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p Today propaganda is part of imperialist policy and one of its most important weapons. Although imperialist propaganda has a whole range of permanent objectives of an ideological nature (attacks on socialist ideals, defence of the foundations of the bourgeois viewpoint, and so on) it is increasingly serving a definite policy of the imperialist powers and is directed and co-ordinated within the framework of their common strategy and tactics. For a study of the basic guidelines of imperialist propaganda it is necessary to examine this strategy and tactics.

In the documents of the June 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties it is underscored that the "core of the aggressive policy of imperialism is the drive to use all means to weaken the positions of socialism, suppress the national liberation movement, hamstring the struggle of the working people in the capitalist countries and halt the irreversible decline of capitalism. The spearhead of the aggressive strategy of imperialism continues to be aimed first and foremost against the socialist countries".  [222•* 

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p Such are the foundations of imperialist strategy, and to lose sight of them would mean to build illusions about the policies of monopoly capitalism and to fall captive to opportunist delusions. However, the concrete requirements of the policies pursued by socialist countries, the Communist parties and the entire anti-imperialist movement demand more than simply an analysis of the strategic foundations of the class enemy’s policies. The concrete trends in the policies and tactics of imperialism and the orientation of the different groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie are closely scrutinised in the documents of the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties and in other major documents of the CPSU and the fraternal parties.

p Without taking these concrete factors into account it is impossible ;for the working class, including those of its contingents that have come to power in their countries, to pursue a genuinely Marxist-Leninist policy. Here it is vital to have a clear idea of the trends and guidelines of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

p In the revolutionary movement there have been, and still are, divergences of views on these issues. The Rightopportunist elements are, as a rule, inclined to underestimate the imperialist bourgeoisie’s ability to act as a united class force and have a common strategy on basic issues.

p The "Left”-sectarian elements, on the contrary, regard imperialism as some expressly abstract, almost mystical, force and ignore all its inner shades and contradictions. This is frequently given out as the only revolutionary and genuinely class approach. It will be recalled that this was the position from which the Chinese leaders attempted to discredit the CPSU’s policy of peaceful coexistence, while they themselves preferred to demonstrate their "class implacability" in a polemic with the CPSU and other fraternal parties and not in their actual policy towards the Chinese bourgeoisie or the imperialist countries.

Marxist-Leninist theory rejects both the Right- opportunist and the sectarian-dogmatic approach to any analysis of imperialism and its policies. This calls for unremitting attention to the new issues and problems raised by life, including the problem of differentiation and distinctions among the present-day bourgeoisie.

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p Political usage has long ago accepted terms such as “sober” bourgeois politicians or the “sober-minded” section of the bourgeoisie as distinct from “diehards” or "extreme reactionaries”. Use is frequently made of other terms and concepts—“conservatives” and “liberals”, “hawks” and “doves”, etc.—depending on the problem over which there are differences, and sometimes on the given country.

p If not all then many of these terms are, evidently, quite justified although not one of them is exhaustive—whether the question concerns the reasons for divergences among the ruling bourgeoisie or the real content, character and significance of these divergences. Little help can be expected here from bourgeois researchers, most of whom reduce matters to particular distinctions between individual politicians or to distinctions in “beliefs”, philosophies and attitudes.  [224•* 

p In view of this problem’s complexity and its immense political urgency, we should like to dwell on it in some detail without claiming to offer an exhaustive analysis. For the sake of convenience, from the motley picture of contemporary bourgeois policies we shall single out only two 225 lines, especially as, by and large, they can be regarded as basic.

p The first is the line pursued by extreme reaction, by the most aggressive imperialist elements, who pin their hopes mainly on strength and urge a frontal attack on socialism.

p The substance of this line is self-evident and hardly requires a probing.

p It is a much more complicated task to analyse the second political line, which, in upholding the class interests of the bourgeoisie, allows for side-tracking manoeuvres, concessions, compromises, and so forth. Here one can be misled by the very terms by which this line’s advocates are designated—“moderates”, “liberals”, etc. This point will be appreciated when it is borne in mind that in a sharp political struggle these groups are supported by the most diverse social forces, including the liberal bourgeoisie, the pacifists and, sometimes, large sections of the working people (as was the case in the 1964 presidential elections in the USA, when the overwhelming majority, frequently acting on the principle of the “lesser” evil, voted for Lyndon B. Johnson, giving him a landslide victory over Barry M. Goldwater).

p But if we stop to consider not those who vote for or support this policy but, notably, the interests served by it, we shall find that the terms “liberals” or “moderates” are inadequate, to say the least, or utterly untenable. Actually, the distinctions between the two lines are tactical because both pursue one and the same strategic objective, namely, that of preserving the rule of the monopoly bourgeoisie in a situation witnessing the deepening of capitalism’s general crisis. Similarly, both are spearheaded at socialism, while on the world scene they are aimed at the socialist countries and the revolutionary and liberation movements.

p While stressing the tactical character of the distinctions between these two political lines, we must under no circumstances belittle either the depth or the significance of these distinctions. For the working class they may signify a distinction between a terrorist dictatorship of the fascist type and a bourgeois democracy (even a curtailed one under monopoly rule), while for the socialist countries and all the peoples of the world they spell the difference between a thermonuclear war and a policy envisaging methods of struggle in the world that would not undermine the 226 principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.  [226•*  Thus, although it is a question of distinctions of a tactical nature, these distinctions may be and are (particularly in the present epoch) of very great significance.

p As regards the roots, the origins of these two tactical lines, they evidently represent different answers to one and the same basic fact of our epoch—the steady change of the alignment of class forces in favour of the international working class and the weakening of the positions and influence of world capitalism.

p In assessing the strength and tactics of the class adversary at the very first stage of capitalism’s general crisis, the communist movement drew the conclusion that as capitalism grows weaker its resistance becomes increasingly more savage and it resorts to more extreme and sharper forms of violence. This conclusion was fully borne out by the events of the 1920s and 1930s—the turbid wave of fascism which swept across Europe, the civil war in Spain, the outrages perpetrated by the reactionaries, and the aggressions and annexations which led to a world war.

p After that war developments at first followed the same logic. After recuperating its strength, following the defeat of its most bellicose contingents—German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism—imperialism sought to mount a new offensive on the basis of its former tactics. As early as the close of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s a sharp shift towards reaction was observed in most of the leading imperialist states—suffice it to recall the McCarthy witch-hunts in the USA, the expulsion of Communists from the governments and the offensive against the Constitution in France and Italy, and the revival of militarism in West Germany. On the international scene imperialism started a cold war, pursued a policy of nuclear blackmail, precipitated one grave crisis after another, kindled 227 local wars and provoked bloody reprisals against oppressed peoples who rose to fight for liberation.

p But as the years passed it was gradually found that the picture of imperialist policy was not yet complete. People began to see the outlines of a different political course, of different tactics characterised by greater flexibility, circumspection and willingness to agree to certain compromises in foreign policy, by a more subtle use of economic, political and ideological levers with the purpose of at least temporarily moderating the acuteness of upheavals and preserving power without necessarily resorting to extreme forms of mass terror, and by new methods of ruling oppressed peoples and fighting world socialism.

