57

[introduction.]

Arguments used to prove that nothing could ward off the Second World War are mainly built on the events of the last several months before its outbreak, specifically the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations and, when these came to naught through the fault of the Western powers, the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty. What was behind the events of that period?

Moscow Talks:
the Goals of the Participants

p The political and military negotiations between the USSR, Britain and France in April-August 1939 (Moscow talks) hold a special place in the long epic of the Soviet Union’s struggle for a collective security system to curb fascist aggression and prevent a second world war. This can be explained by the following reasons. In the first place, these talks were held in a critical situation when Germany was on the point of starting a war, and their outcome would have been largely responsible for the future of peace in Europe and for the balance of forces in the event of hostilities. Second, the talks were solidly based on the concrete Soviet proposal for creating a military and political alliance between the USSR, Britain and France that would ensure peace and safeguard the vital interests of all nations opposed to fascist aggression. Should the Western powers have taken a more realistic stand on the Soviet proposal, the prospects for averting the Second World War would have been much better; the rejection of this plan made a second world war imminent.

p The history of the Moscow talks is part of the diametrically opposite concepts of the origins of the Second World War, and it continues to attract the attention of both Marxist and bourgeois scholars. The Marxist studies give an objective and exhaustive picture of the history of the Moscow talks and show that the British and French governments, owing to their class positions and their desire to draw the USSR into 58 a war with Germany, declined to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union. Finally, when Germany’s attack on Poland was just a few days away, they led the talks into an impasse. "It was quite clear that the talks with the Soviet Union, just like the guarantees to Poland and other countries, are regarded by Britain only as a reserve plan to pressure the Nazis into a bargain with them," says a Soviet study on the Moscow talks. "It was with this purpose in mind that the British and French engaged in talks on a military convention. They hoped that by doing so they would make Hitler more compliant in his talks with Britain."  [58•1  Disclosing the class roots of the Anglo-French policy, which was actively supported by ruling quarters in the United States, the Soviet historians point out that "by acting in their most treacherous manner, the Western powers tried in every way possible to make Hitler understand that the Soviet Union had no allies, and that Hitler could attack first Poland, and then the USSR without risking opposition from Britain and France"  [58•2 .

p The Soviet studies show that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, with Soviet diplomats, were working hard for a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain andFrance. They also point out that by carrying on with their peaceful policy, "the main principle of which was the thesis that peace was indivisible, the USSR did its utmost to unite the efforts of all peace loving slates in order to promote peace and curb fascist aggression"  [58•3 .

p The more reactionary historians give a rather eclectic interpretation to the Moscow talks. For one thing, they put a distinctly anti-Soviet complexion on these talks. However, owing to exhaustive research by Marxist and other progressive historians a growing degree of fairness is observed in assessments of the Moscow talks. Jacques Bariety, Director of the Institute of Contemporary History at Strasbourg University, writes, for example, that the Soviet Union "was quite serious about these crucial negotiations". But, he continues, 59 the USSR "was profoundly distrustful of the genuine desire of the West to sign an agreement with it"  [59•1 . What the Western countries were sadly lacking in was that "genuine desire" Bari6ty was talking about. An even more unequivocal assessment to this effect was made by Professor Lothar Kettenacker, who said that "if London had on April 18 immediately and without subterfuge stated its unqualified readiness to accept the Soviet proposals for an alliance and had taken a more serious view of the principle of collective security in Europe, the ’front of peace’ would probably have been formed. This background to the situation forced Churchill, on June 22, 1941, the day of the German offensive in the East, to stretch out his hand to the USSR with the offer of such an alliance"  [59•2 .

p The transcripts of the meetings of the Foreign Relations Committee of the British Cabinet held on June 9 and June 20, 1939, are very revealing in that they shed light on the positions of the Western powers at the Moscow talks. They show, in the first place, that the British government was not only well informed, but in fact was sure that the Soviet Union was fully prepared to sign a trilateral agreement; secondly, that the British government was clearly aware that the success or failure of these talks meant the difference between peace and war; third, the British government’s "negotiations game" created "the formidable danger" of an agreement between Germany and the USSR.

