p Setting its sights on a world war, German imperialism aspired to much more than mere revenge for the 1918 defeat. It craved for world rule, a world-wide colonial empire in which the German monopolies meant to embrace the developed European countries.
p The German imperialists’ racial theory advocating extermination or enslavement of all other peoples by the German Herrenvolk was the ideological groundwork for Hitler’s programme of conquest. Hitler described subjugation of other nations as the historical mission of the Germans, destined to provide the world with "a class of new masters”. He said this in so many words:
p "We want to make a selection for a class of new masters who will be devoid of moral pity, a class which will realise that because of its better race it has the right to dominate others, a class that will be able to establish and maintain without hesitation its domination over the masses." [17•1
18p Extolling aggression and violence, Hitler propaganda created a military cult, depicting war as the most noble of occupations for the German master race. "The divine essence of man (i.e., German—Deborin),” wrote Rosenberg, the nazi theorist, "must be defended with blood." [18•1
p The nazi ideology also rested on the theory of "insufficient living space”. Fanning chauvinism, nazi propaganda maintained that all German troubles (especially painful during the world-wide economic crisis of 1929-1933) stemmed from overpopulation. And the solution for this problem, allegedly created by the advancement of other peoples, was said to be conquest of foreign land. [18•2
p Oswald Spengler, the German philosopher, said in a book in 1933 that immense colonial areas were available that could provide Lebensraum for the German race. [18•3 Hitler declared publicly: "We are overpopulated and cannot feed ourselves from our own land.... The final solution of the vital questions lies in expanding our living space.... If the Urals with their incalculable material resources, Siberia with its rich forests, and the Ukraine with its incalculable grain areas were part of Germany, the latter would attain abundance under National-Socialist leadership." [18•4
p The German rulers were plotting conquest of European, even of overseas, countries, and the Soviet Union, which they regarded as an object for colonisation, stood high up in their list. One of the leading nazi journalists wrote: "The Germans consider Russia a future colony.... Russia is entering a new stage in her history: it is becoming a colonial country." [18•5
p Direct war preparations began immediately on Hitler’s assumption of power, gaining in intensity in 1936, when the nazi congress in Nuremberg adopted a four-year plan to build up Germany’s war-making potential. In 1933, RM 700 million was invested in the war industry, investments rising to RM 9,000 million in 1936 and 15,500 million in 1938, and passing the 1933 level by as much as i, 1250 per cent in 1939. [18•6
19p Total cost of economic preparations for war passed the RM 90,000 million mark between 1933 and 1939. Out of this sum, 55,000 million was spent on arms* production, 10,000 million on acquiring or producing and building up a stockpile of strategic raw materials, and nearly 25,000 million on state military investments. [19•1
p War production swallowed up tremendous financial and material resources, and a vast amount of labour. Between 1933 and 1939, for example, employment in the Junkers aircraft concern soared from 3,000 to 53,000 workers. [19•2
p The armed forces for the contemplated aggressive war grew rapidly, as may be seen from the following table:
The Nazi Military Build-up [19•3
1932 1936 1939 Total divisions 7 36 103 incl.: Panzer - 3 6 Motorised — — 8p The German generals, who willingly acknowledged Hitler’s leadership, primed for the war with extraordinary thoroughness. They knew it would be difficult for Germany to overcome the rest of the world. That was why they attached particular importance to the surprise element in attack, a factor yielding a distinct edge over the enemy. General Heinz Guderian wrote in an article in 1935, explaining the advantages of a sudden*attack: "One night the gates of the plane hangars and’army motor pools will swing open, the motors will break into song and the units will head forward. The first sudden strike will capture or destroy the enemy’s important industrial and raw-material areas from the air, switching them out of war production. The enemy’s government and military centres will be paralysed, and his 20 communications crippled. The first sudden strategic assault will carry the troops more or less far into enemy territory." [20•1
p The generals’ accent on a lightning war completely suited Hitler: He told his closest associates that when his government decided war as propitious, he would not indulge in negotiations. "If ever I attack an adversary,” he declared, "I would not do it like Mussolini. I would not negotiate month after month and indulge in protracted preparations. I would act as I have always acted: suddenly, streaking out of the night and hitting lightning-like at my opponent." [20•2
p It was envisaged, moreover, that numerous German agents planted by the aggressor would help considerably in the sudden seizure of the countries concerned.
