p In Marxist literature very little has been written on philosophical pluralism. Neither has any great attention been devoted in Marxist history to studies of the pluralistic trend or aspect in the works of a number of philosophers, including whole philosophical schools, such as pragmatism and personalism.

p A scientific, Marxist description of philosophical pluralism was given by the Soviet philosopher I.Narskiy in a special article published in Vol. 4 of ’Filosophskaya Entsiklopedia’ (Philosophical Encyclopedia): ’Pluralism is a view, according to which there are several or a multitude of substantial principles or kinds of being independent of each other. Pluralism is opposed to monism. In its nature it is an idealistic trend, which made its appearance in history as a modification of dualism, or as an attempt at an eclectic resolution of the contradictions of idealistic monism,’ (60, c. 278).

p The content of pluralism is revealed in a similar way also by Manfred Buhr (GDR): ’Designation of a kind of idealistic world views, which reject the unity of the world and instead of it proclaim diversity as a fundamental principle of reality. This diversity is conceived by pluralism as a multitude of independent essences or layers (components) of being, without, an inner link and not subordinated to any laws of mutual transformation’ (96,8.854).

p If we examine the above quotations, we might at first sight get the impression that there is some logical 17 contradiction in them. On the one hand, it is asserted that ’pluralism is counterposed to monism’, i.e. to materialism and to idealism (because materialism and idealism are monistic philosophies). On the other hand, in both articles the link’between pluralism and idealism is stressed, with the respective nuances, I.Narskiy declares that in its essence pluralism is an idealistic trend. And M. Buhr simply characterizes pluralism as ’a kind of idealistic world views’.

p In order to understand this apparent contradiction, one should take into consideration the following. There is no doubt that all adherents of pluralism reject monism, i.e. the view that there exists a uniform and single beginning or an original basis of the world. But subsequently there are substantial differences. Some pluralists think that their conception of a multitude of substances means a rejection at the same time of both materialism and idealism. But in the final count, they usually remain captured by idealism, or allowan eclectic combination of elements of idealism and materialism. Other adherents of pluralism think that the pluralistic: form offers them the possibility, while preserving the idealistic initial position, of overcoming certain fundamental difficulties of idealistic monism. They, therefore, openly preserve idealism, but reject its monistic form, the monistic interpretation of the diversity in the world.

p From what has been said so far it can be seen that pluralism is an unfundamental, intermediate and eclectic trend in philosophy, which rejects the monistic, mainly materialistic, and in certain cases also the idealistic solution of the first, ontological aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy—the question of which is primary, matter or consciousness.

p A pluralistic approach is also used by some bourgeois philosophers in the solution of the second, gnoseological side of the fundamental question of philosophy, the problem of knowledge of the world, of cognition. In this instance pluralism manifests itself mainly in the concept of the existence of ’many truths’ for one and the same question.

p An attempt at a systematic analysis of the content of the terms ‘monism’ and pluralism^^1^^ and at classifying the kinds of pluralism has been made by Marvin Farber. He rightly indicates that there are two basic kinds of monism, materialistic and idealistic (the writer calls the latter spiritualism—Author’s Note) (108, p. 149). Farber even manifests a certain inclination towards materialistic monism, admitting that ’physical reality’ is the basis of objective reality. But at once he hastens to point out that ’monism in this sense should be conceived as a programme, not claimed as a finished solution’. (108, p. 156). In most cases, however, we notice in Farber an inclination towards positivism and, on this basis, towards ‘moderate’ pluralism.

p Farber does not adopt the monistic approach mainly because he cannot understand the dialectics between possibility and reality, between the formal (for instance, mathematical and logical truth) and the real. This can be seen in his statement that ’It is the idea of formal possibility that separates the formal from the real and which prevents their reduction to a common basis’. (108, p. 164).

p Dialectical materialistic monism has correctly solved the problem of possibility and reality, as well as that of the formal truths of mathematics and logic and reality. The formal truths (mathematical, logical, etc.) are a manifestation of the universal. The universal (together with the particular, which is less universal) is a facet, an aspect of unique material objects, phenomena, processes. As V.I.Lenin pointed out, the common logical ‘figures’ are a reflection, an abstraction of the most general, common relations between things. (14, c.168). There is no general (and particular) without the unique, just as there is no unique without the particular and general. That is why, contrary to Farber’s assertion, ’the formal and the real’ have a common basis, which is matter, or material reality.