p The architects of the policy of abetting the aggressors against the USSR actually said at these meetings:

p Chamberlain: "The Russians had every intention of reaching an agreement but wished to get the best possible terms.”  [59•3  Halifax: "Information from many different sources points to the necessity of reaching an agreement with Russia, as otherwise Hitler might well be encouraged to take some 60 violent action"  [60•1 . Halifax also noted that by reaching an agreement with Russia the allies could protect themselves for a time from an even more formidable danger—the likely agreement between Germany and Russia, and could ensure Poland’s security. He went on to note, "it seemed clear that Russia was anxious to secure the maintenance of Poland’s independence and had no wish to see Poland destroyed"  [60•2 .

Chamberlain., Halifax and Wilson stated some obvious truths, but they took an entirely opposite course which clearly reflected the desire of the ruling quarters of Britain, France and the United States to use the Moscow talks as a means of putting pressure on Germany. The architects of the Munich policy hoped, by betraying Poland, to channel the German troops towards the USSR and in this way let fascist aggression "take its own course". As a matter of fact the British Prime Minister did not even try to conceal these plans from his entourage. In his view, if Poland and other countries to whom Britain and France had given "guarantees" did not receive their aid (which is exactly what happened), "there was a likelihood that they would be rapidly overrun and that Germany would then be on the Russian frontiers"  [60•3 .

Game of Talks

The Moscow talks were being closely watched by the British Cabinet and its numerous committees and subcommittees which resorted to stalling tactics in order to scuttle the talks ostensibly through the fault of the USSR  [60•4 . Each time a new version of a treaty with the USSR came up for discussion, the British leaders made it quite clear that, in the event of a German attack on the USSR, they would default on their commitments, and leave the Soviet Union fighting single-handed against the fascist coalition.

61 Steering the other members of the Cabinet along this course of action Lord Halifax said on June 21, 1939: "If, for example, the Russian government sought to keep this country fighting for some fantastic object, common sense would ... reassert itself’  [61•1 . Building up an anti-Soviet atmosphere around the talks, Chamberlain insisted that whatever concerned an alliance with Russia filled him with foreboding, and that he had no faith in Russia’s stability and doubted her ability to help her allies in the event of war.

p He said a treaty with the USSR would be "a millstone around our necks for years and might result in our sons being called upon to fight for Russian interests"  [61•2 . He was echoed by obedient ministers. Lord Chatfield, the Minister for Coordination of Defence, who was directly responsible for the activities of the British delegation at the Moscow talks, expressed the hope that his colleagues would understand with what aversion he was forced to view the possibility of an alliance with the Soviets  [61•3 .

p By the middle of July, Britain and France had brought the talks to a stalemate. The British government agreed to the principle of mutual assistance between the three powers, but then wrecked the crucial part of the talks on the granting of guarantees by the three powers to the Baltic countries by objecting to such guarantees extending to cases of indirect aggression, like that which had shortly before, in March 1939, happened in Czechoslovakia, whose territory was occupied bv German troops with the consent of President Hacha. In the conditions when the Baltic countries were ruled by pro-fascist governments, such security guarantees were of major significance for the safety of the USSR and for halting German aggression in time. However, the British government rejected the Soviet proposals.

p Meanwhile the threat of war in Europe was growing rapidly. The clear-cut position of the Soviet Union at the Moscow talks was increasingly supported by broad segments of the population in Britain and France, and by sober-minded men 62 in the ruling elite of these countries. A public opinion poll taken in the autumn of 1938 showed that 57 per cent of the French people approved the Munich agreement against 37 per cent (with the others abstaining). In the summer of the next year, 76 per cent of those polled favoured the use of force in the event of Germany attacking Poland and 81 per cent favoured an alliance of France and Britain with the Soviet . Union  [62•1 . The leader of the British Communists Harry Pollitt wrote in July 1939: "...eighty seven out of every hundred people in Britain want a pact with the Soviet Union. Why? Because, above everything else, they want to prevent war, and understand that the most effective way of doing so is to join forces with a great and powerful country which has proved time and time again during the past crucial years that it has no warlike plans and is prepared to come wholeheartedly to the side of its allies in any system of collective security if they are attacked by the mad dogs of fascism".  [62•2 

