p The world of scientific truth is the sphere of free human thought. But, although the thought is paradoxical, the human significance of science, connected with the social aspects derived from the application of scientific results, has a somewhat limiting effect upon this freedom.
p Contemporary science possesses enormous potential for moral impact. Its moral authority is so great today that even obscurantists are compelled to assert that they rely upon science and to doctor their fantasies with a scientific profile and presenting these fantasies as the fruits of scientific investigation.
p However, an evaluation of the moral authority of science must not overlook that amazing duality of feeling which it evokes among many people who try to give a philosophical assessment of the scientific path and of the consequences of scientific development. This duality was clearly demonstrated when the results of the physicist’s, and in our day, the biologist’s intrusion into the micro-world, were first made known. These explorations offered to science the keys to doors over which is inscribed the warning: "DANGEROUS TO THE WORLD!”. Even a simple awareness that certain of these keys have been located and that the discovery of others is imminent, provokes widespread pessimism, particularly when the historical stage is cluttered with political adventurists and half-mad fanatics who have also seized these keys in their tenacious grip. Belligerent and ignorant philistines have already drawn up a formula for salvation: get rid of all the physicists, then we can live peacefully!
p That scientific achievements may be employed not only for the good of society but for its detriment has been known for a long time. Today, however, it has become especially clear that science can serve not only the well-being of mankind but also to bring about catastrophe. Therefore at no earlier point did the scientist experience such moral responsibility before mankind as he does today; responsibility for the biological, material and moral effects stemming from the results of his searches.
p The fact that the massive scientific and technological revolution unfolding before our eyes has encountered human society in a socially-heterogeneous condition adds particular significance to the question of what exactly contemporary science is concerned with and what progress it expects to make in the near future. For us this is, without exaggeration, a question of life and death. It is simultaneously a question of life 62 and death for science, for it touches upon one of the basic principles essential for its development—the freedom of scientific inquiry and of scientific thought. This is the most important moral pre-requisite for the existence of and progress in science. The wheel has come full circle.
p The freedom to think is guaranteed by the laws of biology. In this sense the problem of free scientific thought does not exist, for in reality and for the time being at least no one has devised a means of preventing people from thinking, although direct intrusions in the thought processes are in principle possible. But it is one matter to think in general, and another to conduct a scientific inquiry.
p Science’s drive to find the truth requires freedom of research and the exchange of opinions. In this sense science—in its struggle for the completion of the tasks facing it—is uniformly hostile to limitations advanced both by dogmatists of any given faith (as for example, in the pitiful spectacle of the "monkey trial" when, with the help of the civil courts, an effort was made to condemn Darwinism, to accuse it of offending human dignity) and by vulgar and dogmatic philosophy, as for example when tne theoreticians of the Chinese "cultural revolution" condemned the whole of world culture as useless rubbish. The resistance to limitations of this type represents a fight for a high level of morality, and the position taken by a scientist in this struggle does much to define his moral stance.
p The problem of unrestricted scientific thought, however, is not confined to the unhindered search for the truth. The question is much broader and more profound. Freedom of scientific inquiry and of judging the truth is not to be equated in terms of moral content with that of freedom of choice of the aims of research. If we wish to locate the main difficulty, it is to be found precisely in the choice of research goals.
p Objects for research are unlimited, whereas research possibilities are restricted. It would be quite impossible to study everything—-one must make a choice of goals. Reflection may be centred on any convenient topic. Research demands definite methods and conditions. The less significant the moral and social component in the scientific results achieved and the greater the role played in obtaining these results by "thinking proper" the more there will be in common between the freedom of choosing a research subject and the freedom of inquiry. For the student of pure mathematics the decision to study or not to study a given theorem depends above all on individual choice, on his scientific interest. This however is true 63 only so long as paper and books are the only research tools in demand. When a calculating machine is drawn into his work, the question of the expedience of allocating machine time for the given goal arises. When the solution of a mathematical problem requires a concerted effort by a large number of scientists, when research is inconceivable without the employment of powerful technological facilities, the choice of assignments is no longer dictated by the "free will" of any given mathematician.
p The applied sciences present even more restrictions in the choice of subject and research methods. Here individual choice is at times totally excluded and the scientist is forced to subordinate this choice to the dictates of social needs, to conduct research along lines consistent with society’s more urgent tasks. This creates certain moral limitations in research and requires that the scholar make his own decision concerning a number of ethical and moral problems connected with the goal-orientation of the scientific inquiry. Some of these are relatively simple, as for example, the posing of tasks connected with certain infringements upon individual scientific interests. Others are more complex and indeed at times tragic. Such problems are most often confronted by people in the field of medicine, but also by physicists and biologists working on projects which might lead to beneficial results for given individuals or for society as a whole ... or to equally baneful effects.
p The concern with truth and with the well-being of society defines the moral wellsprings of the scientific inquiry and contributes to the moral authority enjoyed by science and the scientist. The latter is often endowed with this authority for the simple fact he is a member of the scientific community, in the form perhaps of an “advance”, for it is widely assumed that he will work to advance the welfare of society.
p In this connection the scientist is from time to time confronted with a complex question: does he have the moral right to conduct a given scientific inquiry? Such, for example, was the dilemma of many Western physicists when confronted with the task of developing the atom bomb during World War II. Aware of the possible consequences if such a weapon fell into the hands of the fascists, some scientists declined to participate in the elaboration of the corresponding physical problems. Others, on the other hand, took active part in this project, for they sided with the camp fighting fascism. Both the former and the latter were guided by a sense of high moral responsibility for the fate of mankind. Although the bomb, as a result of the moral position taken by scientists, was in fact 64 developed in the countries belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition, it was certainly not applied to this struggle, as it had been assumed. This was the source of a deep moraltragedy for many atomic scientists, in particular for such a humanist as Einstein, who had cast his support in the decisive moment and wielded his authority before the financing organs in the USA to promote the decision to begin work on the atom bomb.
As is well known reactionary forces employed the new forms of weaponry against a peaceful population. The threat of the atom bomb became a permanent political trump among imperialist circles. These circumstances cast a new light on the moral problem of the task carried out by Soviet physicists at this point in history. Their work on the atom bornb led to the consolidation of the defence capacity of the socialist countries, which forced proponents of a new war to clip their wings. Thus in the given instance work on the development of a threatening type of weapon had a humanitarian goal, for it contributed to the cause of peace on earth.
Notes
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