, who has the right to choose it. And the fact that a married woman is compelled to submit to her husband’s choice vividly illustrates her unequal status in the family. Article 215 of the French Civil Code says that a woman may have the right to have a separate domicile for herself and her children which is granted by the court only in the exceptional case where the domicile chosen by her husband represents a physical or moral danger to the family.

p The question of selecting a domicile is linked with another, very important question of cohabitation. In all capitalist countries man and wife must live together. This is their conjugal duty as determined by the law. But violation of this duty does not have the same implications for each of the spouses. Under the Italian Civil Code (Article 147), for example, the wife forfeits the 152 right to maintenance and is deprived of her personal property acquired prior to her marriage if she leaves the matrimonial home without reasonable cause and refuses to return to it. Rut these sanctions are not applied to the husband for the same offense. Under the Common Law as it existed in England up to the turn of the century, desertion a wife was sufficient grounds not only for demanding her forcible return, but also for instituting legal proceedings against people preventing her from doing so, thus depriving the husband of her services. In some cases suits were instituted for monetary compensation for the loss of these services. Today such suits, which are justly regarded in juridical literature as survivals of the old view regarding the wife as the property of her husband, are not satisfied. But refusal to live together with the husband is sufficient ground for the latler not to provide maintenance^

p One of the most vivid manifestations of the married woman’s inferior status is her restricted legal capacity. Up to the middle of the 20th century, underage, mentally ill and married women had no legal capacity under the civil law. After marriage a woman found herself in the same position as juveniles and the insane. Individual legal systems substantiated this in different ways but the result was always the same.

p In countries which had adopted many provisions of the French Civil Code and the German Civil Code married woman was deprived of legal capacity because the husband was the head of the family- and as such was responsible for her property status, while the wife’s duty was to look after the house. In England and other countries practising Common Law, this 153 was justified by the fact that husband and wife were regarded as a single subject of the law. Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England which are still quoted in legal practice state: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband__" Thus the transformation of husband and wife into a single subject of the law as a result of their marriage in effect deprived the woman of her rights and transferred them to her husband.

p The legal incapacitation of the married woman meant that she could not dispose of her property even that which belonged to her prior to marriage, to transact business, file suits and speak in court. She could not accept gifts, receive inheritance and so forth without the consent of her husband.

p In the middle of the 1930s a number of capitalist countries revoked the most odious statutes which incapacitated married women. But to this day their legal capacity is considerably restricted owing to the entire pattern of the bourgeois family, and the property relations within it. That is why even though the laws relating to the legal capacity of women, which have been adopted in recent decades, are definitely a gain of the progressive forces, they frequently have little effect on the family and on the status of women in it.

p Moreover, the legal capacity of women in some capitalist countries and in many states in the USA is still considerably restricted. In almost all states a married woman cannot enter into binding contracts in her own name, and can 154 neither mortgage nor alienate real estate without her husband’s consent. In some states (Florida and Luisiana) a woman has the right independently to exercise certain civil and procedural rights in keeping with the corresponding rulings of the court or administrative bodies. Furthermore, there are states in which laws granting women partial legal capacity are given a restrictive interpretation.

p The question of legal capacity is a matter of considerable importance because it concerns everyday life and actions. The fact that a married woman may act solely with the consent of her husband not only makes life difficult but also demeans her and leads to family conflicts. Such a humiliating position causes the greatest pain to women active in social life and who therefore are unable to reconcile themselves to what their forebears regarded as a natural state of affairs.

p The question of whether or not a married woman has the right to take up a job or engage in professional activity is of crucial importance in determining a woman’s status in the family. This question has been and continues to be in the centre of an acute controversy in many capitalist states. Until a few decades ago it was stipulated in the laws of a number of countries (or accepted in the legal practice of others) that a woman could seek employment or engage in professional activity only with her husband’s consent. This statute clashed with the new times, when more and more women were employed in industry and their participation in political and public life steadily increased. Only recently, as a result of gradual reforms, recognition, though partial, was extended to the woman’s right to work in her chosen field and engage 155 in professional activity. The law passed in France on July 13, 1965 stipulated that women have the right to engage in professional activity without their husbands’ consent and, in connection jvith this activity, conduct all sort of business and assume commitments with regard to their personal property. But even after such a definitive act the right of women to take part in professional activity is not unconditional. It has been noted in legal literature that such activity if conducted without the consent of the husband may be interpreted as violation of conjugal duties and detrimental to the interests of the family, as envisaged in Article 232 of the French Civil Code.

