__SERIES__
Criticism
General Editor
G. KH. SHAKHNAZAROV
Progress
Publishers
Moscow
Translated from the Russian by James Riordan Designed by Vadim Knleshov
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[4]CONTENTS
page ~
Introduction............... 7
CHAPTER ONE. GENESIS OF WESTERN POLITICAL SCIENCE............ 17
1. `Traditional' #nd `New' Political Science . . 17
2. Mosca's Idea of Political Class and Pareto's Elite Theory............ 40
3. Max Weber's Sociology of the State ... 74
4. Robert Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy . . 83
5. Arthur Bentley's Interest Group Theory . . 90
CHAPTER TWO. US POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
TODAY ,................ 115
1. Establishment of US Political Science as an Academic Discipline and Its Modern Profile 115
2. Empirical Theories of Political Power and Political Behaviour.......... 126
3. Democracy Theory and Elitism Concepts . . 133
4. Technocratic Concepts of Political Power 145
5. Political Systems Sociology and Comparative Analysis of Political Development .... 157
CHAPTER THREE. POLITICAL STUDIES IN
BRITAIN................ 200
1. Salient Aspects of British Political Studies 200
2. Political Parties........... 209
3. Pressure Group Study......... 220
4. Analysis of Political Culture and Political Systems.............. 224
CHAPTER FOUR. FRENCH POLITICAL SCIENCE 241
1. Establishment of Political Science .... 241
2. Concepts of Political Power...... 253
3. Theory of Political Institutions. Institutional Concept of the State......... 263
4. Social Stratification Theories. Parties and Pressure Groups........... 270
5. Study of Political Regimes and Political Systems.............. 291
[5]page ~
CHAPTER FIVE. POLITICAL STUDIES IN POSTWAR ITALY.............. 315
1. Landmarks in Political Studies..... 315
2. Empirical Studies......» . . . 320
3. Sociology of Party Systems....... 323
4. Some Problems of Method in Modern Italian Political Studies........ 329
CHAPTER SIX. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN WEST
GERMANY............... 336
1. Landmarks in Political Science..... 336
2. Political Science and Philosophy of the State 355
3. The General Doctrine of the State, Sociology
of the State and Political Sociology . . . 365
4. Sociological Concepts of Political Science 383
5. Socio-Philosophical and Structural-- Functionalist Macro-Sociological Concepts of Democracy and Political Organisation of Bourgeois Society............ 387
Conclusion............... 418
Name Index............... 426
[6] __ALPHA_LVL1__ INTRODUCTIONModern social science is characterised by a broad development of studies into politics and political relations. Such studies occupy a special place in the leading countries of the West, where they are carried out in the framework of a special academic discipline---political science.
Political science in the USA and West European countries is by no means a new object of study for Soviet researchers. Numerous publications on the subject, method and most important problems in this area of Western social science have appeared over the past decade. A number of valuable studies of this type have been conducted in other socialist countries, too. Scholars gave most of their attention /to theory and methodology, and in so doing, were concerned most of all with sociological concepts and approaches. ' This was occasioned by their especially keen interest in politico-theoretical knowledge and by the development of their own sociology as an academic discipline and as a sociological (as well as 7 philosophical and juridical) aspect of the study of government.
Although the Marxist-Leninist science of government and law monistically combines in itself philosophical, sociological and juridical aspects, it is the sociological approach and the working out of the sociological aspect which have enabled Marxism to take the fetish out of legal form and reveal the objective laws of relationship between society and the state. It is therefore impossible not to agree with the view held in scientific literature that 'the theory of government and law is first of all a sociological, and only secondarily legal, science".^^2^^ This, in turn, insistently dictates the necessity for further broadening and deepening the study of the sociological problems of government.
The specifics of the sociological aspect of the theory of government may be most adequately revealed through Lenin's definition of politics as the area of relations of all classes and strata to the state and government.^^3^^ This definition implies the necessity to study a most important ami utterly sociological problem of political theory, that of the social structure of power and those real connections which exist between society and the state, between political power and such highly important characteristics of class society as its social class structure and spiritual culture. Here the concept of 'the state' in the classic works of Marxism is used not only in the meaning of an apparatus of class rule, but in the wider, sociologically more complete meaning of political organisation, form, structure of class society and its political system as an entire system of political relationships fixing the distribution of the 8 positions of power---the subordination between the classes, social strata and groups that form society.~^^4^^
From the sociological point of view, the stateis a system of a particular class society which is based on rule-subordination relationships, and th& substance of which is class antagonisms and class struggle. A political system is the consequence of given antagonisms and, at the same time, is the condition for preserving human society as someintegrated, albeit internally contradictory whole, as the specific unification of the ruling and the ruled, a particular organisation of rule.
A study of Western political science is called for by both the necessity for well-reasoned criticism of its concepts and by the requirements posed! by the further development of Marxist-Leninist social science. It is important not only to see the class limitation of bourgeois authors, but to beable to single out scientifically valuable ideasand methods of studying social and political reality in their works. In this connection, Lenin's well-known proposition that the scientific achievements of bourgeois scholars must be mastered and re-worked^^5^^ acquires special methodological significance.
As a result of heightened interest in the sociological aspect of the theory of the state, most Soviet researchers have seen in Western political science most of all a political sociology, not an applied but, rather, a theoretical discipline illuminating the fundamental problem of power and political relations. Moreover, certain authors have begun to perceive in Western political sociology a certain, theoretical `super-discipline' integrating the basic positions of political science, 9 sociology and social psychology.^^6^^ With regard to the structure of Marxist-Leninist social science, views have appeared favouring the creation of a sociology of politics as a special sociological theory combining various levels of politico-- sociological knowledge and therefore playing the part of a special political science in the system of Marxist-Leninist social science.~^^7^^
Of course, the sociological theory of politics does not and cannot exhaust all political theory, to say nothing of political science as a whole. Significant changes have taken place in recent years in Western political science which the llth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) helped bring to light. It was held in Moscow in August 1979, bringing together more than 1,500 scholars from 59 countries. As reports and discussions at the Congress showed, the following tendencies are now apparent in Western political science: 1) the waning of contrasting attitudes with regard to `scientific' (empirical) knowledge vs. 'non-- scientific' (philosophical), accompanied by increased attention to correlating knowledge and moral •evaluation, determining political values and bringing them into a system; 2) rising interest in the history of political doctrines and their new interpretation and in the historical method, and criticism of the absolutisation of distinctions between the normative and historical approaches; 3) a certain shift towards investigation of legislative and executive institutions, law and judicial •organs; 4) a perceptible rise in the interest of Western political scientists in Marxism, accompanied by attempts to modernise it and adapt it to various sorts of bourgeois-liberal and 10 revisionist views; 5) the borrowing of methods and concepts from other sciences and the emergence therefrom of new trends in political science, such as biopolitics, political geography, ethnopolitics, «t al.; 6) growth of the applied significance of political science and the expanding recruitment of professional political scientists for work in .government.
Modern political science is integrated in nature. New knowledge about the correlation of economics and politics, politics and law, comparative studies of judicial practice and tendencies in federalism; political systems, the environment, resources and technology; biopolitics, psychopolitics, political geography; normative political theory, political values and norms in the modern world---all these and many other economic, legal, and philosophical problems of political relations were the subject of discussions by scholars at the llth IPSA World Congress.
At the same time, problems of political sociology also occupied a conspicuous place at the Congress: the problems of power and inequality, the dimensions of power, the socio-political problems of pluralism, political culture and political elites, bureaucracy and political development; the expression of interests and their accommodation, public opinion and political parties, political support and alienation, the legitimacy and authority of governmental decisions, political socialisation, et al. Here specialists on the problem of accumulation of political knowledge emphasized that, after 1949, political science in most countries developed in the direction of sociological and sociopsychological studies and approaches.^^8^^
Of all the numerous definitions of political 11 science in Western literature, the most common remains the definition of this discipline as thescience of political power. What is especially important is that it is the concepts of political power which claim to expose the fundamental patterns of political life and attempt to explain political forms and institutions, as well as the political system as a whole, by society's social structure and by the nature of lasting relationships between the rulers and the ruled, the dominating and the dominated. This, [therefore, constitutes an attempt to explain on a theoretical level the workings of state power, the most important problem of politics in an antagonistic class society, a problem which has traditionally attracted scholars on government from various countries at all times. For this reason, it is methodologically completely justified and remains topical to distinguish political sociology in Western political science, and theoretical and methodological aspects, above all, the concepts of power and political relations, in political sociology.
The theoretical concepts of power and political relations as the focus of research by Western political science represent the principal interest of the authors of the work at hand, too. Their attention is centred on the sociological problems of the political system and democracy as the most important aspect of the study of government which may conditionally be termed the sociology of government. At the same time, the work discusses the more general theoretical and methodological problems of political science as an academic discipline in the leading countries of the West and its place in the system of other disciplines involved in the study of politics. Un- 12 like earlier works in this area, the present work devotes particular attention ito the genesis of the contemporary concepts of .power and society's political system, to the earlier stages of Western political science's evolution and its originators. This retrospective angle allows the works of contemporary political scientists to be more adequately assessed and to more clearly show the continuity in the development of non-Marxist social and political thought, as well as the borrowing of a number of fundamental ideas from political thinkers of the past for constructing contemporary politico-theoretical concepts and doctrines. The team of authors includes N. N. Deyev, S. A. Yegorov, G. V. Gazenko, V. G. Grafsky, P. S. Gratsiansky, B. A. Kurkin, E. N. Ozhiganov, V. V. Smirnov.
NOTES
~^^1^^ See, for example, F. M. Burlatsky, Lenin. State. Politics, Moscow, 1971; F. M. Burlatsky, A. A. Galkin, Sociology. Politics. International Relations, Moscow, v!974; A. V. Dmitriev, Political Sociology in the USA, Leningrad, 1971; N. M. Keizerov, Power and Authority. A Critique of Bourgeois Theories, Moscow, 1973; A. A. Fedoseyev, Politics as an Object of Sociological Studies. A Critique of Methodological Principles of Contemporary Bourgeois Political Science, Leningrad, 1974; V. Y. Chirkin, 'The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Bourgeois 13 Political Science', Political and Legal Doctrines of Contemporary Imperialism, Moscow, 1974; P. S. Gratsiansky, Political Science in France. Critical Essays, Moscow, 1975; V. V. Smirnov, 'The Concept of Political Culture in Political Science of the USA', Peaceful Coexistence and Socio-Political Development, Moscow, 1977; S. A. Yegorov, 'On Political Studies in Present-Day Britain', Peaceful Coexistence and Socio-Political Development; J. Wiatr, Sociology of Political Relations, Moscow, 1979; G. V. Gazenko, 'On the History of Political Science in Italy', Peaceful Coexistence.. .; S. A. Yegorov, 'Political Science in the USA: Traditionalism, Scientism and Present-Day Dilemmas', Voprosy filosofii, 1979, No. 7; G. V. Gazenko, 'Gaetano Mosca: A Concept of Political Science', Political and Legal Ideas and Institutions in Their Historical Development, Moscow, 1980; idem., 'The Problem of Power in the Politico-- Sociological Theory of Vilfredo Pareto', Historical and Legal Studies: Problems and Prospects, Moscow, 1982 (all in Russian).
~^^2^^ D. M. Ugrinovich, 'On the Subject Matter of Marxist Sociology', Essays on the Methodology of Cognition of Social Phenomena, Moscow, 1970, p. 45 (in Russian).
~^^3^^ See V. I. Lenin, 'A Great Beginning', Collected Works, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 421.
14~^^4^^ See Karl Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law', Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1975, pp. 30-31; idem., 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform by a Prussian"', ibid., pp. 197-98.
~^^5^^ See V. I. Lenin, 'Materialism and Empirio-Criticism', Collected Works, Vol. 14, 1974, p. 343.
~^^6^^ See A. V. Dmitriev, op. cit., pp. 4, 8.
~^^7^^ See A. A. Fedoseyev, op. cit., pp. 21, 23.
~^^8^^ See V. S. Semenov, 'Accumulation of Political Knowledge Since 1949', Peace Politics and Development of Political Systems. The Yearbook of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences. 1978, Moscow, 1979, pp. 28-29 (in Russian).
[15] ~ [16] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER ONE __ALPHA_LVL1__ GENESIS OF WESTERNModern Western literature employs the concept 'political science' largely to denote a special academic discipline institutionalised in advanced capitalist states since the last war. The term is frequently linked with the notion of `strict', ' objective' and systematised political knowledge that relies on `exact' methods of analysis borrowed from the natural sciences. It is associated with a `dispassionate' and `sober' approach to political reality, with an aspiration and ability to see real motive forces and springs of the political mechanism that lie behind external forms, to see how the laws of operation and development of the institution of political power and the whole system of political relationships manifest themselves.
Political science includes empirical investigation of the social structure of power, political influence and political behaviour, political orientations and public opinion, the forecasting of political situations, etc. It is claimed that such __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2---01532 17 research is carried out with the aid of the latest armoury of scientific analysis (mathematical modelling, factor and correlation analysis, mathematical game theory, systems analysis, and so on), that it invariably rests on the principle of `verification'---`strict' testing of hypotheses by observation, surveys and establishment of correlations, etc.
In so far as all these methods ate widely popular in sociology, the `new' political science is increasingly bound up with sociological research, leaving in parenthesis not only political philosophy and juridical science of government but those political works that do not fit into the narrow understanding of the scope and nature of political knowledge. Hence such common identification in Western literature of 'political science' and 'political sociology' or attempts to highlight solely the sociological orientation of all political science.
Political science as a discipline resting on neopositivist methodology and focused on studying empirically observable political behaviour has been linked to the prospects and possibilities of political knowledge developing in line with scientific and technological progress since the last war. Alongside the neopositivist orientation within the bounds of Western political science as an academic discipline more traditional approaches have prevailed, a philosophical, historical and juridical-institutional examination of politics and political power. What is more, some sociologists have been disinclined to identify political science with political sociology; in fact they have even counterposed the two, emphasising the institutional-government nature of the former and the 18 socio-structural and Behavioural aspect of tne latter.
In the view of the American sociologist Lewis Coser, 'All study of political processes focuses attention on the state, the institution which claims, to 'quote Max Weber, "the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory" ', while political sociologists are concerned with studying wider aspects of interaction between state administration and social structure, political and social processes. 'Political sociology,' Coser wrote, 'is that branch of sociology which is concerned with the social causes and consequences of given power distributions within or between societies, and with the social and political conflicts that lead to changes in the allocation of power.' ' Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset continued the same idea, 'Like political science, political sociology is concerned with the distribution and the exercise of power in society. Unlike political science, it is not concerned with the institutional provisions for that distribution and exercise, but takes these as given. Thus, political science starts with the state and examines how it affects society, while political sociology starts^ with society and examines how it affects the state, i.e., the formal institutions for the distribution and exercise of power.'^^2^^
Differences between political science and political sociology were seen too in research objectives. In Lipset's words, political science always tried to study modes of enhancing the efficient operation of the state machinery, whereas ' political sociology .. . has been the ``radical'' discipline, stressing social conflict and social change and focusing on latent functions, informal __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 aspects, and ... the dysfunctional aspects ol politics.'^^3^^
Such a contrasting of political sociology and political science is only partly valid and applicable principally to the early stages of their development as disciplines. It has as its major source the rivalry between the disciplines as differentiation stiffened after the war. The postwar formation of political science emanated from a desire by a certain group of social scientists to establish just such an independent academic discipline as sociology, history, psychology and jurisprudence. At the same time, political sociologists were concerned to preserve their positions within the framework of sociology, seeing competitors in the sociology-oriented political scientists intruding on the preserve of sociologists. That intrusion, however, was natural and inevitable, and no matter how much certain political sociologists tried to portray political science as a purely institutional-juridical discipline, it was increasingly sociologised nonetheless, brought closer to political sociology both in subject-matter and in research methods. In turn, political sociologists experienced a sociological inhibition of their `subdiscipline', manifest in a self-isolation from the institutional aspects of the problem; they recognised the fact that a study of social behaviour in the political sphere was impossible without account for the active regulating effect of official political structures and norms---- governmental machinery, ruling political parties, legal systems, etc. They began to realise that governmental structures also represented special social entities which, in turn, divided up into interest groups interacting among themselves and relating 20 to non-governmental social structures. Moreover, some political sociologists displayed a heightened interest in sociological analysis of governmental structures, administrative forms and political regimes. In formulating their versions of a sociological theory of politics they had to advance to a level of analysis of problems traditional for science of government; and here they were face to face with the classical problem of the state as a political system, a form of organisation of class society.
This evolution in the interests of political sociologists can be clearly seen in Lipset's change of direction. Whereas in the late 1950s and early 1960s be was insisting on the existence of differences between political science and political sociology, by the end of the 60s he had changed his tune. Not only was he recognising the convergence of the two disciplines, he was setting the study of society's state structure as the prime issue of political sociology.
In his own words: 'Ever since the term sociology was first applied, the analysis of political processes and institutions has been one of its most important concerns.' Furthermore, 'this definition does not imply causal priority to society over polity, political sociology is not, or not solely, the study of the social factors which condition the political order. For political institutions are themselves social structures, and hence are often the independent ... factors which affect other nonpolitical aspects of the social structure.' In his opinion, 'the formal provisions denning the executive, the division of powers among different political units, or the laws which define the procedure for electing officials (elections 21 systerns, types of constituencies, and so on)', not merely are important; they 'have had powerful determining influences on the shape of the class structure; which groups have a sense of group consciousness; the lines of communications; the extent to which given nations have significant subcultures; and the like. Societal conceptions of proper authority relations may affect the power of officeholders, but the way in which the political institutions distribute political authority may influence orientations towards those in authority in a variety of structures. Politics, no more than economics, is an epiphenomenon of general social structures.'~^^4^^
So Lipset not only justified the need for sociological analysis of governmental and other official political structures, he unambiguously recognised the importance of the juridical form of state organisation and the political process, manifestly overstating their role in class formation and the development of social consciousness.
In reviewing his attitude to the place of political sociology within the social sciences, he treats it as a filial discipline encompassing the overlapping area of sociology and political science: the problem of interaction between society and the state, between the social system and political institutions. Further, as he observes, 'the linkage and overlap between sociology and political science date back, in fact, to the formal origins of both disciplines in the late nineteenth century', and 'in Europe, the work of Weber, Michels, Mosca, Pareto and Siegfried was relevant to the emerging concerns of what eventually became two fields.' Here he is actually voicing the opinion that the major sociologists pf th.e 22 late 19th century 'were, for the most part, political sociologists, or, it may even be said, sociological political scientists'.^^5^^
Lipset's interpretation of political sociology as a discipline in which sociology is integrated with the science of government essentially means the rebirth of the traditional notion of political science as a paramount field of study for sociology.
Historically, the formation of sociological knowledge began with the study of forms of government, an analysis of the state as a political structure of society. Back in Ancient Greece we find the idea of the state as a specific form of human association caused by social differentiation and the division of labour. According to Plato, the state was a social organisation outgrowing patriarchal and tribal organisation in the course of development of cattle-herding, farming, handicraft and commerce, and it was in the division of labour that he saw the basis of the states of his time. One distinguishing feature of real forms of state organisation of human society is inequality formulated in laws which, in Plato's view, always express the interests of the most powerful class, given out as being for the general good.~^^6^^
Plato's pupil Aristotle did not simply define the state as a natural and supreme form of human communion in relation to the family and tribal settlements, he actually termed its elements rich and poor, tillers of the soil, artisan? and merchants, the notables and non-notables. The distribution among them of positions of power and of roles in regulating social affairs represented, in his view, the state structure, its constitution. Depending on which social element prevailed in the state administration and which 23 interests were pursued by the rulers, Aristotle constructed his typology of forms of government and provided a classification of different ancient states. And here the main factors predisposing the forms of state structure were not professional, but property differences, as a result of which oligarchy always prevailed when the rich governed, and democracy when the poor took charge.~^^7^^ In Aristotle's view, therefore, the state is a socially stratified society, an association of people, whose constitution is determined by the prevalence in its administration of the various social interests resulting fr-om differentiation.
Subsequent development of sociological knowledge occurred within the bounds of that tradition, of the analysis of the state structure and forms of government from the standpoint of distribution of power among the various classes and social strata and a search for an `ideal' combination of social elements (above all aristocracy and the people) in administering the affairs of a state-organised society. Such thinkers as Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, James Harrington, Montesquieu, David Hume, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville all developed the theory of the state and considerably enriched political science whose basis had been laid by Aristotle in his Politics. Thus, a sociological understanding of the nature of the state was enriched by the ideas of Machiavelli on the functional nature of differences between the aristocracy and the people, Madison's theory of political factions, the tenets of Montesquieu and de Tocqueville on mores as an important factor in the emergence and preservation of political forms, Madison's concept of 24 a federal republic as a special form of mixed government, de Tocqueville's idea of social democracy, notions of forms of government being determined by distribution of property and of people's selfish striving for property and power inevitably engendering an oligarchy which established its political suzerainty (Harrington, Hume, Adams, Hamilton and Madison).
Ideas of specific politically organised and constitutionally legal forms of ensuring a stable and moderate `mixed' government were significant in furthering political knowledge in the 18th century. Montesquieu's concept of 'separation of powers' augmented by the theory of checks and counterchecks from the American federalists (Adams, Hamilton and Madison) opened up a new stage in political science where political sociology came to be combined with a juridical approach, with the art, based on the science of government and law, of constitutional reinforcement of the principle of balanced distribution of political power in society, precluding a manifestation of extremes of autocracy, oligarchy and democracy in tyranny, dictatorship and anarchy. If we bear in mind that the theoreticians of that period widely resorted to the experience of history (comparative historical analysis) and the philosophy of Enlightenment (the natural law concept of inalienable human rights and the idea of a social contract as the basis of state formation) complemented by a psychological doctrine of selfishness (Hume), we have to admit that in the late 18th century political science integrated all aspects of political theory---philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and institutional law.
The revolutionary bourgeoisie of America and 25 France, in striving to establish and bolster their power, not only extracted everything of value from the political theoretical legacy of the past, they considerably enriched it with new ideas and theoretical constructions aimed at resolving the central task of the time---the constitutional consolidation of the new political system. And documents like The Federalist Papers (a series of articles by Hamilton, Madison and John Jay in support of the draft federal Constitution of the USA of 1787) are more than an outstanding memorial to political thought of the past. In tho words of the noted American historian Clinton Rossiter, 'The Federalist is the most important work in political science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to be written, in the United States. It is, indeed, the one product of the American mind that is rightly counted among the classics of political theory.'~^^8^^
The appearance of documents akin to Federalist was possible only in a situation of victorious culmination of revolution, and a realistic comprehension of the nature of the state and tho legislator's tasks distinguished only the best and most educated leaders of that revolution. In other countries, however, where the feudal autocracy succeeded in clinging on to political supremacy (primarily Germany), there was a strengthening of idealist notions about the state and it was treated as an abstract idea or external force standing above society. With the development, then, of juridical positivism, a formal-juridical understanding of the state as a special juridical institution or juridical personage gained credence.
The emergence oi Marxism marked a qualitatively new stage in political science. Peing 26 shaped in the fight against idealist philosophical concepts and dogmatic juridical Weltanschauung, Marxism defetishised the legal form, and continued and furthered a materialist understanding of the state system, demonstrating that political relations of domination-cum-subordination have their roots in the system of production relations of exploiting society, a superstructure rising above its economic base.
As sociology became an independent discipline (Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer), a new stage began in the development of political science---the emergence of initial notions of the development of political regimes and institutions through using the comparative historical method and organic analogy (Spencer's sociology of political institutions). The dogmatic normativism of juridical science both fended off sociologists and led fundamentally to a discrediting of the juridical philosophy itself. The process of differentiation between jurisprudence and sociology went so far that the two types of positivism--- juridical and sociological---ended up at opposite poles, and sociological positivism gained ground and force precisely under the slogan of combating the dogmatism and formalism of juridical positivism.
'
So the first serious disintegration of political science took place: the divorce of a large part of scientists of government from sociologists and their shift to formal-dogmatic jurisprudence. As a consequence, in some countries (above all Britain, partially in France and especially in the USA), it was mainly philosophers and sociologists like Comte, Spencer, William Sumner and Lester Ward wfyo studied the state system.
27Spencer was the first sociologist seriously to apply the method of organic analogy to the study of society and its political institutions; he was the first to realise that one should regard the term 'social organism' often used in the literature not simply as a metaphor, but as a certain objective reality---a community of principles inherent in the organisation of society and the individual biological organism. To his credit too is discovery of the common law of evolution existing in living nature from simple to complex ( integration), from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous (differentiation) and from the indefinite to the definite.
Despite his schematic approach, Spencer's concept of evolution reflected the real historical process of social development, the transfer from feudalism with its predominance of the natural economy and rigid hierarchical system ('military system') to capitalism based on commodity production, a system of free competition and liberal parliamentary democracy ('industrial system'). At the same time, Spencer drew attention to the militarist and bureaucratic trends that were plainly manifest in Europe. He was, moreover, the first sociologist to attempt to elucidate these pernicious processes and their consequences by uncovering the inner laws of the operation and development of complex bureaucratic institutions.
In applying his favourite method of organic analogy, he expressed the idea that any developed, fully formed structure would resist change and that this principle operates with law-giving force in any society; proof of that is the conservatism of every long-standing institution. What is more, resistance to reorganisation does 28 not simply exist, it grows as the governing apparatus becomes more complex and expanded, in so far as the burgeoning social stratum of administrators is concerned solely with a selfish desire for self-preservation and satisfaction of their own needs. Spencer's sociology is here of particular interest since he was able with the help of organic analogy to outline the contours of the future socio-critical approach to the problem of bureaucracy.~^^9^^
The complexity and contradictory nature of political affairs, the exacerbation of political issues in most capitalist countries ( bureaucratisation, militarism, corruption, monopoly machinations, etc.) at the turn of the century forced some sociologists to take a fresh look at the state and politics, to focus attention on hidden power structures. So there appeared a new realistic political science which, nonetheless, was devoid of strict parameters and represented a colourful melange of socio-critical, reformist and reactionary-pessimist notions of power and society's political system, that had taken shape on the basis of the various philosophical schools. This was a form of renaissance caused by crisis phenomena of capitalist society and its political institutions. In a number of countries the deepening of the crisis went so far that it halted the development of political science for quite a time.
From the viewpoint of the modern student of political theory the most interesting ideas are those of the Italian jurist Gaetano Mosca and the sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, the German sociologists Max Weber and Robert Michels and the American political scientist Arthur Bentley. They are justly regarded as the founders of modern 29 bourgeois political sociology, and many of tiie latest works of Western political scientists bear the imprint of their ideological influence.
The 1960s were a particularly important stage in Western political science. It was then that authors began theoretically to substantiate empirical research into power and political behaviour, to reveal general patterns of the political process, while the integral analytical category became the notion of the political system, based on the idea of the interrelationships of structure (institutions and norms) and processes ( behaviour of various social groups and individuals), of all kinds of social action that had to do with political decision-making. Reliance on `action' meant, on the one hand, a heightened attention to studying empirically observable behaviour, account for formal norms and institutions only to the extent to which they actually affected that behaviour. On the other, the concept of `action' began to mean a study of political behaviour in the context of the system, with account for the interconnection and interdependence of all elements of the political system, a certain order and stability in the interaction of those elements.
Great importance began to be attached to such notions as `milieu', `parameter', `input' and ' output' of the political system, the processes of interchange between the system and the milieu, the functioning of the political system on `input' and `output' levels. These ideas emerged in political science due to the same impact that computer science and general systems theory were having on the science of society. But it was the ideas of structural functionalism, and particularly the understanding of function as processes vital 30 for the organism, satisfying its definite needs, an understanding borrowed from biology and social anthropology, that found most favour among political scientists. Of particular interest was Talcott Parsons's idea of functional imperatives (or requisites) whose realisation would ensure the normal state (equilibrium) of the social system, that is, attaining the goal, adapting the system to the environment, integrating all the system's components and regulating tensions concealed within it.
The idea of functional imperatives lay behind several variants of the political systems theory (W. Mitchell, S. N. Eisenstadt), although some leading political scientists, like Gabriel Almond, focused prime attention on the interaction of those real political structures (interest groups, parties, mass media, state power agencies) that take part at various stages of the process of articulation and consensus of political interests. The same idea had quite an impact on elaboration of the political development theory whose proponents focused attention both on the problem of integration (the concepts of legitimacy--- Richard Merelman and David Easton, institutionalisation [stable basic political organisations and procedures]---S. Huntington and Joseph La Palombara, secularisation---Almond and Sidney Verba), and on differentiation (specialisation) of roles and autonomy of various socio-political' structures from state agencies (Almond, Lucian Pye and Richard Fagen) which, in turn, operate on the principle of division of power and checks and counterchecks.
In itself the pressing need to study problems of integration and differentiation in political 31 sociology is beyond doubt. Differentiation is an important aspect of political and social development generally; it demonstrates society's objective need for division of labour and its specialisation, which is why Marx viewed the need for differentiation and allocation of functions as an elementary and primary condition for the organisation of any 'socially-combined activity'. Secularisation is also paramount, being justly assessed by Marxist scholars as a profound process of disintegration of dogmatic religious thinking. And the issue of integration is no less salient for political development. Both social stability itself, and the regulation and order ensuring that stability are an objective necessity, a functional imperative for maintaining any mode of production and the whole set of social relations as an integral social organism based upon it.
In the early 1960s, Parsons acknowledged Spencer as the founder of the modern systems approach to sociology. In his introduction to Spencer's The Study of Sociology, he wrote that the book 'contains much that is surprisingly modern and relevant to our own time'. He especially emphasised that Spencer's principal ideas--- society as a self-regulating system and functional differentiation as a prime mover of development--- were 'as important today as they were when he wrote', and brought 'Spencer very close to the position of modern ``functional'' theory in sociology'. From Parsons's point of view, it is absolutely crucial that Spencer 'established a direct theoretical link between the social and biological sciences' and that he drew attention to those objective and subjective difficulties with which the formation of sociology as a science is 32 connected. In that sense, says Parsons, Spencer 'may be considered to be a more important forerunner of the field currently called the sociology of knowledge'.~^^10^^
Parsons, concerned in the late 1960s with theoretical study of the problems of social change, joined Spencer in defining social development within the parameters of differentiation and integration. u
The 1960s-born notions of society as a selfregulating system and of development as a process of growing heterogeneity of elements of the system (differentiation), with a simultaneous increase in relations between its elements ( integration) , essentially reproduced the corresponding ideas of Spencer's sociology. In the developing debate over problems of methodology of the systems approach and comparative analysis, effectively the same arguments that Spencer had once put forward were adduced in favour of the analogy method and against its absolutisation. In several instances latter-day Western sociologists committed methodological errors that Spencer had managed to avoid, even though he had not had at his disposal the armoury of scientific analysis methods available to sociologists and political scientists in the 1960s. Furthermore, the key issue of political sociology---that of political development---was for Western scientists methodologically fettered to strengthening the stability of institutions in the political system, while Spencer saw precisely in the malleability of the political structure the necessary condition for progressive development, while regarding its immobility and stability, its loss of flexibility, as a hindrance to further growth and social development.
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-01532 33The American sociologist John Peel, the author of a book about Spencer, pointed out that Spencer had been the first through his organic analogy to single out three paramount social subsystems in society---the supportive, or industrial system, the distributive system (communication and trade) and the regulating or political system. Present-day sociology owes a debt to Spencer, says Peel, for introducing the categories of ' system, equilibrium, institution and above all structure and function'. Therefore, Spencer may with full justification be regarded as a forerunner of modern functionalism. His functionalism was inseparable from his evolutionism. Moreover, he was above all interested in the problem of development, while sociologists of the 1950s and early 1960s had lowered their sights to the problem of functioning and stability. l'^^2^^
No less remarkable is also the interest that contemporary American political scientists have begun to display in Federalist political science. Back in 1966, Gabriel Almond called the authors 'systems theorists', stressing that his own version of functionalism directly came from the classical tradition of 17th-18th century political theory with its idea of separating powers as a means of ensuring justice, freedom and property rights.^^13^^ The subsequent development of American political science, particularly towards the late 1970s, marked a real renaissance in liberal constitutionalism of the late 18th century with its faith in a system of 'checks and counterchecks' as an effective means against the dangerous concentration of power and the encroachments of government on the rights and freedoms of citizens. Evidence of this renaissance of classical 34 constitutionalism may be seen in the publication in Philadelphia of the theoretical journal Publius, a rallying point for neoconservative political scientists. H
Problems of political sociology have been variously posed and tackled at different stages of development of political theory. But, owing to the objective social laws immanent in any political system, the history of political and legal thought shows a clearly defined continuity and repetition of ideas, a return to so-called eternal problems. The problem of who or what groups rule, in whose interests and by what methods just about holds centre stage in the history of political and legal thought as an approach to studying the state. The same problem is central, too, in the latter-day sociology of the state.
Distribution of power positions in the state and the most stable principles of the relations of all classes and strata to the state and government constitute in very general approximation the subject matter of this field of political theoretical studies. More specific problems of sociology of the state include a study of government as a relatively .autonomous social group and an analysis of interrelationships between the power groupings of the ruling class which implement political power or control its implementation (the study of bureaucracy, technocracy, 'power elite', etc.). Sociology of the state also encompasses a study of those stable models of political behaviour and political orientations which typify the relationship of classes, strata and groups that form society towards the principles of the political system and the prevailing real structure of political power and government---i.e., the __PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 paramount aspects ol the wider issue of political culture as an area of study of political sociology. Also important are the study of informal relations of power/subordination at various stages of state administration and an analysis of social factors of a political regime---the conditions (climate) in which the politics of a particular country takes place, in which the whole system of relations operates in regard to political power and administration.
A sociological analysis of political parties is more intricate. In the strict sense of the word, social structure of power within parties themselves goes beyond the bounds of sociology of the state and refers to political sociology in the broad sense. But study of the same problem in regard to ruling parties directly refers to the subject matter of sociology of the state, inasmuch as one cannot understand the real operation of the institution of state power in present-day political systems without elucidating it.
From the viewpoint of sociology, the principles of political relations are the main distinguishing feature of state structure. Political organisations permitted by the ruling class to take part in the political process become elements of the state system. And here the political parties are the major connecting link between classes (or some part or grouping of it) and state public power, directly oriented on participating in its implementation, on upholding their interests in the activity of the apparatus itself of public power. The ruling parties are the principal political administrative structures of the modern state, the nucleus of the mechanism of political power understood as the sum total of all those various 36 forms of management, control and influence in which the real role of the ruling class within the system of political relations finds its direct embodiment.
Such an approach to political power by no means plays down the importance of the apparatus of state power itself: taking possession of the apparatus is the mode of establishing political power, and controlling it is the principal condition for realising the vital political interests of classes, strata and other social groups. Its very structure, constitutional principles, legal norms behind the formation and organisation of state power agencies and the distribution of competence among them go a long way to determine the nature of the political system, the main and most stable features of the system of political relations and the political regime. It is hardly surprising that it is precisely the question of division and balance of power that has occupied such a prominent place in political theory, oriented on the search for political organisational means to avert excessive concentration of power, an oligarchical and autocratic regeneration of democracies. The reality of politics, however, is such that the formal constitution is constantly being supplemented, and is frequently being deformed by the 'de facto constitution', informal distribution of positions of power, control and influence. And such phenomena, informal political links, norms and relations, are being studied by present-day political science.
The emergence of the 'political system' category reflects primarily the penetration of a systems approach logic into political science. At the same time, however, the category reflects also 37 the prevailing trend, common to political science, towards sociologisation, towards an enhanced role for the sociological aspect in cognising the laws of operation and development of state-organised societies of various historical types.
It is patently obvious that a study of the informal mechanism of political power serves not only and not so much as a means of realising the systems approach, as of a sociological examination of the state, as an analysis of real social relations between the politically dominant class and the state apparatus. The sociological aspect (by contrast with the institutional-organisational and regulatory) is the central issue in determining the social and class nature of any state and ruling political parties. It helps pinpoint not only the general laws of political development, but also the specific features of a particular political system, to explain the real-life political regimes which take shape as a result of the specific alignment of political forces in a situation of traditions and norms of spiritual culture specific to each country.
The informal, actual relations (together with formal legal ones) between various classes, strata and groups in regard to state power are the overriding systems-forming relations of any stateorganised society. And an examination of all those actual relations and interdependences exposing the social content of the political system conception is the key aspect of systems analysis of the state within the bounds of the integral (interdisciplinary) political system category. With such an approach there is (no need to put the state on the same footing as the political system. At the same time, the prime attention 38 of the sociologist focuses not on government itself, but on its socio-cultural milieu; furthermore, he studies mainly the effect of that milieu on government and not the other way about.
The general systems theory has done much to improve the notional apparatus of political science, to spell out important analytical concepts and categories. But besides the irrefutably positive contribution to elaborating a notional apparatus, it has also established a certain notional confusion on the issue, and there is still no common ground in comprehending such disputed categories as `system', `structure' and `organisation'. Many variants of the general systems theory have been put forward on the basis of very abstract conceptualising, which has hampered their being tied in with empirical facts. What is more, there is still a tendency to view as systems any arbitrarily chosen relationships, the sum total of real or imagined elements selected by any means from the surrounding world.
However, the systems approach is an adequate means of studying not any objects designated arbitrarily as systems, but only those between parts of which there exist real and law-governed, stable links and relationships. Such an object of study is any state-organised society with the whole multiplicity of political phenomena and processes for the study of which the general systems notional apparatus is evidently insufficient; what is needed is a whole set of methods, approaches, concepts and categories elaborated by a study of society.
Comparative analysis is particularly important among such methods and approaches; its wide use is becoming increasingly necessary for 39 promoting the theory of political systems. And a further enhancement of the effectiveness of comparative analysis greatly depends on success in resolving the problem of transferring that method to an operational level of specific work methods and approaches, particularly statistical, correlational and factor analysis.
The application of those methods requires special efforts in constructing capacious yet, at the same time, sufficiently differentiated analytical conceptions and categories capable of accounting for, classifying and systematising available information. It is especially important to operationalise categories typifying the major structural elements and parameters of operation and development of any political system. Political change itself today and the problems it engenders insistently dictate the search for new methods and approaches and widen the range of issues under study, which ultimately means improving the methods of scientific analysis and extending the subject matter being investigated. Here resorting to traditional political science paves the way for a more adequate assessment of the merits and demerits of various study methods, for a clearer understanding of the extent to which modern ways and means of cognising the laws of socio-political reality are really effective (and not illusory) innovations.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. MOSCA'S IDEA OF POLITICALItaly has been represented by Gaetano Mosca M858-1941) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) in the history of modern political science.
40Mosca's first work in political science was The Theory of Governing and Parliamentary Government (1884),~^^15^^ in which the 26-year-old lawyer set forth his idea of 'political class'---the first version of elitism which was to become an important component part of modern political science and sociology. The idea was developed in Mosca's work Elements of Political Science (Vol. 1 came out in 1896, Vol. 2 in 1923).
Mosca writes that even in the times of antiquity the idea arose in the minds of philosophers that the social phenomena unfolding before their eyes were not purely fortuitous, nor manifestations of the will of an almighty divine power, but the result of a psychological tendency determining the actions of masses of people. 'Since the time of Aristotle men have been trying to discover laws and modes that regulated the actions of this tendency whose study came to be known as ``politics''.'I6 Many political thinkers of the 14th-17th centuries, including Machiavelli, set themselves not so much to define these continuous tendencies in all human societies as to study the means by which one person or group of people were able to acquire supreme power in society and defend that power from encroachments. Here Mosca distinguished political science from the art of politics as the practical implementation of politics. He illustrates his idea by way of analogy: 'Political economy studies laws and essential tendencies which regulate production and distribution of wealth, but this study is in no way equivalent .to the art of enrichment and preserving the wealth.'^^17^^ He regards an essential trend in promoting disciplines studying politics as an aspiration to explain, support or 41 refute existing forms of government with the aid of various theories. In actual fact, he reduces these theories to one form or another of manifesting the instrumental nature of political and legal ideology or, using his terminology, to a 'political formula'.
The research tasks of political science, in his view, in spite of the diffusion of formulations scattered ahout his book, may be reduced to the following: to study laws that regulate the organisation of human society; to study trends regulating the structure of political power; to cognise exact laws that determine the social nature of human beings; to discover the laws that regulate the difference in political regimes in the world.1S
He is convinced that, irrespective of the practical effectiveness of political science, in the future, 'progress of the discipline will be wholly based on a study of social facts', and that these facts can be extracted only from the history of various nations. Hence the conclusion: 'If political science has to be based on the study and observation of political facts, we should turn to the ancient historical method,'^^19^^ which is based on the essential identity of trends and political inclinations of mankind. He regards as an obligatory condition of a sound application of the historical method 'a broad and precise knowledge of history', and history 'not of a single period or people, but, if possible, the history of humankind.'~^^20^^ The essential facts for a political scientist are those concerning the type and social organisation of various peoples and various epochs.
The historical method is for Mosca the principal method of political science. 'He opposes absolutisation of both the factor of physical 42 environmcnt and the ethnic or somatic criteria in the social sciences. As he emphasises, 'Just as we have not found any law which would, relying on difference in climates, reflect differences in human society and different types which they represent, so we have not found a law which would be based exclusively on difference in races.' So he concludes that it is not possible 'to associate the progress or downfall of nations with their organic improvement or deterioration'.~^^21^^ He counterposes the law of social dichotomy of society, referred to below, to those laws.
Vilfredo Pareto was trained as an engineer, but became involved with political economy and then general sociology within which he gravitated towards political problems. His elite theory is set forth in Treatise on General Sociology (1916) where he examines the social system as a whole.^^22^^ From 1920 onwards, in the words of G. Busino, he was mostly engrossed in a single problem: what makes people act politically, what are the deep-seated motives for political action, how does political power come into being and fade away? That is why Joseph Schumpeter called Pareto's latest works 'a sociology of the political process'.^^23^^
A very firm notion of Mosca's and Pareto's theories being identical pervades sociological literature. Some authors even refer to the MoscaPareto concept.^^24^^ This emanates from the proximity of the point of departure of their theories, a certain coincidence in the subject matter and individual sociological conclusions, as well as factors of an ideological order. (As a matter of fact fascism employed some aspects of their 43 concepts, which, however, does not mean that they were ideologists of fascism.)
In a certain sense identification of these theories was promoted by the fact that American sociologists talked of a 'Machiavellian school' in which they included Mosca, Pareto, Michels and even Georges Sorel.^^25^^ The tradition continues to the present. As an Italian scholar writes, 'We are so used to linking the names of Mosca and Pareto that sometimes we forget the great difference in their theories.'^^26^^ N. Bohbio feels that the view of Mosca and Pareto as 'twin brothers' is 'an indication of a superficial analysis of their theories'.^^27^^ With the exception of Sorel, the group is regarded as the first school of elitism. Antonio Gramsci took a particular position in regard to Mosca's and Pareto's theories; he underlined the need for a `convergence' of the political class and elite .theories as two attempts 'to explain the historical process of forming and developing the intelligentsia and its role in state and public affairs.'^^28^^ It is clear, however, that `convergence' of the theories is not the same as their `identification'.
Soviet works on society have noted the most general features of the theories and their flaws~^^29^^. A. A. Galkin, for example, stresses 'the purely extra-historical, solely formal approach to study matter' typical of most members of the school; he notes that for the `Machiavellians', the power elite is an extra-temporal category virtually independent of social processes, and the difference in social systems is levelled out. What is common to them, he says, is that the ruling elite they examine is more or less united, possessing special spiritual, social and political qualities, a group 44 that is aware of its privileged status and is pet'- ceived as such by a large segment of society. Galkin notes that recognition of the existence of the elite and a special mechanism for its interaction has turned into an apology for the elitist system.^^30^^
A general' description of the concepts cannot, nevertheless, be a substitute for their critical comparative analysis.
We must bear in mind that Mosca never systematically set out a theory of political class, even though the problem dominated several of his works. As Gramsci wrote about his first work, 'The "political class" concept, whose defence is becoming the central issue of all Mosca's works on political theory, is exceedingly weak and badly thought through, and is theoretically unsubstantiated.'~^^31^^
Present-day Italian non-Marxist scholars actually agree with that assessment. To a large extent the caveats on insufficient argumentation apply to Pareto's elite theory as well.
During the 1960s some Italian historians of political science used the case-study method and comparative analysis in analysing the theories of Mosca and Pareto. What they did was to break down and systematise the terminology -and various aspects of the mechanisms of forming and operation of the social groups designated as ' political class' and `elite'.^^32^^ They were guided by the following scheme: composition, formation and expansion of the 'political class' and the `elite', replacement and mutual exchange of these social groups, and their organisation and means of implementing power in the light of Mosca's and Pareto's work.
45Despite certain worthy features of this approach, it does contain a number of substantial defects. In particular, the excessive detailing leads to erosion of parameters between some aspects, a fact that Bobbio called attention to. Thus, the formation and mutual exchange of social groups is illustrated, essentially, by the same material. The authors have in fact shied away from comparing the views of the two theoreticians on society's political organisation, and as a result a comparison of elements is not logical or comprehensive enough. The comparative analysis method, in our view, does enable one most clearly to show features of similarity and dissimilarity in the works of the fathers of elitism. Without claiming within this work to provide an exhaustive analysis, we shall nonetheless try to compare and contrast some propositions of Mosca and Pareto on the most substantive points.
First of all we must set out the starting points of the theories before us. Mosca several times set forth his fundamental ideas virtually without change. Thus, in 1884, he wrote that 'at any time and any place everything in government that is a prescribed part, an implementation ot power and contains in itself command and responsibility, is always the competence of a special class, elements of which may actually vary in the most diverse way depending on the specifics of the age and country; however, no matter how that class took shape, it is always formed as an insignificant minority against the subject mass governed by it.'^^33^^ Mosca termed this special class `political'.
In his book Elements of Political Science of 1896, he wrote, 'Amidst the constant trends and 46 facts that may he observed in all political organisms, the following may clearly be demonstralcd to everyone: in all societies, from those poorly developed and hardly having attained the beginnings of civilisation to those that are enlightened and powerful, there exist two classes of people: the class of rulers and the class of ruled. The first, always less numerous, carries out all political functions, monopolises power and makes use of the advantages inherent in it, while the second, being more numerous, is governed and regulated by the first in a more or less legitimate way or, indeed, more or less arbitrarily and coercively and provides it, at least apparently, with the material means of support necessary for the vitality of the political organism.'^^34^^
In the second volume of his Elements, he sets out his position somewhat more clearly: 'In all human societies that have attained a certain level of development and culture, political administration in the widest sense of the word, including .. . administrative, military, religious, economic and moral leadership, is implemented continually by a special---i.e., organised, minority.'~^^35^^
Pareto, on the other hand, writes, 'The least we can do is to divide society into two strata--- i.e., into a higher stratum in which the rulers are normally to be found, and a lower stratum where the ruled are to be found. This fact is so obvious that at any time it can be grasped by even an ill-equipped observer.'^^36^^ He emphasises that 'whether some theoreticians like, it or not, human society is heterogeneous and individuals differ physically, morally and intellectually'.37 The aggregate of groups 'of individuals who act 47 with lofty indicators in any field obtains the name of elite'.^^38^^ The elite is divided into `ruling' and `non-ruling', and the 'ruling elite is made up of all those who directly or indirectly (but sufficiently effectively) take part in administration'.~^^39^^
The first ideas of Pareto's theory are contained in the article 'An Application of Sociological Theories' (1900)~^^40^^. The preface to his book Socialist Systems (1902)~^^41^^ is usually seen as a draft outline of the final elaboration of the theory given in his major work Treatise on General Sociology (1916).
Based on his ideas on the interdependence of social phenomena both in economics and sociology, Pareto introduced the concept of 'social system' which was to become the principal category of present-day sociology and political science.
For Pareto the social system is some sort of aggregate of interconnections within society, existing in relative and fluctuating equilibrium (there is an interaction between the `residues', `derivations' and the interests of various individuals and groups that constitute society and act logically or rationally, but more often, illogically or irrationally). By `residues' he understands psychological stimuli that ultimately determine the irrational action of people and human communities, which remain after all rational motives have been removed. He calls `derivations' the various pseudo-logical explanations and justifications for illogical behaviour.
In so far as Pareto thinks that human activity is largely irrational (in particular, politics, to his mind, is largely a function of psychology), ho provides an extensive classification of 6 classes 48 of residues. Two of them are tied up with political phenomena: Class I is the 'instinct for combinations'---which, in Pareto's view, lies behind all social change and includes desire to alter the status quo, to find a new way or means to create better conditions and similar aspirations induced by a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Class II of the residues is the 'persistence of aggregates' or, as Warren Samuels formulates it more correctly, 'group persistences'.^^42^^ This distinguishes the tendency to consolidate and preserve the status quo, the interrelationships between individuals, families, kinship groups and social classes, beliefs, territorial links and other conservative aspirations.
The term `elite' as used by Pareto ultimately came to dominate sociological literature, since the expression 'elite theory' (elitist theory or elitism) is used in such a wide sense that it also includes Mosca's political class theory. This terminological aspect of the problem stirred up discussion among political scientists and sociologists. Both of the key terms, political class and elite, have come under fire. Mosca began criticism of Pareto's views while defending the supremacy of his own concepts.^^43^^ Asserting that the institution he was looking at included 'elements most capable of governing', Mosca emphasised that 'that does not mean that these elements are intellectually and morally more mature and advanced'.~^^44^^ In that connection he proclaimed the term elite evaluative and imprecise, used by Pareto 'to designate what had much earlier [ approximately 20 years before] been called a political class'.^^45^^
There is now near unanimous agreement that __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-01532 49 the very terminology used by Mosca and Pareto testifies to the flaws in both theories. First and foremost critics have noted the `pluralisation'--- i.e., their use of a large number of synonyms for fundamental concepts that are far from always the same.
Thus, besides the term political class, Mosca used the expressions 'dominating class or political class', 'ruling class or political class', 'upper classes', 'class of rulers', 'organised minority' and 'governing minority'. Norberto Bobbio explains Mosca's use of expressions distinct from the term political class by the fact that they enabled him to depict the opposite class as 'a class dominated, ruled, inferior, governed' or as the 'disorganised governed majority'.^^46^^
It should be noted that Bobbio ignores the possibility of the existence of antonyms of the term political class. But they do exist, even though they are not used. We refer to 'apolitical class' or 'antipolitical class'. Effectively one could speak of Mosca's rejection of the participation in political affairs of the popular masses who, indeed, influence the actions of the ruling political groups.
Another commentator, Carlo Marletti, does draw attention to Mosca's terminological inexactitude, but urges that we should not exaggerate the difficulties that arise out of it, In his opinion, only two terms---class and organised minority--- undoubtedly cause analytical difficulties, while the others, whether nouns or adjectives, are merely 'stylistic curiosities which do not permit the insertion of differences into the concepts'.4r
Gramsci in his day had spoken about the analytical difficulties with the term political class 50 Marletti referred to (i.e., difficulties in singling out specific people or social groups that are part of the political class). The fundamental concept of political class, in his words, is a riddle, since it is 'flexible and elastic'. He goes on to say that 'Sometimes it seems that political class is understood as the middle class, at other times as an aggregate of property classes, at times even what is called "the enlightened section" of society or "political personnel" (obviously parliamentarian) of the state; sometimes it seems that the bureaucracy, including its highest stratum, should be excluded from the political class since it has to be, in fact, controlled and directed by the political class.'^^48^^
D. Fiorot also notes that the term `class', used as if it were something neutral and non-- evaluative, gives the impression of being `monolithic' which can, as happened with Mosca, 'stifle antagonism that is very often encountered among various groups acting within the limits of one and the same political class'.^^49^^
Pareto's terminology is similarly not very precise. His elite (or, as he writes, 'classe eletta') is divided into ruling elite and non-ruling elite. Sometimes Pareto uses the expression ruling class as the equivalent of ruling elite, referring to individuals directly engaged in administration. He also employs the term 'higher stratum'; on occasion this is equivalent to `elite' and sometimes to groups of different types of elite. He singles out `aristocracy' from the higher stratum--- a hazily defined set of families whose members are regarded as possessing the qualities necessary for membership of the elite. There is also the concept of 'dominating group'---a group that __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 actually has power within the bounds of the 'ruling elite.'
His 'lower stratum' is also interpreted variously. Sometimes it equates with the 'class of the ruled' or the 'class of the governed' (which also includes the 'non-ruling elite'), and sometimes it represents the vast populace from which all elitist groups are excluded.^^50^^
Mosca and Pareto attempted to define the major characteristics of the dominating groups and the process through which changes occur in class structure. As a result of comparative research, Mosca came to the conclusion that political class is chosen in various ways, but always proceeding from certain qualities and abilities of individuals. 'The ruling minority is ordinarily constituted in a manner by which the individuals which comprise it are distinguished from the mass of the governed by a certain quality which gives them a certain material, intellectual and even moral superiority ... In other words they have some requisite virtues which are strongly appreciated and lend them value in the society in which they live.'^^51^^
The qualities may change depending on historical epochs. Military prowess was just such a quality in primitive societies. Then wealth took over as civilisation developed. Overall, Mosca distinguishes three qualities that variously open the way to the political class: military prowess, wealth and the priesthood with which three forms of aristocracy were associated---military, financial and religious. He attributed less importance to the possession of scientific knowledge, postulating that that virtue might become an important political force only at a far-advanced 52 stage of civilisation, and that of political value is 'not so much science in itself as the practical application, the social benefit that can be extracted from it'.^^52^^
Ability to govern is the sine qua non and overriding criterion for forming a political class. Mosca stresses that 'as Saint-Simon already knew, that is the sum of all personal qualities most appropriate for directing a people in a particular period'.^^53^^ Experience of administration obtained from training is of prime importance. Mosca excludes a close connection between affiliation to the ruling class by birth and possession of those lofty virtues, but he accepts that the aristocracy possesses those qualities most, receiving them not only through their 'blue blood', but through upbringing.
Pareto, proceeding from the premise that individuals differ, elaborated criteria of belonging in the elite; he proposed a system of points for every sphere of human activity to describe the abilities of individuals. For example, the very best expert is given 10 points while a complete cretin has none. Whoever manages to acquire a million lira (by hook or by crook) receives 10, while the person who makes only a thousand lira has 6; anyone who just manages to keep the wolf from the door may get 1, while denizens of the poorhouse gain 0. He suggests calling the class that gains the highest number of points in its sphere of activity the elite which, as mentioned earlier, falls into two classes---the ruling and non-ruling elite. As an example, he says that a brilliant chess player naturally is part of the elite, yet just as naturally his gift as a chess player does not pave the way for him to take 53 part in government and, consequently, unless he possesses some other virtues he does not enter the ruling elite.~^^54^^
Mosca names three means by which the political class strengthens and replenishes itself: inheritance, selection and cooption. He pays most attention to the first. And he notes two tendencies: on the one hand, all political classes strive to become inheritors by de facto if not de jure means; this aspiration is so strong that when a certain status is legally established, it is clear that it has already actually existed for some time; on the other hand, there are always new forces that strive to replace the old forces.
Depending on whether the first or the second tendency will prevail, there takes place either a 'closing and crystallisation' of the political class, or its more or less rapid renovation. Mosca calls the first tendency aristocratic, the second democratic. He assumes that 'it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate any of these tendencies completely. Absolute victory of the aristocratic tendency would presuppose that the ideas and conditions of human associations would never alter; experience shows the absurdity of such a supposition. On the other hand, absolute triumph of the democratic tendency is only feasible on condition that sons would not inherit funds, contacts and educational advantages that helped their fathers to seize all the choice positions.'^^55^^
He gives preference to that type of society that has a certain balance between these tendencies, averring that the ruling class needs a certain stability to avoid experiencing radical changes with each generation; what is also beneficial is the penetration of elements from the 54 inferior class, as long as this does not happen too swiftly and substantially. He thinks cooption (the deliberate introduction of new members into the ruling class) a socially useful method, although he nowhere talks of this in any detail.
Mosca sees as a 'sign of an impending serious transformation of the ruling class' when there is 'any indication that the political formula is out of date, that belief in its principles is shaken', and he stresses that 'the French Revolution took place when the great majority of the French stopped believing in the divine right of kings, and the Russian Revolution occurred when virtually all the intellectuals, and perhaps also most Russian workers, ceased believing in the Gzar having the right from God to govern Holy Russia authocratically.'5e
:
In a reference to the distant past, Mosca notes that swift and sometimes complete replacements of the ruling class occurred following invasions of barbarian tribes which settled in the conquered territories and ousted the former rulers. By contrast contemporary turbulent social change resulted from internal factors. 'A political class being attacked by a political force from below falls apart. Instead of invasion we have revolutions. . . But irrespective of violence and any causes of cataclysms that revolutionise the makeup and structure of the ruling class, it is virtually certain that some, more or less numerous, elements of the old ruling class will become part of the ranks of the new.'~^^57^^
Pareto devotes no less attention to replenishing the ruling class. He is convinced that ' aristocracies are not eternal. For whatever reason, it is irrefutable that they disappear over 55 periods of time.'^^58^^ Pareto's aphorism that 'history is the cemetery of the aristocracy' has become a classic. But aristocracies not simply diminish. They deteriorate in quality, 'lose their energy; there is a declining proportion of the residues enabling them to win power and hold on to it'.^^59^^ Subsequently, however, the ruling class is re-established, and 'not only quantitatively, but (and this is most important) qualitatively as well: the families rising out of the lower classes bring with them energy and proportions of the residue necessary for them to cling to power. They also regenerate themselves, since they lose their ultimately degenerated members.'^^60^^ He underlines that thanks to the circulation of classes the ruling elite is always in a state of slow and continuous transformation.
One point of departure for Mosca's idea of political class was the critique of the traditional classification of forms of government that had prevailed in constitutional law. Mosca believed that those classifications had general defects, being formulated on the basis of observations of only one facet of the history of political organisms. A major defect, he felt, was that they took account of more external features than essential ones when differentiating those political organisms. He declared it impossible to rule millions of subjects by a single monarch without the help of a hierarchy of functionaries, or for democracy to function without coordination and organisation from the organised minority.
This was something he had in common with Pareto, who stressed that the ruling class existed everywhere, even where a despot ruled, but the forms of its manifestation differed,' In absolute 56 regimes the ruler held the stage alone. In the so-called democratic systems parliament came to the fore. In -both cases, however, there were usually people behind the stage playing a crucial part in the real business of administration.~^^61^^ Pareto categorised them as an oligarchy.
Mosca delineates four types of political organisation: the city state, the feudal state, the bureaucratic state and the modern representative state.
He thought the feudal state the simplest and most primitive organisation. It was also, he felt, the least satisfactory, in so far as 'it rarely succeeds in coordinating all the popular forces for attaining any particular objective (peaceful or military)'^^62^^ He saw its characteristic feature in the scattered nature of the state into small parts, in each of which the ruler's representative accorded himself all the sovereign's rights. Consequently, each part of the state became so autonomous from the centre that complete dismemberment was relatively easy. Thus, unity of the feudal state and association between its constituent parts could only be upheld in the event of the central agency being administered by a supreme ruler possessing prestige and energy sufficient to keep local elites in awe of him, or of national sentiment being strong enough to prevent the state falling apart.
When examining the bureaucratic state, Mosca notes that in it 'the functions of government are distributed not geographically but in accordance with their character . . . each attribute of the sovereign power is now laid upon the majority of separate hierarchies of officials, each of which receives his impulse from the central 57 state agency. Since the various functions ot government are distributed among different people, the activity of small groups who implement control over the state becomes much more effective and reliable.'^^63^^ The possibility of centrifugal tendencies diminishes sharply. The shift from feudalism to the bureaucratic stage is usually very slow (for instance, the struggle in France between the central monarchy and the feudal lords lasted about 7 centuries---from Hugh Capet to Louis XIV). The disintegration of the bureaucratic states, in Mosca's view, is a less frequent event than that of feudal states, but if it does take place (as, for example, in the Western Roman Empire), destruction is likely to be more complete and drawn-out than in the feudal system, and the downfall of the political machine here is accompanied by a weakening of the moral forces and economic power of the state. He notes that within the innermost departments of almost all absolutist bureaucratic states of Europe, especially in Louis XIV's France, there were elements which ultimately led to the transformation of that type of state into the modern representative state. He draws attention to the relative swiftness of that transformation (no more than a century and a half in France). This was due to the rapid emergence of a new social class which rose up and consolidated itself among the common folk and the offspring of the ancient feudal aristocracy. He is referring to the bourgeoisie in the broadest meaning of the term, which combined a measure of prosperity with technical and scientific culture that was much higher by contrast with the culture of other social classes. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social 58 Contract achieved swift success in- the course of the intellectual rejuvenation and emergence of a new approach to political life. In dealing with Rousseau's concept, Mosca comes to the conclusion that it accords with the idea of ancient classical democracy, the only difference being that in olden times slaves were deprived of voting rights and debarred from public duties.
The modern representative state, in his view, is the result of conceptions inherited from classical antiquity and adapted to the needs of 19th century society, although he does, indeed, note the profound disharmony between the theoretical prerequisites of this type of state and its practical operation. He also notes that this type of political organisation of society is modified in several countries.
'The great originality of British political history,' he writes, 'is the slow and gradual transformation of the feudal regime sanctioned by the Magna Carta into the modern representative regime. This transformation came to an end in the last century, bypassing the period of bureaucratic and military absolutism typical in one way or another of all countries in continental Europe.'~^^64^^
Specialisation of different political functions, cooperations and mutual control between bureaucratic and elected elements, that are the two main features of the modern representative state, led to a situation in which this state can be seen as a type of political organisation, the most intricate and, consequently, the most `delicate' among all states that have existed in the history of humanity.
Nonetheless Mosca asserts that, despite the gradual introduction of universal voting rights, 59 effective power in that type of state always remains, on the one hand, in the hands of the more well-to-do classes and, on the other, in the hands of the middle classes in 'democratic countries'. These middle classes always prevail in the leading bodies of political parties, in electoral committees and among the editors of the daily press, the bureaucracy and officer corps. On the whole, power remains with the organised minority.
