Igor Usacfiev
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A World
Progress Publishers Moscow
[1] Translated from the Russian by Kimberley Pilarski and
Jim Riordan
Designed by Vyacheslav Chernetsov
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[2]CONTENTS
Introduction..........
Chapter I. The Disarmament Controversy Chapter II. The Social Roots of Militarism ~
Chapter III. Socialist Ideal.....
Chapter IV. Is Disarmament Attainable?
Notes.............
Index .........
5 15 45 85 146 227 232 [3] ~ [4] __ALPHA_LVL1__ INTRODUCTIONToday's world is burdened with many problems, yet no problem is more urgent, more vitally important for mankind than the halting of the arms race. The reaching of understanding on measures of genuine limitation, and then reduction of arms has acquired exceptional significance. Disarmament has become the most important global problem, affecting every country, people and human being on earth.
The arms race, if not stopped, may create a dire threat not only to peace and the security of nations but also to the very existence of mankind. This thought rings out again and again in the speeches of authoritative public and political figures and in the slogans of the peace marches, gradually reaching the heart of every sober-minded person. Without a solution to the disarmament problem the preservation of modern civilization and the opportunity for further social progress cannot be guaranteed. As Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CG CPSU, has said, "one cannot help seeing that Washington's present policy has sharpened the international situation to dangerous extremes.
``The war preparations of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have grown to an unheard-of, record scale. Official spokesmen in Washington are heard to discourse on the possibility of `limited', `sustained' and other varieties of nuclear war. This is intended to reassure people, to accustom them to the thought that such war is acceptable. Veritably, one has to be blind to the realities of our time not to see that wherever and however a nuclear 5 whirlwind arises, it will inevitably go out of control and cause a worldwide catastrophe.''^^*^^
The arms race not only casts a shadow over the future of many nations but is already causing them severe, almost irreparable damage. The arms buildup, leading to the exhaustion of resources and promoting discord among governments, threatens to nullify efforts to settle critical global problems, such as food resources, energy, the extensive use of the World Ocean and outer space, elimination of the world's most dangerous diseases and ecological issues. Squandering resources on the production and deployment of weapons hampers a solution of such urgent problems of our time as bridging the gap in economic development of various countries and regions, improving the quality of life in the former colonies and increasing their access to all the benefits of world civilisation. A successful curbing of the arms race and a turn toward the actual implementation of genuine disarmament would radically improve the world political climate. Releasing the means presently being devoured by nuclear arms would allow a marked acceleration of economic and social progress, to which witness studies undertaken by the United Nations.
Because of this and for the sake of securing international peace and security and of resolving the pressing problems facing individual nations and _-_-_
^^*^^ Y. V. Andropov. Report at a Jubilee Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR 60 Mark the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. December 21, 1982. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. Moscow, 1982, p. 22.
6 mankind as a whole, the halting of the arms race has become imperative. The popular movement to preserve peace, relax international tension and halt the arms race has become the most extensive and mass democratic movement today. It has become a ponderable factor determining the fate of the modern world. Certain groups in some Western countries are concerned about this, since this is becoming increasingly obvious in spite of the vicissitudes and complex interdependence of international events. The reason for their unease is simple---the more powerful the forces advocating peace, social progress and justice, the less hopeful the position of those whose prosperity is built on violation of people's rights, the plundering of other's wealth, the incitement of enmity, armed violence and war.The rivalry between such forces, polarised by their very nature, is giving poignance to the present-day political and ideological struggle on questions of disarmament. Time does not lessen the intensity of the struggle. But how can it be otherwise when disarmament negotiations make no progress, when mountains of arms continue to grow, when such weapons are produced which may make control over them and their coordinated limitation exceptionally difficult, if not impossible?
The disarmament problem is now the focus of modern international affairs. And not only as a problem which mankind must solve; it has now acquired a new aspect. In the 1970s the first agreements were reached and put into effect, introducing some limitations on the arms build-up. This was a qualitatively new phenomenon, a first in the history of international relations.
Unfortunately, those people who for one reason 7 or another oppose the halting of the arms race, the curtailment of military production, the reduction of armed forces and the transition to actual disarmament of states have become increasingly active. They realise that people's awareness that accord can be reached on the disarmament issue, their awareness of the direct advantages of a containment of the arms race can strengthen the peace movement. All this, of course, poses a direct threat to the profits of the military-industrial complex.