p On July 25 the Anglo-French side agreed to adopt a Soviet proposal on holding talks with a view to signing a military convention. In spite of this consent by the British, the political guidelines of Chamberlain and his entourage at the talks which took place in Moscow between August 12 and 21, 1939, remained unchanged. By decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the Soviet military mission was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov, People’s Commissar of Defence. The Soviet delegation was not only instructed to conduct talks, but also to sign a military convention with Britain and France against aggression in Europe. The military missions of Britain and France were, made up of persons of secondary status (the British mission was headed by Admiral Drax, and the French mission by a member of the Military Council, General Doumenc) who had no powers to sign a military agreement. 63 Significantly, the British delegation had no written authority to hold talks in Moscow  [63•1 .

p Bourgeois historians claim that the British and French delegations went to Moscow in order to sign a military convention, but this was not the case. According to British documents, Admiral Drax had been instructed to play for time as long as possible with the objective of wrecking the talks. Drax knew what was required of him. However, even he had serious doubts about the ways this assignment should be accomplished. The question was raised at the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 2, 1939, three days before the British and French delegations departed for the USSR. Taking part in that meeting were Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, Minister for Coordination of Defence Lord Chatfield, Secretary for War Hore-Belisha, Admiral Drax, and others. We shall give a slightly abridged transcript of this meeting.

p “Staff Conversations with Russia.

p “Lord Chatfield asked the Delegation whether they had any points to raise on the instructions they had received. "Admiral Drax said that he had a few points on which he would appreciate further enlightenment.

p “Firstly, it was assumed that the Mission was to reach a quick decision rather than that the Staff conversations should be allowed to drag on and that the ultimate aim was to achieve a political agreement. On the other hand, in his instructions  [63•2  he had been directed to go slowly and cautiously until such time as the political agreement was reached. There might be some difficulty in this, as it was probable that the Russians would be hoping for some tangible results from the military conversations before they were prepared to give their final agreement to the political pact.

p “Lord Halifax agreed. He appreciated that the Mission had a very difficult task. It was, in his opinion, very difficult to dissociate entirely the political from military 64 negotiations..,. From a hurried perusal of the Instructions it appeared that the attitude adopted by the Mission, if con fined entirely to the letter of the Instructions, would create a good deal of suspicion in the Russian mind.

p “Admiral Drax then drew attention to the long list of questions in Part 3 of the Instructions which it was suggested might be put to the Russian General Staff. It would be impossible to put these questions without being prepared to give information in reply to similar questions which might be put by the Russian Staff. For instance, he was instructed to impress upon the Russians the desirability of their supplying war material to Poland, Roumania and Turkey. The Russians might well point out that they were already supplying war material to China, and to ask them to extend supplies to three other countries was asking a good deal....  [64•1  "General Heywood  [64•2  said that in his view the Russian General Staff might tackle the Mission on the question of indirect aggression.  [64•3 

65

p “Admiral Drax asked whether the British Ambassador to Moscow could be invited to ensure, before the arrival of the Mission, that their contact would be direct with the heads of the Russian services. It would, in his opinion, be most unfortunate if the Delegation had to deal with subordinate officers who would constantly be compelled to refer to their superiors.

p “Lord Halifax undertook to ask the Ambassador to do his best to arrange these matters on the lines Admiral Drax had suggested.

p “Lord Chatfield asked whether it could be assumed that the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the details set out in the Memorandum of instructions.

