69

p An analysis and all-round account of the forces affecting international relations, their objective evaluation at any given moment, is an extremely complicated affair. This is not simply because of the vast number of forces (state, alliances of states, classes and parties within those states, etc.), but also because of the complexity, the diversity and the breadth of the very notion of strength. Even applied to an individual state, the question of what determines its strength, how to measure it, how to compare it with the strength of another state or with other forces operating in the world, is far from easy. In examining it, one notices the deep rift between the bourgeois and the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the notion of strength in international relations; one notices the topical and methodological significance of Lenin’s profoundly dialectical approach to assessing the strength, nature and alignment of international forces in the world today.

p It might seem that the question of strength of states, of the balance of power between them, might be resolved by reference to such indices as size of territory, population and natural resources. Other things being equal, a larger state with a bigger population and richer and more diverse natural resources should be stronger than a smaller and less well-endowed state. However, none of these factors predetermine automatically a country’s strength or its role in international relations. These are rather elements or, to be more precise, prerequisites, of strength. Let us compare, for example, India and Great Britain: on all the above-mentioned indices India is superior to Great Britain, but Britain’s 70 actual weight in international relations until very recently far exceeded that of India.

p The history of international relations knows several instances when states inferior to others in territory, population and natural resources have shown a superiority and gained victory when their strength has been put to the test. Furthermore, in many cases a large population and high rate of growth of population produce certain difficulties within a country and weaken its position internationally. Today, it is hardly necessary to provide proof of the limited importance of geographical and demographic factors.

p The works of Lenin and other Marxists and the programme documents of the world communist movement show the extensive and far-reaching meaning of strength (and, correspondingly, the balance of power). The Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of a country’s strength is based on the prime significance of the mode of production of material goods, the nature of relations of production, and the socioeconomic system. In his analysis of the sources of strength of the Soviet state, Lenin said: “In the last analysis, the deepest source of strength for victories over the bourgeoisie and the sole guarantee of the durability and permanence of these victories can only be a new and higher mode of social production, the substitution of large-scale socialist production for capitalist and petty-bourgeois production.”  [70•* 

p A change in the mode of production inevitably produces shifts in the correlation of forces in the world.

p The history of international relations confirms this thesis; one needs only refer to the international consequences of the socialist revolution in Russia, or the shift in the relation of international political forces associated with the social changes in Central and Southeast Europe.

p The irrefutable propositions concerning the prime importance for the international balance of power of changes in the socio-economic system, however, needs further elaboration and concretisation, at any rate in regard to contemporary events. First, the decisive influence of the socio-economic basis on a country’s strength in world politics is normally 71 manifested through other factors. Second, these propositions are not sufficient to assess the balance of power between states belonging to the same socio-economic formation—and such an assessment is not only important from the point of view of relations between these states, but it also serves as an essential element of the world balance of power as a whole.

p Other factors such as the economic structure and technological level of production, the volume of industrial and agricultural production and the size of national wealth are extremely important in describing a country’s strength and potential in international relations and in the balance of power with other countries. In the present-day world of the scientific and technological revolution, such factors as the level of education and science, the quantity and quality of scientific achievements, the forms of organisation of research and their application are growing in importance. All that, together with natural resources and manpower, may to a certain degree be regarded as the material basis for a country’s strength in comparison with others, and its importance in world politics.

p In the light of this, one can understand how greatly the implementation of Lenin’s plan for building socialism and the Party’s unceasing efforts to raise labour productivity and the effectiveness of social production have contributed to strengthening the Soviet Union and its international status.

p Nonetheless, the notion of strength and balance of power is not simply a matter of economics. In his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin spoke of general economic, financial and military strength,  [71•*  and made the distinction between “purely” economic changes in strength and non-economic changes (e.g., military):  [71•**  the latter, although they are associated with economic factors, are by no means identical with them, inasmuch as they have their own characteristics and, at times, an independent meaning.

p In the view of many bourgeois politicians and ideologists, a country’s strength in foreign policy is brought down 72 to its direct material and physical power, and above all to military potential. In their theoretical constructions and practical actions, the understanding of strength is directly associated with coercion or, at any rate, with the ability to be coercive, with the capacity to exert direct coercive pressure on opponents.

