62

[introduction.]

p K. Ivanov

p A new Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist party was, in effect, formed at the 9th Congress of the CPC in April 1969. This “Congress”, with the glorious name of the Communist Party of China to camouflage it, was used by the Maoists to screen their military-political coup and legalise their usurpation of political and state power. The materials of the “Congress” (the report delivered by Lin Piao and the new "Constitution of the CPC”) show that Mao Tse-tung’s chauvinistic and adventurist views continue to be given out as modern Marxism-Leninism, that the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of the Maoists continues to be called the " dictatorship of the proletariat”, and that their divisive activities and policy of forming and uniting splinter groups of renegades and traitors to the Communist and Workers’ Parties continues to be called "proletarian internationalism”. The Maoists are keeping up their campaigns of slander against the USSR and other socialist countries, which are the decisive force of the contemporary age in the struggle for peace and socialism and comprise the mainstay of the peoples of the world in the liberation struggle against imperialist reaction.

p In the sphere of foreign policy the activities of the Mao group may be qualified as a frenzied ideological and political assault on the world communist movement. As was noted by L. I. Brezhnev at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, "from polemics with the Communist Parties the CPC leaders went on to splitting, subversive activity, to active attempts to set the revolutionary forces of our day against each other. From cutting off their ties with the socialist countries to hostile acts against them. From criticism of peaceful coexistence to the staging of armed conflicts, to a policy undermining the cause of peace”.  [62•*  The adventurism in foreign and domestic policy, the unprincipled bid for hegemony in the communist 63 movement and the unremitting attempts to engineer a clash between socialist countries and bring about a world war between the main socialist and capitalist countries attest to the immense ideological and moral degradation of the Maoist leadership and its transition to a socio-political stand that is fundamentally hostile to communism and socialism. "The facts show,” L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "that the Chinese leadership only speaks of struggle against imperialism while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, in deeds. It helps the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at times of acute international crisis. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union movement, and so on.”  [63•* 

All this is further evidence that Maoism is an extremely reactionary and double-faced variant of petty-bourgeois ideology. Maoism’s real ambitions have nothing in common with the pseudo-Marxist verbiage that it uses as a screen. This is the typical language of the Maoists which they have evolved by paraphrasing indisputable, Marxist propositions and giving a Sinicised slant to Marxist-Leninist formulations quoted at random. These propositions and formulations are given the appearance of sayings similar to the traditional maxims in the Confucian Four Books or in the Five Books of the sages which the Chinese people understand and are familiar with. All this conglomerate is given out as a combination of the general truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In reality this is the practice of petty-bourgeois nationalism, the double-dealing of a chauvinistic ideologist who chooses to understand and interpret Marxism as he sees fit. The policy pursued by the Maoists cannot be regarded as accidental or as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. Essentially, it represents "a large-scale attack on the world communist and working-class movement, ... on our world outlook, on Marxism-Leninism”.  [63•** 

64

I

p There is a definite logic in the ideological evolution of Maoism. In this article we shall examine some aspects of this evolution.

p The Great-Power chauvinism is theoretically substantiated in the philosophical discourses of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters.

p For instance, in 1964 the Maoists organised a broad philosophical discussion of the concept of "split unity”. They claimed that Mao Tse-tung’s "great contribution" was in allegedly being the first to apply the "dialectics of the split unity" to the solution of major political problems. For the Mao group the essence of this “dialectics” boils down to a “philosophical” justification of its divisive policies. For example, an editorial carried jointly on February 4, 1964 by Jenmin Jihpao and Hungchi states that all things tend to split and that, therefore, the split in the contemporary international working-class movement is inevitable, that it is “normal” and even “useful”. All who speak of the unity of opposites and "the merging of two beginnings" are accused of revisionism and of "siding with the Soviet revisionists”.

p Moreover, it is quite evident that in analysing the contemporary international situation and in the question of the main and leading force of the anti-imperialist struggle, in particular, Mao Tse-tung and his group subjectively and pragmatically apply the dialectics of the principal and the non-principal contradictions, arbitrarily determining what is principal and what is non-principal.