Imperialism’s second political and tactical line thus began to move to the forefront. It does not, of course, represent something fundamentally new; there had previously been instances of the bourgeoisie having recourse to sidetracking manoeuvres, in which pressure was combined with concessions to the working class.  [227•*  Similarly, one must not for a moment harbour the illusion that the bourgeoisie has entirely abandoned the policy of direct, frontal attacks, fascist repressions, acute cold war and foreign policy adventures fraught with the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe. To cite recent examples, the very fact that people like Goldwater and Wallace have appeared on the political scene in the USA, the chief imperialist power, convincingly shows that this policy is still far from being an historical relic. The fact that more moderate and less diehard representatives of the bourgeoisie have triumphed at elections does not yet in itself resolve the outcome of the struggle: the “vanquished” may yet repeatedly attempt to take revenge, and the “victors” themselves do not see eye to eye with one another. Although they sometimes come to power waving “moderation” and “flexibility” as their banner one cannot rule out the possibility of their making concessions to the more extremist circles.

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p Another point one must not lose sight of is that any serious economic or political crisis tends to aggravate the struggle and speed up the polarisation of forces, which may end in a political shift in various directions. One and the same economic crisis (1929-32) cleared the way to power for Roosevelt and his bourgeois-reformist New Deal in the USA, and for Hitler and nazism in Germany. Political shifts of this kind, sparked by major upheavals, cannot be discounted today (here we have the evidence of the presidential elections in the USA in 1968 when George C. Wallace, representative of the extreme reactionaries, polled nearly 10 million votes, this being the response of a considerable section of the philistine mass to the exacerbation of the domestic political situation caused by a whole series of factors—beginning with Negro and student actions and ending with an unprecedented upgrade of crime that made the slogan "law and order" attractive and topical).

p Nevertheless, if we consider both these tactics in their development and if we examine the overriding trends of the class struggle, we can draw the conclusion that, while reflecting the conditions of definite historical periods, one of them sooner expresses the striving of some imperialist groups to continue using old methods in the new historical situation, and the other signifies a desire to find new ways of struggle that would be more in line with the conditions of the present and, possibly, future stages of history, in other words, it expresses capitalism’s desire to adapt itself to the new conditions of its existence.

p At the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties L. I. Brezhnev noted: "The growth of socialism’s might, the abolition of colonial regimes, and pressure by the workingclass movement increasingly influence the inner processes and policies of imperialism. Many important features of modern imperialism can be explained by the fact that it is compelled to adapt itself to new conditions, to the conditions of struggle between the two systems."  [228•* 

p There is no doubt that this process of adaptation is going on in many capitalist countries. Even some Western observers have drawn attention to it. Commenting on the 1964 229 election campaign in the USA and on the forces standing behind the two candidates, the French weekly L’Express wrote: "Ford versus Hunt (the Texas multi-millionaire, who backed Goldwater.—G.A.) spells out modern capitalism, which relies on the organs of state, versus feudal capitalism, which detests everything linked with the government and in pursuance of its mercenary interests wants the return of the old ’free enterprise’. In the persons of Johnson and Goldwater they found their candidates. Here it is not a case of a Left-wing leader in the classical sense against a Right-wing leader, but one capitalist against another."  [229•* 

p This analysis does not give the full picture, but it does make an important point, namely, the different attitudes of the two politicians and the two tactics to present conditions.

p In elaborating on this point, it may be said that while one of these tactical lines has its roots more in the conditions of the early stages of capitalism’s general crisis, the second reflects capitalism’s adaptation to the realities of the present stage of its general crisis, to conditions in which the old methods of classical struggle lead to further setbacks and can only accelerate the final downfall of imperialism. Awareness of this truth is precisely what is compelling many avowed proponents of capitalism and enemies of communism to oppose people like Goldwater and Wallace.

But this does not mean that outright fascism and terror, and unconcealed warmongering in foreign policy have now become a thing of the past. In addition to the points made above, it must be noted that the two political lines we are speaking of are not divided by an insuperable barrier. The distinctions between them are tactical and fit into the framework of one and the same strategy. Besides, their differentiation is not and cannot be complete. Between them are many intermediate forces, groups and trends and this makes the picture very motley, unstable and always subject to major reshuffles, with the result that the actual programme of one or another politician always contains elements of both tactical lines. It is thus sooner a question of proportions.

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p However, as we see it, the second tactical line is linked more closely with present-day conditions and reflects the attempts to adapt imperialist policy to these conditions. This process of adaptation is closely connected with the monopoly bourgeoisie’s new forms of organisation, primarily with state-monopoly capitalism, which emerged not only as a consequence of the further concentration of capital and the development of the modern productive forces in conformity with the operation of the economic laws of capitalism but also as a consequence of political factors springing from the aggravation of the class struggle. In this context state-monopoly capitalism can unquestionably be regarded also as a new and improved form of organisation of the ruling bourgeoisie in its class struggle against the proletariat.

p This means that the working class has to contend with a more organised class adversary, who has interlocked his economic organisations with his political (including the highest of them—the state) and ideological organisations, with an adversary who has built up a huge machine of political and spiritual rule and has lately been going over to new forms of international organisation. Monopoly capitalism’s new organisation, naturally, does not yet predetermine its new tactics (an example being nazi Germany which had highly developed forms of state-monopoly capitalism). Therefore, when we speak of adaptation, we must consider these two aspects separately.