At the start of the 1980s the international situation has become serious. The Soviet-American arms limitation talks have come to a standstill. The gap has grown between what little has been gained by lengthy and difficult negotiations and what remains to be done to stave off the danger of military catastrophe. Technological innovations in the military sphere and the development and deployment of new weapons systems are substantially outstripping the efforts of diplomacy.
At the threshold of the 1980s US ruling quarters--- and here it is difficult to distinguish between Democrats and Republicans---began to freeze negotiations with the Soviet Union on questions concerning disarmament. These negotiations were apparently hindering the Pentagon's plans to disrupt the existing balance and open the doors wide for an arms race in all weapons types. Only the consistent efforts of the socialist countries and the pressure of the peace movement has forced Washington to begin negotiations in Geneva on medium-range nuclear missiles.
Stockpiles of arms are amassing and, what is more dangerous, the new weapons systems are becoming more sophisticated, while their destructive force and 8 effectiveness are growing. More and more countries now possess sophisticated lethal weaponry. Whatever is said on this account, peace is not therefore becoming more durable and stable. On the contrary, it is becoming all the more fragile, more prone to an accident with an unpredictable outcome.
Under these circumstances the duty of all reasonable people of all political convictions, concerned about the fate of their friends, their people and their country, is to join in the struggle to curtail the arms race, to reach agreement on practical steps to limit arms and achieve disarmament. A task such as this seems so clear that no one should oppose it. But, unfortunately, the situation is much more complex and far from satisfactory. Besides those individuals who for various reasons shut themselves off from the political problems of modern life and even encourage others, especially young people, to the same, thereby encouraging their spiritual emptiness and narrow-mindedness, there are others who consciously and purposefully undermine the notion of disarmament.
Today it seldom happens that a prominent statesman will announce openly that he is categorically against disarmament. Even if one could be found who would admit it openly, he would be likely to have to take the only possible step, to quit politics, for the electorate, even though they may not appreciate all subtleties of world politics and the likely consequences of a nuclear conflict, would know from common sense to oppose war, to oppose an unrestrained arms race.
There is therefore an abundance of political chameleons of various hues and colours. All appear to be for a lessening of the military burden, pathetically 9 indignant about the danger of war and prepared to abide by the commandment "Thou shalt not kill". But only on certain conditions. And here is where they change colour to suit their stipulated conditions and reservations. The distinction is manifest in an ability to find streamlined formulas which try to convince others of the need to disarm while avoiding such obligations oneself, or at least justifying the desirability of avoiding such measures.
Certain bourgeois politicians have long held the conviction that in practical politics it is important not who you are but who you are reputed to be, that is, what image or stereotype you can create in the eyes of other people. And such possibilities, as we know, do exist in the West---the mass media ensure them.
We certainly would not indiscriminately attribute such views to all Western politicians, who include individuals unselfishly serving their country and people. That explains, by the way, the big part which a few neutral (and comparatively small) countries play in European politics.
They, for example, did much to ensure successful completion to the Helsinki Conference.^^*^^ They contributed to the development of the Helsinki process despite the restraining efforts of a few Western powers.
There are, however, political figures of a different kind. Their main concern is not to conduct a policy that actually meets the interests of peace, but to present their policy as if it does by using the full force of the massive propaganda machine. That is _-_-_
^^*^^ Hereinafter see Notes.
10 not even political cosmetics, but a deception, in the full sense of the word, of their own people.While striving to convince public opinion of the "noble aims" of their own policies, such figures at the same time earnestly work to create a poor opinion of the political opponents. Thus notwithstanding historical facts and the realities of contemporary political life, the Soviet Union is being unjustly accused of aggressive and expansionist plans, which it allegedly implements by ``exporting'' revolution^^2^^, supporting "international terrorism" or, finally, threatening military ``invasion''.
Such propaganda has taken on particular scope over the assistance given by Soviet people to their Afghan neighbours, victims of an undeclared war. The clues lead, as the increasingly numerous facts show, to centres run by people who suffer no pangs of conscience in using hired assassins or leading astray illiterate peasants.