At the same time, he remarks that with complete cohesion of the political and administrative sphere between bureaucratic elements and the electorate there is greater access for the more able elements of the governed majority to the ruling minority.
The modern representative state, like its precursors, contains embryos which, as they develop, may cause it to decline and disintegrate. Casting an eye towards Pareto, Weber and Michels, Mosca talks of the danger of a plutocratic, bureaucratic and military dictatorship, and of a demagogic dictatorship of a few leaders who turn the people's heads and ultimately display the instincts of plunderers to the detriment of common and individual interests.
Typically, the modern representative state is not mentioned in his History of Political Doctrines, written in the 1930s at a time of full-scale fascism in Italy.
He devotes particular attention to a study of political class organisation. By organisation he means a set of legislative measures and politicoadministrative procedures that are put into effect by the political class so as to uphold its own solidarity and to cling to power.
He denotes two types of political 60 administration, based on the principle of transferring political power by a social ladder. In some cases, power moves downwards so that selection of the lower official is made by the higher (old Oriental monarchies, the Roman and Byzantine empires). In others it is delegated from below to people above, by the governed to the governing (the ancient city-states or medieval communes). The former type of organisation is what he calls ' autocratic', the latter is `liberal'. It is also possible to combine the two types of political organisation in representative governments: in the USA, for example, the president is elected and then he appoints members of his administration.
An autocratic regime presupposes the existence of an autocrat---i.e., 'someone who personifies the institution on whose behalf all invested in a part or particle of the public authority function'.^^65^^ In the event of an autocracy being inherited there may be a combination of the autocratic principle and the aristocratic tendency, while in the event of an elected autocracy there may be a combination with a democratic tendency.
The liberal principle has a more or less refined organisation of electoral system, though one should distinguish situations when the electoral body coincides with the political class (as in the Republic of Venice) and when there is a broader electoral body. In the first instance the electoral method serves as an internal change in the political class and encourages an aristocratic tendency. In the second, the electoral method could have been useful in refurbishing the ruling class had it not, illegally holding on to directive and punitive powers, resorted to any means possible to coerce the electors.
61A typical feature of the liberal regime is that law is based on consensus of the bulk of citizens who, however, may be just a small part of the populace of the state, and that 'functionaries who directly or indirectly are appointed by their subordinates are temporary and responsible for their actions before the law'.^^66^^
Mosca thinks that autocratic regimes are more durable than liberal, inasmuch as the latter may 'function only in suitable circumstances, preferably in periods of economic prosperity and substantial intellectual flourishing'. He states that 'it would be naive to suppose that regimes termed liberal are actually founded, as their political formula maintains, on the explicit consent of the majority of the people'.^^67^^ And he goes on to stress that electoral agreement takes place between organised minorities controlling the unorganised majority of voters who can choose only between a small number of candidates from that minority.
Many great political thinkers, he says, share common intuition in regard to the durability of political institutions. They agree on the notion that that durability 'depends on the unity and adaptability of different but constant principles and tendencies which are bound to operate in all political organisms'.6S In the early 1920s Mosca thought it premature to formulate a law, but found it feasible to propose his hypothesis by which 'the stability of a state and the rarefaction of any violent political crisis ... which causes inexpressible suffering to a large part of humanity and interrupts progress of civilisation sometimes for a long time, are almost always ensured by the prevalence of one of two 62 principies or one of two tendencies',es the tendencies he analysed.
He admits that it is hard to find a political regime in which a single principle or tendency would be manifest in an absolutely pure form, yet he is still sure that the prevalence of autocracy or liberalism, aristocratic or democratic tendencies serves as a fundamental criterion for defining the type of political organisation of any nation in any epoch. He never completed his typology of political regimes. Some Western scholars, summing up his arguments, underline that the power principles he enumerated, being combined with the two tendencies of supplementing and changing the political class, determine four types of political regime: aristocratic-autocratic, aristocratic-liberal, democratic-autocratic and democratic-liberal. In their view, a basis for comparative political analysis is thus set out.^^70^^
Typically enough, when describing the principles and tendencies of the political organisation of a political class, Mosca does not employ the term `oligarchy'. Evidently this is not only because he turned his back on the classical triad of governing forms. In his typology, both the aristocratic and the democratic tendency essentially bear an oligarchical character. As a result, with any combination of principles and tendencies, Mosca's typology leads to the logical conclusion, which Mosca himself does not formulate, that power always lies in the hands of the oligarchy which takes various forms and structures according to the criteria he set forward.
Both in autocratic and in liberal regimes, below the first stratum of the ruling class there is always another, more numerous stratum which 63 includes all who are capable of governing the nation. No political organisation is possible without that stratum, since the first stratum would have directly to guide the actions of the masses. Mosca emphasises that 'on the level of morality, intelligence and activity of the second stratum depends ultimately the competence of any political organism'.^^71^^ The term 'the second stratum of the political class' appeared in Mosca's conceptualising only in the second volume of his Elements of Political Science, patently not without influence from Pareto's 'elite circulation'.
He particularly sees a threat of crisis for the modern representative state in the political decline of the middle class, as happened in many European states in the 1920s, inasmuch as an inevitable consequence of that decline, in the event of it lasting for a generation, has to be the intellectual decline of the middle class.
Pareto's analysis of forms of government rests on the elitist principle and develops in the psychological-sociological context. Effectively, he disregards the constitutional-administrative aspect, since he thinks that 'all theories of the parliamentary and constitutional state of the past century have no relevance for what is happening now, in so far as their sources are different from those determining the course of events. If, for example, we turn to Mill's Representative Government and Liberty, which were so famous at the time, we are mentally transported to a society that has nothing in common with contemporary Britain, and so we find it devoid of reality.'^^72^^
True, Pareto recognises the importance of the phenomenon of political system wlu'ch is closely bound up with the nature of the ruling class. He 64 notes two etxremes in describing the political system: either they pay too much attention to its form to the detriment of the essence, or ( especially in France under Napoleon III, and particularly the economists) they pay scant attention both to the form and indeed the essence of the political system. Here he counterposes utterly political and exclusively economic theories of society, including historical materialism in the latter, which testifies to his distorted interpretation of Marxism as a theory of economic determinism.
Pareto concludes that two opposing forces operate in any human community---centripetal, facilitating a stronger central power, and centrifugal, encouraging its division. He postulates that the centrifugal force may arise and the centripetal may diminish through strengthening the `residue' of family relationships and those of similar groups, and the needs of individual societies ( often in concert with economic circumstances), through lessening homogeneity (often in concert with the `residue' of a religious nature) and the growth of certain hierarchical sentiments.
In Pareto's opinion, the residues grow strong and weak in an undulating fashion which corresponds to the action of the centrifugal and centripetal forces. In times of a centrifugal lurch 'the central authority (monarchical, oligarchical or plebeian or whatever) grows weaker; what is called the ``sovereignty'' of that authority has a tendency to become an empty phrase, it disintegrates ... and there develops the authority of a few individuals, a few groups, who theoretically are still subordinated but have practically acquired independence. Consequently, the weak ... not being protected by the sovereign any more, seek __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-01532 65 another defence and justice; they put their trust in a powerful personage, they explicitly or secretly join up with other weak individuals to form a corporation, commune or syndicate.'^^73^^
This undulating movement, however, engenders countervailing circumstances. 'As it develops, protection becomes subordination; as a result, the number of opponents of the existing order grows and, if the social conditions and, mainly, the economic conditions are favourable, their power also grows. Conversely, the power of the numerous adherents of sovereignty wanes, since as fear of the central authority steadily diminishes, rivalry increases and is transformed into open conflict that gravitates towards anarchy; it still continues to exist when the central authority begins to grow strong again.'^^74^^
International conflicts may also affect the centrifugal and centripetal movement: 'mistakes by the central authority in wartime may lead to its downfall and, consequently, to a centrifugal movement; victory may have the opposite effect. If it is gained through heavy losses among the subjects, the central authority may be weakened.' 7&
Pareto stresses that 'everywhere there exists an administrative, relatively small class which holds on to power partly by force and partly by consent of the large subordinate class. Differences essentially consist mainly in the proportions of force and agreement; and in regard to the form---in the mode of using force and obtaining agreement.'^^76^^ Further, 'In the course of history, agreement and force have always been manifest as means of government.'77 He divides modes of implementing authority 66 into two principal types: I is governments which use predominantly material force and the force of religious and other similar sentiments; II is governments that use predominantly cunning and skill. The first type, to which helong governments of the Greek cities during the era of tyrannies, of Sparta, of Rome in the times of Augustus and Tiberius, the Republic of Venice in the latter part of its existence, many Euro*- pean states in the 18th century, have a ruling class in which there are residues of a conservative character (persistence of aggregates) which prevails over tendencies for changes (instinct of combination) and the elite circulates slowly as a rule. The second type falls into two subtypes: (a) governments basically oriented on using sentiments, as in theocratic states; and (b) governments which 'use skill and cunning aiming mainly at interests, but do not wish to say that they disregard sentiments. These are the administrations of the Athenian demagogues, the Roman aristocracy in different ieras of the Republic, most medieval republics and, finally, the very important type of government of ``speculators'' of our time.'^^78^^ Governments of the second type have a ruling class in which instincts of combination prevail over the residues of a conservative character, since 'to act with skill and guile one has to have a highlydeveloped instinct for combination and not be too scrupulous.'^^79^^ Within subtype II (a) circulation of elites is usually slow, while in subtype II (b) it is rapid and even very rapid, and it reaches a maximum in the governing of contemporary `speculators'. Pareto feels it necessary to point out the __PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 possibiiity of merger of the first type and subtype II (a) in administrations 'using force mainly in relations with other countries, and skill in domestic relations. The type of administration by the Roman patricians in the good days of the republic is close to that type.'^^80^^
He attempts to show that authority in all its manifestations is the decisive force by which problems of choice are resolved. He claims that it is impossible to find laws of `right' regulating division of social advantages in relations between different classes. The lion's share is seized by classes 'having most force, intelligence, ability and cunning';^^81^^ 'people in power normally have a certain inclination to use that authority to hold on to their positions and to abuse it for guaranteeing their own benefits and advantages which they sometimes cannot distinguish from the benefits of the party and almost always associate with those of the nation.'~^^82^^
In response to the question of resorting to force, Pareto said that 'force is used both by those who wish to preserve certain uniformities, and by those who wish to step over them; and the violence of some is set against the violence of others and conflicts with it. In fact, if an adherent of the ruling class disavows the use of force, this implies that that person is against the use of force by dissidents trying to avoid the norms of that uniformity. On the other hand, if he says that he approves of the use of force that really means he approves its use by the public authority so as to impose uniformity upon the dissidents and, vice versa, if a member of the lower class has an aversion for the use of force in society, then he actually has an aversion for 68 the vise of force to bring dissidents to heel, while if he is in favour of the use of force, he thinks of the employment of force by those who wish to put an end to certain social uniformities.' 83 He also examines the means at the disposal of a ruling class used to remove individuals who are suspected of possessing talent dangerous to that class and who can overthrow it. He asserts that humanity is a specific feature of weak governments. Pareto's arguments are themselves devoid of sentimentality. Thus, he thinks that using sentiments held by society's members for attaining a particular goal is in itself neither useful, nor harmful, that benefit or harm depend exclusively on the goal itself: if it is of benefit to society it is useful, if damaging---it is harmful.~^^84^^ Just as adamant is his assertion that for the subordinate part of the population it is better to believe that the ethical evaluation of a particular measure is in concert with its social benefit.^^85^^
Mosca and Pareto differ also in their views on 'optimum government'. A study of historical events led Mosca to the conclusion that the 'best regimes---i.e., that last for a long time and are capable of obviating violent crises that could cast humanity back to barbarism---are mixed ones.' 86 They do not have predominantly autocratic or liberal principles, and aristocratic tendencies are weakened by steady and continual replenishment of the ruling class, enabling it to take on board the best elements in society. Mosca is here effectively following in the footsteps of Machiavelli. But for that regime to hold out for a long time, 'conditions have to exist that even the wisest legislation cannot create by fiat. The necessary 69 multiplicity and balance of ruling forces, if they are to operate well, requires a high degree of civilisation in the society. Furthermore, the church must be separated from the state, economic decisions should not be monopolised by groups adopting political decisions; the means of coercion should not be controlled by any particular faction of people, and people with a high standard of culture and technical training must have access to the ruling class. But it is even more necessary to attain a high level of education, which is usually a slow process, and a lengthy experience of inventing the most practical means of teaching economic management.'~^^87^^
Pareto, on the other hand, was convinced that the social system is in a state of flexible equilibrium, that 'oscillations of different parts of the social phenomenon constantly depend on the state of its other parts; they are simply manifestations of a change in these parts. Moreover, one may say that recession periods are precisely the cause of subsequent booms and vice versa.'^^88^^ As a result, searches for the 'optimum government' are chimerical both because of the imprecision of the concepts `optimum' and 'individual and social good', and because 'one thereby presupposes an impossible situation when motion ceases in that state termed optimum'.^^89^^ Although Pareto mentioned the question of 'optimum government' in several paragraphs of his Trattato, he provided no clear-cut definition for it and deemed it necessary to discard the term `democracy' as one even hazier than the term `religion'. However, in a supplement to para. 2240, he wrote that 'the best of governments existing today, and the best 70 so far observable, is one in Switzerland, especially in the form it takes in small cantons.'
In summing up the brief comparative analysis, we may state both the difference and the similarity of both concepts. Mosca accentuates the stability of society's political organisation, while Pareto pays more attention to change. On the whole both concepts mutually complement one another. In that sense use of the Mosca-Pareto concept formula can be justified if one views it as a peculiar synthesis of different notions when the bourgeois sociology of political authority was in its infancy.
In describing that new sphere of theoretical political knowledge, Gramsci drew attention to the fact that the emergence of political power sociology was prompted by the crisis processes in the political affairs of the West and the simultaneous crisis in the science of society itself, where positivist sociology was trying to supplant traditional political science; as a result, study of the state was exceedingly impoverished and replaced by trivial evolutionary schemes. 'The fortune of sociology,' wrote Gramsci in his 'Sociology and Political Science', 'is bound up with the depression period in political science and political art that occurred in the 19th century (to be more exact, in the second half, together with the destiny of evolutionary and positivist theories which appeared at that time).'^^90^^ He goes on to elaborate: 'What is really important in sociology is political science. .. If political science means science of the state, and the state is seen as the whole complex of practical and theoretical activity through which the ruling class both justifies and maintains its supremacy and 71 successfully obtains the active consent of the people being ruled, it becomes clear that all the major issues of sociology are nothing else than issues of political science.'9!
If we look closely at the full text of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks^^92^^, it is apparent that Mosca took his attention more than did Pareto. That is because Mosca essentially spoke as the restorer of political science in Italy. In addition, Mosca was one of the first political scientists attempting to `refute' and `elucidate' historical materialism, and that naturally evoked criticism. As Gramsci put it, 'Mosca unconsciously reflects discussions induced by historical materialism, yet reflects them as a provincial who catches the echo of the debates going on in the capital, but who has no chance of acquiring their documents and major texts'. Gramsci comes to the conclusion that 'Mosca belongs to that section of university professors who, when studying the trifling ideas of a third-rate medieval publicist, think it their duty to show off (albeit with all due caution) the historical method, although they do not regard and never have regarded a study of historical materialism worthy of that approach, never thought it necessary to study it from primary sources and contented themselves with a glance through newspaper columns and popular brochures'.93 One serious drawback in Mosca's theory, in Gramsci's view, was the lack of any grasp of the problem of political parties.
Mosca put great store by the practical effectiveness of political science in the future. He saw this effectiveness in elaborating^^1^^ a 'scientific policy'. Although he came to use the term 'scientific policy' only in the 1920s; he had already in 1884 72 argued against the dilettantism of politicians. By 'scientific policy' he meant a policy carried out by statesmen who, while manipulating the governed majority, would be guided in their decisions by the methods and results of the social sciences. In the early 1920s he openly wrote that the principal task of political science was to seek means 'to remove or make less frequent and onerous the great social or political catastrophes which from time to time interrupt the motion of stability and cause a reversal to barbarity'~^^94^^ of nations at very different levels. At a time when capitalism's general crisis was beginning and society was being reconstructed in a revolutionary way, Mosca, as Bobbio put it, 'chased the mirage of a science of anti-revolution'.~^^95^^ Such a stand is certainly not original. Some 150 years before Mosca such eminent political thinkers as John Adams and Edmund Burke were putting forward just such conservative views. They, too, cherished the part of being leading political theoreticians warning the ruling classes of the dangers of anarchy and despotism by the mass revolutionary movements.
More than half a century after the end of Mosca's and Pareto's scholarly activity we can make certain assessments of their theories from the standpoint of the level of present-day political science. In essence, they represent a transitional stage between classical political theory and political science of today. The importance of Mosca's political science and Pareto's political-- sociological theory consists in that the content of their notional apparatus provided an impulse to present-day political scientific theories.
The works of Mosca and Pareto set forth 73 certain topical issues concerning the structure of political power and drew attention to the group nature of realisation of any form of it. They widened the field of study of that phenomenon. Traditional studies of the functions of political power were supplemented by an analysis of the mechanism and conditions of its operation; together with a legal category of authority there appeared a political-sociological category. It should be added, however, that the `new' political science, and also sociology (including political sociology) had no success in Italy at the time. One reason was the powerful influence in Italian culture of Benedetto Croce's idealist neo-Hegelian philosophy and, later, the domination of fascist ideology.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. MAX WEBER'S SOCIOLOGYThe German philosopher, sociologist and historian Max Weber (1864-1920) exerted considerable influence on the formation of political sociology as an independent discipline in contemporary Western science of society. The content of Weber's political ideas has to be seen in the light of the role of ideological leader of German moderate bourgeois liberalism which he endeavoured to pay throughout the crisis period of German political history, which culminated in the downfall of the monarchist regime and the establishment of the Weimar Republic.
Right up to the defeat of Germany in World War I Weber shared the general conviction of the leaders of the German liberal bourgeoisie that constitutional monarchy was the most acceptable model from the viewpoint of political 74 succession, legitimacy and implementation of the imperialist policy of a 'strong state'. This view was set forth in the work of F. Neumann, a founder of the German Democratic Party, Democracy and Empire, in which he tried to combine monarchist ideas with bourgeois-liberal political values. Western scholars have repeatedly noted the mutual influence of Weber's and Neumann's political views. Weber saw the main reason for the ineffectiveness of Wilhelm II's regime in the lack of competent political leadership which, in his opinion, was due to the profound misfit between Germany's economic and political structures. He frequently levelled withering criticism at various aspects of the regime, castigating it for the catastrophic consequences of Germany's home and foreign policy between 1900 and 1918. In 1918, Weber changed his political tune and formulated the idea of a 'plebiscite leadership democracy' (plebiszitaren Fiihrerdemokratie] that reflected his class position on questions of Germany's political development. Weber proceeds from the idea that the political system of late capitalist society decisively depends on the operation of the tentacular structure of the professional bureaucracy. This thesis rests on Weber's historical and economic research undertaken from a position of defence of bourgeois-liberal values of 'rational capitalism' and 'individual freedom'. From Weber's viewpoint, with all the multiplicity of specific historical forms of economic life, it contains two countervailing tendencies--- rational individual enterprise and total statification (bureaucratisation) of economic activity.96 According to his economic theory, the specific `rationalism' of Western culture embodied in the 75 religious ethics of Protestantism became the basis for the realisation, by the mid-19th century, of the first tendency in the industrial states of Western Europe and the USA.^^97^^ He sees the formation of state-monopoly capitalism at the turn of the century as an inevitable consequence of the second tendency's development. Total bureaucratisation, he claims, is the invariable fate of all modern democracies that have no other choice.^^98^^ In so far as he views bureaucracy as an 'instrument of authority' that has its source in the 'universal rationalisation' and is autonomous in relation to social classes and groups, the main problem of Weber's democracy concept is reduced to defining the control mechanisms over the bureaucratic apparatus. Without hesitation he rejects the well-known principles of `classical' democracy theory as unrealistic and ushers to the forefront the technique of selecting the political elite which, could effectively subordinate the bureaucracy to its own objectives. He describes political leadership acting as a counterweight to formal-rational characteristics of the apparatus as `charismatic'." As the eminent student of Weber's theoretical legacy Wolfgang Mommsen, Professor of History at the University of Diisseldorf, rightly notes, the importance of parliamentary democracy in his understanding of it was 'essentially reduced to two functions: selection of political leaders and control of purely technical administrative bureaucracy which, consequently, was not expected to fulfil tasks of political leadership'.~^^10^^°
When analysing Weber's views on democracy, many of which were expressed iij article form (Weber was an influential political journalist), 76 we should bear in mind the peculiarities of his method of studying politics and political power. Being a neo-Kantian, he denied the existence and possibility of studying any objective historical laws as a matter of principle. In his view, sociology was a rational discipline, striving to gain an interpretive understanding of social behaviour with the assistance of typological methods.~^^101^^ Although Weber himself was a critic of psychology in the social sciences, his typology of political behaviour is based on the use of certain psychological characteristics ascribed to the subjects of behaviour. He claimed that all political actions can be interpreted depending on their orientation on certain kinds of belief in the legitimacy of the existing order. From this standpoint, two models may be singled out and counterposed to each other: 1. rational-legal authority whose essential element is professional bureaucracy, and 2. charismatic authority resting on the irrational belief of the masses in superhuman or supernatural qualities of the leaders.
Weber needed the notion of charisma to explain the reasons for political change and describe dynamic aspects of politics. He saw in charismatic leadership an alternative to total bureaucracy whose consequences were considered to be particularly threatening in view of the balance of power in Germany's political arena towards the end of World War I. He called upon its political leaders to form a new political system in which the main support would be a 'strong parliament' and the activity of national political parties (in a series of articles in Frankfurter Zeitung, November 1918). This system was designated primarily to effectively neutralise the political 77 activity of both the right-wing conservative groups and the left, especially the communist, parties and organisations.
Weber's practical views on 'mass democracy' took shape under the impact of the studies of James Bryce, M. Ostrogorsky and Robert Michels who uncovered certain real processes of the concentration of power in the hands of elitist groups using liberal-democratic institutions for implementing their political supremacy. Weber had no doubts that democracy was impossible without popular mobilisation by political elites and that 'any attempt to influence the masses necessarily includes certain elements of charisma'.~^^102^^ He saw the main aim for `democratising' Germany's political structure not in the consistent implementation of the bourgeois-democratic principle 'of ruling in the name of the people', but in removing the obstacles in the way of complete bourgeois power---the domination of uncontrolled bureaucracy and the political influence of the semifeudal class of large-scale landowners. On the other hand, `democratisation' was supposed to establish political institutions capable of halting the march of socialism as a historical alternative to the capitalist system. Being a fierce critic of the communist movement and ideology in his political articles, Weber overtly defended the domination of the bourgeoisie and the need to preserve capitalism. Socialism for him meant merely universal `statification', leading to the unrestrained rule of bureaucracy, while proletarian dictatorship meant bureaucratic dictatorship.~^^103^^
Under the impact of the 1918 political events in Germany and the collapse of personal attempts 78 to take part in politics as a German Democratic Party candidate, the focus of Weber's constitutional programme switched from a 'strong parliament' to the charismatic personality of the Reichsprasident (article in Berliner Borsenzeitung, 25 February 1919). Inasmuch as the source of supreme legitimacy of the Reichsprasident was a plebiscite, ttie nation's leader was able to take individual decisions on paramount political issues outside any democratic institutions and norms. The crux of Weber's argument was that only a president possessing charismatic virtues was able to ensure the nation's political unity, while parties and parliament were supposed to reflect the clash ol fragmentary socio-economic interests. As he wrote, 'Only a president directly elected by the people as head of executive power, as the top chief of the administration, as holder of the right to a delaying veto, dissolution of parliament and organisation of a popular referendum, embodies genuine democracy which means subordination of the nation to the personally chosen leader rather than the arbitrary action of political cliques.'~^^104^^
Weber's programme expressed the vital political interests of those groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie which, while maintaining a formal respect for parliamentary democracy, saw in the 'strong personality' of a Reichsprasident a chance to deal with the acute class problems of capitalist society and to establish political order that could guarantee stable capitalist economic development. At the same time, the idea bore the obvious imprint of Weber's personal ambitions, hankering as he was after an exclusive role in reconstructing Germany's political system. The left-wing 79 liberal circles of Gorman intellectuals saw Weber as a political leader of the first rank, a potential leader of the German nation in its critical hour. Weber, however, was unable to play such a role and realise his plan of political reconstruction. In his zeal to substantiate the transforming significance of a charismatic leadership, he practically ignored the likelihood of that charisma leading to a totalitarian regime, and that still leads to embarassment among political scientists who subscribe to his ideas. As Mommsen writes, 'Many scholars have been puzzled by the fact that Weber's ideal-typical theory of ``charisma'' does not allow any distinction between the "genuine charisma of responsible democratic leaders, as for instance, Gladstone or Roosevelt, and the pernicious charisma of personalities like Kurt Eisner or Adolf Hitler." Where then is the borderline between a type of charismatic rule which guarantees freedom within a democratic social order, and that which may result in the emergence of a totalitarian or quasitotalitarian regime? Weber's political sociology is so designed that this question must be left unanswered.'105 On that basis some scholars accuse Weber of providing a political theory to prompt various social groups in the 1920s and 1930s to adopt fascist ideology. In fact, however, the orientation of his `charisma' concept was based not on some hidden sympathies with autocratic regimes and ideologies, but on a desire to reduce to a minimum actual popular participation in implementing authority within the bounds of parliamentary democracy. The masses were to be provided merely with the chance to choose between rival elites and to support their behaviour. Democracy, 80 in Weber's view, does not envisage the responsibility of a political elite or any institutions to control political decision-making.
This idea is closely bound up with his theory of political power and the state. The `power' category here meant the opportunity existing within certain social relations which permits certain groups to have their way despite resistance, irrespective of the grounds for that opportunity. The theoretical grounds for distributing power may be the 'class situation', 'status group' and `party', but the content of such categories prevents any definition of the actual sources of power. Of paramount importance in Weber's theory is the factor of monopoly use of force which he treats as an inherent phenomenon of social organisations.
Political elites using legitimate force are portrayed as independent groups coming out as active elements of political history. The masses, however, are at best viewed as an object of political `mobilisation'. Elites are the creators of certain types of legitimation and successfully preserve their power for as long as they succeed in upholding the viability of their aspirations for supremacy. Weber finds the historical roots of legitimation in the mystical and religious beliefs of social and political elites (a large part of his sociology of religion is devoted .to describing historical types of legitimation).
His definition of `law' is also bound up with legitimate coercion. Weber defines any `order' as `law' if the likelihood exists of deviant behaviour being met with legitimate force employed by a special group of people. He therefore treats `law' even more widely than the __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6-01532 81 sociological doctrines of law produced in the early
20th century (Lamber, Erlich, et al.). The state serves as the apparatus for ensuring such a likelihood; he claims that a coercive political association may be termed the `state' to the extent that its administrative body successfully enforces a monopoly of legitimate use of physical force for maintaining order. A rationalised bureaucracy is a type of 'legal power' and, consequently, decisions taken by the bureaucracy are `law'. Of particular interest to sociology, in his view, is the question of who actually has control of the administrative apparatus (i.e., type of elite), while the traditional problems of juridical science utterly lose any sense for sociology.
Weber's approach is in marked contrast with 19th century juridical doctrines. Jurisprudence as the basis of liberal outlook is thrown out the window. Weber makes no bones about linking his notions of democracy with politically active bourgeois groups not confined to the bounds of formal legitimacy, but capable of carrying out effective command of German society during its political reconstruction. That elite, in his opinion, also had to cope with the task of turning Germany into a strong imperialist state of world importance. Considerable differences, however, exist between Weber's practical programme and his theoretical views; these stem from the contradictory nature of his political premises that lie in the mainstream of bourgeois-liberal traditions. As a realistic sociologist, he appreciated that concentration of power in the circumstances of incipient state-monopoly capitalism would invariably lead to the destruction of rationalism in politics; yet he unsuccessfully tried to come up 82 with an acceptable answer in a semi-- authoritarian, semi-democratic system combining charismatic legitimacy and rational leadership.
The ambiguity of his political programme laid him open to fierce criticism from the most diverse ideological schools. In particular, the elements of bourgeois democracy contained in his theory brought down on him attacks from the Nazi theoreticians Carl Schmitt and Ghristoph Steding.~^^106^^ A number of bourgeois liberals accuse Weber of totalitarianism and anti-democracy. Thus, the noted Canadian political scientist Robert Presthus writes that he really had no conception of democracy and that 'his conception of leadership, moreover, was essentially aristocratic, somewhat freighted with mysticism.'^^107^^ Yet, criticism of Weber's idea of democracy did not prevent extensive use by Western political scientists of various elements of his political theory. What is more, Weber's principal methodological ideas in studying political power greatly influence the direction and content of contemporary political sociology in the USA and Western Europe.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. ROBERT MICHELS'S IRON LAWRobert Michols (1876-1936) is one of the recognised classics of present-day Western political sociology. The theoretical and methodological content of his political studies reflects the specific nature of the political philosophy of European petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the first decades of the 20th century. His political convictions and orientations changed sharply several times, __PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83 passing through 4 main stages: 1. anarchist socialism (1898-1906); 2. social democratic ideology (1907- 1909); 3. nationalism and anti-democracy (1910- 1921); 4. fascism (1922-1936).
The focus of his political theory is the crisis of institutions and ideology of parliamentary democracy. The major aim of this theory is to demonstrate the practical impossibility of implementing democratic principles owing to the immanent characteristics of capitalist political organisation and the 'oligarchical tendencies' in mass political organisations---parties, trade unions and other groups. His early works which express his interest in petty-bourgeois anarchic socialism contain principally ethical-social ideas and as such do not come under his political sociology. His criticism of parliamentary democracy expressed the views and moods of those sections of the petty bourgeoisie which comprised the initial mass basis for fascism. As Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian communist leader, once wrote, 'As a social group they awaited power for quite some time. The power won seemed to them their own. These groups proceeded from a Utopian concept that the petty bourgeoisie can come to power and dictate their laws to the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie, can organise society on planned principles, etc.' 10S
Michels's theoretical views on parliamentary democracy took shape within the parameters of two concepts---theoretical syndicalism (Hubert Lagardelle and Georges Sorel) and elitism (Pareto). From the first idea he took the principal tenets of criticism of 'parliamentary evolution' popular with the socialist parties of Western Europe, from the second---the demand to 84 'render harmless' parliamentarism and replace it by minority dictatorship headed by a charismatic leader. He saw the itask of sociology not in creating all-embracing theoretical systems, but in ' explaining faultlessly' the causal tendencies and countertendencies of social life. He postulated that this task can" be posed and resolved 'purely scientifically'.~^^109^^ An understanding of his approach to science, comes wholly from the counterposing of `moral' (value) and `objective' (outside values) types of thinking. This aspect of his approach came from the influence of ideas of Weber (neo-Kantianism) and Pareto (modified positivism). He did not analyse the problems of the social conditionality of theories and types of thinking, the correlation between the social position of the scholar and the content of his conceptions. He was silent on that. Lenin summed up Michels's approach exactly when he wrote: 'Michels, of course, considers that his servility to the bourgeoisie is "scientific objectivism".' On the subject of Michels's comparative assessment of Italian imperialism Lenin noted that 'from the bourgeois standpoint, this argument is unassailable'. no
Proceeding from the above-mentioned ideas on aims and tasks of scientific research, Michels attempted to establish the caiisal factors of power stratification in mass democratic organisations of bourgeois society. He wrote, 'The complex of tendencies which stand in the way of an implementation of democracy only makes it difficult to unravel and catalogue.. . These tendencies lie 1. in the essence of human nature, 2. in the essence of the political struggle, and 3. in the essence of organisation. Deniocracy leads to oligarchy, turns 85 into oligarchy. In putting forward this thesis we are far from making a condemnation or moral judgement on any political parties or regimes. Like all sociological laws, the law expressing the aspiration of any human aggregate to form a hierarchy stands beyond good and evil.' 1U
He claimed that the concept of `oligarchy' was intended essentially 'to supplement and clarify Marxism' on a number of vital points. In his opinion, 'the formula of the need for a replacement of one ruling stratum by another and the law of oligarchy that follows from it as a necessary form of collective life in no way rejects and replaces the materialist understanding of history, it only supplements it. There is no contradiction between an idea by which history is a process of continuous class struggle and the idea that class struggle leads to the establishment of a fresh oligarchy.'~^^112^^ He feels that the oligarchy phenomenon can be explained partly psychologically (the psychology of the masses and the psychology of organisations), and partly organically (laws of structures of organisations), with the principal role belonging to the first group of factors.
Michels prefaced the sociological proper analysis of politics with the concept of political history based on the idea of preserving and modifying 'the aristocracy principle' in the process of replacing various kinds of 'ruling classes' irrespective of their origin and composition. He supposed that behaviour of the 'ruling class' in conditions of bourgeois democracy is determined by the impact of ithe `masses' on the political process. The `masses' category in his concept has a largely psychological content in so far as it describes not the socio-political structure of society but the 86 sum total of psychical qualities typifying the generic type of 'mass person' of the imperialist era. In these qualities he included political indifference, incompetence, the need for leadership, a sense of gratitude to leaders, the need for respect for leaders, the herd instinct ( disappearance of personality), etc.
He believed that the 'ruling class' in mass late capitalist society conies up against the need to organise the masses to take part in the political process and to justify the legitimacy of the regime in their eyes. Among groups after power within the bounds of bourgeois democracy, the roost effective turn out to be those which are able to ensure support for their objectives from the organised `masses'. But the very 'principle of organisation', being a necessary condition for dominating the `masses', leads to the emergence of a power hierarchy. Michels insisted that ' Whoever speaks of organisation speaks of a tendency towards oligarchy... As the organisation develops democracy goes into decline.'^^113^^ He depicted the bureaucratisation process of mass political organisations in the imperialist era as an absolute law, evaluating it from the viewpoint of a pettybourgeois intellectual experiencing the demise of his democratic illusions and becoming a proponent of right-wing extremist political views. He saw `oligarchy' as the unavoidable fate of any democracy, irrespective of its historical forms and social class basis.
According to his concept, the oligarchical structure of power arises as three groups of factors interact: 1. the technical qualities of a political organisation; 2. the psychological qualities of the organised masses, and 3. the 87 psychological characteristics of political leaders. He attributed prime importance to motivation for the advancement of political leaders both by the group and by individuals occupying positions of power. The hierarchical power structure that has taken shape, in his view, develops further by its own inner laws, reproducing oligarchical tendencies on an extending scale. The gradual transition from 'spontaneous leadership' to `oligarchy' takes place in two stages: 1. `professionalised' and 2. `stabilised' leadership. m This scheme has something in common with the 'routinisation of charisma' of his close friend Max Weber. In both cases we are dealing with attempts to define the content of political power through psychological behavioural constructions. In his most well-known sociojogical work The Sociology of Political Parties (1911), Michels termed the whole set of tendencies leading to the emergence of an oligarchical power structure the 'iron law of oligarchy'.
The direct object of this study was the actual process of bureaucratisation of West European social democratic parties of the Second International. He was well acquainted with their organisational structure, since he himself was a member of the Socialist Party of Italy (in 1907 he was even its delegate at the socialist congress in Stuttgart).
Psychology is the main method of Michels's political sociology, which is a variant of the sociological theory of elites. Although he did analyse interaction between the social and the political structures of society, behind his approach lies the idealist thesis that the 'elitist nature of a nation' aspires to embodiment in the 88 domlnating groups; in other words, the political elite is a product of the national psyche.^^115^^
Michels singles out three autonomous elements in the structure of the 'dominant class': political, economic and intellectual, whose interaction is conditioned by the requirements to enforce supremacy.^^116^^ Depending on the concrete historical situation, therefore, real power may be implemented by `political-economic' (plutocratic), ' political-intellectual' or a 'wilful political' class.117 Pareto's 'circulation of elites' in a somewhat modified form lays an important part in Michels's description of the political process. The downfall of the fundamental institutions of bourgeois democracy in Italy and Germany was put down to the action of the law of 'circulation of elites'. The new 'wilful political' class, according to his understanding, had to carry out two historical tasks: to replace the `plutocracy' (i.e., bourgeois democracy) that was tottering and ineffective from a leadership standpoint, and to ensure defence of the nation from the 'Bolshevik menace'. "8 He saw the embodiment of his ideal of a 'wilful class' headed by a charismatic leader in Italian fascism and its leader Benito Mussolini. Appointed on Mussolini's personal authority to the post of University Professor in Perugia, he took an active part in organising special 'fascist faculties of political science', whose aims were to 'create a new political thinking, to train fascist state cadres and promote the theory of fascism'.^^119^^ In his later works this one-time critic of 'oligarchical tendencies' and `despotism' became a direct apologist for the totalitarian structure of authority established by the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany. Soon after his arrival in 89 Italy his course of lectures read at the University of Rome was published (Corso di sociologies politico,, Milan, 1927); subsequently, his collected works on political science had two editions: R. Michels, Studi sulla democrazia e sutt' autorita, Florence, 1933; idem., Nuovi studi sulla classe politica, Rome, 1936.
In spite of this finale to Michels's theoretical evolution, various schools of contemporary Western political science openly extol his work in the theory of politics and political power. This influence may be put down to the following factors:
1. the principal issues of politics which Michels tried to explain maintain their topicality for present-day political scientists (political elites, leadership, parties, bureaucracy, etc.);
2. 'psychological determinism' has become a popular approach in the West in the methods of political research;
3. his category apparatus of the political organisation theory permits the pragmatic use of its various elements depending on the objectives pursued by the various researchers.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. ARTHUR BENTLEY'S INTERESTAttempts at concrete sociological conceptualising of politics have existed in American political science from the early decades of this century, during the development of the bourgeois-reform Progressive movement. Members of academic political science were a component part of that movement. The aims of transformation, in which political science was attributed an important role, 90 were the reconstruction, improvement and strengthening of the state apparatus, making its efficiency compatible with liberal democratic values, selection of the administrative elite on the basis of political science recommendations, and the education of citizens in the spirit of bourgeois-democratic political culture. Elaboration of practical recommendations for the reform activity in state administration presupposed, in particular, a concrete analysis of such real political phenomena as rivalry between various branches of the state system, public opinion and its effect on politics, the impact of interest groups on the political process, and so on. Such an analysis of the state and politics could not take place solely on the basis of the former comparative historical methodological orientation of political science and the traditional doctrines of constitutionalism---'division of powers', 'rule of law', etc. So American political scientists and scholars of the state increasingly began to turn to scientific disciplines studying real social structures and processes, and above all to the swiftly-developing sociology and psychology.
These new tendencies in political science took shape in the circumstances of crisis in historicism and fading influence of historical-evolutionary methodology on science of society. At the same time, there was a growing popularity of the philosophy of pragmatism and the ideas and theories of the British political realist thinkers like .Tames Bryce, Walter Bagehot and George Wallace.
The new approach to analysing state administration and socio-political factors affecting it can clearly be seen in the works of such political scientists as W, Wilson, Charles Beard, 91 Lawrence Lowell, Henry Jones Ford, Albert Hart and Frank Goodnow. But it was Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (1908) that particularly showed up the realistic tendencies in an approach to analysing politics, an attempt to work out a scientific method and theory of empirical research of the state, politics and political behaviour.
Arthur Bentley (1870-1957) is one of the founders of interest group theory, and his work is the first behaviourist-sociological study of the process of state administration in the USA. While it embodied new departures appearing in the views on the state and politics, The Process of Government was way ahead of its time. In anticipating the future development of political science in the USA, it exerted an immense influence upon it---but only many years later, remaining for almost 20 years unnoticed in American political science.
Behind Bentley's theory and his approach to the state administrative process is the concept of people's activity preconditioned by their interests and oriented on securing those interests. The activity conception is for Bentley an integral category, the 'raw material' for studying state administration,~^^12^^° by which he understands the interaction of institutions and elements of the whole political-administrative system of American society of his time.
The activity of people fighting to attain their goals takes place not individually but through groups in which they are united by common interests and which Bentley distinguishes by the character of their activity. Therefore a group is seen as a mass human activity. Individual 92 convictions and ideas, ideology as a whole, personality and its behaviour have meaning only in the context of group activity and are meaningful to the extent that they help determine models of group behaviour. Once he receives an orientation for his own social activity given to him by ideas and emotions, the individual himself merges with the group as a whole, and relations between individual and group processes are integrated to the maximum. Since Bentley does not believe in groups without their interest, then interest, activity and group are synonymous concepts. I21 The interest of a group needed for its identification depends not on oral rhetoric, programmes and declarations of the group about its objectives, but on its observable activity and the behaviour of group members.
In this instance Bentley is making an absolute out of the contrasting of so-called vocal behaviour and observable group behaviour. What he calls 'oral political rhetoric' is actually a manifestation of the empirically-observable behaviour of group members and group activity. The aims and orientations of pressure groups in the American political process are reflected not only in the actual behaviour of their members, but also in the oral manifesto declarations and speeches of leaders, which lend themselves to empirical observation even though they do need the most circumspect critical analysis.
Justly criticising the individualist notions of the American psychological school of Albion Small and others and Herbert Spencer's ' sentiments theory', Bentley opposed examining ideas and ideals as the prime cause of group behaviour, its 'independent variables' standing above the 93 state administrative process.~^^122^^ At the same time, he markedly underestimated the effect on that process of overall class, extra-group and personality aspects of political consciousness, political culture as a whole. While urging that we take account of the importance of ideological factors when analysing state administration only to the extent that they reflect fundamental group interests and goals, he simultaneously called them 'spectres^^1^^ and 'ghosts^^1^^ that hampered political scientists.
Bentley saw interest group activity in group relations with one another as a constantly changing process in which there is pressure on government from the social forces they personify for the purpose of imposing their will on it. During this process strong groups dominate, subordinating and forcing weaker ones to obey, while the state administration itself adapts and settles conflicts and reaches equilibrium among rival groups. I23 'All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or agencies of government) to mediate the adjustment.^^1^^ Hence the analysis of state administration had to be based, according to this theory, on empirical observation of the results of group interaction and be evaluated in the appropriate social context. 'It is only as we isolate these group activities, determine their representative values, and get the whole process stated in terms of them, that we ap-. proach to a satisfactory knowledge of government.'~^^124^^
In so far as the activity of government institutions appears in this scheme as part of group 94 activity, Bentley feels that it is futile to classify these institutions as isolated formations, since they are the reflection of 'the deeper-lying interest groups of society'.~^^125^^ Thus, the Constitution, Congress, the President, the courts and law, in representing merely official interest groups, express group interests and activities reflecting the models of group behaviour which may be traced in relatively stable forms over a period of time. Although Bentley did not reject the relative stability of state-legal institutions, he did maintain nevertheless that they change because of the changeability and fluidity of the process of group rivalry and interaction. That change takes place on different levels depending on real organisation structures of interest groups and group behaviour. Thus, changes in the prevailing law and its adaptation to new circumstances do not occur, in his view, on one and the same level and simultaneously in various sections of law. Amendments to the constitution and other formal administrative institutions have the same character.
Differences in political regimes, according to Bentley, represent differences in types of group activity or group technique. For example, differences between despotism and democracy reflect different means of representation of interests. l28
But he does not specify the representation of interests of which groups he is referring to. In influencing the state and degree of democracy in a political system, the political regime primarily reflects the class nature of public authority. It is characterised not only by the means of representation of social and political interests, the state of democratic rights and liberties, but by the whole aggregate of devices and methods of 95 implementing state power and activity of political institutions within the political system, by the type and methods of political and state leadership, by the personality of the leaders, by the relation of the political administrative structure to the legal foundations of its activity. A political regime takes shape under the impact of a specific correlation of class, group, political and ideological forces and factors, the political culture as a whole, the whole political dynamic. It is also affected by the actual distribution of authority and influence within the political system and, above all, within the state apparatus.
Bentley urged scholars to pay prime attention to an empirical study of those institutions and links in the state administration that affect formal decision-making and coercion---legislative, executive and juridical-administrative agencies, since they are most amenable to observation. The same applies to political parties and other organised pressure groups. But since the state administration is, in his view, not only a set of institutional structures, rather a more intricate process, then one needs empirically to study less formal and noticeable groups and the latent circumstances affecting the process. He asserted that most group conflicts were resolved not on the level of observable official regulation, but within the invisible process of rivalry, adaptation and regulation of interests among numerous groups and subgroups.~^^127^^
In the ongoing and constantly changing process of American state administration, as Bentley saw it, these numerous groups and subgroups freely combined together, fell apart and came together again depending on their internal 96 cohesion and force of influence, while each individual in one group or another constantly adapted his behaviour to the changing circumstances. In some instances conflicts and contradictions between groups can be resolved peacefully, and the attainment of equilibrium and compromise is established by official institutions (' official groups') which act as arbiters. In other cases, if these 'official groups', which include the army and police as well as legislative, executive, administrative and legal institutions, are strong enough they can forcibly impose a settlement upon the various conflicting groups and thereby maintain a more or less stable equilibrium, which also frequently acquires legal form. Stability of the 'official groups' or governments themselves, responsible for the stability of the state administration as a whole, Bentley emphasises, depends primarily on their ability to find acceptable compromise means of resolving inter-group conflict and acting as arbiter. The state administrative process, including the entire cycle of inter-group struggle from conflict to attainment of equilibrium, is accompanied by the development of such formal principles of bourgeois democracy as 'majority rule', the consent of the ruled to submit to that rule, universal suffrage, the jury system, etc., as well as custom, tradition, ethical and moral principles, which Bentley calls forms of `customary' group behaviour.
Bentley's work shows the real social and political processes occurring when state-monopoly capitalism was taking shape and crisis was affecting the classical-liberal form of democracy and the 'distribution of power' doctrine. He pinpointed such phenomena as differentiation in __PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7-01532 97 American society into a multitude of semiautonomous non-governmental groups and organisations pursuing their own private interests in accordance with which they obtained certain undertakings from the state, conversion of the individual into an agent of various and at times incompatible social roles, the possession by some interest groups of a certain part of political influence or force, the manifestation of a competitive struggle between various links in the state apparatus, and so on. In viewing the administrative process through the prism of struggle of various interest groups, with the state as arbiter in the struggle, Bentley produced a more realistic assessment of politics in contemporary America than did proponents of the 'division of powers' theory in the science of constitutional law and the formal-juridical approach in American political science.
Certain elements of Bentley's methodology also had more realism than did the institutionaldescriptive and purely psychological approaches to the state and politics. In particular, his focus on socio-economic factors as the source of state and political life, his view of ideology from the standpoint of group needs and objectives, and his analytical method of social group interpretation of socio-political and state affairs have something in common with the materialist approach to analysis of the state and politics. Bentley's theory, therefore, is of some interest also from the viewpoint of the study of real-life tendencies in the history of social and political thought in the USA.
In formulating the main tenets of his theory, however, Bentley does not reveal the content and 98 correlation of sueli notions as 'state administration', `government', 'interest groups', `interests', which are the basis for their formation and determine their activity. While saying that the `interest' of a group is multifaceted and takes shape predominantly from the social milieu, he does not spell out which factors of that milieu are determining ones. While recognising the importance of the economic basis of politics, he rejects the determining role of the economic basis in the system of socio-political relations. 'The economic basis of political life must, of course, be fully recognised, though it does not necessarily follow that the economic basis in the usual limited use of the word is the exclusive, or even in every detail the dominant, basis of political activity.'~^^128^^ The major difference between MarxistLeninist .theory and that of Bentley's interest groups lies in understanding the origin and role of social groups and classes. While Marx and Engels spoke of society falling into classes on the grounds of economic affairs and relations of production, and rightly examined classes above all as economic social groups, Bentley treats any society merely as an aggregate of the most diverse social groups that comprise it.
His rejection of the decisive role of interests uniting people into socio-political and economic groups by dint of work activity and actual social status coloured Bentley's relativist view of politics not as a process of class relations and struggle, but as a process of group rivalry with specilic political interests. He thought that the approach to politics as a process presupposed an analysis of precisely those groups, since as they fell apart, re-emerged and again fell apart, they allegedly __PRINTERS_P_99_COMMENT__ 7* 99 __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END] Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1985/CPS431/20100311/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2010.03.11) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+
ensured the dynamism and flow of the state administrative process. He applied classes to groups with a 'multiplicity of interests' inclined to stable existence, and therefore not possessing much importance for his `dynamic' model. He criticised Marx for dealing with too general and stable collectives which, he alleged, were less important for an analysis of politics.
Bentley's position on the `irrelevance' of the class approach for analysing the state administrative process is plainly untenable. A MarxistLeninist class approach presupposes a comprehensive, dialectical analysis of social life, including such vital elements of society's social structure as classes, specific social strata and groups, their work and their ideological and socio-political activity. The subject matter of analysis also comprises the influence of various elements of the social structure on the state administrative process, the reciprocal influence of the state and politics on the economy, the singling out of a connection between various strata and groups and classes and their interests, etc. In fact, in his works The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and The Class Struggles in France, Marx gave models of a materialist sociological analysis of politics, indicating that the bourgeois class consists of several social groups: industrialists, financiers, etc., who have their own political differences.~^^129^^
Bentley's method predetermined his attention not so much to analysing real contradictions and motive forces of the political process as to private conflicts and rivalry between groups, often belonging to one and the same class, ,to problems of their peaceful settlement within the frame-
100work of the capitalist system. That is why he devotes a great deal of attention in his functionalist model to the reaching of a socio-political compromise, while the model itself absolutises the changeability of political behaviour in the state administrative process; he explains this by social pluralism of participants in it, which, he feels, is typical of American capitalism. Contempt for a class approach to politics and the bourgeois-reformist essence of the objectives of the Progressives were responsible, in particular, for Bentley's apologist stance over social and moral values, his purely reformist conception of prospects for overcoming abuses in the US sociopolitical system and for improving it. Criticism of the evils of American capitalism came from a disquiet over the fate of American bourgeois democracy, yet that was by no means accompanied by a rejection of capitalism. On the contrary, Bentley felt tbat the USA had the opportunity to reduce the abuses and overcome deficiencies in the system without resorting to revolutionary methods.~^^13^^° It could do so because of the fluidity of inter-group relations in the American state administrative process, enabling the country to regulate interests and to find political compromises which would be helped by the selfrestraint of victory groups. Thus, Bentley's theory ultimately fulfils a socio-protective function. It substantiates the aims of American bourgeois reformers whose demands helped sow the illusion of the possible attainment of social justice in capitalist conditions.
Bentley's absolutist view of the malleable process of state administration governed his relativist view of the actual role in that process of the
101major state-legal and political institutions. This not only led to a distorted conception of them, it also made his theory unfit for explaining the stability and clear-cut shape of a whole number of constitutional mechanisms and principles of US state administration. Thus, on that basis it is difficult to justify with any weighty arguments the four-year presidential term of office in the USA (given the simultaneous dynamism of group interests represented by the president), the relative stability of constitutional principles of ' division of powers', federalism, the practice of juridical supervision, the existence of the Congress committee system, etc. Bentley's view of the state as one of the 'official pressure groups' reflecting deep-seated group interests, equally ignores both the relative independence and the class nature of state power under capitalism. Such an approach dissolves state institutions into other elements of the political system and atomises state authority among interest groups independent of the state. However, as is convincingly shown in Marxist studies of state political practice, it is the state that is in the focus of politics. The state is the political arm of the real subject of power-holding in the USA---monopoly capital, and American history is replete with examples when it has overtly acted on the side of the ruling class to safeguard its interests. The role of the state and pressure groups in the state administrative process and American politics is by no means entirely the same. Although the will and power of the ruling monopoly bourgeoisie in the USA are realised and refracted through a whole range of socio-political institutions, organisations and groups which undoubtedly impinge
102upon the process of political power and state administration, the state plays the part of the most organised and concentrated force in implementing politics and state administration, monopolising the adoption of state political decisions.
Bentley's theory does not make a clear distinction between the interests of groups expressing the will of the ruling class and those of other groups and associations. Meanwhile, 'equal opportunities' for influencing the state actually mean that it is those groups that represent the interests of the ruling class and its separate factions that primarily establish direct links with the institutions of the contemporary state in the USA. Once inserted into the mechanism of state administration, pressure groups representing the interests of monopoly capital acquire immense political gravity and influence. The social power and degree of influence of various groups on the implementation of state authority emanate not only from their interests, as Bentley thought, but also from the level of their organisation, the unequal economic and political opportunities and abilities of their members for coordinated action. For example, the party machines in the US twoparty system, headed by party bosses, have played an important part in turning one of the two bourgeois parties into a dominating force thanks to its smooth-running organisational mechanism.
Bentley's 'process of government' has had enormous theoretical-methodological impact on contemporary political science in the USA and particularly on its behaviourist orientation. His call for the use of empirical and quantitative methods in political analysis, his critique of ideological factors, the sociological analysis of group
103pressure, of political parties, leadership and public opinion and particularly his view of state administration as a process have all earned him a reputation as founder of the concrete-sociological approach to politics and US state administration, of present-day behavioural political science; and his work is credited with the role of a sort of introduction to the study of political behaviour. He is also known as a theoretician who tried by a group approach to substantiate the real role of political parties, political leadership and public opinion in US constitutional practice and the functioning of the American political process, their influence on the activity of state institutions. Present-day American and some West European political scientists examine political parties and pressure groups, their rivalry and interaction to a large extent under the influence of his theory, seeing them as an important link in the system of 'checks and counterchecks' of state administration and in political decisionmaking.
As behavioural empirical and theoretical studies extended their popularity in the USA during the 1930s and particularly since the 1950s and into the 1980s, American political scientists increasingly turned to the work of Arthur Bentley as an important theoretical source. The group theory of politics developed by him has become the basis for a concrete-sociological approach to study of political actuality in capitalist countries, and for the theory of political pluralism and various empirical theories of power that lie behind many contemporary conceptions of Western democracy.
Bentley's work is assessed by most modern political scientists as being classical in the field,
104although, on their own admission, it is more cited than deeply analysed. Empiricists and theorists turn to it as an important source of substantiating the `liberal-pluralist' approach to a study of political reality. One of the practical uses of that approach is theoretically to justify and convey to the political consciousness of citizens the interaction of pressure groups and the state as a natural contemporary development of Western 'liberal democracy'.
Under the influence of Bentley's ideas studies were made in the recent decades of the activity of small groups within state and political institutions, including the legislative committees of Congress, and the blocs and factions within other governmental establishments. A re-examination, in terms of Bentley's concepts, of legal practice from the point of view of interaction and conflict of interest groups has helped promote sociological jurisprudence and the sociology of law.
The fundamental theoretical premises of Bentley's theory in many respects continue to predetermine the subject matter and direction of study of the state administrative process in the USA; at the same time, the Americocentric nature of modern versions of the theory survives.
NOTES
~^^1^^ Lewis A. Coser (ed.), Political Sociology, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 1.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 26.
~^^3^^ Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, Leonard S. Gottrell Jr. (eds.), Sociology Today. Problems and Prospects,
105New York, Basic Books Inc., 1959, p. 83.
~^^4^^ Talcott Parsons (ed.), American Sociology. Perspectives, Problems, Methods, New York, Basic Books Inc., 1968, pp. 156, 157.
^^5^^ Ibid., p. 156.
~^^6^^ The Dialogues of Plato. Vol. II. Republic, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 177.
^^7^^ The Politics of Aristotle. Vol. I, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1885, Book I, IV.
~^^8^^ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers, New York, A Mentor Book from New American Library, 1961, p. VII.
~^^9^^ Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, Vol. II, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1898, pp. 254-57.
~^^10^^ Talcott Parsons, Introduction to Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology, Ann Arbor, 1961, pp. V-VII.
~^^11^^ Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, New York, The Free Press, 1969, p. 25.
~^^12^^ J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer. The Evolution of a Sociologist, New York, Basic Books Inc., 1971, pp. 181-84.
~^^13^^ Gabriel Almond, G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1966, pp. 10-11.
~^^14^^ Publius. The Journal of Federalism, Philadelphia, Centre for the Study of Federalism.
106~^^15^^ We have used the edition: Gaetano Mosca, Teorica del governi e governo parlamentare, Milan, 1968.
~^^16^^ Mosca, Elementi di sclenza politica, Bari, Gius, Laterza & Figli, 1939, Vol. 1, p. 14.
~^^17^^ Ibid.
~^^18^^ Norberto Bobbio, Saggi sulla scienza politica in Italia, Bari, Editori Laterza, 1969, p. 182.
~^^10^^ Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica, Vol. 1, p. 69.
~^^20^^ Ibid., pp. 70, 77.
~^^21^^ Ibid., p. 16.
~^^22^^ Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generate, 2nd Edition, Florence, G. Barbera, 1923.
~^^23^^ Giovanni Busino, Preface to Vilfredo Pareto, La transformation de la democratic, Geneva, 1970, p. IX; Joseph A. Schumpater, Ten Great Economists. From Marx to Keynes, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd,, 1951, p. 136.
~^^24^^ This point is elaborated in the Soviet work: G. K. Ashin, M. A. Shafir, " Elitism and Democracy', Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 2, 1971, p. 139 (in Russian).
~^^25^^ See, for example, James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, New York, Day, 1943. .
~^^26^^ Carlo Marletti, 'Glassi ed elites politiche: teorie ed analisi', Questioni di sociologia, presentazione di Francesco Alberoni, Brescia, La Scuola Editrice, 1966, Vol. 2, p. 147.
107~^^27^^ Bobbio, op. cit., pp. 238, 239.
~^^28^^ Opere di Antonio Gramsci, Vol. 3: Gli intellettuali e I'organizzazione delta cultura, Turin, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1949, p. 4.
~^^29^^ See, for example, G. K. Ashin, The Myth of Elite and 'Mass Society', Moscow, 1966; A. A. Galkin, 'The Ruling Elite of Modern Capitalism', Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 3, 1969; A. A. Mishin, Bourgeois Democracy and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle, Moscow, 1972; Y. V. Osipova, 'The Sociological System of Vilfredo Pareto', The History of Bourgeois Sociology of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries, Moscow, 1979; P. S. Gurevich, 'Modern Bourgeois Elitism: Sources, Versions and Tendencies', Socio-Political Theories of Modern Bourgeois Ideology, Moscow, 1981 (all in Russian).
~^^30^^ Galkin, op. cit., p. 75.
~^^31^^ Opere di Antonio Gramsci, Vol. 4, II Risorgimento, op. cit., p. 59.
~^^32^^ Bobbio was the first to conduct such an `operation' on Mosca's idea. See Bobbio, op. cit., pp. 199-211. Basing himself on this work, the Italian professor Dino Fiorot contrasted the two theories: Dino Fiorot, II realismo politico di Vilfredo Pareto, Milan, Edizioni di Comunita, 1969, pp. 212-18.
~^^33^^ Mosca, Teorica dei governi e governo parlamentare, op. cit., p. 11.
10S
s* Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
~^^35^^ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 5.
~^^36^^ Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generate, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 260.
~^^37^^ 76id., p. 254.
~^^38^^ Ibid., p. 257.
~^^39^^ /6id.
~^^40^^ V. Pareto, 'Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche', Scritti sociologici de Vilfredo Pareto, Turin, Unione tipograficoeditrice torinese, 1966, pp. 232-93.
~^^41^^ V. Pareto, op. cit., Introduction, Turin, Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1974, pp. 7-52.
~^^42^^ Warren J. Samuels, Pareto on Policy, Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1974, p. 70.
~^^43^^ For the polemic between Mosca and Pareto see James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class. Gaetano Mosca and the Elite, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958; and Carlo Mongardini, 'Mosca, Pareto e Taine', Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto: Revue europeenne d'histoire des sciences sociales, Geneva, No. 5, 1965.
~^^44^^ Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 173.
~^^45^^ Ibid. In that connection one should avoid erroneously ascribing to Mosca the term `elite', as sometimes happens in the literature.
~^^46^^ Bobbio, Saggi..., pp. 202, 203.
~^^47^^ Marletti, op. cit., p. 144.
~^^48^^ Antonio Gramsci, Note snl Machiavelli snUa politica e sullo stato moderno,
109Turin, Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1949,
p. 140.
~^^49^^ Fiorot, II realismo. . ., pp. 212-13. ~^^60^^ See ibid., p. 213.
~^^51^^ Mosca, Elementi..., Vol. 1, p. 88.
~^^52^^ Ibid., p. 97.
~^^53^^ Mosca, Storia dette dottrine politiche, Bari, Laterza, 1966, p. 302.
~^^54^^ Pareto, Trattato. . ., Vol. 3, p. 257.
~^^55^^ Mosca, Storia..., p. 303.
~^^56^^ Ibid., p. 296.
~^^57^^ Ibid., pp. 304, 305.
~^^58^^ Pareto, Trattato. .., Vol. 3, p. 262.
~^^59^^ Ibid.
~^^60^^ Ibid., pp. 262-63.
~^^61^^ Ibid., p. 388.
~^^62^^ Mosca, Storia. . ., p. 297.
~^^63^^ Ibid., p. 298.
~^^64^^ Mosca, Elementi..., Vol. 2, p. 83.
~^^65^^ Ibid., p. 102.
~^^66^^ Ibid., p. 116.
~^^67^^ Mosca, Storia. . ., p. 301.
«^^8^^ Mosca, Elementi. . ., Vol. 2, p. 142.
~^^69^^ Ibid.
~^^70^^ See, for example, Geraint Parry, Political Elites, London, Allen & Unwin, 1969.
~^^71^^ Mosca, Elementi..., Vol. 2, p. 110.
~^^72^^ Vilfredo Pareto, Transjormazioni della democrazia, Rocca Casciano, Capelli editore, 1964, p. 43.
~^^73^^ Ibid., p. 62.
~^^74^^ Ibid., p. 63.
~^^75^^ Ibid., p. 64.
~^^76^^ Pareto, Trattato..., Vol. 3, p. 385.
~^^77^^ Ibid., p. 388.
110?« Ibid., p. 434.
~^^79^^ Ibid., pp. 434-35.
~^^80^^ Ibid., p. 236.
~^^81^^ See Vilfredo Pareto, Traite de Sociologie Generate, Vol. 2, Lausanne, Librairie, Payot et Cie., 1919, p. 860.