p It might seem tempting at first view to reduce the question of international balance of power to one of the balance of armed forces of countries or groups of countries, the more so since the size of an army, the number and quality of armaments, etc., can be measured relatively easily, however roughly. To restrict the notion of a country’s strength and its balance of power with other countries to purely military indices does have a certain logic, insofar as war is a direct test of a country’s strength. Sharp turns in the balance of international power are usually associated with wars.

p The experience of the First and Second World wars, their immense international political consequences, and the mounting role of militarism and the arms race, particularly after the Second World War, would seem to bear out the idea that the purely military factor plays the determining role in evaluating both the strength of a particular state and the balance of power between states. It is natural, then, that in the period immediately following the last war the cult of power, belief in the omnipotence of the latest weapons became particularly popular in the imperialist camp. Many foreign policy doctrines (and also various foreign policy acts) were based on a primitive calculation of the size of armies, the number of tanks, ships and aircraft, and the destructive power of the bombs. The American international commentator John H. Herz wrote that “political developments constitute a superstructure over the system and the development of the means of destruction”.  [72•* 

p The experience of recent decades, however, including both world wars—which, in the one-sided approach of imperialist ideologists, serves as an apology for militarism, of the role of the military factor in the international balance, of 73 power—convincingly demonstrates the inadequacy of evaluating the balance of power solely on the basis of material, let alone purely military, factors, although the importance of the latter is really very great.

p Marxism-Leninism soberly evaluates the role of coercion in history (including international relations) and by no means absolutises this role, nor does it equalise the importance of strength and coercion.

p The history of international relations, and particularly of Soviet foreign policy, bears out the immense role of moral and political factors (alongside economic and military), behind which lie advanced ideas, the political awareness, resoluteness and organisation of the masses.

p The history of Marxism-Leninism strikingly illustrates Marx’s words that “Theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses”.  [73•*  Progressive ideas that correctly express the requirements of social development have often successfully countered crude material force.

p The importance of the ideological, moral and political component of a country’s domestic and external strength and of the international balance of power keeps pace with the growth in political awareness, organisation and activity of the people. On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote: “Ideas become a power when they grip the people. And precisely at the present time the Bolsheviks, i. e., the representatives of revolutionary proletarian internationalism, have embodied in their policy the idea that is motivating countless working people all over the world.”  [73•**  These ideas were fully borne out by the developing events.

p Analysing the young Soviet Republic’s sources of strength Lenin wrote: "The force on which this new authority was based, and sought to base itself, was not the force of bayonets usurped by a handful of militarists, not the power of the ’police force’, not the power of money, nor the power of any previously established institutions. It was nothing of the kind. The new organs of authority possessed neither arms, nor money, nor old institutions. Their power ... had nothing in 74 common with the old instruments of power. ... It was based on the mass of the people”.  [74•* 

p Lenin frequently stressed the important part played by such factors as the moral influence of the proletariat, its organisation and discipline, and the class consciousness of all working people, in successfully resolving home and foreign policy tasks.

p “A state is strong,” he said, “when the people are politically conscious. It is strong when the people know everything, can form an opinion of everything and do everything consciously.”  [74•** 

p The huge role played by moral and political factors as a source of strength of the Soviet state was clearly apparent in the course and outcome of the military conflict between the socialist republic and the coalition of the bourgeois states. Analysing the factors behind the Soviet people’s successful defence of their country against the attacks by the imperialist states, although the latter had military and economic superiority, Lenin underlined the role of the moral and political factors; he had in mind not simply the internal sources of the moral strength of the Soviet people, but also the favourable international political situation.

p “Would our proletariat have had the moral strength,” Lenin asked, “if it had not relied on the sympathy of the workers of the advanced countries, who supported us... ? With this support, our proletariat—numerically weak and tormented by poverty and privation—won out because it had the moral strength.”  [74•*** 

p Inter-imperialist contradictions were also an indirect source of the strength of the Soviet state. From this standpoint the alliance of imperialist states for the purpose of military intervention against Soviet Russia did not signify a direct arithmetical compounding of forces. The bickering that went on within this alliance weakened both its potential power and its effective action.

p Therefore, the notion of international balance of power 75 is very complicated. A country’s weight in world politics is preconditioned by many different factors, the importance of which may change.

