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PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW
[1]Introduction by V. A. Krivtsov
__COMPILER__ Compiled by V. F. FeoktistovMAOH3M BE3 MACKH
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__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 1972A point strongly made at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June 1969 was that every effort had to be bent to counteract Right- and Left-opportunist distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory and policy and to combat revisionism, dogmatism and Left-sectarian adventurism. Many of the speakers noted that today opportunism and adventurism were most strikingly in evidence in the policy of the present Chinese leadership. In particular, they underscored the harm and danger of the Maoists' divisive activities, chauvinism and anti-Sovietism.
The political and ideological make-up of Maoism has gone through several stages-,determined by the development of the Chinese revolution and the struggle that is going on in the Communist Party of China between the MarxistLeninist internationalists, on the one hand, and the nationalists and opportunists, on the other. A specific of Maoism's evolution is that being a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic, revisionist doctrine and increasingly departing from MarxismLeninism, it has made constant use of Marxism-Leninism as a screen. At first it was given out as Sinicised Marxism allegedly representing the integration of Marxism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, and then as a new and higher phase of the development of Marxism-Leninism as a whole.
In other words, Maoism has used this great teaching, as a cover in order to exploit its prestige, deal it a blow, discredit it and gradually replace it with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', first in China and then throughout the world. While screening the opportunist substance of his views with Marxist-Leninist terminology Mao Tse-tung has made statements such as "Leninism is inacceptable to China'', "the road for China has been charted not by Leninism but by Maoism'', "everybody, including the Russians, will recognise Maoism five or seven years after the Chinese revolution" and so on.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ M. Altaisky and V. Georgiyev, = Anti-Marxist Substance of Mao Tse-tung's Philosophical Tenets, Mysl Publishers, Russ. cd., Moscow, 1969, p. 17.
5Mao Tse-tung gave a deep insight into his political views and objectives when he was interviewed by the American journalist Forman in 1944. Speaking of China's future, he said: "We shall differ"from the USSR economically. And we shall differ from the USSR politically, too. We by no means want to establish a policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact, we welcome free competition and private enterprise, and we shall allow and welcome, on a basis of mutual agreement, foreign investment in trade and industry in the areas under our control.. .. We welcome foreigners and foreign capital in China. As regards government, we shall differ from the USSR in that respect, too... . Our democratic government will include landowners, merchants, capitalists, bourgeoisie, peasants and workers.''^^*^^
Statements of this kind might have been interpreted as having been dictated by purely tactical considerations, but developments over the past decade have shown that this was not simply tactics. The Maoists' hopes of enlisting United States assistance in 1945 were not justified. The USA continued their assistance to the Kuomintang and for some time the Maoists abandoned their flirtation with the US imperialists.
In a short introduction it is not possible to show what the real views of the Maoists have been and how they have been camouflaged at every stage, but it is necessary to examine Maoism at its new stage, which began with the socalled 9th Congress of the CPC in April 1969. Our objective is to expose what lies behind the definition, given in the new CPC Constitution adopted at that Congress, that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is the "Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism is moving to its total downfall, and socialism---to victory throughout the world''.
An analysis of Maoism's evolution gives us grounds for asserting that this evolution has been marked by a steady intensification of elements of nationalism, which in the views and political actions of the Maoists grew from worship of China's specific, from Sinicentrism, into Great-Han chauvinism, racialism and anti-Sovietism. The 9th Congress was a major landmark in this long nationalistic transformation of Maoism, for it gave final shape to the Maoist claims to _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung Yinghsiang (Impressions of Mao Tsc-liing), 1945, pp. 9-10.
6 world domination, which Mao Tse-tung and his entourage have been hoping to secure through a world war. That explains why they are maintaining that a world war is inevitable, calling on the Chinese people to prepare for war and elemental calamities, militarising China and speeding up the development of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.China is being turned into an armed camp and the people are being accustomed to the idea that war will break out in the near future.
For tactical considerations the Maoists continue to use Leftist phrases as a means of camouflaging their Great-Han annexationist designs, but a comparison of what was allegorically stated at the Congress and mirrored in its documents with what Chinese post-Congress propaganda is saying for home consumption clearly shows what really lies behind the hegemonistic aims of the Maoists. Of the propaganda material being spread by the Maoists in China, attention is attracted particularly by an article lauding and glorifying war carried in the newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao on May 14, 1969. "The proletariat,'' this article states, "cannot achieve final victory throughout the world without war.'' In present-day China Mao Tse-tung's supporters are called the ``proletariat''. This gives the above quotation from Chiehfangchun Pao a pronounced hegemonistic meaning, and it is interpreted as such by the Chinese reader to whom the article is addressed. "A new China has emerged,'' the article goes on to say, "and a new world is bound to appear'', i.e., a world, we may add, modelled on the China of Mao Tse-tung.
This lays bare the true meaning of the definition which the CPC Constitution gives of the ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung. By declaring that this ``thought'' is "the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism is moving to its total downfall, and socialism---to victory throughout the world'', the Maoists are in fact asserting that the present epoch will witness the establishment of Chinese domination over the entire world because they include the USSR and other socialist countries in the concept ``imperialism'', and by ``socialism'' they mean only China. The 9th Congress of the CPC has thus given a totally new definition of Maoism. First, it stated bluntly that Maoism is no longer confined to the 7 boundaries of China but claims world-wide significance and, second, divulged that the Maoists have set their sights on winning world-wide domination.
Of course, the claims of Mao Tse-tung and his sycophants to world supremacy are very much reminiscent of the dreams which the Chinese bourgeoisie and its ideologists nursed at the turn of the century. It would be appropriate to recall the words of Liang Chi-chao, whose ideas fascinated Mao Tse-tung early in his career: "There is one great cause to which our ancestors devoted all their strength continuously for five thousand years. ... What is this cause? I call it the cause of extending the Chinese nation. Originally our Chinese nation consisted only of a few small tribes inhabiting Shantung and Honan. In the course of thousands of years they gradually grew and developed into a great nation, which created a vast and grand empire. They grew along two channels. The first was through the assimilation of the countless nationalities inside and outside our borders. The second was through the steady migration of the people of our nation to the frontiers and the extension of territory.... History has been moving along these channels for five thousand years.''^^*^^ The frankly expansionist views of Liang Chichao and his ilk are being enlarged on in China today by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, who are, in effect, preaching the further "extension of the Chinese nation" and, in line with this preaching, making territorial claims on the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic, India and other countries. As distinct from the Chinese bourgeoisie, which stated its predatory plans openly, the Maoists have donned the toga of revolutionaries and promise to deliver the peoples "from exploitation of man by man'', and so forth.
However, this masquerade is divested of its colour as soon as we compare what the Maoists say with the political line pursued by them in China and on the international scene.
Since 1958, when Mao Tse-tung and his supporters managed to revise the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress on the further building of socialism and impose the notorious adventurist "three red banners" policy on the country, the elements of socialism created by the CPC and the Chinese people in the course of the first seven years after the _-_-_
^^*^^ Tsui Chin Chih Wu Shih Chi, Shanghai, 1922.
8 proclamation of the People's Republic of China 4iave been gradually eradicated. The Maoists' "big leap" and "people's communes" were a heavy blow to the Chinese economy and held up the building of socialism, while during the " cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung and his supporters struck mainly at the socialist gains in the superstructure. They shook and weakened the basis on which this superstructure was erected. This patently exposed them as an anti-socialist force and showed that what they want is not socialism and the welfare of the Chinese people but international hegemony. Further evidence in support of this conclusion was provided by the 9th Congress of the CPC. It did not produce any constructive programme for socialist construction in China, only repeating the "big leap" and other ideas of Mao Tse-tung which have been cast overboard by life. The main task set by it was not the development of the productive forces (after the Congress the very idea of developing the productive forces was branded reactionary) but the intensification of the "class struggle'', which the Maoists regard as the prime motive force of present-day China's development.The Congress endorsed the revolutionary committees as the principal organs of political power instead of the statutory Party and constitutional state bodies. Set up during the "cultural revolution'', these revolutionary committees are the instruments of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters. The army was named by the Congress as the "main component of the state''. That is why the military play the first fiddle in the party committees now being set up.
At the Congress, to discourage anybody from aspiring to complete the building of socialism in China (the general line of the CPC, recorded in documents published in 1953, envisaged the building of socialism in China within a period of 15 years), the Maoists declared that "final victory in a given socialist country not only requires the effort of the proletariat and other strata of the population of that country but depends on the triumph of the world revolution''. However, inasmuch as the Maoists maintain that the world revolution depends directly on a world war, it follows that socialist construction can be completed only as a result of a world war. Consequently, at the present stage the 9 principal aim of the Chinese leadership is not socialism but a world war, and their only purpose for mentioning the "world revolution" is to veil their Great-Han, chauvinistic policies and make the peoples believe that in driving towards war they are pursuing a revolutionary objective.
Another specific of Maoism's current evolution is that antiSovietism has been raised to the level of official policy. Evidence of this is that at the 9th Congress the struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community was proclaimed as one of the tasks of the new Maoist party. As a matter of fact, this has its own logic. After the appalling economic and political setbacks provoked by the attempts to prove that Maoism is a viable teaching, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters can no longer exist without anti-Sovietism, which they use in an effort to justify their disastrous policies in the eyes of the Chinese people. Moreover, they need anti-Sovietism in order to divert the attention of the Chinese people from the colossal difficulties and privation which they encounter day after day because the Maoists are sacrificing the interests of socialism to their Great-Power ambitions. The Maoists count on using anti-Sovietism to whip up chauvinistic passions and thereby unite the Chinese people round themselves and end the split caused in the nation by the internecine strife precipitated by the "cultural revolution''.
Lastly, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters need antiSovietism as a means of enlisting the backing and assistance of the capitalist countries for their fight against world socialism.
We have already seen that in 1945 the Maoists had no aversion to stretching out their hands for a sop from imperialism. But at the time they could not pay back with antiSovietism because they needed Soviet assistance. Today they receive bounties from the imperialist powers and are paying with betrayal of socialism and with anti-Sovietism.
All the facts indicate that from a nationalistic and opportunist deviation in the world revolutionary movement Maoism has become a Great-Han, anti-communist and antiSoviet trend jeopardising the world revolutionary process and the cause of democracy, socialism, progress and peace. Tt is steadily turning into a militaristic, geopolitical system of views serving a bureaucratic group that has isolated itself 10 from the people and aspires to impose its will on all mankind.
The articles in this volume will help the reader to understand what brought Maoism to the present stage.
The book is divided into three parts. The first analyses the ideological sources of Maoism and examines Mao Tsetung's views on a number of key problems of dialectical and historical materialism. The second reviews Maoism's economic policies and shows that the guidelines of these policies are totally untenable. The third exposes the anti-socialist activities of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters on the international scene and assesses their adventurist foreign policy and subversive divisive activities in the world revolutionary and national liberation movements.
In the broad historical sense Maoism has no future because it is anti-scientific, anti-historical and cut off from reality. But this is precisely what makes it so dangerous today. Its subjectivism and voluntarism have time and again given rise to adventurism in domestic and foreign policy. While getting entangled more and more deeply in its own contradictions, Maoism is still capable of inflicting enormous harm.
As L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, noted in his report Lenin's Cause Lives on and Triumphs to the joint sitting of the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR held in commemoration of the centenary of Lenin's birth, "practice shows that nothing good comes of a departure from socialist internationalism, from its replacement by nationalism and chauvinism. Such a policy, naturally, does not conform either to the interests of the world socialist system as a whole, or to the interests of the revolutionary process throughout the world. ... By their actions against the country of Lenin and against the world communist movement the initiators of this campaign expose themselves before the masses as apostates of the revolutionary cause of Lenin''.^^*^^
The Maoists are increasingly isolating themselves not only from the international communist and working-class movement but also from the Chinese people. Their views and actions have nothing in common with the aspirations of _-_-_
^^*^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Lenin s Cause Lives on and Triumphs, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1970, pp. 50--51.
11 genuine Chinese Communists or of the Chinese people as a whole. The time will unquestionably come when China will return to the road of socialist construction, progress and socialist internationalism.V. Krivtsov
[12] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Part I __ALPHA_LVL1__ A CriticismP. Fedoseyev
[13] ~ [14] __NOTE__ LVL2 moved back under LVL1.A powerful impetus was given to the national liberation movement throughout the world by the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism at the hands of the Soviet Union and other freedom-loving countries.
Led by the Communist Party, the Chinese people accomplished a great national liberation and people's democratic revolutio'n in an unremitting struggle against the imperialists and internal reactionary forces. The Communist Party of China and its leaders stirred the popular masses to action for national and social emancipation. This led to the defeat of the counter-revolutionary forces headed by Chiang Kaishek and the United States imperialists. The successful outcome of the national liberation, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggle enabled the Chinese people to go over to the socialist stage of the revolution under the direction of the Communist Party.
In the Soviet Union and all other countries the working people warmly welcomed the victory of the Chinese people and constantly rendered them all possible assistance. The Communist Party of China enjoyed enormous prestige and respect in the world communist movement.
Today a group of Chinese leaders headed by Mao Tsetung are baiting and persecuting most of the Party executives and cadres who bore the brunt of the revolutionary work during the liberation struggle and the years of socialist construction. The supporters of this group are attacking the vital interests of the workers and peasants, harassing the intelligentsia and victimising its most prominent representatives. On the international level their attacks are directed not at imperialism but at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, at the CPSU and all fraternal Communist parties. The divisive policy pursued by these Chinese leaders is undermining the unity of the world revolutionary forces, inflicting infinite damage on the national liberation movement and playing into the hands of imperialism, of US imperialism above all.
How is this turn of events to be explained? How could revolutionaries degenerate so much as to destroy the principal leading force of the revolution, the Party, and 15 massacre its most active cadres? What made them sink into malicious anti-Sovietism and surpass the most diehard anticommunists in slandering the Soviet Union? What caused this political depravity and degeneration of the Chinese leaders?
First and foremost, it must be remembered that Mao Tsetung and his supporters joined the Communist Party during the national liberation struggle, in which different class forces and political groups were involved. The agenda of that stage did not call for any demarcation of social groups and political leaders on questions of social reforms and on the ways and means of building socialism. They proclaimed themselves Marxists and exponents of socialist development, and the Party entrusted them with high office and supported them. The defeat of the US imperialist-backed Chiang Kai-shek regime and the conquest of political power by the popular masses headed by the working class opened the road to the socialist reorganisation of social life.
It is axiomatic that the opposition of bourgeois and pettybourgeois elements stiffens markedly during the transition to socialism. The Chinese leaders proved unable to withstand the pressure of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sentiments, succumbed to petty-bourgeois nationalistic passions and assumed the role of exponents of anti-proletarian ideology and policy. Here the contributing factors, evidently, were such features of Chinese reality as the predominance of the petty-bourgeois strata in the country's social structure, the relatively small substratum of industrial workers in a huge population and the small percentage of workers in the Party. Another factor to be considered is the long-standing tradition of Great-Power, Great-Han chauvinism, whose exponents made every effort to fan the Chinese people's legitimate indignation over the national humiliation they were forced to suffer when China was a semi-colony. In its documents the CPC sternly warned against the danger of GreatPower chauvinism and insisted that all its manifestation be combated. For example, in an editorial in December 1956 the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao wrote: "It is particularly essential that we Chinese should remember that under the Han, Tang, Ming and Ching dynasties our country was a great empire, although for nearly a hundred years, since the latter half of the 19th century, it was a victim of aggression 16 and was reduced to the status of a semi-colony. At present our country is still backward economically and culturally, but when the conditions change the trend towards GreatPower chauvinism will undoubtedly become extremely dangerous unless every effort is made to stop it. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that today this danger has already begun to manifest itself among some of our cadres. That is why in the resolution adopted by the 8th National Congress of the CPC and in the statement issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China on November 1, 1956 our cadres have been set the task of fighting the trend towards Great-Power chauvinism.'' The Mao group not only turned a deaf ear to these warnings but when the class struggle grew acute during the period of transition it came forward as spokesman of Great-Power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adventurism.
Mao Tse-tung's divergence from the basic line adopted by the Communist Party of China and from the international communist movement, and his own special line in domestic and foreign policy became increasingly more pronounced during the period of transition from capitalist and precapitalist relations to socialism. When he began forcing the CPC to adopt the adventurist "big leap" and "people's communes" policy and pursue a similarly adventurist line in international relations it became evident that this divergence was really deep. Experience has shown that when outworn social systems are broken up there is an upsurge of revolutionary adventurism, which expresses the psychology of the berserk petty bourgeois. Here dizziness with the success of the revolutionary change oddly combines with fear of the difficulties that arise in the course of socialist construction, particularly in a backward country. This gives rise to the vain ultra-revolutionary attempts to resolve in one go all the problems of international policy and internal development, leap over all vital stages and break into the "realm of communism" by storm.
The Mao group dismissed the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC, which mirrored the Marxist-Leninist approach to problems of external and internal policy and laid down the Party's general line for the period of transition to socialism. The "great proletarian cultural revolution'', which was the signal for pogroms against the Communist __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2---534 17 Party and its cadres, and for unbridled chauvinism and anti-Sovietism, marked the continuation and crystallisation of this group's policy of petty-bourgeois adventurism.
There have been many instances when people who had participated in the national liberation movement or in a bourgeois-democratic revolution and even in a socialist revolution became hostile to communism as soon as their country's transition to socialist development was started. The transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution is a complex process and constitutes an important stage witnessing a fundamental regrouping of the class forces. For the petty-bourgeois parties and leaders this is a critical stage. Sober-thinking revolutionaries from among the pettybourgeois intellectuals side with the proletariat and gradually arrive at scientific socialism. But far from all pettybourgeois revolutionaries (with their vacillation and negative actions, which temporarily play a certain positive role at the democratic phase of the revolution) are equal to the demands of the period of transition to socialist changes. At this stage many of them fail to move forward along the road to socialism. They turn into dead ends of history and ultimately suffer political bankruptcy. This, for instance, is what happened with some leaders of the Soviet Union who went astray to the ``Right'' or the ``Left''. Similar cases were observed in other countries. This turning-point marking the transition to socialist construction finally reveals who are not proletarian revolutionaries, not Marxists-Leninists, but ideological spokesmen of the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie. The political bankruptcy and degeneration of this category of leaders from petty-bourgeois revolutionaries to petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries is not accidental. It springs from their class positions, their theoretical views and their understanding of politics and tactics. Mao Tse-tung's degradation is not the result of individual errors or of differences with Marxism. It is due to a depraved philosophy and a vicious policy of petty-bourgeois adventurism.
The Chinese splitters and anti-Sovietists, the organisers of the "great proletarian cultural revolution'', have proclaimed Maoism as the ``highest'' stage of the development of Marxism. Mao Tse-tung has studied some Marxist works and on individual issues he has even propounded Marxist views, but on the whole his theoretical concept vulgarises and revises 18 the Marxist teaching from the standpoint of pettybourgeois nationalism and adventurism.
In place of materialist dialectics Maoism offers sophistry and eclecticism. It has rejected the materialist understanding of history in favour of voluntarism, and the theory of the class struggle and revolution in favour of what is essentially a militarist understanding of the revolutionary process. Maoism refuses to recognise the proletariat's leading role in the communist reconstruction of society, and challenges the Party's role as the vanguard of the working class. It belittles the role played by the masses in history and idealises ``heroes'' as the main makers of history. It preaches belief in the supernatural powers of the ``leader'' and intensifies the personality cult. It opposes scientific communism on fundamental problems of strategy and tactics.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The MaterialistThe point of departure of the materialist understanding of history is that the production of material values underlies social development. Materialism is inseparably linked with the recognition that economic relations are the factor determining the entire system of social relations, and that in antagonistic society the class struggle is the principal motive force of history. In the course of a century bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theorists have been attacking these fundamental principles of Marxism, counterposing all sorts of idealistic concepts to materialist principles.
An expression of the voluntaristic understanding of history is, for example, the "theory of violence'', according to which the course of social life and the position of classes and nations are determined not by economic development, not by economic relations, but by force of compulsion. This theory was energetically propounded in the 19th century by the not unknown German petty-bourgeois socialist Eugene Karl Diihring, who believed that the decisive factor of social life was not economic development but political strength.
Marx and Engels demonstrated that the "theory of violence" was untenable, showed the interaction between economics and politics and between objective conditions and the 19 subjective factor in history, and defined the role played by violence in changing the forms of social life. Violence cannot create new productive forces or new social relations. But when the conditions are ripe for revolution, revolutionary violence serves as a means of overthrowing the outworn social system and reorganising social life in accordance with the level and requirements of the development of the productive forces. "Force,'' Marx said, "is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.''^^*^^ Revolutionary violence does not sweep away the laws of economic development and does not replace material production. It pulls down the socio-political obstacles to the development of the productive forces.
Petty-bourgeois anarchism and other varieties of revolutionary adventurism have sought to replace the materialism of Marx with voluntarism and subjectivism. For instance, according to Mikhail Bakunin, ``ideals'' and ``revolt'' are the movers of the social revolution, whose purpose is to build life on the basis of the "broadest will''. Criticising Bakunin's understanding of the prerequisites for society's revolutionary reorganisation, Marx wrote: "The will, not economic conditions, is the basis of his social revolution.~"^^**^^
Having undertaken to ``Sinicise'' Marxist theory, the Maoists adopted the stand of petty-bourgeois ideologists and rejected the fundamental principles of materialism in favour of voluntarism and subjectivism. In fact they have substituted the materialist understanding of history with the notorious "theory of violence''.
In the history of social thinking in China, as in Western countries, the "theory of violence" originated in old philosophical schools. For instance, Han Fei-tzu, the chief exponent of the ancient Chinese school of Fachia (Legalists), taught that only the most extreme and ruthless methods were needed in politics and that power rested solely on force and compulsion.
The history of the ideological struggle shows that the "theory of violence" closely intertwines with justification of war, with the ideology of militarism. Small wonder that it became particularly widespread in the epoch of imperialism, _-_-_
^^*^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 751.
^^**^^ Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 2 (in 3 volumes), p. 412.
20 when forced decisions and wars began to play a large role in determining the course of history.This "theory`s'' close link with chauvinism, with claims to world domination is more pronounced today than ever before. People infected with chauvinism and nursing hegemonistic ambitions are quite naturally attracted to the "theory of violence''. They pin their hopes on military means of struggle, and belittle or ignore the significance of economic development and economic problems.
The Chinese preachers of the "theory of violence'', who hide behind a smokescreen of revolutionary verbiage, believe that war is the cardinal means of settling all social contradictions. The essence of Maoism's concept of history is revealed by the following thesis: "War is the highest form of struggle, existing ever since the emergence of private property and social classes, for settling contradictions between classes, between nations, between states, or between political groups at given stages of their development.''^^*^^
In place of the Marxist theory that ever since society's division into classes the class struggle has been the dominant factor of history, Mao Tse-tung thus offers his militarist understanding of history as a history of wars. According to him, in politics the guideline should be laid down not by the laws of the class struggle but by the laws of war. Marxism holds that in class society the relations between the classes underlie all social phenomena and developments, including wars, but Mao Tse-tung's standpoint is that the class struggle must be understood in the light of the laws of war. He writes: "War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all laws of war are applied by a nation, a state, a class, or a political group waging a war to win victory for itself.''^^**^^
Marxism-Leninism teaches that war is the continuation of the policy pursued by definite classes to attain their class aims. In other words, war is a form of struggle for the interests of a given class. But from the theories expounded by Mao Tse-tung it follows that the class struggle must be governed by the laws of war.
Employing Marxist terminology and using the concepts _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tsc-tung, Vol. 1, London, 1954, p. 176.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 187.
21 ``classes" and "class struggle" for the sake of appearances, Mao Tse-tung ignores the Marxist theory of the class struggle and the proletarian revolution, doggedly replacing it with his militarist "theory of violence'', the theory of a military upheaval. "Political power,'' he insists, "grows out of the barrel of a gun.''^^*^^ According to his own admission, this is a paraphrase of the maxim of the Chinese militarists: "Whoever has an army has power.''^^**^^ Its own inner logic brings Maoism to the conclusion that it is not economic relations that ultimately determine to whom the political power belongs in a country, but the gun, the army, as a selfsufficing force determining the destinies of society. Military force is made a fetish of also in Mao Tse-tung's arguments about the future of human society. He says that "the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun''.^^***^^He claims that a world war is the only means by which lasting peace may be achieved and socialism can triumph on a world-wide scale, saying "there is only one way . . . namely, to oppose war by means of war''.^^****^^ His supporters cold-bloodedly reason that even if half of mankind is annihilated in a world war, there will still remain the other half. On the other hand, imperialism would be destroyed and socialism would reign throughout the world. This fully fits in with Mao Tse-tung's theoretical views.
The Mao group opposes the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. They reject the Leninist thesis that after its establishment first in one or several countries, socialism influences world development chiefly through the force of its example, its economic policy, its achievements in economic and cultural development.
In effect, the Chinese ``Marxists'' preach the theory that revolution must be exported by means of war. It goes without saying that they want this war to be started by the Soviet Union, and allege that since it is not fighting such a war it has struck a bargain with United States imperialism and lapsed into ``revisionism''. The Maoists frequently repeat the Chinese saying: "Sit on a mountain and watch the tigers _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 272.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 271.
^^***^^ Ibid., p. 273.
^^****^^ Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 179.
22 fight''. Are they contemplating involving the Soviet Union in a world war and watching this war from a ``mountain''?In accordance with his militarist understanding of history Mao Tse-tung has replaced materialist dialectics with a metaphysical concept of struggle between antagonistic forces, turning dialectics into sophistry.
Instead of the dialectical teaching of development and of resolving contradictions in the course of a struggle, Mao Tse-tung propounds the thesis that opposites change reciprocally. His view of development is that in the course of movement each opposite occupies the position which had earlier been occupied by its opposite. The opposites themselves are analysed metaphysically, as not subject to change, as something constant and immutable. Thereby Mao Tsetung ignores the vital dialectical thesis that development is, in effect, the transition from one quality to another, in the process of which old contradictions are surmounted.
Instead of dialectics, Mao Tse-tung offers the theory of opposing forces, which know no qualitative change and can only change places and by turns pull each other from side to side or up and down. What we get here is something resembling the notorious theory of equilibrium, according to which contradictions balance each other, so that from time to time this equilibrium is disturbed and then restored, and the movement thus continues. This understanding of dialectics, naturally, undermines its very foundation and, essentially, signifies rejection of development. If opposites only change places and if history is nothing but the movement of opposites, the disturbance and restoration of equilibrium, nothing new can take shape, no qualitative changes can take place in social development.
Mao Tse-tung's admirers try to apply their primitive understanding of the struggle of opposites to the essence of the historical process, to the charting of the strategy and tactics of the world communist movement. This is how these ``dialectics'' look when applied to the revolutionary process: ".. .by means of revolution, the proletariat, once the ruled, becomes the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, originally the ruler, becomes the ruled, and is transferred to the position originally occupied by its opposite.''^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 44.
23According to Mao Tse-tung this kind of ``dialectical'' change of opposites takes place in the course of revolutionary transformations in the countryside: ''. . .the land-owning landlord class becomes a class deprived of its land, while the peasants, once deprived of their land, become small holders of land.''^^*^^
This interpretation of the dialectics of history quite obviously has nothing in common with the real course of historical development. The bourgeoisie, it goes without saying, has never gone over and will never go over "to the position originally occupied by its opposite'', i.e., the working class, in the same way as the proletariat will never turn into the bourgeoisie. There have been cases of capitalists being ruined and becoming wage workers, and of individual workers becoming entrepreneurs. But this does not mean that the substance of the socialist revolution is the conversion of the proletariat into the bourgeoisie, and of the bourgeoisie into the proletariat. Similarly, history knows of no case of peasants having taken the place of the landowner class, or of the landowner class becoming peasants. A qualitatively new class structure takes shape in society with the emergence of a new mode of production. Revolutionary transformations bring about not merely a change of places occupied by opposite classes, but a fundamental change of the classes themselves, and lead to the moulding of new class relations. Nobody save metaphysicians can believe that the old classes can remain, merely changing places with each other, under a new mode of production as a result of revolution.
These examples illustrate the fundamental distinctions between Marxist dialectics and the sophistry of the Chinese theorists. They missed the main point of Marxist-Leninist teaching, namely, that opposites are not immutable and everlasting, that they are in the process of ceaseless movement and change. The revolutionary significance of MarxistLeninist dialectics lies precisely in its teaching that inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher content. Thus, the replacement of capitalism by socialism signifies not a "change of places" between socialism and capitalism but the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the new, socialist system.
_-_-_^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 45.
24This interpretation of dialectics as a ``reshuffle'' of opposites is not some minor aspect in the views of Mao Tse-tung. In the last analysis it underlies the militarist understanding of the historical process so typical of Maoism. Indeed, by obviating the need for taking the qualitative changes of social phenomena into consideration, this metaphysical set-up makes it possible to group historical phenomena not from the point of view of their concrete social significance but under the abstract ``timeless'' categories of ``war'' and ``peace''.
``As everybody knows,'' Mao Tse-tung writes, "war and peace transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace. ... Peace is transformed into war.''^^*^^ History knows of many cases when wars of a definite type were followed not by peace but by other wars of a different social nature. For example, with time the liberation wars of the French bourgeois revolution turned into reactionary wars of aggrandizement waged by the Empire of Napoleon. These wars brought enslavement to many peoples and, in their turn, gave rise to a period of national liberation wars.
Or take another historical example. The First World War was not simply replaced by peace. In Russia the imperialist war turned into a civil war. Historical development after the October Revolution was characterised by the world's division into two camps---socialist Russia and the capitalist states encircling her. The Second World War likewise did not end with a simple return to the pre-war peace. A fundamental qualitative feature of the period since that war is the formation of the world socialist system. The change that took place in the balance of power between socialism and capitalism gave the national liberation movement new, unprecedented scope, and capitalism's colonial system collapsed. This has greatly increased the possibilities of fighting imperialist aggression and created real prerequisites for averting another world war through the concerted efforts of the socialist countries and all the peace-loving nations fighting imperialism.
The fundamental qualitative changes that have taken place in the course of historical development and the intricate interdependence of phenomena do not fit into the _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., p. 45.
25 abstract, metaphysical pattern of peace being replaced by war and of war leading to peace, a pattern under which lasting peace can only be achieved through war. Maoism's allegedly ``dialectical'' interpretation of history turns out to be a purely subjectivist, sophistical distortion of the real process of social development. __ALPHA_LVL3__ RepudiationMarxism-Leninism is the scientific teaching of the working class, summing up the experience of its struggle, providing it with the theory and tactics for the revolutionary transformation of society, and scientifically substantiating the ways and means of building socialism. Proletarian internationalism is embodied in Marxism-Leninism.
Maoism is a petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic ideology and policy in theory justifying hegemonism in the international communist and the national liberation movements. It is an expression of petty-bourgeois adventurism in domestic and foreign policy, which became especially pronounced when China moved from democratic to socialist reforms.
The Chinese pseudo-Marxists' negation of the proletariat's leading role is clearly expressed in their understanding of the essence of the world revolutionary process. On the basis of a non-Marxist interpretation of the experience of the national liberation, people's democratic revolution in China, Mao Tse-tung expands this interpretation to embrace the entire world revolutionary process and the problems of socialist construction in different countries.
The peasantry, as everybody knows, is numerically the largest force in the national liberation movement. When Lenin analysed the problems of this movement he said that it was absolutely necessary to take into account the fact that "the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consists of peasants. ... It would be Utopian to believe that proletarian parties in these backward countries, if indeed they can emerge in them, can pursue communist tactics and a communist policy, without establishing definite relations with the peasant movement and without giving it effective support''.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 241--42.
26Lenin dealt comprehensively with the question of the role played by the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the national liberation movement, and brought it to the logical conclusion that there had to be an alliance between the proletariat and the working peasants in the socialist revolution and in the building of socialism. This thesis has been acknowledged and accepted as a guide to action by the Communists of all countries.
In China the peasants played a prominent revolutionary role in the national liberation struggle and the people's revolution. By applying Marxist-Leninist ideas to the specific conditions obtaining in China and relying on the experience of the working-class movement and on proletarian revolutionary cadres, the Communist Party of China was able to make successful use of the tremendous revolutionary potentialities of the millions of peasants in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution. A major role in this struggle was played by the revolutionary bases set up in rural areas. But Mao Tse-tung drew from this fact the totally unfounded conclusion that at the socialist stage of the revolution the alignment of motive forces remains the same as at the democratic stage, and that the socialist revolution would come from the countryside to the towns.
Based on this premise, his forecast of the development of the world revolutionary process is that the insurgent "world village" would surround the "world city'', that the peasant uprisings in Asian, African and Latin American countries would surround North America and Western Europe and destroy world imperialism. As distinct from Lenin's teaching of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry on a global scale, the Maoists set the countryside apart from the towns, the East from the West.
This concept obviously springs from their scepticism of the revolutionary possibilities of the world working class, from their refusal to recognise the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolutionary process and in the socialist reconstruction of society.
This concept is fundamentally at variance with the development of the world revolutionary movement and with the vital interests of the peoples of the developing countries who are fighting imperialism. It leads to the dismemberment of the world's principal revolutionary forces, to the 27 isolation of the national liberation movement from the socialist countries and the international working-class movement. Such isolation would leave the working people of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the tender mercies of "their own" landowners and capitalists and doom them to bondage to foreign capital.
What is making the Chinese arch-revolutionaries seek to force the world revolutionary movement to accept this concept? Is it because they are orienting themselves not on the socialist countries and the world communist movement but on the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements in the Eastern countries and counting on using them as tools for the attainment of their hegemonistic ambitions?
Small wonder that in their domestic policy the Mao group belittles the role of the working class and rejects the very idea that the masses of China should be led by the proletariat.
Mao Tse-tung advanced the idea of turning the agricultural cooperatives into people's communes and proclaimed that the communes were the best means of speeding up the transition to communism. In his opinion, rural people's communes are a universal form of communist construction. He went to all lengths to make the Communist Party of China accept these fantasies. As early as August 1958 a decision adopted by the Central Committee of the CPC stated: "The people's commune is the best organisational form for the gradual transition from socialism to communism, and in its development it will be the primary unit of the future communist society.. . . The attainment of communism in our country is evidently no longer a matter of the distant future. We must make energetic use of the people's commune and through it find the concrete road of transition to communism.'' This decision recommended: "Militarise organisations, act in a militant spirit and follow a collective way of life.'' Established initially in the countryside, the communes, as planned by the Maoists, would then embrace industry and unite the entire urban population, and thereby lead to the triumph of communism on a national level.
Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have thus ``discovered'' a fairly old Socialist-Revolutionary theory, according to which the countryside would arrive at communism earlier 28 than the towns and would carry with it the urban population. Theories of this kind were searchingly criticised and emphatically rejected by Lenin. An indisputable law is that in the socialist revolution and in the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism the town gives the lead to the countryside. On this point Lenin wrote: "The town inevitably leads the country. The country inevitably follows the town."^^*^^ By rejecting this immutable law of Marxism, Mao Tse-tung has denied the working class its leading role in the socialist reorganisation of society.
The failure of the people's communes undermined the standing of the Maoists but did not cure them of the ailment of petty-bourgeois, Populist-anarchist notions about the motive forces of society's communist reconstruction.
The notorious "great proletarian cultural revolution" was the most striking demonstration of the Maoists' rejection of the leading role of the working class and its Party, and of their distrust of the trade unions and the Young Communist League. They counterposed students and anarchist hungweiping and rebel organisations to the Party and organised their assault on the latter. From the dustbin of history they extracted the Trotskyite slogan: "Students are the barometer of the revolution''.
The Maoists are making wide use of troops to smash the Party and state organs. Armed force against legal organisations of the working class is evidently the practical illustration of the thesis that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun'', which the Maoists regard as a "major contribution" to the Marxist teaching of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Actually, in present-day China the interpretation and application of this thesis betrays efforts to justify a reactionary military coup.
In the theory and practice of the Maoists the negation of the role of the working class and its Party is closely linked with their disregard for the basic interests of the working people. They have given the label of ``economism'' to the policy of raising the living standard under socialism. Their bid to achieve communism without providing the people with material incentives, exclusively by ``revolutionary'' appeals and slogans, is totally at variance with Leninism. Under the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 257.
29 guise of communist propaganda, they are, in effect, serving up the old Confucianist teachings that moral self-perfection is the means of settling all problems and overcoming all ills.It is not difficult to see that disregard for economic conditions runs counter to the materialist understanding of history and is based on voluntaristic concepts and, in the last analysis, on the "theory of violence''. No Marxist can ignore the material conditions of society's life and development and disregard the basic interests and needs of the masses. Socialism is called on to ensure the masses not only with political power but also with a steady rise of their living standard and cultural level. Any disregard of these basic interests is indissolubly linked with the anti-popular ideology of the personality cult.
The Chinese admirers of Mao Tse-tung idolise him as the originator of the theory that under socialism the decisive role is played by the subjective factor. According to Sinicised Marxism, objective factors determined social development only in the past, before the socialist revolution, while under socialism they have been superseded by subjective factors. This magnification of the role played by the subjective factor is ultimately reduced to the influence of a ``great'' personality on the social process.
True, Mao Tse-tung and his followers speak verbosely of the role of the masses and of the working class, but in fact they have nothing but scorn for the people. Mao Tsetung portrays China's huge population as being devoid of ideas and cultural traditions, likening it to a "sheet of clean paper" on which anything may be written. "There is nothing,'' he says, "on a clean sheet of paper but on it one can write the newest and most beautiful words, and draw the newest and most beautiful pictures.'' That is how Mao Tse-tung himself portrays the relationship between himself, as the "leader and mentor'', and the Chinese people.
Anti-Marxist views of this kind have been criticised by Chinese Communists. Alarm over the growing cult of Mao's personality was voiced at the 8th Congress of the CPC. At that Congress, in connection with the revision of the Party Constitution, it was stated: "Of course the cult of the individual is a social phenomenon with a long history, and it cannot but find certain reflections in our Party and public life.'' The Congress denounced the personality cult and put it on, 30 record that the Party held no brief for personality deification, which was alien to it.
This denunciation of the ideology and practice of the personality cult is fiercely resented by Mao Tse-tung and his admirers. One can therefore see why the hungweipings are vilely abusing those who had ever been opposed to the inordinate exaltation of Mao Tse-tung.
The Mao personality cult has resulted in the belittlement of the role played by the masses and the Party, and in the rejection of socialist democracy. What leading role of the Party and what norms of Party life are there to speak of when in the course of the 17 years since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China there has been only one Congress of the CPC.
The deification of Mao Tse-tung has surpassed the most ugly manifestations of the personality cult known to history. While the Chinese emperors were regarded as the "Sons of Heaven" and rulers of a Celestial Empire, Mao Tse-tung is extolled as the brightest sun. Here his supporters stick to the long-standing vicious tradition of the cult of rulers. More than two thousand years ago the Chinese philosopher Mo Ti wrote: "What the lord regards as truth must be regarded as truth by us; what the lord regards as a lie must be regarded as a lie by us.'' Precepts of this kind are now used to ``substantiate'' the Mao personality cult and reduce the masses to an unthinking mob memorising the precepts of the ``ruler''.
Having lost all sense of proportion, Mao Tse-tung's votaries have declared that Maoism is the ``highest'' stage of Marxism and want it to be accepted as such by all the Communist Parties in the world, by all peoples. They count on making the Mao cult a weapon for achieving dominance in the world communist and national liberation movements.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ DistortionMao Tse-tung holds that the theory of violence, military administration and compulsion are applicable to all historical periods, including the highest phase of communism. He 31 rejects socialism as being a special phase of communism, including it in the transition period during which compulsion and suppression play a substantial role. He goes so far as to attribute his concepts to the classics of MarxismLeninism. For instance, in the recommendations of the Central Committee of the CPC (see Pravda, July 14, 1963) it is stated: "Both Marx and Lenin considered the entire period until the beginning of the highest phase of communist society as a period of transition from capitalism to communism, as the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.''
Actually, in Critique of the Gotha Programme and other works Marx clearly distinguished between the period of transition, the first phase of communism, i.e., socialism, and the highest phase of communism. Conformably, in his famous The State and Revolution Lenin singled out the following stages of the formation and development of the communist system, namely: "the transition from capitalism to communism'', i.e., its first phase, then follows "the first phase of communist society" and, lastly, "the highest phase of communist society.''^^*^^ In this and subsequent works he examined the question of the economic foundation of society, and of the state and its functions during each of these stages.
During the period of transition the economy is polystructural, for this is a period when survivals of the capitalist economic system are still in evidence and, consequently the exploiting class exists and an unremitting class struggle on the principle of "who will win" rages between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Enlarging on Marx's ideas about the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state of the transition period, Lenin wrote: "During the transition from capitalism to communism suppression is still necessary, but it is now the suppression of the exploiting minority by the exploited majority. A special apparatus, a special machine for suppression, the `state', is still necessary, but this is now a transitional state.''^^**^^
During the first phase of communism, i.e., under socialism, all the means of production are publicly owned and every person engaged in socially useful work is paid in accordance with the work done by him. The existence of the state _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, pp. 464--68.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 463
32 during the first phase of communism is linked by Lenin not with the need for suppressing hostile classes, because such classes no longer exist, but with the task of protecting and multiplying public property and controlling the measure of labour and the measure of consumption. He wrote: "To this extent, therefore, there still remains the need for a state, which, while safeguarding the common ownership of the means of production, would safeguard equality in labour and in the distribution of products.''^^*^^The economic foundation for the complete withering away of the state is provided by the attainment of a level in the development of the communist formation where the productive forces can fully satisfy the reasonable requirements of all citizens, and the essential distinctions between labour by hand and by brain disappear.
On this point Lenin wrote: "The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts the rule: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs', i.e., when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social intercourse and when their labour has become so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability''.^^**^^ Such are the dialectics of the formation of the communist system, and such are the principal stages of its development.
Why then do the Chinese pseudo-theorists reject socialism as a special phase of the formation of the communist social system, and why do they identify socialism with the transition period? The answer is that having adopted antiSovietism as a policy and by insinuating that bourgeois elements are growing in the USSR, the Maoists want the CPSU and the Soviet Union to accept the theory according to which the class struggle grows ever more acute until the highest phase of communism is attained. They unequivocally suggest that the function of suppression, exercised by the socialist state towards the exploiting classes during the transition period, should be preserved throughout the period of socialism right until the highest phase of communism.
The Chinese theorists and propagandists endlessly repeat that under socialism the class struggle inevitably grows acute _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 467.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 469.
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3---534 33 and will last at least 100 or 200 years or, perhaps, even longer. This thesis is a gross distortion of Marxism-Leninism and of the prospects of socialist development.The struggle against alien elements continues, of course, even under socialism. But under conditions where exploiting classes are non-existent and only the friendly classes of workers, collective farmers and the socialist intelligentsia have remained the principal aim is to ensure the further unity of all social strata round the working class and consolidate the socio-political and ideological unity of socialist society.
The enemies of the Soviet Union have always dreamed of driving a wedge between the Soviet working class, peasants and the intelligentsia, to disunite them and weaken and undermine their socio-political and ideological cohesion. Is this not the aim of the anti-Soviet campaign of the Maoists? Is this not the reason why they savagely attack the CPSU Programme's propositions on the growth of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a socialist state of the entire people? What makes them so eager to compel the CPSU to adopt the anti-Leninist line of applying dictatorial methods of administration and of curtailing socialist democracy in conditions of complete arid final victory of socialism, until the highest phase of communism has been reached? They obviously want to narrow down the mass social basis of the Soviet state and shatter the unity of the people round the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.
There is another aspect to this identification of socialism as the first phase of communism with the transition period, namely, the fear of the Chinese leaders to make a concrete analysis of the economic and class structures of Chinese society and of the real forms of the class struggle during the period of transition.
Socialist reforms, as everybody knows, presuppose radical changes in the relationship between classes. Mao Tse-tung, however, studiously avoids this question or speaks of it in a vague and abstract way.
In February 1957 in a speech on "The Correct Solution of the Contradictions Within a Nation'', he offered no analysis of the economic and class structures of Chinese society during the transition period. Instead, he listed all sorts of contradictions, grouping them under two categories: 34 contradictions with enemies and contradictions within the nation. Among the latter he singled out the following contradictions: between the proletariat and the peasants; between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. The contradiction between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie and the contradictions within the national bourgeoisie were lumped together in the same category.
Actually, this abstract characteristic is tantamount to abandoning the class approach in assessing the different strata of society in the transition period, and to automatically carrying over the tactics characterising the national liberation stage of the revolution to the stage of socialist reforms. If, during the transition period, as this pattern implies, the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasants are of the same type as those between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie, the policy of the proletariat towards these classes must also be of the same type.
Shortly before this, in the resolution adopted by the 8th Congress of the CPC it was stressed that "the internal contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie continues to be the main one''. However, at the same Congress Mao Tse-tung put forward a vaguely worded slogan about uniting the "democratic classes''. From his ``teaching'' of the contradictions during the period of transition from capitalism to communism it follows that communism can be built through the unity of the working class and peasants with the bourgeoisie.
The countries moving towards socialism naturally differ from each other in social structure and in the class composition of the population. In the Soviet Union the exploiting classes have been uprooted long ago, and this process involved a bitter struggle. The landowner class and the big bourgeoisie were eradicated in the course of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War. Then, with the development of the socialist industry and state and cooperative trade, capitalist elements were ousted from industry and trade, while the kulaks were liquidated as a class through nation-wide collectivisation.
In China, on the other hand, there has been a "peaceful reorganisation of capitalist industry and trade''. Mixed stateprivate enterprises were set up and the factories were __PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 ``redeemed" through the payment of a rate of interest on capital to the capitalists.
Marxism-Leninism takes into account the diverse forms of socialist construction and of the class struggle in the different countries. However, it goes without saying that the general laws of the class struggle must not be ignored. If the exploiting elements---capitalists, landowners, kulaks, merchants---have remained in one capacity or another and have been set to work in state-owned or co-operative enterprises, it does not mean that they have adopted socialism. It must be seen and understood that even after the so-called peaceful reorganisation of capitalist industry and trade, these elements continue to influence society's class structure and also politics and ideology. These elements are fertile soil for chauvinism, racialism, nationalism and other trends.
The Chinese press has never published statistics to show how many capitalists in China continue to receive an interest on their capital from the state and what this interest amounts to. According to figures published in the foreign press, there are in China today over a million capitalists who continue to receive five per cent on their "capital investments''; of this number about 300,000 hold executive jobs at nationalised enterprises. As salaries they receive from 300 to 400 dollars a month, while the interest on capital paid to some of them adds up to 200,000--300,000 dollars and in a number of cases to over a million dollars a year. In order to receive such incomes in capitalist countries, share-- holders must own capital amounting to several million dollars. The Chinese ``Marxists'' keep this mechanism of capitalist exploitation a close secret. Neither is anything being said of the fact that over the past few years China has been reorienting her external economic relations from the socialist to the capitalist world.
Indicative in this respect is that the "great proletarian cultural revolution" did not in the least affect the interests of the Chinese millionaires. Initially, in some of their leaflets the hungweipings demanded a halt to the payment of interest on capital to the capitalists. However, as by a signal, this motif disappeared from the arch-revolutionary tatzupao (wall newspapers).
This attitude to the capitalists has, of course, completely puzzled representatives of a number of Communist Parties 36 and it has been strongly criticised by them. The `` explanation'' offered by Mao Tse-tung's supporters is that the question of cancelling the payment of interest on capital to the capitalists would be raised after the completion of the "great proletarian cultural revolution''. They have thereby demonstrated that the "cultural revolution" is not an antibourgeois revolution but a struggle to establish the armybacked Maoist military-bureaucratic dictatorship. At the same time, the "cultural revolution" was launched with the objective of crushing the resistance of the Party and Government cadres and organisations and of the people to the adventurist policy of the Maoist group.
Mao Tse-tung's supporters are evidently aware that these attempts have failed ignominiously. They are changing their tactics, applying Mao Tse-tung's pet principle, borrowed from ancient politicians, of "alternately stretching and releasing.'' The Maoists are beginning to flirt with a section of the executive cadre, while continuing to attack others. From time to time they have begun to beat a retreat and blame the lack of discipline among the hungweipings and tsaofans for the butchery in the Party organisations and for the massacre of their leaders. But this manoeuvre does not hold out the prospect of success. Life shows that many Chinese Communists are much more staunch and devoted to communism than Mao Tse-tung and his supporters expected, and the Chinese workers, peasants and intellectuals did not prove to be the "clean sheet of paper" on which Mao Tsetung planned to write what suited him. The stiff resistance that is being put up to the "cultural revolution" by the Party and non-Party masses is evidence that the wanton, adventurist policy underlying the "great cultural revolution'', which plunged the country into chaos, will be brought to a halt by the Communists of China and the Chinese people. The Marxist-Leninist line will triumph in the CPC sooner or later, and the CPC will occupy a worthy place in the world communist movement, while People's China will return to the united ranks of the common anti-imperialist front.