p The upbringing of children occupies a very large place in the life of a family. Bourgeois legislation on this issue still gives preference to the father. Until they become of age children are subject to parental authority and are obliged to abide by the decisions of a person endowed with such authority, i.e., the father.

p The original text of the French Civil Code stipulated that parental authority belonged to the father as the head of the family. The law of July 23, 1942 amended this provision. The new text states that parental authority belongs to both the father and the mother and that for the duration of the marriage parental authority is exercised by the father as the head of the family. But changes in the wording did not alter the substance. The law established cases where the mother acquires the right to exercise parental authority. But this provision applies in exceptional circumstances connected, as a rule, with the father’s inability, due to specific reasons, to exercise this authority.

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p There is a similar provision in the Italian Civil Code. An underage son or daughter can leave the parental home only with the consent of the father and only the father can bring him or her back if they had left the home without permission. The father can appeal to the judge if his son or daughter misbehaves and demand that he or she be committed to a reform school. The father has the final word in deciding the future of his children: whether they will go to work or continue studying, their future vocation, and so forth. Thus, all matters connected with the future of the children the mother is obliged to submit to the decision taken by the father.

p Property relations also occupy an important part in the life of a family. In this field the woman’s subordinate position in the capitalist world, even if she is a member of the ruling class, makes itself felt with particular force. The system of matrimonial property is established either by law or by contract. In Common Law countries the system established by the law predominates. In France, Belgium, Italy and some other countries contractual rights in property play a very important role. In the latter case property relations are finalised in a marriage contract and often the families of the future man and wife are parties to it.

p In France, for instance, there are several types of arrangements concerning matrimonial property. Under the marriage contract the spouses may own in common the property which each had on marriage and property acquired during wedlock. They may also have community of property acquired during marriage while each retaining what he or she had on marriage. The 157 contract may provide for separate rights in property, community of property may be envisaged for parts or types of property, or different systems may be applied in respect of real estate and movables, etc. All these regulations are designed to prevent the husband from squandering property his wife had on marriage but not to ensure the right of the wife to dispose of her property at will. Even when a marriage contract contains a clause providing for separate properly, the wife is not entitled to administer her properly or receive income from it, for all income is regarded as belonging to the husband and goes to pay for family expenses.

p The right of women to dispose of her income and also, but to a limited extent, to dispose of property which was in her possession on marriage, has been recognised only lately.

p The disposal of a woman’s dowery is also subject to special regulations. Dowery is that part of property which is designated in the marriage contract and which can be presented either by the future wife or by her parents or any third party. Under French and Italian laws real property which forms a part of the dowery remains in the possession of the wife, while the part consisting of movables and money is transferred to the husband. In keeping with marriage contracts a husband has the right to dispose of a part or certain items of movable property in the capacity of his wife’s “debtor”. In the event of a dissolution of marriage an equivalent part is returned to the wife. But even so the wife’s interests are affected, for the husband has to return the same sum of money which had been handed over to him and other items of property according to the appraisal 158 at the time of the marriage. As a result of the inflationary processes going on in capitalist economy over the past several decades, the actual value which is returned to the wife is incomparably smaller than what the husband had received in his time.

p The fact thai the husband alone is legally empowered to administer his wife’s dowery as long as the marriage lasts is another instance of the violation of the lattcr’s interests. True, under the law a marriage contract may include a clause entitling the wife to use a part of the income from property for her personal expenses. In view of the fact that many women are being drawn into labour activity and have their own earnings, marriage contracts and some statutes on marriage do not envisage that the husband alone is entitled to administer all property. But this applies only to the right of the woman to dispose of her personal earnings. The right of the husband to dispose of matrimonial property arid, his wife’s dowery usually remains unaffected.