p Thorough account of the world balance of power, including the strength of the Soviet socialist state, very much governed the success of Lenin’s foreign policy. Besides the young Soviet Republic’s limited economic and military possibilities, this policy took into consideration its immense political impact on the world, the worldwide popular support which increased its strength, and the contradictions in the imperialist camp.

p “Materially—economically and militarily—,” Lenin wrote in 1921, “we are extremely weak; but morally—by which, of course, I mean not abstract morals, but the alignment of the real forces of all classes in all countries—we are the strongest of all. This has been proved in practice; it has been proved not merely by words but by deeds; it has been proved once and, if history takes a certain turn, it will, perhaps, be proved many times again.”  [75•* 

p Naturally enough, the importance of moral and political factors, their effectiveness and impact on the balance of power increase manifold when they rely on a material basis. As a general rule, the firmer this basis, the more effective is foreign policy and the greater is a country’s international prestige and potential. Nevertheless, one can hardly speak of a direct and automatic dependence. Growth in military and economic potential is not identical to growth in political influence. Increasing material strength may in some instances be accompanied by moral losses and far from always leads to a shift in the general balance of power. Conversely, purely material losses do not always signify a weakening in a country’s strength in international relations. Such losses may be made up for by a certain moral and political gain. A comprehensive and unbiased account of the pros and cons in these circumstances is an essential precondition for effective foreign policy decisions.

p The Leninist policy of the young Soviet state towards Eastern countries is an instructive example in this respect. 76 The renunciation of the special rights and privileges which tsarist Russia enjoyed in these countries, of possessions belonging to it, of territorial claims, helped to consolidate Soviet foreign policy positions on a new basis, to consolidate relations with Eastern countries and to increase the overall anti-imperialist forces; this was therefore accompanied by an undeniable moral and political gain, which became a considerable and favourable element for Soviet Russia in the ensuing balance of power throughout the world.

p When the Soviet Republic declared its new principles in foreign policy and began to carry them out it attracted the sympathy of ordinary people everywhere in the world, and it influenced the position of the ruling classes and entire countries, enhancing its authority and power in world affairs. All this brought changes in the world balance of power. As socialism continued to grow, the importance of material factors such as economic might and military potential considerably grew as well. This illustrated the Soviet economic policy’s international significance, referred to by Lenin. The Soviet Union’s successes in economic development and in strengthening its defence capacity, which were achieved in a brief span of time, signified a growth in its might, and, correspondingly, a shift in ’the world balance of power.

p The mounting importance of the military and economic factors in the balance of world power had an obvious impact on the course and outcome of the Second World War. At the same time, the war demonstrated the moral and political superiority of the Soviet Union over nazi Germany. As before, inter-imperialist contradictions played an exceedingly important part. The entire alignment of forces and the formation and efficacy of the anti-Hitler coalition of Great Britain, the USA, the USSR and other countries were eloquent testimony of that.

p Some bourgeois ideologists, reluctant to recognise the superiority of socialism over capitalism in principle, and playing down the Soviet Union’s sources of strength which stem from features of the socialist system are inclined to attribute to inter-imperialist contradictions a decisive role in the balance of power between the two systems throughout the whole of the period of Soviet existence. The American 77 diplomat George Kennan has defined “the standard components for a rousing Soviet diplomatic success: one part of Soviet resourcefulness and singlemindedness of purpose; two parts amateurism, complacency, and disunity on the part of the West”.  [77•*  In like vein, Senator Fulbright has said that “over the last half century the unity or disunity of the West has been the ultimate determinant of the fortunes of communism”.  [77•**  The untenability of such assertions is selfevident, particularly in the light of the Soviet Union’s scientific and technological achievements and increased military and economic strength since the last war.

p The contemporary scientific and technological revolution has given growing importance to military and technological factors in the international balance of power. In the opinion of many bourgeois writers, it is precisely these factors that are today the only basis of power and influence of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in world politics. Thus, in a book published in 1965, Thomas Wolfe, an American specialist on military and political questions, maintains that “the power position and political standing of the Soviet Union in the world today rest to a large extent on Soviet military strength and the technology associated with it”.  [77•***  However, the exaggeration of the part played by military and technological factors in the balance of power testifies to the biased nature of bourgeois scholarship in the same way as do the exaggerated views of Kennan and Fulbright on the part played by Western disunity.