Kommunist, No. 5, 19P7. pp. 107--22
[37] __ALPHA_LVL2__ MaoismA. Rumyantsev
The ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung, proclaimed as the pinnacle of Marxism-Leninism, is currently the ideological foundation of social life in China.
In order to lay bare the actual content of this ``thought'' it must be analysed carefully and compared with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and also with the consequences of its implementation in practice. Such an analysis is the sole means of exposing Maoism as a system of ideas running counter to the basic interests of the Chinese people and to socialist construction in China, as an anti-scientific, antiMarxist-Leninist system of ideas raised in fact to the level of religious dogmas forcibly planted in the country and in one way or another poisoning the minds of millions of Chinese. Moreover, such an analysis is necessary because Maoism is seeking to influence the national liberation movement throughout the world and gain control of various of its trends. To a certain extent Maoism exercises a corrupting influence on the world working-class movement, too, chiefly through unstable and mostly extremely adventurist elements. This makes it imperative that Marxists-Leninists should expose the theory and practice of Maoism which is inflicting enormous damage to the cause of the socialist reorganisation of society.
The development of the present-day world revolutionary process, of which the communist movement is the leading force, closely intertwines with the national liberation, people's democratic and socialist revolutions. Different social classes, strata and groups are involved in this process. The great teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, tested and verified in revolutionary struggle and socialist construction, has become the theoretical, ideological and political weapon of the working people in their struggle for liberation.
Ever broader non-proletarian strata of working people are being drawn into the revolutionary movement headed by the world proletariat. Of course, the non-proletarian masses enter the revolutionary movement with their own interests and views. Under certain conditions their theorists, 38 while giving verbal recognition to Marxism-Leninism, may become active exponents of non-Marxist views. The world communist movement has time and again encountered phenomena of this kind and given a rebuff to various groups and trends that emerged in its ranks and tried to impose on it either a Right-opportunist policy or Leftist sectarianism and adventurism, in other words, a petty-bourgeois outlook using Marxism as a blind. On many occasions Lenin warned that the "growth of the working-class movement necessarily attracts to its ranks a certain number of petty-bourgeois elements, people who are under the spell of bourgeois ideology, who find it difficult to rid themselves of that ideology and continually lapse back into it''.^^*^^
The possibility of Marxist-Leninist theory being distorted or supplanted by non-Marxist maxims is particularly great in cases where a revolutionary struggle is started in countries that are extremely backward economically and politically, where the working class is numerically small and peasants and other petty-bourgeois strata are the main force of the revolution, where for one reason or another no link exists with the international working-class movement and where no proletarian party steeled in class battles exists. These are the conditions that took shape in the revolutionary movement in China during the first half of the present century.
China was a semi-colonial country almost until the mid20th century. Capitalist relations had already emerged but semi-feudal and feudal relations were still very strong. The country was being rapaciously exploited by foreign capitalists and by the compradore bourgeoisie and landowners. Industrial workers constituted less than one per cent of the gainfully employed population. The bulk of the people (90 per cent) were peasants. In the large towns petty-bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian elements were predominant.
The Chinese working-class movement was very weak even during the first 25 years of the 20th century. When the Communist Party of China was founded in 1921 it had only a few score of members. Political actions involving seamen, railway workers and some other contingents of the working class took place between 1921 and 1925, but the anti-feudal, _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 17, p. 230.
39 anti-imperialist, national liberation movement remained the basic content of the revolutionary process in that country. The Communist Party of China grew, drawing most of its new members from the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. It was under these social conditions that Mao Tse-tung's ideological and political thinking was moulded.Mao Tse-tung was born in a peasant family. As a youth he was mesmerised by the history of Ancient China, and from the very outset his views were influenced by Confucianism. The history of other nations lay outside his field of attention. In school Mao and his fellow pupils memorised books propounding the dogmas of Confucius and also of Mencius, Tzu Ssu and other Confucian scholars. Like many other young people of those days, Mao Tse-tung ``rebelled'' against Confucian scholasticism, but feudal-monarchist views, particularly the idea of a great China as the overlord of Asia and the whole world, reflecting the traditional view of the Chinese nationalists that China is the centre of the world, remained deeply-rooted in Mao Tse-tung's mind.
At the close of 1918 he struck up a close friendship in Peking with some active proponents of anarchism, corresponded with anarchists in other cities and even urged the formation of an anarchist society in Hunan and other provinces.
Direct testimony of his powerful attraction to anarchism was an article entitled "Broad Alliance of the People'', which he published in the summer of 1919 in the journal Hsiangchiang pinglun. In this article he gave preference to anarchism over Marxism, considering the views of the anarchists "broader and more profound" than the views of the Marxists.
In 1920 he joined the movement of communist study groups. As his subsequent activity showed, this switch did not make him drop his anarchist outlook. At the 6th Congress of the CPC in 1928 it was pointed out that as a political commissar of the Chinese Red Army Mao Tse-tung had pursued a policy that was "typical mainly of the lumpenproletariat and of the petty bourgeoisie reduced to despair and seeing no way out for itself''. Mao Tse-tung's anarchist ideas again came to the fore later, particularly during the notorious "cultural revolution''.
He came into contact with Marxist philosophy and political economy only in 1933, when he read some textbooks on 40 the subject. Generally speaking, he gained his knowledge of Marxism chiefly by reading popular literature, for example, Ali Ssu-chi's Popular Philosophy, and not by a systematic study of the works of the classics of Marxism-- Leninism. This is quite understandable because in the 1920s and the early 1930s, when Mao Tse-tung formed his outlook of the world, the basic works of the classics of Marxism were not published in China. Mao Tse-tung knows no foreign language.
An analysis of the articles written by Mao Tse-tung shows that many of the Lenin quotations used by him were obtained at second hand in distorted and abridged form. Moreover, it is known that he called those who studied Marx's Capital "dogmatists uselessly racking their brains''.
In fact, Mao Tse-tung has never known the basic works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Unquestionably, he has acquainted himself with Marxism, but his knowledge of it is superficial and distorted. Marxism-Leninism as an integral teaching and a harmonious system of dialectical, materialist views has remained a sealed book to him.
In a number of speeches he claimed that although the petty-bourgeois way of thinking was inculcated in him at school, he rid himself of this psychology when he became a revolutionary. He wrote that he "studied Marxism a little from books and made the first steps in ideological selfre-education, but re-education proceeded chiefly in the course of a long class struggle" (my italics.---A.R.).^^*^^
Let us accept the statement that Mao Tse-tung " reeducated himself" in the course of the struggle that was directly linked with his practical work. In other words, let us accept the fact that his theoretical views derived from his practice and were a generalisation of the revolutionary process in which he was directly involved. Then let us put the question generally: Can a modern scientific philosophy be evolved independently by generalising mainly the practice of the anti-feudal, national liberation movement?
A scientific philosophy such as Marxism-Leninism can in our day be assimilated and mastered by leaders of the anti-feudal, national liberation revolutions, but it cannot be _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung, The Correct Solution of the Contradictions Within a Nation, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1957, p. 26.
41 evolved from the practice solely of these revolutions. The philosophy of scientific Marxism presupposes a scientific generalisation of the highest stage of civilisation---large-scale machine industry and world economic relations with all their effects on socio-political relations. Marxism is the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat and its rise and development are indissolubly linked with the struggle waged by that progressive class.Having emerged on the soil of the class antagonisms of bourgeois society, Marxism provides the key to understanding pre-capitalist relations as well. That is why it attracts the attention of the leaders of anti-feudal movements and exerts a definite influence on their way of thinking. Today, anti-feudal and national liberation movements inescapably develop into anti-imperialist revolutions closely linked with the entire world revolutionary process, whose motive force is the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie. All this opens the door to the dissemination of Marxism in the countries of the colonial and semi-colonial world and to its assimilation by the leaders of the revolutionary movement in these countries. But it is one thing to master the scientific world outlook and apply it in the course of the anti-feudal, anti-colonial revolutions and another to work out this outlook solely on the basis of the practice of these revolutions.
Mao Tse-tung's veiled claim to having independently worked out a scientific philosophy in the course of the class struggle in China is untenable.
It is indisputable that Marxism has influenced the thinking of many leaders of the modern anti-feudal, national liberation movements. But the very concept of influence implies a wide range of hues and transitional stages---from the assimilation of individual elements of Marxism and attempts to combine them with non-Marxist (including religious) philosophical and political concepts, to an unconditional adoption of scientific communism.
In backward, colonial and semi-colonial countries, the class composition of the movement leaves an imprint on its course and form. Even if its leaders sincerely strive to be guided by scientific Marxist theory, the practice of the revolutionary movement in such countries is not at once delivered from typically petty-bourgeois limitations and 42 contradictions. In its turn, this cannot help exercising some influence on the world outlook of these leaders. That is why it is so necessary for them to make a successive, systematic and profound study of Marxism-Leninism and the entire experience of the international working-class movement and to assess the achieved results self-critically. The poorer their grounding in theory the more easily they come under the influence of petty-bourgeois psychology and ideology while continuing to regard themselves as Marxists. But it is not a matter of what any leader thinks he is, but of the objective content of his views and practical activity.
Mao Tse-tung is a case in point. He never mastered Marxism as an integral teaching, but obtained a fragmentary knowledge of it in a truncated and primitive form. As we shall show later, he used "Chinese specifics" as the plea for rejecting the experience of the international working-class movement, while during the class struggle in China he kept coming under the influence of typically petty-bourgeois views and sentiments.
This was most strikingly illustrated by his stand in the struggle within the Chinese Communist Party, shifting now to the Right, now to the Left of the line objectively dictated by the social reality of China. For instance, at the 3rd Congress of the CPC he adhered to a line combining a Rightwing pessimistic assessment of the proletariat's " potentialities with a Left-wing adventurist point of view, according to which the development of the Chinese revolution depended directly on a military invasion of China. In 1927 Mao Tse-tung put his stake on the theory of "permanent revolution.'' At the same time, he maintained that the socialist revolution was on the agenda in China (``we are standing on the threshold not of 1905 but of 1917''). In April 1929 he suggested a Leftist plan for the seizure of Kiangsi province. In 1930 he sided with Li Li-san, who calculated on involving the USSR in a world war.
He laid claim to the leadership of the Party, having no use for the Central Committee. A document adopted by the Party committee of Southeast Hunan in December 1930 states: "Wishing to preserve his position, Mao Tse-tung planned the physical destruction of leading cadres of the Party and the Youth League in Kiangsi province and the creation of a party bearing exclusively the hue of the Maoist 43 group in order to use it as a weapon against the Central Committee.'' An element of this plan was the destruction in that same year, on instructions from Mao Tse-tung, of the CPC special committee and the provincial government and many leaders of Fukien. The pretext for this monstrosity against innocent people was the accusation that they were members of a counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation. There have been quite a few facts of this sort in Mao Tsetung's career.
An insight of Mao Tse-tung is contained in a document signed by the special CPC committee in Yenan: "Mao Tsetung, as everybody knows, is an extremely cunning and slippery character with a hyper-developed individuality... . His activity shows that he is definitely unsuitable, a criminal to the cause of the class struggle, an enemy of the Bolshevik Party.''
In the sharp struggle that raged in the Party at the close of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s the Mao group ousted the internationalist Communists from the leadership and began laying down the Party line.
As a result of the kaleidoscope of ``teachings'' in his mind and of his petty-bourgeois nature, Mao Tse-tung wavered under the new conditions, too. For instance, in 1935 and 1936 he made an attempt to employ Leftist tactics that would have undermined the real possibilities of forming a united national front in China.
He makes wide use of Marxist terminology, which veils the petty-bourgeois substance of his theories. At first glance some of the propositions in his articles seem to be Marxist. This is particularly true of the articles that were reprinted after the Chinese revolution. In the new editions they were carefully edited and this gave them a Marxist aspect. This is what misleads readers.
Mao Tse-tung did not at once claim world-wide importance for his ``thought''. The first stage was the "Sinicisation of Marxism''. This ``thought'' was very clearly formulated by Mao Tse-tung at the 6th plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee in October 1938. This is what he said at the plenary meeting: "Before it can be applied Marxism must acquire a national form. The concept of abstract Marxism simply does not exist. There only exists concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is a Marxism that has 44 acquired national form" (my italics.---A.R.). Further, he sets the task of "Sinicising Marxism" on the "basis of Chinese specifics''.^^*^^
While confining Marxism to national boundaries, he calls it an international teaching. But, according to him, it appears that Marxism can exist as an international teaching only as the sum of its national forms, that is as German, British, French, Russian, Chinese Marxism and so on. In the long run this signifies the negation of the class international essence of Marxism as the doctrine of the international proletariat, and the abandonment of the common interests of the proletariat and other working people of all countries. It will be recalled that one of the basic propositions of Marxism, formulated by Marx and Engels in the Manifesto of the Communist Party is that the Communists of all countries are agreed that all proletarians have common interests. A feature distinguishing Communists is that in the "struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality" (my italics.---A.R.).^^**^^
When one examines Mao Tse-tung's ``thought'' on " Sinicised Marxism'', particularly in its new wording (i.e., in the way it is worded in his Selected Works), the first impression is that it does not deviate from Marxism. It may seem that Mao Tse-tung had merely paraphrased or concretised for China Lenin's words that it is necessary to learn "to apply the general and basic principles of communism to the specific relations between classes and parties, to the specific features in the objective development towards communism, which are different in each country and which we must be able to discover, study and predict''.^^***^^ But let us compare what Lenin wrote with what Mao Tse-tung says.
Lenin spoke of the application of the principles of Marxism that are common and fundamental to all peoples, and said that in applying these principles account must be taken of the given country's specifics, which it was necessary to learn to discover, study and predict. On the basis of the _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung, At the New Stage, Chinese ed., Chungking, pp. 73--75.
^^**^^ Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (in 3 volumes), Moscow, 1969, p. 120.
^^***^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 89.
45 general principles of Marxism he made an exhaustive study of the development of capitalism in Russia, defined its place in the capitalist world system, showed the alignment of classes and parties in the country and their international relations and, in accordance with his study of reality, gave "conscious expression to those forms of struggle of the revolutionary classes which arise of themselves in the course of the movement''.^^*^^ Lenin discovered and showed the common in the specific, and saw the objective behind the subjective and the international behind the national.He applied Marxism to the specifics of Russia, using the experience of the struggle of the international working-class movement instead of disregarding it. The experience gained by the working class of Russia in tackling the common tasks of the proletariat is now part of the treasure-store of the international working-class movement. Lenin's generalising works, which deal with this experience with its international basis and national specifics, have enriched Marxism as an international teaching and borne out the common and basic principles of that teaching. He did not remake Marxism to fit it into national specifics and did not give it a Russian national form. As Maurice Thorez aptly put it: "It signified the implementation, enrichment and development of Marxism, but by no means the Russification of Marxism. Quite the contrary.''^^**^^
By contrast, Mao Tse-tung speaks of the "Sinicisation of Marxism" and uses the argument of national specifics to reject Marxism's international content. He demands that Marxism should be given a national form a priori before studying reality, before any practical steps have been taken.^^***^^ In one and the same breath he proclaims the "Sinicisation of Marxism" and rejects and discriminates against the general truths of Marxism-Leninism, calling them a "foreign eight-legged essay'', "empty and abstract talk" and ``doctrinairism''.
Instead of concretely applying the general truths of Marxism to Chinese reality, he suggests a preliminary, vulgar ``sifting'', taking from Marxism only what is suitable to _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 11, p. 213.
^^**^^ Pravda, October 13, 1963.
^^***^^ Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1953, p. 365.
46 the pragmatic designs of his group. But this sort of juggling emasculates the substance of Marxism as an integral teaching in which all the components are interrelated and supplement one another. In their cohesion all the components of Marxism give general expression to the real relations in the class struggle taking place in the world and mirror mankind's historical movement.Mao Tse-tung's immediate associates say that his greatest achievement is that he has evolved a Chinese or Asian brand of Marxism in contrast to its ``European'' form.
From the very beginning of his acquaintanceship with Marxist-Leninist theory Mao Tse-tung had, in effect, `` retouched'' Marxism with various anarchist propositions. In fact, is not his argument that before it can be applied Marxism must be given a purely Chinese national form, a piece of voluntarism, an attempt to impose unrealistic patterns on objective reality? The implication is that it is enough to pick out something ``exclusive'' without tying it in with what is ``common'' in the world process, in other words, to pick out a detail and on that basis build up a speculative scheme and thereby have the possibility of ``making'' history and coming forward as a "maker of history''.
Maoist theorists often make the claim that the Chinese revolution owes its triumph to the "thought of Mao Tsetung''. Are there any grounds for this?
History has shown that a people can accomplish an antiimperialist revolution even if its leaders are non-Marxists. But in the given case it would be truer to say that the revolution in China triumphed in spite of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. It was consummated on the basis of the general and basic principles of Marxism-Leninism applied to the specific conditions in China in 1945--47, and as a result of mutual assistance and close, fraternal unity between the Chinese people and the world communist movement.
In 1949 the Maoists declared that their experience was a model for all colonial and dependent countries. After 1958 Mao Tse-tung openly laid claim to the leadership of the entire world communist movement and the role of its supreme theoretician.
The high priests of the Mao personality cult call him "the great Marxist-Leninist of our times, who brilliantly, creatively and all-sidedly inherited, upheld and developed 47 MarxismLeninism, raising it to a new stage''. In December 1960 Lin Piao called the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" a new phase of the development of Marxist theory, saying that it was the Marxism-Leninism "of the epoch of the downfall of imperialism and the triumph of socialism''. In May 1967 Jenmin Jihpao and Hungchi, the theoretical organ of the CPC Central Committee, wrote: "Marx and Engels laid the foundation of the theory of scientific socialism. Lenin and Stalin enlarged on Marxism, settled a series of problems of the proletarian revolution in the epoch of imperialism and resolved problems of the theory and practice of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has developed Marxism-Leninism, solving a number of problems of the proletarian revolution in the modern epoch, of the theory and practice of accomplishing the revolution and preventing capitalist restoration under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such are the three great milestones in the history of the development of Marxism.''
These ideas were echoed in a leaflet devoted to the "Mao stage" of the development of Marxism. It was brought out on June 1, 1967, by the Crimson East hungweiping regiment of School No. 41, Peking, and is headed: Three Great Milestones in the History of Marxism. Its opening words are: "We greet the world upon its entry into the epoch of Mao Tse-tung.''
The hungweipings, as everybody knows, are directed by the Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs at the CPC Central Committee and by the Army. This leaflet, therefore, cannot be regarded as the work of schoolchildren.
What works of Mao Tse-tung characterise his ``stage'' of the development of Marxism-Leninism? It is claimed that his principal theoretical contribution consists of the following essays: On Practice, On Contradiction, The Correct Solution of the Contradictions Within a Nation and Where Do People Get Correct Ideas? The above-mentioned leaflet calls these essays the "most comprehensive, perfect and systematised highest result of all the works on Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (my italics.---A.R.).
Since the Maoists themselves offer these essays as Mao Tse-tung's principal contribution to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it would be useful to ascertain the substance of the ideas propounded in them.
48Mao Tse-tung's main essays---On Practice and On Contradiction---deal with the problem of the unity and struggle of opposites, the problem of contradictions intrinsic in things and phenomena. These essays contain references to works by Marx, Engels and Lenin. In expounding the problem of contradictions he quotes the Philosophical Notebooks, in which Lenin defined dialectics as a teaching of the unity and struggle of opposites, as the study of contradictions in the very substance of things.
However, a close examination of Mao Tse-tung's views brings to light the fact that he gives the concept of dialectics a content that has nothing in common with Marxism.
Indeed, from Mao Tse-tung's numerous statements it is obvious that he regards contradiction as the relationship between any pair of opposites. For instance, in the essay On Contradiction, to illustrate the thesis that opposites cannot exist in isolation from each other, he writes: "Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would also be no life. Without `above', there would be no `below'; without `below', there would also be no `above'. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would also be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would also be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenantpeasants; without tenant-peasants, there would also be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without a proletariat, there would also be no bourgeoisie.''^^*^^
Characteristically, he reduces genuine dialectical opposites (for instance, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) to a purely external, mechanical counterposition of different aspects of a phenomenon (above and below, facility and difficulty, and so on). But these ``opposites'' have neither been nor can ever be the source of the spontaneous development of things. As Lenin pointed out, the "inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one''.^^**^^
Mao Tse-tung treats phenomena superficially, never going into their essence. This is a distinguishing feature of his maxims. The external counterposition of the elements of _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, London, 1954, p. 43.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 97.
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---534 49 things does not reveal their specific inner contradictions and links, the unity of their aspects and the struggle between them, or, as Lenin wrote, the unfolding of the mutually determining and mutually penetrating aspects giving rise to the development of a phenomenon independently of the mind. If one finds one or another pair of self-evident opposites it does not mean that one has applied dialectics to a study of reality. The mechanical counterposing of various pairs of qualitative characteristics of a phenomenon or an object which do not reflect its dialectical essence only leads to a simplification and distortion of dialectics. In fact, this may be qualified as philistine vulgarisation.Mao Tse-tung's vulgar interpretation of contradictions is all the more glaring because he does not understand that dialectical opposites, which in unity form a whole, occupy diverse places in this unity. Within the framework of unity each opposite plays a different role. Some generate action preserving the given unity, others generate an opposite action. Conformably to capitalist society, Marx wrote: ''. . . the private owner is therefore the conservative side, the proletarian, the destructive side. From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter, that of annihilating it.''^^*^^
No dialectical contradiction exists without these two aspects, in other words, without these two aspects there can be no unity, struggle nor unfolding of opposites and, consequently, the entire phenomenon cannot develop.
One might get the impression that Mao Tse-tung appreciates the difference between the progressive and conservative aspect of a contradiction, that he only calls these aspects in his own way. "Of the two contradictory aspects,'' he writes, "one must be the principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is that which plays the leading role in the contradiction.''^^**^^
At first glance it may seem that Mao Tse-tung's understanding of the relation between the principal and secondary aspects of a contradiction coincide with the dialecticalmaterialist understanding of this problem.
But in fact Mao Tse-tung builds up his theory on the _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx and Engels, The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique, Moscow, 1956, p. 51.
^^**^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 37.
50 basis of a mechanistic notion of the relationship of opposites. In the essay On Contradiction he writes that the contradictory aspects of every process always "exclude each other, struggle with each other and are opposed to each other'', nothing more. Further, he notes that such aspects are contained also "in human thought''.^^*^^ This text had been edited and does not at once reveal what he really means. Originally Mao Tse-tung's view, i.e., the view stated in a lecture delivered at Yenan in 1937, revealed beyond any doubt his mechanistic approach to the contradiction of aspects. "In every process opposites are most antagonistic and irreconcilable. They do not fuse. They are enemies hating each other. In the development of all processes in the world and in human thought, too, there is this kind of hostile contradictions. There are no exceptions to this rule.''According to him, the relationship between hostile opposites, between "two enemies hating each other" is what determines which aspect is the principal one.
On this basis he expounds his understanding of the leading role of the main aspect in a contradiction solely in the spirit of a quantitative, external and, consequently, mechanistic examination of the process. The whole trouble is that he does not have a Marxist understanding of the "principal contradiction''. His is a primitive understanding: the bourgeoisie rules capitalist society, hence it is the principal element. Actually, the principal factor is the proletariat, which gives impetus to the struggle and, consequently to the forces of development. That is why Marx called the proletariat the destructive, and the bourgeoisie the conservative aspect of capitalist society.
Enlarging on his theory about the principal and nonprincipal aspects of contradiction, Mao Tse-tung offers the following thesis: ".. .the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the quality of a thing changes accordingly.''^^**^^ This transformation, he says, takes place as a result of the change in the alignment of the forces of the two belligerent sides: "In a certain process or at a certain stage in the development of a contradiction, the principal aspect is A and the non-principal is B; at another stage of development or in _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 43.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 38.
__PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 another process of development, the roles are reversed---a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the strength with which each of the two aspects struggles against the other in the development of a thing.'' Further, he speaks of the "supersession of the old by the new''.Mao Tse-tung thus regards the change in the alignment of forces as a quantitative growth or decrease of these forces. He counterposes one aspect to the other as external forces acting against each other. But the old does not wear away, it is not obliterated by the new. The new preserves everything of value in the old. In dialectical contradiction the new and the old are not mechanistically opposed to each other. Growing out of and negating the old, the new unfolds in a spiral, embodying the useful achievements of the old on a higher level.
The thesis that the principal aspect of a contradiction becomes the non-principal and vice versa is extended by Mao Tse-tung to the assertion that "each of the two contradictory aspects within a thing, because of certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the opposite position" (my italics.---A.R.).^^*^^ Materialist dialectics speaks, for example, of the transformation of definite quantitative changes into qualitative ones, and also of contradictions being mutually conditioned and also mutually penetrating, without which no contradiction can exist. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, says nothing of this. According to him, under certain conditions the aspects of a contradiction change places, in other words, they change their position.
He tries to back this idea up with a number of examples. Here is one of them, which is repeated in different variations: ''. . .by means of revolution, the proletariat, once the ruled, becomes the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, originally the ruler, becomes the ruled, and is transferred to the position originally occupied by its opposite" (my italics.---A.R.).*
On the face of it, this example sounds very impressive. Indeed, does not the bourgeoisie lose its dominant position under certain conditions, i.e., as a result of a proletarian revolution? It unquestionably loses that position, and the _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., p. 44.
52 proletariat becomes the ruling class. All that is true. Also true is that the proletarian revolution resolves the contradictions of capitalist society. But the question is: Does the bourgeoisie in fact go over to the position that was occupied by its opposite, i.e., the proletariat, and does the proletariat take over the position of the bourgeoisie? After contradictions are settled do opposites undergo no transformation, only changing places? The proletariat is a class of exploited hired workers. Does the bourgeoisie become an exploited class "by means of the revolution" of the proletariat, and does the proletariat, as a result, exploit the bourgeoisie? Once this question is put it shows that Mao's arguments are philosophically untenable and non-dialectical.By putting into effect the objectively necessary complete socialisation of the means of production, abolishing exploitation of man by man and ultimately eradicating all social distinctions, the proletarian revolution changes the entire social system. Consequently, in the process of its development the proletarian revolution does not turn the bourgeoisie from a ruling to a subordinate class. It liquidates it as a class. Correspondingly, the proletariat becomes the working class of socialist society. The revolution is not a single act, but a process in which the social system is fundamentally reorganised. This reorganisation takes place under the direction of the working class. This is the essence of the leading position occupied in society by the proletariat, which far from perpetuating its rule uses it to abolish the exploiting classes and build a classless society. Consequently, the proletariat does not simply take over from the bourgeoisie, but occupies a position that neither existed nor could exist under the bourgeoisie, which rules the working masses.
However, ignoring these theoretical propositions of Marxism, propositions that have been borne out by practice, Mao Tse-tung lectured his listeners at the Anti-Japanese MilitaryPolitical University in Yenan in 1937: "Under certain conditions these classes (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.--- A. R.) change places, so that the exploiters become the exploited, and the exploited become the exploiters, while capitalist society is transformed into a socialist (!) society" (my italics.---A/?.).
In his philosophising Mao Tse-tung juggles with words, many of which are borrowed from ancient Chinese sources
53 (for instance, "there is no good fortune without misfortune'', "the worse the better'', and so on). On this sort of foundation the Maoists make their political assessments of world developments. In extolling the "thought of the great helmsman'', the Chinese press has frequently argued as follows: the USA attacked Vietnam---all the better because that brings the USA nearer to its doom; Israel attacked the Arab states---all the better because Israel had thereby exposed itself as an aggressor, while the Arabs had learned a useful lesson; if the capitalists begin a thermonuclear war--- all the better because as a result of this war socialism will become the only system in the world. The transformation of the aspects of a contradiction into each other is thus a fundamental point in the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. This thesis is used for political conclusions.It is generally known that Mao Tse-tung has never engaged in any scientific elaboration of philosophy. Most of his arguments are pragmatic, being a means of furthering his unscrupulous political aims.
Here is an example of how Mao Tse-tung ``theoretically'' justifies his subjectivistic and adventurist policy. The Chinese press frequently quotes Marx's proposition that an idea becomes a material force when it takes hold of the masses. Using this proposition out of its proper context, the Maoists link it with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" that the Chinese people are a clean sheet of paper. "There is nothing on a clean sheet of paper,'' Mao Tse-tung says, "but on it one can write the newest and most beautiful words, and draw the newest and most beautiful pictures."^^*^^ In other words, the people can be made to accept any idea if they are compelled to learn that idea by heart. This, then, would mean that an "idea has won the masses" and that it had thereby become a material force. One can now do anything one likes in accordance with this imposed ``idea'', regardless of the objective trend of development and of the objective material conditions of life. In line with this interpretation, the Maoists evolved their proposition that "politics is the commanding force'', and on this basis they gave effect to their adventurist "big leap" policy in economic development, _-_-_
^^*^^ Second Session of the CPC National Congress, = Chinese ed., Peking, 1958, p. 66.
54 formed "people's communes" in villages and towns, pursued the course of skipping necessary stages of the transition to communism. In this way Marx's scientific propositions were replaced with the subjectivistic concepts of Mao Tse-tung. In Mao Tse-tung's ``philosophy'' the role of consciousness is thus voluntaristically hypertrophied, consciousness comes forward as the factor determining social existence despite all the ``Marxist'' terms camouflaging this proposition.Marxism attaches due importance to the subjective activity of people, recognising not arbitrary but scientifically substantiated activity. This is the only subjective activity that yields the proper objective results. Society sets itself and carries out only feasible tasks and advances only objectively realisable ideas. In formulating the proposition on the conversion of ideas into a material force Marx linked it with a fundamental principle of historical materialism, according to which social development is determined not by ideas but by objective historical laws. Once they have captured the minds of people, ideas stimulate the revolutionary activity of the masses, who translate them into reality. However, Mao Tse-tung has no use for objective conditions and the corresponding trend of development. He relies on personal pragmatic wishes, on voluntarism.
In the Yenan lecture, he noted, speaking of the source of movement: ''. . .it is not enough to recognise that movement is engendered by contradiction; one must clearly picture the state in which a contradiction gives rise to movement.'' According to Mao Tse-tung, a contradiction has two states: (1) the state of unity (identity) and (2) the state of split unity. In its first state movement, "in ordinary life, is called rest, immutability, immobility, death, stagnation, deadlock, equilibrium, peace, uniformity, harmony, unity, alliance''. This, he says, is a specific form of movement. A movement enters its usual state, Mao says, when unity is split. This signifies "struggle, life, movement, instability, animation, change, disharmony, disequilibrium, and collision that grows into conflict and war''.
The initial state of a contradiction, according to this pattern, is unity and equilibrium. But this state is "relative, temporary and conditional''. The next state of a contradiction is split unity and disequilibrium. This, he says, is absolute. The pattern of movement, as he sees it, is: equilibrium 55 ---disequilibrium. But how is the transition effected from a state of equilibrium to a state of disequilibrium? In the Yenan lecture he simply postulates that identity, unity, rest, death and other relative states, i.e., equilibrium, are included in the absolute state of struggle, i.e., disequilibrium.
When Mao Tse-tung rewrote this part of the lecture into an essay for his Selected Works, he sought to make it sound scientifically tenable by using pseudo-Marxist terminology. Instead of contradictions in a state of unity and split unity, he wrote of two states of a thing in their movement: the state of relative rest and the state of absolute change. His explanation of the transition of a thing from one state to another is: "When the movement of a thing assumes the first form, it only undergoes a quantitative but not a qualitative change and consequently appears in a state of seeming rest. When the movement of a thing assumes the second form it has already reached a certain culminating point of the quantitative change of the first form, caused the dissolution of the entity, produced a qualitative change, and consequently appears as conspicuous change.''^^*^^ Thus, according to Mao Tse-tung, a ``dismemberment'' or a ``split'' of the entity occurs when a thing is in a state of qualitative change, in a leap, as a result of the disturbance of the equilibrium inherent in the first state.
By disturbing this equilibrium, Mao Tse-tung argues, the second state thereby resolves the contradiction, i.e., it determines the appearance of a new phenomenon and, consequently, of a new equilibrium. His "theory of disequilibrium" thus acquires the following pattern: "equilibrium---disturbance of equilibrium, or disequilibrium---new equilibrium''. In a textbook Dialectical Materialism, published in Peking, Mao Tse-tung's "theory of disequilibrium" is formulated as follows: equilibrium---disequilibrium---restoration of equilibrium.
This does not in any way differ from the mechanistic "theory of equilibrium''. When we examine the similarities and differences between the "theory of equilibrium" and the "theory of disequilibrium'', it must be noted that abstract, formal identity is the point of departure in both theories. "Split unity" appears subsequently, at the moment of a leap, at the moment equilibrium is disturbed. The _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tifng, Vol. 2, p. 48.
56 dialectical contradiction is not the impulse of development but the final moment, the result, stemming not as the immanent stimulus of development but as the result of the external causes upsetting the equilibrium. A change of quality restores the equilibrium and so on ad infinitum.The "theory of equilibrium" is not something new encountered by Marxism-Leninism; this theory had long ago been criticised by Marxists as untenable and incompatible with materialist dialectics. It will be recalled that Nikolai Bukharin, an exponent of the "theory of equilibrium" and one of the most active adversaries of Marxist dialectics, distinguished a stable and an unstable equilibrium in every existing system. A system is stable when its opposite aspects are in a state of equilibrium. It becomes unstable when the equilibrium of the aspects is upset (the Maoist state of disequilibrium). The restoration of equilibrium ensures the new stability of the system (compare with Mao Tse-tung's: "it is necessary to secure equilibrium and unity'').
In a book entitled The Philosophy of Living Experience Alexander Bogdanov, a zealous proponent of the "theory of equilibrium'', wrote: "From equilibrium through the struggle of two forces disturbing it to new equilibrium."^^*^^ Earlier, in the 19th century, the same argument was offered by Herbert Spencer in First Principles, from which Bogdanov drew his knowledge. But this is exactly the pattern of Mao Tse-tung's equilibrium---disequilibrium---new equilibrium. Mao Tsetung has thus reduced dialectics to the mechanistic theory of equilibrium, only giving it a new name.
His "theory of disequilibrium" rests on his metaphysical method---empiricism and bare analysis. In a speech on propaganda at the National Conference of the CPC on March 12, 1957, he identified the analytical with the dialectical method. "The analytical method,'' he declared, "is the dialectical method.''^^**^^
However, the method of scientific cognition is much more complex than a simple analysis. Dialectics is inconceivable without unity between analysis and synthesis. It presupposes the analytical dismemberment of the concrete whole into its _-_-_
^^*^^ The Philosophy of Living Experience, Gosizdat, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1920, p. 197.
^^**^^ Excerpts from the Works of Chairman Mao, 2nd Chinese ed., Peking, 1966, p. 223.
57 elements and the subsequent synthesising activity of cognition, in the course of which the concrete whole is reproduced and the contradictions intrinsic to it are brought to light.Progressive dialectical development from the lower to the higher is accomplished through the spontaneous emergence and settlement of contradictions. However, the Maoist "theory of disequilibrium" with its cyclic pattern of `` equilibrium---disequilibrium---equilibrium'' creates only the appearance of a progressive movement in accordance with the law of negation of the negation. Actually, it is a theory of viciously infinite rotation, of two alternating states of a phenomenon, whatever reservations Mao Tse-tung cares to make. Rotation does not settle contradiction.
The vicious infinity of alternating states of things is expressed by Mao Tse-tung in a number of formulas. For instance, he writes: "Practice, knowledge, more practice, more knowledge; the cyclical repetition of this pattern to infinity.''^^*^^ The analogous pattern ``unity---criticism---unity'' likewise rests on the endless rotation of the same forms. The same pattern is seen in the triad: summing up of experience ---taking it to the masses---new summing up of experience. Or the formula of the development of knowledge: specific--- general---specific, and so on.^^**^^
Here and there Mao Tse-tung states that development follows an ascending curve. But these are only words, because the formula of cyclical repetition does not express an ascent. Dialectical movement is accomplished not along a circle but along a spiral. In the Philosophical Notebooks Lenin stressed that a return to the old is a return to the "seemingly old'', and not a reproduction of the old. Dialectics gives the formula of progress, while the theory of equilibrium or disequilibrium offers the formula of a viciously infinite rotation along one and the same circle.
Mao Tse-tung regards the settlement of a contradiction as the eradication of the ``bad'' and the leaving of the ``good''. Marx, it will be remembered, criticised a similar assertion by Proudhon. "The very setting of the problem of eliminating the bad side,'' he wrote, "cuts short the dialectic movement.''^^***^^ When a contradiction is settled, both its sides _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, p. 297.
^^**^^ Ibid., Vol. 2,_p. 23.
^^***^^ Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Moscow, 1966, p. 98.
58 disappear, and a new phenomenon arises with its own new contradictions. Mao Tse-tung does not understand the dialectical nature of opposites, and he is, therefore, unable to understand their unity, unfolding or struggle.Filling materialist dialectics with terms alien to its content, the Mao group uses ``Marxist'' phraseology as a screen for its divisive activities in the world communist movement. After starting subversive activities in the socialist camp and the world communist movement, the Maoists held a philosophical discussion on the law of unity and the struggle of opposites in 1962. At this discussion the "unity of opposites'', "split unity" and other concepts were interpreted in a spirit calculated to create the ``theoretical'' justification of their divisive activities. This was candidly stated by Hungchi, the Maoist theoretical journal: "Under the present conditions of the class struggle in the world and in the country, the CPC Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung emphasise that use must be made of the concept of 'split unity' and the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle against modern revisionism"',^^*^^ meaning, above all, the activity of the CPSU. Accordingly, the Maoists began tailoring many propositions of Marxism and falsifying them.
Every philosophical problem of Marxism has been distorted in the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. For instance, he replaces the problem of the main link in a chain of phenomena with the problem of the main contradictions in the mass of contradictions inherent in a given phenomenon. Moreover, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, as the principal contradiction of modern times, is played down in favour of the contradiction between the metropolises and the colonies. According to Mao Tse-tung, the national liberation movement is the principal movement of our day, while the working-class movement is secondary.^^**^^
This sort of substitution is distinctly traceable in the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" on the predominant significance of the "world village'', and on the "world city" being surrounded by the "world village''. This ``thought'' clashes with the proposition, formulated at international meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties, that the principal contradiction of our epoch is between socialism (the proletariat) and _-_-_
^^*^^ Hungchi, No. 16, 1964.
^^**^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, pp. 35--36.
59 capitalism (the bourgeoisie). The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" on the "world village" was clearly set forth by Lin Piao in Hungchi: "If one takes the whole world, then North America and Western Europe may be called the 'world city', while Asia, Africa and Latin America may be called the 'world village'. Since the Second World War the revolutionary proletarian movement has been on the downgrade in the capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe, while the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has unfolded on an unprecedented scale. In this sense, the modern world revolution presents a picture of the towns being surrounded by the village" (my italics.---A.R.)^^*^^To further his political designs Mao Tse-tung deliberately misrepresents also the problem of antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions. He links the settlement of antagonistic contradictions with external forces, saying, for example: "A bomb, before the explosion, is an entity in which contradictory things temporarily coexist because of certain conditions. The explosion takes place only when a new condition (ignition) is present.''^^**^^ Consequently, in order to make a bomb explode, its content has to be influenced from without. Thus, there is no spontaneous development, no real settlement of contradictions (if the ``bomb'' is the symbol of the unity of opposites). This interpretation of the settlement of contradictions serves as the theoretical foundation for the "export of revolution''.
In the works of Mao Tse-tung the distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions is, in effect, reduced to how a contradiction is settled---peacefully or nonpeacefully. The distinction, therefore, lies not in the relations of exploitation, which give social relations an antagonistic character, but in the way the contradiction is solved.
It must be borne in mind that the possibility of resolving antagonistic contradictions peacefully does not change the social nature of an antagonistic contradiction. As regards the conversion of non-antagonistic into antagonistic contradictions, Mao Tse-tung again reduces this to a problem of how the contradiction is resolved.
_-_-_^^*^^ "Long Live Victory in the People's War'', Hungchi, Vol. 2, No. 10, 1965.
^^**^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2, p. 50.
60The same concerns the Maoist interpretation of other key propositions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The law of the transition from quantity to quality is replaced with a voluntaristic concept that a leap can be accomplished regardless of whether the material and social prerequisites have matured for society's transition to a new and higher stage of development (the theory and practice of the "big leap'', the mass production of metal by primitive methods, and so on).
Maoism totally ignores the dialectical law of negation of the negation, according to which development, progress and the appearance of the new presuppose the preservation of everything of value accumulated at preceding stages of social development. This was demonstrated with striking clarity during the "cultural revolution''. In spite of the teaching of the classics of Marxism-Leninism that all the achievements of human culture of all the preceding ages must be mastered, the Maoists proclaimed that they were building a new, proletarian communist culture on the ruins of the old culture, of all that mankind had accumulated in the course of its development. It may be said that the "thought of Mao Tsetung" has come into a most acute contradiction with the national, human foundations of Chinese culture, destroying them along with the long-established norms of behaviour and morals of the Chinese people. Maoism encourages the desecration of the graves of progressive Chinese leaders, for instance, the grave of Chu Chiu-po, the defamation of the memory of militant democrats who died in the revolution, popular writers (Lao She and others), and prominent figures in science and art (Chi Pai-shih and others). This is profoundly inimical to the feelings of the Chinese people.
The "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', which is a set of philistine and in most cases eclectic ideas of an anarchist and idealistic order, has nothing in common with Marxist-- Leninist philosophy. It is widely used by the Mao group as the theoretical foundation for its assault on all adversaries with the purpose of strengthening its hold on the country.
This ``thought'' is fundamentally at variance with the very principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the mission of remoulding society along socialist lines, a mission which history has assigned to the proletariat, heading the working masses.
Kommunist, No. 2, 1969, pp. 91--106
[61] __ALPHA_LVL2__ IdeologicalK. Ivanov
A new Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist party was, in effect, formed at the 9th Congress of the CPC in April 1969. This ``Congress'', with the glorious name of the Communist Party of China to camouflage it, was used by the Maoists to screen their military-political coup and legalise their usurpation of political and state power. The materials of the ``Congress'' (the report delivered by Lin Piao and the new "Constitution of the CPC'') show that Mao Tse-tung's chauvinistic and adventurist views continue to be given out as modern Marxism-Leninism, that the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of the Maoists continues to be called the " dictatorship of the proletariat'', and that their divisive activities and policy of forming and uniting splinter groups of renegades and traitors to the Communist and Workers' Parties continues to be called "proletarian internationalism''. The Maoists are keeping up their campaigns of slander against the USSR and other socialist countries, which are the decisive force of the contemporary age in the struggle for peace and socialism and comprise the mainstay of the peoples of the world in the liberation struggle against imperialist reaction.
In the sphere of foreign policy the activities of the Mao group may be qualified as a frenzied ideological and political assault on the world communist movement. As was noted by L. I. Brezhnev at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, "from polemics with the Communist Parties the CPC leaders went on to splitting, subversive activity, to active attempts to set the revolutionary forces of our day against each other. From cutting off their ties with the socialist countries to hostile acts against them. From criticism of peaceful coexistence to the staging of armed conflicts, to a policy undermining the cause of peace''.^^*^^ The adventurism in foreign and domestic policy, the unprincipled bid for hegemony in the communist _-_-_
^^*^^ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, 1969, p. 157.
62 movement and the unremitting attempts to engineer a clash between socialist countries and bring about a world war between the main socialist and capitalist countries attest to the immense ideological and moral degradation of the Maoist leadership and its transition to a socio-political stand that is fundamentally hostile to communism and socialism. "The facts show,'' L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "that the Chinese leadership only speaks of struggle against imperialism while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, in deeds. It helps the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at times of acute international crisis. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union movement, and so on.''^^*^^All this is further evidence that Maoism is an extremely reactionary and double-faced variant of petty-bourgeois ideology. Maoism's real ambitions have nothing in common with the pseudo-Marxist verbiage that it uses as a screen. This is the typical language of the Maoists which they have evolved by paraphrasing indisputable, Marxist propositions and giving a Sinicised slant to Marxist-Leninist formulations quoted at random. These propositions and formulations are given the appearance of sayings similar to the traditional maxims in the Confucian Four Books or in the Five Books of the sages which the Chinese people understand and are familiar with. All this conglomerate is given out as a combination of the general truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In reality this is the practice of petty-bourgeois nationalism, the double-dealing of a chauvinistic ideologist who chooses to understand and interpret Marxism as he sees fit. The policy pursued by the Maoists cannot be regarded as accidental or as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. Essentially, it represents "a large-scale attack on the world communist and working-class movement, ... on our world outlook, on Marxism-Leninism''.^^**^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Ibid., p. 159.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 180.
63There is a definite logic in the ideological evolution of Maoism. In this article we shall examine some aspects of this evolution.
The Great-Power chauvinism is theoretically substantiated in the philosophical discourses of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters.
For instance, in 1964 the Maoists organised a broad philosophical discussion of the concept of "split unity''. They claimed that Mao Tse-tung's "great contribution" was in allegedly being the first to apply the "dialectics of the split unity" to the solution of major political problems. For the Mao group the essence of this ``dialectics'' boils down to a ``philosophical'' justification of its divisive policies. For example, an editorial carried jointly on February 4, 1964 by Jenmin Jihpao and Hungchi states that all things tend to split and that, therefore, the split in the contemporary international working-class movement is inevitable, that it is ``normal'' and even ``useful''. All who speak of the unity of opposites and "the merging of two beginnings" are accused of revisionism and of "siding with the Soviet revisionists''.
Moreover, it is quite evident that in analysing the contemporary international situation and in the question of the main and leading force of the anti-imperialist struggle, in particular, Mao Tse-tung and his group subjectively and pragmatically apply the dialectics of the principal and the non-principal contradictions, arbitrarily determining what is principal and what is non-principal.
Along with Marxist propositions borrowed mainly from the popular Soviet literature of the 1930s, the philosophical works of Mao Tse-tung contain a series of anti-scientific, mechanistical arguments. For example, in the work entitled On Contradiction he examines the law of unity and struggle of opposites not as a law of development by virtue of inner contradictions but as a simple combination of pairs of externally opposite sides (above and below, difficulty and facility, misfortune and good fortune, and so on) and their change relative to each other.
This metaphysical, anti-Marxist understanding of the law of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably brings him round to rejecting this key law of materialist dialectics in 64 favour of the theory of equilibrium. He wrote, for example: "In our country we annually draw up an economic development plan and establish the corresponding proportions between accumulation and consumption. This equilibrium is a temporary and relative unity of opposites. A year passes and, generally speaking, this equilibrium is upset by the struggle of opposites, this unity changes and equilibrium gives way to disequilibrium, unity ceases to be unity, and in the next year we have again to strive for equilibrium and unity.. . In this connection, subjective regulation sometimes does not conform to objective reality, contradictions arise and the equilibrium is lost. This is called making a mistake. Contradictions continuously arise and are continuously settled, and this is precisely the dialectical law of the development of things and phenomena.''^^*^^
The theory of equilibrium is thus given out for materialist dialectics and serves the Mao group as a means of justifying the failures and setbacks of its economic policy.
A specific of Mao Tse-tung's method is his abstract approach to all the key categories of Marxist philosophy. This approach serves the definite pragmatic purpose of substantiating and justifying the Mao group's adventurist policies. Further evidence of this is to be found in Mao Tse-tung's On Practice.
In this work it is asserted over and over again that the "viewpoint of practice is the first and basic viewpoint in the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism'', that it is necessary to "discover truth through practice, and through practice to verify and develop truth'', and so on. However, under cover of Marxist phrases of this kind, he completely strips the concepts ``practice'' and ``truth'' of their materialist content. In his interpretation of practice, the materialist essence of the Marxist theory of knowledge---"the recognition of the external world and the reflection thereof in the minds of men"^^**^^---disappears. Mao Tse-tung does not, of course, reject this materialist principle either. He writes, for instance: "If man wants to achieve success in his work.. . he must make his thoughts correspond to the laws of the objective world surrounding him; if they do not correspond, _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung, The Correct Solution of the Contradictions Witliin a Nation, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1957, p. 17.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 29.