p Along with Marxist propositions borrowed mainly from the popular Soviet literature of the 1930s, the philosophical works of Mao Tse-tung contain a series of anti-scientific, mechanistical arguments. For example, in the work entitled On Contradiction he examines the law of unity and struggle of opposites not as a law of development by virtue of inner contradictions but as a simple combination of pairs of externally opposite sides (above and below, difficulty and facility, misfortune and good fortune, and so on) and their change relative to each other.

p This metaphysical, anti-Marxist understanding of the law of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably brings him round to rejecting this key law of materialist dialectics in 65 favour of the theory of equilibrium. He wrote, for example: "In our country we annually draw up an economic development plan and establish the corresponding proportions between accumulation and consumption. This equilibrium is a temporary and relative unity of opposites. A year passes and, generally speaking, this equilibrium is upset by the struggle of opposites, this unity changes and equilibrium gives way to disequilibrium, unity ceases to be unity, and in the next year we have again to strive for equilibrium and unity.. . In this connection, subjective regulation sometimes does not conform to objective reality, contradictions arise and the equilibrium is lost. This is called making a mistake. Contradictions continuously arise and are continuously settled, and this is precisely the dialectical law of the development of things and phenomena.”  [65•* 

p The theory of equilibrium is thus given out for materialist dialectics and serves the Mao group as a means of justifying the failures and setbacks of its economic policy.

p A specific of Mao Tse-tung’s method is his abstract approach to all the key categories of Marxist philosophy. This approach serves the definite pragmatic purpose of substantiating and justifying the Mao group’s adventurist policies. Further evidence of this is to be found in Mao Tse-tung’s On Practice.

p In this work it is asserted over and over again that the "viewpoint of practice is the first and basic viewpoint in the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism”, that it is necessary to "discover truth through practice, and through practice to verify and develop truth”, and so on. However, under cover of Marxist phrases of this kind, he completely strips the concepts “practice” and “truth” of their materialist content. In his interpretation of practice, the materialist essence of the Marxist theory of knowledge—"the recognition of the external world and the reflection thereof in the minds of men"  [65•** —disappears. Mao Tse-tung does not, of course, reject this materialist principle either. He writes, for instance: "If man wants to achieve success in his work.. . he must make his thoughts correspond to the laws of the objective world surrounding him; if they do not correspond, 66 he will fail in practice.”  [66•*  But he regards the objective external world with all its laws abstractly as a "clean sheet of paper" designed for the voluntaristic “creativity” of the most “brilliant” subject himself. He views the Chinese people as such a "clean sheet of paper" on which the "newest and most beautiful pictures" may be drawn.

p Inasmuch as “practice” interpreted in this manner is at variance with the real practice of Mao Tse-tung and with the theory officially proclaimed by him, it naturally loses its basic quality, that of being the criterion of truth. Hence Mao Tse-tung’s pragmatic conclusion that only what leads to success is correct, and what leads to failure is wrong and erroneous.

p Further, by metaphysically counterposing rational knowledge to sensuous perception, and theory to practice, and linking practice solely with sensuous perception, Mao Tsetung deprives practice of its rational character and rules out the possibility of its scientific (non-voluntaristic) development.

p This metaphysical interpretation of these two degrees of knowledge, as a result of which practice is given an irrational character, serves Mao Tse-tung as the point of departure for substantiating voluntarism. This was the " philosophical foundation" for slogans such as "politics are the commanding force" and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung is a powerful spiritual atomic bomb”.

p Mao Tse-tung’s philosophical views are thus incompatible with either truth or science, because by coming into contact with one or the other the "absolute authority of the great helmsman" risks bursting like a soap bubble. That is why the Maoists pathologically fear scientific knowledge, trample it into the dust, destroy the cultural heritage, massacre intellectuals and pursue a policy designed to stupefy the people.

p Inasmuch as truth and science are alien to Maoism, it sees its only salvation in sophistry, the constant travelling companion of subjective idealism and voluntarism.

p For the Maoists sophistry is a particularly acceptable means of disguising the substance of their reactionary, idealistic views and of distorting facts through subterfuges camouflaged by externally “wise” reasoning.

