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The Emergence of Feudal Relations in Iran

p The Sassanid Empire held sway in Iran from the third to the seventh century. Its history was directly bound up with that of the Iranian people and their state, which formed the nucleus of the empire. Here the development of feudal relations evolved on the one hand from ancient traditions of slave-ownership as in India or the valley of the Yellow River, and on the other as a result of the collapse of the early society of the Iranian tribes based on clan and commune patterns. The socio-economic, cultural and political changes bound up with the emergence of a feudal society took place here within an ethnically homogeneous unit with a firm central nucleus (central and south-western Iran) as in Japan and Vietnam rather than as in the Arab Caliphate and the Chinese Empire.

p The emergence of a class of peasants bound to the land of their masters took place as slaves working on private estates achieved the status of serfs and the communes gradually broke up. This also resulted in the appearance of a further new class, that of the azats, free prosperous mounted soldiers. Craft guilds grew up in the towns but they did not play any important role in the Iran of the early Middle Ages. A caste system, less rigid than the Indian one, had taken firm root by this time.

p Politically and economically Iran was the strongest state in Western Asia during the third, fourth and fifth centuries. The main power was in the hands of the landed aristocracy and the Zoroastrian Church,, which also owned vast lands and many slaves. The Zoroastrians worshiped the sun, fire, and the moon and stars. Zoroastrianism was adopted as the official religion of the Iranian people at the beginning of our era. This rich and influential religious institution constituted an important social force in Iran.

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p Iran was also to experience a crisis of its slave-holding society, when a movement of the exploited masses, Manichaeism, came into being. Yet, although the Manichaeans criticised the existing social structure as unjust, their protest was confined to passive resistance.

The absence of any significant domestic upheavals enabled the Sassanids to extend their territorial possessions in Transcaucasia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor and to penetrate as far as Central Asia. These conquests, which brought considerable wealth to the slave-owning aristocracy and the empire’s rulers, served to aggravate the mounting crisis within the Iranian slave-holding society. Hunger-strikes became more frequent and mass uprisings against the landowning aristocracy broke out, both among the former commune peasants who hoped to regain their former freedoms, and the azats who wished to assert their hold on small or medium-sized holdings. The rulers of the empire also hoped to gain land by seizing part of the property of the leading aristocratic families with which they contended in vain at the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century. A consolidation of the empire’s central power was also made imperative by the threat on the eastern frontiers of an invasion by the nomad Ephtalites (the name given to the alliance of the Huns and east Iranian tribes, which later set up a feudal state).

Mazdakism

These various groups united their forces in the Mazdakite movement (named after its leader, Mazdak). Unlike their predecessors the Manichaeans, the Mazdakites called for open struggle against social evils and in particular demanded that surplus property should be taken away from the aristocracy. The Sassanian ruler, Kavadh I, entered an alliance with the Mazdakites and the azats, broke the power of the nobility, did away with the caste system and made Mazdakism the state religion. Soon after this victory there was a clash of interests between the broad mass of the peasantry and craftsmen on the one hand and the leading group of the insurgents, the azats and the court, which had come to support their interests, on the other. Once again the azats and Kavadh joined forces and together with the remaining representatives of the secular and religious aristocracy quelled the peasant uprising in the year 529.

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The Sassanid Empire Under Chosroes I

p Feudal Iranian society emerged in the fifth and early sixth centuries, above all during the rule of Chosroes I (531-579). With the victory over the aristocracy, the central power had acquired further vast lands, a considerable part of which was granted to the azats, now that state ownership had been reasserted. All the working people were obliged to pay a per capita tax on their land (instead of being subject to frequent requisitions), which on the whole was less of a burden than earlier taxes. The reassertion of state ownership of the land also made itself felt in the role the state played in the economy (the provision of loans to the farmers, etc.). The section of society which the monarchy relied on above all for support was the azat class, the military estate in that feudal society. The emperor’s permanent army, unlike its Arab counterpart, consisted of mercenaries and together with the azat detachments and the ramified centralised bureaucracy staffed by azats formed the basis of the administrative apparatus in the Sassanid Empire.