65 he will fail in practice.''^^*^^ But he regards the objective external world with all its laws abstractly as a "clean sheet of paper" designed for the voluntaristic ``creativity'' of the most ``brilliant'' subject himself. He views the Chinese people as such a "clean sheet of paper" on which the "newest and most beautiful pictures" may be drawn.Inasmuch as ``practice'' interpreted in this manner is at variance with the real practice of Mao Tse-tung and with the theory officially proclaimed by him, it naturally loses its basic quality, that of being the criterion of truth. Hence Mao Tse-tung's pragmatic conclusion that only what leads to success is correct, and what leads to failure is wrong and erroneous.
Further, by metaphysically counterposing rational knowledge to sensuous perception, and theory to practice, and linking practice solely with sensuous perception, Mao Tsetung deprives practice of its rational character and rules out the possibility of its scientific (non-voluntaristic) development.
This metaphysical interpretation of these two degrees of knowledge, as a result of which practice is given an irrational character, serves Mao Tse-tung as the point of departure for substantiating voluntarism. This was the " philosophical foundation" for slogans such as "politics are the commanding force" and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung is a powerful spiritual atomic bomb''.
Mao Tse-tung's philosophical views are thus incompatible with either truth or science, because by coming into contact with one or the other the "absolute authority of the great helmsman" risks bursting like a soap bubble. That is why the Maoists pathologically fear scientific knowledge, trample it into the dust, destroy the cultural heritage, massacre intellectuals and pursue a policy designed to stupefy the people.
Inasmuch as truth and science are alien to Maoism, it sees its only salvation in sophistry, the constant travelling companion of subjective idealism and voluntarism.
For the Maoists sophistry is a particularly acceptable means of disguising the substance of their reactionary, idealistic views and of distorting facts through subterfuges camouflaged by externally ``wise'' reasoning.
_-_-_^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, pp. 283--84, 297.
66It must be noted that the sophistry of the Maoists has its roots in the idealistic philosophy of Ancient China. It noticeably manifests itself in Confucius, who in the chronicle Springs and Autumns arbitrarily characterised and nicknamed the political leaders of his day in order to compel people to submit to the despotism of the ancestral nobility, so that "the rebels and crafty people among the royal servants trembled with fear" (Mencius, Collected Works, Chapter Ten Wen-kung, Chinese ed.). This sort of sophistry was further developed by Huai Shih and Kung Sun-lung (4th-3rd century B.C.). They preached that all concepts of things are established by man and are of a relative nature: "A dog may be called a ram'', "a white dog may be called black''.^^*^^
With the same lack of restraint the Maoists slap insulting labels like "servitors of imperialism" and "modern revisionists" on leaders of the communist movement and on entire parties. The naive demagogy of the Maoists, who call imperialism a "paper tiger'', originates from the same source.
What is the reason for the scholastic nature of the Maoist ``philosophy'' and for its hostile attitude to science and truth? The explanation, we believe, is to be found in nationalist narrowness, which was cultivated over the course of many centuries by the ruling classes of feudal China. Their standpoint was that nothing foreign merited attention because China was the "summit of world civilisation''. This nationalist understanding of spiritual culture could not help but profoundly influence the various social strata of present-day China; it has unquestionably influenced Maoism. It is not surprising, therefore, that while claiming to being the " absolute authority" in all the problems of the world and to being the "ultimate judges'', Mao Tse-tung and his group ignore the experience of the communist movement in other countries and flout collectively worked out decisions on basic problems of the tactics and strategy of the communist movement at the present stage. Nor is it surprising that Mao Tse-tung's philosophical views took shape in isolation from the main line in the development of philosophical thought, _-_-_
^^*^^ A point to be noted is that like their Ancient Greek counterparts, the Ancient Chinese sophists played a positive role in the development of dialectical ideas.
67 which has absorbed all of the world's achievements in the natural science and in philosophical thinking. The "summit of world Marxist philosophy'', as Chinese propaganda calls the views of Mao Tse-tung, thus stands on the sand of the solitary Chinese island.This ``island'', which Mao Tse-tung is using as a springboard for his "philosophical take-off'', has been specially prepared by him and deliberately purged of the materialist, progressive and democratic ideas accumulated by Chinese society. Borrowing and successiveness are highly typical of Maoism. The Maoists choose to include in their ideological arsenal not the wealth of materialist and democratic traditions of Chinese philosophy but the debris of reactionary ideologies and conservative elements of the most diverse ideological trends in Chinese history, and they are adapting these debris to justify their ideological and political platform.
The history of Chinese thought is rich in materialist and democratic traditions. By criticising idealism and mysticism, the ancient Chinese materialists helped to promote scientific knowledge and social progress. They were opposed to subjectivism and anarchy both in the process of knowledge and in the settlement of socio-political and ethical problems, demanding that things should be understood as they were "without adding anything to them or subtracting anything from them''.^^*^^ While respecting the finest traditions of the past, they constantly put forward new ideas aimed at "mastering things''. Many of them sided with the humiliated and the oppressed and condemned social injustice and the despotism of the ruling nobility. By acting in the interests of historical progress and spreading some democratic ideas they shook the foundations on which the ancestor cult and the cult of kings and emperors rested.
All these progressive traditions of ancient Chinese philosophy were further developed in the works of Wang Chung, Fan Chen, Chang Tsai, Fan Yi-chih, Wang Chuanshan, Tai Chen, Tan Ssu-tung and many other eminent _-_-_
^^*^^ Kuan 'I'su, Chapter Hsin Shu Shang, p. 221; Collected Works «/ the Sages, Vol. 5, Chinese ed., Shanghai, 1930.
68 materialist philosophers, who levelled scathing and wellargumented criticism at Confucianist idealism, Buddhist and Taoist scholasticism and the ethical-political doctrines of the ideologists of Chinese feudalism. These traditions provided the ideological foundation for the democratic and patriotic teaching of Sun Yat-sen, who, after the October Socialist Revolution, formulated the three cardinal principles underlying the struggle of the Chinese people for national and social liberation. These principles were: "Alliance with Soviet Russia; alliance with the Communists; support of the workers and peasants.'' These same principles were the bedrock of the Marxist-Leninist line charted by Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po and their comrades-in-arms in the CPC.The materialist, democratic and patriotic traditions of Chinese thought clash with the spirit of Maoism and undermine its foundations. This is admitted even by the Maoists. For instance, they write that the progressive traditions of the past might "eclipse the light of the thought of Mao Tsetung" and "paralyse the feeling of love for Chairman Mao and his works" (Chungkuo Chingnien Pao, August 6, 1966). Small wonder, therefore, that the anti-popular, idealistic line in the spiritual traditions of China and primarily the reactionary trend in Confucianism were used as the principal ideological mainspring of Maoism.
A few preliminary remarks must be made regarding the influence of Confucianism on Maoism.
Like the teaching of Confucius (6th-5th century B.C.), Confucianism as a whole is extremely complex. Confucius was one of Ancient China's greatest scholars and the custodian of her cultural values. The private school founded by him was the initial stage of the formation and development of the system of education and schools. There are many rational ideas in Confucius's teaching. However, he was an ardent champion of the interests and privileges of the hereditary clan nobility, which in his day was in the throes of disintegration and decline as a result of the emergence of private ownership and the development of exchange. All his thoughts and activity were directed towards restoring the outworn socio-political system of the early period of the Chou dynasty (2nd-1st millennium B.C.).
Even in the ancient period of development of Confucianism a materialist trend (Hsun Tzu) came into being alongside the 69 established idealistic trend (Mericius). In the Middle Ages, at least in the period when the feudal system took shape and gained strength (4th-7th century), Confucianism played a certain progressive role when it opposed the domination of Buddhism in all spheres of the country's socio-political and cultural life. Materialist and democratic trends are clearly traceable in the theories propounded by some exponents of Confucianism (Han Yu, Chang Tsai and others).
When we speak of Confucianism as an ideological mainspring of Maoism, we have in mind its principal trend, namely, the leading trend in the ideology and policy of feudalism, which predominated in China for many centuries.
First, let us note what the Mao cult has externally in common with the cult of Confucius. The image of Mao Tse-tung as the "brightest sun" stems directly from the traditional image of Confucius as a "divine deity" by whose will state administration is implemented and under the ``rays'' of whose ideas life flourishes on earth.
In line with this interpretation of Confucius, the agents of the Kuomintang reaction proclaimed Confucianism as the "ideological foundation" of human progress and prosperity, and prophesied that in one way or another all the nations of the world would ultimately follow the road charted by Confucius. Today the cult of Mao Tse-tung, of the "brightest sun'', must show the peoples the road to a better life.
The Mao cult fulfils the same functions as Confucianism ---the cultivation of submissiveness and blind obedience. This aim is served by jen (``philanthropy'', ``humanism''), which is the central category of the Confucius teaching, and by the co-related concepts of chung (``fidelity to the lord''), yi (``duty'') and others. Confucius and his followers paid particular attention to the concept hsiao (``filial piety'') in the belief that "those who revere their parents and respect their elders rarely fail to obey their superiors''.^^*^^ Commenting on patriarchal traditions and popular customs in their own way, the Confucianists thus used them to educate people in the spirit of blind obedience to the ruling nobility. This Confucianist method is now widely used by the Maoists to educate the hungweiping fanatics.
_-_-_^^*^^ Talks and Discourses (Confucius), Chapter "Hsiu Erh'', p. 3; Collected Works of the Sages, Vol. 1, Chinese cd.
70The cult of Mao and the cult of Confucianism have a common ideological foundation---dogmatism and subjectivism.
Even the way Maoism is propagated, for example, the memorising of quotations from the works of Mao Tse-tung, is reminiscent of medieval Confucianist education. In feudal times, the Confucianist teaching, expounded in the Four Books and the Five Books as a dogma was learned by heart at all schools. Every pupil had to memorise numerous dicta of Confucius and his disciples, usually without understanding their meaning. ``Scientists'' who had memorised these dicta became eligible for office in the government. This practice, cultivated by the feudal nobility in the course of many centuries, became a "national tradition'', which in China today is the main form of propagating the "Sinicised Marxism" of Mao Tse-tung. These medieval methods of bringing up Confucianist fanatics and devoted servitors of the feudal nobility are today used to bring up mechanical ``cogs'' blindly fulfilling the will of Mao Tse-tung and his group.
Like medieval Confucianism, the dogmatism of the Mao group suppresses initiative and turns man into a fanatic executor of the will of the ruling clique, depriving him of reason and knowledge. This is bluntly put by the Maoist fanatics, who say: "We do not need brains---our minds are armed with the thought of Mao.''
Confucianist dogmatism demands the unconditional observance of patriarchal-clan traditions. Confucius held that Heaven's will was embodied in the traditions established by ancestors---the wise rulers of ancient times. He classified these traditions under the heading li (``ceremony'', ``etiquette'') and insisted that they were sacrosanct.
The only difference between the dogmatism of Mao Tsetung and Confucianism is that in line with the spirit of the times he does not refer to Heaven's will and ancestors. Maoism can afford to dispense with "celestial volition" and ancestors (``wise rulers of ancient times'') because Mao Tsetung's supporters have long ago turned him into a "living deity" and, as Maoist propaganda maintains, all the wisdom accumulated by mankind is concentrated in Mao Tse-tung.
Confucius asserted that in the Celestial Empire the life of people depended entirely on wise rulers. The rulers, he 71 said, were like the wind, and their subjects were like the grass: the grass bent in the direction the wind blew. 11 rulers governed wisely, the people "would work without a murmur''.^^*^^ "Ordinary people,'' he said, should not reason over the affairs of state, and they had "to be made to follow obediently and should not be allowed to know everything''.^^**^^
The subjectivist idealistic views of Confucius were enlarged on by his disciple Mencius (5th-4th century B.C.).
Subsequently, in combination with the Buddhist intuitionism of the Chan sect and passing through several stages of development the subjectivist idealistic doctrines of Confucius and Mencius evolved into a system in the teaching of the leading neo-Confucianist Wang Yang-ming (1472--1528 or 1529). Wang Yang-ming held: "No things and no laws governing them exist outside my reasoning" and "the essence of all things is the product of my reasoning.''^^***^^ He himself maintained that the cardinal aim of his teaching was "to cleanse the hearts of men of all vestiges of egoistic ambition''.^^****^^ In other words, man must meekly endure all privations and any oppression, and blindly obey the powers that be.
Neo-Confucianist subjective idealism quite naturally became the ideological source of the Mao group's adventurist and nationalistic views. It is not difficult to see the direct link between Wang Yang-ming's declaration that "things are the product of my reasoning" and the arbitrary determination of the country's development, the striving to speed up history and the reluctance to abide by the laws of economic and social development.
Even phenomena like the Maoists' rejection of the importance of material incentives and their absolutisation of the factor of political influence over the masses spring directly from Chu Hsi's (1130--1200) neo-Confucianist theory that the nature of man is dual. According to this theory there are two origins in things: li (``law'', ``order'') as the reasonable creative force, and chi (``air'', ``ether'') as the passive matter. In man the first origin gives rise to the _-_-_
^^*^^ Talks and Discourses (Confucius], Chapter "Yao Yuyeh'', p. 417.
^^**^^ Ibid., Chapter "Tai Po'', p. 161.
^^***^^ Hou Wai-lu and Others, A General History of Cliincsc Ideology, Vol. 4, Part 2, Chinese ed., Peking, 1960, p. 884.
^^****^^ Ibid., p. 899.
72 positive quality of striving to do good, and the second to the negative quality of succumbing to sense temptations. Chu Hsi's doctrine was that while developing his intrinsic desire to do good man had to curb his aspiration for material benefits. He regarded education in the Confucianist spirit as the decisive factor, holding that the purpose of such education was to preserve and strengthen the heaven-endowed good beginning in man and check his ``whims'', "his egoistical aspirations'', in other words, to curb man's desire to satisfy his requirements.Chu Hsi's theory of man and the views of the Maoists have one and the same ideological foundation---the absolutisation of the role of education and disregard of the need to satisfy man's material requirements. The sole difference is that while Chu Hsi's theory pursued the object of serving the interests of the feudal nobility, Maoism justifies the adventurist and nationalistic policies of Mao Tse-tung and his followers.
When we speak of the ideological mainsprings of Maoism it would be wrong to confine ourselves to a comparison between it and Confucianism without mentioning other trends in the history of Chinese thought, for example, Legalism and Taoism, from which the Maoists borrowed some elements to substantiate the "Sinicisation of Marxism''. Every materialist and progressive ideological trend in history has had its negative aspects and historical limitations. The Maoists adopted these negative elements and adapted them to their own ends.
Lao Tzu's materialist teaching of Tao, of the natural way of things, was used by the Legalists (Han Fei and others) as the basis for what in those days were progressive sociological views and to put forward a clear political programme of struggle for the eradication of survivals of the patriarchalclan system, the elimination of inter-state partitions which hampered the country's economic development, and the creation of a centralised, united Chinese state. They believed that the basic means of putting this programme into effect were the establishment of a legislative body, the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the hereditary nobility, the enhancement of imperial authority in all spheres of the country's political and economic life, the conversion of the rural commune from the owner of the land to a self-- 73 governing association of free landowners, the encouragement of agriculture as the main vehicle for building up the state's economic might, the intensification of the state's coercive functions towards its subjects, the improvement of military art and the conduct of wars of aggrandizement.
The Legalists held the view that if the state could concentrate all the efforts of the people on agriculture and war over a long period of time it would grow powerful and ultimately win world domination. Shang Yang, a prominent Legalist, is credited with saying that "those who learn to fight will pass through the gates of war to wealth and eminence, and those who are obstinate and disobedient must be punished without mercy'', and then "everybody will say: the main thing is war, nothing else''.^^*^^
In domestic policy the Legalists accentuated the punitive function of the state, and in foreign policy they highlighted offensive wars. This was demanded by the historical development of Chinese society in those remote times.
A fierce ideological and political struggle raged between Legalism and Confucianism in the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. Confucianism was defeated utterly. At the next stage, towards the end of the 2nd century B.C., when the Chinese state was in the main united as the Han Empire, its coercive function receded into the background, giving way to education and to ideological and moral influences. Under these conditions the Confucianists gained the upper hand over their ideological rivals from the Legalist camp. Legalism gradually disappeared from the historical scene and Confucianism won recognition as the official state ideology. However, the Confucianists who took over the administration of the centralised Han state had to incorporate in their teaching of "humane administration" the Legalist idea that the state had to pursue its coercive function through legislation.
From this period onwards the political doctrine of Confucianism, which subsequently became the predominant ideology of Chinese feudalism, incorporated two elements: the concept of the ``humane'' function of the state and its punitive function. In different periods of medieval China, depending on the specific historical situation, these aspects _-_-_
^^*^^ L. S. Perelomov, Book of the Shang Province Ruler, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1968, p. 208.
74 gained in prominence, alternately. However, the punitive function of the state, which the Legalists had earlier applied solely to crush the resistance of conservative social forces to social progress, was now directed mainly against insurgent peasants and the anti-feudal opposition and implemented in the wars of aggrandizement against neighbouring tribes and peoples.Today the coercive function of the state, conceived by the Legalists as a means of achieving historical progress, and the ideas of compulsion directed against the people in their Confucianist interpretation are used by the Maoists for their anti-socialist line in domestic policy and for their adventurist, chauvinistic line in foreign policy. This aggressive foreign policy is spearheaded chiefly at the Soviet Union, which has contributed so much to the victory of the Chinese revolution and towards the establishment of socialism in China.
The chauvinistic and adventurist aspirations of Maoism are thus nourished not only by the feudal Confucianist ideology but also by earlier progressive but subsequently modified ideas of the ancient Chinese Legalists. Further evidence of this is the almost total coincidence of the arguments of the Maoists and those of the ancient Chinese Legalists about war as the only way to settle all socio-political problems. Their only difference is that the Maoists regard war as the sole universal means of bringing their reactionary hegemonistic designs to fruition, while for the Legalists war was a potent means of fighting for social progress.
Moreover, the most diverse reactionary elements of the different trends in China's history are being concentrated as ideological weapons in the Maoist arsenal. Take, for instance, the Maoist policy of stupefying the people, a policy whose roots go deep into antiquity and which was pursued in one way or another by Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism.
Yu min chenchieh or "policy of stupefying the people" was pursued by Confucianism in ancient times with the aim of giving the hereditary clan nobility influence over the people and upholding the patriarchal-clan traditions of ancestors. Taoism and Legalism put forward the idea of stupefying the people as a reaction to the spread of Confucianist ideas. The exponents of Taoism believed that the Confucianist social-ethical teaching was corrupting the people, 75 leading to rebellion and upsetting the natural way of life. Lao Tzu, for instance, called the Confucianist ethical-moral teaching a "great hypocrisy''. The Legalists argued that if the ethical ideas of Confucianism became widespread the "ruler would be unable to force (the people) to fight and the state would inescapably be dismembered and would ultimately perish''.^^*^^
The Maoists borrowed from the experience accumulated by the ruling classes of the past and created a developed system of manipulating individuals and masses. Their policy of stupefying the people is directed towards blocking the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the country and halting the growth of socialist consciousness among the working people by fanning nationalistic passions and propagating antiSovietism. This policy is facilitated by the people's total isolation from the outside world and by the veil of secrecy over the actions of the leadership and over what is happening in the country.
In ancient Chinese thought there are two distinct lines: the line of Lao Tzu and the line of Confucius. Their teachings differ on all the basic problems of philosophy and ideology.
Feudal Confucian traditions were glorified in Chinese literature in the course of many centuries, while heretic ideological trends, Taoism above all, were distorted and disparaged. This Confucianist approach to the history of Chinese thought is kept alive by bourgeois scholars in China herself and in the West, particularly in the USA. The Maoists have given this line a specific form.
While verbally dissociating themselves from Confucianism, the Maoists in fact give scholars, chiefly of the old school, every possibility of nourishing the traditional line of lauding Confucianism in a new way. For example, Feng Yu-lan asserts that all the basic ideas of Confucius in their ``pure'', "abstract form" must be applied in the period of socialist construction, too.^^**^^ Kuo Mo-jo has gone even farther than _-_-_
^^*^^ L. S. Perelomov, Book of the Shang Province Ruler, p. 157.
^^**^^ Feng Yu-lan, "The Successiveness of China's Philosophical Heritage'', in a collection Materials of the Debate on Problems of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Chinese ed., Peking, 1957, pp. 273--75.
76 that. Characterising Confucius as a ``materialist'' and `` revolutionary''^^*^^ and identifying his teaching with Marxism, he holds that compared with Confucius Marx produced nothing new.^^**^^ Chu Chien-chi, professor at Peking University, has drawn a far-reaching conclusion from this, declaring that Confucius was the founder of Chinese philosophy and that the philosophy evolved by him had a much greater impact on 18th century European philosophy than the philosophy of Ancient Greece. He writes that the influence of Chinese philosophy in Europe "was embodied, on the one hand, in French materialist philosophy and, on the other, in German idealistic dialectics''.^^***^^ Thus, according to Chu Chien-chi, Confucianist philosophy, which had glorified feudalism in China in the course of many centuries, is the ancient source of Marxism.The Maoists, for their part, in pursuance of their own special brand of Confucianism in their interpretation of the history of Chinese thought, savagely attack the ideological adversaries of Confucianism, chiefly Lao Tzu and Chuangtzu. For instance, in the works of Kuan Feng, who was a member of the "Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs'', the Tao of Lao Tzu are proclaimed the "absolute spirit'', while the teachings of Chuang-tzu are described as the "most reactionary nihilism''.^^****^^ The reason for this attitude of the Maoists to outstanding ancient scholars is that the latter's materialist ideas and scathing criticism of social injustice have become topical in the light of the Mao Tse-tung's adventurist policy. It is enough to quote the words of Chuang-tzu addressed to Confucius:
``You are sowing lies, spreading slander and imprudently lauding the (kings) Beautiful and Warlike. . .. You speak too much of erroneous teaching; you do not till the soil yet you eat; you do not weave yet you clothe your body. Smacking your lips and thrashing with your tongue, (you) by your _-_-_
^^*^^ Kuo Mo-jo, Philosophers of Ancient China, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1961, pp. 100--46.
^^**^^ Kuo Mo-jo, Laughter from the Dungeon, Chinese ed., Shanghai, 1950, p. 27.
^^***^^ Philosophical Studies, No. 4, 1957, Peking, pp. 48--57.
^^****^^ Materials of a Discussion of the Philosophy of Lao tzti, Chinese ed., Peking, 1957, p. 200; Kuan Feng, Translation, Commentary and Criticism of the "Inner Chapters of Chnang-tzu'', Chinese ed., pp. 5-6.
77 own arbitrary choice decide what is true and what is a He in order to mislead the rulers of the Celestial Kingdom and keep its sages from their labours. In your imprudence you have invented filial piety and fraternal obedience, and you are soliciting success from the rulers, from the rich arid the noble. Your crimes are grave.''^^*^^Naturally, words of this sort could not fail to arouse the anger of the Maoists. That is why, long before the "great cultural revolution'', they took up arms against the progressive philosophers of the past.
Thus, two seemingly conflicting lines---the line of Maoism and the line of anti-communism---converge not only on problems of contemporary international politics but also in the approach to the cultural traditions of China.
Voprosy filosofii, No. 7, 1969, pp. 40--50
_-_-_^^*^^ The Atheists, Materialists and Dialecticians of Ancient China. Translated into Russian by L. D. Posdneyeva, Moscrtjw, 1967, p. 204.
[78] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Destruction ofE. Batalov
The philosophical views of Mao Tse-tung, who, according to the "Communique of the llth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC'', "inherited, upheld and brilliantly, creatively and comprehensively developed Marxism-Leninism, and raised it to a new level'', is frequently called the "philosophy of practice" on the grounds that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is permeated with the spirit of creativity, that in this ``thought'' the doctrine of practice occupies a prominent place and serves as one of the theoretical foundations of the policy pursued by him.
Indeed, Mao Tse-tung discourses at length about `` practice'', about the "link between theory and practice''. Basically, the concept propounded by him does not clash with his policy with all its catastrophic consequences. On the contrary, it gives it theoretical foundation. A superficial reading of individual works (particularly random excerpts from these works) of Mao himself and of the active propagators of his ``thought'' in different countries may, it is true, create the illusion that Mao's concept of practice is similar to the Marxist views on this subject, and give the impression that in China today Marxist ``words'' are at variance with nonMarxist ``deeds'', especially if it is borne in mind that there are Marxist elements in Mao's concept, which has been built up with the aid of Marxist terminology and mirrors some of the real problems confronting socialist society and real trends of present-day social development.
However, we see no basic contradiction between the theory propounded by Mao Tse-tung and the practice pursued by him, or between his early and later theoretical works. During the decades in which the "thought of Mao" took shape, his views naturally underwent an evolution: with time (or temporarily) he tacitly abandoned some propositions, and developed others, revealing the secret of what formerly had seemed to be insignificant ``nuances'' and "shades of meaning'', thereby showing their deep-going theoretical and 79 political purport. Nonetheless, the "thought of Mao" has always performed the social function of substantiating and justifying his policies, while the evolution of this ``thought'' was directly or indirectly linked with the changes in his political line.
An analysis of the "thought of Mao'', taken in unity with the policy followed by his group,^^*^^ i.e., as a socially functioning system, allows us to draw the conclusion that Mao's concept of practice has nothing in common with the further development of Marxism-Leninism. Strictly speaking, it cannot be called Marxist at all. Similarly, it is neither a reproduction nor a development of any other philosophical concept---Confucianist, pragmatic and so on---known to history. Mao Tse-tung's concept of practice is specifically (by its structure, if not by the composition of its elements) the product of the concrete historical conditions obtaining in China, where the "thought of Mao'', which gives an ideal reflection of these conditions, was moulded.^^**^^
In characterising Marxist philosophy generally and gnosiology in particular, Mao Tse-tung underscores chiefly their _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung's policies must be scrutinised when we review his theoretical constructions because, as Jean-fimile Vidal correctly points out, "today the voluntaristic policies of the Maoists help us to see through some of their arguments, whose real meaning had until now eluded us" (J.-E. Vidal, Oil va la Chine? Paris, 1967, p. 263).
^^**^^ These are, first and foremost, China's economic backwardness, which, despite the availability of huge manpower resources unconnected with the means of production and in a situation witnessing a general speeding up of the rate of social development, is pushing the leadership towards a policy of settling all the contradictions of Chinese society through the enthusiasm of the people, and forcing them to move the accent to "subjective activity'', which they believe will ``compensate'' for the absence of the material prerequisites of progress.
Also among these conditions is China's relative seclusion, her isolation (both cultural and political) from the outside world. This hinders exchanges of all forms of experience and creates favourable soil for overrating the significance and scale of own experience.
Another condition is the social make-up of Chinese society: the numerically small working class, the preponderance of the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie and declassed elements, the significance of which in China is usually underestimated by observers. Lastly, the earthlyanthropological character of traditional Chinese philosophy (chiefly Buddhism and Confucianism), which accentuates the transformation of the ``spirit'', the mentality of the subject as the basic principle for changing the conditions ol his existence.
80 practical essence, leaving in the background what underlies practice. "The viewpoint of practice,'' he insists, referring to Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and the Theses on I'cuerbach, "is the first and basic" (my italics.---E.B.) " viewpoint of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism'',^^*^^ while the "practical character" of dialectical materialism, is, along with its class character, its "most striking feature''.By using the works of Marx and Lenin in the traditional Confucian manner, i.e., at random picking out words and phrases from the text, Mao Tse-tung has failed to grasp the substance of the Marxist-Leninist theory of practice, which is founded on recognition of the objective world and on the existence of things independently of our consciousness. It is only on this level that we can give a materialist interpretation of ``experience'', ``practice'', ``truth'' and the " reorganisation of the world''. That is precisely why Lenin said that "recognition of the external world and the reflection of it in the human mind form the basis of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism''.^^**^^
Indeed, to say that the practical nature of Marxist philosophy is its "most striking feature'', that dialectical materialism is a "philosophy of practice'', without placing practice on a materialist foundation, means to say nothing, because in this case it is not clear how Marxist philosophy differs from a number of other philosophical schools, say, pragmatism, which may likewise and with full grounds be ranked as a "practical philosophy''. Mao does not, of course, deny the existence of objective reality, but for him it is an abstraction, a sort of "thing for itself": it must be recognised, but once recognised it can be completely ignored or, which is the same, regarded as plastic and acquiring an arbitrarily chosen form under the influence of the subject's activity. "An obvious specific of the 600 million-strong Chinese people'', Mao Tse-tung said in 1958, "is, among other features, its poverty and the fact that it is a sheet of clean paper. This is bad at first glance, but actually it is good. There is nothing on a clean sheet of paper, but on it one can write the newest and most beautiful words, and draw the newest and most _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, p. 284.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 15.
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---534 81 beautiful pictures" (Hungchi, 1958, No. 1). In other words, one can ignore the level of China's productive forces, her traditions and the international situation, in short, abstract oneself from the diversity of the objective world.This attitude is far removed from Marxism because for the materialist dialectician acknowledgement of the material foundation of practice means not simply placing on record the primary nature of being but recognising the constant interaction between the subject and the object, recognising that human practice is determined by objective conditions taken concretely and integrally, for without taking these conditions into account it is impossible to chart and put into effect a correct political line, i.e., a political line conforming to the concrete conditions of social life.
Non-recognition of the fact that the subject's practical activity is determined by objective conditions inevitably leads to a pragmatic approach to theory as a ``working'' conception, which ``serves'' practice, to a subjectivist, instrumentalist interpretation of truth as a purely utilitarian weapon. For Mao Tse-tung and his group truth is not what adequately, even if intentionally, reflects the objective state of things, but what is useful and advantageous, what ``serves'' in the given conditions. In one of his latest and, of course ``brilliant'' works, Where Do People Get Correct Ideas?, Mao Tse-tung writes: "Generally speaking, what leads to a successful result is correct, and what is not crowned with success is wrong" (Chinese ed., Peking, 1964, p. 129).
Naturally, this interpretation of truth is very convenient because it allows justifying zigzags and ``leaps'' from one extreme to another and promising that communism would be attained now "in three years of hard work'', now in scores of years hence, or "perhaps even hundreds of years'', but it has nothing to do with Marxism.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ In explaining the empiricism and pragmatism of Mao Tse-tung even an erudite student of modern China can rarely resist the temptation of looking for the "root of the evil" in the anti-metaphysical traditions of Chinese philosophy, above all in the practical earthly philosophy of Confucianism. (As a matter of fact, this specific of Chinese philosophy is one of the reasons why so much popularity was enjoyed among a considerable section of the pre-revolutionary Chinese intelligentsia by the instrumentalism of John Dewey and his Chinese disciple Hu Shih, which in its turn became one of the factors moulding the thinking of the Chinese intellectual in the 1920s-40s.) But the empiricism __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 83. 82
Marxism regards practice---living, purposeful, objectsensuous activity (which is called practice only so far as it is compared with theory as hardened activity embodied in objects)---not only as a criterion of truth and a source of knowledge but as the process of knowledge proper, which includes perceptual and rational elements. Conversely, as a process knowledge is practice inasmuch as it provides the ideal model of subsequent practical activity. The farther the process of the "humanisation of nature" advances and the more science becomes a direct productive force, the higher is the degree of rationalisation reached by perceptual knowledge and of the mutual penetration and mutual conditionally of practice and knowledge (theory).
In Mao Tse-tung's concept of practice, on the contrary, practice is divorced from knowledge, theory is opposed to practice. "Practice, knowledge, more practice, more knowledge; the cyclical repetition of this pattern to infinity, and with each cycle, the elevation of the content of practice and knowledge to a higher level" (my italics.---E.B.).^^*^^ Here knowledge (both perceptual and rational), on the one hand, and practice, on the other, come forward as distinct, mechanically alternating cycles. In its turn, within the framework of the "cycle of knowledge'', perceptual knowledge is separated from rational knowledge, which is its opposite. Mao Tse-tung insists that it is necessary to "start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge, and then, starting from rational knowledge, actively direct revolutionary practice so as to remould the subjective and the objective world"^^**^^ (my italics.---E.B.).
In order to make sure that this is not "simply an accidental vulgarisation" or a slip of the pen, but a ``nuance'' concealing an entire concept, we have to look into other works by Mao Tse-tung, for example, the essay Rectify the Party's Style in Work (1942), in which he writes: All comparatively complete knowledge is acquired through two stages, _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 82. and pragmatism of Mao Tse-tung may be explained not so much by the tradition of Chinese classical philosophy, although their influence cannot be denied, as by his approach to the tasks of the Chinese revolution, by his orientation chiefly on the peasantry and declassed elements.
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 1, p. 297.
^^**^^ Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83 first, the stage of perceptual knowledge and, secondly, the stage of rational knowledge, the latter being the development of the former to a higher plane.''^^*^^ We learn that the knowledge acquired perceptually can exist independently in the same way as rational knowledge (although Mao Tse-tung qualifies this as a ``bad'' phenomenon). There even are "two kinds of comrades" possessing "partial knowledge": comrades who read books and possess rational knowledge but lack the perceptual knowledge, that is gained through practice; comrades engaged in practical work whose "knowledge is usually perceptual and partial. . .they lack rational and comprehensive knowledge''.^^**^^ How does one obtain "complete knowledge"? By integrating ``partial'' knowledge. "Thus there are two kinds of incomplete knowledge: one is knowledge already contained in books and the other is knowledge which is usually perceptual and partial, and both are onesided. Only through an integration of the two can excellent and comparatively complete knowledge emerge.''^^***^^Two elements can thus be clearly defined: the isolation of perceptual and rational knowledge and the striving to link practice only with perceptual knowledge, which means depriving practice of its rational and cognitive nature. This approach reduces practice to pure experience (``knowledge starts with experience---this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge"^^****^^), to empiricism, which Mao Tse-tung sometimes attacks but which, as the Japanese philosopher Mori Nobushige justifiably notes, is intrinsic to Mao himself,^^*****^^ and ultimately leads to the destruction of practice as rational activity. Practice degenerates into blind, unconscious, thoughtless activity, which at best provides the raw material for a subsequent gnosiological, theoretical analysis, while the activity of the subject is reduced to the blind performance of the will of the "great leader'', to that of a " stainless cog" of a mammoth machine, set in motion personally by the ``helmsman'', who ruthlessly ``changes'' these ``cogs'' if they begin to ``rust'', i.e., to think. This is the purpose of _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4, London, 1956, p. 33.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 34.
^^***^^ Ibid., pp. 34--35.
^^****^^ Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 291.
^^*****^^ Mori Nobushige, Criticism of Mao Tse-tungs Works "On Practice" and "On Contradiction'', Japanese ed., Tokyo, 1965.
84 the endless appeals to "obey the Chairman" and to "learn from the Army"---to learn to obey unquestioningly.Peking propaganda's demagogic slogans about " remoulding the consciousness" and "awakening the consciousness" of every individual must not mislead us because this `` remoulding'' and ``awakening'' mean drumming the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" into the mind of every person. In the long run this is done with the purpose not of rationalising practice and introducing an element of consciousness into the activity of the masses but to regiment people's thinking, to force them to adopt slogans blindly and, as a result, prevent them from acquiring real, i.e., critical, knowledge of the world around them through practice. "We resolutely carry out all the instructions of Chairman Mao---those we understand and those we yet do not understand,'' declares the Maoist newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao. "We must resolutely carry out the instructions of Chairman Mao, which coincide with our own ideas, but we must also carry out those that do not coincide with our own ideas.'' This anti-intellectual spirit is perhaps best expressed in a hungweiping slogan, which says: "We need no brains! Our minds are armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung.'' This is a direct precept to mould in the minds of the masses and individuals cut and dried forms of perception and reasoning, into which, as into the bed of Procrustes, the entire multiform content of the practical work of the present-day Chinese could be squeezed.
Mao Tse-tung's rejection of the determining nature of the subject's practical activity is not accidental. He claims that he is the creator of the "theory of active reflection'', which, according to the authors of the book Dialectical Materialism, published in China in 1963, "deals a crushing blow at mechanistic theories that obscure the subjective activity of people''. In fact, Mao Tse-tung tries to deal a blow, but it is aimed not at mechanistic but at dialectical materialism. He seeks to achieve this by absolutising the role of ideological and political practice and belittling or completely rejecting the role of economic practice, attributing to "subjective activity'', to ``ideas'', the ``determining'', ``decisive'' role in reorganising the world. "The social life of people,'' he writes 85 in the article Where Do People Get Correct Ideas? " determines their ideology. As soon as correct ideas, propounded by the advanced classes, are adopted by the masses, they become a material force for the reconstruction of society and of the world.'' Naturally, these "correct ideas" are the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. "The thought of Mao Tse-tung, which is an unprecedented^ powerful spiritual atomic bomb, becomes a great material force that transforms the world as soon as the masses adopt it and achieve the further revolutionisation of their thinking.''^^*^^
Ideas, of course, play an active role in changing the objective world. This has been repeated time and again by Marx, Engels and Lenin. But they have always spoken of the relative independence of ideas, superstructures and politics, for ideas, as everybody knows, cannot turn into an object; they only act as the instrument by which one object is turned into another, a conversion whose condition is not only that the masses should master revolutionary ideas but that there should be concrete material prerequisites. This is passed over in silence by Mao Tse-tung, who limits himself to speaking generally about the role of objective reality.
Unconditionally giving politics and ideology first place, he ignores the circumstance that the role of ideas, of ideology and politics changes depending on the concrete conditions of time and place. During the socialist revolution and socialist construction all forms of practice---economic, political and ideological---are dialectically interrelated. In particular, a manifestation of this is that now one now another of these forms of practice acquires prominence, i.e., plays the leading role, at the different stages of the development of socialist society. Moreover, economic practice plays a dual role: as the basic form of practice, which in the long run determines society's development even at stages when the leading role is played by political and ideological practice, and as the principal form of practice, when it moves to the forefront.^^**^^ Moreover, with the establishment of _-_-_
^^*^^ Jenmin Jihpao, August 8, 19G7.
^^**^^ Ideological and political practice does not lose its significance under socialism. Characterising the situation that emerged in Russia after the socialist revolution, Lenin wrote in March 1918: "It goes without saying that for any government that is at all democratic the task of convincing the masses can never be wholly overshadowed---on __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 87. 86 socialist social relations a change occurs not only in the role but in the essence of political practice: it is no longer a struggle of the victorious class for power (because it is already at the helm of power), but a drive to promote socialist democracy. In a socialist state this is the only historical justification for giving politics prominence for certain periods. But for Mao Tse-tung the theory of the primacy of political and ideological practice over economic practice is a means of justifying the economic failures that have occurred through his own fault, and the measures to strengthen his shaken positions in the army, the Party and the state.
The artificial accentuation---almost twenty years after the people's revolution---of political practice as a struggle for power (of which the most acute and open form was the notorious "great proletarian cultural revolution'') and the orientation on a permanent political struggle as the motive force of socialist society had by their inner logic to compel the Maoists, sooner or later, to go over from "verbal criticism'', i.e., from discrediting their adversaries politically and morally, from accusing them of ``revisionism'', "abstract humanism'', "bourgeois degeneration" and "anti-Party activity'', to "criticism by force'', which grew into a process, cold-bloodedly directed by the ``Chairman'' himself, of physically destroying the "internal enemy'', whom Mao Tsetung saw not in the Chinese bourgeoisie, who were, by no means accidentally, unaffected by the "cultural revolution'', but in true Chinese Communists, who, devoted to socialism, ventured to put up some form of resistance to the Maoist line of setting up a military-bureaucratic regime in China, a regime that clashes with the very essence of socialism.
But the orientation on permanent political practice as a struggle for power has yet another aspect, namely, a struggle against the "foreign political enemy''. For Mao Tse-tung this enemy is not international imperialism, but socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union, for in the policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet Union the Mao group sees the main obstacle to its adventurist bid for _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 86. the contrary, it will always be among the important tasks of government. As a key issue, it will only have significance for parties of the opposition or for parties that are fighting for ideals of the future" (Collected Works, Vol. 42, pp. 68--69). The key issue now, Lenin emphasised, was that of administering the state.
87 international domination. For a number of years Peking propaganda has been running a virulent campaign of slander against the Soviet people and the socialist system in the USSR in an effort, in violation of the norms of relations between socialist countries, to impose on Soviet society their own recipe for the building of communism and push the CPSU into starting a Maoist-type "cultural revolution" in the Soviet Union, curtailing democracy, kindling a "class struggle" and pursuing a policy of repressions. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries were accused of ``economism'', "deviation from the revolution" and "bourgeois degeneration''. "After the conquest of power by the proletariat," Jenmin Jihpao wrote on August 25, 1967, "there are two diametrically opposing lines in the country's development. The first is the line of Soviet revisionism, which one-sidedly accentuates material production, machines, mechanisation and material incentives. This line opposes giving prominence to politics, pushes the class struggle into the background and abolishes the dictatorship of the proletariat.'' The second line, of course, is the "line of the Chairman'', which gives first place to politics and is, therefore, "genuinely Marxist''. What was meant by this "Marxist line" was shown by subsequent developments, when passing from "verbal criticism" to " criticism by force'', within the country, the Maoists, in their quest for a nationalistic foundation on which to rally the Chinese people under the "banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', levelled this "criticism by force" at the "foreign political enemy'', i.e., the socialist countries. __NOTE__ Missing "*" marker in body ?!?![floating footnote]^^*^^
While the "cultural revolution" has greatly retarded China's cultural development, confronted her with great economic difficulties, reduced the already low standard of living"' and seriously shaken her prestige as a civilised country in the eyes of progressive people in many countries, the Maoist line of armed provocations against socialist _-_-_
^^*^^ The disastrous effects of the "cultural revolution" will make themselves felt for a long time to come. An example is the "revolutionary reform" in education, which will result in an acute shortage of much needed trained specialists in the immediate future. If this shortage induces the leadership to make another attempt to surmount difficulties by means of ideological campaigns and political adventures it may bring the country to the verge of an economic and, ultimately, a political catastrophe.
88 countries is fundamentally at variance with the real interests of the Chinese people and quite plainly leads not only to a further weakening of Peking's international positions but to the total collapse of its prestige in the international communist movement. This is the inevitable result of destroying practice as a rational activity, and of replacing economic development and state administration by "political activity" in its vulgar interpretation.Practice may be counterposed to theory only on the gnosiological level. Theoretical activity (not theory as a product) is itself practice, i.e., it signifies the transformation of the objectively perceptible world ideally, not materially. Practice embraces ideal activity as well, for material practice, which really transforms the objective perceptible world, is human practice and, consequently, it rests on a plan devised by man in the process of ideally modelling purposeful material activity.
At the early stages of civilisation ideal and material practice were not separated from each other, in the same way as work by brain was not separated from work by hand. But with the separation of work by brain from work by hand and with the division of the spheres of practice into material and ideal spheres, the intelligentsia began to emerge as a special substratum with ideal practice as its prerogative. Under capitalism this division of practice into spheres embodied in the division into intelligentsia and "ordinary people" is a vital prerequisite for the sale of labour by the proletariat and assumes extreme forms.
Under socialist (and communist) social relations, the spheres of ideal and material practice, labour by hand and by brain, are gradually fused. However, this process takes a very long time. Essential distinctions remain between physical and mental labour at the first stage of communism, and this means that the division of the spheres of practice also remains. The intelligentsia, too, remains as a social substratum engaged in ideal practice. Moreover, scientific and technological progress, which turns science into a direct productive force and increases the historical scale of the working people's activity, enhances the role played by the intelligentsia while preserving it as an independent substratum. 89 The only difference is that now the intelligentsia is no longer divorced from the "ordinary people" but is linked with them, inasmuch as in conditions of the general growth of the cultural level theoretical activity ceases to be the prerogative of intellectuals. Nonetheless, any artificial acceleration of the integration of ideal and material practice in contravention of concrete material conditions, and any aspiration to abolish the intelligentsia can only halt the process of bringing about a convergence of the intelligentsia and the people. But this is the very line pursued by Mao Tse-tung.
The "intelligentsia problem" has always worried Mao Tse-tung, who, for political reasons, recognised the need for intellectuals but remained suspicious of them, regarding them as a potential subversive force capable not only of independently opposing his policies but also sowing among the people the "poison grass" of doubt in his infallibility. Strictly speaking, Mao Tse-tung's concept of practice rejects the right of the intelligentsia to independent existence. Intellectuals engage in mental, theoretical activity, which, according to Mao Tse-tung, is not practice and yields only ``rational'', i.e., ``partial'', ``incomplete'' and, even worse, ``dogmatic'' knowledge. "They ought to learn the truth that many so-called intellectuals are relatively the least knowledgeable, while the workers and peasants are on occasions more knowledgeable.''^^*^^ To turn ``incomplete'', ``book'', ``rational'' knowledge into complete knowledge it must be ``integrated'' with perceptual knowledge, i.e., with practice. According to Mao Tse-tung this integration must be achieved by drawing the ``bookworms'', i.e., the intellectuals (who cannot even be called fullfledged intellectuals until they are involved in practice) into practical activity through ``integration'' with the ``people'', in other words, by transferring them to practical (or more exactly, physical) work.
The Communist Party of China had indeed been confronted with the task of remoulding the thinking of the Chinese bourgeois intellectuals who had joined the Party during the revolution, and drawing them into the revolutionary practice of the proletariat.^^**^^ But Mao Tse-tung gave a _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4, p. 32.
^^**^^ The Chinese intelligentsia (mostly scholars), whose formation as a specific social substratum (inasmuch as they were recruited from various classes by means of state examinations) began in feudal times, __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 91. 90 vulgar interpretation of this process, identifying the " remoulding of the world outlook" of the intellectual with instilling the "thought of Mao" into his head, and taking the intelligentsia's integration with the people to mean its virtual annihilation. This explains why after the revolution in China, when a new army of intellectuals, many of whom came from workers' and peasants' families, took shape, Mao Tse-tung adopted a harder line towards the intelligentsia: ``brainwashing'' campaigns followed one after another in quick succession; it became customary to send intellectuals to the countryside for long periods of "re-education through labour" (drawing into practice); professionalism, erudition and manifestations of high culture began to be stigmatised as bourgeois survivals and as attempts at "suppressing the masses''; critical thinking and an uncompromising attitude to shortcomings were assessed as counter-revolutionary; any accomplishment distinguishing a person from the masses was qualified as egoism and egocentrism and, consequently, as ``revisionism''. During the "great proletarian cultural revolution" the policy of "rolling the intellectual in mud" and deprofessionalising him was carried to extremes. The slogan "integration with the masses" was, in effect, interpreted as a call upon the intelligentsia to master the "culture of the masses'', which was described as the most ``advanced'' and the "most revolutionary''. This meant denying the sphere of ideal practice to the intelligentsia inasmuch as this specific and relatively independent sphere was itself rejected.
As a result the very existence of the intellectuals as a social substratum, which "are so called just because they most consciously, most resolutely and most accurately reflect and express the development of class interests and _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 90. comprised a detached corporative group isolated from the working classes and, at the same time, constituted a considerable social force because they were the only custodians of Chinese traditional culture (before the revolution over 90 per cent of the population were illiterate) and had close ties with the ruling class, inasmuch as by tradition only scholars with a classical (Confucianist) education were eligible for high office in China. These features---isolation and corporation---were, in the main, preserved by the bourgeois intelligentsia, which emerged in China at the close of the 19th century. The intellectuals who went over to the revolution were likewise educated in accordance with the traditions of feudal-bourgeois culture, of course, largely determined their social behaviour in their new role as revolutionary intellectuals.
91 political groupings in society as a whole,''^^*^^ was called in question.True, until recently part of the Chinese intelligentsia was not affected by the policy of ``revolutionisation''. This was stipulated in the "Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'', which stated: "More attention must be paid to valuable scientists and scientific and engineering cadres. They may also be helped to change their thinking and style of work step by step.'' However, this does not change the general conclusion that Mao Tse-tung is aiming to destroy the intelligentsia and, for a certain period, preserve only a narrow segment deliberately isolated from society in the calculation that as a result of this isolation they will cease being intellectuals and turn into technocrats, into asocial cogs of a gigantic state machine.