p However, it is, we believe, an incontrovertible fact that under conditions witnessing a further modification of the alignment of forces the process of capitalism’s adaptation to the new realities could not fail to evoke, at least in a part of the imperialist bourgeoisie, a striving to evolve new tactics in the class struggle. Here the aim is to find more effective ways of ensuring its supremacy over its class adversaries, who in addition to the proletariat, include other classes and social strata of modern bourgeois society.

p Use of the increased economic potentialities, the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, the huge, ramified apparatus of class rule, including the state, the political parties, the colossal machinery of spiritual influence and the key positions in the reformist organisations of the proletariat has given monopoly capital more 231 room for its manoeuvres and for combining pressure with concessions and social demagogy. By taking advantage of the fact that there has been a considerable expansion of the sphere of social life that lends itself to the direct and indirect influence of the state-monopoly mechanism, monopoly capital is able to agree more easily to a compromise in the area where unyielding resistance is disadvantageous or dangerous and find compensation in an area where the adversary does not expect to be attacked, is not prepared to meet such an attack and holds weak positions.

p Also typical of these tactics are the attempts, while preserving inviolable the foundations of the existing system, to get rid in some way of certain extremes, some of the ugliest phenomena, which, while being traditional for capitalism and springing from its exploiting nature, are becoming increasingly dangerous—the distress of some sections of the working people, devastating economic crises, the denial of rights to racial and national minorities, etc. In a number of capitalist countries some steps have been taken in this direction and corresponding programmes have been advanced (in the USA—from the Roosevelt New Deal to the Johnson "great society" programme).  [231•* 

p Of course, it would be naive to imagine that capitalism can cure its social ulcers. But in itself the "bourgeois reformism" policy is highly indicative. It is evidence not only of the fact that capitalism is growing weaker but also of the fact that there is mounting resistance from the working 232 class and pressure from the force of the example set by the socialist community, which has given the working masses new battle slogans—total employment, democratic control of the economy and policy, greater social and political rights, and so on.

p Such is the situation in domestic policy. As regards the imperialist bourgeoisie’s class struggle on the international scene the need for new tactics became imperative as a result of the radical change in the balance of strength between capitalism and socialism and as a result of the changes in the nature of war due to the development of missile-nuclear weapons. There has been no modification of the objective of at least halting the further spread of socialism and, where possible, reversing the course of events and restoring capitalism’s undivided rule in the world. But under the new conditions the struggle for this objective has demanded new political means and methods, new tactics.

p At this point we should like to make some reservations in order to warn against a simplified approach to complex political problems of this kind. The political struggle remains an extremely intricate sphere. Although the imperialist bourgeoisie is making a considerable effort to conduct this struggle in a purposeful and organised manner it would be naive to surmise that the changes in the tactics, means and methods of the political struggle are taking place in the same way as in the military sphere: that a kind of political General Staff, which draws up a common plan and issues orders in accordance with which various campaigns are launched, has come into being.

p When you are confronted not by an enemy army but by a social class, by a class adversary, and on an international scale to boot, things are much more complicated. Of course, this class has its various “headquarters”— governments, political parties and organisations, and international centres—and it tries to subordinate their activities more and more to a conscious principle, especially today, when politics enlists the services of science and numerous scientific centres.

p However, in the course of a political struggle tactics, i.e., the set of applied techniques and methods, are worked out and take shape in a different way than in a military struggle. The reason for this is not only that in the first 233 case organisation is less rigid than in the second. This is sooner not the reason but the consequence of some of the vital specifics of the political struggle.

p One of these specifics is that any social class is such a complex and numerous group of people that it is usually impossible to achieve complete unity among its ranks.

p This applies fully to the bourgeoisie as well. Even if we discount such non-typical cases as the defection of some of its representatives to the camp of the class adversaries (such cases are known in the history of the revolutionary movement), we shall find that the bourgeoisie has always had diverse groups in its ranks. This is true also of the imperialist bourgeoisie. In almost every capitalist country it is divided not only into various parties (the distinctions between them may sometimes be purely formal), but also into groups—from fascist to liberal—rent by very real and frequently very acute contradictions.

p If we bear in mind the alignment of class forces on a worldwide scale we shall see that there are other distinctions, notably distinctions and contradictions between the national contingents of the imperialist bourgeoisie. These distinctions and contradictions are so sharp that until lately they have inevitably led to military conflicts and collisions (in one of these conflicts—the Second World War—a group of capitalist powers, in alliance with the first state of the victorious proletariat, waged an armed struggle against another group of capitalist countries).

Another crucial specific of the political struggle is that as distinct from the military struggle it is much more difficult to make an immediate assessment of the real significance of an event, phenomenon or action—whether it is a “pure” victory or defeat, the price that has to be paid for it, the consequences it will have in the more remote future, and so forth. In this situation phenomena, events and political actions may be assessed differently by the various groups of one and the same class (in the given case, the imperialist bourgeoisie): what seems like a victory to some groups may be regarded as a defeat by others. The competitive struggle for power between the different groups sometimes makes these distinctions extremely acute, as was vividly shown by the’recent presidential election campaigns in the USA.

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p All this is mentioned as a warning against simplified, misconceived ideas about a complex and sometimes contradictory process such as the shaping of tactics in the class struggle.

p In the ruling class of the Western countries the question of the methods, means and tactics to be employed against world socialism remains to this day the object of a serious internal struggle. In the USA, for example, there is on this issue a whole political palette of contradictory opinions—from the most bellicose, which in effect dovetail with the direct preaching of war (at the 1968 elections the retired General Curtis LeMay was Wallace’s running mate for the Vice-Presidency—this is only one of many examples), to moderate, which can be taken to mean agreement with the principle of peaceful coexistence and competition between the two social systems.

p This makes it difficult and, possibly, particularly vital, to ascertain the leading trends, which not only mirror the views and intentions of individuals or groups but may today or in the near future form the foundation for real political actions.

p In the case of imperialism’s policy towards the Third World, this trend, it seems to us, takes the shape of the tactics and entire set of political means and methods intrinsic to neocolonialism. But this does not rule out the use, in many cases, of such “traditional” methods as colonial wars, "gunboat policy" and so forth. The example of Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, some of Britain’s " possessions" in the Caribbean, and the Portuguese colonies in Africa show that such methods are by no means past history. However, these same examples are evidence that such methods have no future. It must not be imagined that the lessons of recent years have been mastered only by the adversaries of imperialism, and that the imperialist camp has remained blind and deaf to them.