p In Common Law capitalist countries, and in Scandinavian and some other countries separate property is the rule. Whatever each of the spouses earns, purchases or acquires during marriage is regarded as his or her property. To all appearances this is a fair arrangement ostensibly placing man and wife in an equal position. In actual fact, however, the system of separate property often places the woman in virtual bondage. The burden of housework which rests on her shoulders, care for the husband and child upbringing are not recognised as entitling her to a share in matrimonial property so that a woman who devotes all her time and 159 strength to taking care of the family is actually deprived of all rights in property.

p Courts in England and some US states have made exceptions in cases when there were special agreements between the spouses under which the wife assisted the husband in his professional activity and was entitled to a certain portion of the earnings for her services. In England, moreover, the property which a wife acquired out of money saved from the sum she received from her husband to run the household was held to be their common property. This was legalised in the 1964 Matrimonial Property Law on the married woman’s rights in property.

p Changes have also been introduced in the law concerning the house in which the family lived. There have been cases in judicial practice when courts, regardless of who owned the house, allowed the other spouse to reside in it. In one case the court formulated this principle as follows: "It is the husband’s duty to provide his wife with the roof over her head and the children, too. So long as the wife behaves herself, she is entitled to remain in the matrimonial home.... If he should seek to get rid of her, the Court will restrain him. If he should succeed in making her go, the Court will restore her. In an extreme case, if his conduct is so outrageous as to make it impossible for them to live together, the Court will order him to go out and leave her there.”

p Later, under the 1970 law, which came into force on January 1, 1971, the court received the right to decide who will continue to live in the house and also, provided there are special grounds, to recognise the wife’s right to a portion of the property acquired by the spouses. 160 In these cases the court in effect is not bound to follow any statutes and a great deal depends on its approach to the matter.

p Judicial practice and new legislation relating to matrimonial property in England are but a weak attempt to protect the wife’s interests. A wife can continue to live in the house so long as she behaves properly, while her husband can be evicted only if guilty of outrageous behaviour. The difference in the approach to the question is obvious.

p Legislation establishing grounds for divorce shed much light on the actual status of the woman in the family. The question of divorce is especially important for women, for due to his dominating position in the family it is more easier for the husband to find grounds for the legal dissolution of marriage. Moreover, for a long period of time the law enabled the husband to obtain a dissolution of marriage on grounds which were not available to women. In France, for instance, the right of the husband to obtain a divorce on grounds of adultery is fixed in Article 229 of the Civil Code, and the right of the wife to obtain a divorce on similar grounds is set forth separately in Article 230. The inclusion of these rights in two different articles is explained by the fact that in the original text of the Civil Code (and this provision remained in force throughout the 19th century) the husband could sue for divorce irrespective of the place where his wife committed adultery, but a wife could do so only if her husband had committed it in their matrimonial home. Insofar as the grounds were different they were fixed in different articles. Italian law contained similar statutes right up to 1968. A husband’s infidelity 161 was not regarded as reason for the separation of the spouses, while a wife’s infidelity was not only grounds for terminating cohabitation but also a criminal offense. A husband could be brought to court on criminal charges only if he kept his mistress in the home which he shared with his wife.

p By Common Law divorce may be granted if one of the spouses is found guilty of violating conjugal duties. Legislation in the overwhelming majority of capitalist countries specifies grounds for the legal dissolution of marriage. The French Civil Code recognises adultery and also the sentencing of one of the spouses to strict legal punishment (usually a long prison term) as grounds for divorce. Moreover, Article 232 stipulates that a court may grant divorce on the grounds of cruelty, beatings and insulting behaviour on the part of one of the spouses, provided these offenses constitute a gross violation of family duties and make further cohabitation impossible.

p Prior to the law of 1969 the following were grounds for divorce in England: adultery, cruelty desertion of the family for a long period (not less than two years) and living apart for a considerable length of time.

p In the United States grounds for divorce are fixed by state laws and here we have a very motley picture. In some states there are no grounds for divorce, in others it is obtained with exceptional ease. There are states where marriages are legally dissolved when a husband does not provide sufficient maintenance for his wife. In others habitual drunkeness on the part of the wife, but not on the part of the husband is regarded as grounds for divorce. In Kentucky, 162 for instance, a legal dissolution of marriage may be obtained on the ground of the wife’s matrimonial offences even though no proof of her guilt is necessary.

