p Capturing Czechoslovakia was for Hitler Germany a far more difficult job than Austria. Apart from the absence of any valid pretext for crushing the sovereign Czech and Slovak state, the latter’s international position was conspicuously stable. Czechoslovakia was an ally of the Soviet Union and France, and any head-on aggression would run into the resistance of Czechoslovak patriots and their allies. The biggest deterrent of all was the Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Aid Treaty, for there could be no doubt as to the USSR’s living up to its commitments to the letter. The other factor was Czech and Slovak patriotism blending with the patriotic and internationalist sentiment of workers and other progressives in Britain and France, where a strong movement was in motion to protect Czechoslovakia.

p These factors were a headache for the British and French rulers, convinced that the German government had made its future moves conditional on the outcome of its claims to Czechoslovak territory. A perfidious plan crystallised, assuming special prominence in the secret war preparations. In substance, it was designed to frighten the peoples with threats of war and, exploiting their peaceful aspirations, meet the German demands, clearing the path for the nazi war machine. The British and French governments wanted merely a guarantee that German guns were trained eastward, away from them.

p Blackmail with war as a stake —and this in order to unleash a war—was a novel dodge in the secret book of imperialist diplomacy. The blackmail began in May 1938, when nazi Germany failed to overcome at once the resistance to her plans of taking Czechoslovakia. In that critical hour, British and French diplomacy picked up the cue. They claimed that due to Czechoslovak reluctance to meet Germany half-way a war was likely to break out any day. This was tantamount to shifting the guilt on the victim of aggression. The British and French governments undertook a "peace-making mission".

p To begin with, ex-Foreign Minister Lord Runciman was hastily dispatched to Prague as mediator. This amounted to outright incitement, for he was known as a nazi sympathiser. The move was to back up the German intentions, to avert a hazi retreat and portray the predatory fascist demands as legitimate and reasonable, forcing the Czechoslovak 27 Government to bow and reject French and Soviet assistance. The French Government, for its part, cast about frantically for a valid excuse to shirk its obligations. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, declared its determination and readiness to render every possible aid, including armed assistance, denying everything that was alleged to obstruct such aid. The Soviet stand was publicly announced, and also communicated to the governments of Czechoslovakia and France.  [27•1 

p The USSR made the most of all opportunities to organise resistance to fascist aggression and render Czechoslovakia armed support, let alone political and moral aid. Regrettably, its efforts were rejected by the Czechoslovak Government under President Benes.

p In the meantime, Chamberlain twice held secret talks with Hitler. His attitude delighted the nazi dictator. The Fuehrer could barely conceal his joy. During their second meeting in Bad Godesberg on September 22, 1938, the two came to terms on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. But one point still had to be settled: the resistance of Czechoslovakia and of progressives in Britain and France had to be squashed.

p That was when blackmail by suggesting war was used to the fullest. A partial mobilisation was carried into effect in France on September 21. Trenches were dug and antiaircraft guns stationed in Paris squares and streets. Evacuation of the French capital started. In Britain, the Navy was alerted, sandbags covered shop and office windows in Londpn, and schoolchildren were shipped out of the city. The US Government advised its citizens to leave Europe due to "imminence of war".  [27•2  Pacifist books describing war horrors, heretofore banned in Britain and France, were run off the presses hastily. The Western governments made a show of lamenting that they might have to go to war against a “guiltless” Germany on behalf of “intransigent” Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain said this in so many words over the radio:

p "How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."  [27•3 

p That was how the groundwork was laid for betraying Czechoslovakia and European peace.

p In those critical days, the Soviet Union renewed its proposal of a broad international conference to prevent further aggression: it would "search for practical measures to counteract aggression and save the peace by a collective effort".  [28•1  If the Soviet proposal had been accepted, it would have effectively blocked fascist aggression. But that was farthest from the minds of Hitler’s abettors.

p Western intentions were not to repulse Germany, but to compel Prague to bow to her demands. Giving way to Western pressure, the Czechoslovak Government under President Bene§ surrendered unconditionally, accepting Hitler’s extortionate demands. This was tantamount to national betrayal.