p The nazis began fanning a war hysteria at home long before the hostilities. Speeches by leaders and generals, martial music over the radio, films and fascist songs combined with grandiose military spectacles consisting of stamping soldiers’ boots, a rhythmic swaying of helmets, howls of Heil, were to inject faith that Germany was unconquerable, that her claims to world supremacy were justified.
p Hitler’s brazen behaviour actually covered up apprehensions and cowardice. Tearing down the restrictions set by the Versailles Treaty, the German Government was careful each time to leave itself avenues for hasty retreat. When they realised that resistance would not be forthcoming, however, they grew immeasurably bolder.
p It was with second thoughts, teeth chattering from fear, that Hitler set to remilitarising the Rhine zone in March 1936. It seemed impossible that France would show no sign of outrage over this gross violation of treaty commitments by her dangerous neighbour. Yet the Hitler clique got away with it. "Hitler gazed tensely westward on that day, towards Paris and London. He waited 24 hours, then 48. When no intervention resulted, he breathed a sigh of relief.... He had gambled, and he won,” wrote Otto Dietrich, Hitler’s press chief, in his memoirs. [20•3
p Hitler Germany was more sure of her ground when she intervened in Spain jointly with Italy, and thereafter began preparing new acts of aggression.
21p What lay behind the inactivity of many of the states selected as objects of fascist aggression? There were two motives: firstly, the nazi government had prevailed on many statesmen that its war preparations were aimed “solely” against the Soviet Union and no Western powers were imperilled; secondly, and closely associated with the former, some statesmen thought German aggression advantageous, hoping to share in the spoils with the German monopolies. Take the utterances in the House of Lords in February 1937 of Labourite Sydney Arnold, a figure prominent in the AngloGerman Friendship Society. "If there is another war on the continent,” he said, "and Great Britain stands aside, we are not likely to be in danger if Germany were amongst the victorious Powers or the defeated Powers." [21•1 Replying on behalf of the government, Lord Halifax, then Keeper of the Seal, fell in with this view. [21•2
p Some years after the Second World War, Lyndon Johnson, the Senator who later became US President, admitted: "France could have stopped Hitler when he started into the Saar. France and England combined could have prevented the occupation of Austria or even later stopped the Nazis at Czechoslovakia. The tjnited States, England and France could have prevented the rape of Poland.. .." [21•3
p But nothing of the kind was done.
p Their earliest acts of aggression, committed with impunity, so encouraged the German imperialists that they went ahead with their war preparations. That was in 1937. The General Staff drew up a secret Directive for Unified Preparation for War, circulated among the troops on June 24. "Inasmuch as favourable political opportunities have appeared for Germany,” it said, "the most must be made of them, implying such preparations of the Armed Forces as would enable them to begin the war suddenly... to catch the adversary by surprise and inflict a devastating lightning stroke." [21•4
p Hitler endorsed the main points of the directive at a conference on November 5, 1937. In his three-hour speech he gave an exposition of war variants. "The question for 22 MISSING : 24-26 scanned twice. 23 MISSING : 24-26 scanned twice. 24
p On the other hand, however, the Spanish war showed that in a world engagement invaders are bound to encounter powerful popular resistance. International brigades of antifascists from 54 countries [24•1 fought valiantly in Spain for peace and democracy against fascism. On the sun-scorched Spanish soil a broad international anti-fascist front defended the interests of the Spanish and all the peoples of Europe against the Italo-German troops.
p That explains the hesitant German tactics in the early months of the Spanish war. Seeing this uncertainty, the Western governments decided to prod the nazis to new acts of aggression, for which a series of secret talks and conferences was held in November 1937.
p Halifax conferred with Hitler in Obersalzberg ( Berchtesgaden) on behalf of the British Government and the French cabinet with the same degree of secrecy with Johannes Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris. Besides meeting Eisenlohr Benes even stooped to meeting Gestapo representatives. In San Francisco, too, prominent US industrialists and politicians held a secret conference with German diplomatists.