The consolidation of feudal relations and the suppression of peasant unrest enabled the Sassanids to renew their expansion to the south and drive back the Ephtalites from their eastern frontiers. In the west after some initial successes Iran found itself involved in a long and costly war with Byzantium.

Arabia at the Beginning of the Seventh Century

p The emergence of feudal relations in the Arabian peninsula and the immediately adjacent territories took place in the middle of the 1st millennium A. D., with the gradual collapse of slaveholding societies in the south and south-west of the peninsula, and the disintegration of the primitive clan system of the nomads in other areas.

p By that time a large part of the herds and pastures were in the hands of the clan nobility, while there was land hunger among the poorer nomad tribes, particularly as subsistence livestock-breeding was not sufficient to support the growing population. Inter-tribal wars for land began, in the course of which various alliances were drawn up. The urge to achieve territorial expansion at the expense of neighbouring tribes grew steadily stronger. Another factor which promoted this drive towards unification was the increasing number of economic and political links between the more developed regions of Arabia •where feudal patterns were already taking shape and between these regions and the nomad peoples.

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A movement towards the unification of all the Arabs began which coincided with the feudalisation of both the nomad and settled peoples; the movement soon took on a religious character as well, propagating the new religion of Islam.

The Beginnings of Islam

Islam is a monotheistic religion, recognising one god Allah, represented on earth by his Prophets and their deputies, the caliphs. This religion demanded of its adherents unquestioning obedience to god and his servants: Moslem religious organisations had much in common with those of the state. At the outset the propagation of Islam was linked with the name of the Prophet Mohammed (570-632). The movement for religious unity among the Arab peoples and criticism of the practice of slavery brought Mohammed many followers from various social strata. An important aspect of Islam, which reflected the territorial aspirations and the drive for unification among the Arab peoples in the early feudal society (whose main source of livelihood was their herds), was the tendency to spread the "faith of the Prophet" by force into neighbouring lands.

The Unification of the Arabs
and the Emergence of the Caliphate

p The Mohammedan state of Medina which appeared in the first third of the seventh century soon began to extend its frontiers. This territorial expansion was facilitated by the spread of Islam: the most vital aspect of Islam was the struggle for the achievement of strong political power. The centralised theocracy instituted by Mohammed derived its support from troops which were remunerated not with land but shares of plunder captured in battle. This system (which did not exclude the presence of landowners among the warriors and commanders) received every support from the first caliphs (successors of the Prophet) and ensured the constant fighting efficiency of the army over a relatively long period. Another factor which contributed towards the consolidation of the central power was the collection of taxes from all holders of land, although the rates were less in the case of the feudal lords. Only a small part of the land was owned by the state (common land or that which was not under cultivation), while the bulk of it was either private or clan property.

p The caliphs allocated plots from the state lands to those holding military or administrative office for as long as they were in office 185 and this marked the beginning of a new class of landowners and powerful nobles whose estates were dependent on their state service. These lands could be taken away from their owners on condition that the new owner carried out the duties required of him. This system of landholding, which soon spread to Asia Minor and North Africa, differed fundamentally from those to be found in the Far East and India.

p By the middle of the seventh century Arabia was united but there was no hope of permanent stability in as far as this unity offered no solution to the problem of land distribution. After setting up powerful landed estates in Arabia the Arab chieftains aspired to extend them at the expense of neighbouring peoples.

p Meanwhile, in the course of a large number of campaigns the nomads, for whom there was no place in feudal Arabia, became professional warriors and later landowners in the various countries they conquered. This served to consolidate feudal social patterns still further, and meant that the caliphs had reliable troops at their disposal, who were welded together by a common faith and ethnic background; these troops lived by plundering conquered lands.

p In the seventh century the Arabs embarked on a major expedition against Byzantium and Iran, both of which had been weakened by mutual hostilities and domestic upheavals.

p In the year 636 Byzantium was forced out of Syria and Palestine and in 651 the Arabs occupied Iran. A factor of no small importance in the success of these new conquerors was their religious tolerance (only economic methods were used to encourage conversion to Islam) and their respect for the property of all those who surrendered to them without resistance. This had the effect of neutralising considerable sections of the population in the conquered countries, particularly since at that period the caliphs restricted themselves to the collection of taxes without recruiting soldiers or doing away with the privileges of the local nobility. Furthermore, conquered territories were declared state property and while the local population were made subject to taxation the tax burden of the local chieftains was considerably reduced. Converts to Islam were freed from a special tax which infidels were obliged to pay.

p The basis of the caliphate’s economic system was conditional landownership in return for service, obligatory taxes and military service and the obligation to till land owned (the right to transfer being also ensured). This type of landownership was the predominant one after the mass redistribution by the caliphs of the lands of their enemies. Private and communal ownership of land were less common. The land of the powerful chieftains was generally worked by bond peasants.