Persons who regularly engage in activity designed to undermine international security are usually the most vociferous in such propaganda. And it is perfectly obvious politically and psychologically why they display particular zeal---for they are political brokers and traders who prey on people's ignorance, on an enhanced sense of fear and uncertainty about the future, all with the help of the press, radio and television, resorting to the services of hack correspondents and politicians.
The camouflage resorted to by those who cannot take even the most modest steps towards arms production limitation or by those who for one reason or other still cannot accept actual disarmament considerably distorts the overall picture of world political currents. It is therefore not surprising that many 11 people, who include those sincerely striving to strengthen peace, often fall victim to Trustification caused by groups which are trying to impede agreement on long-mature disarmament measures.
It is quite possible that all the members of the Krupp dynasty, the giant arms manufacturer, from the founder to the last remaining member, were decent parishioners and never refused a philanthropic service. And it must be supposed that the American billionaire McDonnell has just as industriously borne his Christian duties and has even paid for peace-keeping efforts of the US United Nations Association. That certainly did not prevent him, however, from developing, making and selling Phantom fighter-bombers which killed and maimed thousands in the Middle East and South-East Asia.
It is therefore important today to return to the sources of the disarmament problem, to purge it of all distortions, to expose the struggle being waged around it for many decades, if not centuries. This is not at all an abstract academic exercise, it is an issue of vital importance to world political affairs of our time.
The question of how the idea of disarmament arose and developed has not so much a cognitive as a profoundly practical political significance. It is not a matter of squaring certain historical accounts, but exposing realistic paths leading to disarmament, as well as the social forces which help to reach and carry out disarmament agreements.
It is appropriate to mention that contemporary bourgeois historiography does not like to refer to the popular struggle for disarmament which developed, particularly in Europe, in the latter half of the last century. The number of Western 12 publications dealing with the disarmament movement of that time is negligible. It is, of course, not a matter of the poor memory of historians or the insignificance of the question. It is a political issue. Why stir up a past to remind us yet again of how many times imperialism poisoned people's minds with militarism and chauvinism and caused bloody wars?
The bourgeois press and scholarly research contain arguments about the unreality of disarmament. At one time it was customary to appeal to `` pugnacious'' human nature. Human beings are imputed to have base, bellicose instincts which, obviously, destine to failure any attempt to agree on doing away with weapons. Such a theme dominated many works written after World War I, which many bourgeois authors portrayed as a ``misunderstanding'', the result of the uncontrollable train of events after the shooting at Sarajevo.^^3^^ In other words, the notion of historical fatalism was implied.
In our time technological theories have come to the fore, depicting the arms race as a natural outcome of, almost a synonym for, scientific and technical progress.
The development of technology, of course, broadens the potential material base of the arms race and creates requisites for the mass production of increasingly refined means of destruction. But it is not the technological base itself that determines what to produce. Politics holds the key. And it is not fortuitous that persons connected in one way or another with the military-industrial complex insist upon the technological ``fatalism'' of the arms race; they have a direct interest in it.
Assertions that disarmament is an "unrealisable dream", no matter what reasoning is used, are 13 clearly politically motivated and serve the interests of certain social groups.
International tension calls for bigger military expenditures. Hence everything capable of reducing tension and, even more, what opens up the prospect of curtailing military expenditure is opposed by the group which receives big profits from fanning military hysteria. It does not neglect any opportunity to discredit the very idea of disarmament, to instill the idea that it is unattainable, and thereby to deny the content and meaning of the mounting mass movement for disarmament. At the same time it pursues another objective: gradually to sow distrust, and then to distort the position of the other side in negotiations. Indeed if disarmament is a dream and if any measures in that area are unattainable, then those who make proposals on its account, especially far-reaching proposals, are engaged in a fraud, being concerned only to make political capital. Small steps and half-steps, immediately halted by a fresh buildup of arms, cannot genuinely guarantee a realisable movement to actual disarmament when, having replaced serious, businesslike negotiations by mere propaganda ploys, one side represents as a purely tactical stratagem any proposals put forward by the other side. Is not that the way the reactionary press and certain analysts in the West have attempted to present UN disarmament negotiations?
The truth lies elsewhere. Hence the urgent need to show when and how the disarmament idea was born and who is its real advocate and why. There lies the purpose of the present work.
[14] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter I __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE DISARMAMENT CONTROVERSYWhat caused the arms race? When did the idea of disarmament arise? And how does the arms race relate to the objective of disarmament?
