p Montaigne, the outstanding forerunner of the French Enlightenment, revived the ancient secularised interpretation of wisdom from the standpoint of a philosophical scepticism that placed havoc with theology and scholastics. Quite in the spirit of Epicurus, Montaigne declares that "all the wisdom and all the discourse in the world serves in the long run only to teach us not to fear death".  [42•1  In his Essays Montaigne frequently refers to the sayings of the Bible, but only in order to extract from them the human wisdom they inherited from the human wisdom of the ancients, their moral maxims regarding the rational ordering of human life.

p Pierre Bayle, another splendid exponent of bourgeois free thinking, interprets wisdom as a courageous desire to go through to the end in seeking truth, a fearless urge to cast aside misconceptions and prejudice, an unshakeable awareness of the fact that nothing is forbidden to reason. "Reason,” he says in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, "has every right to hunt anything it wishes. But reason itself must not be defective. One should agree only with good and noble ideas and act only in accordance with them, no matter what those around us may say. In both respects the wise man shows equal courage.”  [42•2 

p The founders of bourgeois philosophy, Francis Bacon and Descartes, go even further, since they not only repudiate medieval ideology but also 43 substantiate the new ideal of knowledge—- scientificality. Science is understood as authentic and systematic knowledge, drawn from a natural and not “supernatural” source, i.e., through perusal of the "Great Book of Nature”, which lies open for all men to study and meditate upon. The New Age, as Maritain puts it, is characterised by a "conflict between wisdom and the sciences and the victory of science over wisdom".  [43•1 

p In one of his essays Bacon ridicules the " wisdom for a man’s self" of the schoolmen, which, as he says, is by no means harmless but, on the contrary, is manifestly pernicious for society. "Wisdom for a man’s self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing. It is the wisdom of rats, that will be sure to leave a house somewhat before it falls. It is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger, who .digged and made room for him. It is the wisdom of crocodiles that shed tears when they would devour.”  [43•2  But surely there is other wisdom besides this? Bacon does not deny it. Nor does he deny divine wisdom, but the whole significance of "natural philosophy" lies, so he believes, in methodical, rationally organised inquiry into the laws of nature, in order to multiply human inventions, which are far more capable of conducing to the benefit of mankind than all the pearls of wisdom of Ancient Greece. "Now the wisdom of the Greeks was professorial and much given to disputations; a kind of wisdom most adverse to the inquisition of truth.”  [43•3 

p Descartes’ position was that wisdom is not a particular kind of knowledge, distinct from all others and accessible only to a few: "The whole sum of knowledge and science is but human wisdom, which remains always one and the same, no matter how various the subjects to which it is applied. . . .”  [44•1 

p This new understanding of wisdom fully accords with the spirit of the New Age, which substitutes for the contemplation of commonplace, constantly observed reality the active drives of exploration and discovery, experiment, strict proof and testing of the results obtained,

p Descartes helped to found not only the philosophy but also the mathematics and natural science of modern times. Wisdom, according to his teaching, is characterised not only by "good sense in affairs" but also by "perfect knowledge of all that it is given to man to know".  [44•2  Perfect knowledge is reliable knowledge; his assumptions, firmly established, self-evident truths, are so clear and sharp that there can be no doubt as to the truth of them. Defining philosophy as the love of wisdom, and wisdom as knowledge "of the truths concerning the most important things”,  [44•3  Descartes, as a true spokesman of the young, progressive bourgeoisie, observes that "people who engage professionally in philosophy are often less wise and less rational than others who have never applied themselves to this study”. ...  [44•4  None of his reservations to the effect that only God is wholly wise because only He 45 has complete knowledge of everything, can weaken the revolutionary impact of the basic philosophical demand put forward by Descartes, the demand for scientific proof, which, as he constantly emphasised, can only be effected through independent, critical research, based on experiment and the "natural light" (lumen naturale) of human reason. There are four means of attaining wisdom or scientific, true knowledge, says Descartes. These are: cognition of selfevident truths; the experience of the senses; knowledge acquired through conversation with others; and the reading of good books. As for divine revelation, Descartes says that "it does not raise us gradually but all at once to infallible faith".  [45•1  This statement sounds an ironic rather than devout note, particularly if one remembers that, according to Descartes, wisdom is not faith but knowledge, which cannot be acquired at one sitting.