~^^82^^ Pareto, Trattato.. ., Vol. 3, pp. 420-21.
~^^83^^ Ibid., p. 336.
~^^84^^ Ibid., § 2249.
~^^85^^ Ibid., § 2274.
~^^86^^ Mosca, Storia..., p. 305.
~^^87^^ Ibid,
~^^88^^ Pareto, Transformazioni. .., p. 42.
~^^89^^ Ibid., p. 43.
~^^90^^ Gramsci, Note sul Machiavelli. . ., p. 79.
~^^91^^ Ibid. This phrase is cited in the literature either as an illustration of a full comprehension of the meaning of the political issue in Marxist sociology (Sociological Thought in the Polish People's Republic, Moscow, 1968, p. 67---in Russian), or for describing the influence of political science on Western sociology (A. A. Fedoseyev, Politics as an Object of Sociological Research, Leningrad, 1974, p. 20---in Russian). We think that these interpretations are inadequate from Gramsci's viewpoint in the context, in that he criticises the ambitiousness of positivist sociology in claiming the place of political science and, essentially, reduces this sociology to a science of the state.
~^^92^^ Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, Turin, Einaudi, 1975, Vols. 1-4.
~^^93^^ Gramsci, Note sul Machiavelli. . ., p. 140.
Ill
``* Mosca, Elementi..., Vol. 2, p. 190.
~^^95^^ Bobbio, Saggi..., p. 191.
~^^96^^ See, for example, Max Weber, ' Agrarverhaltnisse im Altertum', Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, hrsg. von J. Conrad, W. Lexis, L. Elster, Edg. Loening, Vol. 1, Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1909, pp. 52-188.
~^^97^^ Max Weber, 'Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus', Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie von Max Weber, Vol. I, Tubingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1922.
~^^98^^ Max Weber. Werk und Person. Dokumente ausgewahlt und kommentiert von Eduard Baumgarten, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, 1964, pp. 245-47.
~^^99^^ Max Weber, Grundriss der Sozialokonomie, III. Abteilung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1. Halbband, Tubingen, Verlag J. G. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1925, p. 156.
100 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920, Tubingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) , 1959, pp. 394, 395.
~^^101^^ Max Weber, 'Uber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie', Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre von Max Weber, Tubingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1922, pp. 403-50.
~^^102^^ Max Weber, Grundriss der Sozialokonomie, 2. Halbband, p. 768.
112~^^103^^ See Max Weber. Werk und Person, pp. 247-59.
~^^104^^ Ibid., p. 281.
105 Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy. Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber, Oxford, Basil Blackweil, 1974, pp. 91-92.
~^^106^^ Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth (eds.), Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 59-67.
~^^107^^ Robert Presthus, Foreword to Use Dronberger, The Political Thought of Max Weber, New York, Meredith Corporation, 1971, p. XII.
~^^108^^ Palmiro Togliatti, Lezioni sul fascismo, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1976, p. 30.
~^^109^^ Robert Michels, Znr Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie, Leipzig, Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1925, pp. IX, X.
~^^110^^ V. I. Lenin, 'Imperialism and Socialism in Italy, Collected Works, Vol. 21, 1980, p. 358.
~^^111^^ Michels, Zur Soziologie..., p. VII.
~^^112^^ Ibid., p. 499.
~^^113^^ Ibid., p. 33.
~^^114^^ Ibid., p. 501.
~^^115^^ See Robert Michels, Der Patriotismus. Prolegomena zu seiner soziologischen Analyse, Munich and Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1929, pp. 50, 51.
~^^116^^ See Robert Michels, Umschichtungen in den herrschenden Klassen nach dem
8-01532 113
Kriege, Stuttgart-Berlin, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1934, pp. III-IV.
~^^117^^ Ibid., pp. 113-14.
~^^118^^ Robert Michels, Sozialismus und Faschismus als politische Stromungen in Italien. Historische Studien. Vol. II, Munich, Meyer and lessen, 1925, p. 260.
~^^119^^ Robert Michels, 'Einige Materialen zur Geschichte und Soziologie des italienischen Hochschulwesens', Archiv }iir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, hrsg. von Emil Lederer, 60. Band, 3. Heft, Tubingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1928, pp. 565-66.
~^^120^^ See Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1967, pp. 175-76, 180.
~^^121^^ Ibid., pp. 118, 184, 234.
~^^122^^ Ibid., pp. 26, 37, 84, 90, 117, 206.
~^^123^^ Ibid., p. 260.
~^^124^^ Ibid., p. 269.
~^^125^^ Ibid., p. 300.
~^^126^^ Ibid., p. 314.
~^^127^^ Ibid., pp. 209-11.
~^^128^^ Ibid., p. 209.
~^^129^^ See Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 11, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1979, pp. 170-73; Karl Marx, 'The Class Struggles in France', Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 10, 1978, pp.- 48-50.
~^^130^^ Bentley, op. cit., pp. 205, 229, 359, 371.
[114] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER TWO __ALPHA_LVL1__ US POLITICAL SOCIOLOGYEarlier than elsewhere the new political science formed an independent academic discipline in the USA with a high degree of professionalism and specialisation, and with its own research methods. By 1973 it accounted for up to 60 branches, while by 1977 the number of research subjects in political sciences, including the American, had risen 8 times, the number of methods had doubled and data used had increased 20-fold over the 1952 level.
Political science in the USA is distinguished by a marked empirical orientation, reliance on sociological and socio-psychological methods and approaches. The systematic use within its framework of empirical methods of research into various aspects of political power and political behaviour has stimulated political sociology, which has become an influential area of both sociology and political science.
In scale of academic, research and practical activity, US political science has developed in leaps and bounds, far surpassing political sci-
8* 115
fences in other capitalist countries. In the mid1970s, half of all individual members of the International Political Science Association were Americans.' Back in 1950 the membership of the American Political Science Association stood at 5,100, while by 1974.it had grown to 15,631.~^^2^^
US political science is concentrated mainly in universities and is quite markedly academic in character. Over half the US political scientists combine lecturing with research. The number of politics departments in universities had reached 1340 by the mid-1970s.^^3^^
Besides university departments and research centres, political research is undertaken in specialised and governmental centres. Everywhere political scientists are drawn into practical politics and administration. Many are consultants in the federal agencies, in the administration of states and in various project organisations. In the mid-1970s, 10.5 per cent of political scientists were engaged in purely research work, while there were 16.5 per cent in management and state administration.~^^4^^ The interest of US ruling circles in obtaining all-embracing information and scientifically substantiated recommendations on various aspects of home and international policy produces intensive financing of political research by both federal government and private funds.
Among the leading political periodicals of the American Political Science Association, and of regional and departmental associations and sections are the following: The American Political Science Review, The Political Science Quarterly, Political Science, The Journal of Politics, The Western Political Quarterly, The Mid-West JourUS
nal of Political Science, The World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Public Opinion Quarterly and The Public Administration Review.
The widening sphere of research and rapid development of US political science are being accompanied not only by cooperation between political scientists and government representatives, but by substantial influence from political science on politics and the political sciences of Western countries and some developing states. By stimulating methodology within them, it is attracting the keen attention of Western specialists to assessment of prospects for promoting political science generally.
Despite the efforts of scientologists in American political science to turn it into a purely experimental discipline, its principal function has always been the political socialisation of citizens in bourgeois-liberal values, putting across to them the aims and standards of bourgeois-democratic political culture and loyalty to existing political institutions. It is this that determines the ideological and apologist role of US political science.
The enumerated facts testify to the intricate and multifaceted nature of contemporary American political science, its national specifics. That is why the following assessment given by the British political scientist Bernard Crick over 20 years ago is still apposite: 'The study of politics in the United States today is something in size, content and method unique in Western intellectual history.'~^^5^^
Modern US political science is a product of an extensive evolution. Its establishment and formation as academic discipline is inseparable from the whole complex of socio-political changes that
H7
have taken place in the USA over the decades since the North's victory in the American Civil War. One of the vital stimulants of its development has been the emergence of a new system of university education in the country and the impact of European political-legal, historical and sociological thought. The term 'political science' initially had extensive and indeterminate significance, including political philosophy, political economy, law and political history. Together with the growth in specialisation and professional training in universities in the latter part of the last century, the study of politics gradually took a hold as an independent university discipline, although organisationally and methodologically it was closely associated with philosophy, constitutional law and history.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, the historical orientation of political science was particularly marked; its leading lights were such well-known historians as Herbert B. Adams, John W. Burgess and Andrew White. Being in some degree under the influence of European positivist philosophy, some of them tried to apply ideas of evolutionism to political history. They studied problems of the state and politics in a comparative-historical and legal way and in a context of the political evolution of state-legal and political institutions, linked up with the idea of historical progress.~^^6^^ Although a descriptive approach dominated such research, it did reflect the aspiration of its authors to get away from the literarynarrative method of reminiscences and rewriting and, as opposed to philosophical cogitations on the state and politics, to give credence to analysis of historical facts and data as a necessary con-
118dition for obtaining new knowledge. In imitation of European scholars and under the impact of Darwinism and positivist sociology, the founders of political science saw the comparative historical method as the principal method of discovering the laws of politics. On the other hand, however, they ignored socio-economic and class factors. The formal principles of bourgeois constitutionalism and democracy in its Anglo-- American version served them as a standard for political development and historical progress associated with it.
The historical situation that had formed in the USA on the eve of and during the country's entry into the era of monopoly capitalism, the developing activity of the muckrakers and the bourgeois-reformist Progressive movement in which many academic political scientists were involved, the philosophical-epistemological consequences of the methodological crisis in bourgeois historicism and the rise in the USA of the philosophy of pragmatism all affected the professional arid methodological profile of American political science. The erstwhile methodological orientation was too abstract, f ormal and descriptive to elaborate principles of reforms in such crucial areas as the state apparatus, government, political leadership and the electoral system. Fresh issues and interests of practical politics paved the way for a weakening of European influence, the steady erosion of a historical orientation and the shift of attention to analysis of contemporary, real-life state-political structure and the informal processes within it: public opinion, pressure groups, etc. At the start of the era the `realist' tendency in political science began to manifest itself increasing-
ly strongly; it subsequently took a firm hold in the works of Bentley, W. Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Charles Beard, Lawrence Lowell, Henry Jones Ford and Albert Hart. The process of selfdetermination in political science and its incipient Americanisation came to a head with the setting up in 1903 of the American Political Science Association, proclaiming the need for a realistic development of the discipline. At the same time, the historical and legal approaches continued to hold on to their firm positions in political research whose central subject matter remained description of the activity of the state and constitutional law.
Further progress in political science was accelerated by the unprecedented growth in the state apparatus and executive power following World War I, the effect of socialist revolution in Russia and the deepening crisis of capitalism, the Great Depression and Roosevelt's New Deal, and the conversion of bourgeois-democratic institutions in several European states into fascist and authoritarian regimes. In the interwar period students of politics in the USA were stimulated by the mounting need to study conditions that would maintain the political stability of American capitalism, enhance the efficiency of the state administration and shore up bourgeois democracy.
In the context of the new practical tasks and research interests, sociological and particularly socio-psychological approaches were becoming increasingly popular. The regeneration of earlier attempts to build political science on the model of the natural sciences, using the new methodology, and to focus its attention on analysing political behaviour is patently evident,
120In the 1920s and 1930s this new methodological orientation is associated with the work of Charles Merriam and Harold D. Lasswell. As a scientific method for studying politics they took from experimental psychology the idea of the paradigm, suggested by L. L. Thurstone who saw the basis for studying individual behaviour in attitude. Attitudes could be measured on a scale and through a study of opinions obtained in questionnaires and interviews. Thurstone's paradigm of experimental psychometrics heralded the birth in political research of an entire movement known under the name `behaviourist'.^^7^^ Its initiators and their followers, belonging mainly to the Chicago School in American political science, proclaimed the vital need to study human behaviour in institutions, groups and in the political process as a whole. In this, they set their main sights on analysing political power and the political process rather than the state.
Chiding political science for its lack of a scientific approach, Merriam argued in his early work that it was possible to overcome that defect by closely integrating it with other sciences. He developed his argument in New Aspects of Politics.~^^8^^ Political science, he thought, should more widely rely on related sciences and especially on data obtained through empirical sociological methods. He attributed particular importance to prospects for integrating political science with medicine, psychiatry and psychology.^^9^^ He asserted that politics and psychology existed for settling a socio-political or military conflict, not for lessening it. He viewed politics research issues in a wider context---of science and progress, the self-realisation of all that was best in human
121beings. Merriam sounds a note of trepidation, no doubt caused by the socio-political situation of the 1920s and 1930s and a premonition of military catastrophe. Reliance on science and a pragmatic view of reality, the desire to bring politics together with science all rub shoulders with moral values and objectives. His approach to the scientific nature of political analysis bears the stamp of subjectivism. He makes no bones about linking his criterion of science in politics with its ability to serve American bourgeoisdemocratic values and principles and to act as an instrument for improving American democracy, which he associates with scientific progress and a sort of scientific `truth' in the social sphere, with the optimum variant of political relations. All the same, Merriam was opposed to the blatant conversion of political science into a weapon of ideology. Firm in his belief that the efficiency of American democracy and its improvement had to be based on scientific search, and not a moral gospel, he objectively advocated scientism in political science and apologism in politics.
George Catlin took a more radical and openly scientistic position on the scientific role of political science in his work Science and Method of Politics.^^10^^ He favoured a pure science of politics free from philosophical and political values. His thesis that power is the essence of politics and that political science should be value-free and deal primarily with the study of political power was shared by many representatives of the new orientation.
Behaviourist empirical research into power and political behaviour is concentrated 'on studying
parties, pressure groups, elections and public opinion. Such research includes the work of E. Herring, Harold Gosnell, Arthur Holcombe, Holton Odegard, Stuart Arthur Rice and E. E. Schattschneider. And interest in using quantitative analytical methods began to grow. u
The same period saw the early elaboration of the behaviourist theory of politics, whose development in the 1930s was associated with the name of Merriam's pupil, Harold Lasswell. In trying to .establish a scientific theory of political power and political behaviour that would help to manage social processes, Lasswell turned to the Freudian approach and formulated a theory of political psychoanalysis. His principal premises were set forth in the works Psychopathology and Politics and Power and Personality.~^^12^^
In the book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Lasswell examines problems of political power and its delegation in society. He defines his approach to politics as 'the study of influence and the influential'. I3 Elites whose political influence depends on the ways they manipulate the environment are the prime subject of political power-holding. In his wartime book Democracy Through Public Opinion he abandons his elitist view of political power for its assessment in the context of the bourgeois-democratic political process, seeing public opinion and its study as important sources and conditions of democratic government and legitimacy. In later works, such as Analysis of Political Behaviour, he advocated a separation of behaviourist method from value judgements and the personal preference of the political scientist, viewing its enhanced effectiveness in the wide use of quantitative analysis.
123During the 1930s behaviourist leanings and their fierce opposition to historical and legal studies widened the divide between traditionalists and behaviourists, leaving less and less room for any compromise over method between them. This divide was accompanied by an absolutisation of empiricism by the behaviourists in political science and their contempt for theoretical generalisations, for the attainments of American historians and legal experts in concrete-historical and juridical analysis of state and political issues. After World War II, behaviourism became entrenched in US political science. The Chicago School played a key part in this; that was where the leading political scientists of the 1950s and 1960s received their political training. During this period the term `behaviourism' gained universal scientific coinage.
Behaviourism in political science is a methodological orientation whose objective is to analyse all phenomena of state administration through people's observable behaviour. u In the behaviourist view, through studying actual behaviour one can establish the intentions and motivation of whole groups as well as the individuals. Its proponents proclaimed the guiding principles of behaviourist political science to be scientific neutrality, reliance on data obtained through selective empirical surveys, content analysis, etc., their strict systematisation and mathematical processing, the precise formulation of hypotheses and their empirical testing.
Behaviourist political science was clearly influenced by such sociological works as The American Soldier by Paul Lazarfeld and S. A. Stouffer, Voting by H. Gaudet and Bernard
124Berelson, and Lazarleld's The People's Choice, all dealing with elections and voting behaviour, and by the sociology and political science of S. Rokkan, Robert Merton and Seymour Lipset.
The integration of political science and sociology and social psychology led to the formation of political sociology whose representative focused their main attention on studying the interrelationships between political processes and the social environment, the study of social structure, socio-political institutions and processes, groups and various informal aspects of politics. Much store was put by the study of political motivation for individual and group behaviour.
Behaviourist methodology and theory developed through a sociological analysis of the behaviour of voters and public opinion (V. 0. Key), political leadership and elites (Lasswell), political socialisation (Robert E. Lane, David Easton and Jack Dennis) and political recruitment (Joulot), political culture (Almond, Verba and Pye), legislative institutions (Loewenberg, Young, Matthews), political parties (Austin Ranney and Herbert McClosky), bureaucracy (La Palombara) and decision making (Herbert Simon).
The theoretical and empirical study of pressure groups in American politics gained most attention. In the postwar period US political scientists discovered Arthur Bentley's theory, which provoked a powerful stream of articles and books on interest groups and their behaviour. Elaboration of group theory was accompanied by intensive empirical studies. Meanwhile, the lack of coincidence between the results of these studies and the theoretical models of the political process were becoming more and more apparent.
125 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. EMPIRICAL THEORIES OFDavid Truman's The Governmental Process 15 was one of the most typical theoretical studies of the American political process and behaviour using the group approach in postwar behaviourist political science.
Truman believed that a study of politics is above all a study of power relations. To comprehend these complex relations better he suggested resorting to interest group theory consisting of three principal ideas and three additional theoretical premises.
In the first three concepts he puts `group', 'potential- group' and `equilibrium'. A group, in his definition, is a multitude of individuals interacting among themselves with a certain degree of frequency.^^16^^ Interaction is the key concept in defining the group; he divides the `group' itself into simply `group' and 'interest group'. Typical of each of them is an interest determined by the principal aims of group members. A peculiar feature of the interest group is its demands on other groups set out on the basis of the fundamental aims of its members for forming and strengthening certain types of behaviour.~^^17^^
The potential group is a conglomerate of individuals with certain common positions, but individuals - who are not interacting (and that means not representing an actual group) as long as they do not perceive in the actions of other groups any intrusion on their common interest.18 In some cases potential groups can Represent the interests of local significance, in others wider
126interests that come from common moral and value ideals and principles of society (belief in democracy, civil rights and liberties and other values imperatives). In the latter event potential groups establish the so-called rules of the game according to which various groups ought to act and construct their internal organisation.^^19^^
When types of interaction between groups contain a relatively high degree of stability they attain a state of equilibrium.
Proceeding from these concepts, Truman formulates three additional premises: socio-political, psychological and general for the first and second. First, society ought to be seen as interacting groups, and the political process as a group struggle for control over the distribution of resources. Interest groups act through the medium of state-political institutions which are a reflection of the group struggle and therefore dependent on their activity. Second, group interaction is the main source of political aims the determination of which depends on how effectively the political scientist can spot the individual's group allegiances. The group may impose its norms on the individual through his interaction with other members of the group, but he is more likely to perceive these norms in aspiring, consciously or unconsciously, to belong to the group. And, finally, interaction at all levels has a tendency to equilibrium and stability. According to this third premise the political process is seen as a cycle of interconnected acts: an infringement upon former models of interaction causes reaction from the group which is accompanied by firmer activity by its members aimed at reestablishing the previous equilibrium or creating
127a new one.^^20^^ This activity, in turn, disrupts the models of interaction of other individuals and groups until a new equilibrium is established on all levels as a result of this fluctuating process. Truman sees the relative stability of the US bourgeois-democratic system, first, in that Americans simultaneously can be members of several groups and therefore can have a host of intermingling interests. Second, their membership in potential groups that set the rules of the game facilitates this stability.^^21^^
Truman underlines the decisive part played by socio-political aims of group members as primary in determining the existence of interest within a group, of the group itself and the nature of its demands on other groups. These aims are determined, according to his theory, not by the group's social affiliation to certain strata and classes, but by the individual's psychological adherence to group norms. In viewing groups and their interaction as the source of these aims, Truman ignores the issue of more fundamental and multifarious social factors forming group norms, whose importance Bentley emphasised. So the group differentiation of participants in the political process, typical of modern bourgeois society, appears in Truman's theory as a purely psychological phenomenon rather than a reflection of deeper-going social processes taking place in the socio-class structure of that society.
If, according to Truman, the group is identified through attitudes, and aims come from the group, then we have an obvious contradiction in his theoretical system. His explanation for the relative stability of US political institutions is rather unconvincing, particularly when he at-
128tributes it to what he claims is participation of Americans in potential groups. He avers that the source of aims that lie behind interests combining people in a group are the groups themselves, while the potential group is essentially made up of aims that only potentially may take shape in a group. What happens is that aims precede the appearance of groups. Thus, Truman's potential group cannot serve as a category explaining the stability of American political institutions.
Truman says nothing on the structure of attitudes which shape the group interest, on why the content of political culture in particular groups acquires different forms and can alter at different times. The concept of `equilibrium' does not work when it comes up against the political reality of America; Truman's theory nonetheless puts equilibrium as well as stability, as prime methodological and practical force. In his concept, state institutions whose job is to regulate relations between groups are unjustifiably deprived of relative independence and merely reflect the interests of various pressure groups in their activity.
Because it flies in the face of logic, Truman's theoretical system is largely inapplicable for analysis, generalisation and elucidation of empirical material which he cites in his work. When he attempts to explain the cause of the variety of pressure groups in different societies and at different times, in many cases he confines himself merely to general hypotheses and turns to other theoretical and methodological approaches.
Robert A. Dahl proposes a more differentiated approach to the power mechanism. His concept, based on the results of empirical study of the
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political process carried out in the city of Haven, was set out in Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.'^^2^^'^^2^^' This followed an article by Dahl criticising C. Wright Mills's power elite model.^^23^^ Dahl's position has to be seen in the light of this critique, rejecting the existence of a uniform power elite in the USA, and the discussion of ithe social, economic and, political sources of influence and power in Amer* ican society.
Like Bentley and Truman, Dahl analyses politics through the prism of interaction of interest groups representing a collection of individuals with common values, aims and demands. He singles out both relatively stable groups and groups liable to fluctuation. Besides, interest groups differ in their stability depending on the areas in which they are influential.^^24^^ In Dahl's view, political initiative and real political influence come not from the group itself but from its leader relying on the support of a narrow circle of people. Although certain groups are interested in that policy and their support is important for the ruling elite, the groups themselves generally take a back seat.
Dahl's view of the limited nature of influence that stable interest group-institutions exert takes the form of a theoretical generalisation in his subsequent arguments. At the same time, he stresses the immense influence on the governing process of a resourceful, experienced leader who knows how to employ his resources to the maximum, and for whom other group members are merely agents of his policy.
In answering the question of w,ho actually governs, Dahl concludes that none of the stable
130interest groups wliich he studied empirically in New Haven controlled the political process and the political system in the city, partly because of vacillations in the use of political resources. In his opinion, New Haven represented a pluralistic political system where a number of different sets of leaders governed, 'each having access to a different combination of political resources'.^^25^^
He transposes these conclusions to the American political process generally. In particular, he notes ithat most Americans taking part in political life in some way are chance participants, and their political activity depends on various circumstances. Most Americans, save in electoral campaign periods, take part in politics sporadically; he thereby refutes an analysis of `objective' and `unarticulated' interests, since they are unconnected, he claims, with observable purposive group activity.
In assessing the American political system as pluralist, Dahl is following in the footsteps of Bentley and Truman. Yet, like Truman, he does not accept Bentley's view of American politics as a process. But while Truman regards governmental institutions and organised groups as stabilising factors that facilitate equilibrium between groups, Dahl lays emphasis on the nature of the political regime in which institutions and groups act, as well as the activity of political leaders correlating with the norms of the regime. In Dahl's view of things, the norms and expectations of political strata are the source of loyal political behaviour by citizens and elites governing institutions and groups. He believes that the conduct of members of the political strata is subordinate to the norms
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of the bourgeois-democratic regime and, in turn, upholds its operation in a pluralist form. He links these political norms with bourgeois-democratic values and rules of the game, and it is they that prevent certain groups from seizing political power. In so far as the behaviour of members of interest groups, in turn, is shaped by leaders, then here Dahl evidently parts company with Bentley. He deduces the factors stabilising pressure group activity from those structural elements of a political regime which Bentley regarded as only the `technique', the instruments by which pressure group interests were expressed and satisfied.^^26^^
A change in the form of political domination by no means signifies that the class essence of political power under capitalism has changed. Monopoly capital and its instrument---the state--- continue to be the real subject of power in bourgeois democracies. The power groups competing among themselves do not attack the fundamentals of the status quo, since they see in it a guarantee of their interests and are therefore interested in upholding its foundations. Further, their political behaviour depends not on `norms' or 'rules of the game', as Dahl thinks, but on their class interest, on that 'objective situation' whose mechanism of influence on the psychology of the political participant he refuses to analyse. While not denying the importance of socio-- economic factors in politics, he nonetheless groundlessly isolates from them values, norms, motives and attitudes of political leaders and elites and, in making an absolute out of them, turns psychological factors into motive forces of the political process. The accent he places on political
132stability and his search for its sources in values and norms of political participants, and particularly leaders, not only makes his work scientifically unconvincing and static, but also gives it an apologist tenor.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. DEMOCRACY THEORY ANDSeveral rival schools proposing contradictory concepts feature in American political science on the subject of democracy theory. The particular nature and trends in argumentation on democracy issues in the 1970s emanate from the dominant influence exerted by the `process' theory of democracy. As a political theory the contemporary American version of liberalism represents a hybrid doctrine comprising the ideas of classical bourgeois theory of democracy and the major tenets of pluralism. Classical bourgeois democracy theory was recognised as inadequate for modern political reality, devoid of methodological meaning and Utopian, in so far as it rested on metaphysical ideas of 'human nature' and 'harmony of interests'.^^27^^
Criticism of traditional concepts and searching for a 'scientific theory' led to the extensive use in American political science of the `process' version which has two variants: pluralist and elitist. Proponents of the former see democracy as a political mechanism regulating interaction between conflicting interests through various social groups having legal access to decision-making. Within the framework of the latter, democracy is seen as
133a political process ensuring th6 implementation of democratic principles of selection and of the operation of a political elite.
The basic issue of the process theory is to determine the conditions of stability of a political regime, the most important of which is formation of a political government on the basis of legitimate rules and procedures. This version, looked at from the conceptual viewpoint, is the result of applying behaviourist methodology for creating a `scientific' theory whose main criterion is the effectiveness of a political system. Scientism in American political science is expressed in the fundamental rejection of resolving substantive issues of politics, and in concentrating attention on creating operational methods of research and formal models of political systems. Traditional values problems of democracy theory are replaced by purely functional problems analysed from positions of political behaviourism.
The advocates of process theory, by rejecting the basic principles of liberalism in the name of scientific neutrality, also forfeit a normative grounding for their modernised version of democracy. Some political scientists, although admitting that these principles are Utopian, reckon that they comprise the value-normative basis of1 empirical concepts of politics and that any rejection of them leads to a rupture between the historical, normative and empirical theories of the American political system.
The process version turned out to be incapable of responding to the crucial issues of political reality relating to the crisis of legitimacy in US bourgeois-democratic institutions and traditions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Occupied
mainly with the problem of stability, the process approach advocates without any grounds at all made the status quo synonymous with democracy, obviating the question of the nature of socio-political conflicts.
A number of American political scientists insist on the need to introduce a new normative theory (Leo Strauss, E. Meehan, Fred Frohock, Bruce Wright, etc.), although they do not agree about its content. The term `normative', in Wright's opinion, refers to political theory of a philosophical nature which establishes a number of rational criteria of obligation that define the value basis of a democratic system.^^28^^ But the problem is that selection of those criteria depends on the nature of that philosophical doctrine which is supported by one or another political scientist of the normative strain. Today the content of the works by the normativists is determined not so much by elaboration of political theory as by the struggle against the direct rival---positivism.
The major arguments against the positivist thesis of neutrality were set out in the 1950s by Leo Strauss and are currently shared by all normativists. All the same, this criticism, no matter how valid, does not remove the theoretical weakness of normativism itself emanating from the bourgeois-idealist understanding of ' democratic values'.
By reducing the history of political thought to contention between the value approach and neutralism, the normativists shy away from study of the social determinant of political 'theories, their link with the interests of particular classes and social groups. The class position of the nor-
mativists themselves is concealed behind a facade of 'moral polity' that demands subordination of the political process to universal, in reality bourgeois moral principles.^^29^^ At the present time most American political scientists prefer to use empirical theories of politics which contain no normative premises and do not go beyond the bounds of the process version.
Differences in the ideological attitudes of American political scientists have given rise to four concepts of the democracy theory: 1. pluralism, 2. democratic elitism, 3. neoelitism, 4. a left-wing radical conception of the 'ruling class'.
The fierce debate between elitism and pluralism began with the book by the well-known sociologist C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956), and has focused ever since mainly on the issues of power. The American sociologist William Kornhauser singled out five dimensions of power by which the hostile sides take different positions: 1. structure; 2. changes in the structure; 3. operation of the structure of power; 4. bases; and 5. consequences of the realisation of power.~^^30^^
Pluralists defend the thesis on power dispersion among interest groups in the American political system, and legislative, governmental and judiciary agencies are viewed as special groups possessing special functions. The political scientist Darryl Baskin reduces the notions of the pluralists on the US political system to three aspects: 1. the proliferation of voluntarist-- instrumental forms of associational life and the assumption of public functions by private groups; 2. the institutional and territorial fragmentation of formal public authority and the decentralisa-
tion of informal patterns of political activity; 3. the penetration and reintegration of this pluralised pattern of power by a select portion of the associational universe.^^31^^ The structure of political power is identified, therefore, with the structure of group activity, so the sphere of concrete research into politics is confined by the formal processes of decision-making and the institutions supporting them. The pluralist concepts of democracy represented, for example, in the works of Truman, Earl Lathem or Dahl came out of generalisations of fragmentary knowledge of those processes in the institutions of the US political system.
Criticism of pluralism occurs on two planes, demonstrating (a) the theoretical and empirical inadequacy of interest group theory and (b) the futility of attempts to turn group theory into a general democracy theory. This criticism rests on many facts that are being hushed up by 'group dogma', particularly on the hierarchy of the structure of groups, their unequal status in the political process and the existence of a bloc between the legislative, governmental and group elites.
Serious flaws in the pluralist methodology were revealed during discussion on problems of correlating the concepts of `public' and ' governmental' politics, the implementation of power through `non-decision-making' and specification of power relations in various areas of the political process. One aspect of this discussion was the concept of the role of elites in the political process; this was suggested by the American political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratg in the early 1960s. They showed that the
137ability of elites to get their interests realised was ensured both by affecting the decision-making process and by controlling the content of issues that reach the level of government. The alternatives that could threaten the vital interests of elites are not allowed to enter legitimate political activity, and non-decision-making therefore became an important means of implementing authority. Critics of pluralism used this approach to analyse the activity of the US government and legislative hierarchy in key areas of public politics.
In the study of political power structure the pluralist decision-making method was counterposed to the `position' method whose prime task was to determine the power positions within institutions that hold political power and supremacy. The pluralist concept was established by using uncoordinated information on decisionmaking in various parts of the gigantic mosaic of the American political process; moreover, pluralists did not try to analyse the qualitative specifics of decisions at various levels. Their critics put forward as a criterion the 'type of problems' whose resolution has a direct bearing on the socio-political system as a whole. With its help they can determine the central authority institutions, their role in the political process, and the range of people occupying command positions in them and their socio-economic and cultural characteristics.
As they studied the hierarchical power structure they noticed the inability of pluralism to explain major political phenomena typifying the contemporary stage of US bourgeois democracy. American political science was therefore faced
with the problem of the actual role and functions of groups that hold the top positions in the socio-political hierarchy. The political scientists Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone write, 'The concept of political elites presents special problems to democratic societies. There is the initial difficulty encountered on the philosophical level: how to reconcile the fact of elite rule with the normative tradition stressing self-government, popular sovereignty, and related democratic values. Then there are the practical, institutional difficulties: how to devise political institutions which ensure that elites govern in accord with preferences and needs of the broader population.'~^^32^^
Many scholars try to reconcile bourgeois-- democratic values and the functions of the political elite. Thus, the concept of 'democratic elitism' recognises the elitist nature of political power in Western democracy and maintains that the principles of democracy are ensured through open competition among elites with the support of various social groups and the opportunity for opposition groups to dispute the conduct of government. Further, the study of problems of recruitment, responsibility and circulation of the political elite has shown a direct dependence between social stratification and elite recruitment (20 per cent of the US population that fall within the `wealthy' category comprise 90 per cent of the political elite). The prevailing inequality in 'democratic recruitment' is linked to characteristics of family, status, sex, race, education and ideology. In the opinion of the 'democratic elitists', democracy does not mean abolition of elites; it replaces the principle of biological repro-
139duction of political leadership by principles of talent, education and attainment.
Decision-making is described as a process of concensus of elite positions---i. e., negotiations among various groups; and two main models of elite circulation are identified: modification and coercion (revolution). The political history of the USA, in the view of bourgeois political scientists, coincides with the first model and includes economic, cultural, demographic and technological change in American society.
In the concept of 'democratic elitism' the essence of elite supremacy is supplanted by elite effectiveness. American political scientists see the principal purpose of elites in ensuring the stability of the US socio-political system. For example, Robert Presthus argues that the stability of the US and Canadian political systems depends on successful accommodation between three elites---the legislative, bureaucratic and the interest group leadership. Elite accommodation, in his view, depends on the functional demands of the first two elites for information, expertise and. ideological backing from the third. 'Despite the assumptions of classical democratic theory, some such delegation of authority, legitimacy, and power to ruling elites has been found necessary in most political systems. The conception of elite accommodation used here rests directly upon this common social imperative.'^^33^^
There is no concerted opinion within the framework of 'democratic elitism' on composition, functions and characteristics of elites. Some variants come close to neoelitism.
The neoelitists are among the opponents of pluralism. They maintain, not without grounds,
140that the pluralist concept of power is a hidden form of elitism; at the same time they assert that pluralism essentially differs from the fundamental principles of the classical bourgeois theory of democracy.^^34^^ American political science should, in their opinion, free itself from that contradiction. The neoelitist model of power structure proceeds from the concept of a 'ruling elite', conspicuous by a relative unity and by special functions. The neoelitists have undertaken studies of formal positions of authority in the dominant institutions of three sections of interests---corporate, governmental and public interest (education system, funding organisations, etc.).^^35^^ These studies have shed light on certain aspects of the concentration of 'authority and control' in the US political system and have provided the neoelitists with additional arguments in the debate about which of the two models--- the 'ruling elite' or the 'plural elite'---more adequately reflects the real structure of political authority. The neoelitist interpretation of democracy rests on the fundamental thesis that the ruling elite in the USA is more consistent, rational and energetic in implementing the ideals of democracy than the wide mass of the American public. Thus, Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler write, 'Elite theory suggests that elites are distinguished from the masses not only by their socio-economic background but also by their attitudes and values. Elites give greater support to the principles and beliefs underlying the political system.'^^36^^ Neoelitism, therefore, makes no bones about its stake on the wisdom of the elite and openly defends the need for it to control the US socio-political system.
141By contrast with neoelitism, left-radical ' ruling class' theorists (C. Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff, R. Young, A. Wolfe, etc.) take a dim view of the role of the top strata of the US socio-political hierarchy. Ruling class seizure of control over the major areas of economic, social and political life is seen as the chief cause of the decline of democracy. Mills formulated the basis of this concept---the sociology of power and leadership. He and his followers erroneously suppose that the Marxist concept of power cannot apply to modern 'mass society' with its intricate system of stratification and new forms of 'social apathy'. On the other hand, they are unhappy about reducing politics to the decisionmaking process, typical of pluralism. Hence their attempt to lay a new path in political sociology.
The eminent sociologist Irving Horowitz, for example, believes that the fresh prospect for that discipline lies in an analysis of the interaction of economic, governmental and military elites among themselves and with the system of social stratification.^^37^^
The notions of power and leadership sociology reflect certain real processes that determine the content of the present-day political system in the USA. The political elite plays the part of the command centre in the power mechanism. It incorporates the leaders of the biggest industrial corporations and people who occupy the top posts in the legislative, governmental and military hierarchies and in the sector of public interest (leaders of influential interest groups, legal firms, private universities, foundations, etc.). Inasmuch as each of these hierarchies represents
142a certain functional unity, the groups of people who direct them can be viewed as functional elites which, in the process of interaction, form corresponding segments of a national political elite. In order effectively to have their way the US monopoly bourgeoisie has brought into being a series of formal and informal institutions which ensure effective communication and interaction among these segments.
Domhoff defines the governing class as a ' social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth.'~^^38^^ The power elite is, he believes, 'active, working members of the upper class and high-level employees in institutions controlled by members of the upper class. The power elite has its roots in and serves the interests of the social upper class.'~^^39^^ He therefore departs from Mills's basic idea of three power centres in the US political system and conies close to the Marxist position.
Contemporary bourgeois democracy in the USA is seen by critical political scientists as a system of political institutions organised to ensure the domination of the governing class. From that standpoint they subject to a critical analysis the designation and operation of various elements of the system---political parties, Congress, the executive power, the court system, the legal system, etc.~^^40^^
From the point of view of power relations any political system in the West is characterised by a certain type of communication between the political elite and social groups that have no access to the decision-making process. The stability of political systems to a considerable extent depends on the ability of political elites to guar-
143antee backing for their actions from various social groups whose interests do not coincide. One of the most dubious assertions of pluralism was that stability of bourgeois democracy in the USA was ensured by `consensus'---adherence of Americans to common political values irrespective of their social status. To defend that argument a theory of political culture was worked out with numerous empirical investigations undertaken. In successfully refuting the 'democratic consensus' notion, the left radicals meanwhile wrongly evaluate the class content of bourgeois democracy and its dependence on the specific correlation of class forces. In their view, the chief function of the 'pseudodemocratic process' in the USA is to integrate the conservative masses (by that they mean the US working class in the first place), which supposedly share common stabilising requirements of state monopoly capitalism. They write of the formation in the lower social structure of an 'inert society', the object of political and ideological manipulation by the power elite. Analysis of the power concentration processes comprises a strong part of the critical concept of the ruling class, but its weakness and limitation stem from the criticism of US bourgeois democracy resting on the ideals of pettybourgeois humanism.
American political scientists try to establish a common theory of democracy that is adequate for empirical study of political power and, at the same time, takes account of the principal traditions of bourgeois-democratic philosophy. They link this task's solution with a reorientation of political science and sociology towards elitism. Despite the proliferation of variants, it does
144have two mutually-connected elements. First, its proponents think it possible to use descriptive empirical concepts of elite (as opposed to value, ideological concepts) that are supposed to have no ideological weighting and intended only to explain the actual role of elites in the American political process. Second, they endeavour to find a `democratic' (in contrast with the totalitarian) version of elitism, and logically and empirically to substantiate it. That is how there appeared the concept of 'procedural democracy' (Prewitt) and `polyarchy' (Dahl).^^41^^ The degree of criticism of the 'elitist-democratic system' depends on the ideological stance of the particular scholar. But American political science, with the exception of the 'ruling class' concept, unambiguously puts the responsibility for continuing stability and modernisation of the US political system on the elite groups of American society.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. TECHNOCRATIC CONCEPTS OFThe increase in political demand for professional knowledge and the mounting prestige of experts in policy forming have encouraged the idea that experts are steadily becoming agents of power as well as knowledge in the modern state with its infinitely more complex political life. Bourgeois ideologists have spoken of the onset of a 'scientific civilisation' in which science and technology are seen as becoming the main motive force of social and political development. The arising power and management system has come to be called a technocracy, a managerial society, the scientifically run state, etc.
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The rise of technocratic notions coincided partly with the strong shifts and breakthroughs in scientific and technological spheres that have been termed the scientific and technological revolution. In the course of these changes the role of scientific management has markedly grown in regulating social relations, in working out a concrete policy and social administration. The idea of technocratic government became popular and desirable above all to members of management and to their propagandists from among ecpnomists, sociologists and scientific management theorists.
Relying on the myth created by bourgeois economists that a transfer of economic power has taken place from owners to managers and shareholders, bourgeois propaganda began energetically to support the idea that capitalism had entered a new phase of its evolution---that of the conciliation of class antagonisms, relating chiefly to a scientific `rationalisation' of socio-political and economic activity. Science, technology and omnipotent `technocracy' in the shape of managers, planners and consultants on social policy were proclaimed to be the heroes of the ' managerial revolution'.
The positivist orientation of `behavioural' sociology in the USA between 1940 and 1970 largely facilitated the spreading of a technocratic frame of mind among theoreticians of state management (Simon) and 'scientific democracy'. They maintained that the decision-making process, being based on experimental data and observations, was capable of providing Western democracy with a scientific rationale and efficiency. 'Scientific democracy' was in effect as a by-
146product of a scientistic ideology, at foot positivist, with all the methods inherent in it: the cult of rationalism and efficiency, antihistoricism and externally dispassionate political attitudes.
In the last two decades or so American literature has produced several variants of political management of society and the state, presupposing the transfer of power to specialists, the extensive use of scientific research, etc.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 'end of ideology' notions of Edward Shils, Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset depicted America as a welfare state in which salient political problems were resolved, the ideological antagonisms had vanished and been replaced by a higher, more rational 'sociological consciousness' that was being used in industrial and state management. Subsequently, in the circumstances of crises in US politics in the 1960s and 1970s, which demonstrated the incompetence of notions about the declining role of ideology, the theory of 'postindustriai society' was put forward. It linked up the thesis of the growing role of theoretical knowledge in managing society not so much with the 'end of ideology' as with the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution---the changes in technology, social structure and relations between government and the corporations.
In the view of the sociologist Benjamin S. Kleinberg we owe a debt to the end-of-ideology proponents for providing us with a theory of 'technocratic management' and an analysis of the rising `technocratic' class as one of the foundations of the postindustriai society. 'In contrast with Mills's concern about the concentra-
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lion of power in a bureaucratic society, the endof-ideologists looked upon the greatly expanded administrative apparatus of major institutions as an instrument of productive efficiency in industry, and as a means of equalitarian fairness, in politics and organisational life. In their eyes, the basic problems of industrial society had been solved: the classic poverty of the working classes had been overcome, the economic system had been stabilised, and the welfare of the marginal groups, of minorities and the residual poor, was administratively ensured.'^^42^^
End-of-ideology advocates emphasised both the unsuitability of traditional theories of government with popular assistance and political pluralism as a stable balance of group interests, and classical economic theories.
A specific trait of some American versions of technocratic theories is the notion of scientific management that has been around since the time of Frederick Taylor and has gradually become part of state administration. The idea of the elite nature of a ruling regime of technocrats forms another essential feature of the theories.
The growth and growing complexity of organisations under capitalist conditions in production, social services and state administration provides a rich hunting ground for technocratic illusions. An emphasis is made on a lack of information and competence among rank-and-file members of organisations. 'Many decisions cannot be made by individuals who are playing parts at the bottom level of the structure. They don't have the information to ascertain what the effects of the decision might be elsewhere in the structure.'~^^43^^
148Such a view runs into opposition from advocates of bourgeois individualism who emphasise the dehumanising effect of modern technology and business, and oppose the erroneous use of a scientific approach to human relations. They are in favour of a new type of manager or an organisation---a leader with humane views, going further than simply making production efficient and, moreover, able to carry those qualities through the pernicious atmosphere of business and mechanical bureaucracy. 'Despite the expanding use of computers and mathematical procedures, we are still unable to predict from past evidence the swings of political attitudes, business enterprise, consumer spending, birth rates, or fashions before change has already begun. We are but recording change, not predicting it.'Vi That was written by the economist J. Douglas Brown, Dean of Princeton University.
The idea of politics predominating over economics, along with that of capitalism as a technically and rationally organised society is one of the main postulates of the technocratic outlook. The theorists of postindustrial society include in the new 'technocratic class' a fairly wide spectrum of social groups and strata---top managerial personnel of the state and corr>orations, scholars, pnsnneers. technologists and intellectuals in the humanities. Among the technocrats of postindustrial society Daniel Bell includes 'the creative elite of scientists and the top professional administrator. . . . the middle class of engineers and the professorate; and the proletariat of technicians.' AK
By putting off the onset of technocratic society into the future, its proponents invariably be-
149come drawn into contemporary debates on the future of capitalism and thereby make a contribution to bourgeois manipulation of social consciousness in the crisis development of state-- monopoly capitalism.
The technocratic concepts serve to express the pretentions of administrative and scientific elites to a bigger say in running society. Their ideologists put forward the theory of 'mature development' in which they criticise the pluralists of the 1950s for seriously underestimating the role of the state in the political process and for ignoring new social strata (`classes') who are said to have considerable resources and influence over the political process (primarily managers and scholars in the academic system).
The exaggerated role of managers indirectly reflects also the growing part played by the top corporations in implementing political power within society and the state. Present-day multinationals, with their enormous financial and material resources, are beginning obviously to weary of even that symbolic state control that exists over their activity. It is in that context that one has to perceive the increasing clamour of protest against excessive srovernment regulation in tax policy, phrases about 'overgoverned society' and calls to return to laissez faire.
Furthermore, literary representatives of big business are beginning to put to doubt government ability to carry out an effective social welfare policy, trying to justify the expediency of transferring such concerns to the monopolies. They talk even of creeping socialism that is supposed to be steadily becoming a reality in the framework of some corporations.
150The social and political reality in such declarations lies not so much in a confrontation between the state and monopolies as in the further growth of the might of the monopoly elite to which representatives of the managerial elite are attaching themselves more and more closely through family and business ties.
The idea of expertocracy put forward by the sociologist Burnham Beckwith is typical of several concepts of technocracy. In particular he forecasts that at subsequent stages of the ' political evolution' of society (including socialism) democracy will be replaced by a government of experts selected not by the populace but by experts themselves or, rather, by their organisations. In Beckwith's view, experts are more talented, better educated and more experienced than politicians on particular issues.
He criticises liberal political ideology for a lack of consistent stages of political development. 'Capitalist political scientists now accept the theory of past political evolution, but they predict no new major political stage beyond democratic government. The most popular outline of such evolution is feudal monarchy, absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, democracy. ... I do not propose to question or revise it here. Rather I wish to discuss in detail a grossly neglected topic, namely the inevitable next stage in political evolution after democracy.^^146^^
In trying to open the curtains on the future, Beckwith, like most Western futurologists, merely projects into the future certain modern phenomena and tendencies. In dealing with the present he singles out the following factors in favour of a government of experts: growing
151complexity and proliferation of social problems, decline in interest in them from ordinary people, the high cost of electoral campaigns, and the ineluctable selfishness of politicians. Voters are so incompetent, Beckwith asserts, that they cannot distinguish an expert from a charlatan and serious advice from all manner of propaganda.~^^47^^
Rightly underlining that experts possess more specialised knowledge than voters and politicians, first, he wrongly sees this division of labour as eternal and immutable, second, he exaggerates the overall social functions of experts in Western society and their actual role in elaborating and implementing specific reforms. It is at least naive to suppose that experts may help reduce such painful and ugly processes as racial segregation and discrimination, or religious clashes and excesses, all interlaced into the fabric of the socio-political relations of bourgeois society.
In his futurologist forecasting Beckwith eclectically combines scienticratic illusions with political reformism. In explaining the motives of his critical attitude to the prevailing forms of democracy, he says plainly, 'My criticism of democracy is not conservative or reactionary, but evolutionary.'~^^48^^
In view of the success of the scientific and technological revolution, a discussion began among scientific intellectuals of the social and political consequences of applying electronics to governing people and social processes. Technocratically-minded specialists have talked of a computerised society, while their opponents talk of the threat of electronic fa seism., Not very long ago the French scholar of technocratic problems,
152Jean Meynaud, noted that one should not blame machines for alienation which has its roots in the political passivity of ordinary people and, deep down, in the relations between different social groups. 'If an electronic fascism does arrive, it is the human community or, rather, the ruling class, that has the task of deciding the way ahead, and not a mechanical apparatus, no matter how much it is accorded responsibility for such a degradation.'~^^49^^
The advocates of a pressing use of computers in state administration discuss, for example, the prospect of voting from home by telephone, but under the supervision of computers (on the grounds of security and for avoiding double voting). 'Voting from the home is a technical possibility, and perhaps will be implemented in some countries before the end of the century,' James Martin and Adrian Norman write. ' Continuous computerised referendums on all matters of public importance may appear to be the logical extension of Western democracy, but if attempted, would almost certainly be its ultimate downfall! Could any political system survive the volatility of ill-educated public opinion? The computerised society must steer a narrow course between automation of democracy and automation of tyranny.'~^^50^^
Holtan Odegard, political scientist and expert in applying science to state administration, shares the same idea. In his The Politics of Truth, he puts forward the idea of 'science in administration' which, in his view, best conforms to the age of science. The scientific revolution, he says, has led to a sharp break with previous historical human experience manifest, for example, in the
153insoluble crisis of democracy and the spasms of the big stick politics. Only science can clean out the Augean stables of democratic politics; already now it has to start experimental work on human material in numerous laboratories of scientific administration. Science cannot find answers to all questions, but it does provide the means for doing so.
Thanks to science, the political process, in Odegard's view, and relationships of a moral nature can become a means of effective social control. The existing forms of elections do not provide a genuine mechanism reliable enough for producing leaders. The erosion of the foundations of property in present circumstances is also leading to the degradation of power, since a person without property is just like a piano-player without a piano.
Such are the brightest hues of Odegard's technocratic eloquence. What is also notable is his principal thesis that political science will take on an important role as an 'all-pervasive social science' in the course of 'necessary changes for the better'. 'As democracy develops into an experimental method for improving thought, action, feeling and purpose, coming into its proper role as the broadest, most generalised, and comprehensive inquiry (comprising even the environmental sciences as a sub-category), political science will emerge as the queen among the social sciences.*B1
An urge to adapt as much as possible scientific methods to the requirements of social and political practice actually becomes the propagation of power of the aristocracy of narrow professional knowledge, the further perpetuation of
154the gap between the educated elite and the incompetent masses. Odegard's scientised political programme comes close to the aims of rightwing radical conservatism, the modern ultras. It, therefore, bears witness to the fact that the technocrats are today expressing a fairly wide spectrum of political demands and expectations, of different strains of bourgeois political reformism.
It should be noted that technocratic notions often receive support in official circles and government propaganda. Works of ideologists of technocratic reformism often cite the late President John Kennedy on the mainly technical nature of problems confronting modern society, and the United States in particular. 'What is at stake in our economic decisions today,' Kennedy said, 'is not some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the country with passion but the practical management of a modern economy.' In a reference to American's urgent economic problems, he went on to say that 'technical answers---not political answers---must be provided'.~^^52^^
Typical of liberal critics of technocracy is recognition of the popularity and growth in influence of specialists as a specifically new factor in the life of society and the state. Noting that specialists today have not yet comprised an integral part of the state machinery, Meynaud sees this as the result of the counter-action of mightier forces in which he includes civil servants and the social forces standing behind them. 'The spirit of the time, oriented on research into maximum productivity, is certainly favourable to the technocratic ideology. It is all the more important to identify the beneficiaries of that movement.'~^^53^^
155The American scholar Jeffrey Straussman writes, 'Technocratic experts help to narrow the contours of choice, provide options, and guide discussion. This does not imply that technocratic counsel is therefore dominant in the policy process.'~^^54^^ The present power-holders still follow the political recipe of Machiavelli---to listen to advice when they themselves wish to, and not when others will them to. And those advocates of technocratic politics are barking up the wrong tree, Straussman writes, if they think that the vast quantitative changes in the growth of knowledge and the administrative professions have already led to a qualitative shift in the power structure of advanced industrial societies.~^^55^^
Left-wing radicals unconditionally reject the opinion of the technocratic ideologists on the sensible and rational stratification of American society, where, the latter say, the most able and worthy officials come to the top of the pile. With more than a glance in the direction of Marxist criticism some of them aspire towards a deeper social analysis of the political administrative mechanisms of bourgeois society, to exposure of its fundamental contradictions. One example is the work of University of Virginia sociologist Randall Collins, The Credential Society, in which he studies material on the history of professional training to show the formation in the USA of a whole network of bureaucratic, political and technocratic sinecures that shape a parasitical administrative superstructure (the credential society) above the 'producing class'. 'The issue of credential stratification points at the central feature of occupational stratification today: property in positions. To restructure these
156would be a more fundamental economic revolution than any we have yet seen.'~^^56^^
The apologist essence of technocratic power and government concepts can be seen mainly in the way they reject out of hand the prospect of revolutionary renovation of capitalist society on socialist principles, which are declared to be excessive and outmoded. Proponents of these concepts maintain that class conflicts are no serious threat to the system, and that the main problem is conflict between capitalist owners and the technocracy that hankers after power.^^57^^
They thereby present merely another version of bourgeois illusions about the real tendencies of social development. Without providing any fundamental alternative to the existing power structure, the proponents of technocratic rule just tamper with the idea of dictatorship by the ruling minority and therefore find an enthusiastic welcome among those with real power.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. POLITICAL SYSTEMS SOCIOLOGYThe empirical study of power and political behaviour, as well as the 'middle level' theory, held sway in US political science immediately after World War II. In the late 1950s they were supplemented by the elaboration of general theoretical-methodological questions within the framework of behaviourism. The need to give careful thought to complex political reality and to produce practical policies, and also the logic of political science itself, were behind attempts to set up a universal, empirically proven theory of po-
157litics and political development, a key place in which would go to a comparative analysis of political processes.
The ideas of systems and structural-functional analysis, taken from sociology, formed the basis for this type of theory.
Within political science the sociological concept of Talcott Parsons's social system was transformed by David Easton, William Mitchell, Gabriel Almond and Karl Deutsch^^58^^ into the concept of 'political system' with its typical structural elements and functions.
From a general theoretical standpoint, the construction of a systems theory of politics useful for comparative analysis rests on the dichotomy between traditionalism and modernism. Comparison of political systems within this dichotomy is the result of the influence of the ideas of Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies and Talcott Parsons on American sociology and political science. In several cases the WeberianParsonian scheme is complemented by propositions from bourgeois classical political theory ('distribution of powers', 'rule of law', etc.) 59 and those of contemporary political pluralism.
During the 1960s Easton advocated the establishment of a general theory embracing the activity of both national and international political systems.^^60^^ As a prime task he set out an analysis of conditions necessary for the self-- survival of the political system; he thought it necessary to examine four basic categories: the political system, its environments, outputs and feedback.~^^61^^
He defines the political system 'as those interactions through which values are authoritatively
158allocated for a society*.^^6^^^ Its principal designation is to distribute those values and to get an absolute majority of the populace to accept that distribution. That is why political distribution of values rests on power and may be effected by coercive means. It is these functions that characterise the specific nature of the political system by comparison with the subsystems surrounding it and are 'the essential variables of political life'.~^^63^^ Easton's functionalist approach to determining the political system and politics is ahistorical. He skirts round questions concerning the origin and essence of the political system, its historical type, its relationship with the state, the social nature of decisions on distributing values, etc. Essentially, he provides no criteria for assessing the content of concrete politics in the concrete political system. Therefore, the concept of politics given by Easton actually prevents access to a study of the motive forces of politics, the political system and its institutions.
Being an `open' and `adaptive' system of behaviour, the political system, according to Easton, is influenced by the environment.^^64^^
With the help of regulating mechanisms, the political system develops response reactions to adapt itself to external conditions. Through these mechanisms it regulates its own behaviour, transforms and alters its internal structure. If the system does not take measures to avert the destructive influence of the environment disastrous for its normal operation and if the strains are so great that the authorities cannot make their decisions binding, then the political system can flounder. Easton's paramount idea is to preserve the system through adaptation. or> This has
159a quite obvious practical orientation and fits perfectly the policy of preserving and stabilising the US political system. That is why its political-cum-ideological function quite unambiguously lies behind the outer appearence of value neutrality in Eastou's scheme of things. As the Soviet scholar V. Y. Chirkin has written, 'To preserve the system is Easton's foremost idea which, if we translate it into class language, means providing recipes for adapting the capitalist establishment to changing conditions.' B6
According to Easton, the exchange and interaction of the political system with the environment occur through the inputs and outputs. Input takes place in the form either of demands or of back-up. In the first instance it is opinion addressed to power agencies on desirable or undesirable distribution of values in society. Back-up ensures relative stability of power agencies which transform the demands of the environment into appropriate decisions and create the necessary conditions for using ways and means by which such a transformation is effected---i.e., for the normal operation of the political regime. Back-up plays an important part, too, in ensuring accord among members of the political community. The basic objects of back-up in the political system are the authorities, the regime and the political community.^^87^^
Easton's concept of power encompasses both formal political institutions and informal processes. The political regime is some general matrix of stable expectations, and by political community Easton means a group of people interconnected^ by division of political labour.
As a result of input a process occurs by which
160the environment affects the system, as a consequence of which there is a reaction---output--- i.e., authoritative decisions on distribution of values. Hence, the political process is a process of transformation of information, its transfer from input to output. Yet Easton says nothing about the social content of that information, he skirts round the question of the need to pinpoint material interests lying behind demands on the input level. In reacting to environmental signals, political systems simultaneously make changes in society and support stability. And while changeability in their activity is a secondary functional characteristic, survival and self-- preservation are their principal features.
Replacement of the concept of state by that of political system made it possible to identify a number of informal mechanisms in the operation of the modern state. Recognition by several Western political scientists of the dynamism of the political system, the need for empirical study of its functions at the levels of `possibility', `transformation', `preservation' and `adaptation' signified an orientation on studying the processes of its adaption to contemporary political dynamics. However, the processes of change and development in political systems are reduced either to the system returning to its previous state or to the establishment of a new equilibrium of the system, and key attention is focused on the problem of functioning, stability, and survival of political systems.^^68^^ A view of stages of evolution and development merely as different phases of change in structure and the divorce of structural-functional analysis from scientific historicism do not resolve the problem of a
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change from one type of political system to another.
The orientation on functioning and stability, precluding any search for fundamental sources of development, largely reflects the ideological content of the structural-functional analysis in bourgeois sociology and political science, the rejection of any analysis of real social contradictions in society. This orientation is due to the traditionally reformist function of non-Marxist science of society with its inherent evolutionist conception of social development, which rejects the class struggle and revolutionary changes in society as decisive motive forces of the historical process.
Behind the systems concepts of American political scientists lie extremely formalised models of a political system which are incapable of providing any understanding of the concrete historical, socio-political processes. By contrast, a dialectical-materialist understanding of politics takes account of its connection with class interests and the class struggle, with the relationships of classes and social strata on the subject of state power. As the founders of MarxismLeninism demonstrated, political organisation arises together with the division of society into classes and the appearance of the state.^^69^^ A class approach enables one to establish the historical type and class essence of a political system and its structural elements. If you reject an analysis of the class essence of politics and political power, you tend to identify political authority with power relations generally. Meanwhile, being a key concept of political theory, political power has a historical socio-class nature and is
162characterised by the real ability of a class, group and individual to carry out its or his will expressed in politics and legal norms.^^70^^ Such an approach to the study of politics also involves a concrete analysis of specific political situations and takes into account the intricate nature of politics as a social phenomenon, having both structural and functional aspects.
The ahistorical patterns of a political system provided by Easton and other American systems analysis theorists, which are distinguished by their abstract and formalised approach, are of little use for a concrete analysis of political life or for building an adequate general theory of politics.
Comparative study of political development became the paramount orientation of general political theory in the period from the 1960s to 1980s. (Some caveats are required when talking of 'political development', since in fact if refers to a set of different and at times contradictory concepts, often unconnected in any theoreticalmethodological way.) Conceptualised in US political science, this orientation came to be seen as the most important theoretical basis of studies devoted to analysis of political aspects of social development in countries emerging from colonial dependence. This grew out of the need for theoretical interpretation of the processes of rapid change in political institutions and value orientations in developing countries and out of the practical interests of American politics. As American political scientists themselves admit, when faced with the rise in anti-Western feeling in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the obvious intensification in those areas of communist in-
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163fluence, political sociologists focused their attention on those social forces that could act as motive forces of political change in those regions in a direction compatible with the political interests of the United States.
A comparative study of the growth of political systems in developing countries is a constituent part of the broad area of research normally known as the 'sociology of development'.~^^71^^
The methodological basis of the research is the traditionalism-modernism dichotomy within the framework of the modernisation concept, resting on the propositions of the traditional and industrial society theories (Raymond Aron, Walt Rostow, etc.). 'Social modernisation' signifies the processes of rationalisation, integration and formation of a 'democratic infrastructure' (i. e., conditions for the operation of bourgeois-- democratic political regimes), and mobilisation and activation of the masses conditioned by socio-- economic development.^^72^^ Social modernisation here is identified either with Westernisation or the creation of local varieties of socio-political systems in developing states, while political modernisation is seen in close kinship with social modernisation.~^^73^^
American political science possesses no commonly-accepted theory of political development. The philosopher Prof. Thomas Spragens writes, 'To someone interested in the conceptual structure of the field of political development, its most striking feature is the extraordinary evanescence of its central concept. Reams have already been written about political development, but there seems to be little clarity or unanimity about what "political development" really means.'^^74^^
164High on the list of popularity are concepts in which political development is tied in either with socio-economic growth, or with governmental, `democratic', organisational-institutional and other aspects of social modernisation.
Under the impact of Walt Rostow's stages of growth theory several political scientists try to establish a direct correlation between the level of socio-economic development and the bourgeois-democratic form of government as the paramount, they feel, political aspect of modernisation. Necessary prerequisites of `democratic' political development are reckoned to be the relevant technical-economic conditions and accumulation of capital, which are supposed to ensure a stimulus to economic growth and to guarantee socio-political stability.^^75^^ Proceeding from that general postulate, the economic growth approach proponents in US political science claim that political development is 'primarily a function of a level of economic development sufficient to serve the material needs of the people and to enhance a reasonable harmony between economic aspirations and satisfactions'.re
Lipset wrote that the main reason for the growing radicalisation and revolutionary-- mindedness among people in developing countries was their low living standards, poverty and squalor.~^^77^^ Only a society with a high enough standard of living and minimal poverty could ensure conditions for democracy and popular participation in political affairs. Where there were largescale poverty and a tiny privileged elite, the political system, he feels, would be based either on oligarchy or on tyranny.