It would seem that comprehensive answers to these questions have existed for a long time. Yet to this day opposing views mark the speeches of politicians and the works of various scholars. Far from all opinions help to make the picture clear. There are those which rather cloud it over, not necessarily with intent, although they do exist.
The questions we have raised seem outwardly straightforward. But they deal with a subject with a long history, connected with big political stakes which heighten its emotional force. Therefore, those attempting to find answers to these questions may involuntarily fall victim to insufficient information or unwittingly find themselves deceived by deliberate misinformation. And the struggle is as intense as is the desire to convince others of the error of their ways.
Now that the arms race has asquired enormous scope and a situation exists where a simple human mistake or chance computer error can cause a chain reaction leading to nuclear catastrophe, a clear notion of its causes, of its motive forces, of the real restraint proponents, has become a historical necessity in the full sense of the word. The world is faced with the task of removing the delayed-action mine which the arms contest has become; it must do everything to prevent a disastrous explosion. That 15 requires a careful, genuinely objective and considered approach to exposing factors that stimulate the arms race, as well as ways to stop it and means to bring that about.
Let us take as example the question of how the international problem of the arms race relates to disarmament. No one can dispute that the halting of the arms race is a compulsory first stage of real disarmament. You have to halt the train before reversing it. This idea has often been reiterated at many disarmament discussions.
Much less apparent is which came first: the birth of the disarmament idea or the need to halt the arms race. The question is by no means scholastic. It has a direct relationship to the historical roots of these questions, to their development and social content. Without an understanding of the sources of any issue it is difficult, if not impossible, to offer reasonable prescriptions for its solution. Disarmament in this respect is, of course, no exception.
We may encounter claims that the disarmament idea was born in ancient biblical times, usually by reference to the well-known words in the Old Testament Book of the prophet Isaiah: ".. .They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks...". This now renowned aphorism inspired the Soviet sculptor Yevgeni Vuchetich^^4^^, whose sculpture reminds visitors to the UN Headquarters in New York of the humane aspirations to transform instruments of death into implements of life.
It would be wrong, however, to regard that symbol as serious confirmation that the disarmament idea had firmly taken root in so remote a past; that would be succumbing to an elegant myth. Of course, 16 people of that epoch to no less a degree than today aspired for peace. Notwithstanding the claims of old- and new-style Freudians, who see base animal instincts and primarily inherent aggression in human nature, human beings have always been and always will be creators. The hiblicall myth of world creation was itself founded on this, and the features of its creator were human. Witness to this is the ageold history of mankind, the monuments to human labour and the entire wealth of modern civilisation, now being threatened by the sword of Damocles of nuclear catastrophe.
There must be peace in order to create, and there must be faith that the creative endeavour of today will not be trampled upon and cast into the flames of tomorrow. The clear biblical message showed its dream of this: the prophet Isaiah appealed to the people: "gird yourselves, and ye shall be broken in pieces". And that, given a fertile enough imagination and appropriate will, may be interpreted as a warning against the arms race; or, on the other hand, as a call to arms with proper circumspection rather like "arms control". You take your pick. But it would be naive in the extreme to take that latter view when one recalls the material living conditions in those remote times.
The Roman empire managed to form large-scale armed forces for the time---the famous legions. At various times in history, oriental satraps also had numerous troops. Yet, however mighty these armies were, invariably it was a relatively small number of artisans that made their weapons manually. Their quantity and quality depended on the personal experience and skill of the craftsman and on the availability of easily-accessible materials.
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2---2045 17The veneration of arms instilled from childhood helped their artisan production to reach the level of art. The reader may have seen in many world museums ancient blades and suits of armour skillfully adorned with engravings, precious metals and stones. In the client's view, such weapons had to be stunning, to demonstrate wealth and glory.
If we look at the matter from a different, prosaic, as it were, industrial view, we see that the desire to ennoble a weapon was at variance with large-scale manufacturing, which is the invariable basis of a real arms race. Such a race needs large-scale flowline production, and not expensive construction of individual blades, muskets and armour to artistic perfection. Mass production requires an appropriate industrial base, technology and work force.
