p This book is part of much more comprehensive study which the author hopes to complete within the next few years. Even so, though not embracing all the problems implied in the title, it does deal with the specific nature of philosophical knowledge, its substance, form and structure, from historical angle and may, therefore, be described as a historico-philosophical study.

p Historico-philosophical studies come in various shapes and sizes. Some of them investigate the development of the philosophical thought of a particular people. Some examine the development of philosophy on a world-historic scale with the philosophical thought of various nations emerging as historical stages in the development of world philosophy as a whole. Some deal with the various branches of philosophy, with the history of epistemology, ontology, dialectics, natural philosophy and ethics, or with certain philosophical trends, schools, the work of individual philosophers, stages of philosophical development, and so on. Each type of inquiry has its specific 6 task, but all presuppose the solution of the theoretical problems of the history of philosophy. For instance, the problem of contradiction in the history of philosophy cannot, in my view, be satisfactorily solved without a scientific conception of the particular qualities of philosophical problems and how, in particular, philosophy solves them. Moreover, to be able to trace the development of the concept of contradiction in the history of philosophy, one must be clearly aware of the basic features of the philosophical approach to cognition of reality, the ideological function of philosophy, the epistemological and class roots of the various philosophical approaches to the solution of this problem.

p The subject of historico-philosophical research is philosophy; the problems of historico- philosophical science are philosophical problems. These propositions, it seems to me, are quite obvious but, notwithstanding Cicero’s remark that proof only belittles the obvious, I believe that they still demand to be proved, theoretically grounded, and this is what a great part of this book is about.

p Although no philosophical doctrine can claim to embrace all philosophical questions, there is not a single philosophical problem that does not fall within the scope of historico-philosophical science. Besides which, historico-philosophical science is concerned with problems that are not part of philosophy as such. These are the historical problems of the emergence and development of philosophy, its objective dependence on social conditions, its epistemological roots and so on. Nevertheless, historico-philosophical science is not a “marginal” discipline, its source lies not in the “crossing” of history and philosophy, of 7 two relatively independent fields of knowledge, but in the objectively conditioned historical process of the development of philosophical knowledge, its critical appreciation and, probably, its self-awareness.

p The problems of the history of philosophy arise not because they are outside the competence of both philosophy and history. Like all philosophical problems, they have been generated by the historical and everyday experience of all mankind, and particularly in the process of cognition—scientific and philosophical. The historian of philosophy must certainly be a historian in the full sense of the term. But no matter how important it is for him to be scrupulously efficient in investigating the social conditions that give rise to a certain philosophical doctrine, his main task is to understand that ’doctrine, to appreciate it critically, to show its connection with other philosophical doctrines, a connection that must in some way or other be conditioned by the socio-historical process. Regarded from this standpoint, historico-philosophical science is a specific means of philosophical inquiry, it is the philosophy of philosophy or, to be more concise, metaphilosophy.

p It is quite impossible to treat the history of philosophy purely “historically”, empirically, without being guided by a broad and flexible "scale of values" derived from the very history of philosophy itself, from the history of man’s historical development and his quest for knowledge. Even the application of the term “ development” to the history of philosophy makes certain obvious philosophical assumptions, e.g. the assumption that certain irreversible processes of change and progress actually occur in philosophy.

p Any attempt to discover an absolute recording system is just as futile in the history of philosophy as in physics. It immediately gives itself away, as a claim to complete impartiality, and no real philosopher can be completely impartial, any more than he can be without his own point of view. The adepts of impartiality ignore the obvious fact that historians of philosophy place different value on one and the same doctrine, and this happens not because they have been remiss in studying their sources and facts or because they have departed from the scientific standards demanded by historiography. The crux of the matter lies much deeper.

p No exposition can be a word-for-word repetition of what a particular philosopher wrote. At the very least it will be a retelling in one’s own words. But what serious investigator of the historical process of the development of philosophy would confine himself to a mere retelling, which does not usually imply understanding? Understanding and interpretation are inseparable from each other and the student of the history of philosophy must strive for a scientifically objective understanding of his subject, which is quite incompatible with refusal to take up any definite theoretical and, hence, conceptual position. For this reason the demand that one should remain utterly dispassionate in writing the history of philosophy is merely an invitation to remain in disagreement with oneself, with one’s theoretical conscience. Science is impossible without criteria of scientificality, but in philosophy and the history of philosophy there is no unanimity on this question. Historico-philosophical science has therefore to work out criteria for the evaluation of philosophical doctrines, proceeding from critical 9 generalisation of the historico-philosophical process that is at work throughout the world.

p It stands to reason that these criteria (and the methods of inquiry they entail) may prove completely unsatisfactory if the historian of philosophy adopts a sectarian philosophical position and assumes, for example, that only Thomas Aquinas created a system of absolute philosophical truths, whereas his great forerunners (with the possible exception of Aristotle) languished in darkness and the philosophers of any later period have merely departed from the true path laid down for them by "Doctor Angelicus”.