He rightly indicates the importance of indus-
165trialisation, rising living standards and educational development, at least for some aspects of political development. Yet while recognising social conditions for political development, he does not relate them to general laws of social development. He identifies the process of political development quite erroneously with bourgeois democracy exclusively and so he classifies countries in an oversimplified scheme as 'stable democracies' and 'unstable democracies and dictatorships', which some scholars regard as a onesided approach.^^78^^ A number of political scientists recognise the dependence of political development on socio-economic factors; and that is a certain step forward by contrast with notions in which the state and politics are fully divorced from the economy.~^^79^^
The methods, technique and procedures for measuring correlations between socio-economic and political variables are certainly of interest. Yet the correlation was established without account for the relative independence of politics, while political development was seen in isolation from the influence of international politics, the role played by the common people, political leaders, etc. While lumping together advanced capitalist and socialist countries in the ' industrial society' theory, Western scholars have nonetheless spoken of modernisation of developing countries only under the impact of the historical experience of bourgeois states, thereby ignoring the state-political development of the USSR and other socialist countries.
During the 1960s rationalisation came in for considerable attention in analysing political development; it was understood as a process of re-
166placement of informal, functionally-diffused patterns of interrelationships by `secularised' forms of contemporary bureaucratic organisation. Rationalisation is closely bound up with the notion of differentiation, signifying the growing specialisation and more numerous functions in the political system and the mounting complexity of their role structure.^^80^^ It has to be noted that making an absolute out of oligarchical-- bureaucratic principles in state administration, underlining the need for replacing the `irrational' by `rational', tends to ignore political democracy, to estrange the functions of running society from the society itself,- to concentrate them in the hands of the administrative elite, to set up a caste-type system and rigid hierarchy.
The overriding goal of the political strategy and ideological expansion of neocolonialism in the developing countries consists in justifying the need for them to adopt Western socio-- political institutions. In the words of Seymour Lipset, one of the major concerns of political sociology is to analyse the social conditions needed for promoting democracy.
A high place in this goes to those political concepts which link the fundamental ' parameters' of political modernisation with formal patterns of Western liberal democracy as forms of ofovernment and political order---'pluralism*, `competition', 'balance of power' and 'political participation'.~^^81^^
Orientation on the bourgeois-democratic model, which is put out as the ideal prototype for political development, is at its most blatant in the ideas of `autonomy' and `equality'. The `autonomy' advocates emphasise that the inde-
167pendence of different political groups from state power, in relation to which they act as autonomous pressure groups, is an important parameter of political development, while the transformation of political systems towards convergence with that model is precisely the process of ' political modernisation.'~^^82^^ The presence within the political system of 'subsystem autonomy', presupposing a multiparty system, freedom of association, the relative autonomy of agencies of local self-government from central authorities, etc., predetermines, too, the level of `democracy' in the system. The link between that idea and the above political pluralism theory is obvious.
What the proponents of the `equality' idea (Lucien Pye, for instance)~^^83^^ have in mind above all is the formal possibility of citizens taking part in the political process through the institution of elections, ignoring therein the problem of actual socio-political inequality of those taking part in politics.
The concepts of 'subsystem autonomy' and political `equality' are merely ideal types that reflect primarily European-American political experience. They become an abstract-universal category of the development of the state and political systems, and are therefore ahistorical. The political reality of developing countries shows that a number of political systems in countries with various social orientations have established one-party regimes that despite the theories of American political scientists represent a centralising factor of political life. What is more, a multiparty system is normally an exception to the general trend towards the establishment of a single-party system. M
168The centralisation of state administration on central and local levels in these countries is also at odds with the pluralist-autonomist approach. That centralisation is manifest, for example, in the dominant status of government officials (and not t)f ap^ncies elected by the populace) in the systems of local administration. Historically, this is in some measure due both to the legacy of the colonial past and to the objective need to unite efforts for coping with economic and cultural hackwardness, economic dislocation and the incomplete nature of national consolidation processes. It is important to bear in mind that strong administrative centralisation is not in itself an indicator of maturity or immaturity of a political system. When analysing a state, and particularly local administration, one must single out socio-political factors of the correlation of centralisation and decentralisation as two of its ineluctable ingredients. A paramount criterion here is the degree of real participation by working people in state administration as a whole and in its separate administrative-territorial units, which above all depends on the socio-class nature and orientation of activity by those forces in the developing countries which in each concrete case make use of the mechanism of one-party government.
A lack of conformity between the political reality of developing countries and the idea of political development as the product of 'social modernisation' inevitably connected with the establishment of a Western type of society has engendered other approaches to the problem. Thus, the concept put forward by professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University that the main aim
169of politics is to ensure optimal conditions for supporting and preserving political stability, is considerably at odds with the various aspects of social modernisation. The stability of principal political organisations and procedures---i. e., their institutionalisation, is the most important criterion of political development in Huntington's view.~^^85^^
The improvement of organisational-structural, `institutional' aspects of political affairs is no doubt an index of political development. The focus on that facet of the political process in some measure reflects American aspirations to overcome the bias of concepts that identify political development only with one type of political system, and to make it more flexible. But, in setting out an effective and stable political organisation (`institutionalisation') as the main feature of political development, they are not relating it to the social nature and socio-political orientation and are, therefore, ignoring the qualitative side--- the specific-historical features of political systems.
In the latter part of the 1970s, Huntington used new empirical material to lend a fresh meaning to his concept: he analysed the process of political development through the prism of the political participation theory and against the background of the interaction of three main so-
,,cial factors: economic development, socio-- economic equality and political participation. Along
.with his co-author Joan Nelson, writing of the prime importance of one or another of these factors for the process of political modernisation and of the consequences of their effect on one another, he concluded that any accentuation of
170political participation in that process, of its primacy over other factors, could both slow down economic growth and impede political participation or even stimulate movement towards greater socio-economic equality. The rate of movement towards equality could be stepped up by means of the `autocratic' political mechanism which, in turn, could lead to new `unequal' social groups and classes that could require the use of political participation for protecting their socio-economic situation. So in the interaction of these three factors, the question of which of them should primarily be used in the modernisation process would depend on the choice of the ruling elite.~^^86^^
Just as Lipset and Daniel Lerner looked at the dependence of politics on the economy in terms of technological determinism, so Huntington and Nelson also tend to see political participation as a dependent variable, as a function of social and economic modernisation, though more complex and indirect than some other factors. Such an approach does not enable them to explain the ideological and institutional role of popular political participation and popular political activity in the process of political development at different stages, and in particular at the stage of the liberation struggle for national independence. As the main criterion in the concept, which distinguishes traditional society from modern society, political participation is viewed here merely as the institutionalised function of a liberal-- democratic regime, acting within the bounds of the bourgeois political system. That is why, in taking first and foremost bourgeois society to mean modern society, Huntington and Nelson do not
171progress beyond recognising the inevitability of characteristics of Western democracies being assimilated by the political systems of developing countries. Meanwhile, the world today contains other possibilities for ex-colonies---a non-- capitalist path of development which ultimately leads to socialism.
Manifestation of the ideological function of comparative political studies in general and ' political science of development' in particular is apparent, as one case, when scholars tackle the problem of constructing a typology of political systems and regimes. Characteristic of such typologies is classification of political systems from the standpoint of formal principles of organisation and the distribution of political authority in a particular society. Many of them rely methodologically on Max Weber's 'ideal type' concept and on the structural-functional analysis. American political scientists use a variety of formal criteria and indices, among which the most popular seem to be various indications of a political regime, stability and efficiency, legitimacy and other levels of political development. 8r
The biggest infhience of the Weberian idea can be traced to classifications, whose authors analyse `developing' political systems within the framework of a dichotomous concept of ' traditional' and `modernised' ideal types of society. In simplified versions of such classifications developing countries are either wholly identified with the `traditional' type or occupy an intermediate position between two extreme points of the `traditionalism-modernism' dichotomy. The two extreme types of systems correspond to three pairs of categories: particnlarism-nniversalism,
172conformism-activity and efficiency, functional non-diffusion-functional specialisation.
The impossibility of describing the whole gamut of real systems in terms of `traditionalism' and `modernism' produced attempts to create more differentiated typologies. ^ Their common base is the triade `traditionalism'-`democracy'- `totalitarianism', resting on the counterdistinction of democracy and dictatorship traditional to Western political science. Mixed types are slipped in between the basic types. Within the framework of that triade the various political systems correlate either with the bourgeois-liberal pattern as the most `developed' and `modern' standard, or with the `totalitarian' and ' communist' models.^^89^^
Such typologies are based on formal structural-functional indices, ignoring the socio-class nature of political power, and they arbitrarily combine in a single group different types of political systems---different in their historical, socio-class, juridical and cultural character, and compared outside their specific historical context.
__*_*_*__The above-mentioned theories of political development, political modernisation and the comparative politics typology reflect the most characteristic theoretical-methodological orientations of research into this area in US political science largely in the 1960s. They contain some general and formal structural-functionalist and other criteria for comparing political systems and their evolution in the course of modernisation of political institutions and functions; they also con-
173tain some interesting observations, provide considerable empirical material, and some of their views on individual questions are valid and useful. At the same time, in calling for intensive research development that would enable them to analyse and compare world political processes from the viewpoint of a broad historical perspective, the American political scientists mainly see them through the mirror of Western historical experience, and they see `modernisation', which neglects a non-capitalist path of development, as the only possible version of historical progress. The criteria of political development are, therefore, also used within historically parochial parameters outlined by that theory. The specific features of development in one type of society are taken as common law-governed patterns of development, and the features of development and the functioning of liberal-democratic regimes in the West are heralded as universal models transferred to political regimes with different national and social characteristics.
During the 1970s and especially at the start of the 1980s, criticism of the ethnocentrism, veiled apologetics and scientific inefficiency of these concepts stimulated attempts by Western scholars to reform the notions of the 1960s into terms which, they feel, are more in keeping with the present political reality in the developing countries. At the same time they looked for new aspects of research into the problem.
If we single out the main ideological-- theoretical orientations in contemporary American political science, within the bounds of which criticism and attempts are being made either to improve or to reject theories of political modernisa-
174Lion and political development with their traditionalism-modernism dichotomy, the following groupings may be identified: 1. a liberal trend represented by the leading proponents of the ' political science of development' whose efforts are largely concerned with improving that theory (most of them, although they are critical of its biased nature, nonetheless admit the inevitability of some features of the bourgeois-democratic regime like, for example, 'political participation', as an inseparable feature of political development) ; 2. a neo-Marxist trend whose proponents underline the need for bringing developing countries up to date in a revolutionary way; 3. a trend orienting developing states on a special path of development based on their own traditional social situation.
From the viewpoint of method, attempts by the liberal trend proponents to polish up the idea of political development are bound up with overcoming the limitations of structural functionalism in the analysis of problems of nationalpolitical development through supplementing it with a historical analysis and other methods and approaches. The authors of the book Crises and Sequences in Political Development^^90^^ base themselves on a `crisis' approach in trying to combine the structural-functionalist theories of political development and those of modernisation of the 1960s into a general macro-theory of political development which would lay claim to coherence and dynamism. According to that theory, political development is viewed as continual interaction between the processes of structural differentiation, the `imperatives' of political equality and the ability of political systems to integrate, to
175react to the impact of the environment and to adapt to it. Such interaction forms a ' development syndrome'. In the early stages of the modernisation process the political system possesses a certain set level of all three components of the syndrome and their accompanying indices, such as identity, legitimacy, political participation and distribution of resources. As the system begins on the road to modernisation and as the interaction of the three syndrome components starts to intensify, there arise crises in the remaining parameters of the political system engendered by their mutual incompatibility at various stages of modernisation.
From that standpoint development is treated as a process in the course of which the political system adapts to the crisis and acquires the ability successfully to institutionalise the new forms of integration, participation and distribution of resources.
The attempt to apply the crisis approach reflects the complicated and contradictory process of present-day socio-political development in newly-liberated ex-colonies. It is not clear, however, what serves as the source of the development syndrome and its motive forces, and how the crises are connected with its three components.
In the early 1980s the theorists of political development have increasingly admitted the existence of both pro-Western and other paths of political development; this is being accompanied by recipes for improving the epistemological aspects of those theories. Thus, the Danish political scientist Georg Sorensen, in his paper 'The "Missing Link": Theories and Strategies of De-
176velopment' delivered at the llth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Moscow, 12-18 August, 1979, put forward a thesis by which the theoretical weakness and practical ineffectiveness of modern research into political development were put down to the fact that it divides up three paramount parts of this area of Western political science: theories, strategies and notions of political development. 9i By theory of development he means a set of hypotheses that impinge upon conditions, interrelationships and structures describing the development process. Development strategy consists of proposals for improving actions aimed at activising the development process. And, finally, the notion of development establishes its objectives---i. e., it determines what is understood by this process and term that designates it. In Sorensen's opinion, what is needed is a fresh theoretical-- methodological approach to this research that would re-- establish a close connection between theories, strategies and notions of development, and it would focus on taking account of all three parameters. Strategy had to be at the heart of it.~^^92^^
From a theoretical viewpoint, his scheme contains something of interest. But by emphasising the incomplete nature of the political development theory, Sorensen himself confines it merely to abstract recommendations in which there is no qualitative evaluation of existing ' developmental' strategies, leaving the issue of creating a concrete theory of political development effectively open.
One reason for the failure in attempts to create a general theory of political development in contemporary American political science is the
12-01532 177
one-sided development of theoretical aspects of political modernisation into a supertheory that is often based on an inadequate empirical foundation. That is why they stress the need for a more systematic involvement of empirical facts in the theoretical research into the problems. In particular, this is apparent in papers prepared by political developmentalists for the llth IPS A World Congress in Moscow.^^93^^
A socio-psychological personality theory of political modernisation has been formulated in recent years within the framework of the liberal trend in political development theories. The political scientists Alex Inkels and David H. Smith have sought to refute the widespread thesis that a 'modernising individual' is simultaneously a vehicle of traditional and modern psychological attitudes. By contrast with political scientists who maintain that tradition and modernism can be interconnected and that they would be useless as analytical categories in analysing the modernisation process, Inkels and Smith single out psychological modernity as a particular psychological syndrome. According to their concept, different aspects of an individual's psychology do not change at random in relation to one another in the process of modernisation, but the individual alters as a whole. They here stress the modernising role of modern professions.^^94^^
`Personality' theories of political modernisation show up observations that are useful scientifically and affect psychological shifts in the political consciousness of the populace in developing countries. But their proponents, like the theorists who proceed from the idea of the social differentiation of the evolutionary theory of mod-
178ernisation, use as their starting notion model the same old `traditionalism-modernism' dichotomy. In so far as they frequently take modern development values to mean consumer-oriented values and attitudes inherent in Western society, the issue of national political development is often reduced to demonstrating psychological analogies between developing and Western societies, while the psychological influence of the values of a traditional culture, as well as the ideals of the revolutionary reconstruction of society, are often ignored as a factor of development.
A characteristic feature of the theoreticalmethodological evolution of the political development and political modernisation idea in the 1970s was opposition to liberal notions by several alternative left-wing radical concepts of political development, largely under the impact of post-behaviourist moods in political science. Among their leading lights were Andre Gunder Frank, S. A. Brett and Colin Leys. Methodologically they all rest on the 'dependent development' theory which sees socio-political processes occurring in developing countries (referring first and foremost to capitalist-oriented states) in terms of the Marxist theory of imperialism and neocolonialism as processes at work in the peripheral constituent part of the global system of world capitalism.
Advocates of the theory define the content of the development process of young national states as aspiration for socialism which, in their view, is a sine qua non of genuine national independence. By contrast with the liberal approach, which considers the transfer of Western economic and political institutions as the highest form
12* 179
of decolonisation, the 'dependent developmentalists' view that transfer as the source and continuation of neocolonialism, inasmuch as those institutions are invariably controlled by the ruling class expressing the interests of international capitalism. They feel that the tasks of sociologists and political scientists in that connection should be to study the dynamics of 'peripheral capitalism' of the developing countries, their social and class structure on which that capitalism grows, the socio-class contradictions and class struggle whose results can lead to its downfall. A scientifically-based study of the dynamics of 'peripheral capitalism' can only occur, they feel, with the help of historical materialism, and the starting point for such studies has to be the applications and adaptation of Marxist theory to the conditions of the developing nations.~^^95^^
Evidently, the dependent development concept is close to a Marxist interpretation of several problems facing newly-liberated countries. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they evoke sharp criticism from Western liberal political scientists. Various alternatives to the notions of `dependence' and `development' are also proposed.
Not only radicals reject the main theoreticalmethodological premises of political modernisation, but this concept has also come under fire from conservatives in present-day Western political science. Thus, M. V. Naidu, in a paper prepared for the llth Moscow IPS A World Congress, 'The Western Model of Development: Its Relevancy, Feasibility and Desirability for the Third World', put forward the idea that the experience of socio-political development of both
180the USA, Britain and the USSR is inapplicable to the developing states from the viewpoint of both prerequisites and results.~^^96^^ In his opinion, both the capitalist and the communist social systems proceed from the idea of material factors determining political development, of the owners of economic wealth having to be also the holders of political power. In Naidu's view, both systems only part company on the question of who should own material wealth---private or public enterprises. Following this very simplified interpretation, Naidu allots political development two crucial goals---industrialisation and modernisation, which constitute what he calls 'the operational definition of development'.^^97^^ By combining qualitatively different and sometimes diametrically opposed socio-political systems of modern industrial countries and developing states of different social orientations into some abstract `Western' model of development, without any grounds at all Naidu attributes the adverse consequences that accompanied capitalist development (the growth and intensification of monopolies, colonialism, militarisation and wars, the dehumanisation of science and technology, 'mass culture', environmental pollution, etc.) to universal products of any modernisation in its ' Western' variant.
Today American political scientists are paying more and more attention to studying the social structure of developing countries and particularly the political behaviour of peasants, the role of political leadership and its socio-political orientation, of bureaucracy, of charismatic leaders and the military in socio-political development. This theme was discussed in a number of papers
181presented to the llth IPSA World Congress.98 At the same time, while emphasising the importance of applied concrete research into political processes in developing countries, American political scientists call for further theoretical elaboration of political development issues which, resting on an adequate empirical base, would have practical application, and would have an effect on national leadership that takes political decisions. In proposing these ultimately pragmatic recipes, they assume that this will help save the fate of political science in the Third World. The concepts of political modernisation and political development, adapted to the new situation, continue to exert a considerable influence on general theoretical and concrete research. Despite the prevailing sharp criticism of the Western-centric orientation and the traditionalismmodernism dichotomy, as well as the desire by several Western scholars to go beyond their narrow framework, these fundamental premises of the political development concepts continue to predetermine the results of a range of theoretical studies.
By encouraging the practical orientation of newly-formulated versions, political science, judging by the recommendations and the direct and indirect ideological strains of their proponents, will continue to strive to use the most apposite of them in the interests of Western practical policy in the developing states, so as to direct their development either overtly along the capitalist path, or in a direction that suits their interests. In the final count, this prospect emanates from the community of ideological-theoretical aims and social functions of Western developmental
182political science and the science of politics generally.
During the 1970s and 1980s the pluralist democracy theory has also come in for critical revision from moderate reformist, left-radical and traditionalist positions. Some reassessment of totalitarianism is also taking place.
It is, however, too early to talk of any crisis in the totalitarian model or its rejection in bourgeois political science. In recent years doubts have been voiced about the compatibility of the convergence theory with Sovietological analysis. Some Sovietologists, for example, feel it not worth attempting to use group theory as an alternative to the totalitarian model. In their view, the group approach does not work not because of any methodological defects but because the socialist countries lack officially-recognised political pluralism. So the authors maintain that the totalitarian model should not be dismissed since it emphasises 'what is truly important in Soviet politics: a high degree of centralised power, with policy initiative wholly reserved for the centre.' "
Some Sovietologists assess the unchanging socialist nature of the Soviet political system as demonstrating that it is incapable of bourgeois regeneration and `democratisation' in conditions of detente.
At the same time, some studies of the socialist political system continue to attempt to interpret new processes occurring in the world induced by detente from a 'political convergence' approach.~^^10^^°
Calls for a more systematic use of the principle of historicism accompany criticism of theoreti-
183cal precepts and attempts to adapt them to contemporary political reality. Leading political scientists favour justification of the need for a more radical version of structural-functional analysis using the historical approach, so as to make it more palatable for describing, explaining and comparing socio-political processes. Almond, for example, sees an important means of refining political science in return to historical sociology and political science, and selection of 'historical episodes' being determined by the theoretical interests of the political scientist.^^101^^
By contrast, University of Georgia Professor Eugene F. Miller maintains that the capacity of the historical approach to sustain a science of politics 'is, to say the least, problematical', since its principles 'lead to an epistemological relativism that renders questionable that very possibility of science or philosophy as understood in the Western tradition'. He is certainly right when he sees elements of relativism and agnosticism in the vulgar `historicism' of bourgeois philosophers and sociologists. Yet it is apparent that he does not see the differences between `historicism' and scientific historicism. Since he does not believe in the capacity of positivist behaviourism and relativist `historicism' to facilitate the progress of political science, Miller approves of the efforts of those scholars who asmre to resurrect traditional political philosophy.^^102^^
Political scientists see another way to overcome the methodological difficulties of political theory in resolving the problem of the correlation between philosophical-evaluative and scientific aspects of political knowledge. David Easton, for example, suggests strengthening the effective-
184ness of theoretical political science through combining the different elements of systems, structural-functionalist analysis, behaviourism and empiricism, the quantitative and the normative-evaluative approach. David Apter and S. Mushi advocate the use of a normative-- evaluative approach in concert with structural functionalism and behaviourism.
Thomas Spragens underlines the need to bridge the traditional gap between empirical and normative theories of political science.~^^103^^
In recognising the link between scientific theory and the political scientist's social position, ideology and ethics, these political scientists are throwing down the gauntlet to the positivist-- behaviourist methodological tradition. But they are shifting the problem to an abstract-ethical plane, ignoring the connection between the normativeethical sphere of social life and the economic, political and cultural spheres. So recognition of the evaluative approach does not go beyond the bounds of their liberal outlook.
__*_*_*__In the late 1960s and early 1970s internal contradictions sharply intensified within American political science. The unpopular war in Vietnam, serious economic recession and fight against poverty, the exacerbation of racial problems and civil disobedience campaigns, the rise of a counter-culture and the New Left, urban and environmental problems and, finally, the positive process of international detente all had a wide-ranging resonance in American political science. Under
185the impact of these factors, methodological arguments flared up with renewed force between the traditionalists and the behaviourists; the issue of place and designation of political science acquired new meaning.
The anti-behaviourist opposition became the agent of new moods in political science: its nucleus was the radical left that had taken shape under the influence of the New Left and particularly radical sociological ideology. They opposed the dominance in political science of the behavioural establishment, and they sharply attacked the adverse aspects of behaviourist methodology, the obsession with methodological issues to the detriment of the analysis of urgent issues in politics, the conservative and apologetical function of political science.
Public distrust of state-political institutions, loss of faith in the effectiveness of governmental decisions, hostility to bureaucracy and declining prestige of higher education were all reflected especially graphically in criticism of the apologetical orientation of academic political science. The radical critics formed a group in favour of the `new' political science, opposing the formally impersonal nature of political science, and favouring the need for a new science directly taking part in resolving acute socio-political issues.~^^104^^ What they lacked, however, was a clearcut socio-political programme, while their rejection of the purely academic role of political science and their call for active political involvement of political scientists was accompanied by a simplified understanding of the correlation of ideological, moral and scientific aspects of political analysis.
186Under the influence of the new historical circumstances and criticism by the left radicals, dissatisfaction with the state of theory and the adverse aspects of behaviourism, that had been muffled in the 1960s, once again embraced a whole number of political scientists who were far from being hostile to behaviourism, and also some leading theorists of political science. Although in a more restrained tone than that uttered by the left radicals, criticism was being made of behavioural methodology, of its divorce from historicism, the gulf between theory and practice, the absence of moral and ideological values, its America-centrism, etc.~^^105^^ These critical moods became known as the 'post-behavioural revolution'.
The challenge thrown down to behaviourism, though it set a whole number of problems of a different order, did not lead to any fundamental changes or the setting up of a methodological alternative to behaviourism. Objectivist methodology continues to cling to its firm positions, while behavioural political scientists still dominate the American Association of Political Science. In assessing the results of the 'post-- behavioural revolution' and forecasting the future of US political science, Harvard University Professor Karl W. Deutsch writes that elaboration of new themes and methods will not move towards replacement of the former methodological orientation, but rather towards succession and addition of other parameters of political analysis that go beyond the bounds of direct observation, yet encouraging a deeper understanding of the object being studied. He agrees with David Easton that 'There will hardly be soon a "Post-behav-
187ioural" epoch in political science, in the sense that interest in behavioural evidence will cease.'~^^106^^
Meanwhile, traditionalist and neotraditionalist strains continue to exist in contemporary American political science. Similarly, there are tendencies to `reideologise' it, to review the role of political theories and concepts that were criticised by political scientists themselves in the late 1980s and early 1970s. Some scholars see the way to overcome difficulties in present-day political science through restoring the close association between political science and the traditional methods of political analysis.~^^107^^ In the sphere of problem-content research these strains emanate from a mounting interest in historical-- philosophical political subject matter, in classical bourgeois-democratic principles and doctrines of state-political structure.10S Neotraditionalist moods together with neoconservative tendencies in political sociology specifically reflect the shift to the right taking place in the public consciousness. At the same time, resorting to traditional constitutional and political-ideological principles is an attempt to restore the values of liberal democracy and make political science more adequate for contemporary US political practice.
NOTES
~^^1^^ Fred I. Greenstein, Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, p. 113.
~^^2^^ Philip H. Melanson, Political Science and Political Knowledge, Washington,
188Public Affairs Press, 1975, p. 28.
~^^3^^ Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1, p. 54.
~^^4^^ Ibid., p. 121.
~^^5^^ Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics. Its Origins and Conditions, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p. XL
~^^6^^ Richard Jensen, 'History and the Political Scientist', Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), Politics and the Social Sciences, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 2-3.
~^^7^^ Lipset, Politics and the Social Sciences, p. 5.
~^^8^^ Charles E. Merriam, New, ..Aspects of Politics, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1925.
~^^9^^ Ibid., pp. 132, 133.
~^^10^^ G. E. G. Catlin, The Science and Method of Politics, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1964.
~^^11^^ Stuart Arthur Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1928.
~^^12^^ Harold Dwight Lasswell. Psychopathology and Politics, New York, The Viking Press, 1960; idem., Power and Personality, New York, W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1976.
~^^13^^ Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York, Meridian Books Inc., 1958, p. 13.
~^^14^^ Robert A. Dahl, 'The Behavioural Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Pro-
189test', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, December 1961, pp. 763-72.
~^^15^^ David B. Truman, The Governmental Process. Political Interests and Public Opinion, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
~^^10^^ Ibid., pp. 23-33.
~^^17^^ Ibid., p. 33.
is Ibid., p. 51.
~^^19^^ Ibid., pp. 138, 512.
~^^20^^ Ibid., pp. 19-20, 27-31, 58-60, 165.
~^^21^^ Ibid., pp. 66, 67, 156-67, 512.
~^^22^^ Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.
~^^23^^ See Robert A. Dahl, 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, June 1958, pp. 463-69.
~^^24^^ Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 137-38, 148-59.
~^^25^^ Ibid., p. 86.
26 Ibid., pp. 316-21.
~^^27^^ David M. Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis, New York, Random House, 1971, pp. 1-50.
~^^28^^ Bruce E. Wright, 'A Cognitivist Programme for Normative Political Theory', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, August 1974, pp. 675-96.
~^^29^^ For example, Fred M. Frohock, Normative Political Theory, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974, pp. 105-09.
190~^^30^^ William Kornhauser, ' "Power Elite" or "Veto Groups"?', C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite, Compiled by G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard, Boston, Beacon Press, 1971, p. 38.
~^^31^^ Darryl Baskiii, American Pluralist Democracy: A Critique, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971, p. 26.
~^^32^^ Kenneth Prewitt, Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites. Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy, New York, Harper and Row, 1973, p. 130.
~^^33^^ Robert Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 332.
~^^34^^ See Thomas R. Dye, L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction in American Politics, Belmont, California, Duxbury Press, 1971, pp. 9-18.
~^^35^^ See Thomas R. Dye, John W. Pickering, 'Governmental and Corporate Elites: Convergence and Differentiation', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, November 1974, pp. 900-25.
~^^36^^ Dye and Zeigler, op. cit., p. 327.
~^^37^^ Irving Louis Horowitz, Foundations of Political Sociology, New York, Harper & Row, 1972, pp. XVI-XVII.
~^^38^^ G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 5.
~^^39^^ G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles. The Governing Class in America,
191New York, Random House, 1970, pp. 106-07.
~^^40^^ See, for example, G. William, ' Domhofi, Fat Cats and Democrats. The Role of the Big Rich in the Party of the Common Man, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1972; E. S. Greenberg, R. P. Young (eds.), American Politics Reconsidered. Power and Inequality in American Society, North Scituate, Mass., 1973; R. Lefcourt (ed.), Law Against the People, New York, Random House, 1971.
~^^41^^ Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971.
~^^42^^ Benjamin S. Kleinberg, American Society in the Postindustrial Age. Technocracy, Power and the End of Ideology, Columbus, Ohio, A. Bell & Howel Company, 1973, p. 3.
~^^43^^ Thomas E. Drabek, J. Eugene Haas, Understanding Complex Organisations, Dubuque, Iowa, Win. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1974, p. 15.
~^^44^^ J. Douglas Brown, The Human Nature of Organisations, New York, AMACOM, 1973, pp. 5-6.
~^^45^^ Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973, pp. 213-14.
~^^46^^ Burnham P. Beckwith, Government by Experts. The Next Stage in Political Evolution, New York, Exposition Press, 1972, p. 6.
192~^^47^^ Ibid., pp. 38-39.
~^^48^^ Ibid., pp. 7-8.
~^^49^^ Jean Meynaud, La technocratic, myth ou realite?, Paris, Payot, 1964, p. 235.
~^^50^^ James Martin, Adrian R. D. Norman, The Computerised Society, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 298-99.
~^^51^^ lioltan P. Odegard, The Politics of Truth: Toward Reconstruction in Democracy, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 1971, pp. 142, 3, 7, 14, 134, 139, 273.
~^^52^^ Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology. Essays in Social Sciences and Social Theory in Honour of C. Wright Mills, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 284.
~^^53^^ Meynaud, op. cit., p. 284.
~^^54^^ Jeffrey D. Straussman, The Limits of Technocratic Politics, New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1978, p. 35.
~^^55^^ Ibid., p. 24.
~^^56^^ Randall Collins, The Credential Society. An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification, New York, Academic Press, Inc., 1979, p. 203.
~^^57^^ See, for example, Robert L. Heilbroner, Business Civilisation in Decline, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1976.
~^^58^^ See David A. Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs, 1965; Gabriel A. Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems', The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1956, pp. 391-409; William
13-01532 193
C. Mitchell, The American Policy: A Social and Cultural Interpretation, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962; Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control, New York, Free Press, 1966.
~^^59^^ See Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1966, pp. 17- 18.
~^^60^^ David A. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965, pp. 3-8, 13-16, 484-88.
61 Ibid., pp. 8, 17-19, 28.
~^^62^^ Ibid., p. 21.
~^^83^^ Ibid., p. 24.
~^^64^^ Ibid., pp. 21-24.
~^^65^^ Ibid., pp. 29-32.
~^^66^^ V. Y. Ghirkin, 'The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Bourgeois Political Science', The Political Legal Doctrines of Contemporary Imperialism, Moscow, 1974, p. 131 (in Russian).
~^^67^^ Easton, op. cit., pp. 278-340.
68 Ibid., p. 27.
~^^69^^ See Marx to Friedrich Bolte in New York, November 23, 1871, Selected Correspondence, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 254-55; V. I. Lenin, 'What Is to Be Done?', Collected Works, Vol. 5, 1977, pp. 421-22.
194^ See V. 1. Lenin, 'May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat', Collected Works, Vol. 19, Moscow, 1973, p. 221; 'Letters on Tactics', Collected Works, Vol. 24, 1977, p. 44; 'Has Power Disappeared?', ibid., p. 445.
~^^71^^ For more detail see S. A. Yegorov, 'Some Concepts of Political Development in the Current US Political Science', International Affairs, Politics and the Individual, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).
~^^72^^ See The Non-Soviet East and Current Affairs, Vol. 2, Moscow, pp. 644-57
(in Russian).
~^^73^^ David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 10---`Modernisation'---New York, The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968, pp. 386-401.
~^^74^^ Thomas A. Spragens Jr., The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory. Toward a Postbehavioural Science of Politics, New York, Dunellen, 1973, p. 85.
~^^75^^ Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Noncommunist Manifesto, Cambridge, The University Press, 1960; ide?n., Politics and the Stages of Growth, Cambridge, The University Press, 1971; Max F. Millican, Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, New York, Harper, 1957.
~^^76^^ World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1, October 1964, p. 11.
13* 195
?? Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1960.
~^^78^^ Marvin E. Olsen, 'Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development', American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 1968, p. 700.
~^^79^^ Phillips Outright, 'National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis', American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 1963, pp. 253-64; idem., 'Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security Programs', The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 5, March 1965, pp. 537-50; Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1960.
~^^80^^ Lucien W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962; idem., Aspects of Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1966; Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 99.
~^^81^^ Frederick W. Frey, 'Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey', Lucien W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 298-326; Almond,
196Coleman, op. cit., p. 533; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1958; Gabriel A. Almond, Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1965, p. 4.
~^^82^^ Almond, Powell, Comparative Politics, op. cit., p. 300.
~^^83^^ Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., pp. 45-48.
~^^84^^ See Y. A. Yudin, Political Systems in Countries of Tropical Africa, Moscow, 1975, pp. 162, 163, 165 (in Russian).
~^^85^^ Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay', World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, April 1965, pp. 399-402.
~^^86^^ See Huntington, Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice. Political Participation in Developing Countries, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 72.
~^^87^^ Arthur S. Banks, Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Policy Survey, Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1963, p. 83.
~^^88^^ H. V. Wiseman, Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966; David Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernisation, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 115; idem,., Political Change. Collected Essays, London, Cass, 1973.
~^^89^^ Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 23-28.
197~^^90^^ Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1971.
~^^91^^ Georg Sorensen, The 'Missing Link': Theories and Strategies of Development, The llth IPS A World Congress, Moscow, August 1979, p. 1.
~^^92^^ Ibid., pp. 3, 5-10, 12.
~^^93^^ Joel D. Barkan, The Development and Under-development of Development Theory: Why Political Science Has Failed the Third World, The llth I PS A World Congress, Moscow, August 1979, p. 2.
~^^94^^ Alex Inkels, David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, London, Heinemann, 1974.
~^^95^^ Aidan Foster-Carter, 'From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment', World Development, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1976, pp. 167-70.
~^^96^^ M. V. Naidu, The Western Model of Development: Its Relevancy, Feasibility and Desirability for the Third World, The llth IPS A World Congress, Moscow, August 1979, pp. 1, 19-22.
w-Ibid., p. 1.
~^^98^^ See, for example, Claude E. Welch, The Military: Product, Facilitator or Antagonist of Socio-Economic Development, IPSA, Buffalo, New York, 1979; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, New Haven,
198Yale University Press, 1976.
~^^99^^ William E. Odom, 'A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Polities', World Politics, Vol. 28, July 1976, pp. 566, 567.
~^^100^^ See Daniel N. Nelson, 'Political Convergence: An Empirical Assessment', World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, April 1978.
~^^101^^ Gabriel A. Almond, Approaches to Developmental Causation, Munich, IPSA 1970, pp. 33-34.
~^^102^^ Eugene F. Miller, 'Positivism, Historicism and Political Inquiry', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3, September 1972, p. 816.
~^^103^^ Spragens, The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory, op. cit., pp. 5, 15-69, 85-106, 164.
~^^104^^ Marvin Surkin, Alan Wolfe (eds.), An End to Political Science. The Caucus Papers, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1970.
~^^105^^ Spragens, op. cit.
~^^106^^ Karl W. Deutsch, Participation. Newsletter of the IPSA, Ottawa, 1978, p. 10.
~^^107^^ See World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 4, July 1977.
~^^108^^ George W. Carey, 'Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1,
March 1978, pp. 151-64.
[199] Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1985/CPS431/20100311/299.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2010.03.11) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER THREE __ALPHA_LVL1__ POLITICAL STUDIES IN BRITAIN __ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. SALIENT ASPECTS OF BRITISHPolitical studies within British academic sociology began at the end of the last century when the London School of Economics came into being as part of London University. The teaching and study of state administration and political institutions, civil service, British constitutional and administrative law, international relations and colonial administration, political philosophy and theory, political, constitutional and socio-economic history were all concentrated at the LSE, and later at Oxford (particularly noted in this field), Cambridge, Manchester, Liverpool and other universities up to World War II. These disciplines were taught in faculties that bore their name or in political science faculties. Political studies meant normally a formal-juridical description of state and legal institutions and a study of the history of political thought. Economic methods had a marked influence on the study of politics. Names on the compulsory reading lists included Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, William Bagehot, James Bryco, A.Dicey and Ivor Jennings. Political studies were
200carried on by such men as Ernest Barker, G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski, Charles Manning, William Robson and Herman Finer. During World War II, a whole range of British political scientists were involved in practical policymaking and state government.
Present-day British political science is a new branch of the humanities that took shape in the postwar decades. During that time its sociological and social-psychological orientation grew strong, the economic approach intensified and there was a steady growth in political education generally.
The aspects of political life that came under scrutiny expanded, embracing elections and political behaviour of the electorate ', public opinion, political parties and pressure groups, various mechanisms of interaction between political institutions and society, local politics, comparative analysis of political systems, etc. The guiding principles of political science were declared to be those typical of positivist political science, notably freedom from prejudice and narrow group sentiment, strict analysis and objectivity. At the same time, the traditional political disciplines (political philosophy and history, public administration, etc.) and methodological approaches continued to hold firm places in political studies. When comparing political science in the USA and Great Britain, the American political scientist Dwight Waldo came to the conclusion that although the latter was rapidly developing a `new' positivist political science it differed from the former in generally remaining under the strong influence of historical-- philosophicalhumanitarian interests,^^2^^
201The question of subject, method and sphere of competence of political science long remained debatable. Since the early 1950s the compromise term 'political studies' began to be coined to designate political science. The conclusions of political studies have been acquiring considerable importance for political practice. On that basis recommendations are made and taken up by the government and monopolies for socio-political manipulation and for strengthening the stability of British state-monopoly capitalism, its positions both at home and abroad.
The Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom was inaugurated in 1950 and affiliated to the International Political Science Association. The initiators of the Association's establishment, were Harold Laski, Ernest Barker, William Robson, Reg Bassett, Charles Wilson, Norman Chester, Denis Brogan, W. J. M. Mackenzie, K. Smellie, Kenneth Wheare, G. D. H. Cole, Michael Oakeshott and others. The Association's journal Political Studies started publication in 1950. The subject matter of the new political science is found in a more concentrated form in The British Journal of Political Science. The Association maintains various contacts with the British Sociological Association, the European Consortium for Political Research and the Politics Association of Britain which deals with the study and teaching of politics in schools and colleges. Many British political scientists are simultaneously members of both these. associations. British members take an active part in the International Political Science Association. Robson and Chester have, for example, both been IPSA presidents,
202In 1976 the PSA organised the TPSA Congress in Edinburgh. It has sections on British government, comparative politics, political theory, international relations, and also on the developing countries and the use of new research methods. Political scientists from foreign universities and Commonwealth countries are associate members of the Association. It also has specialised groups like the Civil Service Committee, the Political Sociology Group, groups on American, French and West German politics, etc.
The Association's growth in membership gives some idea of the rapid rate of development of political studies in Britain, lln 1951 it had 100 members, in 1960-179, 1965-270, 1967-400, 1971-540, and 1975-76 almost 600.^^3^^ The leading lights of modern academic political studies are S. E. Finer, David Butler, A. H. Birch, Bernard Crick, W. J. M. Mackenzie, Ian Budge, Kenneth Wheare, Jean Blondel, Brian Barry, Peter Campbell, G. Moodie and Richard Rose.
Research and teaching of politics disciplines take place in some 40 universities. Oxford ( Nuffield College) and the London School of Economics and Political Science play a particularly leading role.
Since WW II, and especially during the 1960s, many universities set up faculties and introduced courses reflecting the subject matter and specific nature of the `new' political science. The name 'political studies' was cemented into the nomenclature of those faculties---politics, sociology of politics, comparative politics, British government and political institutions, local government, political theory, public administration,
203international relations, etc. The study and teaching of politics since the early 1960s have taken on an explicitly practical and applied character. There is a large number of centres of Soviet studies, among which the best known are the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London, Birmingham University's Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow University's Institute of Soviet and East-European Studies and a number of faculties at the universities of Oxford, Leicester, Belfast, Leeds and others. Most Soviet studies are anti-communist in orientation and content. University centres specialising in the study of international relations include the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge, the Royal Institute of International Affairs at University College, London, the Centre of International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and other research divisions in university faculties at Oxford, London, Glasgow and Welsh universities.
The Fabian Society, the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs are all engaged in political studies in one form or another.
The leading political journals and publications give some idea of the scale and main orientations of British political studies: Political Studies, The British Journal of Political Science, Government and Opposition, The Political Quarterly, Public Administration, Soviet Studies, Policy and Politics, etc. The major areas of political analysis are British politics, comparative
204politics and regional studies, political theory and methodology.
Since the early 1950s a large number of works on political issues ol state power, philosophy, history and sociology have been published, testifying to the new stage of development in British political studies. The range of the new political science is steadily expanding; it comprises studies of the political system and the political process~^^4^^, and encompasses political parties pressure groups, influence of the labour movement on the political process, political ideology, local politics, political behaviour and political culture, political orientations and activity of various classes and social groups, public opinion, voting, elections, mass media, political leadership and elites. A great deal of attention is being given to methodological problems of political science and political theory. Many of the studies include empirical political surveys, containing a mass of material relating to the operation of the British political system and British political behaviour, and informal mechanisms of political authority.
Special study aids on political issues are published for schools and colleges, meant to supplement or even replace the traditional school textbooks and oriented on a sociological approach to the study of politics. Thus, on the initiative of the Politics Association and under the editorship of Bernard Crick and Derek Heater the Political Realities series is published with the proclaimed aim of breaking with purely descriptive and institutional approaches and helping 'pupils, students and young voters to discover what are the main objects of political contro-
versy'.~^^5^^
205A great deal of political study in postwar Britain has been devoted to problems of a ' scientific nature' (Bernard Crick and others), research is continuing into the history of political thought (Ernest Barker, H. Butterfield, etc.), political philosophy and theory (Michael Oakeshott, John Plamenatz, Brian Barry, B. Holden, etc.). A large part of the general stream of political literature is taken up with Sovietological and regional studies and works on international relations; information material is published on political problems. In the last decade there has been a marked increase in the amount of works devoted to government and political affairs in Northern Ireland, the Ulster problem.
Empirical and theoretical orientations are both apparent in British political studies, the ' realistic' approach rubs shoulders with the ' institutional-descriptive'. The lack of a generally-- accepted theory and methodology, of a strict categorical apparatus, and the use of contradictory concepts all raise arguments among British scholars.
American political science has a substantial impact on the development of British political studies.^^6^^ The main theoretical-methodological concepts and sociological approaches elaborated in American political science are illuminated in works by R. Jones on a structural-functional analysis of politics, J. P. Nettl on the theory of political mobilisation, M. Davis, W. Lewis and H. Wiseman on political systems theory, I. Davis on political change, and works on comparative analysis of politics and political development. Topical theoretical-methodological and substantive issues in US political science are regularly
206discussed on the pages of British political studies periodicals.
Comparative studies of state and political systems in various countries and regional studies all have a prominent place in Britain.~^^7^^ Some of them are published in the Studies in Comparative Politics series edited by Samuel Finer and Ghita lonescu. The comparativists pay attention to both historical, legal, philosophical and ideological aspects, and to structural-functional, behavioural and socio-psychological issues in political systems and processes.
Sociological and socio-psychological studies have enabled scholars to assemble and study considerable comparative material on the British political system, the electoral system, political parties and the mechanism of political pressures on government and parliament by various formal and informal groups, on the psychology of political behaviour of the electorate, and on political systems and institutions of other nations. Political history, economics, philosophy and some branches of law hold a prominent place in political studies.
All the same, the expanding parameters of sociological studies of politics, their increasing specialisation and growth in the number of political scientists in modern Britain are not being accompanied by corresponding enhanced prestige for the new political science as an academic discipline. In that sense British political sociologists continue somewhat to lag behind economists, historians, philosophers and law students. Partly this is due to the lack of generally-- accepted scientific theory of politics, methodological eclecticism and the narrowness of empirical stu-
207dies. Despite a clear desire to bridge the gap between theory and practice, the processes they are analysing are often confined merely to people's participation in elections, to the activity of political parties and pressure groups. It is rare to come across any new subject matter in the immense volume of political literature, and many works simply duplicate one another.
The scale of sociological research in Britain is closely linked, as in other Western countries, to the social function of political studies---- maintaining social equilibrium within the bounds of the capitalist system and looking for effective instruments of power.
It is important to bear in mind that under the impact of the socio-political changes of the 1970s and 1980s, many of the previously used concepts and approaches of the 1950s and 1960s are obviously obsolete and inadequate for presentday British political reality. Today the focus of British political studies is on the changing mechanisms of political authority; scholars are reviewing the old notions and images of functioning of the two-party system, the activity of pressure groups, parliament, the civil service, local government and other political institutions and processes. While continuing to perform a socioprotective function in the old traditional way, the science is being oriented on new subject matter and on modifying former study themes, approaches and concepts. Along with the new subject matter (the effect of Britain's Common Market membership on its political institutions, national-political autonomy for Scotland and Wales, etc.), the following are being put forward, as hitherto, as the most urgent problems
208of contemporary British political science: the party syslem and the changes taking place in it, studies of corporativism in connection with subject matter of pressure groups, issues of political behaviour and political culture, etc. Analysis of some of these issues, undertaken in this chapter, has been made with account for the latest changes and trends taking place in British political studies and in their context.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. POLITICAL PARTIESPolitical parties constitute a central issue of contemporary British political studies. The importance of their study was once emphasised by the eminent British constitutionalist Ivor Jennings, who maintained that an analysis of the state system in Great Britain had to start and end with an analysis of political parties.~^^8^^ Modern scholars also view the importance of studying political parties in the fact that the British government system is party government.9 In their view, study of the functioning of the two-party system provides the key to an understanding of the real political mechanism in Brit^ ain today and shows what marks it off from the political systems of other countries.
The major directions in the study of political parties are apparent in the literature published since the early 1950s, in which the authors examine historically the causes for the emergence, specific features and evolution of political parties. Articles and monographs analyse the structure of parties, the principles of their organisa-
14-01532 209
tion and functioning, the delegation of positions of power within parties, and the activity of parties in the localities. High on the list of topics are party preferences and party loyalty, electoral behaviour, party ideology and propaganda, many of which rest on the results of empirical sociological surveys of political attitudes and the political culture of voters.
Political parties are mainly viewed as agents of class or group interests, vehicles of ideology, instruments of certain groups aspiring to take power, and so on. At the same time they are analysed as implementing a number of key functions within the political system---consolidating interests, organising and expressing public opinion, recruiting political leaders and forming governments.
Some of the latest works show a desire to avoid giving a blanket answer to the question of whether the British system is made up of two parties. This reflects the growing awareness of the fact that present political reality does not fit into the concept of two parties. Yet most students of political parties since the 1950s analyse them from the standpoint and within the terms of the two-party system.
The point is often made in British political studies that the two-party system is the product of a conscious desire by voters to have a political choice. They base themselves on the idea that the electorate's perceptions of parties are relatively steadfast. By contrast perceptions of leaders are relatively shortlived. In the view of British students of politics, the effect of a political leader's personality on the electorate is much less than in the United States. Ac-
210cording to their estimates the majority of men and women standing for the Labour and Conservative parties in an election campaign do not refer to their party leader in their electoral addresses.
British political scientists recognise the link between political parties and classes, although they do make a number of reservations. In particular, they underline that the individual's social status does exert influence on party preferences. As questionnaires have revealed, the Labour Party is most often perceived by its members as a party expressing class interests. Conservatives prefer to present themselves as a ' national' party, while their opponents describe the Tories as the party of the well-to-do, the upper class. The Liberals, though rejecting the idea that they have some class bias, are seen by students of politics as the party of the middle class. While admitting the class conditioning of political parties, British political scientists stress the presence in the obtaining system of freedom of party choice and the absence of 'crude social determinism'. And they cite statistics showing the relatively marked differences between expectations of sociologists identifying voters by their social affiliation, and the actual behaviour of the electorate.
Many political works of the 1960s and early 1970s stressed the relative stability of British party loyalty and relatively small number of floating voters as a typical feature of the British two-party system. Cross-cultural study of postwar elections in 19 Western countries, which demonstrated the lack of long-term change in party support and the relative stability of par-
14*
211
ty adherence through several elections, enabled British scholars in the early 1970s to conclude that Britain was one of the most static two-- party systems.~^^10^^ Insignificant vacillations in the electorate's voting lead to a marked change in party control over parliamentary seats and a replacement of party majority in parliament. In that event, they claim, hypertrophied impression arises that resounding changes are taking place in Britain. Assertions about stability in the British party system and British party preferences are complemented by the notion of ' attractiveness' of both parties to the voters. They do make the reservation that an equal degree of party influence at national level does not tally with the result of their rivalry locally. n As elections in the first part of the 1970s showed, however, these political scientists are making an absolute of the stability of the British party system. The main trend in the 1970 and 1974 elections consisted in a sharp increase in the number of floating voters and non-voters, a drop in the support for parties that make up the two-party system and growing support at the polls for third parties.
The parliamentary elections of 1979 were more traditional in the sense of them following the two-party pattern.~^^12^^ At the same time, the split that took place in March 1981 in the Labour Party and the formation of the new Social Democratic Party bear witness to the continuing serious internal contradictions in the British two-party system. The Social Democratic-- Liberal Alliance which arose in 1981 during parliamentary by-elections and which enjoyed influence only in certain parts of the country, was able
212to put forward an overall national policy and is now making inroads into the positions of the two chief rivals on the political scene, the Conservatives and Labour Party. The Alliance's activity particularly intensified after its formal approval at conferences of the Social Democratic and Liberal parties in the autumn of 1981. At the local elections the Social Democrats and Liberals received as much as 46 per cent of the vote, while the Labour Party won 27 per cent and the Conservatives 25 per cent. The same balance of power was manifest in parliamentary by-- elections. In that connection Western political observers and political scientists are writing of the weakening of party loyalty and the threat to the two-party system, of changes in Britain's political structure, and they are increasingly focusing attention on processes underway in the country's two-party system.~^^13^^ By assisting the Alliance politically and organisationally to shore up its positions, the British ruling class is striving by all possible means to prevent a Labour government from taking office with its programme of democratic reform hammered out at recent Party conferences. The ruling class endeavours to drive a wedge into the Labour Party, to isolate and debilitate its left wing as much as possible within the labour movement, to demoralise the trade unions; to do so it uses the mass media to keep up the pressure on the Labour Party and the labour movement as a whole.
Thus, the contemporary political reality of Great Britain does not fit into the concept of the two-party system which, in addition, ignores the Communist Party and the nationalist parties of Scotland and Wales.
313The `stability' of the British two-party system, of which many British political scientists used to speak, was due not so much to its attractiveness to voters as the lack of a genuine political choice for many people. Voting for one of two parties was in a high measure due to the conviction among the electorate that only ithose parties had a real chance of getting in. The results of sociological studies have confirmed that many voters were ready to vote for third parties, but they had not done so since they thought them incapable of winning in their constituency, Jet alone forming a government. The lack of political choice encouraged the growth in indifference and non-voting, the level of which is relatively high by comparison with other European countries. As British political scientists observe, the number of non-voters at the general elections increased from 11.6 per cent in 1951 to 24.9 per cent in 1970 and continues to grow.14 That, is one reason why the present trend in political science is to put to doubt the effectiveness of the mechanism of the two-party system and its ability adequately to represent the interests of voters. Essentially, British bourgeois democracy is being put to doubt.
Political scholars today feel that any British political party has a limited value as a source of governmental policy, in so far as the process of converting a particular party's candidate into a member of the government through the mechanism of party politics tends to preclude his or her influence on the formation of the party's political course.^^15^^
In their comparison of the Conservative and Labour parties, John Lees and Richard Kjmber
214suggest that their chief function is to preserve two teams of parliamentary leaders between whom the electors have to make the occasional choice.^^18^^ The election of a future M. P.. especially at the local level, depends more on party activists, the party circle, than on the electorate, voting more for the political machine designed to implement their promised changes and reforms than for a specific M. P.^^17^^ While stressing that the inability of parties to respond to all the expectations which they develop in the voters is a great drawback to the present system of British government, scholars make several recommendations aimed at partially improving the system and removing its oligarchical tendencies. Normally these recommendations boil down to airy-fairy desires to make the system function better and do not affect the socio-class essence of British liberal democracy. In particular, they declare the need to create conditions within the framework of the existing political regime for an extension of formal political participation and greater popular involvement in politics. They do not, however, say that it is necessary to set up qualitatively new socio-political relations that go beyond bourgeois liberalism.
Much importance is attributed to the study of power distribution within parties. The wellknown political scientist Robert McKenzie drew attention to this problem in the work British Political Parties first published back in 1955.is In the face of affirmations by ideologists of both parties that substantial differences existed between the organisational and operational principles of the parties, McKenzie advanced the thesis that power distribution within them was anal-
215ogous. That, in his view, was largely apparent in the domination of the parliamentary leadership over the other sections of the parties. He rightly showed the actual existence in British parties, and especially in the Labour Party, of two (very much standing opposed to each other) organisations and of oligarchical control within a party. In noting that, he threw down a definite challenge to the ideologists of Labourism and their myths of party democracy and representative leadership in the British two-party system. But he obviously underestimated the possibility, particularly within the Labour Party, of the active influence on Party leadership by local Party organisations and collective members in the person of the trade unions.
An analysis of relations between the parliamentary Labour Party and the rest of the party membership during the 1964-1970 Labour government does much to discredit McKenzie's thesis of the subordinate status of the extra-- parliamentary party membership, which, in this opinion, was traditionally based on an alliance of leaders of the parliamentary party and the ' Praetorian guard' of union leaders.^^19^^
The most recent history of the Conservative Party also fails to support the notion of some political scholars about a clearly-expressed hierarchy of power and deferential orientations in regard to leaders.~^^20^^ Many political studies of the Liberal Party are also outmoded in view of the social and political changes and the modifications within the Party itself.^^21^^
Sociological and behavioural orientation and an integrated approach are particularly noticeable in studies of socio-psychological parameters---the
21f>
preferences arid attitudes reflecting British political culture.^^2^^'^^2^^ Scholars see their importance in the need to delineate the conditions and factors that facilitate relative stability of the British political system.
A number of political scientists consider the cause of that stability to lie in the continuing support given by members of the working-class electorate to the Conservative Party. McKenzie and Silver, for example, analysed modern British working-class conservatism, using a historical approach as well as random sociological surveys, but avoiding any class evaluation of the historical phenomena under study.^^23^^ They claimed that the 1867 electoral reform that had given the working class the vote strengthened the hand of the Conservative Party, which gained working-class backing. They explained that by the fact that in their political propaganda and practical activity when in power the Tories managed to create an attractive image of the Party and type of society they were advertising.^^24^^ Having analysed Tory propaganda literature since 1867, McKenzie and Silver underlined that the main Tory argument was to maintain that only in their hands were the country's principal institutions absolutely safe. In proclaiming that it was the party of national interests, it identified itself with such institutions as the monarchy, the House of Lords and the prevailing socio-- economic system.^^25^^
McKenzie and Silver used a set of varied criteria to classify working-class conservatives as `deferential' and `secular'.2e The former see the Conservative Party elite as the only rulers of Britain sensitive to its traditions and distinguished
317features, and the only people competent, by
dint of their origin, experience and outlook, to run the economy and get to grips with the problem of insufficiency of free resources, etc. The latter, the `secular', assess the elite at a more pragmatic level---as people demonstrating the best art of state government. This is, however, a conditional and unstable adherence based on the electorate's assessment of the Party's practical activity and future advantages.
In so far as the Conservative Party depends on those two types of backing from working-class voters, it has acquired two interconnected strategies for attracting working-class votes. On the one hand, having taken possession before other parties of symbols of social 'deference^^1^^ and national loyalty, the Tories, in the opinion of McKenzie and Silver, have tried to set themselves above the maelstrom of political struggle, avoiding purely material rivalry for working-class votes.27 On the other hand, they are aware of the need to fight in the political market for that part of the working-class electorate which has not been so susceptible to the slogan of `deferential' trust. In the fight for that backing the Tories have had the considerable advantage of not being tied to a programme doctrine, and therefore being much freer to campaign flexibly and opportunistically.~^^28^^
McKenzic and Silver think that the party preference of both surveyed groups of working-class voters is very much guided by faith in the ability of a particular party to guarantee 'harmony of interests' in society, to obviate an inequitable distribution of social benefits.^^29^^
Evidently, interest by British political -scjen-
218tists in studying the political behaviour of the working class reflects the growth in its social and political voice in the modern world. However, in viewing working-class conservatives as a necessary component part that can bring stability to the British political system and can help the coexistence of different interests within it, McKenzie and Silver are actually saying, behind their notions of its unique qualities, that British society is based on class collaboration.
By giving out the political preferences of a small part of surveyed working-class voters as the political views of the whole working-class electorate, they are inclined to underestimate the strength of the British labour movement and its anti-capitalist sentiment. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party is backed by sections of working people who are backward in their level of political awareness and class maturity, and normally stand aside from the mainstream of class struggle.~^^30^^ Tory support from part of the working class is due also to disillusionment with the ability of the Labour Party vigorously and consistently to guarantee the working class's interests.^^31^^
Under the impact of the socio-political events of the 1970s there is much dispute today among political scientists and in political quarters over changes in the prevailing rules of party politics, including organisational reconstruction of parties, electoral reform, the ensuring of state financing of parties, and coalition government. The stream of critical literature is noticeably growing on the flaws and foibles of British political parties.
The adaptation of study of parties to the new circumstances is apparent, in particular, in that
219political scientists are being recommended to take account of the growing criticism of parties among `informed' (i. e., scholarly and academic) and wide public opinion, changes in the conditions of party support and party affiliation, the rise and exacerbation of party rivalry in Wales and Scotland, the relationships between ministers belonging to the ruling party and civil servants, and various aspects of the functioning of the Labour and Conservative parties.^^3^^'^^2^^ Just as crucial remain problems of constituencies, parliament, government, the electorate, party doctrines and ideologies. Inasmuch as the party system represents a vital mechanism of British political government, such recommendations are primarily aimed at removing the existing `dysfunctions' and crises, at fortifying the vitality of the political system as a whole. But they have a relatively narrow character, and studies of the political system oriented on them are normally being carried out outside the broad economic, political, national and comparative context. Amidst the welter of frequent recommendations what continues to be absent is a scientific socio-class evaluation of processes and trends occurring in that system which ultimately reflect the crisis processes in the development of British state-monopoly capitalism and its political system as a whole.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. PRESSURE GROUP STUDYStudy of pressure groups is certainly among the overriding topics of research by present-day British political scientists. Empirical studies of their role in the legislative, legal and administrative processes have become a major area of ana-
22(1
lysis in Britain as well as America. The view of the political process as interaction and rivalry among autonomous and influential groups and associations led to the `group' approach in the two countries becoming a sort of theoretical scheme claiming to explain political behaviour. During the 1950s and 1960s the theory of pluralist democracy, which had become a kind of academic ideology, began to be applied to Britain on the basis of this approach; this was apparent in the works of S. E. Finer, Allen Potter, Samuel Beer, David Marsh, Richard Kimber and J. Richardson.~^^33^^
t should be noted, however, that already in the 1970s the former group theory went through marked modification. Several British scholars came to the conclusion that interest group studies had 'rather lost direction'.^^34^^ Accordingly, they accentuated the need to study the activity of individual pressure groups in a theoretical and methodological context that would link that activity to the political system and process as a whole. In recent years they have been increasingly using as suitable context the idea of the 'corporate state'. So analysis of neocorporatist subject matter is a typical trait of British political studies today.~^^35^^
In interpreting the concepts `corporatism' and the 'corporate state', British scholars frequently focus on so-called liberal corporatism which does not claim, they aver, to replace the existing system with alternative institutional mechanisms of parliamentary and party government, but at the same time encourages greater integration in the British socio-political system. Typical of such a neocorporate state is the presence of specific 'cor-
221porate' institutions consisting of representatives of interest groups and the government and having delegated responsibility for government activity. Such institutions could embrace the whole sphere of economic affairs or could be confined, as is said to be the case in modern Britain, to a few crucial areas. In essence, what they mean is a certain mode of ordering mutual relations between the government, big business groupings and the unions. They underscore the decisive importance of interrelations and cooperation between pressure groups as a typical element of the modern British 'corporate state'.
In G. Lehmbruch's view, liberal corporatism is not just cooperation of the government with interest groups. Its distinguishing feature is a high degree of cooperation between the groups themselves in working out economic policy. When talking of political autonomy and independence of pressure groups, British political scientists emphasise the presence of centralisation in relations between big socio-economic groups (like, for example, the British Trades Union Congress) and the government, and the corporate interaction within them. By contrast with the political pluralism theory here the government's role in its relations with interest groups markedly rises. As a result, such terms as 'institutionalised pluralism' and 'state domination' have entered the vocabulary of the theory.
With an eye to the limited scale of corporatism in Britain some scholars frequently replace the term `corporatism' by `tripartism'; this is the British version of the contemporary notion of the corporate state restricted by interrelations between three of its main elements: the government,
222the Confederation of British Industry and the TUG, which discuss and take key political and economic decisions.
