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CHAPTER II.
THE REVISIONISTS AND
PLURALISM
 
1. Is It Necessary for Marxism to be Pluralistic?
 

p We have seen that true, creative Marxism-Leninism is alien to the idea of pluralism of any kind—either in the direction of a retreat from the monistic and materialistic interpretation of social development, or in the direction of recognizing the existence of many equally good theories concerning the development of society.

p It is logical in this connection to ask ourselves the question: what is the attitude of the representatives of revisionist deviations from Marxism-Leninism towards the bourgeois idea about its pluralization?

p In this connection the efforts of the Zagreb philosopher Predrag Vranicki, one of the editors of the revisionist philosophical magazine ‘Praxis’ should be pointed out first of all. Vranicki expounds his views on the question in his ‘theses’, published in the materials of the 14th International Congress on Philosophy, which was held in September 1968 in Vienna. The title of these ‘Theses’ is self-explanatory: ’On the necessity of different variants in Marxist philosophy’ (172, S. 139- 141).

p Let us note that in his book ’history of Marxism’ published in Zagreb in 1961, Vranicki was still championing an ‘integral’, i.e. monolithic Marxism. However, even then the idea of ‘variants’ was not alien to him. Thus, for instance, in the above-mentioned book he proclaimed Leninism as a variant of Marxism, which had not ’justified itself (52, c. 333). Starting out from such a false basis, he has come to the conclusion of the necessity of many variants.

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p In their form, Vranicki’s ‘theses’ strive to imitate K. Marx’s famous theses on Ludwig Feuerbach. In the first thesis, though in not a very clear form, Vranicki expresses a correct thought—that the level of philosophy depends upon the level of human and social practice.

p Correct conclusions could be drawn from this thought along two lines: first, that, in its development, philosophy may arrive at a scientific stage and become a consistent science only when social practice, or more precisely society itself, arrives at a certain stage of development. And, secondly, that while in society there exist classes with antagonistic interests, philosophy will of necessity have a class character.

p Vranicki, however, takes another road. After indicating in his second thesis that the many-sidedness of social practice gives rise to many-sidedness in the theoretical approach to this practice, Vranicki enters a field in which the unscientific character of his approach begins to manifest itself clearly. In his third thesis he explains that precisely for the reasons indicated in the first two theses—and to avoid misunderstandings adding in parentheses ’without taking into consideration other changing historical conditions such as class reasons’—’philosophy so far has had of necessity to be diverse’.

p It is here that clarity should be introduced: the many-sidedness of social practice calls for manysidedness in the theoretical approach, but not for manysidedness only. The many-sided approach K in the study of social practice is needed, because social life is a very complicated social field, in which an interwining of different laws takes place, for the study of which mankind has created different sciences: philosophy, sociology, political economy, etc. Hower, the manysided social phenomena of one and the same kind are studied by one science which brings these many-sided phenomena under the common denominators of the respective laws. Or, to put it in a more general way, every science analyzes and expresses one or another complex and many-sided field of objective reality, but 139 in every more or less delineated field of objective reality the respective science reveals its laws and on this basis strives and builds up an integrated scientific theory.

p The same is true of scientific Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, sociology, etc. Dialectical and historical materialism and MarxismLeninism as a whole is an integrated scientific theory, precisely because it reveals the general laws of complex and many-sided reality and, above all, of society and social practice. .And like the other sciences Marxism also develops and enriches itself, but this further development of Marxism-Leninism, as we have already pointed out, does not destroy, but consolidates its monolithic character.

p But can we explain the diversity in philosophy hitherto, i.e. the presence in it of many schools and trends, by the many-sidedness of social practice precisely outside the class structure, i.e. outside the contradictory interests of the different classes? In order to avoid being accused of one-sidedness let us once again underline that there are gnoseological reasons for the formation of the different trends in the historical development of philosophy. However, social and class considerations have been decisive and of paramount importance for the existence of the main trends and schools in the whole history of mankind up to now. In other words, Vranicki abandons the main, social and class aspect of the Marxist approach to social phenomena.

p The erroneous courseof Vranicki’s thoughts becomes clearer in the following thesis, where he tries to explain ‘pluralism’ in Marxist philosophy.