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p It must be noted that the sophistry of the Maoists has its roots in the idealistic philosophy of Ancient China. It noticeably manifests itself in Confucius, who in the chronicle Springs and Autumns arbitrarily characterised and nicknamed the political leaders of his day in order to compel people to submit to the despotism of the ancestral nobility, so that "the rebels and crafty people among the royal servants trembled with fear" (Mencius, Collected Works, Chapter Ten Wen-kung, Chinese ed.). This sort of sophistry was further developed by Huai Shih and Kung Sun-lung (4th-3rd century B.C.). They preached that all concepts of things are established by man and are of a relative nature: "A dog may be called a ram”, "a white dog may be called black”.  [67•* 

p With the same lack of restraint the Maoists slap insulting labels like "servitors of imperialism" and "modern revisionists" on leaders of the communist movement and on entire parties. The naive demagogy of the Maoists, who call imperialism a "paper tiger”, originates from the same source.

p What is the reason for the scholastic nature of the Maoist “philosophy” and for its hostile attitude to science and truth? The explanation, we believe, is to be found in nationalist narrowness, which was cultivated over the course of many centuries by the ruling classes of feudal China. Their standpoint was that nothing foreign merited attention because China was the "summit of world civilisation”. This nationalist understanding of spiritual culture could not help but profoundly influence the various social strata of present-day China; it has unquestionably influenced Maoism. It is not surprising, therefore, that while claiming to being the " absolute authority" in all the problems of the world and to being the "ultimate judges”, Mao Tse-tung and his group ignore the experience of the communist movement in other countries and flout collectively worked out decisions on basic problems of the tactics and strategy of the communist movement at the present stage. Nor is it surprising that Mao Tse-tung’s philosophical views took shape in isolation from the main line in the development of philosophical thought, 68 which has absorbed all of the world’s achievements in the natural science and in philosophical thinking. The "summit of world Marxist philosophy”, as Chinese propaganda calls the views of Mao Tse-tung, thus stands on the sand of the solitary Chinese island.

This “island”, which Mao Tse-tung is using as a springboard for his "philosophical take-off”, has been specially prepared by him and deliberately purged of the materialist, progressive and democratic ideas accumulated by Chinese society. Borrowing and successiveness are highly typical of Maoism. The Maoists choose to include in their ideological arsenal not the wealth of materialist and democratic traditions of Chinese philosophy but the debris of reactionary ideologies and conservative elements of the most diverse ideological trends in Chinese history, and they are adapting these debris to justify their ideological and political platform.

II

p The history of Chinese thought is rich in materialist and democratic traditions. By criticising idealism and mysticism, the ancient Chinese materialists helped to promote scientific knowledge and social progress. They were opposed to subjectivism and anarchy both in the process of knowledge and in the settlement of socio-political and ethical problems, demanding that things should be understood as they were "without adding anything to them or subtracting anything from them”.  [68•*  While respecting the finest traditions of the past, they constantly put forward new ideas aimed at "mastering things”. Many of them sided with the humiliated and the oppressed and condemned social injustice and the despotism of the ruling nobility. By acting in the interests of historical progress and spreading some democratic ideas they shook the foundations on which the ancestor cult and the cult of kings and emperors rested.

p All these progressive traditions of ancient Chinese philosophy were further developed in the works of Wang Chung, Fan Chen, Chang Tsai, Fan Yi-chih, Wang Chuanshan, Tai Chen, Tan Ssu-tung and many other eminent 69 materialist philosophers, who levelled scathing and wellargumented criticism at Confucianist idealism, Buddhist and Taoist scholasticism and the ethical-political doctrines of the ideologists of Chinese feudalism. These traditions provided the ideological foundation for the democratic and patriotic teaching of Sun Yat-sen, who, after the October Socialist Revolution, formulated the three cardinal principles underlying the struggle of the Chinese people for national and social liberation. These principles were: "Alliance with Soviet Russia; alliance with the Communists; support of the workers and peasants.” These same principles were the bedrock of the Marxist-Leninist line charted by Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po and their comrades-in-arms in the CPC.