p The philosophy of Marxism, however, does provide a real theoretical basis for a scientific history of philosophy, since it scientifically summarises the whole development of philosophical thought up to the time of the emergence of Marxism and continues to do so as subsequent stages are reached. This also means that dialectical and historical materialism is not only historically but also logically based on the history of philosophy, which critically analyses the manifold conceptions of philosophy and formulates as a deduction from its whole development (and that of scientific cognition in general) the basic premises of dialectical and historical materialism. In this sense, it may be said that the scientific history of philosophy as a theoretical conception of the development of philosophical knowledge is an organic component of the philosophy of Marxism. The concept "philosophy of Marxism" is wider in scope than the concept "dialectical and historical materialism”, because it also embraces the scientific history of philosophy as well as certain other philosophical disciplines (ethics, aesthetics, etc.).

p Dialectical and historical materialism is fundamentally opposed to any group limitations or narrowness. One has only to recall how the founders of Marxism-Leninism criticised not only vulgar but also metaphysical, mechanistic materialism, and also the anthropological materialism of Feuerbach, or how highly they valued the brilliant ideas contained in the idealist teachings of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Rousseau and Hegel. From this we realise that Marxism is the philosophy in which objectivity and partisanship are organically united.

p The philosophy of Marxism, while rejecting on principle the idea of a perfect and complete philosophical system (absolute science, as Marx called it), is constantly in motion, in development, on the road to new discoveries. It is constantly aware of and grappling with its unsolved problems and, while criticising its ideological opponents, also criticises itself, recognising that it is limited by the boundaries of knowledge achieved not only in the philosophical but also in the general scientific fields. Marxist philosophy is also the history of philosophy, and particularly the history of Marxist philosophy, of its progressive development, a history that provides the theoretical prerequisites and method for the investigation of any philosophical doctrine. Like any system of scientific knowledge, the philosophy of Marxism regards its scientific propositions only as an approximate reflection of reality, as the unity of relative and absolute truth, the latter being understood dialectically, i.e., relative within its own frame of reference. The significance of dialectical and historical materialism for the scientific history of philosophy is not to be found in any claim to offer the history of philosophy cut- 11 and-dried solutions and formulas, but in its ability to guide inquiry into the development of philosophy along a truly scientific path.

p Since it applies what Engels called the "logical method”, historico-philosophical science is itself a philosophical theory. It investigates such specific features of philosophy as the forms of cognition, its basic types, structure, problems, and development, its relation to other forms of social consciousness (particularly science, art, religion), the nature of philosophical controversy, change in the subject of philosophy and the affirmation of scientific philosophical knowledge, thus answering the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge.

p If the basic question of any philosophy is ultimately the question of the relation of the spiritual to the material, is not the question "What is philosophy?" the basic question of historicophilosophical science?

p The significance of this apparently elementary question becomes obvious to anyone who can perceive even in the most general form the distinction between philosophy and the specialised sciences, arid who asks himself why different philosophical systems existed and continue to exist, while there are no fundamentally different, incompatible systems of mathematics or physics.

p This is, of course, not merely a matter of definition, which would be of purely formal significance, but of making a critical generalisation of the development of philosophy, which to no small degree determines its social status and scientific prestige and enables it to solve correctly problems that were posed by philosophy in the past but still confront it today. Hence we reach the 12 direct conclusion that the major problem of historico-philosophical science is the problem of philosophy. To understand this amazing phenomenon of the spiritual life of society, the history of mankind’s intellectual development, to understand this specific form of knowledge and selfknowledge, its necessity, its irremovability, its not immediately obvious but ever growing significance in the intellectual development of the individual, to discover its role in the ideological struggle which today, more than ever in the past, is a struggle between world views, to disclose the potential possibilities of philosophy and how to realise them—all this is an urgent necessity not only for the historians of philosophy but also for anyone to whom the question of the meaning of his own life does not appear utterly pointless.

p Philosophy has suffered a strange fate. A synonym of science in the ancient world, it now seeks to achieve recognition as a science on a level with newly emerged sciences of modern times. How has this come about? Is it because philosophy, on account of its great age, has fallen behind its younger comrades and is no longer fit to compete in the Marathon of knowledge? Or perhaps there is no riddle at all and the answer is simply that what was a science in ancient times cannot by its very nature be a science today? As Francis Bacon remarked, the ancients were but children while we are people of a new age, entering upon our maturity. But it is doubtful whether the concept of maturity can be applied unconditionally to the human race at any stage of its development. Man always has everything ahead of him, in the future. There is, admittedly, another explanation of this delicate situation, 13 tentatively proposed by Windelband. Is not philosophy, he asks, in the position of Shakespeare’s King Lear, who gave away all his possessions to his daughters and was himself cast out into the street as a useless and troublesome old man?

p At all events, philosophy now has to win its right of citizenship in the republic of science, although it has formally never been deprived of this right. This is an inner necessity for philosophy, a necessity that it must feel in the face of any other science, no matter how restricted its field of reference.

