OF THE MORAL-JURIDICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE SCIENTIFIC
THEORY OF SOCIETY
p Kant’s ethical conception of society strikes one with its clarity and sharpness of definition, with the unwavering nature of a personal conviction molded in a crucible of doubt and despair. It maintains a purity born of suffering and confirmed in experience: not the purity characterizing naivete, but the spotlessness of mature judgement achieved at a high cost.
p Still, the Kantian moral subject is marked by something which arouses one’s caution and even fright. Its inner concentration imperceptibly undergoes a transformation into "epistemological seclusion”, into the illusion that the drama of cognition has already been exhausted and brought to a conclusion.
p Kantian philosophy is alien to the conception of the morally-motivated cognitive interest. The passion for cognition (and in general, an interest in the world) for Kant appears as a forgivable weakness peculiar to the human spirit, as a distinguishing feature of the pre-moral, prudent-calculating consciousness, which endeavours to apprehend and reconnoitre a situation from the point of view of possible success or failure. The moral consciousness appears for the first time in Kantian philosophy as the captious intellectual censor of this passion (in the form of a critic of the exaggerated pretensions of the "theoretical reason”).
p The moral subject as such (the subject of Kant’s second Critique) experiences no need for surveying the surrounding world; the place occupied by cognitive interests is now held by stoical imperturbability, by a readiness to accept and endure even the very worst. Through this the world is pushed aside and ceases to be a captivating question worthy of one’s interest. This world—with all its indeterminacy, elusiveness and all (the exact amount is irrelevant) the disheartening unexpected twists that might occur in the future—is taken into account in advance. Objective reality (including socio-historical reality) enters simply as a source of trials and tribulations which must be endured with dignity and without inquiry into their origin and character.
p The Kantian moral subject is receptive to people experiencing the burden of history and society, but not to history and society as such. He is capable of rapidly distinguishing between good and evil, and justice and injustice to that extent to which 117 they have been actualized in direct inter-personal relationships. But he lacks the capability or impulse to develop a more penetrating vision of social injustice in the root sense of the word, that is to say injustice stemming from the objective relations of larger social groupings, in the "things and circumstances" surrounding the individual.
p This limitation in the Kantian ethics stands out the more boldly the sharper the definition of the specific moral aspect of social problems. As early as the first half of the nineteenth century the rapid development of economic and historical knowledge, complex fluctuations in the class struggle rendered urgent the question of the manner in which the moral subject (the individual, selflessly dedicated to the principle of justice) should turn to the "fundamental objectivities" of social reality.
p A highly important role in the resolution of this problem was played by the creation of a scientific theory of society which conceived of the social entirety as an object external to, yet internally significant for the individual.
p In the 1870s the question of the relationship between ethics and science was given expressive and precise personification, articulated in the theme "Kant and Marx”. Relegating to the background the quite incidental motivations which determined the initial rendering of this theme in the works of the neo-Kantians and of certain German Social Democrats of a philosophical bent, we will try to clarify this theme, underscoring that which was in fact most important and timeless: the question of the relationship between the internal axioms of the moral consciousness and scientific theory, fuelling and presupposing the morally-motivated cognitive interest in society.
p Kantian practical philosophy in a certain sense summarized the consciousness of an entire era: it established that the significance of the historical movement contemporary to the elaboration of this philosophy rested in the stripping of all forms of personal dependence from the individual. The formula of the categorical imperative "never treat another person as a means, but always as an end in itself"—is one of the clearest anti-feudal and “anti-arbitrary” philosophical assertions to be worked out in the eighteenth century.
p In our opinion the authentic enthusiasm of the early bourgeois revolutions is expressed more sharply in The Critique of Practical Reason than in the Enlightenment doctrines inspiring these revolutions. The fundamental slogan of the Enlightenment, of the "unfettered natural individual”, was an ideologically inadequate formulation. Indeed, the actual movement stimulated by this slogan defended not the "authentic 118 nature”, but rather the personal freedom of the individual, the formal right to express his will and independently to dispose of his energy and the fruits of his labour. Kant was the first to give this a corresponding philosophical formulation by advancing to priority positions such categories as “autonomy”, "personal dignity”, “formalism” and "causality through freedom”. The figures of the Enlightenment were ideologues of the bourgeois revolution, Kant its confessor.