p The materialist, democratic and patriotic traditions of Chinese thought clash with the spirit of Maoism and undermine its foundations. This is admitted even by the Maoists. For instance, they write that the progressive traditions of the past might "eclipse the light of the thought of Mao Tsetung" and "paralyse the feeling of love for Chairman Mao and his works" (Chungkuo Chingnien Pao, August 6, 1966). Small wonder, therefore, that the anti-popular, idealistic line in the spiritual traditions of China and primarily the reactionary trend in Confucianism were used as the principal ideological mainspring of Maoism.

p A few preliminary remarks must be made regarding the influence of Confucianism on Maoism.

p Like the teaching of Confucius (6th-5th century B.C.), Confucianism as a whole is extremely complex. Confucius was one of Ancient China’s greatest scholars and the custodian of her cultural values. The private school founded by him was the initial stage of the formation and development of the system of education and schools. There are many rational ideas in Confucius’s teaching. However, he was an ardent champion of the interests and privileges of the hereditary clan nobility, which in his day was in the throes of disintegration and decline as a result of the emergence of private ownership and the development of exchange. All his thoughts and activity were directed towards restoring the outworn socio-political system of the early period of the Chou dynasty (2nd-1st millennium B.C.).

p Even in the ancient period of development of Confucianism a materialist trend (Hsun Tzu) came into being alongside the 70 established idealistic trend (Mericius). In the Middle Ages, at least in the period when the feudal system took shape and gained strength (4th-7th century), Confucianism played a certain progressive role when it opposed the domination of Buddhism in all spheres of the country’s socio-political and cultural life. Materialist and democratic trends are clearly traceable in the theories propounded by some exponents of Confucianism (Han Yu, Chang Tsai and others).

p When we speak of Confucianism as an ideological mainspring of Maoism, we have in mind its principal trend, namely, the leading trend in the ideology and policy of feudalism, which predominated in China for many centuries.

p First, let us note what the Mao cult has externally in common with the cult of Confucius. The image of Mao Tse-tung as the "brightest sun" stems directly from the traditional image of Confucius as a "divine deity" by whose will state administration is implemented and under the “rays” of whose ideas life flourishes on earth.

p In line with this interpretation of Confucius, the agents of the Kuomintang reaction proclaimed Confucianism as the "ideological foundation" of human progress and prosperity, and prophesied that in one way or another all the nations of the world would ultimately follow the road charted by Confucius. Today the cult of Mao Tse-tung, of the "brightest sun”, must show the peoples the road to a better life.

p The Mao cult fulfils the same functions as Confucianism —the cultivation of submissiveness and blind obedience. This aim is served by jen (“philanthropy”, “humanism”), which is the central category of the Confucius teaching, and by the co-related concepts of chung (“fidelity to the lord”), yi (“duty”) and others. Confucius and his followers paid particular attention to the concept hsiao (“filial piety”) in the belief that "those who revere their parents and respect their elders rarely fail to obey their superiors”.  [70•*  Commenting on patriarchal traditions and popular customs in their own way, the Confucianists thus used them to educate people in the spirit of blind obedience to the ruling nobility. This Confucianist method is now widely used by the Maoists to educate the hungweiping fanatics.

71

p The cult of Mao and the cult of Confucianism have a common ideological foundation—dogmatism and subjectivism.

p Even the way Maoism is propagated, for example, the memorising of quotations from the works of Mao Tse-tung, is reminiscent of medieval Confucianist education. In feudal times, the Confucianist teaching, expounded in the Four Books and the Five Books as a dogma was learned by heart at all schools. Every pupil had to memorise numerous dicta of Confucius and his disciples, usually without understanding their meaning. “Scientists” who had memorised these dicta became eligible for office in the government. This practice, cultivated by the feudal nobility in the course of many centuries, became a "national tradition”, which in China today is the main form of propagating the "Sinicised Marxism" of Mao Tse-tung. These medieval methods of bringing up Confucianist fanatics and devoted servitors of the feudal nobility are today used to bring up mechanical “cogs” blindly fulfilling the will of Mao Tse-tung and his group.