p On September 29-30, 1938, the heads of government of Germany, Britain, France and Italy gathered in Munich. France and Britain burned their bridges: the idea of collective security lay buried. The conference that abandoned Czechoslovakia to the tender mercies, of the nazis was the main stepping stone to a second world war. The aggressor, who barely had time to digest Austria, could not believe his eyes. Munich prodded him on to new acts of brigandage. It wrote finis to the idea of a united front against Hitler and his ambitions, paving the way for a united front against the Soviet Union in the interest of German fascism. Eager to direct aggression eastward, the French and British governments sought pledges that no aggression would follow against them. On the second day of the Munich conference, September 30, an Anglo-German non-aggression declaration was signed, with a similar Franco-German declaration signed on December 6, 1938, consummating France’s rejection of her mutual aid treaty with the Soviet Union.

p Now, 30 years later, the vast majority of historians of different schools, assess the Munich deal in much the same terms as the Soviet Union did in the wake of the event. Herbert Feis, a US historian, writes: "The Munich agreement had allowed Hitler to tear Czechoslovakia apart, leaving Poland and the Soviet Union exposed to German assault."  [28•2  Michael Freund, a West-German historian, chimes in: "With 29 Bohemian soil resounding to the tread of marching Germans, the whole world caved in. The cornerstone had been pulled out of the order erected by the Versailles Treaty. But that was not all. The path to the East had been paved for the German Reich."  [29•1 

p The Munichites saw to it that the secrecy shrouding the birth of war should become denser still. The critical war step was described as salvation from war. Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome on his return to Britain. Girls in snow-white dresses presented him with flowers. His portraits, framed in laurel wreaths, were displayed in all respectable clubs. His umbrella was described as an emblem of peace. Medallions were on sale, depicting the umbrella crossed by a peace palm. Streets formerly named Peace were renamed Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain made a triumphant entry into Parliament. His claim that he had secured "peace for our time"  [29•2  evoked an ovation. What Chamberlain did not say was what kind of peace he had secured.

p Chamberlain assumed that having given Hitler the green light in the East, he had ruled out war in the West. But the nazi leaders had their own ideas. Ribbentrop, for one, said derisively to Hitler: "That old man has today signed the death warrant of the British Empire and left it to us to fill in the date."  [29•3 

p After Munich the war drive was redoubled. At first Germany seized part of Czechoslovakia, then the rest of it. Then it grabbed Memel, now Klaipeda, from Lithuania, and saddled Rumania with an unequal economic treaty, turning her into Germany’s economic appendage. In the meantime, Italy overran Albania.

p The fascist rash spread over Europe. No longer was there any doubt left in anyone’s mind as to the kind of “peace” achieved in Munich. Yet the governments of the United States, Britain and France still acted as neutral observers, letting no opportunity escape, however, to remind Hitler about his promised eastward crusade. If they ever intervened in the course of events, it was unfailingly in Germany’s favour. Take Spain: helping the Italo-German 30 interventionists conclude the war, they untied the nazis’ hands for new ventures.

p The Soviet Union was the only country that pulled no punches in exposing each act of fascist aggression and coming out in defence of the victims. In a note to Germany on March 19, 1939, the Soviet Government refused to acknowledge as lawful and consistent with the principle of self- determination the rape inflicted on Czechoslovakia. It described her occupation as an arbitrary act of violence and aggression.  [30•1 

p Far from bettering the international position of Britain and France, the Munich deal had lamentable consequences for those two countries, and for Poland. Before Munich the German leaders and generals wrangled behind the scenes over the direction of fresh armed campaigns. Some suggested the course of least resistance—starting the war for world supremacy by attacking Britain, France and Poland, the latter being the ally of the former two. Others, on the other hand, suggested war against the Soviet Union with Polish aid. The friends and foes of the second alternative equally feared Soviet strength. Diplomat Ernst von Weizsaecker revealed later that the nazis believed the Soviet Union to be more dangerous than any other adversary.  [30•2 

p After Munich, the choice was clear: the Western countries would be attacked first, but to avoid a war on two fronts the German generals suggested crushing Poland first of all. Here was how they reasoned: in case of a German attack on Britain and France, their ally Poland would be more likely to come to their aid than if the reverse happened and Poland were attacked first. Hitler spoke with contempt of his Munich collocutors and their policy: "I have witnessed the miserable worms ... in Munich. They will be too cowardly to attack."  [30•3 

p Besides, attacking Poland appeared more attractive to the German generals, because it would place their troops along the Soviet border, securing a staging area for a subsequent assault, envisaged after Germany’s victory over the Western powers.

Prior to Munich, the Genera’l Staff worked on a war plan against Poland merely provisionally. After Munich, it was completed in double quick time. On April 11, 1939, it was 31 endorsed by the government. War hovered over the continent. Yet it was not too late to block the avalanche by extraordinary collective action.