Capitalism created such a base. Its emergence on to the historical stage marked a singular change from the former state of military affairs and that which developed after the bourgeois revolutions. Assembly-line production of which America is so proud was not conceived in the factories of Henry Ford. A long time before him another American, Eli Whitney, put into operation a production line for the assembling of muskets.^^*^^ Mass arms production began. It resulted in the arms race becoming an acute international problem already in the 19th century.
The subsequent change in the international situation was bound to affect the notion of disarmament. In early human society disarmament was connected rather with abstract Utopian ideas about ensuring everlasting peace on earth. Authors of various plans and philosophical treatises on disarmament had naive _-_-_
^^*^^ W. Millis. Arms and Men. New York, 1956, p. 59.
18 idealist notions about the world. They would not and could not see that social forces predominated for which weapons were a means of protecting their acquired privileges. Humanists were ahead of their time and therefore their prescriptions on how to perpetuate peace could not be put into practice despite their allure.The author of the world-famous treatise Praise of Folly, Erasmus of Rotterdam, was convinced of the obvious disastrous consequences of war and the just as obvious advantages of peace. He considered that peace was worth any price, for war losses, especially for civilian population---that is, not those who profited from arms---were invariably far dearer. His appraisal has today acquired even greater weight and, it must be supposed, is in harmony with thoughts in the minds of sober statesmen when they have to take decisions capable of tilting the balance towards military conflict or peaceful settlement of outstanding controversies. As far as the Dutch humanist is concerned, he was guided by pure reason, repudiating political folly which, unfortunately, still persists today and occasionally influences the decisions of some Western statesmen.
Another great humanist, William Penn, after whom the American state of Pennsylvania is named, also considered stable peace beneficial to the people. He assumed that the natural consequence of such peace would be reduction in military expenditure. This seems irrefutable logic. However now, as in the past, this thought means breaking with ossified ideas; for throughout history wealth and power had been acquired by force of arms, though it has been used for the people's liberation struggle, both social and national. Yet only a society free of human __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 exploitation fulfills the function of safeguarding the security of citizens and the native land.
The English Quaker, John Bellers, drew attention to the close connection between disarmament and peace. In 1710, he proposed a plan for a peaceful alliance of states. He attempted to convince members of the House of Commons that only disarmament could prevent aggression, and that without disarmament peace would be nothing more than an armistice. These reasonable thoughts, however, made little impression on the bourgeoisie and landlords, who thought Britannia could rule the world.
At about the same time the French abbe St. Pierre expressed the view that all states, large and small, should have identical armies. He thought that a balance could thus be achieved to ensure stable peace. Revising the writings of St. Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated his own "judgement on the project of perpetual peace", expounding in 1756 economic arguments for disarmament. He wrote that peoples and states would receive greater benefits from permanent peace, "from the enormous savings effected by the reduction of the military establishments with a multitude of fortresses and an enormous quantity of troops, which swallow up their revenues and become daily a heavier charge on their people and on themselves''.^^*^^ Visitors to the Palais des Nations in Geneva can see among exhibits of the League of Nations museum the original edition of the works by Rousseau on the principles of political law.
In all the ideas mentioned the disarmament idea _-_-_
^^*^^ Merze Tate. The Disarmament Illusion. The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907. The MacMillan Company, New York, 1942, p. 5.
20 nevertheless did not grow into any kind of integral doctrine about ways and means of eliminating the instruments of warfare. Appeals of humanists possibly aroused ideas, excited minds and consciences, but did not markedly affect interstate relations. The cannons, by order of Louis XIV, remained the last reason of kings.^^5^^A more profound elaboration of the disarmament idea is connected with the names of philosophers and lawyers who played a substantial role in shaping international law. The French enlightener of the first half of the 18th century Charles Montesquieu appealed for humanity to be delivered from the cruel methods of human extermination. He emphasised that the accumulation of weapons and retention of large armies had not only contributed to wars, but, what was more, had led to the suppression of liberty. It would not be a bad thing for present-day Western politicians to remember Montesquieu's thoughts. He wrote in his Persian Letters that "just the invention of bombs has deprived all the peoples of Europe of liberty". He argued that the destructive power of the new weapons had given monarchs an "excuse for keeping large standing armies with which they began to oppress their subjects''.^^*^^ The French philosopher foresaw the danger which the development of destructive military technology could create for people. He spoke of the possibility of discovering the secret for making a weapon that could annihilate entire nations. The great French humanist keenly understood the way of thinking of the class to which he himself belonged; his _-_-_
^^*^^ Montesquieu. Leltrrs persnnes. Tome second, Paris, p. 30.
