p It is to Lenin’s great credit that he revealed the tremendous historic importance of the problem of the relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world, indicated the way it could be resolved and advocated the principle of peaceful coexistence as the basic strategy of socialist foreign policy towards the capitalist states. “We are now in a transitional phase,” Lenin said, “and our revolution is surrounded by capitalist countries. As long as we are in this phase, we are forced to seek highly complex forms of relationships.” [154•*
p Lenin based his argument on a careful analysis of the specific historical situation and proved, first, the inevitability of the simultaneous existence of states with different social systems for an entire historical period; second, the desirability and expediency, from the point of view of socialist interests, of peaceful forms of this coexistence; third, the real possibility of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, despite the opposing nature of their social and economic systems and the aggressive designs of imperialism.
p Events have fully borne out Lenin’s theory of socialist revolution and the consequent principles of foreign policy. Socialism was unable to triumph simultaneously in many countries and initially it won the day in one country alone. “...The period of the coexistence side by side of socialist and capitalist states" has begun, Lenin wrote. [154•** Therefore, the coexistence of states with different social systems became an indisputable fact of history. Since the simultaneous existence of the socialist state and capitalist states became inevitable, the working class which had come to power in one 155 country and needed to strengthen its power, to defend and consolidate its revolutionary gains, was objectively interested in peace and in peaceful coexistence with the surrounding capitalist countries that were its class enemies.
p The principle of peaceful coexistence logically followed from Lenin’s conception of socialist foreign policy, for the most favourable external conditions for building socialism (to ensure which was the purpose of the foreign policy of the socialist state) were the conditions of peaceful existence and, consequently, of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries.
p The principle of peaceful coexistence as the main principle of the policy of the socialist state in respect to capitalist countries conformed to the interests of the Soviet working people and to the interests of the world revolutionary process and of the working people throughout the world. It was this point that Lenin substantiated in a profound and comprehensive way in the hard struggle against Trotsky and the “Left”-wing Communists during the wrangling over the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The “Left”-wing proponents of revolutionary phrasemongering did not take account of the real situation nor did they understand the specific nature of the foreign policy tasks of the proletariat that had come to power in one country; they jeopardised the very existence of Soviet power and in principle renounced the possibility and expediency of any relations with capitalist countries other than “revolutionary war”. This attitude essentially left no place for the foreign policy activity of the socialist state. Typical in that respect was the position of Trotsky, who was appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs after the October Revolution.
p He declared with his customary forthrightness: “Will we have any diplomatic work? I shall make a few revolutionary appeals and then shut up shop.” [155•*
p Similar views were voiced at the Seventh Party Congress convened specially to debate the issue of a peace treaty with Germany. Bukharin, for example, maintained that “there can never be peaceful coexistence between us—between the 156 Soviet Republic and international capital”. And “the only prospect as far as possibility and need are concerned is war against international capital”.... [156•* Demagogically, Trotsky maintained that “for the revolutionary class, deals with the imperialists are inadmissible”.... [156•**
p Despite the opposition from “Left”-wing Communists and Trotsky, the ultra-revolutionary phrasemongering and foreign policy adventurism which could have put paid to the revolution, the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany was concluded at Lenin’s initiative. Lenin defined this treaty as “the most significant result of the foreign policy of the Council of People’s Commissars”, [156•*** and he upheld the fundamental principles of a socialist, genuinely revolutionary foreign policy that corresponded to the interests both of the Soviet people and of tbe working people of other countries.
p The international debut of the socialist state signified a qualitatively new stage in the proletariat’s class struggle against the bourgeoisie throughout the world and the appearance of new, previously unknown, forms of struggle. The issue concerning selection of appropriate forms of struggle in regard to foreign policy has all the more importance in that the victorious working class is confronted in this sphere with imperialism, a particularly strong, experienced and cunning enemy. Lenin stressed that imperialism must be fought, and one must know how to fight it; socialist revolution in other countries must be helped and one had to know how to help it. [156•****
p In the arguments with “Left”-wing Communists who were calling for the “pushing” of revolution by war, Lenin showed that such views have nothing in common with Marxism: "Actually, however, the interests of the world revolution demand that Soviet power, having overthrown the bourgeoisie in our country, should help that revolution, but that it 157 should choose a form of help which is commensurate with its own strength.” [157•*
p What in former conditions had not been acceptable to the proletariat (an agreement with one group of imperialist predators), became permissible and necessary in the new situation, in the interests of world socialist revolution. “We sat at the table beside Hoffmann and not Liebknecht—and in doing so we assisted the German revolution,” [157•** Lenin said.