p But precisely for this reason anyone who approaches the human community through the prism of Kantian categories snags upon the fundamental and profoundly honest illusion of that era—the political and juridical illusion of society. The substance of this illusion may be found in the fact that the lack of respect for personal freedom was treated as the final source of all evil, that the elimination of the variety of forms of personal dependence and of the arbitrariness inescapably characterizing the feudal-monarchist state was equated with the elimination of all oppression and injustice. The depth of selfdeception marking these most elevated of human expectations is well known. The newly-established world of political and juridical freedoms was destined to become the kingdom of impersonal class oppression.
p The new type of social injustice characteristic of capitalism came to the surface of social life in the form of an unprecedented polarization of wealth and plundering of the productive force of the individual as well as massive demoralization. These disheartening manifestations were observed by numerous social thinkers, however for a prolonged interval no one succeeded in providing a clear and uncontradictory legal qualification of these phenomena. The capitalist system of exploitation turned out to be invulnerable to social criticism which had developed in the current of the Enlightenment and Kantian thought. The cries of reproach grew louder and louder but never could quite turn into a verdict of condemnation. This is in fact no surprise, since capitalist society was deft enough to utilize and thoroughly to rob the individual without having to resort to personal violence, without trampling on his right to express his free will or his right to private property. Your eyes tell you that injustice is on hand; your mind tells you that this is not so.
p For social thought to be supplemented with moral-juridical sharpness of vision, it was necessary (no matter how paradoxical this may seem) to overcome the heritage left by the earlier moral-juridical approach, its stubborn concentration on the issues of personal freedom and personal dependence. Into the 119 field of vision of critical analysis, oriented to the problem of justice, it was necessary to introduce phenomena which had never before interested "pure moralists" and theoreticians of private law—the fundamental objectivities of the capitalist process: the exchange of commodities, the hiring of labour, the organization of production at the capitalist factory and such characteristics of the world of wealth as price, value, profit, etc.
p The thinker to carry out this task was Marx. In his works he was the first to demonstrate that a basic condition for the elaboration of an accusatory verdict against bourgeois civilization is the study of the objective (independent of will and consciousness) social ties and their material embodiment. In relation to the moral and juridical critique of capitalism (and before Marx’s most important works appeared this critique could be located above all in the currents of socialist and revolutionary democratic ideology) his scientific analysis of the capitalist system emerged not only as a tool for objective social orientation, but as a means of increasing the depth of ethical insight and of deepening its morally exposing pathos.
p In the study of the classic Marxist legacy this side of the question often remains in the shadows. We will focus precisely upon this, turning above all to those sections of Capital in which economic analysis is subsumed to the task of reformulating a number of legal problems. The main thrust of these chapters is to provide a foundation for the right to the expropriation of capitalist private property under capitalism.
p The basic empirical data with which Marx begins his analysis is the terrifying spectacle of the plundering of live labour power in the capitalist economic system and facts demonstrating the existence in society of organized mass murder through overwork and referring to the transformation of the working population of the capitalist countries into " generations or human beings, stunted, short-lived, swiftly replacing each other, plucked, so to say, before maturity". [119•1
p By the time that the first volume of Capital had been written these facts had already become the object of social indignation and had attracted the displeasure of hundreds of liberal and socialist writers. It is indicative, however, that this indignation was overlain with a film of sentimental haziness and had by no means crystallized into a juridically substantiated verdict or clear conception of guilt from which could be derived the right to definite decisions and actions.
