p Mao said the “cultural revolution" was “absolutely necessary and highly timely in consolidating the proletarian dictatorship, preventing the restoration of capitalism and building socialism”. In their efforts to prove that the “cultural revolution" was a “natural development" and “ accorded with Marxist doctrine" the Maoists cited the founders of Marxism-Leninism.

p In order to justify his assertions concerning the danger of a restoration of capitalism in full-scale socialist society, Mao referred to the following words of Lenin’s: “The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope turns into 196 attempts at restoration."  [196•1  Mao thinks these words of Lenin’s back up his idea that because the danger of restoration continues to exist right up to the construction of full-scale communist society the implication is that even in full-scale socialist society there must be a bitter class struggle. Mao ignores Lenin’s remark to the effect that socialism is in fact communism, but only its first, or lower, phase. Lenin regarded the transition to communism as transition to its first stage—socialism. Here is what Lenin said about this in his work The State and Revolution: “What is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the ‘first’, or lower, phase of communist society. Insofar as the means of production become common property, the word ‘communism’ is also applicable here, providing we do not forget that this is not complete communism."  [196•2 

p When Lenin said that the exploiters still have hopes of restoration he had in mind the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, in which the issue of “who beats whom" is decided. Mao tries to extend this period, and to include in it the whole of socialist society, when the issue of “who beats whom" has already been decided. The Chinese leaders have been driving home the idea that the restoration of capitalism in the socialist countries is inevitable. They have slanderously declared that this process is already taking place in the Soviet Union and in a number of other socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, they “ recommend" that the peoples of these countries, including the Soviet people, should stage “cultural revolutions" like the Chinese one.

p In China’s case the possibility of a capitalist restoration there cannot be denied because the country is still going through the transition period proper. To this very day, we find in Chinese society the national bourgeoisie and numerous remnants of old exploiting classes, who have visions of restoring the old social order. Nor can it be denied that their hopes of doing so have materially increased after socialist 197 ideas were discredited among some social sections of the Chinese people by the Maoist leadership’s subjectivist policies.

p The “great proletarian cultural revolution" in China is in no sense directed against the national bourgeoisie and the remnants of the other exploiting classes. None of those who have been “exposed” as being opponents of the “thought of Mao Tse-tung" were capitalists or received unearned incomes. The Chinese press has admitted as much. Hungchih said in No. 8 for 1966: “The great proletarian cultural revolution in our country is aimed against a handful of scoundrels who have used the signboard of communism to peddle their anti-communist wares. It is aimed against the handful of anti-Party, anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary bourgeois intellectuals.”

p The “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (adopted on August 8, 1966) said: “Because the cultural revolution is a revolution it inevitably meets with resistance. The source of this resistance lies mainly among those vested with power who have infiltrated into the Party and are going the capitalist way.” It added: “The present movement is centred on the struggle against those vested with power who are within the ranks of the Party and who are going the capitalist way."  [197•1 

p Who are these men who are “vested with power ... and are going the capitalist way"? It turns out that the advocates of the counter-revolutionary line and restoration of capitalism in China and of struggle against the Party and socialism are Party cadres. The result is a pretty weird picture: it is not the bourgeois elements, but Party cadres who have visions of restoring capitalism in China.

p Mao’s shameless speculation on the threat of a capitalist restoration in China and the demagogic nature of his assertions about a “life-and-death struggle between bourgeois restoration and proletarian counter-restoration"  [197•2  ultimately lays bare the true reasons behind the notorious “great proletarian cultural revolution”. We believe the reasons to be these.

p The Maoists’ adventurist experiments in stepping up China’s entry into communism by means of the “Three Red Banners" line proved to be a fiasco. These experiments inflicted great damage on the Chinese economy, and it is still trying to make good these losses. In industrial and agricultural production China remains essentially on the 1957-1959 level. A large part of the national income goes into military needs, above all the fabrication of nuclear weapons. Despite some stabilisation of the economic and political situation following the failure of the “Great Leap Forward”, Mao’s erroneous domestic and foreign policy line has, for all practical purposes, driven the country into a dead end. It was announced that 1966 marked the start of the third fiveyear period, but no target figures for the five-year plan have yet been published. It would be wrong to assume that the gross errors made by Mao and his followers, including the “Great Leap Forward”, have already become a part of history and have been forgotten by the Chinese people.

