V.S.NERSESYANTS

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian by Vladimir Stankevich Designed by Yuri Samsonov

Contents

B. C. Hepcecjrai;

nOAHTHHECKHE yHEHHH flPEBHEft ITEIJHH

Ha amjuiucKOM

© Hs^aTeABCTBo «HayKa», 1979

English translation © Progress Publishers 1986

Introduction...............................

5

Chapter One THE EARLY PERIOD

(Ninth-Sixth Centuries B. C.)

1. Inception of Political Thought...................

7

2. Seven Sages .............................

17

3. Pythagoras a'nd the Pythagoreans.................

24

4. Heraclitus ..............................

39

Chapter Two

THE ZENITH

(Fifth-Early Fourth Centuries B. C.)

1. Democritus..............................

52

2. The Sophists.............................

68

3. Socrates................................

93

4. Plato .................................

110

5. Aristotle ...............................

146

Chapter Three

HELLENISTIC PERIOD (Late Fourth-Second Centuries B. C.)

1. Epicurus ...............................

176

2. The Stoics ..............................

183

3. Polybius ...............................

193

Conclusion................................

205

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Introduction

The Ancient Greek thinkers have played an outstanding part in the history of intellectual culture in general and political and legal thought in particular. They laid the foundation for a theoretical approach to nature and society and are justly credited with effecting a transition from the mythological world view based on a fantastic reflection of reality and oracular prophecy to the rational understanding and explanation of being.

Proceeding from the need to know rather than to believe, the Greek philosophers were the first to raise the most fundamental problems of the state, law and politics. The solutions they offered have foreshadowed in many respects the future development of political thought and their echoes have not yet completely died down in our times.

Speaking of the unique place occupied by Greek philosophy in the entire history of culture, Engels wrote: "If in regard to the Greeks metaphysics was right in particulars, in regard to metaphysics the Greeks were right in general. That is the first reason why we are compelled in philosophy as in so many other spheres to return again and again to the achievements of that small people whose universal talents and activity assured it a place in the history of human development that no other people can ever claim. The other reason, however, is that the manifold forms of Greek philosophy contain in embryo, in the nascent state, almost all later modes of outlook on the world." '

This high appraisal of the Ancient Greeks' philosophy covers also their achievements in political theory, the views of the state

~^^1^^ Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, 46.

and law which were closely connected with philosophical doctrines and shared their merits and demerits.

The purpose of this publication is to provide a descriptive analysis of the main ideas and doctrines of the leading representatives of Greek political thought throughout its history, from the first attempts at a rational explanation of political phenomena to the final stage of its decline and extinction. The problems arising in this analysis usually lie at the crossroads of such disciplines as the history of political and legal teachings, the history of philosophy, the philosophy of the state and law, etc., and are therefore notable for their complex character. This made it necessary to elucidate, within the framework of the so-called portraiture method traditionally used in the exposition of political teachings, a number of general methodological problems.

In writing this book the author tried to trace the links between different conceptions in the evolution of Greek political theory and did his best to show, if only in brief outline, their influence on the political thought of later epochs.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EARLY PERIOD

(Ninth-Sixth Centuries B. C.)

1. INCEPTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

At the early stage of history the world outlook of ancient peoples, the Greeks inclusive, was essentially mythological. Their political and legal views had not yet separated off from this single syncretic outlook and the order of things on the earth was regarded as an integral part of the cosmic order, divine in its origin and content. The earthly life of men, their social, political and legal institutions, relations with the gods and with one another were treated within the framework and on the basis of the mythological versions of the origin of the cosmos ( cosmology) and the gods (theogony). The mythological history of the world reflecting various cosmogonic and theogonic views was not a simple narration of the events that had occurred in the past, but an obligatory world outlook upheld by custom and tradition as one of the foundations of social life. Myth as a peculiar form of historical knowledge was at the same time a source of mandatory rules and standards of behaviour which were to be strictly observed at present and in the future. Myth served as a model of human relations sanctified by divine authority. In the period when the mythological views of the divine (cosmic, heavenly) origin of social institutions held undivided sway over men's minds, myth constituted the basis of a totalitarian ideology unopposed by any rival notions, conceptions or doctrines. The doubts that arose later as a result of long historical development and found their expression in the rationalisation of myth testified to the beginning of its disintegration and collapse.

Strictly speaking, political and legal theories emerge only at a comparatively advanced stage of early class societies and states. From the theoretical viewpoint, the rise of political teachings (political theory) is an expression of the general process of the

rationalisation of human knowledge and genesis of philosophy.

Developing within the framework of this process, legal and, political views take shape as but one of the aspects of the world outlook expressed in myth.^^1^^

Mythological consciousness is dominated by the idea of the divine, supra-human origin of the existing social order and power. To the Greek mind the cosmos, in contrast to chaos, was arranged by the gods and owed its orderliness to divine presence. This idea runs through all myths concerned with ethical, socio-political and legal problems of Ancient Greek society.

The existing social relations and institutions were sanctified by one or another myth which provided an explanation of their origin, justified their existence and served as an ideological basis for attempts to perpetuate the traditional social system. In short, in primitive societies myth performed the legislative function making and enforcing the norms of social conduct.^^2^^ At the stage of religio-mythological consciousness law had not yet turned into a body of legal norms of behaviour and existed as.one of the aspects of the private, social and public life that was in conformity with tradition and public sentiment. The laws of that time reflected mythological, religious, ethical and other views closely

knitted together and were generally traced to a divine primary source. They were ascribed either directly to the gods or to their deputies on the earth (legendary state founders and lawgivers or living rulers). Like the Hindus, Egyptians and Jews, the Ancient Greeks also believed in the divine origin of their laws.

Since legal order on the earth was conceived as an integral part of cosmic order, all thoughts of violations of traditional rules, rites and norms by individuals were believed to pose a serious threat to celestial and terrestrial harmony and to be fraught with cosmic catastrophies. This explains, for one, the meticulous ordering of people's conduct and the existence of various religious taboos that were to be observed on pain of severe punishments (both in this and in the other worlds). Since the existing orders and laws were regarded as divine and sacred, their violation was tantamount to challenging the gods.

The process of the rationalisation of politico-legal views that started in the first millennium B. C. was indicative of the departure from the primeval mythological world outlook and of the collapse of the priests' monopoly.

This rationalisation consisted in the secularisation of myth which gradually lost its aura of holiness and its interpretation stopped being the exclusive province of the priesthood. As a result, the broad public became increasingly involved in more or less free discussions of matters of the state and law. In the eighthsixth centuries B. C. the departure from the initial mythological views and the tendency towards a more rational outlook on the world in general and on the state and law in particular were in evidence everywhere, though the intensity of this process, its forms and consequences were different in different countries depending on their social and political conditions. This universal tendency was expressed in the teachings of Confucius, Mo-tzu, Lao-tzu and the legists in China, Buddha in India, Zarathustra in Persia, the sermons of Jewish prophets Jeremiah, Isaiah and others in Palestine, the oral and written works of epic poets, dramatists, sages, sophists and philosophers in Greece, and jurists in Rome.

The struggle of the gods for power over the world was one of the main themes of ancient theogonic and cosmogonic myths (in the interpretation of the orphics, Homer and Hesiod). The passing of the highest power from Uranus to Cronos and then to Zeus had been accompanied, according to myth, by radical

~^^1^^ The traditional heading "from myth to logos" in relevant literature epitomising the general progress of the rationalisation of man's world outlook can hardly be regarded as accurate, though it cannot be denied the advantages of demonstrativeness and clarity. First and foremost, myth and logos are not always comparable, since logos is a specific method of discourse and inquiry, whereas myth is a combination of both the method and the substance of narration (the plot of the story). The syncretic method of myth does not exclude logos and the view that myth is essentially illogical appears to be erratic. The essence of myth, its specificity should not be confused with the inadequacy of its method as such (e. g. lack of logic or some other defect), nor with the arbitrariness of its subject (that is why myth is not a fancy, but a legend); the distinguishing feature of myth is the obvious cognitive discrepancy between its form and content which inevitably leads to misunderstanding (in the literal sense of the word) characteristic of myth in general. The distortion of facts and the lack of their comprehension in myth result from the ignorance of the myth originator and his inability to explain the factual material he deals with.

~^^2^^ This socio-normative aspect of myth was the object of special attention of the English ethnographer and mythologist Bronislaw Malinowski (Myth in Primitive Psychology, London, 1926). According to him, myth played an important social function. It justified the existing social system, laws and moral values, expressed and codified, as it were, current beliefs, sanctified tradition, guided men in their practical activity and taught them the rules of behaviour.

changes in the principles and methods of governing the world. These changes affected not only relations between the gods themselves, but also their attitude to people and the whole organisation of terrestrial life. According to Greek theogony, it was only after supreme power was seized by the Olympian gods with Zeus at the head that justice and the rule of law was established on the earth (i. e. in polis life).

From the viewpoint of ethics, Zeus was considered the supreme guardian of universal justice (dike); its violation was not only an anti-social act, but, first and foremost, an offence of the gods bound to incur a divine punishment. This view is clearly expressed, for instance, in Homer.

As when, in autumn time, the dark-brown earth Is whelmed with water from the stormy clouds, When Jupiter pours down his heaviest rains, Offended at men's crimes who override The laws by violence, and drive justice forth From the tribunals, heedless of the gods And their displeasure...^^1^^

The notions dike (justice) and themis (custom, law justice)² used by Homer are very characteristic of the sense of right of Greek society in the Heroic Age (the late second and the early first millennium B. C.) commonly known as Homeric society or Homeric Greece. Describing this society with its system of government (the council - boule, the popular assembly -agora, and the military commander---basileus) father right and the inheritance of property by the children, Engels notes that in the Heroic Age the state was still non-existent: "Only one thing was missing: ...an institution that would perpetuate, not only the newly-rising class division of society, but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the non-possessing classes and the rule of the former over the latter.''^^3^^

In view of the absence of the state as a specific organisation of class domination, Homeric society, naturally enough, did not know law in the sense of the state legislation, but it knew law as custom and justice (themis), as well as the principle of social and legal justice (dike). Law and justice, though closely linked together in the consciousness of Homeric society, were not identical and differed from one another even terminologically. Justice (dike) was the foundation and principle of law as existing custom and tradition (themis), whereas custom or common law (themis) was understood as kind of materialisation of eternal justice (dike), as its presence, manifestation and observance in relations between people and the gods themselves.

As distinct from themis standing for custom or common law based on justice (dike), the honour due to every god or man by right and custom is called by Homer time. The meaning of this word is clearly revealed in Iliad in the passage where Poseidon claims his ``honour'' as the realm he received by lot:

We are three brothers,---Rhea brought us forth,---

The sons of Saturn,- Jupiter, and I,

And Pluto, regent of the realm below.

Three parts were 'made of all existing things,

And each of us received his heritage.

The lots were shaken; and to me it fell

To dwell forever in the hoary deep,

And Pluto took the gloomy realm of night,

And, lastly, Jupiter the ample heaven

And air and clouds. Yet doth the earth remain,

With high Olympus, common to us all.

(Iliad, p. 69 [Book XV, pp. 232-242].)

Each god or hero has his own honour (time) and, consequently, his rights. In point of fact, this is just what time means--- the right to be in charge of a certain field of activity and relations, to possess one's own domain. For instance, Ares is in charge of war and bloody battles, Aphrodite's domain is love, Athena Pallas is pre-eminent as a civic goddess wise in the protection of city-states (polises), etc. Heroes also have ``honours'' and the ``honour'' of Achilles as a goddess's son is higher than that of mortal Hector. Both the gods and the heroes fight for their ``honour''. This fight is no easy matter and calls for the

^lThe Iliad of Homer, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1870, pp. 110-111. (Book XVI, pp. 482-485).

~^^2^^ Themis was also the name of the Greek goddess of justice.

~^^3^^ Frederick Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State", in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 275.

utmost exertion of one's powers-in other words, for a feat of valour.

The legal significance of this fight for ``honour'' is obvious: in the Heroic Age described by Homer and notable for transition from primitive-communal society to the state organisation ``honour'' was nothing else but an individual's claim corresponding to his merits (feats) and founded on the right of the stronger.

This close interdependence of right and ``honour'' ' attests to the fact that the law of Homeric society was understood as a body of rights vested in an individual in accordance with the principle of justice (dike) and in compliance with the existing custom (themis). Since both the content and scope of rights depended on the bearer and therefore had a strictly individual character, rights were in fact nothing but privileges. That means that not only the idea of equal rights, but even the conception of law as an equalising principle and a standard were entirely alien to Homeric society. Moreover, the very purpose of law in that society was to consolidate and formalise inequality, though this inequality was understood to derive not from arbitrariness, but from justice (dike) and custom (themis).^^2^^

Consequently, the just (in accordance with dike and themis) was the foundation and the criterion of the lawful. The notion of law was inseparable from that of justice. It was only due to the legitimation of what fell within the notion of justice (dike) that one or another claim acquired a legal status and became a custom (themis), a generally recognised standard of conduct and relations among the members of a community.

Unequal, selective approach to different people in accordance with their relative merits and virtues was well exemplified by

Odysseus's attitude to his fellow countrymen: exhorting the ``good'' ones and appealing to their sense of honour and to common ideals, he resorted to threats and even man-handling in relation to the ``bad'' ones, e. g. Thersites:

But when he found one of the lower sort Shouting and brawling, with the royal wand He smote him, and reproved him sharply, thus: "Friend, take thy seat in quiet, and attend To what thy betters say; thou art not strong Nor valiant, and thou art of mean repute In combat and in council. We, the Greeks, Cannot be all supreme in power. The rule Of the many is not well. One must be chief In war, and one the king, to whom the son Of Saturn gives the sceptre, making him The lawgiver, that he may rule the rest. (Iliad, pp. 36-37 [Book II, 246-257].)

Homer's life fell on the eighth century B. C. and the events described in his poems took place as far back as the late thirteenth century B. C. (Troy fell in 1225 B. C.). As regards the cosmological and theogonical myths treated by Homer already in a clearly rationalistic and sometimes even skeptical vein, their origin dates to a much earlier period when the primitive mind took mythological stories at their face value and had no doubt about the authenticity of the events they described.

Further rationalisation of the primordial cosmogonies and theogonies is represented by Hesiod's Theogony (Origin of the Gods) and Works and Days (seventh century B. C.). In the context of the problems we are concerned with, special interest attaches to Hesiod's understanding of the mythological gods as the ethical and legal principles and forces.

The descent in the line of supreme deities (Chaos-Uranus - Cronos-Zeus and the Olympian gods, semigods and heroes) is conceived in the Theogony as a process of successive changes of ethical forces leading to the establishment of the moral and legal order in divine and human affairs. Very characteristic in this respect is Hesiod's view of the basic principles allegedly underlying the rule of Zeus and the Olympian gods. According to his theogony, the marriage of Zeus and Themis, one of his

~^^1^^ Significandy, dishonour automatically entailed the forfeiture of rights. A man deprived of ``honour'' became an alien without kith and kin in a given group or society (Iliad, IX, 646-648). Even much later, when written law was already in existence and the judicial proceedings were sufficiently elaborated, dishonour, for instance in Athens, was regarded as a severe punishment implying the offender's loss (complete or partial) of his rights.

~^^2^^ The concept of justice as inequality was characteristic of the ancient sense of right in general and figured prominently in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. The Stagirite even went so far as to distinguish between rectificatory and distributive justice: the latter, administered in accordance with deserts, merits, etc., is in fact nothing else than inequality.

numerous wives, resulted in the birth of two daughters, goddesses Dike (justice), and Eunomia (fairness). Hence, Zeus's coming to power ushered in the era of justice, legal order and social prosperity.

Very much like in Homer, justice (dike) in Hesiod is contrasted with coercion and violence. Dike and Eunomia, the daughters of Zeus, the embodiment of perfection and benevolence, and Themis, the embodiment of eternal, natural and divine order, represent two different aspects of law: Dike safeguards divine justice and punishes those who encroach upon it, whereas Eunomia signifies the divine nature of lawfulness in society and stands for the inseparable unity of the rule of law on the one hand, and social (state) order, on the other. Here we find in embryo the antithesis of two notions running through the entire history of the Greek philosophy of law: the notion of natural law or the law deriving from nature (physis) and the notion of artificial or positive law which is a product of convention (norms).

In his Works and Days Hesiod describes the history of human society as a succession of five ages: Golden, Silver, Copper, the age of semigods or heroes and, finally, the contemporary Iron Age. The people of the Golden Age (under Cronos) led a happy life without toil and worries. The people of the Silver Age who did not worship the gods were destroyed by Zeus. The bellicose people of the Copper Age destroyed themselves in internecine wars. The noble race of semigods---the heroes of the fourth epoch (the age of Heracles and the Trojan War) - perished in evil wars and bloody battles.

The life of people during the last, Iron Age is painted by Hesiod in dark colours. Lamenting over the back-breaking toil of his generation, the reign offeree and violence in human relations, the degradation of morals and the contempt of law and justice, he remarks:

And I wish that I were not any part

of the fifth generation

of men, but had died before it came,

or been born afterward.

For here now is the age of iron. Never by daytime

will there be an end to hard work and pain,

nor in the night

to weariness, when the gods will send anxieties

to trouble us...

...when the father no longer agrees with the children,

nor children with their father,

when guest is no longer at one with host,

nor companion to companion,

when your brother is no longer your friend,

as he was in the old days.

Men will deprive their parents of all rights,

as they grow old,

and people will mock them too,

babbling bitter words against them...

...Strong of hand, one man shall seek

the city of another.

There will be no favor for the man

who keeps his oath, for the righteous

and the good man, rather men shall give their praise

to violence

and the doer of evil. Right will be in the arm.

Shame will

not be. The vile man will crowd his better out,

and attack him

with twisted accusations and swear an oath

to his story---'

The poems of Homer and Hesiod had a powerful impact on the subsequent ethical and mythological notions of the Ancient Greeks.^^2^^ The "father of history" Herodotus (fifth century B. C.) wrote: "Whence the gods severally sprang, whether or no they had all existed from eternity, what forms they bore---these are questions of which the Greeks knew nothing until the other day, so to speak. For Homer and Hesiod were the first to compose Theogonies, and give the gods their epithets, to allot them their several offices and occupations and describe their forms; and

~^^1^^ Hesiod, The Works and Days, 174-193, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959, pp. 39-41.

~^^2^^ The ethical and legal views expressed in the poems of Homer and Hesiod were used by a number of ancient lawgivers. For instance, on the evidence of Plutarch, the legendary legislator of Sparta Lycurgus found in Homer's poems a wealth of material invaluable for education of a statesman.

they lived but four hundred years before my time, as I believe" (The History of Herodotus, II, 53). Herodotus also tells us that the knowledge about the gods came to Greece from the Pelasgi who, in turn, had got it from Egypt (The History of Herodotus, II, 52). The ethical rationalisation of myth, the ascription of human characteristics and weaknesses to the gods and the unmistakable anthropomorphic trend in Homer's and particularly Hesiod's poems aroused serious objections of a number of Ancient Greek philosophers in the later period. For instance, the reputed founder of the Eleatic school (called so after the city of Elaea in South Italy) Xenophanes (the sixth-fifth centuries B. C.) advanced a philosophical idea of One God comparable to mortals neither in form nor thought and criticised Homer and Hesiod for having "attributed to the gods all things that are a shame and disgrace among mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception". Xenophanes's idea of god, "ungenerated, eternal and like a ball" marked a further departure from the traditional mythological notions and another step towards the interpretation of the mythological pantheon in rationalistic terms. Homer's understanding of the mythological gods was also criticised by Plato. His contemporaries still held the poet in high esteem and regarded him as an educator of Hellas whose views ought to be known well and used as a guide in ordering human affairs and regulating one's life (Plato, Republic, X, 606c).' Sharing this opinion and acknowledging Homer's greatness, Plato nevertheless deemed it necessary to ban his poems in the ideal state: "For if you ... allow the honeyed Muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State" (Plato, Republic, X, 607). It should be noted, however, that for all its deference to the names of Homer and Hesiod Athenian democracy showed rather a guarded attitude to some of their statements considering them detrimental to the interests of the populace. Significantly, Socrates's accusers who had him brought to trial and condemned to death in 399 B. C. adduced the philosopher's habit of quoting "the worst passages from great writers, particularly Homer and Hesiod" as evidence of his hostility towards the

~^^1^^ Great Books of the Western World. Vol. 6, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 1952, p. 60.

common people (see Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, II, 56-58). Indeed, under the conditions of acute political struggle waged by the Athenian populace against the adherents of the aristocratic, oligarchic or tyrannical system of government a number of passages in Homer and Hesiod had acquired a clear anti-- democratic ring and evoked suspicion on the part of democratic leaders. The general trend towards rationalisation of morality, law and justice in human affairs characteristic of Homer's and Hesiod's poems gained even greater prominence in the activity of the Seven Sages.

2. SEVEN SAGES

Under this head ancient tradition usually included Thales, Pittacus, Periander, Bias of Priene, Solon, Cleobulus and Chilo the Lacedaemonian, whose life and activity fell on the late seventh-early sixth centuries B. C. However, historical sources are not unanimous regarding the names of the Seven. For instance, Plato in his Protagoras mentioned Myson the Chenian instead of Periander. The apophthegms (dicta) ascribed to these sages included various moral maxims and political precepts and represented folk wisdom notable for its rationalistic and secular character. Not infrequently, the authors of these apophthegms took an active part in politics and were rulers or legislators.

The inception of Greek natural philosophy is linked with the name of Thales of Miletus. He is known to have made extensive travels in the East and was believed to be initiated in the mysteries of the Babylonian, Egyptian, Phoenician and Persian magi and priests. Having but little faith in mythological stories and seeking to account for the universe in naturalistic terms, Thales advanced a materialistic idea of water as the primary cause of everything. The depth of his scientific knowledge was attested to by his accurate prediction of a full solar eclipse that occurred, according to modern data, on 25 May 585 B. C.

Though Thales came from a noble family, his socio-political views were moderate and he opposed the extremes of both wealth and poverty. This idea of moderateness, the golden mean in law, politics and property relations was also characteristic of the other sages whose lives were contemporaneous with the period of aggravating struggle of the broad masses against the old aristocracy on the one hand, and the rising class of the nouveaux

2-113

riches, on the other. From the viewpoint of politics, the exaltation of measure in the dicta of the Seven was directed towards achieving a compromise between different sections of the population and preserving the unity of the polis in the face of the intensifying class struggle. Thales is credited with this eloquent maxim of moral and righteous conduct: "Refrain from doing what you blame in others.''

As regards his actual participation in politics, we have the evidence of Herodotus to the effect that Thales urged the Ionian cities to form a confederation against the impending Persian invasion: "He councelled them to establish a single seat of government, and pointed out Teos as the fittest place for it, 'for that,' he said, 'was the centre of Ionia. Their other cities might still continue to enjoy their own laws, just as if they were independent states'." (The History of Herodotus, 1, 170).

Thales's advice, however, was not followed. After the Ionian polises had been subjugated by the Persians, a similar idea of alliance was put forward by Bias of Priene, also one of the ``Seven''. According to Herodotus, Bias exhorted the lonians "to join in one body, set sail for Sardinia, and there found a single Pan-Ionic city; so they would escape from slavery and rise to great fortune, being masters of the largest island in the world, exercising dominion even beyond its bounds; whereas if they stayed in Ionia, he saw no prospect of their ever recovering their lost freedom" (ibid.). Bias was reputed to have set the greatest store by the state where the citizens have as much fear of the law as they would have of the tyrant. Tradition also credits him with the opinion that death by the law is the worse.

Respect for the law is characteristic of other sages too. Assigned to Chilo, for instance, is the saying "Obey the law". In his opinion the best polis was the one where citizens obeyed the law more than they did the orators. Consonant with it is the apophthegm "Obey the law which you would make for yourself originated by Pittacus who was entrusted by the Mytilenaeans with dictatorial power for 10 years to protect them against the exiled nobles. According to another of his sayings, supreme power is vested in the laws. He is also said to be the author of the aphorism "Learn to obey before you command". On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, he made a law whereby for any offence committed in a state of intoxication the penalty should be doubled. Its very modern ring shows that the legal

consciousness of that period was anything but archaic.

No less concordant with our times appears to be Periander's concern with crime prevention. Diogenes Laertius assigns to him this precept: "Correct not only the offenders but also those who are on the point of offending." ' Preferring democracy to tyranny, Periander maintained, however, that a good democracy should approximate to aristocracy. He is also credited with the apophthegm "Use old laws, but young greens" which presumably not only extolled the stability of the laws, but also reflected veneration for tradition characteristic of the adherents of aristocratic government. Not a few of Periander's dicta were devoted to the ethical principles of human conduct and political relations within a city-state. This latter aspect gained special prominence in the activity of Socrates and his followers, particularly Plato.

The canon of the Seven Sages also included Solon (c. 638-559 B. C.), a famous Athenian statesman and law-maker. By the amount of property he owned, as well as by his occupation and way of life Solon belonged to the middle strata of Athenian society. On the evidence of some sources in his early life he was a trader, made extensive travels and acquired a wealth of knowledge, of the customs, laws and forms of government of other states. He was held in high esteem both by his fellow-- countrymen and outside Athens. According to Aristotle, he ranked among the foremost men of his time.^^2^^

Under the conditions of bitter political strife between the Athenian populace and nobility (the eupatrids], the rich and the poor, the debtors and the creditors, Solon was elected first archon (ruler or leader) with legislative powers and found himself in the position of an umpire trusted by both contending parties and having the task of their reconciliation. Having taken the matters in his hands, he passed new laws (594 B. C.) and introduced radical changes in the socio-political structure of the Athenian polis. According to Engels, Solon "started the series of so-called political revolutions by an encroachment on property... In Solon's revolution, creditors' property had to suffer for the bene-

~^^1^^ Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Heinemann London; Harward University Press, Cambridge, Mass., Vol. 1, MCMXXXVIII, p. 101.

~^^2^^ Aristotle: II, The Athenian Constitution, 53, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 9, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, p. 554.

fit of debtors' property. The debts were simply annulled".' Solon's first step was the so-called "disburdening ordinance" whereby he cancelled all private and state debts and released from slavery those who had been unable to pay them. He prohibited enslavement for debt in the future and banned personal security for loans. He also carried out an important constitutional reform breaking the eupatrid monopoly of the chief magistracies. For this purpose he divided the free population into the four classes on a basis of property qualification: pentacosiomedimnoi, hippeis (horse-men), zeugitae (probably hoplites or infantrymen) and thetes (day labourers). Responsible offices were open only to members of the first three classes. The thetes were not eligible for office, but they were assured memberships of the popular assembly and participation in law courts.

Solon instituted a council (boule) of 400 (100 from each of the four Athenian tribes) which partly sapped the authority of the Areopagus, heretofore the stronghold of aristocracy. However, even after the Solonian reforms the Areopagus retained a number of important prerogatives (exposition and guardianship of the law, prosecution for unconstitutional acts and homicide cases, etc.).

Solon is also known to have made a law "enacting that any one who, in a time of civil factions, did not take up arms with either party, should lose his rights as a citizen and cease to have any part in the state" (Aristotle: II, The Athenian Constitution, 8, 5, op. cit., p. 556). This law was evidently intended to stir the middle strata of the population to political activity and thus to weaken the influence of the extremist elements in both contending parties.

Solon attached great importance to the political and legal agility of the citizens. He held that the triumph of justice could not be assured if the wrong was left for the victim alone to fight against - the important thing was to enlist the support of those who were not directly affected by an act of injustice. It is for this reason that Solon's legislation provided in certain cases for the right of every citizen to sue the wrongdoer and plead in behalf of a wronged party. The idea of the citizens' universal participation in the struggle for the rule of law in a polis was central to the Solonian understanding of lawfulness.

~^^1^^ Frederick Engels, "The Origin of the Family...", op. cit., p. 280.

According to Solon, the rule of law was of utmost importance for the state's prosperity. Lawlessness and internecine strife were the greatest evils, and law and order, the greatest boon for a people. Characterising the state system established by Solon's legislation, Engels wrote: "Thus, an entirely new element was introduced into the constitution: private ownership. The rights and duties of the citizens were graduated according to the amount of land they owned; and as the propertied classes gained influence the old consanguine groups were driven into the background. The gentile constitution suffered another defeat."'

Solonian moderate democracy restricted by property qualifications was based on a compromise between the nobility and the demos, the rich and the poor. However, the lawgiver apparently failed to justify the hopes of both rival parties. The nobles were dissatisfied with his departure from the traditional order and cancellations of debts, whereas the populace resented Solon's concessions to the aristocrats and failure to level all men in property and rights. According to Aristotle, "Solon, however, had resisted both classes. He might have made himself a despot by attaching himself to whichever party he chose, but he preferred, though at the cost of incurring the enmity of both, to be the saviour of his country and the ideal lawgiver" (Aristotle: II, The Athenian Constitution, 112, op. cit., p. 557).

Solon, who was also an excellent poet, made no secret in his elegies of his unwillingness to gratify excessive claims of one rival party at the expense of the other. Speaking of his reconciliatory role, he likens himself to "a wolf turning at bay among the hounds" and notes with satisfaction that he "stood forth a landmark in the midst, and barred the foes from battle" (ibid., p. 558).

Elsewhere he describes his stand in the following words:

/ gave to the mass of the people such rank as befitted

their need,

I took not away their honour, and I granted naught to

their greed,

While those who were rich in power, who in wealth were

glorious and great,

I bethought me that naught should befall them unworthy

Engels, "The Origin of the Family...", op. cit., p. 281.

their splendour and state,

So I stood with my shield outstretched, and

both were safe in its sight,

And I would not that either should triumph, when the

triumph was not with right (ibid., p. 557).

Solon admits that he stood against tyranny and coercion on the one hand, and equality of the commoner and nobleman, on the other. Addressing the dissatisfied demos, he recalls that they owe their gains to him alone, and remonstrating with the aristocrats he reminds them of their sad plight in the face of the popular discontent that he managed to abate:

...had another held the goad as I,

One in whose heart was guile and greediness,

He had not kept the people back from strife (ibid., p. 557).

Many of Solon's poems that were preserved for us by Aristotle are keynoted for the feeling of satisfaction with his choice of the path of justice and with the successful accomplishment of the difficult task he was assigned. They sound both as an account of the work he has done and as a reply to his critics:

Of all the aims for which I summoned forth The people, was there one I compassed not? Thou, when slow time brings justice in its train,

0 mighty mother of the Olympian gods,

Dark Earth, thou best canst witness, from whose breast

1 swept the pillars broadcast planted there, And made thee free, who hadst been slave of

yore.

And many a man whom fraud or law had sold For from his god-built land, an outcast slave, I brought again to Athens; yea, and some, Exiles from home through debt's oppressive load, Speaking no more the, dear Athenian tongue, But wandering far and wide, I brought again; And those that here in vilest slavery Crouched 'neath a master's frown, I set them free. Thus might and right were yoked in harmony, Since by the force of law I won my ends

And kept my promise. Equal laws I gave

To evil and to good, with even hand

Drawing straight justice for the lot of each (ibid.,

pp. 557-558).

Solon's reforms and legislation gave rise to widely diverging interpretations. The Athenians started to ply him with questions regarding the true meaning of his laws which, according to Aristotle, "were not drawn up in simple and explicit terms" (ibid., p. 556). Anti-democratic elements believed that Solon had deliberately made the laws obscure in order that the final decision might be in the hands of the people whose influence in the courts was predominant. Aristotle rejected this idea explaining the indefiniteness of Solon's laws as follows: "It is impossible to attain ideal perfection when framing a law in general terms" (ibid.).

In the face of the sharpening controversy over the new laws Solon the legislator, unwilling to be involved in the interpretation of his own ordinances with respect to concrete cases and specific situations, made up his mind to leave Athens for ten years after having the citizens swear a solemn oath that they would observe his laws and not change them during that period. Solon believed that his presence at Athens and personal intervention in the interpretation and enforcement of the new laws would be detrimental to their stability and to the firmness of legal order.

Solon framed his laws for one hundred years, i. e. for all time. Despite the dissension among the Athenians after his departure, the limited democracy established by him lasted several decades.

In the sixties of the sixth century B. C., political power in Athens was usurped by Pisistratus' whose administration,

~^^1^^ Pisistratus was expelled from Athens twice, but each time came back to power. Of special interest are the circumstances of his first restoration as they throw a very clear light upon the character of the Athenians' social consciousness. According to Herodotus (History), the adherents of Pisistratus played a crude practical joke on the Athenians. They arrayed a tall beautiful matron as Athena the goddess and paraded her in a chariot along the city streets having announced beforehand that the protectress of the polis herself was to bring Pisistratus back from the exile. The Athenians took the farce at its face value and accepted the deposited tyrant. This story is illustrative of both the naive faith of the spectators and, in no lesser degree, of the craft of the conspirators who had gone so far in their unbelief as not to stop at fabricating gods.

according to Aristotle, "was temperate ... and more like constitutional government than a tyranny" (ibid., p. 559). The dictatorship lasted for nearly half a century and under his sons became harsh and cruel.

After the Pisistratides' tyranny was overthrown, the sociopolitical system of Athens was further reformed along democratic lines in 509 B. C. by Cleisthenes whose innovations were even more radical than Solon's. During the subsequent period of Greco-Persian wars power in Athens went into the hands of the aristocratic party for at least 17 years. Yet already in 462 B. C. the reforms of Ephialtes deprived the Areopagus of its most important functions and marked another big step towards strengthening the democratic regime.

The rule of the demos was further consolidated under Pericles, a famous statesman and an outstanding leader of the masses in the period between 450 and 429 B. C. It was only twice (in 411 and 404 B. C.) that the anti-democratic party succeeded in seizing power for a few months during the Peloponnesian War as a result of oligarchic coups. However, after temporary setbacks the Athenian demos successfully regained power. In his survey of the political changes in the Athenian polis Aristotle notes that democracy took its rise from Solon's reforms.

3. PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS

Pythagoras (c. 580-500 B. C.) was, according to Herodotus, one of the most outstanding Hellenic philosophers (The History of Herodotus, IV, 95). He was born on Samos, an Ionian island, in the family of a wealthy trader Mnesarchus. Tradition tells us of his travels in Egypt and Babylonia. After Polycrates the tyrant assumed power on Samos, Pythagoras left his native island for good and settled at Croton, the leading Greek colony with aristocratic government in South Italy. Owing to his reputation, Pythagoras soon attained a position of authority in the city and founded a school where he expounded his views to a select body of followers bound by stringent rules of discipline and loyalty to their master. The Pythagorean clandestine aristocratic societies or brotherhoods, partly religious and pardy political, sprang up first in Croton, then in many other cities in South Italy and other parts of Magna Graecia. Their members' interests focused not only on scientific, philosophical, religious and ethical pro-

blems, but also on political issues. At its initial stage Pythagoreanism was a secret esoteric lore which was revealed only to the initiated in a given society (heteria). Admission to heterias was open, after appropriate check-ups and tests, both to men and women. The Pythagoreans led an ascetic life and were notable for self-imposed restrictions and temperance in everything - food, clothing, behaviour, speech, emotions. Characteristic of the relations between the members of a Pythagorean community was strict discipline and loyalty to their brotherhood and to one another, as well as the spirit of mutual assistance, friendship and love. The authority of Pythagoras was absolute. He was considered the author of all the basic principles of Pythagoreanism as a doctrine, movement and organisation.

There are good reasons to believe that Pythagoras expounded his teaching by word of mouth and that all those initiated into the mysteries of the new lore were bound to keep allegiance to the oral traditions. The first Pythagorean credited, though on disputable grounds, with a written treatise On Nature was Philolaus of South Italy born in Tarentum or Croton some 25 years after Pythagoras's death. At the end of the sixth century B. C., an outburst of popular discontent swept off Pythagorean societies in the cities of South Italy and a number of their leading members were killed. Some of the survivors, among them Philolaus, Lysis and Archippus fled to other Greek polises which had already developed by that time a ramified network of Pythagorean communities. According to Porphyry, men like Lysis and Archippus of Tarentum who managed to escape, as well as those who were abroad at the time of the rebellion collected in note form what little they could of the philosophy of Pythagoras---"dim and obscure scraps". On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, "die book which passes as the work of Pythagoras is by Lysis of Tarentum, a Pythagorean, who fled to Thebes and taught Epaminondas" (Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Pythagoras, VIII, 7). Pythagoras was presumably the first to distinguish philosophy as love for wisdom from wisdom (sophia) as such and to call himself a philosopher but not a wise man, for, he said, no one is wise save god.

Central to Pythagoreanism was the number-doctrine according to which numbers constitute the cause and the principle of the universe. Referring to the Pythagorean teaching, Aristotle writes: "Contemporaneously with these thinkers, and even

before them, the so-called Pythagoreans, who were engaged in the study of mathematical objects, were the first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it, they regarded the principles of mathematical objects as the principles of all things. Since of mathematical objects numbers are by nature first, and (a) they seemed to observe in numbers, rather than in fire or earth or water, many likenesses to things, both existing and in generation (and so they regarded such and such an attribute of numbers as justice, such other as soul or intellect, another as opportunity, and similarly with almost all of the others), and (b) they also observed numerical attributes and ratios in die objects of harmonics; since, then, all other things appeared in their nature to be likenesses of numbers, and numbers to be first in the whole of nature, they came to the belief that the elements of numbers are the elements of all things and that the whole heaven is a harmony and a number." ^l

The Pythagorean conception of opposites is notable for elements of dialectics. Believing opposites to be the source of all being, the Pythagoreans put forward ten pairs (limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, right and left, male and female, at rest and moving, straight and crooked, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong) and held that their combination and unity account for the harmony of our world and the universe as a whole. Harmony, in their opinion, has a numerical nature and can be expressed in numerical or mathematical relationships. Expounding Pythagorean views, Philolaus wrote that the nature and power of number manifest themselves not only in demonic and divine things, but also in human affairs and relations, in all technical arts and in music. The nature of number and harmony are averse to falsehood which is their antithesis; conversely, truth is akin to number and linked to it from the very beginning.

As regards ethics, the Pythagoreans held that justice is expressed in number 4 as being the first square, that is the first number multiplied by itself, and the essence of justice is requital or reciprocity. Referring to such views, Aristotle wrote: " Pythagoras was the first to treat of virtue, but erroneously; in reducing the virtues to numbers he made his researches irrelevant to their

~^^1^^ Aristotle's Metaphysics, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1966, p. 20-21.

subject, for justice is not a square number "(Magna Moralia 1182

a 11).

Leaving aside the Pythagorean addiction to number-- symbolism and attempts to identify ethical and other relations with one or another number, one ought to admit that their definition of justice as requital of like for like was a philosophical abstraction of the ancient principle of retaliation ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"). Its distinguishing feature, besides the notably abstract character, consists in a particularised conception of justice understood as reciprocity ad hoc, for a given particular case, and not as equality in the sense of one and the same measure with respect to different phenomena and relations. In other words, equality for the Pythagoreans was a variable measure different in different situations, and not a single standard or model of behaviour. To be sure, the category of measure and commensurability (viewed, in its numerical form, as the essence of harmony and even justice) was of special importance for the genesis of the notion of abstract equality and, consequently, for the conception of law as the application of equal measure to relations of inequality. Indeed, the Pythagorean doctrine was an important advance on the views of the Seven Sages: the Pythagoreans not only conceived of justice as due measure, but focused on the moment of equality which was crucial for all subsequent evolution of ethical and legal notions.

The depth and novelty of the Pythagorean conception consisted in that they construed the familiar notion of due measure in terms of numerical proportion or equality. Their mathematical approach causing them to reduce all problems to equations proved instrumental in deepening the analysis of ethical questions; however, this method could not be carried too far-there was a limit beyond which lay the mysticism of numbers and downright absurdity.

According to the Pythagorean ethical theory, men in their diverse relations should proceed from different kinds of justice understood as reciprocity, its concrete form depending on the character of the relations. This principle accounts for the variation of the "due measure", the proper way of conduct which, in the Pythagoreans' view, may change within a broad range. A certain line of conduct may be appropriate in dealings with one

W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 302.

sort of people under one set of circumstances and quite unacceptable in dealings with another sort and under different circumstances. Much depends on the difference in age, social worth, kinship, merits and other distinctions among people. This "case approach" to the selection of proper measure in human relations was combined in Pythagorean ethics with a tendency towards classification of similar circumstantial patterns and modes of behaviour under typical conditions, i. e. with attempts to define standards of man's conduct in similar cases, as well as a certain principle of proper measure applicable to all spheres of relations among people. This proper measure presumably lends itself to quantitative analysis, the methods of which could be studied like a special art, yet, according to the Pythagoreans, its essence is elusive and it cannot be grasped by rational thought and become the object of science dealing with the general nature of things. However, the proper measure is always attended by what men call beauty and harmony. It is akin to the cause which is the soul of everything, be it science, experience, birth, or a house, a state, an army, etc., but is hard to perceive and comprehend...

As is evidenced from these statements, ethical studies extending also to politics and law brought the Pythagoreans to the problem of a general definition of justice which would apply not only to individual cases and specific fields, but cover all spheres of human relations. In search of such a general principle of justice they strove to give more meat to the abstract notion of justice understood broadly as requital of like for like (good for good and bad for bad) and focused their attention on the meaning and nature of "proper measure". Admitting the difficulties involved in the definition of "proper measure" in general and in particular cases, the Pythagoreans nevertheless pointed out some of its mathematico-aesthetic criteria (beauty, mensurability, harmony) and axiologico-hierarchical characteristics. In the eyes of the Pythagoreans, the proper measure was not the arithmetic mean, i. e. the commonnest and the most typical, but the most valuable. In other words, the measure as a yardstick represented the highest good in a hierarchy of values and, owing to its normative character, had a beneficial influence on the conduct of men. The Pythagoreans were very cautious in their approach to the definition of the cause or principle of "proper measure", since an error of judgement regarding the principle was likely, in

their opinion, to derail the whole science based upon it. Indeed, a wrong premise, they held, inevitably invalidates all the consequences. On the evidence of Aristoxenus, a peripatetic author of Pythagorean Declarations, central to the Pythagorean doctrine of the "proper measure" was the ethico-aesthetic principle of "true love for beauty". Characteristic of the Pythagoreans, as well as of the ancient mind as a whole, was a syncretic understanding of beauty as both ethical and aesthetical perfection, as the beautiful and the good moulded into one. However, the originality of Pythagoreanism lies in that it transcended this synthesis by bringing in the mathematical idea, scientific and mystical at the same time, of beauty as essentially divine numerical harmony. The love for such harmony was in the Pythagoreans' view the key to the radical restructuring of man's entire life, his personal, family and public relations in accordance with true principles. Calling himself philosopher, Pythagoras was in fact the first thinker to propose the reformation of society along the lines prompted by reason. In his person philosophy set up its first claim to the throne of wisdom rallying great minds under its banner and also making no less powerful enemies for many centuries to come.

Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans held that true love for beauty manifests itself in the way of life and devotion to science. Indeed, true love, particularly intellectual by nature, opens the way to high morals and virtuous life, whereas theoretical and practical studies concerned with harmony and perfection reveal hidden beauty in the structure of the universe. This true love for beauty was cultivated with special zeal in Pythagorean communities which devoted great attention to the purification and salvation of the soul and believed mathematical and musical studies to be the most instrumental in promoting the soul's

harmony.

Owing much of their philosophy to the Orphic religious tradition with its notions of the soul's immortality and transmigration after the death of the body, the Pythagoreans were engaged in secret rites (mysteries) whereby they sought to achieve purgation and assimilate to the divine. According to the OrphicoPythagorean beliefs, what men call life is in fact the death of the immortal soul which is condemned to the body as a tomb. By reason of its bodily contamination, the soul passes through an indefinite cycle of births assuming different forms in accordance

with its way of life on the earth. Man's aim in life therefore is redemption from the wheel of transmigration, that is from the body with its sensations and desires, by elevating the divine element of his soul and subduing the earthly so as to unite with the gods in the region of the blessed. This ethical doctrine prohibited suicide on the grounds that the soul is yoked to the body as a punishment and man is condemned to endure the trial by the will of the gods. Characterising the Orphico-Pythagorean views on the subject, Plato wrote: "There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away." ' For the Pythagoreans conformity with the divine was the ultimate purpose of man's life and the chief aim of all their prescriptions. Their whole life was ordered with a view to assimilating to god. Pythagoras taught that justice could best be ensured by the power of god and the idea of supreme deity as a guardian of mankind was the governing principle of his views of the state and law.

Next to the gods and demons in authority came the parents and the laws which were to be obeyed willingly and without any resentment. In the eyes of the Pythagoreans, obedience to the law ranked high in the scale of virtues and good laws were considered a great asset.^^2^^ Castigating the legislators' bias towards new-fangled ideas, the Pythagoreans demanded adherence to die traditional customs and laws, even if they were not perfect, maintaining, on the evidence of Jamblichus, that it did not befit a man to reject the existing laws in favour of dubious innovations (Jamblichus, V. P. 174).