120p Marx was the first to demonstrate that the legal impracticability of the moods and sufferings engendered in every unprejudiced observer by the capitalist factory system was preconditioned by the habit of inevitably regarding guilt to be personal guilt. This stance encouraged the search for the source of capitalist exploitation in the legal abuses committed by one person (the owner) against another (the employee).
p Capital brought into focus the fact that the owner-employee relationship within the commodity-capitalist economy is in reality the result of the imposition, one upon the other, of three different strands which can be separated and isolated only through theoretical analysis. This is first of all the relationship of the capitalist and the worker as free and equal private individuals on the labour market, in the sphere of commodity exchange. The second strand concerns their conflicting (antinomical) juridical relations as far as the consumption of the commodity purchased by the capitalist is concerned (labour power). The third strand is their antagonistic relationships as representatives of two social classes standing in opposing positions, as “personifications” of capital and labour.
p The relationships between the capitalist and the worker on the labour market (expressing the only actual personal tie between them) are so built that the most rigorous ethic or private code can find no fault with these relationships (the object of reproach can only be modifications of these relationships brought forth by the influence of the corresponding class-social conjuncture). "The owner of labour power and the owner of money,” writes Marx, "meet in the market, and deal with each othe"r as on the basis of equal right ... both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law.” [120•1 The capitalist purchases labour power with the voluntary consent of its owner and pays for it in accordance with its actual value. Marx dismisses from the start those attractive but juridically unfounded suppositions concerning the mandatory nature of this deal and suggesting that capitalist profit can arise from market deception or from the infringement upon the rights of the worker as a commodity-owner. Mocking attempts to portray the capitalist as a private individual making ill use of nis rights, Marx wrote: "This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labourpower goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of 121 man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property.... Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own.” [121•1
p But can it be that the abuses of the capitalist and the violence employed against the person of the worker begin behind the gates of the factory? Yes and no, replies Marx, for in reality we find there not the realm of open illegality, but the world of legal antinomies.
p The capitalist has purchased labour power for a definite length of time, in the course of which he is its full owner. This latter fact signifies that the intensity of the productive consumption of labour power is the indisputable private right of the owner of capital. At the same time labour power is the means of existence for the worker, and as a result of the excessive consumption of this labour power it is the worker himself, not an object separated from him and handed by him to another, who is worn out.
p The right of the capitalist to the intensive consumption of labour power is something distinct from the right to the life of the worker as such (that is to say a right over its duration). But it is from excessive work that this life is in fact shortened. The worker thus has every justification to declare to the capitalist: "To you ... belongs the use of my daily labour power. But by an unlimited extension of the working-day, you may in one day use up a quantity of labour power greater than I can restore in three. What you gain in labour I lose in substance. The use of my labour power and the spoliation of it are quite different things.... That is against our contract and the law of exchanges.” [121•2
p To the claims of the worker, however, the following answer may be forthcoming:
p “The owner of the money has paid the value of a day’s labour power; his, therefore, is the use of it for a day; a day’s labour belongs to him. The circumstance, that on the one hand the daily sustenance of labour power costs only half a day’s 122 labour, while on the other hand the very same labour power can work during a whole day ... is, without doubt, a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injury to the seller.” [122•1
p Summarizing this mutually just and mutually fruitless altercation Marx wrote: "... the nature of the exchange of commodities itself imposes no limit to the working-day, no limit to surplus-labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working-day as long as possible, and to make, whenever possible, two working-days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working-day to one of definite normal duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges [my emphasis—E.S.]. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is working-day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working class.” [122•2
p Let us dwell at first upon the content of the proposition, underlined by us, concerning the conflict between two rights which are equally sanctioned by law.
p In Marx’s Capital the legal conflict is usually conveyed in the language of interests, that of mutual solicitation. But it can also be presented as a collision of obligations, as moral competition.
p The capitalist could easily have presented his position as that of an obligation, he could justifiably say to the worker: "The extraordinary exploitation of your labour power is my obligation, is my duty—before my father and grandfather, who accumulated the money with which I am now purchasing this labour power. If I am incapable of utilizing it to its utmost, if I am sentimental with you, I will succumb to the competition and become a squanderer of the wealth earned by others. This would mean that I would commit a crime against my ancestors who bequeathed to me the duty of increasing capital resources, of expanding production and of providing work for an ever growing number of your kind.” These conclusions are quite convincing on that level of understanding promoted by the moral-juridical approach to the problem.