p Spinoza revives the Epicurean conception of wisdom, but on a new, rational basis that presupposes scientific, proven investigation of external nature and human essence. Epicurus assumed that the philosophical explanation of the phenomena of nature should be in accord with our sense perceptions, which he regarded as completely reliable. Spinoza, who followed Galileo and Descartes in fully appreciating the philosophical significance of Copernicus’ discovery of the contradiction between sensual appearance and the essence of phenomena, argued the need for strict logical (geometrical) proof of philosophical propositions. From the standpoint of Epicurus, celestial phenomena as distinct from 46 the terrestrial had permitted of the most varied explanations compatible with the evidence of the senses. And all these explanations were reasonable as long as they did not contradict the senses and were also conducive to peace of mind. In contrast to Epicurus, Spinoza argues that both the terrestrial and the celestial must be explained on similar lines, since necessity is everywhere the same and is expressed by the necessity of logic and mathematics.

p Wisdom, according to Spinoza, is cognition of universal necessity and action in accordance with it. Therefore wisdom is not only knowledge but also freedom, which lies in mastery of oneself. Spinoza declares: "The wise man’s business is to make use of things and to take as much pleasure in them as possible (but not to the point of surfeit, for this is no longer pleasure). The wise man should, I say, support and restore himself with moderate food and drink, and also with the scents and beauty of green plants, beautiful clothes, music, games and exercises, the theatre and suchlike, which anyone can partake in without harm to others.”  [46•1  How far this is from the medieval ideal of wisdom!

p Spinoza’s conception of the philosopher-sage is usually interpreted as if Spinoza believed the wise man should be a hermit, absorbed only in meditation and remote from all human joys. There is a modicum of truth in this, but it should not be exaggerated, particularly if we consider that in the 17th century scientists were few in number and had only just begun to form a separate profession. Wisdom for Spinoza was 47 primarily the cultivation of the intellect combined with the quest for theoretical knowledge.

p In the idealist doctrine of Leibnitz wisdom is interpreted as "perfect science”. Admittedly, Leibnitz regards metaphysics and the speculative system of the "truths of reason" as such a science, which he contrasts with empirical scientific knowledge, with the "truths of fact”. The idealist interpretation of the principle of scientificality, the rationalist “substantiation” of theological notions, the juxtaposition of metaphysics to physics—all this was, of course, a concession to the feudal ideology reigning in Germany. All the same, it is science that he regards as the adequate expression of wisdom, and Leibnitz could appreciate science not only as a philosopher but as a brilliant mathematician and experimental scientist. Science is irrefutable. This belief is shared not only by materialists but also by the progressive spokesmen of idealist philosophy, and it is from this standpoint that they pose the traditional philosophical question of the nature of wisdom.

p Of course, the concept of science existed even in medieval scholastics. Even the mystics did not always reject it. The science .of .the New Age, however—true science—introduces a fundamentally new concept of scientificality. This concept has to be accepted, although certainly not without reservations, even by the idealist philosophers, at any rate those who can be regarded as progressive thinkers. As for the materialists, they are enthusiastic advocates of scientific inquiry into nature.

p Holbach’s System of Nature is an encyclopaedia of the philosophical wisdom of French 18th century materialism. His stated aim is to 48 liberate man from the chains of ignorance, gullibility, deception and self-deception, to restore him to nature from which he has been decoyed by religion, by concocted systems and the shameful worship of error; to show him the true path to happiness. Man needs truth more than he needs his daily bread, because truth is knowledge of the actual relations between people and things. People are deceived only when they turn away from nature and refuse to consider its laws and ignore experience—the only source of knowledge. "When people refuse to be guided by experience and disown reason, the figments of their imagination grow huger with every passing day; they plunge joyfully into the depths of error; they congratulate themselves on their imagined discoveries and achievements, while in reality their thoughts are ever more closely confined in darkness.”  [48•1  Back to nature! This means casting aside the existence of the supernatural, putting down all the chimeras of religion. Nothing exists except nature. Nature is no abstract being but an infinite whole, an infinite variety of phenomenal Man is the highest creation of nature, and only by acting in accordance with its laws can he attain his ends. Virtue, reason, truth are not spiritualist essences, they are born of nature and only they deserve to be worshipped. Holbach makes a vigorous appeal to them: "Inspire man with courage, give him energy; allow him at last to love and respect himself; let him realise his own dignity; let him dare to liberate himself; let him be happy and free; let him be the slave only of your laws; let him improve his lot; let 49 him love his neighbours; let him know delight and allow others to delight as well.”  [49•1 