The greatest evil for the Pythagoreans was anarchy ( lawlessness). Criticising it, they pointed out that man by nature cannot do without guidance and leadership. They described "man's

nature" as complex and unstable, dominated by different feelings, emotions, moods and passions, since man is endowed with both the senses and reason, the mortal body and the immortal soul. Owing to such a heterogeneous composition man cannot do without leadership which must mould his nature into due shape and bring order into his life. In support of their views the Pydiagoreans adduced the example of a wilful unruly beast that has to be subdued for its own good. However, their argument for die need of guidance and control of man's conduct was not confined to this rather crude analogy, and in order to substantiate their dieory the Pythagoreans underscored the specific character of rule in human society. In his discourse upon the rulers and their subjects, Pythagoras pointed out that the former must be not only competent, but also humane, and the latter not only docile, but also willing to accept the guidance of their superiors. According to the Pythagoreans, an important task of the rulers was to cater to the interests of all age groups of the country's population. In respect of the young it meant, first and foremost, proper education of children and youth in the spirit of the existing customs and laws with a view to making them good citizens. Old men were assigned the field of judicial activity, advisement and cogitation.

The Pythagoreans held that the purpose of education and management was to promote high standards in the conduct of personal and public affairs and to harmonise human relations, since order and symmetry are beautiful and useful whereas disorder and asymmetry are ugly and harmful. Man therefore must never be allowed to act on his own. Every citizen must obey his lawful and benevolent audiorities.

The Pythagoreans advocated the aristocratic form of government understood not as the rule of the old gentile nobility, but as the authority of the best, the few knowing and competent. Their aristocratic sympathies and mistrust of democracy sprang from intellectual contempt for the common people's judgement. The Pythagoreans held that it was unreasonable to heed the opinions of the mob as only few were endowed with the gift of clear thinking and a sense of harmony.

The Pythagoreans took an active part in the political life of city-states in Magna Graecia and their adherents ascended to power in many polises. After the democratic revolution of 510 B. C. at die neighbouring city of Sybaris, Croton's rival, Pytha-

~^^1^^ The Dialogues of Plato. Phaedo, 62b, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 412.

~^^2^^ This is vouched for as a strong Pythagorean conviction by numerous ancient sources. One of them is cited in Philosophy oj Right by Hegel who tells a story of a father inquiring of a Pythagorean about the best way to bring up his son in the spirit of morality and receiving advice to make him citizen of a state with good laws. Hegel cites this reply in support of his own view that an individual can gain his rights only if he is citizen of a good state. Hegel on the whole subscribed to the Pythagorean conception of education as an art of making men moral and preparing them for the acceptance of a political order governed by the law.

goras persuaded the Crotonian assembly to grant asylum to the Sybaritean refugees and in the war that followed Sybaris was destroyed. In c. 500 B. C., the demos rebelled at Croton itself and its influential Pythagorean society was smashed. Later, in the time of Philolaus (about 430 B. C.) the rebellion spread throughout the country and the leading members of the Pythagorean brotherhood perished. Only few managed to escape from Magna Graecia to other Greek polises. However, even in the fourth century B. C. the Pythagoreans still held important offices in Italian cities. For instance, Plato's close friend Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum was several times elected strategus (commander in chief with practically unlimited powers) and gained numerous victories over the enemies of his native city. Besides politics, Archytas made notable contributions to mathematics, mechanics, philosophy and, according to Diogenes Laertius, was generally admired for his excellence in all fields. On the same evidence it was none other than Archytas who warned Plato of the intention of Dionysius the Younger, the tyrant of Syracuse, to put him to death and in this way saved his friend's life.

In the work On Mathematics Archytas, treating of purely mathematical problems, expounds simultaneously the typically Pythagorean idea of numbers as the criterion and instrument for ordering human relations. In his opinion, the art of calculation is instrumental in ending strife and promoting concord among people; it has made it possible to prevent men from cheating one another and allowed equality "fc set in. Indeed, all deals are based on a count whereby the poor people get their due from the rich, and the rich reckon with the poor, both believing in the exchange of equal possessions. Again, count keeps the ill-- intentioned from deceit as they know well that their tricks can be easily exposed. The beneficial influence of calculation extends even to those who cannot count, as they are careful not to persist in their erroneous judgements so as not to descredit themselves.

Archytas is said to have spoken of law court with great reverence as the seat of justice. On the evidence of Aristotle, he equated the judge with the altar, since a wronged man turns for protection to both.

Timaeus of Locri (fifth century B. C.) was another Pythagorean who played a prominent part in the public affairs of Magna Graecia. A contemporary of Socrates, Anaxagoras and Philo-

laus, he was described by Plato in his dialogue Timaeus as one of those men who were equally capable of philosophical studies and statecraft owing to their natural intelligence and education.

The ethical and political conceptions and ideals of the Pythagoreans by far outlived their original societies violently trampled out all over Magna Graecia in the middle of the fifth century B. C. Pythagoreanism left an indelible mark on the history of ancient culture and many outstanding thinkers of later times, among them Socrates and Plato, were strongly influenced by its political and legal concepts, not to speak of the philosophical doctrines.^^1^^

Pythagorean influence is traceable in a number of Utopian projects of a perfect society and state system that made their appearance in the fifth century B. C. The authors of those projects were evidently inspired not only by the ideas of equality, justice and harmony expressed in philosophical and mathematical terms and conceived as the foundation of a perfect social order, but also by the practical example of the Pythagorean societies, their common meals, common studies and the remarkable spirit of friendship, collectivity and mutual assistance. The Pythagorean teaching of purification whereby society can be reformed and harmony substituted for dissension and anarchy had a unique emotional and intellectual appeal to numerous expounders of the ideal social order.

One of such ancient Utopias is ascribed to Phaleas of Chalcedon. According to Aristotle, Phaleas started from a conviction that the pivotal question of all revolutions was the regulation of property and accordingly proposed that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions in land. He thought that in a new colony the equalisation might be accomplished without difficulty, and in an old state it might be effected by the regulation of dowries: the rich might give dowries, but should not receive them, and the poor might receive dowries, but should not give them (Aristotle: II, Politics, II, 7, 1266a).

A different scheme for achieving social harmony was advanced (in the second half of the fifth century B. C.) by neoPythagorean Hippodamus of Miletus, a man of versatile knowledge and great abilities. He was an architect and achieved fame

~^^1^^ For more detail see Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1947, pp. 45-50.

as a town-planner. Ancient tradition credits him with the construction of the port town of Piraeus on the rectangular grid plan that was later adopted throughout the Greek world. On some evidence he also planned the city of Rhodes on the island of die same name and is said to have built a strategic road connecting Piraeus with Athens. It was in the sphere of architecture that Hippodamus gave substance to the Pythagorean notions of proportion, perfection and harmony. Aristotle described him as an eccentric and ambitious man who tried to pass himself off as an adept in the knowledge of nature.

Turning to social and political problems, Hippodamus, "the first person not a statesman" (Aristotle: II, Politics, II, 8, 1267b) hazarded a project of the. best form of government.' The ideal polity of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three classes---artisans, farmers, and soldiers. All magistrates were to be elected by the people, i. e. by the aforementioned three classes outside of which remained the slaves, the aliens and all those who were not ``citizens''. The main task of die magistrates was to watch over the interests of the state.

Hippodamus also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private. The revenue from the sacred land was to maintain the customary worship of the gods, the public land was to support the warriors, whereas the private land was to be the property of the husbandmen. Hippodamus also divided laws into three classes on die grounds that there are three subjects of lawsuits - insult, injury, and homicide.

More concrete were Hippodamus's plans regarding judiciary. He, for one, proposed setting up a single final court of appeal to examine all cases alleged to have been improperly decided by the courts of first instance. Such a court of appeal conceived as an elective body of old men had hidierto not been known in the Hellenic judicial system. Hippodamus furdier proposed to reform the court proceedings which, in his opinion, were deficient in that the existing rules committed the judges to perjury as they had to choose only between sustaining the charges in full

and passing a verdict of ``guilty'' or acquitting the defendant. In other words, the judges were deprived of any initiative and limited to the alternative offered by the parties even if the truth was known to lie half-way between or elsewhere. Hippodamus therefore proposed that court decisions ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that everyone should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal, but, if he partly aquitted and partly condemned he was to distinguish accordingly. As is evidenced from the above, the main idea of the reform proposed by Hippodamus in the sphere of the judicature boiled down to the enhancement of the court's role, extension of its prerogatives and strengdiening of its autonomy and indepen^ dence from the litigants' claims. Hippodamus also deemed it necessary to adopt a special law for honouring those who discovered anything for the good of the state.

The ethical and political views of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans have been a matter of much dispute which mainly results from different understanding of the substance and character of what is generally described as Pythagorean aristocratism. Indeed, the historians are apparently unanimous in defining the Pythagorean social teaching as aristocratic, but differ in whether it should be regarded as expressing the ideology of old hereditary aristocracy nostalgic for its former sway, or as eulogising the new "aristocracy of spirit" and advocating the rule of the moral and intellectual elite. According to the French historian of philosophy Frangois Laurent, Pythagoras did lean towards aristocratic rule, but then this attitude could be an imputation on all antiquity. The ancients, in Laurent's opinion, did not know true equality, they practiced it only within a certain caste. The philosophers yielding to this universal trend constructed their perfect polity along the same lines. Like Plato, Pythagoras may have been inspired by the Doric political organisation which realised equality, unity and solidarity at least in the metropolis (Sparta). Yet aristocracy as understood by Pythagoras was far more superior to the existing aristocratic system of government which was merely formalised by the Lacedaemonian legislation. Sparta was founded on coercion and only held out by a most outrageous abuse of force. By contrast, the Pythagorean community did not come about by way of conquest, its soul, according to Laurent, was brotherhood and love.

~^^1^^ This genre of politico-legal literature later gained wide currency and was popular both in the classical period of Greek thought (cf. Plato's projects of the ideal state) and in the Hellenistic epoch (e. g. the perfect social systems without slavery and private property in Euhemerus's Sacred History and in Jambul's City of the Sun dating to the third century B. C.).

In this explicit account of Pythagorean aristocratism the author rightfully underscores the limited character of the ancient notion of equality and aptly points out the difference between the Pythagorean and Spartan elitist approach, yet his interpretation of the aristocratic tendency of Pythagoreanism as a mere expression of the ancients' peculiar understanding of equality in the teeth of the Pythagorean patent hostility towards democracy can hardly be accepted as tenable. Nor should one ignore the fact that the Pythagoreans themselves, for all the ostensible difference of their ethical and political views from the Spartan-Cretan ideology and political practices, particularly over the problem of violence, were by no means advocates of non-resistance to evil. The Croton-Sybaris conflict of 510 B. C. and other similar events provide convincing evidence for their readiness to resort to force wherever they deemed it necessary for establishing the politico-legal order they approved. Theoretically, too, their understanding of justice as requital of like for like implied reciprocity and, consequently, justified the use of force in principle. Besides, one ought not to identify the theoretical principles of Pythagorean ethics and the principles underlying the relations of the members of the Pythagorean brotherhood itself with the political practices they introduced and defended. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans are known to have been strongly biased towards the aristocratic state systems of such Doric polises as Crete and Sparta, yet they advocated the rule of new enlightened aristocracy very different from the old hereditary nobility. Hence their exaltation of knowledge and "those who know", their conception of justice as equality (which was completely unacceptable to old gentile aristocracy), their laudation of the rule of law and justice.' In the light of the above the contention of Karl Hildenbrand, a German historian of the philosophy of right, that the purpose of the Pythagorean alliance, this "aristocracy of spirit" was to enhance the influence of the "aristocracy of blood"^^2^^ can hardly be regarded as tenable.

The aristocratism of the Pythagoreans seems to be reformative and renovating rather than conservative. Leading in contemporary science and philosophy, the Pythagoreans championed

~^^1^^ Barker, op. cit., pp. 46-49.

^^2^^ Karl Hildenbrand, Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Utaatsphilosophie, Leipzig, Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1860, S. 52-53.

scientific progress, stood for die development of production, trade and monetary relations, and rejected old aristocratic narrow-mindedness and stagnation.

The Pythagorean moderate philosophical doctrine of the harmony of opposites does not automatically lead to an ideology of political conservatism, nor the Heraclitean radical dialectical doctrine of the struggle of opposites to a progressive social stand (though Heraclitus's political convictions were indeed different from the ideals of old aristocracy). The antithesis of the philosophical doctrines of the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus (conciliation of opposites as against their struggle) need not necessarily imply a similar antithesis of their socio-political platforms. On the contrary, for all the distinctions between the philosophical conceptions of the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus, they both espoused the side of genuine aristocracy, the aristocracy of knowledge. The difference between them surfaced in the answer to the question: What is true knowledge?

Unlike the Pythagoreans who were actively engaged in public affairs, Heraclitus shunned all political activity as something below his dignity (according to one of the apocryphal anecdotes, he was found playing dice with the children and when asked why replied to the citizens: "Why are you surprised, you goodfor-nothings? Isn't this better than playing politics with you?"--- Diogenes Laertius. IX, 3). The Pythagoreans showed far greater interest in the problems of society and the state than Heraclitus. For one thing, the very formation of societies playing an active part in the political life of Greek cities provides conclusive evidence for the greater social vigour of the Pythagoreans. Their spirit of collectivism, even inspired as it was by aristocratic ideals, was alien to the individualist-minded Ephesian aristocrat who held the majority of mankind in great contempt and viewed any collective as a hateful unreasonable mob. In the light of the above it appears wrong in principle to regard the Pythagorean communities and their political activity as indicative of the aristocratic conservatism of the Pythagoreans identifying at the same time, rather one-sidedly, the blatant individualism and political indifference of Heraclitus with progressive social views and rejection of old aristocratic ideals.

Insofar as the socio-political views of the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus are comparable at all, the former appear to go far beyond the latter in radicalism, concreteness and common sense.

In the time of the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus (the sixth - the early fifth century B.C.) the broad masses that rose to political activity through the whole of Magna Graecia dealt a death blow to the domination of old aristocracy. Its downfall had been prepared by the steady growth of productive forces, the development of trade and handicrafts that resulted in the accumulation of great wealth in the hands of a new stratum of slave-owning society-shop owners, big tradesmen, etc. In the struggle for power between hereditary nobility, the nouveaux riches and the demos in most polises old aristocracy was gradually losing its dominant positions and, in case of an occasional reversal of fortunes, regained them but temporarily. Yet even in such cases it had to take into account the interests of the new social stratainfluential money-bags, tradesmen, artisans and the poor sections which tended to coalesce in the acute class struggle. Aristocracy was therefore compelled to steer the middle course and seek compromise with its social and political enemies. The time of its undivided sway had long since passed and the new social conditions imperatively demanded that the leaders of aristocracy adopt a new political strategy and offer new ideological solutions. As a result, the views of the adherents of aristocratic government and the very conception of aristocracy were bound to undergo a radical transformation. In point of fact, the masterminds of aristocracy were faced with the problem of reappraisal of values and had to evolve a new conception of aristocracy or, more accurately, a conception of new aristocracy.

The approach of the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus to this problem rested on a common foundation: they both selected an intellectual (logico-philosophical, mathematical, i. e. `` artificial'' and not natural) criterion for ranking a man as ``best'', ``noble'', ``virtuous'' regarded in their time as synonymous with ``aristocratic''. This transition from the conception of hereditary aristocracy (aristocracy by birth, i. e. by nature) to that of aristocracy of spirit was highly significant if only for the fact that aristocracy was no longer regarded as an exclusive caste and became, as it were, an open class. The access to it was not a natural privilege, a gift of nature, but a result of merits and personal endeavour. This renovation and extension of the conception of aristocracy was patently at variance with old aristocratic ideology and ran counter to the convictions of its orthodox expounders.

Very indicative in this respect is the contrast between the Pythagorean and Heraclitean conception of "the best" as aristocrats of spirit on the one hand and the attitude of Theognis the poet of Megara (the late sixth-early fifth centuries B. C.), on the other. Theognis in his elegiac verse extols the nobility of birth, the old aristocracy, and sharply contrasts it as "the good" to the mob, "the bad", "knowing nought of decrees or of laws". The noble character and the exalted qualities, according to Theognis, are hereditable, and it holds true both of men and animals. The poet laments over the fate of a state where aristocracy has been overthrown and compares it to a non-steerable ship caught in the midst of a storm. He is ready to shed the blood of "the bad" in order to restore the rule of "the noble" so dear to him, and calls on his supporters to quell the demos without any mercy.

In the light of Theognis's uncompromising stand which can be taken for a model of loyalty to the old aristocratic traditions, the new approach championed by the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus acquires special significance for all the difference of their neo-aristocratic ideals. Indeed, grieving over the past and commenting with sarcasm on the new order of things Heraclitus is not blinded by his aristocratic descent and sympathies to the inevitability of social change and is keenly aware of the need to reappraise values and adopt new (neo-aristocratic) ideals. As regards the Pythagoreans, they are not handicapped by nostalgia for bygone days; filled with optimism and confidence, they engage in reformative activity in a bid to promote the rule of "the best", the aristocrats of knowledge, specially selected and nurtured. If one may use modern terminology, the Pythagorean communities were in fact nothing but education and training centres for the functionaries of a new aristocratic party. Its programme was neo-aristocratic reformation intended to stem the tide of popular discontent and prevent the demos from seizing political power.

4. HERACLITUS

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 530-c. 470 B. C.), a famous ancient dialectician, came of an aristocratic clan of the highest rank whose members were known to have been kings (basileuses) at his native city. However, in the time of Heraclitus the power

at Ephesus was in the hands of the demos and his royal clan had been driven into the background. Turning his back on political activity and disdaining participation in public affairs, Heraclitus nevertheless devoted considerable attention to the problems of polis life in his philosophical treatises. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius (IX, 5) Heraclitus's work On Nature "is divided into discourses, one of the universe, another on politics, and the third on theology''.

The political and legal views of Heraclitus can only be understood in the context of his world outlook as a whole.^^1^^ He held that all things in the world are in perpetual change, motion, struggle and renewal, and asserted that it is not possible to step twice into the same river (Plato, Cratylus}. The sun, according to Heraclitus, is not only new every day, but always new at every moment.^^2^^

In this perpetual flux of change everything consists of opposites which pass into each other and make a unity. Day and night are one, good and bad are one, the straight and the crooked are also one. "The road up and the road down are one and the same" (Fr. 60). More explicit is fragment 88: "And as the same thing there exists in us living and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old: for these things having changed round are those, and those things having changed round again are these ones." Fragment 42 asserts: "We exist and do not exist... The rivers into which we step are the same and not the same." Similar relativism, not absolute but within the framework of a definite contrariety is expressed in fragment 65: "One thing, the only truly wise, does not and does consent to be called by the name of Zeus." This relativism in Heraclitus himself and in a number of his followers is not by any means tantamount to an assertion that the world is disorderly and unknowable.

The examples of the identity of opposites (whole and not

whole, all and one, life and death, good and bad, war and peace, concord and discord, the convergent and divergent, satiety and hunger, etc.) cited by Heraclitus testify to the presence of necessary connections and "invisible harmony" which can be grasped by the human mind. The first cause of the orderly interaction of opposites and the principle of orderliness of the cosmos as a whole understood by Heraclitus as the "ordered world" or the "world order" is fire, the primary substance of the world in the Milesian sense. Heraclitus describes it as a universal equivalent of opposites passing into one another and as a measure of the world order: "All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods are for gold and gold for goods" (Fr. 22).

The measure of fire determines the appearance of the cosmos. Heraclitus's fire governs everything, separating and connecting world phenomena. The formation of the cosmos, i. e. the ordering of the world results from the want of fire (the way down), whereas the abundance of fire (``satiety'' and the way up) leads to a conflagration and destruction of the cosmos. The length of the whole cycle (the Great Year) from the beginning to the end of the cosmos is 10,800 years. "This (world-) order (the same of all) did none of gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures" (Fr. 20). Lenin described this pronouncement as "a very good exposition of the principles of dialectical materialism".^^1^^

This changing measure of fire swaying the destinies of the cosmos is, according to Heraclitus, the universal law, the eternal logos which orders all things and determines the course of all that comes to pass. Everything in the world occurs in accordance with the universal and divine logos, i. e. in strife and by necessity, therefore justice and truth consists in living up to its dictates.

The notions of universal strife and eternal war of opposites underly not only the cosmological and epistemological views of Heraclitus, but also his ethical, social and political conceptions and constitute the core of his world outlook as a whole. "One must know that war is common and right is strife and that all

~^^1^^ Characteristic of Heraclitus and the ancient thinkers in general is a tendency to consider social problems, as well as all earthly human affairs and relations in their inseparable connection and unity with global, cosmic processes. Hence the conception of polis order as a reflection of the cosmic order, and the search for the cosmic sources of the norms and standards of human behaviour. Political knowledge is understood as a part of the knowledge of nature at large.

~^^2^^ Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, 6, 32 B, Cambridge at the University Press, 1962, p. 264.

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Lassalle's Book The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus", Collected Works, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 347.

things are happening by strife and necessity" (Fr. 62).

The philosophical proposition of law and necessity as the governing principle of the world (the universal logos) constitutes the basis of Heraclitus's ethical theory. The very idea of a single ordering principle that reigns supreme in the world implies, when extended to the sphere of human affairs and relations, a moral obligation to observe it: "Therefore it is necessary to follow the common (that is, the universal: for ``common'' means ``universal''): but although the logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding" (Fr. 92). From this philosophico-epistemological tenet of Heraclitus ensues the conception of the different worth of people, their inequality. The faculty of reason is a great asset common to all men, yet most of them prove unable to grasp the meaning of the obvious (the common logos), each claiming a wisdom peculiar to himself.

Wisdom, according to Heraclitus, is only accessible to few. It consists in the understanding that the world is governed by reason, the logos. Though even the wisest of men will appear an ape when compared with god, one can grasp the truth by thinking and self-search and act in accordance with his knowledge. Echoing the saying "Know thyself said to have been inscribed on the wall of Apollo's temple in Delphi and evidently viewing it as god's command, Heraclitus confessed with pride that he had "sought for himself (Fr. 101). He definitely puts himself on the side of the wise and claims to have seen the truth as no man before. However, human wisdom compared to divine reason is nothing but opinion and the highest a mortal can aspire to is to become a philosopher, i. e. not a possessor, but only a lover of wisdom. In the view of Heraclitus, men who are philosophers must be inquirers into many things (Fr. 49).

Heraclitus shows little respect for his predecessors and contemporaries universally held in high esteem as sages: "Of all whose accounts I have heard no one reaches the point of recognizing that wise is separated from all" (Fr. 18). Homer, in his opinion, deserves to be expelled from the contests and flogged. Incidentally, a similar derogatory attitude to Homer was exhibited by Plato, the reason being presumably Homer's frivolous and disparaging remarks on the gods. Heraclitus also speaks with irony of Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecateus: "Much learning does not teach sense" (Fr. 46). He speaks in complimentary terms only of one of the Seven Sages-Bias of

Priene "who was of more logos than the rest" (Fr. 112). Heraclitus must have been favourably impressed by Bias's insistence on the obedience to law in polis life and particularly by his conviction that the highest good is reason capable of grasping justice and truth. In Heraclitus's eyes Bias must have taken the correct road towards the comprehension of the logos of ethics and law in the polis life.

In order to get a clear insight into the mind of Heraclitus as a champion of aristocracy, we should take into account his sharp contrast between the so-called ``philosophers'', "the wise", "the best" on the one hand, and the ignorant mob, on the other. The epistemological antithesis between the knowing and the ignorant transforms in the socio-political antithesis between few and many. In the struggle of these opposites the sympathies of Heraclitus are entirely on the side of the ``knowing'', the few. He openly and blatantly-in a manner comparable perhaps only with Nietzsche - attacks "the mob", "the many", their opinions, way of life, religion, political institutions. Everything connected with the mob is alien and hateful to him. There is no doubt that Heraclitus is opposed to democracy in general and to the democratic government in his native Ephesiis in particular. He bitterly resents the victory of the populace and speaks of his fellow-countrymen with sarcasm and undisguised animosity.

Democracy for Heraclitus was the rule of "the bad" and `` unreasonable''. Rejecting democracy and advocating the government of "the best", Heraclitus put forward a case for aristocracy-yet not the old hereditary nobility, the aristocracy of blood, but new aristocracy of spirit, the intellectual elite. He had little sympathy for the nobles who took for granted all their privileges, the political ones inclusive, as a natural endowment, as something belonging to them by the right of birth. The revolt of the demos and the establishment of the democratic form of government had dealt a death blow to the patriarchal ideology of old aristocracy, and Heraclitus never sided with the conservative advocates of "the best" clinging to the past and dreaming of getting back their lost privileges-he was not a practical politician and pragmatic approach to reality was entirely alien to his cast of mind. Estranged and contemptuous, he looked down on the sphere of politics with its petty interests and polis passions from the height of the cosmic logos he believed himself to be in communion with: "The best renounce all for one thing... But

most men stuff themselves like cattle" (Fr. 111). Having turned away from the public affairs of his native city, Heraclitus throws this sarcastic wish at his fellow-countrymen: "May wealth not fail you, men of Ephesus so that you may be convicted of your wickedness!" (Fr. 84). The loftiness of Heraclitus sprang not so much from the psychologycal traits of his character as from the high standards, the measure of the cosmic fire and logos, that he applied to human affairs and polis life. Hence the gloomy pessimism of die Ephesian thinker and his sobriquets of the Weeping Philosopher and the Obscure.' The philosopher indifferent to earthly blessings and oriented towards eternal glory could not have wept over die lost privileges of aristocracy, nor could he have been inspired by the idea of their retrieval...

Heraclitus's pronouncements on "the best" and "the bad", on the polis, the laws, etc. are more than the expression of his personal views---they are in fact philosophical conceptions relating to politics, the state and the law. It should therefore be clear that his aristocratic political ideals can by no means be identified with one or another positive programme and specific ideology of political power. The philosophical doctrine of Heraclitus is notable for its abstract universal character which sets it apart from concrete politico-ideological programmes. This means, for instance, that the principle of conformity of men's entire life (including the affairs of the state, the laws, etc.) with the dictates of the logos is applicable to all forms and types of government. It stands to reason that this principle is directed, first and foremost, against democracy, yet it is also incompatible with the rule of old hereditary aristocracy.

Owing to its ideal character as a universal measure and scale, the philosophical principle of government stated by Heraclitus does not accord with the positive political practices of either old aristocracy or democracy, though there does seem to be one point of close affinity between the views of Heraclitus and the

old aristocratic ideology-the eulogy on the merits of the few, "the best", as contrasted with the baseness and stupidity of the many, "the bad". This, however, should not mislead us since the above attributes acquire new connotations in the mouth of Heraclitus for whom the criterion of the division is not birth and blood, but personal virtues and wisdom. The main division of mankind, according to Heraclitus, is into the knowing and the ignorant, and this division underlies the philosopher's scale of values. Both the old aristocracy and Heraclitus are for the few, "the best", but they are different ``few'' and different ``best''.

In the light of the above the social doctrine of Heraclitus should be rightly qualified as elitist. Under the specific historical and political conditions of his time this elitism was objectively a neo-aristocratic alternative to democracy which was in the ascendant throughout the Greek world.^^1^^ In all fragments where Heraclitus extolls "the best" as "the few", he levels his shafts against democracy; in other fragments where he identifies "the best" with "the knowing", "the wise", he clearly departs from the aristocratic tradition. This departure from the ideology of the old nobility is particularly manifest in the question of the laws. Historians justly note that underscoring the importance of the new written law of the polis (nomos) Heraclitus thereby rejected old aristocratic sense of right based on the clan law and age-old traditions and customs.

The people, according to Heraclitus, must fight for the law as they do for the city wall (Fr. 100). This clear-cut statement, very much in the nature of a battle-cry, is not of course a call for defence of the rights of a democratic party-rather, it is a supraparty principle of legality as such, a principle of the rule of law in polis life.

The polis and its law, according to Heraclitus, are derived from one common source and are equally divine and rational: "Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the

' The title of the Weeping Philosopher bestowed upon Heraclitus in antiquity was more than just a figure of speech. There is good reason to believe that the folly and misery of mankind indeed moved him to compassionate and helpless tears of a man acutely aware of a tremendous gulf between the cosmic logos and men's wretched and vain life. Heraclitus's ``weeping'' and his ``obscurity'' (which was not a simple lack of clarity in his aphorisms) derive from one and the same source-the sorrow of his wisdom.

~^^1^^ The opinion that Heraclitus propounded reactionary views in politics and advocated the political ideology of hereditary aristocracy appears to us onesided. Equally untenable, in our view, is the opposite theory regarding Heraclitus as a champion of social reforms in the manner of Solon, i. e. as a moderate democrat which he was not.

divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over" (Fr. 91). Elsewhere the divine law as the source of all human laws is called by Heraclitus the logos, reason and nature (see Fr. 65).

The universal logos or divine justice (dike) must be reflected in human laws. Their imperfection, according to Heraclitus, results from men's inability to understand it. Correct thinking or reflection can overcome wrong notions of justice and help man grasp the everlasting logos. Significantly, the Heraclitean doctrine of divine justice identified by him with the universal logos was later elaborated by Socrates and Plato in their sharp polemics with the sophists who adduced the plurality of notions of justice as an argument for ethical relativity and individualism. Heraclitus holds that the divine cosmic processes and the cosmos as a whole representing the measure of eternal fire provide the scale and measure for human affairs and relations, the laws inclusive. Without such a divine fiery scale men would not have the very notion of justice. Heraclitus thus does not confine himself to an assertion of the divine origin of human laws: the traditional theological approach is too shallow for him. In his eyes, Zeus is no more than just another name for the world logos. Heraclitus modifies the old conception of Zeus as the ruler of all things and speaks instead of the logos and everlasting fire. Zeus, logos and fire for Heraclitus are synonyms. On the theological side, the human law is derived from divine justice and truth, on the epistemological side, from the universal logos, and on the ontological side, from eternal fire. In this triad the leading role belongs to the ontological principle providing the measure and scale for everything else; indeed, the measure of fire is accountable for the orderliness of the cosmos itself.

It will be recalled that already the Seven Sages in their ethicopolitical maxims showed great interest in the notion of measure which they generally understood as the golden mean between two extremes. The Pythagoreans elaborated this notion and made an important advance on their predecessors. Due measure in their teachings is no longer the arithmetic mean and the typical-it is the world's most valuable harmony which is essentially numerical. The essence of measure is thus derived by the Pythagoreans from the numerical essence of the cosmic order and harmony, but not from empirical phenomena as their ``mean''. Heraclitus treats the problem in a similar manner, linking the

conception of measure with the cosmic order and its primary cause (fire). However, his approach to the problem appears to be more consistent and profound: the changeful ``measure'' (and mensurability) inherent in fire itself as the cosmic primary source and material becomes in Heraclitus the universal scale of all being. Heraclitus in fact asserted not only the objective, ontological nature of the ``measure'', but also pointed out the dialectics of its change and ``fluidity''.

According to Heraclitus, the measure of all cosmic and earthly phenomena depends on the fluctuating (within the limits of the great, cosmic year) measure of fire which underlies the necessity and order of natural and social processes: "Sun will not overstep his measures, if he does, the Erinyes, the minions of Justice, will find him out" (Fr. 29). To bolster up his ontology Heraclitus, as we see, appeals to theology: the fiery measure is guarded by the gods who relentlessly crack down on those overstepping it. Heraclitus foretells inevitable punishment of trespassers against measure both in this and in the other world.

The main epistemological characteristic of the human laws consists in their conformity with the universal (cosmic) law. This implies correct understanding of the cosmic and divine nature of the law, that is its ontological and theological characteristics. Such an understanding can only be attained by the ``knowing'', the best few. Here we again come to Heraclitean elitism. Indeed, the essence of the law being its conformity with the universal logos, the formal procedure of its adoption by the city's assembly becomes immaterial. Again, the insight into the logos and, consequently, the correct assessment of the law is only the blessing of the few...

It is not surprising therefore that Heraclitus unequivocally prefers the legal judgements of the few over the opinions of the ignorant demos. Moreover, his mistrust of popular wisdom extends to all spheres of political life and he takes no pains to disguise his hostility towards democracy: "One man is to me ten thousand, if he be the best" (Fr. 113).

For all his neo-aristocratic elitism and philosophical indifference to political practices, Heraclitus's views exhibit a clear idea of solidarity of the free members of the polis. Despite their internal discord, they have one common enemy, the slaves. War, according to Heraclitus, "is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves and

others free" (Fr. 44). The ``freemen-slaves'' antithesis ' is thus the general ideological and socio-political background for Heraclitus, and it must never be lost sight of in the assessment of his statements about the contrast between "the good" and "the bad", "the few" and "the mob''.

Generally speaking, the basic propositions underlying the world view of Heraclitus do not rule out the possibility of social harmony, something in the nature of Plato's ideal city---given the recognition of the universal logos by all its free members. Though the doctrine of Heraclitus lacks the political enthusiasm and optimistic faith needed to actualise this possibility, it does not reject it in principle since the way to the logos and, consequently, to the polis elite is open to everyone.

It should be noted that this potentiality of the philosophical credo professed by Heraclitus was hardly recognised by the philosopher himself-political reformism and the idea of a perfect political system were entirely alien to him. The nearest he came to this idea was his statement about the common interests of the free members of the polis as reflected in the polis itself and in its laws. Hence his appeal to all the free citizens of the polis to quell insolence more promptly than a conflagration and to observe the common law of the polis.

The political and legal views of Heraclitus remain firmly in the polis ideological tradition. Speaking of the polis and its laws, he is primarily concerned with his native Ephesus considered to be the city of Artemis, like Athens was believed to be under the patronage of Athena. His famous pronouncement that a rightminded people should defend the law as they would their city's walls was in fact an appeal to the citizens to stand up for the divine (i. e. rational, according with the universal logos) statute of their polis. The law (nomos} in Heraclitus is not an ordinance of the city's assembly or some other legislative body, but a divine principle of the polis constitution, the rational foundation of its existence. The polis and its law (nomos} are derived from divine

justice and must not deviate from it in order not to incur the wrath of the gods. Urging his fellow-citizens to follow the dictates of the everlasting logos, Heraclitus deposits the manuscript of his work in the temple of Artemis leaving it in the custody of the city's divine protectress.

The teaching of Heraclitus was far-famed in Hellas and exerted a profound influence on the subsequent philosophical, political and legal thought. Thus Socrates and Plato advocating respectively the government of the knowing and the rule of the philosophers were obviously under no small debt to the Heraclitean idea of the rule of "the best" capable of understanding the universal logos. Very fruitful proved also Heraclitus's conceptions of reason as the objective (cosmic, divine) foundation of changeful human notions of justice and truth, and of the universal logos as the foundation of nomos. These conceptions inspired many ancient thinkers who elaborated on them and carried further the Heraclitean train of thought. One can safely say in this connection that Heraclitus's conceptions established a paradigm for all natural right doctrines of antiquity and modern times in which natural right is identified with some rational principle (a norm of universal reason) that has to be expressed in the positive law.

The writers of antiquity widely adopted the Heraclitean neoaristocratic vocabulary with its sharp contrast between the knowledge of "the best" and the opinion of the ``mob'' and the tendency to treat the old ``aristocracy-demos'' antithesis in terms of distinctions between the knowing few and the ignorant many. All post-Heraclitean ideological attacks against democracy and the advocacy of elitist conceptions revealed, as a rule, a clear trace of intellectual mistrust of the politico-legal judgements of the populace, so characteristic of Heraclitus. His predominantly intellectual, even epistemological interpretation of the notion of "the best", hitherto connotatively ethical, became, as it were, a philosophical standard for ancient authors. Various aspects of Heraclitus's teaching have been the object of lively interest in all epochs and continue to draw the researchers' attention in our time. Particularly fruitful and inspiring to historians was his dialectical outlook on nature and society. Very characteristic in this respect was the admission of Hegel that he had not omitted a single proposition of Heraclitean dialectics in his Logic.

~^^1^^ Contrasting the freemen and the slaves, Heraclitus simultaneously contrasted the aristocrats ("the best") and the common folk (the demos or ``mob'') which gives reason for qualifying his views as aristocratic, elitist and antidemocratic. The views of old aristocracy were not different in this respect and its advocates also took for granted the unbridgeable gulf between the freemen and the slaves.

A number of contemporary bourgeois writers specialising in the criticism of the principles of dialectics and historicism, particularly in their Marxist interpretation, seek to establish direct links between the ancient conceptions, Hegel and Marxism, and adduce historical continuity of ideas as an argument in support of their politically biased theories. Thus Karl Popper castigating Hegel and Marx for ``totalitarianism'' attempts to trace it back to ancient teachings: "Hegel, the source of all contemporary historicism, was a direct follower of Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle." '

Proceeding from this preconceived scheme and focusing on Heraclitus's and Hegel's conceptions of war, such writers class all proponents of dialectics with its doctrine of the struggle of opposites as their followers, thereby completely ignoring important distinctions between various conceptions of dialectics. To be sure, the general influence of Heraclitus, particularly his dialectical ideas, on all subsequent dialectical thought is indisputable, yet it is hardly justifiable to interprete Hegel's views on war, e. g. his "ethical moment of war", in terms of Heraclitus's war-father and war-common statements or to equate the conceptions of Heraclitus, Hegel and other dialecticians.

The Heraclitean ``war'' taken in the context of his teaching as a whole is nothing but a sharp, concentrated image of universal strife, a figure of picture-language. It is a parable rather than a concept of the struggle of opposites and should by no means be construed as an adequate representation of the essence of real phenomena. Contrary to Heraclitus, Hegel conceives war not as the "father of all", but as a child of ethics. The war in Heraclitus is ``common'' and the "father of all" for the simple reason that he lacks the middle term, the synthesis of the opposites, so that harmony in his eyes takes the shape of the struggle as such. Unlike the Heraclitean war-father, the Hegelian war is but a moment of ethical unity understood as the synthesis of the opposing forces.

The tendency to link Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx and directly relate their views on a broad range of philosophical, political and legal problems clearly reveals itself in West-German historian Karlheinz Rode. In his opinion, the dialectical world

outlook of Heraclitus, modified and elaborated, revives 2000 years later in the shape of Hegel's complete philosophical system and closely related dialectical materialism determining today the legal system of half the world.^^1^^ Distorting the real history of political teachings, the author strives to read the contradictions allegedly underlying the present-day ideological struggle into the early period of ancient thought. He, for one, shows a great amount of hindsight in the comparative analysis of the ideological platforms of Solon and Heraclitus interpreting them in terms of the present-day battle of ideas and making out as the prototypes of the antagonistic ideologies of the two socio-economic systems. According to Rode, Solon and Heraclitus represent two peaks of early Greek philosophy and are an inexhaustible fountain-head of modern antagonistic ideologies seeking to legitimise themselves.^^2^^ Passing over to the Heraclitus-Hegel-Marxism ideological continuity, Rode models it on the Solon-Heraclitus antithesis.

In connection with Heraclitus's heritage special mention should be made of the rabid champion of the new aristocracy and new slavery Friedrich Nietzsche. Expressing his admiration for the Ephesian philosopher, Nietzsche interpreted his views in terms of his own anti-democratic doctrines of ``superman'' and "eternal return". Nietzsche's interpretation of Heraclitean philosophy as tragic world outlook was later adopted by many adherents of existentialism.

Heraclitus's teaching of universal strife in nature and society was widely used, in a modified form, by the representatives of Social Darvinism. The Heraclitean idea of the universal governing logos, the divine source of all rational politico-legal systems and institutions in human society exerted a lasting influence on various doctrines of natural law and was used by the exponents of both rationalistic and theological theories.

~^^1^^ Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II, Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 27.

~^^1^^ Karlheinz Rode, Geschichte der europaischen Rechtsphilosophie, Werner-- Verlag, Diisseldorf, 1974, S. 12.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ZENITH

(Fifth-Early Fourth Centuries B. C.)

a ripe old age and put an end to his life by abstaining from food. He was buried with great honours at the city's expense and a bronze monument was raised to him.

Democritus was an encyclopaedic thinker and one of the most prolific writers of antiquity. Judging from the extant evidence and a few isolated fragments of his genuine writings, the works of Democritus covered practically all the fields of contemporary natural, philosophical, ethical, legal and political studies. He shares the fame of the founder of atomistics with Leucippus (c. 500-440 B. C.) and occupies an outstanding place in the history of philosophy. Lenin described Democritus as the brightest exponent of materialism in antiquity.^^1^^

Democritus held that reality was essentially a combination of two primary causes or elements: atoms or indivisible material particles, and void. In their eternal motion in void immutable particles impinge on one another and come together to form physical objects. The universe is infinite in space and consists of innumerable worlds, some of them coming into being, others dying. Everything occurs by necessity as a result of spontaneous movement of atoms in empty space, without any outside interference or divine providence. Being immutable and homogeneous, the atoms differ from one another only in the shape, arrangement and position. As regards man's ability to cognise reality, Democritus held that "truth is in the depths", it is imperceptible, i. e. hidden from sense. Sextus Empiricus quotes Democritus as saying: "By convention is sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but by verity atoms and void" (Sex. Adv. Math. VII, 135).^^2^^ In terms of contemporary science this view amounts to an assertion of the subjective character of such sensible qualities as taste, heat and cold because all of them come only from the shape, arrangement and position of the atoms.

Despite this vein of scepticism regarding the trustworthiness of human knowledge in general and sense perceptions in particular, Democritus did not deny the possibility of objective knowledge. According to the same source, he maintained that there

1. DEMOCRITUS

The life and work of Democritus (c. 460-370 B. C.) were contemporaneous with the period of the greatest economic and cultural prosperity of ancient polises. He was born into an aristocratic family at Abdera, in Thrace. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, his father Damasippus was so wealthy as to be able to entertain Persian king Xerxes with all his army. From his early childhood to a venerable age Democritus was possessed by insatiable thirst for knowledge. His first teachers were magi and Chaldeans, left by Xerxes as a token of gratitude for the hospitality he was accorded.

After his father's death Democritus took the smaller share of the legacy and set out to see the world. He made voyages of study to Babylon, Persia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Athens and a number of other Hellenic polises. On his return to Abdera where he had left his brothers Herodotus and Damasus, Democritus faced a charge of dissipation involving punishment: the laws of his native city denied the right to be buried in Abdera to those who have squandered their father's property. However, Democritus succeeded in winning the judges over to his side by reading to them his best work The Great Diacosmos. The book was estimated at a sizable sum of 500 talents (some sources give 100 talents) and the charge of dissipation against Democritus was dropped.

Later the prestige of Democritus rose so high that the citizens of Abdera elected him archon (ruler). Among the extant evidence of his archonship is a silver coin with words "Under Democritus" stamped upon it. The Abderites showed their respect for Democritus by nicknaming him Philosophy, just as later they would give the soubriquet of Reason to Protagoras, another of their famous compatriots. Democritus is known to have reached

~^^1^^ See V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism", Collected Works, Vol. 14, 1977, p. 130.

~^^2^^ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, Book I, William Heinemann, Ltd., London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1935.

are two forms of cognition, one through the senses or ``bastard'', and the other through the intellect or ``legitimate''. "Whenever the bastard kind is unable any longer to see what has become too small, or to hear or smell or taste or perceive it by touch, (one must have recourse to) another and finer (instrument)" (ibid., 139).

Democritus's atomistic theory and epistemological views could not but influence his approach to specific ethical, political and legal problems. He was one of the first thinkers in the history of ancient philosophy who professed the evolutionary theory of society and its political institutions and treated the origin of mankind and the progress of culture in terms of the universal process of natural development reducible to haphazard collisions and recoils of atoms in vacuum. Democritus taught that men, like other animals, arose from water and mud and led a disorderly life, each seeking his own food and shelter. Gradually they learned to herd together in order to survive thus creating the nuclei of future nations. In the course of a long evolutionary process groups of people compelled by necessity and taught by experience and wild nature gradually acquired knowledge and skills, developed language as a means of communication, learned to use fire and build houses, invented the arts and everything else required for collective life. Thus human society, according to Democritus, emerged as a result of a long process of evolution from what was purportedly the original ``natural'' state. The leading role in this transition from savagery to civilisation was assigned by Democritus to "human nature", i. e. to the fact that man is endowed by nature with deft hands, native intelligence and ingenuity. Owing to these gifts, as well as to his innate gregariousness, the primitive man managed to survive in the struggle for existence and adjusted himself to the unfavourable external conditions.

According to the evolutionary view of society held by Democritus the gods played no part in man's ascent to civilisation. Progress was achieved by stern necessity and man's natural cleverness. The notions of the gods were born of ignorance and lack of understanding of celestial phenomena that inspired the primitive man with awe. Developing the atomistic doctrine, Democritus laid particular emphasis on necessity as the only source of natural and social progress, and completely rejected any role of divine providence in human affairs.

Although society and its laws are a product of spontaneous development, they do not emerge as ready-made institutions, but are shaped by men in the process of their evolution to higher forms of civilisation. The very progress of man's skills and culture was conceived by Democritus in terms of his determinist theory, i. e. as the necessary development of man's inherent qualitites. In his opinion, therefore, the seemingly artificial character of the state and the laws attested to the specificity of these products of human culture rather than to their arbitrariness and independence from nature.