p Philosophy’s right to full citizenship is called in question first of all by everyday consciousness, secondly by certain exponents of the specialised sciences and, thirdly, by some philosophers. The everyday arguments usually boil down to the assertion that philosophy does not inspire confidence because it does not always take into account the demands of common sense. In the past many representatives of the positive sciences supported this commonplace argument, but nowadays, since the creation of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, they are more inclined to agree with Engels, who wrote: "Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.”  [13•1 

p Some scientists reproach philosophy for not being able to answer the questions that are put to it or, worse still, for answering questions with questions to which the specialised sciences, thorough though they may be, are unable to find an answer. All these questions (whether they are 14 asked by science or philosophy), are difficult ones but it at least can be said in defence of philosophy that the people who ask the questions which it fails to answer cannot answer these questions either. On the other hand, if philosophy, instead of answering a question, asks one itself, we should consider whether the question is well formulated. If it is, philosophy has already made some contribution to the problem.

p Philosophy’s most dangerous enemies, however, are to be found within its own ranks. The biggest hue and cry was raised by the neo-positivists, who declared all the historically evolved problems of philosophy illusory and non-existent in reality, while the historico-philosophical process was presented as a history of continuous misapprehension. In making their claim, the neo-positivists failed to notice the fact that the mistakes of the great philosophers were great mistakes, and the neo-positivist campaign against philosophy has ended in inglorious defeat. They themselves have been compelled to admit the unavoidability of “metaphysical” (philosophical) problems. The problems they called pseudoproblems have turned out to be real problems to which neo-positivism has found no positive approach.

p The neo-positivists acquired partially deserved influence with their special studies in logic, which have no direct bearing on their obviously subjectivist and agnostic philosophical teaching. The crisis of neo-positivism is largely due to an awareness of this now quite obvious fact. Neopositivism was opposed by the natural scientists, including some who for a time had been under its influence. This is a highly important fact because neo-positivism, unlike other idealist doctrines, as I. G. Petrovsky notes, "parasitises to a great extent 15 on the actual achievements of modern science".  [15•1  The statements by Albert Einstein, Max Plank, Louis de Broglie, Max Born and other outstanding men of science, criticising neo-positivist scepticism and substantiating materialist (and essentially dialectical) views, have convincingly demonstrated that philosophy is vital to theoretical natural science. The relevance of philosophical problems has thus been testified by non- philosophers who have devoted themselves to philosophical problems and made a considerable contribution to the development of philosophical thought. This naturally opens up promising vistas before the historians of philosophy.

p In the past 10-15 years Marxist-Leninist historico-philosophical science has been enriched by numerous researches. The six-volume History of Philosophy (Moscow, 1957-1965) was the first attempt to make a global study of the development of all philosophy from the time of its inception to the present day. Naturally this collective work, in which many Marxist historians of philosophy from other countries besides the Soviet Union participated, sums up a considerable number of specialised historico_rphilosophical studies. The numerous works of Soviet historians of philosophy, concerning separate philosophical trends, schools and systems, undoubtedly contribute not only to historico-philosophical science but also to the development of dialectical and historical materialism. "At the present time,” P. N. Fedoseyev writes, "the transition from a predominantly descriptive stage of historico-philosophical science to 16 analytical inquiry into the logic of the development of philosophical thought is becoming increasingly evident.”  [16•1  All this paves the way for the systematic theoretical investigation of the fundamental problems of the historico-philosophical process.

p Our task has been not only to solve the problems confronting us to the best of our ability but also to pose problems regardless of whether we ourselves can solve them at present. A common dogmatic distortion of the essence of philosophy is to be found in the view that the questions proposed by philosophy are far less important than the answers it supplies. On the other hand, when scientific Marxist-Leninist philosophy is under discussion, the dogmatist imagines that this philosophy has already answered all the questions ever posed in the past, and that one has only to wait for science and practice to pose new questions, which will immediately receive the right answers. In reality, however, by no means all the questions raised by philosophy’s previous development can be solved at the present time. What is more, philosophy does not merely wait for questions to be fired at it from outside. Philosophy itself asks questions. It puts them not only to itself but to the sciences and to any sphere of conscious human activity. If in this book I have succeeded, even to some extent, in posing questions that for various reasons have escaped the general notice— questions that deserve to be discussed regardless of whether we can answer them or not—my labours will not have been in vain.

p Dialectical and historical materialism is a developing philosophical science in which, as in any science, there are unsolved problems. They should not be left in the background. Rather, we should draw the researcher’s attention to them. And the historian of philosophy, since he is a representative of dialectical and historical materialism, naturally seeks in his specialised researches not merely to illuminate philosophy’s historical past but to contribute to the solution of its present-day problems or, at least, their correct and constructive positing.

p I am fully prepared to admit that although I have done my best to substantiate them, some of my conclusions are controversial. But I have also assumed that some of the propositions that are so well established in textbooks on philosophy and which, presumably owing to constant repetition, have come to appear infallible, are in fact by no means infallible and also require discussion.

Any inquiry, unlike a work of popular science, is published so that it may be discussed. This is my attitude in publishing the present work, in which I feel I have considered only questions that deserve scientific discussion.