p While armed struggle dominated Soviet relations with the capitalist world in the early years, and while Lenin’s idea of peaceful coexistence did not then obtain any wide practical implementation, this did not mean that the Soviet Republic had repudiated this foreign policy line or, even less so, that it was theoretically groundless. The armed struggle which the Soviet people conducted for over three years had been imposed upon them by the imperialists, it was a necessary response to the armed intervention by foreign powers. In such circumstances, Lenin stood for the most resolute opposition to the aggressors, for the most serious attitude to the country’s defence, and for constant improvement of the fighting capacity of the Red Army and the defence potential of the Soviet state.
p While Lenin consistently pursued his peaceful coexistence policy, he never considered it automatically ensured or “eternal”. In his understanding, peaceful coexistence was not idyllic, it implied a struggle in the political, ideological and economic spheres. “We never imagined,” he said, “that with the fighting over and the advent of peace, the capitalist wolf would lie down with the socialist lamb.” [157•***
p Lenin frequently warned of the danger of the peace being disturbed, and even of the inevitability of new armed clashes between socialism and capitalism. However, he understood this inevitability to stem not from the oppositenature of the two systems as such, but from the aggressive anti-Soviet strivings of the imperialists which relatively 158 weak socialism was not then capable of taming. The Soviet peaceful coexistence policy, therefore, is not something that stems from a temporary political situation, nor from the relative weakness of socialism at a certain historical stage, nor can it be reduced to a tactical slogan, as many Western ideologists assert. The peaceful coexistence policy reflects a long-term strategic policy in relations with capitalist countries, drawn up by Lenin on the basis of an examination of objective factors and trends, and the basic interests of the Soviet state and the world revolutionary process.
p The new principles of international relations that were put forward by Lenin were embodied and further developed by the Soviet state in its foreign policy at the end of the Civil War. Describing the practical activity of the Party and the Soviet Government in foreign policy, Lenin said, at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (RCP(B]): “...Our attention and all our endeavours were aimed at switching from our relations of war with the capitalist countries to relations of peace and trade.” [158•*
p A new phase in the development of relations between states with different systems began after the Civil War. Defeat of the internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention signified, as Lenin expressed it, “not only a breathing-space but something much more significant”—a period in the development of international relations “in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states.” [158•**
p The new situation utterly confirmed the correctness and vitality of Lenin’s principles of relations with capitalist countries. The Soviet Government did not alter its foreign policy principles. Georgi Chicherin said in June 1920: “Our slogan was and still remains the same: peaceful coexistence with other governments no matter who they are.”
p Lenin wrote in December 1921, summarising the experience of the existence of the Soviet Republic in its capitalist encirclement: “It seemed inconceivable from the political and military aspects. That it is possible both politically and 159 militarily has now been proved; it is a fact. But what about trade? What about economic relations?” [159•*
p His answer to that question was quite unambiguous: “I know of no reason why a socialist commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalist countries.” [159•**
p Development of economic ties with the capitalist world conformed with the interests of the young Soviet Republic.
p Lenin’s ideas determined the attitude taken by the Soviet delegation both during negotiations with individual capitalist states and at first important international conference with Soviet participation, which met in Genoa in 1922. Pravda wrote at the time that the invitation of Soviet Russia to that conference was “a victory for our revolution. It is not the end of the struggle but a new success in the fight on a new front and with new methods.” Although the hostile attitude of the bourgeois governments which did not renounce their attempts to bring down the socialist system hampered an extensive development of economic ties with the capitalist world, Lenin firmly believed in the real possibility of normal relations with capitalist countries and indicated the objective prerequisites of peaceful coexistence. He said: “There is a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force is world general economic relations, which compel them to make contact with us.” [159•***
p Lenin continued the same train of thought at the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(B): “The fact of the matter is that the most urgent, pressing and practical interests that have been sharply revealed in all the capitalist countries during the past few years call for the development, regulation and expansion of trade with Russia. Since such interests exist, we may argue, we may quarrel, we may disagree on specific combinations—it is highly probable that we shall have to disagree—this fundamental economic necessity will, nevertheless, after all is said and done, make a way for itself.” [159•****
160p Support by the working people both at home and abroad was an important factor of success for the peaceful Soviet policy, of the real possibility of peaceful coexistence. Lenin frequently underlined the importance of the struggle of the working class in capitalist countries for stopping imperialist intervention and for strengthening the international position of the Soviet Republic.
p Lenin considered the contradictions within the imperialist camp—both between individual countries and between various ruling groupings within a particular country—as another important factor facilitating peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. “The more powerful enemy,” he said, “can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. . . . And this applies equally to the period before and after the proletariat has won political power.” [160•*
p Lenin returned time and again to this idea, developing it in respect to specific circumstances.
p His ideas had special significance for the foreign policy of the socialist country when it was surrounded by economically and militarily superior capitalist countries.