Elaborating on the evolutionary conception of society, Democritus offered a new solution to the problem of relation between nature and human society, dating from the time of Hesiod. He rejected the traditional Greek antithesis between what exists "by justice" or "by nature" on the one hand, and "by opinion" or "by common consent", on the other, and held that there is no unbridgeable gulf between them. Indeed, according to the epistemological doctrine of atomistic determinism, man is capable not only of sensual (``bastard'') cognition usually associated with convention and opinion, but also of rational (``legitimate'') cognition providing the true knowledge of reality.

The ethical, political and legal views of Democritus are based on his conceptions of ``nature'' and ``truth''. Justice, according to Democritus, is what conforms to nature, and injustice is what contradicts it. The real thrust of this statement, reflecting the essence of the natural law doctrine is not against justice as such, but only against erroneous notions of justice, i. e. against what is considered just by ``bastard'' knowledge and ill-informed " common opinion", wherefore the critical attitude of Democritus to the existing laws and state systems conforming with "common opinion" but running counter to the dictates of nature and true justice. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, Democritus maintained that the laws exist only by convention, whereas "in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space". Proceeding from the same nature-law antithesis, Democritus taught that the laws are a wicked contrivance and a wise man should not obey them but live free. Freedom, in his opinion, is independence from convention and its artificial restrictions.

The relationship between the natural and the artificial plays a very important part in the philosophy and ethics of Democritus.

His views on various social, political, legal and moral problems derive from a conviction that the artificial (understood in the broad sense as all spheres of human activity) need not be necessarily at variance with the natural and should be brought in harmony with real justice and truth. His criticism of the artificial (existing social institutions, customs and laws) stems from positive ideals and has nothing in common with the notorious nihilism of the later sophists who used to counterpose nature and art (law, convention, etc.).

The ethical theory of Democritus resting on the premise that man is capable of attaining objective knowledge of reality given appropriate conditions (education, etc.) aims at bridging the gulf between the artificial and the natural and at improving men's moral qualities and the existing socio-political institutions. On the whole, Democritus advocates reconciliation between what exists "by nature" and "by convention" giving priority to the natural principle of ``truth'' over ``opinion'' and, contrary to some sophistic theories, seeks to prevent enmity and war between them.

Believing in the evolutionary progress of society as a result of the extension and deepening of human knowledge, improvement of morals, etc., Democritus professed the golden mean theory, criticising the extremes (excess and deficiency), castigating vices (ambition, greediness, envy, intemperance, etc.), pilloring injustice, arbitrariness, intolerance, and recommended observing "due measure" in everything. Since fortune is fickle and life is short and burdensome, man, according to Democritus, should aspire to the sublime and eternal disregarding everything base and transitory. Tradition credits Democritus with a statement that he "would rather discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia" (Diogenes Laertius, VIII). He sharply attacked avidity and acquisitiveness and held that a wise man should be very moderate in acquiring property and should not take more care over it that it is absolutely necessary. Coming out against the dangerous extremes of wealth and property, Democritus sought in every way to play down the real significance of their opposition and contended that they are nothing but synonyms of want and abundance, thereby shifting the problem from the socio-political to the moral-psychological plane: he who contents himself with little has but few wants and is therefore not poor. Hence, moderation in desires is equivalent to

abundance or, using Democritus's own words, few wants equate poverty with wealth. Such utterances praising moderation and temperance were mainly addressed to the lower classes. As regards the rich sections, Democritus exhorted them to curb their vices (avarice, greediness, dissipation) and to show good will, justice and kindness to other citizens. In one of the extant passages he says that when the wealthy are ready to lend money to the poor and be helpful and kind to them, the ensuing compassion, solidarity, comradeship, mutual assistance and conformity of opinions are of incalculable benefit. Moderation, temperance and observance of measure (in the amount of property one possesses, in needs, desires, conduct, etc.) are, according to Democritus, indispensable conditions not only for well organised social life, but also for the attainment of personal happiness and what is ultimate goal of living-cheerfulness or contentment (eythymia) understood by Democritus as "a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 45). Contentment, according to Democritus, is a reward of wisdom and virtuous life and can only be achieved by the exercise of man's intellectual and moral faculties. Without knowledge and intellect neither wealth nor power can make a man just or happy.

Setting great store by proper upbringing and education, Democritus gave priority to training over natural disposition and adduced ignorance as the cause of wrongdoing. Education, in his opinion, helps nature bring out man's innate qualities, its success being conditional on three things: natural abilities, practice and time. Practice has the leading part and most good men owe their virtuousness to training rather than to inherent qualities. Education provides guidance for young people and helps old men to tread their path, adorns the prosperous and consoles the distressed, entertains at home and does not burden in travels, always at hand-by night and in the day-time, in one's native land and abroad. Democritus commends perseverance in studies and persistence in labour: any work, he says, is more pleasant than idleness if people get what they expect from it. Proper education and training lay the foundation of wisdom with its three abilities which apply to all human affairs: to think well, to speak well and to act well (Diogenes Laertius, 822). Democritus repeatedly stressed that it is nothing else than reason that underlies the unity of word and deed, intention and action.

A trustworthy man, he says, is distinguished and recognised not only by what he does, but also by what he wishes. Goodness, according to Democritus, consists not only in the abstention from doing wrong, but also in not wishing to do wrong. A virtuous man acts rightly from intelligence, the sense of duty and revulsion against wrongdoing as such, and not from fear of punishment. A man's duty is primarily an obligation to himself, therefore self-respect and shame before one's own conscience should prevent one from doing wrong even if no one else learns about it. Justice, according to Democritus, consists in fulfilling one's duty, whereas injustice is failure to meet one's obligations, evasion of one's duties. In Democritus's opinion, it is better to be wronged than to do wrong. Duty obligates a man to prevent acts of injustice and stand up for the wronged and the offended. If it proves impossible for some reason or other, a virtuous man should at least refrain from participation in wrongdoing. No support for exultant injustice-such is the minimum prescribed by the Democritean ethics of duty. As regards the maximum, it consists both in courage and right-mindedness (Fr. 181).

The ethical views of Democritus, for all his exhortations to temperance and moderation have nothing in common with asceticism. The philosopher believes it unwise to suppress natural desires, since a life without holidays, as he aptly puts it, is a tiresome journey without halts and only dull people deny themselves pleasure congenial to human nature and do not strive to enjoy life. By exercising his moral and intellectual powers, a man, according to Democritus, learns to enjoy excellence for its own sake. He who has achieved contentment respects himself as he simultaneously shares in the beautiful and contemplates it. This self-respect and love of one's own self accompanying eythymia are something very different from selfishness or egocentricity.

Democritus extols friendship, mutual assistance and compassion. However, contrary to the Pythagoreans who held that friends should have all things in common, Democritus was against the community of property even among members of the same family and friends. Common property, in his view, is never properly cared for and is apt to be squandered.

Friendship goes hand in hand with conformity of opinion or consensus which is highly valued by Democritus on ethical and political grounds. Consensus unites the citizens of a polis in a sin-

gle body of friends and tends to enhance the strength of the state. Without a consensus, according to Democritus, it is not possible to perform feats of valour or wage wars.

In the view of Democritus, conformity of opinion is synonymous with moral, spiritual and socio-political solidarity which allows of noble emulation, but rules out hegemonistic tendencies among the citizens. A contest of the noble-spirited, Democritus explains, is beneficial to all contestants whereas aspiration for supremacy may involve harm to the opponent and make the aspirant forget his own interests wherefore it is not sensible. Besides, the striving for domination gives rise to envy and leads to discord detrimental both to the contestants and to the solidarity of the free citizens of the polis as a whole. Internecine war, according to Democritus, is an evil to both sides causing woe to both the conqueror and the conquered. In Democritus's opinion, solidarity and consensus in the circle of intimate friends is a model for all free members of the polis. As regards the slaves, Democritus did not consider them self-dependent individuals and subjects of social relations in the nature of politico-legal ``atoms''. Viewing slavery as a natural phenomenon, he likened the slaves to parts of their master's body and taught that they should be used accordingly, each for his own purpose. This view of the slave as animate property was characteristic of ancient social consciousness and sense of justice, and later found its expression in Aristotle's ethics.

In Democritus's view, conformity of opinion and the socioethical solidarity of the free members of the polis are indispensable for a well-governed state. The polis is a "common cause" of all its free members. The state embodies the common cause of its citizens and serves as its foundation determining the form and substance of the citizens' rights and duties. Democritus underscored that the affairs of the state should be given priority over all other affairs and that every citizen should look after the prosperity of the state without striving to get more honours than are due him and without seizing more power than is necessary for the common good. A well-run state, he affirmed, is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe, when this is destroyed, all is destroyed.

This aphoristic statement by Democritus is one of the earliest and, perhaps, most unequivocal and outspoken eulogies of the polis as a form of "common cause" which are characteristic of

all ancient political thought. Even Plato, a staunch adherent of the idea of statehood that he was, appears to be more prudent in his glorification of the state's omnipotence. It should be noted, however-and this is borne out by the context of Democritus's panegyric - that he speaks of a well-run polis, that is of an ideal state. Besides, die state as conceived by Democritus is a community of free men united by common interest rather than by an external alien force dominating over them. Viewed in its most general form, the conception of Democritus implies that the power in such a community is vested in its free members who coalesce in the polis as their ``commonwealth''. The state as such created by a community of free men but not identical with it, escaped Democritus's attention. He is not concerned with the problem of how to protect the members of a community from the state, but rather seeks the methods for turning a community into a well-run polis and inducing the citizens to follow its laws, i. e. to lead a political life.

The ancient polis in the time of Democritus was not only a city-state, but also a community-state, and all public life in it was centred upon public rather than private affairs involving the all-polis interests or public concern. Its sphere was very broad and included family life, upbringing of children, education, etc. Very characteristic in this respect was the general politicisation of ancient thought that clearly manifested itself in a tendency to treat various philosophical, religious, ethical, social and other problems as matters of public concern pertaining to all-polis tasks and ideals, i. e. in a political interpretation of essentially non-political (from the modern viewpoint) issues. Using the notions of a later period, one could say that civil society in the epoch of ancient polis had not yet separated off from the "political state" and had not turned into an independent sphere of private interests existing side by side with the public or political interests. In this indeterminate whole the political (all-polis) interests, affairs and notions clearly dominated over all particular and private interests, claims and sentiments: "Among the Greeks civil society was the slave of political society." '

Characteristically, Democritus expresses the primacy of the

interests of the state, the "common cause", over the interests of its citizens not in legal, but in ethical terms considering it a moral duty rather than a legal obligation of each member of the polis to care for public welfare. From his viewpoint the links between the citizens and the polis are rooted not in legal, but in ethical principles, and represent a moral, and not a legal relationship. Moreover, in Democritus's eyes the polis itself is a moral rather than a legal institution. Such an ethical approach to the problem of relationship between the citizen and the state is notably one-sided as compared with the legal approach. Indeed, a legal relationship between two subjects, e. g. the citizen and the state, connotes reciprocity and requital in virtue of the very principle of equality and correspondence of rights and obligations inherent in the concept of law. Of course, in certain legal relations one side may prove to have nothing but rights, and the other side, nothing but duties. Such exceptions, however, do not disprove the general principle of legal relations which are impossible without the equality of their subjects and the reciprocity of their rights and duties. By contrast, ethical relations including those between the citizen and the state presuppose essential inequality of their subjects and are based on principles other than mutuality and requital. Speaking of the relationship between the citizen and the polis, Democritus, as well as many ancient writers before and after him, proceeded from the obvious ethical inequality of the two parties: the state as the general and the whole was considered incomparably more valuable than individual citizens with their particular interests. The subordination of the lower subject (an individual citizen, a family, a community) to the higher one (the state with its common interest) was the absolute moral duty arising from a source other than equality and directed towards a goal other than the expectation of reciprocity.

A more rationalistic, i. e. legal, approach to the relationship of the citizen and the state was still alien not only to Democritus, but also to later writers. This lack of sophistication was not, of course, a result of some intellectual inadequacy of ancient thinkers-it merely attested to the immaturity of the socio-political relations of the epoch reflected in contemporary political teachings. In the final analysis, this immaturity also accounted for the lack of differentiation, both in real life and in its theoretical reflection, between ethics and politics on the one hand, and legal

~^^1^^ K. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, 1975, p. 73.

phenomena, on the other.

Later, under the socio-political conditions of more developed Roman society secular jurisprudence became a separate branch of knowledge and its representatives in the person of the Roman jurists and particularly Cicero developed conceptions of the state not only as the "common cause", the "popular cause", etc., which were characteristic of the Greek thinkers too, but also as the "legal community" or "legal communion". As a result, the relations between the citizen and the state were placed on a new footing and began to be viewed as legal relations.

It should be noted, however, that the achievements of Roman political and legal thought rested on the foundation laid by the Greek thinkers, which fact the Romans themselves were only too willing to admit.

It is highly characteristic of the ethical approach of Democritus to political and legal issues that in the moral duties of a citizen he includes not only voluntary submission to the polis authorities and laws, but also due intellectual subordination in the form of a hierarchy based on the abilities of its members. It is proper, he holds, to be obedient to the law, to the ruler, and to the wiser. In terms of politics, such pronouncements were intended to substantiate the "rule of the better" concept current among political thinkers in Ancient Greece. In line with the old tradition, Democritus unequivocally states that government is the prerogative of the better by nature. "The better" to him are not money-bags or old aristocracy, but those endowed with the highest intellectual and moral virtues.

The extant fragments of Democritus do not offer any systematic exposition of his theory of the forms of government giving but disjointed views on the subject. Very outspoken, for instance, is the contrast between democracy and despotic (autocratic) rule: in the philosopher's opinion, poverty under democracy is no less preferable to the so-called prosperity under a king than freedom to slavery. This explicit statement appears to be the only unambiguous evidence from Democritus's own pen for his sympathy with democracy. Significantly, judging from the context of the above comparison, by the ``king'' Democritus understands the Persian monarch and treats the subject in die manner of other Greek authors counterposing the Hellenic polis and the freedom of its citizens to despotic barbar-

ian states with the slave system and arbitrary rule of the king. The critical shafts of Democritus could scarcely have been levelled against political parties in contemporary Greek states since the political life in Magna Graecia in his time centred upon the struggle between democracy, aristocracy and oligarchy; any attacks against autocratic government would have been nothing but anachronism. True, the possibility of tyranny remained on the agenda - but in the eyes of the Greeks this form of government was different from monarchy and tyrant was not identified with king.

Advocating free communion of polis members and rejecting the submission of the citizens to arbitrary rule, Democritus at the same time takes a firm stand for the government of "the better" and criticises the shortcomings of democracy. The philosopher's numerous statements on the ethical and intellectual inequality of citizens attest to his hostility towards the populace and sympathy with the intellectual elite, "the better". Tradition credits him with these maxims having an obvious anti-democratic ring: "It is better for the fools to obey, than to rule"; "It is hard to obey the unworthy"; "It is unwise to trust a madman with a sword and an evil-minded one with power". In the opinion of Democritus, the art of government is the highest of all arts. He recommends that it be thoroughly mastered and that only those be allowed to rule who have sufficient experience, knowledge and moral virtues.

According to Democritus, bad citizens promoted to high positions which they do not deserve show negligence, stupidity and insolence in the conduct of state affairs. They are susceptible to flattery and fond of servility detrimental to the "common cause" and public welfare. In contrast with such "bad citizens", a true statesman holds the community's opinion of himself in high esteem and, accepting die honours he justly deserved, avoids flatterers and does not strive to curry favour with the populace.

Among the extant fragments of Democritus are some in which he gives advice to the statesman. Before starting to rule others, a statesman, according to Democritus, ought to learn how to rule himself. He must be just, courageous and dauntless in his deeds and thoughts. He must know well the interests of the people, take account of the public sentiment and be able to appraise correctly both the general state of polis affairs and the current situation. He must be fearless when dealing with enemies and show

kindness to his subordinates. The highest virtue and justice of a political leader consists, according to Democritus, in the ability to distribute honours among citizens strictly in accordance with their merits. This concept of political justice notable for a certain anti-democratic strain was later elaborated in great detail by Plato and Aristotle.

Besides the accessibility of public office to all free citizens characteristic of democratic government, Democritus also censures the accountability of state officials to the demos. In his opinion, it does not befit a ruler to be answerable to anyone but himself, nor is it proper for the one who rules over others to find himself in a year or so under their rule...

It is worth noting that these critical remarks were not entirely groundless, as under contemporary democracy state officials failing to curry favour with the demos stood a good chance of being victimised and persecuted after the expiration of their term of office. Democritus however does not confine his criticism to the inadequacy of democratic procedures but comes out against the very principle of accountability of the ruler to the ruled, "the better" to "the worse''.

The laws, according to Democritus, are intended to improve men's life in the polis, but they are not omnipotent. In order to benefit by the laws, the citizens must exert efforts and learn to abide by them: "The aim of the law is to benefit human life, but it can only do so when men are willing to accept its benefits: it reveals its excellence to those who obey". In Democritus's eyes, the ethical value of both the law and lawful actions lies in their conformity with virtue, the highest good. Virtue as such is more powerful than the law, the latter being but one and not the best instrument of the former. "By encouragement and persuasive words one will prove a more powerful advocate of virtue than by law and compulsion; for he who is kept from wrong by law is likely to sin in secret, but he who is brought to duty by conviction is unlikely to err either in secret or openly" (DK, Fr. 181). This passage provides a clue to Democritus's assertions that the law is a bad contrivance, that a wise man should not obey the laws but live free, and that the whole world is open to the sage as it is the fatherland of lofty spirit. The freedom of the sage from any particular polis and its laws exalted by Democritus derives from the high degree of the sage's virtuousness which elevates him above ordinary men needing the moral custody of the

state. The laws are in fact made for rank-and-file citizens in order to put a curb on their envies, malice and natural tendency towards dissension. They are not needed by the sage who is guided by reason towards contentment (eythymia) and virtuous living under any form of government and under any laws.

Treating the problems of the state and law from the viewpoint of the ``sage'', Democritus exhibits a good deal of scepticism towards traditional polis patriotism and respect for the laws. Remaining true to his principle of well-being or contentment as the goal of life, he recommends avoiding the extremes - excessive zeal for public affairs on the one hand and neglect of one's duties to the state, on the other: "To good men, it is not advantageous that they should neglect their own affairs for other things; for their private affairs suffer. But if a man neglects public affairs, he is ill spoken of, even if he steals nothing and does no wrong" (Democritus, Fr. 253). The general trend of Democritus's moral precepts was against vanity in both public and private life. His maxims in fact boiled down to the advice to attend to one's own business, i. e. to do what conforms with nature and is really necessary, as becomes a wise man. In his pursuit of contentment or well-being Democritus goes as far as rejecting marriage and child-bearing as things treacherous and troublesome. In his opinion, it is best to have no children at all, but if one feels a need for them, he should adopt a friend's rather than beget his own.

Democritus's views on punishment occupy an important place in his political theory. In his opinion, discord and enmity among men spring from envy congenial with them. Only the few-sages, "the best", are free from this vice, wherefore their right to be a law unto themselves. As regards all others, i. e. the majority of mankind, the polis law is absolutely indispensable as a means of holding in leash their deleterious wilfulness. The laws, according to Democritus, would exercise no restraint on individual freedom if men did not strive to injure one another. Being laid, as they are, for ordinary men, the laws must be strictly observed and any attempt to break them must be severely punished. All those who trample on justice and injure others are to be killed without compunction. The one who does so stands a better chance of preserving his rights, property, courage and the peace of mind under any form of government than the one who neglects this duty.

Advocating inexorable punishment of criminals in the name of public welfare, Democritus underscores the need to proceed in accordance with the written law or legal custom of long standing. In his opinion, scoundrels should be treated as prescribed for harmful animals and reptiles: they should be put to death in any state where the native laws do not rule otherwise. The exception, he adds, is to be made only in two cases: when the criminal takes refuge in a sanctuary or when his life is protected by an oath or a treaty. Referring, in fact, to the conditions of necessary self-defence, Democritus maintains that the one who kills a robber or a pirate, or orders others to do so, should be exempted from punishment. On the other hand, the release of a criminal from well-deserved punishment should be qualified, in his opinion, as injustice and culpable negligence.

On the whole, the views of Democritus on crime and punishment are based on his conception of law as a means of restraint and compulsion of the inferior majority of mankind incapable of virtuous conduct and heedless of persuasive words due to the inherent moral and intellectual deficiencies of their nature.

The conceptions of Democritus gained wide currency among the ancient thinkers already during his lifetime and exerted a profound influence on the subsequent development of philosophical and political thought. The atomistic doctrine of Leucippus and Democritus was elaborated by their outstanding follower Epicurus who also adopted and modified a number of principles of Democritus's politico-legal teaching, particularly his political ethics and theory of law.

Later writers on political and legal subjects were greatly indebted to Democritus for his investigations into the problems of ``nature'' (physis) versus ``law'' (norms) and ``truth'' versus ``opinion''. These problems pivoting on the conception of natural right were brought into the limelight by the sophists, acquired new aspects and for a long time occupied the centre of the philosophical stage exercising, after the sophists, the minds of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Despite the wide difference of these thinkers' views on the origin and substance of the laws and political institutions of the polis, they could not keep away from the nomos-physis controversy and had to take a definite stand by subscribing to one of the versions of the conflicting theories. Democritus was an elder contemporary of the first-generation sophists known also as the ``early'' sophists, and one of the first

(before Socrates and Plato) critics of their relativism, rhetorical practices and verbal tricks intended to trip up opponents in a debate and confuse the issues. He is known to have called the sophists squabblers and tricksters, which opinion he may have formed during his talks with Protagoras of Abdera, the most prominent among die sophists (according to some sources, young Protagoras came to listen to his famous fellow-- countryman and even became his pupil). On the evidence of Plutarch, confirmed also by Sextus Empiricus in his book Against the Logicians (VII, 389), Democritus had a polemic with sophist Protagoras and advanced many convincing arguments against him.

In connection with the so-called Democritus-sophists line it should be noted that the sophists carried to an extreme and turned into an absolute the Democritean thesis that social institutions and laws are artificial and exist by ``opinion'', and not by ``truth''. Besides, exaggerating the role of sensations and sensible knowledge in general, the sophists called in question the validity of the very conception of objective truth substituting for it ``opinion'' and subjective conviction.

The arguments of the sophists were later developed by the sceptics. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, the founder of ancient scepticism Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B. C.) quoted Democritus more often than any other philosopher. According to ancient sources, Pyrrho's teacher Anaxarchus had familiarised himself with the writings of Democritus, made no discoveries and written nothing of interest, but was known to abuse everybody-the gods and the men. Tradition says that he was a court philosopher of Alexander the Great and once told his master, with reference to Democritus, of the existence of innumerable worlds. The young conqueror was greatly upset and observed ruefully that he himself had not been able to subdue even one of them...

The sceptics adduced a number of Democritus's pronouncements on the difficulty of attaining true knowledge (such as "truth is in the depths", etc.) as evidence of his sceptical views and did their best to recast his thoughts in their own mould. Interpreting his eythymia (contentment) as ataraxia ( imperturbability) and apathy (lack of emotion), they ascribed to him a much greater indifference to politics and public affairs than his ethical conceptions actually implied.

Democritus was an outstanding precursor of Socrates and

Plato in the criticism of sophistic relativism and subjectivism. For all the difference of their views, all the three recognised, in contrast with the sophists, the objective truth and the possibility of its cognition, and this conviction was the corner-stone of their political and legal conceptions. In the light of this obvious affinity of their philosophical postulates it appears very strange that Plato never mentioned by name his famous predecessor whose works were known in Plato's time to all enlightened Hellas. Touching upon this question, Diogenes Laertius gives this explanation: "Aristoxenus in his Historical Motes affirms that Plato wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could collect, but that Amyclas and Clinias the Pythagoreans prevented him saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for already the books were widely circulated" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 40). However that may be, Plato's silence can hardly be regarded as accidental. Most likely, he had ideological rea-" sons of his own that are not known to us. His omission did not detract from the fame of Democritus, just as, for instance, the renown of Socrates did not suffer because of the refusal of Democritus to recognise his wisdom (on some evidence, Democritus once visited Athens and had a talk with Socrates without disclosing his name).

Democritus, it will be recalled, was averse to vainglory and preached modesty and avoidance of public notice. Let us assume, then, that the deplorable loss of his works anticipating Aristotle's in encyclopaedic scope and versatility, and the glaring gap in Plato's dialogues were but tricks of the Greek wilful goddess of fortune Tyche who turned the tables on the philosopher himself.

2. THE SOPHISTS

The rise of general interest in political and legal subjects in ancient Greece is connected with the sophists who came to the foreground in the intellectual life of Greek society in the second half of the fifth century-a period of sweeping democratic changes that followed the magnificent victory of the Hellines over their formidable enemy-the Persian Empire.

The name ``sophist'' (from Greek ``sophos''---wise) was originally applied to a man proficient in various fields of human endeavour (crafts, arts, science, etc.). Later, after Protagoras, it

came to mean "man of wisdom" who trained his pupils for fees in the art of clear thinking and rhetoric needed for a successful business or political career. According to Protagoras, the first sophists among whom he included Orpheus, Musaeus, Homer, Hesiod, Simonides and other masters of the arts, did not call themselves by that name only because they feared jealousies, enmities and conspiracies: "I therefore take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgement appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment" (Plato, Protagoras, 317).

In popular use the word ``sophist'' has always had a ring of disdain about it: from the viewpoint of common sense it carries a connotation of cunning subtilisation and sly hair-splitting. The claim of the Greek sophists to wisdom which was presumably beyond the common people's wits evoked natural negative reaction on the part of the demos to their mumbo-jumbo and often exposed them to suspicion and odium. Characteristically, speaking depreciatingly of Prometheus's craftiness Greek dramatist Aeschylus calls his hero a ``sophist''.

Particularly detrimental to the reputation of the sophists in the eyes of the public was their irresistible desire to outargue the opponents in a dispute at all costs and their remarkable unscrupulousness in the choice of methods to attain this end. The overwhelming majority of the sophists were not averse from using various verbal tricks and subtle logical fallacies in order to trip up and disparage their rivals. Sophistic rhetoric (art of eloquence) and eristic (art of disputation) were double-edged weapons: on the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras contended that there are two opposite, but equally tenable arguments on every subject, and a characteristic feature of sophistic orators was their readiness to defend with equal zeal any of the two opposing views seeking to make the weaker cause the stronger and vice versa.

Not only the style and form, but also the content of the sophists' discourse, their essentially new world outlook (a trend towards relativism and subjectivism, denial of all absolutes and authorities, scepticism towards the gods, sharp criticism of traditional religious, ethical, political and legal conceptions, ridicule of superstitions) were a shock to the conservatives and a bold challenge to the age-old polis order, ancient customs and beliefs.

Not of the least importance was also the fact that the leading sophists had come to Athens, the centre of the contemporary cultural life and, according to Pericles, "the school of all Hellas", from other polises and were naturally regarded by the conservative Athenians with certain suspicion as aliens. It was no wonder that in the eyes of most of the native citizens sophistic appeared a dubious, if not altogether disreputable, art (Athens produced its own philosophers and sophists much later and owed a great debt to the older philosophical schools and trends of the Hellenic polises in Asia Minor and South Italy). The Athenians clearly displayed their impatience with foreign charlatanry by ousting the visiting "teachers of wisdom"---- natural philosopher Anaxagoras and sophist Protagoras, and by executing the home-bred ``sophist'' Socrates, who was the second (after Anaxagoras's pupil Archelaus) Athenian philosopher and, ironically, the first profound critic of sophistic philosophical and ethical conceptions. The final touch to the black reputation of the sophists was put by Plato and odier Socratics at whose hands the word ``sophist'' definitely became a term of opprobrium. Wishing to vindicate their teacher Socrates and dissociate him from the sins of the sophists, they set up an insurmountable barrier between philosophy as an aspiration to true wisdom and sophistic as its counterfeit. Plato, for instance, describes the sophist in these words: "He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows---who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class ofphantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine-any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and leneage will say the very truth" (Plato, Sophist, 268d).

Plato's negative attitude to the sophists was shared by Aristotle who pursued further the critical line of his teacher: " Dialectics is tentative concerning things which philosophy knows, sophistry makes the appearance of knowing without knowing" (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1004b,). It is highly significant, however, that in both Plato's and Aristotle's works which are the main source of ancient evidence for the views of the sophists the latter emerge as original and profound thinkers despite the obvious anti-sophistic bias of their authors. In point of fact, the sophistic

conceptions, denied but not refuted, fall in and merge with the general Socra tic-Platonic -Aristotelian line in ancient philosophy which could not have been started without the sophistic break with the old ``physicists'' on a broad number of issues, political and legal ones inclusive.

The sophists were brave and profound innovators in philosophy, logic, epistemology, ethics, politics, rhetoric and many other fields of knowledge. Previous natural philosophy, concerned primarily with the objective ``divine'' nature of things, left out of account the individual and his active role in the world, i. e. the subjective factor in being and cognition, and ignored the social substance and character of man's theoretical and practical activity. The sophists, contrariwise, looked at the world from the standpoint of individual consciousness and drew radical conclusions from their new approach thereby turning the inquisitive human mind from the objectively divine to the subjectively human complex of phenomena and problems.

The transition from die physicalistic to the humanistic outlook on the world was a great historical change, justly credited to the sophistic movement. The age of enlightenment, ushered in by the sophists, brought further rationalisation of the notions of nature, society, state, politics, law and ethics, and marked a new approach to the traditional problems of man-polis relationship and a new understanding of man's place in the world. The motto of this ancient enlightenment was the famous diesis of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things.''

Proceeding from this proud principle, the sophists set out in search of a more substantial basis for ethics and politics than tradition and old customs and focused their attention on the laws governing the emergence and operation of politico-legal institutions. Their conceptions laid the foundation of a theoretical inquiry into a number of fundamental problems of state and law.

The activity of the sophists presupposing free discussion of all philosophical, ethical and political questions tended, in turn, to deepen and further rationalise the moral, political and legal views in die broad masses stimulating their active participation in public affairs. It is not surprising therefore that the atmosphere of democratic polises, Athens including, was particularly conducive to the sophistic movement. Speaking of the Athenian democratic practices, Pericles said: "We Athenians are able to

judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all" ( Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, II, 40).'

The sophists played an outstanding part in the political enlightenment of their fellow countrymen. However, the results of their efforts were not always positive, as was soon to be discovered by the sophists themselves and their contemporaries.

The sophists did not make a single school and professed difierent philosophical, political and legal theories. Already ancient doxographers distinguished between two generations of the sophists: Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Antiphon, and others were known as earlier sophists, and Thrasymachus, Callicles, Lycophron and others, as later sophists. Most of the earlier sophists were on the whole of a democratic cast of mind, whereas the later sophists were largely represented by adherents of other forms of government (aristocracy, oligarchy).

Protagoras (c. 481-411 B. C.) was a citizen of Abdera in Thrace. According to a biographical version traceable to Epicurus, he earned his living as a porter and once, carrying a bundle of firewood, was met by Democritus. Impressed by the skillfully made packet, Democritus took him in his service and made his clerk.^^2^^ In the forties of the fifth century B. C. Protagoras came to Athens and, calling himself a sophist, started giving lessons in the art of politics and "prudence in affairs private as well as public" (Plato, Protagoras, 318). His fees were very high and he fixed the sums personally. If a pupil considered the price too high, Protagoras offered him to go into a temple and take on oath of the value of the instruction he had received whereupon he paid the sum he had vouched for. Tradition tells us that Protagoras once made a deal with his pupil Euathlus whereby the latter was to pay him the fee after winning his first case in a law court. The pupil, however, was in no hurry to get a case and the teacher threatened to sue him. Puzzled Euathlus replied that he

had not won a case yet and had received no fee. "Nay," said Protagoras, "if I win this case against you I must have the fee, for winning it; if you win, I must have it, because you win it" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 56).

Protagoras enjoyed a reputation for great learning, eloquence and eristic (polemic) skill. He had numerous pupils and was a friend of Pericles. On the evidence of Plutarch, a man had been accidentally killed with a javelin in a public contest and Pericles "spent a whole day with Protagoras in a serious dispute, whether the javelin, or the man that threw it, or the masters of the games who appointed these sports, were, according to the strictest and best reason, to be accounted for the cause of this mischance" (Plutarch, Pericles, 36). According to Diogenes Laertius as reported by Heraclides Ponticus, Protagoras was invited by Pericles to draw up a constitution for a new Athenian colony of Thurii in South Italy. The visit of Protagoras to Cicily is vouched for by Plato (Plato, Greater Hippias, 282e).

During his last visit to Athens Protagoras, already of ripe old age, was charged (by Athenian Pythodorus) with impiety. His books were collected from their possessors and publicly burned, and he himself hurriedly fled from the city. On some evidence, he was drowned by shipwreck on the way to Cicily. Protagoras was the author of numerous treatises of which only their titles, or, at best, isolated fragments have survived. The list of his works includes Truth, Of the Ancient Order of Things, On the Gods, The Art of Controversy, On Mathematics, Of Wrestling, Of the State, Of Ambition, Of Virtues, Of the Misdeeds of Mankind, Of Forensic Speech for a Fee, A Book of Precepts, and others. The keynote of Protagoras's views is his famous statement: "Man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the nonexistence of things that are not" (Plato, Theaetetus, 152a). Plato's Socrates interprets this maxim in the spirit of subjectivist sensualism and relativism: "Knowledge is simply perception" (ibid., 151e) and "things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me" (ibid., 152). One can hardly accept this interpretation since ``man'' in Protagoras was not an empirical individual, but a human being as such, synonymous with mankind. Asserting the relativity of sensations and of human knowledge in general, Protagoras proceeds not from the uniqueness of each individual and peculiarity of his perceptions, but from the specificity of human conscious-

~^^1^^ Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 6, p. 397.

~^^2^^ This legend is being dismissed by modern investigators as improbable since Protagoras was 15 or 20 years older than Democritus. It is much more likely that Democritus was influenced by Protagoras, but not vice versa. Protagoras, in turn, was indebted to Parmenides and Anaxagoras.

ness, the attitude of humanity to the surrounding world.^^1^^ Protagoras speaks of the relativity of all that lends itself to human measure rather than of the measure itself, thereby clearly exhibiting the influence of the Heraclitean conception of universal flux. Relative and changeful, according to Protagoras, is not the measure, but what is being measured. If it were immutable and absolute after the manner of Parmenides, it would be its own measure, the limited human faculties would be completely inadequate and, contrary to Parmenides, no thought would be able to attain to true knowledge.

According to Protagoras, man alone, with his sensations and consciousness, provides a measure of relative and mutable being, thereby making truth as such possible. In the final analysis, it is this essentially human substance of truth that accounts for all individual men's ``participation'' in it despite the broad diversity and difference of their sensations and judgements. The absence of a single (invariant) truth is therefore the result of its ``human'' nature (due to the changefulness and relativeness of all things), but not of the difference of individuals and their sensations. Things appear different to different individuals not because of their epistemological inequality, but because-and this is the crux of the matter---they are different with different men. Hence, the diversity of individual truths results from and attests to their ``human'' nature which is incompatible with a single and absolute standard.

It is worth noting in this context that the man-measure doctrine does not consort with the elitist theories professed by some of the sophists---one cannot reasonably see the measure of all things in man and simultaneously deny the possession of this instrument of cognition to the ``many''. Protagoras's congruence

at this point is largely a result of his democratic views. Very characteristic in this respect is his account of the origin of human society given in the form of a myth and reproduced by Plato in his dialogue Protagoras. According to Protagoras, the original gifts of Prometheus ("the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them") and the subsequent gifts of Zeus ("reverence and justice" intended to save the human race from self-annihilation due to the lack of the art of government) were made the common property of all men, wherefore all men share in wisdom and virtue and are in principle equal. These ethicoepistemological conceptions were in fact a reflection of Protagoras's democratic convictions.

The man-measure doctrine of Protagoras glorifying man and placing him in the centre of the universe ran counter to the traditional religious outlook, according to which the world measure was essentially divine, man's knowledge was the gift of the gods and he himself was completely at their mercy. Coming out against this doctrine, Plato writes in the dialogue Laws: "Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say (Protagoras)" (Plato, Laws, 716c).

Sceptical attitude to the gods and religious traditions ensuing from Protagoras's basic epistemological tenets was an important aspect of his enlightening activity. In the treatise On the Gods he wrote: "As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life" (Diogenes Laertius, op. cit, Protagoras, IX, 51).

One must not be misled regarding Protagoras's religious agnosticism by the mythological form he sometimes gave to his thought as is the case with the above tale. The great sophist resorted to myth not only by way of adornment likely to give more pleasure to his listeners and capture their imagination, but also as a convenient method for conveying his message along traditional lines the audience was used to.

Using the well-known myth of Prometheus, Protagoras in the debate with Socrates expounds his thesis that the art of government which is the prime requisite for organised social life can be acquired by training and that wisdom and political virtues are equally accessible to all people. It is only because these gifts had not been restricted by Zeus to selected individuals that men

' Taking exception to the views of ancient doxographers and modern commentators who class Protagoras as a sensualist and relativist, some scholars adduce his ``correlativism'', i. e. the doctrine of constant correlation between thought and reality very different from the Parmenidean identity of thinking and being. According to this doctrine of Protagoras, everything present in thought is real, and any statement of any man at any given moment is true, i. e. related to being. The non-existent is what is not being perceived or thought (Olof Gigon, Sokrates, A. Francke AG Verlag, Bern, 1947, S. 249-250). The weak point of this generally correct interpretation consists, in our opinion, in that it apparently ignores the universal character of Protagoras's ``man'' as the source and carrier of the measure of all things.

were capable to pass from the original state of lawlessness, dispersion and mutual destruction to law, order and unity.

The democratic essence of Protagoras's parable and politicolegal conception consists in the contention that there would be no state if only a few shared in political virtues, that is justice, fair-mindedness and moderation.

Now virtues unlike reason and practical intelligence bestowed on the human race by Prometheus from the very beginning and underlying man's ability to learn technical skills are not innate qualities. They do not arise automatically, but can be acquired by teaching and assiduous practice, and that is what the sophists are supposed to do. "The existence of a state," says Protagoras, "implies that no man is unskilled in virtue" (Plato, Protagoras, 32 7a). Unlike Socrates who censures Athenian democracy for allowing incompetent citizens (carpenters, shoe-makers, coppersmiths, tradesmen, etc.) to participate in polis affairs, Protagoras readily accepts it as the Athenians, in his opinion, possess the political virtues to a sufficient degree.

Since virtues needed in private and public affairs can be taught and learned, proper education of all members of the polis is a matter of state importance. Linking his conception of the attainability of virtue with man's responsibility for his actions, Protagoras offers his own justification of the punishment of criminals: in his opinion, "he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong, for what has been done cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again" (Plato, Protagoras, 324 b-c). Political virtues (justice, self-restraint, etc.), as well as the polis and its laws come, according to Protagoras, under the heading of things that have man as their measure. The progress of human society described by Protagoras in the myth shows that he regards the state and the laws as artificial institutions resulting from the spread of political virtues and man's increasing skill in the art of government. They come not by nature, but by convention, embodying man's wisdom and ability to master the political art for the common good of all citizens.

Proceeding from his epistemological doctrine, Protagoras takes a resolute stand against what is natural (physis] and extols the state, laws and political wisdom as products of human knowledge, as man's great achievements attesting to his rise

above the savageness of nature and assimilation to the ``divine'' (Plato, Protagoras, 322a).

In contrast with the later sophists who divorced nomos from physis and put forward a case for the ``natural'' as true against the ``artificial'' as false, Protagoras viewed the artificial as the criterion of social progress and evidence for man's wisdom and virtuousness. His idea of the possibility of promoting political virtues by education was aimed at consolidating and multiplying the gains of society of which die most important were the state and the laws.

The ``artificial'' things, as well as the ``natural'' ones are relative, fluid and mutable, yet the certitude of human knowledge (including the knowledge of the ``artificial'' state and laws) attests to their authenticity and genuineness.

The adduction of knowledge as evidence for the validity of human institutions gives yet another dimension to Protagoras's doctrine of education and training for the public weal and clarifies the crucial role of the principle of utility in his theory of knowledge. The diversity of individual trudis does not mean that they are equally useful or, to put it another way, that different truths about one and the same thing have equal values. From the viewpoint of the polis as a form of commonwealth, the greatest value lies with the virtuousness of its citizens and the equity of their relations.

The wisdom (and usefulness) of the educator, be he a parent, an orator or an official, consists in the ability to instil in the citizens socially useful views and direct them to the course of action promoting common good. Plato ascribes to Protagoras the following words: "The wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to each state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it; and what the wise man does is to cause good to appear, and be real, for each of them instead of evil" (Plato, Theaetetus, 167c).

The principle of common good underlies not only the problem of proper education, but also the need for state coercion in relation to those who act in defiance of public interests and violate the law of the state. "The city," says Protagoras, "outlines the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time, and compels us to exercise and to obey authority in accordance with those; and he who transgresses them is to be

corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account" (ibid., 326d-e).

In the view of Protagoras, the relativity of all statements concerning the polis and the laws does not detract from their value. Though all artificial things, the state institutions and laws inclusive, depend on man's advancement in political art through the mediation, as it were, of his ``measure'', they are not a product of man's arbitrary judgement. For all their relativity ( changefulness and diversity), the notions of the polis, laws, justice, etc. are objective by virtue of their veracity and, consequently, lend themselves to modification by the sensible conceptions of public weal.

Which of the numerous competing truths in the sphere of politico-legal relations in the polis gets the upper hand largely depends on the education of the citizens and on what they believe to be just and useful. Education and training, that is the job of the sophists, acquire great political importance and enlightenment turns into a powerful instrument in the struggle for people's minds. Protagoras was well aware of the practical significance of his activity and maintained that a theory of art without practice and practice without theory are nothing.

Protagoras went down in the history of Greek political thought as a champion of the principles of justice, law and order, believing them to be objective values. The democratic form of the realisation of these principles was in full accord with his own conception of truth and utility. His activity as an educator and enlightener was aimed at promoting the political art and disseminating democratic ideas and values.

Gorgias (c. 483-375 B. C.) was another prominent sophist who came from Leontini, a small town in Sicily. He is said to have taken lessons in philosophy from Empedocles (a pupil of Parmenides, the head of the Eleatic school), and in rhetoric, from Teisias of Syracuse who, after his teacher Corax, described rhetoric as the "demiurge of conviction". Philostratus writes "that the art of the sophists carries back to him as though he were its father" (Philostratus and Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists, I, 9, 492).

Gorgias made a reputation for oratory in his native town. In 427 B. C. he went to Athens on an embassy to plead the cause of Leontini against Syracuse and ask the Council for military aid.

His oratory amazed the Athenians and won them over to his view. Moving from one Hellenic polis to another, Gorgias gave lessons and public exhibitions of his skill for high fees. On the invitation of tyrant Jason he went to rich Thessaly where he spent most of his life. However, according to his pupil Isocrates, Gorgias had no fixed abode in any city, incurred no public expenses and was exempt from all taxes. Besides, he was not married and had no children being thus free from this "most enduring and onerous of all social duties''.

Gorgias lived a long life and preserved his spirits and lucidity of mind till the very end. When asked about the cause of his longevity, he said that he had never done anything for pleasure. His memory was perpetuated by a statue of gold erected for him in the Delphian temple, presumably on the enormous means he had saved during his lifetime.

Gorgias attached extreme importance to rhetoric and regarded it as the queen of sciences opening the way to supreme power. His views which exerted a considerable influence on the sophistic movement were based on definite philosophical principles and reflected a definite world outlook. Underscoring the need for philosophical studies, Gorgias once wittily observed that those who ignored philosophy in their pursuit of special arts reminded him of the suitors of Penelope fornicating with her maids...

Gorgias's own philosophical studies led him to ontological nihilism and agnosticism. For his theoretical creed we have this evidence of Sextus Empiricus: "Gorgias of Leontini ... in his book entitled "Concerning the Nonexistent or Concerning Nature" tries to establish successively three main points-firstly, that nothing exists; secondly, that even if anything exists it is inapprehensible by man; thirdly, that even if anything is apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible and incommunicable to one's neighbour" (Sextus Empiricus, VII-VIII, Against the Logicians, Book I, 65 Vol. 2). It was in the spirit of this utter agnosticism denying any objective criterion of truth and truth itself that Gorgias developed his views on the role of rhetoric, as an art of persuasion by eloquence. Asserting that we all live in the world of opinion and the truth is whatever each of us is persuaded to believe, he in fact substitutes rhetoric, verisimilitude and general consent for the philosophical demonstration of truth.

In contrast with Protagoras and other sophists who professed to be teachers of virtue, Gorgias claimed only the intention of making clever speakers, since true knowledge of any object or phenomenon (including virtue) was not accessible to either the teacher or the pupil. According to Plato, he held that "the art of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will" (Plato, Philebus, 58-58b).

One should not conclude from the above that Gorgias was against virtue and rejected all ethical notions. We have sufficient grounds to believe that his nihilistic attitude was confined to a single universal virtue, the same for all (and, naturally, to the possibility of its cognition should it exist) and did not prevent him from asserting the existence of individual virtues.

In one of Plato's dialogues, Gorgias's pupil Meno speaking with Socrates gives this account of his teacher's views: "Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and consequently there is no difficulty about definitions; for there is a virtue relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And I take it the same may be said of vice, Socrates" (Plato, Meno, 71e-72).

