p If the main class contradiction in China in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, according to Mao, continues to be the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, one would think that the revolutionary forces should concentrate their efforts on the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie. In practice this is far from being so. The Chinese press carries no reports about a class struggle against the bourgeois elements, no calls on the people to intensify the struggle against them, nor reports about subversive activity by the national bourgeoisie.

p In 1956, following the wholesale conversion of all private enterprises into state-private enterprises, the state assessed the share of private capital at these enterprises as being worth 2,200 million yuan. Every year the former owners of the enterprises converted into state-private enterprises are paid 5 per cent on their invested capital. This means they receive 110-120 million yuan a year. Initially, the payment of interest, started in 1956, was expected to go on until the end of the second five-year period, that is, up to 1962, by when the state should have paid out almost 35 per cent of 194 the value of the private capital, that is, 770 million yuan.  [194•1  However, the payment of interest has continued to this very day, and there is no indication when it will be stopped.

p Another important form in buying out private capital in China, apart from the fixed interest, is the very high salaries paid to working capitalists. Thus, average salaries to former capitalists working in foreign trade establishments in Shanghai came to 223 yuan, as compared with the average of 50-60 yuan for industrial wages. A capitalist who is director of the Shenhsin textile mill No. 9 in Shanghai was paid 400 yuan a month, while the director of the same factory representing the state was paid 160 yuan. Some Shanghai capitalists have salaries running to more than 1,000 yuan a month. If the buying out payments already received by the capitalists are added to the amount by which the capitalists’ salaries exceed those of government officials of equal rank (let us note that it is the high salary and not the fixed interest that is the capitalists’ chief source of income) the total may be safely regarded as fully covering the value of the means of production bought up from the Chinese bourgeoisie.

p Despite the fact that the buying out of the means of production from the bourgeoisie under the proletarian dictatorship does not amount to a transaction of sale (a fact the Chinese theorists did not deny in their articles either), the Chinese leadership, while claiming to be extra “ revolutionary" and urging a step-up of the class struggle, continue to pay the bourgeoisie “smart money" 20 years since the establishment of the people’s power.

p The following fact shows the Maoists’ attitude to the bourgeoisie.

p Liu Nieh-yi is a capitalist who lives in Shanghai. His father had owned many enterprises, which in 1956 were estimated to be worth 90 million yuan. Following the father’s death, the estate was shared out equally among his 10 sons. Liu Nieh-yi’s share came to a number of match factories. Every year, he receives from the state 5 per cent interest on his capital, which comes to 450,000 yuan. Liu is chairman of 195 the Shanghai industrialists’ and merchants’ federation, and as director of one of his former factories receives a monthly salary of 250 yuan. His nine brothers cannot complain either. They too receive 450,000 yuan a year each and a higherthan-average salary. One of them, for instance, is director of a cement plant and has a salary of 690 yuan.

p Liu Nieh-yi will tell you straight away that in China the “dictatorship of the proletariat is not aimed against the Chinese bourgeoisie”, and that he already regards himself as a common working cadre. Consequently, the loud talk about the class struggle and greater class vigilance has not prevented Mao and his entourage from forgetting it when dealing with the Chinese bourgeoisie.

At the 9th Congress of the CPC much was said about fighting the class enemies and purging the “class ranks”, but the question of the national bourgeoisie, the last exploiter class of Chinese society, was not even considered. Mao’s attitude to the national bourgeoisie can hardly be squared with the Maoists’ revolutionary catchwords and is in fact marked by compromise, Right-opportunist flirtation and concessions, an urge to neutralise it and even to win it over to the Maoists’ side in their fight against the Chinese people’s socialist gains. Consequently, their Leftist words go hand in hand with their Right-opportunist deeds.