p Like medieval Confucianism, the dogmatism of the Mao group suppresses initiative and turns man into a fanatic executor of the will of the ruling clique, depriving him of reason and knowledge. This is bluntly put by the Maoist fanatics, who say: "We do not need brains—our minds are armed with the thought of Mao.”

p Confucianist dogmatism demands the unconditional observance of patriarchal-clan traditions. Confucius held that Heaven’s will was embodied in the traditions established by ancestors—the wise rulers of ancient times. He classified these traditions under the heading li (“ceremony”, “etiquette”) and insisted that they were sacrosanct.

p The only difference between the dogmatism of Mao Tsetung and Confucianism is that in line with the spirit of the times he does not refer to Heaven’s will and ancestors. Maoism can afford to dispense with "celestial volition" and ancestors (“wise rulers of ancient times”) because Mao Tsetung’s supporters have long ago turned him into a "living deity" and, as Maoist propaganda maintains, all the wisdom accumulated by mankind is concentrated in Mao Tse-tung.

p Confucius asserted that in the Celestial Empire the life of people depended entirely on wise rulers. The rulers, he 72 said, were like the wind, and their subjects were like the grass: the grass bent in the direction the wind blew. 11 rulers governed wisely, the people "would work without a murmur”.  [72•*  "Ordinary people,” he said, should not reason over the affairs of state, and they had "to be made to follow obediently and should not be allowed to know everything”.  [72•** 

p The subjectivist idealistic views of Confucius were enlarged on by his disciple Mencius (5th-4th century B.C.).

p Subsequently, in combination with the Buddhist intuitionism of the Chan sect and passing through several stages of development the subjectivist idealistic doctrines of Confucius and Mencius evolved into a system in the teaching of the leading neo-Confucianist Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528 or 1529). Wang Yang-ming held: "No things and no laws governing them exist outside my reasoning" and "the essence of all things is the product of my reasoning.”  [72•***  He himself maintained that the cardinal aim of his teaching was "to cleanse the hearts of men of all vestiges of egoistic ambition”.  [72•****  In other words, man must meekly endure all privations and any oppression, and blindly obey the powers that be.

p Neo-Confucianist subjective idealism quite naturally became the ideological source of the Mao group’s adventurist and nationalistic views. It is not difficult to see the direct link between Wang Yang-ming’s declaration that "things are the product of my reasoning" and the arbitrary determination of the country’s development, the striving to speed up history and the reluctance to abide by the laws of economic and social development.

p Even phenomena like the Maoists’ rejection of the importance of material incentives and their absolutisation of the factor of political influence over the masses spring directly from Chu Hsi’s (1130-1200) neo-Confucianist theory that the nature of man is dual. According to this theory there are two origins in things: li (“law”, “order”) as the reasonable creative force, and chi (“air”, “ether”) as the passive matter. In man the first origin gives rise to the 73 positive quality of striving to do good, and the second to the negative quality of succumbing to sense temptations. Chu Hsi’s doctrine was that while developing his intrinsic desire to do good man had to curb his aspiration for material benefits. He regarded education in the Confucianist spirit as the decisive factor, holding that the purpose of such education was to preserve and strengthen the heaven-endowed good beginning in man and check his “whims”, "his egoistical aspirations”, in other words, to curb man’s desire to satisfy his requirements.

p Chu Hsi’s theory of man and the views of the Maoists have one and the same ideological foundation—the absolutisation of the role of education and disregard of the need to satisfy man’s material requirements. The sole difference is that while Chu Hsi’s theory pursued the object of serving the interests of the feudal nobility, Maoism justifies the adventurist and nationalistic policies of Mao Tse-tung and his followers.

p When we speak of the ideological mainsprings of Maoism it would be wrong to confine ourselves to a comparison between it and Confucianism without mentioning other trends in the history of Chinese thought, for example, Legalism and Taoism, from which the Maoists borrowed some elements to substantiate the "Sinicisation of Marxism”. Every materialist and progressive ideological trend in history has had its negative aspects and historical limitations. The Maoists adopted these negative elements and adapted them to their own ends.