Plato's evidence for a differentiated approach of Gorgias to ethical categories is borne out by Aristotle's laudatory comment: "Far better than such [general] definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes" (Aristotle: II, Politics, I, 13, 1260a 25).

The ``pluralisation'' of ethical standards was an obvious departure from collectivist morality towards individualism which could not but erode the foundation of polis life and the traditional unity of citizens regarding ethical, political and moral problems.

In rhetoric, Gorgias's interest seems to have centred upon forensic speeches in which he usually described arguments for the defence against one or another accusatory thesis having a deeprooted tradition behind it. The chief aim of his oratory addressed to the court of the people was to induce the judges, by word of reason, to change their minds and to win them over to the side of the defence overcoming their prejudice and denseness. Public speeches of this kind, invalidating obsolete religious,

aesthetic, ethic and legal views were bound to have a strong political resonance even if they were not directly concerned with polis affairs. In the conditions of the broad participation of free citizens in the discussion of common problems Gorgias's public rhetoric was an essential component of the political art and could be used as an effective instrument in struggle for power. Public word in polis life turned into a public force.^^1^^

The rhetoric of Gorgias can be exemplified by his Encomium of Helen where the master of the "art of persuasion" comes out against the age-old tradition blaming Helen for the woes of the Trojan War. On the evidence of Gorgias himself he sought to disprove the opinion shared by all ancient poets, to vindicate Helen's memory by disclosing the truth, and to reduce ignorance to silence. Gorgias argues the innocence of Helen by attributing her flight into Troy to the operation of the forces beyond her control. Helen's action, he contends, was either the result of the gods' will so that she was driven by fate of necessity, or abduction by force, or seduction by persuasive words, or captivation by love. In all these instances Helen is guiltless, being either a victim of divine fate (in the first case, and also in the fourth, if love is believed to be sent by Eros), or mortals' coercion (physical in the second case and mental in the third). Should one consider love but a body's ailment and soul's delusion, Helen again is not guilty, as her infatuation was in the nature of a misfortune rather than a fault and she acted without evil intent by a whim of chance, i. e. against her will.

The case for Helen put forward by Gorgias is notable for a new concept of guilt essentially different from the views of his contemporaries. In contrast with a very broad understanding of culpability that was characteristic of his time and led to the socalled objective imputation (attribution of evil to a doer solely on the basis of objective results of his actions), Gorgias proposed to recognise a person guilty only in case of malicious intent on his part. Adducing force majeure (vis major) or chance (casus) as arguments against culpability, he in fact denied all other forms of guilt. His theory whereby a man can only be guilty of intentional wrongdoing was firmly within the sophistic tradition

~^^1^^ One researcher justly notes that Gorgias's art of persuasion making it possible to manipulate the audience turned out "an instrument of power" (See Karlheinz Rode, op. cit., S. 17).

6 113

of enlightened rationalism and individualism.

It is very characteristic of Gorgias that both in Encomium on Helen and Defence ofPalamedes ' he takes a firm stand for ``truth'' and ``justice'' underscoring their social value. Relative and dependent on the persuasiveness of their advocates as they are, truth and justice, in his opinion, adorn the city, instil courage in its men, impart beauty to the body, wisdom to the soul, virtue to the cause and verity to the word. The opposite, he says, is discord and confusion.

The art of eloquence, according to Gorgias, must be equal to its high mission. The word is a mighty despot and wields great power of persuasion moulding the soul at its will. Warning against the perils that come from the abuse of the power of word, Gorgias qualifies persuasion by false reasoning as compulsion and is perhaps the first thinker to have clearly equated them in terms of legal responsibility.

Gorgias sharply attacked "false reasoning" and, ironically, foreshadowed in this point Plato's criticism of sophistic. As evidence that artful persuasion can make false opinions appear true ones, Gorgias adduced verbal contests in popular assemblies where a skillful but deceitful speech not infrequently won the support of the demos. The guiding principle of his own rhetorical art was the exaltation of aesthetic, ethic and political virtues.

Gorgias gives a high appraisal .of the achievements of human culture including the "written laws, these guardians of justice". A written law is man's contrivance, i. e. something artificial, different from unwritten ``justice'' which, according to Gorgias, is the substance of human affairs, the divine and universal law. Yet the distinction between them in Gorgias does not turn into their opposition. Advocating the written laws, Gorgias nevertheless rates justice as a higher value.

In his Essay on Death glorifying the Athenians who had fallen in battle, Gorgias draws a line of demarcation between "mild justice" and "rigid law", and brings in the notion of "right time" or opportunity, i. e. expediency (kairos). Eulogising the departed, Gorgias recalls their noble deeds and points out that

they often displayed genuine sense of right and placed the truth of the substance above the letter of the law, thus recognising that truly divine and universal law consists in saying and doing the right thing at the right time. Gorgias further links justice with equality and points out that the deceased were just to their compatriots by virtue of their inherent feeling for equality.

Gorgias held in great esteem the blessings of peace which, in his opinion, brought everything beautiful and good to mankind. In his Olympian Oration delivered in approximately 408 B. C. during the inter-Hellenic Peloponnesian War Gorgias called all Hellenes to unity and peace exhorting them to end their fratricidal strife and join forces against the barbarians.

The same idea of unity and' peace was advocated by him in the Essay on Death-die funeral oration delivered in Athens, one of the two chief rival states in the struggle for domination over the Hellenic world (the other one was Sparta). Taking due care not to stroke the wrong way the bellicose and hegemonistically minded Athenians and praising them for their victories over the Medes, Gorgias at the same time cautiously rubbed in the idea that "victories over barbarians call for hymns of praise, but victories over Greeks for dirges." '

Gorgias had many pupils, the most famous of whom were orator Isocrates, sophists Polus of Acragas and Alcidamas of Elaea.

Sophist Prodicus (born c. 470 B. C.) came from Ceos, a small island north of Crete. Often coming to Athens on official missions from Ceos, he acquired there a fame as a teacher of virtue and a great language specialist. He was particularly good at interpreting the meanings of words and drawing fine distinctions between synonyms. Socrates who was among Prodicus's listeners spoke of his art in complimentary terms and even spent one drachma to hear his lecture (Prodicus is known to have charged 50 drachmas for the full course, but Socrates evidently had neither such money nor the need for prolonged studies). In Plato's dialogue Protagoras Socrates calls himself a disciple of Prodicus and even his friend - though not without an undertone of irony characteristic of him.

In his Theaetetus, Plato ascribes to Socrates a rather ambig.uous statement, obviously not very flattering to Prodicus, that

~^^1^^ Palamedes was one of the heroes of the Trojan War killed by the Hellenes through a false charge of Odysseus. Plato's Socrates mentions his name among those of his predecessors who have "suffered death through an unjust judgement" (Plato, Apology, 41-41b).

~^^1^^ Philostratus and Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists, I, 9, 494, William Heinemann, Ltd., Cambridge, Mas., Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 33.

he had sent many of his pupils barren of good ideas but otherwise bright and promising to Prodicus and "other inspired sages" as they were not in need of his art of midwifery, i. e. dialectics (Plato, Theaetetus, 151b). This and odier statements frequent in Plato's dialogues may well have been the echoes of his polemic against the sophists.

Prodicus held that the highest good in man's life is virtue and developed this idea in an allegorical form in his heroic fable "Choice of Heracles" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates).

When Heracles was passing from childhood to adolescence and had to decide which path of life to take, he was accosted by two beautiful women representing Virtue and Vice. Striving to win him over, Vice promised him a life of ease and pleasure whereas Virtue exposing the falsity of her rival's arguments, promised nothing but a life of hard work and anxiety insisting that everything good could only come by sweat and toil. She concluded her speech with these words: "If you would gain the favour of the Deity you must be at the pains of worshipping Him; if you would be beloved by your friends you must study to oblige them; if you would be honoured by any city you must be of service to it; and if you would be admired by all Greece, on account of your probity and valour, you must exert yourself to do her some eminent service. If you would render your fields fruitful, and fill your arms with corn, you must labour to cultivate the soil accordingly. Would you grow rich by your herds, a proper care must be taken of them; would you extend your dominions by arms, and be rendered capable of setting at liberty your captive friends, and bringing your enemies to subjection, you must not only learn of those that are experienced in the art of war, but exercise yourself also in the use of military affairs; and if you would excel in the strength of your body you must keep your body in due subjection to your mind, and exercise it with labour and pains" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, II, 1, 28).

Virtue, according to Prodicus, is the only right, though long and arduous road to a happy and contented life not only for an individual, but for all people, the whole human race. In his moral theory he assigns an important role to labour as an instrument of personal advancement and social progress. His doctrine is keynoted by the idea of man's responsibility for his own wel-

fare and for the common good which is in marked contrast with the traditional beliefs in Providence and the will of the gods. The gods in Prodicus help only those who are themselves solicitous about their affairs and do not shun hard work. His high assessment of the role of labour was an obvious departure from the views of his contemporaries scornful of all kinds of physical work.

Prodicus also sets great store by labour in his theory of the origin of society and the state in which he ascribes the emergence of the commonwealth and the general prosperity of its citizens to their purpose-oriented concerted efforts. It is not to the gods, but to hard toil and ingenuity that people owe their mastery over the blind forces of nature, suppression of baneful strife and the benefits of the selfless and organised polis life. An important place in this cultural progress belongs to language, the necessary instrument of people's communion and mutual understanding.

According to Prodicus, the progress of mankind brought about not only language and the state, but also religion, an important product of human efforts and one of man's greatest achievements. Taking a purely naturalistic and rational view of religion, Prodicus maintained that it had arisen from the tendency of primitive man to deify things useful to his life-the sun, various natural phenomena, bread (as goddess Demeter), wine (as god Dionysus), etc. He therefore recognised religion only from the utilitarian, as it were, viewpoint and criticised its unreasonable and irrational rites, such as wailing over the dead, etc. In his opinion, death does not concern itself with either the living, or the dead, because the former have nothing to do with death as they are alive, and the latter are indifferent to it as they are dead. Like Protagoras, he exalts human skills and regards all artificial products of human progress, including the state, law, religion, and virtue as beneficial to mankind. His views are still free from the scepticism and nihilism in relation to everything ``artificial'' that became a characteristic feature of many later sophists.

HippiasofElis (c. 460-400 B. C.) was one of the most versatile men of his time proficient in such widely diverse subjects as music, language, mathematics, astronomy, poetry, rhetoric, politics, etc. As a paid teacher of sophistic he visited many Hellenic polises and enjoyed great success. Plato tells us that Hippias, being once in a boastful mood and praising his profession,

highly lucrative and demanding wisdom, said to Socrates: " Socrates, you know nothing of the real charms of all this business. If you were told how much I have earned, you would be astounded. To take one case only---I went to Sicily once while Protagoras was living there; he had a great reputation and was a far older man than I, and yet in a short time I made more than 150 minas;' why, in one place alone, Inycus, a very small place, I took more than 20 minas. When I returned home with the money I gave it to my father, reducing him and his fellow citizens to a condition of stupefied amazement. And I feel pretty sure that I have made more money than any other two sophists you like to mention put together" (Plato, Greater Hippias, 282e).

Hippias took special pride in his versatility and apparently aspired after the ideal of omniscience which was synonymous with vanity and shallowness in the eyes of Heraclitus before him and Plato after. In the practical sphere it very naturally took the form of self-sufficiency which, on some evidence, Hippias regarded as the goal of life. According to Plato, he appeared at Olympia wearing only the things he had made himself including a ring, an oil flask and a strigil. His emphasis on man's independence was one of the clear expressions of individualism characteristic in one or another form of the sophistic movement as a whole.

The views of Hippias on legal problems were distinguished by originality and indicative of the independence of his thought. He was the first among the sophists to contrast nature (physis) and law (norms) in the spirit of the natural-law theory^^2^^ and

make out a case for nature on humanitarian grounds. Upholding the nature of things or the law of nature as true law free from the errors and limitations of human (positive) law, Hippias conceived it as the foundation of man's right to self-determination in accordance with the dictates of nature. In his view natural law was justice, whereas positive law resulting from human consent and often changing imposed on man artificial conventions and was injustice: "The laws are what the citizens have ordained by an universal consent" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, IV, IV, 13).

As arguments against the positive laws Hippias adduced their conventionality, frequent alterations, transitoriness and dependence on the judgement of short-lived legislators. Being a product of opinion, they could not be regarded as true for all times, as being absolutely necessary: "But how can it be imagined," argued Hippias, "that the laws are a good thing, and that it is good to obey them, since even they that made them mend, alter, and repeal them so often?" (ibid., IV, IV, 14). By contrast, unwritten natural law, according to Hippias, is universal in application and observed everywhere (ibid., IV, IV, 19).

The theory of natural law was also professed by sophist Antiphon (c. 400 B. C.). Arguing the equality of all men by nature, he adduced the same natural needs of both the Hellenes and the barbarians, the aristocrats and the common folk. Inequality, in his opinion, arose from human laws, not from nature. Contrasting the "laws of the polis" and the "laws of nature", he gives preference to the latter. Though justice, in his opinion, consists in not transgressing the laws and customs of one's state, many prescriptions regarded as just by the law are at odds with man's nature. Even useful commands of the law are fetters on man, whereas the precepts of nature are directed towards his freedom. Besides, violation of man-made laws without detection does one no harm, whereas the laws of nature cannot be flouted with impunity, because the edicts of the laws are imposed artificially and those of nature are compulsory. Again, the precepts of human laws are arrived at by consent, not by natural growth, whereas those of nature are not a matter of consent. In his work On Concord Antiphon contrasts the hardships of the first men's isolated existence with the advantages of civilised life in communities and castigates selfish strife among people, advocating concord and unity, particularly in relation to the polis

~^^1^^ A fabulous sum in Hippias's time; all the property of Socrates, his interlocutor, was said to be worth 5 minas, a good horse cost 10 minas and a skillful slave approximately as much.

~^^2^^ The many-sided Russian wordpravo has no exact English equivalent and is translated as ``law'' or ``right'' depending on its specific meaning in the text or traditional usage. For instance, Hegel's Grundlinim der Philosophie des Rechts is known in English-speaking countries as The Philosophy of Right, whereas in modern translations from Russian into English it is invariably called The Philosophy of Law. The same is true of the doctrine of natural right and the doctrine of natural law. Such examples can be multiplied, the more so as the translator had to take due account of the vocabulary of universally recognised English translations of ancient writers frequently cited in the text.

In view of the above, the terms ``law'' and ``right'' are often used in this book as synonyms, their selection being prompted by contextual rather than conceptual considerations.- Tr.

laws and public affairs. In this connection he underlines the importance of proper education which, in his opinion, should be based on natural law and aimed at suppressing the egoistic inclinations of the citizens.

Proceeding from the antithesis between natural and positive laws and comparing them to the advantage of the former, Antiphon not only criticised the contemporary polis laws and institutions but also sought to bring them in conformity with his rationalistic conception of man's nature.

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon was one of the most original and famous sophists of the second generation. His approach to political problems was keynoted by realism and critical spirit accountable for his impatience with religious and moral hypocrisy and for persistent attempts to uncover the naked truth and strip off all sorts of illusions. The views of Thrasymachus were notable for a good deal of scepticism and pessimism. The exact cause of his death is not known, but there are grounds to believe that he committed suicide.

According to Thrasymachus, politics is the sphere of human interests, not the gods' concern. The gods, he says, do not see what goes on among men. If they did, they would not neglect the greatest of human goods, namely justice, yet we see man making no use of it.

In Thrasymachus's view, what currently goes by the name of justice is nothing but fiction and actually stands for the interest of the stronger, those who are in power at a particular moment. All governments, he asserts, enact laws in their own interests and declare it justice.

This reversal of moral values in the conception of Thrasymachus deprives politics (public power, laws, etc.) of any ethical foundation and uncovers its real essence - the struggle of different social forces for power. The positive laws divested of all objective moral value turn into the embodiment of the rulers' interest.

According to Thrasymachus, the interest of the stronger is the criterion of practical politics and the principle of government. In each state, he says, the laws are made by those who hold the reins: democracy frames democratic laws, tyranny-tyrannical laws, etc. Having established such laws, the authorities call them just for their subjects and punish the transgressors as violators of justice. The subjects obey the laws in the ruler's interest and to

their own disadvantage. For a ruler to seize power and keep subjects at bay is profitable whereas to display pity and give way to compassion is perilous. Injustice, says Thrasymachus, is stronger and more profitable than justice.

Ridiculing the naive, from his viewpoint, attempts of Socrates to apply ethical standards to practical politics, Thrasymachus says to him: "So entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good, that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice, the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just" (Plato, Republic, I, 343, cd).

As is evidenced from the above passages, Thrasymachus neither advocated, nor censured a definite form of government (e. g. aristocracy in the first case, which has been frequently imputed to him, or democracy, in the second). All forms, in his opinion, are equally devised to further the rulers' interests. His conception theoretically boils down to the assertion that in all contemporary states power and laws rest on force usually cloaked under a fine phrase.

Thrasymachus went down in history as a political thinker who had brought in bold relief the role of compulsion in the activity of the state, focused on the authoritarian nature of law and politics and clearly expressed the idea that the ethical notions of contemporary society (i. e. the sphere of contemporary ideology) were dominated by the views of those who were in power.

The ethical foundation of politics was also rejected by Polus of Acragas, Gorgias's pupil. His interest mainly centred upon the practical aspect of social relations, i. e. the empirical reality of the contemporary state. Polus's views on the part played by practical experience in the process of cognition were later highly appraised by Aristotle in his Metaphysics: "And experience seems to be almost similar to science and art, but science and art come to men through experience; for, as Polus rightly says, ' experience made art, but inexperience, luck'" (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981a).

Polus extolled rhetoric as an important means for achieving domination over people. The orator, in his opinion, can do "as he likes" very much in the manner of the tyrant. Because there is no justice in relations among people, it is better, he argues, to commit injustice in achieving one's ends than suffer injustice

from others. Or, to put it another way, it is better to be the tyrant than his victim. Pursuing further this train of thought, he comes to the vindication of the tyrant and exalts his freedom-"the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like" (Plato, Gorgias, 469c).

The unrestrained urge for power and the conception of the right of the stronger are personified in Collides, a young Athenian aristocrat, described in Plato's dialogue Gorgias. Apart from Plato, we have no evidence for his existence and some commentators regard him as a purely fictitious figure brought in by Plato as an example of the unscrupulous and dangerous demagogue holding the tyrant for an ideal and believing the height of justice to be a conquest won by force. He may well have been a mask for Plato's ambitious uncle Critias.

Contrasting the law of nature to the positive laws and customs very much in the manner of the sophists, Plato's Callicles contends that "the makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests" (Plato, Gorgias, 483b). In his opinion, the majority are only too glad of equality as they know their weakness, "and therefore the endeavour to have more than the many is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker" (ibid).

According to Callicles, the law of natural right ordains that everywhere among animals, men, whole cities and races, the superior rule over and have more than the inferior. From the position of this law Callicles attacks democratic law and institutions based on the principle of equality. In his aristocratic interpretation the law of nature turns into the right of the better (stronger, wiser) to inequality.

The political views of Critias (450-403 B. C.), one of the leading figures among the Thirty Tyrants (404-403 B. C.), are also traditionally included under the head of sophistic enlightenment though he never taught wisdom for money in the manner of regular sophists. Consumed with ambition and thirst for power, he became an intimate member of the circle of Socrates in order to learn something of his master's skill of argument, then left it when he thought he had got enough and plunged into the

rough-and-tumble of politics. Sources tell us that he lost his life in war against democracy having earned himself a reputation of the most cruel and bloodthirsty member of the ruling tyrannical clique.

In the play Sisyphus, Critias expounds his theory of religion as a contrivance of a clever ruler designed to keep his subjects in check.

Speaking through the mouth of Sisyphus, the main hero of the play, Critias gives this story. There was a time when the life of man was disorderly and beastlike. Then men laid down laws, but these could only prevent open deeds of violence and men continued to commit them in secret. A way out was found by a shrewd legislator who invented the immortal gods, hearing and seeing everything so that no one could sin secretly with impunity.

Hence, religion is described by Critias as a deliberate imposture designed to enforce the law by fear of punishment.

According to Sextus Empiricus, "Critias, one of the tyrants at Athens, seems to belong to the company of the atheists when he says that the ancient lawgivers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that nobody injured his neighbours privily through fear of vengeance at the hands of the Gods" (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, IX-X, 1, 54).

Continuing the line of political voluntarism and ethico-- religious scepticism characteristic of the views of a number of sophists, Critias declares that not only the laws, but also religion and the ethical notions based upon it are a human invention-a useful teaching "concealing under speech untrue" (ibid.).

Such theories undermining the traditional ethical and religious canons cleared the way for political unscrupulousness and downright adventurism. Indeed, when the opportunity presented itself and Critias was elected with the Thirty to draw up a constitution for Athens after its capitulation in 404, he passed from philosophy to practical struggle for power and, standing out for murderous excesses even against the background of his associates engaged in the massacre of his opponents. On the evidence of Xenophon, "Critias was the most insatiable and cruel of all the thirty tyrants" (Xenophon. The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, London, Paris, New York, Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1904, p. 18).

Sophist Lycophron, according to Aristotle, regarded the state as a product of men's agreement about alliance and believed law to be only a convention, "a surety to one another of justice", that has no real power to make the citizens good and just (Aristotle: II, Politics, III, 9, 1280b 5, 10).

In all evidence, Lycophron viewed "personal rights" as natural and inalienable and law as a means of guaranteeing their inviolability. His theory of social contract accounting for the origin of the state and law was based on the notion of the natural equality of men and their individual rights. Rejecting men's inequality by nature, he disparaged noble birth as something altogether empty.

Another sophist of the younger generation, Alcidarws of Elaea (early fourth century) was, like Lycophron, a pupil of Gorgias. He chiefly owes his place in the history of political teachings to a theory that all people are equal including the slaves and is credited with a remarkable statement: "God has set all men free; nature has made no man a slave.''

natural-right theories and are the fountain-head of current doctrines reducing the essence of law to force, advocating the individual's inalienable rights, etc.

3. SOCRATES

Socrates (469-399 B. C.) is one of the most remarkable farfamed characters in the intellectual history of mankind. For over two and a half millennia there has been a ring of glory about his name and an aura of enigma surrounding his personality. Describing Socrates as the "demiurge of Greek philosophy" and a "wise man", young Marx wrote in his dissertation "Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature": "He is therefore just as much a substantial individual as the earlier philosophers, but after the manner of subjectivity, not enclosed in himself, not an image of the gods, but a human one, not mysterious, but clear and luminous, not a seer, but a sociable man." '

Socrates was born in the family of Athenian sculptor or stonemason Sophroniscus and midwife Phaenarete, and this later gave him the cause to call his method of dialectical reasoning maieutics or intellectual midwifery intended to help his interlocutors bring to birth their ideas if they had them. Aristotle says that the interest of Socrates in human problems was sparked off when he saw the famous motto "Know thyself on the Delphian temple of Apollo. Its impression on Socrates was so great that he abandoned natural science for moral philosophy and later regarded this event as a turning point in his life. Socrates even came to view all his subsequent inquires into the nature of man as service to Apollo, the more so as the Delphic oracle named him, according to a wide-spread legend, as the wisest of all men...

From the scanty evidence of his external life we know that he took part as a hoplite (a heavy-armed infantry soldier) in three large battles-at Potidaea (in 432 B. C.), Daelium (in 424 B. C.) and Amphipolis (422 B. C.). In all these military campaigns (on the eve of and during the Peloponnesian War) he distinguished himself by his pluck and remarkable endurance.

On the testimony of Socrates himself his daimonion or inner

~^^1^^ Karl Marx, "Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 438.

The humanism of the Greek sophists that came about as a natural product of the intellectual revolution in die fifth century B. C. and the shift of interest from external nature to man's world found its expression in numerous and widely diverging theories. Inspired by the great idea of man's sovereignty which was epitomised in the proud man-the-measure statement of Protagoras mey tried, as it were, almost every possible rationalistic and humanistic interpretation of the origin and functions of the existing religious, ethical, political and legal views and institutions. The sophists were the first secular theorists of the state, law and politics and exerted a tremendous influence on all subsequent (and not only ancient) political and legal doctrines. Their theoretical views, particularly on the relationship between nature and law, the natural and the artificial in the field of state and legal relations, might and right, justice and law, ethics and politics have been widely used in different modifications by political thinkers in antiquity, the Middle Ages and in our time.

The politico-legal conceptions of the Greek sophists have largely foreshadowed various modern juridico-positivist or

voice prevented him from taking part in politics. That does not mean, however, that he was in any way indifferent to polis affairs or to his duties as a citizen. All his life was spent in the discussions of philosophical, moral and political problems. Though Socrates did not participate in debates in the popular assembly and was only engaged in private talks, his influence on public affairs was considerable as he promptly responded to every turn in contemporary political life, showed great concern about the shortcomings of Athenian democracy, proposed ways to correct them and displayed lively interest in all major theoretical problems of the state, politics, law, justice and public duties of citizens. When once the lot fell upon him (in 406 B. C.) to participate in the trial of Athenian generals in the Council (boule), he refused, in the face of popular clamour, to yield to threats and support the illegal decision of its members to try the defendants in a body instead of considering their cases separately. The generals were finally slain after being convicted indiscriminately by hand-raising in the assembly contrary to law. Socrates proved the only member of the Council who defended legality to die end and remained true to his convictions. Significantly, soon after die execution of the generals the Athenians repented of what they had done and called to account die most zealous accusers for deluding die demos.

A great deal of courage was also displayed by Socrates under the tyrannical government of the Thirty headed by Critias. The rulers banned his lessons and ordered him to participate in the arrest of the undesirable citizens in order to implicate him in their crimes (die usual practice of the oligarchs was to dispose of those whose property they coveted). Socrates openly refused to obey die orders of the new rulers and was only saved from their revenge by the restoration of democracy.

Socrates is known to have been resolutely opposed to the practice of taking fees introduced by die sophists. He maintained that by so doing they deprived themselves of the freedom to converse widi diose they liked and even called their art prostitution on the ground that selling one's mind is no better than selling one's body. He always gave his lessons free diough his family's circumstances were extremely straitened, if not altogether beggarly (he had three children under age by Xanthippe, his wife). Seeking to nettle Socrates, Antiphon the sophist once told him with contempt that no slave would endure the miserable exist-

ence he was dragging out.

In 399 B. C. die leaders of democracy that had come back to power brought him to trial on charges on impiety and corruption of the youth. The indictment read: "Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods recognized by die state, and of introducing other, new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting die youdi. The penalty demanded is death" (Diogenes Laertius, II, 40).

The Athenian court consisting of 501 judges sentenced him to the deatii penalty by a majority of 80 votes.

Keeping his allegiance to die laws of the polis and rejecting the principle of "injustice for injustice", Socrates refused to accept his friends' plan to smuggle him out of the city and at the appointed time drank a cup of poison (hemlock).

Socrates never put down his views in writing expounding them in talks with his friends and opponents. These talks described in detail by Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle contain the substance of his moral philosophy and provide a clue to his theory of the state, law and politics.

Rejecting the ethical and epistemological relativism and subjectivism of the sophists togetiier with their laudation of unrestrained brute force, Socrates affirms the objective character of moral standards, laws and political principles, and seeks to give diem a rational explanation in logical terms.

Ethics in the view of Socrates is political and politics is ethical. The highest of all virtues is the political art or arete which includes statecraft and makes men good politicians, public officials, house-managers, etc., that is useful citizens.

This highest virtue, or "royal art" as Socrates called it, ensures success in bodi public and private affairs, as it implies die possession of the skill of management and is based on knowledge. The skill of a good house-master is akin to the skill of a public official and the former can easily switch over to the duties of die latter: "Between the conduct of a family and that of a State the sole difference is that of a greater or lesser number; for as to all besides there is much conformity between them" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, pp. 108-109).

Athens, reasons Socrates, consists of more than ten thousand houses and one cannot propose to manage them if he does not know how to build one house. On die other hand, if one has the mastery of the necessary skill and knows how to manage people,

he will prove successful whatever he does-runs a house, commands an army or rules a state. Emphasising the affinity and inherent unity of apparently very different arts, Socrates does not disregard their specificity. He is well aware that the skills and knowledge needed, for instance, by a house-manager, a general, a pilot or a politician essentially differ, the main thrust of his argument being against the confusion of virtue as such with technical skills and good workmanship in a carpenter, a shoemaker, a physician, a flutist, etc., which are outside the province of ethics.

Socrates holds that the political virtue, like virtue in general, is knowledge. "He said likewise that justice and every other virtue is only a science, because all the actions of justice and of the other virtues are good and honourable, and that all who know the beauty of these actions think nothing more charming" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, p. 128).

This fundamental principle of Socratic ethics underlies his political theory and determines his approach to the problems of the state, law and politics. In his moral philosophy Socrates does not distinguish between ethics and politics. Nor does Plato. A conclusive delimitation of these spheres which is not to be found even in Aristotle could only be undertaken on the basis of more mature socio-political relations and new theoretical concepts reflecting them.

The political ethics of Socrates summed up, as it were, the results of the previous development of Greek political thought and served as a starting ground for its ascent to such heights as the political philosophy of Plato and the political science of Aristotle.

For Socrates and his predecessors the ethical value of the polis with its laws and institutions, as well as political virtue as a whole, is derived from their divine origin, the mythical gods being regarded as the fountain-head of morality. Yet in his rationalistic interpretation the mythological foundation of the polis and the divine nature of virtue undergo radical transformation. The traditional political conceptions dating to Homer and Hesiod (the divine nature of the polis laws), Pythagoras (philosophical reason as the foundation of polis life), the sages and Heraclitus (the rule of the law), Protagoras and some other sophists (the rule of the better as the dictate of reason, the need for teaching political virtue) are remodelled and elaborated by

Socrates in accordance with his own rationalistic philosophy. Believing in the power of reason and being convinced that universals are only open to the mind, Socrates focused his attention on general notions and oriented the discussions of ethical, political and legal problems towards formulating broad definitions. He is traditionally regarded as the founder of theoretical ethics which paved the way for Plato's and Aristotle's logical and political conceptions.

The philosophical doctrine of the objectivity of polis virtues and polis mode of life, moral foundation of politics and laws expounded by Socrates was directed against both the traditional mythological views and the sophistic ethical and epistemological relativism and subjectivism that went side by side with eulogies of brute force and with nihilistic attitude to moral canons. Adhering to the principle of legality, Socrates attacked the contemporary political practices of democratic, oligarchic, tyrannical and aristocratic governments from the position of the abstract ideal of justice as deviations from the dictates of reason. In his view, the close connection and even internal unity of the polis and its laws arose from their common divine origin. The moral organisation of polis life is impossible without laws, just as law and order cannot exist without the polis. The laws, according to Socrates, are the foundation of the polis.

Both Socrates and the sophists distinguished between what later came to be known as natural law (right) and positive laws, i. e. decrees, prescriptions and rulings of polis authorities. Yet Socrates did not turn the difference between them into an antithesis which was the case with some of the sophists. Both the unwritten divine law and the written human laws are rooted, according to Socrates, in one and the same justice which is not only the criterion of legality, but is in fact identical with it: "I should have thought," said Socrates, "I had given at once a good definition, and a clear instance of justice, when I called it an aversion from doing injustice. But since you will not allow it to be so, see whether this will satisfy you: I say, then, that justice 'is nothing but the observance of the Jaws' " (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, p. 171).

This pithy statement serves as an epitome of the whole of Socratic political ethics, just as, for instance, the famous Hegelian thesis "All that is real is rational; all that is rational is real" represents the gist of the Hegelian philosophy of right. Signifi-

cantly, both propositions are notable not only for external and formal likeness, but also for profound internal affinity, as they assert the rational and ethical substance of politico-legal phenomena.

The mutability of human laws as such underlined by the sophists is not regarded by Socrates as attesting to their injustice, just as the transitory nature of war does not depreciate valour in the name of the native country.

Socrates makes a firm stand for such an order in the polis which guarantees justice of the instituted laws. Preaching loyalty to the polis laws, he links it with the concord of the citizens without which, in his opinion, neither a state can subsist and not be overthrown, nor a house prosper. Characteristically, by concord Socrates means citizens' allegiance and obedience to the laws, but not the uniformity of their opinions, views and tastes. Xenophon attributes to Socrates the following statement: "A Republic that is obedient to the laws is happy in peace, and invincible in war. Moreover, you know that concord is a great happiness in a State. It is daily recommended to the people; and it is an established custom all over Greece to make the citizens swear to live in good understanding with one another, and each of them takes an oath to do so. Now, I do not believe that this unity is exacted to them, only that they might choose the same company of comedians, or of musicians, nor that they might give their approbation to the same poets, or all take delight in the same diversions, but they may all unanimously obey the laws" (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, IV, IV, 15-16). The exaltation of law-abidingness did not mean that Socrates regarded every enactment or prescript of polis authorities as a law that ought to command general respect and obedience. His proposition of the identity of lawful and just, as well as the high appraisal of legality and well-organised polis life based on the precepts of reason implied the ideal rather than actual state of affairs and therefore carried a formidable charge of criticism of contemporary practical politics and state officials (very indicative in this context is Socrates's comparison of himself to a gadfly ordained by god to reproach men and arouse their conscience). In the sphere of politico-legal relations the identification by Socrates of virtue widi knowledge which is the main principle of his moral philosophy finds its expression in the maxim "Rulers are those who know how to rule". This aphorism is a natural

corollary to the Socratic doctrine of the state as die embodiment of reason and justice which has an obvious undertone of discontent and is addressed to all forms of government: kings and rulers, he contends, are not those who carry the sceptre, nor those on whom the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or trickery, but those who know how to rule (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, III, IX, 10).

Socrates in fact advocated what later came to be known as the ``king-philosopher'' theory---die upshot of the intellectual aristocratism that pervaded his moral philosophy. It is highly indicative that Socrates was equally censorious of democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, hereditary aristocracy and traditional monarchy, and that his political ideal did not seem to fit in with any government.

On the theoretical side, Socratic ideal represented an attempt to give a rationalistic account of the essence of the state, whereas on the practical side it aimed at asserting the principle of competence in the management of polis affairs.

In his classification of the various forms of government Socrates sought .to define their specific, constituent principles. He held that "the rule of men with their consent and according to the laws of the state was monarchy, but rule over unwilling subjects, not according to law but at the whim of the ruler, was tyranny. A constitution in which the rulers were chosen from among those who fulfilled the requirements of the laws he called an aristocracy, when the qualification for office was property, a plutocracy, and when all die people were eligible, a democracy" (Xenophon, Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, IV, VI, 12). The ideas of Socrates, particularly his emphasis on the law as the criterion for the classification of the forms of government, the contrast between monarchy and tyranny, and others exerted a considerable influence on the subsequent political theories of ancient thinkers, above all Plato, Aristotle and Polybius, and, through them, on various politico-legal doctrines of the middle ages and modern times.

Socrates's advocacy of the government of the wise, i. e. "those who know how to rule", had nothing to do with a disguised apology of some contemporary political order. His theoretical principles were incompatible with the practical politics of his time: "He who will fight for the right," he says, "if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and not a pub-

lie one" (Plato, Apology, 32a). For Socrates, the only acceptable rule was the rule of the law instituted with the citizens' consent. It is worth noting in this context that the opinion of some scholars ranking Socrates with reactionaries or regarding him as an advocate of a reactionary state system appears to us completely untenable: Socrates deliberately set himself apart from political strife and abiding by his ethical canons alternately came into a conflict now with democracy, now with tyrannical dictatorship. That does not mean, of course, that he had no political sympathies or antipathies. On the evidence of Xenophon and Plato, he commended the laws of aristocratic Lacedaemon (Sparta) and Crete, moderately oligarchic Thebes and Megara.

Generally speaking, Socrates favoured the rule of the wise rather than that of the old hereditary aristocracy or nouveaux riches. He was violently opposed to tyranny as the arbitrary and lawless rule of force. Underscoring the transitory character of tyrannical government, Socrates pointed out that the tyrant executing worthy and reasonable citizens is bound shortly to be punished himself (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, III, IX, 12). He was also disillusioned with democracy and expressed his disapproval of its methods of government, though in a milder form.

The chief shortcoming of democracy in Socrates's eyes was the incompetence of its officials appointed by the chance of the lot. He held in very low esteem the political wisdom of the popular assembly which played the decisive role in the home and foreign policy of Athenian democracy. Ridiculing the omnipotence of the demos which could make nitwits into generals, Socrates once mockingly suggested that the assembly should vote asses into horses badly needed by the Athenians at the moment... It should be noted, however, that for all his attacks on democracy Socrates never proposed to replace it by another form of government, but only to improve its efficiency and competence. He was a great patriot of Athens and his bitter criticism of the shortcomings of democratic government went naturally hand in hand with his complete loyalty to the native polis. Exalting the high moral qualities of the Athenians as compared with other Hellenes, he noted with pride that no one could match his compatriots in the valour of their ancestors and the number of glorious feats they had performed (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, III, V, 3). Yet this superiority in valour over

100 •

other Hellenes had been irretrievably lost in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. The military setbacks of Athens were accompanied by internal dissension and antidemocratic coups that brought in their wake short-lived oligarchic and even tyrannical regimes. In order to suppress the growing opposition, democracy in turn had to resort to extreme measures and this further aggravated internal tensions and struggle for power.

In contrast with the enemies of the Athenian democracy who laid the blame for all external and internal difficulties on the democratic system of government, the rule of the demos, Socrates attributed them to the corruption of the morals of his fellow-countrymen and to their arrogance that led to laxity, neglect of duty and insubordination in military and civil affairs. In his opinion, the Athenians tending to self-indulgence like all people were put off their guard and gave way to complacency on account of their great advantages. This proved fateful and they lost their superiority to the more wary rival. The Athenians would do better, he remarked with bitterness, if they at least tried to imitate those who are considered the first, and acted in their manner (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, III, V, 13-14).

Socrates's allusion to "the first" was not intended to disparage his fellow-citizens or induce them to restructure the Athenian state system on the Spartan model, but rather to urge them to restore their city's greatness at all cost, even by imitating their more successful adversary.

Socrates's exhortation of the Athenians to take a closer look at their enemy's achievements was but a sober and wise recommendation though, of course, it could not suit the taste of his ambitious compatriots. The aim of Socrates was to improve the management of public affairs in Athens and had nothing to do with a breach of allegiance to his native polis that was imputed to him. Significantly, Socrates did not regard the sins of his fellow-citizens and their violations of moral canons as an incurable disease. When Pericles the junior complains to Socrates about the internal discord in his native city, the litigiousness of the Athenians, their mutual hatred and desire to make profit out of the state and one another, Socrates calls his young interlocutor's attention to the advantages of the Athenian political system that holds out hope of the recovery of their city's greatness.

Castigating the greed of gain and unscrupulous money-- making that seized the Athenians, their contempt of reason and virtue, the incompetence of democratic officials and the practice of appointing the rulers of the city by lot in the belief that one man's opinion is as good as another's, Socrates at the same time did not call in question the fundamental principles of the Athenian political system that had been developing along democratic lines ever since the Solonean reforms. The idea of the citizen's unconditional loyalty to his polis and its laws underlies all moral philosophy of Socrates and is central to his politicolegal doctrine. In the view of Socrates every citizen entering voluntarily into a social compact and becoming a member of a state assumes a moral obligation to abide by its laws and usages (Plato, Crito, 51). This conception makes Socrates one of the first exponents of the social contract theory in the history of European political thought. In the Socratic version of this theory notable for a peculiar paternalistic strain the citizen and the polis cannot be equal in their rights, just as the child and the slave cannot be on equal terms with the fadier and the master, respectively. Moreover, the laws are higher and holier than mother or father. Describing his imaginary talk with the Athenian laws, Socrates quotes them as saying: "We further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him" (Plato, Crito, 51).

According to Socrates, any one who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city may go where he likes retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in which the laws order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implicit contract that he will do as the laws command him.

In other words, citizenship is accepted voluntarily and the Athenian has three alternatives: either to obey the laws, or to get them changed by persuasion and other peaceful means in order to prevent possible injustice and wrongdoing, or else to emigrate. If the citizen casts his lot with the state, he is bound to keep his allegiance. "And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in bat-

tie, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any odier place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country" (Plato, Crito, 51 b-c).

This law-abidirfgness demonstrated by Socrates all through his life and brought out in bold relief by his dramatic death stemmed from the traditional Hellenic attitude to the law as the basis of well-ordered and just polis life. The Hellenes even considered respect for the law their main feature distinguishing them from the non-Hellenes, i. e. the ``barbarians''. It is worth mentioning in this context the opinion of one of the Indian sages, gymnosophist ("naked sophist") Dandamis expressed by him about his Greek colleagues during the Asian Expedition of Alexander the Great. On the evidence of Plutarch, "Dandamis received him [Alexander] with more civility, and hearing him discourse of Socrates, Pythagoras, and Diogenes, told him he thought them men of great parts and to have erred in nothing so much as in having too great respect for the laws and customs of their country..." (Plutarch, Alexander, 65).' True, already in the time of Socrates polis patriotism and the authority of the laws were being called in question and subjected to criticism, particularly severe on the part of the sophists, the itinerant teachers of wisdom. Cosmopolitan views had gained wide currency which attested to the progressing erosion of the Greek polis system and its ideology. Socrates's pupil Aristippus, for instance, is said to have been "everywhere an alien" and professed a theory that a man could only be happy if he was free and did not identify himself with any particular state (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, II, I, 14).

Remaining firmly within the tradition of polis patriotism, Socrates viewed critically the contemporary trend towards cosmopolitanism and emphasised die free citizens' moral obligations before the state being run in accordance with reason and just laws. It is only on this road of reason and justice that man, according to Socrates, can expect to attain freedom an invaluable treasure both for the individual and the state (Xenophon,

Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 6, pp. 571-572.

The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, IV, V, 2). To act freely is to act reasonably in the best possible manner, i. e. against one's incontinence which tends to bring man under the control of his base instincts and passions. By turning man away from virtue, incontinence makes him a miserable slave who turns his back upon the compacts and agreements he contracted as a citizen and revokes his obligations to the polis plunging it into chaos. Arguing against sophist Callicles who exalted the right of the stronger and justified his wantonness and tyranny over the weaker, Socrates upholds equality as one of the fundamental principles of the polis order and justice: "And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to notice this: you have not perceived the power of geometrical equality, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, because you do not care about geometry" (Plato, Gorgias, 508). By "geometrical equality" Socrates means political justice and equity or right judgement in terms of political virtue as distinct from simple numerical or arithmetical equality. Man's worth lies not in strength and ability to maintain his power by force, but in his reasonableness, political virtue and understanding what is good for the polis. This, in turn, calls for proper education and training.

Political and other virtues are developed by study and effort. Those who aspire after a political career and power must learn the virtue of self-control or continence and acquire necessary knowledge for the good of the polis and its citizens.

Ruling, according to Socrates, is not a pleasure but an exercise of virtue, and its aim is not to gratify the ruler's selfish wishes and whims, but to attain the welfare of all. A politician is only entitled to those honours that he earned by his service to the state. Adducing Homer's reference to Agamemnon as the " shepherd of peoples", Socrates observes that a ruler or a military leader ought to be primarily concerned about the needs of his subjects or soldiers, and not his own. Those who use power to further their selfish interests deserve severe punishment. Culpable, in Socrates's opinion, is also the attitude of those who solicit a vote for an office without first studying the subject they are

going to concern themselves with. Socrates called strange the wide-spread opinion that statecraft, the greatest of all arts, comes to man automatically, whereas in all other trades, far less important, men only gain efficiency after appropriate study and application.

In Socrates's opinion, every individual, whether gifted or dull, should train himself for the craft he chose to ply. Particularly important is such training for talented men who decided to go in for politics. Such men, not infrequently unrestrained and wilful by nature, are apt to cause the state and their compatriots immense harm if they are not properly educated. Contrariwise, given good upbringing, thorough knowledge of their future field, mastery of the art of government and political virtue, they can be of tremendous benefit to their native country.

The management of polis affairs in accordance with the precepts of reason is, in Socrates's view, the only sure way to the public weal. Setting great store by education and training, he valued their fruits higher than the gifts of fortune (Xenophon, The Memorable Thoughts of Socrates, III, IX, 14).

Though Socrates kept off politics, he showed great interest in polis affairs and constantly sought to influence them in the right direction. The chief aim of his philosophical talks, all his enlightening activity was to educate his listeners, particularly young ones, in the spirit of political virtue. Firmly adhering to his views on justice, lawfulness and true government, Socrates repeatedly entered into conflicts with authorities (under democracy, as well as under the rule of the Thirty) which, naturally, strove to suppress his damaging criticism and finally made his drink his cup of poison.