It would be wrong, of course, to believe that socialist society must perpetuate the gap created by bourgeois society between the intelligentsia and the people and, consequently, the division of practice into spheres. On the contrary, socialism is the social system that gives rise to the prerequisites and real conditions for erasing the essential distinctions between manual and mental labour and abolishing the boundaries between ideal and material practice. Even Mao Tsetung grasps this fundamental trend of socialism, which has been scientifically substantiated by Marxism-Leninism. But Marxism approaches this problem differently. This approach has been excellently described by Antonio Gramsci, who wrote that Marxist philosophy does not seek to pinion " ' ordinary' people at the level of their primitive philosophy of common sense. On the contrary, it strives to lead them to a higher conception of life. Its aim in stressing the need for contact between the intelligentsia and `ordinary' people is not to restrict scientific activity and thereby maintain unity at the low level of the masses but to set up an intellectualmoral bloc, which would make it politically possible to promote the progress of the masses instead of only small groups of intellectuals" (my italics.---E.B.}^^**^^
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 7, p. 45.
^^**^^ Opcre di Antonio Gramsci, Vol. 2, // Materialismo Slurico c la Filosofia di Benedetto Croce, Rome, 1949, p. 11.
92When Marx criticised those who sanctified the words ``people'' and ``proletariat'',^^*^^ he did not, of course, seek to humiliate the worker or belittle his revolutionary role. On the contrary, he wanted to show the real position of the proletariat in capitalist society, so that the proletariat would know where it stood and be able to change this position. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, in an effort to resolve the `` intelligentsia-people'' problem, demagogically flatters the people, forgetting that the people have not so much to enlighten as to be enlightened by this same intelligentsia. Indeed, the Chinese people have changed during the years of popular rule, but they still have a long road to travel to reach the summits of world culture. This can be achieved not by hypocritically flattering the people, by encouraging religious feeling and ignorance, by spreading the cult of Mao Tse-tung, or by setting the people apart from the intelligentsia, but by helping to establish close contact between them, not by abolishing the intelligentsia as a substratum or by reducing the intellectual to the level of a semi-literate peasant, but by raising the peasant to the level of the intellectual.
Marxism-Leninism regards practical activity as the means by which changes and transformations are accomplished. The transformation of the world is precisely what constitutes a vital condition and the basic content of human existence. But the process of changing and transforming the world does not boil down solely to revolutions, to ``leaps' (consummating periods of evolution, of qualitative accumulation). It covers peaceful evolution because no revolution, neither social nor scientific and technological, can be accomplished without preparation, without the corresponding "initial accumulation''.
There are thus always two types of practice: revolutionary-critical and day-to-day, ordinary, evolutionary practice, inasmuch as it prepares and sustains revolutionary-critical practice.
Mao Tse-tung is an avowed exponent of the theory of permanent revolution. But in his interpretation of permanent _-_-_
^^*^^ K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, Bd. 8, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, I960, S. 413.
93 revolution he differs from Marx or Lenin (for whom the continuity of the revolutionary process meant the consistent consummation of the revolution in accordance with objective historical laws). For Mao Tse-tung permanent revolution means leaping over stages, rejecting pauses in the revolution, with revolutions following one after another without stops or intervals.On the basis of this interpretation of permanent revolution he not only counterposes day-to-day, ``evolutionary'' to ``revolutionary'' practice, but tries to reduce the former to naught. While he does not reject day-to-day activity as activity generally, he rejects it as day-to-day activity. Actually, in Mao Tse-tung's conception there is no place for real revolutionary-critical activity either, for he regards it in the spirit of unalloyed anarchism, seeing its highest form in destruction, in ``rebellion''. Maoism reduces Marxism to bare rebellion. "Thousands upon thousands of Marxist propositions,'' writes Hungchi, organ of the Central Committee of the CPC, "in the long run boil down to one thing, namely, that 'rebellion is a just cause'. This is the very soul of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. ... To shun rebellion means simply to wallow in revisionism.. . . We want to turn the old world upside down, to smash it to pieces, to precipitate chaos and confusion. And the greater this confusion is, the better. . . . We want to consummate our rebellion, start a huge uprising of the proletariat and create a new, proletarian world" (No. 10, 1966, p. 11).
It is not easy, of course, for the average revolutionary, particularly if he comes from the petty bourgeoisie, to relinquish "revolutionary nihilism" and "military romanticism" and to get used to day-to-day creative activity. Without such day-to-day creative activity, without calm, planned, day-to-day creative work there can be no revolution. "History knows moments when the most important thing for the success of the revolution is to heap up as large a quantity of the fragments as possible, i.e., to blow up as many of the old institutions as possible; moments arise when enough has been blown up and the next task is to perform the `prosaic' (for the petty-bourgeois revolutionary, the `boring') task of clearing away the fragments; and moments arise when the careful nursing of the rudiments of the new system, which are growing amidst the wreckage on a soil 94 which as yet has been badly cleared of rubble, is the most important thing.''^^*^^ Lenin specified the periods when activity is destructive and when it is constructive. He wrote: "In bourgeois revolutions, the principal task of the mass of working people was to fulfil the negative or destructive work of abolishing feudalism, monarchy and medievalism. ... In every socialist revolution, however, .. . the principal task of the proletariat, and of the poor peasants which it leads, is the positive or constructive work of setting up an extremely intricate and delicate system of new organisational relationships extending to the planned production and distribution of the goods required for the existence of tens of millions of people.''^^**^^
China went through a period of ``destruction'', which lasted several decades at least. By the inner logic of the development of the socialist revolution there should now have commenced a new period not rejecting ``destruction'' (as a stage of development) but subordinating it to construction as the basic task in the building of socialism. Mao Tse-tung, however, continues to depend on the old, ``tested'' methods of destruction, which seem more revolutionary to him. He is now destroying not the old but the new world created by the Chinese workers, peasants and intellectuals themselves.
History shows that on the international and even on the national scale the periods of revolutionary leaps in various spheres of human activity do not usually coincide. A fundamental revolutionary break-up of social relations may take place during a period of relative ``tranquillity'' in the development of many fields of science and technology, and the scientific and technological revolution may come about during a period when social relations are relatively stable.
Another lesson from history is that being governed by inner laws revolutionary changes in different fields of activity acquire diverse forms. The appearance of "revolutionary masses" on the stage does not mean that a "revolutionary theatre" has been created, in the same way that the smashing of machines does not lead to a revolution in technology. Therefore, any attempt to unify the forms of revolutionarycritical practice in various spheres can only more or less considerably delay the real revolution in these spheres.
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 274.
^^**^^ Ibid., pp. 238, 241.
95This sort of ``revolutionisation'', without the ground for it being prepared by the entire course of preceding development, and, therefore, inevitably doomed to be purely external, leads to rejection not only of the old, outworn and unreasonable but also to the destruction of really reasonable links and relations, in short, to degradation. An example of this is the "revolutionary reform" in education, which the "cultural revolution" has reduced to the cancellation of `` nonrevolutionary'' sciences, the burning of books, the smashing of school equipment, and so forth, or the ``revolution'' in literature and art whose purpose is to replace professional art with second-rate amateurism and reject the entire world and national cultural heritage.
In addition to giving rein to anarchy and destroying practice as rational activity, such a ``revolution'', in the given case conducted under the banner of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', discredits and distorts Marxist-Leninist theory and the Marxist teaching of practice.
Voprosy filosofii, No. 3, 1969, pp. 93--104
[96] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Maoism:A. Titarenko
A dangerous anti-socialist factor of our day, Maoism has its own economic, social, national, military, ideological, moral and psychological features and specifics. But in this article we are concerned only with one very important aspect of Maoism, namely, the features that characterise its distortion of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of morals and politics, its rejection of communist humanism and its abandonment of the scientific strategy and tactics of the proletarian class struggle. The sad lesson which all Marxists have yet to draw from the practice and ``theory'' of Maoism is extremely instructive precisely in this respect.
__*_*_*__Scientific communism has always developed in uncompromising struggle with petty-bourgeois ideology, including its ``ultra-revolutionary'', adventurist trends. Marx and Engels had time and again spoken strongly against supplanting the end objectives of the proletarian movement by pettybourgeois equalitarian demands; the ideal of a free communist society by the dismal regime of "barrack communism''; a flourishing culture by its sectarian, primitive restriction; political awareness and initiative on the part of the working people by fanatic belief and the sermon of blind obedience; creation by irresponsible destruction; the comprehensive development of the individual by anti-humanist disregard for the destiny of people and the conversion of the individual into a "zero value'', into a standard ``cog'' turned out mechanically to order "from above''. Small wonder that after the October Revolution Lenin noted: "If we had made any concessions to petty-bourgeois illusions.. .we would have ruined the whole cause of the proletarian revolution.''^^*^^ In China, where the predominance and patriarchal nature of the peasants were even more pronounced than in old _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 207. 7---534
97 Russia, political leaders came forward who not only succumbed to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element but gave this element's perverted understanding of socialism the shape of a programme of action, of a primitive world outlook, which its exponents ludicrously call the "highest stage" of Marxism-Leninism.In criticising the theory of primitive, levelling `` communism'' in all its diverse variants, Marx underlined that in "negating the personality of man in every sphere, this type of communism" has nothing in common with scientific communism and humanism. This "crude communism" drives its proponents towards the "negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation'', towards a return "to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man''.^^*^^ This criticism is topical to this day for it enables us to understand the various distortions of communism---petty-bourgeois, pre-proletarian, patriarchal---that have grotesquely intertwined with the practice, policies and slogans of the Maoists in China.
Maoist policies, theoretical patterns and moral standards constitute a categorical break with the communist -world outlook. In the interrelation of the moral and political factors they grossly flout the principles of Marxist humanism, and make the loftiest virtue out of anti-humanism of a militarybureaucratic and pseudo-revolutionary mould. The egoistical, Great-Power, nationalist ambitions of the Mao group in China are portrayed as immutable ``axioms'' of political life. Moral principles are reduced to simple "idolised stimulants" for manipulating the masses and a means of inculcating blind faith and unthinking fanaticism; morals not only lose all relative independence (and their ``controlling'' role in political life) but are shamelessly emasculated and divorced from the achievements of moral development determined by the world communist movement and from the achievements of general historical moral progress.
True, at first glance it may seem that morals are almost the determining factor of political life in China. This impression is created by the huge masses of people marching with portraits of Mao Tse-tung and by the bellicose, _-_-_
^^*^^ Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow, 1959, p. 100.
98 unremitting, flagrantly ``moralising'' message of social slogans. Actually, however, the role of the moral factor in China's political life has never been so debased and reduced as at present. The power-hungry, hegemonistic, anti-Soviet designs of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage (which have assumed a fantastic scale) are being implemented at dear cost to the interests of the working people and the cause of socialism, with the involvement of moral fanaticism that has been turned into a near-religion. Filthy artifices and methods of struggle against revolutionary cadres are proclaimed as the ``best'' from the moral standpoint.Intrigues, lies, demagogy, threats, physical destruction of opponents, the baiting of various groups of the population against each other, cynical exploitation of the prejudices and ignorance of backward sections, and cult forms of selfadvertisement are used to strengthen the absolute rule of Mao Tse-tung, glorify him for "tens of thousands of years" in China, and win domination for Maoism in the world communist movement. The constant recourse to disgusting, amoral methods in politics has brought the selfish ambitions of the Maoists to light. The foulest political means are openly proclaimed ``moral'' only because they emanate from the "reddest of the red suns"---Mao Tse-tung. The real objectives pursued by the Maoists have nothing in common either with socialism or with Marxism-Leninism. Theirs is a bellicose nationalism and a despotic striving to secure unlimited power to their military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Marxist students of contemporary ideological and political life in China agree that many of the Maoist political slogans and actions and their pseudo-Marxist verbiage are a blind for anti-Soviet designs and Mao Tse-tung's hegemonistic claims to "world suzerainty'', for his imperial claims to unlimited autocratic power in China and the world. These claims are evidence that the Maoists have completely abandoned the ideals of the communist world outlook. The reactionary, amoral, anti-humane means employed by the Maoists in the socio-political struggle are fully in accord with the non-Marxist, anti-revolutionary aims of their pseudo-- socialism. The barefaced anti-Sovietism of the Maoists and their adventurist foreign policy ambitions are mirrored in the revised Party Constitution and in the communique adopted by the 9th Congress of the CPC.
99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/MU245/20080516/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.05.17) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+Alongside the hungweiping slogan that "there is no crime in revolution'', the political slogans being thundered in China include "do not be a modest and courteous intellectual" and "have no fear of disorders''. Peking propaganda unremittingly inflames the masses of China to violence, and gives every encouragement to vile passions, cruelty, ridicule and wild fanaticism. In order to instil in the minds and feelings of millions a primitive, blind moral that all, even their most adventurist and treacherous, political acts are justifiable, the Maoists artificially fostered moral chaos by means of the "cultural revolution''. In effect, they took the offensive against some elementary, humane, positive moral rules of behaviour in order to sow moral confusion among the bulk of the Chinese working people. While speaking of a ``class'' approach to human behaviour, they destroyed the foundations of active, Marxist humanism, which demands respect for elementary norms of morality and justice. Love of mankind and altruistic feelings are, Lenin wrote, "the most rudimentary, the most elementary premises, convictions and principles of the whole of democracy''^^*^^ The founders of Marxism-Leninism held that it went without saying that tortures, indignities, brutality and other means demoralising the masses were impermissible in the struggle for socialism. The Maoists, however, cynically trampled this principle without the least compunction.
Upon encountering opposition to their adventurist policies they launched a frenzied campaign of mass repressions and cynically proclaimed arbitrary rule and violence towards the Communist Party and the working masses a ``genuine'' dictatorship of the proletariat and ``genuine'' socialism. By shattering the Communist Party they aimed to perpetuate the despotic rule of a handful of intriguers, who had isolated themselves from the people. And having taken this road it was only natural that they should have replaced the people's democratic system with a military-bureaucratic regime, which, as Marx put it neatly, comes forward as "barrack communism''. As was noted in a Pravda editorial on February 16, 1967, under the heading "On the Anti-Soviet Policy of Mao Tse-tung and His Group'', the line followed by the Maoists "shows that for the sake of power they are _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 324.
100 prepared to sacrifice everything---the interests of socialism, the interests of their people, the interests of the revolution''. Along with other developments this is an outcome of the Maoists' gross distortion of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the correlation between politics and morals. Moreover, it is the result of the degeneration of policy (and of the politicians themselves) started by the abandonment of the moral content of communist aims and the flouting of the principles of Marxist humanism to suit mercenary, Great-Power ambitions. Policies approving everything that serves the purposes proclaimed by the men in power, without any reasonable, critical approach to these purposes, are used for adventurist intrigues calculated to place unlimited power in the hands of a small group of politicians who are alien to the proletariat and the working masses as a whole. These policies twist and warp not only (and not so much) the letter but the very meaning and spirit of socialism.Even if it is disguised with socialist slogans, petty-- bourgeois revolutionism is quite unstable morally. A revolutionary with a petty-bourgeois way of thinking quickly loses all moral restraint and staunchness in the ups and downs of political struggle. Going from one extreme to another, the petty-bourgeois revolutionary easily loses his enthusiasm. He may by inertia still continue to repeat revolutionary formulas, but they no longer cover his moral emptiness, which is rapidly supplemented by power-hungry ambitions. Pettybourgeois adventurists like the Maoists, who have climbed to power, use this power to further their own selfish aims. After gaining control of the instruments of compulsion they make them self-contained, independent and free from control from below and turn them into weapons, which the regime uses to preserve itself and extend its authority. Under Mao Tse-tung this weapon consists of the army, the police, paramilitary hungweiping organisations, and so on. Here the principles of communist policy are basically distorted, above all by the fact that undisguised violence and mass terror are regarded as a ``cure-all''. This distortion of the means of achieving the aims of the revolution inevitably leads to the moral emasculation of the aims themselves. Hypocritically using the name of the revolution, the Mao group has recourse to violence---in its extreme forms---where it is not needed, directing it at champions of the revolution.
101Ominous signs that Mao Tse-tung and his sycophants were flouting the principles of communist humanism could be discerned even at the earliest stages of their career (as was shown by A. Kadataskottaya in the book Man, God or Sphynx. A Political Portrait of Mao Tse-tung, these signs were perceptible long ago). The principles of Marxist humanism are an encumbrance to the politician with a propensity for adventuristic intrigues. They are, therefore, distorted or buried in oblivion. When they are separated from the policy, strategy and tactics of a Communist Party, the ideals, aims and hopes incorporated in them become a collection of recipes stripped of socio-historical meaning, a pile of propositions that may be interpreted at will. Precisely in this case---when the ideals of communist humanism are flouted or shelved---there arises the possibility for such a distortion of the foundations of Marxist policy, which, as has happened with Maoism, in the long run leads to degeneration, to an anti-socialist turn and the establishment of an anti-popular military-bureaucratic regime.
On the subject of practical political activity in building socialism, Marx insisted that the leadership pursue this activity in "bright daylight, with no pretensions to infallibility, not hiding itself behind circumlocution offices, not ashamed to confess blunders by correcting them''.^^*^^ The political movement in China, named the "great cultural revolution" (which in fact has nothing in common either with culture or with revolution), is as far removed from these requirements of Marxism as the earth is from the sky. One of the aims of this movement is to consolidate the Mao cult, which has been carried to absurdity, to the point of idolatry. Underlying this cult is a reactionary political and a sinister socio-psychological purpose. The assertion of the Maoists that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung is the absolute authority" in the direct sense of the word is implemented in China's political and ideological life with unparalleled, primitive callousness and doggedness. Having acquired absurd forms, which would undoubtedly have been ludicrous had they not become so tragic to the destiny of the great Chinese people, the Mao cult turns the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" into a kind of theosophy, according to which a deity in the _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx and Engels, On the Paris Commune, Moscow, 1971, p. 155.
102 image of man is capable of endowing with omnipotence and moral goodness all who accept its purposes and ideas, and of giving moral ``indulgence'' to any action directed "from above''. This deity is invested with all the right to historical initiative---alienated from the millions of "stainless cogs" deprived of such initiative, of individuals, whose role is now reduced to marching with a book of Mao quotations in their hands, to hysterical worship and blind obedience. This deification of Mao in China is gradually destroying not only critical, creative thinking but generally all theoretical, scientific thinking in sociology, replacing it with blind faith and fanatical acquiescence. While the Marxist-Leninist concept of socialism takes as its premise the development of the political initiative and activity of the broadest masses, in China we observe the reverse: the initiative is in the hands of the deity and his retinue, who are not subject to democratic control from below and turn the artificially fostered ``enthusiasm'' of part of the population into a means of incessantly suppressing their (real and fictitious) rivals.In this moral and political atmosphere all distortions, deviations and even crimes stemming from the monstrous cult of Mao Tse-tung are proclaimed a necessity and a ``law'' of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a law of socialism. This can only discredit the very idea of socialism. Ascetic, blind and total submission of the will of millions of people to the will of Mao Tse-tung is the caricature morality of society and man which the Maoists are planting.
The French Marxist Jean-fimile Vidal wrote: "The economic foundations of socialism were laid in China. .. . But can they guarantee a socialist future in a country where the working class has been deprived of the possibility to act as leader, where one man or a group of people has destroyed everything that enabled the people to control, criticise and express their will, and exercises arbitrary power;.. .the threat has arisen that a regime resting not on the working class and the poor peasants but chiefly on the army, some security agencies and the hungweiping organisations will gain further ground. Such a regime may take the country out of socialism and direct it to a road of perilous gambles.''^^*^^
Not many years have passed since these apprehensions _-_-_
^^*^^ J.-\^E. Vidal, Oil va la Chine? Paris, 1967, p. 284.
103 were voiced, but they have come true. The foreign policy of the Maoist leaders has been marked by such disgraceful and treacherous acts as armed provocations on the Soviet frontier, the launching of military adventures jeopardising the security and territorial integrity of the world's first socialist state. In domestic policy the Maoists have still further intensified the repression and massacre of cadres of shattered Party and public organisations and the sinister features of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship resembling the Eastern despotic regimes of the past are coming more and more to the surface. This has given the Chinese Communist Wang Ming grounds for assessing the present sociopolitical practices of the Maoists in China as a " counterrevolutionary upheaval directed in the country at the Communist Party and the people and outside it at the Soviet Union and the international communist movement''.^^*^^The Peking leaders have not fortuitously declared that humanism is a ``bourgeois'' concept. As the newspaper Kuangming Jihpao wrote on December 3, 1965, humanism has now "become a form of consciousness that is thoroughly reactionary''. Humanism, the newspaper declared, is `` incompatible'' with the class struggle of the proletariat now being waged in accordance with the "thought of Chairman Mao''. The adventurist intrigues of the Maoists are indeed incompatible with Marxist socialist humanism. They have distorted the communist ideal, which is inconceivable without its genuinely humanistic content. The Maoists have no use for humanism, describing it as a "postulate of revisionism" and, under the guise of fighting revisionism, are hitting the vital interests of the people and fanning anti-Sovietism. "In production we must strive for high indices, and in living standards we must maintain a low level"---this utterance of Mao Tse-tung eloquently illustrates the anti-humanistic aspects of his ideal of primitive, egalitarian ``communism'''. One of the charges levelled at Deputy Prime Minister Tao Chu was that he was reported as saying that "the purpose of the revolution is to ensure a happy life for the people''. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 9th Congress of the CPC did not consider economic problems, the ways and means of _-_-_
^^*^^ Wang Ming, China. "Cultural Revolution or Counter-- Revolutionary Upheaval?" Za rubezhom, No. 13, 1969, p. 18.
104 putting an end to China's economic backwardness and alleviating the difficult material condition of the people. In the anti-Soviet and nationalist, Great-Power clamour at the Congress, even the third five-year plan proclaimed three years ago was ``forgotten''.Mao Tse-tung's Leftist, adventurist thesis that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is the foundation for a regime of unending persecution and repressions. This ``gun'' is aimed not at the foreign or internal bourgeoisie but at the ``revisionists'' in the Party, the army and cultural institutions, i.e., at the working people. The Maoist theorists sometimes assert that the struggle against ``revisionism'' (read ---destruction of the revolutionary forces and organisations in China) is waged with the aim of building up monolithic ``unity'' in the country. This understanding of unity, and of the means of achieving it, is one of the most disgusting and sinister aspects of fanatical political jockeying that has blossomed in the atmosphere created by the petty-bourgeois adventurist, pseudo-socialist and nationalistic preachings of Maoism.
The fact that this sort of ``unity'' has nothing in common with scientific socialism was noted by Marx when he denounced the petty-bourgeois adventurist ideas propounded by Bakunin: "Unity of thought and action is vital to the success of the revolution. The members of the International are trying to create this unity through propaganda, discussion and the open organisation of the proletariat---but to Bakunin's way of thinking all that is wanted is a secret organisation of hundreds of people, of the privileged representatives of the revolutionary idea kept in the reserve of a selfappointed General Staff permanently under the command of 'Citizen B.' Here unity of thought and action means nothing but dogmatism and blind obedience. .. . We are confronted with a veritable Jesuit Order.''^^*^^
The Maoists regard unbridled violence as the panacea for all ills. Violence is used not only against enemies but also against the working people, against all opponents and even against people only suspected of independent thinking. Efforts are being made to confine the spiritual world of every Chinese to the utterances of the "great helmsman" and _-_-_
^^*^^ K. Marx, F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 18, Russ. ed., pp. 341--42.
105 to use this unified, primitive ``ideology'' to regulate man's behaviour---from the workbench to the most intimate aspects of everyday and private life. Under the slogan of " integrating industry, agriculture and military science'', the Maoists are forcing the workers to engage, in addition to their own work, in agriculture and undergo military training under the supervision of army officers. The Chinese has to devote every free minute to the memorising of quotations from the works of Mao Tse-tung. Every morning the workers are obliged to stand before a portrait of Mao Tse-tung and ask for inspiring ``instructions'', and in the evenings they are expected to give an account of their day's activities. This is designed to achieve an "ideological stunting" of the people and play the role of preventive moral and psychological terror. This kind of terror is supplemented with real, physical terror: the country is dotted with ``re-education'' and concentration camps; the people, as in the black days of mediaeval times, are offered unending spectacles of public executions, beatings and indignities. On orders from Mao Tsetung the whole population has undergone "psychological reeducation''. In the towns the inhabitants have been divided into small groups of about 10 families, a security officer being appointed to each group. Every adult has to write a detailed account of his past activities, state his attitude to Mao Tsetung's policies and so on. The members of these groups are forced to inform against each other.Founded on the fallacious notion that violence cures all ills, the political practices of the petty-bourgeois adventurist Mao group are anti-humane and menace the lives of many people. They have their own sinister logic---as time passes these practices are carried beyond the direct aims pursued by violence. This is strikingly demonstrated by the "cultural revolution''. Its victims were not only adversaries to the regime and revolutionary cadres. Persecution was spread to persons who unquestionably regarded themselves ``loyal'' to Mao Tse-tung. Very indicative in this respect is that from 1949 onwards (i.e., from the moment the People's Republic of China was proclaimed) the number of persons physically destroyed, instead of decreasing (as might have been expected in a country where socialist construction was proceeding successfully and state power was in the hands of the workers and peasants), showed a steady and considerable 106 increase. Characteristically, the 9th Congress of the CPC, held in April 1969, proclaimed the beginning of a campaign under the slogan ``struggle---criticism---transformation'', which signifies an intensification of repressions in the country. Violence is thus moving beyond its initial, specifically political objectives and acquires the nature of "permanent, intimidating pressure on the population. The Mao group needs this atmosphere of suspicion, fear and uncertainty of the morrow---resulting from such ``preventive'' violence (violence for the sake of violence)---in order to consolidate its rule. In this atmosphere, naturally, all norms of genuine socialist morals are superseded by substitute norms of slavish obedience and blind expectation of new initiatives and instructions "from above''.
Having supplanted Marxism-Leninism by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', the Maoists are trying to turn various theoretical propositions into instruments of crude political demagogy: ``justification'' for any arbitrary, even the most injurious, anti-socialist political act of Mao Tse-tung is at once ``found'' in tailored quotations from the classics of MarxismLeninism.
The monopoly of ``thought'' seized by Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates allows them to use mass media to declare true today what was rejected yesterday, and vice versa. Even individual Marxist propositions, which the Maoists always use out of context, are turned into dead dogmas, lifeless phrases or a collection of words, and utilised for political purposes. Rank-and-file ``theorists'' of Maoism have become priests of the Mao cult and repeat his utterances parrot-fashion. It is becoming dangerous not only to speak and write in any way other than Mao Tse-tung's but even to think independently. Divorced from their real meaning and from the creative spirit of Marxist theory, vulgarised and twisted by the Maoists, individual Marxist propositions have been turned into symbolic ``labels''---quotations, which may be tagged on to anything. For instance, the thesis of "converting the ideal into the real" was used to justify the outrages perpetrated by the hungweipings; the assault on the people's standard of living was justified by the slogan of the ``primacy'' of politics over the economy; the demand that the old (bourgeois) state machine be destroyed served as the justification for smashing constitutional state organs; divisive 107 activities, provocations and intrigues in the international communist movement are justified by a distorted version of the dialectical proposition on the "split entity'', and so on. When various propositions of Marxist theory are used to disguise the actions of ambitious politicians, they cannot help but lose their meaning even in cases when they are reproduced word for word. It is also noteworthy that along with the process of emasculating Marxist theory, the conversion of its various propositions into an incoherent set of demagogic labels is formalised, the propositions themselves are divested of their true meaning and the norms of socialist morals are dropped. The propositions are used as a sort of drug to inculcate blind faith in the "great helmsman'', a drug that works automatically. The only moral ``criterion'' is that everything that comes "from above"---from Mao Tse-tung and his entourage---is morally sound and unquestionably brilliant.
The primitive authoritarian moral of blind obedience is entirely at variance with communist morality, with the moral development of the individual moulded in the process of communist construction in line with the principles of Marxist humanism.
The actions and ``theories'' of Maoism thus have their own ``logic'' and their own ``sequence''. This is the ``logic'' of adventurist deviations from Marxism-Leninism, of degeneration, of distortions of the theory and practice of communism. This is the ``logic'' of Maoism as a socio-political and ideological phenomenon of our century and it has been crowned with the emergence of a military-bureaucratic regime, which is essentially anti-socialist, counter-- revolutionary in domestic policy, and chauvinistic in foreign policy, a regime that has abandoned the principles of communist humanism in order to pursue a policy of Machiavellian adventurism.
Filosofskiye nauki, No. 4, 1969, pp. 14--22
[108] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Part II __ALPHA_LVL1__ Anti-Marxist A. Rumyantsev,
A. Sterbalova
The political chaos into which Mao Tse-tung and his group have plunged China is bombastically called the "great proletarian cultural revolution''. At the llth plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC it was declared that the "broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary intellectuals" comprise the main force of this ``revolution''"^^*^^. It has been proclaimed that its aim is to further the "class struggle" of the proletariat against survivals of capitalism in the state and social system of China, and its official task is to destroy "bourgeois degenerates'', who are trying to steer the country's development into capitalist channels.
History knows of many cases when reactionary aims were camouflaged with revolutionary verbiage and a regressive movement was accomplished under the guise of social progress. But it would be hard to name a historical precedent where propaganda has diverged so far from the essence of developments. The ``revolutionary'' slogans shouted in China today mask counter-revolutionary actions. The "proletarian revolution" is, in fact, a military reactionary coup put into effect by the top leadership. The "struggle against bourgeois degenerates" has turned out to mean the destruction of proletarian political and economic organisations, the shattering of the proletarian Party and the uprooting of the most progressive segment of the intelligentsia.
As the turbulent and tragic events developed, it became obvious that the "cultural revolution" was mostly hitting the working class, the mainstay of socialism in China.
_-_-_^^*^^ "Decision of the CC CPC on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'', Jenmin Jihpao, August 9, 1966.
111 __ALPHA_LVL3__ From RealismThe revolution which in 1949 led to the creation of the People's Republic of China was an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. Its specific feature was the close intertwining of national liberation and social tasks, and its historical peculiarity lay in the integration of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal torrents. The first few years after the victory of the revolution witnessed the almost simultaneous abolition of colonial dependence, the eradication of feudal survivals, an agrarian reform, the nationalisation of key industries, the break-up of the old state machine, the establishment of a new social system and the appearance of contours of economic and social progress. The ultimate aim of all these changes was to create the foundations of a socialist economy.
The main difficulties in China's development towards socialism were: the polystructural nature of the Chinese economy ranging from the clan and primitive communal systems in the outlying regions to the capitalist mode of production in a number of large cities, the extremely low level of economic development, and the almost total absence of the material prerequisites for the socialist mode of production. The backward structure of industry and agriculture, the intricate system of social interrelations and the widening gap between the level of economic development and the population density confronted China's leaders with grave problems. One of the cardinal problems was the fundamental reconstruction of the primitive productive forces, for without such reconstruction the economy could not hope to develop along socialist lines. But the technical re-equipment of industry was hampered by the meagre sources of capital investment and by the enormous overpopulation. To get around these difficulties there had to be flexibility, a strict account of objective trends and a thorough scientific scrutiny of every major political and economic undertaking.
The Communist Party of China started out by drawing up a realistic long-term programme for the reorganisation of industry and agriculture. Its salient provisions were: the broad use of state capitalism, gradual cooperation by stages, the building of the foundations of modern industry with Soviet assistance, and the study and creative __PARAGRAPH_PAUSE__ 112 Table 1 PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN THE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION ('000,000) Year Total population Gainfully employed population Number of workers Percentage of workers 1949 549 329 3.0 0.9 1953 596 358 6.2 1.7 1957 657 394 9.0 2.3 1965 735 441 11.0 2.5 Note: No accurate statistics are available in China. In establishing the gainfully employed population the authors acted on the assumption that size of this population is equal to that of the so-called active population and comprises roughly (iO per cent of the total. The figures for the total population in 1949, 1953 and 1957 are from the official Chinese press. The figure for 1965 is an estimate made by the authors. The figures of the latest census taken in 1964 have not been published. In China the annual population increment averages 2.3 per cent and fluctuates in the vicinity of 15 million. The labour force grows by two million a year and exceeds the employment growth 10-fold. __PARAGRAPH_CONT__ application of the economic experience gained by the developed socialist countries. These measures could be put into effect provided there was active, creative initiative on the part of China's millions and their growing participation not only in implementing but also in determining the political and economic line of the newly established people's democratic state. The close unity of all strata of the people and the promotion of broad social democracy directed by the working class were an indispensable condition of China's successful advance towards socialism.
However, the specifics of China's class structure, in which the peasants are predominant, made it hard for the Chinese working class to carry out its historical mission. In China contingents of the modern working class took shape only in the past few decades. In 1949 industrial workers comprised about 0.5 per cent of the total population and 0.9 per cent of the gainfully employed population.
Moreover, the Chinese proletariat was concentrated in the industrial centres, and these were islands in the vast 113 ocean of the millions of peasants. Its territorial isolation from the huge masses of atomised peasant households was a major obstacle to the spread of proletarian influence in the Chinese countryside. In addition, the influence of the proletariat was restricted by the propagation of a kind of `` peasant'' Marxism in the CPC. The ascension to power of exponents of the "peasant revolution"' with Mao Tse-tung at their head was accompanied by inadequate understanding of the proletariat's importance, by the reduction of the entire strategy of the revolutionary process to the thesis of the "village surrounding the town''. No one disputes the immense revolutionary role of the peasants in a country like China. But the development of the revolution solely in the shape of a "peasant revolutionary war" led objectively to an underestimation of the hegemony of the proletariat. The overestimation of the role played by the peasants became particularly dangerous at the stage when the people's democratic revolution grew into a socialist revolution. Nonetheless, the Chinese proletariat played a considerable role in the revolutionary movement, in the long liberation, anti-imperialist struggle and in building the economic and political foundations of the new, people's democratic system. In its turn, the revolution brought the working class a certain improvement of its living conditions. Some progress was made in solving the problem of unemployment, which was regarded as insuperable in pre-revolutionary China, the wage system was adjusted, the medical service was improved and social insurance was introduced. However, the partial alleviation of the working people's lot was quite inadequate in the light of the vociferous and grandiloquent official declarations. The working day was still 10--12 hours long, no system of annual holidays existed and low-paid juvenile and female labour was widely employed at the factories. Apprenticeship was dragged out to five and even seven years, and this allowed paying the apprentices an extremely small wage. This situation was the result not only of the country's huge economic backwardness but also the Peking leadership's certain disregard of the elementary demands of the workingclass movement. At their 6th national congress in 1948 the trade unions charted a broad programme of social reforms demanding an 8-10-hour working day, equal pay for men, women and juveniles, and the abolition of the semi-feudal 114 contract system in industry. But most of the programme's demands remained a dead letter. Their realisation was opposed by Mao Tse-tung, who considered that the drive for an improvement of the proletariat's working conditions was a syndicalist and economic deviation that checked the revolutionary enthusiasm of the proletarian masses.
In 1955 and 1957 the infringements of the workers' economic rights once again became a bone of contention in the Party and in the trade unions. Discontent mounted in the country, strikes flared up in several places and there was unrest among the peasants.''^^*^^ Those who championed the interests of the proletariat were again accused of economism. The deterioration of the condition of the working class was said to be a temporary difficulty of development, but it was becoming evident that China's leadership was pursuing a questionable policy.
The realistic programme of economic reforms was increasingly abandoned in favour of gigantesque plans and a feverish economic race. The working people were set the task of achieving, within a matter of a few years, an industrial growth rate that would allow China to overtake and outstrip Britain in the main economic indices and take her to a leading position in scientific and cultural development.
At the close of the first five-year plan period, the economic policy of the Chinese leadership called for a huge acceleration of heavy industry's growth rate, and this inevitably led to cuts in investments in agriculture. As a result, the Chinese countryside with its primitive technology impeded any steady rise of the rate of industrialisation. This situation would hardly have arisen if the Chinese leadership had not abandoned the programme of comprehensive development of agricultural production through the gradual cooperation of the peasants. The initial programme for the reorganisation of the countryside in the course of three five-year plans was soberly realistic. It envisaged the transfer to collective ownership through a series of transitional stages, the creation of conditions for building up the productive forces, and preparing the peasants for socialist methods of farming. But miscalculations in industrialisation gave rise to gross errors _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung had to admit tliis in 1957 (sec his 'flic Correct Solution of Contradictions Within a Nation, Russ. cd., Moscow. 1!M7, pp. 40--41).
__PRINTERS_P_115_COMMENT__ 8* 115 in agricultural policy, one of which was the demand for the maximum acceleration of the rate of cooperation. Without any radical changes in the nature of the productive forces an attempt was made to reorganise the peasants' way of life within eight months. The peasants were not prepared for this change either economically or psychologically. The certain growth of production achieved through a simple cooperation of labour did not moderate the disproportion between industry and agriculture. Collective farming founded on primitive implements and manual labour could not meet even the requirements of the rural population. Pressured by want, the peasants began Hocking to the towns. In an effort to check this migration the authorities issued special decrees prohibiting any movement on the part of the rural population. The contradiction between the individual and collective interests of the peasants revolved in a vicious circle framed by the callous system of income distribution and attaching cooperative members to the land by administrative order, a system bordering on feudal survivals. The low level of farm output narrowed down industry's raw material resources, caused food shortages in the towns and, by the law of retroaction, affected the condition of the working class. Table 2 RATE OF COOPERATION in Date Percentage of peasant households embraced by cooperatives Summer 1955 ..... 15 November 1955 ........ December 1955 ....... about 30 60 January 1956 78 February 1950 ........ 85 April 1956 90 June 1956 .......... 91.7The zigzags and convulsions of the political line aggravated the social and economic contradictions in China. Official policy, which came more and more under Mao Tse-tung's personal direction, began to acquire features of subjectivism 116 and voluntarism in contravention of the democratic principles of the country's leadership. The quests for methods of removing the disproportion between production and consumption, between the rate of economic growth and the possibilities for accumulation, and between the development rate in industry and agriculture began to be expressed in theoretical concepts justifying the marked discrepancy between the requirements of objective laws and the subjective plans forced upon the people by the leadership.
Chinese practice strikingly shows how political and social life is deformed when it is sacrificed to the anti-scientific dogma of "politics is the commanding force''. Having turned upside down Lenin's thesis that politics is the concentrated expression of the economy, the Chinese pseudo-Marxists have subordinated the development of social production to their nationalistic political objectives without giving the least consideration for the interests of the people, of the working class above all. Economic management increasingly came under political dictation. The proletariat was deprived of its historical mission in the social revolution. It found itself playing the role of a passive observer, and from the subject of the revolutionary process it turned into the object of the social experiments conducted by the Mao group, which lost its links with the people.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The "Big Leap"The subjective errors in policy intensified the objectively existing difficulties and engendered new economic contradictions. By progressively accumulating they gave rise to failures and setbacks in China's economy. All this pushed the leadership into feverish quests for new administrative solutions, made it look for a way to end all difficulties once and for all, and served as the medium nourishing fantastic, impracticable plans. Thus was born the programme of the "big leap" and "people's communes'', which preposterously pursued the purpose of completing the building of socialism within a few years.
Once launched, the "big leap" programme led to its direct antithesis. Every element of this programme contained the embryo of its own negation. Initially marked by a rapid expansion of production, it created the soil for a general 117 economic collapse which thrust the country's economy many years back. While promising the working people "three years of hard work and ten thousand years of happiness'', it brought them to the verge of starvation and destitution. At first generating a rapid numerical growth of the working class, the "big leap" prepared the conditions for the subsequent sharp diminution of its ranks, the decline of the workers' qualifications and the proletariat's partial absorption by the peasantry.
The economic objective of the "big leap" was to achieve a sudden, convulsive, purely extensive expansion of production by straining every nerve to the breaking-point, organising paramilitary labour detachments and drawing the entire population into construction. The principal link of the new production system comprised not modern machinery or developed productive forces, but an enormous mass of small, semi-primitive enterprises. It was believed that together with the people's communes these enterprises would secure a sharp increase of industrial and agricultural output.
Table 3 NUMERICAL'GROWTH OF FACTORY AND OFFICE WORKERS End of year total ('000) Growth compared with 1949 Percentage of factory and office workers in Percentage of factory and office workers COOO) production in the non-productive sphere 1949 8,094 --- 65.0 35.0 1950 10,239 2,235 60.9 39.1 1951 12,815 4,811 63.8 36.2 1952 15,804 7,800 66.1 33.9 1953 18,256 10,252 67.7 32.3 1954 18,809 10,805 68.7 31.3 1955 19,076 11,072 68.5 31.5 1950 24,230 16,226 72.2 27.8 1957 24,506 16,502 72.9 27.1 Compiled on the basis of statistics given in The' Great Decade, Chinese ed., Peking, lO.'iD.Naturally, the mushrooming of tens of thousands of small enterprises swelled the ranks of the working class. This rapid numerical growth of the proletariat did not signify a 118 simultaneous growth of the army of industrial workers. It was chiefly a growth of the number of semi-artisan proletarians, But even this process was soon cut short by the economic decline, which was the natural consummation of the policy of economic adventurism.
A grave economic regression was the price that China paid for this ill-advised experiment. Industrial output dropped by 50 per cent and agricultural output by 30 or 35 per cent. The country was left without food, and its factories found themselves without agricultural raw materials. The newly opened small enterprises had to be closed. Even the large iron and steel and engineering plants operated at 50--70 per cent of their capacity. Unemployment appeared, and an effort was made to tackle the problem by forcibly resettling roughly 30 million people, with 12 million factory and office workers among them, in rural areas. The ascents and slumps in the dynamic of the proletariat's numerical growth caused by the movement of labour power to and from the towns gave rise to social collisions and to unrest among the workers.
Table 4 DYNAMIC OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FACTOR Y AND OFFICE WORKERS IN CHINA DURING AND AFTER THE "DIG LEAP"* ('000,000) Year Year End of year total Growth (+ ) or decrease (---) compared with the preceding year 1958 45.3 +20.8 1959 45 . 4 + 0.1 1960 44.0 ---1.4 1961 28---30** _14_l(i** 1962 30---31** + 1---2** 1963 32---33** -]- 2.0** 1964 34---35** -|- 2.0** * From 1958 onwards tlie category e[ factory and office workers lias included employees of county centres, villages and also rural enterprises and offices turned over to the people's communes. ** Estimate.The Mao group had no alternative but to beat a retreat and proclaim the ``rectification'' of mistakes, which marked the appearance of yet another new policy: "agriculture 119 constitutes the foundation''. The peasants were returned their auxiliary plots of land, which comprised 5 per cent of the total crop area and yielded 10 per cent of the gross farm output. The people's communes system was reconsidered, the free market livened up, while the threat of mass unemployment compelled the Chinese leadership to institute an 8-hour working day.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The Spirit of TachingThe economic stabilisation that began to show in 1962-- 1965 did not bring about any marked improvement in the life of the workers. Only the most urgent problem, that of famine, was settled. Wages remained at the 1956 level of 40 to 60 yuans a month. Some categories of workers, mainly apprentices, are paid 23 yuans. The minimum cost of living in Peking is 59--60 yuans a month for a family of three. Staple foods are still rationed. Factory and office employees receive a guaranteed minimum of grain, averaging half a kilo a day, which is frequently replaced with sweet potatoes. Meat is issued only on holidays, and the annual ration of vegetable oil and sugar does not exceed 2.5 kilos. Cotton fabrics (from four to seven metres a year per person) are sold against ration cards. The high commercial prices (2.52 yuans per kilo of pork, 1.6 yuans per kilo of vegetable oil, 0.5 yuan per kilo of rice, 20--40 yuans per metre of woollen fabric, over 1,000 yuans for a television set) make it impossible to increase individual consumption because the working people cannot afford these commodities.
Under this extremely high cost of living the Chinese leaders called for more austerity, asserting that from 8 to 10 yuans a month were enough to ensure a person with a satisfactory standard of living. Even before 1963, the psychological atmosphere at factories and offices was such that the workers and employees found themselves compelled to deposit a considerable portion of their earnings in the savings bank. In practice the possibility of drawing on these savings accounts was ruled out. The working people were thus burdened with an additional tax, which provided the state with a growth of accumulations by cutting down the budget of the workingman's family. The vicious circle of errors committed by the Chinese leaders brought them round to 120 abolishing material incentives for work. On the eve of the "big leap" piece-rates and bonuses were replaced with a system of "rational low wages''. This system, likewise a kind of indirect tax levied by simply holding down wages while demanding higher labour productivity, has become particularly widespread in recent years.^^*^^
The "latest word" in the economic thinking of the Maoists is the institution of an experimental system of labour organisation---``workers-and-peasants''---which in 1965 embraced more than 30 branches of the national economy. Under the new system from 20 to 50 per cent of the permanent staff of workers at industrial enterprises located in rural localities (at some enterprises this percentage is much higher, reaching 70) are replaced with temporary or seasonal workers recruited from among the peasants. Factories and people's communes conclude labour agreements under which the communes provide labour, periodically renewing it. This category of workers is used chiefly on heavy, manual work that does not require modern machinery. It is not embraced by social insurance and gets the lowest rate, which is not paid out directly to the worker or, if it is paid, the worker receives at most one-third of the wage. The rest of the income goes into the collective fund of the people's commune and is subject to centralised distribution, mainly for production requirements.
The experience of the Taching oil workers is given out as an example of a "genuinely socialist attitude to labour''. It consists of a ``voluntary'' renunciation of material incentives, in a transfer to self-supply, in the promotion of production with minimum investments by the state. At Taching and at enterprises being set up or reorganised after its model, wages are 50--66 per cent lower than at factories equipped with modern machines. The Taching experience combines industrial and agricultural labour and involves the enlistment of all the members of the families of factory and office workers. Men are employed chiefly at the oilfields and in construction, and women and children work in _-_-_
^^*^^ The system of rational low wages was first introduced in 1957. Piece-rates and bonuses were restored during the so-called `` adjustment''. But with the start of the campaign for the "socialist education" of the masses and, particularly, during the "cultural revolution" piecerates and bonuses again began to give way to the "rational low wages''.
121 agriculture and in the services industry. Industrial and office workers and the members of their families have built dugouts, which serve them as dwellings. In 19G4 this saved the state 20 million yuans, while the labour force needed for dwelling construction was cut by several thousand people.The "Taching example" has been proclaimed the programme line in economic development in China. The Mao group has called on the people to reshape factories in all branches of industry, offices, organisations and educational institutions on the Taching model, which is described as the prototype of communist society and called the "golden bridge to communism''. In an effort to give a Marxist content to these measures, the Chinese journal Laotung wrote that "the new forms of labour organisation not only meet the vital requirements of socialist construction but serve as a means of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism; they gradually erase the distinctions between workers and peasants, between town and countryside and between work by hand and by brain, and create the conditions for the transition to communism".*
In effect, these high-flown words hide a policy of abolishing the cadre composition of the proletariat, achieving a general social levelling, and replacing free and creative work with universal labour conscription. If this is communism, it is barrack communism, which Marx and Engels caustically ridiculed when they denounced the views of the Bakuninists as expressing the instinctive hostility of pettybourgeois, anarchist revolutionaries for the working class.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ A DisinheritedThe striving to forge ahead at all costs, leap over indispensable historical stages and proclaim the establishment of communist relations in China earlier than in any other socialist country was dictated not only by the complex situation in China herself but by the CPC leadership's intention of dominating the international working-class movement. But here too grave setbacks awaited the Maoists. The unprincipled factional activity, the slander hurled at
* Laotung, No. 1, 1966, p. 2.
122 Communists who disagreed with them, the barefaced falsification of Marxism, the insistent preaching of war invested with revolutionary verbiage alienated the overwhelming majority of Communist and Workers' Parties from the CPC.Finding itself in self-imposed isolation and faced with difficult problems, the Chinese leadership sought to give its miscalculations the guise of "scientific socialism" and the appearance of the latest word in the theory and practice of Marxism. To this end it chose the road of deifying Mao Tse-tung proclaiming him the highest authority on scientific communism and the leader of the world revolution and using his name to sanctify any arbitrary and ill-considered act in domestic and foreign policy.
The Maoists used the people's vague and amorphous ideas of socialism and tenacity of Chinese traditional social psychology founded on the millennia-long moral teaching of Confucianism to whip up the Mao cult to fantastic proportions. Confucianist dicta are an immutable law, an absolute dogma and ultimate truth that must be remembered and complied with at all times. Dogmatic faith in the infallibility of authorities and the scholastic repetition of approved wisdoms seriously undermined the inclination towards independent thinking and judgement. Man saw the entire value of the world solely in the rules and aphorisms formulated by the authorities. By playing on these survivals in the minds of the masses it was possible to establish the Mao cult and raise Mao Tse-tung to the level of a "supreme leader" and "master prophet''. Absolute ideological conformism and the regimentation of individuals were to serve as the pedestal for the "supreme leader" and his unlimited dictatorship. Not only criticism, but even silent disapproval of the deified prophet's ideas were regarded as a threat to the very existence of the socialist system in China.
