p The German leaders saw the events approaching the inevitable end. No hope survived of a military victory. But^as they saw it, one hope remained —that of exploiting the mounting anti-democratic and anti-Soviet sentiment among the US and British rulers in the interest of German militarism. Hitler told his associates: "Never in history was there a coalition like that of our enemies, composed of such heterogeneous elements with such divergent aims__He who, like a spider sitting in the middle of his web, can watch 187 developments, observes how these antagonisms grow stronger and stronger from hour to hour."  [187•1 

p The information at Hitler’s disposal was largely true. The following entry in Fieldmarshal Alanbrooke’s diary, dated July 27, 1944, became known to the public after the war. Here is what the Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefsof-Staff of British Armed Forces wrote: "Back to War Office to have an hour with Secretary of State discussing post-war policy in Europe. Should Germany be dismembered or gradually converted to an ally to meet the Russian threat of twenty years hence? I suggested the latter and feel certain that we must from now onwards regard Germany in a very different light. Germany is no longer the dominating power in Europe—Russia is — Therefore, foster Germany, gradually build her up and bring her into a Federation of Western Europe."  [187•2 

p The nazis were also encouraged by the conduct of the British interventionists in Greece. In the early hours of October 4, 1944, British troops landed in Southern Greece without meeting resistance. The Germans had withdrawn, while the Liberation Army, in hot pursuit, had moved north. For two months, the British Government built up its armed forces in Greece, but did not betray its true intents. It acted on Churchill’s bfder: "It is most desirable to strike out of £he blue without any preliminary crisis."  [187•3  The "strike out of the blue" came on December 3, when the British provoked a conflict in Athens. General Ronald MacKenzie Scobie, in command of the British troops, received instructions calling for extreme measures: "Do not hesitate to act."  [187•4  And further: "We have to hold and dominate Athens,. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary."  [187•5  Churchill recalled Arthur Balfour’s telegram to the British authorities in Ireland in the i88os: "Don’t hesitate to shoot."  [187•6  And General Scobie’s troops did’ not hesitate.

p Wholesale killings and arrests were complemented by brutal air and sea raids on Greek towns and villages. For 33 days 188 the British interventionists waged a sanguinary war against the people of Greece, employing methods reminiscent of the nazis’. With brute force they saddled the nation with a monarcho-fascist government.

p Examining the ways of exploiting this behaviour of the British and US governments, Berlin decided to mount a major counter-offensive in the West. The nazis hoped that thiswould encourage the tendency in Washington and London to seek a separate understanding with Germany, this disrupting the anti-fascist coalition. On the face of it, the situation was favourable. British and US troops in France and Belgium were preparing to celebrate Christmas. Officers and men were given leave and battle-preparedness dropped.

p The nazi plan was to repeat the breakthrough of May 1940. Again, after breaching the front, the German armies were to hinge rapidly toward the coast with the object of cutting off and wiping out the maritime group of the Allied troops in the area. But unlike 1940, the route to the coast was to be somewhat shorter. The breach was to be in the Ardennes between Monschau and Echternach, at the junction of British and US armies. It would then develop towards Dinant-Namur-Liege, and to Antwerp, by then the main US and British supply centre. The huge depots in that part would, if Antwerp were captured, greatly ease the situation of the German Army.

p The depletion in strength on the Eastern Front prevented the nazis from deploying a strong enough force for the operation. Numbers were to be compensated by quality. Three German armies—the yth, 5th Panzer and 6th SS, includingbrigades of Hitler’s bodyguards—were placed under the command of General-Fieldmarshal Rundstedt, but instead of the 3,000 warplanes envisaged in the plan, he was given only 700-900.  [188•1 

p The Germans struck at dawn on December 16 with the advantage of surprise. The attack was unexpected for the Allied Command, not only due to poor intelligence and reconnaissance, but chiefly to its confidence that the main German effort would continue against the Soviet Union. Lack of integrity, of the US and British governments, proved the chief reason for the German success in the Ardennes.The front was breached 80 km in width and no km in depth. 189 German forward units crossed the Maas at Dinant and then reached the river west of Liege. The Anglo-American armies retreated in disorder, leaving behind vast quantities of arms, ammunition and fuel.

p Before dawn on January i, 1945, the nazis mounted another offensive, this time in Alsace, advancing 30 km in three days.

p The Ardennes and Alsace offensives aggravated controversies between the US, British and French governments and the respective military commands, this adding to the difficulty of eliminating the consequences of the German breakthrough. Quite obviously, the nazis would try to deploy fresh strength to develop their initial success.

p The US and British governments turned to the Soviet Union, requesting a new Red Army offensive to draw off German troops and compel them to abandon their enterprise in the West. The first to suggest this was Eisenhower in his letter to the Chrefs-of-Staff. "If...,” he wrote, "it is the Russian intention to launch a major offensive in the course of this or next month, knowledge of the fact would be of the utmost importance to me and I would condition my plans accordingly. Can anything be done to effect this coordi- nation?"  [189•1 

p Churchill sent a personal message to Stalin on January 6, laying stress on the dangers "when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative."  [189•2  He asked "whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January."  [189•3 

p Although the Soviet troops had only just completed a major autumn-winter offensive and the weather forecasts were extremely unfavourable, Stalin sent Churchill an affirmative , reply the next day. It contained the opinion of the Soviet generals. Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev, then in command of the 1st Ukrainian Front, recalls in his memoirs that altering the Soviet schedule created difficulties, involving an immense organisational effort. However, the Soviet generals, officers and men "realised that the change had been dictated by general strategic considerations and, hence, had to be accepted".  [189•4 

p Less than a week after Churchill’s message the Red Army launched an offensive all along the front from the Baltic to the Carpathians (on January 12, 1945). This was a striking example of faithful observance of Allied responsibility and of how coordinated actions pay off. The nazi plan in the West was thwarted, with German troops hastily pulled back to the Soviet-German front.

Soviet fidelity to the duty of ally was of fundamental significance. It shored up the coalition. And the last of Hitler’s trumps was beaten. Yet he clung on with the desperation of a maniac. He still hoped for a split among the Allies.