p “The Chiefs of Staff recorded the acceptance of the details of the Memorandum".  [65•1 

p The clarification received by Admiral Drax confirms the earlier apprehension that the British side was not even intending to achieve an agreement with the USSR. There was no question raised about signing a military convention. Drax was 66 advised to discuss military plans on a "purely hypothetical basis". British diplomacy concentrated its efforts primarily on ways to camouflage the true aims that the British and French missions sought to achieve at the Moscow talks, also to "find itself an out" in answering questions of substance from the Soviet side, which Drax feared most of all. Halifax outlined, in no uncertain terms, what in his opinion should be done to wreck the talks: to reject "firmly" any proposal for Britain and France to help coordinate the necessary measures with their allies-Poland and Romania-to forestall German aggression. Drax carried out this order of his superior, albeit in a somewhat different situation.

p Reactionary historians claim that an atmosphere of suspicion surrounded the Western missions in Moscow and that they felt they were under constant surveillance. This assertion is at variance with what the British ambassador to Moscow, William Seeds, wrote in a letter to Lord Halifax on August 17. Seeds noted the hospitality and courtesy shown by the Soviet side to the Western missions. He also said that "Marshal Voroshilov whom I had not had the opportunity of meeting before ... gave a most favourable impression both of friendliness and energy. He seemed really pleased to meet the* Mission." "The first business meeting of the three Missions took place on Saturday morning August 12 at the Ministry of Defence despite the fact that this was a ‘free day’"  [66•1 .

p On that day it was found out that the British mission had no official credentials for holding talks. A transcript of the ensuing dialogue between the heads of the Soviet and British missions captures that awkward moment.

p “Marshal Voroshilov: ’...But in my opinion we need written credentials in order that we may all know within what limits you are empowered to negotiate, what questions you can deal with, to what extent you are competent to discuss them, and to what result these negotiations may lead. Our powers, as you see, are all-embracing.... Your powers, outlined verbally, are not entirely clear to me. In any case, it seems to me that the question is not an idle one; it determines from the outset the order and form of our negotiations.’

67

p “Admiral Drax points out ... that if it were convenient to transfer the negotiations to London he would be given full powers....

p “Marshal Voroshilov remarks amid general laughter that bringing papers from London to Moscow is easier than for so big a company to go to London."  [67•1 

p In the evening of August 12, Drax sent Chatfield a telegram saying: "At the first meeting today the Russian delegates produced a document appointing by name five Soviet officers to act as plenipotentiaries with power to sign (a convention-^uthor). Voroshilov hoped that we had similar powers. The French General  [67•2  stated that he had authority to discuss but not to sign and produced a document signed by E. Daladier giving him power’to negotiate with the High Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces on all questions regarding collaboration needed between the armed forces of the two countries’". Admiral Drax pointed out that the British had no written credentials. He declared that this could be at once rectified and that they would obtain authority similar to the French. He requested that the credentials be sent by air mail, and pointed out that it was essential that the three members of the British delegation be mentioned by name.

p Voroshilov suggested that the conversations should continue pending the arrival of the written authority. Admiral Drax emphasised that "It was urged by the Russians and agreed by all that absolute secrecy  [67•3  in regard to the press 68 should be maintained, until an agreed statement could be issued. I request that this be observed with reference to this telegram. Significantly, the French Ambassador and the General were making no report to Paris"  [68•1 .

p The officials in London were in no hurry to forward the papers. It was only on August 15 that the documents were at last prepared for dispatch. The document signed by Lord Halifax read that Admiral Drax, Major-General Heywood and Marshal of the Air Force Barnett were "constituted and appointed plenipotentiaries and representatives having full power and authority to negotiate with the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on all questions regarding collaboration between the Armed Forces of the Union and those of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland".  [68•2  As can be seen, the British mission had not been given powers to sign a military convention or any other related documents.

p When, upon Admiral Drax’s arrival in Moscow, the British Embassy read the instructions he had been given in London, the British diplomats could not help noticing the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the objectives which the British government wanted to achieve through military talks. Ambassador Seeds sent the following telegram to London on August 12:

p “Admiral Drax’s written instructions seem to the effect that military conversations go slowly, until agreement has been reached on political questions still outstanding. I have pointed out to him that, in my opinion, which is shared by the French Ambassador, Monsieur Molotov on his side will probably evade coming to any agreement with us on these political points until he has reason to believe that military talks have at least made very considerable progress.