p Lenin formulated the rule: ”. . .We must be able to take advantage of the antagonisms and contradictions existing among the imperialists.” [160•**
p On the issues of foreign policy and relations with bourgeois states, he stressed the vast practical importance of contradictions between those members of the bourgeois camp “who are inclined to settle the problem by war” and those “who are inclined towards pacifism, even the worst kind of 161 pacifism, which from the communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism.” [161•*
p Lenin noted the possibility and the need of isolating the most reactionary, aggressive and interventionist elements within influential political circles of the bourgeois countries.
p In his review of the tasks facing the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference, he considered that a major, if not the most important, political one was to separate the pacifist wing in the bourgeois camp, to “make it known that we consider possible and desirable not only a trade, but a political agreement with them.” [161•**
p Lenin consistently conducted a policy designed to normalise relations with bourgeois states. He advocated the widest economic ties with them. He granted the possibility, and demonstrated in practice his readiness, in the interests of peace and socialism, to make inevitable compromises in foreign policy, concessions, and even sacrifices. Speaking, for example, about the granting of concessions to foreign businessmen, he said: “We pay a certain ‘tribute’ to world capitalism; we ‘ransom’ ourselves under certain arrangements, thereby immediately stabilising the Soviet power and improving our economic conditions.” [161•***
p In the whole of his activity Lenin gave examples of how to combine “the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory manoeuvres, zigzags, retreats and so on...”. [161•****
p According to Chicherin, Lenin showed “an inimitable political realism” and “a peerless flexibility” at the same time as “he had the knack of knowing the limit beyond which it was necessary to show firmness.” [161•***** This limit lay in the distinction between secondary and prime interests, the task of preserving and consolidating the major gains of the 162 socialist revolution. To preserve peace, Lenin said: “We are ready to make huge concessions and sacrifices, but not any kind and not for ever.” [162•*
p Thus, during the negotiations with Germany over the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty—one of the most critical moments in Soviet history—Lenin defined the limit of concessions, the decisive criterion of the position of the Soviet Republic, which was vitally interested in concluding a peace treaty with Germany, as follows: “If the Germans said that they wanted to overthrow Bolshevik power, we would naturally have to fight....” [162•** He later gave a comprehensive assessment of the results of the negotiations with Germany and the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty: “At that time we sacrificed no fundamental interests; we conceded minor interests and preserved what was fundamental.” [162•***
p Advocating, as he did, a specific analysis of a specific situation, Lenin called for an approach that would not renounce in general a military agreement with one of the imperialist coalitions against another. However, he formulated just as tersely and unambiguously conditions for accepting agreements with the imperialists: he referred to cases when “such an agreement could, without undermining the basis of Soviet power, strengthen its position and paralyse the attacks of any imperialist power...”. [162•****
p The principle of inviolability of the foundations of the socialist system also fully apply to economic relations between socialist and capitalist states. Lenin resolutely and unequivocally insisted that the Soviet state have a monopoly of foreign trade. The Soviet Government took the same attitude on the question of concessions. Chicherin said in 1919: “We underline once again that our concessions should not be to the detriment of the fundamental principles of the Soviet system and the gradual implementation of communism in Russia.” [162•*****
163p Leonid Krasin, the first People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade, said the same thing when he formulated the conditions of economic agreements with capitalist states: “The sovereignty of the Russian state and the non-intervention of other powers in its internal affairs or with its internal laws is one of the lundamental conditions.” [163•*
p In relations with the capitalist world, whatever form they took, Soviet foreign policy invariably insisted and continues to insist upon the inviolability of the Soviet people’s revolutionary gains. This principle dominates the entire activity of the Soviet state internationally and helps to bring success in the struggle against imperialist reaction.
p As Lenin understood it, peaceful coexistence stems from the right of every nation freely, without outside interference, to arrange its affairs as it desires. The very notion of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems results from the retention of that difference, presupposes a renunciation of attempts at interference in the internal affairs of another country.
p Leninist foreign policy has staunchly resisted all imperialist attemps to interfere in Soviet internal affairs and has consistently adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Many years ago, Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin said: “Respect for the will and laws of other countries and the maintenance of peace are the basic principles of the international policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics....” [163•**
p The strengthening of the socialist state and its economic progress facilitated the efforts of Soviet foreign policy for peaceful coexistence. In 1924, when diplomatic relations were established with leading capitalist countries, a period of recognition entered the history of international relations. The 14th CPSU Congress noted consolidation and extension of the breathing-space, which turned into a whole period “of peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the 164 capitalist states...”. [164•* Chicherin, in a speech at the Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1925, described this period “as a peaceful duel between the two economic systems”, and he remarked further on the increasingly successful development of this duel for the Soviet Union. [164•**
p Practice, therefore, confirmed the possibility, correctness and fruitfulness of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence even at a time when the world balance of power still lay with imperialism, when the bourgeois countries could count on their military superiority. But the successful building of socialism in the Soviet Union was all the while undermining these considerations.