p Philosophical wisdom, according to the teaching of the French materialists, should not be a dispassionate contemplation and justification of what is. Its calling is to be militant, to expose slavish genuflection to the past, to tyranny, ignorance and indolence, to spread truth, humanity and happiness, to promote the reasonable reordering of human life. Its passionate protest against feudal oppression endows French materialism with a new aspect that qualitatively distinguishes it from all previous philosophies. This is expressed in the very definition of philosophy as love of wisdom. Helvetius says: "Philosophy, as the very etymology of the word proves, consists in love of wisdom and the search for truth. But all love is passion.”  [49•2 

p German classical idealism, despite its constant polemic with French materialism, is at bottom inspired by the same bourgeois-humanist ideals that Holbach, Helvetius and their associates seek to substantiate. On closer inspection Kant’s categorical imperative turns out to be an idealist, a priori interpretation of the ethics of enlightened self-interest. Despite the juxtaposition of practical reason to theoretical reason with the corresponding postulation of the need for a “practical” outlet beyond the bounds of experience and for acceptance of Christian dogma, Kant is unshakeably convinced that only science constitutes the real foundation of wisdom. It is in his Critique of Practical Reason that he 50 formulates the conclusion: "Science (critically inves- . tigated and methodically organised) is the strait gate that leads to the teaching of wisdom, if by this we understand not only what man does as what should serve as a guiding star for teachers, so that they can well and clearly point out the way to wisdom. . . .”  [50•1 

p Kant’s immediate successor, Fichte, goes even further in this direction. For him philosophy is a scientific doctrine. Admittedly, at the same time it is a subjective-idealist, voluntarist ontology, but this contradiction, which is inseparable from the idealist interpretation of scientific knowledge, does not detract from the historical significance of Fichte’s broad philosophical posing of the problem of scientific philosophy. In Fichte’s philosophy science is the highest form of knowledge, and philosophy can retain its leading place in man’s intellectual life only to the extent that its understanding of the world becomes scientific and bears out the principles of all scientific knowledge in general. From this standpoint the traditional interpretation of philosophy as love of wisdom falls to the ground because philosophy, like any other scientific discipline, must now be systematic. Scientific doctrine, says Fichte, calmly allows any other philosophy to be what it chooses: passion for wisdom, just wisdom, world wisdom, wisdom of life and all the other wisdoms. This is not a denial of wisdom but a denial of its superscientificality, a denial that nevertheless conflicts with Fichte’s own idealistically constructed system of perfect, absolute scientifico-philosophical knowledge.

p Hegel’s philosophy is a new stride forward on the path from prc-scientific philosophical wisdom to scientific philosophical knowledge, which is to be understood as the dialectical treatment of this wisdom—its negation and preservation. Hegel holds that the task of learning in his time is to raise philosophy to the rank of science. In his Phenomenology of Mind he pours sarcastic ridicule on romantic philosophising whose exponents regard themselves as prophets inspired from above. Their occupation is not research but holding forth. They "imagine that by veiling self-awareness in fog and repudiating reason they become the initialed ones whom God endows with wisdom while they sleep; what they actually receive and invent in their sleep is thus also dreams".  [51•1  Hegel had in mind Schelling, Jacobi and other philosophers with leanings towards irrationalism. In contrast to them he argues that philosophical truth cannot by its very nature be immediate knowledge. It is by nature mediate. It develops, enriches itself, discovers its own contradictions. The task of the philosopher is to penetrate into the immanent rhythm of the developing concept and move with it, avoiding any interruption of this motion "through the will and already acquired wisdom".  [51•2  Here he is speaking of the dialectical method, the dialectical motion of philosophical knowledge overcoming its traditional metaphysical limitations, dogmatism and the absolutising of results achieved.

In his introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel writes: "The true form in which 52 truth exists can be only its scientific system. It has been my intention to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science, to a goal whose attainment would allow it to renounce its name of love of knowledge and become actual knowledge.”  [52•1  Hegel’s encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences was in fact such an attempt, doomed to failure owing to the contradiction between method and system in Hegelian philosophy. This contradiction and the related absolutisation of historically limited philosophical knowledge was unavoidable without abandoning idealism. A positive solution to the problem of creating a scientific philosophy became possible only thanks to the materialist and dialectical philosophy of Marxism, a philosophy that by its categorical repudiation of dogmatic system-building, by the creative development of its own propositions, the critical assimilation of the achievements of science and practice, poses in quite a new light the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge and all that through the ages has been called wisdom.