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p The incorporation into the caliphate of new lands, economically independent of it and peopled by men of different races with their own history and traditions, led to disorder within the state, such as was to be found in all early feudal states.

p Cavalry troops, who were only granted the right to a share of military booty, rose up under the leadership of Ali (602-661) against the Arab aristocracy, which had acquired large tracts of land. In the year 656 Ali became Caliph but the aristocracy rallied together and organised a resistance movement led by Moawiya of the Omayyads whose main stronghold was Syria, one of the most developed of the newly conquered lands.

Social contradictions in the course of the struggle between the cavalry and the nobility were soon to find expression in doctrinal controversy. All’s supporters set up the Shiite sect  [186•*  (which was soon to take root throughout Iran), while Moawiya’s supporters set up the Sunnite sect, which after the latter’s victory was to become the orthodox one. The Sunnite teaching is based on Moslem legends or sunna which arose later than the Koran (the Moslem holy book dictated by Mohammed) and which reflected the new developments to be seen in Arab society, its subsequent class stratification. Another sector of the cavalry set up the Khawarij sect, which propagated equality of all believers.

Arab Conquests

p Relying on Syrian manpower and material resources and supported by the powerful chieftains Moawiya emerged victorious from these hostilities. He continued to use Syria as his administrative centre and embarked on cruel exploitation of the population of Iraq and Iran. The Omayyads (Moawiya’s descendants) waged unsuccessful wars against Byzantium in Asia Minor, but their armies swept through North Africa ending Byzantine rule there. The local Berber chieftains, who had long been at war with the North African nomads, went over to the side of the Arabs. During the years 711-714 the Arab armies led by Tafiq conquered the Iberian peninsula and then invaded France. Their defeat at the battle of Poitiers (732) obliged the Arabs to withdraw beyond the Pyrenees which then became the border of the Arab Empire.

During this period Arab armies also appeared in Transcaucasia, north-west India and as far as Central Asia. Thus by the middle of the eighth century a giant Omayyad Empire had been 187 set up, which owed its success to the combination of a mighty army, the small extent of the changes made in local government apparatuses, and the privileges granted to local chieftains, whose ranks were swelled by Arabs granted land by way of reward in the conquered countries.

The Omayyad Empire

p The reign of the Omayyad dynasty (661-750) was marked by a rapid growth of close contacts between the Arabs and local rulers despite the fact that the Arab element predominated (in the state language, methods of labour exploitation and tax collection, religion, the fiscal and legal systems). Yet by the beginning of the eighth century mass conversion to Islam led to a decline in the taxes gleaned from the non-Moslems, which undermined the caliphate’s economic power.

The latter-day Omayyad caliphs introduced sharp increases in taxes: the military expenditure involved in maintaining the unity of the enormous empire could no longer be met through the exploitation of the enormous subject territories. The first half of the eighth century was marked by a whole series of rebellions in the conquered lands which eventually spread to Syria itself. A great uprising in Central Asia which then spread to Iran and Iraq brought about the downfall of the Omayyads. Yet power was not taken over by the insurgents but the members of the Abbasid family, who exploited the turbulent situation to their own advantage: the caliphs of this dynasty sought their main support in the Iraqi province of the empire, which had been exposed to very strong Arab influences, and made Baghdad their capital (750-1258).