p On the contrary, every effort is now being made to chart a new policy that could tie the Third World to imperialism with the bonds of the most diverse dependence and prevent it from taking the non-capitalist road of development. This is borne out by the fact that while formerly the imperialists deliberately sought to keep the Asian, African and Latin American countries at the pre-capitalist level of 235 development, today they are taking economic and political steps to speed up the formation of capitalist relations in these countries. Take the immense effort the USA and other imperialist countries are making to train a new “native” elite in these countries in the spirit needed by imperialism. Lastly, consider the vast attention that is today being accorded in the Western countries (notably in the USA) to the quest for the ways and means of resolving some of the Third World’s pressing economic problems with the aid of the latest achievements of science and technology (the breeding and cultivation of new varieties of grain designed to solve the problem of starvation, the plans for nuclearpowered desalination and irrigation complexes for the seaboard regions of tropical deserts, the project for a system of "low dams" in the Amazon valley, and so on). Only naive people can accept this as disinterested philanthropy. The purpose is quite different. The imperialist states are looking for new and more effective ways of preserving their hold, in present-day conditions, on the countries that have won liberation from colonial bondage.

p In relation to the socialist countries, too, imperialism’s new tactics pursue obviously class aims.

p It would be wrong to say that these new tactics have replaced the "rolling back" and “liberation” doctrines that provide solely for a military attack combined with massive subversive activities. Military pressure has by no means been removed from the agenda. In the USA, for example, forces seeking military “superiority” over the USSR and other socialist countries are still active. There are no grounds for saying that imperialism has relinquished or intends to relinquish its subversive activities (although the positions of these forces have been undermined by the signing of the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitations and other agreements).

p And yet, despite the fact that “traditional” means of fighting socialism have not been abandoned, there are growing signs that increasing attention will be accorded other methods and tactics.

p These tactics have not yet taken final shape, although attempts have been made in that direction (the "bridge building" policy may be regarded as one such attempt). But the essence of the "new approach" to the struggle against 236 socialism is now quite obvious. The frantic frontal anticommunism of the old type, which, many Western political strategists believe, only led to closer unity among the socialist countries, has been rejected. Instead, a more subtle and differentiated anti-communism has been advanced, which, in individual cases, does not rule out economic, scientific, technological and cultural relations with various countries, or even certain forms of co-operation, all of which, however, pursue the aim of undermining world socialism as a whole. Within the framework of these tactics not every socialist country and not every Communist is described as a "deadly enemy”. The abolition of the socialist system and the restoration of capitalism are not proclaimed as the direct objective.

p They pin their hopes on something quite different: first, on the gradual “transformation” (or “erosion”) of the socialist system, which would make it more “acceptable” and less dangerous as a neighbour of capitalism on our planet; and, second, on disunity between the socialist countries, on the dismemberment of the socialist community into the smallest possible fragments, which would, from the standpoint of the imperialists, likewise make socialism a less dangerous adversary and undermine its influence on the course and main direction of world development.

p As many imperialist theorists and politicians see it, Western policies must foster these processes. To this end they suggest a wide range of means, including support for opportunist trends in the Communist parties of socialist countries and an ideological campaign (not only propagandist but also political and economic) designed to encourage nationalism and anti-Sovietism.

p The shaping of this new policy of imperialism is a complicated and sometimes contradictory process. It has many opponents in the camp of the imperialist bourgeoisie itself, especially in the most rabidly anti-communist groups, which still cling to the idea of a “crusade” against communism. This policy has disappointed its own architects, especially in the light of recent events, notably, the failure of the attempt to wrest Czechoslovakia away from the socialist camp.

p Nevertheless, this new approach to the struggle against the socialist community is gradually winning more 237 supporters in the West largely on account of Peking’s divisive, anti-Soviet policies. Characteristically, the Republican Administration that came to power in the USA in 1968 was initially quite cool to the “bridge-building” policy, preferring to rely on “traditional” methods of power policy. But within a few months it launched some experiments that fully harmonised with the recipes of the most dedicated advocates of “bridge-building”.

p From the political standpoint the composition of those who are demanding a new approach to socialist countries is quite mixed. They include not only resourceful and wily antagonists of socialism (some of the diehard reactionaries are beginning to side with them). Many aspects of the new policy and tactics have the backing also of liberal groups, which have acquired a good reputation in the West by their opposition to extreme reaction and advocacy of economic and social reforms in domestic policy, by their stand against the arms race and colonial wars, and by their demand for a relaxation of international tension and normal relations with socialist countries.

p Their readiness to support the new tactics against the socialist countries should not cause surprise. They remain adversaries of socialism not only because of their world outlook and class positions. The new tactics themselves are by no means inflexible. They allow for a policy prejudicial to socialism, for political demands expressing a striving to avoid military conflicts and dangerous political confrontations, to normalise the international situation and to bring policies in line with the present-day realities. These political demands can essentially dovetail with the stand of the socialist countries upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence. An example of this kind is provided by definite changes in Soviet-American relations that found expression in the top-level meeting in May 1972 and in relevant agreements signed at the time.

At this point one could end the listing of the new elements that are increasingly determining the tactics of the imperialist bourgeoisie at the various bridgeheads of the class struggle. But in connection with imperialism’s new tactics there is yet another major political question, namely, the attitude to these tactics by the adversaries of imperialism.

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p This is a significant question, because in the revolutionary movement there are sectarian groups and individuals who contend that imperialism’s old, traditional policy, which still has many adherents in the most reactionary, extreme Right-wing circles of the bourgeoisie, is more preferable from the standpoint of the revolution. They argue that this policy promises to hasten the denouement, that it aggravates contradictions and very forcefully indicts imperialism (the Chinese leaders are trying to take advantage of views and sentiments of this kind).

p While we are fully aware of the anti-socialist nature of the more subtle varieties of imperialist policy, of their hostility to progress and of their perfidy and danger, we cannot subscribe to these views.

p The revolutionary movement of the working class has no grounds for regretting the above-mentioned modifications in the policies of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the very fact that these modifications have occurred reveals with increasing clarity imperialism’s aspiration to shift its accent from frontal attacks to manoeuvres, to combine pressure with concessions and compromises. The working class and the liberation movement have every justification to assess these modifications as the outcome of their successes and achievements that have markedly changed the balance of strength in the world.