“Under such conditions I consider the military talks are likely to produce no results beyond arousing once again Russian fears that we are not in earnest, and are not trying to conclude a concrete and definite agreement.... I should deeply regret if that were the actual decision of his Majesty’s 69 Government as all indications so far go to show that Soviet military negotiators are really out for business."  [69•1 

Key Question at Military Talks

p The British government was clearly bent on stalling the talks. At a time when the Soviet delegation offered a well substantiated and clearly formulated plan for coordinating the military efforts of the three powers to check German aggression, the Western delegations did not go beyond generalities.  [69•2  The desire of the Western powers to achieve an agreement that would open the USSR to an attack by the Nazi armies became particularly clear during the discussion of the cardinal question of letting Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania in the event of German aggression to ensure an effective defence not only of the Soviet frontiers, but also of the whole of Poland and Romania. On August 14 Voroshilov asked Drax and Doumenc to clarify their positions on this very important question.

p On the night of August 14 (or to be more precise at 1.00 a.m. August 15), Ambassador Seeds sent an express telegram:

p “French Ambassador and I have discussed with Heads of Mission the situation arising out of this morning’s meeting with Soviet delegation.

p “He and I are agreed that Russians have now raised fundamental problem on which military talks will succeed or fail.... We are agreed that position taken up by Soviet delegation is one on which they will stand firnvand that any attempts to shake it will meet with the same failure as has been the case in so much of our political negotiations.

p “Our suggestion is that French General Staff should get in touch with Polish General Staff and obtain their consent to the three delegations.... I beg to stress the need for extreme urgency arid extreme secrecy."  [69•3 

70

p Meanwhile Drax was marking time at the talks, setting forth home truths such as "it is necessary to cut off all enemy communications", "find and smash the enemy fleet", etc.

p Some Western authors have given currency to the version that the talks were stalled mainly by the military weakness of the Soviet Union, which was a matter of speculation and guesswork in London and Paris. This version was on several occasions used by Chamberlain and his men at British Cabinet meetings at the time when the Moscow talks were in progress. What grounds did the British government have to think that the Soviet Union was weak militarily? Undoubtedly, the British and French governments were very well informed of the armed forces that the Soviet Union was prepared to field against an aggressor in Europe: 136 divisions, 5 thousand heavy artillery pieces, 9 to 10 thousand tanks, from 5 to 6.5 thousand combat aircraft. The proposals put forward by the Soviet delegation at the talks contained not only these data, but also a converted plan of action by the three powers in the event of German aggression in Europe  [70•1 . Extensive information with regard to the Soviet military strength is also contained in a report of the subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, a body which, by British standards, is very competent in such matters. The report presented to the Cabinet read:

p “At our Meeting on 16th August, 1939, we gave consideration to the military aspects of the action proposed in connection with the Mission telegram.... In our opinion, it is only logical that the Russians should be given every facility for rendering assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the side of the anti-aggression Powers. We consider it so important to meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to adopt a helpful attitude....

p “The conclusion of a Treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best way of preventing a war. The satisfactory 71 conclusion of this Treaty will undoubtedly be endangered if the present Russian proposals for co-operation with Poland and Pvoumania are turned down by those countries"  [71•1 .

p The American historian Telford Taylor blamed the deadlock in the talks on the British and French who, he said, were "too slow and too late"  [71•2 . Duroselle believes that France "seemed to be the only one of the three powers that was anxious to reach agreement  [71•3 ". A more impartial and objective participant in the Moscow talks, Andre Beaufre, later an army general of note, wrote about the Soviet proposals that "it was hard to be any more clear or concrete....These proposals stood in startling contrast with the nebulous abstractions of the Franco-British plattorm... The Soviet arguments carried a Lot of weight.... Our position was false from beginning to end".  [71•4 

p A short while ago a book was published in Paris whose author, L6on Noel, was the French ambassador in Warsaw at the time of the Moscow talks. In spite of his antiSoviet outpourings, Noel, nevertheless, sheds some more light on what really happened during those critical days.