The execution of Socrates was a great shock to the Athenians. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, they repented soon after his death and, believing themselves deliberately deceived, condemned Meletus to death, and other accusers to banishment. Famous Greek sculptor Lysippus made a bronze statue of Socrates which was exhibited in the Athenian museum. Other ancient sources, corroborating the report of Diogenes Laertius on the general reaction of the Athenians, vary in detail. According to Diodorus, the accusers of Socrates were executed without trial. Plutarch says they hanged themselves despised by their fellow-countrymen and deprived by them of "fire and water", whereas in the version of rhetorician Themistius (fourth century

B. C.) Anytus was stoned to death.

All these reports of repentance and retribution may well have been greatly exaggerated, reflecting but the historical sense of justice of subsequent generations and being indicative of their tribute to the tragic memory of Socrates. However, in the light of the attested habit of the Athenians to reconsider their rash decisions and make up for the injustice they have committed in wrath they appear very plausible indeed. Their creditability becomes even higher if one thinks of the political background of Socrates's trial and its psychological effects: after the thing had been done repentance was not only a good means of relieving one's guilty conscience and declining all responsibility for the execution of the innocent, but also an effective method of making oneself a participant in his increasing fame. Living Socrates was an intolerable nuisance to his contemporaries, whereas dead Socrates, no longer casting their sins and vanity in their teeth, stood above all strife and could be used'as a banner in political intrigues and struggle for power. A society based on social injustice is bound to be hypocritical and needs dumb idols to cover up the real intentions of its leaders.

Judging from the extant evidence, the controversy over the heritage of Socrates that flared up in antiquity demonstrated the growing influence of the Socratics who surpassed their opponents in talent, number and organisation. Each of the rival Socratic schools-the Platonic, the Cynic (founded by Antisthenes and preaching man's self-sufficiency and freedom from the outer world), the Cyrenaic (founded by Aristippus and professing the doctrine of pleasure as the sole or chief goal in life), the Megarian (founded by Euclides and famous for its logical inquiries and numerous paradoxes), and the Elian (founded by Phaedo of Elis and showing a close affinity with the Megarians) ---made a contribution to their common cause, the vindication of their teacher.

Particularly important for the historical destinies of Socrates's intellectual legacy was the role played by the Platonists.

The ideas of Socrates underlying the activity of the Platonic Academy influenced Aristotle's Lyceum (the Peripatetics) and the two schools came to dominate the philosophical scene for many subsequent centuries. Through the Cynics and Cyrenaics his conceptions, slightly modified, passed on to the Greek and then Roman Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics.

Socrates's tragic end sublimated his whole life and gave him a nimbus of unique integrity and honesty. It invested his words and deeds with profound meaning and genuine sincerity, endowed his image with unfading attractiveness and became one of the Socratic enigmas exercising the minds of many philosophers and commentators till nowadays. The condemnation and execution of Socrates that crowned his life's toils opened to him the way to spiritual immortality.

The works of Christian writers of the Middle Ages as a whole show a general trend to make Socrates a martyr of faith in the manner of Christian saints despite his paganism, wherefore frequent parallels between Socrates and Jesus Christ.

The Enlighteners, too, regard Socrates as their precursor and colleague who sacrificed his life on the altar of reason.

A more profound view on the historical role of Socrates was expressed by Hegel who exerted a considerable influence on the subsequent writers. The tragedy of Socrates, in his opinion, consisted in that the truth was simultaneously on the side of Socrates and on that of the Athenian polis because the former championed the new principle of individual freedom and the latter defended the status quo sanctified by age-old tradition. The fate of Socrates was not accidental: it was predetermined, according to Hegel, by the law of world history whereby its heroes personifying novel principles are bound to come out against the existing principles and laws and to fall victim of their retaliation. Yet the retribution cannot suppress the novel principle, it only destroys its exponent, the individual.

In the opinion of the nineteenth-century Danish religious philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, precursor of existentialism, Socrates's execution was the inevitable requital for his life, the most interesting of all on the earth, since the more genuine ( interesting) the man's life, the greater the miseries and pains he has to endure.

Fiercely attacking the rationalism of Socrates and his ethics as one of the theoretical fountain-heads of the slave morality of the masses, Friedrich Nietzsche at the same time did justice not only to his ability to live up to the rationalistic ideas professed by him, but, which is much more important, to depart without fear of death overcoming it by the power of his thought. Nietzsche notes that Socrates evidently got his death sentence of his own free will declining the alternative of exile and thereby becoming

an ideal of unprecedented attraction to the Greek youth.

Gustav Kafka described the condemnation of Socrates as a blameworthy act of "reactionary democracy''.

Karl Jaspers, one of the eminent representatives of existentialism in the twentieth century, describes Socrates as one of the outstanding figures of world history alongside Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus Christ. By his ``existentia'', i. e. his life and death, Socrates, in Jaspers's view, gave a convincing demonstration of the senselessness, fragility and absurdity of man's existence. The scepticism of Socrates, the ironic style of his life and readiness for death clearly displayed by him at the trial impart to life, absurd as it is, a profound meaning (incidentally, echoing the German existentialist, the British positivist John Stuart Mill caustically observed that it is better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied pig). Socrates, according to Jaspers, was a martyr of philosophy who solicited his own death; his execution was not a juridical murder, but a juridical suicide.

R. Guardini, too, describes Socrates's acceptance of the death sentence as escape to genuine reality and true life. In his opinion, the decision of Socrates attested not to morbid longing for dissolution, but to acute awareness of the tragic character of his exalted mission and the inevitability of his doom. Owing to the dramatic culmination of Socrates's life, his fate has become one of the central topics of European intellectual history.

According to Helmut Kuhn, Socratic questions with their undercurrent of anxiety and uneasiness-and his questions are always topical as they are forever destined to remain unanswered-broke through the narrow horizon of Greek thought. In Kuhn's opinion, the unlawful condemnation and death of Socrates testified to the fact that Athens was no longer capable of abiding a "true citizen". Socrates was the last one. By his death he released men from the chains of the polis, made them free and prepared them for acceptance of new solitariness and new forms of community.

The objectivity of Plato, Xenophon and other adherents of Socrates describing his case is called in question by Bertrand Russell. He holds that the Athenians would not have condemned Socrates to death if the character drawn by his advocates had been true to life. In Russell's opinion, the trial, even as presented by Socrates's supporters, was on the whole quite lawful, and the only omission that might be imputed to the Ath-

enian court is its disregard of the defendant's plea to hear the witnesses on the charge of youth corruption.

A notable feature of the latest Soviet publications about Socrates, particularly those of historico-philosophical nature, is that their authors have largely abandoned the earlier conception of Socrates the reactionary who was justly punished for his retrograde views by a death sentence. For instance, Alexei Losev, a Soviet researcher, has come to the conclusion that Socrates was executed by obscurants and die-hards. According to Feokhary Kessidi, the condemnation of Socrates was not only a tragedy, but also an event of tremendous significance in the entire history of moral values; as such, it is liable only to the verdict of posterity. Those who associate the name of Socrates with a new stage in the history of philosophical thought cannot justify his execution, and the half-and-half solution proposed by Hegel can hardly be regarded as tenable. The death of Socrates, in Kessidi's opinion, was neither a suicide, nor a judicial error---it was the inevitable result of his loyalty to the mission he was charged with.

As is evidenced from the above survey of opinions, very cursory and fragmentary as it is, old Socrates's file is leafed anew by each successive epoch. Yet such reassessment of the past unavoidable in historical studies should not lead to its distortion, and historians must be constantly on guard against the possibility of hindsight creeping into their accounts. It is also worth noting in this context that the so-called verdicts of history with their connotation of finality and irrevocability have one obvious disadvantage - they can only be brought in on the doings of the dead and are therefore always late to exert any influence on the participants in the dramatic events that leave imprints in the consciousness of mankind. One would be utterly wrong, however, to infer from this that verdicts of history carry but little weight with posterity. Experience points to the opposite. Based on fundamental human values such verdicts provide incontestable precedents that help towards a better understanding of the present and future and, which is no less important, hold out consolation and hope to victims of injustice who, like Socrates, prefer eternity and truth to the remnant of their earthly life.

Staking one's all on the verdict of history (which was the verdict of posterity or the gods in the case of Socrates) implies ada-

mantine faith in spiritual immortality. Paradoxically, Socrates charged with atheism in all earnest considered himself Apollo's philosophical servant and sincerely believed in the gods' judgement of all men after their death. His accusers and judges were patently inferior to him in the sincerity and genuineness of this faith. Socrates viewed the charges against him from the perspective of history that would undoubtedly acquit him, and this could not but cast a shadow of predetermination on the course and outcome of his trial.

What is obvious now in retrospect was clear to Socrates in perspective: wisdom condemned to death in his person would outlive the judges.

tation of his friends and returned to Athens where in 387 B. C. he bought a grove of trees in a green suburb just outside the city walls and founded there his famous Academy called after Athenian hero Academus. It was destined to become one of the intellectual and educational centres of Greece for almost a millennium (till 529 A.D.).

The world outlook of Plato was formed under a tremendous influence of Socrates who was Plato's teacher during the most impressionable years of his life (407-399 B. C.). Plato is also known to have thoroughly studied the views of his other predecessors-Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides and the sophists. Besides, Plato's literary heritage reveals unmistakable traces of his long talks with the Egyptian priests in Heliopolis and the Pythagoreans in South Italy.

Plato's philosophical views underwent considerable changes in the course of his long life. His earlier dialogues known as Socratic (Apology, Protagoras, Crito, and others) are on the whole dominated by Socrates's rationalism which is clearly exhibited in the search for general notions covering a large variety of empirical phenomena, special interest in moral problems, etc. Plato's own theory of ideas appears only in the later dialogues, such as the Republic, Statesman, Sophist, Parmenides, etc. In comparison with the rationalism of the earlier Socratic dialogues they are indicative of a growing influence of mysticism, preoccupation with mythological themes and a clear trend towards Pythagorean and religious doctrines.

Particularly characteristic in this respect is Plato's last work Laws, a very long dialogue bearing an obvious imprint of Pythagorean numerical mysticism and religio-mythological beliefs. Significantly, it,is Plato's only dialogue in which Socrates takes no part. He is replaced by an old ``Athenian'', presumably the author himself.

The problems of the state, law and politics occupy an important place in Plato's philosophy and it is not accidental that his two largest works are Republic and Laws.

Central to Plato's philosophy is his theory of ideas which boils down to the assertion that true reality consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal Ideas, whereas the empirical objects, things and phenomena given us in sensations are not real as they are related not to being but to something movable, becoming (Sophist, 246 b). Referring to this fundamental postulate, Lenin

4. PLATO

Plato (427-347 B.C.) occupies a prominent place in the history of ancient political theory and is justly ranked among the greatest thinkers of all times. He came from a very distinguished Athenian clan which included Attica's last king Codrus, famous Athenian lawgiver Solon, leader of the Thirty Tyrants Critias and some other notable figures of Athenian history. As is evidenced from his so-called seventh letter, largely autobiographical, in his young years he also looked forward to a political career and intended to take part in state affairs as soon as he had come of age. However, the political turmoil of that period (the establishment of a tyrannical government headed by his uncle Critias and the execution of Socrates by reestablished democracy) made him give up his former plans.

After the death of Socrates Plato together with his other pupils left Athens. He stopped for a while at Megara, then made several trips abroad visiting Egypt, South Italy and Sicily. He is known to have established friendly relations with a relative of the tyrant of Syracuse and made several trips to this city in the hope of winning its rulers over to his philosophy and realising his ideal of an enlightened monarch. His hopes, however, were rudely shattered: in an atmosphere of intrigues characteristic of tyrannical rule Plato for some unknown reason incurred the tyrant's wrath, was handed over to the Spartans and sold by them into slavery.

Tradition holds that he was soon let free owing to the solici-

described philosophical idealism as the "line of Plato" in philosophy.'

Plato does not deny the world of objects and phenomena, but considers it unreal and secondary from the ontological, epistemological and axiological viewpoints. In Plato's eyes, the phenomenal world is not absolutely divorced and isolated from die world of ideas as the former is nothing else but the latter's distorted image and bleak shadow. Conversely, the world of ideas is the eternal, immutable and divine model of man's changeful world, i. e. true reality.

Knowledge, according to Plato, is the knowledge of true reality, i. e. the world of ideas. It is only accessible to few, the philosophers (Republic, V, 576 b), and cannot be grasped by the common people, the crowd.

The idea, according to Plato, is the image and essence of a thing, its primary cause and principle. Or, to put it another way, the idea is the essence of a thing with its empirically variable and changeful appearance. The primacy of the idea over the thing is the primacy of its immutable essence over die diversity of appearances and phenomena. The world of ideas is the constituting framework of the world of appearance, therefore any attempt to rationalise earthly phenomena (for instance, politico-legal relations), i. e. to bring them in conformity with their true being and divine archetypes consists essentially in modelling them on the corresponding ideas which are not only the ontological foundation and primary cause of the world of phenomena, but also the guiding principle, standard and model (paradigm) of its organisation.

The ideal state as presented by Plato in Republic is the realisation of divine ideas in earthly socio-political life with maximum possible accuracy. Constructing the ideal just state, Plato proceeds from his conception of the correspondence between the cosmos at large, the state and the individual human soul. The very idea of justice implies that a just man is akin to a just state and assimilates to it. To the three faculties (or parts) of the human soul---the rational, the forceful, and the concupiscentcorrespond respectively die three functions of the state---the deliberative, the protective, and the acquisitive-and these, in

turn, to the three classes that make up the state structure: the rulers, the warriors, and the producers (the artisans and farmers).

Now justice, according to Plato, consists in order, that is in a state of things where each class and each man has his own work to do and does not go outside the sphere assigned to him. Besides, justice demands a corresponding state structure, a social hierarchy ensuring a harmonious unity of the above three principles for the common good: wisdom (i. e. the philosophers, who personify the faculty of sound judgement) ought to rule, courage (i. e. the warrior class) ought to provide armed protection to the state and obey the first principle, and temperance or self-control (which is the virtue of the artisans, farmers and other producers "by nature most insatiable of gain" [Republic, IV, 442]) ought to obey both.

Seeking to substantiate the caste structure of his ideal state by arguments from history, Plato adduces the division of labour. Defining polis as a joint settlement of men brought together by common needs, he argues at length that the best way to meet them is to have all citizens specialise in different fields of activity. "Plato's Republic, in so far as division of labour is treated in it, as the formative principle of the State, is merely the Athenian idealisation of the Egyptian system of castes." '

The chief goal of education, which is the object of special attention in the ideal state, is to uphold the hierarchy of castes and ensure strict observance of the rules of private and public life laid once and for all.

Plato sets great store by the "white lie" that all men were born of the mother-earth and therefore must care for the country they live in, defend it and treat other citizens as their brothers. Believing it vitally important to propagate this myth among die population of the ideal state, he offers to wind it up as follows: "Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children" (Republic, III, 415).

~^^1^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 346.

~^^1^^ See V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empiric-Criticism", Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 130.

1)2

As one can see, this myth is intended to exhort the citizens to obedience, extols concord and brotherhood, and simultaneously serves as a justification of people's inequality in the ideal state structure.

,

,

Rigid as the caste system may be, Plato does not forget to provide for the cases when gold begets silver and vice versa. The inter-caste transfers (free changes of status!) are prompted by the need to preserve the principle of the initial division into different castes and ensure the purity of the idea. It is not accidental that the myth ends in a warning that the state would perish if its safety were entrusted to an iron or brass guardian.

To ensure that the guardians or warriors are always equal to their tasks, their whole life is organised on the principles of solidarity, community of interests, equality and collectivism. "In the first place," writes Plato, "none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should diey have a private house or store closed against anyone who has a mind to enter" (Republic, III, 416 d). The warriors receive everything they need from the third class. They should live together and have common meals like soldiers in a camp. They should be prohibited not only to use, but even to touch gold and silver.

Of crucial importance for the safety of the ideal state is, in Plato's opinion, the community of the guardians' wives and children. Women in the ideal state have equal rights and possibilities with men.

The two higher classes are denied the right to family in the conventional sense of the word. Children are brought up and educated by the state. Sexual intercourse for the purpose of reproducing the state's population (even in matters of love Plato rejects pleasure and stands for curbing the passions) is strictly supervised by specially appointed officials who carefully select the mating couples on the principle of their class affiliation. By doing away with individual family among the guardians Plato hoped to unite them in a single ruling family in which all members are relatives.

The lower class receives but little attention from Plato and he leaves the regimentation of their reproduction, property, labour and all their life to the discretion of the ideal state's authorities. His chief interest lies in the proper selection and education of the rulers and their assistants. Despite Plato's deliberate vagueness

in respect of the social status of the members of the third class, they are evidently conceived by him as free men and not slaves, though one does not find it easy to distinguish this freedom to satisfy obediently the material needs of the upper classes from the status of ordinary Athenian slaves.

Plato's design of the third estate does not provide for the freedom of the slaves whose fate holds out but academic interest to the founder of the ideal state and is. treated by him in ethical and epistemological rather than socio-political terms-in point of fact, his Utopia modelled on an abstract idea confines the free demos to a kind of ghetto for the second-rate and underprivileged. The aristocrat's daydream has at last come true: the commoners are put in their place, if only in an imaginary state. It should be noted in this context that Plato, evidently vaguely aware of the dubious character of his political ideal, makes this significant remark by way of its justification: "Our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of die whole we should be most likely to find justice" (Republic, IV, 420 be).

Plato's ethical theory is governed by his aesthetical ideal: the ultimate aim of his perfect state is the beauty of the whole (Republic., 420), the ``happiness'' of the beautiful whole being not the conventional human ``good'', but the philosophico-political ``justice''.

Coming out against the extremes of wealth and poverty, Plato advocates temperance and moderation. In his view, the main socio-economic distinction of the ideal state from all other states consists in that each of the latter ones is a plurality: "Not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. Each will contain not less than two divisions, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich, which are at war with one another; and within each there are many smaller divisions. You would be altogether beside the mark if you treated these as a single State" (Republic, IV, 422e-423). Showing a keen insight into the causes of the split of a single state into "two cities" and tracing them to socio-- political antagonism between wealth and poverty, Plato believes that suppressing private interests, giving priority to the claims of the state supposedly representing the interests of the whole, and inculcating a spirit of unquestioning obedience can avert the

danger of such a split and eliminate the source of internecine

tants" (but not ``lords'' or ``rulers''), the rulers refer to one another as ``co-guardians'' (but not ``co-rulers''), and to the third class as ``payers'' and ``bread-winners''.

The main political rights in the ideal state are vested in the rulers and their assistants. The advancement of the third class (labourers) into the first or second class and their entrance upon office is tantamount, in the view of Plato, to the ruin of the state. Plato in his Republic is firmly convinced that the project of an ideal state can be translated into reality, though he is aware of the difficulties involved. He shows no interest in the practical aspects of the problem: far more important for Plato is the existence of the ideal model in heaven and its availability to any one who is prepared to commit himself to put it into practice, "but whether such a city exists or even will exist in fact, is no matter" (Republic, IX, 592b).

However, even if an ideal state becomes a reality, its existence cannot be eternal. Conceiving the change and succession of various forms of government as rotation within a definite cycle, Plato proceeds from a certain analogy between the five forms of government (aristocracy, timocracy,^^1^^ oligarchy, democracy and tyranny) and the five faculties or parts of the human soul. Plato even maintains that there exists a geometrical number which determines the duration of this cycle for posterity and plays a decisive role in improving inborn qualities of the human race. On the whole, the cyclic rotation of the five government forms is conditioned by the corruption of human nature and penetration of iron into silver and brass into gold. The resultant discrepancies and deviations open the way to enmity and discord. Counterposing the aristocratic form of government as the only correct and good one to the four other incorrect and corrupt forms in the eighth book of Republic, Plato characterises them one after another in the order of their progressive degeneration into the lower forms. He gives a detailed description of the whole cycle of degradation and, using various arguments ( philosophical, historical, political, psychological, mythological, mystical, etc.) in support of his social theory, presents a broad and dynamic panorama of the contemporary political life in the diversity of its changing forms.

war.

In Plato's eyes, the ideal state is the just government of the best. He subscribes to the natural right doctrine of Socrates expounded by him in the controversy with the sophists and identifies the lawful and the just based, in his opinion, on a common divine and ideal principle. One of the chief aims of his multifaceted dialogue Republic was to refute from this position the thesis of sophist Thrasymachus that justice is the right of the stronger.

The rule of philosophers and the operation of just laws are presented in Plato's Republic as two interdependent aspects of a single ideal project.

The true philosophers, according to Plato, do not thirst for power, but their rule is necessary for the common good and for the state as a whole. Plato in fact proclaims the principle: " philosophers for the state but not the state for philosophers". Combining the fervour of an ancient enlightener with the rigorism of the founder of a just state, Plato demands that the philosophers should get down to earth from their soaring heights of contemplation in order to take care of the poor imprisoned human souls.

In the mouth of Plato, the well-known maxim about the right of the philosopher to political power assumes the form of the following solemn pronouncement: "Until philosophers are kings in their cities, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,-no, nor the human race, as I believe, and then only will this our ideal State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day" (Republic, V, 473d).

The ideal state as the rule of the better and noble is, according to Plato, the best form of government which can be called either a monarchy if the power in the state belongs to one ruler, or an aristocracy if it is shared by several rulers. Generally speaking, for Plato the notions of monarch and aristocrat are identical (Republic, IX, 587d).

A curious feature of Plato's ideal state is the vocabulary used by the members of different castes when addressing one another. All those who do not belong to the ruling caste call one another ``citizens''. The citizens call the rulers ``saviours'' and "assis-

' Defined by Plato as a state in which love of honour or glory is the ruling principle (from the Greek -time, meaning honour, worth, value).

The degradation of ideal aristocracy leads to the emergence of private ownership of land and houses which turns free men into slaves. Reason as the foundation of the state structure gives way to violence and rivalry characteristic of timocracy which Plato associates with the Crito-Spartan type of government. A timocratic state will be eternally at war with its neighbours, and war, according to Plato, results "from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public" (Republic, II, 373e). Particularly pernicious, in Plato's view, are wars among the Hellenes.

The corruption of the timocratic state wrapped up in wars and internal strife leads to oligarchy due to the accumulation of considerable wealth in private hands. This system is based on property qualifications and state power belongs to the wealthy. The poor do not participate in government.

Oligarchy depends for its existence on intimidation and the use of armed force. An oligarchic state is internally split in two antagonistic camps, the poor and the rich. The growing hatred of the indigent for the avid and good-for-nothing money-bags results in a revolution which brings in a democratic government. Democracy, according to Plato, "comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and in this form of government the magistrates are commonly elected by lot" (Republic, VIII, 557). Democracy on the whole is regarded by Plato as a rather agreeable social system lacking, however, proper government. The equality characteristic of democracy puts the good and the bad ones on the same level.

In Plato's opinion, democracy is distinguished by a general deterioration of moral standards due to the prevalence of false opinions characteristic of the mob rule.

A corrupt state is brought to ruin by what is held in high esteem and avidly sought for: military victories under timocracy, wealth under oligarchy, freedom under democracy. In other words, each form of government perishes due to the abuse of its own principle and to the contradictions inherent in it. Thus democracy, according to Plato, gets intoxicated with straight freedom and passes into what is its continuation and opposite-tyranny. Excessive freedom turns into excessive slavery. The tyrant gains power as the people's protector:

``Whenever tyranny appears, the protectorship of the people is the root from which it springs" (Republic, 565d). Tyranny is the worst form of government based on lawlessness and extermination of more or less prominent citizens as the tyrant's potential opponents. It fosters suspicion, stifles free thought and engages in the mass execution of all those who are courageous, magnanimous, reasonable or wealthy under a false pretext of treachery.

Such is the list of crimes, far from complete, imputed by Plato to tyranny at the end of his immortal eighth book of Republic. It went down in the history of ancient political theory as an example of devastating criticism of tyrannical rule, perhaps the most expressive in all world literature.

The life of a tyrant, according to Plato's "moral arithmetics" is 729 times harder than the life of an aristocratic monarch. Such is, so to speak, the amplitude of happiness within the rotary cycle of government forms.

Plato's numerous political conceptions are further developed and elaborated in his later dialogues Crito, Statesman and Laws where the philosopher makes extensive use of myths and legends as the traditional setting of social theories. By comparison with the earlier Socratic dialogues notable for their rational analysis and special interest in general definitions, the investigations of later Plato show an increasing trend towards the philosophical interpretation and intellectual refinement of traditional mythological material.

The idealisation of the past takes the form of conscious orientation on large-scale mythological events which, according to Plato, are of everlasting importance in the history of mankind. In point of fact, these mythical events (the advent of the gods, the institution of government among the mortals, the communication of divine gifts such as political virtues, etc.) provide for Plato a source of constant inspiration and serve as a starting point of all his later inquiries into philosophical and political problems. In Plato's opinion, it is only in the light of these events that one can form a correct view of all subsequent human history.

The glorious past emerging from the myths---which Plato always took for granted-is inseparably linked with Heaven, therefore even the greatest achievement of Plato's philosophical thought, the theory of ideas, is rooted in his unquestioning faith in the divine origin of the human race and the whole world. This

faith also underlies his theory of knowledge, the knowledge of ideas inclusive, which is understood by him as a recollection of what happened to the soul in the other world.

Plato is known to have held rather peculiar notions of the past,^^1^^ owing them probably to his famous relatives (Solon through Critias) and partly to the Egyptian priests who did not think highly of the Hellenes' knowledge of history. Thus Critias, the senior (probably the grandfather of Critias, the sophist and tyrant) describing an ideal state of the days of old refers the legend to Solon who has purportedly heard it from priests ( Critias, 108d). According to tradition, nine thousand years before Solon's time a war had occurred between the tribes which dwelt outside the Pillars of Heracles (i. e. Gibraltar) and all those who dwelt without them. Of the combatants on the one side, the ancient city of Athens was reported to have been the leader and to have fought out the war; the combatants on the other side were commanded by the kings of the island of Atlantis. Both Athens and Atlantis are described by Plato as the models of divine government and perfect organisation of the mortals' life.

The political system of ancient Athens described in Critias reminds one of the ideal state in Republic, whereas the government of Atlantis based on the laws of Poseidon with their many specific prescriptions is given a more detailed consideration in Laws.

A number of important politico-legal problems are discussed by Plato in his dialogue Statesman (Politicus). The myth narrated by Plato there describes the life of people on the earth before Zeus, under Cronos. God was the governor of the whole world, and other gods subject to him ruled over parts of the world and were shepherds to men preventing them from violence, war or devouring one another. Men lived in accord with nature and there was no strife among them. "God was to man what man is now to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families" (Statesman, 272).

According to Plato, the people of those times were infinitely happier than his contemporaries. Yet in the fullness of time, when the cosmic cycle was completed, the ruler of the universe let go the helm and became a spectator. The inferior deities fol-

lowed suit and gave up their hold abandoning the universe to the mercy of fate. After a period of chaos and utter ruin the Creator restored order, the tumult ceased and a new cycle started.

At first the case of the new human race was very helpless and pitiable. Left without divine care, men found themselves alone among wild beasts and had to carry on the struggle for their existence without sustenance, arts or knowledge. They were on the verge of extinction and that was the time when the gods brought them fire, taught them arts and gave them seeds and plants.

Reciting this myth, Plato seeks to convince the readers that the order in the state and the patterns of organised human life should be modelled on divine archetypes, i. e. the ideal forms of government in the Golden Age-or, using philosophical terminology, on ideas.

Politics, according to Plato, is the sphere of royal art which calls for profound knowledge and ability to rule people. Given such knowledge and abilities, the rulers "may govern us either with or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on some scientific principle,-it makes no difference" (Statesman, 293). The only true state is the one where governors act according to the rules of wisdom and justice and are found to possess the royal science which evidently consists in die knowledge of the divine methods of government and in the ability to imitate them.

Taking a view that "the differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human beings do not admit of any universal and simple rule" (294b), Plato gives preference to the royal wisdom of the true ruler over the law which is only "the second best" (Statesman, 300). For this reason Plato rejects the need for very detailed legislation in the ideal state and holds diat the wise legislator enacting for the common good should lay down laws "in a general form for the majority" roughly meeting the needs of individuals (Statesman, 295). All other states that are only imitations of the true form should be governed in accordance with written laws and traditional customs of the country.

The principle of the division of government structures into different forms is, according to Plato, the degree of their approximation to the divine cosmic archetype. The best state (royalty) ruled by a true king is conceived as the nearest approach to

~^^1^^ For one thing, the legend of Atlantis has originated from his dialogue Critias.

divine government, the inevitable gap resulting only from the difference between the mortal monarch and god. After the cosmic upheaval royalty, in Plato's opinion, is the model for all other states which should strive to imitate it. They should be governed in accordance with the laws-"copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from die lips of those who have knowledge" (Statesman, 300c).

Besides the ideal government based on the "royal science" and true statesmanship, there exist, according to Plato, three other forms---monarchy, die government of the few and the government of the many. Each of these lower forms can be further divided on the principle of observance or neglect of the laws: thus monarchy falls into royalty and tyranny, the rule of the few into aristocracy and oligarchy, and the rule of the many, into lawful democracy and lawless democracy. So there are seven forms of government, including the true one, which "must be ranked apart from them all''.

As is evidenced from the above, the principle of legality, though recognised by Plato, plays but a secondary part in his scheme. Criticising oligarchy, democracy and tyranny in his usual manner, Plato observes that democracy is the worst of all lawful governments and the best of all lawless ones. Hence, the democratic lack of order is preferable in Plato's eyes to oligarchy and tyranny: "If diey are all without the restrains of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best" (Statesman, 303b).

Plato draws a line of demarcation between the political knowledge which is the distinguishing feature of a true ruler, and the contiguous arts-military, judicial and rhetorical. Thus the power of the judge, in his opinion, is not royal but only the power of a guardian of the laws which ministers to the royal power. Plato defines the political art as the ability to weave the fabric of the state: die royal science is over all other sciences and, having charge of the laws and of all matters affecting the state, weaves them all into one. The truly royal science, according to Plato, "ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act" (Statesman, 305). Plato's parallel between politics and the weaving art was an apt and capacious formula that can be deservedly called the ancient equivalent of the modern assimilation of the state to a machine.

Plato's last dialogue known as Laws and written in a fairly ripe old age is a compendium of the philosopher's political and

legal views. Plato offers there a more realistic project of a true state which he calls "the second best''.

As distinct from the first ideal state described in Republic, the nearest approximation to it is conceived by Plato as a community of 5040 citizens, each with his separate allotment of land. The landholdings together with dwellings are distributed among them by lot and only for use, but not as their property. They remain in possession of the state and cannot be sold or otherwise disposed of outside the family passing by right of succession to one of the children.

All population is divided into four property classes and citizens pass from one class to another depending on the change in their material condition. A special law is to be enacted setting the limits of wealth and poverty.

Private individuals are not to have any gold or silver. Usury is prohibited and all extravagance is ruled out.

The population of the polis, besides the 5040, includes slaves and aliens who are engaged in farming, crafts and commerce (usually on a small scale and not aimed at personal gain).

One of the important assumptions underlying Plato's project of the "second best" state is that "each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do" (Laws, 778).

Advocating equality in the sphere of consumption, Plato proposes that all necessity produce be divided into three parts. Two parts should be consumed by the free members of society and by the slaves respectively, and the third part, exchanged for handicraft goods: "Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two;---neither that which is assigned to masters of the slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be equal and alike and let every citizen take his two portions and distribute them among slaves and freemen, he having power to determine the quantity and quality" (Laws, 848c).

The organisation of everyday life in the second state, like in the first one, is governed by the idea of promoting the conformity of opinion and fostering the spirit of collectivism among the citizens. Though Plato concedes the citizens the right to have individual families, he provides for an elaborate law-governed system of education committing children to the charge of numerous state officials. Women have equal rights with men, though they

are denied membership of the highest ruling body.

Political rights are granted only to the citizens of the state, their main concern being to preserve and strengthen the existing state system. Citizens have equal rights, but the very principle of equality is treated by Plato in a typically aristocratic manner: "For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonized by measure" (Laws, 757).

The state described by Plato in Laws is a hybrid of two forms of government, monarchy and democracy. In his opinion, the Persians and the Athenians respectively carried the two principles to the extreme, whereas a good state partaking of both ought to be moderate regarding the questions of freedom and obedience.

The highest governing body in Plato's state is an Areopagus of 37 rulers recruited by multistage election. The contingent of voters is limited to those who can carry arms or have already taken part in combat. The age of the rulers is restricted to within 50 to 70 and their term of office cannot be longer than 20 years. The rulers have ample prerogatives but their main function is to be "the guardian of the law''.

Considerable power is vested in a Council consisting of 360 elected members (90 from each class). Plato also mentions a popular assembly indicating that attendance at its meetings is compulsory for citizens of the first and second classes only, and those of the third and fourth classes are free to act as they like. The laws of the state also provide for election of a great number of various civilian and military officials.

All candidates undergo a scrutiny which is kind of a check on their qualifications for office.

Besides the above governing bodies, Plato proposes to set up a special board - the Nocturnal Council consisting of the wisest and oldest guardians of the law, top magistrates of the state and a certain number of promising young men---and to "hand over the city to them" (Laws, 961, 969c). The members of this Nocturnal Council which meets between dawn and sunrise and is conceived as the summit of the state and the guarantor of its security ("a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state") should excel all others, like the philosophers of the ideal state, in the knowledge of the cosmos and in political insight, share in the whole scheme of education and concern themselves in promoting virtue and human excellence. This supreme body

which is the directing mind of the state apparently brings it closer to the ideal proclaimed by Plato in Republic.

Plato draws a sharp distinction between states where the rulers stand above the law, and those where the law is supreme: "For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, is preserved, and has every blessing which the Gods can confer" (Laws, 715d).

It is very significant that Plato regards his second best state as representing the latter type, i. e. as based on the law. This intention, however, ill accords with the philosopher's aristocratic sympathies, both on the political and intellectual side, and it is little wonder that his proposals (and not only in the Laws) show an obvious trend towards the cult of an enlightened ruler. Despite Plato's keen insight into the nature of law and politics often displayed in his projects, his political thought is dominated by the deep-seated conviction that "a strength of art is superior to the law" and that a ruler possessing the royal science is above law: "For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge" (Laws, 875c).

The unity of philosophical and political perspectives characteristic of Plato's political philosophy in general here tricks him, as it were, into confusing very different problems.

The antithesis of knowledge and law invoked by Plato and treated in philosophy in abstract terms as the primacy of reason over changeful convention assumes in politics a very concrete form and, as the fate of Plato's teacher Socrates has only too clearly demonstrated, is usually viewed in terms of crime and punishment. Even if this primacy of reason were legalised and fixed by state ordinances (Plato, to do him justice, has never carried his idealism to such an extreme), the philosophical and political implications of such an act would be entirely different. The strength and weakness of Plato's conception inspiring and disappointing many subsequent generations of philosophers and politicians are rooted in the illusion that the products of reason understood in the idealistic manner can be directly translated into political reality. All such attempts undertaken both by Plato and his numerous followers inevitably led to the idealisa-

don of politics and politisation of philosophy.

Plato's views of the laws, like those of the state derive from his" basic conception of divine government as the archetype and model for imitation. In his Law s he reiterates the old myth of the Golden Age and concludes: "Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term `law', the distribution of mind" (Laws, 713e-714).

The view of the law as "the distribution of mind", i. e. the embodiment of reason, became a commonplace with all later adherents of the rationalistic line in the philosophy of right. The specificity of Plato's conception consists in that the law in his eyes represents the rationale of non-existent rather than actual relations and is therefore instrumental in restoring, if only partially and in accordance with the mortals' ability, the standards of divine government. Plato hopes that the laws can help him improve contemporary society by reanimating the prehistoric forms of life, long since dead, and stemming the rising tide of anarchy in the corrupt Athenian state.

Having little hope of the voluntary acceptance of his laws by the population of the imaginary state, Plato proposes to purge the country of undesirable elements leaving only the good ones (Laws, 735c-736c). The best kind of purgation, according to Plato, is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving death or exile, and this is precisely what many of the laws proposed by Plato aim at.

Plato develops his conception of the laws in a polemic with the sophists. In contrast with Protagoras who believed man to be the measure of all things, Plato holds that the measure of the lawful which is the same as the just is god. Levelling his shafts at Thrasymachus, Plato draws a line of demarcation between true and false laws, the former being only those that are made for the good of the state as a whole, but not a clique of usurpers.

In Plato's view, the governments involved in political struggle for power "are not polities at all, nor are laws which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning" (Laws, 715b). This is, perhaps, the most uncompromising statement

against the political line of Thrasymachus in the history of Greek thought.

Alongside the purely philosophico-idealistic approach to the problems of the state and law, Plato's last dialogue reveals in embryo the new historico-geographic trend which was later continued by Aristotle, Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean Bodin and particularly by Montesquieu in his L'Esprit des Lois. In this dialogue the past is no longer rolled into an ideal one-dimensional archetype of government and a yardstick of comparison, but is treated from a historical perspective as a succession of societies, states, morals, customs and laws (from the Deluge to Plato's time).

Plato describes here post-diluvian primitive society with its tribal system, rule of the elders and obedience to tradition and ancient customs, the subsequent unification of several clans into a state, the emergence of aristocratic government or royal power and the enactment of first laws; the history of Ilion (Troy), Argos, Messenia and Lacedaemon (Sparta), the true and untrue forms in their systems and legislation; the history of Persia and Athens, as well as the negative results of the extremes of monarchy and democracy. Plato's historical outline ends in a conclusion that the contemporary legislator should adhere to the principle of moderation, limiting the power of the rulers on the one hand, and the freedom of the ruled, on the other.

The geography of the country, its climate, soil, etc. exert an influence on the state system and on legislation: "We must not fail to observe", points out Plato, "that there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly" (Laws, 747d).

The notion of imitation central to Plato's entire political doctrine is very indicative of his low regard for man's intellect and creative powers by comparison with the gods. This idea is clearly expressed by Plato in his myth where human beings are presented as the gods' puppets who never know if they are intended to be a mere plaything or created for a more important purpose. Their affections are like cords and strings which pull them different and opposite ways. There is one among these cords, the "golden cord of reason called by us the common law of the state" which every man ought to grasp and pull with it against all the rest (Laws, 645).

Human affairs, according to Plato, are hardly worth considering in earnest. Since man is made to be the plaything of the

gods-"and this, truly considered, is the best of him"-he ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing in order to propitiate the gods. Playing all his life, man must observe the rules of the game-these rules are called the laws. Plato the legislator remains an aesthete demanding that the puppet should be an excellent performer and live as long and as well as he can (Laws, 803).

Plato's myth of man as a plaything of the gods somewhat detracts from the value of his recommendation to combine compulsion and persuasion in enforcing the law. He was the first to clearly formulate this politico-legal principle and also to adduce it as an argument for introducing^ preamble to the laws. Inspired by the above myth of men-puppets, Plato deems it necessary to establish the strictest possible control over their whole life, public and private. Indeed, his laws regulate the citizens' daily routine down to the minutest detail leaving no moment of day or dark unaccounted for and exercising vigilance even to their everyday habits and harmless little trickery. Seeking to preserve status quo and inviolability of the laws at all cost and enchanted by the phenomenal stability of the Egyptian state that has resisted change for ten thousand years, Plato declares war on all innovations, institutes strict supervision over the poets and musicians and comes out against arbitrary alterations in children's games. His laws carefully guard the state from what may be regarded as harmful influences and provide for the greatest possible isolation of its citizens from foreigners. Plato even goes as far as completely prohibiting persons under forty from travelling abroad and puts a total ban on all trips overseas in a private capacity. The exception is only made for those who visit a foreign country as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission, with a view to "winning a glory" for the Platonic state in other countries. Besides, the state may also send abroad ``spectators'' (provided they are cleared by the guardians of the law) who will study foreign laws and usages with a view to profiting by other people's experience. The intercourse with foreigners within the state itself is restricted to a minimum and supervised with utmost care.

The firmness of the laws cannot be ensured unless the state has a proper judiciary, as "a city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city" (Laws, 768). Yet judicature in Plato's understanding does not make a separate branch of government or a

specific function of the state. Outlining his system of courts of justice, Plato frankly admits that they "cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices" (Laws, 768d).

Every magistrate, according to Plato, must also be judge of some things and all citizens must also participate in the administration of justice in a general way. Besides various courts of arbitration and courts for private suits, Plato proposes to set up a court of law in every tribe and also special tribunals for public causes which shall examine cases of common interest. These should be composed of judges elected from every magistracy and subjected to a scrutiny held in the presence of the electors. Plato makes out a case for the active participation of judges in legal proceedings, since a silent judge who says no more than the litigants will never, according to Plato, be able to decide justly. Plato's laws also provide for defence against criminal charges in court proceedings, though he shows a good deal of bias towards the advocates who "make the better cause appear the worse''.

Plato sets great store by the knowledge of the laws and strongly recommends studying the works of the legislators "for of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (vovs vous)" (Laws, 957c).

On top of the severe punishments awaiting all those who violate the laws comes the retribution from the gods and Plato darkly reminds the wrongdoers of the inexorable vengeance of Dike, the goddess of justice. Yet even this does not seem to satisfy Plato and he invokes the immortality of the soul and its primacy over everything corporeal in order to bolster up his conception of the divine nature of the law. Being congenial to the soul and also sharing in the eternal primary causes, the law thus acquires an ontological status deriving directly from traditional Greek mythology.

Plato's philosophico-mythological views take in fact the shape of a compulsory religion intended to add the fear of the gods to the restraints of the law in order to secure the necessary conformity of opinion and immunise the ``true'' state against any pernicious influence.

The intellectual heritage of Plato has been exercising the minds of philosophers, political thinkers, jurists and sociologists for over twenty-five centuries. The unique longevity and topicality of his conceptions are mainly traceable to a remarkable combination of the creative genius and imagination of Plato the poet with the profound insight into the most fundamental and ever new problems of human existence of Plato the philosopher and investigator.

His pupil Aristotle who became Plato's chief opponent in the subsequent history of Greek thought was not only under a considerable influence of the Platonic political philosophy, but also played an important part in the dissemination of his teacher's ideas.

Of Greek ancient writers who were in great measure indebted to Plato's ideas (partly in the Aristotelian interpretation), special mention should be made of Polybius the historian. By developing and elaborating Plato's notions of the cyclic progression of the forms of the state and his views on the advantages of mixed government he has played an important part in popularising Greek political thought and, in particular, in winning over ancient Roman and later West-European writers to Platonic philosophy. Of the Roman political thinkers, the most succeptible to Plato's political theory proved to be Cicero who adopted not only his principle of mixture at all government levels, but also a number of his natural right conceptions.

The works of Plato and his followers, particularly Plotinus, were in the focus of attention of the early Christian and medieval thinkers. This period was marked by the appearance of Augustine's De Civitate Dei (The City of God) which played an important part in the Christianisation of the Platonic and Aristotelian politico-legal views and their interpretation in the spirit of Christian theology.

The political doctrine of Thomism, the leading trend in Catholic philosophy that carries back to medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) adopted and gave a new peculiar interpretation to the Platonic notions of the forms of government, the prevalence of the soul's rational principle in the perfect state, the essentially divine source of legislation, etc. No wonder-the caste system of Plato's ideal city could not fail to be

found congenial to the hierarchical structure of feudal society by its ideologists.

Plato's idea that each class should mind its own business acquired a new progressive ring in the writings of Marsilius of Padua who came out against the clergy's pretension to the right of interference in the affairs of other estates.

In the epoch of the Renaissance the cultured world got direct access to Plato's works which enabled the readers to dispense with Augustine's neo-Platonism, Latin translations and their various interpretations. The interest in Plato soared up reflecting the general desire to shake off the fetters of dogmatised Aristotelianism.

Plato's eulogy of legitimate monarchy with its blessings contrasted to the curse of tyrannical rule, as well as his advocacy of mixed government representing the best features of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy met with wide response in the sixteenth century under the conditions of growing popular discontent with absolute monarchy. The ideologists of rising bourgeoisie who went down in history under the name of monarchomachists or fighters against monarchs found Plato's conception concordant with their own theory of limited monarchy based on class representation and made ample use of his arguments against tyranny as the most wicked and corrupt form of government.

Plato's doctrine of the ideal state undergoes a radical transformation in the social Utopias of Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella. The fundamental distinction between the Utopian socialism of these thinkers and the so-called communism of Plato derives, first and foremost, from the difference of their socio-- political platforms. Yet casting their essentially new ideals in an old mould the founders of Utopian socialism borrowed from Plato not only the conception of the perfect state, but also the faith in its practicability and a number of important theoretical propositions.

The same is true of the Utopians of the eighteenth century Mably and Morelly whose views, particularly those of true legislation meeting the demands of nature and largely reflecting the mythical social harmony (the Golden Age) at the dawn of human history are notable for a strong influence of Plato's ideas. This influence is traceable even in the Utopian projects of social restructuring put forward by Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen

who owe to Plato some of their schemes and propositions (e. g. social stratification due to the division of labour, the harmony of passions and harmonious society, the place of education, the position of woman, etc.).

The rationalistic trend in the interpretation of Plato's heritage that started under the Renaissance is characteristic of all early bourgeois ideology.

Plato is the ancient precursor of Spinoza and Hobbes who developed and applied the geometrical method in the analysis of society and politics. Very significant is also a remarkable parallelism between Plato's concept of politics as the royal art of weaving together different virtues and antagonistic passions in a single smooth and strong fabric of the state and Hobbes's assimilation of the state to a complex mechanism knocked together by different human passions. Again, there is good reason to believe that the idea of one complusory state religion advocated by Spinoza, Rousseau, Pufendorf and other political thinkers in modern times as different variants of the so-called civic religion carries back to Plato's doctrine of the ideal city. The Polizeistaat of Christian Wolff, too, has much in common with Plato's ubiquitous and omniscient hierarchy with its vigilant nocturnal council and untiring guardians of the law.

Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois clearly bespeaks the influence of Platonic political conceptions. Describing the factors that determine the "spirit of the laws" and advancing a theory of interconditionality of the morals, political system and the laws, Montesquieu repeatedly refers to Plato as his authoritative forerunner. Plato's influence is traceable not only in the understanding by Montesquieu of different forms of government, but also in his conception of their evolution and change. Directly following in the wake of Plato, Montesquieu holds that the corruption of every form of government starts widi the deterioration of its own principle. Of course, Plato did not speak of the separation of powers, yet his idea of the advantages of mixed government forestalls Montesquieu's famous theory and underlies his arguments for the separation and balance of different powers.

Plato's celebrated king-philosopher ideal was eagerly adopted by die adherents of enlightened absolutism (Voltaire, Diderot, and odiers). The unshakable faith in the "wise laws" characteristic of Helvetius, Holbach and Diderot is attributable, in the last analysis, to Plato's influence and attests to his strong grip on

the minds of the French Enlighteners.

The community of ideas between Plato and Rousseau reveals itself in their common belief in the Golden Age of the human race conceived as primitive communism or the natural state when people had everything in common, everybody was happy and there was no private property. Both of them regard the emergence of private property as a factor of major significance largely accountable for the general degradation of morals.

In his political and legal views Rousseau also subscribes to Plato's central idea in the sphere of politics-the primacy of the whole over its parts, that is the state as representing common interest over the class and the individual. The same idea was also adopted by Hegel (partly straight from Plato and Aristotle and partly from Rousseau drawing a special distinction between the universal will and the will of all) who gave it specific interpretation and developed further in the context of his system of absolute idealism.

Plato's state, according to Hegel, is not an empty and abstract ideal, but an ideal expression of the wholeness of Greek morality (in the Hegelian interpretation of this concept). As regards the crucial question of the relationship between philosophy and reality Plato, in Hegel's opinion, took the right stand giving a philosophical expression to the ideal reality of the Greek polis.

Kant's notions of the state and politics corresponding to the idea of law, i. e. of true republican government, are concordant widi Plato's ideal projects and reflect the old claim of philosophy to supreme political power. Yet Kant's ambitions do not go that far. In his opinion, it is impossible and not even necessary for the king to be a philosopher or for a philosopher to be the king. It would be quite sufficient if the monarchs or self-governing peoples (adhering to die laws based on the principle of equality) do not deny their philosophers the right to exist and make their views known to die public. Indeed, explains Kant, no one but the philosophers can be instrumental, given the conditions of publicity, in achieving the true aim of politics-the common weal.

Even more profound was the influence of Plato on Fichte whose Utopian project of a German bourgeois society (Self-- contained Merchant State, 1800) was largely modelled on the ideas of his ancient predecessor (meticulous regulation of all life, division by the state of all citizens on the principle of trade and occupa-

tion, economic exclusiveness and self-reliance, etc).

Platonic parallelism between the state and man, the faculties of the soul and the powers of the state, various biological and psychological conceptions of the relationship between the whole and its parts are common, with various modifications, to many representatives of the organic theory of the state, politics and law.

In the nineteenth-twentieth centuries the revival of the natural right doctrine evoked fresh interest in Plato's political views which gained wide currency in a number of its modern variants. Characteristic of Catholic theology, for one, is the Thomist line notable for the interpretation of the natural right conceptions of Plato and Aristotle in the spirit of Christian dogmas.

A serious attempt to give a neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato's theory of the state and law was made by Erich Cassirer at the beginning of the twentieth century. Regarding the doctrine of natural right (law) as an intermediate link between philosophy and jurisprudence, Cassirer sees its origin in Plato's idealism at large. The doctrine of natural right, in his opinion, underlies all Plato's views relating to being-in-itself, true being and being by nature but not by convention. Proceeding from the neo-- Kantian ``pure'' idea of law, Cassirer also describes the Platonic state as a legal institution which owes its reality not to external necessity (it would contradict the notion of pure rationality) but, on the contrary, is deduced from the conditions of self-- consciousness.

This understanding of the principle of law as a purely logical construct lies at the root of Cassirer's interpretation of other natural right doctrines, including the one advanced by Kant. Plato, according to Cassirer, takes no exception to the modern notion of freedom as he stands for the rule of reason and not of some arbitrary caste in a state.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Plato's political philosophy in general and his natural right doctrine in particular attracted special attention of Pavel Novgorodtsev, a Russian historian of political theories who urged his colleagues to give more attention to the Socratic-Platonic line in the ancient heritage, and whose approach reflected the liberal ideology of neoHegelianism and neo-Kantianism. Taking a further step in the same direction, some German historians in the late 1920s (e. g.

K. Gronau and Werner Jaeger) already hazarded a theory about Plato's revival and turned their eyes to him for guidance in practical politics.

In the 1940s the Greco-Platonic synthesis of liberty and law, truth and right, logos and dike was hailed by neo-Kantianist Ernst Cassirer as a profound achievement of Greek political thought and as a key to the analysis of contemporary problems of law and politics. Somewhat earlier German historian Rudolf Polmann had come out in defence of Plato's political philosophy against the attacks of Hegel, Eduard Zeller, Otto Gierke and other writers who accused Plato of ignoring individual rights and freedoms in his conception of law.

The period after World War II is characterised by numerous attempts of the bourgeois commentators of Plato's political theory to accommodate his views to the needs of the present-day ideological struggle.

Highly critical of Plato's politico-legal conceptions are such bourgeois liberals as Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Ernst Topitsch, and others (all of them professing positivist views). These writers generally try to pass Plato for a champion of totalitarianism and an advocate of the authoritarian state.

According to Popper, both medieval authoritarianism and modern totalitarianism carry back to Plato. Popper includes contemporary communism under the head of totalitarianism and links Plato to Marx (through Hegel), giving vent to his anticommunist feelings towards them both.

Bertrand Russell describes Plato's political philosophy as "authoritarianism in politics". He frankly admits that he treats Plato "with as little reverence as if he were a contemporary English or American advocate of totalitarianism" '.

All attempts to pass off the ancient philosopher as a contemporary democrat or totalitarian are essentially anti-historical. Under the specific conditions of his time Plato advocated aristocratic government and presented his political ideal in philosophical attire as a perfect city. Taken out of the context of Plato's historical environment, it inevitably turns into an abstraction

~^^1^^ Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1946, p. 125.

and its individual features acquire the properties of ideal theoretical models and guiding principles applicable in the sphere of law and politics at all times. Such an approach, however, is incompatible with the objective assessment of their political and theoretical significance. If Plato's legacy is to have any practical value at all, it must be viewed in the historical perspective, i. e. with due regard for the socio-economic, political and epistemological conditions of its genesis.

The attitude of Soviet historians to Plato's political theory deserves special attention, since the general appraisal of his views has a direct bearing on the assessment of other politicolegal conceptions of antiquity related in one way or another to Plato's teaching (e. g. those of the sophists, Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc.) and, for that matter, on the understanding of the axiological approach to the past in general, of its place and significance in historical investigations.

The label of a reactionary fastened on Plato by a number of scholars appears to us completely gratuitous if only for the fact that Plato was a staunch opponent and censurer of oligarchic coups and oligarchic government in general. This is clearly seen both from his general doctrine of the forms of government in which oligarchy is treated as a corrupt and untrue form, and from the critical stand he took against contemporary political practices under oligarchic rule.

Plato's feelings were anti-oligarchic no less than anti-- democratic, and it was not accidental that he refused to participate not only in the affairs of the democratic state, but also in the oligarchic revolution of 404 B. C. in Athens though the leader of the Thirty was none other than his own uncle Critias.

For similar reasons one can hardly accept the view of some historians that Plato was a mouthpiece of the reactionary Athenian slave-owners - his criticism of practically all contemporary forms of government from the position of an abstract ideal ("the rule of the philosophers") accords ill with this flat unqualified formula. Incidentally, from the same position Plato also castigated timocracy usually exemplified in his writings by the Creto-Spartan political system- this attitude does not very well tally with the "idealisation of Spartan institutions" ascribed to him by some commentators.

True, timocracy in Plato's scheme of constitutional corruption is preferable to oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, yet all

these forms of government, timocracy including, are perverted and untrue in principle.

The mistaken notions of die reactionary character of Plato's political views are largely a result of the misinterpretation of his doctrine of political forms of government in general and the aristocratic form in particular. The thing is that in the eyes of some scholars adherence to aristocratic government, understood at that in a somewhat one-sided way, is synonymous with being a ``reactionary''. This primitive approach fallacious as it is from the standpoint of logic is also untenable from the historical angle as it leaves out of account the actual theoretical and political views of Plato.

In describing above the political conceptions of Pythagoras, Heraclitus and other ancient thinkers we have already pointed out the difference between the platforms of the old "aristocracy of blood" and the new "aristocracy of spirit". This difference should not be disregarded when one attempts to get an insight into Plato's mind.

It is very significant that Plato who came of an old noble family and was a typical "aristocrat of blood" was led by his philosophical, political and legal views to take a stand against both hereditary aristocracy and the aristocracy of wealth or oligarchy and to become an advocate of new aristocracy-the aristocracy of spirit and knowledge. His negative attitude to tyranny can hardly be accounted for by the fact that in ancient Greece tyranny was not infrequently directed against the privileges of hereditary aristocracy. Plato was not an upholder of such privileges and his criticism of tyranny was not prompted by personal considerations and self-interest - it was with him a matter of principle.

Plato's aristocratic government as the best of all possible forms is an ideal scheme, a materialisation of the idea of the rule of intellectual and moral elite which, according to Plato, includes only true philosophers. What is more, the virtues of a true philosopher are not innate but can be acquired and, strictly speaking, noble birth is of little consequence. The Platonic theory of aristocracy and aristocratic government was essentially different from the views and notions of old aristocracy regarding their natural privileges and claims to power.

The right of merit as the basis of government was, of course, more progressive than the hereditary right of birth, and Plato, as

well as his other predecessors and particularly Socrates made no small contribution to the philosophical substantiation of the new principle. It was upheld by many progressive thinkers of subsequent epochs, particularly by the French Enlighteners, who fought against the political privileges and pretensions of the contemporary nobility. Its significance has not been lost till nowadays and the echoes of die past political battles are still ringing, for instance, in the demands for competent leadership, scientific approach to die problems of management, etc. This is an important aspect of Plato's ``aristocratism'' which cannot be left out of account in historical studies and which does not dovetail with die attribute ``reactionary'' often attached to his political Utopia.

It is also worth noting in this context that any sound axiological analysis of one or another thinker's conceptions in terms of the single-valued ``progress-reaction'' antithesis implies of necessity a definite scale of socio-political values and can only be undertaken on the basis of a clear-cut doctrine of historical progress. This approach alone will provide the necessary guidelines for comparison and ensure the investigator against absolute relativism on the one hand, and arbitrariness, on the other.

For instance, if we view the Platonic conception of the rule of philosophers from the historical angle, i. e. from the standpoint of the cognition of politico-legal phenomena, we are bound to admit that it represents an important milestone in die history of die rational interpretation of man's growing political and legal experience. In this approach the very idealisation of die principle of political government based on reason and knowledge appears as an important and necessary stage in die philosophical interpretation of political phenomena.

On the socio-political and ideological side this principle was an important advance on the ideology of old aristocracy. Besides, it provided a philosophical substantiation of the right of die slaves to equality in the sphere of consumption. Plato clearly states in his Laws that no one of the three portions of agricultural produce which are to be distributed among die population should be greater than either of the other two-"neither that which is assigned to masters or to slaves" (848c), whereas in Republic he even makes an attempt to dispense with the division of the city population into the freemen and the slaves by introducing three classes in accordance with the natural division of

labour within die polis. The harshness of die laws in Plato's ideal state must not detract from his far-sightedness, nor overshadow die humanistic and progressive tendencies (under the conditions of ancient slavery!) of his political theory.

Let us now consider Plato's aristocratic government with its principle of die rule of "those who have knowledge" from a slightly different perspective comparing it with the dieory and practice of Athenian democracy. Such a comparison, in our opinion, could throw additional light on some controversial points regarding Plato's attitude to democracy, since his criticism of the democratic form of government and its basic principles is adduced by many researchers as important evidence for his reactionary views.

Plato did criticise Athenian democracy. Yet he simultaneously criticised all other forms of government in existence (despotism, tyranny, monarchy, aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy). Plato's political ideal (die rule of philosophers, the aristocracy of knowledge) was a product of abstract contemplative thought, a Utopia essentially nihilistic and critical of all existing forms of political organisation and government conceived by him only as various degrees of departure from his other-worldly image of perfection. It would be naive and tendentious to ascribe Plato's ideal largely or primarily to his anti-democratic sentiments-though, of course, his censorious attitude to democracy (as well as to odier forms of non-philosophical government) could not leave his ideal completely unaffected.

Plato, like his teacher Socrates executed by Athenian democracy, mainly castigated it for lack of competence, recruitment of public officials by the lot, etc. The advocacy of the rule of those who have knowledge, i. e. the "true philosophers" skilled in the art of government and endowed with all kinds of virtues, was tanta'mout, in the light of the contemporary democratic practice and theory, to an attempt at pushing away the masses from the helm of the state. To be sure, from the viewpoint of the free demos, die principle of such a rule was unacceptable and, using the present-day term, reactionary. Yet in order to understand its significance under the specific conditions of Plato's time, i. e. to appraise it in a historical perspective, one is bound to ask this question: Could die demos itself be identified with social progress, or was its own stand progressive?

In answering this question one should not overlook the fact

that the ancient demos consisted of free citizens who lived off the forced labour of the slaves and never called in question the legitimacy of the social system which denied the political and all other rights to a vast majority of the city's population. Contemporary democracy took slavery for granted as an institution based on natural justice. It was a narrow-minded and self-- seeking democracy envious of somebody else's rights and exceedingly jealous of their own privileges. The ancient demos constantly demanded equality with the upper strata and took watchful care of its advantages over the lower classes. It is not accidental that ``demagogy'' has become a word of opprobrium-it owes its scornful ring to the craftiness of democratic leaders, usually of privileged families themselves, who skillfully manipulated public opinion covering up the greed of the demos and simultaneously their own ambition with verbiage of justice and equality.

Is it possible at aH to do away with social barriers and privileges within one, the ``free'', class of society if its freedom rests on the slavery of another class? The logic of socio-political progress and the lessons of history show that such partial egalitarianism in the interests of only one social group runs counter to the fundamental principle of stratification underlying the whole structure of a hierarchical society. In a state based on social inequality and privileges this principle acquires a universal character and determines social relations within all strata.

Ancient slave-owning democracy was not the rule of the majority of the population, but only the rule of the majority of free clansmen, i. e. those who belonged to one of the Athenian clans and were entitled by right of birth involving no effort on their part to the privileges of a free member of the polis community. In comparison with this essentially hereditary right to political privileges the right of knowledge was far more equalitarian by nature. Its champions rejected the qualifying function of social distinctions and proclaimed knowledge the universal criterion which should be applicable to all. From the standpoint of this criterion neither man's place in the social scale, nor the welfare standards are indicative of his true worth-he is, first and foremost, a being endowed with reason, Homo sapiens, and should only be viewed in terms of this universal characteristic. The implementation of this rationalistic principle is accompanied in Plato by the construction of an ideal social system dis-

playing certain features of "consumer Communism" (absence of both private property and family; community of property, wives and children within the two upper classes in Republic', equality of all classes in the sphere of consumption in Laws).

The unrealistic, Utopian character of Plato's projects of the perfect state clearly testifies to the impracticability of his principle of government (reason instead of noble birth or property qualifications) under the existing conditions of slavery. This principle demanded, in order to be realised, overstepping the bounds of the contemporary social system---and this is precisely the way history moves onward, both in terms of theory and practice, ever transgressing the limits of the existing social forms and replacing them by new ones. Plato showed profound insight into the nature of social and political unrest and its causes tracing them to the sway of private property, the antagonism between the rich and the poor, and offered his own remedy to the ills of contemporary society. It was a new principle of the organisation of human life, unknown to ancient slave-owning society.

The significance of Plato's political doctrine was not lost on future generations. Proponents of historical progress advocating various theories of social restructuring on new, just principles simply could not pass over his ideal state in silence and either argued against it or adduced it as an argument in support of their own projects. In modern times Plato's views exerted a considerable influence on the theories of early Utopians who criticised private property and invented ideal forms of society based on the community of property, wives and children, equality in the sphere of consumption, etc.

The historical role of Plato's Utopia as a fountain-head of markedly progressive social doctrines of later epochs is an important argument against the interpretation of his teaching as reactionary or retrogressive. On the contrary, one cannot but concede consistency to those liberally-minded anti-communist commentators, champions of the inviolability of private property, who have sensed danger in the progressive anti-proprietary tendencies of Plato's schemes. Their opposition is natural and accords with the socio-political views they profess. On the other hand, consistency appears to be sadly lacking in the approach of those opponents of private property who criticise Plato's Utopia and assess it as reactionary without any qualifications.

In the analysis of Plato's socio-political teaching a historian must be constantly on his guard against the danger of oversimplification, resisting the temptation to reduce the enormous complexity of Plato's ideas to a single principle, a fixed idea. Alexei Losev, speaking of the restorative tendency in Plato's conceptions and a reactionary character of his Utopia, at the same time does not shut his eyes to the opposite tendency which clearly manifests itself in Plato's teaching: "It is what we call moral fibre, an urge to change the surrounding world in accordance with our convictions. Plato in this respect has always been an enemy of complacent Philistines. It is precisely this irresistible drive towards the ideal and selfless service to the principle that has made Plato's philosophy famous through millennia, though its assessments have always varied and it undoubtedly deserves censure and condemnation in its concrete form. Plato's moral code has become a historical relic, a curiosity, yet on the formal side the value of moral substance advocated by Plato has never died." ' Giving an overall appraisal of Plato's legacy, the author underlines the democratic tendencies of his thought clearly manifested in the rejection of dogmatism, untiring search for truth, the dialogic form of his discourse, frank admission of doubts, hesitancy and absence of ready answers.

A concrete historical approach to the political theory of Plato is also characteristic of Valentin Asmus, a prominent Soviet humanist.^^2^^ Criticising various aspects of Plato's doctrine of aristocratic government, the author at the same time does not describe it as patently reactionary. His keen sense of historicism reveals itself, for instance, in that he treats Plato's doctrine in its specific historical environment without losing sight of its limitations and traces the subsequent historical development and transformations of Plato's original notions, ideas and values. This approach enables the author to avoid superficial and onesided conclusions in the assessment of Plato's conceptions of freedom, relationship between the state and the individual, the socio-political status of different classes, etc.

Asmus justly observes that the very title of Plato's dialogue

Republic reflects a signal feature of the ancient mind, in fact, the whole world outlook of the ancients, not of Plato alone: it is the exact opposite of individualism in modern West-European thought and consists in the conviction that a free member of society is inseparable from the state as a whole to which he belongs and that this relationship is to be the model for the solution of all major philosophical problems.'

This notion of universal statehood, as it were, underlies the whole doctrine of Plato's ideal social system: "The subject of freedom and of the highest excellence in Plato is not an individual, not even a class, but all society, the state as a whole. The utopia of Plato is not a theory of the individual freedom of citizens, but a theory of a total freedom-the freedom of the state in its totality, wholeness and indivisibility.''^^2^^

Analysing Plato's Utopia (the Platonic "communism of consumption, but not production"), Asmus justly draws a distinction between its two different but interrelated aspects, critical or negative and constructive or positive. Due account of both these aspects in the historical perspective enables him to get a better insight into the nature of Plato's opposition to the existing forms of government and into the true relationship between his ideal state and contemporary reality.

The relationship of Plato's doctrine of ideal state to the theory of the separation of powers deserves special attention. Such a theory could only arise on the basis of practice- a real division of labour in the sphere of public life and would have been impossible without an elaborate system of notions reflecting this practice. Plato did regard the division of labour as "the formative principle of the State"~^^3^^ and this thesis undoubtedly contributed to the theoretical substantiation of the need for the separation of powers in modern times. Yet Plato himself had no such theory. Moreover, the division of labour among different classes denies the very idea of the separation of powers. Indeed, the upper class, i. e. the ruling philosophers in Plato, are vested with final authority on all matters of government and this is exactly what the separation of powers is intended to prevent.

The power of the rulers is in no way restricted by the arrange-

~^^1^^ A. F. Losev, The Life and Work of Plato, Moscow, 1969, p. 68 (in Russian).

~^^2^^ V. F. Asmus, Plato, pp. 136-179; idem. "The State", in: Plato, Vol. 3, Part 1, Moscow, 1971 pp. 579-613 (in Russian).

~^^1^^ V. F. Asmus, "The State", p. 579.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 608.

~^^3^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 346.

ment whereby they take turns in discharging their legislative, executive and judicial functions. This versatility in the exercise of their authority is but another evidence for the undivided sway they hold in the state, for the unity of state power they embody. There is every reason to regard the ruling elite of the Platonic state as an uncontrolled autocratic clique wielding unlimited power in the state. Idealising and exalting the rule of this clique, Plato could not have conceivably subscribed to the doctrine of the separation of powers directed against its absolute monopoly.

The difference in the competence of various state organs referred to by Plato, Aristotle and other ancient thinkers-and, in particular, the allusion to legislative, executive and judicial bodies does not by any means signify that they sought to substantiate the principle of the separation of powers or proceeded from it in the exposition of their doctrines. Plato's views in this respect have been defined above with sufficient clarity.

As regards Aristotle, his stand requires certain qualification. Aristotle was more explicit and consistent than Plato in distinguishing between the component parts of the state structure: "All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for each constitution.... There is (1) one element which deliberates about public affairs; secondly (2) that concerned with the magistracies - the questions being, what they should be, over what they should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing to them; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power" (Aristotle, Politics, IV, 14, 1297b35-1298a).

Yet Aristotle did not focus his attention on the relations of these "three elements" with one another (their interdependence, counteraction, mutual restraints, etc.) which would only be natural for an exponent of the principle of the separation of powers, but rather concerned himself with their specific organisation under different forms of government. Though the above "three elements" constitute, according to Aristotle, the foundation of every form of government and "the very distinction between the forms results from the different organisation of each of the elements" (ibid.), Aristotle did not consider the latter in terms of the power separation doctrine, i. e. as separate powers or relatively independent functions of a single state power, but treated them instead as formative components.

If Aristotle had proceeded from the principle of the separation

of powers, he would not have confined himself to the statement cited above. He would have said that the difference between the forms of government is conditioned not only, and not so much by the difference in the organisation of each of the elements, but first and foremost by their interrelation, the manner in which they interact, the form and degree of their participation in the exercise by the state of its separate powers. Yet Aristotle never said any such things.

That clearly shows that Aristotle speaks here not of the elements of state power, but of the elements of a form of government. He mentions power or authority only in connection with the magistracies (offices) and it is very significant that in his doctrine the magistrates are vested not only with executive, but also with legislative authority: "Speaking generally, those are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding, especially the last; for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate" (ibid., IV, 15, 1299a). This view hardly gives any ground for saddling Aristotle with the doctrine of the separation of powers.

If one were to trace this doctrine to its theoretical sources, he would probably find more promise in the ancient conception of polity (creditable primarily to Aristotle and Polybius) as a mixed form of government. The authors of this conception considered polity to be advantageous in that it combined different principles of ``unperverted'' forms conceived in fact as different powers of the state. The correct combination and the proper balance of these principles could guarantee, in their opinion, a fair degree of political stability in the state and provide an optimal form and a just measure for the participation of different social classes (the demos, the wealthy and the aristocrats) in the discharge of state functions, that is in government.

Hence, what the doctrine of the separation of powers seeks to attain by dividing the authority of the state among different classes and organs, the conception of mixed government achieves by integrating the principles of different political forms within the framework of polity. To be sure, a certain similarity of aims characteristic of the ancient and modern theories in question gives no cause for ignoring their essential differences, including those of the theoretico-conceptual nature. A historian must always be on his guard against the temptation to moder-

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nise the past as it inevitably leads to superficiality and errors in the assessment of ancient authors' views.

Much in the political philosophy of Plato reflecting hoary antiquity has become obsolete and trivial, yet it also contains food for reflection and cannot be denied great cognitive value. Engels, for one, gave a high appraisal of "Plato's presentation - one which, for his time, was full of genius-of the division of labour as the natural basis of the city (which for the Greeks was identical with the state)".^^1^^

To sum up then. Plato opened up new vistas in philosophy and introduced a vast complex of politico-legal problems into the sphere of scientific inquiry. Many of the solutions he offered bear a distinct mark of his creative genius. They went down in the history of subsequent political thought, both those having epistemological value and those found illusory. The socio-- political and ideological orientations of Plato's doctrines, as well as their destinies are very different, yet they make an integral part of the cultural legacy of mankind. Without a critical appraisal of Plato's political philosophy one cannot expect to keep one's bearings in the ocean of political teachings and legal doctrines of the past and present, nor indeed to work out a sound approach to the contemporary political practices.

The spiritual and intellectual experience of such a giant as Plato is always instructive, both or the positive and negative sides. Plato's thought will never lose its topicality as it reflects the past experience of humanity.

5. ARISTOTLE

Aristotle (384-322 B. C.), the greatest thinker of antiquity, has made an enormous contribution to the history of philosophical and political thought and is justly considered the originator of political science as an independent department of knowledge.

His literary heritage was held in great esteem by Marx, Engels and Lenin.^^2^^

~^^1^^ Engels, Anti-Duhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 261.

~^^2^^ See: Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 27; Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 66; "Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 427; "Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 34; V. I. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Book Lectures on the History of Philosophy", Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 285.

Aristotle was born at Stagira, a small town in Thrace on the north of the eastern coast of the Aegean Sea and is therefore often referred to in historical literature as the Stagirite. His father Nichomachus is known to have been a court physician to king Amyntas III of Macedon for many years. After his death, at the age of seventeen Aristotle went to Athens (in 367 B. C.) in order to join Plato's Academy and remained its member, first as a pupil, then as a teacher till the death of its founder. In 347 B. C. Aristotle left Athens and for a number of years lived in other Greek cities. In 342 B. C. he accepted the offer of king Philip II of Macedon to be tutor of his son Alexander, the future great conqueror, and stayed with him till 340 B. C.

In 335 B. C. Aristotle returned to Athens, where he founded his own philosophical school (the Lyceum), remaining its head almost till the end of his life.

The death of Alexander the Great in 323 B. C. set off a general popular uprising against the rule of Macedon and Aristotle, known for his pro-Macedonian views, found himself in a precarious position. Like Socrates, he was accused of disloyalty to Athens and a charge of impiety was promptly brought up against him. Aristotle was compelled to go into voluntary exile and ironically explained his hasty departure from the city by a wish to save the Athenians from repeatedly sinning against philosophy. He retreated to his mother's native township Chalsis on the island of Euboea where he had some property, and died there a few months later.

Aristotle was a very prolific writer, but many of his works have been irretrievably lost. The surviving works where he discussed the problems of law and politics include Politics, The Athenian Constitution, Ethics and Rhetoric. His politico-legal doctrine as a whole is expounded in Politics.

Aristotle made an attempt to develop a comprehensive doctrine of politics as a separate science closely linked with ethics. A scientific approach to politics presupposes, according to Aristotle, an elaborate system of ethical notions, i. e. a thorough acquaintance with the nature of virtues and morals.

The objects of political science are the beautiful and the just; the same objects are also studied by ethics which treats them as virtues. Ethics is an introduction to politics, its propaedeutic. Alongside specific ethical problems, Aristotle also investigates in

his Ethics into a number of other questions pertaining to law and politics.

In the hierarchy of goals aspired to by different arts and sciences the goal of the political science is the highest. Subordinate to it are the goals of all other practical sciences (politics is also conceived as a practical science studying man's practical activity) insofar as it concerns itself with the supreme good of man and the state (Ethics, I, 1).

The highest good, according to Aristotle* consists in contentment or the fullness of life. Indeed, nothing but contentment makes man self-sufficient or autarchical and is always the final goal or the goal in itself, never a means to another goal.

Contentment as the highest goal of all human efforts consists in activity based on virtue, and it is the attainment of this end which is the aim of politics: "We assumed the End ofpolitic to be most excellent: now this bestows most care on making the members of the community of a certain character; good that is and apt to do what is honourable" (Ethics, I, IX, 1099b).

The discussion of moral virtues and qualities of a "good man" in Ethics serves as an introduction to Politics where Aristotle treats of political virtues characteristic of a "good citizen" and unfolds his doctrine of political relationships in general.

Aristotle's concept of virtue rests on the conviction that virtue is not an innate quality. Virtues, he says, are acquired by the soul and divided into intellectual and moral. "Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit" (Ethics, II, 1, 1103a). Moral virtues are inherent in man's character and reveal themselves in his actions. They can be acquired in the course of man's life and consolidated by constant exercise.

Men, according to Aristotle, are not born virtuous or otherwise. Contrary to Plato's thesis that virtues are innate and cannot be taught, Aristotle professed a more realistic conception of virtue as potentiality which can be actualised by good habits: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i. e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it" (Ethics, II, VI, 1107a). Man's moral choice is voluntary and he is free to take the path of virtue or vice: "If it is in our power to do and to for-

bear doing what is creditable or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power" (Ethics, III, V,

However, deviating from the above conception of free will, Aristotle maintains that the aspiration to the true goal is not a matter of one's own choice : "One must be born with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby to judge fairly and choose that which is really good" (Ethics, III, V, 11 lib).

Passing to the problem of justice, Aristotle clearly reveals the relationship between ethics and politics. Justice is the highest of all qualities acquired by the soul (courage, temperance, generosity, magnanimity, etc.) and falls within the province of ethics being a component part of virtue in general. Yet justice also has a specific aspect whereby it comes within the scope of politics -it is the principle of rectitude and equitable relations among people. By justice in law and politics is understood the highest virtue, i. e. political justice.

Aristotle draws a distinction between two main varieties of justice -distributive and corrective. The former is concerned with the distribution of various benefits in accordance with the contribution of each member of a community to the common good, and the shares among them in terms of honour, wealth, money may be very different. By contrast, the aim of the corrective justice is to promote equality in exchange of goods belonging to individuals in accordance with the amount and quality of labour contained therein. It covers various transactions and deals, damages, punishments, etc.

Aristotle's conception of two types of justice in fact echoes Plato's views of two types of equality : in both cases an attempt is made to justify inequality in the sphere of socio-political relations. The principle of just inequality (in Plato) or unequal justice (in Aristotle) is considered an essential condition for proper organisation of politico-legal life.

The principal conclusion that follows from Aristotle's ethical doctrine and is of crucial importance for his political theory consists in the thesis that political justice is only possible among free and socially equal members of a community, and its final aim is to ensure their contentment or autarchy.

Political justice is thus conceived as a principle of the political form of authority (as distinct from the non-political authority of

the master over the slaves and the father over the children) and as a political method of controlling relations among people. A political community presupposes freedom and equality of its members both in the exercise of authority and in subordination. A natural corollary to the ethical doctrine expounded by Aristotle in Ethics is the doctrine of the state structure and its different forms, which constitutes the subject-matter of his Politics.

Outlining his method of scientific investigation into political phenomena, the Stagirite points out its three elements: breaking up the state as a complex whole into its component parts, considering the distinguishing properties of each of them, and investigating different state structures and the activity of the state in accordance with different combinations of its components. Aristotle underlines that he uses different principles of division since the whole naturally falls into different elements and different combinations of these elements depending on the functions of the whole.

Aristotle's views on the structure of the whole and on the relations of its elements are dominated by organistic notions. He often resorts to direct analogies between the state and the living organism, assimilates various elements of society to the soul and the body, etc.

An important feature of Aristotle's approach to political reality is that his analysis abounds in historical parallels, comparisons of the past and contemporary experience and exhibits a conscious tendency towards a theoretical generalisation and scientific treatment of political practices. As compared with Plato, the role of myth in his conceptions is reduced to a minimum.

Aristotle made a great advance on Plato in terms of realism. His down-to-earth approach to political problems reveals itself both in the methods of his analysis and in the pragmatic treatment of the object of his investigations (political phenomena). Aristotle seeks to comprehend the inner logic and the true meaning of real political relations, i. e. to get a clear insight into the sphere which was to Plato nothing but a sorry spectacle of puppets vainly trying to imitate the divine archetypes.

Yet on the whole, despite considerable achievements in the rationalisation of political studies and persistent, though not always well reasoned, polemic against his teacher, Aristotle remains under a considerable influence of the ideal politico-legal

schemes masterly developed by Plato. In many respects his approach is essentially different from that of Plato, but not infrequently Aristotle tacitly follows in the wake of his predecessor or greatly exaggerates their differences.

The problems of the state, law and politics are mainly treated by Aristotle in terms of an ideal state conceived as a political community of free and equal individuals.

In his conception and definition of the state Aristotle proceeds from ideal parameters of the ancient polis-the city-state. What Aristotle calls the state is in fact nothing but a product of Hellenic culture only, the highest form of the Greeks' communion. The barbarians, both European and Asiatic, are incapable, in Aristotle's opinion, of rising to statehood (Politics, VII, 6, 1, 1327b).

Aristotle avers that the state is a natural growth and exists very much like the first partnerships, the household and the village. However, the state is the highest form of partnership covering all other forms and being their object and end. In political society all other partnerships attain their goal (happy life) and completion. Man is by nature a political animal and it is only in the political community or the state that his true self can be fully realised. Not all people, according to Aristotle, have managed to reach this advanced stage. The barbarians, for one, have failed to rise to the heights of political partnership of free and equal citizens owing to their retarded development. "Barbarian and slave are the same in nature," declares Aristotle (Politics, I, 1,5, 1252b).

In Aristotle's view, the master-slave relations are characteristic of the household, and not the state. By contrast, political authority derives from the relations of freedom and equality and is essentially different from the authority of the father over his children or the master over his slaves. The community of the barbarians is therefore non-political and antecedent to the emergence of the state. Politics, political justice and the state are, according to Aristotle, below the gods and above the barbarians. Between the gods and the barbarians stands the morally developed Hellene-the citizen of the state: "He who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity" (Politics, I, 1, 1253a).

Since the nature of man and the different forms of men's communion can only attain perfection in a state, "the state is by

nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual" (ibid., 1253a).

This thesis about the priority of the state over the individual and various forms of communion adopted in later political teachings (Rousseau, Hegel, etc.) is understood by Aristotle in the sense that the state alone, first, permits the ultimate end of human nature and men's communion to be attained and, second, enables the individual, the family, etc. to function as component parts of a single whole-a living political organism.

Hence, in Aristotle's political theory the primacy of the state implying the hierarchy and subordination of goals rests logically on his teleological and organistic notions. Historically, however, that is from the viewpoint of actual social and ethico-cultural progress, the state is preceded by the individual, the family, etc.

Both for Aristotle and for Plato the state is a single whole and a unity of its components, yet Aristotle comes out against Plato's tendency towards totalitarianism: "This extreme unification of the state is clearly not good" (Politics, II, 2, 1261b). The state consists of a multitude of elements showing a wide diversity of properties within the unity of one structural organisation. A lesser degree of the unity of these elements is preferable to a greater degree. A tendency towards extreme unification (for instance, the community of property, wives and children) is bound, in Aristotle's opinion, to destroy the state.

Proceeding from this premise, Aristotle subjects both projects of the ideal state advanced by Plato to well-grounded criticism. In his opinion, "in way both the household and the state should be a unit, but they should not be so in every way" (Politics, II, 2, 9, 1263b).

Aristotle makes a firm stand for the rights of an individual, the right to private property first and foremost, and comes out in defence of an individual family asserting its specificity and independence from the state. His arguments were later widely used by numerous opponents of all sorts of socialisation of property, family and children.

Private property, in Aristotle's opinion, derives in the final analysis from man's nature, his natural love of his own self. Already in Ethics Aristotle regards egoism as a very important virtue, since a man "is specially a friend to himself and so he is bound to love himself the most" (Ethics, IX, VIII, 1168b). Such egoism, in Aristotle's view, attests to moral excellence and is

commendable in contrast with unjust and reprehensible egoism commonly held in contempt. The legislator therefore should recognise private property as a rational and virtuous principle.

Aristotle, however, is also censorious of mercenariness, excessive acquisitiveness, etc. Advocating private property, he at the same time contends that it should be used for the common interests.

The community of property, wives and children leads to obliteration of personal responsibility, tends to foster idleness, laxity and negligence, and is attended by all sorts of confusion, squabbles and discord, whereas friendly relations are a great boon to the state. A confusion of ``mine'' and "someone else`s'' and a transition from "this is mine" to "this is ours" is fraught with many a predicament in private and public life: "How much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion!" (Politics, II, 3, 1262a).

Evil in states, according to Aristotle, springs not from the absence of the community of property, but from the moral corruption of people. Therefore the remedy proposed by Plato in fact amounts to turning "a harmony into unison or a rhythm into a single foot" (Politics, II, 2, 1263b). It would only make the state worse, if not destroy it altogether.

The state, according to Aristotle, is a composite body. From the standpoint of form, it is a collection of citizens rather than of such primary elements as individuals, households, etc. The definition of the state constitution or form of government depends therefore on who is entitled to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature of a citizen is. In Aristotle's view, a citizen of the state is one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office, and the state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous to secure independence of life (Politics, III, 1275b).

Each form of government has its own definition of citizen and its own grounds for granting a set of civil rights to one or another group of individuals. A change in the notion of citizen and, consequently, in the form of government brings about a corresponding change of government itself.

The form of government which is also described by Aristotle as the political system or the constitution of the state is determined by the composition of the ruling body of the state, i. e. by the number of those who are vested with supreme power (one, a

few, many). Besides, he draws a distinction between correct or true forms of government and incorrect or corrupted ones ( perversions) . In the true forms the rulers govern with a view to the common interest, whereas in perverted forms they pursue their own selfish ends. The three true forms of government are kingship or royalty, aristocracy and polity or constitutional government, the perversions are respectively tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (Politics, III, 7, 1279a).

Each form, in turn, has several varieties depending on the combinations of their constituent elements.

The varieties of royalty or kingship are:

(1) A lifelong generalship (exemplified by the Spartan constitution) guided by law.

(2) Kingships existing among some of the barbarians ( hereditary and based on law, but despotic and of a tyrannical nature).

(3) Elective tyranny among the ancient Greeks which differs from the barbarian monarchies only in that it is not hereditary. (An example is the rule of Pittacus, one of the Seven Sages, elected by the people of Mytilene to resist external invasion). Such monarchies, according to Aristotle, are in the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic, and also of the nature of kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects.

(4) Hereditary legal kingships over willing subjects in the heroic period.

(5) Absolute monarchy with a single ruler sovereign over all matters.

Conventional monarchy, according to Aristotle, is not the best form of government. Arguing against Plato, Aristotle contends that it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best laws than by the best men since the law does not contain the emotional element and is therefore superior to the human soul in which it is innate. Besides, in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person whoever he may be.

Aristotle, however, concedes the right to absolute power to an outstanding individual whose virtue, like that of god, may prove to exceed the virtue of all others. In that case it would be just for such an individual to be king and sovereign over all matters, and for the community to obey him, for kingship must of necessity be based on the outstanding superiority of one man and is therefore the highest of all other constitutions. This, however, is a very

rare occurrence.

Aristocracy, according to Aristotle, is the government of the best, that is those who are absolutely superior in virtue to all others. This form is more advantageous than monarchy. Under perfect aristocracy the virtue of a man and that of a citizen are the same, i. e. a man is good in the abstract sense, whereas under other aristocratic constitutions those regarded as good are only good relative to their constitution. Such secondary kinds of aristocracy are exemplified by Carthage where the constitution takes in view wealth, virtue and the common people, Sparta where account is taken only of the latter two, and polities inclining towards oligarchy.

The most correct form of government, in Aristotle's opinion, is polity or constitutional government (the term polity was commonly used in Aristotle's time to denote the political system in general). It is the government of the multitude who exercise their authority in common interest. All other constitutions are deviations from polity. On the other hand, polity itself is conceived by Aristotle as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, and the principle of alliance of wealth and freedom which obtains in most other constitutions is in fact characteristic of the state in general as the framework of political partnership. Of the incorrect constitutions tyranny is the worst. Two kinds of tyranny (kingships existing among the barbarians and elective tyranny among the ancient Greeks) are akin to monarchy as they are based on law and voluntary acceptance by the subjects, but the rule under both constitutions is despotic being essentially arbitrary and not political. The third kind of tyranny or tyranny in the fullest degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship, exercises irresponsible rule over unwilling subjects with a view to its own private interest.

Aristotle devotes special attention to oligarchy and democracy. These incorrect forms of government are in many respects diametrically opposite, wherefore one has good grounds to regard their hybrid or mixture as polity.

Aristotle stresses that the specific distinctions of oligarchy and democracy as forms of government, their constituting principles, as it were, are wealth and poverty, and not the number of those who rule: "For few or many to have power is an accidental feature" (Politics, 1279b). It should be noted in this context that however important the wealth-power antithesis is for dis-

tinguishing between oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle has yet another reason for relegating the numerical criterion to a secondary plan: he prepares grounds for a conception of polity as a majority rule which takes the edge off the antagonism between the rich and the poor.

Characterising democracy, Aristotle dwells in detail on the class composition of Greek slave-owning society. He views various classes and sections of the polis population as necessary components of any state irrespective of its constitution, and distinguishes, in particular, such classes and estates as the farmers, artisans, tradespeople, labourers, the well-to-do, the warriors, the judges, the class of public servants (officials). The classes engaged in manual labour and contributing to necessary utility belong to the ``body'' of the state (the "first city" in Plato), whereas the military class, the judiciary and the deliberative class (this latter embodying the function of political intelligence) constitute its ``soul''.

Pointing out that the ``soul'' of the state like that of a man is much more important than the ``body'', Aristotle even rebukes Plato for allegedly limiting the functions of the state to the supply of the necessities of life and ignoring its main purpose--- to aim at the most supreme of all goods (Politics, IV, 129la). Plato, however, hardly deserves this reproach though Aristotle's conception of the social structure of a state is indeed more elaborate than that of his former teacher. In point of fait, in Platons scheme the activity of the lower classes aimed at meeting the material needs of society is also subordinated to the higher principle of the state and both the "first city" in Plato's Republic and the ``body'' of the state in Aristotle's Politics represent one and the same sphere of activity which in later political theories (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries) came to be known as "civic society", i.e. a sphere of private interests distinguished from the state as a political organisation concerned with public interests. It should be noted, however, that Plato and Aristotle focused their attention not so much on activity as such (let alone productive activity) as on its subjects, i. e. social strata and classes. The essential elements of the state are the rich and the poor "and as the one or the other prevails they form the government" (Politics, IV, 1291b).

Democracy as the predominance of the poor in government also falls into several varieties in accordance with the principles

governing the distribution of civil rights among different social strata and, consequently, determining their participation in the affairs of the state. Aristotle distinguishes five such varieties. The first is characterised by the equality of the rich and the poor in respect of supreme power-the poor have no more prominence than the rich, and neither class is sovereign. Under the second kind of democracy the offices are held on low property qualifications, i. e. not all free adults are equal in their rights. Describing the third and the fourth kinds of democracy, Aristotle calls the rule of law and an equal share in office as their distinguishing features, but makes no mention of magistrates' qualifications.

Under the fifth variety of democracy, all the other regulations are the same except that supreme power belongs not to the law, but the ``multitude'' (demos). Aristotle's attitude to this system is openly negative. In his opinion, under a democracy of this nature the decrees of the assembly override the law and the demos exercising monarchic rule becomes despotic so that the whole political system assimilates to the tyrannical form of monarchy. As a result, actual power passes into the hands of the demagogues who, like the flatterers under monarchy, are held in honour-"their spirit is the same and both exercise despotic control over the better classes, and the decrees voted by the assembly are like the commands issued in a tyranny. The demagogues and the flatterers are the same people and either set has the very strongest influence with the respective ruling power-the flatterers with the tyrants and the demagogues with democracies of this kind" (Politics, IV, 1292a).

In Aristotle's opinion, "such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where laws do not govern there is no constitution" (Politics, IV, 1292a).

As is evidenced from The Athenian Constitution, under this extreme form of democracy Aristotle includes the democracy under Pericles and afterwards, regarding Pericles himself as a demagogue. He concedes, however, that "as Pericles was leader of the people, things went tolerably well with the state; but when he was dead there was a great change for the worse" ( Athenian Constitution, 28).

Of all the forms of democracy Aristotle only speaks commendably of the constitution based on low property qualifications, reconciliation of the rich and the poor, and the rule of law. Hence the high appraisal by Aristotle of the reforms of Solon

who, in Aristotle's opinion, was the originator of democracy in Athens. The subsequent expansion of democracy is regarded by Aristotle as the worsening of the state and as moral degradation. Besides Solon and ancient rulers, Aristotle speaks highly of Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes.