p Farber categorizes ontological (substantial) and logical (postulational) pluralism as major kinds of pluralism. Closely interwoven with them is causal pluralism.

p Ontological or substantial pluralism is that in connection with which we speak of more than one kind of substance. As an example Farber gives Descartes’ view on the differentiation between matter, mind and God as different kinds of substance. Causal pluralism on the other hand recognizes the ’existence of more than one causal system, unrelated to one another causally.’ (108, p. 165). If we proceed only from what has been said so far, we might think that Farber manifests no more than a certain inaccuracy in calling only substantial pluralism ontological, whereas in fact ’causal pluralism’ is a further variety of ontological pluralism, while in this instance it is a question mainly of different ‘structures’ or causal systems. The picture becomes more complex, however, when he examines the two basic kinds of pluralism: ontological and logical. He writes: ’A distinction should be drawn between ontological and logical pluralism, the latter meaning that there are distinct and irreducible systems of knowledge’ (108, p. 155). But by ’distinct systems of knowledge’ Farber understands the knowledge of qualitatively different fields of reality. Thus, he speaks of formal (mathematical and logical), physical, biological and social knowledge. Farber sees the difference between themin the ’diversity of types of organization’, i.e. on the different basic forms of the motion of matter (108, p. 155, 156). But then, what Farber calls ’logical’ pluralism affects not only the structure of knowledge but above all the structure of the cognitive, i.e. it is essentially identical with causal pluralism, which is in fact a form of ontological pluralism.

p Farber goes on to speak of a relative autonomy of the four fields indicated as separate ’causal systems’ which allegedly constitute the basis of ontological pluralism (108, p. 161, 162). But as a matter of fact, Farber finds it difficult to delimit the four basic causal systems as fields of reality: the formal, physical, biological and social, from their corresponding, as he says, logical systems or systems of knowledge. The confusion and difficulty in this instance are due to the fact that Farber rejects the theory of reflection. Thus for him at 20 one stage objective reality or ‘existence’ is the correlate of our knowledge (108, p. 161) and at another stage the different fields or aspects of reality (causal systems) and their reflection in the human head (logical systems) prove to be identical.

p In the field of knowledge, Farber also speaks of pluralism regarding the question of truth. ’Agnosticism, skepticism and pragmatic relativism have been pluralistic forms of denial of this view of truth’ (of objective knowledge—Author’s Note), Farber declares (108, p. 167). In fact it is here that he manifests pluralism with respect to the second, gnoseological side of the fundamental question of philosophy.

p In analyzing certain stages in Farber’s interesting, though internally contradictory attempt at systematizing the different kinds of pluralism, we have in part expounded our views on the question. There are two main kinds of pluralism: ontological and gnoseological, which are attempts at a non-monistic, i.e. pluralistic solution of the two main aspects of the fundamental question in philosophy. Ontological pluralism is an attempt at an ‘intermediate’ or ‘third’ solution to the question of which is primary: matter or consciousness; it is above all directed against the scientific, dialectical and materialistic solution to this question. Gnoseological pluralism, on the other hand, is one of the unscientific attempts to obtain a relativistic and subjectivistic answer to the problem of the cognizability of the world.

p Within the framework of ontological pluralism, we distinguish first of all two main varieties: atomistic pluralism and structural pluralism. Under atomistic pluralism we include all philosophical teachings’ which seek the ’ultimate basis’ of reality in certain very simple, indivisible, etc. elements, particles and units. For some pluralists it is the endless variety of things and phenomena that constitute the ’neutral substance’ and which in the process of practical and cognitive activity are differentiated as objective facts or subjective experiences (James), whereas for others they are monads (Leibniz), persons (personalism )or fact-atoms (Russell and Wittgenstein).

p Structural pluralism includes such philosophical teachings, which maintain the view that there exist several substances or independent foundations of being, which above all differ from each other in their structure. Among these are the different ‘strata’ of ’realities (realms) of being’ (N.Hartmann, G.Santayana) or separate ‘worlds’ (K.Popper).

p Within the system of gnoseological pluralism the pragmatic concept of ’many truths’ is of the greatest significance. This is in fact the main methodological basis of the different forms of ideological pluralism.

The rejection of the thesis of the objectivity of truth and the maintenance of the view that on every question, depending upon the interests of individual groups and persons, there may be a great multitude of‘truths’, serves precisely as a theoretical and methodological basis for recognizing the right of existence of a countless number of schools, trends and ‘isms’ in philosophy and in all other fields of ideology.