p The instructions issued by General Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the French General Staff of National Defence, to the French mission at the Moscow talks, were "too vague".  [71•5  The French political and military leaders were very well familiar with the position of Poland and, what is more, using bourgeois Poland’s hostile policy for the USSR as a screen, the French government, just like the British government, played a treacherous game aimed at scuttling the Moscow talks. Noel cites a typical episode. On August 19, in a talk with the French military attache, the chief of the Polish General Staff, Waclaw Stachiewicz, reaffirmed the refusal of the Polish government to allow Soviet troops to pass through Polish territory in the event of German aggression. To which the French military attache told Stachiewicz: "Don’t 72 tell me about your refusal just yet. It would be better if our mission in Moscow could manoeuvre as though you had not yet stated your refusal"  [72•1 . Noel also quotes General Beaufre’s assessment of the strategy of the Western powers at the Moscow talks: "The idea was not to have the Poles reply whether or not they were prepared to give Soviet troops free passage across their territory, but to find a pretext to drag out the talks...".  [72•2 

p But for what purpose? To this Soviet historians give an exhaustive reply: Britain was holding secret negotiations with the fascist Reich behind the back of the Soviet Union. In the course of these talks the British government made far-reaching proposals about Anglo-German cooperation ’and about concluding a non-aggression treaty. The British side also proposed that the two countries divide the world into spheres of influence and refrain from interfering in these spheres. Moreover, the British ruling quarters promised the Nazis to break off the talks with the USSR and to renounce their guarantees to Poland which they had shortly before given to her, i.e., to betray Poland to Hitler the same way as Czechoslovakia had been betrayed. The details of this collusion, according to British sources, were to be specified at a personal meeting between Chamberlain and Goring who was expected to arrive on the British Isles on August 23. Goring’s plane was to land on a secluded aerodrome in Hertfordshire where he was to be met in deep secrecy by representatives of the British government. From here the Reichsmarschall was to proceed to Chamberlain’s country residence at Chequers  [72•3 .

p A considerable share of the responsibility for this situation rests with the ruling elite in the United States. It is still hard to ascertain the degree of responsibility, although the facts at the disposal of the historians show that while trying to create the impression that the United 73 States stood aloof from European politics, American diplomats were also trying hard to prevent the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR, Britain and France, and were in favour of collusion with Germany against the Soviet Union. "In economic matters Germany has to have a free hand in the East as well as in the Southeast", said one of the participants in the "negotiations game", the American ambassador to London, Joseph P. Kennedy.  [73•1  Characteristically, some of the American historians, Telford Taylor among them, each putting his own interpretation on these events, seem to be avoiding extra trouble by keeping silent about the fact that Britain and Germany had been negotiating behind the back of the USSR.

p The finale of the Moscow talks is well known. On August 22, 1939, Doumenc told the head of the Soviet delegation that he had received an affirmative answer from his government to the "key question" and credentials to sign the military convention. At the same time he admitted that he knew nothing about the positions of the British, Polish and Romanian governments.  [73•2  Thus the Western powers gave no answer to this key problem at issue, bringing the talks into stalemate.

The Soviet Union never let up on its efforts to create a collective security system in order to halt German aggression and to prevent a second world war. The breaking off of the Moscow talks by Britain and France meant that the last chance of halting an impending Wehrmacht onslaught and of forestalling the war had been lost. The Soviet Union found itself in an extremely difficult situation. The plans of world imperialism to attack the Soviet Union from west and east were close to fruition (it should be borne in mind that at that time the Soviet armed forces, together with Mongolian troops, were fighting off a Japanese attack on the River Khalkhin Gol in Mongolia).