p But that is not the only point. Colonial wars, fascism and contempt for the economic and political interests of the proletariat and all other working people spell out more sacrifice and hardships for the masses. The Communists cannot reason like bourgeois politicians, for whom the masses are merely pawns on the chessboard, where significance attaches to the end result and losses are of little account. The struggle waged by the Communists has only one objective and meaning—the defence of the interests of the working people, not only of future but also of present generations.

p As regards the “exacerbations” springing from the old traditional policies of the imperialists, they are not the sole cause of the upsurge of the proletariat’s class struggle. Had that been the case any political or economic crisis would inevitably have been accompanied by revolutionary explosions. A revolutionary upsurge takes place only when by the 239 time a favourable situation arises the problem of bringing the masses into the anti-imperialist struggle and preparing them for the socialist revolution has been resolved. This is accomplished in the course of the struggle for direct economic and political interests, for democratic objectives. That is why the tactics of the bourgeoisie provide for "safety valves" in the shape of concessions and compromises, and that is why in the long run these tactics are doomed to failure. By securing various concessions the working masses not only improve the conditions of their life and work but also gain experience—they master the new lessons of the class struggle, acquire confidence in their own strength and become more politically conscious and organised.

p The class struggle has its own dialectics. The fact that the bourgeois politicians have begun to see things more clearly is not the only reason why more cautious, flexible and subtle tactics are finding many proponents among the imperialist bourgeoisie (the future will show if this is temporary or not). In the final analysis this is a result of the successes of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the oppressed people, of the increased might of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and of their Leninist policy of achieving the utmost strengthening of the socialist community and supporting the revolutionary and national liberation movements, of their uncompromising struggle against imperialism and its policy of aggression, of their drive for peace and peaceful coexistence. In imperialism’s new and more cautious tactics much, in effect, has been forced upon it by its adversaries.

p Nothing has been changed by the fact that these new tactics are enabling imperialism to avoid some of the losses and setbacks that would otherwise have been inescapable. When one assesses the complex phenomena of politics generally, one cannot apply the elementary rules of arithmetic. In politics the loss sustained by one side is frequently by no means equal to the gain derived by the other. Decisions are sometimes made which do not benefit (or, on the contrary, benefit) either side.

p Experience has shown that in the long run a fascist dictatorship boomerangs on the bourgeoisie. But this does not imply that on these grounds such a dictatorship can be welcomed by the working class. Or take the struggle to avert 240 a thermonuclear war. This is a vital matter to the peoples despite the fact that if imperialism starts such a war it would unquestionably be devoured by its flames.

p There is another very important factor which must be considered. The imperialist bourgeoisie’s new tactics in the class struggle are also a result of its efforts to adapt itself to the new realities of the epoch. It can count on success only to the extent and until the working-class and liberation movements in their turn “adapt” themselves to these modifications in the policies of their class enemy, until they see through the political designs of their adversary and counter these designs with their own improved tactics and organisation.

p This applies to the new elements in imperialism’s policies as a whole, to its struggle in all the key bridgeheads and to some aspects of its struggle against socialism. True, here we must agree on what should be considered “new” in these policies.

Take the attempts of the imperialists to utilise the policies of China’s Maoist leadership for their anti-Soviet aims. This can hardly be attributed to the growth of liberal tendencies and the striving to pursue a more flexible and reasonable line. At the close of the 1940s and in the early 1950s (i.e., atthe very heightof the cold war), the US Government displayed similar “flexibility” with regard to Yugoslavia as soon as her relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. Far from being a “new” element in imperialist policy this is a manifestation of new factors in the political situation (in the given case the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China), which the imperialists have always tried to turn to their advantage. Characteristically, in the USA the orthodox representatives of the most extreme, diehard reactionary circles have closed ranks with the proponents of a "new policy" towards China. The American press comments on the Nixon visit to Peking in February 1972 are striking evidence that these steps by US diplomacy have the support both of those who urge normal relations with all countries, including the People’s Republic of China, and those who seek to use such normalisation for anti-Soviet purposes. The same may be said of imperialism’s efforts to utilise any manifestation of nationalism in socialist countries.

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p This is approximately the case with the exhortations to make massive use of all possible means to undermine and disintegrate socialism "from within”, including support for opportunism, attempts to influence intellectuals and young people and various acts of ideological subversion. All this is today more and more frequently linked with the " bridgebuilding" policy. Indeed, this policy relies largely on methods of this kind. Here it is not a case of something “new” in the policy of the imperialist powers but rather a manifestation of that policy’s traditional character and successiveness. Attempts to undermine socialism from within, with intensified ideological pressure as one of the vehicles, are not novel in imperialist policy as one can easily see by re-reading the works written by James Burnham, John Foster Dulles and some other high priests of anti-communism in the 1940s and 1950s.

p If we look beyond the traditional, constant elements of imperialist policy towards socialist countries, we shall find that the aim of the new tactics (including the tactics expressed in the “bridge-building” policy) is essentially (a) not so much to crush socialism and restore capitalism as to gradually “transform” or “erode” the socialist system, and (b) to go over from a policy of uncompromising hostility and maximum restriction of contacts and relations with socialist countries all along the line to a certain expansion and utilisation of economic, scientific, technological and cultural relations.

Basically, this policy remains spearheaded against the socialist system. This must be clear to anyone who analyses imperialism and its policies from a Marxist-Leninist and not an opportunist position. But there is something else that must be clear to any Marxist-Leninist, namely, that the imperialist powers cannot be expected to have a different, friendly policy towards socialism. Properly speaking, the principles suggested by the Communists for relations between states with different social systems, the principles of peaceful coexistence, likewise do not in any way presuppose any cessation of the inevitable struggle between the two systems but only imply the exclusion of military means of waging this struggle, the relaxation of international tension and the establishment of mutually beneficial co- operation between states in definite spheres.