p The fight against the aggressive inclinations of world imperialism and the campaign to preserve peace, which the Soviet Government consistently carried out, being guided by Lenin’s idea of peaceful coexistence, had great importance. In the most direct fashion, it corresponded to the vital interests of the peoples of other countries as well as those of the Soviet Union.
p Soviet Party and Government leaders frequently reaffirmed their loyalty to the Leninist peaceful coexistence principle. The Central Committee’s political report to the 15th Party Congress stated: “The basis of our relations with the capitalist states lies in the acceptance of coexistence between the two opposing systems. Practice has completely justified that.” [164•***
p The trend towards development of these relations from purely economic ones to political became a characteristic feature of contacts with capitalist countries. Their importance continued to rise in the overall complex of international and political relations and in the resolution of urgent issues of world politics; the constructive nature of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence became more obvious as the basic policy towards countries with the opposing social and economic system.
165p The nature and forms of relations with the capitalist countries acquired special significance in the mid-1930s when, following Japanese aggression against China, a hotbed of war arose in the Far East, and when the threat to peace in Europe increased sharply with the establishment of the nazi dictatorship in Germany. For the sake of stronger peace, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to take an active part in ensuring collective security, to organise a collective resistance to aggressors and to expand, on that basis, co-operation with the capitalist countries. In December 1933 the Party’s Central Committee adopted a resolution which envisaged the possibility of the Soviet Union entering the League of Nations and concluding a regional agreement, with the participation of a wide group of European states, on mutual defence against aggression. The Soviet policy of peace and strengthening of commercial links with all countries was reaffirmed by the 17th and 18th Party Congresses.
p The Soviet Union’s signing, in the early 1930s, virtually with all neighbouring countries, of conventions on the definition of aggression, its entry into the League of Nations, participation in negotiations on an Eastern Pact, the SovietFrench and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance (1935), the Soviet readiness to conclude a military agreement with Britain and France, a readiness that was expressed in a number of documents—all these important acts testified to the Soviet Union’s sincere desire to guarantee international security, to avert war and to organise a collective rebuff to an aggressor. The Munich policy of the Western governments, however, nullified the results of these efforts and the possibilities associated with them.
p The subsequent Second World War showed the strength of the Soviet socialist state, its resolution and capacity to deal a crushing blow to aggression and to attempts to weaken socialism by means of war. Further, the war furnished new evidence of the possibility of co-operation between the socialist state and capitalist countries on the basis of common interests, irrespective of the different social systems.
p The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence acquired even more relevance after the war when socialism emerged 166 beyond the bounds of one country, when socialist revolution won the day in various countries of Europe and Asia and a world socialist system arose. These countries proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of their policy in relation to capitalist countries.
The principles advocated by Lenin at the dawn of Soviet history concerning relations between socialist and capitalist countries had successfully stood the test of time.
Notes
[154•*] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. :«. p. IS!).
[154•**] Ibid.. Vol. 30, p. 39.
[155•*] See S. Zarnitsky, A. Sergcycv, C/iic/ierin, Moscow, 1966, p. 61 (in Russian).
[156•*] 7th Extraordinary Congress of the RCI’(B), March 1918. Stenographic Record, Moscow. 1962, pp. 29, 35 (in Russian).
[156•**] Ibid., p. 71.
[156•***] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29. p. 63.
[156•****] Ibid., Vol. 27, pp. 64-65.
[157•*] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27,
[157•**] Ibid., p. 102.
[157•***] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 452.
[158•*] V. I. Lenin, Collected Wnrks, Vol. 32, p. 180.
[158•**] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 412.
[159•*] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 151.
[159•**] Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 177.
[159•***] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 155.
[159•****] Ibid., p. 265.
[160•*] V. I. Lenin, Cnlli’fli-il Works, Vol. 31, pp. 70-71.
[160•**] Ibid., p. 439.
[161•*] Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 264.
[161•**] Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 403.
[161•***] Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 347.
[161•****] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 95.
[161•*****] See G. V. Chicherin, Articles and Speeches on Foreign Policy pp. 278, 282.
[162•*] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 148.
[162•**] Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 522.
[162•***] Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 440.
[162•****] Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 361.
[162•*****] G. V. Chicherin, op. cit., p. 134.
[163•*] L. Krasin, Foreign Trade, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, p. 264 (in Russian).
[163•**] Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol. VIII, Moscow, 19fi3, p. 64 (in Russian).
[164•*] CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 244 (in Russian).
[164•**] G. V. Chicherin, op. cit., p. 373.
[164•***] 16th Congress of the RCP(B). December 1927. Stenographic Record, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1961, p. 54 (in Russian).
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