The Abbasid Caliphate

p The enormous empire of the Omayyads started to collapse a mere six years after the Abbasids came to power. Despite all the efforts of the caliphs, the army in the conquered territories turned into a class of landowners of varying degrees of wealth and power, who were more closely bound up with the places where they lived than with the centre of the caliphate, and no longer felt the need for the latter’s support.

p Although the reign of the Abbasid dynasty saw the steady disintegration of the caliphate, the eighth and ninth centuries also saw a great rise in the economy and culture of the Arab world, particularly in its centre, Iraq. Here was not only a comparatively uniform feudal society to be found over a large territory, but 188 social consolidation was also furthered by a rapid development of agriculture, crafts and trade. At that time the Arab countries were among the most advanced in the world. Arab trade routes spread far across Europe, Asia and Africa. The distribution of booty no longer represented a major form of economic exploitation. The main form of land distribution was the granting of tracts of uncultivated land—the property of the caliphs—to administrators in return for their service to the state. Privatelyowned lands and the caliph’s property accounted for large areas of land. The owners of lands which were dependent on state office, regardless of their social background, were subject to military service, and by the end of the caliphate’s rule they were obliged to bring detachments of armed retainers to battle with them. The peasants who worked these estates paid taxes to the state and rent to their masters. Land taxes accounted for the bulk of the state revenue.

p As in other states, so in the Arab Empire lands granted for state service gradually became private property. Here the process took place in the ninth century. An important part in this process was played by growth of the landed estates (or waqfs) in the hands of Moslem religious institutions. These lands were neither subject to land taxes nor were their inhabitants liable for military service. Part of these waqfs were only nominally owned by religious institutions, since while local chieftains made a gift of them to their spiritual mentors, in practice they kept the bulk of the revenue gleaned from them for themselves. As more and more of such lands became hereditary landed estates and waqfs the peasants became increasingly dependent on their masters and less and less so on the state.

Yet the state continued to demand half their earnings, which, since the private landowners in their turn were also putting more pressure on the peasants, meant that their position was much more difficult than before. The lot of the non-Arab peasants was particularly hard: all the peasants suffered from the almost universal transition from taxes in kind to money taxes and the resultant spread of usury.

The Decline of the Caliphate

p As discontent among the peasantry mounted, particularly in the outlying non-Arab parts of the empire, a struggle broke out between the powerful landowners and the central power as the former sought to assert their economic and political independence. The caliphate had been obliged to grant wide authority to provincial governors because of the overall inefficiency of the state 189 apparatus and gradually started to lose control over them. The independent Tulunid dynasty emerged in Egypt and the Tahirid dynasty in Iran, to name but two examples. So as to counteract these separatist tendencies the caliphs sought to strengthen the state apparatus and created the office of vizier (ministers of state directly responsible to the caliph), but it proved impossible to restore the empire’s former unity- The main bastion of the caliph’s power—the monolithic army of Arab nomads, living on battle plunder and without roots—had disappeared. The mercenary army consisting of Berbers, Khorasans and soldiers from among other subject peoples proved highly unreliable.

Although the decline of the empire’s central power was deferred by the fact that the caliph was universally accepted as the spiritual leader of Islam, from the ninth century onwards the caliphate proved unequal to its basic function, that of keeping the masses under control. The Babek uprising (816-837) in Azerbaijan and north-western Iran marked the beginning of the end for the caliphate. Soon revolts of the Iraqi peasants and the nomads of Northern Arabia (869-883) broke out and similar disturbances continued in the tenth century. Exploiting the weak position of the caliphate, Central Asia and Iran reasserted their independence in the second quarter of the ninth century and Syria, Egypt and Palestine followed suit in the second half of the ninth century. By the middle of the tenth century the caliphate was in control of nothing apart from Baghdad and its surrounding territory and in practice the caliph was nothing more than the religious leader of the Moslem world. In 1258 the Mongols captured Baghdad and the caliph was slain.

Arab Culture

p The political sway of the Arab countries during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries was accompanied by major cultural achievements, particularly in the central regions of the caliphate and the Iberian peninsula. Science made great advances, furthering and developing all that had been inherited from the Ancient World.

p Particularly outstanding were the achievements in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, geography and history. The Arabs brought to Europe a number of Chinese discoveries, such as the compass, paper and gunpowder. Although much of their philosophy was inherited from the past, considerable new advances were made under the influence of Moslem religious teaching. Despite its religious essence Arab philosophy was also to exhibit rationalist aspects as well.