All that the latter-day prophet had to do to become a second edition of Confucius was to spread his teaching as widely as possible. "The thought of Mao Tse-tung has to be instilled into the minds of the workers and peasants by closely connecting the study and application of his works with practice. This is the only way to change the spiritual make-up of the working people and turn spiritual force into a huge material force,'' wrote the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao. The application of the ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung, the same 123 newspaper reported, developed "into an ideological revolutionary movement that has no parallel in human history''. Quotations from the ``creations'' of Mao Tse-tung were learned by heart, sung, and used as accompaniment for dances. People of various professions "achieved unprecedented labour successes" with the assistance of these quotations.
The front along which the assault was made on people's minds was steadily widened. A new campaign of "socialist re-education" was announced in order to uproot alien ideology and ``revolutionise'' the thinking of factory and office workers. The people were deluged with apologetic articles and documents, whose purpose was to find a way out of the tangled economic situation by preaching "an adequate form of consciousness''. This was an organised assault by all media of ideological indoctrination---the press, radio and television.
One of the aims of this assault was to turn the worker into an unthinking robot in the production process, regiment the thoughts of all the people and stifle all their material and cultural requirements. The ultimate purpose of the campaign to "revolutionise thinking" was to complete the process of reducing the worker to the level of a simple mechanism and a disinherited pawn on the political chessboard started soon after the failure of the "big leap''. To this end the spiritual law-makers of modern China invented new moral criteria that have become known as the ``heroisation'' of the individual.
Slogans were turned out and offered to the masses: "learn from Lei Feng'', "learn from Wang Chieh'', "learn from Chiao Yu-lu" and so on ad infinitum. Propaganda described the death of Chiao Yu-lu, secretary of a county Party committee, from a liver disease as death "for the sake of the revolution''. "Heroic self-sacrifice" was how official propaganda described the death of Lei Feng who died in a road accident, the death of Owuyang Hai, who was accidentally run over by a train, and the death of Wang Chieh, who was killed as a result of carelessly handling explosives. As a rule, after their death, diaries "were found" which showed the moral credo of these "good disciples of Mao Tse-tung''.
The philosophical journal Chehsueh Yanchiu undertook the task of ``theoretically'' substantiating the birth of the new norms of human behaviour in accordance with the ideal 124 of the Maoists. "The moulding of communist morality among the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers,'' this journal wrote, "takes place in the course of revolutionary practice and is the result of their heeding the counsels of Chairman Mao, keenly studying and effectively applying the works of Chairman Mao and breaking with all the old notions of morality. The principal condition is to arm oneself with the thought of Mao Tse-tung and drive all survivals of personal concepts out of one's head. . .. Lofty ideas are the source of lofty moral qualities, and the teaching of Chairman Mao is the source of all lofty ideas.''^^*^^
In order to prove that truth comes from the lips of the people, the same magazine offered a cross-section of utterances by "heroic individuals''. This cross-section was reprinted by all leading Chinese newspapers and presented as the "basic principles of the proletariat's communist morals''. The following are some of these precepts, which have been turned into a kind of model for the new man of the Mao Tse-tung mould.
``Man's role in revolutionary work is similar to that of a cog in a machine. A machine consists of a vast number of inter-related cogs and it is only due to this that it can operate at its full capacity. Although a cog is small, its role is inestimable. I want to be a cog always. A cog must be constantly cleaned and protected so that it does not rust. The same concerns man's ideology. It too must be constantly checked to prevent hitches" (from the Diary of PL A soldier Lei Feng).
``I want to become a universal cog. I shall remain wherever the Party places me, and I shall shine eternally, never rusting" (from the Diary of PLA soldier Wang Chieh).
``I must be like a cog: if it accords with the Party's interests, wherever I am driven, into a rifle, a farm implement, a lorry or a machine-tool---I agree to everything, and everywhere I shall perform the role of a small cog" (Chang Hungchih, model worker at Taching).
The sole purpose of this vulgarisation of the role of the individual, of this humiliation of human dignity, is to educate people in a spirit of slavish and unconditional obedience. The same aim was pursued by another thesis of Chinese _-_-_
^^*^^ Chehsueh Yanchiu, No. 1, 1966.
125 propaganda, namely, "always be a simple toiler''. This was nothing but an aspiration to snuft out any attempt on the part of the people to change their social position, and it was permeated with the spirit of Confucianism with its strict regimentation of immutable social relations.The "revolutionisation of thinking" was accompanied by practical steps to paralyse the will of the working class and nullify its political rights. The insignificance of the role played by the working class is shown also by the social composition of the Chinese Communist Party, in which workers comprise 12--14 per cent of the membership. Large proletarian organisations---Party, trade union and Young Communist League---have been in effect removed from the leadership and supplanted by political departments, most of which are headed by army officers. These have their own propaganda, organisation, personnel and military training divisions. One of the propaganda slogans---"learn from the People's Liberation Army"---demands that the working people live and work in military fashion. Workers, employees and peasants are made to devote several hours a week to military drill. The country's entire life has been put on a military footing.
Between the workers and the enterprises employing them, and between the workers and the organs of power there is a ramified and numerous social substratum of cadres called kanpu. In the oppressive atmosphere created by the Mao cult the enormous, all-penetrating administrative apparatus with its nearly 20 million employees has acquired all the features of a bureaucratic machine. Regulation of the activities of the kanpu from above has fettered individual initiative. The kanpu are required to carry out orders unconditionally in the spirit of army discipline and have been turned into a blind instrument of the ``supreme'' will of one man. Originally designed as an organ of dual control, the bureaucratic system of administration functions only in one direction---from top to bottom. Signals from the locality about economic difficulties are regarded as criticism from discontented elements or doubters. Formally, the kanpu act in the name of the people, but in fact they are the force which obstructed and stilled the creative initiative of the masses. This has resulted in the curtailment of the workers' constitutional rights and of their political role, and in the 126 restriction of their participation in production management and in the organs of state administration.
The absence of control from below cleared the way to arbitrary decisions. Political and social measures degenerated into countless campaigns, which were adopted as a style of work by the state apparatus. Subjectivism and arbitrary rule became standard practice in state and inner-Party life. The top echelon of the state apparatus and the Party grew into a despotic force that depended chiefly on the army and passed decisions at its own discretion.
The state's distrust for the workers made the workers distrust the state. Latent discontent mounted, causing an estrangement between the working class and the policies pursued by the Maoists. Explosive material accumulated in the proletarian organisations---in the Party and the trade unions. Even the kanpu system itself came into sharp conflict with the people whose job it was to put it into effect. This unfeeling machine weighed down not only on the working masses and the intelligentsia but also on the state and Party apparatus. Many of the kanpu officials were recruited from among workers, peasants and soldiers of the PLA. They saw at first hand the difficult condition of the people and the disastrous effects of Mao Tse-tung's adventurist line. The failure of the "big leap" proved to be a serious test for many cadres. It shook their confidence in the "leader`s'' infallibility, sowed bewilderment and vacillation and made them doubt the current policies. As an antidote to the fermenting discontent, the Maoists injected a ``pacifying'' vaccine into the body of the nation in the shape of the "great proletarian cultural revolution'', which was nothing less than an assault on Party cadres, intellectuals and all doubters and discontented people.^^*^^
It was not easy for the Chinese workers to see where they stood in the struggle that had broken out in the Party. The programme of removing a considerable section of the creative intelligentsia and Party and state cadres, who dared to think independently of the canons of Maoism, was screened with pseudo-revolutionary slogans calling for a struggle _-_-_
^^*^^ It is not our purpose to consider the causes and objectives of flic "cultural revolution''. In this article we are concerned with the attitude of the Chinese working class to the developments in China.
127 against bourgeois and reactionary elements "in Party authority taking the capitalist road''. The psychological terror directed against Party cadres was conducted as "criticism from below" and given the form of a "mass line''. The struggle for power at the summit of the hierarchic pyramid was camouflaged as a movement against old ideology, customs and culture.At the outset of the "cultural revolution" the working masses, including the industrial proletariat, adopted the stand of passive observers. But when the battle of words erupted into action---the seizure of industrial enterprises, a further offensive on wages, which were cut by another 10 per cent, the disbandment of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the destruction of the Komsomol organisations, the dissolution of provincial, town and county committees of the CPC, the replacement of organs of people's power with "revolutionary committees" of hungweipings and tsaofans--- the workers found themselves compelled to go over to a spontaneous defence. This reaction was not expected by the inspirers of the political hysteria, for they had counted on the blind support of the masses.
The reign of terror instituted by the Maoist fanatics and the atmosphere of fear could not suppress the anger and indignation of advanced contingents of the proletariat. The strikes at the factories and the bloodshed in many cities, particularly in Nanking and Shanghai where a hundred thousand workers took part in the fighting in January 1967, made it obvious that a large section of the Chinese workers did not share the idea of the "cultural revolution''.
The leadership reacted instantly to the resistance of the workers. Army "propaganda teams" were sent to the factories to suppress the proletariat and maintain ``discipline''. The reorganisation of the constitutional organs of power and their replacement with military-control and "revolutionary committees" consisting of representatives of the army, the tsaofans and top echelon officials supporting Mao Tse-tung is still in progress. Army control has been established over political and economic life throughout China.
The struggle has by no means ended. The actions of the working masses against the excesses of the "cultural revolution'', the serious dislocation of the country's economy, the widespread resistance being put up by the opponents of Mao 128 Tse-tung in the Party, in state institutions and even in the army, and the differences between the "exponents of Maoism" themselves have forced the Mao group to change to a policy of temporary manoeuvres and even to beat a partial retreat. The one-sided information coming from China makes it impossible to consider all the facets and nuances of phenomena that have not reached their logical climax. Any forecast made today would be premature, to say the least. But the trends as a whole amply show what the Mao group is hoping to achieve by spearheading the "cultural revolution" at the working class of China. Its objective is to suppress the working class, crush its resistance and protests, and discourage its efforts to uphold its human rights under the prevailing authoritarian, dictatorial regime. Evidence of this is the invention being spread about the bourgeois degeneration of some contingents of the proletariat.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Is the Working ClassOne of the theses being vigorously spread in China is that "the class struggle intensifies under socialism" not only between the working people and the remnants of the bourgeoisie, but also within the working class. The journal Hsin Chianske wrote that "certain degenerates and new bourgeois elements may appear within the contingents of the working class, among high officials of state institutions, among factory and office workers.. . . From the standpoint of objective conditions this possibility is the result of the penetration of bourgeois ideology into the ranks of the proletariat, while the `birthmarks' inherited by the working class from the old society are the subjective conditions for the above-mentioned possibility''.^^*^^
Do the objective and subjective possibilities for this sort of degeneration exist in China? First, it would not be superfluous to consider what this means. Some sections of the working people may join the ranks of the bourgeoisie if, at the cost of privation and immense effort, they accumulate funds, use them for the purchase of the means of production _-_-_
^^*^^ Chao Lin, "Some Questions of the Class Struggle in the Period of Transition'', Hsin Chianshe, No. 11, 1963.
__PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9--534 129 and capitalise their income. It will be recalled that in the period witnessing the disintegration of feudalism in Western Europe and serfdom in Russia, a section of the peasants acquired capitalist property in this manner and joined the ranks of the bourgeoisie. There were cases of individuals from working-class families becoming capitalists.But neither European nor Russian, much less Asian, practice knows of any instance of a more or less considerable number of proletarians becoming capitalists and living by exploiting hired labour. This conclusion has been fully borne out by the sociological studies conducted by Communists and progressive scientists in the socialist and capitalist countries. Even according to statistics compiled by bourgeois sociology, the "social mobility" of the proletariat is confined to the acquisition of a few shares by individual workers, but this does not change their objective position in the system of capitalist relations of production. For these workers the principal source of livelihood remains the sale of their labour, hired labour at the factories remaining the undisputed property of the capitalists, of their monopoly associations or the bourgeois state.
Much less, therefore, is it possible for workers to become capitalists in a country that has taken the road of socialist development. Under the socialist system the bourgeoisie is liquidated as a class, and as a social concept it is destroyed and disappears. In a transitional society its economic and political positions are fundamentally undermined. Under these conditions it is absurd and unscientific to speak of the bourgeois degeneration of various sections of the working class. The process is sooner the reverse: the bourgeoisie is compelled gradually to dissolve in the working classes.
However, the concept "bourgeois degeneration" has another (ideological) meaning. It is frequently taken to mean capitalist influence and a definite way of thinking, which penetrates the consciousness of certain sections of the working people without changing their objective class position. Socialist society develops not in a vacuum but in the real, contemporary world with its powerful capitalist states and strong bourgeoisie that has extensive experience of class struggle in its peaceful and non-peaceful forms, and a varied arsenal of means and methods of influencing the working masses ideologically and politically. But long experience 130 shows that the Chinese proletariat is immune to bourgeois influence. The compradore and national bourgeoisie was least of all concerned with winning the support of the Chinese working class. On the contrary, it subjected the Chinese workers to brutal, inhuman exploitation, regarding them only as mute slaves and chaining them to tyranny and illiteracy.
As regards the influence of the imperialist bourgeoisie of capitalist countries, the Chinese working class, which has experienced long years of colonial rule and savage foreign oppression, is perfectly well aware of what may issue from any intensification of bourgeois influence in China. If ever an accusation of bourgeois degeneration was laid at the wrong door, this is it. In every aspect of its life---economic position, social experience, way of thinking, and traditions of revolutionary struggle---the Chinese working class is associated not with capitalism but with socialism. It expects socialism, not capitalism, to bring to materialisation its hopes and aspirations and secure to it a fundamental improvement of its economic condition.
But perhaps what the Maoists have in mind is that in present-day China it is possible for the remaining capitalists to bribe individual workers? Indeed, among socialist countries China is an exception. In that country the dissolution and disappearance of the bourgeoisie has been held up artificially by the state. The capitalists who consented to co-operate with the government have been granted immense benefits and privileges, which set them apart from the rest of the population. They receive parasitical incomes amounting to 5 per cent of their former capital, enjoy the right of free exit to foreign countries, hold executive positions in industry and have their own mansions and cars.^^*^^ In the socialist world China is the only country with millionaire investors. Some have even been appointed to government posts and in the higher legislative bodies. However that may be, the Chinese national bourgeoisie has been deprived of the means of production and it is hardly conceivable that it would share part of its income with the working class for the sake of a hopeless cause.
_-_-_^^*^^ In China there are some 1,200,000 capitalists. The period in which the government pledged to pay them a fixed rate ol interest expired in H)(i2, but the Chinese leaders prolonged this period to I'KjG and then lor another JO years.
131The Maoists evidently disagree with these obvious truths. In order to reinforce their assertions that the working class has ``birthmarks'', they refer to the authority of Lenin, who said that the old society "inevitably cultivated in the workingman the desire to escape exploitation even by means of deception, to wriggle out of it, to escape, if only for a moment, from loathsome labour, to procure at least a crust of bread by any possible means, at any cost, so as not to starve, so as to subdue the pangs of hunger suffered by himself and by his near ones''.^^*^^ The Chinese theorists maintain that under the dictatorship of the proletariat and public ownership the political and economic position of the working class changes radically and there is no need to "seek deliverance from exploitation'', engage in ``deceit'' or shun "loathsome wor.k''. In the same breath they add that the ``birthmarks'' remain in the form of "sinful aspirations''. What do these vague words mean? Possibly, the workers' desire to eat and to see their families fed. The journal Hsin Chianshe wrote that the ``uprooting'' of this `` aspiration'', which it qualifies as a survival of the old society, is part of the proletariat's ideological re-education.^^**^^
This brings to the fore the real purpose of the drive for the ideological re-education of the people, who, according to the Maoist canons, must work solely "for the sake of the revolution, not for themselves personally, not in order to earn money and support a family''.^^***^^ The same purpose is pursued by the struggle against economism, which, in the light of the latest developments, acquires a specific political hue. While vulgarising and ignoring the people's natural desire for an improvement of their economic condition, the social demagogy of the Maoists calls upon the people to sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of social interests, and characterises personal interests as counterrevolutionary economism. In their opinion it boils down to "using bribery to indulge the demands of numerically small backward groups, corrupt the revolutionary will of the masses, direct the political struggle of the masses towards the phoney path of economism so that they would cease to _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 411.
^^**^^ Hsin Chianshe, No. 11, 1963.
^^***^^ Jcnmin Jihpao, April 28, 1966.
132 reckon with the interests of the state and the collective, with the interests of the future, and pursue exclusively personal, temporary interests''.^^*^^While flouting the socialist principles requiring the combination of personal and social interests, the Chinese ideologists propound the absurd theory that the people's aspiration for a better life has to be curbed because it is a "class aspiration and mirrors the class struggle within the proletariat and the working masses''.^^**^^ "Aspirations, shortcomings and the `birthmarks' inherited by the working class from the old society," Hsin Chianshe writes, "are the inner factors making some people degenerates, profiteers or embezzlers and turning the contradictions within the people into contradictions between them and our enemies.''^^***^^
The Chinese working class is thus accused of all mortal sins into which it has never nor can ever lapse. It is charged with aspiring for a better life and every means is used to indoctrinate it into killing its individuality and turning into a "stainless cog''. The workers' requirements are reduced to a minimum, which is hardly enough to restore their physical strength to say nothing of their rights. The Maoists do not confine themselves to attacks on the Chinese proletariat. They accuse the peoples of the socialist countries of bourgeois degeneration, declare that the working class of the capitalist countries has lost its revolutionary spirit, and charge the international communist and working-class movement with opportunism. Contrary to their official statements, they are guided not by concern for the development of the world revolution but by a petty-bourgeois fury, Great-Power chauvinism and hatred of the Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers' Parties that have rejected their claims to dictatorship and domination. This in fact is the meaning of the "latest discoveries" of the Maoist theorists with their inventions about the bourgeois degeneration of the Chinese working class and of the socialist countries.
A society where the only forms of ownership are state and collective has no objective soil for the spontaneous restoration of private proprietor capitalist relations and the _-_-_
^^*^^ Jciimin /ihjjdo, January 12, 1967.
^^**^^ 11 sin Cliianshc, No. 11, 1963.
^^***^^ Ibid.
133 accompanying degeneration of various contingents of the working class. But given certain conditions this society may be faced with the threat that closed bureaucratic castes may appear, usurp the management of the means of production, divorce themselves from the people and ignore their demands and requirements. Such castes may take shape in economically undeveloped countries accomplishing the transition to socialism in the absence of clearly defined material prerequisites of the socialist mode of production, in countries that lack democratic traditions, have a very small industrial proletariat and where the population is predominantly peasant. This danger becomes real when the leadership of such a country disregards the extensive international experience of building socialism, turns away from an alliance with the proletariat of the developed socialist and capitalist countries, rejects a scientific policy in favour of adventurism, and identifies socialism with the selfish interests of a small ruling group that recognises no other methods of leadership other than the unlimited arbitrary rule of a deified leader placed over society.Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhduiuirixlniye otnoshcniya, No. (i, 1967, pp. 30--44
[134] __ALPHA_LVL2__ The "CulturalV. Vyatsky
The Chinese working class has many revolutionary traditions. It powerfully influenced the course of the national liberation, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggle, contributed greatly towards the victory of the socialist revolution and the creation of the People's Republic of China, and played the decisive role in consolidating the economic and political foundations of the new system and in promoting China's socialist development. However, at all stages of the revolutionary movement the working class of China encountered enormous difficulties of both an objective and subjective nature.
For a long time, from 1927 to almost 1949, the leading organs of the Communist Party of China were located in economically backward regions far away from working-class centres. The geographical isolation of the proletarian centres from these areas made it difficult for the working class to influence the peasantry, the revolutionary army and, in the long run, the Party itself. Some of the difficulties were due to the economic and political condition of the Chinese proletariat. There were very few industrial workers proper in China. The working class had not completely purged itself of patriarchal survivals and petty-bourgeois sentiments. It lacked the experience of leading a revolutionary movement involving different strata of the population. The proletariat's numerical weakness, the low level of the productive forces, particularly of modern industry, the backward structure of the economy and the heavy petty-bourgeois pressure were serious obstacles to working-class leadership of society even after the revolution triumphed,
Moreover, the development of the working-class movement was fettered by the subjectivist, misdirected policy of the CPC's nationalistic petty-bourgeois leaders, of Mao Tse-tung above all. An unremitting struggle raged over the workingclass problem between two main trends: internationalist Marxist and nationalistic, petty-bourgeois. While representatives of the Marxist-Leninist trend in the CPC, supported 135 by the international working-class movement, upheld the interests of the Chinese proletariat and sought to consolidate its leading role in the revolution, the nationalists for years underrated work in the towns and in many cases allowed the Kuomintang to seize complete control of them. Mao Tse-tung and his associates reduced the entire strategy of the revolutionary process to "surrounding the town by the village''. They absolutised the role of the Chinese peasantry, disregarding the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. For instance, at the 3rd Congress of the CPC in 1923 Mao Tse-tung declared that "a massive organisation of workers created by Communists is impracticable''. He believed that an independent workers' "trade union movement cannot be started in China''.
The result of this line was that instead of increasing, the proletarian stratum in the CPC began to diminish from the 1930s onwards. In 1927 nearly 58 per cent of the Party membership were workers, yet in 1949 only 3 per cent were proletarians. Mao Tse-tung absolutised the specifics of the revolutionary movement in China. On account of the protracted character of the armed struggle, the army had not only to fight but carry out political tasks: organise the population, administer the various areas and even build up the Party. The Maoists gave army leadership out as leadership by the Party and the working class. In particular, it was declared that the proletariat was implementing its hegemony and alliance with the peasantry through the army despite the fact that it was a peasant army.
The victory of the revolution and all-round assistance from the CPSU, other fraternal parties and the international working-class movement created the conditions for a fundamental change of the role played by the working class of China in politics and in economic leadership. In the country's Constitution it was proclaimed that the People's Republic of China is "a state directed by the working class''. The Constitution of the CPC defined the Party as "the vanguard of the Chinese working class''. With the victory of the revolution it became possible to improve the material condition of the workers. Relying on assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and drawing on their experience, the Chinese working class and the Marxist-Leninist internationalist forces in the CPC led China along the road of socialist 136 construction. In the period from 1949 to the close of the 1950s the influence of the working class in China's political life grew substantially, the internationalist forces in the CPC won stronger positions and there was an expansion of friendly relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In particular, this was seen in the proceedings and decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC in 1956, which witnessed the strengthening and consolidation of the true Marxist-Leninist forces.
Initially Mao Tse-tung and his group had to orient themselves on the Soviet Union's experience and on assistance from the world socialist camp. The working class of China, most of the Communists and the politically conscious working people regarded this as the surest way to the country's socialist reconstruction. However, at the same time, the Maoists sought to adapt China's progress linked with socialist construction and with the utilisation of the experience and assistance of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries to their Great-Power ambitions, and gradually began counterposing their own special aims to the task of building a socialist China. At the close of the 1950s the CPC leadership openly proclaimed this line in foreign and domestic policy. This signified a complete rupture with MarxismLeninism and a switch to anti-Sovietism.
The Maoists raised every possible obstacle to prevent the working class and its representatives from occupying key positions in the Party and the Government.
The proletariat's leading role in the leadership of society was depreciated by the Maoists, and this was shown by the fact that its immediate vital interests and requirements were ignored. The working people's aspiration for a higher standard of living was assessed as a syndicalist deviation and as economism. Due to the Maoist opposition, the measures to improve the working conditions and living standard of the workers were slowed down. Poverty and backwardness were declared a factor of socialist construction and the slogan "Poverty is a good thing" was proclaimed. Mao Tsetung's attempt to implement his own ``special'' line in economic development (``big leap'') struck a devastating blow at the material condition of the working class. The living standard in China, which showed a marked rise during the first five-year plan period, subsequently dropped sharply. 137 The second five-year plan (1958--62) envisaged a 25 per cent rise in wages, but it was disrupted.
Another aspect of Mao Tse-tung's economic policy merits attention. A large number of young peasants joined the working class in 1958 mainly as apprentice workers. The ``worker-and-peasant'' system of labour began to be instituted on a nation-wide scale in the economy. The essence of this system is that by contract with the communes industrial enterprises hire peasants as temporary (for a term of from three to five years) or seasonal workers, while the permanent workers are compelled to engage in farming after their day's work. The ``worker-peasants'' from the countryside are in a totally different position than the permanent workers. They receive considerably smaller wages for the same work; their families are not allowed to join them in the towns; part of their wages are deducted into the social fund of the communes sending them to the given factory (some factories pay them no wages at all, remunerating the commune with production waste); at the end of their term they have to return to their commune, and their place is taken by other peasants.
This policy is giving rise to singular strata in the working class and to discriminatory distinctions and inequality in working conditions, wages, hire and everyday life, which have nothing to do with the real distinctions in the quantity and quality of the labour of workers. The stratification in the working class and the contradictions between its various groups are used to undermine proletarian unity.
The depreciation of the proletariat's leading role is manifested also in the Maoists' interpretation of the substance of the world revolutionary process. They reject the thesis that the working class and its principal creation, the world socialist system, are in the centre of the modern epoch. The development of the world revolutionary process is depicted as a movement of the peasant masses, of the petty-bourgeois forces and trends in the Asian, African and Latin American countries, which surround the "world city'', as a struggle of the ``poor'' peoples against the ``rich'', of the "world village" against the "world city''. In effect, the Maoists thereby reject the revolutionary role of the socialist countries and the hegemony of the world proletariat in the liberation movement. They accuse the working class of (he Soviet Union and other socialist countries of "bourgeois 138 degeneration'', and the international communist and working-class movement of burying the interests of the world revolution in oblivion. They belittle the role played by the working class in the developing countries and in the national liberation movement.
The assault launched in the course of the "cultural revolution" on the proletariat's political and economic gains is thus by no means accidental. It stems from the Maoists' disregard of the working class, their underestimation of its revolutionary potentialities and their rejection of its leading role. This has always been the typical approach of the nationalistic, petty-bourgeois elements in the CPC.
The "cultural revolution" created a real threat to the socialist achievements in China, undermined the position of the working class and heavily affected its political and economic interests. The working class, mainstay of socialism in China, has become one of the principal targets of the "cultural revolution''.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Assault on the PoliticalChinese propaganda claims that the aim of the "cultural revolution" is to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Actually, however, the anti-Marxist line of the Mao group and all its practical and political activity have divested the concepts of dictatorship of the proletariat and hegemony of the working class of their true content. The political superstructure of the people's democratic system is being demolished and replaced with a military-bureaucratic regime of personal power.
One of Mao Tse-tung's chief objectives in the "cultural revolution" is to destroy the CPC as a party of the working class and to set up, in its stead, a new political party, a party of the leader, implicitly obedient to his will and desires. The CPC has been paralysed and removed from the leadership of the country's political life. The Central Committee and other leading Party organs exist only nominally. More than two-thirds of the members and alternate members of the Central Committee have been discredited and repressed. All the six territorial bureaus of the Central Committee and all provincial, city and branch Party committees have been 139 disbanded. The lower Party organisations, including the Party committees at the factories, are in effect idle.
Lately the Maoists have started the "adjustment and reorganisation of the Party''. This is nothing less than a massive purge---all who show the least doubt in Mao Tsetung and his policies are expelled. Moreover, it is planned to bring "new blood" into the Party (more than 10 million hungweipings and tsaofans). Maoism, which is accorded the role of the "only basis for a united Party'', is the ideological foundation of the emerging political organisation.
The Maoists have undermined or completely destroyed the constitutional organs of state power. The highest legislative organ, the National Assembly of People's Representatives, and its Standing Committee are not functioning. The people's committees in the localities have been abolished, and the work of the State Council and of most of the ministries has been disorganised.
The Maoists are setting up "revolutionary committees" to replace the people's and Party committees, whose function, according to the country's Constitution and the Constitution of the CPC, is to ensure the leading role of the working class. "The revolutionary committees'', Chiehfangchun Pao, the army newspaper, wrote in August 1968, "are one of the creative finds of the working class" and the "latest form of proletarian power''. In fact, the function of these committees is the very reverse---the removal of the working class from the leadership of society. Formally, they are being set up on the basis of a "three-way alliance'', not between the working class, the peasants and the intelligentsia, but between army representatives, cadres supporting Mao Tsetung, and the "revolutionary masses'', i.e., the hungweipings and the tsaofans.
The "revolutionary committees" exercise the powers formerly enjoyed by Party and state organs, in other words, they are "vested with full political, economic, financial, cultural and educational powers''. The working class and the peasants have been deprived of all possibility of influencing these ``committees''. There is no hint of democratic elections. One of the principal tasks of the "revolutionary committees" is to consolidate Mao Tse-tung's personal power, while the unconditional fulfilment of his instructions is held to be the "highest criterion" of their work.
140Peking propaganda tries to prove that the "cultural revolution" was started to enable the "revolutionary workers and peasants to take over power''. Actually, despite the smokescreen, power is being concentrated in the hands of the army leadership. The chairmen of nearly all the " revolutionary committees" are army officers (commanders of military districts or garrisons, or political commissars). Foreign observers have noted that of the 13.5 men promoted to leading posts in China during the past few years, 111 are army officers.
The army has become a key factor of life in China. Consisting mostly of peasants, it is the mainstay of the " cultural revolution''. It sets up "revolutionary committees'', and selects men for leading posts through the "direct participation of army representatives in revolutionary committees of all levels''. Moreover, it has been entrusted with " reorganising the Party" after its own model. "Army traditions,'' Jcnmin Jihpao underlined on August I, 1968, "are the traditions of the Party''.
The Maoists did not shrink from destroying the trade unions, too. At the end of December 1966 the National Federation of Trade Unions and its newspaper Kungjen Jihpao were raided and closed by thugs from the Union of Red Rebels. The Maoists intend to replace the trade unions with a new organisation called Kungtaihoy, an association chiefly of tsaofans selected according to their devotion to Mao Tse-tung. At the close of 1967 the Minister for Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih declared that the "Kungtaihoy must embrace the revolutionary workers and, for all practical purposes, it will, in future, replace the former trade unions''.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ ``Proletarianisation''The Maoists' distrust of the workers is strikingly shown by their slanderous thesis about the "bourgeois degeneration" of the working class. "Bourgeois influence,'' wrote the newspaper Peiching Jihpao, "has penetrated the body of the working class in a thousand ways.'' This is what lies at the back of the drive to "proletarianise the working class''. In effect, it signifies that a sweeping offensive has been started against the ideological, moral and political positions of the working class. The claims that "the class struggle within 141 the working class has intensified" show that a nation-wide brainwashing campaign is under way. It has been announced that the chief task at industrial enterprises is to `` revolutionise'' and ``proletarianise'' the workers and to get on with the "class struggle''.^^*^^
In the ideological sphere this indicates that the Maoists are determined to make the people abandon the ideals of scientific communism, of Marxism-Leninism. They are seeking to replace the proletarian ideology with the nationalistic, revisionist "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', with a personality cult carried to fanatic idolatry. They want the workers to be robots "eternally devoted to Mao Tse-tung'', "neither saying nor doing anything unfavourable to Mao Tse-tung" and "carrying out Mao's orders even if they do not understand them''. The slogan of "eradicating selfishness and establishing selflessness" is designed to "drive all remnants of individual thinking from the heads of the workers''.
In the political sphere these are attempts to put an end to the social activity and political independence of the workers and turn the working class into an unthinking productive force, and the workers into "small cogs'', into blind and disinherited executors meekly accepting any whim of the "great helmsman''. The philosophy of blind submission, which the Maoists are trying to foist on the Chinese worker, has been bared by "iron Wang'', foreman at the Taching oilfields, whom Chinese propaganda has called a "model of revolutionisation for workers throughout China": "Chairman Mao teaches us to be 'submissive buffaloes'. . . they're very good: the strongest and, at the same time, the most hardy. ... I want to be a buffalo all my life.''^^**^^
In the cultural sphere the Maoists have frozen the low educational level of the workers (according to official statistics more than 20 per cent of the workers and nearly 40 per cent of the seasonal and contract workers are illiterate) and have artificially cut the working people off from the achievements of Chinese and world culture.
As envisaged by its inspirers and organisers, a cardinal objective of the "cultural revolution" is to eradicate from the minds of the workers all vestiges of proletarian _-_-_
^^*^^ Jciimiti Jili/xio, March 24, 19GS; Kiuuigmin Jili/xio, May <S, 1968.
^^**^^ Jciiniiii Jill/inn, January 12, 19G6.
142 internationalism and friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their working class, whip up nationalism and Great-Power chauvinism and kindle antiSovietism. The Chinese workers are urged to learn from "iron Wang" how to hate Soviet people. Such is the thoroughly nationalistic policy of the Maoists. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Economic ProgrammeMao Tse-tung and his group have turned the edge of their attacks against those who wanted China's economic development to proceed in accordance with the economic laws of socialism, in close co-operation with the world socialist system and with the objective of raising the people's living standard and cultural level. The Maoists have rejected this line, qualifying it as ``revisionist''.
The "cultural revolution" brought with it further attempts to make China adopt a voluntaristic policy designed to subordinate the economy entirely to Great-Power, hegemonistic aims. The "three red banners"---"general line'', "big leap" and "people's communes"---were again brought into the limelight by the llth plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in August 1966. Moreover, this meeting adopted a series of "basic directives" and "new instructions" of Mao Tse-tung.
The development of industries directly linked with the military-technological complex is receiving priority, and all the resources available to the state are channelled to them. In this connection any effort to raise the people's living standard and cultural level is branded ``revisionist'' and ``reactionary''. The Maoists have rejected the use of commodity-money relations and economic levers. They pin all their hopes on what they term as the "revolutionisation of people's way of thinking''.
It will be recalled that the "three red banners" economic policy had sparked a crisis in China, destroyed part of the productive forces, caused glaring disproportions in the national economy and led to a steep decline of the living standard. In 1958 the "big leap" and the ``revolutionisation'' resulted in a longer working day, the conversion of factories into barracks, egalitarian distribution on the level of the 143 lowest wage, reduction of the number of days off to two a month, and so on. What does this "new programme" hold out ior the working class?
First, its removal from the direction of the economy and then the militarisation of labour. The army has been given the premier role in economic management. In fact, it has been put in control of all the principal management organs in the national economy and directly at industrial enterprises, the rural people's communes, and financial and trade organisations and offices. The Maoists expect that by instilling the "army spirit" in the minds of the people they will strengthen discipline and achieve an intensification of labour. The workers are urged to "study the experience of labour organisation on the pattern of military units" and set up "industrial detachments modelled on the army" which would be an "army in civilian clothes''.^^*^^ Essentially speaking, this is a Trotskyite approach to the working class.
The numerical growth of the working class is being obstructed. It will be recalled that the Chinese working class was seriously hit by the shrinkage of industrial output and the paring down of capital construction as a result of the failure of the "big leap''. The number of industrial workers, including apprentices, dropped from 14,500,000 in 1960 to about 10 million in 1964, i.e., to approximately the 1957 level. In subsequent years, the number of industrial and office workers did not show any marked increase.''^^**^^ China is one of the few countries in the world where the working class has not grown in recent years.
The Maoists demand that workers should "pay no attention to the poor living conditions" and "spare no effort where labour is needed''. Any action on the part of workers to secure a better standard of living is regarded as a crime, branded as "counter-revolutionary economism" and summarily punished. Workers demanding the reinstitution of bonuses and the settlement of vital questions relating to labour protection and social insurance are denounced as counterrevolutionaries. Jenmin Jihpao called for a "cessation of action directed towards raising wages, improving living standards and conditions, and securing additional payments and various additional assistance''.
_-_-_^^*^^ Kungjcn Jik/xio, April 3 and August 3, I960.
^^**^^ Laotung, No. 1, 1966.
144The material condition of the workers took a further plunge as a result of difficulties in the supply of staple foods. More commodities (matches, salt, coal, footwear, tobacco) were put on the ration list, which already included grain and sweet potatoes (12--15 kilos a month), vegetable oil (125-- 150 grams a month), sugar (150 grams a month) and cotton fabric and articles made from it (from 3 to 7 metres per year per person). Due to the very meagre food rations the workers are compelled to buy food in the black market.
Chinese propaganda uses the example of the Taching oilfields to panegyrise the "new programme" of economic development. At the oilfields production and labour are organised along the principle of "combining industry and agriculture" by setting up an "industrial-agricultural village''. In practice, this means the formation of closed, `` selfsufficing'' economic units. State funds are used for purely production purposes, the wage fund is reduced to a minimum and no allocations whatever are made for social and everyday requirements. A certain growth of production is achieved by intensifying labour. Material incentives have been abolished. Labour is organised "after the model of army units" and the ``worker-and-peasant'' pattern. The workers' families are also included in the "labour army" and used for work in the fields. Dwellings are built by the workers and their families. An indication of the workers' response to the "Taching experiment" is that there were a series of strikes at the oilfields during the "cultural revolution''. Ten thousand workers left the oilfields and part of the equipment was destroyed.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ "New Tactics"Like all other working people in China the proletariat, as a whole, does not accept the Maoist policies, regarding them as an attack on the aims for which it had fought during the revolution.
At the initial phase of their assault on the working class and on the Party and people's committees, the Maoists used the hungweipings, whom they called the "backbone of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "pathfinders of the revolution" (decisions of the llth plenary meeting of the Central __PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__ 10--534 145 Committee of the CPC). There are nearly 30 million hungweipings and tsaofans---this is treble the number of industrial workers. In Peking the hungweipings threatened the workers with "revolutionary action" if they did not desist from pressing for their rights. Extremist elements went so far as to declare that the workers were the enemies of the revolution. In Foochow the hungweipings openly proclaimed their intention of "overthrowing the proletariat and its dictatorship''.
However, the hungweipings encountered growing resistance from the working class. At a number of factories in Shanghai, China's major industrial centre, the workers sent the Central Committee of the CPC a strongly worded protest after the hungweipings had attacked the Shanghai City Committee of the CPC. They wrote that "such action could only have been conceived by class enemies" and assessed it as an attempt "to depose the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism''. In Kwangchow, one of China's largest ports, the workers declared that the actions against the Party committees and the constitutional organs of power were a manifestation of "deadly class hatred for the Party and socialism''.
A wave of massive strikes swept across the country, powerfully affecting the largest industrial regions. According to the foreign press, these strikes involved over 7 million workers in 60 towns. In most cases the workers demanded higher wages and better working and living conditions. In effect, they were actions directed against the policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group. Troops were sent to the factories to pacify the workers. "This was a very important measure designed to ensure order in industry and continue the cultural revolution,'' Chou En-lai said. The newspaper Jenmin Jihpao admitted that "the army took over or assumed control of all the main industrial enterprises and railway junctions''.
The offensive on the vital rights and interests of the workers, the attacks on so-called economism, and the political disorders strongly affected discipline and labour productivity at the factories.
In the course of the "cultural revolution" the working class found itself split organisationally and politically: misled by Maoist propaganda, the least conscious sections of the workers and part of the apprentices were drawn into the 146 tsaofan (rebel) political organisation. In Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin and other cities the workers formed Chihweitui (Red Guard) detachments in opposition to the tsaofans. Moreover, at some factories the workers began setting up narrow professional organisations (for instance, drivers, porters) in order somehow to protect their economic interests, and also various ``societies'' and ``circles'' of workers from the same province or town, which were a typical feature of semi-feudal China. At many factories there are up to a dozen different "revolutionary organisations" fighting each other. This makes it extremely difficult for the healthy forces in the working class to uphold Marxism-Leninism and the gains of socialism in China.
In order to break the resistance of the working class the Maoists have lately had somewhat to change their tactics. They are manoeuvring and using more extensive means of influencing the working people.
In August 1968 Jenmin Jihpao published Mao Tse-tung's "new instructions'', which stated that the "proletariat is the leading class" and called for every effort to be made "to promote the leading role of the working class in the great cultural revolution and in all other spheres''. But these are empty words.
This talk about the leading role of the working class is now needed mainly to veil somehow the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, the personal power regime and the special role being played by the army. The Maoists need an obedient working class indoctrinated in the spirit of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" to consolidate the results of the "cultural revolution'', and they use the name of the proletariat to cover the glaring lawlessness in dealing with their adversaries. However, the Peking leaders have most certainly noted the proletariat's pent-up hostility to the "cultural revolution" and the excesses of the hungweipings. They are afraid that the opposition might utilise this unrest. That is why they are trying to give the impression that in the "new order" being set up by them the working class is ensured with the corresponding rights and the leading role. Moreover, they hope this would give an outlet to the proletariat's dissatisfaction and thereby curb the hungweipings, who have discredited themselves in the eyes of the people and started fighting among themselves.
__PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__ 10* 147Isolated by the international working-class movement's condemnation of their anti-labour policies, the Maoists are trying to soften criticism by the Marxist-Leninist parties and, at the same time, continuing their subversive activities behind a screen of flowery words about the working class.
Efforts have lately been launched to unite the various groups of workers on a Maoist foundation, on the basis of recognition of the "absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. Mao Tse-tung has declared that "there must be no place for a split in the working class''. One of the means of achieving this ``unity'' is the massive purge among the workers which the Maoists currently regard as their " principal strategic task''.^^*^^
As before, the ultimate objective of the Maoists is to prevent the working class from uniting, tear it away from the influence of healthy forces, discredit and weed out its finest representatives and break its resistance. Direct suppression is also practised. The Maoists continue to provoke contradictions between the different sections and groups of the working class in order to undermine its strength. But whatever measures the Chinese revisionists try to enforce they will never succeed in turning the working class away from the true road of revolution.
Chinese propaganda calls Mao Tse-tung the "greatest leader of the proletariat''. These absurd claims are exploded by facts, which clearly show that the Maoists are pursuing an anti-Marxist, anti-labour policy. The splitters are afraid of the working class because the workers are blocking the road to their objectives. The "cultural revolution" has forcefully demonstrated that any underestimation of the proletariat's revolutionary potentialities leads to a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and to policies crippling the liberation struggle of the working people. Lenin always emphasised that only the proletariat can lead the majority of the working people "if it is sufficiently numerous, class-conscious and disciplined''.^^**^^ These conditions are being undermined by the Mao group. For the Chinese working class the situation is extremely difficult. Through a reign of terror, direct suppression, intimidation, refined social demagogy and various _-_-_
^^*^^ Honan Jihpao, April 1, 1968.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, pp. 264--65.
148 subterfuges the Maoists want to prevent the working class from perceiving the true nature of their political campaign and consolidating its ranks.The Chinese working class and all other healthy forces in the country are continuing their uphill struggle to protect their basic political and economic interests and rights, uphold the gains of socialism and secure China's progress towards socialism in fraternity and friendship with the socialist countries and the revolutionary forces throughout the world. In this they have the fraternal support of the working class of all countries.
Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, No. 11, 1968,
pp. 22--30
A. Vladimirov
At the llth plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, held in 1966, it was proclaimed "the situation for another general leap is taking shape" in China.^^*^^ The Peking leaders evidently intended to repeat the "big leap" experiment. This is not surprising because the "big leap" concept is part and parcel of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
Practice, as everybody knows, is the final test of any policy, and economic policy is no exception to the rule. How far have the economic directives of the Chinese leadership stood the test of practice?
After overthrowing the landowners and the big bourgeoisie in 1949 the Chinese people started out on radical social reforms in their country. During the initial years after the revolution they registered impressive achievements in economic and cultural development. In many ways these successes were due to China's all-round political, economic, military and cultural co-operation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.
China's economy, dislocated by war and economic chaos, was restored by 1953. From 1953 to 1957, the period of the first five-year plan, gross output of industry and agriculture increased 67.7 per cent. During this period the annual rate of growth of output was 18 per cent in industry and 4.5 per cent in agriculture, gross output of industry and agriculture increasing at a rate of 10.9 per cent. Grain production soared from 108 to 185 million tons in the period from 1949 to 1957.^^**^^
The production capacities built or reconstructed with Soviet assistance enabled China to produce annually 8,700,000 tons of pig iron, 8,400,000 tons of steel and 32,200,000 tons of coal and shale. In 1959 the enterprises built with Soviet assistance accounted for 70 per cent of China's tin, 100 per cent of her synthetic rubber, 25--30 per cent of her electric power and 80 per cent of her lorries and _-_-_
^^*^^ Communique on the llth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Hsinhua News Agency, August 13, 1966.
^^**^^ A Great Decade, published by the State Statistical Board of the PRC, Chinese ed., Peking, 1959, p. 17.
150 tractors. More than 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to work in China between 1950 and 1960. From 1951 to 1962 nearly 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and workers and 1,000 scientists were trained or given facilities for practical work in the Soviet Union. Over 11,000 undergraduate and post-graduate students completed a course of study at Soviet institutions of higher learning.^^*^^Side by side with the achievements in economic development, serious difficulties came to light by 1958, due chiefly to the enormous gap between the level attained by the productive forces and the requirements of the country's rapidly growing population. During the period of the first five-year plan employment increased 1.5 per cent annually, while the population increment was 2.3 per cent. The standard of living rose very slowly, with immense difficulty. Despite the relatively high rate of general growth of industrial output, per capita consumption in the period from 1953 to 1957 increased, according to obviously overstated official statistics, at a rate of 5.2 per cent annually. Foreign economists estimate this rate at 1.9 per cent.
It was found objectively necessary to step up the rate of the country's economic development. However, objective necessity was one thing, and the ways and means of achieving this acceleration was another. The means adopted by the Chinese leadership proved to be ill-advised, to put it mildly.
The basic outlines of the second five-year plan of economic development, adopted at the 8th Congress of the CPC in 1956, took into account the country's real possibilities, its financial, labour and natural resources. It was planned to double industrial output and increase agricultural production 35 per cent in the course of this second five-year plan period. Furthermore, the draft plan envisaged the corresponding growth of investments in agriculture. It was believed that approximately three five-year plans would be required for China's industrialisation.
However, as is stated in the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "at the end of the fifties the CPC leadership adopted a new line in foreign and domestic _-_-_
^^*^^ For Unity of the International Communist Movement, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 206.
151 policy, which was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism and flagrantly contradicted the principles of proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. The Mao Tse-tung group took up a policy in which it combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power chauvinism disguised by Left phraseology; it openly set out on a course intended to undermine the unity of the socialist community and to split the world communist movement''.A new line, called the "big leap'', was proclaimed in economic development in 1958. Its aim was to ``leap'' over natural stages of social advancement and, by using the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, industrialise China and mechanise her agriculture within an unprecedentedly short span of time. The Chinese leadership called upon the people "to work hard for three years and in the main change the appearance of most regions in the country''. Ignoring the requirements of the basic economic laws and closing their eyes to China's own potentialities and resources, the Peking leaders planned to overtake and surpass the developed capitalist countries in the principal economic spheres within five years. Then this period was reduced to 2-3 years.^^*^^ The CPC leadership demanded unrealistic rates of economic development, calling upon the people and the Party to increase industrial output 6.5-fold in the next five-year plan period at an annual growth rate of 45 per cent, and boost agricultural output 2.5 times at an annual growth rate of 20 per cent. Steel output was to grow from 5,300,000 million to some 80,000,000 or 100,000,000 tons. It is hardly necessary to say that these ``plans'' had no scientific foundation and clashed with the Leninist principles of socialist economic management. In short, they were a piece of adventurism in economic development.
The "big leap" was conceived as a kind of "cavalry charge''. Underlying it was the perverted belief that by fully employing all available manpower, especially in rural localities, production could be quickly increased. The Chinese leadership counted on achieving a considerable effect mainly by intensifying labour and even by reducing wages. They pinned their hopes chiefly on subjective factors such as the revolutionary enthusiasm and patriotism of the people. _-_-_
^^*^^ Hungchi, No. 1, 1959.