p The establishment in the law and judicial practice of specific grounds for divorce calls for proof of the facts. The court must have proof of adultery, beatings, mutually insulting behaviour, etc. As a result, the investigation of a family’s intimate life turns divorce proceedings in bourgeois courts into one of the most revolting spectacles in the life of society. The need to furnish proof of such facts has turned perjury, private investigations and blackmail into a flourishing business.

p Not infrequently a husband and a wife whose family had long fallen apart prefer not to petition for a legal dissolution of marriage to avoid being subjected to the humiliating court proceedings. This leads to dire consequences for the spouses, who are in fact living apart, and for the children born of their marriages.

p The example of the socialist countries in which there are no formal grounds for divorce and divorce is granted only when it is clear that there is no chance to preserve the family, and where the court never intrudes into the intimate relations of the spouses, shows how it is possible to approach the problem of divorce in a way that combines society’s concern for preserving the family with high respect for the personality.

p Evidently it was the force of this example that accounted for the fact that Article 1 of the new English Law on Divorce of 1969 almost word for word repeats the corresponding article of the Fundamentals of Legislation on Marriage and 163 the Family of the USSR and the Union Republics. It stipulates that a person can petition for divorce only if there is evidence that the marriage has in effect broken down and that the union cannot be restored. Yet ensuing articles state that specific circumstances are regarded as proof of the fact that the union has been disrupted and cannot be restored. Then follows a list of what are in effect the same old grounds for divorce: adultery, cruelty and long desertion. And so people seeking divorce have to go through the same humiliating proceedings of a divorce suit. Of course recognition of the factual termination of marriage and the impossibility of restoring it as the sole ground for divorce, and the transformation of the former grounds into that of facts proving the impossibility of restoring the marriage is a shift in emphasis that orients the courts towards displaying a more circumspect approach to the parties concerned, but it is still a very small step in the right direction.

p Thus far we have dwelt only on the legal dissolution of a civil marriage, but things are much more difficult in countries where the state is not separated from the church and where most marriages are solemnised before a clergyman. The tragic consequences caused by the complete ban on divorce in Italy are well known. The question of divorce was the focal point of a long and bitter struggle. Tragedies seared thousands of men and women who had long been alienated from each other but were held married and whose lasting ties with other people were not recognised by the law. Children born into a well-knit, good family lived under the constant threat that under the law complete strangers "the lawful husband of the mother,” or "the lawful 164 wife of the father" could take them away from their parents.

p A divorce bill was finally adopted in 1972 after very lengthy debates. Under it divorce may be granted on the following grounds: if one of the spouses had been sentenced to exile or a long term of imprisonment; attempt on the life of one spouse by the other; factual termination of marriage for 5-7 years; insanity of one of the spouses in view of which marital relationship is precluded; the adoption by one of the spouses of foreign citizenship and his or her legal dissolution of the former marriage and marriage to another person according to the law of another country. Apart from making things much easier for thousands upon thousands of people, this act is also an important step on the way to purging legislation and judicial practice of medieval survivals and is definitely a victory of the secular forces over the reactionaries and the clergy.

p In Italy and in other countries, where only religious marriages are considered valid, the attitude to divorce of the country’s major religion is important. This is a particularly acute issue in countries with a predominantly Catholic population since, as a rule, the Catholic Church does not recognise divorce. It was none other than the church which insisted on holding a referendum on divorce in Italy in 1974, and which resulted in a complete defeat of the clericals.

p The French Civil Code and the Common Law rule that a court’s decree on legal separation may be obtained by man and wife whose religious marriage cannot be dissolved by the church. In such cases the wife has the right to determine 165 her new residence; the spouses’ property may be divided; and the wife is granted the right to transact all necessary business connected with the administration of her share of the property. But the spouses who have in fact severed all mutual bonds are still considered man and wife and cannot marry a second time. And even where a civil marriage has been legally dissolved the law (Art. 228) allows a woman to marry only 300 days following the termination of her earlier marriage, a restriction which does not apply to men. In keeping with Article 340 of the Italian Civil Code, a widow who wishes to marry must inform the court and the latter may set her definite conditions concerning the upbringing of her children.

p In the light of the above it becomes clear that the increasing involvement of women in economic and cultural activity leads to definite changes in their family status.

But the legislation and implementation of their rights in the family lag far behind the demands posed by life itself.