p Lao Tzu’s materialist teaching of Tao, of the natural way of things, was used by the Legalists (Han Fei and others) as the basis for what in those days were progressive sociological views and to put forward a clear political programme of struggle for the eradication of survivals of the patriarchalclan system, the elimination of inter-state partitions which hampered the country’s economic development, and the creation of a centralised, united Chinese state. They believed that the basic means of putting this programme into effect were the establishment of a legislative body, the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the hereditary nobility, the enhancement of imperial authority in all spheres of the country’s political and economic life, the conversion of the rural commune from the owner of the land to a self- 74 governing association of free landowners, the encouragement of agriculture as the main vehicle for building up the state’s economic might, the intensification of the state’s coercive functions towards its subjects, the improvement of military art and the conduct of wars of aggrandizement.

p The Legalists held the view that if the state could concentrate all the efforts of the people on agriculture and war over a long period of time it would grow powerful and ultimately win world domination. Shang Yang, a prominent Legalist, is credited with saying that "those who learn to fight will pass through the gates of war to wealth and eminence, and those who are obstinate and disobedient must be punished without mercy”, and then "everybody will say: the main thing is war, nothing else”.  [74•* 

p In domestic policy the Legalists accentuated the punitive function of the state, and in foreign policy they highlighted offensive wars. This was demanded by the historical development of Chinese society in those remote times.

p A fierce ideological and political struggle raged between Legalism and Confucianism in the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. Confucianism was defeated utterly. At the next stage, towards the end of the 2nd century B.C., when the Chinese state was in the main united as the Han Empire, its coercive function receded into the background, giving way to education and to ideological and moral influences. Under these conditions the Confucianists gained the upper hand over their ideological rivals from the Legalist camp. Legalism gradually disappeared from the historical scene and Confucianism won recognition as the official state ideology. However, the Confucianists who took over the administration of the centralised Han state had to incorporate in their teaching of "humane administration" the Legalist idea that the state had to pursue its coercive function through legislation.

p From this period onwards the political doctrine of Confucianism, which subsequently became the predominant ideology of Chinese feudalism, incorporated two elements: the concept of the “humane” function of the state and its punitive function. In different periods of medieval China, depending on the specific historical situation, these aspects 75 gained in prominence, alternately. However, the punitive function of the state, which the Legalists had earlier applied solely to crush the resistance of conservative social forces to social progress, was now directed mainly against insurgent peasants and the anti-feudal opposition and implemented in the wars of aggrandizement against neighbouring tribes and peoples.

p Today the coercive function of the state, conceived by the Legalists as a means of achieving historical progress, and the ideas of compulsion directed against the people in their Confucianist interpretation are used by the Maoists for their anti-socialist line in domestic policy and for their adventurist, chauvinistic line in foreign policy. This aggressive foreign policy is spearheaded chiefly at the Soviet Union, which has contributed so much to the victory of the Chinese revolution and towards the establishment of socialism in China.

p The chauvinistic and adventurist aspirations of Maoism are thus nourished not only by the feudal Confucianist ideology but also by earlier progressive but subsequently modified ideas of the ancient Chinese Legalists. Further evidence of this is the almost total coincidence of the arguments of the Maoists and those of the ancient Chinese Legalists about war as the only way to settle all socio-political problems. Their only difference is that the Maoists regard war as the sole universal means of bringing their reactionary hegemonistic designs to fruition, while for the Legalists war was a potent means of fighting for social progress.

p Moreover, the most diverse reactionary elements of the different trends in China’s history are being concentrated as ideological weapons in the Maoist arsenal. Take, for instance, the Maoist policy of stupefying the people, a policy whose roots go deep into antiquity and which was pursued in one way or another by Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism.