152 Instead of material incentives they offered political and moral encouragement. On the whole, the Chinese theorists gave precedence to political consciousness and moral incentives over material incentives, proclaiming the former revolutionary and the latter backward, bourgeois manifestations of ``individualism'' and ``selfishness''. In practice this meant disregarding and stigmatising the socialist principle of distribution according to work. "The big leap,'' the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao wrote, "has swept away the principle of material incentives.''^^*^^Peking propaganda claimed that the "big leap" was a fundamentally "new word" in Marxism-Leninism and that it was applicable throughout the world. Rejecting the law of planned and proportionate economic development under socialism, the Peking leaders said they had discovered a law of U-shaped economic development. The substance of this ``law'' is that the planned, proportionate and harmonious development of all branches of the national economy is alien to the socialist economy; that intrinsic to it is a movement of leaps and bounds, an uneven development in which a sharp upsurge gives way to an ebb. In the report of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress in 1958 it was stated that U-shaped development is "high at the beginning and the end, but low in the middle. Didn't we see very clearly how things developed on the production front in 1956--1957-1958 in the form of an upsurge, then an ebb, and then an even bigger upsurge or, in other words, a leap forward, then a conservative phase and then another big leap forward?''^^**^^
Another manifestation of the Chinese leadership's pettybourgeois adventurism and voluntarism was that they underrated the large modern enterprises, scorning modern science and overrating small-scale primitive industry. Instead of completing the large projects, that had been started and whose importance had been formally admitted, the Chinese leadership oriented the economy mainly on small and medium semi-primitive factories. In the press it was argued that _-_-_
^^*^^ Jenmin Jihpao, November 13, 1958.
^^**^^ Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking, May 5, 1958, p. 39.
153 small enterprises could be run very cheaply and were more profitable than large factories and mines equipped with the most up-to-date machinery.Striking evidence of this ``line'' was the nation-wide drive to produce pig iron and steel by primitive methods. Hundreds of thousands of medieval furnaces for the smelting of pig iron and steel sprang up throughout China, in the streets and yards of villages and towns. According to the Chinese press nearly 100 million workers, peasants, students and trained professionals were enlisted to tend these furnaces. Household utensils were smelted down. Much of the ore and coal designated for the large iron and steel plants was channelled to these furnaces. Naturally, the blow to the country's economy was immense. These experiments involved a colossal waste in labour and raw materials. The output of the medieval furnaces proved to be unusable.
A similar situation was observed in other industries, notably the engineering industry. No attention was paid to quality. Large numbers of tractors, lorries, metal-cutting lathes and so on were manufactured by "simplified methods" in violation of technical requirements. Naturally, these ``simplified'' machines proved to be useless.
Industrial production was severely hit by the practice, prevalent in the period of the "big leap'', of disregarding specifications regarding the capacity of machinery, and ignoring the estimates and advice of specialists, technicians and skilled workers. This led to mass spoilage. Valuable equipment was put out of commission and entire workshops and factories were brought to a standstill. The specialists who opposed violations of specifications and technologies were branded as ``conservatives'' and ``reactionaries'', given the sack and, in many cases, sent to "re-education through labour" camps. This thinned the ranks of the Chinese technical intelligentsia, of the cadres most needed for the development of production.
The Peking leaders calculated that the "big leap" would allow China to be the first country to enter communism. To achieve this they believed it was sufficient to set up a nation-wide network of "people's communes" that would engage in industrial production, agriculture, trade, education and military organisation and would thus create the conditions "for erasing the distinctions between town and 154 countryside, between workers and peasants and between labour by hand and by brain''.
``Monobranch agricultural producers' cooperatives embracing several tens or several hundreds of households,'' states a decision passed by the Central Committee of the CPC on August 29, 1958, "can no longer meet the requirements of development. Under present-day conditions, the establishment of people's communes, in which agriculture, forestry, livestock-breeding, ancillary husbandry and fishing would develop comprehensively, and which would combine industry, agriculture, trade, education and military organisation, is a necessary basic policy aimed at leading the peasants in accelerated socialist construction, the building of socialism ahead of schedule and the gradual transition to communism.''^^*^^
The Chinese leaders maintained that the "people's communes" envisaged by them would "develop into the primary unit of the future communist society''. The "experimental rules of the Weihsing people's commune'', published in Jenmin Jihpao as a guide for local organs of power, stated that the "people's commune" was the "primary organisation of society''.^^**^^ The Chinese leaders pictured the entire country as an association of "people's communes" with a self-- sufficient natural economy resting on a primitive technological foundation.
These petty-bourgeois views, reflecting an aspiration to make the "people's communes'', districts and entire provinces economically self-sufficient, ran counter to the objective trend of socialist economic development towards the specialisation and cooperation of production on the scale not only of one country but of the socialist system as a whole. By forming "people's communes" the Chinese leaders disrupted the economic links and cooperation between individual areas and thereby inflicted tremendous damage on the Chinese economy.
They regarded the "people's commune" as a lever that would enable China to go over from collective to public ownership in agriculture and to the communist principle of distribution within a matter of a few years (from three to _-_-_
^^*^^ The Movement to Set Up People's Communes in China, Chinese eel., Peking, 1958.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, August 7, 1958.
155 six years). In 1958 the peasants in many areas were deprived of their ancillary plots of land and all the property of the commune members, down to household utensils, was socialised. Article 5 of the above-mentioned "experimental rules of the Weihsing people's commune" prescribed the socialisation of the land granted to commune members for their personal use.Army regulations were introduced everywhere. Labour organisation was militarised: the peasants were formed into companies, regiments and divisions. They received equal payment for labour and meals at socialised canteens, independently of the results of their work. This, of course, adversely affected their desire to work.
In December 1958 the task was set of substantially reducing the area of ploughland (it was planned to use the released land for storage lakes and orchards). The national conference of foremost farmers, held early in 1959, decided "gradually to reduce the crop area and the manpower in agriculture and turn the country into a vast orchard''.^^*^^ The newspaper Jenmin Jihpao called this decision a "programme of struggle of all the people's communes''.^^**^^
Having put forward the slogan "sow less and harvest more'', the Peking leadership now demanded deep ploughing (in some cases down to a metre) and dense sowing (in some experiment plots rice was planted so closely that the fields were a solid green mass on which it was possible to walk without falling through).^^***^^ ``Instructions'' of this kind were completely at variance with real possibilities and elementary requirements of modern agronomy. These ``innovations'' led to smaller yields of grain and industrial crops, loss of soil fertility and a general decline of agricultural production.
Besides, it was found that official quarters were producing fake reports. In the press it was announced that in 1958 grain production totalled 375 million tons, which was double the output in 1957.^^****^^ On the basis of this figure the central organisations and the local authorities and "people's communes" planned the consumption of grain. Unrestricted free distribution of staple foods was introduced in many areas. _-_-_
^^*^^ Hsinhua Bulletin, January 3, 1959.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, January 2, 1959.
^^***^^ Hsinhua Bulletin, January 3, 1959.
^^****^^ Jenmin Jihpao, January 1, 1959.
156 The resultant over-expenditure of grain led to an acute food shortage. Soon the Chinese leaders had to announce that in 1958 the grain harvest in fact totalled not 375 million tons but only 250 million tons^^*^^ (but even this was an overstated figure: the 1958 grain output evidently did not exceed 200 million tons).In 1959 and 1960 the food situation in China sharply deteriorated as a result of the considerable decline of the grain output, the over-expenditure of a large quantity of grain on consumption, and the drought. In 1961 some areas were on the verge of famine.
The "big leap" was similarly damaging to industry. During the first year of this "big leap" there was some growth in gross industrial (from 70,000 million to 117,000 million yuans)^^**^^ and agricultural output due to the efforts of the working people, but in subsequent years industrial production declined steadily.
The principal reasons behind this decline were the diminution of output of agriculture, which provides nearly half of the raw material for industry, the drop in the output of electric power and, in particular, the acute shortage of coal, huge quantities of which had been used up in the tiny blastfurnaces. This dislocated China's fuel balance, over 90 per cent of which consists of coal. The production of poor quality pig iron and steel created a shortage of metal, and this affected all other branches of the national economy, notably the engineering industry.
China's economy was wrenched out of proportion. Due to the raw material shortage, production first dwindled and then came to a standstill at many industrial enterprises. Capital construction was halted. The mass conservation of building projects froze huge funds. The curtailment of production in the light industry created an enormous gap between the output of consumer goods and the requirements of the market. The supply of necessities to the population shrank catastrophically. Soviet economists have estimated that compared with 1956 annual consumption per head of population decreased as follows in 1962--63: grain---from 202 kilos to 135--170 kilos; vegetable oil---from 6.4 kilos to _-_-_
^^*^^ Hsinhua Bulletin, August 28, 1959.
^^**^^ A Great Decade, p. 14.
157 1.5--1.2 kilos. In 1961 food production fell to 170 million tons, as a result of which daily per capita consumption averaged only 900-1,200 calories.^^*^^The economic adventurism of the Chinese leaders brought China's economy to the verge of total collapse in 1961. It is hard to make even an approximate estimate of the loss suffered by China through the adventurist actions of the Peking leaders---no official statistics have been published in China since 1959. Some idea of the scale of this loss may be obtained from the rough estimates made by Japanese economists. According to these estimates, China's gross national product in 1964 amounted to only 80,000 or 90,000 million dollars,^^**^^ which is 15 per cent below the 1958 level. American experts, whose analysis is based on some official Chinese statistics, have arrived at the same conclusion.
Table 1 shows that in the period 1952--65 the annual rate of growth of the gross and national product as a whole and in terms of per head of population average 3.3 and 1.4 per cent respectively. The decline of China's industrial output after 1959 is illustrated in Table 2.
Table 1 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT Year Total ('000,000,000 yuans) Per capita (yuans) Year Total ('000,000,000 yuans) Per capita (yuans) 1952 68.6 121 1959 176.8 267 1953 73.3 126 1960 155.9 232 1954 77.8 131 1961 127.5 187 1955 83.3 137 1962 99.5 144 1956 96.4 155 1963 107.4 153 1957 104.2 164 1964 117.3 165 1958 145.0 222 1965 126.2 175 Source: An Economic Profile of Mainland China. Studies Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1967, Vol. 1, p. 50. This study was prepared by a team of American experts, who offer their own estimates, which may be, of course, inexact but nonetheless give an approximate idea of economic development in China. _-_-_^^*^^ The Japan Times, January 16, 196G.
^^**^^ Ibid.
158 Table 2 OUTPUT OF KEY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 1909 1964 Steel ('000,000 tons) ............ 13.3 9 Coal ('000,000 tons) ........... 347.8 220 Electric power ('000,000,000 kw) ...... 41.5 32 Oil ('000,000 tons) .......... 3.7 6.5 Cement ('000,000 tons) ......... . . 12.3 8 Grain ('000,000 tons) ....... 270.5 183 Cotton f 000.000 tons) ............ 2.3 1.2 Source: 'Ilie Oriental Economist, January 1967.Such are some of the results of Peking's widely publicised "big leap''. The CPC leaders were unable to use the favourable opportunities created for development by the socialist state system. Their adventurist policies have cost the Chinese people dear. This experiment may be called a big backward leap.
In the same way that Big Leap, pride of the Chinese shipbuilding industry built in 1958--59, hit a reef and sank soon after its maiden cruise, the huge ship of the Chinese economy has been cast on a reef as a result of misled handling by its helmsmen.
The "big leap" could not help but fail because this policy was completely divorced from reality. Mao Tse-tung and his group entirely ignored the fact that in a technologically backward country like China the building of socialism involves greater difficulties than in industrially developed countries. They disregarded Lenin's warning that circumspection was needed in economic policy. He wrote: ".. .a backward country can easily begin because its adversary has become rotten, because its bourgeoisie is not organised, but for it to continue demands of that country a hundred thousand times more circumspection, caution and endurance. It will be different in Western Europe; there it will be immeasurably more difficult to begin but immeasurably easier to go on. It could not be otherwise, because the degree of 159 organisation and solidarity of the proletariat there is incomparably greater.''^^*^^
Not venturing to analyse the effects of the "great leap" after its failure, the Chinese leaders confined themselves to general and vague admissions that some of their actions in that period had been wrong. According to the Peking correspondent of the Japanese newspaper Mainichi, Mao Tsetung admitted at the 10th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC on September 28, 1962, that "a number of mistakes had been made"^^**^^ in 1959 and 1960, the principal mistakes being the "lack of a correct understanding of the situation and the lack of experience''. At the same time, the Chinese leaders made an attempt to blame the difficulties encountered by the country on various "objective factors" and also on the Soviet Union.
Life, however, brought the Chinese leaders round to seeing that it was necessary to chart a new economic policy if the country was to be saved from economic collapse. While continuing to defend their discredited theories, they were compelled to take urgent steps to stabilise the economic situation. The line towards, to use their terminology, " adjustment, consolidation, replenishment and enhancement" was adopted at the 9th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in January 1961. This new economic policy gave priority to agriculture, to its restoration and development, chiefly in the production of food. The Chinese leadership abandoned long-term planning, going over to operative economic management on the basis of annual plans. In 1964 employment among the non-rural population was 25 per cent below the 1958 level. Nearly 30 million urban dwellers were resettled in the countryside.
The line towards "adjustment, consolidation, replenishment and enhancement'', aimed at removing the disastrous consequences of the "big leap'', was enforced in the course of five years. In 1965 the national product was restored to its 1958 volume. As regards per capita production, it was still below the 1958 level in 1965. For seven years there was no increment in production while other Asian countries registered steady economic progress. Foreign specialists estimate _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 291.
^^**^^ Mainichi, March 9, 1967.
160 that during the past eight years the annual rate of growth of production in all branches of the Chinese economy averaged about 4 per cent.^^*^^However, the fundamental problems of the Chinese economy remained unsolved. China fell even farther behind in resolving the basic problem---that of increasing production per head of population. In 1966 the need for considerably speeding up the rate of economic development was more acute than in 1958. Moreover, by that time the external conditions for solving this problem had substantially deteriorated as compared with the 1950s. With their own hands the Chinese leaders destroyed such a vital factor to China as the co-operation and fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
It will be recalled that 1966 was proclaimed by the Chinese leaders as the first year of China's third five-year plan of economic development. However, the "cultural revolution'', which the Peking press calls a "great strategic measure'',^^**^^ jeopardised this plan.
The "cultural revolution" and the petty-bourgeois anarchy attending it disorganised industry and agriculture and disrupted transport and communications. Hundreds of thousands of hungweipings and tsaofans travelled back and forth across the country, paralysing the railways and the automobile transport and dislocating supplies and trade between the towns and villages, particularly the supply of consumer goods to the population.
The countless rallies, meetings and demonstrations distracted tens of millions of workers and peasants from productive work. The baiting of Party and Government cadres hit organisation in industry and agriculture. In this connection the Chinese press had to admit that part of the cadres were obstructing agricultural production, that "some through a sense of injury and others motivated by fear had relinquished their leadership of production, thereby letting things drift''.^^***^^
In a situation marked by petty-bourgeois anarchy it is _-_-_
^^*^^ On January 16, 1966 The Japan Times wrote that in 1964 the Chinese economy showed a growth rate of 3 per cent, i.e., approximately equal to the population increment.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, June 1, 1967.
^^***^^ Hungchi, No. 3, 1967.
__PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__ 11--534 161 not surprising that there have been cases of embezzlement and squandering of state and collective funds, of reserve funds of seeds and fodder being arbitrarily distributed among the peasants, of uncontrolled slaughter of livestock. In the decision adopted by the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council of the PRC and the Military Committee of the CC CPC on January 19, 1967 it was admitted that "state food and other warehouses have been plundered" in many localities.Under the slogan of "struggle against economism" Mao Tse-tung and his group have started an intensive drive to lower the people's living standard. Wages and the general standard of living dropped in the course of the "cultural revolution''. Official Chinese propaganda calls on the people to prepare for further larger difficulties and privation. The fact that for a whole year schools and institutions of higher learning had been closed and students had been distracted from their studies will inevitably affect the training of cadres for all branches of the national economy.
During the "big leap" of 1958 the Chinese leaders promised the people "ten thousand years of happiness after three years of hard work''. Nearly ten years have passed, but there has been no improvement in the life of the people, and the Chinese economy is running into increasing difficulties. While the "big leap" of 1958--59 wrecked the second fiveyear plan and held up China's economic development for many years, the "cultural revolution" has torpedoed the third five-year plan with similarly disastrous effects for China.
Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 10, 1967 pp. 107--13
[162] __ALPHA_LVL2__ The MaoistsM. Sladkovsky
The Chinese people's real friends are noting the ruinous effects of Mao Tse-tung's anti-socialist policies on China's socio-economic development with growing anxiety. During the past year, as at the 9th National Congress of the CPC, held in Peking on April 1-24, 1969, the Maoist leadership had not put forward a positive programme for China's further development. Attention continues to be riveted to the assault on the general line and decisions of the 8th National Congress of the CPC (September 1956), in which it was underscored that Marxism-Leninism is the ideological foundation of the Party and its guide in the practical work of building socialism in China. Not venturing to tell the truth to the people openly, the Maoists attack the Party's former decisions with the claim that they are fighting a " capitulationist and revisionist line''.
Nobody today doubts that the CPC's programme decisions envisaging socialist transformations and China's conversion from a backward agrarian country into a leading industrialagrarian socialist state had been cancelled by Mao Tse-tung long ago. Any demand that these decisions be implemented is branded as sedition.
With Lin Piao as their spokesman, the Maoists repeated anti-socialist, Trotskyite theories at the 9th Congress and in effect abandoned the building of socialism in China, making the building of the new society dependent on the "world revolution'', on the "liberation of all mankind''. The Maoists contend that China plays the main role in the fulfilment of this "great mission'', and that war is the only means of achieving this goal.
The preparations for war in order to attain their hegemonistic Great-Power ambitions are the pivot of the "thought of Mao" and the foundation of all the Maoist policies. The Peking leaders are gearing China's domestic and foreign policy to their external expansionist aims and conformably adapting the entire system of state power and the economic structure.
163With the aid of the army and through open terror and violence the Maoists have disorganised the Party, demolished the constitutional system of power and established "revolutionary committees" as organs of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship and obedient militarised tools of the "great helmsman''. The principal aims and functions of the Maoist organs of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship are to suppress democracy, maintain a "military camp" regime and consolidate the ``thought'' and personal power of Mao Tse-tung. As Lin Piao put it, the military-bureaucratic dictatorship will clamp down on "anybody who ventures to oppose Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the thought of Mao Tsetung at any time and under any circumstances''. This dictatorship has nothing in common, of course, with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, as Lenin pointed out, is the first-ever system "to create democracy for the people, for the majority, along with the necessary suppression of the exploiters, of the minority''.^^*^^
Militarisation has now become universal in China, embracing not only the economy and absorbing over 40 per cent of the state budget, but all other aspects of public life. The scale of militarisation far exceeds the level needed to ensure the country's defence. The Maoists are whipping up a war psychosis in order to secure the maximum mobilisation of material resources and foster an expansionist, chauvinistic spirit among the people.
In this situation the socialisation of the means of production ceases to serve the interests of the people. It does not develop in accordance with a state plan, with the aim of boosting the people's standard of living and cultural level, while the economy founded on it is subordinated to the attainment of external, expansionist goals. Although state and cooperative ownership remains the economic foundation of Chinese society, it has been placed in danger of being deformed and losing its socialist character. The economic policy pursued by Peking conflicts with Lenin's injunction that "the aim (and essence) of socialism---the transfer of the land, factories, etc., in general, of all the means of production, to the ownership of the whole of society and the replacement of the capitalist mode of production by _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 463.
164 production according to a common plan in the interests of all members of society".^^*^^There are two distinct spheres in China's present-day economy. The first embraces a small group of industries linked with war production and controlled by the central military authority. These industries are abundantly financed by the state, have better equipment and more fully enjoy state services and benefits. During the "cultural revolution" military production was safeguarded against the excesses of the hungweipings and continued to expand with special emphasis on the development of nuclear weapons, which swallowed at least half of the country's military allocations. Civilian industries are in a different position. In recent years they have not had a common state plan, their management has been decentralised and they have been placed on a selfsufficing basis. They are required to "rely on their own resources'', i.e., to do without centralised investments and credits, independently find sources of raw materials and give priority to the requirements of the army and war production, leaving steadily dwindling resources for the satisfaction of the most urgent requirements of the population.
There are a number of deep-rooted reasons for this stagnation of industrial production for civilian needs. These reasons spring from the political and economic upheavals precipitated by the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution''. One of them is that the Chinese working class has been removed from political leadership in the centre and in the localities, and another is that material incentives for developing production no longer exist. The purpose of the struggle against "bourgeois economism'', as the Maoists have christened material incentives for boosting labour productivity, is to disorganise the working class and bring the young, unskilled workers into conflict with the skilled contingent of the proletariat. The Peking authorities have closed a number of factories and resettled the ``surplus'' urban population in the countryside. Besides, workers and intellectuals are made to go to the countryside not in order to consolidate proletarian leadership in agriculture and bring urban culture to the peasants. On the contrary, they are required to learn _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 275.
165 from the peasants and accustom themselves to farm labour and the peasant way of life. They are becoming dependents of the peasants, in other words, redundant in the countryside. This is by no means helping to "throw a bridge between town and countryside''. It is leading to alienation, to a rift between urban dwellers and the peasants, to surplus and unproductive migration. The Chinese newspapers are almost daily filled with reports about "unauthorised remigration from the countryside'', the "discontent of urban youth with their lot in the countryside" and so on.The general state of the civilian industries is characterised by their orientation solely on current production, and by the limited resources for investment, particularly in the extracting industry.
The fact that industrial production was in danger of being dislocated made the "headquarters of the cultural revolution" take urgent steps to intensify military control in industry.
In mid-1968, under the guise of achieving "greater unity under the leadership of the army'', a nation-wide drive was started to set up military control at all factories producing consumer goods. Military control was accompanied with the institution of army discipline at the factories and the formation of storm detachments and various punitive organs. With the aid of the army and the tsaofan paramilitary detachments, the Mao group managed to achieve some measure of stabilisation, stop further disorganisation in industrial management and restore a more or less normal rhythm of work at factories and offices. But military-administrative measures have never been the means of creating a stable foundation for the development of industrial production. In the long run they can only lead to a further dislocation of the economy. This is borne out by the following table.
These figures show that had China continued to develop on the scientific basis of socialist planning, i.e., in line with Lenin's teaching on the need for planned state organisation requiring tens of millions of people to observe uniform norms in production and distribution, the output of the basic industrial products would have been at least 150 or 250 per cent above the present level. It must be borne in mind that the low level of industrial output does not influence the __PARAGRAPH_PAUSE__ 166 OUTPUT OF KEY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IN 1949--69 Targets Actual output of the 2nd (estimate) 1949 1958 and 3rd hve-- year plans 1967 1969 1967 1969 Steel ('000,000 tons) 0.16 8.0 30.0 43.0 10 12 Pig iron " " 0.25 9.5 30.0 43.0 12 14 Coal 32 270 400 525 170 210 Electric power ('000,000,000 kwh) 4.3 27.5 120 180 55 60 __PARAGRAPH_CONT__ development of war industries, which receive most of the state's material resources.
The militarisation of the economy is having a particularly adverse effect on agriculture, the principal branch of the Chinese economy. It will be remembered that in China agriculture is the occupation of nearly 80 per cent of the population and accounts for roughly 50 per cent of the national product in terms of cost. Back in the years of the "big leap" the Peking leaders cancelled the 12-year general plan of agricultural development, which called for the building of large irrigation systems, the expansion of the irrigated area, the development of virgin land and other projects in order to increase grain production from 185 million tons in 1956-- 57 to 320--350 million tons in 1967.
With the militarisation of the economy in full swing, the Mao group is popularising the example of the large Tachai brigade, which has relinquished state assistance and gone over to self-sufficiency. In other words, they are demanding that the state financing of agriculture should stop and that peasants should remain content with their own local resources. It is not hard to see that in a situation where the peasant households use extremely backward implements, the peasants are unable to tackle the problems confronting agriculture with their own means, without state assistance and without land improvement on a national scale. As a result, even under favourable weather conditions agriculture cannot exceed the 1956--57 level of production to any appreciable extent.
167The total output of grain, which is the staple food of the Chinese population, has fluctuated within the approximate limit of 180--190 million tons during the past three years. In view of the population increment the per capita supply of grain has diminished by at least 15 per cent during the past 12 years.
As in industry, the disruption of socialist methods of economic management and the cancellation of plans for large-scale capital building have held up agricultural development for 10--12 years.
Peking propaganda cannot hide the fact that the state has had to have recourse to violent measures involving the army in order to obtain foodstuffs from the peasants. Army control has spread not only to the distribution of food but also to agricultural production. In Chinese agriculture a situation is arising in which the work of the peasant is becoming a kind of forced labour and the peasant collectives are deprived of the right to dispose of the products of their labour. In the countryside collective ownership is being increasingly separated from the peasants, while the armycontrolled "people's commune" has become an organ of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, an organ of compulsion relative to the peasants.
In foreign economic policy the Peking leaders are curtailing relations with socialist countries, justifying this by a policy of "reliance on own resources''. This sort of justification has no leg to stand on. It is artificial and its sole purpose is to veil their anti-socialist foreign policy.
All the socialist countries are building socialism mainly with their own national resources. Moreover, they combine this with co-operation and mutual assistance, which serve as a powerful accelerator of socialist construction. Thus, " reliance on own resources" is augmented with reliance on the economic might of the socialist community as a whole.
During the first decade after 1949, when economic development in the PRC proceeded on the basis of the general line and decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC, the economy was financed chiefly from the country's own resources. Assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was a decisive contribution towards the development of modern industry, transport and communications, particularly new industries such as aircraft-building, automobile, 168 instrument-making and so on, and also towards raising the general scientific and technological level of production. Consequently, the slogan "reliance on own resources" now adopted by the Maoists is not new or unusual for the socialist countries, China included, the only innovation being that in the early 1960s it was given a new political slant not so much to mobilise China's own resources as to isolate her from the world socialist system.
Throughout the past decade the Peking leadership has reduced the share of the socialist countries in China's foreign trade from 68--70 per cent in 1956--59 to 24--25 per cent in 1968--69. In Peking they no longer venture to blame this rupture of economic relations on these countries as used to be the case in the early 1960s.
The whole world knows that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have time and again offered to expand trade and scientific, technological and cultural co-operation with the People's Republic of China.
Touching on the Soviet Union's relations with China, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, noted: "The CPSU and the Soviet Government have been unchangeably following a policy aimed at restoring and furthering friendly relations with the People's Republic of China. It is not our fault that these relations have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. While waging a principled struggle against divisive activity in the international communist movement and against the propagation of anti-Leninist views, we have always been, and still are, trying to prevent ideological differences spreading to inter-state relations. At the International Meeting in Moscow the Communist and Workers' Parties have reiterated their support for this policy.''
But Peking persists in its anti-socialist course. Having subordinated foreign economic relations to its anti-socialist policy the Maoist leadership is violating international agreements and bilateral treaties with socialist countries.
In its foreign trade Peking is currently orienting itself more and more on the capitalist world. Also to be noted is the fact that the ruling circles of capitalist countries are also taking energetic steps to find the ways and means of expanding economic and political relations with China. Japanese policy is extremely indicative in this respect.
169At the close of 1969 the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan adopted a fundamentally different attitude towards China. Formerly the Japanese Government refused to recognise the People's Republic of China and allowed Japanese firms to trade with China only on a non-governmental, private-legal basis (Japanese firms trading with China were denied the use of government banks and other facilities usually accorded in Japanese foreign trade), but now Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has announced that Japan is prepared to negotiate with the PRC Government and that the Japanese Foreign Office has been given the pertinent instructions. Japanese ruling circles are making no secret of the fact that their drive to expand relations with China is based on the surmise that the PRC Government "will adopt a more co-ordinated and constructive stand in foreign relations'', in other words, that it would consent to some compromise.
The Great-Power chauvinistic concepts of the Maoists, as the ``thought'' of Mao, are flagrantly at variance with proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism. In opposition to scientific communism and the Leninist teaching of socialist construction, Mao Tse-tung and his group have adopted a "special line'', which has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. That is why the Maoists are directing their attacks chiefly at the international communist movement, the socialist community and, above all, the Soviet Union, regarding it as the principal force standing in the way of their anti-socialist line and their hegemonistic, GreatPower ambitions.
Mao's "special line" runs counter to the basic aims proclaimed in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and to the interests of the Chinese people, and therefore has no future in China.
However, it must be borne in mind that in view of China's backwardness, territorial disunity and huge population, the present socio-economic processes may be drawn out and follow a zigzag course. The consolidation of the socialist road in China will depend on whether the CPC is able to strengthen its leading role on a Marxist-Leninist foundation, overcome the ruinous effects of the "special line" and win the support of the Chinese people. During the difficult early years of Soviet power, Lenin warned the Communists: 170 ``Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-proletarians, around the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will overthrow our workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship.''^^*^^
The anti-Leninist, anti-socialist policy of the present Peking leaders is hitting the vital interests of the Chinese working people and encountering increasing resistance from various strata of Chinese society. This gives the Chinese people's true friends the hope that in China healthy forces will come forward and bring the People's Republic of China back into the socialist community.
Izvestia, April 27, 1970
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 337.
[171] __ALPHA_LVL2__ MilitarisationV. Vyatsky
In furtherance of their Great-Power, nationalistic ambitions, Mao Tse-tung and his group are seeking to effect a radical reorganisation of China's political and economic pattern and eradicate the fundamental socialist gains of the Chinese people. The "cultural revolution" has shown lucidly that the emerging military-bureaucratic regime is designed mainly to serve their hegemonistic plans, speed up the development of war industries, ensure the creation of missilenuclear weapons and militarise the economy. The militarisation programme is the principal component of Mao Tsetung's strategy in recent years and is being carried out under the slogans of "Prepare for War'', "The whole country must learn from the army" and "Work on military science and arm the whole people''.
The adventurist "big leap" and "people's communes" policy, which demonstrated Peking's departure from the socialist principles and methods of economic management and clearly revealed that the Maoists had dropped the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and were out to sever relations with the socialist community, marked, among other things, a turn towards a rapid growth of military expenditure with the purpose of developing "their own" nuclear weapons. In 1953--58 China's allocations for military requirements amounted to 5,000-6,000 million yuans or 19 per cent (in 1957) of the state budget expenditures, and in 1958 to 12 per cent. In subsequent years despite the fact that the "big leap" and ``communisation'' had brought China's economy to the verge of irreparable catastrophe, the Maoists doggedly steered towards the country's militarisation. Many factories of the civilian branches of industry were brought to a standstill after the failure of the "big leap''. Famine prevailed. Nevertheless every effort was made to satisfy the ravenous nuclear appetites of the Chinese nationalists. Foreign research centres have estimated that in 1966 China's military expenditures totalled nearly 15,000 million yuans. Almost three times more money was spent for military purposes in 1967 than in 1960. China began to spend over 10 per cent of her national income on militarisation. 172 The preparations that were made in 1958--64 for the first nuclear test cost the Chinese people roughly 10,000 million yuans. According to the estimates of foreign experts had the funds used by the Chinese leaders on the production of nuclear weapons been used in the same period for industrial development China might have doubled her output of steel and pig iron, increased her output of electric power fourfold, and of oil fivefold, or fully satisfied her grain requirements. It is not hard to picture what this would have meant to China, where the level of modern industrial development is still low and the people have to contend with many hardships.
Directly before the "cultural revolution'', the Mao group, which had by that time seized control of the army, took a number of steps to speed up the development of the war industry. An agency for war industry was set up at the State Council and five new ``engineering'' ministries were formed to direct various branches of military production. After starting the "cultural revolution" and attacking their opponents, the Maoists began dealing summarily with those who held that China did not need an atomic bomb of her own. China's military expenditures went on growing. Today they amount to over one-third of the budget, exceed the total investments in the national economy and are several times larger than the investments in industry. The disorders generated by the "cultural revolution" hardly affected the war industry. According to the French journal Energie the building of new projects of the nuclear industry went forward apace. An atomic reactor was completed in a Peking suburb in mid-1966, and a cyclotron was placed in operation in early 1967. China's second plutonium reactor was under construction near Paotou, and a plant with the most up-- todate installations for the production of concentrated uranium by gas diffusion was built in Sinkiang. All attempts to spread the "cultural revolution" to war industry enterprises were cut short. Addressing war industry workers early in 1968, the Premier of the State Council stressed that as distinct from other branches of the national economy, where the `` revolution'' should be pressed forward, "in the defence industry first place must be accorded to production and research''. The Chinese Academy of Sciences was put under army control in order to speed up the nuclear armament programme. 173 In developing nuclear weapons the Maoists draw on the services of militarists in a number of leading capitalist countries. In January 1969 the newspaper Die Welt wrote that "despite the disturbances caused by the cultural revolution ... in the immediate future China will have the possibility of going forward with her armament plans''.
Where are the Maoists thinking to get further enormous funds for these plans?
At present China does not have the economic possibilities for quickly mobilising considerable funds for military purposes on a more or less sound foundation. The "cultural revolution" has dislocated the economy. In a speech in February 1968 Chou En-lai noted: "The cultural revolution is costing us very dear, only a little less than the anti-Japanese war and the civil war against the Kuomintang''. Last year industrial output fell by at least 10--15 per cent compared with 1966; agricultural production likewise declined; finances and domestic trade were disrupted; foreign trade shrank by almost 20 per cent. The state reserves of many key commodities have been almost totally exhausted, and many factories and entire branches of industry are short of raw materials.
The attempts of the Mao group to solve the problem of increasing farm output by political campaigns and the building of primitive irrigation systems without providing the rural communes with modern machinery, without promoting a real cultural revolution in the village, and by constantly wringing the surplus product from the countryside are impoverishing the Chinese peasant.
While continuing to enforce their voluntaristic economic policy in this situation, the Maoists are trying to obtain funds for their military programme by a further assault on the vital rights and interests of the Chinese working people. In this assault they are, among other things, reducing state allocations for public education, culture, the health services and other social needs of the working people.
Some idea of the "latest constructive" steps taken by the Maoists to attain these aims is given by the massive measures that have been lately started in China.
The transfer of the elementary schools to the agricultural brigades in the countryside and to the factories in the towns. With more than 90 per cent of the elementary and 174 secondary schools and 80 per cent of the pupils in rural localities, the Maoists are at the moment concentrating on transferring primary schools to the production brigades. After this transfer is completed, the Chinese press openly states, "the state will no longer finance the primary school" and "will not pay salaries to teachers; instead the production brigade will allot work-day units to them''. Formerly the state paid teachers the tiny monthly salary of 33 yuans and half a kilo of grain (including sweet potatoes in terms of grain) per day against ration cards, now this ``burden'' is being removed and the "saved funds---money and marketable grain---are being channelled into ... defence requirements''. Moreover, on direct instructions from Mao Tse-tung, the term of instruction and number of students at institutions of higher learning and secondary schools is being reduced. The entire system of education is being militarised to a point where a "new structure" is replacing classes and courses: the students are formed into companies, platoons and squads, and the system of education is being reorganised on the model of military and political training in the army.
A "cooperative medical system" under which medical services for the rural population (in China the people have to pay for medical attention) are paid for out of funds formed by contributions by the peasants and the brigades (usually one or two yuans per person per year), and medical personnel are reduced to the position of ``doctors-and-peasants''. Instead of a salary from the state they will be paid against work-day units by the brigade. Attention is drawn to the experience of "barefooted doctors" who treat patients without discontinuing agricultural work.
In rural localities trade is placed in the hands of the rural communes and production brigades, and the supply and marketing cooperatives are, in effect, being abolished. Moreover, the state reserves the right to determine the procurement plans, prices and volume of trade. It pays for transportation but divests itself of the obligation to pay wages to employees of the rural trade network, who are beginning to be paid by the brigades against work-day units as peasants. The production brigade is obliged to fulfil the state purchases and sales plan in the countryside.
More than 20 million people are being moved from the towns to the countryside. Mao Tse-tung has personally 175 ordered ``mobilisation'' with the purpose of resettling town dwellers in the villages. In addition to its aim of stabilising the political situation in the towns and alleviating the food shortage (the peasants are compelled to provide for the maintenance of the resettlers), the resettlement pursues military objectives: young people are sent to frontier regions where they are formed into paramilitary ``building'' units; moreover, a number of industrial projects are being moved to inland regions. In the new localities the factories are distributed over a large territory to enable them to continue operating in the event of war.
The policy of reducing wages is being continued in the towns. During the "cultural revolution" wages have dropped by 10--15 per cent. At present it is planned to cut the wages of skilled workers and office employees receiving over 100 yuans; the salaries of teachers and other intellectuals are being cut drastically. The question of decreasing the wages of skilled workers is being ``discussed'' at the factories.
Militarisation is embracing all aspects of life in China, including the national economy. Mao Tse-tung has openly declared that the army should be accorded a "major role" in China, that it should be turned into a "great school" and that it should be used as a model for reorganising the country. "Inject the army spirit into the national economy!" the Maoists demand.
In China today all more or less large-scale ``undertakings'' are strictly controlled by the army and directed by army instructors. In economic management, too, the army plays a considerable role. The economic and organisational functions of the people's state and the CPC's leading role in the economy have been reduced to zero. The military control committees have taken over the central departments; the revolutionary committees direct the economy in the localities; and army representatives are in charge of factories and offices. The journal Hungchi admitted: "The participation of army representatives or the militia is necessary in all organisations, from top to bottom.''
The management of many industrial enterprises is being reorganised on the military pattern, army discipline is enforced and military training is conducted everywhere. In the national economy executives are required to "study the experience of organising labour on the pattern of military 176 units" and to form workers into "industrial units" that would be an "army in civilian clothes''. Numerous cases of militarisation at factories are now openly featured by the Chinese press. The newspaper Chiang-hsi Jihpao wrote, for instance, that squads, platoons and companies on the model of army units have been introduced as a form of labour organisation at the Nanchang Tractor Plant and the Nanchang Cigarette Mill. Work begins and ends and the workers take a break by signal. Workers have to march in file when they want to go anywhere on the premises of the factory, and they are controlled by army supervisors.
The 9th Congress of the CPC endorsed the policy of militarisation and reiterated the line towards "preparations for war''. The Congress communique bluntly states that the army will continue "exercising military control and supervising the military and political training" of the entire population. Control functions in industry and agriculture have been secured to the army.
All these trends are leading towards the disproportionate, misshapen development of China's economy: the atomic bomb and the rickshaw, the electronic equipment of missile systems and the conservation of backwardness, the illiteracy of hundreds of millions of people, huge allocations for the war industry and the reduction of the already small expenditures on the health services---these are becoming typical in China.
This situation is witnessing a sharp aggravation of political contradictions in China, a growth of popular unrest and increasing resistance to the dangerous, anti-popular policies of the Mao group. The Maoists organise foreign policy adventures in an effort to break the resistance of the healthy forces, divert the people's attention from the failures of their policy and justify the country's militarisation and the tragic condition of the Chinese working people. In China herself Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are trying to create an atmosphere of "class struggle'', portray China as a fortress besieged on all sides by enemies and fill the Chinese people with the poison of nationalism and bellicose anti-Sovietism.
At no time has the Soviet Union threatened China. The Soviet Government Statement of March 29, 1969 declared in part: "True to Lenin's behests, the Soviet Government has done everything in its power to strengthen __PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12--534 177 Soviet-Chinese friendship and co-operation.'' While emphatically denouncing the present dangerous policies of the Peking leaders, the Soviet people believe that in the long run the fundamental interests of the two peoples will make it possible to remove the obstacles to normal Soviet-Chinese relations.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. No. 22, May 1969, p. 21
[178] __ALPHA_LVL2__ The SubstanceN. Kapchenko
The evolution of the political line of the Mao group, which is currently ruling the destiny of a country with a population of 700 million, has entered a new phase. This is evident from numerous facts relating to the Maoists' domestic policy and to their activities on the international scene. The principal indicator and cardinal feature reflecting this qualitatively new stage of Peking's policy are that the attacks against the Soviet Union have become the basic line of its international policy. Here it is not a case of an accidental or isolated phenomena, but of the logical expression of GreatPower, expansionist ambitions intrinsic to the Maoist plans.
The development of the Maoist political platform has been very symbolical over the past decade. Initially, the Maoists made believe that their clash with the international communist movement and, above all, with the CPSU was over the interpretation of various theoretical propositions relating to the most pressing problems of the world revolutionary movement. The impression was thus created that the differences were primarily of an ideological and theoretical nature. However, as time passed, it became increasingly evident that here it was not a case even of considerable divergences on questions of theory. Mao Tse-tung and his supporters started a political struggle against socialist countries, steadily fanning it, and in the end putting forward a chauvinistic, expansionist foreign policy programme. Thereby they strikingly demonstrated their intention to steer the differences into a new channel---the channel of inter-state relations.
Thus, the moral and political degradation of the Maoist renegades ran from the proclamation of a special stand on individual questions of theory to territorial claims and the organisation of armed provocations against the Soviet Union. For some time it was yet possible to regard the divergences with the Peking splitters as a divergence within the socialist community and the world communist movement, but Mao Tse-tung and his supporters pilloried and exposed themselves as accomplices of imperialism and reaction when they started shattering the CPC and openly embarked on a course __PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__ 12* 179 of turning China into a force hostile to the socialist countries. Whatever the tactics employed by them today or in future they will not change the main content and direction of their policy on the international scene.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ On the RoadHistory knows of many regressive trends, movements and upheavals triggered by class treachery. Nonetheless what has, and still is, happening in China hardly has a historical precedent either for its nature or scale. It is not so much the depth of the political degradation of individuals as the socio-political consequences stemming from the present situation in China. This is a case of a perverted anti-socialist line underlying the domestic and foreign policy of a country that is one of the world's great powers, a country that had been building socialism. In the given case, the scale of the ideological and political betrayal is multiplied, as it were, by the size of the country in which it is committed.
The almost 20-year-old history of the People's Republic of China may be divided into two periods, with the end of the 1950s as the line between them.
The first period witnessed far-reaching socio-economic and political reforms aimed at creating the foundation of socialist society in China. It was clear that in a country with the productive forces at a low level of development and with deep-rooted elements of pre-capitalist relations of production widely prevalent, there would be enormous difficulties in putting socialist reforms into effect.
After the people's revolution of 1949 these difficulties came to the fore. But the Communist Party of China had the possibility of drawing up a programme of socialist construction on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and of creatively utilising the Soviet people's vast experience of building socialism. In a CPC document it was stressed that "the road traversed by the Soviet Union is the example that we have to follow today''.^^*^^
The Communist Party of China charted a programme of socialist construction with emphasis on industrialisation and _-_-_
^^*^^ Theses for the Study and Propagatiori of the Party's General Line in the Period of Transition, Chinese ed., Peking, 1954, p. 13.
180 the gradual socialist reorganisation of agriculture. This policy received legislative embodiment in the Constitution of the PRC (1954) and was recorded in the decisions adopted by the 8th Congress of the CPC (1956). Other steps were taken to consolidate and improve the people's democratic system. The building of the economic basis of socialism and the corresponding political superstructure was started under the leadership of the Communist Party. It was only correct leadership by the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism that could guarantee the successful fulfilment of this extremely complex task ( particularly in the conditions obtaining in China).However, with the development of socialist construction and the growing scale of the tasks confronting the country, the influence of petty-bourgeois, nationalistic elements became increasingly felt in the CPC itself and, above all, among its leaders. This trend was propounded by Mao Tsetung, who had long ago formed a group that was loyal to himself personally. Utilising his position as Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and encountering little resistance, he forced upon the Party a series of political propositions undermining and revising the general line adopted by the CPC Congress, the highest Party authority.
In 1958 industrialisation and the gradual cooperation of agriculture were supplanted by the "big leap" and the "people's communes" policy, underlying which were pettybourgeois adventurism and hegemonistic ambitions. Everybody knows the sad outcome of this Mao Tse-tung inspired course. When speaking of this people usually draw attention to the direct economic damage suffered by China. For our part, we should like to draw attention to another, similarly important aspect of this question.
At the time the "big leap" and "people's communes" policy was proclaimed, the socialist system of production relations (the economic basis of socialism) has not taken final shape in China. The first telling blow was struck at the socialist relations of production emerging in the countryside in 1955 when, ignoring the real situation in the villages, the Mao group sharply accelerated the formation of agricultural cooperatives. Then followed the "big leap" and the organisation, on orders from above, of "people's communes" throughout the country. This was a crushing blow at the 181 nascent economic basis of socialism in both town and countryside.
As from that period the basic principles of socialist economic management, the forms and methods of managing the economy were flouted. The task of "securing the maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the people'',^^*^^ proclaimed at the 8th Congress of the CPC as the Party's main objective, was shelved. This could not but have far-reaching socio-economic consequences.
The undermining of the foundations of the socialist system of production relations most adversely affected the state's political superstructure, which was also in the process of formation. It is hardly necessary to accentuate the fact that in a country like China the economic, social, political and ideological influence of the old society was still very much in evidence, and the petty-bourgeois element, patriarchal survivals and so on constantly made themselves felt even after popular rule was established.
Moreover, one must not discount the negative influence of the traditions inherited by new China from the former exploiting systems. Stressing that these factors had to be taken into account, Marx wrote: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living''.^^**^^ The justice of these words is particularly self-evident in the case of China, where the traditions formed centuries ago and generated by the specific feudal way of life, by the features of "Asian despotism" mentioned by the classics of Marxism, complicated the task of reorganising life along socialist lines.
The entire political structure of the PRC was seriously weakened by the influence of all these factors. This was expressed, above all, by the measures that were taken to undermine the leading role of the Communist Party and to replace the principles of democratic centralism in the work of Government and Party bodies and public organisations _-_-_
^^*^^ Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 15--27, 1956), Russ. eel., Moscow, 1956, p. 119.
^^**^^ Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (in 3 volumes), p. 398.
182 with coercion and dictatorial methods. Blind obedience and unthinking subordination were demanded at all levels in the Government and the Party. Any manifestation of discontent with the ruinous adventurist policy of the Maoists was ruthlessly crushed.Lastly, from 1958 onward, the cult of Mao Tse-tung was spread on a steadily mounting scale. On the political level the cardinal objective of this campaign was to create conditions that would exclude all opposition to Mao Tse-tung and enable him to rule the Party arbitrarily.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ From a People'sThe catastrophic effects of the "big leap" and the "people's communes" evidently weakened the position of Mao Tsetung and his supporters in the Party leadership. However, while taking some steps to remedy the situation in the economy, the Central Committee failed to see that Mao Tsetung's policies were leading to disaster. More, we feel that the Central Committee in effect assumed the political responsibility for the adventurist line laid down by Mao Tsetung and his followers. This greatly prejudiced the Party's prestige and its links with the masses and hit the healthy forces in the Party who were opposed to the Maoists.
In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters took steps to strengthen their position and prepare for an attack on those who did not share their petty-bourgeois, adventurist views. They relied chiefly on the army, which in 1959 came under Lin Piao. The army gradually became a self-contained force in China's political life. A nation-wide campaign was started under the slogan "Learn from the army''. The Communist Party's role and function as the leading force of society gradually passed to the army.
Step by step Mao Tse-tung and his supporters created the conditions and requisites for a decisive assault on the sound forces in the CPC.
This general offensive on the foundations of the emergent socialist system in China was labelled "cultural revolution'', which, unquestionably, had an inner link with the "big leap" and the "people's commune" policy. "A play begins with a 183 prologue,'' Mao Tse-tung once said, "but the prologue is not its culmination.''^^*^^ While the period of the "big leap" and the establishment of the "people's communes" could be called a kind of prologue of the Maoist political line that was ``cleansed'' of Marxism-Leninism, the "cultural revolution'', which developed into a stark tragedy for the Chinese people, was its culmination.
A retrospective view of the complex, tangled and sometimes contradictory course of the "cultural revolution" brings to light the keynote of all its stages---concentration of efforts to shatter the Party organisations and destroy the Party cadres in the centre and in the localities. What lies behind the seeming paradox that Mao Tse-tung attacked the Party which he was heading? Unless this question is answered much will seem absurd and strange, to say the least.
However, there was logic in the actions of the Maoists. The main reason inducing them to start the "cultural revolution" was the growing opposition and resistance in practically all links of the Party apparatus to their ruinous policies. They found they could not use the old methods to force the Party to accept their platform and they therefore decided to smash the Party with the aid of the army, and the hungweipings, tsaofans and other essentially pettybourgeois elements on whom they could rely. These were temporary vehicles for the attainment of their objectives, and they created more problems than they solved.
However, in starting the "cultural revolution" the Maoists had their sights also on a more distant goal. They feared not only the existing opposition but also the potential opposition that was making itself felt more and more with the escalation of the Maoist political offensive. Today nobody doubts the real purpose of this offensive, which was not only to force the "ideology of Maoism" with its petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and Great-Power hegemonistic aims on the Party and the country but also to perpetuate it.^^**^^ These aims obviously _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung, Report to the Second Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC, Chinese ed., Peking, 1968, p. 23.