123p Just as convincing however would seem to be the position defended by our hypothetical worker, be he a moralist or a Kantian: "I demand a shortening of the working day not for reasons of self-preservation. I have no obligation to live fifty and not thirty years, but I do have a duty which drives me to this demand, a duty before my family and children. They will perish if I die or lose my ability to work prematurely. What is your duty before your ancestors in comparison with mine before my descendants? And whose employment are you guaranteeing if my children and those of people like me are to perish from the consequences of poverty?”
p Where right clashes with right, morality clashes with morality. And the further the moral analysis of the conflict proceeds, the more rigorous the defence of juridical roles (those given by historv rather than chosen), the stronger is felt the impact of situational compulsion to openly illegal and immoral decisions—to action "from the position of strength”.
p It is often asserted in contemporary bourgeois literature concerned with Capital that Marx saw in the conflict of antinomies (between two equally sanctioned rights) a sanction for a resolution of the conflict through sheer force, as if his critique of the traditional juridical approach to the problem of exploitation was suffused with an enthusiasm for "might makes right”.
p In reality that section of Capital dedicated to an analysis of the conflict of rights between the seller and purchaser of labour power, is least of all an exposition of Marx’s final conclusions, of his credo. This section was written in the critical and ironic manner, when the author conditionally adopts the roles of the agents of the conflict and carries them through to the end. Employing the given method Marx demonstrates to what results the moral-juridical idealism leads if it is consistently utilized in an analysis of the relations underlying exploitation. These results, as we have seen, are quite paradoxical. The moral-juridical consciousness, suffused with respect for the contract, for the amicable reconciliation of contradictions, unexpectedly admits that it has no reasons to object to the "internecine war" which arises spontaneously and which is so shocking to its consciousness.
p This does not mean, of course, that Marx himself rises to the defence of spontaneous class resoluteness, that engendered by the resistance of the legal conflict to a reconciliation between the purchaser and seller of labour power. For Marx the problem of a just, legally justified violence, to which the working 124 class receives sanction from history itself, is precisely what is fundamental in this matter.
p What in fact is this sanction?
p Marx demonstrates that even before the moment in which the individual capitalist and worker meet on the market and conclude as free parties a contract they already stand in a mutual socio-historical relationship represented in the social nature of things, located in their free disposition—in the social nature of capital and labour power.
p Both capital and labour power, separated from all the conditions of labour, arose at some point within the same historical process, in the act of "primitive accumulation"—the forcible plundering of the independent small-scale producer. They were the result of the "polarization of the commodity market" carried out through recourse to the most flagrant illegality. The absence of means of production at the one pole and the concentration of these means at the other—a dependency which those generations born under developed capitalism find as o priori precondition of their existence—is in fact a result of what can only be called usurpation. If this is taken into account (if we glance at the relationship of the seller and the purchaser of labour power in a historical context) we become immediately aware of a change in the sense of the above moral-juridical conflict.
p The owner of capital now emerges as a person disposing of property attained through criminal means: the seller of labour power as the descendant of a people who have been forcibly robbed. Behind the antinomies of two equally sanctioned private rights is exposed the historically sanctioned right to the expropriation of capitalist private property.
p The capitalist speaking in the name of capital itself (rather than in that of his familial responsibility for capital) can only be the open defender of the unremunerated appropriation of another party’s labour. The worker speaking in the name of labour power separated from all the conditions of the implementation of labour (and not in the name of his familial responsibility for the reproduction of this labour power in new generations) emerges as the accusator of this plunder which remains invisible in the individual act of exchange (capital for labour) but is visibly manifested in the history of their mutual relationships.
p As irreconcilable and juridically unequal opponents capital and labour power come into conflict not on the labour market and not in the individual enterprise, but rather in history, on the arena of the development 01 the capitalist social system as a 125 specific internally contradictory whole. This whole is not yielding to ordinary perception. It may be brought into bold relief and studied only with the aid of scientific investigation. Concerned with events on a mass scale, enduring and recurring relationships which are observable only on a larger historical scale, science discovers the special life of the social organism, on the basis of which we may pose the question of the responsibility accruing to various social groups and concerning the historical justification underpinning their claims.