Evidently, attempts to modify the traditional group approach in the context of the neocorporate notion of triparlism are actually an adaptation of political science to the study of processes involving an even greater concentration of power within the British socio-political and economic systems, largely in the hands of the big monopolies whose interests are served primarily by the Confederation of British Industry. Furthermore, neocorporate methods and forms in political administration of bourgeois society are worked out and applied by the bourgeois state for the purpose of establishing a more effective mechanism for integrating the workers and their mass organisations into the capitalist system, for restricting the class struggle. In essence, what we are talking of is the phenomenon of extraparty functional representation of interests in the contemporary capitalist state by means of consultative committees which take part in Ihe drawing up of economic policy. In analysing this process, British political scientists avoid assessing it from the viewpoint of revealing its socio-class and political prerequisites. Maintaining that group theory in its previous formulation does not correspond to British political reality today, they meanwhile interpret modern British corporatism in regard to democracy on the basis of pluralist methodology and make no fundamental difference between the extent of its effect on the political administrative structure of groups and organisations belonging to big business and the workers. The real meaning of neo-
223corporate notions is that they are revising the ideas of liberal democracy, investing them with elements of state direction, while neocorporatism itself, incorporated into the traditionallyformed political mechanism, is restricting parliamentary democracy.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL CULTUREIntegrated analysis of the political system and political process is contained in the works of the well-known political scientist Professor Richard Rose. His studies of British politics show a marked influence of structural-functional analysis and political culture concepts.
In examining the British political system from a structural-functional standpoint, Rose also uses a historical, formal-legal and empirical sociological analyses, the latter based on behavioural methodology. He particularly stresses the importance of the historical method for understanding the specific nature of British politics, since British political development is a 'deviant case' in terms of that of other European states.~^^36^^
Rose defines Britain's place in the modern world and describes its historical past and the influence of that past on the contemporary British political system. On the basis of the legal approach he examines formal mechanisms of British political institutions---the role of parliament, law, the Cabinet and the monarch. Of certain interest is his study of sociological aspects of British politics: political culture and legitimacy, political socialisation and political recruitment, political communication and public opin-
224ion, pressure groups, political parties and elections.
By political culture he understands 'those values, belieis and emotions that give meaning to polities'. He counts 'political liberty' as the supreme value, yet this value is, he feels, traditionally accompanied by a tolerant and beneficient attitude to social inequality which has deep historical roots in Britain. A deferential attitude to one's betters and the chosen, a belief in the outstanding qualities of politicians and trust in them all help, Rose believes, to retain public support when government institutions experience particular difficulties. He comes to the conclusion that loyalty in regard to authority and mutual accord on the lundamental standards of Britisii political life, expressed in basic political attitudes, typify British political culture. Conflicts between parties and even within them are resolved peaceiully precisely because people are solid in their allegiance to the system as a whole even though there may he differences between them on specific issues.^^37^^ At the same time, in drawing the line between the sphere of politics and non-political areas, the British, according to Rose, in line with their cultural attitudes, also defend the values and beliefs that restrict the activity of government. British literature generally singles out as typical of British political culture the vitality of historical traditions and symbols (parliament, the monarchy, etc.) which represent the basic source of political emotions.
A study of political attitudes and beliefs among the populace in regard to the political system is certainly a salient aspect of a sociological analysis of politics. What also merits atten-
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tion in elaborating ideas of political culture is the use of the combined method in studying politics; this enables scholars to employ contemporary methods of sociology, social psychology and other sciences. Empirical research into British political values has produced typical components of their political consciousness and political culture. But like many other scholars, Rose makes an absolute out of the effect of socio-psychoiogical factors on political behaviour. Hence his desire to explain the qualitative specifics of the British political system and political behaviour of the British largely by their cultural peculiarities. In viewing demographic, economic and cultural factors as fundamental sources of political change, he underestimates the role of such a vital factor as relationships between classes and social groups, the class struggle.
The predilection of British functionalist political scientists for studying mainly conditions of stability in Western democracies has done much to determine their approach to the problem of the British political system and culture. Although they certainly have taken account of the changes in the system, including the socio-- psychological and ideological parameters, nevertheless they see political culture as a relatively stable system of idealised relationships whose structure is subject to hardly any serious historical changes and fluctuations.
During the 1970s a marked weakening took place, however, in the emotional force of traditional political symbols and values. Britain's changing role in the modern world, the deepening of crisis processes in its socio-economic and political life, the challenge to the regime from
226the working class in industrial relations, the economic, political and moral consequences of joining the Common Market and events in Northern Ireland, and, lastly, the replacement of the older generation of British people who had borne many traditional political symbols by a younger generation all had considerable repercussions on British political culture.
'\s British political scientists observe, trust in many parliamentary institutions has diminished. Parliament is no longer seen as the only body possessing independent constitutional powers. Such terms as 'party government', 'Cabinet government' and even 'prime-ministerial government' have been coined. It has been said that 'we do not have a system of government by Parliament, but of government through Parliament'.~^^38^^ A deferential attitude towards leaders on the basis of their breeding and education was no longer so much to the fore in the 1970s, and the credibility of leaders in such social spheres as higher education, the Church, business, the trade union movement and mass media was badly shaken. Further, some traditional party doctrines experienced change. Scholars feel that more and more political leaders are now beginning to adhere rather to a dynamic than a static model of British society, and some changes are said to have strengthened 'agreement between adherents of differing political outlooks'.~^^39^^ These features of gradual evolution in changing political values among the British are portrayed as changes of a partial order which go hand in hand with the maintenance of people's allegiance to the regime as a whole.
Professor Bob Jessop of Cambridge University,
15* 227
a political sociologist, tried to link up theoretically the concept ol political culture with society's socio-class structure when explaining the presentday specihcs of British politics and the political system as a whole, and to modify the social deference theory with account for the changes taking place in the system. In his work Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture, he proposes an alternative theoretical approach to the study of the political behaviour of voters, political parties and political stability as a whole, lie attacks former theories of `civility' and ' deference' as inadequate for analysing problems of modern British politics, and he modifies them through latching on to `class' theory seen in the context of the elitist approach and social stratification theory. He asserts that deference in regard to socio-political elites is one aspect of adherence to the dominant system of values in a class-stratified society. So deferential voting by the electorate may be considered as unconscious class voting.^^40^^
In his analysis of the power structure in Britain he tries to show the degree of interaction of the various classes and parties with the dominant values and institutions.^^41^^ For that purpose he uses 'the relatively pluralistic model' of power in modern bourgeois society, formulated in neo-Marxist sociology and political science, as a general methodological model. In line with this model power belongs to various groups and institutions, and not to a single monolithic ruling class. Even if the power sources ultimately consist in control over the means of production, power is realised through many institutions and organisations of the political system. Jessop feels
that in spite of the 'basic plurality' in implementing power, Britain has classes and strata with clearly-expressed 'structured inequalities' in distributing control and benefits, which in turn causes continuing rivalry among them. The most influential are the various capitalist organisations and institutions, and also the traditional 'upper social and economic classes'. In alliance with these forces the capitalist state plays the most effective part as power and control institution in preserving and reproducing these inequalities. 'The bureaucratic and military elites play a supnorting role rather than an autonomous, independently influential one.' And the whole power structure is described as institutional integration and able to maintain control through combining hecremonv institutional inertness and clever implementation of social, economic and nolitical power.'^^52^^ AS for such institutions and groups as trade unions, cooperatives, nationalised industn'es and all the `non-elites', they are seen in that model as having insi<rnificant power even though they mav be capable at a eriven moment of disturbing the balance existing between the dominant elites and the remainder of society.
-Tessop further uses this power model for det`elopino' his conception of ruling political culture which helps, he thinks, better to understand modern British politics. The effect of this power model on the value-cultural svstem is that private enterprise is identified with the national interest; what is more he stresses the 'functional necessity' of economic inequalities and also the inequalities of distribution of benefits in a hierarchically-structured society. Such a model, he
229thinks, belittles the value of attempts to undermine or overthrow the existing regime.
Following a change in the power structure, the prevailing value system alters, according to Jessop. Despite the existence of historical continuity in institutional forms of power and political traditions, the actual distribution of power, and the composition of circulating elites constantly change. These changes are of a gradual, compromise and evolutionary character, which is why the British political culture retains an element of continuity. Elites and institutions that go into decline have not been totally driven out of the British political and economic scene and retain a considerable part of their symbolic significance, as has happened with the monarchy. They also preserve remnants of actual power and continue to affect politics. One result of this is a certain contradiction and eclecticism in the ruling political ideology and, at the same time, an overall impression of stability amidst the changing milieu. That is why he avers that ' traditionalism' on the whole, and not simply `deference' or `civility', 'is a particularly appropriate term for the dominant value system'.
Jessop asserts that despite the rhetorical and symbolic differences between political parties, and the actual `marginal' differences in their politics, they do have fundamental common perceptions of the basic principles of British society.
Re rightly recognises the importance of studying relationships between the socio-class structure of British society, power relations and the cultural-value system. His concept also contains an element of dynamism, a historical approach. But his `class' theory has, too, a subjective in-
230terpretation, and attempts to highlight a connection between society's social structure and the system of political-cultural attitudes and values, in particular in analysing party politics, are made on the basis of non-Marxist theories of stratification, political pluralism and elites whose very essence consists in rejecting the primacy of a class approach as a strictly scientific methodology for studying socio-political questions.
By eclectically combining the elitist approach and a neo-Marxist power model, Jessop's `class' theory, which lays emphasis primarily on analysis of power distribution among the biggest capitalist organisations, the state and `upper' social and economic sections, plays down the importance of the working class and the common people generally in the British socio-political system. It somehow dissolves them into `strata' and `elites'. He obviously underestimates the part played not only by the organised labour movement in the form of the trade unions, but also the cooperative societies and other `non-elite' social sections and ethnic minorities in British society, their socio-political values in the formation of British political culture. Replacement of a scientific class analysis by an elitist-pluralist approach to studying political power and culture results in that the political attitudes and values that have taken shape among members of the upper echelons of the British economic and political establishment are made to look universal. By not making a clear distinction, from the viewpoint of a scientific class approach, between the political culture of the ruling class and that of the working people, Jessop, makes an unjtistified attempt to embrace the political values and
231beliefs of all British people with the concepts of `traditionalism' and `conservatism', to depict them as a common national 'traditional-- conservative' political culture. Meanwhile, in spite of the presence within British political culture of certain common national features, it also includes specific subcultures depending on socio-class, occupational, ethnic, religious and other social structures.
The dynamism of Jessop's anproach normally consists in taking account of short-term chancres in the value system and stressing the unchanging nature of fundamental socio-political attitudes of the `traditional' political culture The historical `continuity' of British political culture of which he writes is actually due mainly to the fact that his 'circulation of elites' occurs over P lengthy historical period within the bounds of the political system whose socio-class essence, despite changes in the 'power structure', remains the same and whose political institutions express first and foremost the will and interests of state monopoly capital. In such circumstances the ruling class possesses immense opportunities to influence the attitudes of the populace in accordance with its own interests.
In striving not to make an absolute of the stabilising effect of political culture. Jessort effectively pronounces `traditional' political culture an `integrating-stabilisinsr' factor in the British political system. It is in the study of the issue of political stability that he sees one of the main purposes of his work. What th;s actually signifies is a desire to find a new model capable of ideologically encouraging 'social peace' given the fragmentation of contemporary political consci-
232ousness in Britain and the crisis in the ' deferential' model of political culture. So, when all is said and done, the idea of `traditional' political culture differs little in its conclusions and designation from the preceding concepts of political culture in British political studies, whose practical purpose has been theoretically and ideologically to justify the regime's political stability and liberal democracy.
Well to the fore in British political stiidies have been comparative studies of government, political institutions and systems in various countries, Sovietological and regional studies, and elaboration of theoretical notions of political development in states liberated from colonial dependence.~^^43^^
Professor S. E. Finer has achieved some eminence in advocating combining `value-free' sociological analysis with value and historical approaches in comparative politics.^^44^^ He approaches analysis of political institutions and their historical roots from a standpoint of methodological eclecticism. His research relies on methodological principles that go back both to American and to European traditions in sociology and political science. Einer puts forward the view that by using a behavioural methodology and sociological approaches one can trace the political process objectively and, at the same time, make moral and value judgements on it. From these general methodological considerations he then moves to examining the issue of political behaviour. It is motivated, in his view, by such concrete situations in which members of a social or political group maintain mutually-exclusive political alternatives. The political process consists in search-
233ing for a way out of such complex situations and resolving them. Proceeding from that premise, Finer expiates on the problem of power and government, on the essence of state administration, he analyses the role of elites and non-elites. Using formal political criteria he proposes a typology of political regimes: `coercion-fear', ' manipulation-deference', `totalitarian' and ' persuasion-bargaining' regimes. And he widely applies historical and contemporary sociological material to describe them.
As comparative criteria Finer uses formal political characteristics ignoring the social nature of political power, the essential differences between state structures in countries with diametrically-opposed historical types and socio-- political orientations. That is why the political regimes being compared do not relate in his scheme to historical types of state. He does not take into consideration the concrete historical peculiarities of political development in states and regions that are analogous in their typological attributes, nor does he use those historical variables that make them different from other typological varieties. His historical approach serves only to illustrate and describe, while his study generally is superficial and static. Finer's value approach rests on his liberal perception of world political reality.
__*_*_*__Expansion of the scope of sociological research into politics in modern Britain has led to an increase in information and knowledge of the mechanisms of operation of formal and informal
234political institutions, of organisations and processes; it has enabled scholars to assemble and generalise a great deal of material concerning the British political system as a whole, the institution of elections and political behaviour of voters, political parties and pressure groups, and the political systems of other countries.
The rise in the labour and democratic movement in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s, the sharpening class and national antagonisms, and the intensifying role of the state and its greater intervention in politics have all produced a wide range of political consequences and changes. These changes have given the lie to many longstanding notions held by British political scientists on power relations within the British political system and are today causing both a critical rethinking and an adaptation of political science to the new subject matter. Bearing in mind the latest trends and needs of political reality, British political studies, like those in other Western states, are striving to keep up with the times. Realisation of that task is what is predetermining the trends in British political studies: the growing popularity of concrete sociological empirical and theoretical studies of the British political system and other systems. In adapting itself to the new historical conditions, political science is endeavouring to pinpoint the tendencies occurring in the system and the particular changes, so as to find the most beneficial opportunities and reserves for more effective operation of the British political system within present-day state-monopoly capitalism.
235NOTES
~^^1^^ It is particularly worth mentioning the series of election studies made under David Butler's direction: see David E. Butler, The British General Election of 1955, London, Macmillan, 1955; David E. Butler, Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959, London, Macmillan, 1960; David E. Butler, Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of October 1974, London, Macmillan, 1979; David E. Butler, Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, London, Macmillan, 1976.
~^^2^^ See Fred I. Greenstein, Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, p. 111.
~^^3^^ See Political Studies, Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3, June-September 1975, pp. 161, 202.
~^^4^^ Among the general works on this subject are Samuel Beer, Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups, London, Faber and Faber, 1965; Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, London, Faber and Faber, 1974; W. Thoenhill (ed.), Modernisation of British Government, London, Pitman, 1975; Dennis Kavanagh, Richard Rose (eds.), New Trends in British Politics, London, Sage, 1977; Max Bcloff, Gillian Peele, The Government of the United Kingdom: Political Authority in a Changing Society, London,
236Weideni'eld and Nicolson, 1980; Anthony Harold Birch, The British System of Government, London, Allen & Unwin, 1980; Richard Rose, Politics in England: An Interpretation for the 1980s, London, Faber Paperbacks, 1980.
~^^5^^ Gavin Drewry, Law, Justice and Politics, London, Longman Group Limited, 1975, p. XIII.
~^^6^^ See Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959; S. E. Finer, 'Almond's Concept of "The Political System": A Textual Critique', Government and Opposition, London, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1969-1970, pp. 3-21.
~^^7^^ See Denis W. Brogan, Douglas V. Verney, Political Patterns in Today's World, London, Hamilton, 1963; S. E. Finer, Comparative Government, London, Penguin, 1970; Gordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, London, Heinemann, 1972; Jean Blondel, Comparing Political Systems, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973; C. H. Dodd, Political Development, London, Macmillan, 1975; S. Henig (ed.), Political Parties in the European Community, London, Allen & Unwin, 1979.
~^^8^^ Ivor Jennings, The British Constitution, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1950, pp. 28-29.
237l^ See .Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, p. 265.
~^^10^^ See Political Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1970, p. 306.
~^^11^^ See Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, p. 272.
~^^12^^ See Parties and Elections in a Capitalist State: the 1970s, Moscow, 1980, pp. 76, 125 (in Russian).
~^^13^^ Leon D. Epstein, 'What Happened to the British Party Model?', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1, March 1980, pp. 9-22.
~^^14^^ Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, p. 268.
~^^15^^ See Richard Rose, The Problem, of Party Government, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974.
~^^16^^ John D. Lees, Richard Kimber (eds,.), Political Parties in Modern Britain. An Organisational and Functional Guide, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 6.
~^^17^^ Richard H. S. Grossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 91.
~^^18^^ R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, London, Heinemann, 1955; 2nd edition, N.Y., London, A. Praeger, 1964.
~^^19^^ See S. P. Peregudov, The Labour Party in the Socio-Political System of Great Britain, Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).
~^^20^^ See Eric Nordlinger, The WorkingClass Tories, London, Macgibbon & Kee, 1967; Robert McKenzie, Allan
238Silver, Angels in Marble. Working Class Conservatives in Urban England, London, Heinemann, 1968.
~^^21^^ See, for example, Jorgen Scott Rasmussen, The Liberal Party. A Study of
Retrenchment and Revival, London, Constable, 1966.
~^^22^^ See, for example, Eric Nordlinger, op. cit.
~^^23^^ See Robert McKenzie, Allan Silver, op. cit.
~^^24^^ Ibid., p. 48.
~^^25^^ Ibid., p. 19.
2fi Ibid., pp. 156-82.
~^^27^^ Ibid., pp. 48-71.
28 ibid.
~^^29^^ Ibid'., pp. 106-20, 126-33.
~^^30^^ See N. M. Stepanova, The Conservative Party and the Working Class in Postwar Britain, Moscow, 1972, p. 8 (in Russian).
~^^31^^ Ibid., pp. 7, 169; see also S. P. Peregudov, op. cit., pp. 56-60.
~^^32^^ See, for instance, Dennis Kavanagh. Richard Rose (eds.), New Trends in British Politics.
~^^33^^ See S. E. Finer, Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain, London, The Pall Mall Press, 1958; Allen Potter, Organised Groups in British National Politics, London, Faber and Faber, 1961; S. Beer, Modern British Politics.
~^^34^^ Political Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 403-04.
~^^35^^ See, for example, Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, Lon-
239don, Methuen, 1972; G. Lehmbruch, Liberal Corporatism and Party Government, Edinburgh, 1976; Tom Keenoy, 'Industrial Relations and the Law: From the Webbs to Corporatism', Zenon Bankowski, Geoff Mungham, (eds.), Essays in Law and Society, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 180-203; Michael Moran, 'Finance Capital and Pressure-Group Politics in Britain', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 4, October 1981, pp. 381-404; Alan Booth, 'Corporatism, Capitalism and Depression in Twentieth-Century Britain', The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 200, 223.
~^^36^^ Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, p. 13.
~^^37^^ Ibid., pp. 115-43.
~^^38^^ Michael Rush, Parliament and the Public, London, Longman, 1976, pp. 22-23.
~^^39^^ Richard Rose, Politics in England Today, p. 398.
~^^40^^ Bob Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974, pp. 45-46.
~^^41^^ Ibid., pp. 63-66.
~^^42^^ Ibid., pp. 63-64.
~^^43^^ See Jean Blondel, op. cit., C. H. Dodd, op. cit.; Ghita lonescu, Comparative Communist Politics, London, Macmillan, 1973; S. Henig, op. cit.
~^^44^^ See S. E. Finer, Comparative Government.
[240] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER FOUR __ALPHA_LVL1__ FRENCH POLITICAL SCIENCE __ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICALPolitical science owes its formation in France to the far-reaching changes in the country's politics during the era of monopoly capitalism. It took shape to some extent as a result of the development of the science of state (or constitutional) law. As Jan Barents has justly noted, it made its way 'from "traitees de droit constitutionnel" via "traitees de droit coiistitutionnel et de science politique" to downright "traitees de science politique" '.i It subsequently spread its wings further and now encompasses virtually all issues of political relations and the political organisation of society.
After political science came into being, the science of constitutional law did not disappear; yet most French jurists do not regard the two disciplines as equal spheres of knowledge. In the opinion of Marcel Prelot, for example, constitutional law has become merely an information
science.
2The politicisation of constitutional law in French science may be clearly traced from the
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late 19th century. Above all we need to note A. Esmein's Elements de droit constilutionnel published in 1895. Esmein does not confine himself to setting out the standards of constitutional law, he tries to give a broader picture of politics. Others who considerably extended the traditional boundaries of constitutional law were Leon Duguit and particularly Maurice Hauriou who formulated the concept of institution which has to become a basic principle of contemporary political science. The Russian Professor M. Ostrogorsky left a considerable mark on French science of society with his Democracy and Political Parties first published in France in 1903, as did Andre Siegfried with his Tableau de partis en France published in 1913. Between the wars there appeared works by Siegfried, Prelot and A. Soulier.
They go beyond the traditional bounds of constitutional law widely using data and methods of sociology, displaying changes in voting for particular parties, analysing the functions of government and parliament, the role of bureaucracy, etc. As an independent discipline, however, political science did not exist in France at that time, and the bulk of French constitutionalists continued to adhere to traditional methods.
An important watershed occurred after WW II. Traditional constitutional law, studying only issues of legally regulating the structure, the order of formation and the parameters of bourgeois state activity, was patently incapable of satisfying the needs of the ruling class. A new discipline was clearly needed. As Prelot says on the subject, 'The conviction was growing and soon grew irresistible in an extremely politicised
242.
world that political science could be no longer
officially neglected.'~^^3^^
The UNESCO-initiated International Colloquium on Political Science, which met in Paris in 1948, had a considerable influence on the development of the science. Participants defined the content of political science as follows:
I. Political theory: 1. Political theory; 2. History of political ideas;
II. Political institutions: 1. Constitution; 2. Central government; 3. Regional and local government; 4. Public administration; 5 Economic and social functions of government; 6. Comparative political institutions;
III. Parties, Groups and Public Opinion: 1. Political parties; 2. Groups and associations; 3. The citizens' participation in government and administration; 4. Public opinion;
IV. International Relations: 1. International politics; 2. International organisation and administration; 3. International law.^^4^^
This list of issues denned the major direction of French political studies for a long time to come.
Another result of the Colloqium was to acquaint French political scientists with the works of their colleagues abroad. As Maurice Duverger writes, it was then that 'we discovered American political science'. ^^5^^ This facilitated further sociologisation of French political science.
Official recognition of political science occurred in the immediate postwar years. The commencement was marked by ordinance of 9 October 1945 which restructured the Ecole libre des sciences politiques. The Ecole Nationale d' Administration and I'Institut d'Etudes politiques at
16* 243
the University of Paris were established. Similar institutes were set up in Aix, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lyons, Strasbourg, and Toulouse. The same period saw the formation of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. The Association de science politique came into being in the spring of 1949, and, jointly with the Fondation, began publishing the Journal Frangais des sciences politiques in 1.951. The academic degree of Doctor of Political Science was introduced in 1956.
The establishment of political science was accompanied by disputes over its subject matter and object of study. Naturally, those, who saw in the new discipline only politicised constitutional law felt that it had no independent objects of research. Therefore, in its initial period the dominant view was that it constituted not so much an independent science as a certain point of view. Prelot writes of the 'point of view' notion as a result of it becoming clear that 'the study of the state, constitutional and related phenomena contain something different from law, cut and dried. The vision of the constitutionalist in order for it to be integral, has got to discern the differences that exist between the concrete situation that he gains through observation and the dogmatic schemes which he builds as a technician.'~^^6^^ In Prelot's view, it was this 'point of view' notion that enabled scholars to introduce political science into study programmes as juridical science without particularly breaking the traditional parameters of higher education.
The 'point of view' idea was held by many eminent political scholars who were subsequently to change course. Thus, in the first edition of his
244Traite de science politique, Georges Burdeau wrote: 'Political science does not have an object of its own; it is solely a method for a more fruitful study of constitutional law, wider angle of vision of traditional problems of public law.'7 In 1961, twelve years on, he was still insisting that what mattered about political science was not the object but the point of view.~^^8^^
As it developed, however, three basic views took shape on the object of study of political science. Some scholars thought the object was the state. The concept that equalised political science and science of the state has few supporters today, and Prelot is the only one of the prominent scholars to subscribe to it. He cites Jean Dabin for support: 'There can be no doubt about it: political science cannot be anything but science of the state . . . and everything that affects the state: such was the object of politics in antiquity, even though the state bore the name of the City. There is no reason for the object of this science disappearing since the time of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero.'^^9^^ Not all scholars discover the roots of this concept in classical literature. Duverger suggests that it came into being in the middle ages, at the same time as the theory of sovereignty. In his view, the idea of political science being science of the state in veiled form contains insistence on a special nature of the state, different from the nature of the forms of community, and on a special quality of state power---i.e. its invariable components are postulates of state sovereignty and the sovereignty of state power.~^^10^^
The bulk of French political scientists, however, think that study of the phenomenon of pow-
245er is the object of political science. In one degree or another this is the view of Duverger, Raymond Aron, Burdeau, Georges Vedel and Bertrand de Jouvenel. Duverger maintains that the advantage of this concept over the former is mainly that it is more `operational', that only it enables scholars to verify the principal hypotheses of political science.
As well as these approaches to defining the object of political science there is also an intermediate approach, according to which only a qualified form of power, not any power, can in some way be the object of political science. Such, for example, is the standpoint of Francois Bourricaud, who sees political science as a science of power in complex societies.^^11^^ This does not seem to us, however, an independent view, rather a variety of approach to political science as science of power.
A number of scholars have accepted the idea that the subject of political science is study of power only with some reservations. Aron, for example, has written that the concept of power is insufficient for defining the subject of political science.^^12^^ Burdeau has voiced similar views, abandoning his earlier position and, in the new edition of his Traite de la science politique, writing that political science must supplement the study of the nature, foundation, actions and results of power with a study of political facts that shape the overall political universe.^^13^^
Burdeati claims that politics is not given in facts, it is contained in reason which qualifies and interprets facts. Each society is based on a certain order, including a hierarchy of members, and has a certain purpose. Facts, acts and situa-
346tions acquire a political character to the extent that they express relations of supremacy and subordination and the overall purpose within a group.
He emphasises that this definition of politics contains two elements: power and overall purpose. He is critical of those authors who forget the second element; in his view, a fact or relation of power acquires political meaning only with account for the presence of overall purpose. M
He goes on to formulate certain ideas about observing political facts. Above all these facts must be singled out from the whole mass of social facts. Selection is made not on the basis of the peculiarities present in observable facts, but through an intellectual scheme or affected reaction which precedes the perception of those facts by the observer. While concrete reality is fragmentary and varied, he writes, the political universe is a uniform and associated world. So the term `universe' is used not for depicting facts and events, but for defining a thinking apparatus, which serves as framework for them, connects them to the system of concepts and beliefs. I5 'That is to say that the political universe is not at all the same as physical universe since, defined by our thought, it has an artificial character.'~^^16^^
If we take Burdeau's idea to its logical conclusion it would seem that he rejects any link between political phenomena and material relations and transfers studies exclusively to the realm of individual and group psychology.
Together with the above-mentioned views, recent years have seen the growing popularity of the ide§ tjiat political science is concerned with
347political relations. According to Madeleine Grawitz, for example, political science includes the relations of rulers among themselves and relations of rulers and the ruled.
As she and her co-author Roger Pinto write, 'It seems that one could define political science as the study of how men use institutions which regulate their joint life and ideas which impel ihem, irrespective of whether they conceived them or whether they received them from preceding generations. Political science could be symbolised by a realm in which ideas, institutions and men are closely intertwined.'~^^17^^
As political science has developed it has resorted more and more to sociological methods. French political scientists have worked out statistical methods of studying political problems, means of researching public opinion and forecasting elections, and they regularly conduct such investigations. They also widely employ computers for tackling questions of practical politics.
French political science possesses a number of features that mark it off from that of other countries. Thus, the theory of institutions is particularly well-developed in France. In Prelot's opinion, 'institutions are the most solid part of political science'.~^^18^^ Burdeau writes of the great fruitfulness of that conception.^^19^^
Despite wide acceptance of the institutions theory, discussion continues within French political science on the issue of the content of ' institution' as a notion. And here Prelot and Duverger markedly part company.^^20^^
Duverger rightly points out that the notion of institution has led to expanding parameters of investigation and a change in its very character.
348'From now on,' he writes, 'we are not only studying political institutions that are regulated by law, but equally those that law ignores more or less totally, those that exist outside the law, for example, political parties, public opinion, propaganda, the press, pressure groups, etc.'2I The institutional approach to studying political phenomena has enabled French scholars in some way to overcome the formalism of the traditional science of constitutional law. French authors do not confine themselves to studying juridical standards intended to regulate the functioning of political institutions, they also study the way in which these standards are being realised. At the same time, they take an interest in other, nonjuridical material, especially non-legal social norms.
Here lies the essential difference between French institutionalism and Italian, the latter almost enclosed within the field of law.
On the basis of institutions theory, French political scientists have undertaken several studies devoted to political regimes. While the old-time French constitutionalists confined themselves merely to examining state institutions, the political scientists have endeavoured to include all institutions existing in society within their analysis, particularly political parties. In Burdeau's opinion, it is parties that determine the form of the political regime.^^22^^
In recent years French political science has shown itself increasingly amenable to American influence in recognising the need to tie in a study of actual interaction and functioning of institutions with a study of other social factors. This is implemented in studying political systems.
249Aron undertook one of the first attempts of this kind. He believed that study of a political system was a problem which arises in studying a political regime. He saw a political system as an autonomous social system whose study had to be carried out before elucidating the links between the political regime and the 'social infrastructure'. In analysing the 'political system', he touches upon questions of the constitution, political party system, and the 'mode of functioning of the regime', which covers the work of parliament, relations between the chambers and government, and elections. He ends his study of the political system with a look at group pressure and political leaders.^^23^^
Duverger's position is far removed from that of Aron's; it was first set out in the eleventh edition of the textbook Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel (1970). In the preface to the new edition the author wrote, 'Political institutions are linked to the economic-social structures, to the levels of development, to ideologies and value systems, to cultural traditions. The ensemble forms the "political system" of each country of which the different elements are not separable.' He goes on to say that over many years he had formed the project of 'presenting political institutions in the social ensemble of which they are part, which is necessary for understanding their operation and their significance'. The first stage in implementing that plan was to provide a description of the actual institutions different from and sometimes even in contrast with those contained in constitutions and laws. Now he is describing institutions ' having set them in their place within the structure.
and beliefs of society where they develop', indicating the mutual dependence of all elements. 'From now on the accent is on the relativity of political regimes instead of examining them as an absolute.'^^24^^
The textbook outlines the basic contours of such an approach to the question. He completed his project in the book Janus, Les deux faces de I'Occident, published in 1972,^^25^^ which will be dealt with below.
For a proper assessment of the scientific significance of French political science, it is worth turning again to the opinions of the scholars themselves on the possibilities and parameters of the studies they are conducting.
In Duverger's view, which is shared by most French political scientists, one should distinguish between politics as a science and politics as an art and practice. He writes of the two sectors of politics, noting that the sector of scientific politics is much smaller than that of politics understood as art and practice. This latter rests on 'imprecise data, not measurable, intuitive and irrational' rather than on a scientific basis.26 One ought not to pin one's hopes on politics becoming fully scientific at some stage. Political decisions depend not only on objective factors, but on judgements about human and social values. Party, class and personal bias lies behind these values.
Duverger asserts that all political concepts have only relative meaning. We can describe, he claims, the Marxist, liberal, conservative, fascist, etc., politics, but there is no universal concept of politics, just as politics itself cannot be upiversal. Political science is capable of provid-
ing only a critique of each concept, singling out those elements that are present in them.~^^27^^
Statesmen effectively utilise the ideas of French political scientists, but the latter aspire to a greater role in French political affairs. In an article devoted to the relationship between political science and practical politics, Prelot does not beat about the bush: 'The practical politician must be, in the wide sense, a scholar.'~^^28^^ In his book Echec an roi, Duverger wrote that political science can be valuable to presidents, prime ministers and politicians generally.^^29^^
French scholars do not restrict their objectives to tackling 'social engineering'. They see a major aim in providing a popular explanation of and commentary on contemporary political processes. It is indicative that many of them constantly address themselves to the mass reader. Arou, for example, used to place his articles in Le Figaro, and from 1977 contributed to the weekly L'Express. Duverger actively contributes to Le Monde. An analysis of these publications in some way provides a key to understanding the place political science holds in the political strategy of the French monopoly bourgeoisie. Taking liberal or sometimes left stances, French political scientists are drawn into bourgeois propaganda exercises. In particular, through their ideas on modern industrial society they vigorously support the notion of integrating the working class' into the system of state-monopoly capitalism, and try to saddle the workers with the ideology of class collaboration.
252 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL POWERThe power issue is one of the most acute in the contemporary ideological struggle. Evidently, it can be deeply studied only by revealing the genuine social nature of social relations that determine the essence of power being implemented in a given country.
There is no single view on power in French political science, no uniform method for studying the phenomenon. At the same time, there is a certain common approach among bourgeois scholars. It is a largely juridical approach to the question, a departure from profound sociological study of political relations, ignoring or playing down the class nature of political power.
One of the most detailed concepts of power is that by Georges Burdeau who looks at it on two planes: the conceptual and the historical. With the former, power is a force at the service of the idea, 'born of the social conscience, destined to lead the group in search for the common good and capable in certain circumstances of imposing prescribed attitude on the members'. He goes on to emphasise that 'power is not so much an external force which puts itself at the service of an idea as the power itself of that idea'.~^^30^^
When he links up the concept of power with that of the 'common good', he almost completely identifies power with law. Power is the norm itself, it is the tangible shape of existence of the legal norm, says Burdeau. The creative role of the idea of law postulates a structure of power; in turn it is precisely power that realises the idea of law with maximum effect. 'It is Power which represents this force necessarily integrat-
253ed in Law ... because, on the one hand, power is the natural continuation of the idea of law from which it proceeds and which justifies it and, on the other hand, in its physical aspect, it has the prerogative of material power, it assures in it the meeting of the idea of law and force.'~^^31^^
Let us note that here Burdeau is referring to the conceptual view of power in which 'power is necessarily separated from the people in whose hands it lies'.~^^32^^ He stresses that personified power is something exterior in regard to the norm, that only on a conceptual plane can the dualism of power and law be removed. As far as personified power is concerned, it ought to be studied only on the historical plane.
The conceptual notion of power, Burdeau asserts, is worked out through observations of the' power phenomenon, a result of applying the experimental method. In our view, this asserti&n is nothing more than an empty declaration; in fact,, the notion has been worked out by purely speculative means. The idea of identifying power and! law is pre-set and is an obviously apologist approach within his set of views.
When he studies power on the historical plane, he tries to expose the 'political-social aspect' of the phenomenon. 'Power,' he claims, 'is the social phenomenon par excellence, in the double sense. On the one hand it is not conceived outside society, in so far as it cannot manifest itself but through social relationships, and on the other, without Power that really is effective, society is an inert body incapable of satisfying its raison d'etre which is continual action.'~^^33^^
He sets himself the task of following the development of this phenomenon from elementary
254non-political to developed political forms through generalising ethnographic and historical material.
Power, he says, arises simultaneously with society: 'Before its action makes itself felt, society's existence is more intentional than real. Once it appears, the group where only a vague awareness of social ends existed acquires by the play of everyday behaviour, by discipline, a clearer understanding of its cohesion. In translating a pressure from a social goal to each of us, Power brings a tangible and concrete unity, the goal and limits of society. There is therefore no place for opposing the group to Power as an aspect of the liberty-authority antithesis. Power is a condition of order and liberty is not possible without order.'^^34^^
Having come into the world simultaneously with society, power therefore gradually evolves. The first form of power is anonymous power, which then gives way to individualised power, and evolution culminates in the formation of institutionalised power; and typical of the last are periodical transformations into individualised power.~^^35^^
Anonymous power is typical of primitive societies. Here power is distributed among the whole mass of individuals and is manifest in the totality of beliefs and customs which directly determine the conduct of the group member without the need for personal authority to intervene. Such a power is the foe of any initiative. In Burdeau's view, it was not political.~^^36^^
At a later stage of society's development, when the rhythm of social life intensifies and the need arises for decisions to be taken in an oper-
255ative way, individualised power takes shape; it belongs to the leader or to a small group of people. But this power lacks the quality of legitimacy. The natural disappearance of the leader normally opens up a period of internecine warfare for power which threatens the very existence of the group.
Institutionalised power replaces individualised power, and the former exists in the juridical form of state.~^^37^^
Examination of power in this `political-social' aspect enables Burdeau to reveal the multiple nature of centres of power. He asserts that the function of making laws is not a monopoly of the state, and since all these centres of power create law, they are all vehicles of political power. He terms state power as official political power; all the others are called actual political powers. Among the latter are forces engendered by each group whose formation is based on a certain purpose desired by its members. The above-- mentioned groups include economic groups, trade unions, parties. The actual powers compete among themselves, but they may also interact, in particular combining with state power.
Burdeau's pluralist theory of power carries a certain originality. By contrast with ideas in which power is diffused when it belongs to everyone and does not belong to anyone, he does not extend the idea of pluralism to official---i.e., state, power. This power juridically remains the dominant instrument of law in the group, and in the sociological, actual plane, its basis or guarantee is the minority, the class, the party in which the content of the idea of law is expressed.
256The mounting role of actual political power, in his view, leads to a weakening of state power, to its democratisation. The actual process of intensification and concentration of the power of monopolies is thereby disguised, being carried out by a single mechanism combining the force of the monopolies with that of the state.
The ideas of Leon Duguit on the rulers and the ruled have had a considerable impact on the notion of political power developed in contemporary political science. In every group of people, he notes, there are those who give orders and those who bow before them; those who make decisions, and those who carry them out: the first are the rulers, the second the ruled.~^^38^^
Aron distinguishes power in general (pouvoir) and political state power (autorite).^^39^^ His definition of power is generally analogous to that of Duguit.
A number of French political scientists consider the concept of power put forward by Duguit too broad. Duverger, for example, chides Duguit for not giving a precise enough definition of the `rulers'.~^^40^^ If the `rulers' are all those who give orders, Duverger says, everyone is simultaneously rulers and the ruled with the exception of the President of the Republic at the top of the social ladder and the lamplighter at the bottom, since they all receive and give orders. If we speak of power every time we notice inequality in human relations, power will exist everywhere and all institutions will have a political character. Duverger thinks that several types of 'material coercion' exist: physical coercion, economic force and the pressure of an organised group.
17-01532 257
Power, in Duverger's view, must contain two elements. On the one hand there is 'material force', on the other conviction, a belief on the part of the subordinates that such subordination is laudable, just and legitimate. There can be no talk of power if the latter is lacking: it is simply domination.
Duverger divorces political power from its economic basis. Andre Hauriou has the same tendency: Tower is an energy of volition which manifests itself among those who take on the enterprise of government of a human group and which allows them to impose it thanks to the double authority of force and competence. As long as it is sustained only by force, it has the character of actual power and becomes power of law by the consent of the governed.'~^^41^^
Hauriou admits the existence of economic power, but insists that political power is not its' derivative. Political power plays the part of arbiter in relation to social forces. The existence of different economic pressure groups forcing various decisions out of the state, in his opinion, testifies that political power in a liberal democracy is not an expression of economic power of the class dominant in society.^^42^^
In actual fact, Hauriou's argument is woefully weak. State power under capitalism is the political domination of the bourgeois class over the whole of society, but not the domination of the individual bourgeois.^^43^^ Naturally, the interests of individual groups and sectors of the bourgeoisie can be satisfied to varying degrees, but all that takes place against the backdrop of defence by the bourgeois state of the vital general class interests of the bourgeoisie.
258Hauriou tries to approach the problem from anotner angle too. in his view, political power must remain direct power. In regard to the individual, it is manifest in the form of commands whose fulhlment is ensured by sanctions in the event of any infringement. Indirect power also exists in society---i.e., when pressure is exerted on means of existence. If an individual does not obey authority he can be threatened with deprivation of those means. This is economic or political-economic power. Political power, even the most stringent, always leaves some minimum of freedom, inasmuch as it does not touch means of existence. The fusion of economic and political power would lead to slavery. That was precisely the situation under feudalism, says Hauriou.
By devorcing economic and political power, French political scientists naturally cannot satisfactorily explain the very existence of political power. They are not far removed from Duguit on this issue.
Duguit wrote that 'it is absolutely impossible to explain why the right to public power exists and how it is justified'.~^^44^^ All one can assert, in his view, is that there is, on the one hand, the belief of individuals in the actual existence of public power and, on the other, the material possibility for a few individuals, named rulers, in a given group to make the use of force dependent on their will. He suggested that two equal, but unprovable hypotheses could be made on the origin of power: power may be considered established either by God or by people.
Following Duguit on this question, Duverger turns his back on any explanation of the origin
n* 259
of power. In people's minds power is customary: 'They find power in the societies where they live, like rain, wind or sun, in physical nature.'45 Study olr the phenomenon of power may be reduced mainly to observing its manifestations, and the political scientist sees its manifestations both in human society and in animal societies. 4U What he aspires after, however, is to reveal the characteristic features of a state that determine those of state power. He thinks the state differs from the other forms of community mainly by two criteria: an especially strong organisation and the intensive solidarity of its members.47 The supremacy of state organisation occurs in three respects.
First, Duverger notes the far-reaching division of labour among the governors. A certain category of governors (legislators) work out the legal norms, another (administrators) apply them to society's members, and judges make up the third group. He avers that such a division of labour exists in other organisations as well as in the state. Thus, in many associations, political parties, and trade unions, congresses play the part of the legislative body, and executive committees are the administration, while arbitration boards are the judges. However, division of labour is not fully developed in these organisations.
Second, he notes the existence in the state of a complete and organised system of sanctions enabling it to attain obedience from its members.
Third, the state possesses considerable material forces for having its decisions carried out. Only the state owns the police and a modern army which have the last word in the event of open social conflict.
260In looking at the question of solidarity among individuals and groups that make up the community. Duverger underlines the supremacy of national relations in regard to any other kind of relations. In the event of conflict between common interests of various groups, national solidarity is supreme, class differences are normally subordinate to its interests.
When he defines the reasons for national solidarity he suggests that this is above all a phenomenon referring to beliefs. Material elements (affinity by racial origin, language, religion, territory, etc.) play a subordinate role. Thus, national solidarity exists in Switzerland where there is only a common territory, and where nationality, language and religion are multiple.
To a Marxist there can be no doubt that it is class features that are dominant in the social behaviour of classes. But, as noted in Soviet literature, 'in one and the same social group and class the dominant and subdominant may change places. There have been cases when in wartime national sentiments have taken precedence over class interests.'^^48^^ Duverger refers to just such cases, but individual examples cannot provide grounds for refuting a general law.
The idea of the dominant value of social solidarity is widely used bv Western scholars in examining methods for implementing political power. That is why Western sociology has a critical tendency to review the definitions of power in which force figures as its feature, and at times the only feature.
This tendency is certainly apparent in French political science. Thus, having noted that implementation of power rests on force and the be-
261Kefs of participants in the state community, Duverger puts his main emphasis on beliefs. He considers the first element to be belief in the need for the existence of power generally. The idea of a leader, authority and power has great significance. 'The idea that one can live without chiefs appears absurd---at least at first sight---because one lives everywhere with chiefs.'^^49^^
The second element is belief in the legitimacy of power. Duverger stresses that this is not a quality inherent in power as such, but only its external evaluation taking shape in the social consciousness. The idea of legitimacy of power, he continues, is formed by the ruling class and, at least partially, is imposed on the class over which it rules. The concept of law plays an important part in forming the idea of legitimacy.~^^50^^ It is the juridical procedure that lends power an institutional character, makes it legitimate in the eyes of citizens. 5I
In defending his thesis of the existence of national solidarity, Duverger at the same time does not fully reiect the idea of the class character of the state. 'Power is always exercised to the benefit of one group, clan or class; combat against it is waged by other grouns, clans or classes who wish to take the place of the predecessors. Meanwhile, within the ruling class itself, the state apparatus remains in the hands of a minority, and the conflicts engendered between it and the majority are different from those in which the ruling class and the ruled classes are onposed. Antagonism between the rulers and the ruled, between those who command and those who have to obey, between power and citizens, manifests itself in all human societies.'~^^52^^
262Duverger has probably come closer than anyone else to the border dividing a Marxist understanding of the essence of power from the bourgeois. He does not take into account that the antagonism of power relationships is bound up with the existence of antagonistic classes, that the class antagonism is the overriding and decisive one. The scientific untenability of Duverger's concept is particularly evident when he examines the essence of power in capitalist conditions (as he does, for example, in his book Janus. Les deux faces de I'Occident, which is critically reviewed below).
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. THEORY OF POLITICALContemporary French political science frequently links the conception of institution with the very definition of the subject of the discipline. Thus, Prelot writes, 'Political studies are not, at least directly, knowledge of men, nor even of relations between men.' They should 'safeguard the fundamental duality of the human being and social institutions'.~^^53^^ Political studies should not engage in an endless multiplicity of relations among people, but should focus attention on pure objective reality which is the reality of institutions in their formation, in their life and in their fading away.5/i
Prelot distinguishes les institutions organismes, which he also calls institution-personne or institution-corps, and les institutions-chases. which he also calls institutions-mecanismes.55 The institution-organisme is 'a human collective
263united by an ideology or a common need and submitting to a recognised authority and to fixed rules'.~^^56^^ And an institution-chose is 'not a human complex juridically unified and structured, but simply a system of rules of law'.~^^57^^
An institutional link may be based on a general idea. But need is more likely to be the basis of this link. It cannot be satisfied through individual resources; at any rate, it can be better satisfied by collective enterprise. The idea or need being constant lends the institution qualities that distinguish it from the simple centre of interest interlacing. Among people who form the institution, the institutional link causes a feeling of exclusiveness or even hostility to outsiders. Concluding his argument, Prelot says that either a clearly expressed or hidden will of an institution is formed, which is carried out by its agencies.
By dint of the existence of that will, the institution exists not only in the consciousness of its members; it acquires features of personality vis-a-vis outsiders. The institution can enter into actual and legal relationships. Relations with other institutions can also be institutionalised.~^^58^^
Similar views on institutions are held by Burdeau, Vedel, Hauriou and other political scientists. Burdeau maintains, 'The institution is an enterprise in the service of an idea, organised in such a way that with the idea being incorporated in the enterprise it has a power and existence superior to those of individuals through which it, acts.'~^^59^^
It is in that form that the theory of institutions gained widest coinage at the first stage of development of French political science when its
264links with constitutional law were still very strong. The convenience of institutionalise! is that it rejects the juridical `extremes' of normativism and thereby uses political notions and categories, at the same time trying to give a juridical interpretation of state law.
The institutional approach by French political scientists to an analysis of socio-political phenomena and processes has been examined in Soviet literature in the works of V. N. Danilenko, who has noted that the study of political institutions, justified and necessary from a scientific viewpoint, should nevertheless be preceded by an analysis of socio-economic structure of society.60 In trying somehow to overcome the flaw in institutions theory, Duverger has worked out a new conception of institution. Formed under the influence of the structuralist idea it essentially differs from the traditional conception in both character and capacity.
According to Duverger, 'institutions are a sort of model of human relations from which concrete relations are copied and thereby acquire stability, continuation and cohesion. They are also distinguished from relations that arise outside all institutional models which are occasional, ephemeral and unstable.'^^61^^ He delineates two elements in the conception of institution: the structural element and beliefs, collecltive ideas.
He thinks it necessary to single out the ' structures' o institutional models themselves and concrete relations which emanate from them. 'Both of them are not separable in practice and constitute the very notion of institutions: structures are systems of relations which have no real existence in these relations themselves; their
265originality is constituted by their liaison with the structural model.'^^62^^
He distinguishes two kinds of institutions. The first are a simple system of relations copied from the structure of a model. Others have an additional technical and material organisation: legal texts, offices, furniture, machinery, emblems, forms, personnel, administrative hierarchy, etc. Such are parliament, ministries, trade unions, associations. Duverger decisively opposes those who see only the latter as institutions.
'In reality,' he writes, 'the technical and material elements which distinguish the `` organisations'' from simple "systems of relations" are secondary in regard to structural models.'^^63^^ He agrees that 'technical and material elements' intensify the cohesion and stability of structural models, making them objective and giving them a perceptible reality. But the structural model too, without material organisation, may be quite cohesive and stable. He regards organisation mainly as an external institution that does not always correspond to its 'profound reality'. 'It is therefore much more in tune with the facts and much more ``operational'' to bring to the forefront unity of the notion of institution in the broad sense, opposed to simple occasional relations, not copied from a structural model, and to relegate to the background opposition of `` organisations'' and structural systems without the corresponding material organisations.'^^64^^ Such an approach to the notion of institution leads to its extension. He sees as institutions an individual's status, his social roles and classes, remaining outside the traditional theory of institutions.
When he conies to analyse the second element
266of an institution (collective ideas and beliefs), Duverger notes that it does not matter whether these ideas correspond to reality or are illusory, what is important is the consensus that they introduce into the social group.
'All institutions are at once a structural model and a sum total of collective ideas of greater or less value,' he writes. 'That is to say that all institutions refer more or less directly to a "value system".'~^^65^^
French political science has formulated an institutional concept of the state on the basis of the general theory of institutions. Thus, defining the concept of the state, Burdeau writes, 'The state is in the first place institutionalised power, then, in a broad sense, the institution itself in which the power rests.'^^66^^ The Soviet scholar I. D. Levin has analysed in detail the institutional concept of the state and particularly the views of Burdeau. Noting that this concept replaced interpretation of the state as a juridical person, Levin writes, 'The fact is that the notion of institution is more flexible and rich in content, hence its advantage for justifying bourgeois state-legal institutions. The state as a juridical person is an essentially fictitious entity expressing only the fact of the organised coexistence of a large number of people on a single territory and the presence of a single authority represented by state agencies. Institutionalism goes further: it advances to the forefront the " common cause", the task, the objective that the state serves. What we are talking of here is the active coexistence, the presence of some common tasks and, moreover, constant ones, which bind all members of society in a single state. The
267principal objective of institutionalism is to put across just such an idea of the state.'^^67^^
Institutionalisation of power, Burdeau explains, means that power shifts from the rulers to the institution which from now on becomes its only possessor. Of course, rulers as such do not disappear, but their place in political life radically alters. While hitherto they used power as their own prerogative, now they are merely agents of the supreme power.^^68^^
According to this idea, the institutionalisation of power and, consequently, the formation of the state are due to processes of an intellectual order. The conviction arises in society that, owing to the inconveniences bound up with it, individualised power has to be replaced by a new form of power. Both the ruled and the rulers are equally interested in that. Fjorn the point of view of the ruled, the value of institutionalisation consists in restraining arbitrary action, subordinating power to the idea of law expressing the interests of the common good.^^69^^ From the point of view of the rulers, institutionalisation ensures the stability they benefit from and continuity of power.~^^70^^ An end to personal power means that the actions of the powerful are set within legal parameters. Actual power becomes legal.
In each specific case the institutionalisation of power is a certain historical solution of the problem of legitimacy of power. And that is impossible without some consensus between the ruled and the rulers. To be recognised, state power, according to Burdeau, must be based on accord and trust. Consensus arises through the solidarity of society's members around the idea of law that is dominant in a given society. The politi-
268cal 'sovereign* forms the content of that idea. 'The idea of law comes from consideration of a socially desirable order; it is determined by a certain idea of the future. The sovereign owes his title to the fact that this social order and this future cannot, without his agreement, be imposed as a goal of juridical regulation. It follows from this situation that sovereignty is a force which arises from the sum total of historical and national circumstances in the political community at a certain moment of its existence.'^^71^^
Hauriou thinks that only the Greek polls, and particularly Rome, comes close to the modern state; the feudal epoch had no state at all. In his view, 'Only from the 16th century did the notion of the state arise in the sense that we now understand this political organisation.'^^72^^ Burdeau goes even further, making no mention of the states of Greece and Rome, and maintaining that the state came into being at the end of the Middle Ages.^^73^^
The sense of this treatment of the question is sufficiently clear. While the class essence of the slave-owning and feudal state is expressed openly, it is carefully masked when it comes to the capitalist state. The ruling class---the bourgeoisie---tries to put across its own selfish interest as the general national interest, and its will as an expression of the general will. By removiug the emergence of the state to a time when the bourgeoisie began its struggle for clipping the monarch's wings, advocates of the institutional idea of the state are laying a cornerstone of the philosophy that the state is above classes.
For a number of political scientists the state is not an objectively existing social phenome-
269non, but only a fact of collective consciousness. In Burdeau's view, 'the state is thus a concept; it only exists in so far as it is assumed by governors who put their power to work, and by the governed who see in it the seat of Power and the foundation of juridical laws, around which the search for the common good is organised.'74 In assessing the institutional notion of the state overall, we share Levin's conclusion that 'the institutionalised characteristic of the state is an abstract description of certain facets of the state, but by no means a definition of its essence, even though it claims that this is what it is. We say ``abstract'', since the most important is lacking in this characteristic---an indication of the specific class character of that cause, that objective which the given state serves.' ^^75^^
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. SOCIAL STRATIFICATIONIn their works Marx and Lenin showed that politics was first and foremost relations between classes. Explaining the specific nature of politics, Lenin underlined that it was an area 'of relationships of all classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between all classes.'^^76^^
Understanding of politics in French political science is entirely different. When defining politics, French scholars normally ignore its class essence. Thus, Francois Goguel and Alfred Grosser claim that politics is 'the sum total of actions and institutions that affect the regulation
270of public affairs in the country and that tend to form a power, to control the action of that power and eventually to replace those who exercise it.'^^77^^ The idea of politics as serving the 'common good' has affected that definition. In recent years, definitions recognising the conflict basis of politics have become fairly widespread. Thus, Jacques Moreau, Georges Dupuis and Jacques Georgel define politics as 'war continued by other means'.^^78^^ Yet here, too, there is no indication that politics is primarily a class struggle.
It does not follow, however, that French political scientists generally ignore the question of classes and the class struggle. As Duverger writes, 'Few deny that class antagonisms are a source of political conflict. The true divide here is that (1) for Marxists all political conflict occurs more or less directly from class antagonisms and contradictions, and (2) for non-Marxists class antagonisms are only one of the factors in political conflict, the importance of that factor being variously appreciated.'^^79^^
Works of Georges Gurwitch have always had a considerable impact on French political studies. In Gurwitch's view, class struggle is the strongest of all social conflicts.^^80^^ At the Third World Congress of Sociology he made critical remarks about the theory of social stratification rejecting the existence of social classes.^^81^^
But while recognising the existence of classes and class struggle, he inserts his own meaning into those notions. From his standpoint, ' social classes are particular, actually existing though scattered groupings which are characterised by their supra-functionality, their tendency towards a strong structuralisation, their resis-
271tance to penetration by society at large and their radical incompatibility with other classes.'^^82^^
In expiating on his definition, he describes each trait that distinguishes social class from a number of other macrogroups.
The first trait is supra-i'unctionality. In opposition to the Marxist concept of class which proceeds from the premise that 'the law of division of labour... lies at the basis of the division into classes',~^^83^^ Gurwitch asserts that it is impossible to give a single characteristic of the labour function inherent in members of a given class.
The second trait is the actual grouping.84 Here he tries to show that classes exist independently of any juridical or other social norms.
The third trait is the tendency towards a strong structuralisation.^^85^^ Class is the largest macrogroup. Glasses fall into various groupings, yet they themselves are not part of any macrogroup.
The fourth trait of social class mentioned by Gurwitch is affinity at a distance.^^86^^ In order to be part of a class there is no need to cooperate in any way: even being at some distance from one another people can belong to one and the same class.
The fifth trait is the 'incompatibility of classes'.~^^87^^ Classes are incapable of merging with one another. Each class strives either to identify itself with society or to subordinate other classes to itself.
Finally, the sixth trait of a social class is its 'unified and closed structure'.^^88^^
Marxism proceeds from the notion that social classes are 'large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a histor-
272ically determined system ol social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and consequently, by the dimensions of the share o° social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.'89 So Marxism links the existence of classes only with historically definite phases of development in production. Classes only arise when private property exists, bound up with the exploitation by one class of the remaining part of society. In opposition to this historical approach to the question, that relies on the undeniably proven fact of the lack of classes in primitive society and is oriented on the disappearance of classes and establishment of complete social equality under communism, Gurwitch proceeds from the total inevitability of classes and social inequality prevailing in all societies. It would seem that such an approach has prevented him from singling out the principal class-forming characteristics. His first trait, supra-functionality, contains merely a negative definition whose incorrectness becomes obvious as soon as we turn to the facts of history. As for the remaining traits, they do describe actual features of classes, but they are all facets derived from the paramount features and do not define the law-governed development of the phenomenon being studied.
Duverger's position is just as remote from genuine historical approach. In his view, class conflict does not come from contradictions between
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the productive forces and relations of production, it is only a product of insufficient development of the productive forces themselves.
Seeing Marx's merit in that he provided a strict definition of class struggle as the cause of political conflict, Duverger, however, says that the Marxist understanding of classes is too narrow. Private ownership of the means of production is only a form of privilege passed on by inheritance. History knows other forms of inherited privilege: in aristocratic society privileges were transferred by law (for example, only noblemen could serve as officers in the army, be judges, receive estates, pensions, etc.); in classical societies affiliation to a caste clearly determined a person's status. Duverger, therefore, puts forward a new definition of classes which he finds more flexible and operational than the Marxist. 'A class is a category of people whose conditions of birth are relatively homogeneous, yet different and unequal to the conditions of birth of other categories. Social classes result from the inequality of chances that society gives to its members at birth, and from the fact that these inequalities determine certain important types of situation at base. Classes may be defined by a level of wealth, by a form of property, by juridical privileges, by cultural advantages, etc. Of little importance are forms of social inequality of birth: what is essential is that there are social inequalities of birth and that they are divided into categories perceived as such by people, producing diversities in forms of life and feelings of affiliation.'^^90^^
Duverger's definition is intended as an alternative to the Marxist definition of classes. Capi-
274talism, he feels, meant a certain move towards equality and enabled the individual to gain advantages and privileges through his work, talent and brain, and to pass them on to his children even if he did not receive them through his own predecessors, which would have been virtually impossible in the aristocratic or caste society. Furthermore, although concentration of capital in certain hands also brought inherited inequality, in various Western states this factor is gradually losing its importance, and it is moral rather than material inheritance that is having a decisive effect on people's destinies. 'The son of a high official, an eminent doctor, a celebrated lawyer, a well-paid director of a big firm, of a high-ranking engineer, has more chances at the outset than that of a worker, a peasant or artisan. First, because he will have more material means to follow his studies; then because he will receive from his milieu an education through osmosis that is very important; finally, because his parents' connections will greatly help him in getting on in life.'~^^91^^
Aron's position- is different. He studiously avoids examining Lenin's definition of classes, maintaining that it is impossible to give a definition of class. 'From Marx to Gurwitch it all happens as if we were assured that societies are divided into classes without being sure of the number and the identity of these classes.'^^92^^
Nevertheless, Aron's works contain a distinction between 'functional classes'---i.e., a natural division of labour among members of society, and 'hereditary classes'. In the latter case, a class's feature is the transfer by inheritance of a place in the social hierarchy and i certain style of life
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and thought. Aron totally ignores the most important class-forming features associated with relations of production.
He notes that 'all modern industrial societies are stratified and destined to remain such for a long time to come'. By stratification he means 'heterogeneity, a hierarchy of groups each of which comprises a certain homogeneity'.~^^93^^
He rejects assertions by American sociologists that classes disappear in industrial society and insists on the inevitability of the existence of functional classes; and he is sceptical about the possibility of hereditary classes disappearing too. Above all, he feels, absolute social mobility is needed for those classes to disappear. 'If the son of a worker had as much chance of becoming an entrepreneur as the son of the latter, classes would exist no more than the fate imposed on the individual.'^^94^^ Such a degree of social mobility is, however, impossible since it presupposes the highest homogeneity of society: 'The son of a worker would not have such a chance of succeeding in his studies unless ways of life are the same from top to bottom of the pyramid.'^^95^^
Aron suggests that there are certain ways of mollifying social antagonisms caused by the existence of classes. The first is the idea of social mobility spreading in the social consciousness, with hereditary privileges easing at the same time. The second way is erosion of the borders between classes. Class antagonisms will weaken if between unskilled workers and entrepreneurs there appear additional echelons in the social hierarchy: skilled workers, foremen, technicians. The third way is reducing inequality of incomes between workers and entrepreneurs.^^96^^
276He is not at all sure that all this will lead to a mollification of class antagonisms. He notes, first, thai an increase in intermediate echelons in the social hierarchy and a reduction in inequality of incomes are not bound to lead to a homogeneous way of life; second, he accords importance to class consciousness. He writes that class consciousness stands opposed to all efforts to achieve social integration, since it has an inexorable character. Even convergence of the material status of members of the opposite class cannot eradicate the 'conscience de separation'.~^^97^^
French political scientists pay much more attention to political parties than they do to social classes. Along with study of elections, the study of political parties is recognised as the strongest feature of French political science. For many authors political science or political sociology is in essence concerned with these two problems. As Bourricaud notes, 'Most authors of textbooks on political sociology . . . very clearly devote their exposition only to describing parties, their functioning in relations of parties and pressure groups, to analysing determinants capable of explaining the electoral processes.'^^98^^
Enhanced interest in studying political parties is hardly fortuitous. As Lenin once wrote: 'The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties.'" The decline in parliamentarism has by no means meant lessening the importance of the party system. On the contrary, in the Fifth Republic the declining role of parliament has been accompanied by an increasing role for the party system.