^^**^^ Stuart Schram, an American sinologist, notes that "it is impossible not to see in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution an attempt by Mao to erect in his own lifetime a monument to himself more lasting than the pyramids: a China which will apply his thought and revere his name for centuries to come''. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, New York, 1966, p. 321.
184 underlie the political campaign that is being conducted in China as a "cultural revolution''.^^*^^This conclusion is borne out also by the socio-political consequences of the "cultural revolution''. The economic basis of socialism and its political superstructure, which, as we have already noted, had been greatly weakened before the "cultural revolution'', were damaged to such an extent that the revolutionary gains of the Chinese people were menaced. The working class has been badly hit. The most class-conscious and politically active workers were either physically destroyed or exiled to the countryside for `` reeducation''. The economic condition of the peasants has deteriorated. Small as it was China's creative and technological intelligentsia has been still further decimated. Artificially ranging the different classes and social substrata against each other and sowing distrust and hostility between and within them, the Maoists have seriously undermined the alliance of the working class with the peasants and all other working people.
Many observers have noted that the national bourgeoisie has been least of all affected by the "cultural revolution''. It is very significant that in analysing the content of this ``revolution'' many bourgeois sinologists note with satisfaction that in the broad sense it is not a ``cultural'' but a social and economic revolution.^^**^^
The fact that the Communist Party of China has been smashed in the course of the political campaign unleashed by Mao Tse-tung has kindled great interest and hope in the camp of the imperialists. For instance, Professor A. Whiting of the USA has pointed out that "the heaviest blows of the cultural revolution fell precisely on the Party.''^^***^^ Whiting can hardly be accused of exaggeration. The scale on which the Party committees were smashed is shown by facts and _-_-_
^^*^^ Some of the ``explanations'' offered of the reasons and nature of the "cultural revolution" by those who portray it as a "utopia of pure communism'', as an attempt "to prevent China from departing from orthodox communism'', as a struggle against the "new bureaucracy" and so forth are groundless, apologetic or simply ridiculous. See, for example, Life, February 21, 1969; The New York Times, January 20, 1969.
^^**^^ Problems of Communism, Washington, March-April 1968, p. 14.
^^***^^ Life, February 21, 1969.
185 figures known to the whole world. For instance, more than three-fourths of the Central Committee members, nearly two-thirds of the Political Bureau members and almost all the members of the Central Committee Secretariat have been repressed or discredited.^^*^^The entire system of state authority in the centre and in the localities has been to all intents and purposes paralysed. The trade unions, the Young Communist League and public and cultural organisations that played an important role in China's political life have been disbanded. The Party committees and the lawful organs of authority have been supplanted by "revolutionary committees'', which are fulfilling the function of temporary organs of authority.
Facts show that the Mao group is out to establish a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. However, this dictatorship, whose content and origin are petty bourgeois, cannot have a broad and dependable social basis because it is alien to the vital interests of the Chinese working class, the peasant masses and the intelligentsia. This is the principal weakness of the Maoists, their Achilles' heel.
The army is the foundation on which the edifice of the present Maoist regime rests. The Mao group has used the army to demolish the lawful organs of authority and turned it from an instrument safeguarding the people's democratic system into a vehicle of its policies. The position held by the army, which had for years been thoroughly indoctrinated in the Maoist spirit, made it easy for Mao Tse-tung and his myrmidons to seize control over it. As a matter of fact, in a number of cases this control has proved to be extremely feeble as shown by the numerous reshuffles and purges among the senior officers, the acts of open insubordination and resistance to the Maoists, and so on.
_-_-_^^*^^ Kommunist, No. 4, 1969, pp. 98--99. The following is an illustration of how the Maoists deal with their adversaries. For nearly a quarter of a century Liu Shao-chi, President of the PRC, was regarded as one of Mao Tse-tung's closest associates. He has been expelled "for ever" from the Party. In the report submitted by the "Special Inquiry Group at the Central Committee of the CPC'', it is stated: "Liu Shaochi's crimes are so monstrous and heinous that death would be much too good for him.'' The text of this report, which was submitted on October 18, 1968 to the 12th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, was published in the London journal The China Quarterly, January-March 1969, pp. 175--80.
186The bureaucratic substratum (in China it is far from being numerically small), recruited from people loyal to Mao Tsetung and his supporters, is the second major mainstay of the Maoist regime.
At present, feeling that they have in the main completed the destructive phase of the "cultural revolution'', the Maoists are concentrating their efforts to achieve a ``positive'' consolidation of the results of that ``revolution''. First and foremost, they are determined to legalise the destruction of the Party and state organs of authority and stabilise the new regime. These were the issues before the 9th Congress of the CPC, which the Mao group held in April 1969.
The Party Constitution, endorsed by the 12th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC on October 31, 1968, gives some idea of the nature of the new, reorganised political party, designed to form, along with the army, the foundation of the military-bureaucratic regime. From beginning to end this Constitution is permeated with ideas and theses that are utterly at variance with Marxism-- Leninism and incompatible with the guiding principles of the communist movement. It openly places Mao Tse-tung above the Party and obliges the members to study and apply the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. It confirms the anti-Soviet tenor of the Maoist policy and raises it to the level of a Party principle.
The unprecedented fact that the Party Constitution contains a clause on the "right of succession to the throne" shows how the Maoists interpret democratic centralism and the principles of Party life. After enumerating Lin Piao's services to Mao Tse-tung, the Constitution states bluntly: "Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's closest associate and successor.''^^*^^ The inclusion of this provision in the Constitution of a party that continues to call itself Communist is testimony of anything except the stability of the Maoist leadership itself, which is being torn by an unremitting struggle between various groups and clans.
The Maoists convened the 9th Congress with the purpose of consolidating the results of the "cultural revolution'', _-_-_
^^*^^ Hongkong's Far Eastern Economic Review (January 16, 1969, p. 87) sarcastically asked in this connection what the Maoists would do if Lin Piao died before Mao.
187 which was nothing less than a gradual political upheaval accomplished with the aid of the army. In other words, the 9th Congress was convened to sanction the degeneration of the people's democratic system into a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.What enabled the Mao group, at least at the given stage, to secure a partial realisation of its plans?
A magazine article, naturally, does not provide the possibility of laying bare and analysing the entire range of objective and subjective factors whose interaction led to the present developments. But I should like to quote a passage from a work by Lenin which will help to give a better understanding of the circumstances that enabled the Maoists to accomplish an essentially counter-revolutionary coup under the guise of a struggle against ``revisionists'' and "restorers of capitalism''. In analysing the prerequisites for averting a social restoration, Lenin wrote: ".. .the only conditional and relative guarantee against restoration is that the revolution should be effected in the most drastic manner possible, effected by the revolutionary class directly, with the least possible participation of go-betweens, compromisers and all sorts of conciliators; that this revolution should really be carried to the end.''^^*^^
Some of the factors mentioned by Lenin were conspicuously lacking in the Chinese revolution. The Mao group constantly sought to divert this revolution from the socialist to the petty-bourgeois road and thereby systematically undermined it with telling effect.
We feel that the Mao group's plans were not discerned and disrupted in time because the Party and its leading organs lacked sufficient political and ideological foresight. The proletarian stratum in the CPC was numerically very small. The level of the Party membership's ideological, political and theoretical training was very low. Another important factor was that for many years the Mao group had cultivated petty-bourgeois, nationalistic sentiments and views in the Party and in the country as a whole. Many of the leaders who disagreed with Mao Tse-tung on various issues were likewise largely infected with these views and sentiments.
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 281.
188To a very large extent the fact that the key post in the Party was held by Mao Tse-tung himself helped the Maoists to carry out their plans. One will understand the atmosphere in which the Maoists launched their attack on the Party and the lawful organs of state authority if one bears in mind that Mao Tse-tung wielded arbitrary power in the Party and flouted elementary norms and principles of Party life, and also if one takes into account the incredible proportions that were reached by the cult of his personality and the cult of his ``thought''.
In assaulting the Party the Maoists had recourse to the most subtle methods of social demagogy and deceit. For instance, while claiming that they were "strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat" they were in fact demolishing the foundations of the people's democratic system. To further their own ends, they exploited not only the political immaturity of young people but also the illiteracy and backwardness of the broad masses. It was certainly no accident that Mao Tse-tung described the Chinese people as "a clean sheet of paper" on which "it is possible to write the newest and most beautiful words and draw the newest and most beautiful pictures''. The "cultural revolution'', evidently, was one of these "beautiful pictures'', which the "great helmsman" decided to inscribe into the history of the Chinese people with fire and sword.
While emphasising that the entire blame for China's present national tragedy devolves entirely on Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, who in pursuance of their political aims did not shrink from plunging China into chaos, note must be made of the great historical responsibility which the healthy forces of the CPC, the Chinese working class and the Chinese people as a whole bear for the destiny of their country and of socialism. The founders of scientific communism had repeatedly pointed out that this responsibility for the development of their countries is borne not only by individual political leaders, parties and classes but also by nations and peoples. Here it would be appropriate to recall a vivid statement by Karl Marx, who said: "A nation and a woman are not forgiven the unguarded hour in which the first adventurer that came along could violate them''.^^*^^ These _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (in 3 volumes), p. 402.
189 words refer to a different epoch and a totally different situation, but they succinctly express the very idea of a nation's historical responsibility for its development. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Peking's ExpansionistThe Mao group's fundamental revision of the CPC's general line as laid down by the 8th Congress also affected the content and basic orientation of China's foreign policy. The Maoists swept away the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, which are the foundation of socialist international policy, and gradually pettybourgeois adventurism and Great-Power chauvinism became the key-note of China's foreign policy.
The "big leap" and "people's communes" line was accompanied by drastic changes in China's foreign policy. This was demonstrated when the Chinese leaders deliberately caused relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to deteriorate and reconsidered their attitude to issues such as the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, disarmament, the eradication of flashpoints of tension, and so on. The foreign policy of the Maoists became increasingly more chauvinistic, adventurist and antiSoviet in proportion to the deepening and development of the anti-socialist orientation of their domestic policy.
In the main, the radical turn in China's foreign policy was completed in the course of the "cultural revolution''. Hard as one might try today it would be impossible to determine how much of the socialist element has remained in the social basis on which the Maoist foreign policy is founded, in the aims it pursues, the principles by which it is guided and the methods it uses.
Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have gone over entirely to anti-Sovietism. They are turning their uncompromising hostility for the Soviet Union into the main orientation of China's state policy. Moreover, they are trying to consolidate the anti-Soviet line as a long-term prospect of China's foreign policy.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ According to the Western press, at the 12th plenary meeting of the GPC Central Committee Mao Tse-tung declared that the Soviet Union "is China's enemy No. 1" and that Peking had to seek a modus __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 191. 190
The switch to anti-Sovietism signified that the Mao group had completed its revision of the basic strategic concepts of China's foreign policy. It is quite obvious that the alliance with the Soviet Union was the cornerstone on which China's national security rested. The very emergence of the People's Republic of China and its choice of socialist development were indissolubly linked with the existence of the Soviet Union and its genuinely internationalist policy. The prerequisites and conditions for China's further advance along the road to socialism and for enhancing her international prestige were friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union.
However, the Mao group chose a different road. It chose to play unscrupulously on the contradictions between the two systems. The line aimed at utilising these contradictions to further their own interests is being turned by the Maoists into the foundation of their foreign policy at the present stage. But like any other game, this one is fraught with the most unexpected consequences: an imaginary advantage may boomerang as an overwhelming defeat.
In order somehow to disguise their betrayal of the interests of world socialism, camouflage the turn in their foreign policy and make themselves more sought after by those who would have no objection to striking a political bargain with them, the Maoists are conducting a clamorous propaganda war against US imperialism. But lately even in the bourgeois press this clamour has been evoking ironical responses and is not taken seriously.
The anti-imperialist slogans that Peking proclaims from time to time are only a smokescreen to mask the Maoists' reluctance to wage a struggle against imperialism. While underscoring this aspect of the Maoists' policy, the bourgeois press notes with satisfaction that the Chinese leaders are confining themselves to loud-mouthed statements and in recent years, "have never moved, despite the most humiliating provocations committed near its southern borders and coastline by American ships and planes''.^^*^^
_-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 190. vivendi with the West. This statement hardly introduces anything new into the policy of the Chinese leaders inasmuch as for a number of years they have been waging a real fight only against the USSR.^^*^^ Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23, 1969, p. 151.
191The trend towards strengthening its international position through all sorts of unscrupulous deals with imperialist circles is growing more pronounced in the policy pursued by Peking. It would be a simplification to consider, for example, that the present state of relations between the USA and China is such as to allow the Maoists to strike a political bargain with Washington on an anti-Soviet basis. In the relations between the USA and China there are many substantial differences, outstanding issues and so forth. But the possibility of such a deal is not to be ruled out, and Peking is creating the conditions for this by orienting its foreign policy on a struggle against the USSR as the "principal enemy" and reducing its anti-imperialist ``activity'' to loud phrases and incantations. It must be noted that among the ruling circles of the USA, too, there is a growing trend towards ``normalising'' relations with the present Peking rulers. Very symptomatic in connection with the policy of the Mao group is the statement in the American journal Current History that "the enemy of yesterday is often the friend of today''.^^*^^
In domestic policy the Maoists believe that the whipping up of tension in the relations with the USSR will help to consolidate their military-bureaucratic regime, which is encountering opposition from different strata of the population despite the repressions. By fanning chauvinistic passions and creating the atmosphere of a "besieged fortress'', the Maoists are trying to kill several birds with one stone: direct popular discontent against the Soviet Union, deal with their political adversaries more ruthlessly than before, strengthen the position of the militarists in the Maoist dictatorship, damp down the struggle between the quarrelling groups in the Maoist camp and unite them under a common banner--- Great-Power nationalism and rabid anti-Sovietism.
Taking an extreme form of double-dyed Great-Power chauvinism, nationalism occupies a special place in the Maoist ideological and political programme. It is the mainspring of the political forces that have grouped round this platform. The experience of modern history shows that political regimes with a weak social basis invariably stake on nationalism and chauvinism, which they regard as the _-_-_
^^*^^ Current History, September 1967, p. 175.
192 means of winning a stronger position and in some measure compensating for the weakness and instability of the social basis.On the foreign policy level the aim of the frontier provocations against the USSR in 1969 was to show the imperialist forces that Peking was determined to continue intensifying its anti-Soviet line. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters hoped these provocations would obstruct the consolidation of the unity of the international communist movement and wreck the efforts to settle existing differences. While one may yet argue about whether the Maoists have succeeded---and if so, to what degree---in attaining their aims in China herself, their foreign policy gambles have definitely increased their isolation on the international scene and been emphatically denounced by socialist countries and all other peace-loving forces.
The actions of the Maoists have shown the world that the policy of adventures and expansion which they are turning into the pivot of China's international policy as a whole is seriously menacing world peace and, above all, the security of the peoples of Asia.
In order to disguise this policy and give it the appearance of a "struggle for the restoration of historical justice" the Maoists hysterically allege that the present frontier between the Soviet Union and China had been delineated on the basis of unequal treaties. This frontier, as the whole world knows, took shape many generations ago and follows natural boundaries demarcating the territories of the Soviet Union and China. It was established on the basis of a series of treaties, whose territorial provisions remain in full force to this day. In evaluating Peking propaganda's outcry over the so-called territorial issue, a Statement issued by the Soviet Government on March 29, 1969 stressed that the purpose of this outcry "is to sow among the Chinese people hate and hostility for our country and the Soviet people''.^^*^^
If one analyses the ``arguments'' which the Peking leaders are advancing in substantiation of their ``right'' to foreign territory, one will see that the only motive is the desire to restore to China almost the entire territory of the Celestial Empire. Anybody conversant with history knows that the _-_-_
^^*^^ Pravda, March SO, 1969. 15--534
193 Chinese emperors, particularly of the Yuan (1280--1368) and Ching (1644--1911) dynasties, pursued a policy of conquest in the north, south, west and east, seeking to subject neighbour,ing peoples and territories. The claims to territories which the Chinese emperors seized or tried to seize centuries ago demonstrate that the Chinese leaders are evidently aspiring to the doubtful honour of being regarded as the heirs of the former dynasties.However, it is hard to assume that even the architects of Chinese policy, who have lost their sense of reality, seriously believe that the wheels of history can be reversed and the once existent situation founded on the "right of conquest" restored. An interesting point is that even the London "Times wrote that Peking was laying claim to lands that had not been Chinese but rather "a part of the dowry of Manchu conquest''.^^*^^
It is quite evident that the expansionist claims of the Maoists are absurd and untenable from both the historical and international legal points of view. Not very long ago it seemed that the Chinese leaders were aware of the absurdity and provocative nature of the ``arguments'' they are now using themselves. In October 1960, for example, Premier Chou En-lai told the American journalist Edgar Snow that "if accounts are to be squared going so far back into history, the world will be thrown into a turmoil. Using this method the United States would have to be returned to British rule, because the United States has only been independent for less than 200 years''.^^**^^ Yet it is precisely this dangerous road of artificially fanning inter-state contradictions and conflicts that has been taken by the present Peking leaders, who, to use the words of Engels, "flout and make a prejudice of a traditional law of nations''.^^***^^
It goes without saying that the Soviet people do not equate the Mao group to the Chinese people, who have to bear the entire burden of that group's adventurist policy. The further implementation of this policy, which is hitting the vital interests of the Chinese people, will inevitably whip up the main contradiction in China's socio-political life---the _-_-_
^^*^^ The Times, March 4, 1969.
^^**^^ Edgar Snow, Red China Today, London, 1963 p. 763.
^^***^^ K. Marx, F. Engels, = Collected Works, Vol. 22, Rus. ed., p. 24.
194 contradiction between the policy pursued by the Maoists and the objective requirements of China's development towards socialism. This is the contradiction that will be decisive in determining the paths and cross-roads of China's historical development. Mezltrlimarodnaya zhizn, No. 5, 1969,
pp. 12--22
V. Gelbras
The Maoist conception of socialism has nothing in common with scientific communism. In the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" the future society is pictured as state ownership of the means of production integrated with a political regime of personal power, where the will, interests and rights of one man tower above the will, interests and rights of 700 million people, where the machinery of state ignores the interests of the people and suppresses every possibility for the free development of society as a whole and each of its members.
It is to the creation of precisely this society that the socioeconomic policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group is directed. Let us examine some aspects of this policy.
Mao Tse-tung has formulated a "universal law" of social development as the "law of U-shaped development" or the "law of zigzag development''. The substance of this law is that equilibrium is followed by disequilibrium and then by equilibrium again.
This subjectivist, mechanistical theory of equilibrium-- disequilibrium is the methodological foundation of the Maoist idea of the factors and motive forces of social development. As a result, the Maoists concentrate on several central issues: how to upset the equilibrium of the social system, to secure disequilibrium, i.e., a "big leap'', avoid the consequent decline in production and maintain a "continuous big leap''. They believe the following factors will help them to solve these problems.
The first is an all-embracing "political campaign'', in the course of which the "big leap" must become the cardinal, so to speak, ideological and political aspiration of the masses. Mao Tse-tung now regards "political campaigns" as the motive force of social development. The key aims of these campaigns are to secure an impulsive upsurge of activity by the masses, counterpose moral stimuli to material incentives, reduce the economic and cultural requirements of the people to a bare minimum and militarise all aspects of social life.
196The second factor consists in making the maximum use of the country's enormous manpower resources.
Lastly, the third factor is the preservation of the extremely low wage level and the freezing of the people's incomes. The currently operating rules governing labour and wages were formulated at the 3rd plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1957. According to Liu Tzu-chiu, Deputy Minister for Labour, "the basic political line in labour and wages in our country is that the food meant for three persons must suffice for five. It provides for the institution of a large number of enterprises and organisations which, with small investments, would ensure the employment of a large number of people. In this situation it is impossible to achieve a more substantial and faster rise of wages just as it is impossible to reduce and abolish unskilled and arduous physical labour within a short span of time''.
Mao Tse-tung has called for the "permanent improvement" of relations of production with the aim of creating the corresponding forms of using labour resources and building up funds, ``saved'' at the expense of the people's standard of living, for the development of a militaryindustrial complex and promoting missile-nuclear research. In his view, the relations of production are constantly `` renewed'' regardless of the real changes occurring in the development of the productive forces.
The experience of the ``leap'' of 1956, the "big leap" of 1958 and the present "cultural revolution" indicates that Mao Tse-tung follows a stereotype pattern of action: " political campaign" giving the initial impulse to subsequent measures; ``reorganisation'' of the relations of production in order to mobilise funds and organise people; and, lastly, a "big leap" aimed at stepping up production. Neither failures, nor the frustration of the plans of economic development, nor the further aggravation of socio-economic contradictions have compelled the Maoists to reconsider their policies. The purpose of the "great proletarian cultural revolution'', it was announced in Peking, is to prepare the ideological, psychological and other prerequisites for the next ``reorganisation'' of social relations and achieve another "big leap''. All this is demagogically screened with references to Marxism, socialism and revolution.
197According to Mao Tse-tung, an all-embracing "political campaign" is the foundation of any work. A specific of such a political ``campaign'' is that it is conducted in isolation of the objective requirements and possibilities of economic development and constitutes an attempt to spur social development artificially.
In contrast to the Marxist proposition that in the long run social progress is determined by the development of the productive forces, Mao Tse-tung, in effect, maintains that social development is determined by the subjective aspirations of the leader and the actions of the masses believing in the wisdom of these aspirations. This is what underlies his notorious principle that "politics is the soul, the commanding force''. The instructions of the "great helmsman" are proclaimed as the iron-clad guarantee of the country's successful development and the only source from which " absolutely correct and ready-made solutions" are to be drawn for every occasion in life. The Maoists assert that "as soon as it takes possession of the masses the thought of Mao Tse-tung turns into an invincible atomic bomb that engenders a huge material force''.
In China all "political campaigns" involve the same political methods, the chief of which are the removal of all opposition elements from active politics, the isolation of waverers, the fanning of nationalistic and chauvinistic sentiments, the indoctrination of the people in a spirit of preparation for war and the creation of an atmosphere of mobilisation. To this end the Maoists have created new flashpoints of international tension or fanned those already in existence: recall the clashes staged by them in the Taiwan Strait, and military action on the frontier between China and India. In recent years the Maoists have been using the war in Vietnam to fan nationalistic and chauvinistic passions. For a number of years Chinese propaganda has been spreading the idea that China is a besieged fortress, threatened by the Soviet Union on one side, by India on another and by the United States of America on yet another. Matters reached a point where Mao Tse-tung and his group started military conflicts on the Soviet frontier.
The present "political campaign" gives an idea of the 198 subtle means by which the Maoists exercise a moral-- political, psychological and physical influence on the masses. They have put in action not only storm detachments of hungweipings and tsaofans but also army units, established military control in all spheres of life, destroyed the Party and disbanded the trade unions and the Young Communist League. Humiliating ``trials'' and public executions, and the resettlement of millions of people for "re-education through labour" have become standard practice. Paramilitary forms of labour organisation and education and special agencies controlling the thoughts and actions of the people have been set up.
This has been designed by the Maoists with the aim of physically destroying some people, politically and morally discrediting others, intimidating still others and completely subordinating the rest of the population, and all in order to preserve power in the hands of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, create the illusion that the "subjective activity of the masses" is on the upsurge and enforce blind obedience to the instructions of Mao Tse-tung. However, the situation in China today witnesses not only the unparalleled tyranny imposed by the Maoists but also resistance to them from the masses, a struggle that is being waged on a huge scale by the Party, the trade unions and the YCL and affecting the life of millions of people.
In recent months Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have been making every effort to speed China's ``reorganisation'', to set up a "new order" through an ``improvement'' of the relations of production.
What lies behind these terms? According to Mao Tsetung, success in the building of the new society depends not on the creation of the appropriate material and technical basis but on the reorganisation of the forms of ownership of the means of production, on a "revolution in people's minds'', and on the materialisation of the traditional peasant ideals of equality among people, ideals which are being demagogically screened with slogans about the abolition of the distinctions between work by brain and by hand, between town and countryside, between industrial and agricultural labour.
199 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/MU245/20080516/245.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.05.17) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ The Maoists do not even attempt to tie in these complex processes with the development of the productive forces.Mao Tse-tung and his group regard the development of the productive forces as purely a fact of will. Take agriculture, for example. In China agricultural production is founded on the employment of manual implements that have been in use for thousands of years. The most widespread of these are the hoe, the wooden plough and the scythe. There are very few draught animals with the result that in many cases the peasants harness themselves to the wooden plough. Boats, wheelbarrows and yokes are the means of transporting burdens. Agriculture is of a natural, and in some areas, semi-natural character. In other words, Chinese agriculture rests on extremely backward, medieval productive forces. Prior to the agrarian reform pre-capitalist relations of production were also very much in evidence. It was under these conditions that on Mao Tse-tung's initiative the establishment of "higher type" agricultural producers' cooperatives was speeded up in 1955--56. These cooperatives were founded on manual labour and the use of primitive, antediluvian wooden implements with the result that in these associations it was not always possible to benefit from the advantages even of simple cooperation. Nonetheless, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the formation of such cooperatives as a " decisive victory of the socialist revolution''. In 1958, the same production basis was used for the formation of "people's communes'', which were proclaimed as the best means of transition from "collective to public ownership" and the most effective way of accomplishing the transition from "socialism to communism''.
During the same year (1958), the Maoists worked out and put into effect their first "concrete measures" to lay down other conditions for "speeding up" the building of communism. The ``worker-and-peasant'' system instituted in the paramilitary labour armies formed of peasants and used in industry, building and transport has been proclaimed a means of eradicating the distinctions between industrial and agricultural labour. However, in the conditions obtaining in China this system only meant---it could mean nothing else--- an organised transfer of unskilled labour from one project to another. But this transfer did not turn peasants into industrial workers. The entire system of production 200 management was abolished at industrial enterprises and office employees were forced to engage in manual labour. For their part, the workers, of whom 80 per cent were illiterate or partially literate, could not become workers ^by brain. Nevertheless, in China they began to extol the "new type of worker"---the ``worker-and-peasant'' and the `` workerand-employee''. A campaign to implant a "communist attitude to work" was started on a massive scale. Actually, the object of this campaign was to lengthen the working day from eight to ten or twelve hours, reduce the number of off-days from four to two per month, establish a barrack regime at factories, abolish payment according to work and introduce "free meals" and levelled distribution.
The attempt to speed up the building of communism collapsed, and its sole result was that China's economy was hurled back several years.
In subsequent years Mao Tse-tung did not reconsider his views on the relations of production. He persisted in his efforts to speed up ``improvement'' of the relations of production and use it to ``boost'' agricultural and industrial development. The Chinese leaders mean to use the " cultural revolution" to ensure a "far-reaching reform of the socialist system'', "complete the socialist revolution on all fronts" and even "ensure the successful transition from socialism to the great goal of communism''.
The "reform of the socialist system" and the " reorganisation of the superstructure" are now in full swing under Mao Tse-tung's slogan calling for the "seizure of power''. However, this pseudo-revolutionary shell conceals a drive to set up a regime of absolute personal power in China. The programme of reorganising the relations of production has been outlined long ago in the "new instructions of Mao Tsetung" christened the "golden bridge to communism''.
The principal aim of this ``reorganisation'' of the relations of production is to set up local social units---``self-sufficing'' economies that would embrace industry, agriculture, transport, trade, military training and so forth. The members of such collectives have to be "workers, peasants and soldiers" at one and the same time. These semi-natural production units with poor economic links between them, in which universal participation in exhausting manual labour is combined with a working day lengthened to the utmost limit, 201 have been proclaimed the "golden bridge to communism''. The motto "Poverty is a good thing'', coined by Mao Tsetung, is applied in these units. Man's spiritual world is forcibly restricted to the postulates of Maoism.
The Taching oilfields and the Tachai production brigade at the commune of the same name in Shansi province are held up as models of the Maoist style units.
The building of the Taching oilfields was started in 1961 in a sparsely inhabited region of Northeast China. In this connection we should like to note two important circumstances. First, from the very beginning the building of this project was conducted in such a way as to produce a " model for the application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. Second, the experiment was conducted under conditions of a modern industrial enterprise with several tens of thousands of workers.
According to Cheng Kuo-tse, deputy chief of the political department at Taching, the following directive was received when the project was under construction: "We are instructed by leading comrades from the Central Committee of the CPC that the general line in the development of the mining district is to combine industry with agriculture, to integrate the town with the countryside, which would benefit industry and be convenient for life; hostels for workers and employees and hostels for families must be spread out, they must not be built in one place, and no large towns must be built; families must be properly organised---the men must work in industry and the women in agriculture, they must be workers-and-peasants and combine industry with agriculture; an organ of authority^^*^^ must be set up in the mining district and it must function in the interests of the enterprise under the overall direction of the mining enterprise's Party committee.''
At Taching everything is subordinated to the idea of a comprehensive, "self-sufficing economy'', of "combining industry with agriculture''. It has "several large and a few score of medium centres of population''. The " industrialagricultural villages" are sited with their crop area near them. The local organ of authority fosters education fully _-_-_
^^*^^ ``Chengfu'' (``Government''), an unusual word in recent years, is used in the Chinese text.
202 in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's instructions: at the schools studies are combined with work and all the pupils learn the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', engage in trade---the schools produce vegetables and other food---and so on. In short, Taching is an urban people's commune (the attempt to set up such communes on a national scale in 1958 ended in failure), a local lower unit of society with a comprehensive economy functioning in full conformity with the line of "reliance on own resources'', without aid from the state. The Chinese press stresses that "the Taching way of life embodies the revolutionary traditions laid down in the 1930s and 1940s in Yenan, where the Chinese leaders lived in caves''.But there is more to this. Measures are being taken to ``erase'' the distinction between work by brain and by hand, between town and countryside and between industrial and agricultural labour. The distinctions between labour by brain and by hand are ``erased'' by forcing engineers and technicians to work regularly in the fields. The distinctions between town and countryside are also ``erased'' in a very peculiar way. "All service premises, canteens, shops, polyclinics and clubs,'' Hsinhua News Agency reported, "are in houses made of clay, straw and waste''. "There is hardly any difference in the housing of the oilworkers and the peasants of the nearby villages. Besides, they are situated near fields where the members of the workers' families engage in agriculture.'' This is nothing less than a flagrant violation of modern industry's demand for a specialised, highly trained machinery of management. It shows the Maoists' scorn for the achievements of civilisation and progressive culture, and signifies a regression, as Marx put it, "to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man'',^^*^^ to the artificial cultivation of universal exhausting manual work, to closer day-to-day contact of workers, engineers, technicians and office employees with backward agricultural production.
In China the "spirit of Taching" has been proclaimed as a "model of the great revolutionary school of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, of the link between town and countryside''. It appears that Taching has opened the road to the creation _-_-_
^^*^^ Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1S44, Moscow, 1967, p. 94.
203 of "enterprises of the Chinese type" in conformity with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.The same ``spirit'' is embodied in agriculture by the Tachai production brigade. There, too, efforts are being made to create a comprehensive, ``self-sufficing'' economy functioning in accordance with the policy of "reliance on own resources''. It is stated in China that this brigade grows grain and raises pigs. It manufactures and repairs primitive farm implements, produces building materials and provides itself with seeds, fodder and fertilisers. All purchases are reduced to a minimum. The brigade members have stopped buying even ink and paper.
The brigade is attempting to "erase the three great distinctions"---between labour by brain and by hand, between town and country and between industrial and agricultural labour---in much the same way as at Taching.
Such are the two piers of Mao Tse-tung's "golden bridge to communism''. The "spirit of Taching" and the "spirit of Tachai" in many ways lay bare the substance of his views and plans.
The attempts that have been made in the course of almost a decade to set up enterprises of the "Taching type" and communes of the "Tachai type" have evidently shown the Mao group that the people do not regard these undertakings with enthusiasm. By the time the "cultural revolution" was started there were in China only 70 enterprises of the "Taching type" and only 56 ``Tachai-type'' communes. This is a drop in the ocean of small enterprises, brigades and communes. That explains why they are now pinning their hopes on the army carrying out this programme. The Maoists are determined "to turn the army into a great school" for the building of the "golden bridge''.
The ``spirit'' of Taching and Tachai mirrors Mao Tsetung's manipulations with the ideals of socialism and communism and his use of Marxist terminology to deceive the people.
The "correct road for China's industrialisation" and the "correct road for the development of agriculture" in the spirit of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" are leading China into an economic impasse and aggravating socio-economic contradictions. Forced to surrender the bulk of their output to the state, deprived of material assistance even in the 204 event of elemental calamity and compelled to reduce local requirements to a bare minimum, the production units "of the Chinese type" are in no position to develop the productive forces. Actually, this is a policy of setting up isolated economic units, of divorcing the interests of the state from those of individual collectives of working people and breaking the alliance of the working class with the peasants. Objectively speaking, Mao Tse-tung's policy is aimed at conserving and reproducing the archaic form of the " traditional society" consisting of isolated communes engaged in self-contained social and economic activity.
We have noted that Mao Tse-tung ignores the material and technical factors of social development. It must be added that his own arguments about industrialisation and the technical reconstruction of agriculture (as distinct from some Party decisions and statements by other leaders of the CPC) are extremely vague. Nowhere does he specify his understanding of these terms although he uses them fairly often in his works. An analysis of his statements in the light of the practical measures started by him will make it clear that he equates industrialisation to the development of industrial production generally (including artisan production as one of the main orientations of industrial development), and the growth of the productive forces to the growth of production regardless of how or at what price this growth is achieved. This is abundantly illustrated by the "big leap" of 1958 and by the ``spirit'' of Taching and Tachai.
Mao Tse-tung says nothing of the creation of the material and technical basis of socialism in China. Although in past years he has sometimes mentioned industrialisation and the technical reconstruction of agriculture (more often than not in connection with the task of "speeding up" the building of communism), in practice he has insisted on accelerated development of artisan production, on the building of small and medium enterprises and the wide use of manual labour.
In the USSR the Party's clear-cut and consistent policy has from the very beginning oriented the Soviet people on the building of the material and technical basis of socialism. 205 Manual labour not machinery was predominant during the years of economic restoration and the first five-year plans. But this labour resulted in the erection of modern factories and the building of the material and technical basis of socialism. In China, on the other hand, the result of the labour of many millions of people in 1958 was the appearance of hundreds of thousands of primitive blast-furnaces, openhearth furnaces and tiny factories and workshops whose output could not be fully used because of its extremely inferior quality. In recent years, too, the building of such enterprises has proceeded on a considerable scale. In many branches of industry they account for the bulk of the output. According to Chinese statistics, they produce 40 per cent of China's chemical fertilisers, 60 per cent of her coal, 70 per cent of her cement and 60 per cent of her farm implements.
Low labour productivity, high production costs and the unsatisfactory quality of the output are due to this large number of small and medium artisan factories with primitive equipment and poorly organised production. Another outcome of this policy is the regression of the rate of growth of the working class at the large factories.
The semi-natural character of Chinese agriculture, which is founded on manual labour, the backward state of the productive forces, the low labour productivity and the absence of stable and considerable sources of accumulation are posing the Chinese leadership with grave problems in charting economic policy. So far agriculture is unable to supply anything near the adequate quantity of food and raw materials for the urban population and industry.
In principle, under these conditions it is possible to steer towards a gradual and, at first, a relatively slow expansion of a modern, large-scale industry capable of becoming the material and technical basis of the new society. But Mao Tse-tung and his group have chosen to follow an altogether different road. Objectively speaking, the entire range of the Maoists' postulates and practical measures are aimed at conserving China's economic backwardness. Efforts are being made to hasten the state's conversion into the supreme owner of all the means of production. The people are removed from the management of these means, which are not used to further the standard of living. In China they are completing the process of levelling wages and securing the peasants to the 206 land and the workers and employees to their respective factories and offices. Paramilitary, coercive forms of labour organisation are being introduced, extra-economic forms of compulsion are being devised in order to increase accumulation, and mass consumption is being reduced to the lowest possible level. As in past years, China is building thousands upon thousands of new primitive enterprises.^^*^^
For a short period after 1958, as a result of the establishment of rural people's communes and under pressure from the organs of authority heading the communes, a sharp increase of accumulations in agriculture was made possible and the vast manpower resources in the countryside were mobilised and employed in a centralised manner. The Chinese press reported that in that period the accumulations of the state and the people's communes amounted to 30 per cent of the net output of agriculture, which means that they reached 10--13 per cent of the national income. In other words, compared with the 1953--57 level they were more than doubled. Further, from 60 to 100 million people were taken from agriculture and formed into labour armies. This meant that from one-fourth to one-half of the able-bodied rural population was diverted from agriculture and employed on irrigation projects and on the construction of small primitive enterprises for the production of pig iron, steel and so on.
In subsequent years the rural people's communes were split into smaller units. In 1958 there were more than 24,000 communes, while in 1965 their number exceeded 73,000 (in 1957 there were over 740,000 rural cooperatives). The production brigades, set up in many cases on the basis of former agricultural producers' cooperatives of the "higher type'', have become the basic production unit in agriculture. These brigades were officially re-established in their right to own land, implements, livestock, buildings, household property and so on. However, the people's communes remained and, in addition to their function as organs of local authority and, thereby, representatives of the state, they planned agricultural output in the production brigades and determined the size of their deliveries to the state and the size of the agricultural _-_-_
^^*^^ This does not concern the military-industrial complex (including the corresponding research centres). In China this complex stands outside "political campaigns" of the "cultural revolution" type.
207 tax. Through the people's communes the state began to determine the volume of food grain consumption by the peasants, the distribution of incomes and even the system of remuneration for labour. The commune was turned into an agency handling the granting of credits and material assistance to the peasants and also the formation of prices in the rural market. It began to control the commodity-money relations between all the organisations and brigades in the given region.As a result, despite the certain retreat from the practice of 1958, the production brigades were, in fact, not restored as collective farms in the full meaning of the word. The state retained its hold on all the levers regulating production, exchange, distribution and consumption in the production brigades. Under these conditions the brigades could be called collective farms with considerable reservations. On the other hand, the commune has become a state form of extraeconomic compulsion with regard to the production brigades.
The communes have, moreover, retained the important function of securing the peasants to the land. In principle, this is typical of a semi-natural economy. In China they had recourse to this on a large scale after 1956, when at the height of the cooperative movement there was a mass migration of peasants to the towns. In 1957 a law was passed forbidding any "spontaneous flow" of peasants to the towns and prescribing administrative measures to evict peasants from the towns and send them to their place of permanent residence.
While preserving the people's communes in the countryside and setting the task of amassing experience of setting up similar communes in the towns (the "Taching experiment''), the Maoists have sharply intensified the ideological and political indoctrination of the people and taken steps to work out special organisational forms of temporarily releasing part of the labour force from agriculture. One of these forms is the ``worker-and-peasant'' system, under which the peasants sent to work outside agriculture have no right to sign a labour contract. All questions concerning labour conditions, wages, term of work in the new place, the living conditions and so on are settled without the participation of the peasants by special agreements between the enterprise concerned and the people's commune.
208In the process of setting up the "new order" Mao Tsetung and his supporters are endeavouring to use the people's communes for a reversion to their 1958 line. The production brigades are being deprived of the last vestiges of economic and production independence. A new campaign has been started to abolish the ancillary plots, the free market and all forms of material incentives, and to effect a return to the militarisation of labour. Millions of urban dwellers---- intellectuals, office employees and students---are being exiled to the villages for "permanent settlement''. People's communes of the Taching type are being set up in the towns. Mao Tse-tung and his group are pinning tremendous hopes on the new "big leap'', which is supposed to have started this year.
The political aims and slogans of Mao Tse-tung and his group are leading to upheavals in China and, as the experience of many years shows, they are impeding the solution of basic socio-economic problems of social development and making it difficult to put an end to economic backwardness. Industry and industrialisation cannot be promoted through the development of primitive production. The discontinuance of economic incentives for factories, communes, production brigades and the working people and the forcible disruption of the established social division of labour are giving rise to new socio-economic problems and are by no means helping to settle existing problems. The policy of the Maoists has already done irreparable damage to the Chinese people and the cause of socialism.
The social effects of this policy have also been devastating. They are not limited to the falling standard of living, the curtailment of housing, cultural and everyday service projects and the disruption of the long-term programmes of abolishing illiteracy. What Mao Tse-tung is out to achieve is to give final shape to his "absolute power" and "absolute authority'', and the course followed by him is destroying normal economic links between the state, the factories and the communes, between the factories and the personnel employed by them, between the communes and the production brigades, and between the production brigades and the peasants. The whole of social production functions on the basis of extra-economic compulsion with all the attendant consequences. This is one of the chief reasons for the destruction of the system of organs of authority through the __PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__ 14---534 209 campaign to "seize power" started by Mao Tse-tung during the "cultural revolution''.
Sooner or later, the road followed by the Maoists is bound to lead to attempts to set up a regime of personal power. The state's isolation from the entire range of society's economic interests inevitably leads to the militarisation of all aspects of social life and the establishment of a militarybureaucratic dictatorship demanding military discipline and dictatorial methods of directing and administering all aspects of social life from above. Independent thinking is stifled. Criticism and self-criticism (except in cases of forced repentance) are prohibited. Everything that may facilitate the growth of the people's cultural level and political awareness is suppressed. In this respect, the "cultural revolution'', started with the promise of ``reforming'' China's social system, is a considered political campaign whose objective is to remove all the obstacles to the creation of precisely such a new state. The 9th Congress of the CPC was used by the Maoists to obtain formal approval of their programme. This ``congress'' called on the people to make further sacrifices, prepare for war and elemental calamities and be ready for another ``leap''.
Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, No. 5, 1969,
pp. 28--37
G. Apalin
In charting and substantiating their policy on the international scene the Maoists attach special importance to ideological factors. Practically every major foreign policy action of the Maoists has been given an ideological slant in advance or subsequently.
The very substance of the Maoists' foreign policy strategy--- the establishment of China's political supremacy in the world---explains the growing role played by ideology in the international activity of the Chinese leaders. It should be noted that the nationalistic, Great-Power policy of the Mao group with its hypocrisy, blackmail and interference in the internal affairs of other countries is taking shape in a period witnessing the political maturing of the present-day revolutionary forces. The Maoists, who are acting in the name of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, therefore use ``ultra-Left'', ``ultra-revolutionary'' slogans to disguise their policy and its real aims and methods. On the other hand, they are hoping that their efforts to indoctrinate the masses in foreign countries ideologically will help to swing the development of international relations in their favour and bring it in line with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
Their ideological concepts in foreign policy also have a domestic designation, the aim being to justify, in the eyes of the Chinese people, their frontal assault on socialism in China and their departure from the principles of internationalism, kindle nationalistic, chauvinistic sentiments among ihe people and thereby create the ideological and political conditions in which to prepare and embark on new and still more dangerous foreign policy adventures.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Evolution of China'sThe political line pursued by the Mao group on the international scene is the product of long evolution, but in its present form it took shape in the course of the past ten years. During the initial years after the Chinese revolution and 213 the emergence of the People's Republic of China its foreign policy was, as a whole, oriented on co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The interests of the Chinese people demanded close unity with world socialism and that was the basis on which the internationalist trends in China's foreign policy developed. The 1954 Constitution and the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC (1956) reiterated the line of building socialism in China in alliance with other socialist countries and defined China's foreign policy as aiming to preserve world peace and promote peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.
However, even during the early period of the PRC's existence, Mao Tse-tung and his group displayed nationalistic tendencies and sought to further their own aims by using the advantages of co-operation with the socialist system. In those years Mao Tse-tung's stand was determined by his understanding that without economic, military and other assistance from the Soviet Union China could not achieve the position of an independent country and strengthen her international prestige. Subsequently, the nationalistic elements in the policy of the Mao group grew increasingly more pronounced and "at the end of the fifties the CPC leadership adopted a new line in foreign and domestic policy, which was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism and flagrantly contradicted the principles of proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction''.^^*^^
The notorious "three red banners" policy (``big leap'', "people's communes" and "general line''), adopted by the Mao group in 1958, envisaged using home policy factors to create the basis for China's supremacy in the world revolutionary movement and, on this foundation, in the world.
At the same time, the Peking leaders charted an antiLeninist line on the international scene. The forces which insisted on adventurist economic plans in China herself and maintained that it was possible to attain communism without passing through the stage of socialist development began to hot up international tension. In 1958--59 the Chinese leaders fundamentally revised China's orientation in foreign policy. _-_-_
^^*^^ Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 53--54.
214 In particular, they took a series of ``resolute'' steps: the rupture of the then improving commercial relations with Japan, the fomenting of a frontier conflict with India, and the aggravation of relations with Indonesia. Naturally, this seriously affected China's international standing.^During the next few years a feature of China's foreign policy was the growing contradiction between her foreign policy aims as a socialist state and the Maoists' aspiration to subordinate China's foreign policy to their chauvinistic ambitions.
During the early 1960s, when it grew obvious that the Maoists' domestic policies had failed and that they were unable to carry out the socio-economic tasks of socialist construction, they concentrated on foreign policy in a bid to achieve their hegemonistic designs by utilising foreign policy factors. Here their hopes rested mainly on a further escalation of international tension, a sharper and more open struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, subversive, provocative actions against the new national states of Asia and Africa and an objective coalescence with the policy of the most reactionary circles of the imperialist powers. The adventurist activities of the Mao group on the international scene entered a new dangerous phase after the llth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee in August 1966.
Nationalism became the pivot of China's foreign policy, which is founded on the present Chinese leadership's doctrine of hegemonism and violence and is disguised with verbiage about world revolution.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Bellicose NationalismThe Maoists have broken with the basic principles and postulates of socialist foreign policy, whose key ideological foundation consists of proletarian internationalism, which presupposes an "alliance with the revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with all the oppressed nations against all and any imperialists'',^^*^^ and the Leninist doctrine of peace and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, a doctrine requiring the creation of favourable external conditions for the building of socialism and _-_-_
^^*^^ V, I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 87,
215 communism and a determined, active struggle against the aggressive, predatory policy of world imperialism.The Chinese leaders not only abuse and slander these Leninist principles and postulates but subject them to a radical revision. Underlying this revision are their hegemonistic ambitions springing from Great-Han nationalism, which flourishes in present-day China under the impact of the Mao cult and petty-bourgeois ideology.
In foreign policy the ideological and political platform of the Mao group can only be understood in the light of the fact that for many centuries the ruling oligarchy of old China had impressed upon the Chinese people that everything Chinese was superior, that China was the most ancient power in the world and the centre of world civilisation. The contradiction between these ideas and the real situation, especially in the period when China was reduced to a semicolony, greatly inflamed national feeling and the aspiration to resurrect China's former glory at all costs.
After the Chinese revolution this motive in China's policy was stilled by internationalist, socialist trends and by the task of building socialism in close alliance with socialist countries. Successful socialist reforms and socialist construction in China, demonstrating the correctness of MarxistLeninist theory in the conditions prevailing in a formerly semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, facilitated the growth of the PRC's international prestige.
However, the understandable feeling of national selfassertion and national pride of the Chinese people, who had shaken off age-old imperialist oppression, and their natural aspiration to put an end to their country's backwardness as soon as possible were gradually perverted by the Mao group, misled and used to the detriment of the Chinese people themselves. This was aggravated by a deliberate slackening of the internationalist education of the Chinese people. The Maoists used the healthy growth of national self-awareness to propagate and cultivate nationalism and chauvinism. They are exploiting the idea of resurrecting China's onetime greatness and hoping to achieve their aims by fanning national egoism and nationalistic prejudices, cultivating national exclusiveness and kindling discord between nations.
By preaching China's exclusiveness they hope to attain two objectives: the first is to win popular support for their 216 domestic and foreign policies and divert the people's attention from pressing domestic problems by stirring their national feeling, and the second---to use the nationalism engendered by long colonial rule in Asia and Africa to extend their influence in the countries of these continents.
The idea of China's superiority over all other nations at all stages of development has lately grown more pronounced in the Maoists' foreign policy doctrine. To substantiate their claim to hegemony they do not scruple to use concepts such as Sinocentrism inherited from the Chinese feudal lords and the Chiang Kai-shek reaction, and also Great-Han prejudices. Chinese propaganda is revising world history, extolling China's role in every possible way. Accentuating China's exclusiveness, Jenmin Jihpao noted: "At a time when many peoples in the West, who in modern history became known as 'cultured nations', were still hunting wild beasts in the forests, our people already had a sophisticated ancient civilisation.''
Examples from China's past are used to foster in the Chinese people a scornful attitude to other peoples and countries. Chinese propaganda preaches that "in the epoch of feudalism the economy and culture of our state, whose backbone consisted of the Han nation, from the Chin and Han to the early period of the Ching dynasty (i.e., for almost 2,000 years---from the 2nd century B.C. to the 17th century A.D.) have always been in the forefront of the world''.^^*^^ In the nationalistic education of the Chinese people it is specially accentuated that the Han nation has been in existence for 4,000 years and is one of the most ancient in the world.