74

The Soviet Union’s Decision

p In a situation which had taken such a menacing turn for the USSR the Soviet government decided to accept Germany’s proposal to sign a non-aggression treaty. There is nothing secret about the reasons why Western historians still continue to fiercely attack the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 (Andreas Hillgruber in the FRG, Gerhard L. Weinberg in the United States, and others  [74•1 ). This forced measure enabled the USSR to ward off, at least for a time, the threat of an attack from the West and, as the subsequent events showed, to gain almost two years of respite for strengthening its defences, and to split up the antiSoviet front of the imperialist powers.

p The Soviet Union right from the start officially declared its neutrality to the warring imperialist groups. The interests of the Soviet people and of the world revolutionary movement required the Soviet Union to complete the building of a socialist society and to build up its defences. An important role in the accomplishment of this historic task was assigned to foreign policy. In the first place it was necessary to strengthen the security of the Soviet frontiers, to confine fascist aggression to a limited geographical zone, to make Germany observe as long as possible its non-aggression commitments and to neutralise the threat of an attack on the Soviet Union by Japan. This course of action served the interests of not only the USSR, and the cause of world socialism, but also of all nations that had fallen victim to fascist aggression or were threatened with attack.

p The USSR attached special significance to the strengthening of its Western borders. Acting jointly and separately, the imperialist powers and their allies, in 1918-1920, wrested from the young Soviet republic a number of areas in an effort to strangle people’s power. Late in 1917 and early in 1918, the troops of boyard Romania 75 invaded the Soviet republic and seized Bessarabia. Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty (1919) Romania received also Bukovina, in defiance of the decision of the popular veche (parliament) on November’3, 1918, on joining the Soviet Ukraine. In 1919, the foreign invaders (Germany, Britain and Poland) and the internal counter-revolution overthrew Soviet power in the Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and replaced it with ultra-reactionary bourgeois dictatorships. Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine were incorporated into Poland under the Treaty of Riga (1921) which ended the war let loose in 1920 by the reactionary regime in Poland supported by Britain and France. In 1939-1940, this historical injustice was corrected, and the people of Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina rejoined the peoples of the USSR. Of tremendous importance was the victory of the revolutionary forces and the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, whose people found their salvation from capitalist oppression and fascist menace in, voluntary accession to the USSR. In early August 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at its seventh session, acceded to the request of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to be admitted to the USSR as full and equal sovereign Soviet republics. As a result, the Baltic region ceased to be a vantage ground for imperialist aggression against the USSR.

p The signing of a peace treaty which ended the Finnish-Soviet armed conflict in 1940 strengthened the security of Leningrad and the northwestern borders of the USSR.  [75•1  The neutrality pact signed with Japan in April 1941 ensured the security of the Soviet borders in the Far East.

p The Soviet Union strictly observed its internationalist commitments by confining fascist aggression. The struggle 76 of the Communist Party and government of the USSR for strengthening its international positions and security resulted in accomplishing key foreign policy goals in 1939-1941, and over the longer term played an important role in routing the invaders.

p Soviet analysts note that this period of Soviet foreign policy (1939-1941) has come in for more ferocious criticism and pseudo-scientific slander on the part of the West than any other period in Soviet history.  [76•1 

p Reactionary historians and ideologists are still busy pushing the myth of collusion between the Soviet Union and Hitler Germany. For example, the authors of the official West German history book, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, write not about the German attack on Poland but about an alleged Germano-Soviet attack on Poland in September 1939.  [76•2  Forrest C. Pogue in the United States tries to prove that the non-aggression treaty with Germany "arrayed the Soviet Union on the side of Hitler".  [76•3  In 1979, these malicious fabrications were picked up by the ideological mentors of the Polish counter-revolution, the agents of the imperialist intelligence services, which entrenched themselves in the KOS-KOR and among the leaders of the much touted Solidarity. They interpret the liberation of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine as Soviet annexation and equate Germany’s treacherous attack on Poland, which deprived it of its national independence, with the march of liberation of the Soviet army through territory which had been taken from Soviet Russia and which was under imminent threat of Nazi occupation  [76•4 .