277A salient feature of French political science is the connection between study of political parties and the demands of practical politics. As the Soviet scholar T. D. Roslavtseva has written, here 'the tasks of a scientific and cognitive order organically fuse with the practical tasks of elaborating methods of strengthening bourgeois parties and weakening the united front of democratic and socialist forces.'~^^10^^°
A study of political parties in France rests on relatively long traditions. After World War II interest in the study increased. A whole range of empirical research appeared on the issue. Daverger made an attempt to create a general theory of parties when he published his Les Partis Politiques back in 1951. The ninth edition came out in 1976 and had translations into English, Spanish, Italian, German, Portuguese and Korean. French scholars regard this as a classical statement on parties.^^101^^
At the basis of his party typology Duvergev puts their structural characteristics, among which he singles out the overall organisational structure, the membership system and ruling bodies.
He adopts the widespread idea of division of parties into three groups: 19th-century bourgeois parties; socialist; communist and fascist. At the same time he finds this classification 'very approximate and very vague; it describes tendencies rather than makes a clear-cut distinction'.^^102^^ A number of parties remain outside the classification.
He lumps communist and fascist parties under one sociological type, viewing similarity in their anatomy. At the same time he notes also the existence of deep-going differences between them
278in organisational structure, social composition, doctrine and philosophy.^^103^^
The lumping together of communist and fascist parties into a single 'sociological type' is so scientifically untenable that it has evoked criticism not only from communists but among bourgeois political scholars as well. Georges Lavau has accused Duverger of an excess of ' anatomism': 'A ``fascist'' party may well model its organisation on that of a communist party .. . but the resemblance will be no more than morphological, that is to say formal, ignoring the essential which can only be explained precisely with the aid of doctrine and social composition.'^^104^^
Moving on to a more detailed examination of party organisational structure, Duverger primarily divides parties into those with `direct' and those with `indirect' structure. Essentially, these are only new names for the division, that has long been around in law and political science, of parties based on individual membership and these based on collective membership.
Duverger also makes classification of parties dependent on the nature of local organisations, differentiating committee-parties, section-parties, cell-parties and stormtrooper parties.
His third form of party classification is their division depending on the system of links between the local organisations (horizontal system) and between the locals and the top ruling bodies (vertical system). Here he divides all parties into 'parties with a close system of communication' and 'parties with a system of weak communications'.
This entire classification is very formal. Duverger ignores a party's social composition arid
279all the explanations he makes as to why one party or another chooses certain organisational forms are very artificial.
His proposed division of parties into `cadre' and `mass' parties strikes the strongest chord in contemporary political science. In his opinion, 'The distinction between cadre parties and mass parties is not based on their size, on the number of members they have; it is not a matter of difference in size, but in structure.'~^^105^^ As an example of a mass party he examines the French Socialist Party. 'The recruitment of new members is its fundamental feature from two points of view, politics and finance. It strives first of all to educate the working class politically, to single out in it an elite capable of taking over the government and administration of the country: members are therefore the very core of the party, the substance of its action. Without members, the party would resemble a teacher without pupils. From the financial point of view, the party essentially depends on the dues paid by its members.' I06
Cadre parties correspond to another concept of political party. Here it is a matter of associating notables for the purpose of preparing elections and maintaining contact with deputies. He distinguishes several categories of notables. First, there are those who by their name or prestige enhance the authority of the hopeful candidate for parliament and win him votes; second, there are those able to organise an election campaign; and third, there are financing notables. Thus, prestige, organisational talents and size of Lhe fortune are the major criteria for recruiting people to work in the party.
280'What the mass parties achieve by number, the cadre parties achieve by selection. . . If one understands by member the person who signs an obligation to the party and pays his dues regularly, the cadre parties do not make members.'^^107^^
The emergence of mass parties, Duverger believes, coincides in time with replacement of limited elections by general elections. In the qualified electoral regimes that were the rule in the 19th century, parties obviously took the form of cadre parties; there could be no question of involving the masses, since they had no political influence. On the other hand, the capitalist financing of elections was considered natural.'~^^108^^
In delineating cadre and mass parties, Duverger tries to conceptualise the fact of the emergence in the latter part of the 19th century of mass proletarian organisations. Yet in place of a clear-cut class feature he uses very indefinite structural features. Typically, he himself realises the relative nature of the basis of the division he has chosen, and notes that differences between cadre and mass parties in some way correspond to differences between right and left, between bourgeois and proletarian parties, in so far as 'neither financially, nor politically did the right bourgeoisie need to organise the masses.'^^109^^
He is forced to admit that it is rather difficult to apply his classification in practice. For one thing, cadre parties not infrequently imitate the organisation of mass parties: 'One should not stick to the official rules contained in the statutes, nor to the declarations of the leaders. The absence of a system of member registra-
281tion or a regular receipt of dues is a fairly good criterion.'^^110^^
Duverger regards a number of parties as semimass. Here he underscores the intermediate character of such parties and suggests they should not be singled out as an independent group in contrast to cadre and mass parties. Among these semi-mass parties he includes indirect parties---i.e., consisting only of collective members. Such, for example, was the British Labour Party in the early years of its existence. From the financial point of view it was a mass party, since election expenses were paid by the trade unions---i.e., ultimately by the working people who made up trade union membership. 'But this collective membership is very different from individual membership: it implies neither actual involvement in politics, nor a personal obligation towards the party. This profoundly changes the nature of the party.' U1
In recent years French students of politics have been trying to brush up the classification suggested by Duverger. In this connection Jean Chariot is worthy of attention. Besides mass and cadre parties Chariot has suggested distinguishing voter parties. In his analysis of L'Union des Democrates pour la Republique, de Gaulle's party, he notes that it had a very diffuse programme and in that respect was very similar to cadre parties. On the other hand, the U.D.R. widely made use of methods for involving ordinary people in politics, as practiced by mass parties. These tactics, he felt, were what ensured it the support of wide sections of voters with quite opposed interests.^^112^^ The study of the 'Gaullist phenomenon' undertaken by Chariot, and his
282supplement to Duverger's classification, received high acclaim in bourgeois literature and are taken into consideration by practical politicians.
Bourgeois authors see Duverger's great service in his classification of 'degrees of participation' in party activity.
In parties without formal membership he distinguishes three 'circles of participation'. The widest of these is formed by the electorate voting for the party; within that circle is a circle of `sympathisers'; and finally there is an inner circle which unites the party activists. The scheme of a party practicing formal membership has to be completed with one more concentric circle: its size is less than that of the sympathisers, but bigger than that of the activists.
'The fundamental problem consists in determining the relations between the different circles.'~^^113^^ A party's nature can be determined by analysing these relations. The inner circle leads and inspires the outer circle. If the first represents the latter and if their ever all orientation coincides, the whole system can be described as democratic; if that is not the case we have oligarchy.
Duverger gives a fairly detailed description of each of the concentric circles.
From the viewpoint of political science, he says, the circle of voters is the most important, since it can easily be measured. The researcher has the appropriate statistics at his disposal.
As applied to cadre parties the number of voters is the only index that enables us to determine the strength or weakness of the party. By comparing the composition ol' its leading bodies with the social composition of its voters, we can
283draw conclusions about degree of democracy in the organisation of a particular party. Information on voters of mass parties provides even greater opportunities for research. In this case, Duverger proposes using the so-called ' membership index' (relationship between number of party members and number of its voters). In his view it is of greatest interest to compare ' membership indexes' for the same party at different times of its evolution, and for different geographical areas, applied to different social and age groups. One can also compare 'membership indexes' of identical parties in different countries and parties of a similar type in one country. This index is quite widely used both in Duverger's own studies and in the works of other French political scientists.1U
The methods proposed by Duverger produce very formal results. The actual role of a party can be denned correctly only through a comprehensive analysis of the historical situation in which the party operates, comparing the orientation of its activity with trends in historical development.
The next concentric circle in his scheme is that of the sympathisers. The sympathiser, he says, is a fairly vague notion. Like the voter 'he brings his vote to the party, but he does not leave it at that. He shows his accord with the party; he avows his political preference.'^^115^^ Sympathies with the party can be expressed in various forms and to varying degrees. The voter who has let out the secret of whom he has voted for is already beginning to be a sympathiser. The next stage is continual and explicit voting for the party. A number of sympathisers carry
284out actions to the benefit of the party: they regularly read party literature, take part in demonstrations and political meetings, in propaganda, contribute to fund raising. But the sympathiser is not yet a party member. In cadre parties, where there is no formal membership, all people openly proclaiming their agreement with the party, save committees, must, in Duverger's view, be counted as sympathisers.
The third circle is party members. The person who becomes a party member must normally fill in and sign a document obliging him to observe party discipline and propagate party doctrine. This act is very significant from two viewpoints: first, it has an important psychological effect on the new member. 'In our civilisation a written pledge is much stronger than an oral pledge: the signature has taken on a magical character which primitive systems attached to certain gestures, to certain formulas, to certain rites.' 1I6 Second, such a document is a more or less detailed questionnaire for the new member.
Duverger distinguishes two types of membership: open and regulated. With open membership it is sufficient to sign the appropriate document. With regulated it is necessary to make an application to join, which is looked at by some body of the party. In some cases the applicant must be presented by people recommending him, themselves already in the party.
The fourth circle consists of activists, and the conception of activists in a cadre party sharply differs from that in a mass party. In mass parties activists comprise the nucleus of each base group. Duverger stresses that activists are not to be confused with leaders; they are merely the executive
285of the party; however, no party activity is possible without them. In the cadre parties, the term activist refers to members of the committees.
Duverger suggests applying 'activity index' to mass parties, which is the numerical relation between the activists and the total membership. He feels that the comparison of the 'membership index' with 'activity index' provides the clearest picture of the real power of a political party. Duverger himself does not manage to make such a comparison since he does not have the necessary information at his fingertips.
A great deal of French research is devoted to studying party systems. Regarding the content of that conception, Duverger wrote that two sets of characteristics had to be taken into account.
First, there are the features of each party's internal structure. Thus, we may distinguish centralised and non-centralised, flexible and inflexible parties, etc.
Second, there are characteristics in defining which we have to bear in mind all parties existing within the country. They include, for example, the number of parties, their relative sizes, importance in political life, geographical location, etc. 'A party system is denned by a certain relationship among all these characteristics.'^^117^^
In turning to his party system typology, he distinguishes primarily the one-party, two-party (Anglo-Saxon type) and multiparty systems: 'Many other distinctions are superimposed on that and combine with it: a system of independent parties or alliances, of balanced parties or dominant parties, of big or small parties, of stable or unstable parties, of evolving to the left or immobile, etc.'^^118^^
286The party system, then, is the result of action of many factors. He distinguishes factors that are specific to each country and general for all. In the first he includes the country's traditions and history, its economic and social structure, religious beliefs, ethnic composition, etc. General factors include among the most salient the electoral system which, he thinks, decisively affects the number and size of parties, the formation of party coalitions and the size of party representation inside parliament. Summing up his thoughts on the effect of the electoral procedure on the party system, Duverger puts forward three formulas in his book Les partis politiques.
1. Proportional representation leads to a system of multiple parties, rigid, independent and stable;
2. The majority system in two rounds leads to a system of multiple parties, flexible, lasting and relatively stable (in all cases);
3. The majority system in a single round leads to a dualist system with alternating independent parties.
He makes the point that these formulas are very general and 'are far from encompassing all the influences of the electoral procedure on the party system.'^^119^^
He has noted that the party system, in turn, plays an important role in establishing electoral procedure: a two-party system encourages the establishment of a majority single-round voting system; the existence of parties inclined to make alliances rejects it; the natural tendency towards alliances contradicts the proportional representation system, etc. 'In the final count, the party system and system of elections are two realities
287indissolubly connected and at times even hard to separate in analysis.'~^^12^^°
In his works, nonetheless, he focuses mainly on the determining effect of the electoral procedure and almost ignores the reverse effect of the party system upon it.
He accords his formulas very great importance, frequently referring to them not only as formulas but even as 'three fundamental sociological laws'.~^^121^^ Some French and US scholars accepted them. Yet, several French authors, especially Georges Lavau, have voiced weighty objections.
In our view, Duverger greatly exaggerates the importance of his observations. There can be no doubt that a certain association exists between the electoral system adopted in a country and the political party system. Thus, it would be very difficult in a single-round majority voting system for a party to emerge which could count on substantial representation in parliament. All the same, dependence between the electoral procedure and the party system is one of a secondary nature; both phenomena are determined mainly by the alignment of class forces in the country.
A comparatively recent work devoted to analysing party systems in Francois Borella's Les partis politiques dans la France d`aujourd'hui. He writes that he is dealing with analysis of the party system not because systems analysis is all the rage, but so as to get at the reality that exists. 'Most parties form an ensemble whose elements are interdependent; an ensemble which must not be confused with the society in which it operates. It is legitimate to talk of a party system in so far as the constituent elements (that is, the parties or coalitions they form) are dura-
288ble and have relations of functional interdependence.'~^^122^^ In his view, parties and coalitions depend on one another to the extent that the condition of one, at least partially, is determined by that of others.
He thinks that when analysing party systems one should take account of geographical and historical circumstances, the social and economic milieu in which the parties operate. He gives less importance to the constitutional mechanism, although finds its influence to be quite considerable in France since 1958. Analysis remains formal and mechanical, he feels, if, when looking at a specific party system, one omits to follow the history of its emergence. It follows that his research programme presupposes a more comprehensive approach to the study of party systems than Duverger's programme. His Achilles' heel is his incorrect interpretation of the conception of social and economic conditions. He adduces considerable factual material, yet does not attempt completely to elucidate the genuine significance of the facts he is examining, to determine the real essence of modern French society.
Pressure groups occupy a prominent place in the politics of capitalist states today. Yet French studies on the subject are few and far between. Back in 1955, Duverger noted that 'there is very little serious work on pressure groups and their operation.' I23 The situation has changed little.
The most eminent works on the subject are the two books by Georges Meynaud, Les groupes de pression (1958) and Nouvelles etudes sur les groupes de pression en France (1962).
When Duverger defines the conception of pressure group he primarily opposes it to the concep-
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tion of party. While parties aspire to seize and utilise power, pressure groups do not take a direct part in the struggle for power, they influence power, being located outside it, exert pressure upon it. Pressure groups put pressure on people in power, hut do not put people in power, at least officially.~^^124^^
He distinguishes organisations acting exclusively in the political sphere (for example, The Parliamentary Association for the Defence of Freedom of Education in France), and organisations for which the exerting of political pressure makes up only part of their activity (for example, trade unions, the church, writers' organisations) . From the standpoint of the structure, ho subdivides pressure groups into mass (trade unions, youth movement, war veterans' association) and cadre (patronage organisations, trade unions of higher education employees). He puts various research centres, advertising agencies, etc., into his third pressure group type.
Duverger studies the form of activity of pressure groups specially. He distinguishes direct action (governmental demarches) and action through public opinion (strikes, demonstrations, etc.).
Pressure group studies could uncover the real centres of power concentration in capitalist society. But the nature of pressure groups can only be exposed adequately if their role in the class struggle is taken into account, and on the basis of an analysis of the socio-class make-up of the group and its class functions within the system of power relations. For the most part that is lacking. Typically, French scholars see trade unions and entrepreneurial organisations as phenomena of the same order.
290 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. STUDY OF POLITICAL REGIMESForms of implementing political power were studied in traditional French science of the state, distinguishing the monarchy and the republic as forms of rule. Moreover, the concept 'political regime' existed in the science of constitutional law.
Bearing in mind this use of the word, Duverger writes that the classification of political regimes has been based on separating the legislative and the executive arms of the state and explaining their relationship. Accordingly, the regime of fusion of powers (absolute monarchy), the regime of division of powers (presidential republic) and the regime of cooperation of powers (parliamentary republic) were distinguished. Today, he says, French scholars view such a classification as supplementary, they see in it merely a classification of 'types of government structures' rather than of political regimes.~^^125^^
Study of 'types of government structures' in traditional constitutional law relied exclusively on legal texts. Political science uses a different method. There is no consensus on the 'political regime' concept, yet all its definitions proceed from the need to study the actual operation and significance of all social institutions.
In comparing the two methods, Michel Lesage writes, 'One consists in taking the Constitution and the published juridical laws as points of departure and in studying their application. The other consists, conversely, in studying first the practice and then the written law in relation to that practice. The second method seems to us far
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preferable to the first. It is much better to begin with analysing practice.'~^^126^^
French scholars have examined the political regime as the overriding feature of the state. The basic flaw in that approach is that it ignores a scientific conception of the type of state, it denies the class content of any state form.
The approach of French scholars to studying political regimes remains essentially formal-- juridical. Lenin condemned this approach many years ago: 'In reality autocracy, constitutional monarchy and republic are merely different forms of class struggle; and the dialectics of history are such that each of these forms passes through different stages of development of its class content, and the transition from one form to another does not (in itself) at all eliminate the rule of the former exploiting classes under the new integument.'~^^127^^
When they maintain that a political regime results from the effect of various social factors, French scholars, nevertheless, do not give a thorough-going analysis of the effect. Switching their attention to political systems they had to concentrate more on the problem. Duverger made such an attempt in his book Sociologie politique.
He says that the search for social factors, engaged in by political scientists and sociologists, has so far consisted in the main in underlining the importance of the class struggle or, more broadly, the importance of economic factors for politics. Yet both of them have not fully explained the nature of relations between politics and social determinants. Science has become bogged down in the discussion of relations between ' infrastructure' and `superstructure'.
292Trying to unravel these difficulties, Duverger suggests a sketch of a general model of the political system in which he attempts to synthesise the Marxist and non-Marxist viewpoints. In fact, the model is very far from Marxism and is under the strong influence of technological determinism.
Duverger has often examined the impact of technology on political development. He assiduously tries to demonstrate that the Marxist and the industrial society standpoints are identical. 'The Western expression "technical progress" translates almost exactly the Marxist formula "state of productive forces" which for socialists determines economic institutions, class relations and the whole social superstructure, including political regimes, ideology, culture, etc.'^^128^^ Yet Marxism, having formulated the law of the level of development of productive forces corresponding to the nature of production relations, has never claimed that productive forces directly affect the superstructure. By contrast Duverger strives to show that productive forces, which he reduces to technology or technical progress, directly affect the superstructural elements. 'Ultimately, the correlation between political regimes and the level of technical and economic development seems just as strong as that between political regimes and systems of ownership of the means of production.'~^^129^^
In working out his model of a political system, Duverger proceeds from his own understanding of the origin and basic features of social classes. As already shown, his views on this question are far removed from a genuine historical approach.
He expresses his general model of a political system in several formulae. The first and most
293general takes the following form:
Here E is 'productive forces in the Marxist sense, or, as they say in the West, technical and economic development'. The second variable C corresponds to 'the existence within the group of certain common subdivisions due to mutual inequality and a tendency for that inequality to become hereditary'. The third variable J is the value system existing in society, and, finally, P is 'political organisation in the wide sense of the word, including the legal apparatus'. I3° He opposes his formula to the Marxist which in his interpretation is: technology (productive forces)---*
``system of production and ownership regime *• social classes "class struggle "political antagonisms.
When he explains the `advantages' of his formula, he relies on the theses that the system of production and the ownership regime are less important than the level of technical development, that not in all eras is the class struggle the main content of political antagonisms. We referred to the theses earlier. Further, he accuses Marxism of a single-factoral approach to politics, particularly of underestimating the factor of culture. Such an accusation has no grounds at all. The purpose of a materialist understanding of history, as formulated by Marx and Engels, is to depict the whole historical process in its entirety (and therefore also the interaction between its various aspects) .~^^131^^ Marxism looks at social reality as a system in which the change of one element causes restructuring of many other elements of the system. At the same time, in reveal-
294ing the decisive importance of society's economic system, Marxism showed the laws to which this restructuring is subordinate.
A study of social factors affecting the political process, including the factors of culture, undoubtedly comprises an important task of science. The task is dealt with successfully in Marxist literature. But, by contrast with bourgeois political science, the study takes place on the basis of recognition and appreciation of the general structural relations and dependencies typical of the social whole.
In emphasising the great importance of cultural factors, Duverger is tightening up his first formula. He puts 'cultural barrage' in the way of action of the variables included in it. This amendment is produced in the following:
B
M
Here M is 'motive forces', B is 'cultural barrage' and S is the political system..~^^132^^
Along with the first formula Duverger proposes a more complex one:
""--' E -»- Ce -*- Je -» P -» CP -v JP
t
In this formula his purpose is to show 'the autonomy of the political apparatus and ideology'. Hence, Ge and Je are factors designated in the first formula as C and J, but now changed through the influence of political organisation.
295The arrows in the formula show the possibility of contradiction between the old and new social stratification of society, between the old and new systems of values. IBS
In these formulae Duverger tries to give each factor a once-and-for-all definite place in the system of social relations. Such a position excludes a specific historical approach to a study of social life. Conversely, the Marxist student, relying on historical materialism, is able comprehensively to define the genesis, place and social functions of a particular social phenomenon.
While noting the schematicism and simplifications in Duverger's formulae, we should note too that he has in some way succeeded in showing the methodological futility of the factor theory which is widespread in French political science and political sociology. The factor theory, as V. A. Tumanov and V. P. Kazimirchuk rightly note, 'while claiming to overcome the "one-- sidedness" of existing studies ... in fact is no more than an eclectical combination of variegated elements, while the decisive factors . . . are put on a par with other important, though not decisive and often derivative conditions.'~^^134^^
The construction of political system models, to Duverger's way of thinking, has to be supplemented by their concrete study. He described the nature of the Western political system in his book Janus. Les deux faces de I'Occident.
'Like Janus . . . the Western system presents two opposed yet complementary faces, this dualism constituting its profound nature. On the one hand, pluralism, liberties and competitive elections grant citizens the possibility of taking part in government much more than ever before, ..
296However, this democracy remains only partial. Inside Western regimes the citizens and their organisations are not the only ones to have political power; they share it principally with the owners of capital, with individual capitalists and especially the big industrial, commercial and financial firms. That is the other face of Janus.'~^^135^^
In the Western system, deputies, ministers and government leaders are not simply puppets in the hands of capitalists. They are able to rely on voters to oppose the pressure of economic power. But the influence of the capitalists is very strong, and capitalists are able to influence citizens as well. Political decisions in such circumstances result from a parallelogram of forces, the product of a combination of the factors indicated.
Overall, the Western regime can only partly be called democratic. In this connection Duverger suggests calling it pluto-democratic, since power is enjoyed simultaneously by the people (demos) and wealth (plutos).~^^136^^ In his view, the term `pluto-democracy' is apposite not only because it is exact, but also because it is neutral, combining both the positive and the negative feature of the concept.
Duverger distinguishes two forms of ' plutodemocracy'. The first existed up to the start of World War II, and he calls it a 'liberal democracy'; the second arose after the war, and is a `techno-democracy'. Within the 'liberal democracy' he pinpoints the period 1914-39 as being transitional. To substantiate the term 'liberal democracy' he refers primarily to the fact that it had 'individualist structures which exactly correspond to liberal ideology'. More extensively describing 'liberal democracy' he says that with
297this political form there are no big monopoly entities; political parties are mainly cadre parties and weakly organised, and members of parliament have no party discipline; pressure groups are likewise poorly organised and undeveloped; large worker organisations arose only in the late 19th century, and hitherto popular influence on politics was very weak.~^^137^^
A central issue in an analysis of the political system of 'liberal democracy' is that of the existence of the major source of power which Duverger calls the 'economic oligarchy'. 'The economic oligarchy does not form a coherent and organised group, but an agglomeration of individuals and categories opposed by multiple rivalries.'~^^138^^ From this fact, he notes, ideologists of liberalism conclude that the economic oligarchy is incapable of playing a leading part. They write of 'social pluralism' which is supposed to comprise the basis of democracy.
Duverger does not question either the existence of that pluralism or the fact of acute rivalry between groups and members of the same group, But he thinks the situation differs little from that which prevailed amidst the aristocratic notables, and no one disputes that the aristocracy was an oligarchical grouping and acted in concert. That solidarity is even more profound among capitalists. While the nobles did sometimes come together with insurgent peasants against other nobles, capitalists never have acted in unison with the revolutionary people. 'Profit and free enterprise assure a cohesion more profound than blue blood.'~^^139^^
When tracing the formation of the capitalist class's common will Duverger simplifies the pro-
298cess, explaining it purely spontaneously and taking no account of the importance that capitalist social organisations and state activity have. 'Spontaneously, all private entrepreneurs find themselves in accord against wage pressure and state control, despite competition of firms and various rivalries. Social pluralism is only superficial. All members of the economic oligarchy are united in a profound belief in the practical efficacy of free enterprise and its moral legitimacy, and in a common fear of popular pressure that would make universal suffrage and democratic institutions much more strong and dangerous.'~^^14^^° In this quotation we see how intricately he combines a penetrating analysis of certain aspects of the capitalist social system with its apologetics. He notes the existence of a general will of the bourgeois class directed against the working people, yet he sees the bourgeois state as a force above classes, to some extent opposed to the bourgeoisie. He characterises the importances of general elections in bourgeois states and bourgeois democracy generally in just such an imprecise way.
Duverger concludes that the bourgeoisie form a bloc that is as dominant in the state as it is in the economy.
According to him, political power is implemented in a 'liberal democracy' by representatives of the 'middle or intermediate class' consisting of professional politicians, state officials and people who shape public opinion. In actual fact, however, the group that Duverger is examining is a party-government (or bureaucratic) oligarchy, comprising part of the bourgeois class, and only the vehicles of public opinion belong to wider
299 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1985/CPS431/20100311/399.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2010.03.11) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+sections of intellectuals who do not always support the ruling oligarchical grouping.
Among people forming public opinion Duverger includes teachers, university dons, tutors, journalists, writers, the clergy, etc. As he says, although 'liberal democracy' does not force people to share any official ideology, practically all citizens from childhood come under the influence of school, the church, family morals and acquire certain fundamental principles, particularly those like private property, free enterprise, competition, profit-making. All that presupposes respect for the economic oligarchy.
A strong aspect of Duverger's research is his indication of the means used by the economic oligarchy for strengthening its domination. First and foremost is the use of money. Numerous schoolteachers, university lecturers and journalists either directly or indirectly receive payment from heads of industrial enterprises. Officials constantly enjoy the incomes of parties, schools and universities which receive subsidies from businessmen. Thus, officials also indirectly receive income from capitalists. Finally, Duverger points out the corruption that is so widespread. He calls all the above-mentioned methods elementary; besides those he also looks at 'more subtle' methods of influence, for example, the relations established between high-up state officials and politicians, on the one hand, and business people, on the other. The practice is common where civil servants obtain well-paid posts in private firms, and where politicians are enticed on to company administrative councils. Like the old aristocracy who concluded their marriage deals with the big bourgeoisie, the latter enter
300into marriage unions with members of the ' intermediate class'.
As well as individual there is also collective influence which is, in Duverger's view, probably stronger. 'A politician, party, newspaper, school, university or church which puts up too strong a resistance to businessmen will see itself deprived of funds needed for its activity.'~^^141^^ Parties, trade unions and associations which can obtain the necessary funds apart from capitalists are outside the system of liberal democracy for which the profit motive, promotion of private enterprise and freedom of their action comprise the motive force. Ultimately, says Duverger, the liberal ideology .is the most effective means of guaranteeing the domination of the economic oligarchy over the 'intermediate class'.
At the same time, he endeavours to reveal the factors that ensure the 'intermediate class' a relative independence. In his view, 'not a single category of intermediate class has ever totally been subordinated to the economic oligarchy.' U2 In order to operate politicians must be elected and re-elected; meanwhile, notes Duverger, the oligarchy cannot impose upon electors the need to prefer a certain candidate, just as it cannot prevent the election of a candidate who is popular. Strict control of civil service procedure, as in Great Britain and France, enables officials to withstand pressure from the economic oligarchy. Universities and the church establish similar conditions for lecturers and priests. Some newspapers are in a position to give their editors a certain freedom. The extent of relative independence of the 'intermediate class' also depends on the specific features of political institutions.
301On the whole, the 'intermediate class' possesses a certain relative autonomy. By way of illustration, Duverger writes that members of that class 'are not simple clowns or ordinary puppets in the hands of businessmen. Like Petrushka, they can have a certain freedom from their masters.' I4S
Duverger's analysis of power implementation in capitalist society has much that corresponds to reality. Marxist literature has frequently noted the relative independence of the state and studied its real role in forming bourgeois politics. As the Soviet scholar, R. P. Fedorov writes, 'We are coming to the conclusion that party-government (or bureaucratic) and monopoly oligarchy are two groups carrying out the class will of monopoly capital, of which each possesses a relative independence of action within its own area. At the same time, they are in close association, strive to affect one another in their own specific interests, and the intervention of monopoly associations in politics accompanies the intervention of the state bureaucracy in the economy.'~^^144^^
The second form of `pluto-democracy' is ' techno-democracy'. Neocapitalism, in Duverger's definition, is the economic basis of the new form; it 'has integrated certain elements of socialism'.~^^145^^ Among such elements are advanced social legislation and the intervention of the state into the economy. Thus, changes in bourgeois society caused by the development of state-- monopoly capitalism and the workers' fight against social oppression are all interpreted in the same vein as the welfare state advocates do. But Duverger does display a certain amount of scepticism about the notion. 'Without doubt this evolu-
302tion of capitalism is illusory and partial.' He goes on to say that capitalists agree to nationalisation only of non-profitable sectors of the economy. 'But the partial socialisation of capitalism is more real in other domains important to citizens; for example, social security and communal services.' Ufl He observes, 'The replacement of the classical liberal state by the "Welfare State" has not brought complete well-being to wage-earners, far from it; but it has greatly diminished their plight.' lw
Duverger links the advent of 'techno-- democracy' with the scientific and technological revolution. Its progress is leading to an enhanced role for technocrats, hence the name of the new form---`techno-democracy'. Yet, while noting the enhanced role of technocrats, he does not claim that they have taken over the running of production. 'Shareholders have retained their prerogatives; they can freely dismiss members of the technostructure and replace them with others.' M8
In describing the features of a political system operating in `techno-democracy' conditions, Duverger notes that along with control over the 'intermediate class' in the new circumstances, the economic oligarchy is faced with the task of controlling popular behaviour. 'That the economic oligarchy dominates politicians and administrators who make up the state apparatus would have no great significance if it did not control at the same time the popular masses who nominate and replace these members of the intermediate class by the play of universal suffrage. Such control is never absolute, but it remains very important.'^^149^^
303Along with time-honoured methods, the new tasks require new ones, which are transforming politics. Several elements of `techno-democracy' are making control over the popular masses more difficult than in 'liberal democracy'. For example, limitations on suffrage have virtually vanished.
A particular difficulty for the economic oligarchy is that 'apart from the United States, the development of mass parties and trade union organisation more or less linked to them is giving citizens more efficient instruments than in liberal democracy for counterbalancing the influence of money'.~^^15^^° Regular membership dues are giving parties and unions sufficient financial assistance. Within these organisations which ' constitute a sort of buttress against the influence of the economic oligarchy',~^^151^^ a large number of voters receive a political education. And the weakening of religious belief weakens the influence of oligarchy over the people.
On the other hand, says Duverger, a number of elements in the `techno-democracy' make it easier for the economic oligarchy to control the people. 'They are all more or less bound up with the development of social consensus and the weakening of the class struggle.'^^152^^ The pages of his book dealing with an analysis of these phenomena show that his social criticism is very restricted; he stops short of speaking out against the fundamental principles of bourgeois society and its political superstructure.
In his view, the strengthening of social consensus facilitates control by the economic oligarchy over the people. But he does not confine himself to that statement, he tries to expose the
304means of control that the economic oligarchy possesses under `techno-democracy'.
Above all he notes the importance of the Cold War. During the 1950s the economic oligarchy waved the Cold War flag so as 'to isolate communists from the rest of the nation and cast them into a ghetto ... The provocations of the gauchists in the United States, in France and elsewhere help mobilise the "silent majority"--- that is, the flock of bleating sheep that faithfully follow the shepherds in the oligarchy's service.'~^^153^^
He writes that after the Paris Commune, the development of social consensus led to the steady erosion of coercion, but in the new circumstances ultra-left agitation is pushing the oligarchy to step it up. He attributes the Cold War, the use of popular lack of political awareness, and physical violence to classical means of control which, with the appearance of the mass media, are being pushed into the background. 'Control of the mass media is thus becoming a fundamental basis for power in the industrial nations.' I54
He says that the mass media are controlled by the economic oligarchy either directly or through the state. Independent newspapers are the exception, but even they must respond to the tastes of their readers which are influenced by the mass media. State-financed radio and television depend on politicians and administrators, and the latter, in turn, depend on the oligarchy. 'An analysis of television, radio and the big press in Western nations shows that they develop tirelessly the themes of superiority of capitalist production, of dangers of socialism, the need for eco-
20-01532 305
nomic concentration, the competence and seriousness of businessmen, the incompetence and inconslancy of politicians, the high cost and red tape of public services, the damage of all ideology (that is, all representation of a society different than the one existing), the irresponsible and pathological nature of intellectuals ... etc. Superficial eroticism and infantile sexuality of publicity serve up this message in a certain appetising way, without altering the conservative nature of it. It is wholly oriented towards justifying the economic oligarchy.'^^155^^
Analysis of the political system of capitalist society made by Duverger contains more than a dose of social criticism. But on the whole the criticism remains rather diluted.
NOTES
~^^1^^ Jan Barents, Political Science in Western Europe, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1961, p. 19.
~^^2^^ Marcel Prelot, La science politique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1961, p. 58.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 55.
~^^4^^ See La Science politique contemporaine. Contribution a la recherche, la methode et I'enseignement, Paris, UNESCO, 1950, p. 4.
~^^5^^ Maurice Duverger, Methodes de la science politique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1959, p. 50.
~^^6^^ Prelot, op. cit., p. 58.
~^^7^^ Georges Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 1, Paris, Librairie gene-
306rale de droit et de jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1949, pp. 8-9.
~^^8^^ Georges Burdeau, Methods de la science politique, Paris, Dalloz, 1959, pp. 49-50, 92-93.
~^^9^^ Jean Dabin, 'Sur la science politique', Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et a I'etranger, No. 1, January-March 1954, p. 9.
~^^10^^ See Maurice Duverger, Sociologie politique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1968, pp. 15-16.
~^^11^^ See Francois Bourricaud, 'Science politique et sociologie', Revue francaise de science politique, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1958, pp. 249-76.
~^^12^^ See Raymond Aron, 'Science et theorie de la politique', Revue franqaise de science politique, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 1961, p. 265; idem, 'La science politique en France', La science politique contemporaine. Contribution a la recherche, la methode et Venseignement, pp. 52-68.
~^^13^^ See Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 1, 2nd edition, Paris, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1966, pp. 5-6.
~^^14^^ Ibid., pp. 126-27. « Ibid., p. 138.
~^^16^^ Ibid., p. 137.
~^^17^^ Roger Pinto, Madeleine Grawitz, Methodes des sciences sociales, Paris, Dalloz, 1971, p. 266.
~^^18^^ Prelot, op. cit., p. 80.
20* 307
~^^19^^ See Burdeau, traite de science potitique, 2nd edition, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 257.
~^^20^^ See Prelot. Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Paris, Dalloz, 1978, p. 39; Duverger, Sociologie politique, p. 103.
~^^21^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1968, p. 7.
~^^22^^ See Burdeau, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1959.
~^^23^^ See Aron, Democratic et totalitarisme, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, pp. 112-29.
~^^24^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1970, pp. 5-6.
~^^25^^ Duverger, Janus. Les deux faces de I'Occident, Paris, Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1972.
~^^26^^ Duverger, Introduction a la politique, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p. 18.
~^^27^^ Ibid., p. 19.
~^^28^^ Prelot, 'Science politique et politique pratique', Revue de I'enseignement superieur, No. 4, 1965, p. 76.
~^^29^^ Duverger, Echec au roi, Paris, Albin Michel, 1978.
~^^30^^ Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 1, p. 406.
si Ibid., p. 418.
~^^32^^ Ibid., p. 421.
~^^33^^ Ibid., p. 402.
~^^3^^* Ibid., pp. 401-02. ~^^35^^ Ibid., pp. 476-77.
308~^^36^^ Ibid., p. 475.
~^^37^^ Ibid., p. 488.
~^^38^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1970, pp. 9-10.
~^^39^^ See Aron, 'A Propos de la Theorie Politique', Revue franqaise de science politique, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1962, p. 6.
~^^40^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1970, p. 10.
~^^41^^ Andre Hauriou, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Paris, Editions Montchrestien, 1972, p. 98.
~^^42^^ Ibid., p. 109.
~^^43^^ See Karl Marx, 'Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality', Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 318.
~^^44^^ Leon Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, Vol. 1, Paris, Ancienne librairie Fontemoing & Cie., 1927, pp. 552, 553.
~^^45^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1968, p. 19.
~^^46^^ See Duverger, Sociologie politique, pp. 174-75.
~^^47^^ See Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1970, p. 28.
~^^48^^ A. G. Kovalev, Course of Lectures on Social Psychology, Moscow, 1972, p. 54 (in Russian).
~^^49^^ Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1970, p. 12.
™ See Ibid. •5i Ibid., p. 25,
309~^^52^^ Duverger, Introduction a la politique, p. 28.
~^^53^^ Prelot, La science politique, p. 81.
~^^54^^ Ibid., p. 82.
~^^55^^ Prelot, Institutions politiques et droit constitulionnel, pp. 39, 40.
~^^56^^ Ibid., p. 39.
~^^57^^ Ibid., p. 40.
~^^58^^ Prelot, La science politique, pp. 82-85.
~^^59^^ Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 2, p. 258.
~^^60^^ V. N. Danilenko, 'The Crisis of Capitalism and Bourgeois Political Science in France, Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 3, 1973, p. 129.
~^^61^^ Duverger, Sociologie politique, p. 103.
~^^6^^2 Ibid.
~^^63^^ Ibid., pp. 103-04.
~^^64^^ Ibid., p. 104.
~^^65^^ Ibid.
~^^66^^ Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 2, p. 261.
~^^67^^ I. D. Levin, Contemporary Bourgeois Science of State Law, Moscow, 1960, p. 153 (in Russian).
~^^68^^ Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 1, p. 489.
~^^69^^ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 226.
~^^70^^ Ibid., p. 225.
~^^71^^ Burdeau, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, p. 25.
~^^72^^ Hauriou, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, p. 86.
~^^73^^ See Burdeau, Traite de science politique, Vol. 2, pp. 191-92.
~^^74^^ Burdeau, Droit constitutionnel et ins-
310titutions politiques, p. 11.
~^^75^^ Levin, op. cit., p. 154.
~^^76^^ V. I. Lenin, 'What Is to Be Done', Collected Works, Vol. 5, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 422.
~^^77^^ Francois Goguel, Alfred Grosser, La Politique en France, Paris, Armand Colin, 1980, p. 5.
~^^78^^ See Jacques Moreau, Georges Dupuis, Jacques Georgel, Elements de sociologie politiqne, Paris, Editions Cujas, 1966, p. 6.
~^^79^^ Duverger, Sodologie politiqne, p. 202.
~^^80^^ See Georges Gurwitch, Le concept des classes sociales, Paris, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1954, p. 121.
~^^81^^ Third World Congress of Sociology, Moscow, 1957, p. 15 (in Russian).
~^^82^^ Gurwitch, op. cit., p. 116.
~^^83^^ Frederick Engels, Anti-Diihring, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 334.
~^^84^^ Gurwitch, op. cit., p. 117.
~^^85^^ Ibid., p. 116. ~^^8^^<5 Ibid., p. 119.
~^^87^^ Ibid., p. 23.
~^^8^^8 Ibid., p. 129.
~^^89^^ V. I. Lenin, 'A Great Beginning', Collected Works, Vol. 29, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 421.
~^^90^^ Duverger, Sodologie politique, p. 199. gi Ibid., p. 200.
~^^92^^ Aron, Etudes politiques, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 23.
~^^93^^ Ibid., p. 15.
~^^94^^ Ibid.
~^^9^^s Ibid., p. 16.
311~^^96^^ Ibid.
~^^97^^ Ibid.
~^^98^^ Frangois Bourricaud, ' "Sociologie de la politique" de Maurice Duverger', Le Monde, 10 November 1973, p. 10.
~^^99^^ V. I. Lenin, 'The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism', Collected Works, Vol. 10, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978, p. 79.
100 T. D. Roslavtseva, 'Some Questions of Political Parties in French Bourgeois Political Science', Peaceful Coexistence and Socio-Political Development: Yearbook of the Soviet Political Sciences Association, Moscow, 1977, p. 209 (in Russian).
~^^101^^ See Frangois Goguel, La vie politique et les partis en France. Les cours de droit Paris, 1951, pp. 3-5.
102 Duverger, Les partis politiques, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1951, p. 20.
~^^103^^ Ibid., p. 19.
~^^104^^ G.-E. Lavau, Partis politiques el realites sociales, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1953, p. 8.
105 Duverger, Les partis politiques, p. 84. «* Ibid.
~^^107^^ Ibid., p. 85. «» Ibid., p. 87. ~^^109^^ Ibid., p. 90. "° Ibid., p. 86.
~^^111^^ Ibid.
~^^112^^ Jean Chariot, Le phenomene ganlliste, Paris, Fayard, 1970, pp. 63-68.
~^^113^^ Duverger, Les partis politiques, p. 113.
~^^114^^ See, for example, Roland Cayrol, Ives
312Tavernier, 'Sociologie des adherents du Parti Socialiste Unifie', Revue frangaise de science politique, Vol. 19, No. 3, June 1969, pp. 699-707.
~^^115^^ Duverger, Les partis polltiques, p. 125.
~^^116^^ Ibid., p. 93.
~^^117^^ Ibid., p. 233. "8 Ibid.
~^^119^^ Ibid., p. 235. «o ibid., p. 234.
12:1 Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1970, p. 156.
~^^122^^ Francois Borella, Les partis politiques dans la France d`aujourd'hui, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1973, p. 9.
123 Duverger, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1955, p. 630.
~^^124^^ Duverger, Sociologie politique, p. 441.
125 Duverger, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 1968, p. 181.
~^^126^^ Michel Lesage, Les regimes politiqnes de l'U.R.S.S. et de I'Europe de I'Est, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1971, p. 10.
~^^127^^ V. I. Lenin, 'How the Socialist-- Revolutionaries Sum Up the Revolution and How the Revolution Has Summed Them Up', Collected Works, Vol. 15, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 337.
128 Duverger, Janus. Les deux faces de VOccident, p. XVI.
~^^129^^ Duverger, Sociologie politique, p. 131. iso Duverger, Sociologie de la politique,
Paris, 1973, p. 362. i^^31^^ See Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, 'The
313German Ideology', Collected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 53.
132 Duverger, Sociologie de la politique, p. 366.
~^^133^^ Ibid., pp. 367-68.
~^^134^^ See Introduction to Pinto, Grawitz, Methods of Social Sciences, Moscow, 1970, p. 7 (in Russian).
135 Duverger, Janus. Les deux faces de I'Occident, p. XII.
~^^136^^ Ibid., p. XIII.
~^^137^^ Ibid., p. 49. iss Ibid., p. 82. ~^^139^^ Ibid.., p. 83. «o Ibid.
MI Ibid., p. 86.
1^^42^^ Ibid., p. 87.
~^^143^^ Ibid.
~^^144^^ R. P. Fedorov, Anonymous Power, Class Organisations of Monopoly Capital in the Federal Republic of Germany, Moscow, 1970, pp. 250, 251 (in Russian).
~^^145^^ Duverger, Janus. Les deux faces de I'Occident, p. 161.
``» Ibid., p. 162.
1^^47^^ Ibid., p. 161.
~^^148^^ Ibid., p. 146. 1*9 Ibid., p. 157.
1^^50^^ Ibid., p. 158.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., p. 159.
«^^3^^ Ibid., p. 165.
~^^154^^ Ibid., p. 166.
155 ibid., p. 169,
[314] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER FIVE __ALPHA_LVL1__ POLITICAL STUDIESAs distinct from other West European countries, the development of political sociology and political science in Italy, interrupted by fascism, did not continue until some time after the war. Typically, UNESCO statistics for postwar political science (1948) do not feature Italy at all. All they say on sociology is that it was following the evolution of philosophical thought.^^1^^ When analysing the ideological struggle in the period following the collapse of fascism and in the immediate aftermath of war, one is struck by the almost complete absence of any connection between political science and political sociology, on the one hand, and the formation of the country's political system, on the other, when the communists and socialists were in opposition after a brief period of participation in government. Later, the eminent Italian jurist and political historian Norberto Bobbio was to describe the situation in II Politico as follows: 'Although historical judgement on such recent years risks being premature, I think one can assert that the begin-
ning of a new course of empirical political science in Italy coincided with the decline in political and ideological fever in the first years after liberation, when the conviction arose that there was no longer the threat of catastrophe and when it was necessary, in fact, to come to terms with the everyday life of peacetime and with drawing up long-term projects with an uncertain outcome.'~^^2^^
But it was fairly soon obvious that political sociology and political science were a reflection of the crisis and the dysfunctional nature of the Italian political system. The renaissance in political science occurred extremely slowly. The reason may be seen not only in the strong effect that Benedetto Grace's philosophy had; in fact, Italian science of society was dominated and is still strongly affected by the idea, that Mosca had once drawn attention to, that traditional disciplines (philosophy, law, economics, geography and history) that have various aspects of politics as their object should be developed; in total these disciplines are called political sciences.~^^3^^ At the same time, Italy showed a marked tendency to form an independent political science whose subject had to be political relations.~^^4^^ And, in Bobbio's words, 'political science in Italy was the last of the social sciences to have arisen in recent years out of the state of decline'.~^^5^^
Just as at the beginning of the century, two very powerful forces hindered the spreading of political science, attacking it from opposite flanks. These were the armies of jurists and historians. The immediate task of political science, in Bobbio's view, was to pave its way between historiography and the juridical disciplines,
316The lag in development of Italian political studies was apparent at the Fourth Congress of the International Political Science Association (Rome, September 1958) and at the Fifth Congress of the International Sociological Association (Milan, September 1959); this evoked some concern among Italian scholars. The concern found expression in several articles published in // Politico (started in 1950) which was actually the country's leading political science organ, being published in the Pavia University Political Sciences Faculty.B
The renaissance of political science began with scholars turning to Mosca's and Pareto's heritage and with the publication of translated works by Wright Mills, Ralf Dahrendorf, Maurice Duverger, Jean Meynaud and other political scientists and sociologists of the USA and Western Europe. At that stage the task was mainly to acquaint readers with the basic tenets of political science and findings of leading Western scholars. Popularisation of the ideological legacy of Pareto and Mosca also had an ideological purpose; it was stressed, among other things, that Italy was one of the first countries to give rise to political science.
The role of initiator of the rebirth of political science in Italy went to the Cesare Alfieri Social and Political Sciences Faculty of the University of Florence. It was there that the so-called Florentine School had been formed in the previous century. Right from the outset, Giovanni Sartori, an Italian scholar best known among foreign political scientists, taking an interest in a wide range of political issues, became the leader of the modern political science orientation of that
317school. Many theoretical works of the Florentine School were not original, being just a critical comparison of the ideas of Western and especially American scholars. Their authors intended them to put an end to what Sartori called ' political illiteracy' in Italy. At the same time they played an important part in promoting Italian political studies, stimulating the organisation of theoretical and empirical research of a sociological bent.
Studies in political science were mainly concentrated in the political science institutes operating at universities in many Italian cities ( Bologna, Catania, Messina, Milan, Pavia, Rome, Florence, etc.). A certain amount of research is financed by big national firms and foreign foundations (like the Rockefeller Foundation).
Translations of foreign political books are brought out mainly by the publishers attached to the Societa Editrice il Mulino (Bologna), whose strongest rivals on political literature are Giuffre Editore SpA (Milan), Giuseppe Laterza e Figli SpA (Bari) and Bulzoni (Rome). In the early 1970s, Mulino dealt with collected works on political science, the first of which was Anthology of Political Science,^^1^^ consisting of articles by Italian and foreign authors on methods and approaches in political science, political power and elites, political culture and political behaviour, political parties and pressure groups, and government and political development; these were accompanied by reviews written by Italian political scientists. Publications devoted to special issues followed up this anthology. So there appeared Power and Political Elites, The Sociology of Political Parties, Parties and Pressure Groups,
318etc.^^8^^ Essentially, there is hardly a substantial work in Western political science that has escaped Italian publishers.
Postwar development of political sociology and political science in Italy may be divided into three stages: the first is the 1950s, the second--- the 1960s, and the third commenced in the late 1960s.
Typical of the 1950s are empirical surveys and initial attempts at theoretically substantiating political sociology and political science. We may note in passing that among the theoretical works only Sartori's book Democracy and Definitions 9 received international acclaim.
Typical of the early 1960s were general works of a largely didactic nature.^^10^^ And only at the end of the 1960s did analytical works appear on theoretical and methodological issues. " In the main, however, they were limited to critical comparison of the viewpoints of American scholars. In that regard it is worth mentioning the book by Giuliano Urbani Analysis of the Political System in which he compares the concepts of Almond and Easton.^^12^^
On the whole, nonetheless, the development of Italian political sociology and political science, save empirical studies, did not go beyond the bounds of a sort of political enlightenment.
Sartori, in advocating the development of a national political science, underlined the importance of American political studies and sociology as the foundation of a national discipline alongside the concepts of Mosca and Pareto. Yet the American basis of Sartori's theoretical outlook led to its logical result: in 1976 he moved to the USA where he took the chair of political sociol-
319ogy at Stanford University,
still retaining his
directorship of the political
magazine Rivista
Italiana di Scienza Politico,,
set up in 1971 as part of the Mulino Society.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. EMPIRICAL STUDIESThe first empirical research was related to the study of political and especially electoral behaviour of the populace. The 1948 parliamentary elections certainly inspired these works. At first they tended to study largely geographical characteristics, in so far as they went some way to determining the interests of those taking part in the election campaigns. As a result of these studies, it became possible to differentiate trends in voting behaviour in the northern, central and southern regions of the country. In spite of the quite vast literature, what is typical generally of postwar studies of voting behaviour is the prime concentration on relatively parochial issues. As the Soviet scholar S. I. Vasiltsov points out, 'So far there have been no major comprehensive works devoted to political structure of the entire national electorate or even the social structure of the electorate of the main political parties throughout the whole postwar period in foreign scholarly literature.'^^13^^
Under the guidance of Sartori, who in the late 1950s was lecturing on applied sociology and political science at the University of Florence, a study was begun, financed by the Rockefeller foundation, of the structure, formation and activity of the Italian parliament. The results of the work, in which some score or more scholars participated, were published in 1963. This was the
320first major interdisciplinary study undertaken in Italy through questionnaires. Until then Italy had not had any study of parliamentary activity or of the character, nature and circulation of the 'political class' from the viewpoint of political science. The work analyses the power of parties, political professionalism and bureaucracy in the state apparatus (statistics on ministerial personnel date from 1861, and the Chamber of Deputies from the 1909 legislature) and gives an idea of the 'legislative inflation' typifying the Italian political system, of the political representativeness of elections and the relative role of parties. It established, for example, the rise in the number of professional politicians over the three legislatures both in the majority parties and in the minority and opposition parties, although the number of semi-professionals still remained considerable. The work enabled scholars to map out the further course of empirical studies of ' political class' circulation and its internal break-down in parliament.
Italy's Political System, the work edited by Paolo Farneti, published 10 years later, is not a uniform study. It contains mainly articles published in various periodicals between 1966 and 1972. All the same, it does shed light on a wide range of issues: economic development and social structure, the structure of interests and solidarity, patronage as pressure channels, subculture and local political reality, parties and party systems, parliament and government, the legislative process, political participation and political behaviour, and institutional problems like the magistrates, bureaucracy and the armed forces.
21-01532 321
In the introduction to the collection Garnet! suggests the following periodisation of the previous 30 years of Italian socio-political life: 1. 1945-1948, the period of institutional formation of the Italian postwar political system; 2. 1948- 1958, the decade of hegemony of political society; 3. 1958-1968, the period of civil society. H Although he denotes the fourth period as 1968- 1972, he gives it no name, probably because of the complexity of the crisis. But the characteristics of the second and third decades reflect the ideas some Italian scholars developed on the backwardness of Italian political society by contrast with civil society. Giorgio Galli, for example, feels that while the Italian bourgeoisie hardly differs from the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of the countries that had reached the phase of mature capitalism, Italian political society largely remains at the pre-modern stage; that is due to the poor distribution of tasks between the bourgeoisie and the political class.^^15^^
E. Sclafari shares that view. He asserts that already from the early 60s civil society was overtaking political society in terms of initiative and progress, and consequently was overtaking its political elite that had until then been more progressive than civil society.
It should be noted that contemporary Italy belongs to those countries, on the one hand, in which substantial shifts have occurred in industrialisation, and on the other, which retain areas of backwardness (in both economic and social structure). All that provokes enormous strains sometimes spilling over into a condemnation of the structure of civil society, political society and the state.
322A specific trait of postwar Italy is the largest state enterprise in Western Europe which also causes a mass of contradictions within the country. As noted by the Soviet writer N. I. Kisovskaya, whose work is concerned with changing relations between the private and state sectors and the accompanying process of increasing complexity in the structure of Italy's ruling class, 'while the economic and social aspects of development in state enterprise in Italy have become the subject of regular study, the political aspects of its activity have not been studied at all attentively either in Soviet, or in Italian scholarly literature, remaining in Italy the preserve of popular journalism.'^^16^^
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. SOCIOLOGY OF PARTY SYSTEMSMuch more attention has gone to Italy's party system. Back in the mid-1960s appeared the work by Giorgio Galli (II bipartltismo imperfetto), who based himself on the notion of 'imperfect bipartism' by which he meant the presence of two big political parties---the ruling Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Communist Party, regarding the remaining parties inconsequential for the country's party and political system. His work dealt with the political structure of the two parties that interested him and the characteristics of their voters.
In Galli's view, tradition forms the basis of the power of the Christian Democratic Party, and organisation that of the Italian Communist Party. He considers the Italian political system an 'imperfect bipartism' since it lacks the principal quality of a two-party system---alternation of
2j* 323
parties in power, inasmuch as for various reasons the Communist Party is still unable to form a government.
Sartori hit back at Galli with a criticial article; he insisted that Duverger's dualist model was wrong in this instance and that 'it is no good compounding the mistake and resurrecting it as a form of "imperfect bipartism" '. Sartori goes on to say that 'in a dualist perspective the Italian system is not simply ``imperfect'', it is, one may say, a system of bipolar repulsion.'"
While Duverger considers bipartism natural, says Sartori, Western Europe actually has not two but three types of party systems: simple pluralism (bipartism), moderate pluralism and extreme pluralism. He insists that one must not unite systems with more than two parties into a single type, and emphasises that a dualist scheme does not elucidate, it rather complicates an appreciation of the systems of extreme pluralism where there are 7 or 8 parties.^^18^^
For Sartori Duverger's thesis of bipartism may well apply to West Germany, Belgium, Sweden and almost all small democracies. But it just does not work for the Fourth Republic in France, for Italy or the Weimar Republic.
He thinks it important to take account not only of the number of poles, but of the distance between them as well, since the system becomes `polarised' when the spectrum of political views is taken to the `extreme'---i.e., when the poles of the political system become virtually antipodes. In that connection party systems should be analysed with account for the number of poles, their distance from one another and their centrifugal or centripetal interaction.
324In order to define what parties should be taken into account, he suggests two criteria. First, the 'coalition potential' of small parties. The party should not be counted if it has been of no use to any ruling majority. But he finds this criterion alone insufficient and puts forward yet another one which he calls the 'threat potential'. This he formulates as follows: 'Parties in permanent opposition excluded from coalition considerations ought to be taken account of to the extent that they force ruling parties to modify their means of competition.'^^19^^
Italy, in his opinion, undoubtedly belongs to extreme pluralist systems since its political system includes 8 parties: the Italian Communist Party, Italian Socialist Party, Italian Social Democratic Party, Italian Republican Party, Christian Democratic Party, Italian Liberal Party, the monarchists and the Italian Social Movement.
Parties as 'the central intermediate or intermediary structure between society, and government'~^^20^^ have interested Sartori since the early 1960s. In the preface to his USA-published first volume of the fundamental monograph Parties and Party Systems, he points out the considerable difficulties in the scholar's way when he tries to correlate the vast amount of material available. He stresses that since the time of Duverger's classical work, the data available have become abundant, yet difficult for theoretical use and that he, Sartori, 'stumbled into masses of empirical material that were neither cumulative nor comparable and, indeed, that added up to nothing.' Further, 'Pluralism, representation, expression, coercion, structure, function, system, ideology, culture, participation, mobilisation, all
325are concepts that are surely central to the party topic. As I encountered each of them, at each encounter most of my time and energy went into understanding how the concept was being used (extravagantly or fuzzily), in discussing it, and in having to justify my own choice of meaning.' All that puts one on one's guard in relation to empirical science itself. 'It would seem that the more sophisticated we become technically, the more inept we become conceptually.'^^21^^
On the whole his view is that 'if modern politics has something peculiarly ``modern'' about it, the novelty derives from a politically active, or politically mobilised, society, which is a new resource and also a new source of complexities.'22 So one has to sort out how and why parties and factions are formed. In classifying party systems what also attracts him is the chance not only to explain, but to forecast. He emphasised such chances in contemporary political science a long time previously.
Thus, he concluded the above-mentioned article on bipartism with the statement that 'the alternative between moderate and extreme pluralism may be resolved in favour of the first system through circumspect and timely "political engineering". Naturally, one must be able to foresee so as to take steps in time. Once the lid has been removed from the Pandora's box of extreme pluralism, the chances of shutting it down are [exceedingly slim. But modern political science has reached a stage which enables one to forecast and, consequently, if need be, to take the necessary measures.''^^23^^
Sartori notes that at first glance it would seem that he gives more importance to the number of
326parties---i.e., numerical criteria of classifying party systems. 'However, a glance at the table of contents suffices to reveal that my major thread is competition.' '^^24^^
Sartori's major purpose is to create a theory of 'competitive democracy'. In his first book Democracy and Definitions he only outlined the theory. The book is particularly esteemed among Italian theoretical political studies, being frequently reprinted. Its extended version, Democratic Theory, has twice been printed in the USA (1962 and 1965) and translated into several languages. The above theory belongs to the ' neoelitist' trend in Western political science. In stating the traditional notion of existence of two theories of democracy---classical and competitive, Sartori holds the view that the latter is only 'complementary to the lacunae of classical theory and corrects the imbalance'. He distinguishes two facets of the concept of democracy---- normative and descriptive. Popular power is the normative conception of democracy, `polyarchy' is the descriptive.~^^25^^
Defining democracy as elective polyarchy, Sartori points out that he is not concerned with problems of whether the system functions `well', since the electoral contention guarantees not the quality of the results, only their democratic character. The rest, the value of the results, depends on the quality of leadership.^^26^^
In the wake of Schumpeter, Friedrich and Dahl, Sartori analyses in detail the 'competitive theory of democracy' and concludes his study with the assertion that democracy should be, first, a selective polyarchy, and second, a polyarchy of merit. However, in remarking on the elit-
327ist and undemocratic nature of merits in forming political leadership, he thinks it necessary to underscore the importance of the traditional principle of 'vertical political equality'---i.e., in selecting and appointing people to any state posts. Otherwise, 'we shall remain not only with an emaciated one-dimensional equality, but also ... with a one-dimensional democracy that is unreliable and unsatisfactory.'^^27^^
In an article on the objectives of political science in Italy, written in the late 1960s, Sartori raised the question of the balance between democracy and the political culture of the ruling elite. 'In a democracy the level of a political class depends in the ultimate analysis on the state of the political culture.'
One can always affirm that 'every democratic country has the political class it merits. But it is even truer to say that a country cannot have a political class better than its political culture'. He suggests that 'if Italy remains an ideological paradise entrusted to the dilettante rule of improvised ``artists'', the fault largely lies not with politicians, but with the political culture enclosed in an indolent provincial vanity, deaf to the mounting multitude of problems, ignorant of or resolutely ignoring political science'.^^28^^
Summing up, Sartori concludes that Italy has a very big gulf between economic-social modernisation, on the one hand, and political antiquation, on the other. He stresses that modernisation of the state presupposes a modern culture that has the dual task of stimulating vpublic influence and facilitating the formation of political scientists capable of finding solutions.
328 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. SOME PROBLEMS OF METHOD INThe Achilles heel of Italian political sociology is problems of method. One can effectively speak only of the Italian (up to 1976) period of Sartori. Other authors, largely colleagues of Sartori, have confined themselves mainly to setting out American political ideas at various levels.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, attempts were made to define the relationship between political science, on the one hand, and sociology and philosophy, on the other. Sartori categorically stated that political science was not part of sociology, and spelled out the relationship between political sociology and the science of politics: even 'within those parameters in which these two sciences fall in terms of subject matter, they differ in approach'.~^^29^^
Like Lipset and Bendix, Sartori sees these differences in the fact that the sociologist studies primarily society itself and its effect on the state apparatus, while the political scientist, on the contrary, studies the effect of the state apparatus on society. Both these approaches suffer from a certain bias, in his view. While the sociologist is inclined to see the motive force of politics only in the social milieu, the political scientist has a tendency to deny this and overestimates the part played by the state mechanism in political decision-making. Such bias, in Sartori's view, is to some extent also due to the fact that the sociologist's independent variables are treated by the political scientist as dependent variables, and vice versa.