p Despite the undeniable upsurge in recent years of military strength in most countries and an increase in the objective role of the military and technological factor in human destiny, one can hardly speak unreservedly about a relative increase in the importance of military and technological strength in the overall international balance of power.

p Moreover, there are no grounds for belittling other factors. 78 The tremendous social changes, the growth in the activity and political consciousness of working people in all countries and, finally, the scientific and technological revolution, are considerably increasing the role played by economic, moralpolitical and ideological components in the strength of countries and in the overall world balance of power. Only the combination of material power with moral power can make a country invincible; there lies the basic cause of the superiority of socialist, progressive forces over reactionary, imperialist forces, the guarantee of their success in foreign policy. The interaction of both these factors is readily apparent in the example of the Soviet Union.

p Soviet economic, scientific and technological achievements, improved living standards, the enhanced political awareness and activity of the Soviet people, the consistently peaceful foreign policy are all prerequisites for the growth both in economic and military strength of world socialism and in its moral authority and the intensity of its foreign political impact. Both the one and the other are important elements in the consolidation of progressive forces and in the overall world balance of power.

p In the light of this, the international significance of the Soviet Union’s Ninth Five-Year Plan, for 1971-1975, is especially great; the main task of the plan, as formulated at the 24th Party Congress, is “to ensure a considerable rise of the people’s material and cultural level on the basis of a high rate of development of socialist production, enhancement of its efficiency, scientific and technical progress and acceleration of the growth of labour productivity”.  [78•* 

p The failure of the American aggression in Vietnam is eloquent testimony of the restricted possibilities for brute military force today and of the growing importance of moral and political factors. Half a million American troops armed with the most modern weapons have been unable to suppress the resistance of the South Vietnamese patriots. Besides the part played by the substantial material assistance to the Vietnamese people from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the failure of American aggression was due to 79 such moral-political factors as the unity and tenacity of the Vietnamese people in fighting for a just cause, the solidarity of progressives the world over with their fight, and the moral-political isolation of the United States. Lenin’s words are as true today as ever: “A nation in which the majority of the workers and peasants realise, feel and see that they are fighting ... for the rule of the working people, for the cause whose victory will ensure them and their children all the benefits of culture, of all that has been created by human labour—such a nation can never be vanquished.”  [79•* 

p The uniqueness and complex interaction of the material and moral-political factors of strength can be seen in the example of American policy in South Vietnam. The aggressive policy of US imperialism has led to the worsening of the US international position. This was recognised, in particular, by Hans Morgenthau, director of the Centre for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago.  [79•** 

p Today, only frank apologists of militarism can evaluate the world balance of power by confining themselves to such categories as the size of armies and the quantity, quality and destructive power of their armaments; they are inclined to deny or underplay the part played by the moral factor in the international balance of power.

p However, most ideologists and politicians of contemporary imperialism, while retaining a faith in military strength as the paramount basis for pursuing an effective foreign policy, cannot help taking account of the realities of our time. The former American Defence Secretary Robert McNamara has written that “arms are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for security. After acquisition of the optimum-sized military force, security is a function not of additional military force but rather of the relationships that we establish with other nations in the world”.  [79•*** 

p Chester Bowles, prominent American student of international relations, sees the root causes of the failure of American foreign policy in the excessive faith in military strength 80 and in the playing down of the importance of dynamic ideas. Seymour Melman, an American economist who heads the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University, comes to the conclusion that in present-day international relations, the stake on military means and methods is unrealistic insofar as “... one nation’s military power can be bypassed by another nation’s direct political and economic methods”.  [80•* 

p Former President Lyndon Johnson, in taking stock of his term of office, made the revealing admission that the greatest lesson was that the United States had a limited ability to control world events. “Because we have, in our nuclear arsenal, the power to destroy the world,” he wrote, “some have been misled to believe that we also have the power to shape the world to our wishes—to compel co-operation and respect. The truth is that neither our nuclear power nor our great wealth can force events into a mold of our making.”  [80•** 

p Even such an advocate of military strength as former West German Chancellor Kiesinger had to confess that “naturally, one cannot measure a country’s importance and political influence only by its military power”.  [80•*** 

p Imperialist politicians and ideologists have by no means renounced their stake on brute military force but are increasingly obliged under pressure of events to come to terms with the mounting role of moral-political factors in international relations. This is apparent in the increasing attention paid by bourgeois writers to ideological issues, including the "theoretical justification" for, or rather concealment, of the reactionary nature of the capitalist system and imperialist policy, and attemps to brainwash the peoples of other countries and reduce the moral-political potential of their opponents.