p Being the most sensitive social barometer, Marxist philosophy, according to Vranicki, needs to be first of all diverse and then it must change so as to react to the changes taking place in social life.

p As to changing, Marxist philosophy no doubt does not remain immutable, although this term in this instance is not sufficiently clearly defined, because there can be all manner of changes. The law-governed changes in 140 Marxist philosophy take the form of its further development and enrichment. The attempts at a revisionist distortion of Marxism also constitute a certain change, but, as we have seen, they go beyond the general quality of Marxism, and are essentially a manifestation of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois ideology.

p But how does Vranicki proceed further? He comes forward with the statement that ’man’s creative work never abides within a prescribed framework’. In this statement, however, the basic Marxist principle is neglected or at least bypassed in silence, that man’s creative activity is developed in the field, i.e. within the framework, of the possibilities created by the objective laws. That is why the quoted thesis opens up the way to subject!vist arbitrariness and voluntarism.

p However, Vranicki also puts forward another incorrect thesis—that it was wrong to consider Marxist philosophy as a theoretical basis of the political vanguard of the proletariat. At this point he definitely breaks with both the fundamental Marxist principle of the class and Party character of every philosophy, and in fact with the principle, initially proclaimed by himself, of the dialectical unity between theory and practice. This is’ because Marxism-Leninism, including its philosophical basis, is a theoretical expression first of all of the interests and struggles of the proletariat, headed by its political vanguard.

p Now we can more easily understand how Vranicki comes to the following wrong conclusions: that the approaches to historical problems and to human problems in general were so diverse that they allowed for most diverse conceptions in Marxist philosophy, including ’extreme differences’ between them; that ’the view of a single Marxist philosophy, or of a uniform structure of this philosophy had to be decisively rejected, and the necessity of different variants had to be admitted’.

p Vranicki does not make an attempt to elucidate the objective reasons (within the framework of the general phrase ’diversity of practice’) that make it necessary for Marxist philosophy not to be an integrated, 141 monolithic science. He does not go on to explain either what, more specifically, in his opinion, should be understood by ’different variants of Marxism’. Does he consider the historically formed and recognized revisionist deviations from Marxism as such ‘variants’? In fact Vranicki’s theorizings are an attempt to proclaim as necessary that which the bourgeois pluralizers accept as a fact, without trying to explain it theoretically.

p Leszek Kolakovski also tries to make a ‘contribution’ to the efforts of adducing arguments in support of the necessity of pluralizing Marxism. As starting point he chooses the erroneous and reactionary view of the predominant part of bourgeois philosophers and sociologists that in the field of the social sciences authentic, objective knowledge is impossible. Proceeding from this anti-scientific standpoint, the refers to the confidence of Marxists that objective knowledge can be obtained as ‘primitive’. As evidence he quotes the assertion that almost every generation reshuffles human history in its own way (132, p. 182). Hence, it follows that Marxism, too. cannot claim to be giving authentic knowledge.

p The assertion that every generation elaborates, i.e. makes its own contribution to, the study of the historical past contains a grain of truth. This is also true of Marxist, scientific historiography. The latter also continues to deepen our knowledge of the past. But with what science is this not the case? Which science has established ’truths of the last instance’, not needing any further development?

p That is why, due to the fact that our social knowledge is limited and incomplete, no relativistic and pluralistic inferences can in any event be made about social science, as Kolakovski does.

p Kolakovski also takes up alien, non-Marxist positions when he denies the necessity of ‘standards’, i.e. criteria for the purity of Marxist doctrine. This recreant from Marxism, without any doubt, is afraid of the criteria of its purity. However, there are such criteria and the chief one among them is social practice, and in this 142 instance the practice of the class struggle and socialist construction. Marxists-Leninists in general can make good use of this criterion. On the basis of it they are in a position to determine Kolakovski’s place in the ideological duel of the times: in the mire of revisionism.

As we can see, both Vranicki and Kolakovski strive to contribute, as best they can, to the justification of the bourgeois conception of pluralizing Marxism, the aim of which is diversionist.

* * *
 

Notes