p The original contribution made by the scientific theory of society to human orientation as a whole consists in the fact that this theory points to the social whole as a being enduring suffering and torment which appeals to us for the resolution of its unsolved contradictions, unhealthy disproportions, obstructions in the path of development, etc. Society is for the first time characterized in this context through tendencies (dynamics of change) and objective requirements. The implementation or non-implementation, satisfaction or non-satisfaction of these tendencies thus emerge as a criterion for the determination of the merit or guilt of those social forces organizing the life of society, economic, cultural and other policies determining either mass prosperity or calamity, phenomena to be experienced not solely by the generation contemporary to these policies.
p The social whole is not a “personality” and to speak of “respect” for it is to render literal a metaphor. Nevertheless it must be admitted that without responsibility before this whole the idea of true responsibility before humans is also inconceivable. Society is an object “impersonal” in nature, in relation to which the morally-developed individual is compelled nevertheless to take a position which is directly appropriate only in relation to “people”.
p Scientific social theory was the first to uncover society as an end in itself and it demands an unconditional recognition of this independence of ends. It is precisely because of objective scientific analysis that the awareness arises that people may suffer from the abuses permitted in relation to the social system (such as voluntarist actions, artificial attempts to preserve the status quo, etc.) no less, and perhaps even more than they suffer from juridical abuses, and further that these abuses themselves are often only the accompanying symptoms of organized violence against history.
p Society in whose contradictions and unrealized possibilities are invisibly represented the suffering and ordeals of present 126 and future generations—such was the new object of moral responsibility discovered by science and unknown to the earlier Enlightenment-Kantian, moral-juridical reflective mind.
p One of the outstanding representatives of neo-Kantianism, Wilhelm Windelband summarized the content of the Kantian categorical imperative in the following manner: "All things may be used as means for one’s ends [my italics—E.S.] but the individual must never be utilized only as a means, on the contrary his absolute worth must always be rendered its due.” [126•1 Desirous of underscoring the basic pathos underlying Kantian “practical philosophy" Windelband in passing let slip its fundamental limitation, divulging its discretely concealed sanctioning of selfish, cynically utilitarian attitude towards any and all “things”. But indeed for Kant "thing is everything which doesn’t fall under the category of personality, that is to say, any reality with the exclusion of the human individual; any reality which can be understood as possessing an independent and purposeful existence separate from other realities. That which is recognized to be the rightful object of selfish attitudes turns out to be, in other words, not only wood or stone, but also natural resources in the widest sense, the economy, the social organism, etc.
p As a result we discover, that the materialist historical theory of society is on a higher moral level than are purely ethical conceptions; this theory extends the principle of respect for the "end in itself" to a number of “things”, “objects” that are not human beings. It was no accident that in the work of Marx the pivotal moment for the criticism of capitalism was the exposure of it as a social system practising "all-encompassing, universal exploitation" and having transformed the accumulation of social wealth as such into a process marked by the barbaric plundering of that wealth already accumulated by nature and history (the fertility of the soil, the mineral resources of the earth, the productive force of the population, etc.).
p With the emergence of Marxism the enthusiasm of the struggle against illegal forms of social actions is supplemented by the enthusiasm of the struggle against its anti-social forms (utilitarian, voluntarist, unfounded utopianism, etc.)—against 127 the defiance not so much of juridical as of economic and socio-historical laws.
p Applying the notion of “law” to extend beyond the sphere of legal relations the scientific theory of society for the first time makes properly social relations and facts accessible to moral analysis. A new category of interdictions is placed alongside the moral commandments, the former bearing directly upon the actions of large social groups, but touching also the individual, as the latter chooses between these groups, and identifies himself with them. In formulating such an interdiction, science for the first time creates the possibility of evaluating a number of objective incongruities in social life as the consequence of the offences and criminal deeds of class groupings. It creates the opportunity of crystallizing indignation at the most massive of human woes into stern social verdicts. It is only owing to this fact that society and the forces active within society (and not solely the actions of isolated individuals) fall within the range of comprehension for the moral subject.
p “The radical law-obedient subject" as we earlier named our hypothetical character, orients himself quite well to events if they unfold in the direction of private rights. If somewhere the freedom to express one’s will is trampled upon, or if someone is calumniated or unjustly convicted, our subject responds promptly and with the full measure of self-sacrifice characteristic of him. He reacts accurately in a manner juridically certified—not simply with indignation, but with a clear awareness of the legal foundations of his indignation.