p It goes without saying that military strength and, in particular, the possession of nuclear weapons, remains an 81 extremely important element in the overall balance of power, and of power and influence in international relations. It testifies to one’s status as a Great Power. Although it is essential, it is not the only aspect. The peculiar nature of the contemporary balance of power in the world enables the nonnuclear states in some degree to compensate for their relative military weakness by active use of economic, political, ideological and other means. The policy of many countries shows this clearly enough.

p The growing role of France internationally in the mid- 1960s was due more to her sober and realistic policy on important international political issues than to her nuclear armoury. If we bear in mind that the direct possibilities which nuclear powers have to display their military superiority in full in resolving current political tasks are, practically speaking, very restricted, then the importance of economic, political and ideological factors in the overall balance of power is even more evident.

p The internal situation in individual countries is acquiring an ever increasing importance in correctly evaluating the international balance of power today. This refers to such events as scientific and technological achievements, devaluation of the pound and the dollar crisis, which directly influence international relations, and such diverse events as the unrest among the Black people in the United States or the "cultural revolution" in China. The impact of such events (in each specific case) on the world balance of power differs greatly both in direction and in scale, but it is a factor to be reckoned with.

p The mounting impact of internal processes on world balance of power is readily apparent in the United States. The French publicist Andre Fontaine has made this relevant point in Le Monde: ”. . .The Vietnamese tragedy, the racial crisis, the wave of violence in the towns, and inflation have developed within the United States a general movement of protest which has no precedent in history since the War of Independence. At the summit of their military and industrial power, the Americans for the first time seem to have lost faith in themselves. How then can their admirers abroad not come to question the justification for their admiration? How 82 can a country which is incapable of preventing the murder, in an interval of three years, of a liberal president and the champion of racial integration and non-violence, be an example to others?”  [82•* 

p The complexity of the category of the balance of power and its components is apparent also in the peculiar tangle of objective and subjective factors. For example, the subjective factor—evaluation by participants in international relations of the relative strength of one another and of the general balance of power, may sometimes play the part of an element of the objective situation. Irrespective of whether such an evaluation is correct or not, it may engender certain actions and bring about consequences of an altogether objective nature, and a change in the objective balance of power. In this connection the role of information (and misinformation) is growing in world politics.

p Marxism-Leninism and a knowledge of the laws of social development give the progressive classes, Communist Parties and socialist countries undoubted advantages over reactionary classes. The ruling classes in capitalist countries, being limited by the narrow class interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, are not normally able correctly to evaluate the real balance of power, and especially the strength of opposing classes and countries.

p It is relevant here to recall the frequent reference made by Lenin to the inability of the bourgeoisie as a class sensibly to analyse reality, to its virtually continuous underestimation of the strength of socialism, especially in the early Soviet years. Even when they had come to accept the existence of the Soviet state, they were for a long time incapable of appreciating its full force, its importance in international relations and the part it played in the overall balance of power. This was made quite obvious both by the failure of Hitler’s plans to obtain a blitz victory over the Soviet Union, and in the British and American imperialist policies in the early part of the war which banked on inevitable Soviet defeat or, at any rate, the weakening of the Soviet Union as a result of the war, and in the defeat 83 of their postwar plans designed to bring the Soviet Union to a state of extreme weakness. Even today, many bourgeois ideologists and politicians often display an inability correctly to judge the strength of world socialism and the world balance of power.

p The distinction between objective power of a particular country and its subjective perception, and the importance of such a subjective factor as an evaluation of the opponent’s strength, are particularly important today when one has to consider the balance of huge nuclear-missile potentials. In recent years this fact has attracted very great attention from bourgeois writers. Typical in this respect is the idea voiced by Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, who has said that bluff, if it is taken seriously, is much more effective than a serious threat interpreted as bluff, insofar as in politics a criterion of military power is its evaluation by the other side.

A Leninist analysis of the international situation as a basis for working out and implementing a well-substantiated foreign policy means admitting the complexity and diversity of the notion of power being applied to international relations, and a careful and comprehensive consideration of the balance of power both within individual nations and on a worldwide scale.