p When Friedrich Engels wrote that the ’great fundamental question of every philosophy, and especially of more recent philosophy, is the question of the relation of thought to being’, Marxism made an epoch-making discovery in philosophy (6, c. 282). It was only on the basis of this discovery that the scientific classification of the various philosophical schools, trends and systems became possible.

p Proceeding precisely from the fundamental question of philosophy—the relations of matter to consciousness —Engels showed that materialism and idealism constitute the two main trends in philosophy (7, c. 281). The scientific, materialistic solution of this question consists, as V.I. Lenin wrote, in the recognition that ’the existence of matter does not depend upon perception. Matter is primary. Perception, thought and consciousness are higher products of matter organized in a specific way. Such are the views of materialists in general and of Marx and Engels in particular’. (13, c. 48). And since, as G.V. Plekhanov said, ’the most consistent and most profound thinkers have always tended towards monism, towards explaining phenomena with the aid of one basic principle (monos in Greek meaning one,) (67, c. 510)—and only matter 12 and spirit, consciousness and ideas can be such basic principles, the history of philosophical thought in its profound essence has been above all a history of the struggle between the two fundamental philosophical trends—materialism and idealism.

p The rise of dialectical and historical materialism meant the creation of a consistent scientific philosophy. Thereby, in the main, all former schools and trends in philosophy were theoretically refuted. Only Marxist philosophy was in fact capable of any real further development.

p However, the decline and decay of the already refuted bourgeois philosophy, which was playing a reactionary ideological role, does not take place quickly and automatically. Neither does it -mean that to this day there still do not exist certain relatively progressive spontaneous materialistic and spontaneous dialectical concepts, especially among philosophically thinking natural scientists in the West.

p In the historical development of human knowledge, the theories, ideas and views which are overthrown in principle by science do not disappear at once, automatically. Even when there are no social or class reasons for their maintenance, the ideas, theories and views rejected by theoretical thought put up a certain resistance. This resistance is put up in point of fact by the champions of these views and theories. Force of habit or inertia is the most active factor. The process itself of realizing the erroneousness of views shared in the past and the adoption of other views, different from the former, is very complicated. The situation becomes much more complicated when it is a question of ideas and views which directly or indirectly affect the interests of broad social strata, i.e. which have a social or class character.

p Dialectical materialism  [12•*  as a new philosophical teaching is an inseparable, very general world view 13 and methodological part of Marxism as a complex social theory illuminating all basic spheres of social life: economics, politics, morals, science and culture. Marxism as a consistently scientific and integrated theory of the development of society is at the same time a new ideology, the theoretical champion of the interests of the class which is most ruthlessly exploited, oppressed and deprived of rights in capitalist society— the proletariat; an ideology, which is called upon to be a theoretical weapon in the hands of this class in the struggle for the historically inevitable overthrow of capitalism and the setting up of a classless communist society. This indissoluble unity between the two sides of Marxism—it is at the same time both a science and an ideology—is scientifically explained, historically true, socially based and progressive. However, it is unacceptable to bourgeois ideologists, mainly because of their class bias.

p In our times there are plenty of social and class factors to nurture the non-scientific and theoretically outdated bourgeois philosophy, which is in basic outline idealistic and anti-dialectical. Interest in the preservation of the non-scientific trends in philosophy stems from the ruling classes in the capitalist countries, and above all from those in the imperialist states. Support for anti-scientific bourgeois philosophy also comes from the remnants of the exploiter classes in the socialist countries.

p Proceeding from what has been said thus far, we can draw the following conclusions. Dialectical and historical materialism is a philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat and of communist society in the process of construction.  [13•*  Idealism in all its varieties is today the philosophy of the bourgeoisie and moribund capitalism.

p The above law-governed social and class polarization of philosophy in modern society reflects the actual state of affairs in broadest outline only. Besides 14 the two basic and opposing monistic trends— materialism and idealism, there exist also intermediate, non-fundamental, less significant philosophical trends. Here we must first point out the views of philosophers trying to evade the question of the relation between matter and consciousness and most often taking up agnostic positions, i.e. who declare the nature of the world incognizable in principle. Akin to theirs in character is also the position of philosophers who consider the problem of whether the world is material or ideal in its essence as a ‘pseudo-problem’, i.e. as a problem to which it is impossible and unnecessary to give an answer. Such in general outline is the position of positivism.

p There are also philosophical teachings which proclaim monism in its two forms—materialism and idealism—as false and one-sided, and maintain the view that more than one essence or substance lies at the bottom of being. These philosophical teachings are called pluralistic (from the Latin piiis, pluris, meaning more.)

p In the past the most widespread form of philosophical pluralism was dualism, which proclaims matter and spirit as equally primary, mutually irreducible principles or substances. However, as Plekhanov very aptly pointed out, ’dualism has never been able to give a satisfactory answer to the inevitable question: in what way can the two separate substances which have nothing in common influence each other (67, c. 510).

p The development of scientific knowledge in our times, especially of neurophysiology, psychology and psychiatry, offers ample and convincing proof of the constant interaction between physiological processes in the organism and man’s spiritual life, or more precisely, of the material dependence of consciousness, as well as of the reverse effect of the psychic upon the vital functions of the organism. Under these circumstances, the positions of dualism become still more untenable. For this reason, among the philosophical 15 schools of our time, one increasingly rarely encounters supporters of dualism in.its pure form.

p In the history of philosophical thought one comes across attempts at setting up pluralistic philosophical teachings in the strict sense of the word, such as put more than two essences or substances at the basis of the creation of the world.

p Gradually, however, and mainly during the twentieth century, the term ‘pluralism’ has acquired a broader meaning in bourgeois literature, as well as in the socio-political sphere in general. Writers began to use the term ‘pluralism’ also for the presence of many theories, conceptions or ideological trends competing with one another, as well as for many classes, strata, groups and organizations with contradictory interests in bourgeois society. Thus, ’pluralism in philosophy’ in this broader sense has come to mean not only the-pluralistic trend, but also the existence of a great number of philosophical trends, movements and schools—the materialistic trend, the various idealistic trends, positivism and other forms of eclecticism, including pluralistic philosophical trends in the narrow sense of the word.

p It should be underlined straightway that not every diversity can be called pluralism. It is justifiable to define as pluralism in the broadest sense of the word those views of diversity in which the members or elements of a given plurality are examined as being essentially independent of each other, as being equal and not in a relation of subordination to each other, but as members’ between which there is above all contradiction and competition. Marxism-Leninism, for instance, recognizes both the diversity in bourgeois society and the class struggle in its various forms, but it proves that bourgeois society is not pluralistic, because the capitalist class is predominant in it.

In many instances, however, the term ‘pluralism’ is misused, being taken to designate variety in general. Thus, for instance V.Frank! writes that pluralism in the field of science consists in the fact that there exist many sciences, and not one single science (111, S. 374). 16 The existence of many sciences is not a pluralistic diversity, because the independence of the individual sciences is relative; among them there is a certain ‘hierarchy’ as well as reciprocal dependence and transitions from one science into another. In this case we cannot speak either of complete independence of the individual sciences, or of a competitive struggle and confrontation between them.