329Discussion on the relationship between political sociology and political science found its reflection in the evaluation by contemporary researches of the 'classical predecessors'. Thus, Dino Fiorot sees Pareto as a political scientist (the very idea is prompted by the works of certain Americans). Antonio Lombardo claims that Mosca as a sociologist is elitist, but as a political scientist is pluralist.^^30^^
When he looks at the relationship between philosophy and political science, Sartori thinks idealist philosophy a burdensome legacy for Italian culture. He does not claim that there is a dominance of official philosophers or that the philosophical type of formation and education of the individual is pernicious in itself. But he does think Italian culture 'remains profoundly affected by a combination of deafness and hostility in regard to the formamentis empirica.^^31^^ He refers to the theory of state to show that a philosopher always perverts reality in some way. He does not transform it because he is invariably dealing with an 'ideal state', but his cogitations on the state are always prescriptive. He is here always trying to get at the essence of the state, to explain the principal content of its existence, while the political scientist is mainly interested not in the essence but in the 'mode of operation', the question of government and the mode of using state power.^^32^^
From the standpoint of method, Sartori's article on the prerequisites and problems of comparative politics is of particular interest. He arranges the methods used by the social sciences according to the changing 'strength of control' (experimental, statistical, comparative and his-
330torical methods) and points out the difficulties and limitations relating to the application of each of them. In his view, the experimental method can be used only for analysing small groups. The difficulty of using the statistical method is not only that you need enormous numbers, but also, to a large extent, that 'the information that lends itself to statistical processing on socio-political questions has suspicious authenticity and validity'.^^33^^
Talking of how the researcher is obliged to resort to comparison as a means of verification if he cannot experiment and lacks information suitable for statistical processing, he stresses that one should not confuse the 'comparative method' with 'statistical comparison', in so far as in the case of the former one means comparison of issues that are not resolved with the statistical key.
He thinks it wrong that many people do not adopt the historical method, regarding it as being too weak from the viewpoint of the aims of control, and says that 'it is absurd to reject history, it is deliberate mutilation'. He distinguishes the 'historical method', which the historian uses for cognising history, and 'historical control' which interests the political scientist as 'treatment of history' capable of engendering generalising hypotheses.
Sartori aspires to uncover the difficulties of using the historical method by separating it from the comparative method, and says that their differences do not yet indicate the weakness of historical control in contrast to the comparative method, but merely testify that the former is harder than the latter. He stresses the need to
331maintain historical control despite all its difficulties, lack of clarity and integration, and also that stronger methods of control cannot replace it.
The attention given here to such an eminent scholar as Giovanni Sartori certainly does not mean that he is the only Italian political scientist worthy of mention; nor does his departure for the USA denote an end of political science in Italy. Moreover, one could speak of the ' politicisation' and shift to the left of political science whose centre is moving into the sphere of influence of the Italian Socialist Party and leftwing radical tendencies. Apart from the alreadymentioned Giorgio Galli, the socialists are represented in the discipline by Luciano Cavalli and several others. The radical left tendency is represented by the eminent Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotti.
On the whole we can now speak of an end to the period of renaissance of political sociology and political science in Italy. Whether Italian political science is acquiring specific national forms, however, will have to be answered some time in the future.
NOTES
~^^1^^ See Giacomo Perticomo, 'La science politique en Italie', La science politique contemporaine. Contribution a la recherche, la methode et I'enseignement, UNESCO, Paris, 1950, pp. 258-69.
332~^^2^^ Norberto Bobbie, 'Teoria e ricerca politica in Italia', II Politico, No. 2, 1961, p. 218.
~^^3^^ See Gli studi politici in Italia. Saggio bibliografico, Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1964.
~^^4^^ See Gli studi politici e sociali in Italia. I diritti deU'uomo nella teoria e nella prassi politica (Atti del terzo congresso nazionale di scienze politiche e sociali, Rome, 13-14 March, 1964), Milan, Publicazioni dell'Associazione italiana di scienze politiche e sociali, 1965.
~^^5^^ See Bobbio, Saggi..., p. 15.
~^^6^^ See, for example, Bruno Leoni, 'II bilancio lamentevole: il sottosviluppo della scienza politica in Italia', 11 Politico, No. 1, 1960; Bobbio, 'teoria e ricerca politica in Italia'.
~^^7^^ Antologia di scienza politica (a cura di Giovanni Sartori), Bologna, Mulino, 1970.
~^^8^^ Poetere ed `elites' politiche (Saggi di R. Aron, P. Bachrach, E. C. Banfield e.a.), a cura di Stefano Passigli, Bologna, Mulino, 1971; Sociologia dei partill politici (Saggi di J. Blondel, M. Du~ verger, I. L. Horowitz e.a.), a cura di G. Sivini, Bologna, Mulino, 1971; Partiti e gruppi di pressione, a cura di Domenico Fisichella, Bologna, Mulino, 1972.
~^^9^^ Giovanni Sartori, Democrazia e definizioni, 4th Edition, Bologna, Mulino, 1972.
~^^10^^ See, for example, F. Barbano, Sociolo-
333gia della politico,. Concetti, metodi e campo di ricerca, Milan, Giuffre, 1961; Alberto Izzo, 'La sociologia del fenomeni politic!', Questioni di sociologia, Vol. 1, Brescia, La Scuola Editrice, 1966.
~^^11^^ Giulio Bruni-Roccia, La scienza politico, nella societa in trans formazioni, Vol. 1, Milan, 1971; Bruni-Roccia, Fondazione della scienza delle strutture politiche, Bologna, Patron, 1974; Giovanni Sartori, 'La politica come ``scienza'' ', Rivista italiana di scienza politica, No. 2, 1972; Paolo Farneti, Sistema politico e societa civile. Saggi di teoria e ricerca politica, Turin, Edizioni Giappichelli, 1971.
~^^12^^ See Giuliano Urbani, L'analisi del sistema politico, Bologna, Mulino, 1971.
~^^13^^ S. I. Vasiltsov, Workers' Parties and Elections in Italy, 1953-1976, Moscow, 1978, p. 17 (in Russian).
~^^14^^ See II sistema politico italiano, a cura di Paolo Farneti, Bologna, Mulino, 1973, p. 27.
~^^15^^ See Giorgio Galli, II bipartitismo imperfetto alia possibile alternativa, Bologna, Mulino, 1975.
~^^16^^ N. I. Kisovskaya, State Enterprise and Political Struggle in Italy, 1960-1975, Moscow, 1977, p. 10 (in Russian).
~^^17^^ Sartori, 'Bipartitismo imperfetto o pluralismo polarizzato?', II sistema politico italiano, a cura di Paolo Farneti, Bologna, Mulino, 1973, p. 306.
is Ibid., p. 287.
334~^^19^^ Ibid., p. 289.
~^^20^^ Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. IX.
~^^21^^ Ibid., p. X.
~^^22^^ Ibid., p. XII.
~^^23^^ Sartori, Bipartitismo imperfetto o plnralismo polarizzato?, p. 309.
~^^24^^ Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. XI.
~^^25^^ Sartori, 'Democrazia competitiva e elites politiche', Rivista italiana di scienza politica, No. 3, 1977, pp. 347-48.
~^^26^^ Ibid., p. 355.
~^^27^^ Ibid.
~^^28^^ Sartori, 'II compito della scienza politica oggi in Italia', II Mulino, No. 208, March-April 1970, pp. 217-18.
~^^29^^ Ibid., p. 209.
~^^30^^ Lombardo, La struttura del potere: Problemi di teoria e di ricerca empirica, Rome, 1972.
~^^31^^ Sartori, 'II compito della scienza politica oggi in Italia', II Mulino, p. 212.
~^^32^^ Ibid., p. 214.
~^^33^^ Sartori, 'La politica comparata: premesse e problem!', Rivista italiana di scienza politica, No. 1, 1971, p. 8.
[335] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ CHAPTER SIX __ALPHA_LVL1__ POLITICAL SCIENCETo a large extent political science tends towards theory and philosophy in the Federal Republic of Germany. A great deal of attention is paid to the study of the history of political theories as a salient aspect of the contemporary theory of politics.l And this is hardly surprising, since it follows from the traditions of the country's socio-political thought. What has influenced political theory in Germany and then in the Federal Republic is that the philosophy of German classical idealism, particularly that of the state, and political and social philosophy have been a sort of compendium of socio-political thought. It is within the framework of these disciplines that politics and the political process have been studied. Today, West German political scientists strive to accord their science functions of a socio-philosophical nature as well, thereby giving it an integrating character.
Thus, Hans Maier writes that political science should accumulate all social knowledge assembled within science of the state, political socio-
336logy and social philosophy.^^2^^ In the 18th and 19th centuries, however, it was social and political philosophy in Germany that was nothing more than the history of political-philosophical and political-legal doctrines, and was seen as 'self-awareness and self-revelation of the human spirit'^^3^^ or as a 'politically engaged philosophy'. 4 Study of the history of political doctrines should, in the view of West German theorists, provide answers to the urgent questions of the day.
A number of scholars view the history of political doctrines both as 'an auxiliary means of forecasting' and as a discipline able to rationalise the cognition of political problems and methods to resolve them, as having immense importance for politicians and political scientists. What is more, as some theorists underline, selfawareness of actors in political history is always a major part of political reality. That is why the task of political science is to turn this self-- awareness into the subject of study which, in turn, cannot be understood without examining the history of political ideas.
All that bears witness to the fact that presentday political science, particularly that of West Germany, has deep roots in the history of political and philosophical ideas, maintaining a continuity of subject matter.
Klaus von Beyme justly notes that there is in West Germany today 'an old conflict between a Platonic-Aristotlean understanding of politics as practical philosophy and the rationalist and empirical theories of the New Time that began with Machiavelli, Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, who had interpreted politics mainly in a technical-rationalist context.'~^^5^^
22-01532
337
In that sense one ought to single out two extremely important directions in West German political science. They are the normative (the so-called normative-ontological) and the neopositivist political science which use in their studies the methodology of critical rationalism associated with Karl Popper and Hans Albert.
The choice of normative and neopositivist orientations as objects of our study is due to the fact that they reflect the traditional argument between social idealism and positivism.
Behind political theories of normative-- ontological political science, whose principal protagonists are Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, Arnold Bergstraesser, Hans Maier, Ernst Hippel, Wilhelm Hennis and Dieter Oberndorfer, is the thesis of the need to combine ethics and politics in practical activity, where ethics would play the part of being the spiritual criterion of politics.6 It is noteworthy that during the 1950s the positivist-oriented jurisprudence also gave way to the renewed doctrines of 'natural law' which, from the point of view of their adherents, could reinforce humanist and ethical principles in law. Similar processes in political science and jurisprudence emphasise not merely the proximity of these disciplines, but also the overall spiritual atmosphere of the time in academic circles of the country. On the whole, neo-idealist concepts had a fairly conservative character, developing as they did in the general stream of anti-- communism.
Normative political science sets itself the task of defining the goal and norms of political activity and political education in the spirit of the principles of humanism for citizens and polili-
338cians. Thus, its founding fathers think it is concerned with the philosophical conceptualisation of reality and with the orientation of political activity to certain social and moral values, being a form of 'sphere of .practical reason'. At the same time, an important task of normative political science is political forecasting.^^7^^
A distinguishing feature of normative political science is also that it is based on certain ethical-philosophical values without which it would degenerate to a simple description of reality. The task of true politics is said to be therapeutic as well as forecasting in regard to the existing system.
Ever since Schopenhauer scholars have been asserting the view that it is just as easy to advocate morality as it is difficult to justify it. So the task of political science was to lay the foundation in the form of a 'new political ontology' or a new moral philosophy. In that case normative political science has developed in the mainstream of traditions of German value philosophy. The name `normative-ontological' given to it is not accidental. It is `normative' because it represents the classical understanding of politics as a practical science serving to prepare and predetermine action. And it is `ontological' by virtue of the fact that a condition of any action aiming to go beyond the bounds of subjective opinion and become a science about a just and humane system is a revised ontology that recognises all spheres of existence, including supernatural and divine, as real and does not try to reduce higher levels of existence to lower ones through cause-and-effect deductions.^^8^^ This is a reference to ontology in the spirit of Nicolai
22* 339
Hartmann, which can exist only within the bounds of metaphysical philosophy.
The fact that values on which normative political science orients political action are designated with the aid of philosophical-religious speculation leaves it wide open to criticism.
Proponents of normative political science criticise positivism precisely because a positivist outlook entails the 'ousting of philosophical orientations and philosophical approach to problems both from political theory and from political life.'^^9^^ Eric Voegelin holds the same view, seeing the main danger of positivism for political science in that it 'subordinates theory to method and thereby turns the sense and objective of science on its head.'^^10^^
It is because positivism deprives morality in politics of its `ontological' sense that Voegelin thinks it necessary to return to the classical interpretation of politics. The task of political science, especially in the era of a crisis in sociopolitical consciousness, is to elucidate the question of what constitutes justice in state and private life.li
Objectivity of criterion in that assessment of reality is only feasible by dint of objectively predetermined, transcendental nature of moral-- philosophical values one of which is said to be the state as 'the reality of a moral idea'.
Being 'critical knowledge about social structure', normative political theory sees, therefore, the `matter' of a social order, a 'just system' as constructive and fundamental. The aid of neoidealist political science is, consequently, not to describe an observable social system empirically; it is a matter here, according to affirmations of leaders
340of the school, of the category based on a philosophical cognition, which facilitates a harmonious combination of individual constituents of society. This category of `order' or `system' comes from the axiologieally-constructed general philosophical notion and is determined by its basic principles.
While political theory is concerned with the concept of order based on the foundation of a metaphysical-ontological philosophy, the concept of 'just system' will be 'dependent upon a correspondingly revised ontology.'^^12^^ Therefore the principles of such a 'just system' will be found not in this but in the next world---i.e., they will have a transcendental character. Advocates of normative-ontological political science, while admitting the difficulties caused by the creation of a 'moral-political ontology', aspire also to a philosophical-anthropological substantiation of their political theory. Some West German scholars even include philosophical anthropology in contemporary political science.
An important qualification, however, must be made here. In nature and tasks, contemoorary philosophical anthropology in the Federal Republic differs considerably from its initial `project' which had been outlined by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner. As Jiirgen Habermas has said, philosophical anthropology should not be seen today as an independent philosophical discipline, the way it was understood in the 1920s---i.e., as a discipline occupying a particular status between theory and empiricism. To a much greater degree one ought to see philosophical anthropology as the view of man and his essence inherent in any philosophical system and serving
341as the basis on which a corresponding political concept is built.~^^13^^ The leader of West German neoconservatism Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner agrees with Habermas, averring that every philosophy has its own anthropology, a certain teaching of the essence of human beings.i4
Peter Baumanns writes on this count that the 'deduction of the essence of human beings from the essence of social being cannot be useful or fruitful in working out a practical philosophy.. . Practical philosophy as edification concerning a just and good life in society is possible as anthropology not as ontology.'I5
Practical philosophy, then, is always anthropology, 'the systematic and normative description of human beings'.ie So the ship of normative-ontological political science is made secure with a second anchor---the category of a `true' human nature, in accordance with which one should erect the social edifice and which, in turn, should be theoretically brought in line with already present values. In the view of anthropologically-oriented West German political scientists, political theory becomes possible by virtue of the supposed immutability of human nature. As Kurt Lenk observes, the axiom of philosophical anthropology on the immutability of human nature lies behind political personalism---the notion of a virtue correlating to the transcendental world~^^17^^ and, therefore, behind the political theory of neoidealism. The question of 'true human nature' acquires decisive importance for elaborating a normative-ontological political theory. It is not hard to understand the inclination of West German theorists to use also the gravitation of sociological and political theory towards philo-
342sophical anthropology---a circumstance that Soviet philosophical literature has mentioned more than once.
Yet even the philosophical-anthropological view of human beings in West German political theory is itself permeated with the spirit of idealism. As the eminent philosopher Helmut Kuhn has said, 'The first and last definition of human beings will be that they are capax Dei and as such are included both in the totality of the world and in its historical development.'^^18^^ Such an inclusion, however, can in no way facilitate the identification of specifically political orientation of human beings in society and cannot, of course, either propose solutions to real human and political problems or become the basis for establishing a political theory capable adequately of conceptualising phenomena of the empirical human world.
Thus, the shift of the centre of gravity of the political science theory of normativism to the sphere of a philosophical interpretation of human essence (strictly set, otherwise the basis of political theory is eroded) poses the question of singling it out as such. But already since the time of the Theses on Fenerbach science has appreciated the futility of such an attempt. It is historical materialism that proposes the elaboration of a new, non-speculative concept of human beings which immediately directs the scholar to the question of a new essence---social relations. This fundamental discovery of Marxism makes senseless any search for an 'eternal true human essence' on the basis of which one could build a political theory.
It is not surprising that the only appreciable
343result of political meanderings of normativism has been works devoted to historical-cum-- ideological subject matter.
The history of political ideas (since real political life has given not so many hopes for the ideals of neoidealist scholars to see light of day) has become that ideological testing ground on which the historical reality of various moral-- political values has been demonstrated. The history of political studies should, in the view of the normative political scientists, substantiate the link between the ideal (presence of generally meaningful extra-temporal values) and the real (their specific historical embodiment) in the process of human history. These values are first actualised, then again shift into the sphere of 'pure spirituality', and this process, from the normativist viewpoint, is historical. The point of studying the history of political ideas is seen by them as explaining the fundamental principles of human community and, therefore, its values. Subjectivism and conservatism of that political school, however, have obviously become manifest in that area of studies.
In that respect Hippel's position is indicative in that he postulates that the triumph of the eternal over the transient, typical of the Middle Ages, went aground in the New Time. Here the subjectivism that had grown out of the depths of its spirit destroyed the moral law as the basis and guide of socio-political reality.'^^19^^ Hippel adds to the list of evil spirits of political studies the names of Machiavelli, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx, whereas the agents of the ideas of good include Frederick II of Prussia. In turn, Leo Strauss also dipped into the creative legacy
344of Machiavelli and came to the conclusion that Marxism was, deep down, Machiavellianism, and the USA was the only country that had broken with Machiavellianism altogether. This position came under bitter attack in West German political science itself. Thus, the idea of 'observing the eternal in the transient' swings round to extreme subjectivism of a conservative kind.
Within the normative idealist version of political science the history of political doctrines is starting to replace or at least to claim to replace political theory. Maier, for example, writes that 'philosophical criticism of existing socio-- political realities is becoming the impulse for their revision and reforming.' And in so far as any political system is realised in the historical process, its concrete content changes owing to the onset of a different historical era, which correspondingly modifies its historical-political assessment. 'The answer to the eternal question of a just social system varies in different eras. At the same time, on the level of philosophical criticism there is a constant process in train consisting in political theory orienting political practice on fulfilling special historical tasks.'^^20^^
The methodology of political idealism is at present under a fairly profound criticism in philosophical, sociological and political literature. Thorhild Stelzig, for example, notes in his article that in recent years 'normative social science has not even accorded any significance to substantiating the various propositions and values, content to make simple postulating about them and not seeing a fundamental need to substantiate them.' 2I Such a version of normative political theory, by freeing itself in such a radical
345way from the torturous issue of self-justification, certainly exacerbates the extremely intricate problem for practical political science---of precisely how the cognition of the essence of a particular socio-political system communicates to the individual a knowledge about tasks in reforming that system in accord with particular values.
At the present time normative-ontological political conceptions are steadily losing their former influence, being unable to stand ultimately the competition of neopositivist political science and the political ideas of the Frankfurt School.
At the same time, they remain within the arsenal of conservative political circles in the country, particularly the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union coalition.
The unsatisfactory nature of the results of research by the neoidealist political school has presented fresh arguments for the neopositivists in West Germany, constantly stressing the idealist and metaphysically-speculative character of the constructions of the idealist school.
Advocates of neopositivist political science base their studies on a neopositivist epistemology and the methodology of critical rationalism expounded by Karl Popper, Hans Albert and Ernst Topitsch. Along with the creators of critical rationalism they include Klaus von Beyme. Gerhard Lehmbruch, E. Krippendorff, Peter Christian Ludz and several others.
Followers of neopositivist political theory agree on the idea that the sphere of the real and the proper must be strictly delineated conceptually, and only the sphere of actual political reality can be subjected to a scientific analysis. Politi-
346ca] science in its neopositivist interpretation requires, first, a critical explanation with the object of removing 'preconceived notions' and, second, formulating forecasts in the form of 'if... then...'. 22
In this respect in Albert's view, it is established that behind sciences, including political science, lie certain values which must be analysed by a method that precludes any evaluation.~^^23^^ The fact that they again infiltrate into scientific propositions should not be seen, according to Albert, as an argument against the possibility of freeing them from value judgements through a critical elimination of the normative foundations of a given judgement.
In spite of the desire by neopositivists to do so, they cannot ignore the value problem in the process of scientific research. Popper himself has indicated the need for metaphysics and ideologies he has constantly cursed when working out new scientific hypotheses.~^^24^^
Albert, in turn, writes that 'a value-free scientific cognition plays an enormous part in rationalising polities', because 'it makes its contribution in answering the question of what can we do?'~^^25^^ Furthermore, he thinks that the ' methological principle of being value-free does not mean the moral neutrality of science'.~^^26^^
Critical rationalism may quite justly be regarded as a paramount orientation in West German political science, inasmuch as it epitomises, in Popper's and Albert's version, both a certain mode of political thinking, and a mode of human existence in the socio-political world, a mode of human political existence.
'Critical rationalism,' writes Albert, 'is a theo-
347ry of the imperfection of human reason, which has certain political consequences, particularly that the social system should be organised with account for the imperfection of human reason. Critical rationalism shows that science both socially and politically cannot propose exact irrefutable solutions. One ought to be suspicious about our assurance that we possess a theory of constructing a perfect harmonious society in which domination and conflicts would be absent.'~^^27^^
Dieter Aldrup writes in the same vein. He maintains that the rational-liberating force of critical rationalism is manifest independently of the nature of political theory. Its prerequisite is the consistent rejection of any attempts theoretically to justify relations of domination, taking them out of the natural-social or historical sphere through using the appropriate system of premises.^^28^^
So the political science of neopositivism, in the view of its adherents, should proceed neither from an ideal model of society, nor from real defects in the existing society.^^29^^ While laying claim to being a truly critical doctrine about society, politics and democracy, it bases itself on the idea of permanent socio-political criticism.
An essential aspect of socio-political thinking is, in Albert's view, 'elucidation of social interconnections, the relations of power and domination, criticism of their ideological camouflage and their verification by facts of political life. This may be seen as a philosophical task which may be posed and resolved only from a philosophical viewpoint.'^^30^^
The duality of the philosophical and political
343criticism of the political science version of critical rationalism has its base in thu idea of the identity of rational philosophy and political modes of thinking, since the main thesis of Popper's and Albert's political philosophy is that political thinking and political action must correspond to the same criteria of rationality as the natural sciences. This tenet of critical rationalism logically stems from the neopositivist principle of 'fundamental epistemological indeterminateness^^1^^, or 'fundamental ignorance'.
Neopositivist political theory, in the opinion of its adherents, is a means 'to subject the political attitudes that dominate a society to a thoroughgoing criticism, and to adapt accumulated philosophical-political knowledge to that task.'^^31^^
Among the major tasks of neopositivist political doctrine is criticism both of dogmatism embodied in political institutions---i.e., in political practice, and of radical utopianism, by which Albert and his supporters most frequently refer to theorists of the Frankfurt School; they also include `elucidation' of the social interconnections for the purpose of cognising the mechanism of functioning of contemporary society.
'Enlightenment of this kind is a hindrance to the dogmatisation of existing or suggested solutions to problems that arise as a result of the chromic social passivity of citizens and their conformism. Enlightenment through critical scientific cognition becomes both an explanation of the facts of political reality and elucidation of the possibilities and limitations arising in political actions, and thereby the possibilities of socio-political practice,'^^32^^ in so far as 'the practical use of science in politics, the use of scien-
349iitic results in resolving social problems is the task that lies fairly and squarely in the area of critical-rational thinking.'^^33^^
The political theory of neopositivism is currently the specific political programme of reformism and, moreover, the methodological source of specific political studies.^^34^^
The role of critical rationalism in West German political science is noteworthy also in the fact that political thought obtains fresh impulses for development in disputes with it, in fending il off and in refuting it.
As Kurt Bayertz has aptly noted, 'critical rationalism pretends to be a political theory representing the only rational concept of politics. It implies a ``scientifically'' grounded idea of political action.^^135^^
The political theory of critical rationalism is an attempt to realise philosophical-- methodological attitudes in particular circumstances of present-day society in the form of 'social technology'.
Critical rationalism is social technology being used in particular social structures. A certain social technology, in Popper's view, serves as 'a scientific basis of polities'.^^36^^ But it can only become such in an 'open society'---i.e., of bourgeois democracy.
Today neopositivist political science is beginning actively to serve contemporary reformism ideologically, steadily becoming a state philosophy in the Federal Republic. As Soviet scholars have justly written, 'theorists of social democracy have needed to appeal to "critical rationalism" in order to invest their reformist ideas and policies with a "modern intellectual shell",
350to cover them up with a ``scientific'', '``realistic'' phraseology so as to court popularity in the fairly broad liberal circles of bourgeois society.'^^37^^
In that respect the critical-rational interpretation of social planning that is closely bound up with the theory of totalitarianism and democracy is extremely indicative. It has manifested with total clarity the abstract schematic understanding of totalitarianism's genesis, the woeful inadequacy of this understanding, and the vulgarisation of the theory and practice of socialist planning.
The concept is indicative also in the sense that it constitutes a sort of realisation of the methodological attitudes of the neopositivist political theory when examining concrete socio-political issues.
It was Popper who put forward the thesis that became the foundation of the updated justification of reformism. According to that thesis, it is possible 'easily to centralise power, but impossible to centralise all knowledge distributed among the many'; it is necessary `wisely' to implement authority within the whole of society.^^38^^
Albert voices the same doubts in endeavouring at one swoop to checkmate the Marxist idea of social planning, on the one hand, and the leftwing theorists in West Germany, on the other.
'There is a view,' Albert writes, 'that a radical improvement in the socio-political system can come about only by concentrating power in a central institution, an elite intended to make a radical ``intrusion'' into social structures so as to reform them in the interests of the whole of society.'~^^39^^
Yet difficulties for such a theory and practice
35i
begin, he thinks, already at the moment when Ihe elite takes upon itself the function of expressing social interests and thereby destroys the `naturally' shaped mechanism for their realisation, as a result of which the control mechanism over the elite itself is demolished. The latter begins, in turn, to pursue its own selfish interests and is unable to realise the initially set Utopian aims.
That, in Albert's view, is the genesis of totalitarianism: society is incapable of realising its interests and even of formulating them. 'In that case we are dealing with the paradox of power concentration: the more it is, the more complicated is the task of realising the aims set before authority, especially due to the radical change in society's interests in totalitarian conditions. Rationality, freedom and reformism, therefore, are closely intertwined. The total ``reason'' of philosophers of history [i.e., leaders of the Frankfurt School] turns out to be irrational and repressive: it is veiled anti-reason.'^^40^^ The fundamental prerequisite of rational politics becomes in that connection 'penetration into its interconnections and practical influence upon it'.^^41^^
Former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has spoken in the same vein in the foreword to Critical Rationalism and Social Democracy: 'An open democratic society can easily turn into a closed totalitarian state when it rejects the pluralism of political attitudes in favour of an abstract ideal. Whoever wishes to safeguard our state from that must take the road of gradual reforms that merit the approval of most of the populace. It is only such a policy that a democrat can call rational.'^^42^^
352Of course, Albert's understanding of the genesis of totalitarianism in no way helps to pinpoint the real reasons why it arose. His notion serves here as an additional `confirmation' of the need for a `positive' critique of existing society, a critique that is aimed ultimately at preserving its basic principles, helps to 'cultivate the conservative ideology of upholding the status quo.'^^43^^
Anticipating such accusations, Albert is at pains to say that many, if not all, forms of social evil 'come for the most part from unpremeditated, unforeseen consequences of institutional planning that can be removed not by breaking up the whole system, but only by managerial measures, through planned intervention by political institutions that are able to do that thanks to a certain political knowledge. A radical policy must be based not on Utopian plans for demolishing the whole system, which are as unrealistic as they are damaging, but on an analysis of political alternatives opted for.^^44^^ The analysis, in turn, can be based only on investigations carried out in the socio-political sciences.
Finally, Albert says, the identification of real political alternatives in the existing socio-- political system 'does not mean orienting science on upholding a given form of domination... We can talk, in fact, only of the reverse---the institutional regulation of domination, control over it, although, of course, the use of corresponding knowledge for realising that regulation can be implemented only in the presence of authority.'~^^45^^
This admission is very significant, the more so that he frequently talked of a situation when in modern societies forces are constantly arising
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and acting that consciously or unconsciously put a brake on scientific development,~^^46^^ and that political institutions in the final count have an effect on scientific and technological progress.~^^47^^
It is at this point that critical-rationalist political science is most vulnerable when it claims to be the only possible rational and, consequently, liberating theory.
So we see in West German political science a very clear crisis in the neoidealist and neopositivist schools equally laying claim to establishing a universal political theory. The arguments between the schools vividly bring out the old antagonisms typical of positivist and idealist philosophies, and the new political issues of a theoretical and methodological nature.
This classification of political orientations in the Federal Republic is certainly not the only one possible: as a consequence of the extreme complexity of intellectual situation, of the intertwining of socio-philosophical and political-legal traditions and orientations it is not possible to classify them strictly by any definite methodological, ideological or political characteristic.
On the whole, the structure of political science in the country may be seen as the sum total of the following orientations:
1. scientific-methodological ideas of political science;
2. concepts of ethical principles of `practical' politics;
3. the theory of the state notions relating to philosophy of the state, general studies of the state and sociology of the state, the state law;
4. political sociological studies within which, in turn, one may differentiate socio-philosophica]
354and structural-functionalist theories of political organisation of bourgeois society; the comparative and historical study of political supremacy types and their ideological formulation---i.e., political studies; empirical investigations of institutions and processes in the political system, which include: the sociology of political institutions, state departments and parties; the sociology of political behaviour, within which they study public opinion and the political role of the mass media. Today West Germany has various viewpoints on the subject matter and objectives of political science. Lenk has singled out several trends in political science in the country.^^48^^
First, by dint of durable state science traditions there continues to exist the idea that political science is state science backed up by an analysis of the dynamics of state institutions (Werner Weber and Ernst Forsthoff). The second group of political scientists reject the unity of subject matter of political science and talk of 'political sciences'---i.e., history, sociology and economics in their political aspect. The third group sees political science merely as an aspect of sociology, paying major attention to the sociological facets of politics (Otto Stammer). The fourth group views the chief objective and aim of political science in a historical-hermeneutic analysis of contemporary events.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. POLITICAL SCIENCE ANDPhilosophy of the state is looked at on two main planes: either as a direct part of political
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science or as a discipline closely connected with political science. Ossip K. Flechtheim, for example, notes the particularly close relationships of political science with the logic, ethics and philosophy of the state.^^49^^ In his view, philosophy ol the state studies the `essential' and the `possible' in the political sphere as well as extra-spatial abstract necessity. This is of importance as an introduction to empirical studies of political scientists. Political science that studies ' actuality' and not necessity, must at the same time take account also of the philosophical principles of politics, the moral teaching of the political.50 Among its objectives is a constant and concrete investigation and analysis of the possibility and difficulty of ethical-political action. Thus, Flechtheim divides philosophy of the state into moral philosophy and political science, and meanwhile underlines their necessary connection. This viewpoint is reflected also in the way he interprets the study matter of political science. It is, in his view, the state to the extent that it represents organisation of authority, as well as all phenomena of authority and domination to the extent that they relate to the state.^^51^^
Philosophy of the state includes a study of its normative principles in two chief aspects: 1. from the viewpoint of the individual's situation regarding the state and society, political-- philosophical anthropology; 2. from the viewpoint of the ethical and socio-philosophical principles of organisation of the state as a whole, representing all society.
The example of Arnold Gehlen, one of the West's leading philosophical anthropologists, makes it obvious how philosophical-anthropolog-
356ical and social theories are almost inadvertently turned into the state philosophy.
Gehlen sees the state as a 'fundamental anthropological institution'^^52^^ along with the family, language and law. Institutions, according to Gehlen, take shape in the process of human community 'by stabilising order and rules whose regulating mechanism should be sought in instincts, but certainly not in reflection on its rational purpose.'^^53^^
An urge for stability of internal and external environment, which, in Gehlen's view, permeates all human existence, becomes therefore the basis of his sociology of institutions. The state as an institution is, according to that concept, not an expression of a certain economic and socio-- political structure of society, but a 'certain structure' whose rationale ultimately may be defined only as a rationally organised support for the historically formed relations between people on a given territory.^^54^^ He provides no more precise definition of the state on the grounds that 'the essence of the state as such does not exist', inasmuch as 'there are no essential traits equally applicable for analysis of the state in Sparta, Rome, Byzantium and the Federal Republic of Germany',^^55^^ and that 'an answer to the question will have only an ideological character'.^^56^^ The state, then, serves the individual as a point of support in the cosmos and sociurn, and destruction of that institution means for human beings instability, degeneration and chaos.^^51^^ Thus, the state is proclaimed to be a `natural', 'biologically determined' organisation. The contemporary state is devoid, in that interpretation, of a political character, it is a socially-indifferent institution,
357a certain administrative apparatus inherited by various social forces in the course of social change and used as such by the ruling headquarters of the new system for constraining its enemies.58 Friedrich Jonas is of a like mind, asserting that 'the state as such does not represent any particular interests and does not use any particular philosophy for its justification, but embodies the principle of emancipation'^^59^^ of human beings; rational will in the state is freed of ultimate objectives (i.e., of separate objectives) and appreciates that if it is to exist in the future, it has to have the will to do so.^^60^^ Thus, the state which arose during the crystallisation of certain human relations and is conditioned biologically, becomes a self-contained force 'with special laws of development of its institutionality'.6I And although Gehlen does note that the state is used as an instrument for attaining goals by particular political forces, all the same in his version the state remains a general and fundamental category, since it 'reduces tensions' that arise within a human being himself. 'We are witnesses,' he writes, 'to a situation where institutions of society, its establishments, laws and styles of behaviour, and also the prevailing forms of their interaction identified as economic, political, social and religious structures, serve as external props for human beings, making morality possible.'~^^62^^ Institutions `liberate' the individual from 'painful searching for standards of proper behaviour, in so far as they confront him now as structured and preset'.~^^83^^ This interpretation of the state contains the threat of manipulating people's minds and conduct, but as far as Gehlen is concerned this danger may exist ('modern man becomes "thor-
358oughly" regulated'),^^84^^ yet it is not seen as repressive manipulation and is the inevitable `cost' of the universal nature of the state.
It is important to note that Gehlen talks of the threat of a new, very profound lack of freedom that he portrays in modern civilisation with its immeasurable moral burdening of the individual, from the viewpoint of 'chaotic subjectivity' that is intensifying through the weakening of institutions, rather than from the viewpoint of rigid and sometimes `inflexible' social institutions, in particular the state. 'Social relations that correspond to class or corporate, or even occupational duties are everywhere losing their importance.' The contemporary condition of society typically is witnessing the 'removal of all restrictions on setting pragmatic goals and consequently any overall growth in tyranny'.~^^85^^ So the collapse of rigid social institutions which Gehlen finds in modern bourgeois society is leading to disruption in people's minds, a decline in culture, and political tyranny. But the acuteness of his criticism of contemporary bourgeois culture is very much blunted when one takes account of the sociological uncertainty of his interpretation of social institutions. His call 'Back to culture' becomes even more obscure if one bears in mind that he says nothing of how it is possible to rehumanise social institutions. He also ignores another aspect---the patterns of development of institutions, since they are not something given for all time. Tn essence, his stance may be reduced to a demand for a 'strong state', being made anew by conservative academic and political circles in the country. One should note that the notion of a 'new Leviathan' is developed in West German
359political science both from a philosophical-- anthropological standpoint, as with Gehlen, and from a sociological standpoint (Carl Schmitt, Werner Weber and Ernst Forsthoff). Today state science and political science demonstrate clearly a polarisation of demands for a 'strong state' capable of overcoming the `irrationality' of the social element, removing `tension' in the social sphere, and demands for an `active' society.
An important issue in West German philosophy of the state, making it part of political science, is the relationship between society and the state, examination of the essence of the state precisely through the prism of its relationship with society. Interpretation of that problem has its traditions in Germany.
In his Philosophy of Law Hegel introduced the concept of civil society by which he meant a system of all-round dependence that may be seen as the `outer' state, the 'state of reason'.66 It is the sphere of realisation of special, particular goals and interests of each individual. Hegel made the point that the human community as a unity of different people was not the state, but precisely civil society.
Civil society in his understanding was a system of requirements mediated by labour and based on the domination of private property and people's universal formal equality. He did not see the state as the product of society; just the reverse, society was the subordinate aspect of the state.
Development of the category of society in Germany is also linked with the name of Lorenz Stein who felt that the historical dialectics of relations between State and society should lead
300to a state of equilibrium between them. A study of society has as its purpose the idea of a moral system, and the supreme reality of society is to combine that idea with property relations.
The system of material relations of property stands opposed to the moral system, and that contradiction within society grows with undiminishing force, threatening the existence of society itself.
If social processes cannot be controlled from within, therefore, they have to be controlled from without, by the state. The state is above society. That is how the conservative tradition of interpreting the relationship between society and state has been consolidated.
In West German philosophy of the state, treatment of society-state relations is subordinated to clear-cut socio-class aims: to substantiate the conservative or liberal bourgeois political order. The crux of the problem of state-society relations in bourgeois ideology is the extent to which a free play of political forces can be permitted against the background of the `disciplining' role of the state. In other words, reference is being made to the measure of relative independence of the bourgeois state in relation to society, including privileged classes and strata, primarily the bourgeoisie itself. In Western political theory this theme has been given formulation as the relationship between 'civil society' and the state. The aggrandizement of the state is typical of conservative ideology, while bourgeois liberals talk of the `guarantees' of 'civil society' to the state.
'The concept of civil society,' writes Helmut Kuhn, 'developed in the time of liberalism in whose doctrine the state was accredited merely
361with the role of protector of individual rights and liberties. Such an understanding of the state did not embrace the whole multiplicity of social life, and that sphere of social life that the state did not reach was what received the name of "civil society".'^^67^^ Further, 'The historical situation which gave rise to the opposition between the state and society and thereby between public and private rights does not pertain any more. Thus, their difference lying behind the concept of society has become rather complex. With the burdensome memories of the totalitarian past no one wants to reject dualism. But nobody knows well enough where to begin.'^^68^^
Attempts to avoid this unpleasant dilemma have engendered no end of intermediate versions. In historical science this division has been most insistently consolidated as 'the material delineating category', though in most cases German sociologists and political scientists have come to prefer the category of 'political community'.
All the same, Kuhn reckons that 'concretely understood, the state is out of the question without being a partner of other social structures.'69 In his opinion, society should be denned as a sphere of human existence that is out of reach of state authority. But just as the 'demarcation line' of the state is constantly being eroded, so society cannot be clearly marked out or given a constant dimension. The problem of the relationship between civil society and the state inevitably leads modern political scholars to the question of the role of the latter in the political and social process, and it is here that the watershed begins dividing sociologists, political scientists and state scientists into two principal camps---
362the conservatives (Weber, Schmitt, Herzog and Forsthoff) and the liberals (Fraenkel, Ralf Dahrendorf, etc.). This point marks one of the major discrepancies in the concepts of a democratic state and a democratic society.
Roman Herzog has set out a rather interesting idea.~^^70^^ He admits the pluralist nature of contemporary social structure, which testifies to the downfall of `unity' of society. In order not to let the genie out of the bottle what we need is a strong state apparatus. In contrast with Weber, however, he views it not as a rigid structure (on a normative level, of course), but as a conscious process of implementing social control. Understanding the difficulties which the constructing of such a `sensible' society comes up against, Herzog nonetheless endeavours to overcome the dualism of society and state by establishing a sort of parity between them, since the construction of a `sensible' state invariably runs up against the question of its legitimacy---i.e., the legitimacy of its acts, and in addition there is the old question of guarantees against its turning mto totalitarianism. The dilemma of 'totalitarian society or totalitarian state' is obviated by extending the state sphere as much as possible; this Herzog designates as 'democratic socio-legal' state.
Forsthoff's concept represents an attempt to explain the relationship between society and state in the industrial society era. He is against all the fashionable attempts to `remove' the dualism of society and state, motivated for the most part by the close intertwining of stale and social processes. Whoever argues thus, he thinks, has not understood the crux of that dualism, which is
363by no means a stratification of the socium into two spheres. And here he continues Hegel's idea in viewing the state and society as necessary dialectical modes of human existence; society as a 'system of needs' and state as the 'reality of the moral idea'.
So the result of the French Revolution was a new social system in which the state and society differed in their specific structural characteristic: society contained social inequality, the state had juridical equality. The state, he says, became a guarantee of freedom and equality.
Today, in his view, there are two dangers for the dualism he has formulated. According to ForsthoH, Weber and other conservative scholars, the first lies in the `socialisation' of the state which is used by society as a tool for attaining selfish goals. They see the second in the reverse--- in the `etatisation' of society---i.e., in totalitarianism. To defend the principle of dualism in such an interpretation, ForsthoB has conceptually to overcome both those obstacles. Demands of human community may be considered fulfilled only when the state 'comes to express and safeguard the specific political system that has a non-technical origin, and defines the parameters within which technical processes take place which, in turn, does not preclude the possibility of adapting the political system to technical realities.'^^71^^
His attempt to uphold the principle of societystate dualism, however, has actually turned into the very opposite---an apology for the strong state where society is inevitably given (as with Hegel) the role of subordination in regard to the state. If the state restrains (or is meant to re-
364strain) destructive social processes, not being simultaneously the product of the same society, then, first, one inevitably recognises the primacy of the state over society (and not partnership according to conditions of the given dualist version) and, second, the very nature of the state, its ontological support, is inevitably taken beyond the bounds of the socium.
It has to be noted that within West German political science there is increasing criticism of the concept of a specula tively understood state which by tradition is perceived as an ahistorical, extraspatial social constant, which is, as a number of authors emphasise, the reason why no satisfactory analytical concept has so far been suggested. That is why very many West German political scientists seek an answer in recipes of pluralist or socio-cybernetic theory or, rather, in the prescription of their multitudinous variants.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF THEThe general doctrine of the state has certainly not disappeared since the emergence of West German political science, but it has been affected by new issues raised by political science.
The works of Hermann Heller in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly his Staatslehre (Leiden, 1934) written as an emigre, were a major step beyond the framework of studies of the state and political sociology. Heller interpreted the state as a certain 'constantly actualising' form of social life. He proceeded from the social function
365ol the state of his time, conditioned by the high degree of social division of labour. He was influenced in this by Max Weber who had defined the state as an organised unity of those possessing authority and those subordinated to it. The state is not only a function of certain factors operating within society, it is also a concretely acting political unity. According to Heller, the state can be understood sociologically only as 'a social formation, a certain historical structure within a concrete socio-historical structure'.^^72^^
By contrast with Weher, however, Heller's theory rests not on the functional characteristic of the state (with Weber it is the monopoly of physical compulsion), but on the teleological social purpose of the state, its influence on distribution of authority and formation of social life in the spirit of 'friendly cooperation' among members of society.
Giinther and Erich Kiichenhoff note the close connection between the general doctrine of the state and political science as a 'theoretical-- pragmatic experimental science of the actual course of state life'; they join them together with other sciences on the state in the concept of 'sciences of state', 'general science of the state' or ' political sciences'^^73^^. The task of general doctrine of the state is to explain the essence and importance of state structures, processes and of what is called the state as an integral whole. And the essence of the state is revealed only by combining sociological and juridical approaches. Thus, the general doctrine of the state claims to be an integral view. Here the need is emphasised to take account of the juridical nature of the state which, however, should not be confined to that.
366The Kiichenhoffs, in the wake of Georg Jellinek, write about the dual nature of the state as of a social formation and of a legal institution. In the sociological sense the state is a jointly operating unitary whole possessing the initial power of domination and located on a certain territory. Elements of a sociological concept of the state--- state territory, the population of the state, state authority and external order of those three factors---are the structure of the state. In the juridical sense the state is a self-regulating territorial entity that possesses authority, a juridical repository of public law.^^74^^ They follow Heller's idea when they give their general definition of the state: 'The state is on the whole a highlyorganised orderly unity of human cooperation. It is an organisation of companionable society, and not a managerial apparatus of authority.'75 Thus, the definition expresses moderate-liberal moral ideas.
Hans Nawiasky has also developed the Jellinek theory of 'two sides'. By separating the legal, social and ideal concept of the state, he singles out the science of state law, the doctrine of the link between state and society ( Staatsgesellschaftslehre), and the science of doctrines of the state (Staatsideenlehre).^^76^^ The major work of another notable among the students of the state, Herbert Kriiger, also underlines the conditional link between state and society.^^77^^
Otto Stammer followed Heller in his concept of political sociology in the postwar period. In Stammer's view, political sociology basically is concerned with two different sets of questions: Hie state as an organised political association within certain historical and social conditions,^^78^^
307and politics as the art and technique of society's influence on the state.
Stammer notes the objective difficulty of distinguishing the state from society today. 'The modern state in its historically individual form as a sovereign, organised political alliance of domination ought to be understood only in the structural and actual relationship of all norms, patterns of behaviour, institutions and groups affecting political will-formation and political decision-making... The state belongs to the political order of co-existence, constitutes the core of political organisation of domination, and in its supreme bodies is the forum for taking supreme political decisions. The state has three functions in regard to society: 1. keeping order; 2. implementing domination; 3. directing socio-political development. The specific structure of state domination and its political functions interact with the nongovernmental elements of the social organism, which are acquiring more and more importance.'~^^79^^
So Stammer interprets political sociology as sociology of the state in both the narrow and the broad sense. It is a state science-oriented political sociology with a strong influence from Max Weber and Hermann Heller.
What is more, he makes quite clear his moderate-conservative meaning of the social role of the state. The social function of the latter, in his view, consists in guaranteeing existing social order with the aid of the state-established legal order and ruling apparatus. On the other hand, social forces have the opportunity to affect the state and even alter the whole social order with the help of the state authority itself---either
368through participation in the authority structures or through organised influence on them from without. Here we see the traditional bourgeois view of the state as a body serving the whole of society and being controlled by it. The real class basis of the bourgeois state and its social functions are utterly ignored. Above all, this approach serves to disguise the real prime socioclass function of the bourgeois state---suppression of the working class and preservation of the exploiting system. This distorted interpretation of the social role of the bourgeois state conditioned, too, Stammer's view of the aims of political sociology. Political sociology has to aspire, on the one hand, to study the economic and social structure of society, and on the other, the organisational structure of the state from the angle of the principles of 'developed democratic state'. These principles include representation of the popular will, the sum total of group wills, and the guarantee of individual rights against obsessive interference by the state into the area of personal freedom. Thus, the concept of a democratic (in the bourgeois-liberal or moderate-- conservative sense) society precedes the politicalsociological concept of the democratic state. Stammer, for example, believes that political sociology should also fulfil a `critical' function in society. It should indicate that bureaucratic perversions in state administration should be removed with the aid of public opinion, active control by parliament and government, and proper education of civil servants.
As Stammer has written, the specific interest of political sociology is aimed at a sociological substantiation of the problem of democracy. De-
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mocracy, he says, cannot be understood in the sense of transferring an amorphous general popular will on the state will through formation of a majority and by an electoral act.
Political will in democracy is formed in society and state through a multifaceted harmonised system of niters. 'The "general will" of the people in a democratic state comes from the multifarious relations which exist between citizens of the state and representatives of the state and are constantly being renewed. . . Groups, strata, classes, parties, administrative bodies are also motors of political will-formation in society and state.'^^80^^ So he sees the subject of political sociology in studying how the organisational structure of the state looks sociologically, and in studying the class structure of society that affects state power. But here he maintains an anti-Marxist stand: 'the political power positions of industrial monopolies or finance-capitalist groups' do not confirm the existence of class domination, since opposing social influences, he feels, are capable of cancelling them out.^^81^^ In fact, however, as shown by Marxist scholars, the monopoly financeindustrial oligarchy is a concentrated expression of the class rule of the contemporary bourgeoisie.~^^82^^ Yet with Stammer the situation is that not every state is class, even though any state is domination. 'The democratic state in many cases today tries, with the help of the objectives it sets itself, to balance the competing wills that come from class division. And we need to study the extent to which it can do so in specific instances and on what group power it can rely.'83 It is clear that political sociology is here lent a role in empirically substantiating bourgeois polit-
ico-normative principles. These principles are social pluralism and competition and, at the same time, the reconciliation of antagonistic class contradictions on the basis of sanctified private property.
In the science of state law, where the state is viewed as an element or institution of law and order, the political science aspect is manifest in that more store is put by, first, the ' constitutional reality' of laws proclaimed, the need to take account of all manner of social and historical factors in applying constitutional standards to a concrete situation and, second, the social and economic function of constitutional standards and structures.
On the example of the science of state law, one of the key disciplines in the science of the state, the notion becomes extremely clear and is popular in German political science, concerning the specific nature of political science as a special approach within science of the state, as well as the relationship of the political science to traditional science of the state, and specifically to the science of state law. In the view of Kurt Sontheimer, political science must provide the science of state law 'a philosophical rationale for the existing content and forms of life in political community, establish the requisites for a deeper understanding of public and legal standard.'~^^84^^ He makes the point that Heller's studies on the state were perceived after 1950 by part of the German political science fraternity as the starting point; he thinks that Heller was right in striving to combine political sociology and science of state law.~^^85^^
It would seem that political science plays the
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part of 'philosophical rationale^^1^^ fop several other
adjacent disciplines as well---sociology, history and economics. That is why political science as a special approach in the philosophy of the state, the overall doctrine of the state, in sociology with historical and economic appendages, is perceived in West Germany as an attempt to comprehend the ideological and social function of those disciplines.
Thus, in the science of state law political science has absorbed the problems of the `legal' and `social' state, lending it a political-- sociological colouring. The 'social nature' of constitutional theory is expressed in the demand for the state to take account of liberal or moderate-- conservative political principles---i.e., a sheer, definite class position.
The methodological atmosphere in which West German political science has developed up till now has certainly been affected by the historical fact of the disintegration and demise of the liberal-democratic legal order in the Weimar Republic, and the `legalistic' character of the Nazi arrival in power. This is the theme of constant reminders from liberal-minded West German political scholars, which stimulates discussion of the relationship between democratic legal forms and the social reality, searches for guarantees against degeneration of liberal democracy.
The growing social activity of the bourgeois state is another salient factor in the politicisation of the science of state law in the country.
The aspiration theoretically to combine the legal and social facets of the activity of the West
372German state found expression in the notion of the 'social and legal state'. That is how the Federal Republic of Germany is termed in its Constitution (Article 28).
The doctrine of the 'social and legal state' has the following features:
1. The only laws that can be issued shall be those that accord with the basic rights promulgated in the Constitution;
2. These laws shall he directly observed in practice;
3. Observance of the principles of the legal state shall be subject to juridical verification;
4. Recognition of the principle of the `legal' state shall not be used for political gain by any social or economic doctrine serving any onesided interests whatsoever;
5. The ideas of the `legal' state shall apply both to relations of the individual to public authority and to his relations to social authorities.
This is the scheme that Fraenkel proposes in State and Politics.~^^86^^
Meanwhile, West German literature is more and more frequently voicing the idea that the `social' and the `legal' state are concepts that sometimes stand opposed to one another. It ought to be stressed that such an interpretation became possible only in the contemporary capitalist state which is vigorously intervening literally in all spheres of human life.
Using the new formula of 'social state---welfare state', the ruling classes in the country are endeavouring to accentuate state functions which consist, they think, in ensuring and providing socio-economic benefits. What this actually means
373is attempts by bourgeois ideologists to present as an apology for the bourgeois state the objective processes bound up with the extention, particularly in the 1960s, of the scale of social payments and the policy of partial redistribution of income. The West German ruling class, as in other developed Western states, was able at a time of relatively favourable economic conditions to pursue this policy in the name of keeping the 'social peace'---which was also prompted by the mounting pressure from the labour movement. Of course, despite that policy, no change in the essence of the bourgeois state took place. As the 1970s and early 1980s were to show, a worsening of the economic situation in (the Western countries was everywhere to lead to a position where precisely that policy was the main target for attack by the monopolies and their political representatives. Capitalist reality itself exploded the myth of the `benevolent' role of the bourgeois state.
The West German concept of the 'social and legal state' received a far-reaching international response at the time. It should also be noted that the issue of democracy is receiving a particular resonance in relation to that idea.
As Werner Weber, a prominent member of the conservative wing of West German political science, writes, between the legal and the social state there exists a certain connection which is manifest in that the individual is the starting point and central category of both conceptions87 and while the legal state has as its objective to defend individual rights and freedoms, the social state is destined to guarantee the individual a worthy existence. The principles of the social
374state, however, clash with those of the legal state. The modern state, the author continues, is unthinkable without fulfilling the functions of social security; it cannot be deprived of them for two reasons. The first is the need for the 'self-- affirmation of the state', in so far as the state, whose inner tranquillity is under threat because poverty and discontent of the common people constantly create the threat of a violent insurrection, cannot exist for a long time. The other reason is the need to maintain a certain level of social security equal for all which demands from the state a great deal of activity and efficiency. The state, writes Werner Weber, has become an immense apparatus for providing social services, but it is in that tendency that so many threats lurk. He sees in the state's social activity the 'neutralisation of popular initiative and responsibility'. A consequence of that is the constant rise in level of demands made by the people on the state, which, he alleges, threatens economic competition and may demolish parliamentary democracy, making it incapable of performing its function.
The social state, therefore, is essentially the administrative state, which leads to a situation where its citizen's world is becoming an ' administrative' world on which he wholly depends and without which he cannot exist. The managerial apparatus is ballooning up so much that laws are losing their juridical sense, taking the form of 'administrative decisions', turning into plans and programmes of executive authority. One more consequence of this process is the urge of political parties to subordinate the administration to themselves as well, which contradicts the
375principles of the legal state. But here, according to Weber, we find a point where the principles of the legal and social state come into conflict. 'The legal state proceeds from the theory of division of powers and presupposes that, whereas the social state relates indifferently to that principle, having a tendency to erode the borders between the legislative and executive authority. The legal state (liberal-oriented) aspires to limit state activity, the social state, conversely, calls for high activity of the state, at any rate an activity that serves to provide for the individual.'~^^88^^ The legal state, Weber argues further, is based on the autonomy and responsibility of the individual for his own fate, whereas the social state deprives him of both and integrates him into the system of satisfying collective requirements. The first is based on freedom of the individual, freedom of economics and culture, whereas the second is based on equalising out living standards, guaranteeing them, etc. Thus, it turns out that the social and the legal state are mutually excluding concepts.
Conservative theorists regard the legal state as a `strong' one, both capable of protecting the basic rights and `order' and epitomising democracy. The actual class essence of the legal state concept has been investigated in detail in Soviet literature.~^^89^^ Its underlying idea is that of the binding of the bourgeois state by law. Meanwhile, as history and latter-day political practice show, the bourgeois state power has always gone beyond the legal framework it has established when the economic and political interests of the ruling class have required it.
Another aspect of the issue, guarantees from
376arbitrary action by the omnipotent state, is quietly left in parenthesis, since it is assumed that the state is not permitted to overstep the bounds of human liberties because of its immanent moral basis. Weber's stance is typical in that connection. To the question of how he sees West Germany's constitutional reality and the political forces that have engendered it, he gives a categorical answer: 'The pluralism of ruling oligarchical groups.'^^90^^ The overall picture of those oligarchies is exceedingly colourful, in his view. First there are political parties, then come trade unions, employers' associations and the Church. These associations embody the social power which, being realised in political parties, from the very start is aimed at achieving political domination. Although he almost detests pluralism, Weber admits that it does contain something positive: it is an ideal system for power division and balance of forces; inasmuch as none of those power complexes is able to squeeze out or destroy the other, there is thereby created a system of equilibrium which restrains the concentration of political power in single hands.
'On the one hand, this is testimony to a real, free, constitutional state. But that balance of power is not formulated; it has no underlying constructive concept, as a result of which the freedom gained with its help displays caste traits and reduces to naught the unity of state rule. In that connection, the destiny of democracy becomes critical; one manifestation of that is the widelyfelt scepticism among the population over the democratic integrity of political reality.' 9I
The fact that a few rule, Weber continues, refers to the essence of democracy, and is natural
377for any state, particularly a state of present-day 'mass democracy'. Those who govern have the function of establishing a political elite which must be legitimised by the people, by public opinion. But here lies the problem. Weber doubts whether managers and other captains of the economy, the Church and unions are capable of creating a firm foundation for a democratic system. The problem is to organise the people democratically into the state by the medium of political parties.^^92^^
So the objective of modern democracy is to do away with the pluralism of oligarchies. 'The Federal Constitution wants that unity, but it uses the means of a defunct political world.'^^93^^ It does not remove the domination of groups, it only improves the apparatus of their rule and provides the technical means for that. The Constitution creates the conditions for the play of oligarchies rather like `Gescheft' rules, and it does not incorporate these groups into the integral order which creates an overall mandatory general will. Thus, it constitutes not a state with generally-recognised supreme courts of appeal as the highest authorities, but only a structure whoso basis is rival leaders without any regulation on their activity.
It is the major task of present-day West German democracy, says Weber, to subordinate the oligarchical agents of power to the government authority, restoring to the state its rightful place.
What we need, he says, is always to bear in mind the state as a whole; then the state's task will be triumph over parties, trade unions, over pressure groups. However, we ought not to make
378futile attempts to create constructions with which to integrate unions into the state. What we should do rather is to focus attention on giving the state more authority.
Weber is well aware of the difficulties which crop up when implementing his programme. One such is the ever expanding function of the welfare state. 'The quantitative increase in the state apparatus and intensification in its social functions combine to act as a poor service. To demand a mechanical increase in the state moans worsening the situation oven more. Yet both in big and small there is the possibility of subordinating to the populace the staff responsible for general interests.'^^94^^
The component parts of that 'staff should be `substantial' elements. He sees them in a judicial corporation (as the most stable group) whose task is concern for the general good, in officialdom which, he maintains, coped splendidly with its functions in the period of constitutional monarchy right up to the Weimar Republic. 'It is party-state mass democracy devoid of any form of state tendency and institutions that cannot exist without officialdom whose task is to be responsible for the state as a whole. Even in tho USA and Britain, which do not have bureaucratic traditions, the need has arisen for setting up an officialdom as an element neutralising partypolitical leadership.'^^95^^ True, he adds, it is not a matter of bringing officials to power, let alone making them into a dictatorship. The task is rather to establish a firm constitutional foundation for the activity of the bureaucracy. But higher officials do not constitute a united, integral group. Their personnel policy is continually being
379affected by party politics and interests, so they need a patron, such as the British monarch or the American president.
'In rejecting our historical past,' Weber sums up, :we have believed for decades that the state should be dismantled so as to guarantee the individual freedom and political self-determination. Yet, by depriving the throne of authority, we have seen that uncontrollable forces have seized power. . . So the main thing when we are talking of individual and political freedom and democracy is to strengthen statehood.'^^96^^ Evidently, Weber is continuing the tradition leading from Lorenz Stein who raised the state above society. Weber is backed up by ForsthoS who claims that the pluralism of pressure groups tends to make the authority of state institutions superfluous. The judicial decision should act as a guarantee of maintaining equilibrium, since it is the only authority in the form of which the state still preserves its legitimacy.
Thus, even the most diehard conservative advocates of the 'strong state' volens nolens admit the weakness of constitutional control of the activity of the various social organisations.
Discussion about the state-society relationship and the democratisation of the state has also penetrated political circles. Indicative in that respect is the argument going on between theorists of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union. Both sides call simultaneously for a 'strong state' and a 'democratic society' and, depending on the particular political situation, advance to the forefront either the notion of a 'strong state' or that of an 'active society'. De-
380mocracy, in the opinion of conservative political and academic circles in West Germany, does contain elements of irrationalism that are largely pernicious for the existing political system. ' Rationality' embodied in a 'strong state' is the guarantee of freedom. Thus, in posing the question of the relationship between freedom and democracy, scholars and politicians invariably deal with the relationship between state and society.
Typical in that sense is the position of the CDU/CSU theorists. On the one hand, there is evident an adverse attitude towards the state in its regulation and control of society, whereas decentralisation is seen as a vitally necessary political measure. They emphasise that to a large degree the state should be an institution of free citizens having responsibility to one another. The structure and activity of the state should be subjected to public control; moreover, the state is accorded the function of an instrument of society.
On the other hand, in works devoted to statelegal problems, there are continual calls for the establishment of a new Leviathan or strong authoritative state which would not resemble a selfservice store; it would be an authority for groups that could not impose their interests upon it. Significantly, the GDU draft manifesto gave the state the function of setting society objectives. Thus, the idea of the state as depicted in recent works by conservative theorists contains a certain duality. This has not escaped the attention of left-wing liberal and social-democratic political scientists and jurists. For instance, Sven Papcke writes, 'Those ideas [of the CDU/CSU] only seem contradictory, since defence of entrepreneu-
381rial freedom requires the use of both concepts of the state.'^^97^^
The rebuke given by left-wing liberals and social democrats to conservative theorists is also ambiguous. Indicative of that is the manifesto document Economic and Political Guidelines for 1975-1985. Its points 2, 4 and 8 state that the social policy of social democrats asserts the active role of the state in transforming the country's social system. But it resolutely rejects any attempt at etatisation. In the same document the state is prescribed the function of safeguarding and guaranteeing the basic rights of citizens. Thus, points 1 and 2 declare that freedom means the absence of degrading dependence and the possibility of free development of the individual within the bounds of justice and solidarity. Freedom becomes a social reality and not an illusion or privilege of the few only when all people have the real opportunity (economic, political, social, cultural) freely to develop. This approach demands, however, an integral concept of the state, but it is here that the social democrats run into difficulties. For example, Willy Brandt defines the modern bourgeois-democratic state as 'an organised legal entity of people whose aim is concern for security, freedom and justice'.98 Here the state becomes a `corresponding' element between the citizen and basic rights.''
In the concept set forth by social-democratic political scholars the state also must be `strong' ---so as to counteract dictatorship by monopoly groups. Thus, the above-mentioned Guidelines say that the dependence of the state and the economy - based on private property is mutual. The state has to gain independence from large-
382scale capital, and its activity must be aimed at transforming society in the spirit of the great fundamental values.