Oligarchy which is the government of the rich also has four forms. In the first, the property qualification for office is so high that the poor have no share in the government. The second is also distinguished by a high qualification and, besides, the vacancies in the governing body are filled by co-optation. In the third, the son succeeds the father in office, whereas in the fourth, likewise hereditary, the magistrates are supreme and not the law. This latter form, according to Aristotle, is akin to tyranny and extreme democracy (Politics, IV, 1292a-1292b).

Polity or constitutional government as the best form of the state combines in itself the most advantageous features of oligarchy and democracy, but is free from their weaknesses and extremes. It occupies a middle position and is, so to speak, a mixture of both forms. Constitutional government is difficult to achieve in practice since the middle element in states seldom plays an important part. The political scene is usually dominated either by large proprietors or by the multitude, therefore the form of government only reflects the interests of the party that comes to power---oligarchy or democracy.

The difficulties involved in the institution of polity are also aggravated, in Aristotle's view, by the fact that the two leading states in Hellas (Athens and Sparta) engraft in their interests either democratic, or oligarchic regimes respectively in other Hellenic states dependent on them. "For these reasons," notes Aristotle, "the middle form of government has rarely, if ever, existed, and among a very few only. One man alone ' of all who ever ruled in Hellas was induced to give this middle constitution to states" (Politics, IV, 1296a).

The Aristotelian conception of polity is not confined to a specific form of government seldom realised in actual life. It is in fact a theoretical scheme of political constitution in general which serves in this sense as kind of a model for the existing empirical forms of government and a criterion for determining

the degree of their deviation from the standards of political justice.

Polity is constructed by Aristotle on the basis of his main ethical and political maxims. He conceives it as the ``middle'' or constitutional form of government where the ``middle'' element prevails in all spheres: in morals (temperance), wealth ( moderate income) and government (predominance of the middle class). "The city which is composed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best constituted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists" (Politics, IV, 1295b). Aristotle believed that it was a great boon to the state if its citizens possessed a moderate but sufficient substance.

The numerous middle class in Aristotle's view averts the split of the polis population into factions and allays the rivalries between political parties.

In polity, according to Aristotle, the middle class should prevail over the extreme elements or at least be stronger than each of them separately. Supreme power in the state should be in the hands of the majority and not the minority, and the number of the supporters of a given constitution among the free population should exceed the number of its opponents.

The legislator should base his orientation on the middle strata of society, and this is true not only of polity, but also of oligarchy and democracy.

Under a given set of conditions the best constitution, according to Aristotle, can only be achieved if its three main elements--- the deliberative body, the magistrates, and the judiciary-are properly formed and function in the best possible manner. Aristotle favours a pattern under which the magistrates have the deciding vote on key issues of the government policy, including those in the sphere of legislation, whereas the popular assembly is only granted a deliberative vote.

As regards the magistracies and law courts, Aristotle believes it imperative that they should be in conformity with the existing form of government. This can only be achieved through the appropriate combination and balance of various methods and procedures employed in their formation and activity ( qualifications for office, election by vote or appointment by lot, payment policy, etc.).

The final aim of the elaborate system of socio-political levers and counterweights proposed by Aristotle is to ensure the high-

~^^1^^ It is commonly believed that Aristotle implied here Solon, yet some scholars hold that he meant Alexander the Great.

est possible degree of stability for the constitution acceptable under the existing circumstances and reflecting the interests of the dominating social strata of the free population.

The analysis of the factors assisting in the consolidation of such a constitution is complemented in Aristotle by an investigation into the causes of party factions and revolutions, a detailed study of the nature of the destructive factors operative under any form of government and of the means for their neutralisation. The Fifth Book of Aristotle's Politics where this subject is treated at length is an echo of the Eighth Book of Plato's Republic resembling it not only in the subject matter, but also in the proposed solutions to the problems under consideration.

According to Aristotle, the starting point and main cause of factions and revolutions of constitution is inequality. It is the desire for equality that is generally the motive for party strife and social unrest. Revolutions mainly result from the disturbance of the relative character of equality and distortion of the principle of political justice which demands in some case adherence to numerical equality, and in others, to proportional equality, i. e. equality of worth (ratios).

Revolutions in constitutions are accompanied by a corresponding change in the principles of government. Each of these principles is relative and justifiable within certain limits only, therefore their absolutisation is erroneous. Thus democracy is based on the assumption that relative equality entails absolute equality, whereas oligarchy proceeds from the opposite principle assuming that relative inequality is identical with absolute inequality: "Some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things" (Politics, V, 1301b). An error in the fundamental constitutional principles is bound to lead to intestine dissension and revolts. "They [ constitutions] are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly" (Politics, V, 1302a). Aristotle draws a distinction between just and unjust revolts. A revolt is just if it is started by underprivileged sections of the population with the aim of getting equal rights with others. On the other hand, one can hardly justify those who enjoying equal rights with others stir up faction to get special privileges. Besides, Aristotle differentiates between revolutions accomplished by force and those resulting from fraud.

Investigating the factors tending to undermine the stability of the state under different forms of government Aristotle offers a specific set of safeguards for each particular constitution.

In his opinion, it is possible both for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure if only they succeed in overcoming their extreme tendencies.

Of all the means that can be used for securing the stability of constitutions the most effective, according to Aristotle, is a system of education suited to the existing order. In Aristotle's opinion, as the end for the whole state is one it is imperative that the education also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that its superintendence must be public, and not on private lines in the way in which each man superintends the education of his own children. Substantiating this thesis, Aristotle points out: "Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state" (Politics, VIII, I, 1337a).

Different constitutions result from the desire of all men for good life and happiness. This universal ideal is attainable in varying degrees under all existing forms of government, but its fullest possible realisation can only be achieved in the best governed state, that is under the constitution affording the greatest opportunities for happiness (Politics, VII, 1332a). Advancing his project of a state that can be constituted in the best possible manner, Aristotle continues the attempts of his predecessors (Plato, Phaleas, and others) whose views he first subjects to a critical analysis. The best state, according to Aristotle, is but a theoretical construction which of necessity lacks the exactness and minuteness of reality given by perception (Politics, VII, 7, 1328a).

The population of the ideally constituted state should be the largest possible with a view to self-sufficiency, yet both the land and the inhabitants should be taken in at a single view, "for a country which can be easily seen can be easily protected" ( Politics, VII, 7, 1327a). The territory of the state which is conceived by Aristotle in terms of ancient polis as the site of the city, should be well situated with regard both to the sea and to the country, and bear every sort of produce thus enabling the inhabitants "to live a life of liberal and at the same time temperate leisure" . (Politics, VII, 7, 1326b). The geographic position of Hellas and

the natural character of the Hellenes are also conducive to the best possible state: the Hellenic race situated between the inhabitants of Europe with its cold climate who are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill and therefore incapable of ruling over others, and the natives of Asia who are intelligent and inventive, but wanting in spirit and therefore always in a state of subjection and slavery, "is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation" (Politics, VII, 7, 1327b). In point of fact, Aristotle is convinced that the Greeks alone are capable of political life as such.

Speaking of the population, Aristotle underscores that the ideal state has a large number of slaves and artisans engaged in manual labour. The artisans, though free, are not to be granted citizenship, nor again the tradesmen and the teeming population that includes the "sailor crowd" whose participation in political life is characteristic of the extreme form of democracy (Politics, VII, 6, 1327b).

The citizens of the most nobly constituted state living off the toil of the slaves and artisans and making up the wealthy class must not, according to Aristotle, lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active participation in politics). They must be warriors, priests and judges safeguarding the law and common interest (Politics, VII, 8, 1328b).

Significantly, a military force is described by Aristotle as an indispensable component of a self-sufficient state: "There must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants" (Politics, VII, 8, 1328b).

The whole land of the state must be divided, according to Aristotle, into two parts of which one must be public, and the other the private property of individuals. Of the public land one portion should be assigned to the services of religion, and the other to defray the cost of the common meals. As regards the land in private ownership, there should be a common use of it by friendly consent so that no citizen may be left without subsistence. In accordance with two kinds of the ownership of land there should also be two kinds of slaves: the property of indivi-

duals and the property of the state employed respectively on the private estates and on the common land. In Aristotle's opinion, it is advantageous that all slaves should have their freedom set before them as a reward for their services.

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the legislator of the best state ought to ensure that its citizens have leasure and peace, "for peace is the end of war, and leasure of toil" (Politics, VII, 15, 1334a).

Proceeding from this conviction, Aristotle subjects to criticism the Lacedaemonian (Spartan) and Cretan constitutions aimed solely at conquest and war. In his opinion, men should not study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved, but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement. Though war is generally a means for acquiring slaves, slavery does not rest on the right of war, but derives from the nature of things. Asserting "slavery by nature", Aristotle declares, in clear defiance of facts, that "some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere" (Politics, I, 6, 1255a) and that men "should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves" (Politics, VII, 14, 1333b). War, according to Aristotle, does not legalise slavery-it is merely the art of acquiring slaves, something in the nature of hunting (Politics, I, 7, 1255b).

What strikes one is Aristotle's arrogant and derogatory manner of speaking about non-Hellenic peoples, purportedly incapable of political life and slaves by nature. Exalting the Hellenic race, Aristotle declares that it would be able to run the world if the Hellenes could be formed into one state (Politics, VII, 7, 1327b).

However, Aristotle's own ideal of the state has nothing to do with such unification of all Hellenes, nor with aggressive plans for the enslavement of other peoples.^^1^^

Aristotle considered peace a great boon to mankind. The idea that the aim of war is peace was first expressed by Plato and later adopted by many writers, including Hegel. Very progressive was Aristotle's view, cautious though as it may be, that the very principle of war could be regarded as contradicting the idea of law and justice: "Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice),

~^^1^^ Therefore the opinion of Karlheinz Rode that Aristotle justified aggressive war with a view to the enslavement of other peoples appears unfounded (See Karlheinz Rode, Geschichte der europaischen Rechtsphilosophie, S. 39).

assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave" (Politics, I, 6, 1255a). This thesis was later brought into great prominence by the opponents of war and adepts of "eternal peace", particularly by Kant and Fichte.

Law, according to Aristotle, provides standards of political relations among people. To live in a state as a political organisation is to abide by the law. The law embodies political justice. Justice is the bond of men in states, for the observance of the law which is the criterion of justice constitutes the principle of order in a political society (Politics, I, 2, 1253a). Hence, the lawful and the just coincide.

Elaborating this conception that carries back to Socrates and Plato Aristotle concretises it in the spirit of his own doctrine of justice. The law serves the common good of the citizens and in this sense is the public weal. The law conceived as political justice regulates only the intercourse among free and equal men, as well as the political relations deriving from authority and subordination, and not the despotic relations between the master and the slave.

The law is also described by Aristotle as equality, but this equality, in accordance with his interpretation of the principle of justice, is not absolute but relative since people are not equal in their worth. Therefore the claims of the better to political privileges rest also on the law. Indeed, the noble, in Aristotle's view, are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble (Politics, III, 13, 1283a).

On the other hand, equality in the relations of the unequals, just as inequality in the relations of the equals, runs counter to nature and is incompatible with political justice and the law of right.

Political justice is partly natural and partly legal. By natural justice Aristotle understands what everywhere has the same force irrespective of whether it is formalised in the legislation of one or another state, whereas under the head of legal justice he includes the laws made by men and usages resulting from general consent (Nicom., Ethics 1, 1134b).

Besides, Aristotle draws a distinction between written law and unwritten law (custom). The latter apparently falls outside the

scope of natural right and is regarded by Aristotle as the sphere of convention or positive prescriptions.

In Aristotle's view, justice is inherent both in the law of natural right and in human enactments. Taking up the old arguments of Socrates and Plato in their polemic against the sophists, Aristotle points out that though the notions of justice are subject to change, they only vary within certain limits. Natural right is a model for the right resulting from convention: "The things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best" (Nicom., Ethics, 7, 1135a).

Distinguishing between justice or right on the one hand and law on the other, Aristotle points out that law and custom are a sort of justice (Politics, I, 6, 1255a 15). That means that a law can only be just if it is based on the corresponding right. Any attempt to dominate and tyrannise over others, whether they will or not, runs counter to the very idea of law: "How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right" (Politics, VII, 2, 1324b).

Sovereign power in the state, according to Aristotle, is embodied in the law and not in man. The law is reason unaffected by human emotions, and "passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men" (Politics, III, 16, 1287a).

Legislation is a part of politics and the art of a legislator consists in framing laws corresponding to a given form of government and not in adapting the constitution to the laws. Therefore the rule of law and not of man guarantees the stability of the existing form of government and the corresponding political regime: "We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law" (Politics, III, 16, 1287a).

The laws corresponding to the correct forms of government will be based on justice and those corresponding to the incorrect forms will be unjust.

Viewing critically such unjust laws, as well as the incorrect forms of government, Aristotle at the same time does not call in question their legal force: "Whatever seems good to the majority of those who share in the government has authority", and this should hold good under any constitution (Politics, IV, 8,

1294a). In his opinion, the rule of law, however unjust its prescriptions may be, is absolutely essential for a political community under any form of government.

Being a universal measure, the law cannot possibly provide for all cases that may arise in actual life, and this is also true of an individual. Yet the universality of the law does not prevent it from being an indispensable regulator of political relationships. If a particular case is not covered by a universal statement, it is necessary to correct the omission---"to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known" (Nicom., Ethics, V, 10, 1137b).

Such a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universal character is called by Aristotle ``equity'' as distinct from the ``justice'' of the law. The equitable is also just, though "not the legally just, but a correction of legal justice". The equitable and the just are therefore identical, "and while both are good the equitable is superior". Hence the equitable man, according to Aristotle, is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense, i. e. to the detriment of his neighbour, but tends to take less than his share though he has the law on his side.

Despite his awareness of the fact that it is impossible to lay down a law for all things (because of their individual peculiarities, fortuity, changeful character, rareness, etc.) and that a special decree is therefore needed to provide for specific cases, Aristotle comes out for the legal regulation of all main aspects of the public, political and private life of individuals thereby advocating adherence to the letter of the law. Moreover, Aristotle asserts that "what the law does not expressly permit it forbids" (Nicom., Ethics, V, 11, 1138a), thus sanctioning the extension of legal prescriptions beyond their proper sphere and unequivocally rejecting the opposite principle "what the law does not expressly forbid, it permits''.

In Aristotle's view, the distinguishing feature of the law as an expression of sovereign will is its compulsive force. Yet even the best laws will prove useless if die population are not brought up in the spirit of the existing constitution and not habituated to the state legislation (Nicom., Ethics, X, 9, 1180a).

The purpose of the laws is to help realise the supreme goal of • the state which is the public weal and the happiness of .all citizens.

Aristotle's impact on all subsequent philosophical and political thought was enormous and its detailed analysis, if it is possible at all, goes far beyond the scope of this book. There was hardly any writer of note in the history of classic, medieval and modern political theory who could side-step the Aristotelian literary heritage in a non-committal way without identifying his own stand in relation to the great, thinker's political and legal conceptions. Much of what has been said earlier about the profound mark left by Plato in the history of our civilisation is fully applicable to his great pupil.

Despite Aristotle's frequent attacks on Plato, not always well grounded and justifiable, the teacher's and pupil's views on a number of cardinal issues appear to be essentially identical or very similar. At any rate, the later authorities on philosophical, political and legal problems viewed the differences between Plato and Aristotle as far less significant than they appeared to the Stagirite himself. In their eyes the doctrines of both thinkers constituted a single theoretical complex representing the summit of Greek philosophical and political thought.^^1^^

Aristotle's influence started already during his lifetime when he was teaching in Plato's Academy and then in his own Lyceum. It was enhanced owing to his close links with the Macedonean court, personal relationships with Alexander the Great and with his regent in Greece Antipater, as well as by the numerous publications of his philosophico-political works. Regrettably, the bulk of them were irretrievably lost and most of those that survived belong to the Lyceum period.

Shortly after Aristotle's death his theory of constitutional government or polity was partly translated into life in Athens under the rule of his pupil Demetrius Phalereus.

On the theoretical side, Aristotle's political doctrine was further developed and elaborated by such prominent peripatetics as Decaearchus of Messene and Theophrastus. They focused

' The term ``Platonism'' current in special literature embraces both the Platonic and Aristotelian legacy when used in a broad historical perspective in relation to the impact of Greek politico-philosophical thought on the subsequent intellectual progress of mankind (see, for instance, Johannes Hessen, Platonismus undProphetismus, Munchen, Basel, 1955, S. 11). Such unqualified `` Platonisation'' of Aristotle can often be misleading as it ignores the specificity of the Aristotelian philosophical and political doctrines.

their attention on the best form of government under the existing conditions (Theophrastus) and on the mixed form of government (Decaearchus).

Two other famous writers who were strongly influenced by the political ideas of Aristotle and subsequently played an important part in the history of political thought as expounders of the Aristotelian theory were Polybius and Cicero. Polybius's teaching of the forms of government and their successive change originated from the theory of Plato and Aristotle and was instrumental in the popularisation of their views.

Holding the conceptions of Aristotle in high regard, Cicero shared most of his views on the advantages of the mixed form of government, subscribed to his teaching of the correspondence between the laws on the one hand and natural right and rational principles on the other, of the identity of the lawful and the just and of their general agreement with the nature of things. The highly critical attitude of both Plato and Aristotle to party strife and to the extremes of democracy, too, was in tune with Cicero's time and appealed to his republican and humanitarian sentiments.

Aristotle's views on the relation of natural right and positive laws, the part played by the law in political life, the realisation of the highest ethical end in the state were largely adopted by various representatives of stoicism and modified in accordance with their cosmopolitan doctrines.

A number of Aristotelian political ideas were adopted by the Church Fathers and modified in the Christian political doctrine. Already Augustine, following in the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle, insisted on a difference between the monarch and the tyrant and advocated true government limited by the law.

Aristotle's Politics translated into Latin in the thirteenth century by Wilhelm von Merbeke evoked much interest and exercised the minds of numerous commentators, among them Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and others. In the fourteenth century it was translated into French and commented on by Nicholas of Oresme. The fifteenth century saw the first translation of Politics from Greek into Latin in Italy. It was made by Leonardo Aretino and published in Venice in 1498.

Besides the monarchy-tyranny antithesis, Thomas Aquinas also adopted Aristotle's conception of the law (the relation of the law and the form of government, the rationality and justice of

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the law, etc.) and many other notions of the Aristotelian doctrine of the forms of government.

Referring to Aristotle as "the Philosopher", Thomas Aquinas and other contemporary commentators held him in very high esteem.

It is very characteristic of the medieval theologians' attitude to Aristotle that even Dante, with his deep reverence for the "teacher of those who have knowledge" placed Aristotle in hell (together with Socrates, Plato and other great pagans), though only in the first circle. In his De Monarchia Dante used a number of Aristotelian arguments in support of his ideal of world monarchy. He, for one, invoked "the Philosopher`s'' authority to substantiate his views on the difference between the true monarchy and the false one (tyranny) and on the realisation of true freedom under a correct form of government.

According to Dante, all the elements of the state (family, village, city), as well as statehood in general come about in a natural way. Yet nature endowed mankind with a higher unity constituting, in his opinion, the natural-right foundation of the world monarchy. A state community correctly organised under the rule of a sovereign aims at the realisation of the natural principles of the highest human community ("humana civilitas") which bears a distinct stamp of the Aristotelian polity.

A number of Aristotle's ideas (about the social structure of the state, the place and functions of different social strata in political life, the part played by the law, etc.) were borrowed and reoriented in a peculiar way by Marsiglio of Padua who adduced the great philosopher of antiquity in support of his own theory of the right of a people to legislative power. The conceptions developed by Aristotle in his Politics were thus used by Marsiglio under very different historical conditions as a means for substantiating the doctrine of people's sovereignty anticipating in fact the social theory of Rousseau.

Having got a new lease of life from Dante and Marsiglio of Padua, the hoary political doctrine of Aristotle remolded by Niccolo Machiavelli, an ideologist of rising bourgeoisie, blossomed out as an original theory of politics freed from the influence of ethics and characteristic of the spirit of modern times.'

~^^1^^ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, 1976, p. 322.

Proceeding from a new conception of the state, law and politics, Machiavelli used creatively the achievements of his ancient predecessors, particularly Aristotle, whose Politics had gained extensive circulation by that time (sixteenth century) and was being widely commented on.

Though Aristotle's Politics is an independent work having its own subject, it is based on ethical principles and in fact merges with his Ethics. Society, according to Aristotle, arises out of the physical needs of man who is not self-sufficing and has to cooperate with other men in order to be sure of subsistence. Originating in the bare needs of life society continues for the sake of a good life. Thus society and the state (conceived by Aristotle as one), as well as the science which deals with them, have an ethical rather than a merely utilitarian aim. The commonly held view of Aristotle as the originator and father of the political science is correct in the sense that Aristotle, proceeding from the political philosophy of Plato, was the first to single out a certain field of human relations and make it the object of an independent study/Yet what he regarded as political science was in fact a much broader complex including also ethics and economics. The trend towards the differentiation of what originally appeared as an undivided whole, characteristic of modern times, is clearly manifest, for instance, in the economic treatise of Nicholas of Oresme who mainly concentrates on the economic aspects of Aristotle's Politics. Machiavelli focuses on the political aspects of Aristotle's teaching and it is not accidental that his interest centres upon the Aristotelian investigation into the causes of social unrest and revolutions, changes of constitutions, sources and causes of party strife and faction, i. e. upon the dynamics of political life.

Seeking to comprehend the. internal logic of political relations, Machiavelli, like Aristotle and other ancient writers, turns his eyes to the climatic and environmental factors influencing the character of people and forms of their intercourse, the sociopolitical significance of property, wealth and poverty, the natural causes of the formation of states, etc.

The interest in practical politics was not alien to Aristotle who regarded his political science as a practical guide. Yet political practices were conceived by Aristotle in the idealist manner, within the framework of ethical principles. In point of fact, his empiricism and realism were subordinate to comprehensive

idealist ethical models whereby the philosopher sought to comprehend and construct the world of human relations. By contrast, Machiavelli's approach to political phenomena is free from such ethico-ideal ``interference'' and ``prejudice'', and this was a tremendous advance on the political theory of the Greek philosopher.

The ``secular'' tendency in the Aristotelian political teaching was also adopted and made more prominent by Jean Bodin who largely follows Aristotle in his analysis of natural and geographic factors, the role of proprietary inequality in political revolutions, the specificity of state power as compared with other kinds of authority, the distinctions of monarchy from tyranny, etc. Incidentally, on this latter point Aristotle also exerted a considerable influence on the monarchomachists.

A number of political ideas of Aristotle, for instance, about the role of geographic and climatic factors, the forms of government, their principles and changes, the correspondence between the laws and institutions of a given form of government, etc. were developed by Charles Louis de Montesquieu.

An important change in the approach to the political theory of Aristotle and to ancient political thought in general is connected with the names of Rousseau and Hegel.

The whole concept of the Aristotelian political science rests on the difference and contrast between the political and despotic principles of government and rule. In like manner, Rousseau conceives the state based on the principles of the social contract as political, civil society contrasting with its antipode and alternative-the despotic form of government. Hence the state of the social contract in Rousseau, like the political community in Aristotle, is an ideal construction, and the despotic form of government castigated with equal severity by both writers, is a nonpolitical, stateless condition of individuals.

The problem of the relationship between the state as a whole (political organism) and its parts (individual citizens) is treated by Rousseau along similar Platonic-Aristotelian lines. He even uses similar arguments---the whole is more important than its parts, the body cannot do harm to its members, etc. This supraindividualistic understanding of the nature of the political whole is expressed by Rousseau in the classical formula of universal will which is different from the will of all. The universal will in the state of social contract is directed towards the attainment of

the common good, i. e. the political ideal Plato and Aristotle were never tired of speaking about in the context of the correct or true forms of government. The achievement of this goal both in the Platonic-Aristotelian political theory and in Rousseau's doctrine of the universal will, its formation and operation, imperatively demands that all kinds of party faction, strife, dissension and internecine war be resolutely excluded from political life. Hegel's attitude to ancient political thought in general and to the Platonic-Aristotelian theory in particular clearly reveals the influence of Rousseau on one important point: Hegel owes to the French philosopher the conception of universal will as opposed to the will of all. The universal will in Hegel's interpretation is the principle of the modern state, and the state in Hegel's eyes, as well as in the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, is the absolute* end, the ethical wholeness of the politically organised life of the people. The Hegelian understanding of the state as the ethical whole is in fact identical with the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of the ethical foundation of the political whole, the moral character of man's life in the state as the highest political community.

Describing the relation of the state whole and its parts, Hegel also resorts to the organistic notions of Plato and Aristotle and reiterates, with appropriate modifications, the idea of Aristotle that the state is by nature prior to the earlier forms of society (family and village), "for it is the end of them", i. e. it represents their entelechy.

Pointing out the inadequacy of the politico-legal views of Plato and Aristotle limited by the historical conditions of their epoch, Hegel stressed that their conception of morality did not recognise man as a subject of individual rights and liberties and did not regard him as a morally self-sufficing person. This principle of subjective freedom was an outgrowth of a later period. It took root, according to Hegel, only thanks to Christianity asserting the independent value of man as an individual and the equality of all people. As regards the Greeks, they rose, in Hegel's opinion, to ethical reality but did not attain the stage of morality. In other words, the ancient state representing the interest of the public repressed personality instead of building upon it and deprived man of individual moral freedom.

Thus Rousseau and Hegel, following different paths and pursuing different aims revived and re-emphasised the ethical

aspect of the political teaching of Plato and Aristotle which had been rejected by Machiavelli inclining in theory and practice towards the sophists (particularly Thrasymachus) and justifying immorality in politics.

In yet another way did the Aristotelian political doctrine influence Kantian philosophy. Kant proceeds from the actually existing gap between theory and practice and, accordingly, between morality and politics. Yet these apparently opposite spheres are not merely alien, estranged from each other-their relations, according to Kant, are characterised by a good deal of tension. Kant believes in the theoretical possibility of basing politics on moral principles, but assigns its realisation in practice to the categorical imperative. Criticising the practical politician from the viewpoint of the theoretical politician, Kant uses arguments very similar to those adduced by Plato and Aristotle in their polemic against the sophists.

Some Western authors, seeking to modernise Aristotle in terms of contemporary topical problems, not infrequently detached his political teaching from its ancient context and interpreted a number of his propositions into an anticipation of the doctrines of constitutionalism, legal state, separation of powers, etc.

Thus Werner Jaeger, a recognised authority among Western historians of antiquity whose work on Aristotle's Metaphysics (1912) is claimed to have marked the dawn of a new era in the study of the Aristotelian heritage, has done much to breathe new life into the political ideals of Plato and Aristotle. Holding them up as models for restructuring contemporary states, Jaeger, though not a Hegelian himself, urged the statesmen to learn political wisdom from the Greek philosophers and strive to bring the power of the state in harmony with its ideal, as it is only under the conditions of such a harmony that a state can preserve the moral health and symmetry of the people's community and withstand the external and internal pressures.^^1^^

In the opinion of Joachim Ritter, the ancient political theory of the classical period, particularly the teaching of Aristotle, provides eternal standards valid for all states and all societies. This everlasting character and perpetuity of the Aristotelian proposi-

~^^1^^ See Werner Jaeger, Humanistische Reden and Vortrage, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1960, S. 102.

tions derive, according to Ritter, from Aristotle's conception of human nature as the substance of the state, law, political order and morality.

Viewing from this angle the modernisation of the natural right doctrine, a topical problem in the contemporary theory of law, he proposes to solve it along Aristotelian lines, i. e. by making a start from human nature which is the source and the truth of contemporary law. Modifying this renovated Aristotelianism after the fashion of Hegel, Joachim Ritter asserts that positive law is based on the reason of reality, and not on a transcendent idea.^^1^^

The Aristotelian doctrine of law and justice, his criticism of Platonic ``communism'' and arguments for private property and against common property has also been readily subscribed to by such a prominent Western scholar of the Aristotelian political thought as Walter Siegfried, who, in addition, reads the "legal state" and kind of a "social compact" into Aristotle's mind.^^2^^

In contrast with Siegfried, who equates despotic rule and tyranny stigmatised by Aristotle with a totalitarian state in the modern sense, Karl Popper describes Aristotle as an enemy of the "open society", and his teaching, as one of the ancient fountain-heads (alongside the Heraclitean and Platonic doctrines) of medieval and modern totalitarianism.. Invoking the " Aristotelian roots of Hegelianism", Popper links ancient political theory to modern totalitarianism.^^3^^

Describing the Aristotelian teaching as totalitarian, Popper in fact not only ignores the principle of concrete historical approach in the assessment of ancient political doctrines, but clearly side-steps those aspects of Aristotle's political theory (e. g. his arguments in support of rational egoism, criticism of despotic rule, tyranny and all other forms of government) which do not consort with his alleged advocacy of totalitarianism.

Upholding, like Popper, bourgeois liberalism and sharing his positivist views, Ernst Topitsch subjects Aristotle and Plato to severe criticism and even goes as far as completely denying any

cognitive value of their theories on the grounds that both ancient philosophers based their analysis of politico-legal subjects on axiological models of thought (technomorphic, sociomorphic, etc.) which are rejected by positivism, together with all axiological categories in general, as metaphysical and unverifiable.

In the opinion of Topitsch, the theoretical propositions of Plato and Aristotle were nothing else than the philosophical rationalisation of pristine shamanism and the true, though hidden, motive for their theorising was the desire to cast off the yoke of reality. Plato and Aristotle, according to Topitsch, first saddle man with a hierarchical structure of his soul where the ignoble part is subordinated to the mind, and then invoke this pattern which is in fact a preconceived model of their perfect state, as an argument in support of their political ideal-the "authoritarian form of government". This is nothing but tautology, arguing in a circle, in which the conclusion is unwarrantably assumed in the hypothesis.

In our opinion, this stultification of Aristotle and Plato results from the an ti-historicity of Topitsch's own approach - equally axiological, for that matter, since the arguments against the authoritarian state and for the liberal-democratic state can arise from no other source than a definite scale of values.

Any progress in the cognition of politico-legal phenomena involves of necessity a definite axiological orientation based on a system of social and ethical values. To be sure, the mere selection of such values from among those already appreciated by mankind is not yet sufficient to give an impetus to political thought. Each real advance in political theory must reveal new spiritual and socio-political values and is bound to enrich human culture. Aristotle was one of those great thinkers who deepened and expanded human knowledge and opened up new horizons in the studies of the state, law and politics.

~^^1^^ See Joachim Ritter, Metaphysik und Politik. Studien yi Aristoteles und Hegel, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, S. 105, 177, 179.

~^^2^^ See Walter Siegfried, Der Rechtsgedanke bei Aristoteles, Schulthess & Co., A. G., Zurich, 1947, S. 47, 51-54, 68, 74-76.

~^^3^^ Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, pp. 1-27.

CHAPTER THREE

HELLENISTIC PERIOD

(Late Fourth-Second Centuries B. C.)

for random collisions of atoms and the emergence of the world in terms of chance and necessity, leaving room for the concept of freedom and opening a way for a more flexible understanding of natural laws.

Epicurus taught that all knowledge is based on sense perceptions which result from the penetration of the ``images'' or ``idols'' of things into the organs of the senses. Falsehood and error, according to Epicurus, "always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to (what is waiting) to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed (or is contradicted)" (Epicurus, The Extant Remains, "Letter to Herodotus", I, 50, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1926, p. 29). Propounding the idea of innumerable worlds, Epicurus recognised the possibility of the existence of worlds similar to ours---with living beings, plants, etc. Nature, according to Epicurus, develops in accordance with its own laws without any interference on the part of the gods. Conceding the existence of gods and recognising the idea of the "blessed and immortal nature", Epicurus gave it a purely atheistic interpretation which sharply contrasted with the contemporary religious notions. Indeed, he lodged the gods in the spaces between worlds and denied them any influence on nature or human society. In point of fact, he recognised the gods in ethical, rather than physical terms.

Epicurus writes: "For gods their are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe diem to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods die beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods" (Epicurus, The Extant Remains, "Letter to Menoeceus", III, 123-124, pp. 83-85).

The "philosophical gods" of Epicurus not only hold themselves apart from the world of nature letting things follow their natural course, but are also completely indifferent to human affairs. Rejecting the idea of divine providence and asserting the ethical independence of man, Epicurus contends that it is only by cognising nature and reasonably following its dictates that man can free himself from fears and superstitions and attain

1. EPICURUS

The life of Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) was contemporaneous with the period of political disintegration of the Greek world. Towards the end of the fourth century B. C. the Greek polises one after another lost their independence and succumbed first to the Macedoneans and then to the Romans. The unprecedented military conquests of Alexander the Great ushered in the epoch of Hellenisation of the East and formation of vast Hellenistic monarchies. In the middle of the second century B. C. Macedon itself fell a prey to Rome and became one of its provinces.

The decline of Greek political thought characteristic of this period clearly manifests itself in the Epicurean and Stoic teachings.

Epicurus was born at Samos in the family of an Athenian teacher. Having left his native island, he visited a number of Hellenic cities and finally settled at Athens. There he bought a house with garden, gathered a group of friends and followers and in 307 B. C. opened his school-die famous ``Garden'' that went down in history as one of the chief philosophical schools of the Hellenistic epoch.

Epicurus was a voluminous writer. His main work Of Nature consisted of 37 books. However, the greater part of his literary heritage was lost and we possess only a few of his letters, isolated fragments of several treatises and some aphorisms.

Epicurus's philosophical views were the continuation and further development of the Democritean atomistic doctrine which he supplemented by his conception of spontaneous, internally conditioned swerve or declination of the atoms from the rectilinear path. It was an important advance on the rigid and fatalistic teaching of Democritus whereby Epicurus accounted

happiness. "It is vain to ask of the goods what a man is capable of supplying for himself' (Epicurus, The Extant Remains, `` Fragments'', LXV, p. 117).

The moral theory of Epicurus linking his physical conceptions with politico-legal notions is the central part of his philosophy. In point of fact, his whole teaching is permeated with his ethical ideas. The Epicurean ethics centres upon the principle of pleasure which gives man happiness and relieves him of pain and suffering. Explaining the essence of his ethical doctrine, Epicurus says: "When therefore we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind" (Epicurus, The Extant Remains, "Letter to Menoeceus", III, 131, p. 89).

In Epicurus's eyes pleasure is a good which is not entirely identical with bodily enjoyment though it cannot be conceived without it. True pleasure is only accessible to a prudent man, particularly a sage. It consists in the understanding that one cannot live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, nor again live a life of prudence, honour and justice without living pleasantly.

The study of nature and the scientific explanation of the causes and aims of man's behaviour are absolutely essential for the attainment of happiness and play an important part in the Epicurean moral philosophy. In practical life, according to Epicurus, it is better to fail in a well-considered choice than to succeed in a poor one. In his opinion, unhappiness with wisdom is preferable to happiness without it.

Epicurean ethics as a whole, as well as its principal values, i. e. pleasure, freedom and ataraxia (the soul's tranquillity) is essentially individualistic. Happiness is attained by man through conscious efforts and comes to him as a reward for thinking and acting in accordance with the dictates of nature.

Epicurus attached great ethical importance to the scientific view of the world: without understanding nature and knowing which events happen by necessity and which by chance man is bound to remain a slave to the fate. Man's freedom, according to Epicurus, consists in his responsibility for all choice and avoidance, i. e. for the selection of the correct course in life. The sphere of man's freedom is the sphere of his responsibility for his

own destiny: according to Epicurus, "with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control". While necessity cannot be called to account, a wise man "sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame" (ibid., "Letter to Menoeceus", III, 133, p. 91).

Freedom, in the view of Epicurus, does not coincide with necessity: "Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity" (ibid, ``Fragments'', IX, p. 107). In order to attain freedom, a man must be able to differentiate between the sphere of necessity and that of chance and, besides, he must learn to satisfy only his natural and necessary needs. A wise and free man taking due account of what is necessary does not become a slave to necessity. An essential feature of a free man is the ability to control his passions and desires and to be content with little: "The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom" (ibid., ``Fragments'', LXXVII, p. 119).

Characteristic of the Epicurean ethical teaching is the advocacy of political indifference and avoidance of active participation in public affairs. "We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics," he preaches (ibid., ``Fragments'', LVIII, p. 115). He equally sets his face against ambition and moneygrubbing because striving after wealth and luxury, no less than after fame and position, implies cringing before the mob or the rulers. Maintaining the natural end of life, i. e. repose and happiness, a free man will not willingly aim at public office.

The Epicurean conception of freedom also implies man's independence from society, the opinion of the ``mob'', etc. The veneration of a sage is a great boon for the venerators themselves, and not for the sage. It is only by secluding himself from society with its petty political intrigues and rivalries that man can attain to freedom and the calm of mind and lead a happy and cheerful life in the narrow circle of intimate friends holding the same views. This indeed was the mode of life cultivated in the Epicurean ``Garden''.

The chief aim of the state administration and the purpose of a political community consist, according to Epicurus, in providing safety for all its members, protecting them from one another and ridding from mutual fear. True safety, in his view, can only result from a quiet life and the retirement from the world.

Within the framework of a political organisation it is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion removing troublesome individuals (ibid., IV, "Principal Doctrines", 143, XIV).

This understanding of the essence and aim of a political community underlies the Epicurean doctrine of the state and law which, according to Epicurus, arise from people's agreement about their "mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed" (ibid., " Principal Doctrines", 150, XXXI).

In the interpretation of Epicurus, justice, as well as the state and the laws are artificial products of convention though they do agree with the prescripts and dictates of nature understood correctly. Yet there is no primordial, eternal and immutable justice as such which arises naturally and does not depend on men's compact about the advantages of their mutual safety. Epicurus explicitly states that "justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever and at any time it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed" (ibid., "Principal Doctrines", 150,XXXIII).

In his view, the criterion of justice and injustice is only applicable to the participants in the compact, i. e. men and peoples. The very notion of justice is mutable depending on the peculiarities of one or another country, the circumstances which change in the course of time, etc. However, with all its mutability, "in its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another" (ibid., "Principal Doctrines", 151,XXXVI).

Every place and every period of time have their own justice, i. e. their natural notion of what is just. Yet all the ``justices'' have one thing in common - they all derive from an agreement about mutual advantages of the participants in the compact. Therefore, if certain actions which were at one time considered just because they accorded with the requirements of men's dealings with one another come into conflict, due to a change in circumstances, with the new natural notions of justice, such actions are indeed unjust as they ceased being useful for advantageous intercourse among members of a community. The actions of men, the activity of authorities and the laws themselves must correspond (in a given place, at a given time and under a given set of circumstances) to the notions of justice underlying the

compact of men about their common good. According to Epicurus, "if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice" (op. cit, "Principal Doctrines", 152, XXXVII).

As is evidenced from this relationship with the law, ``justice'' is conceived by Epicurus as natural right changing in substance in accordance with place, time and circumstances and reflecting the demands of men's mutually beneficial dealings with one another. The leading element of this relationship between natural right and the law, the fountain-head of the natural notions of justice is nothing else than the changeful practical needs of men's partnership with one another.

A change in these needs results in a corresponding change in the notion of the common good, i. e. of what is regarded as justice. Here justice or natural right with changing substance is conceived as the criterion of correspondence between the law and the changing needs of people on the one hand and the changing natural notions of justice, on the other. By these changing notions of justice and injustice which correspond to the requirements of men's co-operation with one another Epicurus in fact implies what in later political theory came to be known as the sense of right.

Taking a materialist view of politico-legal problems, Epicurus regards the content of the mutually beneficial social compact and, consequently, the notions of justice, as secondary, and the practical needs of people's dealings with one another, as primary. The notions of justice, as well as their change are conceived as a result and product of the changing social needs of mankind.

The laws which are not at variance with the principles of justice must be observed by all, since any violation of such laws or deviation from the course they prescribe constitutes an act of injustice. In the opinion of Epicurus, "injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions" (ibid., "Principal Doctrines", 151, XXXIV).

Considering it of paramount importance to rid man of fears which harass his soul, bewilder his mind and make repose and happiness unattainable, Epicurus, it will be noticed, argues the need to observe the laws from psychological and ethical rather

than social, political or legal considerations. Indeed, the anxiety of a law-breaker is one of those fears the Epicurean ethics, this peculiar "fear therapy", is primarily intended to dispel. It is not accidental that Epicurus recommended that men concern themselves with the healing of their lives.

The psycho-ethical motives of Epicurus for law-abidingness also provide a clue to his rather uncommon description of the laws as a means for protecting the ``wise'' (i. e. the morally perfect persons) from the ``mob'', as kind of a public guarantee of the moral freedom and independence of an individual: "The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but that they may not suffer it" (ibid., ``Fragments'', 81, p. 139).

The strain of political indifference in Epicurus is not to be understood, of course, as complete detachment of his moral philosophy from social problems. The Epicurean conception of the state, law and justice allegedly originating from the social compact was essentially democratic by its objective socio-political tendency, since all the participants in the compact were regarded as equal and none possessed any privileges over others. Yet Epicurus, a convinced individualist, held a negative view of extreme democracy and sharply counterposed the wise man to the many. Dissociating himself from the ``mob'' and its ideals, Epicurus wrote: "I was never anxious to please the mob. For what pleased them, I did not know, and what I did know, was far removed from their comprehension" (ibid., ``Fragments'', 43, p. 131). Generally speaking, his moral code accorded the most or rather disagreed the least with a moderate form of democracy based on the rule of law and providing the greatest possible degree of individual freedom.

The teaching of Epicurus had a strong appeal to certain sections of contemporary society and won numerous adherents not only in Greece, but also in Rome. The most famous of them was the Roman poet and materialist philosopher Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99-55 B. C.) who expounded the atomistic views of Epicurus in his poem De Rerum Natura. Epicureanism left a profound imprint on the intellectual history of humanity. The ethical individualism and utilitarianism of Epicurus exerted a notable influence on later moral doctrines whereas his conception of social compact as the source of the state and law gave a powerful impetus to the development of political theory.

2. THE STOICS

The founder of Stoicism was £eno (336-264 B. C.) of Citium, a half-Greek and half-Phoenician colony in Cyprus. Having settled in Athens, he opened his school and started giving lectures in a roofed gallery known as Stoa poikile or "painted porch" (whence the name of the school) adorned with frescoes and frequented by poets.

The history of Stoicism is traditionally divided into three periods: Early Stoicism, Middle Stoicism, and Late or Roman Stoicism. The main representatives of the Early Stoa were, besides Zeno himself, Cleanthes (331-232 B. C.) and Chrysippus (277-208 B. C.). The Middle Stoa was represented by Panaetius (185-110 B. C.) and Posidonius (135-51 B. C.), and the Late (Roman) Stoa, by Marcus Seneca (3-65 A. D.), Epictetus (50-130 A. D.) and Marcus Aurelius (121-180 A. D.).

The Stoics divided their philosophical system into three main parts: logic, physics, and ethics. The problems of the state, law and politics figure in each of them, but receive special attention under the head df ethics. Cleanthes divided philosophy into six departments distinguishing politics as an object of independent studies alongside dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, physics and theology or the teaching of gods. In a more detailed classification of the above departments rhetoric as a part of logic was further divided by the Stoics into deliberative, forensic and solemn.

In their physical theory the Stoics posited two principles in the universe-the active and the passive. "The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i. e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter" (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. £eno, VII, 134). Similar views were propounded by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, Posidonius, and others. They held that god, reason, fate, Zeus, etc. are but different names of one and the same thing.

From the standpoint of ethical and political philosophy much importance attaches to the notion of ``cosmos'' developed in the Stoic physics. The ``cosmos'', according to the Stoics, is first and foremost god which is conceived as the creator of the world order. Yet the ``cosmos'' is simultaneously the totality of the heaven and the earth and all the creatures abounding there,

that is the gods and men and everything created for their sake.

The universe as a whole is governed by necessity or fate which determines all celestial and terrestrial phenomena and binds all things in a single system of cause-effect relationships. Conceived as some kind of unity of divine providence and reason (logos) on the one hand, and natural necessity, on the other, fate, according to Chrysippus, rules everything. Nothing in the world occurs without a cause, and, consequently, everything is necessary. Being more consistent than the Epicureans in their determinism, the Stoics in fact carry it to the extreme of fatalism. Fate in their eyes is an endless succession of causes and consequences or the logos governing the universe.

Fate as the ruling and dominating principle (hegemonikon) is simultaneously the logos of the universe or the law of all being in the universe controlled by providence. Fate in Stoicism emerges as natural or universal law which is divine by nature and is in fact identical with god. Zeno taught that natural law is divine by nature and wields the power to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong.

In accordance with the ethical doctrine of Stoicism, the human soul is a part of nature and the universe as a whole. Hence the main ethical precept of Stoicism---to live in agreement with nature, which means to follow the dictates of reason or natural (universal) law of the universe, to lead an honest, virtuous life. Chrysippus said that the true end of life is to live in conformity with one's own nature and with the universal nature doing nothing prohibited by the universal law, i. e. the logos pervading all things. This logos, according to Chrysippus, was also innate in Zeus, the organiser and creator of all things.