p Yu min chenchieh or "policy of stupefying the people" was pursued by Confucianism in ancient times with the aim of giving the hereditary clan nobility influence over the people and upholding the patriarchal-clan traditions of ancestors. Taoism and Legalism put forward the idea of stupefying the people as a reaction to the spread of Confucianist ideas. The exponents of Taoism believed that the Confucianist social-ethical teaching was corrupting the people, 76 leading to rebellion and upsetting the natural way of life. Lao Tzu, for instance, called the Confucianist ethical-moral teaching a "great hypocrisy”. The Legalists argued that if the ethical ideas of Confucianism became widespread the "ruler would be unable to force (the people) to fight and the state would inescapably be dismembered and would ultimately perish”.  [76•* 

The Maoists borrowed from the experience accumulated by the ruling classes of the past and created a developed system of manipulating individuals and masses. Their policy of stupefying the people is directed towards blocking the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the country and halting the growth of socialist consciousness among the working people by fanning nationalistic passions and propagating antiSovietism. This policy is facilitated by the people’s total isolation from the outside world and by the veil of secrecy over the actions of the leadership and over what is happening in the country.

III

p In ancient Chinese thought there are two distinct lines: the line of Lao Tzu and the line of Confucius. Their teachings differ on all the basic problems of philosophy and ideology.

p Feudal Confucian traditions were glorified in Chinese literature in the course of many centuries, while heretic ideological trends, Taoism above all, were distorted and disparaged. This Confucianist approach to the history of Chinese thought is kept alive by bourgeois scholars in China herself and in the West, particularly in the USA. The Maoists have given this line a specific form.

p While verbally dissociating themselves from Confucianism, the Maoists in fact give scholars, chiefly of the old school, every possibility of nourishing the traditional line of lauding Confucianism in a new way. For example, Feng Yu-lan asserts that all the basic ideas of Confucius in their “pure”, "abstract form" must be applied in the period of socialist construction, too.  [76•**  Kuo Mo-jo has gone even farther than 77 that. Characterising Confucius as a “materialist” and “ revolutionary”  [77•*  and identifying his teaching with Marxism, he holds that compared with Confucius Marx produced nothing new.  [77•**  Chu Chien-chi, professor at Peking University, has drawn a far-reaching conclusion from this, declaring that Confucius was the founder of Chinese philosophy and that the philosophy evolved by him had a much greater impact on 18th century European philosophy than the philosophy of Ancient Greece. He writes that the influence of Chinese philosophy in Europe "was embodied, on the one hand, in French materialist philosophy and, on the other, in German idealistic dialectics”.  [77•***  Thus, according to Chu Chien-chi, Confucianist philosophy, which had glorified feudalism in China in the course of many centuries, is the ancient source of Marxism.

p The Maoists, for their part, in pursuance of their own special brand of Confucianism in their interpretation of the history of Chinese thought, savagely attack the ideological adversaries of Confucianism, chiefly Lao Tzu and Chuangtzu. For instance, in the works of Kuan Feng, who was a member of the "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs”, the Tao of Lao Tzu are proclaimed the "absolute spirit”, while the teachings of Chuang-tzu are described as the "most reactionary nihilism”.  [77•****  The reason for this attitude of the Maoists to outstanding ancient scholars is that the latter’s materialist ideas and scathing criticism of social injustice have become topical in the light of the Mao Tse-tung’s adventurist policy. It is enough to quote the words of Chuang-tzu addressed to Confucius:

p “You are sowing lies, spreading slander and imprudently lauding the (kings) Beautiful and Warlike. . .. You speak too much of erroneous teaching; you do not till the soil yet you eat; you do not weave yet you clothe your body. Smacking your lips and thrashing with your tongue, (you) by your 78 own arbitrary choice decide what is true and what is a He in order to mislead the rulers of the Celestial Kingdom and keep its sages from their labours. In your imprudence you have invented filial piety and fraternal obedience, and you are soliciting success from the rulers, from the rich arid the noble. Your crimes are grave.”  [78•* 

p Naturally, words of this sort could not fail to arouse the anger of the Maoists. That is why, long before the "great cultural revolution”, they took up arms against the progressive philosophers of the past.

p Thus, two seemingly conflicting lines—the line of Maoism and the line of anti-communism—converge not only on problems of contemporary international politics but also in the approach to the cultural traditions of China.

Voprosy filosofii, No. 7, 1969, pp. 40-50