p However, this very same subject conducts himself quite differently in the face of mass calamities which persist despite the observance of the conventions of private law. As a morally sophisticated individual his indignation is aroused, but despite this he finds no strictly moral-juridical foundation for any practical actions whatsoever.
p In order to come to an awareness of the nature of his personal duty in the face of phenomena such as mass poverty, malnutrition, cultural backwardness, oppression, growing crime rates, etc., he would have to be in possession of a knowledge of the norms and interdictions, the violation of which gave rise to the given phenomena. However, the moral-juridical consciousness is in no condition to come independently forth with such knowledge. It is attained by science together with a conception of objects which are completely new and unprecedented in terms of normal experience. By such objects we have in mind "society as a whole”, economic relations, classes and social substrata 128 (“layers”). Science, consequently, does not simply give supplementary information on subjects already within the field of Knowledge but also discovers entire new continents in terms of social reality, which the individual must take into account when he first thinks over his choice of paths in life.
p We have arrived at the most essential point in our analysis.
p Science as it is revealed in the scientific theory of society influences in the most direct fashion the value orientation of the individual to reality. It provides the individual not only with a "knowledge of the facts and circumstances" but also with new objects falling within his responsibility and with respect for the end in itself, justified condemnation, etc. It not only renders more precise vital life decisions which have already been made but, strictly speaking, renders possible for the first time certain of these decisions as such.
p Does this not signify however that science in the given instance has quite stepped beyond the bounds of its actual capabilities, and so subscribes to the scientistic demands of the ordinary consciousness and offers its counsel in those instances where in fact one should be thinking in terms of free choice and a clear moral position? The answer is no, this is not its significance.
p The scientific theory of society from the outset presupposes the moral maturity of the individual whom it addresses.
p The knowledge proffered by scientific theory is meant not for the individual confronting alternatives which are equally advantageous (or unprofitable) but for the individual who has run into an antinomy of rights. He has already passed through the crucible of indeterminate and virtually unresolvable situations. He has already been disillusioned with individualistic wisdom (in the prudent-calculating search for success and happiness). He has come to self-sacrifice and selflessness, based upon a strict order (hierarchy) of motives and values (on a clear awareness of the fact that duty must predominate over inclination, good over gain, truth over expediency, etc.). Finally he has arrived at an understanding of justice as the meaning of human existence.
p If this has not yet taken place, if ethics have not become the formal structure of the individual consciousness, the basic theme of the scientific theory of society—that of social justice—cannot be fully apprehended by the individual, to whom this theory is addressed.
p Theoretical research answers those questions about society which confront the individual who discovers that the existing social organization deprives him not only of the opportunity of 129 satisfying his individual needs (well-being, happiness, selfexpression, etc.) but of the opportunity of fulfilling his obligations, of living "according to the law”.
Scientific theory is a tool helping the moral individual find his bearings in society, and not a means of guiding the ordinary consciousness apart from ethics. Marxism endeavours to make the subject more realistic and far-sighted in a social sense, a subject who has alreadv reached the level of self-sacrifice, of wholehearted effort in the service of justice. But*Marxism’s construct by no means consists in an effort to debunk this subject and replace him by the sober, prudent-calculating individual, standing in need of science as an instrument for the deduction of optimal paths to individual profit. The substance of the matter is by no means located in the reduction of the moral consciousness to the consciousness of the notorious "economic individual”. (This latter is one of the most widespread interpretations of Marxism in contemporary bourgeois literature.) The substance of the matter, in fact, lies in the elevation of the moral consciousness itself by means of science to the vantage point of the ethico-social and ethicohistorical view over society.
Notes
[119•1] K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1971, p. 269.
[120•1] K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 168.
[121•1] Ibid., p. 176.
[121•2] Ibid., p. 234.
[122•1] K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 193-94.
[122•2] Ibid., pp. 234-35.
[126•1] Wilhelm Windelband, Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophic in ihrem Zusammenhange mil der allgemeinen Kultur und den besonderen Wissenschaften, Zweiter Band, Leipzig, 1911, S. 124.