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The Arabs made major contributions to the art of navigation, military strategy, a number of crafts and architecture. Arab literature flowered, with such writers of world stature as Ibn Ishaq and Tabari, while Moslem literature of the Middle East and Central Asia gave the world such great poets as Firdousi and Omar Khayyam.

Central Asia in the Fifth-Seventh Centuries

p Feudal patterns of society in Central Asia emerged first of all among the farmer peoples of Khorezm, Sogdia, etc. In those lands a new class of dependent peasants—bond tenants—had emerged, as slaves were gradually granted plots of land and peasants from the former communes came to be exploited by the clan leaders. All the agrarian princedoms of Central Asia which were developing along feudal lines (they numbered more than 20) were obliged to pay tribute to the rulers of the feudal state of the nomad Ephtalites, but retained their independence in internal matters. Only Khorezm was fully independent.

p In 567 the Ephtalites were defeated by the Turkic nomads and power passed into the hands of their kagan (or leader, later monarch). Here the situation was very different from that in the Arabian peninsula where feudal social patterns had taken shape simultaneously among the Arab farmers and the Arab nomads: the tillers of the land (Sogdians, Khorezmians) were of different racial stock from the nomads, adhered to a different religion and spoke another language. For this reason the feudal patterns in agricultural life did not bring any direct influence to bear on the social structure of the nomad Turkic tribes, and features of feudalism were not to develop until the sixth century. However, these differences did not prevent the oppressed Turkic nomads from joining forces with the impoverished Sogdian farmers in the uprising (583-586) against the nomad chieftains and the clan leaders. The suppression of this uprising led to still harsher exploitation of the former commune peasants. By the seventh century feudal social patterns had come to predominate among all the agrarian peoples of Central Asia.

p The transition to more advanced social relations furthered the development of agriculture, the advance of the silk industry and irrigation systems. A large number of fortified towns sprang up but traders and craftsmen played a less important role than the clan leaders on whom a large section of the urban and village craftsmen were dependent. However, the Central Asian merchants, in particular the Sogdians, traded widely with all neighbouring: countries, especially India and the Middle East. The main 191 religion of these early class societies in Central Asia was Zoroastrianism.

p The numerous princedoms of seventh-century Central Asia did not wage any major wars: after the decline of Turkic power the majority of them became independent. The completion of the subjugation of the peasants in these independent countries gave rise to resistance on their side which found expression in an uprising (end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth century); the doctrines adhered to by the insurgents had much in common with Mazdakite beliefs.

p As feudalism was gradually adopted by the various peoples of Central Asia, a number of ethnic groups and their cultures were to gain prominence: those of Sogdia and Khorezm for example. Hitherto Central Asia had represented a more or less compact, homogeneous ethnic and cultural unit. Many works of Indian, Iranian and Christian literature were brought to these lands, local written languages were perfected, and trade and cultural links with India and China grew and strengthened. Schools of painting and sculpture started to emerge in Central Asia which were quite distinct from Iranian and Indian artistic traditions.

p The Arab armies invaded Central Asia in 651 but met with fierce resistance, which was only broken after a long war (705-715). A factor of considerable importance in this defeat was the lack of unity among the individual feudal rulers, some of whom even betrayed their fellows. The devastation of the country and in particular the irrigation system, the impoverishment of the peasantry, the enforced resettlement of some of the inhabitants and the forcible introduction of Islam led to uprisings which were to keep breaking out all the time, until the states of Central Asia eventually succeeded in re-establishing their independence. But while the revolts of the period 705-737 had expressed the common interests of both the peasants and the nomads, and the local feudal lords, by the middle of the eighth century the clan leaders no longer associated themselves with the movement and large numbers of them were converted to Islam. Gradually there emerged a new social group consisting of landowners and warriors. With the support of this new class the Arab conquerors were able to employ methods of economic coercion so as to convert a considerable part of the population to Islam, introduce state ownership of the land and other feudal institutions.