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p Hence, in analysing imperialist policy, its assessment as “friendly” or “hostile” cannot be used as a point of departure. This policy will always be intrinsically anti-socialist. Significance attaches to something else, namely, the purport of the various trends in imperialist policy and their possible impact on the international situation and on the balance of strength in the world.

p This is the standpoint from which one should consider the new elements in the imperialist policy towards the socialist countries. But since it is a matter of new elements, some of which have not yet been applied in practice but exist rather as general ideas in the minds of individual political theorists, it is quite out of the question to attempt to analyse them comprehensively. But some preliminary considerations may be offered.

p The first of these elements is that imperialism’s new tactics towards the socialist countries obviously express the evaporation of the hope that the socialist system lacks vitality and can be strangled by force. In this sense the new tactics are essentially defensive, and this is mirrored in the theoretical concepts on which they are founded. This applies to the “convergence” theory, which, with all its hostility towards socialism, not only expresses the hope that socialism will change and draw closer to capitalism but also admits that socialism has values which, if borrowed, could benefit capitalism.  [242•*  Even the notorious " transformation" of socialism theory is regarded by many bourgeois theorists in a spirit that is new for the ideologists of anticommunism. George F. Kennan, for example, in speaking of the changes that might possibly occur in socialist countries, including the USSR, draws the conclusion that they can take place "only on the foundation of and within the framework of the present political system, which is now firmly established and which has shaped the political outlooks and assumptions of an entire generation".  [242•** 

p Another consideration that suggests itself when we examine the new elements in imperialism’s policy towards 243 socialist countries is how its theorists interpret issues such as the relaxation of tension, the promotion of economic, scientific and technological contacts, and so forth. It is well known that these propositions are being put forward also by the proponents of the "new policy”, notably of the " bridgebuilding" doctrine. In themselves these propositions evoke no objections. The fact that they have been put forward by bourgeois politicians and theorists may be regarded as a sort of response to the challenge to the West from the policy of peaceful coexistence pursued by socialist countries. But to reduce the “bridge-building” policy to this would be tantamount to concealing its real significance. In recent years it has been developing in a totally different direction. Within the framework of overall imperialist policy even the above-mentioned positive elements have been inevitably perverted. Facts indicate that their acceptability and utility to the West are assessed by many “bridge-building” proponents in accordance with definite criteria totally unconnected with the contribution they can make towards strengthening peace and international security or towards the economic, scientific and cultural advancement of both sides. In fact, here the knowledge of how effectively these elements of the new policy can be used to prejudice socialism is becoming the only criterion.

If, for instance, one takes the report of the Republican Co-ordinating Committee, published on the eve of the 1968 elections in the USA, where the conclusion was offered that "we should also keep clearly in mind that our sole purpose in dealing with the current communist regimes is to encourage and promote their evolution”,  [243•*  one will see that in this context even good words about negotiations, trade and other contacts acquire the shape of ill-concealed subversive activity.  [243•** 

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p This attitude is neither an exception nor the monopoly of one bourgeois party. Here is another example. In a book entitled The Discipline of Power, also published shortly before the 1968 presidential elections, George W. Ball, a leading American diplomat and a prominent figure in the Democratic Party, wrote emphatically in favour of East-West trade and the removal of the discriminatory restrictions imposed on this trade by the USA. But one of his main arguments was: "Now it should be perfectly evident that to press the Soviet Union toward autarchy makes no sense from the point of view of the West.... The Soviet Union would be less able to wage a protracted war if it had to depend on sources of supply on this side of the iron curtain".  [244•* 

p Speaking generally, one must say that many Western political theorists have an astonishing talent for distorting the meaning of even the most positive ideas. As they pass through the mechanism of their thinking, universally acknowledged forms of international intercourse like trade, cultural contacts and so forth, that through the ages have enjoyed a good reputation, immediately turn into their opposites, into sinister instruments of subversion and corruption of other countries.

p The height of this art has been attained by Zbigniew Brzezinski. For him even peace and the relaxation of international tension have become instruments of subversion against world socialism. "Only in a relaxed international atmosphere,” he declares, "could the hidden tensions and contradictions that plague the East surface and become politically important.” A detente, he says, "inevitably challenges" communism.  [244•** 

p Statements and declarations of this sort require a sober approach. Above all, it must be seen that there is a good deal of irresponsible propagandist jabber in them. The apologists of imperialism are now aspiring to lay claim to practically all positive ideas, lofty ideals and honoured slogans (we have already mentioned this feature of their ideological tactics) and it would be patently absurd to 245 acknowledge these claims and surrender to capitalism what it is trying to appropriate in this manner.  [245•* 

p To sum up, it may be said that the new elements in imperialism’s policy towards socialist countries should evidently be assessed much in the same way as the imperialist bourgeoisie’s entire new tactical line in the class struggle. These elements express the striving of the imperialists somehow to adapt themselves to the changes taking place in the world, to the new alignment of forces and to the conditions of capitalism’s deepening general crisis.

p However, in this area of the class struggle (possibly because for imperialism it � is the most complex, important and acute), elements of a more realistic approach to politics have sprouted on the rich soil of anti-communist traditions and prejudices linked with old political guidelines, whose untenability has been demonstrated long ago by the entire course of history.

p In this combination any element of realism can be simply emasculated. But events may possibly take a different turn under which the development of objective reality will, on the contrary, fortify them and enhance their influence on actual policy. Naturally, even in that case the relations between capitalism and socialism will not become idyllic. But they may enter a channel where the menace of a world war will diminish and it will be possible to coexist peacefully and co-operate normally in spheres where such co-operation is beneficial to both sides.

p Properly speaking, this is precisely what is envisaged by the principles of peaceful coexistence which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are upholding on the world scene. Moreover, this is precisely the turn the progressive, democratic forces in the capitalist countries are striving to effect. Among the more sober-minded and 246 farsighted representatives of the bourgeoisie the trend towards such changes will become more and more pronounced as socialism grows stronger and as the hollowness of any other political line is laid bare.

p As regards the official policy of the imperialist powers, the socialist countries have in most cases still to contend with a line involving a variety of old and new methods of fighting the new social system.

p Among these methods ideological propaganda unquestionably holds a prominent place.

p From the pronouncements of some Western theorists, whom we have already mentioned, it may be inferred that the growing role played by ideological propaganda is in many ways linked with the fact that in the nuclear age it is becoming harder and more hazardous to rely on war as a means of crushing an adversary. Similar pronouncements by bourgeois policy-makers and theorists are frequently quoted in Marxist literature to explain why imperialism attaches such great significance to ideological propaganda.

p As such this explanation raises no doubts. The Western leaders, who are beginning to realise that a thermonuclear war would mean suicide for imperialim, have indeed no alternative but to look for other ways of fighting socialism. One of these ways is through ideological propaganda. But this does not mean that the emphasis on ideological propaganda is a characteristic only of the present-day bourgeoisie’s tactics that provide for more flexible methods and circumventing manoeuvres combined with certain concessions and compromises, while the other more rigid, frontal tactics, that include an intensification of military pressure, show no inclination to make broad use of ideological propaganda.