By freely interpreting history and juggling with facts, Maoist propaganda speaks of China's mission as ``protector'' of the states and peoples who were linked with China. In a research on the Emperor Kang-hsi, who is known for his conquests, it is stated that China's struggle against the West was of immense significance for countries neighbouring on China because the "blow struck at the first colonialists in China postponed their offensive on the neighbouring countries. The Asian countries situated far from China and having weak links with her became colonies of the West in the 16th and 17th centuries, while those situated near and having _-_-_
^^*^^ Minchiu Tuangchieh, No. 2, 1961.
217 close links with China (read: conquered by the Chinese emperors) became victims of aggression by Western capitalism only in the 19th century''.^^*^^A bridge is thus thrown to the thesis that the peoples of Asia and Africa must rely solely on China, that China is "the most loyal and most dependable friend" of the peoples of these two continents and the "chief obstacle to US aggression in Asia''. For the hegemonistic foreign policy aims of the Mao group this sort of pseudo-scientific research has created a "historical basis" for substantiating China's present ``liberative'' and "most progressive" mission. The Maoists have been, and still are, trying to prove that China is blazing the road to the future and that other nations must, therefore, follow China. "The Chinese," Jenmin Jihpao wrote, "are the most revolutionary and most progressive nation. The road traversed by the Chinese people is the road which they (the peoples of the world.---G.A.) aspire to take''.^^**^^
Territorial claims founded on the thesis of "detached territories" occupy a prominent place in the Mao group's chauvinistic plans. The fanning of passions and the creation of tension round territorial issues are part of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy. The Mao group is using the territorial question to aggravate relations between countries and stir up nationalistic feelings among the Chinese people. Peking propaganda and the Chinese leaders constantly remind the Chinese and other peoples of the Chinese frontiers that once ran across the territories of many neighbouring countries. At this point it would be appropriate to note that these ``reminders'' of China's present leaders are extremely reminiscent of the statements by the reactionaries of old China.
A textbook on modern history with a map of China of the period before the Opium Wars was published in China in 1954. The authors showed China as including Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and other territories. They called these lands "state territory of China" that were ``wrested'' from her.
At the time it seemed that the published maps were the result of some oversight. But developments demonstrated _-_-_
^^*^^ Lishih Yenchiu, No. 3, 1961.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, February 20, I960,
218 that the appearance of maps with "detached territories" was not accidental. In the early 1960s the Maoists began going to all lengths in extolling the Chinese emperors and their policy of aggrandizement. The historical journal Lishih Yenchiu paid a tribute to Genghis Khan for restoring "our multinational state to its size under the Han and Tang dynasties" and to the Emperor Kang-hsi for creating an empire with frontiers "up to the Pacific in the East, the South Sea Islands in the South, the spurs of the Himalayas in the West and Siberia in the North''.^^*^^A frankly expansionist programme with far-reaching claims was formulated by Mao Tse-tung in a talk with a group of Japanese experts who visited Peking in the summer of 1964. His statements on territorial issues showed that the ruling group in China regarded its claims as part of some "general territorial problem" and was seeking to turn its expansionist impulses into a general principle of its relations with neighbouring countries.
World-wide censure of this sort of claims made the Chinese leaders more cautious. However, their expansionist ambitions come to the surface from time to time. In November 1966 Tuan Lo-fu, Deputy Minister for Education, called on the hungweipings to remember Mao Tse-tung's injunction that "the Chinese people are morally prepared to fight, with their own forces, for the return of territories that once belonged to China''.^^**^^ It is hardly fortuitous that in the summer of 1967 the Maoists began to vent their spleen on the Asian countries which they had been listing for years among the "detached territories''.
In Asian countries progressive opinion had long ago discerned the bellicose chauvinistic nature of the ideological reasons behind the Maoist claims to foreign territory. "The Chinese leaders,'' wrote Dange, Chairman of the Communist Party of India, in 1962, "excessively worship past glory and national history and feverishly seek to restore the country's position historically and geographically as they see it despite the fact that feudal imperialism was its source and external form. Nonetheless, this induces them to ignore other aspects of modern socialist theory.''
_-_-_^^*^^ Lishih Yenchiu, No. 3, 1961; No. 3, 1962.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, November 5, 1966.
219 __ALPHA_LVL3__ HegemonismHegemonistic ambitions are the direct offshoot of the Mao group's extreme nationalism. Since the close of the 1950s Mao Tse-tung and his group have been trying to provide an ideological foundation for their foreign policy line, whose objective has been to secure China's recognition as the centre of world development. In pursuance of this objective they propound the theory that the centre of the world revolution has moved to China. The notorious "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is portrayed not only as the "combination of Marxism-Leninism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution" but also as a "brilliant combination of Marxism-Leninism with the specific practice of the world revolution'',^^*^^ and given out as the "most developed and living Marxism-Leninism'', as "the pinnacle of MarxismLeninism in the contemporary epoch''. Early in 1966 the Chinese leaders adopted a thesis about three historical epochs: the epoch of Marx and Engels as the stage of preparation for the proletarian revolution, the epoch of Lenin as the stage of the victory of the socialist revolution in one country and, lastly, the epoch of Mao Tse-tung as the stage of the "victory of the world revolution and the final eradication of capitalism and imperialism''.^^**^^
In the course of the "cultural revolution" the Mao group dropped its mask and completed its ideological substantiation of the claim to leadership of the revolutionary movement and of world development. The bid for hegemony became not only an ideological foundation of the Maoist foreign policy but a key component of the education of the Chinese people in a spirit of nationalism and chauvinism. The Chinese leaders asserted that the People's Republic of China had become and was recognised by the whole world as the "only centre'', "the mainstay" and ``bedrock'' of the revolutions of the peoples of the world. "China," Jenmin Jihpao wrote in mid-March 1967, "is the centre to which the revolutionary peoples of the whole world are turning with hope, and the powerful base of the world revolution.'' "Peking," Wenhsueh Chanpao declared on April 21, 1967, _-_-_
^^*^^ Jenmin Jihpao, October 1, 1965.
^^**^^ Jangcheng Wenpao, February 5, 1966.
220 ``is the centre of the world revolution, the headquarters from which Mao Tse-tung directs the Chinese and the world revolution.''Having proclaimed that "mankind has entered the new epoch of the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', the Chinese leaders now demand that the peoples of the world follow "only the road indicated by Mao Tse-tung, the road along which China is moving''. The Maoists have not gone very far from the former rulers of China, for instance, the Ming emperors, one of which, in an edict to the ruler of a neighbouring state in Southeast Asia, wrote: "I command that in choosing a Road you follow one that is similar to the Way of Heaven" (as the emperors called their policy).
Hegemonistic ideas and concepts, ``sanctified'' by the llth plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee, are being more and more energetically introduced by the Maoists in China's official foreign policy doctrine and practice. In 1967 Chinese foreign policy was openly set the task of "broadly establishing the absolute authority of the great commanderin-chief Chairman Mao Tse-tung and of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung in every possible way''. This is regarded as a task "of paramount importance on which depends the destiny of the people of China and the peoples of the whole world'', as a "supremely glorious and great task which the epoch and history have entrusted to us''.^^*^^ Anybody disagreeing with this is labelled a "mortal enemy" of China who "would be crushed by the advancing wheel of history''.
The actions of the Maoists on the international scene in 1967 plainly showed that their cardinal foreign policy objective was to spread the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" throughout the world. At a high cost to themselves many countries, including Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, India, Tunisia and Kenya, found what this meant in practice.
The national liberation movement is accorded a special place in the Mao group's tactics to give China an exclusive role in world development. The Maoists aspire to the leadership of that movement in order to have the possibility of acting on the international scene on its behalf and utilising it in their own interests.
The basic aim underlying China's foreign policy activity _-_-_
^^*^^ Jenmin Jihpao, November 3, 1967.
221 in Asia and Africa was stated by Mao Tse-tung as early as 1956. In a talk with a delegation of Italian Communists he declared that "it would he better for the Communist Parties of the old continent to leave the revolutionary movements of Asia and Africa alone, refrain from stating their opinion of them and let the Chinese work out ideology and the methods and aims of the political struggle for them''.In an effort to substantiate ideologically their hegemonistic designs relative to Asian, African and Latin American countries and gambling on the growth of national selfawareness in those continents, the Mao group has evolved and given currency to a thesis that Asia, Africa and Latin America are "the main zone of revolutionary storms'', that the national liberation movement plays the "decisive role" in the world revolutionary process. With the same aim in mind the Chinese leadership uses a geopolitical theory about the amorphous, extra-class "community of destinies and interests" between China and the Asian and African countries, about the division of the world into ``poor'' and ``rich'' nations opposing one another.
But the most striking expression of the Maoist GreatPower hegemonistic plans is, perhaps, the concept of "world village and world city'', which was most fully expounded in an article by Lin Piao entitled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" (September 1965). This ``theory'' declares that the course of modern history is determined by the uncompromising struggle between "world village" (Asian, African and Latin American countries) and the "world city'', which consists of the USA and other capitalist states and also the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries.
This sort of ``theory'' is a chauvinistic, Great-Power attempt to give weight to China and undermine or even destroy the forces, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leaders, stand in China's way on the world scene and prevent her from achieving the status of a power determining the course of world development. China has the largest territory and the largest population, and with her nuclear weapons^^*^^ she has become the strongest military power in _-_-_
^^*^^ Here an interesting point was raised by the journal Afrique nouvelle: "One can say with certainty that after the war in the Middle East the Chinese hydrogen bomb has been spearheaded at the countries of the neutralist camp.... Its purpose is to turn Africa and, if __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 223. 222 the "world village''. The task of vanquishing the "world city" can have only one meaning: the Asian, African and Latin American countries must first accept China's leadership, subordinate their policy to that of China and then start a struggle against all other countries (regardless of whether they are capitalist or socialist) in order to make China the ruling power in the world.
The "people's war" theory has also been evolved to mask the Great-Power ambitions of the Mao group. This ``theory'' is offered as a "magic remedy'', a "universal truth applicable anywhere and everywhere''. Peking's adventurist calls and actions against a number of African and Asian countries in the summer of 1967 demonstrated that the purpose behind this theory is, regardless of the genuine interests of the peoples, to instigate the overthrow of regimes that for some reason do not suit the Maoists.
There is another, sinister, aspect to the theory of "people's war''. It calls on the peoples of Asia and Africa to "smash United States imperialism" by a "people's war" in order to fetter US imperialism in flashpoints of tension as far away as possible from China's frontiers and thereby enable the Maoists to sit snug behind the "Chinese Wall" and without expending their own forces and means compel the USA, with the hands and blood of others, to regard China as an equal. Very indicative in this connection are the words of Chen Yi, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, who said: "The world needs not one but three or four Vietnams.'' If the Maoists' real attitude to the Vietnam issue, their "tacit agreement" with the USA on non-aggression and the words of Lin Piao that in a people's war it is necessary to rely exclusively on one's own strength are taken into account, it will become perfectly clear that the true purpose of Mao Tse-tung and his group is to make others take the chestnuts out of the fire for them.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Justification of ViolenceThe Maoists regard international tension as a propitious medium for the realisation of their hegemonistic plans disguised with slogans of "world revolution''. Having lost faith _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 222. possible, the entire neutralist camp, into a Chinese satellite. In the opinion of the Chinese, all the Third World countries must now take their cue from Peking, the 'strongest of the poor'.''
223 in the forces of socialism and in the possibility of defeating capitalism in economic competition, the Maoists now pin their hopes on artificially speeding up the world revolutionary process and abolishing imperialism by war regardless of the consequences. Hence the absolutisation of violence as the cardinal factor of all historical development. Lenin called this absurd and foolish, and "complete failure to understand the conditions under which a policy of violence can be successful''.^^*^^It should be borne in mind that the Maoists regard the policy of "balancing on the brink of war" as a favourable external condition for uniting the Chinese people on a nationalistic basis, diverting their attention from the acute problems facing the country and justifying their militarybureaucratic dictatorship.
The Maoists have worked hard to justify their concept that international tension and world war are necessary and desirable, a concept designed to give validity to their efforts to sustain and increase international tension and provoke a world war. They declare that far from being a hindrance, a world war would be a boon for the world revolution.
At the 1957 Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, as though developing his thesis of "settling the issue by war'', Mao Tse-tung suggested testing the strength of capitalism with nuclear weapons, arguing that a thermonuclear war was not so bad as it seemed because it would lead to the "total destruction of imperialism''. He developed his idea of international tension as a favourable factor and a component of general politics in the State Council in 1958 and in talks with foreign representatives, particularly with a delegation from the People's Vanguard Party of CostaRica in March 1959, to whom he bluntly declared that he personally "liked international tension''.
In their eagerness to fan and preserve tension in the world, the Maoists are sliding into a position where they in fact justify world imperialism's policy of aggression. Harbouring no illusions that this position would have any support they are camouflaging it with arguments that international tension and imperialist aggression help to awaken and revolutionise the masses. To this end they use a vast _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 60.
224 arsenal of means and methods, referring to past history and citing examples from recent years. At a press conference on September 29, 1965 Chen Yi spoke of US aggression in Korea and Vietnam as a ''test of strength" and declared that this "test of strength is greatly beneliting us, the peoples of the world" because, as Jenmin Jihpao explained later, the "peoples become steeled and the revolutionary struggle is developed" only as a result of imperialist aggression.Significantly, in recent years Chinese foreign policy has not been given the task of ensuring favourable external conditions lor socialist construction in China. This is fully explained by the nature of the Mao group's aims in establishing a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, which, among other things, requires a situation marked by war psychosis and the feeling that China was encircled by hostile countries. Even the "cultural revolution" is served up as "preparations for war''. "Another purpose of the great proletarian cultural revolution,'' Chou En-lai told Hisao Ishina on January 18, 1968, "is to prepare for war.''
The Chinese leaders justify violence in international affairs and world war by feigning ``concern'' for the world revolution. The army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao wrote that "big upheavals are a good thing because they are a sign that the revolution is on the upgrade''. To exclude any suspicion of ambiguity, it goes on to explain: "The First World War was a very great upheaval and it resulted in the emergence of the first socialist state. .. . The Second World War was also a very great upheaval, and it resulted in the emergence of a number of socialist states.'' The newspaper rounded this off with the statement that in our day "the revolution demands great upheavals so that in the course of these upheavals the people can move forward''.^^*^^ Although Chiehfangchun Pao did not venture to dot all its i's, it is quite obvious that historical parallels and analogies were needed in order to proclaim the desirability of another world war, to justify it as a means of achieving ``progress'' even at the cost of the destruction of half of mankind.
The Maoists' stand on the Vietnam issue shows how much hope they are pinning on an intensification of international _-_-_
^^*^^ Chichi ungchun Pao, March 29, 19t>6.
__PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__ 15--534 225 tension, on preventing any relaxation. An early cessation of the war in Vietnam evidently does not fit into their plans. They are insistently suggesting that the Vietnamese people fight a "protracted war''. On this point the Tunisian newspaper Action wrote: "Mao Tse-tung's speculations on the Vietnam conflict are quite obvious. In his eyes this war best of all illustrates his theory that a collision between the two blocs is inevitable. With the least expenditure by China the war sustains tension, which Mao Tse-tung regards as salutary for the success of his policies. The main thing for him is that it should continue.''Absolutisation of violence and orientation on sustained international tension predetermine the adventurist foreign policy tactics of the Chinese leaders. Many of their foreign policy acts in recent years are incompatible with socialist diplomacy and have infringed on the interests of other states and peoples. They have unceremoniously llouted and rejected the basic principle of international law, which demands respect for the sovereignty and independence of other peoples and non-interference in their internal affairs. They unscrupulously violate elementary norms of relations between states, arrogate the right to determine which governments are ``progressive'' or ``reactionary'' (the sole criterion being the attitude to the Mao group), openly call for a struggle against various regimes (including progressive ones), and make despicable attempts to alienate the socialist peoples from their governments and Communist Parties, which firmly adhere to Marxist-Leninist, internationalist positions.
The Chinese leadership moves from one adventure to another. One of these adventures is anti-Sovietism, which the Maoists have imposed on the CPC and China as a basic line in foreign policy. The Mao group's anti-Sovietism is a subject for special study, but here we shall examine only one of its aspects.
The Maoists regard the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle to their Great-Power ambitions and they disguise these ambitions mostly through anti-Sovietism. They claim they are motivated not by hegemonistic designs but by the desire to ``save'' the peoples from the "threat of revisionism'', from the "conspiracy of the Soviet revisionists with US imperialism''. The ideological spearhead of the Mao group's antiSovietism is the thesis of the "two-power supremacy" (USSR 226 and USA) and of none other than China heading the struggle against this ``tyranny''.
While doing everything to keep out of the real struggle with imperialism and evade a confrontation with the forces of imperialism, the Maoists are making every attempt to precipitate military situations outside China in order to draw the Soviet Union into a major war, bring about a military conllict between the USSR and the USA and take advantage of the resulting mutual annihilation to establish Chinese hegemony in the world. In their efforts to intensify international tension and start another world war the Chinese leaders even use the Soviet Union's readiness to help other peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle.
Exposing the real essence of the Maoist policy, the newspaper NuesLra Palabra, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Argentina, wrote: "Maoism represents total capitulation to the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. . . . Anti-Soviet chauvinism and the theory of violence, as a means of explaining the course of history, are founded on a policy designed to provoke a world war, which Maoism will watch from the sidelines and then take advantage of its results.''
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Petty-BourgeoisIn speaking of the social class nature of the Maoist concepts, which determine China's current foreign policy, it must be noted that they reflect the views and sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie, which, as Lenin said, easily goes over to unstable and fruitless revolutionism but is unable to show tenacity, organisation, discipline and staunchness. Lenin's words, "petty-bourgeois revolutionism---menacing, blustering and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in deeds'',^^*^^ apply fully to the stand adopted by the Mao group. The petty-bourgeois revolutionism of the Chinese leaders is closely linked with their bellicose nationalism, for the same socio-economic conditions that give rise to this sort of revolutionism allow nationalism to sink very deep roots.
An idealistic simplification of the difficulties of the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 21.
227 struggle typifies the Mao group's approach to international problems. The Chinese leaders are obviously unable to make an objective, scientific and sober analysis of the situation and ascertain what social forces can blaze the road to the future. Their blindness to reality leads them into subjective theories and to subjectivism in their assessment of developments.In qualifying subjectivism as a "crime against the working class'', Lenin particularly accentuated the following feature of the proponents of subjectivism: "At every step they try to pass off their desires, their `views', their appraisals of the situation and their `plans', as the will of the workers, the needs of the working-class movement.''^^*^^ These words aptly characterise the present Chinese leaders, who would have people believe that only their concepts and assessments of the international situation express the interests and will of all the revolutionary peoples in the world.
Inevitably, this gives birth to a set of preconceived notions about world development. The Chinese leaders not only try to persuade others, above all the Chinese people, that these notions are correct and infallible, but in many cases are themselves trapped by their own schemes. They would give anything to steer historical development into a course that would bear out the notorious "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. They base their calculations on the idealistic conviction that basic contemporary problems can be solved "by will'', regardless of objective laws. Voluntarism and the hypertrophied role of subjective factors lie at the root of the blind faith in the magic force of revolutionary slogans irrespective of the real state of affairs, of the belief in the miraculous power of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', and of the insistence that "only by conforming to the thought of Mao Tse-tung is it possible to triumph and secure the liberation of the peoples of the world''.
Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy concepts are permeated with pragmatism and unscrupulousness, and mirror the aspiration to make ideological principles serve political ambitions. When the Maoists had to justify their withdrawal from the socialist community and their policy of turning China into a force hostile to socialist countries they produced the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 382.
228 ``theory" that "capitalism was being restored" in the socialist countries, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat was degenerating into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie''. When in 1963--64 they went over to a policy of forming alliances with imperialist circles in capitalist countries they renovated their "intermediate zone" concept by dividing this zone into "two belts''. According to the new interpretation of this concept, it appears that the imperialist countries can wage an anti-imperialist struggle and therefore "have common interests with socialist states and with the peoples of all countries''.The practical foreign policy actions of the Maoists arcsharply at variance with their numerous anti-imperialist, arch-revolutionary statements. Peking's Leftist verbiage and recipes are designed to win cheap popularity and the ``glory'' of being the most consistent revolutionaries. While calling upon the peoples to abolish colonialism solely by armed force, the Chinese politicians prescribe a different position for themselves: they avoid any demonstrations of force and prefer "to settle peacefully, by negotiations" the question of colonial possessions (Hongkong and Macao) on Chinese territory. While constantly demanding of the peoples of Asia a ``determined'', "spear against spear" struggle with United States imperialism, Mao and his group have not the least intention to counter US aggression in Asia. This is what led Peking, in 1966, to a "tacit agreement" with Washington on non-aggression, implying that neither side would hinder the other in Southeast Asia. The Maoists' attitude to the Vietnam question is an example of their policy, which is pseudo-revolutionary in form and anti-popular in substance, and shows their utter cowardice in face of US imperialism.
fn the present world situation when the "utmost extension of the struggle against the policy and ideology of imperialism acquires particular importance'',^^*^^ when in its efforts to halt the wheel of history imperialism is using nationalistic and revisionist elements, the practice and concepts of the Maoists' foreign policy are especially damaging and dangerous. In effect, the Maoists are helping imperialist propaganda in its slander against socialism, in its attempts to portray socialism _-_-_
^^*^^ I,. I. Brezhnev, Fifly Years of Great Acliicvemcnls of Socialism, Moscow, 1967, p. 67.
229 as a social system oriented on war as a means of achieving its aims.Despite the screen of ``revolutionary'' verbiage, the Maoists have, through their foreign policy activity, laid bare the antipopular, anti-revolutionary and anti-scientific nature of their concepts, which fundamentally contradict the objective laws of world development. All the attempts of the Maoists to analyse the alignment of forces in the world and to work out strategy and tactics for the world revolutionary movement have proved to be untenable. Life has rejected their policies and ``theories''. The world's revolutionary forces, which are waging a struggle against imperialism, have displayed maturity and in Peking's foreign policy concepts and actions they have detected the egoism of the Chinese leaders, who set at nought the destiny of their own country, and their intention of sacrificing the interests of the Chinese and other peoples for the sake of their own mercenary aims. Peking's isolation in the socialist community, the growing distrust of the Afro-Asian countries for Chinese policy and the sharp decline of China's international prestige are the results of the Mao group's adventurist, Great-Power policy on the international scene, and this is a tragedy for the Chinese people. The failures of the Maoists evoke no surprise. The reasons for these failures lie not only in the viciousness and untenability of the concepts on which Maoist policy rests but also in the impressive successes of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the achievements of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other members of the socialist community which is winning increasing recognition among the peoples of the world. Whatever efforts the Maoists make, they cannot slow down, much less stop, the operation of the objective laws of social development. All the attempts of Mao and his supporters to implement their own ``thought'' only accelerate the exposure and bankruptcy of their anti-Marxist-Leninist, petty-bourgeois, adventurist policy with its Great-Power designs.
Mezhtliiiinroilnayri zhizn, No. 6. 19R8, pp. 60--72
230 __ALPHA_LVL2__ The NationalM. Kapitsa
The present-day national liberation movement is one of the three torrents of the world-wide revolutionary process alongside the world socialist system, whose peoples are engaged in the revolutionary work of building socialism and communism, and the working-class movement of the capitalist countries. The formation of the world socialist system, mainstay of the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the world, facilitated the downfall of the colonial system. Tens of countries have now achieved political independence and 1,500 million people have shed the chains of slavery. Currently, the principal objective of the national liberation movement is to secure economic independence and social progress. The economic and social changes taking place in the developing countries and the active struggle of the peoples of former colonies for peace and international co-operation are an important part of the world revolutionary process, whose vanguard consists of the socialist community and the organised working class.
In many of the developing countries Communists play an active part in the struggle for socialism. As Lenin saw it, the task of the Communist elements in oppressed countries "is to arouse the working masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organisation, regardless of the level they have reached; to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to join the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle''.^^*^^ He attached immense importance to close links between the national liberation movement and the world-wide struggle of the proletariat, which is "the only ally of the hundreds of millions of the working and exploited peoples of the East''.^^**^^
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 162.
^^**^^ Ibid.
231In recent years, however, the problem of relations between the three torrents of the world revolutionary movement has become the object of undisguised demagogy. Left-opportunist and chauvinist elements in China (the Mao group) are proclaiming that the epicentre of the world socialist revolution is now in the zone of the national liberation struggle and that the destiny of world socialism and the cause of revolution in the developed capitalist countries, therefore, depend on the outcome of that struggle. This is a patent distortion ol the Marxist-Leninist conception of world revolution. It ignores the historical role of the working class and is an attempt to destroy the cohesion of the world revolutionary process.
Life has demonstrated that equally harmful to the interests of the national liberation movement are the attempts to dismember the liberation movement into separate contingents and groups and close them up within their national boundaries under the pretext that national specifics must be respected, and the attempts to distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching, belittle the role of the revolutionary experience accumulated by the international working-class movement, absolutise and substantiate the ``universal'' character of the experience of one country and impose on the national liberation forces stereotype tactics evolved without consideration for specific conditions.
China's liberation was a heavy blow to the colonial system of imperialism and accelerated its downfall. The victory of the revolution in China was greeted by the peoples of Asia and Africa. Diplomatic relations with People's China were established by Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Ceylon and other countries. Friendly relations between China and the Afro-Asian countries were given a powerful boost when China and India proclaimed the famous five principles of peaceful coexistence and China took an active part in the Bandung Conference in 1955.
However, as the Chinese leaders slid further into GreatHan chauvinism and hegemonism and departed from Marxism-Leninism, their aspiration to influence and control the national liberation movement grew increasingly more pronounced.
232 __ALPHA_LVL3__ Adventurist SlogansIn order to achieve such influence and control Mao Tsetung and his minions are trying to isolate the new countries and counterpose the national liberation movement to the socialist community and the working class of the capitalist states. The Maoists believe that in this way it would be easier to gain the support of this movement and turn it into an instrument of their Great-Power policy.
The Peking ``theorists'' allege that the proletariat of the developed capitalist countries has lost its militancy and is no longer capable of independent revolutionary activity. The Maoists accord to the socialist system solely the role of a ``strongpoint'' supporting the national liberation movement and the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat. According to these views and concepts the world socialist system does not determine the course of world development and does not even play an independent role in the revolutionary struggle of the masses against imperialism. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung and his accomplices maintain that China is the only country capable of correctly understanding and scientifically interpreting Afro-Asian problems, that she is a consistent and true friend of the peoples of these continents. They bluntly declare that modern "China, guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung, is the centre of the great association of revolutionary peoples of the whole world''.
They are trying to prove that the ``thought'' of the "great helmsman" is the theoretical basis for the solution of the problems of social development throughout the world, above all in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This purpose is served by the aspiration to absolutise the specific experience of the Chinese revolution, of guerrilla warfare in particular, and to deduce from it "general laws" applicable by all countries and peoples irrespective of their own national and social experience.
Nobody will deny that the peasants played a colossal revolutionary role in the national liberation struggle and people's revolution in China. By applying Marxist-Leninist ideas to the specific conditions prevailing in China and __PRINTERS_P_233_COMMENT__ 18---534 233 relying on the experience of the working-class movement and proletarian cadres, the Communist Party of China successfully used the revolutionary potential of the millions of peasants in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. A large role was played in this struggle by the revolutionary strongpoints in rural areas. At the same time, the liberation of Northeastern China by the Soviet Army in co-operation with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army was of tremendous importance to the Chinese revolution. After organs of popular rule were set up in that area it became the principal strongpoint of the Chinese revolutionary forces and the source of their combat steeling and equipment. Building up adequate forces with Soviet assistance, the People's Liberation Army of China advanced southward and in two years liberated the whole country from the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
Mao Tse-tung drew a totally unfounded conclusion from this. His picture of the development of the world revolutionary movement was that an insurgent "world village" would surround the "world city" (in which category he classifies, among others, the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries), that peasant uprisings in Asian, African and Latin American countries would surround North America and Western Europe and in that way destroy world imperialism. Day after day the Chinese leaders maintain that in Asia and Africa the conditions have matured for revolution, that a people's war has to be started everywhere. It was along these lines that Chou En-lai spoke at Dar es Salaam in the summer of 1965 and Lin Piao wrote his treatise Long Live the Victory of the People's War! published in 1965. The Mao group indiscriminately demands a people's war in all countries, an armed struggle for the overthrow of the governments.
Thus, contrary to the Leninist teaching of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry on a global scale, the Maoists seek to drive a wedge between the town and countryside, between the working people of the East and the working class of the West, the peoples of the developing countries (the "poor South'') and the peoples of the industrially developed countries (the "rich North''). These tactics can only result in disunity among revolutionaries, and in the isolation of the national liberation movement from its 234 true allies---the world socialist system and the international working-class movement.
Marxists-Leninists support, as they have always done, armed uprisings and wars of liberation of oppressed peoples against colonialists and despotic regimes. But against whom must the peoples, say, of Egypt, Burma, Algeria, Syria, Guinea or Congo (Brazzaville) rise against? The governments of these countries have started radical social and economic reforms of a progressive nature and are taking steps to undermine and abolish the positions held by the imperialist powers, strengthen economic independence and raise the standard of living. The overthrow of these governments is sought by local reactionaries and the Western monopolies. That is with whom the Mao group is in fact closing ranks.
Peking's attempts to hasten revolutionary eruptions regardless of whether the masses are ready for a social revolution and its insistence on stereotype methods and forms of struggle that were successful in China but cannot be applied in other countries have in a number of cases resulted in catastrophic consequences. Such was the outcome of local armed actions and attempts to set up liberated areas in some Southeast Asian countries. Mao Tse-tung and his group bear much of the responsibility for the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party provoked by Right-wing reactionary forces.
During the "cultural revolution" the stream of ultrarevolutionary verbiage from Peking turned into torrents. Aiming to kindle Asian and African nationalism, Peking preaches the thesis that the "poor coloured peoples" have a common destiny, that the "white nations" cannot understand and have always been hostile to them, and propagates the idea of setting up an Afro-Asian commonwealth. At the same time, it doggedly seeks to inculcate the ``thought'' of the "great helmsman" and calls upon the peoples to take up arms and start an armed struggle.
In Burma the Maoist agents organised armed actions with the purpose of overthrowing the progressive government. In July 1967 Jenmin Jihpao called the peasant disturbances in the Naksalbari district, India, a "spark of the thought of Mao Tse-tung that flared up on Indian soil''. Addressing Chinese diplomats accredited to African countries, Mao __PRINTERS_P_235_COMMENT__ 16* 235 Tsetung's wife, Chiang Ching, set them the task of implanting a "warlike spirit" in the new African regional and national organisations and helping the numerous revolutionary organisations in Africa to set up a united front under the "great banner of the revolutionary thought of Mao Tsetung''.
Having seen through the aims and actions of the hungweipings and tsaofans in China, progressive social forces in Asian and African countries have emphatically rejected the attempts of the Chinese agents to form gangs of hungweipings in their countries and made it plain that they had no use for the ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung and would not accept the "great helmsman" as their leader.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ "Reliance on OwnHaving set their sights on erecting a Chinese Wall between the national liberation movement and the socialist community, the Peking leaders are trying to make the peoples fighting for independence renounce all-sided cooperation with socialist countries.
It is indisputable that the peoples building a new life must rely on their own strength and utilise the resources of their countries. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on mutual assistance by no means presupposes the cultivation of a spirit of dependence. But the Chinese leaders have advanced the concept of "reliance on own resources" for different reasons, one of which is to break up the alliance of the national liberation movement with the world socialist system. To this end they misrepresent the nature of Soviet assistance to the developing countries, belittle its importance and try to discredit its noble, internationalist character. Their calculation is simple: by slandering the Soviet Union and isolating the national liberation movement from the USSR they would have the opportunity of magnifying China's importance to the destinies of the developing countries and facilitating the attainment of Mao Tse-tung's hegemonistic ambitions.
But the peoples of the developing countries know the scale and disinterested nature of the assistance they receive from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They know 236 that Soviet credits to their countries exceed 4,000 million rubles, that in Asian and African countries the Soviet Union has helped or is helping to build 638 industrial and other projects, of which 260 have been placed in operation. They know that over 400 industrial and other projects have been built or are under construction with assistance from Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Moreover, the USSR and other fraternal countries are doing much to help a number of young states strengthen their defence capability.
In their turn, the developing countries are selling the Soviet Union and other socialist states traditional and "many other commodities and coming forward in a united front with socialism against imperialism and its policy of diktat and discrimination in international economic relations.
This co-operation constitutes not only direct but also tremendous indirect assistance to the liberated countries. It is giving them a strong hand in their relations with the imperialist powers. Having lost their monopoly of granting loans and credits, of the supply of equipment, and of technological knowhow, the imperialist powers can no longer implement a policy of economic or military-economic diktat relative to developing countries.
African and Asian statesmen and civic leaders have time and again underlined the friendly and disinterested nature of Soviet assistance and its efficacy in helping to consolidate the independence of their countries.
``In our relations with the Soviet Union,'' Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, noted in one of his speeches, "we have always highly prized the support given us by the Soviet Union in all our battles with imperialism.'' The newspaper La Depeche du Cambodge wrote on December 12, 1967 that the Soviet Government's statement of its position (in connection with fresh United States military provocations against Cambodia) represents a positive act to Cambodia, while in certain circles it has become a ``good'' tone to accuse Moscow of conspiring with the US imperialists. Had this been true, the newspaper stressed, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam would not have received modern weapons from the Soviet Union in quantities enabling it to equip entire regiments and thereby increase their fire power.
If one were to examine what Peking is doing for the 237 developing countries one will find that its total assistance to date amounts to less than 300 million rubles. With China's help only small industrial enterprises, and a few schools, bridges and roads have been built in Asian and African countries. But even this insignificant assistance is made dependent on the stand adopted by the recipient country, on its actions. For instance, in the summer of 1967 when the Burmese Government put an end to the excesses of the local hungweipings, China ceased her supplies of equipment to Burma and the Chinese experts working in that country did not report for work. All Chinese experts in Burma were recalled by Peking at the close of October 1967.
The newspaper Ngurumo (Tanzania) wrote on December 1, 1967: "China has not fulfilled her promise of granting Kenya three million dollars, and nothing is heard either of the 15 million dollar interest-free loan promised by the People's Republic of China. . . . The Chinese have slowed down credits on the grounds that Kenya has refused to allow the Chinese to pursue their activities in that country. .. . Instead of sending textbooks and technical literature, the Chinese persevered in circulating the works of Mao Tse-tung by mail.'' The Soviet Union, Al Akhbar of Lebanon emphasised, has been rendering and continues to render effective assistance to Egypt, Syria and other AfroAsian countries, helping them to promote their economy and increase their defence might. "China, on the other hand,'' the newspaper wrote, "confines herself to empty words and to hurling invectives at the imperialists.''
As the Chinese proverb says, a grain of dust will not sully the sea. This applies to the Chinese insinuations about Soviet assistance to the developing countries.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Attempts to SplitIn Peking they are going to all ends in their efforts to spread the idea that all the ``coloured'' and ``poor'' nations should unite against the ``white'' and ``rich'' nations, among whom they shamelessly bracket the USSR and other European socialist countries. In various Asian and African democratic organisations Chinese delegates have insisted that the Asian and African peoples should defend their special 238 interests, on the basis of which they must set up their exclusive associations.
At a preparatory meeting in Djakarta for the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference the Chinese delegation opposed the equal participation of representatives of Soviet Asian republics. The same political line was pursued by the Chinese leaders at other international conferences. For example, when representatives of 22 Asian and African countries met in Djakarta in April 1964 to discuss the question of convening the Second Afro-Asian Conference on the level of heads of state and government, some of the delegations proposed inviting the Soviet Union on the grounds that the USSR was the most consistent champion of the interests of the Afro-Asian peoples and its participation would lend the conference more weight. The delegate of India, Singh, said he felt that being an Asian power the Soviet Union had every right to attend the conference, especially as ever since the Bandung Conference it had steadfastly been on the side of the Afro-Asian peoples and had rendered them extensive assistance. The Chinese delegate, Chen Yi, however, opposed this motion, arguing that the Soviet Union was not an Asian power.
Chou En-lai and Chen Yi undertook two tours of Asian and African countries in an effort to prevent the USSR from being invited to the conference and to direct the preparations in such a way as to enable Peking to play first fiddle at the conference and gain recognition for China's hegemony. When in Peking they finally realised that the leaders of most of the Asian and African countries would not accept the Chinese view they wrecked the conference even before it could start, grossly insulting the heads of state and government of the Afro-Asian countries.
Finding they could not use the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the Mao group began to undermine this movement from within. This activity reached a high point at the Eighth Session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation Council.
In view of the provocative behaviour of the Chinese Maoists, many leaders and organisations in that movement spoke against the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference being held in Peking as had been decided at the Fourth Conference in Winneba, Ghana, in May 1965. In early February 1967 the Cairo newspaper Al Masaa reported that more than 239 twenty countries had notified the Secretary of the AfroAsian Solidarity Organisation that they would not attend the conference if it was held in Peking. But the Secretariat, as the Organisation's Rules demanded, did not examine this question, deferring it to the Nicosia session of the Organisation's Council that was held in February 1967.
Peking refused to attend the Nicosia session but sent its representatives in the guise of Hsinhua News Agency correspondents. At the press conferences they reeled off long monologues about the "struggle with modern revisionism" and the "attractive force of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" and tried to brainwash or even, as was reported in the press, bribe some of the delegates. They spread slanderous rumours, hindered the proceedings at the session and, in the end, the Cypriot delegate, who presided over the session, had no alternative but to request them to leave the hall.
After a series of setbacks in its efforts to undermine the Afro-Asian solidarity movement from within, Peking decided to oppose it with the aid of its puppets. It set up " international organisations" composed chiefly of dmigres residing in Peking and political allies of the Maoists in splinter groups in a number of countries.
The Maoists seized control of the Secretariat of the Association of Afro-Asian Journalists, in which practically no journalists remained. In 1966 the Mao group split the AfroAsian Writers' Organisation and set up the Standing Bureau of Afro-Asian Writers in Peking. Acting in opposition to the Nicosia decisions, the Maoists announced the establishment of a Chinese Preparatory Committee for the Fifth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Peking.
Peking thus came into direct conflict with most of the democratic organisations in Asian and African countries.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Revolutionism in Words,Mao Tse-tung and his group claim they are dependable allies of the national liberation movement. But these are empty words because when it comes to action, when something more than hollow declarations are wanted, they look the other way. On May 29, 1967 U.S. News & World Report wrote that ever since the war in Korea, China had been avoiding a major conflict with the United States despite its 240 loud but hollow threats. As soon as developments begin to head towards a direct clash, as has happened in the Taiwan Strait in 1958, th,e tactics of verbal threats take over. On October 18, 1967 New York Times quoted Professor Alexander Ecstein of the University of Michigan as saying that China was bellicose only on the political level.
Future historians will be at a loss to explain the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and his group to the US aggression in Vietnam, their rejection of collective action and their slander of Soviet assistance to that country. Essentially, the Maoists are acting much as some West European governments acted when in 1936--37 they obstructed assistance to the Spanish Republicans who were fighting fascism.
In Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings: 1953--1967, published in Chicago in 1967, Kenneth Young, who was United States Ambassador in Thailand and the American representative in SEATO, writes that despite the official line of hostility towards the USA and the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the PRC has in the past 14 years been trying to maintain permanent diplomatic contacts with the USA. Peking and Washington, Young notes, "have dealt with each other far more frequently and much more extensively than is generally known''. At the United States-Chinese talks in Warsaw the discussion of issues such as the crisis in Laos and in Vietnam, he says, allowed the governments of the USA and the PRC to ascertain their intentions towards each other and establish definite limits and avoid miscalculations.
Or take Peking's attitude to the conflict between India and Pakistan. Does it conform to the interests of the liberation movement? The military collision between these two countries absorbed material means needed for economic development and the resultant weakening of these countries benefited only the colonialists. It diverted world public opinion from the US aggression in Vietnam. What did Peking do in this situation? It engaged in stirring up trouble, and provoked frontier clashes in the Himalayas in an effort to kindle a big war in Southeast Asia. China was about the only country that gave a hostile reception to the Tashkent Declaration, which laid the foundation for settling the conflict between India and Pakistan.
Mao Tse-tung and his group gave another ugly display 241 during the Israeli aggression against Arab countries in June 1967. While the peoples of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were resisting the Israeli army, and the USSR and other peaceloving countries were making every effort to put an end to the aggression, Peking engaged in tub-thumping and tried to fan the military conflict although it was perfectly plain that any further protraction of the war could be used to stop the progressive development of Egypt, Syria and some other Arab countries. In a message to Cairo Chinese Premier Chou En-lai hysterically called for the continuation of the war. When the USSR organised the airlift of weapons and ammunition to the Arab countries and rendered every possible assistance in order to replace the losses and abolish the consequences of the Israeli aggression, and when a difficult political and diplomatic struggle was started to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied by them, Peking propaganda slandered, as it continues to do to this day, the Arab peoples and their true friends. Writing with indignation about the attempts of the Peking leaders to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship, the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar pointed out: "Chinese propaganda is trying to use the present tense situation caused in the Middle East by the Israeli aggression to slander the Soviet Union. <.. .> By its attempts to drive a wedge between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union, Peking is rendering a direct service to the imperialists, who are seeking to nullify the progressive gains of the peoples of the Arab East.''
It would be legitimate to ask why the Chinese leaders, who pose as champions of the liberation of nations, are doing nothing to settle the problem of British and Portuguese colonial rule in Hongkong and Macao, why they are reconciling themselves to the existence of these colonies on their territory and supplying them with food and water, and why they are not letting the Chinese residing in these territories take action for their reunion with their homeland? The explanation is that Hongkong is a broad channel for China's economic relations with the capitalist powers and that in recent years China's net convertible currency receipts from Hongkong and Macao exceeded, according to foreign sources, 1,000 million US dollars annually. For Peking dollars have proved to be more important than the task of abolishing imperialist colonies on Chinese soil.
242 __ALPHA_LVL3__ TraditionalismAn analysis of Maoist policy shows that it has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. It is determined by GreatPower ambitions and bears the imprint of the traditional outlook of old China's rulers on the world and on the place occupied by the Middle Kingdom in the world.
If we compare the foreign policy of imperial China with the foreign policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his minions, we shall find that the Mao group is continuing to gravitate towards the traditional line of the Chinese emperors, borrowing and developing the concept of hegemonism. Today, as in the days of the emperors, notions about a "special mission" of the Han nation and Peking underlie the hegemonistic ambitions. In former times wars of aggression, Great-Han chauvinism and Sinocentrism were the attributes of a foreign policy doctrine exalting the Middle Kingdom.
The ideology of militarism preached widely in China today has its roots in the ancient Chinese philosophical school of fachia. Like the philosophy of Shang Yang, who lived in the 4th century B.C., Mao Tse-tung preaches that war is inevitable and tries to prove this with the aid of traditional methods of Chinese sophistry: "We are for the abolition of wars, we do not need war, but war can be abolished only through war. If you want to get rid of rifles, you must use a rifle.'' Approximately similar arguments were offered by Shang Yang. He wrote: "If by war it is possible to destroy war, then even war is permissible; if by massacre it is possible to destroy massacre, then even massacre is permissible; if punishment may be destroyed by punishment then even stern punishment is permissible.''
At different times of the historical past the traditional concepts of the Chinese emperor's supreme power over neighbouring peoples were expounded by various means. In some cases the Chinese rulers subjugated neighbouring countries and even annihilated entire nations. In other cases they had to rest content with purely external manifestations of vassalage. As a result of wars lasting many years, the Chinese emperors developed a peculiar method of conquering neighbouring countries. Under the Han dynasty this was known as tsan shih, which meant gnawing at neighbouring countries in 243 the same way as the silkworm gnaws at a mulberry leaf. Also traditional was the method of setting nations against each other. Chinese diplomacy, particularly during the Middle Ages, very skilfully and not unsuccessfully employed the method of "suppressing barbarians with the aid of barbarians''.
Mao Tse-tung and his accomplices are taking practical steps to implement their predatory ambitions and establish Chinese supremacy in Southeast Asia. To this end they calculate on employing the tactics of "neither war nor peace'', intended ultimately to shatter these countries and place them under Chinese leadership. A border conflict, which grows acute from time to time, has been dragging on with India for ten years. Peking sends Delhi ultimatums and tries to interfere in India's internal affairs. Maoist agents are spinning webs of intrigue and conspiracies in Bhutan and Sikkim. Neither has the small Himalayan state of Nepal escaped flagrant interference from China. The Chinese embassy attempted to spread the ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung and distributed badges bearing his portrait. When this was condemned by Nepalese public opinion, the Chinese embassy abused and threatened the government of Nepal.
The Chinese notes to the government of Burma, which pursues a neutralist policy, are reminiscent of the language used by the Manchu hordes that overran Burma in 1765. Moreover, Peking instigates armed attacks against the Revolutionary Council of Burma and urges the northern tribes of Burma to start a separatist movement. The hungweipings have also intimidated Laos, claiming that Laos "is preparing to attack China" and threatening to ``punish'' it. In Southeast Asia public opinion has assessed these declarations as a primitive pretext for blackmailing Laos.
Imperialism and its agents are making use of _the Mao group's policy and actions, which contravene the principle of equality among nations and communist morals, to intimidate the peoples with the threat of Chinese aggression and form various blocs under the aegis of the United States.
The American press writes of the Peking leadership's policies with unconcealed delight, underscoring two circumstances which are favouring the designs of the United States. The first is China's weakening as a result of the convulsions of the "cultural revolution''. In the opinion of Professor 244 Fairbank, US State Department adviser on Chinese affairs, political unrest in a country like China provides first-class possibilities for the USA's "positive diplomacy'', in other words, for the realisation of US aggressive plans in Asia. The second is that Washington is using the activities of the Maoist agents in Southeast Asian countries and the Far East in an attempt to persuade the peoples of these areas that the United States ``umbrella'' is their only salvation from the "threats of Chinese communism''. These countries are thus offered the spurious alternative: either Maoist domination with the horrors of the "cultural revolution" or the formation of military blocs controlled by the United States.
By supplying Washington and its allies with arguments justifying Peking's aggressive Great-Power policy, the Maoists are stabbing the Vietnamese people in the back and objectively facilitating the escalation of US aggression in Southeast Asia and the Far East. The USA and its allies in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines are making haste to take advantage of the situation in order to set up a new military system for the suppression of liberation movements and draw non-aligned countries into militarypolitical blocs.
Nationalism and internationalism are antipodal. Internationalism is the ideology of the working class, while nationalism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie. Those who seek to set the embattled peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against the socialist countries and the international workingclass movement are betraying the ideals of internationalism and injuring both the national liberation revolutions and international socialism. They are bringing grist to the mill of neocolonialism, whose dream is to divide the peoples fighting imperialism, isolate the national liberation movement from the socialist countries and separate it from the working-class movement in the developed capitalist states.
Through their divisive activities the Maoists have won the favour of the imperialists. In an article entitled "The Road Back to Mainland China'', carried by the magazine New Republic on August 17, 1963, Professor Cyrus H. Peacke of the United States noted that the Chinese leaders "have turned, despite their militant ideology, to the `imperialists'''. On the basis of this argument he suggested that the USA reconsider the doctrine that the road to the USA's return to continental 245 China lies through war, declaring that this road lies through the utmost Western support for Chinese nationalism and anti-Sovietism. In other words, Peacke suggests turning China into an anti-Soviet force and thereby undermining the anti-imperialist front as a whole. At the close of April 1968, Bill D. Moyers, Special Assistant to former US President Lyndon B. Johnson, suggested abandoning ``rhetoric'' in the discussion of the China issue and adopting a "correct military attitude" to Peking which would give recognition to the possibility of reaching agreement with the Peking leaders. At about the same time US Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey urged the building of "peaceful bridges" between the USA and China.
The greater the cohesion of the revolutionary forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America acting in a united front with the socialist countries and the international working-class movement, and forming a world-wide revolutionary torrent, the greater will be the successes of the national liberation struggle against the remnants of colonialism and for the political and economic independence of the developing countries.
Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 7, 1968, pp. 12--22
[246] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END]REQUEST TO READERS ~
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