One may conclude from that that the slogan of a 'strong state' in its specific political application becomes now a means of struggle in a social-democratic spirit, now, as the works by CDU/GSU theorists show, a means of combating 'democratisation of society'. That precludes the possibility of any simple evaluation of the 'strong state' concept.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OFThe expanding field of research is a constant trend in West German political science. Many politicians talk about the growing politicisation of society. Society itself as a whole is being viewed from the standpoint of the system of political relations and attitudes, while democracy is being seen as a mode of both organising the state and an instrument to give shape to the whole 'politically organised' society, the political system. The beginning of that process may be traced to the end of the last and start of the present centuries when there arose the political theories of democracy; democracy then meant a certain mode of interaction among political forces, and not a formal organisation of state institutions. Such were the theories of 'plebiscitary democracy' of Max Weber or Schumpeter's ' processual democracy'. Indeed, many public organisations, movements, ideological and socio-- psychological propositions have acquired great political importance in bourgeois society during the im-
383perialist era. An objective need arises for interpreting democracy as a means of organising and functioning of the whole of society. This need gained a dual theoretical expression: first, in the form of socio-philosophical concepts of democracy; second, in political-sociological concepts of democracy resting on structural-- functional analysis.
Sociologically-oriented political science in West Germany differs from state-oriented political sociology in that it is directly linked to global socio-philosophical and socio-system concepts. Its distinguishing feature is also that it is mainly being elaborated by sociologists, philosophers, social scientists, journalists and politicians, rather than jurists. It can be called political sociology in the wide sense. As Otto Stammer has put it, 'political sociology is concerned with social and socio-psychological prerequisites and consequences of political action, with the structure and interconnection of various political systems primarily in countries of the contemporary world. Its interest is particularly in studying the interdependence between the economic system, the social structure, ideology and the mode of behaviour of social groups, on the one hand and the structure of political order and political events, on the other.'~^^10^^°
It should be noted that, in accordance with the general features of the entire political science in the country, in the sociologically-oriented notions, too, behind the analysis lies the state as the centre of socio-political activity, which, however, does not deprive this approach of originality by contrast with science of the state, since it is founded primarily on categories and
384methodology of contemporary bourgeois sociology. Flechtheim believes that the subject of political science---the political system of 'modern mass democracy'---may be divided into the following separate elements:
1. Constitution, including the principles of state administration;
2. The electoral system and voting process;
3. The institutions and organs of the state (parliament, government, state administration, the court system, security agencies, etc.);
4. The party system;
5. Public associations that are not parties;
6. Organisation of the mass media;
7. Political and ideological attitudes, orientations, etc.;
8. International contacts (treaties, institutions, etc.).^^101^^
Flechtheim calls for an emphasis on the ' political process', the dynamics of political institutions. In this case he is voicing the opinion, widespread in Western literature, which separates political sociology and political science. While the latter is understood as a discipline mainly concerned with the functions of political institutions and oriented largely on the state, the former deals especially with social conflicts, social change, informal aspects and dysfunctional elements of politics, and political decision-making. Yet, the separation of political science and political sociology in West Germany does not seem to have acquired as much clear-cut division as in the USA, precisely because the study of dynamic processes in politics is closely bound up with the state and the entire system of its agencies.
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Siegfried Landshut views the problems of political sociology as a result of the contradiction between the legal status of people as free and equal individuals and their actual inequality as members of society. Another important issue of political sociology is political will-formation.102 In summary, one may say that political sociology in the Federal Republic has the same subject of research as other national variants of political sociology---the interrelationship between society and the state from the viewpoint of the political function of social forces, parties, the electorate, the political function of social processes; that is, the social process of formation of the socalled universal will and the factors in that willformation. Yet by contrast with American political sociology, the West German brand has a much stronger theoretical accentuation, a link with ethical-normative propositions of political theory. Otto Stammer thinks that the posing o£ questions in political sociology is bound up with the study of how power generally develops in certain socio-historical conditions of a socialcultural situation; how political will-formation occurs in the milieu of groups, alliances and organisations in regard to the state and within the state itself; how, finally, the state itself operates as a social entity of associations and the system of domination in society, whose political centre it represents.^^103^^
On the one hand, Stammer sees the state as a special kind of organisation, a certain social entity with a specific inner function that follows from its functions; on the other, he points also to the importance of understanding the state as a 'state machine'. Here he refers to Max Weber
386who described tbe contemporary state in a sociological way---as the organised political association of domination whose structural characteristic was the existence of an administrative stall^^104^^ Stammer notes the mounting politicisation of society and, at the same time, the socialisation of the state in the sense that economic and social interests are acquiring ever more importance for the state. Yet at the same time he does not omit to say that the democratic state can never coincide with society. Ios
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANDJoseph Schuinpeter's idea set out in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is well known among the numerous theories of democracy.106 He tried to demonstrate that democracy was only a formal political organisational principle. 'Democracy is not based on certain social values; it is a system of institutions designed for putting political decisions into effect, in which these decisions are made in a competitive struggle for the people's vote.'^^107^^ This theory of democracy is diametrically opposed to the so-called classical theory which he defines as an 'institutional system designed for putting political decisions into effect, characterised by the people themselves tackling disputed issues, that is, by selecting people who have to do their will'.^^108^^
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Democracy differs from other state relationships not in a sense of quality, it signifies merely the iustitutionalisation of another functional mode of selecting the rulers.
The general `rationalisation' of social processes (a term which Max Weber introduced to sociology) leads, says Schumpeter, to the `rational' selection of rulers through general elections. Rationalisation by no means signifies that relations of domination disappear, that people take destiny into their own hands. He is sceptical about the great mass of voters who, he says, 'are incapable of any action save panic'.^^109^^ The only way to restore social discipline, he thinks, is to introduce socialism, though in a barrack-type bureaucratic form.
The systems approach in West German political science, being in the mainstream of structural functionalism, is applied accordingly to the problem of democracy. Niklas Luhmann, for example, defines democracy as 'upholding the complexity (Komplexitat) in spite of the need urgently to take decisions, upholding as wide a sphere as possible in which new and other decisions are being worked out. Here lies the rationality of democracy and its humaneness, its reason.'~^^110^^ In complex systems 'the classical theory of democracy' as representation of interests must be radically reconsidered. Specific participation of all individuals in the political decision-making process is not only Utopian, it is a false idea. The `people' (Luhmann's inverted commas) can belong to a political system only as the agents of a particular role (according to functionalist terminology), and the role of voter is secondary. Politics---i.e., the political system, legitimi-
388ses itself not by the fact that it defines the process of political will-formation; it cannot rely on anything in its decisions, it must itself create that reliance. 1!1
While the classical theory of democracy sees individual participation in political win-- formation as both a means and an end in itself, being the self-realisation of human beings in the social world, democracy in Luhinann's interpretation becomes a purely technical function which ensures that the political system can exist and uphold its rationality. So it is not surprising that so many political scientists, Josef Esser one of them, claim that 'human beings in their concrete, socially-conditioned individuality have completely vanished in that concept'.~^^112^^
The form of combination of the specifically sociological definition of democracy with the ' critical-rationalistic' substantiation of it is the concept set out in Critical Rationalism and Social Democracy~^^113^^ where the demand for democracy is explained by the complexity of the cognition" process.
The social sphere, according to authors of that work, is the sphere of 'principal indeterminateness' and therefore is subject to irrational interpretations. 'The premise of principal indetermiriateness in scientific and political life from which comes critical rationalism is leading directly to the need for a democratic method.'^^114^^ So epistemological issues grow into political issues.
Taking Schumpeter's definition of democracy, Gerd Fleischmann, author of an article in the collection, notes that such a version of democracy should not be understood narrowly, only in the state-legal sense. In his view, which is
389shared by Dahrendorf, that understanding of democracy, if not identical, is at any rate very similar to the process of seeking scientific truth. Here he ascribes to classical scientific theory 'anti-democratic implications, in so far as it morally disqualifies differences of opinion and errors, while the competitive struggle for votes is conceivable only when a difference of opinion is assessed positively'.^^115^^
The greatest danger to science therefore comes from the dogmatisation of an error which can only be avoided through constant critical reflection. It follows from this, says Fleischmann, that 'all institutions studied and all types of behaviour . . . should be seen from the point of view of whether they help or hinder criticism'.116 Recognition of the premise of principal indeterminateness, he reckons, is in full accord with the democratic method of competing for votes. Conversely, 'mutual criticism that occurs in a situation of free and effective competition where the political process does not lose its significance is a requirement of the indeterminateness principle. Since no one can have absolute knowledge about a just system and ways to attain it, then, consequently, what is meant is preserving diversity of opinion as the possibility for mutual criticism.' 1W
All the same, says Fleischmami, the principle of `indeterminateness' is constantly questioning the democratic method, just as the ' dogmatisation of institutions of the representative state can mean the dogmatisation of an error.'^^118^^ That principle, too, requires the existence of institutions which would 'effectively counteract any restraint on criticism'.^^119^^
390The problems of 'active society' are most vividly reflected in the concepts of Jiirgen Haberrnas and Half Dahrendorf.
Habermas is a proponent of 'dialectical-- critical' methodology in political science. In his The Changing Structure of the Community he shows that today the political process is taking place mainly in associations and political parties, relegating to the community the role of a virtual onlooker. He notes that 'a community of people united in organisations has taken the place of a community representing private people. Only the former is today capable of effectively taking part in the process of social communication, using inner-party and inner-association channels, and on their basis in practical communication between the state and society.'i20 Two trends in development are typical of the political community in the present-day social state. On the one hand, there is the development of the ' demonstrative and manipulative publicity' proceeding from the organisations 'over the public's heads' and, on the other, 'the social state, continuing the traditions of the legal state, upholds the principle of a politically functioning community as a consequence of which the community, through the medium of organisations and with their assistance, is included in the critical process of communication.'^^121^^ According to Habcrinas, the critical' and the `manipulative' publicity are in sharp contradiction in the constitutional reality of the social state. Noting this circumstance, Habermas writes that 'with further bureau cratisation of administration of the state and society, the competence of highly-skilled specialists should not by the logic of things be the object
391of public debate'.^^122^^ One has to bear in mind that today 'control over state-political bureaucracy is possible only by a social-political bureaucracy of parties and associations which, in turn, is also subject to control within public organisations. Within one and the same organisation in the process of public communication, it will probably become impossible to establish a definite stable relationship between the adopting of bureaucratic decisions and their quasi-- parliamentary discussion.'^^123^^
It is indicative that the conservative Forsthoff has also pointed to that aspect of the problem. As the state's functions grow more complex, he said, democratic control over their performance becomes more and more problematic. The citizen is confronted by the present-day state 'in the role of the dilettante who is unable to get to the heart of state affairs and is wholly dependent therefore on the specialist'. m That is why citizens can only be activated in a very limited aspect and this is fraught with danger for the existing political system.
Habermas sees an earnest of democracy not, in the strengthening of statehood---i.e., not in intensified state intervention in the life of society, but in enhancing the part played by conscious, `enlightened' community that elaborates the goals and ideals of socio-political life, actively takes part in the political process, and is the 'living spirit' of democracy and the guarantee of its preservation. Democracy, as liberal West German political scientists aver, exists only as long as 'critical community' is able effectively to take the political initiative and control bureaucratic activity.
392The very development of the Western political system breeds justified fears among liberal political scholars, since, in their view, Western societies stand on the threshold not of a rebirth of traditional liberalism, but of 'medieval servility amidst economic abundance', encouraged first and foremost by the system of 'rational-- bureaucratic domination' in whose survival are interested officials and association chiefs for whom there is a danger both in extra-parliamentary opposition and in the new liberalism. This is forcing liberal theorists to review the existing concepts of democracy.
In Habermas's political theory democracy is 'institutionally-guaranteed forms of social communication, in the process of which the question is resolved of how people can and want to coexist in circumstances of ever increasing constraint'.~^^125^^ The decisive condition for 'human emancipation', progress and democracy lies, in Habermas's view, in unrestrained public discussion of the desirability and suitability of the various principles and standards on which political action is oriented. This, in turn, confronts political theory and practice with the question of 'eliminating institutions that possess the potential of domination, through the organisation of public communication that would exclude any coercion'.^^126^^ Besides, the concept of free communication arises in the form of the ideal communion in which chances to take part in it would be evenly distributed among its participants.
Haberrnas stresses that the aim of his theory of democracy is to remove domination itself, precisely the 'uncontrolled domination', and not to legitimise authority of 'self-styled enlighten-
393ers'. I27 It is here that we see the liberal-Utopian elements of his political theory in which the rule of capital may he done away with through a universal awareness that there is no need in that domination. That form of democracy simply does not touch on the question of the mechanism of domination, one of the basic issues of political science, as a result of which tho illusion grows among many of Habermas's followers that they can remove the power of the bourgeoisie merely by means of a critical barrage and sociopolitical communication.
Habermas sees the problems of democracy in line with analysis of contemporary 'late-- capitalism statehood': democracy performs in his version 'the functions of legitimising a political system'. Individual participation in the process of political will-formation ('material democracy') removes, in his view, the contradictions that arise through the social character of labour and the private form of appropriation of produced values. So as to prevent discussion of that issue by the 'critical community', the administrative system (i.e., the bourgeois state) has to be sufficiently autonomous in regard to the system of socio-- political will-formation which, according to Habermas, is what is happening in the existing liberal democracy 'ensuring the loyalty of the masses and precluding at the same time their political activity'.~^^128^^ He thinks that the development of the bourgeois state produces an ever-- increasing requirement for legitimacy which is satisfied by means of political democracy (on the basis of universal suffrage). The state, therefore, acls towards various capitalist groupings not only as a summary capitalist: it is obliged also to take
394account of the overall interests of the populace so as to secure their loyalty.
In view of the growing demand for legitimation of decisions taken by the political system the community is faced with the problem of formulating goals and values for socio-political practice. In turn, the state uses the whole of the socio-teclmical potential so as to manipulate the community. However, writes Habermas, opportunities for such manipulation are strictly limited, since the socio-cultural system sharply contradicts the administrative system and opposes control over itself by the latter. Here he defines the socio-cultural system as a cultural heritage ( system of cultural values) and institutions thanks to which it receives a normative force. Because of the autonomy of the socio-cultural system and its oppositional character in relation to the administrative system, total manipulation of the community for any length of time is impossible either with the help of the 'conservative-- authoritarian' welfare state or with the help of a fascist dictatorship, since the socio-cultural system is constantly producing values which cannot be realised under authoritarianism. The socio-- cultural system thus becomes an effective counterweight to authoritarian tendencies in the modern bourgeois state.
Among the virtues of Habermas's political theory, however, there is its criticism of the widespread opinion that somehow social conflicts can be drowned in prosperity. 'Even if the state does succeed in raising labour productivity to an extent where it attains crisis-free, but not uninterrupted economic development, that -- development will not bo determined by the overall in-
395terests of the people. The reason for that is the class structure of society. That is the real cause of the crisis of legitimacy.'^^129^^
So a major reason for the crisis in legitimacy and the struggle between the socio-cultural and the administrative spheres is the divergence in class interests. However, this indisputably correct proposition is not taken further in Habermas's concept which clearly suffers from elements of utopia. Nor does his thesis of the autonomy of the socio-cultural system enabling it effectively to counter the onslaught of the state and, in turn, force it on to the defensive, look fully convincing. He himself admits that while many spheres of culture in contemporary capitalism (avant-garde art, communicative ethics, etc.) are indeed `subversive' for bourgeois society, others (scientistic philosophy, utilitarian morality, religion) have taken on board political and economic objectives imposed upon them by the administrative system. But it is the crisis phenomena in bourgeois culture that create, in his mind, more and more objective requisites for a move towards a new, `different' society. Only new culture (new ethics, progressive art) can win out over the purposive goals set by the administrative system---i.e., by the bourgeois bureaucratic state, and become the basis of a motive-forming force within the same socio-- economic system.
As he analyses the present state of Western democracy, and not hiding his pessimism, Habermas all the same reckons that 'politically functioning community' must stimulate a 'critical interpretation of reality'. As the Soviet scholar G. M. Tavrizyan has written, 'A critical inter-
pretation of reality .. . does not at all mean destroying the status quo of bourgeois society. Haberrnas sets social theory merely one task: to admit that it is objectively possible to reduce to a minimum the conflict of class interests lying behind the structure of society.'~^^13^^°
Ralf Dahrendorf's socio-philosophical concept of conflicts is the key to his understanding of democracy. It is based on four premises:
1. Every society and each element in its structure is subject to change at a certain time ( premise of historicity).
2. Every society constitutes a contradictory system of elements (premise of 'explosive danger').
3. Each element in society facilitates its change (premise of dysfunctionality or productivity).
4. Every society exists through force used by some over others (premise of coercion).
He sees his task in establishing a theory of society and social development on the basis of revising Marx's theory. Here he also tries to provide a new interpretation of the theory of classes and class struggle.
The permanent objective, reason and consequences of social conflicts, he writes, are to maintain the process of change in society and its component parts. Conflicts to a high degree are necessary in the process of social change.^^131^^ He sees society's task (and partly that of the state) in regulating and channelling social conflicts, preventing them from developing into civil war.
Here he concludes that classes are temporary social entities that arise in those circumstances when whatever social, economic and political processes fuse different social groups into one big
397group. Classes, therefore, are, in his view, ' empirical social substances'.
He sees authority as largely independent of control over the means of production; he interprets that in the spirit of Max Weber and says it means the likelihood that 'an order of a certain content will produce obedience with the person for whom it is intended'.1HZ
Any attempts to extinguish the system of domination inevitably grow into the establishment of a new system of domination, in so far as society is a normative continuum, and norm-- creation is once again bound up with the use of force---i.e., with domination.
Dahrendorf's `conflict' theory of democracy lays claim to the title of a theory of the political process, democracy and power. The picture of a neutral representative welfare state seems too idyllic to Dahrendorf to be true, but there is a grain of truth, he feels, in the way proponents of the pluralist theory understand the contemporary bourgeois state. Universal suffrage is one element confirming the relative veracity of the pluralist theory.
Liberal democracy, according to Dahrendorf, has four propositions as its basis: effective realisation of equal status of citizens for all who take part in the political process; the existence of competing elites and interest groups, of which none are able to monopolise political power; the prevalence of a certain type of values which, in contrast with private values of non-participation, are nothing more than the standard of public virtue; and, finally, recognition and legitimation of differences of opinion and conflicts as an inevitable and creative element of social life.
398Conflict, according to Dahrendorf, moans freedom, since it is the only expression of variety and the incompatibility of human interests and desires. Political institutions create certain boundaries within which political action is feasible in the course of conflicts---i.e., a certain freedom. But, he says, only those political institutions establish the boundaries of that freedom which produce rules of the game in the process of discussion and display of differences, and that do not attempt to resolve bones of contention in essence.
Such institutions, continues Dahrendorf, do not have pretensions about making individuals free, they confine themselves to the fully attainable goal of guaranteeing everyone the chance of freedom. Representative institutions establish the framework in which change is possible. The task consists in strengthening representative institutions so as to make liberal society viable and effective. A number of social, political and technical requisites are needed for conflict not to acquire the highest form of intensity and for conditions to be set up for its successful regulation. Social pluralism is a factor affecting the intensity of social conflicts. The more pluralist is social structure the less intense is the conflict, and vice versa.
When he examines the problems of conflict in their specific-historical conjunction, he is bound to mention the question of threats to modern pluralist democracy whose concept he also tries to interpret through social conflict category.
There are, he says, two approaches to democracy that stand opposed to one another. In the narrower sense it is understood as equality, in
399 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1985/CPS431/20100311/431.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2010.03.11) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ the wider as freedom. He believes that a certain moment exists at which equality hecomes an actual hindrance to freedom. On that basis he sharply criticises conformism and the domination of bureaucracy.In discussing deiuocratisation of society, he pays a great deal of attention to active and passive community, considering that the level of democracy in society depends apart from all else also on the activity of the population in tackling political problems.
'At any time,' he writes, 'one may distinguish the three following groups: (a) passive community that does not take part in political affairs owing to the lack of motivation or interest or as a result of obstacles thrown up by the conflicting parties; (b) passive community that sporadically takes part in the political process, but whose initiative does not go beyond a single issue at the polls; (c) active community that regularly and consciously takes part in the political process and in the activity of organisations.'^^133^^
On average, he writes further, active community is in terms of size much smaller than the two preceding groups, not exceeding 10 per cent of the total number of voters according to some theories, and up to 1 per cent according to others. 'A democratic Utopia of a totally active community as a programme of action is totalitarian just the same as all Utopias; but fortunately it is impossible.'^^134^^
Dahrendorf stresses that the political process requires the active community to comprise a very small part of citizens, while the regular encouragement of the active community is, in his view, a condition of the possibility of modern dynamic
400politics. It acts, after all, as a guarantee of a constitution of freedom, but by itself it is far from sufficient. To uphold the social status quo, it is much more important to have relations maintained between active and passive communities. Thus, his theory is a convoluted attempt to integrate social conflict into the existing---i.e., the bourgeois-democratic, political system.
At a time of deepening crisis in the bourgeois socio-political system in the 1970s, attempts were made in West German political science to modernise the concept of pluralism. This was evident in reports read by participants in the 1979 Moscow llth Congress of the International Political Science Association.
Rainer Eisfeld, for example, asserted that political theory must approach the study of social facts from a normative viewpoint, in accordance with the concept of political form of society based on the idea of human dignity. Pluralism, in his view, determines both the objective arid the process as inalienable elements of the concept of democracy. The objective is substantive rationality of decisions taken. The democratic process lies in 'citizens taking part in all aspects of public affairs'. Thus democracy is not reduced merely to politicar method, to certain type of institutional structure for political decision-making. Eisfeld also rejects other reductionist interpretations of democracy (the presence of party rivalry at elections, the free circulation of elites). He thinks that the individual cannot satisfy his inherent creative potential within the existing economic structure through the numerous social associations. His social-reformist position is apparent in his treatment of the 'pluralist normative
26-01532 401
challenge'. He views pluralism as the theory of the transitional stage o! the possible, although indefinite, development 'from capitalism to socialism', at least as applied to countries in Western Europe. In this connection he formulates a number of propositions at the centre of which is the idea of socialising the means of production. He hedges his bets in saying that it should under no circumstances be identified with nationalisation.
The report 'Basic Values and Pluralist Organisation of State' delivered by Udo Bermbach dealt with the question of pluralist state organisation in West Germany. He noted that the West German theory of pluralism from the very beginning had a normative character. Democracy in that concept was understood as organisation of competing groups and interests on the basis of a binding agreement in regard to the principal values. In practice, however, the system of values of the very constitution was excluded,from the 'pluralist interpretation', and that engendered substantial problems in political life. In political practice, he said, the 'pluralist institutional structure' excludes large sectors of the population from effective political participation. And that holds the threat of the existing political-- administrative system losing legitimacy. The sphere of consensus in regard to basic state and society values is becoming ever narrower. Economic instability, social inequality and many other problems have led to a growth in multifarious value orientations which are hard to fit into value principles that are dominant in society. He thinks that a decisive factor in the further existence and development of the theory of pluralism is the sus-
402ceptibility of the theory of pluralism to new value orientations which have the ability to secure consensus. The integration into the political system of socio-political forces which have been deprived of access to political decision-making requires, he says, 'modification of the fundamental economic values and principles and economic structures'. He passes judgement here on prospects for 'socialist pluralism'.
The above-mentioned concepts are a very typical reaction by the social-reformist wing of political scientists to the growing complexity of the socio-political situation.
The polemics which conservative circles in West German science and politics have launched against the liberal pluralists are based on the counterposing of an abstractly understood freedom to a no less abstractly understood democracy.
Typical, for example, are the views of H. Schelsky.^^135^^ His attacks are mainly on the idea of democratising society, intensively propagated among left-wing liberals.
In his view, the high level of political activity among the common, people is leading to a growth in destructive conflicts, pretensions of authority, encouraging an irrationalisation of the political process, since incompetent people are being drawn into politics. This, in turn, causes a distortion and primitive reduction of political problems. Thus, he writes, the stronger are political conflicts, the more inevitable is the shift of their front from the state and governmental institutions to other institutions of society. For example, the demand for more democracy ultimately shows a trend towards dictatorship. Significant-
26* 403
ly, Schelsky does not consider democracy itself as something negative and containing the embryo of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It only becomes negative when it presents a danger for the existing (i.e., bourgeois) political system. Gehlen takes the same view. In those concepts `fixed' institutions (including the state) personify reason, while popular actions personify unreason and irrationality.
The problem of counterposing democratic (in the bourgeois sense) and `totalitarian' systems of domination has acquired special significance in the Federal Republic---as a result both of the country's fascist past, and of the role that the country played against the socialist countries in the cold war. That explains the important place that the problems of democratic organisation have occupied in regard to the relationship of society and state and the Sovietologist anti-- communist studies. These studies have become an organic part of the political and sociological research in historical and contemporary types of political rule in which they include both formal-state structures and the processes of political socialisation, national psychology, political culture and the practical functioning of state and political institutions. All the leading West German political scholars constructing typologies of political systems have tried their hand at Sovietology. Jiirgen Fijalkowski, for example, formulated the polarisation of `democratic' and ' totalitarian' societies as a counterposing, on the one hand, of 'group interest, tolerance and the general spirit' and, on the other, ' ideologicallyoriented politicisation reaching up to personal life', the .'recognition of organised pluralism of
404interests and legalisation of de-ideologised opposition' to 'raonopolistically organised subordination of pluralism of interests and ideologically substantiated repression of opposition'.^^136^^
Comparative studies of political systems in developed countries are of particular importance in West German political science. As already mentioned above, the very concept of political system is used in the literature in two aspects: first, as a category removing the dualism of society and the state and, second, expressing a certain relationship between state and non-state institutions in the life of preserit-day society. It is in the latter sense that the term 'political system' is used in analysing the socio-political processes of developed countries in the West.
Among recent publications on this subject it is worth singling out Klaus von Beyme's The Parliamentary Systems of Government in Europe (1973), The Political System of Italy (1970), From Fascism to Developing Dictatorship. The Ruling Elite in Spain (1971) and Political Theories of the Present (1977), and also works by other authors concerned with political systems in Austria, Switzerland, France and the USA. A distinguishing feature of all these works is an attempt to study the political process in developed capitalist countries, the interaction of state-legal and political institutions, parties, associations and unions. This approach compels the authors to carry out both a juridical (state-legal) and a sociological analysis of modern bourgeois society. Beyme, for example, studies key links and institutions in the political process, parliament-government-head of state, as they interact; he notes that 'not all processes of social change
405necessarily result in a change of the system's institutions'.^^137^^ He pays most attention to specifying the interests of particular social groups and their embodiment in the political decisions of associations, groups and political parties. Further, he and other authors see the efficacy of taking these interests by political parties into account as a factor in the stability of the existing (i.e., bourgeois) political system. It is interesting that it is the study of stability factors in the political system that is beginning to engross West German political scholars more and more, which is a sign of the veiled and, at times, even obvious apology for the prevailing bourgeois-- democratic system. Luhmann, for example, writes in his Sociological Explanation that 'the status quo is characterised by the presence of consensus. Whoever wants change takes on the burden and risk of initiative.'^^138^^ Further, 'the implicit and almost unmotivated subordination to binding decisions [taken by the political system] will be the normal course of affairs'.^^139^^ He does not even attempt to pose the question of who will take the decisions and in whose interests. And Beyme considers that it is the 'parliamentary system of government that is one of the most viable constitutional mechanisms for the institutional regulation of political and social conflicts'.~^^14^^°
NOTES
~^^1^^ See Rainer M. Lepsius, Denkschrifl zur Lage der Soziologie und der Politischen Wissenschaft, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1961, p. 8.
406~^^2^^ Hans Maier, Politische Wissenschaft in Deutschland. Aufsdtze zur Lehrtradition und Bildungspraxis, Munich, R. Piper and Co., 1969, pp. 106, 107.
~^^3^^ Rudolf Stanka, Geschichte der politischen Philosophic, Vol. 1: Die politische Philosophic des Altertums, Vienna-Cologne, Verlag A. Sexl, 1951, p. 7.
~^^4^^ Hermann Liibbe, Politische Philosophic in Deutschland, Basle-Stuttgart, Berno Schwabe and Co. Verlag, 1963, P. 9.
~^^5^^ Klaus von Beyme, 'Politische Wissenschaften', C. D. Kernig (ed.), Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft. Eine vergleichende Enzyklopadie, Vol. 5, Freiburg-Basle-Vienna, 1972, p. 80.
~^^6^^ Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, ' Politische Forschung in Deutschland', Otto Stammer (ed.), Politische Forschung, Cologne and Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960, pp. 153-73.
~^^7^^ Arnold Bergstraesser, Weltpolitik als Wissenschaft. Geschichtliches Bewusstsein und politische Entscheidung, Cologne and Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965, p. 259.
~^^8^^ Eric Voegelin, Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik, Munich, 1959, p. 14.
~^^9^^ Wilhelm Hennis, Politik und praktische Philosophic. Eine Studie zur Rekonstruktion der politischen Wissenschaft, Berlin, Luchterhand, 1963, p. 23.
~^^10^^ Eric Voegelin, Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik, pp. 20, 21.
407~^^11^^ Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis. Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik, Munich, R. Piper and Go. Verlag, 1966, p. 285.
~^^12^^ Voegelin, Die neue Wissenschaft der Politik, p. 14.
~^^13^^ Jiirgen Habermas, Kultur und Kritik. Verstreute Aufsdtze, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973, p. 91.
~^^14^^ Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner (ed.), Rekonstrnktion des Konservatismus, Freiburg, Verlag Rombach, 1972, p. 46.
~^^15^^ Peter Baumanns, Einfiihrung in die praktische Philosophic, Stuttgart, Frommann Verlag, 1977, pp. 12, 13.
~^^16^^ Ibid., p. 13.
~^^17^^ Kurt Lenk, Politische Wissenschaft. Ein Grundriss, Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1975, p. 63.
~^^18^^ Helmut Kuhn, Das Sein und das Gate, Munich, Kosel-Verlag, 1962, p. 187.
~^^19^^ Ernst von Hippel, Geschichte der Staatsphilosophie, Vol. 1, Meisenheim
am Glan, Verlag Anton Hain, 1955, p. 8.
~^^20^^ Hans Maier, Heinz Rausch, Horst Denzer (eds.), Klassiker des politischen Denkens, Vol. 1, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1968, pp. XI, XII.
~^^21^^ Thorhild Stelzig, Gerhard Weissers, 'Konzept einer normativen Sozialwissenschaft', Christian von Ferber, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (eds.), Kolner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 19, Cologne, 1977, p. 269.
408~^^22^^ Gerhard Lehmbruch, Einfuhrung in die Politikwissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1967, p. 42.
~^^23^^ Hans Albert, Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik, Neuwied am Rhein, 1967, p. 156.
~^^24^^ See Karl R. Popper, Logik der Forschung, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1966, p. 13.
~^^25^^ Hans Albert, 'Wissenschaft, Technologie und Politik', G. Liihrs, Thilo Sarrazin et al. (eds.), Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1975, p. 324.
~^^26^^ Hans Albert, Aufkldrung und Steuerung, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 1976, p. 191.
~^^27^^ Hans Albert, Plddoyer fur Kritischen Rationalismus, Munich, R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1971, pp. 70-71.
~^^28^^ Dieter Aldrup, 'Zu einer rationalen Theorie der Politik', Luhrs, Sarrazin, Kritischer Rationalismus..., p. 265.
~^^29^^ See Ernst Topitsch,' ``Politisierte'' Wissenschaft---Anspriiche ohne Legitimation', Kurt Hiibner et al. (eds.), Die politische Herausforderung der Wissenschaft, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1976, p. 170.
~^^30^^ Hans Albert, Aufkldrung und Steuerung, p. 190.
~^^31^^ Ibid., p. 21.
~^^32^^ Ibid., p. 22.
~^^33^^ Ibid., p. 189.
~^^34^^ Very indicative in that respect are the works of K. Beyme, Das politische
409System Italiens, Stuttgart, 1970, pp. 130, 132; idem., Vom Faschismus zur Entwicklungsdiktatur---Machtelite and Opposition in Spanien, Munich, 1971, pp. 175-90; K. P. Lutz and E. Krippendorff concerned with an analysis of international relations in keeping the peace.
~^^35^^ Kurt Bayertz, Josef Schleifstein, Mythologie der 'kritischen Vernunft'. Zur Kritik der Erkenntnis- und Geschichtstheorie Karl Poppers, Cologne, PahlRugenstein, 1977, p. 148.
~^^36^^ Karl R. Popper, Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde, I. Der Zauber Platans, Munich, Francke Verlag, 1975, p. 48.
~^^37^^ See 'Critical Rationalism': Philosophy and Politics (Analysis of Concepts and Tendencies), Moscow, Mysl, 1981, p. 250 (in Russian).
~^^38^^ Karl Popper, Das Elend des Historizismus, Tubingen, 1971, pp. 63, 64, 68.
~^^39^^ Albert, Aufkldrung. .., p. 32.
~^^40^^ Ibid., p. 33. « Ibid., p. 176.
~^^42^^ Helmut Schmidt, `Vorwort', Liihrs, Sarrazin, Kritischer Rationalismus, p. VIII.
~^^43^^ Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Volkssouverdnitdt. Eine Untersuchung der Bedingnngen demokratischer Legitimitdt, Stuttgart, Ernst Klett Verlag, 1977, p. 182.
~^^44^^ Albert, Aufkldrung. .., p. 23.
~^^45^^ Ibid., p. 24.
410~^^46^^ Albert, 'Wissenschaft, Technologic und Politik', p. 328.
~^^47^^ Ibid., p. 329.
~^^48^^ Lenk, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
~^^49^^ See Ossip K." Flechtheim, 'Zur Problematik der Politologie', W. Bernsdorf, G. Eisermann (eds.), Die Einheit der Sozialwissenschaften. Franz Eulenburg zum Gedachtnis, Stuttgart, 1955 (in Heinrich Schneider (ed.), Aufgabe und Selbstverstandnis der politischen Wissenschaft, Darmstadt, 1967, p. 77).
~^^50^^ See Ibid., pp. 80, 81.
~^^51^^ See Ibid., p. 85.
~^^52^^ Theodor W. Adorno, Arnold Gehlen, '1st die Soziologie eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen?', Friedmann Grenz,
•• Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, p. 245.
~^^53^^ Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral. Eine pluralistische Ethik, Frankfurt am Main, Athenaum-Verlag, 1969, p. 95.
~^^54^^ Arnold Gehlen, Urmensch und Spatkultur;, Bohn, Athenaum-Verlag, 1956. p. 257.
~^^55^^ Ibid., p. 237.
5^^6^^ Ibid., p. 41.
~^^57^^ Arnold Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter. Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der industriellen Gesellschaft, Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1957, p. 24.
~^^58^^ Arnold Gehlen, Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1963, p. 269.
411~^^59^^ Friedrich Jonas, Geschichte der Soziologie, Vol. 1, Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1968, p. 155.
~^^60^^ Ibid.
~^^61^^ Gehlen, Urmensch und Spatkultur, p. 41.
~^^62^^ Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1961, p. 23.
~^^63^^ See Gehlen, Die Seele. .., p. 74.
~^^64^^ Ibid., p. 115.
~^^85^^ Ibid., pp. 114-16.
~^^66^^ G. W. F. Hegel, Samtliche Werke,
Vol. 7, Stuttgart, Fr. Frommanns Ver-
lag, 1928, p. 263. ~^^76^^ Helmut Kuhn, Der Staat. Eine philos-
ophische Darstellung, Munich, Kosel-
Verlag, 1967, p. 291.
~^^68^^ Ibid., p. 292.
~^^6^^9 Ibid., p., 293.
~^^70^^ See Roman Herzog, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Frankfurt am Main, Athena'um, 1971.
~^^71^^ Ernst Forsthoff, Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1971, p. 42.
~^^72^^ See Hermann Heller, Staatslehre, Leiden, 1934, pp. 48-50.
~^^73^^ See Giinther and Erich Kiichenhoff, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1957, p. 13.
~^^74^^ See Ibid., pp. 17-19.
~^^7^^5 Ibid., p. 21.
~^^76^^ See Hans Nawiasky, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Vol. 2, Cologne, Verlagsanstalt Benziger und Ko. A.G., 1956.
~^^77^^ See Herbert Kriiger, Allgemeine
412Staalslehre, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1964.
~^^78^^ 'The sociology of the state,' wrote Stammer in 1969, 'developed in Germany first within the juridical discipline of a general study of the state, but today it is simultaneously a component part of political sociology and political science' (Otto Stammer, ' Staatssoziologie', Wilhelm Bernsdorf (ed.), Worterbuch der Soziologie, Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1969, p. 1007.
~^^79^^ Ibid., p. 1009.
~^^80^^ See Schneider, Aufgabe..., p. 346.
~^^81^^ See Ibid., p. 257.
~^^82^^ R. P. Fedorov, Anonymous Power. Class Organisations of Monopoly Capital in the FRG, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).
~^^83^^ See Schneider, Aufgabe..., p. 358.
~^^84^^ Kurt Sontheimer, Tolitische Wissenschaft und Staatsrechtslehre', Hemrich Schneider (ed.), Aufgabe..., p. 428.
~^^85^^ Ibid., pp. 413, 414.
~^^86^^ Ernst Fraenkel, Karl Dietrich Bracker (eds.), Staat und Politik Neuausgabe, Hamburg, Fischer Biicherei, 1969, p. 290.
~^^87^^ Werner Weber, Spannungen und Krafte im westdeutschen Verfassnngssystem, Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1970, p. 231.
~^^88^^ Ibid., p. 235.
~^^89^^ V. A. Tumanov, Bourgeois Legal Ideology. On the Critique of Law DocUS
trines, Moscow, 1971, pp. 64-74 (in Russian).
~^^90^^ Weber, op. cit., p. 44.
~^^91^^ Ibid., p. 51.
~^^92^^ G. Leibholz mentions the same problem, suggesting that the democratisation of parties is more a general state task than an inner-party one. He thinks it necessary for the people to give political parties a mandate which is then realised through parliament and government on a party-state basis.
~^^93^^ Weber, op. cit., p. 56.
~^^94^^ Ibid., p. 137.
~^^95^^ Ibid., p. 139.
~^^96^^ Ibid., pp. 141-42.
~^^97^^ Sven Papcke, 'Freiheit ohne Gleichheit? Zum Demokratieverstandnis der Opposition', Die Neue Gesellschaft, No. 4, 1976, p. 295.
~^^98^^ Willy Brandt, Vber den Tag hinaus. Eine Zwischenbilanz, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 1974, p. 116.
~^^99^^ Ibid., p. 120.
~^^100^^ Stammer, 'Politische Soziologie', p. 815.
~^^101^^ See Flechtheim, 'Zur Problematik der Politologie', pp. 85, 86.
~^^102^^ See Siegfried Landshut, 'Zum Begriff und Gegenstand der politischen Soziologie', Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 1956, pp. 410-14 in Aufgabe und Selbstv erst dndnis der politischen Wissenschaft, Hamburg, 1967, pp. 382, 383).
~^^103^^ See Otto Stammer, 'Herrschaftsord-
414nung und Gesellschaftsstruktur', Politische Soziologie und Demokratieforschung, Berlin, 1965, Aufgabe. . ., p. 331.
~^^104^^ See Ibid., p. 364.
~^^105^^ See Ibid., p. 372.
~^^106^^ See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Berne, Verlag A. Francke, 1946.
~^^107^^ Ibid., p. 428.
~^^108^^ Ibid., p. 397.
~^^109^^ Ibid., p. 450.
~^^110^^ Niklas Luhmann, Politische Planung. Aufsatze zur Soziologie von Politik und Verwaltung, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975, p. 40.
~^^111^^ Ibid., p. 38.
~^^112^^ Josef Esser, Einfiihrung in die materialistische Staatsanalyse, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 1975, p. 27.
~^^113^^ Georg Liihrs, Thilo Sarrazin et al. (eds.), Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialdemokratie, Hamburg, 1975, pp. 1-53.
~^^114^^ Ibid., p. 43.
115 Gerd Fleischmann, 'Kritischer Rationalismus und Demokratie', Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialdemokratie, p. 289.
«^^6^^ Ibid., p. 293. ~^^117^^ Ibid., p. 294. "8 Ibid.
~^^119^^ Ibid., p. 295.
~^^120^^ Jiirgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit, Neuwied, Luchterhand Verlag, 1971, p. 274.
415«i Ibid.
~^^122^^ Ibid., p. 275.
``3 Ibid.
~^^124^^ Ernst Forsthoff, Rechtsstaat im Wandel, Munich, C. H. Beck, 1976, p. 103.
~^^125^^ Jiirgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologic', Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969, pp. 113-14.
~^^126^^ Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 72.
~^^127^^ Habermas, Kultur und Kritik, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, pp. 378, 388.
~^^128^^ Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, p. 309.
~^^129^^ Ibid., p. 320.
~^^130^^ G. M. Tavrizyan, 'The Topical Version of "Critical Theory" of Society', Voprosy filosofii, No. 3, 1976, p. 117 (in Russian).
~^^131^^ Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Freiheit. Zur soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwart, Munich, R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1965, p. 124.
~^^132^^ Ralf Dahrendorf, Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft, Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1957, p. 75.
~^^133^^ Dahrendorf, Konfiikt und Freiheit. Auf dem Weg zur Dienstklassengesellschaft, Munich, R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1972, p. 230.
~^^134^^ Ibid.
416~^^135^^ See H. Schelsky, 'Mehr Demokratie oder mehr Freiheit?', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 January 1973, p. 9.
~^^136^^ Jiirgen Fijalkowski, 'Die Bedeutung der Soziologie fur die politische Wissenschaft^^1^^, Aufgabe..., pp. 391-92.
~^^137^^ Klaus von Beyme, Die politischen Theorien der Gegenwart: Sine Einfiihrung, Munich, 1972, p. 99.
~^^138^^ Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklarung. Aufsatze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971, p. 168.
~^^139^^ Ibid., p. 170.
~^^140^^ Klaus von Beyme, Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, Munich, R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1973, p. 892.
[417] __ALPHA_LVL1__ CONCLUSIONA critical analysis of the issues dealt with by Western political science in its genesis and development produces several generalisations and conclusions that substantially delineate the profile of this vast area of contemporary research.
First of all, the widespread notion that the modern character of political science (as distinct from traditional, Aristotelian) is wholly determined by the presence of a certain number of latest analytical methods and approaches certainly requires considerable correction, as the material in this book shows. In itself the counterposing of traditional and modern political science is typical only of a certain trend in political studies---the empirical and behavioural approach that is dominant today in the USA and is still gathering strength in some other countries. With the scientistic narrowing of the subject of political science and the resulting biased assessment as to how modern particular methods of a scientific study of political reality are, the blatant nihilism of political sociologists in relation to the classical heritage of political thought and theory is becoming quite natural and expected. What can the studies of Aristotle, Rousseau or those who penned The Federalist Papers give to an understanding of the modern voter's behaviour? That is how some behaviourists substantiate their nihilist position (people like Robert A. Dahletal.).^^1^^
The narrow-mindedness of the positivist approach in political science is rightly coming un-
418der fire hot only from advocates ot the dialectical-materialist theory of politics. As the material and facts adduced in this book attest, scientistic modernism in political studies is running into stubborn resistance in a whole number of states from representatives of a modern political philosophy that goes back to Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and other outstanding thinkers of the pre-Marxian period. Scientistic political studies are also coming under fierce and largely just attack from left-wing radical sociologists and existentialist philosophers,
Factographic---i.e., `assessing' and `observing' political science in its behavioural variant has, on the one hand, actually pushed back the frontiers of practical studies of political processes and phenomena, but on the other, however paradoxical it may seem, it has constrained political thinking. One consequence of that constraint is the assertion in political science of such approaches to a study of politics that wholly or partially ignore the legal and even state science aspects in studying politics and political processes.
While turning their backs on a philosophical approach as being distracting and ' inconsequential', and at the same time being up in arms against the not omnipotent, indeed, legalistic (formal, dogmatic juridical) analysis of constitutions or statehood as a whole, political scientists have switched attention wholly to the behaviour of participants in the political process---the legislature, bureaucracy, electorate, lobby groups, parties and elites. As a result, the state, as an integral, relatively independent, intricate organisation of political power, is now illuminated in a
27* 419
fragmentary (at best by institutions) or schematic way (as a not wholly distinct component of society's political system), while the overall profile of the state is again shielded by uncoordinated and self-contained forms of bureaucracy, party elites or pressure groups.
Law and morality have become further victims of the scientistic reorientation of science of the state and politics. According to some sociologists law is reduced to an instrument of social control and discipline. It is on this basis that the self-contented yet crippled rigorism of political scientism and technocratism has begun to thrive so abundantly; they reflect in some way the turn to extra-legal and technical-organisational forms of influencing political power and control, the rejection of legal procedure in favour of a subtle manipulating of the law and its perception, a feature inherent in the area of monopoly capitalism.
The unpropitious consequences caused by the conjunction of the notional and conceptual patterns of some disciplines adjacent to the theory of politics are due not to some witting defects in these disciplines, but to the fact that the intrusion of new analytical methods is being accompanied by the exorbitant hopes of scientistic technocrats about their efficacy and reliability, and by a disdain for methods of traditional, political-philosophical or legal analysis of political phenomena and processes.
The development of Western political science and, at the same time, the social utilisation of its scientific results are closely dependent on those demands and requirements that come from normal reproduction of political relations in a
420class-antagonistic society. The demand for professional knowledge in politics has increased immeasurably over the present century and has extended today to such levels and areas of political administrative affairs as the state, parties, mass organisations, the press, individual private capitalist firms, joint-stock companies, etc. The ways and means of using political know-how and abilities are indicators of the extent of conscious or unwitting involvement of Western scholars in the overall mechanism of political domination by the present-day monopoly bourgeoisie.
Back in 1970 the left radical sociologist Marvin Surkin wrote an article entitled 'Sense and Non-Sense in Polities' in which he addressed himself to an analysis of the social efficiency of scholarly approaches by members of the behavioural school; with account for the social role they play he delineated three principal types.
Members of the first approach exhibited, he said, a wish to put science to the service of an ideal government of the future. Here they do not reject influencing the ruling elite. To restrain the rulers from cruel or stupid actions, as well as from bureaucracy, a scholar has to demonstrate to them all the possible consequences of those actions, which, indeed, should also have a beneficial effect on them. Surkin classifies that orientation as 'The New Mandarin' and its scholars as the pet ideologists of those who hold power.
'The Public Advocate' makes up a second category; these are even more helpless servants of society. The main object of their concern is normally the advocacy of partial reforms intended to improve the state of various segments of the pop-
421ulation (as, for example, of the destitute, those deprived of the vote or discriminated against). All they can do, however, has very definite limitations---explicit or implicit, which are inherent in the given social system.
Finally, the last group, 'The Persuasive Neutralist', is marked out against the general background by its call for objectivity and impartiality in science, free from conclusions and judgements of an ideological or value character. In their approach to any issues that require social or political decisions, the neutralists do so in the name of science and bend over backwards to avoid any polemical exaggerations and dogmatism, so as not to be accused of political partiality.^^2^^ Their paramount objective, therefore, is to pile up neutral knowledge of social reality or, in the words of Heinz Eulau, 'to understand and interpret the world, not to change it'.^^3^^
Of course, bourgeois social science in some way also plays the part of social critic. Presentday Western political science is not devoid of socio-critical ideas. But it makes social criticism only within very confined limits, constantly pushing it into the background. Criticism is made only within narrow pre-set limits of partial rationalisation of class domination without which the existence of any political system of contemporary capitalism is unthinkable.
The social justification for the all-pervasive and all-embracing use of results of political research, just as for their generous financing, is often seen in the growing complexity of social life and political processes and, consequently, in the need to retain control over them so as to re-
422gulate them. We now, therefore, understand the utilitarian, organisational-technocratic approach to problems concerning the vital activity of the state or democratic institutions and, as already mentioned, the enormous demand for professional policy-experts at the most varied levels of political power and administration. It is generally known, for example, that political scientists are appointed to the highest or, at least, bordering on the highest posts in the bureaucratic hierarchy, to the 'brain centres' of political parties, the biggest monopolies and their cartels, and to other loci of political power and influence.
For all their pretensions at objectivity and value-free (i.e., non-class and non-party) ideals, the scientific position taken by Western political scholars nevertheless shows quite a wide spectrum of political views---from conservative and ultimately apologist in regard to the status quo to liberal and even radical (petty-bourgeois revolutionarism). The most widespread stance in academic circles and, in some sense, the most convenient is that of the conservative political scientists engaged exclusively in describing and analysing prevailing power institutions and, at the same time, analysing those circumstances and factors that lead to the formation of those institutions, to a certain regime of managing and directing change. In that sense it is unimportant what methodological tools the scholar chooses to use. Even the most up-to-date methodological orientation can. by no means insure against an uncritical reproduction of the existing dominant values and political ideas in society. The American historian and political scientist Sheldon
423S. Wolin notes in that connection that 'Systems theories, communication theories, and structuralfunctional theories are unpolitical theories shaped by the desire to explain certain forms of nonpolitical phenomena. They offer no significant choice or critical analysis of the quality, direction, or fate of public life. Where they are not alien intrusions, they share the same uncritical---and therefore untheoretical---assumptions of the prevailing political ideology which justifies the present "authoritative allocation of values" in our society.' *
A paramount trait of Western political science and political sociology is their long-standing and unabating feud with Marxism which has helped to bring about the greatest change in human history in people's thinking about society and politics, the motive forces and the directions of their historical evolution and development.
Today no one is surprised by the fact that all the substantial non-Marxist constructions and research in political theory over the past hundred years have developed through direct or indirect confrontation with Marxism. As the American sociologist Alvin W. Gouldner has written, 'Indeed, much of the history of Academic Sociology ... is unintelligible except as a response to and a polemic against Marxism. Had there been no Marx, the emphasis and character of the work of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto would have been vastly different.~^^5^^
Just as long-standing as the attempts theoretically to disprove Marxism are the aspirations and designs to adapt some of its propositions to a new platform that is largely eclectical, from a theoretical or political viewpoint, to a new co,n-
424struction or yet another `all-embracing' theory. Just as numerous are the attempts to revise Marx's teaching on the state under the guise of improving and making it more precise.
Our book has mainly focused attention on the methodological aspect of a critique of contemporary Western theories of democracy and politics. In referring to the sources and overall historical movement of bourgeois-theoretical thinking, Marxist political thought is thereby broadening its notions of the ways and means of promoting political knowledge in the current historical age.
NOTES
~^^1^^ See Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. VIII.
~^^2^^ Marvin Surkin, 'Sense and Non-Sense in Polities', Marvin Surkin, Alan Wolfe (eds.), An End to Political Science, New York, Basic Books, 1970, p. 17.
~^^3^^ Heinz Eulau, The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics, New York, Random House, 1963, p. 9.
~^^4^^ Sheldon S. Wolin, 'Political Theory as a Vocation', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, December 1969, p. 1063.
~^^5^^ Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, London, Heinemann, 1970, p. 447,
[425] __ALPHA_LVL1__ NAME INDEXAdams, Herbert---120 Adams, John---24, 25, 73 Albert, Hans---338, 346-
49, 351-53
Aldrup, Dieter---348 Almond, Gabriel---31,
34, 125, 319 Apter, David E.---185 Aristotle---23, 24, 245,
419 Aron, Raymond---164,
246, 249, 250, 252, 275,
276B
Bachrach, Peter---137 Bacon, Francis---327 Bagehot, Walter---91 Baratz, Morton---137 Barents, Jan---241 Barker, Ernest---201, 202, 206
Barry, Brian---203, 206 Baskin, Darryl---136 Bassett, Reg---202 Baumanns, Peter---342 Bayertz, Kurt---350 Beard,
Charles---91,
123 Beckwith, Burnham---
151, 152
Beer, Samuel H.---221 Bell, Daniel---147, 159 Bendix, Reinhard---19,
329 Bentley, Arthur---29,
90-106, 123, 125,
128, 130-32 Berelson, "f Bernard---124-
25 Bergstraesser, Arnold---
338Bermbach, Udo---402 Beyme, Klaus von---337,
340, 405, 406 Birch, A.*|H.---203 Blondel, Jean---203
426Bobbio, Norberto---44,
46, 50, 73, 315, 316 Bodin, Jean---24 Bourricaud, Francois---
246, 277
Brandt, Willy---382 Brett, S. A.---179 Brogan, Denis---202 Brown, J. Douglas---149 Bryce, James---78, 91,
200Budge, Ian---203 Bulzoni---318 Burdeau, Georges---244-
49, 253-56, 264, 267-70 Burgess, John---118 Burke, Edmund---73, 200 Busino, G.---43 Butter, David---203 Butterfield, H.---206
Dahreridorf, Ralf---317, 363, 390, 391, 397-400 Danilenko, V. N.---265 Davis, I.---206 Davis, Morris---206 Dennis, Jack---125 Deutsch, Karl---158, 187 Dicey, A.---201 Domhoff, C. William---
142, 143 Duguit, Leon-242, 257,
259Dupuis, Georges---271 Durkheim, Emile---425 Duverger, Maurice---243, 245, 248, 250-52, 257- 63, 265-67, 271, 273, 274, 278-93, 295-304, 306, 317, 324 Dye, R. Thomas---141
Campbell, Peter---203 Catlin, George---122 Cavalli, Luciano---332 Chariot, Jean---282, 283 Chester, Norman---202,
203Chirkin, V. Y.---160 Cicero---244 Cole, G. D. H.---201 Collins, Randell---156 Comte, Auguste---27 Coser, Lewis A.---19 Crick, Bernard---203,
205, 206 Croce, Benedetto---74,
316D
Dabin, Jean---245 Dahl, Robert A.---130- 32, 137, 145, 327, 419
E
Easton, David---31, 125, 158-61, 184, 187, 319
Eisenstadt, S. N.---31
Einsfeld, Rainer---401
Eisner, Kurt---80
Engels, Frederick---199, 294
Erlich, Eugen---82
Esmein, A.---242
Esser, Josef---389
Eulau, Heinz---422
Fagen, Richard---31 Farneti, Paolo---321, 322 Fedorov, R. P.---302 Fedoseyey, A. A.---Ill Ferrarotti, Franco---334 Fijalkowski, Jiirgen---404
427Finer, Herman---201 Finer, Samuel E.---203,
207, 221, 233, 234 Fiorot, Dino---51, 330 Flechtheim, Ossip K.---
356, 385 Fleischmann, Gerd---389,
390 Ford, Henry Jones---92,
123 Forsthofi, Ernst---355,
360, 363, 364, 380, 392 Fraenkel, E.---363 Frank, Andre Gunder---
179Friedrich, Carl J.---327 Frohock, Fred---135
G
Galkin, A. A.---44, 45,
108 Galli, Giorgio---322-24,
332Gaudet, H.---124 Gehlen, Arnold---356-60,
404Gladstone---80 Goguel, Frangois---270 Goodnow, Frank---92,123 Gosnell, Harold---123 Gouldner, Alvin W.---
424 Gramsci, Antonio---44,
45, 50, 71---73 Grosser, Alfred---270 Gurevich, P. S.---108 Gurwitch, Georges---
271-73, 275
H
Habermas, Jurgen---341, 342, 391-95
Hamilton, Alexander---
24-26 Harrington, James---24,
25Hart, Albert---92, 123 Hartmann, Nicolai---•
339-40 Hauriou, Andre---258,
259, 264
Hauriou, Maurice---242 Heater, Derek B.---205 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich---360, 364,
419 Heller, Hermann---365-
68Hennis, Wilhelm---338 Herring, E.---123 Herzog, Roman---363 Hippel, Ernst---338, 344 Hobbes, Thomas---337 Holcombe, Arthur---123 Holden, B.-206 Horowitz, Irving---142 Hume, David---24, 25 Huntington, Samuel---31,
169-73
Inkels, Alex---178 lonescu, Ghita---207
I
Jay, John---26 Jellinek, Georg---367 Jennings, W. Ivor---201 Jessop, Bob---227, 229-
32Jonas, Friedrich---358 Jones, R.---206 Joulot---125 Jouvenel, Bertrand de
-246
423K
Kaltenbrunner, Gerd .^Klaus---342 Kant, Immanuel---419 Kennedy, John---155 Key, V. 0.-125 Kimber, Richard---214,
221Kisovskaya, N, I.---323 Kleinberg, Benjamin S.
-147 Kornhauser, William---
136Krippendorff, E.---346 Kriiger, Herbert---367 Kiichenhoff, Erich---366,
367 Kuchenhoff, Giinther---
366, 367 Kuhn, Helmut---343,357
Lenin, V. I.-8, 85, 270,
275, 277, 292, 425 Lenk, Kurt---342, 355 Lerner, Daniel---171 Lesage, Michel---291 Levin, I. D.---267, 270 Lewis, W.---206 Leys, Colin---179 Lipset, Seymour M.---19,
21-23, 125, 147, 167,
171, 329
Locke, John---419 Loewenberg, G.---125 Lombardo, Antonio---330 Lowell, Lawrence---92,
123 Ludz, Peter Christian---
346 Luhmann, Niklas---388,
389, 406
Lagardelle, Hubert---84 Lamber---82 Landshut, Siegfried---
386Lane, Robert E.---125 La Palombara, Joseph---
31, 125
Laski, Harold---201, 203 Lasswell, Harold---121,
123, 125
Laterza, Giuseppe---318 Lathem, Earl---137 Lavau, Georges---279.
288 Lazarfeld, Paul F.---124,
125Lees, John---214 Lehmbruch, Gerhard---
222, 346
M
Machiavelli, Niccold---24,
41, 44, 69, 156, 337,
344, 345, 419 Mackenzie, W. J. M.---
202, 203
Madison, James---24-26 Maier, Hans---336, 338,
345Manning, Charles---201 Marletti, Carlo---50, 51 Marsh, David---221 Martin, James---153 Marx, Karl---32, 99,
100, 270, 275, 294,
344, 397, 424 Matthews, Donald---125 McClosky, Herbert---125 McKenzie, Robert---215-
21Meehan, E.---135 Merelman, Richard---31
429Merriaffi, Charles---120-
22Merton, Robert---125 Meynaud, Jean---153,
155, 289, 317 Michels, Robert---22, 29,
44, 60, 78, 83-90 Mill, John Stuart---65,
200-01
Miller, Eugene---184, 185 Mills, G. Wright---64,
131, 136, 142, 143,
147, 317
Mishin, A. A.---108 Mitchell, William---31,
158 Mommsen, Wolfgang---
76, 80 Montesquieu, Charles
Louis---24, 25, 419 Moodie, G.r-203 Moreau, Jacques---271 Mosca, Gaetano---22, 29,
40-46, 49-60, 62-64,
69, 71-73, 316, 317,
319, 330 Mushi, S.---185
Odegard, ttolton---123,
153-55
Osipova, Y. V.---108 Ostrogorsky, M.---78,
242Papcke, Sven---382 Pareto, Vilfredo---22,
29, 40, 43-53, 55-57,
60, 64-73, 84, 317,
319, 330, 425 Parsons, Talkott---31-33,
158Peel, John---34 Pinto, Roger---248 Plamenatz, John---206 Plato---23, 243 Plessner, Helmuth---342 Popper, Karl R.---338,
346, 347, 350, 351 Potter, Allen---221 Prelot, Marcel---241, 242,
244, 245, 248, 252,
263, 264
Presthus, Robert---140 Prewitt, Kenneth---139-
45 Pye, Lucien---168
N
Naidu, M. V.---180, 181 Nawiasky, Hans---367 Nelson, Joan M.---170-
73Nettl, J. Peter---206 Neumann, F.---75 Norman, Adrian---153
R
Ranney, Austin---125 Rice, Stuart Arthur---123 Richardson, J.---221 Robson, William---201-
03Rokkan, S.---125 Roosevelt, Franklin D.---
80, 123 Rose, Richard---203, 224-
26O
Oakeshott, Michael---
202, 206 Oberndorfer, Dieter---338
430Roslavtseva T. D.---278 Rossiter, Clinton---26 Rostow, Walt W.---164,
165 Rousseau, Jean Jacques---
58, 59, 344, 419
S
Saint-Simon,
Claude
Henri---53
Samuels, Warron---49 Sartori, Giovanni---317-
20, 324-32 Schattschneider, E. E.---
123Scheler, Max---341 Schmidt, Helmut---352 Schmitt, Carl---83, 360,
363Schelsky, H.-403, 404 Schumpeter,
Joseph
Alois---53, 327, 383,
387, 389
Sclafari, E.---322 Shils, Eduard---147 Siegfried, Andre---22,
242Silver, Allan---217-19 Simon, Herbert---135,
146Small, Albion---93 Smellie, K.---202 Smith, David H.---178 Sontheimer, Kurt---371 Sorel, George---44, 84 Sorensen, Georg---176,
177Soulier, A.---242 Spencer, Herbert---27-29,
32-34, 93 Spragens, Thomas---164,
185 Stammer, Otto---355,
367-70, 384, 376, 387
Steding, Christoph---83 Stein, Lorenz---301, 380 Stelzig, Thorhild---345 Stone, Alan---139 Stouffer, S. A.---124 Strauss, Leo---135, 338 Straussman, Jeffrey---156 Sumner, William Gra-
ham-27 Surkin, Marvin---421,
422T
Tavrizyan, G. M.---396 Taylor, Frederick W.---
148Thurstone, L. L.---121 Tocqueville, Alexis de---
24, 25
Toennies, Ferdinand---158 Togliatti, Palmiro---84 Topitsch, Ernst---346 Truman, David---126-31,
137U
Urbani, Gitiliano---319
Vasiltsov, S. L---320 Vedel, Georges---246, 264 Verba, Almond---31, 125 Verba, Sidney---31 Voegelin, Eric---338, 340
W
Waldo, Dwight---201 Wallace, George---92 Ward, Lester Frank---27
431Weber, Max-19, 22,
Wolfe, A.-142
29, 74-83, 88, 158,
Wolin, Sheldon---42
172, 363, 364, 366,
Wright, Bruce E.---135
368, 383, 387, 398, 425
Weber, Werner---355,
Y
360, 374-80
Wiseman, H.---206
Young, R.---125, 142
Wheare, Kenneth---202, 203
White, Andrew---118
Z
Wilson, Charles---202
Wilson, W.---92, 120
Zaigler, L. Harmon---141
[432]