p Actually, even the most bellicose groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie, including those who are inclined to rely more on a military* solution, are pressing for the utmost unfolding of ideological propaganda against socialism. This is hardly surprising. In imperialist countries the broad use of ideological means of struggle has always been linked with preparations for and the conduct of wars of aggrandisement. Even the most militarist circles in the West are perfectly well aware that war preparations demand the most painstaking and effective brainwashing in their own 247 country, in allied countries and in countries regarded as the enemy.

p The demarcation between the proponents of the two tactical lines in their attitude to the use of ideological means of struggle should not, therefore, be regarded as a boundary on one side of which are those in favour and on the other those against the active use of propaganda. There is no question of a division on this issue. The contention is over the content, forms and methods of ideological propaganda and over its place in politics.

p Actually, it is a case of a clash between two concepts of propaganda closely related with the struggle between the imperialist bourgeoisie’s two tactical lines. Each of these lines, naturally, envisages its own content, forms, and methods of using all the instruments of foreign policy, including foreign political propaganda.

p The hard-liners, who want to step up the cold war and launch a frontal attack on the socialist camp and on the revolutionary and liberation movements, advocate the most aggressive forms of propaganda. As they see it, the purpose of foreign political propaganda is to intensify interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. They regard propaganda primarily as an instrument of subversion in these countries and in the communist and national liberation movements.

p The proponents of this stand frequently criticise the present propaganda efforts of imperialism as being “soft” and "much too cautious”, as being inadequate in volume, as containing too much information, as having too many “scruples” in occasionally resorting to a lie, as being too timid in using all the dirty gimmicks of psychological warfare. Most of these critics regard propaganda as an allpowerful weapon and believe that along with other methods of subversion and the corresponding military efforts it can resolve the problems of imperialist foreign policy and secure a radical change in the course of events.

p They are suggesting many plans for stepping up propaganda and enlarging the already bulky propaganda machine, and are demanding a substantial increase of the allocations for it.

p A series of these plans is mentioned by Wilson P. Dizard in the book The Strategy of Truth. One of them is the " 248 militant liberty programme" sponsored by the US Defence Department. Another, drawn up by the American Legion, proposed a Cabinet-level department devoted to " unconventional propaganda warfare”. Underlying these projects, Dizard notes, is the idea that "psychological techniques" are an independent weapon that can ensure victory.  [248•* 

p Ideas of this kind are peddled also in influential political and diplomatic circles. This is best illustrated by the proposal by William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, for raising the propaganda department to the level of a ministry and, at the same time, uniting the propaganda efforts of the West through "Marshall plan of ideas".  [248•** 

p These projects have the backing not simply of individual fanatic advocates of “total” propaganda. The backstage manipulators are rather political groups that had risen to power at the height of the cold war and been educated in the spirit of the Dulles hard-line policy of "balancing on the fringe of war”, and also representatives of the topechelon military.

p All of them want an “active” foreign policy. Denning the nature of this policy, a committee headed by Christian A. Herter wrote in its report to the President (naturally, in the most delicate terms) that it "must not only watch things happen and report them, but also help to make things happen".  [248•***  Here propaganda is accorded the role of a major instrument of such interference in the course of events.

p The other foreign policy tactical line, which is more realistic, flexible and circumspect, suggests a different concept of foreign political propaganda. But it, too, accords prominence to propaganda. The proponents of this line are also demanding more funds, a bigger effort in the war of ideas and an enlargement of the propaganda machine. Similarly, they are not inclined to abandon the methods of psychological warfare and “black” propaganda altogether. But, first, foreign political propaganda is accorded a more modest role; the advocates of this line do not believe propaganda is all-powerful and regard policy, which can later 249 be propagated, as the main factor in the fight for people’s minds. And, second, “unconventional” methods are given a smaller role in the propaganda effort on the grounds that their immoderate use may still further discredit foreign policy as being extremely aggressive.

p The proponents of these views sharply sriticise the very concept of foreign political propaganda as psychological warfare. Many leading American theorists and policymakers articulated this criticism as early as the 1950s.

p One of them, Chester Bowles, pointed out that the concept of psychological warfare had been borrowed from the nazis and warned: "If we insist on employing it to describe our activities, we will continue to lose the respect of millions of people throughout the world who were brought up to believe that America is more than a clever gimmick or a cynical manoeuvre".  [249•* 

p This view won supporters in official circles in the USA as early as the period of the Eisenhower Administration. A committee set up in 1953 with W. H. Jackson, a New York attorney, at its head, reported that "cold war" and "psychological warfare" were unhappy terms, and stressed that "new terms are needed... to express the solidarity of freedom-loving men and women everywhere".  [249•**  Correspondingly, as early as 1953 the Psychological Warfare Board (set up by the National Security Council in 1951 to co- ordinate the efforts of various departments) was renamed the Operations Co-ordinating Board. Symbolically, this measure was put into effect at a time when in US official circles they were still peddling the idea of a "liberation policy" envisaging the further intensification of all kinds of subversion, including “psychological”. In other words, the aim of this measure was to camouflage and not to change the substance of propaganda. This was confirmed by Roland I. Perusse, a top-ranking official of the American propaganda department, who, in a comment on the report of the Jackson committee and on the reform that was enforced on the recommendations of that committee, wrote: " Abandonment of the term, however, should by no means result 250 in the abandonment of any of the processes involved in what has been known professionally as ‘psychological warfare’.”  [250•* 

p The proposed reorganisation of foreign political propaganda both as psychological warfare and as a gigantic advertising campaign was criticised by Leonard S. Cottrell Jr., a leading American sociologist, in a paper to the annual convention of the American Sociological Society in 1955. Proposals for this sort of reorganisation, he declared, were sowing the illusion that "there existed somewhere a bag of slick tricks and black magic by which advertising psychologists and other modern spell casters could put across ideas and beliefs in populations we wish to influence”. This, he said, gave the false impression that the struggle for public opinion could be waged solely by psychological means and, moreover, that it could be carried on in a vacuum with no relation "to what was going on in more tangible economic, political or military aspects of international activity”. Moreover, these illusions were giving rise to a "negative strategy”, a strategy of "stopping the advance of communism without offering a feasible alternative”. He added that the "only formula for putting power into our propaganda is that of positive action. There is nothing the soap salesman can do until that condition is met".  [250•** 