p Many Party functionaries and government officials knew who was really to blame for China’s plight. The Maoists could not be unaware of the fact that their domestic and foreign-policy failures had markedly undermined the influence of the “thought of Mao Tse-tung" at home and abroad. So, in order to retain power, Mao and his followers started the “cultural revolution”. Under the pretext of fighting the threat of a capitalist restoration they attacked the Party cadres and the patriotic elements who condemned Mao’s adventurist propositions in the sphere of economic policy and demanded a return to the socialist methods of economic development; those who demanded an end to Mao’s personality cult, which had frozen the life and creativity of the Party; those who insisted on restoring friendly relations and co-operation between China and the Soviet Union; those who urged the use of scientific, technical and cultural achievements in foreign countries; and those who demanded that the intelligentsia should be given more freedom of initiative and allowed to pursue its own creative quest. These demands by internationalist-minded Chinese Marxists, and other men who simply take the common-sense view of things are depicted by Chinese propaganda as an attempt to “restore capitalism”, and as amounting to a 199 “struggle against the Party and socialism" and a “ counterrevolutionary line”.

p These Maoists’ assertions amount to no more than a bogey used to intimidate and terrify the Chinese people, a trick used to justify the Maoists’ political reprisals and to discredit their opponents.  [199•1  Despite these zigzags in China’s political and economic life, brought about by the Maoists’ line, there are considerable numbers of people in China who support socialism. Quite naturally, in the absence of any information concerning the true causes of the difficulties now facing China and the men who were instrumental in producing them, the speculation over the “restoration of capitalism" slogan suits the book of Mao and his followers, because it allows them to retain some of their political and ideological influence.

p During the “cultural revolution" thousands of Party functionaries in charge of ideological and cultural matters, workers in culture, the sciences and the arts in all provinces and cities were removed from their posts and subjected to abuse, humiliation and political harassment. The most prominent leaders of the Communist Party of China fell victim to Mao’s ambitious and treacherous policy, among them Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Peng Chen, member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Lu Ting-yi, alternate member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and head of the CPC Central Committee’s propaganda department, Lo Juiching, Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, and many others.

p The pragmatic nature of the “restoration of capitalism" slogan, designed to meet the narrow group interests of the 200 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/CMTTC290/20070510/290.tx" Maoists, stands out quite clearly in an analysis of the charges brought against Liu Shao-chi. The report to the 9th Congress of the CPC calls Liu a “provocateur”, “a strikebreaker”, and a “running dog of imperialism”. He is alleged to have “concocted the political line of restoring capitalism" in China and of “transforming China into a colony of imperialism and revisionism”, working to condition public opinion for an “overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship”. The really surprising thing, however, is that the report contains no concrete facts to back up these charges. The report does not contain either an outline of Liu’s programme or information about his contacts with the bourgeoisie. Some of the facts concerning “Liu Shao-chi’s black line”, which the report gives, relate mainly to the period before 1949, and merely show that Liu did not share some of Mao’s tactical propositions. The point is that the Maoists were incapable of producing any facts to confirm the absurd assertion that Liu was seeking to restore capitalism, because no such facts are available. The fact is that, beginning from the mid1950s, Liu (like other sober-minded Party leaders) increasingly differed with Mao and his followers on the various aspects of the content and pace of China’s socio-political and economic development.

p Evidence of this comes from the “charges” levelled against Liu Shao-chi by the Hungweiping press. Liu was attacked with special ferocity for having urged in the 1950s that a study should be made of the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and for having “actively preached the idea of learning from the Soviet Union”, “campaigned for Sino-Soviet friendship" and “given a high assessment of Soviet assistance to China”. The Hungweiping press also accused Liu of having entertained the possibility of joining with the Soviet Union in fighting US imperialism.

p One Hungweiping handbill gave this assessment of Liu Shao-chi’s report at the 8th Congress of the CPC: “In his report at the 8th Congress of the CPC in 1956, under the pretext of opposing the personality cult, he came out against Chairman Mao Tse-tung and used the banner of fighting against dogmatism as a pretext for attacking Mao Tse-tung.” Another handbill accused Liu of “revising” the Party Rules, as adopted by the 7th Congress of the CPC. This “revision” amounted to the following. The Party Rules adopted at the 201 7th Congress of the CPC, said that the blend of MarxismLeninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution, as embodied in the “thought of Mao Tse-tung”, was the guiding light of all its work, while the Party Rules adopted by the 8th Congress of the CPC said that every Party member had the duty strenuously to study Marxism-Leninism, but said nothing about studying the “thought of Mao Tsetung”. The handbill asserted that Liu was “mainly responsible for modifying the Party Rules at the 8th Congress of the CPC”. Similar charges were levelled at Teng Hsiaoping, former General Secretary of the CPC.  [201•1 

The nature of the charges brought against Liu once again testifies to the fact that Mao has deliberately distorted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and the class struggle, that he has identified the clash of opinion within the Party and the class struggle, and that he has ranked all the Communists who disagree with his adventurist propositions among the class enemies and supporters of the “bourgeois headquarters”. That is why the report to the 9th Congress says the struggle between Mao and Liu is not an innerParty struggle over the ways of building socialism in China, but a class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The facts also show that Mao has suppressed many of his former associates precisely because they have come out against his pseudo-revolutionary conceptions and lines on classes and class relations.