p Also current to this day are fabrications about the economic assistance rendered by the USSR to Germany 77 when the latter was at war with Britain and France in 1939-1940. Most of this assistance allegedly came in the form of oil deliveries. To this we have to say that economic relations between the USSR and Germany were primarily based on the trade-and-credit agreement signed on August 19, 1939, and on an economic agreement of February 11, 1940, which provided for the export of raw materials from the USSR to Germany and the import of manufactured goods from Germany to the Soviet Union. The list of goods that Germany exported to the Soviet Union included weapons, which accorded with the Soviet interests of defence. For example, the Soviet Union succeeded in buying some German combat aircraft, including the Messerschmitt-109, Junkers-88, and Dornier-215, which helped our military experts to ascertain where Germany stood in aviation technology. The well known Soviet aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev recalls that after examining the German aircraft manufacturing industry, in accordance with instructions of the Soviet government, he wrote a report to Joseph Stalin back in November 1940. Stalin’s comment: "Have our people study German aircraft. Compare them to our latest models. Learn to fight them"  [77•1 .

p A collection of articles published in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1977 under the editorship of Friedrich Forstmeier (former chief of the military history department of the Bundeswehr) and Hans-Erich Volkmann (one of the principal authors of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg) says: "In its commercial relations with Germany the Soviet Union was a hard bargainer which very consistently stood up for its own economic and defence interests. The often repeated view that the Soviet deliveries of raw materials were ’a great boost’ to the German war-oriented economy does not take into consideration the volume and variety of the deliveries which the Soviet Union demanded and, indeed, received from Germany. For example, late in 1940, the USSR agreed to increase its grain 78 deliveries to Germany by 10 per cent, in exchange for Germany increasing her deliveries of aluminium and cobalt which she was badly in need of herself. Any German requests for additional deliveries of raw materials were countered by new Soviet demands not only for machine tools or lorries, but also for military equipment  [78•1 ”. As for the oil deliveries from the Soviet Union to Germany, these were a modest 9,000 tons in the total of 523,000 tons that Germany imported over the first three war months (less than 2 per cent), according to a secret report drawn up by the policy planning subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Britain. In other words, the myth of Soviet-German collusion is refuted by documents which are available in the West. However anti-Soviet propaganda ignores such documents and their assessments, trying at the same time to sow enmity and hatred for the USSR.

p The West German historian Heinrich Hartle furnishes his own brand of evidence to prove that the USSR was "aggressive". He contends that in the course of the German-Soviet talks in November 1940, the Soviet Union had demanded recognition of Bulgaria, Romania, Finland and Turkey as belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence  [78•2 . The New York Times wrote on December 30, 1979, that at the Soviet-German talks in Berlin in November 1940, the government of the USSR had insisted on having its sphere of influence extended to the Black Sea straits and as far away as the Indian Ocean. This interpretation of the German-Soviet talks was clearly put forward with the uninformed reader in mind, for in actual fact the Soviet position at the talks was exactly the opposite.

p German diplomats had prepared a draft agreement between the Axis and the Soviet Union, which had been asked to accede to the territorial claims of its signatories. The Soviet delegation firmly rejected the proposal of the 79 Nazi leaders. The Soviet refusal to discuss the Nazi programme of "delineation of the spheres of influence" and the opposition of the Soviet government to the territorial expansion of the Nazis demonstrated that the USSR would not fall for any diversionary tactics and entertained no illusions with regard to Germany’s true intentions. In his "political testament" Hitler wrote that it was after the departure of the Soviet delegation that he decided to settle "old scores" with Russia. At that time Germany’s preparations for an attack on the USSR were already going ahead full tilt.  [79•1  This is what happened in actual fact.

The main achievement of the foreign policy of the USSR in the initial period of the Second World War was that the Soviet Union had succeeded in staying out of the armed conflict, in gaining nearly two years of respite which had such far-ranging world-wide consequences. By the time Hitler attacked the USSR the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government had succeeded not only in breaking out of the foreign policy isolation created by the U.S.-supported Munich conspiracy of Britain and France with the fascist states, but also in destroying this anti-Soviet front and in creating conditions for building an anti-fascist coalition of the strongest nations of the world: the USSR, the USA and Britain.