p The parleys were part of a Western scheme, a secret effort, to engineer a world war. Spokesmen of the Western " democracies" extolled Hitler for his terrorising Germany’s best people and made pompous speeches about Germany’s mission as a "fortress against Bolshevism”. Hinting transparently at an Eastern campaign, Washington, London and Paris urged Hitler to haste in seizing Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
p The US monopolists went the farthest in their secret contacts with the nazis. In San Francisco they agreed that Germany and the United States should co-operate, for the potential markets, China and Russia, cannot be organised without the active collaboration of American capital. [24•2 That was a step toward a negotiated division of the world. However, the actual situation, highlighted by a sharpening of imperialist contradictions, prevented these plans from materialising.
p British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain publicly, encouraged fascist aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia. "I say,” he declared in the House of Commons on 25 February 22, 1938, "we must not try to delude ourselves, and, still more, we must not try to delude small weak nations, into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression." [25•1 For the hitlerites this was tantamount to an assurance that they could go ahead with impunity.
p A week later, on March i, German troops poured into Austria, soon thereafter incorporated in the German Reich. The Anschluss was officially recognised by the British and French governments, which thereby betrayed the national interests of all the European peoples. Austria’s annexation reinforced Germany’s position in Central Europe, enabling it among other things to encircle Czechoslovakia.
p The Soviet Government was the only one to denounce the German aggression and warn against its dangerous implications for peace. The Soviet statement said, in part: ".. .this time the violence has been perpetrated in the centre of Europe and has created an indubitable menace not only for the eleven countries now contiguous with the aggressor, but also for all European states, and not only European ones. So far the menace has been created to the territorial integrity and, in any case, to the political, economic, and cultural independence of the small nations, whose inevitable enslavement will, however, create the premises for pressure, and even for attacks against the large states as well." [25•2
p The Soviet Government urged a discussion of practical measures either in or outside the League of Nations. It urged all governments, especially the big powers, to work together for the "collective salvation of peace". [25•3
p The British Foreign Office, fearing that someone would jump ahead of it, sent a reply signed by a minor official, saying that any discussion of collective measures to prevent the spread of aggression was, of all things, unlikely to have a "favourable effect upon the prospects of European peace." [25•4
The British refusal coincided with those of the US and France. Heedless of the consequences, the West persisted in its disastrous policy of encouraging Hitler. Now, the fate of Czechoslovakia, one more independent state, hung in the balance.
Notes
[17•1] International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol. 7, Nuremberg 1947, p. 152 (further referred to as IMT. Trial...).
[18•1] Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des so. Jahrhunderts, Munchen, 1942, S. 114.
[18•2] In dozens of countries population is denser than in Germany.
[18•3] O. Spengler, Politische Schriften, Miinchen, 1933, S. 124.
[18•4] Volkischer Beobachter, Sept. 13, 1936.
[18•5] Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, Heft I, 1936, S. 10-11.
[18•6] R. Erbe, Die Nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik, Zurich, 1958, S. 25.
[19•1] Istorijia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovietskogo Soyuza (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union), Vol. I, p. 24 (further referred to as I.V.O.V.S.S.).
[19•2] IML, Dokvmenty i materialy Otdela istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Documents and Materials of the Department of the Great Patriotic War), folio 19208, sheet 2207.
[19•3] Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945,’ Bd. i, Darmstadt 1954, S. 25, Bd. a, S. 102.
[20•1] Heinz Guderian, “Kraftfahrkampftruppen”, Militdrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, No. i, 1935, S. 75.
[20•2] A. Muller, Hitlers motorisierte Stossarmee, Paris, 1936, S. 31-32.
[20•3] O. Dietrich, is John mil Hitler, MUnchen, 1955, S. 44-45.
[21•1] Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 104, p. 303.
[21•2] Ibid., pp. 339-54.
[21•3] Congressional Record, Vol. 93, p. 4695.
[21•4] Tsentralnyi ^gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii (Central State Archives of the October Revolution), file 7445, case 1729, pp. 22-25 (further referred to as CSAOR).
[24•1] I.V.O.y\S.S., Vol. i, p. in.
[24•2] Congressional Record, Vol. 88, Part 10. pp. A-3134-35.
[25•1] Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 332, p. 227.
[25•2] Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, Vol. i, Moscow, 1948, pp. 90-91.
[25•3] Ibid.
[25•4] Ibid., p. 92.
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