p An analogous conclusion is drawn by Dizard, who rejects the recipes of the proponents of extreme forms of psychological warfare and generally of those who see propaganda as the key to the solution of problems. "Whatever the value of psychological operations in the military sphere,” he writes, "there is considerable doubt about its application to the general problem of world opinion.... Preoccupation with techniques has been a hallmark of our search for answers to the problems posed by hostile or indifferent public opinion overseas; it is indicative of a serious weakness in our approach."  [250•***  He characterises the preachers of "total propaganda" as follows: "Propagandists themselves have an inherent tendency to exaggerate their ability to persuade. They are something like Chanticleer, the rooster 251 of French fable, who thought the sun rose every morning because he crowed."  [251•* 

p In his book he quotes George Allen, the former USIA chief, as saying: "I have long been convinced that ninety per cent of the impression which the United States makes abroad depends on our policies and that no more than ten per cent, to make a rough estimate, is how we explain it—whether we say it softly, or loudly, or strongly, or belligerently, or with dulcet tones.... I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not writing down the importance of the US Information Agency. I am writing up the importance of having the public relations aspects of policy taken into consideration when policy is made."  [251•** 

p Behind these views one can, of course, discern the desire to shift most of the responsibility for the setbacks of foreign political propaganda from the propagandists to the politicians, in other words, they are a purely professional defensive response on the part of those who are directly responsible for the US propaganda effort. But while Allen and Dizard may be suspected of trying dodge responsibility, there are hundreds of people uncommitted to propaganda who have made similar statements.

p Definite political tactics dictating the place that should be occupied in it by foreign political propaganda is what chiefly shapes views of this kind. It is quite obvious that political tactics providing for a more flexible adaptation of politics to the real facts and conditions of the present epoch cannot reduce all the methods of moulding public opinion to propaganda. It envisages certain corrections in the policy itself so that the latter would in itself carry a certain propaganda message and would be adapted to influencing world opinion more effectively.  [251•*** 

p It goes without saying that what is envisaged is not 252 a reshaping of United States policies in accordance with the wishes and interests of public opinion but a kind of "imperialist reformism”, whose purpose is, where possible, to strip politics of its most odious aspects and in other cases to help camouflage such aspects more thoroughly.

p The advocates of this line are by no means necessarily less bellicose in their attitude to communism. The differences are more frequently over something else, namely over the reasons for the wide dissemination of communist ideas and over what measures would be most effective in fighting these ideas. Extremely characteristic in this respect are the recommendations which the American preacher of anticommunism Frederick C. Barghoorn offers Western ruling circles: "The most important tool of the free world in the struggle against communist propaganda, however, is not propaganda or counter-propaganda at all, but a series of programmes designed to mitigate or eliminate the conditions which foster susceptibility to Soviet propaganda."  [252•* 

p With this approach is linked the struggle which some of the directors of American foreign political propaganda and a number of politicians have been waging for many years to give the propagandist a share in charting foreign policy. They want this share in order to be able to warn the President or the Secretary of State of the consequences that a given political action might have from the propaganda point of view, or at least to be able to prepare the propaganda machine for these consequences.

The argument over the aims and methods of propaganda and its place in politics (as over the various political tactics we have mentioned above) is still going on. In the official policy of the imperialist powers this is reflected in vacillation now to one side now to the other. For instance, it may be considered that the period during which John F. Kennedy was President of the USA was marked by an upswing of the “reformist” line, a more sober evaluation of propaganda’s potentialities, and attempts to modify policy in order to make it more effective in moulding public opinion. Of course, the war in Vietnam and the mounting aggressive trends of US policy in other parts of the world while the Johnson Administration was in office halted this process.

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p As regards the Nixon Administration, its line in foreign political propaganda seems to be reflected to some extent in the special report of the Republican Party’s Co- ordinating Committee drawn up under the direction of former Assistant Secretary of State R. Hill and published during the 1968 election campaign. This report contains the entire range of arguments used by the circles advocating the utmost intensification of the propaganda effort. It demands larger allocations for USIA, more efficient training for its personnel, an extension of its functions and closer co- ordination between the government effort in propaganda and the efforts of private business.

p The report dwells on propaganda’s link with foreign policy and urges more active propaganda by the US foreign policy apparatus, stressing that aggressive and intelligent use of modern communications may frequently be the shortest and most effective way to carry out specific tasks overseas.  [253•* 

p However, the report ends with the reminder that "deeds speak louder than words" and that this old saying was applicable to the US propaganda effort. "Words can explain action,” it says, "but cannot substitute for policy. Our actual performance at home and abroad determines the effectiveness of our psychological operations abroad. The sharp decline of confidence in and respect for America in recent years is due far more to a qualitative deterioration of policies than to USIA shortcomings".  [253•** 

p Another point to be borne in mind is that US Government policy in foreign political propaganda can hardly be formulated in total isolation from its general policy towards other countries. Therefore, say, the normalisation of SovietUS relations and a relaxation in US relations with the socialist countries will raise the question of the nature of Washington’s foreign political propaganda and of strengthening the hand of those who are opposed to psychological warfare methods that might serve as a source of tension.

p On the whole, despite all the differences of opinion and despite the continuing struggle between viewpoints, it may 254 be said that the highest point in the craze for psychological warfare as a “total” weapon that can almost by itself ensure victory, was evidently passed in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Foreign political propaganda is, of course, receiving serious attention. It is being heavily financed. Steps are being taken to intensify and improve it. But the experience of recent years with its disappointments and unfulfilled hopes has evidently brought the US ruling circles round to the conviction that propaganda cannot be regarded as the panacea for all evils. All the available evidence indicates that this is the framework within which the imperialist governments will act in the foreseeable future.

p This means that considerable attention will be given to foreign political propaganda, to improving it and stepping up its effort. But the ruling circles of the imperialist countries can hardly be expected to accept the advice of those who feel propaganda should be given precedence over other means of struggle. It may rather be expected that more attention will be given to means of struggle linked with the economic, scientific and technological competition between the two systems, and also to attempts to pursue a more differentiated policy towards individual socialist and developing countries.

However, it should be borne in mind that in this policy, too, foreign political propaganda will play a substantial role, but only as part of this policy and not as an independent factor.