21 perception seemed to have divined the future policies of US imperialism, which hopes to bring many nations, if not the whole world, to their knees by brandishing nuclear weapons. Fortunately for mankind there are forces which will never permit such senseless plans to be carried out.A pillar of classical philosophy, Immanuel Kant, also pondered on the problem of maintaining a lasting peace through arms limitation. In his work Zum ewigen Frieden, dated 1775, he formulated a thesis on the need to abolish armies and the means of warfare as important preconditions for achieving this goal. His thoughts marked an important stage in appreciating the importance of disarmament. Some contemporary historians regard Kant as the first idealogue of the movement in defence of peace. Calling for the abolition of standing armies, he said that their existence represented a serious threat to world peace, since they perpetually urge states to strive to surpass each other in size of armed forces. Such a build-up knows no bounds, and since the costs connected with them are ultimately more burdensome than even a short war, the existence of armed forces and the burden of military expenditure become a cause for military aggression, so as to rid oneself of the burden. Kant's reasoning has not lost its significance even in our time. It has often been borne out in international practice, and its significance refutes the opinion of those contemporary politicians who for various reasons (usually mercenary) try to calm public fears and present the arms race even as an economically profitable undertaking.
Almost simultaneously with Kant, the Russian enlightener Vasily Malinovsky published his Dissertation on War and Peace (1798). Also drawing 22 attention to the connection between the arms race and war, he reckoned that arms limitation would do much to help avert war.
Malinovsky wrote, "Wars are generally preceded by all sort of troop movements and arming for battle, and so to prevent wars from the outset they must be limited by laws for the event of absolute need and impending danger from attack.''^^*^^ Here quite clearly echoes a thought relating to measures which in contemporary language are termed " confidence measures". The implementation of such measures helps to remove or substantially lessen the anxiety of states for their security, to create a quiet and relaxed climate in relations between them, which would thus allow for progress on actual troop reductions.
The idea of the need to reduce arms can also be found in the works of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, an adherent to bourgeois liberalism. His peace ideas culminated as plans for setting up an international confederation for safeguarding lasting peace. Within the limits of the organisation it was intended to set a maximum limit on number of troops for each member. Yet, being a spokesman for the views and interests of the British bourgeoisie during the era of industrial capitalism, Bentham attempted to give a theoretical base to the very down-- toearth mercantile considerations which served as a foundation for British foreign policy. Having spurted ahead in industrial development, the British bourgeoisie tried to consolidate its advantage in the most profitable form. It then saw the means for attaining _-_-_
^^*^^ V. F. Malinovsky. Selected Socio-Political Works, Politizdat, Moscow, 1958, p. 80 (in Russian).
23 this end in a ``peaceful'' offensive which would pave the way for British goods in other countries. This, of course, shall be taken into consideration.Yet, it would be wrong to underestimate the positive significance of Bentham's works manifest in advocating arms reduction. In particular, thanks to his efforts, this idea was gaining a wider audience by the early 19th century and beginning appreciably to influence the formation of views of the politically active part of the European public. Confronted by this new situation, the ruling groups of European states began to take countermeasures.
Realising that it was no longer possible to bury the idea of disarmament, they decided to capitalise on its popularity and great impact on the popular mood in their own interests. In other words, they turned the idea into the object of a diplomatic game. Given all the variety of playing methods, its outline has remained immutable in bourgeois diplomacy: portraying oneself as peace-loving and an ardent adherent of disarmament, and the other side as warlike and opposed to disarmament. They have resorted to this scheme for more than a century, and it has become a classical ploy.
In 1816, the Russian Emperor Alexander I proposed to Britain and Austria to agree on a simultaneous reduction of all troop types. Metternich seemed to greet the offer. The Austrian diplomat, however, was not burning with a desire to help strengthen European peace, let alone the position of Russia which had dominated Europe after Napoleon's defeat. The British Prime Minister Lord Castlereagh was much more straightforward in his attitude toward the Tsar's offer---he simply recommended to the Russian Emperor unilaterally to reduce his own 24 armed forces. The manoeuvres of British diplomacy, aspiring to enhance Britain's role in European affairs, therefore buried the Russian initiative.
