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SUBJECTIVISM TRIUMPHS IN SOCIOLOGY
 

p In contrast to the Marxist view of the objective laws of society’s progressive development, bourgeois theorists claimed that progress was a relative and arbitrary conception which depended on the researcher’s standpoint. In the course of the ideological struggle, bourgeois theorists have adopted subjective idealism in sociology.

p In the closing years of his life, Comte stressed the subjective nature of knowledge and reached the conclusion that sociological systems were subjective and not objective. Since then bourgeois theorists have gone beyond his views, criticising the formal concept of social evolution which Spencer gave, and opposing the “transfer” of laws and uniformities from the natural sciences to the study of the social process. They claimed that the science of society was a science of spirit, which 321 meant that anyone was free to invent such “formulas of progress" as he saw fit, and that the category of progress was defined in accordance with the thinker’s “social ideal”. Social ideal, for its part, resulted from the activity of the brain, being the result of subjective assessment of reality.

p The subjective idealist view of history was developed in greatest detail at the turn of the century by the neo-Kantians Rickert, Windelband and others who insisted that social science was a system of subjective evaluations of various social phenomena. They came out against the application of the conceptions of law and uniformity to social life, claiming this to be an unwarranted transfer of conceptions proper only to the natural sciences. With this kind of approach the most die-hard reactionary and champion of obsolete social systems could present himself as a champion of progress. That is exactly what the apologists of the bourgeois system did. Social-reformists under the influence of neo-Kantian views, unable to see the prospect of social development and, consequently, to obtain a scientific criterion for what is progressive, also put the label of progress on anything they liked, and this meant chiefly any bourgeois reform.

p The bourgeois theorists concentrated on attacking the fundamentals of the scientific view of social development, the doctrine of the mode of production, of socio-economic formations and their law-governed development. They were intent on refuting the following important conclusion drawn from an analysis of the historical process: everything that actively promoted the victory of the working class and the new socio-economic formation over the old and obsolete, and subsequently helped to establish and develop it was progressive.

p In the course of the ideological struggle, bourgeois theorists subjected the positivist theory to criticism from the Right. This was an attack by bellicose subjective idealism against the recognition of any objective laws governing social development. The attack was mounted by the neo-Kantians and taken up by other subjective idealists. On the crest of this wave we find Max Weber, the German historian and sociologist, who claimed that the laws of social life, including economic laws, were no more than the products of the human mind which helped to understand reality. The social structures which succeeded one another in the course of history were no more than “ideal types" produced by the mind to help the researcher sort things out in the historical process.

p On the one hand, Weber strove to avoid the impression that the historical process was chaotic, and on the other, to avoid the assumption that it was objective and law-governed. The historical process consisted of unique events and phenomena, and there Weber agreed with other neo-Kantians, including Rickert and Windelband. But the comparative method still safeguarded sociology from complete elimination. In these unique events and phenomena one could discern some general features of the historical process, one could generalise something, so as to 322 produce various ideal types. In this way, Weber modified the neo-Kantian view of the historical process.

p However there was this question to answer: where was the limit to this generalising activity of the sociologist’s mind? Was it possible to go on from the generalisation which resulted in the production of ideal types or successive models of the historical process to assume their succession and change, thereby producing a theory of the social process, however idealistic? On the strength of his neo-Kantian views, Weber allowed himself to recognise only one line in the historical process, namely, the growth and development of the abstracting power of the human mind. But even this he did with his characteristic reservations: “The emancipation of the world from illusion and the attendant rationalisation could be either good or evil, such is our lot.... The old churches are mercifully open ... if there is need to perform a ’sacrifice of the intellect’."  [322•15  Progress in scientific knowledge consisted in a destruction of the old, “comforting” philosophical schemes. Those who are afraid to abandon these schemes have only one alternative: a return to the past, a sacrifice of the intellect.

Thus, Weber put forward a theory according to which social life could be understood only by means of the “ideal types" constructed by the sociologist. Let us add that in our day the advocates of such theories of “ideal types" or “images” have propounded Platonic ideas, claiming that reality is no more than a reflection of ideal types. Others have confined themselves to preaching the Kantian view of conception, declaring that the conceptions of “type” or “image” arise prior to experience. Other sociologists claim that image-conceptions are, after all, some kind of generalisations of empirical material and help to generalise it. On the whole, Weber’s theory proved to be valuable for bourgeois ideologists. Marxism, which has attacked bourgeois ideology from the scientific point, has put forward the doctrine of socio-economic formations. Making use of Weber’s ideas, bourgeois theorists say: we have our own doctrine of the “types” of society. However, because these “types” are no more than the fruit of the mind, because they are ideal, the theorists of the bourgeoisie have nothing to worry about. But that has confused many scientists in the West.

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Notes

[322•15]   Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tubingen, 1951, S. 596.