Bringing his actions in conformity with the ruling fate, with the reason and will of the Demiurge, the wise man attains happiness and the fullness of life. He is guided by reason, and not passion (pathos). Rooting out one's passions with the help of reason and attaining entire freedom from the emotions (apathy) is absolutely indispensable for virtuous life, since passion, according to Zeno, is a disease, a disturbance of the soul incompatible with common sense and running counter to nature. Therefore under the head of virtues or the good the Stoics included, alongside justice, courage and temperance, also prudence or the virtue of reason concerned primarily with the good. The evil, according to the Stoics, was their opposites---injustice, cowar-

dice, lack of restraint and imprudence.

``Apathy" in Stoicism is not ordinary indifference or lack of will. It only implies indifference to things which, however much they may be valued in life, are empty and trifling in terms of universal reason, i. e. are not in conformity with the eternal logos of the cosmos. Indeed, pleasure is transitory and tiresome, fame is devoid of judgement and sinks into oblivion, man becomes ashes or a skeleton, and only a name remains after him, or not a name even. ``Apathy'' is conceived by the Stoics as the rational attitude coincident with the universal reason and at the same time as a drive towards activity prompted by that reason.

Will as rational urge is the opposite of desire and emerges in Stoic ethics as duty. On the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, Zeno was the first to use the word ``duty'' deriving it from ``due'', i. e. understanding it as the action of natural objects. Of the actions resulting from desire some are in conformity with duty, others are against duty, and still others are indifferent. Things according with duty are those inspired by reason, i. e. showing piety towards one's parents, brothers and fatherland, being complaisant with one's friends. Contrary to duty is what is not prompted by reason. The wise man, according to the Stoics, is entirely free from emotions. His resignation to fate is nothing but the expression of his understanding of the laws and logos of the universe. He avoids public affairs only to the extent to which they may run counter to his understanding of his duty. However, in contrast with Epicurus who maintained that the sage must not take part in politics unless he is compelled to, Chrysippus taught "that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him ... since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue" ( Diogenes Laertius, VII, 121). "Not yet will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action" (ibid., VII, 123).

The moral theory of Stoicism was formed under a strong influence of the Cynic school founded by Socrates's pupil Antisthenes. The Stoics held that the wise man ought to lead the life of a Cynic as the mode of thinking and acting of the Cynics was the shortest way to virtue. Freedom is only accessible to a sage, a virtuous man, and all the others are slaves as they are deprived of the possibility of acting independently. Slavery is contrasted with despotism which is also evil for, according to the moral doctrine of Stoicism, the despot is guided in his actions not by rea-

13-113

son, but by passions and desires. The ruler, according to the Stoics, must distinguish between the good and the bad, but vicious men are incapable of doing so. Only die sages, a scattered few, and not the vast multitude of men, mostly fools, possess die powers to rule, are versed in judicature and endowed with the gift of eloquence.

Such Stoic notions of the sages as true rulers were but a modification of the Platonic conception of die rule of philosophers. Civil society, according to the Stoics, is based on die natural bonds of men, their attraction to one another. Hence, the state is conceived by the Stoics as a natural coalescence and not as an artificial formation based on a social compact.

The Stoic doctrine of the natural origin of human society and socio-political life was in large measure shared by Cicero who expounded the views of the Stoics on the state and law. In the opinion of Cicero, people tend to get together, deliberate and unite owing to their gregarious nature. He quotes the Stoics as saying that die universe is governed by the will of the gods and that it is something in the nature of a common city and a community of people and the gods and that each man is a part of this universe wherefore the public weal should be placed higher than the good of an individual.

The Stoics held the view that justice in the intercourse of men in society derived from nothing else than the natural bonds among people, i. e. the conformity of their relations with the universal (natural) law of the cosmos. The natural law was thus conceived by them as the embodiment of universal justice which played die part of the model for relations among people in the political community (state) and for the laws they enacted.

Proceeding from the idea of the universal character of the natural law (and, consequently, justice by nature), Zeno and Chrysippus, as well as their Greek and Roman followers advanced a cosmopolitan doctrine of the state and contended diat all men were citizens of a single world state both by their nature and by the law of the universe as a whole. "My nature," says the Stoic Emperor Aurelius, "is rational and social, and my city and my country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is die world.''

Commenting on the cosmopolitan views of the Stoics, Plutarch describes as uncommon the political conception of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, who considered all men to be his fellow-

citizens and life to be one just as the universe is a unitary whole, instead of stressing the difference between various countries, cities, laws and customs. In die Stoic doctrine humanity emerges, according to Plutarch, as kind of a herd grazing on common pastures in accordance with the universal law.

The very emphasis placed by the Stoics on the universality of die natural law and world state, their all-embracing character and indisputable power sapped the authority of the individual and particular polis governments, laws, customs and usages. Very indicative in this respect is their criticism, after the fashion of Plato and Diogenes the Cynic, of the family and advocacy of the community of wives. Besides the family, the Stoics also attacked such social, political and cultural institutions as law courts, temples, schools, commerce, money, etc.

This cynic fervour of Stoicism, directed against cultural progress, enlightenment and being essentially conservative and even reactionary was graphic evidence of the crisis of contemporary slave-owning society and its values (social, political, legal and spiritual).

From the standpoint of Stoic ethics based on the notions of natural law, slavery as a phenomenon of social life and as a socio-political institution has no justification because it runs counter to the universal logos and contradicts the conception of world citizenship. This idea propounded by Zeno in his Republic also underlies, though in a less explicit form, the typically Stoic contrast between freedom and slavery which is treated in ethical and spiritual rather than socio-political and legal terms. In the view of the Stoics, a wise (virtuous) man is free even in shackles (the famous Stoic philosopher Epictetus, it will be remembered, was a slave), whereas an evil man is always a slave whatever he may be. Truly free men are only sages and kings. In contrast to die despots (and evil men in general) tiiey know what is good and what is bad in both divine and human affairs, wherefore the approval by the Stoics of royal government. According to ancient sources, Chrysippus held that royal powers were unlimited and monarchy could only be stable widi the sages. According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno advocated the idea of mixed government and said that the best form of government was a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent People. £eno, VII, 131).

Proceeding from the idea of the orderly cosmos and the

natural order of society as the expression of absolute reason and purpose, the Stoics stood for strict observance of the human laws that were in accord with the law of nature. According to Zeno and Chrysippus, all sins are equal in terms of world justice. Other Stoics, e. g. Heracledes of Tarsus and Athenodorus, denied the equality of sins and advocated the idea of a differentiated approach to misdemeanours. On the whole, however, all the Stoics were singularly stern and unyielding on the questions of crime and punishment, their asperity arising from a very rigorous and exalted conception of man's duty---to live up to the tasks which god imposed upon him by placing him in the world.

Virtuous men, the Stoics held, are austere for they do not indulge in the pleasures of life, nor transgress the limits of the reasonable sanctioned by the natural law. And they expect similar attitude on the part of others-the law of duty commands that every man should play his part in the world and quit it with dignity. The ideal sage and wise ruler must have no passions at all, as they are but disturbances of the mind and as a disease, ought not to be tolerated for a moment. "At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone, they never relax the penalties fixed by the law, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe" (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Zeno, VII, 123).

These and other prescripts of similar nature in fact sanctified the existing laws and objectively served to preserve slave-owning society with all its institutions. Though Stoicism apparently abounded in radical propositions and carried a considerable revolutionary potential, its exponents aimed their critical fervour towards the moral reformation of man and did not concern themselves with social and political reforms. What is more, their ethical ideal of the sage, the "virtuous man", mainly appealed to the upper strata of society, its privileged, wealthy and educated sections, and was too rigorous and stern for an ordinary man to follow.

The conformism of Stoic philosophy, its patently innocuous socio-political character clearly manifested itself in the teaching of the Roman Stoics---Lucius Annaeus Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. The former held the highest offices in Imperial Rome and was

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Nero's tutor. When Nero was proclaimed Emperor, Seneca became the actual ruler of the Empire, but his political intrigues ended in suicide by order of his cruel and vindictive pupil. As regards Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism did not prevent him from being an Emperor and professing at the same time the doctrine of a "commonwealth based on equity and freedom of speech, and of a monarchy cherishing above all the liberty of the subject" (Meditations, I, 14).

In his only work Meditations written in Greek Marcus Aurelius expounds a doctrine of the world city and man as a citizen of the world. His reasoning runs thus: "If mind is common to us all, then also the reason, whereby we are reasoning beings, is common. If this be so, then also the reason which enjoins what is to be done or left undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the Universe is a kind of Commonwealth. For in what other common government can we say that the whole race of men partakes?" (Meditations, V, 30).

The mind of the Whole, according to Marcus Aurelius, is social and demands intercourse among men. This, however, should not be chaotic, but conform to the existing rational order of the world. Hence the need for a universal hierarchy based on authority and subordination, and for general consensus among men, the most perfect of all beings, which is only attainable through the agency of Stoic philosophy.

The most consistent exposition of the Stoic idea of the spiritual freedom of all people irrespective of their social position belongs to Seneca. The object and sphere of slavery, in his opinion, can only be his body, the sensible part of his being, but not his rational soul. Seneca writes: "It is a mistake for anyone to believe that the condition of slavery penetrates into the whole being of a man. The better part of him is exempt. Only the body is at the mercy and disposition of a master, but the mind is its own master." '

The slaves, according to Seneca, are human beings like all other men and have similar mental faculties. Only the body of

~^^1^^ Seneca, Works in Ten Volumes, Vol. Ill, Moral Essays, in Three Volumes, Vol. Ill, "De Beneficiis", III, 20, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., William Heinemann, Ltd., London, 1975, p. 165.

the slave can be sold and bought, not his free soul. Without rejecting slavery as a socio-political institution, Seneca at the same time sets himself against it on ethical grounds and comes out in defence of the human dignity of the slave. Championing a liberal attitude towards the slaves, he invokes the equal helplessness of the free men and the slaves in face of omnipotent fate as yet another argument for equality of all people: "They are slaves, people declare. Nay, rather they are men. 'Slaves!'. No, comrades. `Slaves'. No, they are our fellow-slaves, if one reflects that Fortune has equal rights over slaves and free men alike" (ibid., Vol. IV, "Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales", 47, 1).

Characteristically, conceding the natural bondage of all mankind to fate, Seneca castigates, after a typically Stoic fashion, man's voluntary servitude and surrender of his human dignity to base instincts: "Show me a man who is not a slave, one is a slave to lust, another to greed, another to ambition, and all men are slaves to fear... No servitude is more disgraceful than that which is self-imposed" (Seneca in Ten Volumes, Vol. IV, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, XLVII. 17, 1979, p. 311).

Sharing the views of his Greek counterparts, Seneca declares that god (which, in his opinion, can also be rightfully called Creative Reason, Fate, Providence, Nature or the World) is the ultimate cause of everything, the first of all the causes on which the others depend. The chain of events is determined by the eternal circulation of Fate. Following its preordained course, Fate sways all destinies and rules the universe asserting its justice. People, in Seneca's opinion, are unable to change the existing world order which includes their own relations and must submit to the will of Fate with proud resignation accepting the laws of nature.

Upholding the Stoic idea of the inseparable unity of the natural and human worlds, Seneca declares: "All that you behold, that which comprises both god and man, is one---we are the parts of one great body. Nature produced us related to one another, since she created us from the same source and to the same end" (ibid., XCV, 52, in Three Volumes, Vol. Ill, 1971). The highest good lies in reason which assimilates man to god and is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a human body. Besides reason, nature has also bestowed upon man the benefit of fellowship which accounts for the unity of the human race. Reason and fellowship gave people dominion over

animals, extended their sovereignty to the elements and enabled them to enjoy the advantages of communal life.

In Seneca's natural-right conception the all-powerful and divine "law of Fate" performs the function of natural law which governs all human institutions, the state and the laws inclusive, and is understood both as a fact of nature (the world order and the causal chain of events) and the imperative of reason. Reason as a fact and a norm of nature is also materialised in human society as a part of the world whole. The correspondence between the human relationships and the divine element arises from the universality of reason: human reason is but a part of divine reason.

The universe, according to Seneca, is a natural state with its natural law; their recognition follows of necessity from the demands of reason. The members of this state in accordance with the law of nature are all people irrespective of whether they realise it or not. As regards separate communities of people, they are accidental by nature and pertain only to a limited number of men, not to the whole human race. According to Seneca, we must have in our mind's eye two states: one including the gods and the men without any frontiers, its limits being only related to the movement of the sun, and the other where we happen to abide. This second one may be Athenian or Carthaginian or connected with some other city and includes only a part of the world's population. Some people may serve simultaneously both the large and the small state, others may serve only the large, and still others only the small one.

The large state, according to Seneca, is more important in ethical terms and its value is unconditional. Indeed, true reason and, consequently, correct understanding of the law of Fate (natural law, divine spirit) consists in recognising the supreme power of the universal law and in relegating chance (e. g. the fortuity of one's birrn and citizenship of some ``small'' state) to a secondary plan. This ethical maxim is equally applicable, according to Seneca, both to individuals and to their communities (states).

The ideas of Greek Stoicism, alongside the political philosophy of Socrates and Plato, also exerted a powerful influence on the famous Roman orator, politician and thinker Marcus Tulius Cicero (106-43 B. C.).

Developing the natural right theory of his predecessors,

Cicero declares reason and the law of nature to be the foundation of the state and its laws: "Those creatures who have received the gift of reason from nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. And if they have received Law, diey have received Justice also. Now all men have received reason, therefore all men have received Justice. Consequently Socrates was right when he cursed, as he often did, the man who first separated utility from Justice; for this separation, he complained, is the source of all mischief." '

The law resting on reason and on the just right of Nature expresses the common interest of all participants in a legal community, i. e. citizens, and of the totality of such participants, i. e. the people. In this sense the state (respublica) emerges simultaneously as die cause of die people (res publica) and as a legal community.

Discussing the forms of government, Cicero echoes the dieory of the Greek philosophers about die advantages of a mixed form of government. Yet he also speaks about the benefits of monarchy, the "saviour of the state", etc., thereby showing a keen insight into the general political trend of his time and coming forward as an advocate of the rising Roman state and new constitutional forms it needed.

The politico-legal substantiation of the right of Rome to world domination and the theoretical grounds for the sovereignty of the princeps were provided by the Roman jurists who were under a considerable influence of the ideas of Stoicism, particularly in Cicero's interpretation.

One of the most important achievements of Roman legal thought was jurisprudence as die science of law and a system of laws. In die first-third centuries A. D. Roman jurists developed an elaborate complex of legal concepts both in the general dieory of law and in its separate fields. Their tiieoretical constructs provided a basis for the development of jurisprudence in die Middle Ages and in modern times.

The Stoics' idea of the spiritual freedom of men and of their

universal equality receives a new interpretation, radical and non-conformist, in die works of early Christian writers. Christianity emerged at the beginning of our era and, according to Engels, "was originally a movement of oppressed people: it first appeared as the religion of slaves and freed men, of poor people deprived of all rights, of peoples subjugated or dispersed by Rome".^^1^^ Having originated among the Jews in die east of the Roman Empire, Christianity soon spread to other countries and later turned into a world religion. Beginning from the fourth century A. D. many countries began to recognize it as the official religion of die state.

The early Christians upheld die Stoic idea of the universal equality of people reshaped in accordance with new social conditions. Striving for its realisation, they came out as resolute opponents of the existing political system and advanced radical social theories. However, canonised later by the church bureaucracy, the Christian doctrine turned into a convenient tool for die ideological justification of die relations of socio-political inequality.

Christianity had a tremendous impact on die entire history of European culture and its influence is traceable in many political and legal conceptions of the later epochs up to our time.

3. POLYBIUS

Polybius (c. 210-c. 128 B. C.), a prominent Greek historian, politician and thinker of the Hellenistic age was born at Megalopolis. His fadier Lycortas was a distinguished statesman and is known to have held an electoral magistracy of strategus (general) of the Achaean League.

The League arose in die fourth century B. C. as a confederation of twelve cities of die northern Peloponnesus. By the middle of die third century B. C. it had been joined by Megalopolis, Argolis, Thigalius, Lepreus, Thliuntus, and a number of other cities of the central Peloponnesus, whereas at the beginning of die second century B. C. the confederation embraced the whole

~^^1^^ Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes, Vol. XVI, ``Laws'', The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, Ltd., London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., I, XII, 33.

~^^1^^ Frederick Engels, "On the History of Early Christianity", in: Marx, Engels, On Religion, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 275.

of the peninsula, including Lacedaemon and Messene. The allied city-states enjoyed equal rights and a considerable degree of independence. The membership of the central Assembly extended to all citizens of the united states who had reached the legal age of 30. The chief aim of the League was to uphold the independence of its members and protect them against the expansionist tendencies of neighbouring states which included, in different periods, Sparta, Macedon, and then Rome.

Polybius whole-heartedly supported the aims of the Achaean League and championed the independence of Greek polises and the whole of Hellas, but he had no illusions about the real state of affairs. Taking a sober view of the correlation of forces, Polybius declared for open support of Rome and acceptance of its domination over Greek cities as the best alternative for the Hellenic world. In 148 B. C. Macedon was reduced to a Roman province, and in 146 the Romans subdued the action of the members of the Achaean League and a number of other Greek polises against the Roman rule. The rebellious polises were included in the Macedonian province of the Roman republic, whereas those cities that had not participated in the anti-Roman action retained a certain degree of their independence as the allies of Rome.

Even before this, in 168 B. C. after the defeat of Macedon in the battle of Pydna during the third Macedonian War the Romans made the Achaeans, their allies in this war, deport to Rome 1000 eminent citizens as hostages. Polybius happened to be one of them.

At Rome Polybius attracted the attention and sympathy of those quarters of the Roman nobility which advocated a liberal attitude towards the people of conquered territories in general and Hellas in particular. The most prominent champions of such a policy were the Scipios, an distinguished family, who actively opposed the tough line of Marcus Porcius Cato and his adherents. At Rome Polybius had the good luck to win the favour and friendship of the Scipios. He became the tutor of Cornelius Scipio (the future conqueror of Hannibal who asserted Rome's supremacy in Spain, Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean) and through his family's influence made a reputation as a reliable and loyal friend of Rome.

Using the good disposition and trust of the Romans, Polybius assumed the role of a mediator between Rome and Greece and

did very much to pacify the conqueror and save whatever remained of the independence of Greek polises included in the Macedonian province under the rule of a Roman proconsul. To the good fortune of the Greeks, this magistracy was held at the time by Lucius Mummius Achaicus whose philhellenic sympathies won him a reputation for political mildness and generosity.

In the period of reconciliation Polybius did his best to secure favourable peace terms for his countrymen and scale down tensions in Greko-Roman relations. Enjoying the confidence of both the victors and the vanquished, he was a very convenient go-between in a political settlement and the Romans agreed to grant the petition of the Achaean states to send them Polybius that he might give them new laws and supervise the establishment of a new order.

The activity of Polybius playing simultaneously the role of a friend of Rome and a defender of Hellas proved to be very successful and he acquitted himself of his delicate mission with honour. On the evidence of Plutarch, Polybius made a very important contribution to the establishment of a new constitution in Hellas under the Roman rule. After six-month toil ten Roman officials vested with authority to introduce new laws in Greece returned to Italy, whereas Polybius was authorised to make the rounds of Greek cities and settle arising disputes. "After a certain time," writes Plutarch, "he succeeded in making people accept the constitution granted to them, and saw to it that no difficulty on any subject arose either in public or in private due to the laws." '

According to Pausanias the geographer, the Achaeans considered Polybius the saviour of Hellas who had quenched the wrath of the Romans against Greece. Their gratitude expressed itself in the erection of numerous statues in his honour.

One of the inscriptions on them, for instance, reads thus: "Greece would never have come to grief, had she obeyed Polybius in all things, and having come to grief, she found succour through him alone.''

~^^1^^ From Plutarch, "Philopoemen 21", in Polybius, The Histories, Book XXXIX, 4,4-63, William Heinemann, Ltd., London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, MCMXXVII, Vol. 6, p. 449.

The historical conceptions of Polybius, including his politicolegal views are expounded in The Histories in 40 books on which his fame chiefly rests. The narration centres upon the period from 220 to 168 B. C., i. e. the 53 years during which Rome made itself master of the whole Mediterranean. Polybius devotes much attention to politico-legal subjects in general and to the advantages of Roman state institutions in particular. Thus his general history emerges essentially as a political history of Rome and the peoples subjugated by it, and as an analysis of the role of the state system and politico-legal institutions in historical development. Significantly, Polybius himself called his work "a political history" (VI, 5, 2).

Stressing his general preference for a comprehensive view of history as a characteristic feature of his method, Polybius notes that there was no universal history before him. All previous writers only concerned themselves with separate wars and certain events making no efforts to comprehend and investigate them from a broader perspective as parts of the general pattern of the world genesis. Whereas Herodotus is justly regarded as the "father of history", Polybius deserves to be called the "father of universal history". It should be noted, however, that the ``world'' of Polybius is confined to the countries of the Mediterranean, therefore his "universal history" is in fact the history of the Mediterranean region.

For all the limitations of the historical approach of Polybius his great advance on the earlier writers consists in an attempt to treat events in the context of a single law-governed historical process. His conception of the organic character of history derives in fact from the traditional Greek notions of fate personified in goddess Tyche and interpreted by the Stoics along rationalistic lines as the universal law and reason. Polybius allots to fate the role of a directive power which sways all destinies in the universe including the political relations among human beings.

In the context of universal history fate in Polybius emerges as historical destiny, as the source, substance, law and necessity of a single process of political developments. Proceeding from his conception, Polybius views the rise of Rome to world dominion as a manifestation of the universal power of fate. In other words, the ascent of Rome in the historical period under consideration is represented by him as preordained by fate and therefore inevi-

table for the rest of mankind: "Fortune has guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and has forced them to incline towards one and the same end" (Polybius, The Histories, Book I.4.I-7, Vol. I, pp. 9-11). This end, according to Polybius, is Rome's supremacy over the world, the greatest and most beneficial act of fate, the unprecedented manifestation of its power. Hence the pro-Roman stand of the historian himself.

Analysing historical events, Polybius attached special importance to novel phenomena and contended that fate constantly invents many things and thus shows its power over men's destinies. The emphasis on novelty which is central to a really historical approach was an important achievement of Polybius. His understanding of history as a necessary law-governed process on the one hand, and as a movement towards something new, not known before, was a notable contribution to the inception and development of the historical world view. Very indicative in this respect was his assessment of the history of Rome as a new page of universal history.

World history, according to Polybius, begins with the establishment of Roman supremacy over the world, and this peculiarity of Roman history accounts for the need to treat it in global terms, that is to adopt a new method of historical research and a new outlook on the world. Expounding his view, Polybius writes: "How they attained to universal empire and what particular circumstances obstructed their grand design, or again how and at what time circumstances contributed to its execution is difficult to discern without a general history. Nor for the same reason it is easy otherwise to perceive the greatness of their achievements and the value of their system of polity" (Polybius, The Histories, Book VIII, I, 6-2.8.6-7).

It would not be correct, however, to exaggerate the independence of Polybius's thought from the traditional cyclic notions in the treatment of historical phenomena. Thus describing the change of constitutions as a succession of events that follow a cyclic pattern Polybius exhibits a strong influence of the political conceptions of Plato and Aristotle. His general approach to historical events, too, is notable for statemindedness, also traceable to Plato, which clearly manifests itself in the conviction that one or another form of government plays a decisive part in all human relations. In his opinion, "the chief cause of success or

the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution, for springing from this, as from a fountain-head, all designs and plans of action not only originate, but reach their consummation" (Polybius, The Histories, Book VI.2.5.-3.2.9-10).

The emergence of the state and the subsequent change of constitutions are described by Polybius (who cites Plato and some of his other predecessors in support of his views) as a natural growth governed by the "law of nature" (VI.4, 9, 13; VI, 5, 1 -10). He distinguishes six main forms of government which succeed one another in perpetual circulation and are ranked in the order of their emergence and change: kingship (royal power), tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy and ochlocracy (mob rule). Polybius underscores the naturalness of the origin of each form of government and points out that it is only by comprehending the very process of the inception of this or that form that one can understand its further evolution---growth, heyday, decline and transition to another form. Each form of government following the general course of nature carries in itself its own life and death. The morphology of statehood (a teaching of the forms of government) put forward by Polybius thus emerges as a variety of the organistic conception of the state.

Polybius considers his view of the natural succession of government forms to be particularly true in respect of the Roman state "since from the outset its formation and growth have been due to natural causes" (VI, 4. 12-5.7, 13), and this idea indeed runs through all his Histories notable for conceptual consistency. The idea of the universal (world) character of the history of Rome is supplemented and substantiated by Polybius on the side of "political history" by his interpretation of the Roman state as a model and classical example of the natural evolution of government forms. As a result, the idea of a "political history" exemplified in Polybius by the history of Rome forms the core, the pivot of his "universal history''.

By way of introduction to his teaching about the forms of government Polybius touches upon the problem of the origin of the state in general. In his opinion, a community of human beings springs from their weakness common to both men and animals: "It being a matter of course that they too should herd together with those of their kind owing to their natural weakness-it is a natural consequence that the man who excels in bodily strength and in courage will lead and rule over the rest" (VI,

4.12-5.7.5-8). Hence, nature itself commands that the master and ruler of the mob should be the one who exceeds all others in physical strength and mental audacity. Physical strength is the sole limit to the ruler's power. In due course feelings of sociability and companionship in such gatherings of men strike root and gradually take the place of brute force - this is the first stage of the formation of kingship, the first developed form of government. During this natural process the ethical notions of good and evil, right and wrong begin to arise in man alongside the idea of duty "which is the beginning and end of justice" (VI, 6. 5-12.7-18). In this context it deserves mention that Polybius's notion of ``duty'' as central to the moral theory clearly betrays the Stoic influence on his political doctrine. Besides, drawing a distinction between monarchy and kingship, he underscores that not every monarchy is a kingship but "only that which is voluntarily accepted by the subjects and where they are governed rather by an appeal to their reason than by fear and force" (VI, 4).

The monarch originally owing his power to truculence and strength gradually and as a matter of course becomes a king since his subjects, according to Polybius, yield obedience to him no longer because they fear his force, but rather because their judgement approves him. Under kingship, rewards and penalties are apportioned according to desert and noble conduct is admired and imitated whilst baseness is held in contempt. The king's subjects join in maintaining his rule even if he is quite enfeebled by age, "ferocity and force having yielded the supremacy to reason" (VI, 6.5-12.12).

In time, however, royal powers become hereditary, the kings abandon their simplicity and paternal solicitude for the common interest and give themselves up to vice and over-- indulgence. As a result, envy, offence, hatred and passionate resentment among the subjects spring up and the kingship changes into a tyranny (VI, 7.7-8.6.8). This situation and this form of government, according to Polybius, mark the beginning of the decline of state power.

Stirring up enmity among people, the tyrants become the object of endless conspiracies, and the first steps towards their overthrow are taken by the noblest and most courageous men as such men are least able to endure the insolence of the tyrant. Supported by the people, they abolish tyrannical rule and insti-

tute an aristocracy. This form of government is characterised by Polybius as the rule of the few which is established with the people's consent and under which "the government is in the hands of a selected body of the justest and wisest men" (VI, 4.2-12.3). At first the aristocratic rulers regard the common good as their first concern, but when the offices in the state become hereditary and the position of authority passes into the hands of those "having no experience of misfortune and none at all of civil equality and liberty of speech" (VI, 7.7-8.6.4), aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy. It is distinguished by the abuse of power, lawlessness, greed of gain and unscrupulous moneygrubbing, indulgence in wine and gluttony.

The revolt of the people against the oligarchs results in their murder or banishment. Still remembering with terror the injustice they have suffered from their former rulers, the people establish a democracy and assume the responsibility for the conduct of affairs. Democracy, according to Polybius, is a form of government under which sovereign power is vested in the decrees of the majority, the law and traditional reverence for the gods reign supreme, the parents and the elders are accorded due respect and obedience.

Those who institute democracy set great store by equality and freedom of speech, but new generations accustomed to these boons and taking them as a matter of course, value them no longer and begin to aspire to offices and pre-eminence. Seeking to gain popularity and lusting for power, the wealthy citizens corrupt the masses in every possible way, and the mob avid for sops and accustomed to feeding at the expense of others finds an enterprising adventurer (demagogue) as its leader and withdraws from public affairs. As a result, the populace "stirred to fury and swayed by passion in all their counsels will no longer consent to obey or even to be the equals of the ruling caste, but will demand the lion's share for themselves. When this happens, the state will change its name to the finest sounding of all, freedom and democracy, but will change its nature to the worst thing of all, mob-rule" (VI, 57.5-58.2.9-10). Describing ochlocracy as a rule of terror and violence, Polybius underscores that it is not only the worst, but also the last stage in the cycle of political revolution. The mob "massacre, banish and plunder until they degenerate again into perfect savages and find once more a master and monarch" (VI, 9.7-10.2.9). Such is, according to

Polybius, the succession of political forms, "the course appointed by nature in which constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point from which they started" (VI, 9.7-10.2.10).

Proceeding from his general conception of the cyclic character of political development which he presents in the form of a sociopsychological analysis of the natural change of constitutions, Polybius draws several conclusions. The most important of them is that each simple form of government is characterised by a considerable degree of instability which springs from its very principle inevitably turning into its opposite. Each constitution, according to Polybius, has an inherent vice and in the course of time changes into its perverted form. In kingship, it is despotism, in aristocracy-oligarchy, and in democracy-the savage rule of violence. Hence, "it is evident that we must regard as the best constitution a combination of all these three varieties" (VI, 3.3-4.1.7), i. e. kingship, aristocracy, and democracy.

In the view of Polybius who is strongly influenced at this point by Aristotle's ideas, the main advantage of such a mixed form of government consists in its stability and immunity from corruption. The first statesman who understood this was, according to Polybius, famous Lacedaemonian lawgiver Lycurgus: "Lycurgus, foreseeing this, did not make his constitution simple and uniform, but united in it all the good and distinctive features of the best governments, so that none of the principles should grow unduly and be perverted into its allied evil, but that, the force of each being neutralised by that of the others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another but that the constitution should remain for long in a state of equilibrium like a well-trimmed boat" (VI, 10.2-10.7).

Explaining the advantages of the mixed form of government established by Lycurgus and based on a combination of different constitutional principles, Polybius points out that in this form the powers of the monarch, people and the elders restrict and balance one another. As a result of such integration of the royal, aristocratic and democratic principles the government, according to Polybius, acquires stability and becomes corruption-- resistant.

This classic conception of a mixed constitution resulting from a combination of different principles of government is in fact aimed at achieving the same effect as the theory of the separation of powers in modern times. Despite all historical, socio-po-

20!

litical and theoretical distinctions between them, the idea of a ``mixed'' government and the theory of the separation of powers have one important feature in common-in both the powers vested in the representative organs of different forms are not dissolved, so to speak, in a single body, the central element of the whole system, but are distributed among different components of the state neutralising and limiting one another.

The' perfect form of mixed government established by Lycurgus enabled the Spartans, according to Polybius, to enjoy freedom for a long time. Speaking of his own period, Polybius contends that of all the contemporary constitutions that of the Romans is the best. Analysing the powers of the three elements of the Roman state, those of the consuls, the senate and the masses representing respectively the royal, aristocratic and democratic principles, Polybius says: "If one fixed one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely monarchical and royal, if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic, and when one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a democracy" (VI, 11.11-12.8.12).

Having described the operation of the Roman state machinery and the exercise by each power of its authority, Polybius surveys the customary political practices and methods whereby separate powers can hinder or, on the contrary, help one another in the performance of their functions. Possible claims of one power to a role greater than it is assigned by the constitution are countered by other powers, the result being the stability and strength of the state. Having a low regard for the democratic constitutions of Thebes and Athens, Polybius contends that they rose to fame only for a short while as if by a whim of fate and at once began to decline without acquiring stable equilibrium. The Athenian people, in his opinion, can be compared to a ship without the helmsman. In contrast to many of his predecessors (Plato, Xenophon, Callisthenes and others) Polybius holds that the Cretan state was essentially different from Lacedaemon and that by its constitution it was a democracy rather than an aristocracy. In his view, the constitution of the Carthaginian state was also of a mixed type but by the time Hannibal started war against Rome Carthage had already passed its peak of glory and was on the decline, whereas Rome (and its state system) was in the heyday of power: " Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the

chief voice in deliberations, while at Rome the senate still retained this, and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were superior" (VI.51.1-52.1).

From the comparative analysis of the Roman and Carthaginian constitutions Polybius draws a general conclusion that of two states at war with each other the final victory is gained by the one that has a better system of government. In particular, the advantage of Rome over Carthage consisted in that the former's constitution represented a more propitious stage of the evolutionary cycle.

Comparing Rome with Sparta, Polybius comes to a different conclusion. Here he underscores that the Lacedaemonian system of government and the legislation of Lycurgus are only suitable for a good defence by the Spartans of their freedom and possessions, and not for conquest of foreign lands. Contrariwise, Rome is suited better than any other country for waging wars of aggression and establishing its domination over other peoples.

Considering the fear of the gods to be an important factor that makes for the unity of Rome, Polybius writes: "I believe that it is the very thing which among other peoples is an object of reproach, I mean superstition, which maintains the cohesion of the Roman State" (VI, 56.2-13.7). Of course, he adds echoing the sophists, if the state only consisted of wise men, no false beliefs would be needed, but in order to handle the mob one must not dispel them: "For this reason I think, not that the ancients acted rashly and at haphazard in introducing among the people notions concerning the gods and beliefs in the terrors of hell, but that the moderns are most rash and foolish in banishing such beliefs" '(VI, 56.2-13.12).

The customs and laws, according to Polybius, are the two main pillars of every state. He extols good customs and laws which make "private lives righteous and well ordered and the general character of the state gentle and just" (VI, 46.6-47.3.2) and underlines the interconnection and interdependence of good customs and laws, good morals and correct forms of government.

Polybius's Histories, his state-oriented conceptions of "political history", cyclic change of state constitutions and mixed government were held in high esteem by posterity and enjoyed great

popularity not only with the subsequent Greek and Roman writers, but also with the political thinkers and statesmen of the Middle Ages and modern times. Polybius's views of the mixed form of government figured prominently in various designs of the "perfect state" and were later used as a basis for the theory of the separation of powers advanced in the seventeenth-- eighteenth centuries in the period of the bourgeois revolutions.

Conclusion

The knowledge of history, including the history of political thought is a necessary, though, of course, not the only requisite for a correct understanding of modern life and its problems. History is more than a tale of the past, dead and buried-it is also a well of experience and wisdom, the sum total and simultaneously the fountain-head of a new development, something eternally significant and instructive, inseparably linked with contemporaneity in the perpetual progress of mankind.

The world-historical significance of the intellectual heritage of Ancient Greece which also includes its political theories and conceptions lies, if anything, in the pioneering character of Greek thought upturning virgin soil in many fields of human knowledge. The discoveries of Greek thinkers cannot be ranked as mere contributions to the history of philosophy and political theory. Owing to their creative genius, remarkable insight and brilliant intuition, they laid the foundation of science at large and formulated basic principles and conceptions in numerous spheres of theory and practice.

Having arisen in a society divided into the freemen and the slaves, the ancient politico-legal thought took shape and developed as the ideology of the freemen. The concept of freedom was central to all political thought and practice of the ancient Greeks and represented their basic value and chief concern. Tc be sure, the ancients' freedom was not universal being denied to the majority of the population - the slaves. These were also excluded from the sphere of politics understood as legal relations of citizens, i. e. full members of the polis with respect to the common interest, and could not be subjects of public rights and duties. In the eyes of the ancient Greeks, politics and all kinds of

practical and intellectual activity relating to it belonged under the head of freedom and were only for the freemen to tackle, whereas the slaves' lot was mainly to do physical work and provide the necessities of life. All relations of production, as well as family relations, were regarded as lying beyond the limits of freedom and, consequently, as falling outside the province of politics. The master-slave and householder-family relations based on the principles of authority and subordination were viewed as non-political. This conception lies at the root of the traditional antithesis between the Hellenic polis life and the ``barbarian'' rule, i. e. between freedom and tyranny, characteristic of ancient political thought. The notion of politics as the relations of freedom and as the way of life of freemen also underlies the understanding of the law as the true expression of freedom and as the standard of political justice regulating the relations of free and equal citizens. Safeguarding the common interest of the polis and the private interests of all its members, the law as the norm of political justice rests on divine justice and on the dictates of nature ("natural law").

The upshot of the traditional view of the polis as the necessary (divine, natural, rational) institution is the conception of the necessary character of such attributes of polis life as politics, law and freedom. They are not regarded as random empirical phenomena brought about by the power of chance, but as the realisation of the dictates of nature, as natural law incarnate, and this conception is central to most of the political teachings of Ancient Greece. Now, in order to conceive of a phenomenon as occurring by necessity and having a necessary character, one has to reveal the laws of its emergence and subsequent development, and that is precisely the reason why ancient political thought focused on the origin and general tendencies of political and legal institutions.

The formation of the philos'ophic, logico-rational and then scientific (in embryo) approaches to the surrounding world brought about a radical change in the reflection of reality in man's consciousness and laid the foundation for a theoretical analysis of social problems. The original mythological notions (Homer and Hesiod) gradually gave way to the philosophical approach (the ``sages'^^3^^, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Democritus), the rationalistic interpretation of the existing customs and beliefs (the sophists), logico-conceptional analysis (Socrates and Plato)

and, finally, to the rudimentary forms of the empirico-scientific (Aristotle) and historico-political (Polybius) investigation of the state and law.

In the epoch of Hellenism when the Greek polises lost their independence and the old values were undergoing a process of reappraisal, the absolute goodness of the polis and its collective life as an ethical unitary whole was called in question from the position of individualistic ethics, the spiritual freedom and independence of an individual (Epicureanism, Stoicism). From the same position the former division of all people into the freemen and the slaves was rejected and the conception of freedom as a socio-political phenomenon gave way to the great principle of universal freedom and equality of people in accordance with the divine laws of nature.

Christianity that first appeared on the scene as the religion of slaves and oppressed people made this principle its banner and gave it wide currency.

Substantial advances, both in the theoretical and practical fields, were made by Greek thought on the Roman soil. Speaking of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism, Marx described them as "the prototypes of the Roman mind, the shape in which Greece wandered to Rome".^^1^^

The political theories and legal views of ancient Greeks exerted a tremendous influence on Roman writers; particularly strong was the impact of their natural right conceptions, the doctrines of politics and political justice, the teachings of the forms of government, of the "mixed constitution", etc. The Stoic conception of a free individual became the foundation of the construct of juridical person (bearer of legal rights and duties) developed by the Roman jurists, whereas the idea of the interdependence of politics and the law characteristic of Greek political thought found its expression in legal terms in Cicero's conception of the state as a public law community. The notions, ideas and conceptions developed by Greek political thinkers were adopted, directly or through Roman writers, by later generations and are rightly reckoned among the great treasures of mankind's cultural heritage.

~^^1^^ Karl Marx, "Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 35.

The thinkers of all subsequent historical periods invariably turned their eyes to the ancient Greeks for spiritual guidance, drew on their intellectual experience and used their theoretical achievements interpreted in accordance with new social conditions for the solution of new problems.

In our time, like in olden days, the history of Greek philosophical and political thought remains an inexhaustible well of ideas and arguments used by the representatives of various political schools and trends in ideological battles in order to substantiate their own views and to flout the views of their opponents.

Political theories and legal conceptions of ancient Greek thinkers, particularly those of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Solon, Democritus, Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics and Polybius have always drawn the later writers' attention and not infrequently turned into the battle-fields of endless ideological and theoretical wars over the problems of the state, law, power, politics, freedom, justice, legislation that are forever topical for mankind.

To be sure, the twenty odd centuries that separate us from the ancient Greeks witnessed many a change in the general assessment of Greek political thought---the approach to classic theories and conceptions varied with the objectives of ideological struggle between different social groups and classes, with the forms it assumed, the arguments used, the issues advanced to the foreground, etc. Yet on the whole the cardinal problems of human society raised by the Greek thinkers have never lost their theoretical and political significance. Moreover, present-day political writers devote increasing attention to the ideas and notions of the classics and we have good cause to assert that the interest of contemporary science in ancient tradition tends to grow.

Correct understanding and assessment of the political and legal conceptions of Ancient Greece- and, for that matter, of the past in general---is only possible on the basis of a historical approach. The principle of historicity safeguards an investigator against onesidedness in the appraisal of various doctrines, enables him to trace the links between the conceptions of Ancient Greece and modern theories with the highest possible degree of accuracy, reveals the evolution of one or another classic theory both in the historical perspective and retrospectively and brings to light the specific laws underlying the development

of political theory and legal notions.

The historical approach provides a key to the politico-legal theory of Ancient Greece with all its specific features determined by the unique socio-historical conditions of the Hellenic world and is instrumental in the objective assessment of its role in later periods and in our time. As a method of theoretical investigation into political and legal doctrines of Ancient Greece, historicity implies the irreversibility and uniqueness of ideological phenomena and presupposes a general recognition of the fact that the original views and constructs of one or another Greek political thinker are bound to acquire a new meaning and new connotations in every new historical situation, in the context of a different socio-political reality.

The classical teachings of the past and, in particular, the major politico-legal conceptions of Ancient Greece are subjected to ever new reassessments and reinterpretations which constitute an important form of the assimilation of mankind's cultural heritage by new generations and normally identify all truly great intellectual values. Such involvement of the past theories in the political and intellectual life of every new epoch testifies to their undying topicality and their reappraisal becomes an effective method not only of presenting the old problems in the new historical and intellectual context, but also of treating the new problems and situations in the light of the well-known ideas of a universally recognised ``classical'' thinker.

In the dialectical unity of the past and the present new things are not, contrary to the popular saying, nothing but thoroughly forgotten old ones-they are always something, contemporary. Every new interpretation of old teachings implies of necessity a new outlook on the past and a new knowledge of the present. The progress of knowledge, including the knowledge of politicolegal phenomena, is therefore not a mere continuation and extension of the spiritual links between different historical periods or a simple quantitative growth of the volume of information available to us, it is also a qualitative change, a renovation.

Another important aspect to the problem of continuity in the sphere of ideas consists in the mediate character of their connection. Indeed, just as political and legal theories are linked with practice not directly, but through the agency of unique historical events and acute ideological struggle, so the theories themselves can only be related to one another through the agency of

the sum total of the theoretical knowledge gained and formulated by mankind in the process of the historical development of its philosophical thought in general and political theory in particular.

As the reader may have noticed, investigation of the intellectual heritage of the past, including the political doctrines and legal concepts of Ancient Greece can greatly benefit from what may at first appear as rather an artificial differentiation between the historical and dieoretical aspects of one or another teaching in interest. Being but an analytical method, such a differentiation is of great cognitive value insofar as it not only provides a framework for scientific investigation, but also lays down a foundation for correct axiological approach. Indeed, on the side of historical specificity the investigator of a political teaching should focus his attention on the concrete socio-political views of its originator, his concepts of society, the state, law, politics, justice, etc., on the relation between these views and the ideology of definite classes and social groups, on the thinker's political sympathies and antipathies, the social interests and trends he expressed, etc., whereas the theoretical aspects of the teaching in question orient the analyst on disclosing its philosophical, epistemological and methodological principles, revealing the arguments the thinker adduced in support of his specific historicallyconditioned political and legal propositions, the main theoretical concepts, thought models and constructs he developed or elaborated in order to substantiate his views, etc.

Equal attention of the investigator to both sides, the historical and dieoretical, of classic politico-legal doctrines not only provides a basis for their correct and well-reasoned assessment, but is also a necessary requisite for disclosing their logical pith, the relations with other doctrines (precedent, contemporary and subsequent), the processes of the integration and differentiation of various conceptions, their struggle, synthesis and continuity, novel features in their historical evolution and links with contemporary theories.

The dialectical unity and interconnection of the historical and theoretical aspects of a political or legal doctrine does not rule out but, on the contrary, presupposes their relative independence, and this enables the theoretical categories, ideas, formulas and constructs of one or another ancient thinker to be extricated, as it were, from their historical specifics and added to

the theoretico-methodological armoury of the developing political science. The expansion and improvement of its conceptual apparatus, the enrichment of its theoretical vocabulary and methodology are convincing testimony to the progress of scientific knowledge, the continuity of ideas and close ties between history and contemporaneity.

The progressive accumulation of politico-legal knowledge reflecting the growing complexity of social relations serves as a powerful stimulant for ever more profound investigation into the so-called eternal problems, such as the relationship between ethics and politics, the citizen and the state, freedom and subordination, power and coercion, right and the law, the forms of government and political regimes, etc. The pioneering efforts of the ancient Greeks in die formulation and study of these problems can scarcely be exaggerated.

Today like in former times the political theory of Ancient Greece continues exercising the minds of historians and political thinkers. It preserves its tremendous cognitive, ideological and methodological value as' the historical foundation of all subsequent political and legal teachings, as the inexhaustible fountain-head of ideas, conceptions and methods of theoretical inquiry and, for this reason, as an important field of contemporary ideological struggle for the cultural heritage of mankind. The invisible ties of history binding together the past and the present will keep the political spirit of the ancient Greeks alive and the achievements of their genius topical as long as our civilisation endures.

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``Law and custom are a sort of justice." (Aristotle)

``For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner." (Plato)

``The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but that they may not suffer it." (Epicurus)

``Now the chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution." (Polybius)