In 1831, European diplomacy returned to the idea of holding a conference on establishing a fixed level of military quotas. In this instance, too, however, the contacts and talks did not bring positive results. All the same, the failures did not stop bourgeois politicians and diplomats from falling back on a number of declarative appeals for arms reduction. In 1841, the British statesman Robert Peel put to the House of Commons the question: "Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce those military armaments which they have so sedulously raised? Is not the time come when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishments?''^^*^^ This broad gesture intended to abolish the armies of Europe did not threaten the interests of the British bourgeoisie, since its industry had become the fulcrum of the country's political and economic might, and its unsurpassed navy, of its military power. Peel was therefore able in 1850 to repeat his offer of reducing the armies of the great states, without risking a thing. Like the first offer, it was not suitable to other European states and had no chance of being adopted.
Even such an experienced politician as Benjamin Disraeli could not help playing on the subject of disarmament for his own benefit. In 1958, he addressed an appeal to "terminate the disastrous system of wild expenditure, by mutually agreeing, with no _-_-_
^^*^^ James Headlam-Morley. Studies in Diftlnmatic History. Methuen 8c Co, Ltd., London, 1930, p. 259.
25 hypocrisy, but in a manner and under circumstances which will admit of no doubt, by the reduction of armaments, that peace is really our policy.''^^*^^ Later on British politicians became more restrained in advancing proposals to reduce armaments while Britons ruled the waves, seeing that they merely irritated European continental states.Times changed and Britain's rival, France, in turn, began to flirt with the idea of troop reductions. Emperor Napoleon III, who needed ostentatious success to prolong his stay on the throne, often resorted to declarations on disarmament. In his diplomatic practice talks on arms reduction served as a diversionary tactic in the hope of blunting the vigilance of rival powers. Hence the persistence with which French diplomacy paraded its peace-making efforts. However, in his article "The French Disarmament" Karl Marx explained that the intention of Napoleon III, proclaimed in the official government bulletin in July 1859, to begin cutting back the French army was a ruse designed to get Britain to halt the build-up of the British army and navy. Marx reminded his readers that the French ruler had resorted to a similar move on the eve of the war with Italy in March 1859.
In 1868, the French government attempted to enlist the support of the British court to get Prussia to agree to arms reduction. In two years the attempt was repeated, but it led nowhere.
Other European courts were not far behind the French in speculating on the idea of peace and disarmament. Austria, for instance, agreed to convene a peace congress in 1859 for settling the Italian _-_-_
^^*^^ James Headlam-Morley. Studies in Diplomatic History. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1930, p. 260.
26 question, but on the condition that Sardinia would first disarm.Step by step the slogan of arms reduction became like small change to the diplomacy of European states, turning into a diplomatic stratagem. The statesmen and governments advancing such a stratagem did not really ponder upon practical activities for restraining the growing arms race. Witness to this is the fact that all appeals to start discussion of arms reduction led to naught, remaining at best just good intentions.
Nevertheless, another process was simultaneously gathering momentum---disarmament was steadily becoming a critical international problem. Having expressed from the beginning general humanist aspirations for establishing eternal peace on earth, this idea gradually gained increasingly clear-cut political outlines and materialised into popular demands, into the slogan of the people's political struggle.
In February 1893 Engels wrote: "In all countries there is a wide stratum of the population on which lie almost exclusively the responsibility to supply the mass of soldiers and pay the bulk part of taxes, who are calling for disarmament.''^^*^^ This assessment by the astute Marxist scholar indicates the sources and scale of the movement for disarmament by the close of the last century, a period when capitalism was beginning its imperialist stage and preparations were under way for an armed clash among imperialist powers for the division and redivision of the world.
The beginning of the disarmament struggle was _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx, Engels. Werke. Bd. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, S. 373.
