p The second top-level conference of the Soviet, US and British leaders was called in the Crimea, with the Soviet delegation housed in Yusupoy Palace, the British in " Vorontsov Palace and the American in Livadia. Although the Crimea had been liberated only shortly, the delegates were assured the maximum possible comfort, despite the fact that negotiators and staff from abroad totalled 2,500.  [190•1 

p The conference opened at the time of a powerful Soviet offensive all along the front. "The appearance of the Red Army at the gates to Berlin,” Max Walter Clauss, a West German historian, notes, "was a factor that dominated the conference."  [190•2 

p At the opening session Churchill thanked the USSR for the winter offensive that had helped the Allies squash the German Ardennes adventure. Stalin replied that he had appreciated the implications of Churchill’s message and saw "that such an offensive had been necessary for the Allies. The Soviet Command had started its offensive even before the planned date. The Soviet Government had considered that to be its duty, the duty of an ally, although it was under no formal obligations on this score. He, Stalin, would like the leaders of the Allied Powers to take into account that Soviet leaders did not merely fulfil their obligations, but were also prepared to fulfil their moral duty as far as possible."  [190•3 

p The conference agreed Allied plans for completing Hitler’s defeat. The decisive significance of the Soviet-German Front was acknowledged. In recognition, capturing Berlin was assigned to .the Red Army. The Crimea Conference endorsed the European Consultative Commission proposals on occupation zones in Germany and the administration of Berlin. The question of inviting France to participate iii the occupation of Germany was settled in the affirmative on the initiative of the Soviet Government.

p When discussing the German occupation zones, the US and British spokesmen went back again to their partition plans. Roosevelt remarked that occupation zones "might prove to be the first step in the dismemberment of Germany”. Churchill added that "he agreed in principle to the dismemberment of Germany".  [191•1  The question remained of how it should be partitioned, he amplified. Stalin expressed strong doubts and insisted that no mention of dismemberment should be made in the surrender terms. Churchill and Roosevelt dragged through a decision that the matter be put before the Foreign Ministers for further, study. Subsequently, on Soviet insistence, it was-struck off the agenda.

p The Soviet point of view triumphed also in relation to the political tasks of the occupation. The delegations accepted a document on this score drafted beforehand; it envisaged measures ruling out any new German aggression and securing the country’s peaceful democratic development. The Big Three declared their determination to disarm and dissolve all German Armed Forces, to abolish forever the German General Staff, which had repeatedly helped German imperialism to revive, to punish all war criminals and wipe out the nazi party, nazi legislation, nazi organisations and nazi institutions.

p A sharp discussion broke out over reparations. Acting on the principle of justice, the Soviet Government declared that Germany should repay her victims at least part of the damage they suffered from her aggression. Total reparations were estimated by the Soviet delegation at $20,000 million, of which half was due to the Soviet Union.

p Churchill objected that reparations would cause starvation in Germany. "If one wanted to ride a horse,” Churchill said, "one had to feed it with oats and hay.” Stalin replied: 192 MISSING 193 MISSING 194 to how best to ensure a united front between the three Powers, to which France and China should be added."  [194•1 

p President Roosevelt advanced a compromise solution, which was finally adopted: the work of the Security Council was based on the unanimity principle, but procedural matters were to be governed by a majority vote (of not less than 7 out of n), while in matters related to peaceful settlement of disputes, the party involved in the conflict (even if a permanent Security Council member) should abstain from voting.

p On the last day of the conference an agreement was signed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or three months after the war in Europe ended.

p The Crimea Conference showed that governments with different social systems were able to hammer out joint and effective solutions. Some participants, however, accepted international co-operation tongue in cheek. Churchill later betrayed his insincerity. He said he had accepted some of the agreements in the Crimea only to encourage the Soviet Union to make the fullest use of its giant military power against Germany and Japan. "What would have happened,” he wrote, "if we have quarreled with Russia while the Germans still had two or three hundred divisions on the fighting front?"  [194•2 

p However, the perfidy of a few cannot detract from the positive significance of the Crimea Conference, the results of which appear even more important in retrospect. The conference spelled the doom of Hitler’s hope of a conflict between the members of the anti-fascist coalition, producing a programme for postwar democratic arrangements.

The people of the Soviet Union and all progressives regard the Crimea Conference as an important milestone along the way to the nazi defeat and the materialisation of the legitimate liberative aims of the Second World War.