However the power of the caliphate was not firmly founded. The uprising of the year 747, which started in Central Asia, brought about the fall of the Omayyads. The peoples of Central Asia rose up against their successors in 751, 776-783, 806-810; the struggle to suppress the insurgents required not only the expedition of part of the caliphate’s troops but constant concessions 192 to the local nobility, in particular the Tajik nobles. In the eighth century the Tajik nobility had already acquired the right to conditional ownership of large parts of the land formerly owned by the communes: from that time onwards the majority of the peasantry lived in feudal bondage. In 819 the Tajik chieftains founded an independent state, and the local Samanid dynasty was to rule Central Asia till 999.

The Peoples of Transcaucasia

p In the countries of Transcaucasia—Armenia, the Georgian princedoms of Kartli and Lazica, and the Albanian princedoms, Albania and Arran, which had attained different levels of social and economic development—the transition to feudal economic patterns began in the fourth century, when the warlords took over the land of the communes which were rapidly falling into decline. New production relations also began to take shape at this time in the estates of the slave-owning nobles. These two processes leading up to the formation of a dependent peasantry were taking place throughout Transcaucasia. The Christian Church was also to play an important part in consolidating these new production relations: it had been firmly established in all the countries of Transcaucasia by the fourth century. Here there was neither state ownership of land nor any unified systems of rents and taxes; the whole population was divided into three estates—landowning warriors, the priesthood and the dependent peasantry, bound to the landowners’ service.

p The fifth and sixth centuries saw important cultural and economic advances and the spread of prosperous trading towns at strategic points along the international trade routes. Local dynasties ruled Transcaucasia under the nominal control of Byzantium or Iran. Various attempts on the part of Iran to turn this nominal control into something more concrete met with strong resistance from the peoples of Transcaucasia. For example, an attempt to assimilate the Armenians, Georgians and Albanians (forbears of the Azerbaijanians) accompanied by an increase in taxes ( including those collected from the church), a ban on Christianity and the ousting of the Armenian princes from their leading offices of state led to the uprising of 450-451 under the Armenian commander Vardan Mamikonyan. The insurgents were defeated but attempts at assimilation were abandoned for some time.

p Another attempt to set up firm Iranian rule in this part of the world led to a large-scale uprising (481-484), as a result of which the Sassanids were obliged once again to abandon their objective. The last attack of this kind was made in the reign of Chosroes I 193 (531-579) when taxes were raised and local administrative officials were replaced by Iranians. The reaction to this was yet another mass uprising of the Armenians, supported by the Georgians, Albanians and Byzantium. In the peace treaty concluded in 591 Iran abandoned its claim to a large part of Transcaucasia and in 628 the whole of it became independent under nominal Byzantine rule. In the course of the incessant wars of the fifth and sixth centuries the azats grew gradually more and more powerful and came to make increasing demands on their peasants. However, the continual harassing from Iran and Byzantium and ethnic differences made the setting up of a united state with a centralised government and a system of state landownership in this part of the world quite impossible. The frequent wars also hampered the growth of large trading centres.

The Arab chieftains established themselves in Transcaucasia only after 60 years of bitter fighting; the Arab governors forcibly converted the people to Islam and introduced their particular system of land exploitation. However in Transcaucasia, unlike the other parts of the Arab empire, Islam hardly took root at all and state ownership of the land was only introduced in Albania. Very few Arabs settled in Transcaucasia and their position there was extremely tenuous: in times of peace the duties of caliphate officials were limited to the collection of taxes. However, these taxes were exorbitant and gave rise to many uprisings both among the peasants and the towndwellers which helped to modify the appetites of the foreign conquerors. Uprisings in Armenia in 748-750 and 774-775 obliged the caliph to cut down taxes; in 781 and 795 similar uprisings took place in Albania. The princes of Armenia and Arran gave their support to all these uprisings hoping to overthrow the caliph’s power. The most important of the Albanian uprisings was that led by the Hurramites and their leader Babek (816-837), who was supported by the Armenians. Babek’s followers succeeded in inflicting a number of defeats on the caliph’s armies who were hard put to it to suppress them. Fourteen years later yet another uprising broke out. Although it was cruelly suppressed in 855, the Arabs left Transcaucasia soon afterwards. The wars against the peoples of Transcaucasia deprived the caliphate of more wealth than the exploitation of those lands brought into its treasury.