27 initiated by the left forces of that time, the liberals and socialists. Giuseppe Mazzini, the eminent Italian patriot, speaking at the Geneva Peace and Liberty Congress (1867), expressed the conviction that the standing armies of all states should simultaneously be demobilised. He doubted, however, whether this could be accomplished without revolution.^^*^^This bourgeois democrat and fighter for the national liberation and unity of Italy was right---it is impossible to halt the arms race by good intentions alone. Something more is necessary---showing the way for settling the problem of war and peace and finding forces capable of ensuring such a solution. This task was fulfilled by Marx and Engels. They showed that war is not an eternal and natural phenomenon in the life of peoples and states, but a phenomenon that arose at a definite socio-historical stage in the development of human society, and that was associated with transient social conditions. War, and consequently the preparation for it (the arms race) is a product of the emergence and development of class society. The ruling classes use various economic, ideological and diplomatic means for their political purposes. If for some reason the ruling classes have difficulties in carrying out their decreed purposes, they resort to an overtly violent way---war. There has not yet been a war without political purposes.
To oppose war in general, therefore, does not mean wishing to eliminate wars entirely from human society. For example, to deny people the right to a war of national liberation would mean artificially preserving imperialist exploitation and colonial _-_-_
^^*^^ See: Merze Tate. Op. cit., p. 38.
28 slavcry, that is, all that has eternally been the source of wars. This goes, too, for the right of a nation to rebuff those fond of seizing foreign territory.Marxists pursue a policy of unmasking and fighting against predatory imperialist wars, and base themselves on the knowledge that forces inevitably appear in the development of human society which are capable of stopping the unleashing of wars and achieving disarmament. This is a natural historical process. In his address to the National Workers Union of the United States", Karl Marx said back in 1869 that the opportunity then existed for a successful struggle to preserve peace since "the working classes are bestriding the scene of history no longer as servile retainers, but as independent actors, conscious of their own responsibility, and able to command peace where their would-be masters shout war''.^^*^^ He further outlined the path following which the worker class could end wars: ".. .the union of the working classes of the different countries must ultimately make international wars impossible''.^^**^^
It fell to Lenin to develop the ideas of the founders of Marxism. He showed that the ideals of socialism for which the international working class was fighting necessitated delivering humanity not only from exploitation, oppression and poverty, but also from the horrors of war. Lenin wrote: "An end to wars, peace among the nations, the cessation of the pillaging and violence---such is our ideal.''^^***^^ Thanks _-_-_
^^*^^ The General Council of the First International. 1868-- 1870. Minutes. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 321.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 152.
^^***^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 293.
29 to the activities of Marxists, the struggle against imperialist wars and for disarmament became an organic part of the revolutionary workers' movement.New forces combined in the fight for disarmament---socialists and the workers movement. "Most of the European Socialist and working class congresses during the period 1888-98 passed resolutions moving the abolition of standing armies.''^^*^^
Yet those who advanced the demands did not display enough persistence; they became obsessed with bourgeois pacifism, which is inherently a noble impulse, but insufficient to translate proposals into action. Moreover, all these movements remained uncoordinated. In 1889, they combined under the aegis of the World Peace Congresses and the Inter-- Parliamentary Union. Each World Peace Congress which was held between 1889 and 1898 adopted resolutions protesting against the arms build-up, proposing either to cut it back or undertake a study of the problem.
The scope of the movement advancing demands for halting the increasing rate of military preparations alarmed primarily the ruling circles of the big powers---the chief culprits of the arms build-up rivalry. They had seriously to ponder the likely sociopolitical consequences of the mass movement, which could irreparably undermine the position of governments responsible for fanning military hysteria. That explains why, towards the end of the last century, the diplomacy of European states became more devious in regard to disarmament.
Tsarist Russia was the first to show perception in its appraisal of the international situation. On _-_-_
^^*^^ Merze Tate. Op. cit., p. 64.
30 24 August 1898, Count Muravyov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, summoned all foreign ambassadors accredited in St. Petersburg. To each was handed a memorandum which said that it was imperative that ways be sought through international discussion to find the most effective means for ensuring the benefits of a true and lasting peace for all peoples, and also for halting the ever-- expanding production of arms. Russia offered to call an international conference to discuss the problem of arms limitation.The St. Petersburg offer was received coolly in other major capitals. What provoked particular hostility was the appeal to agree on cutting down armaments. Professor Komarovsky, who helped draw up the Russian government's proposal, wrote that the "secondary states" were ``sympathetic'' but, unfortunately, "peace did not depend on them. The big powers saw the matter differently: they did not conceal a certain coldness and even hostility behind conventional diplomatic courtesies''.^^*^^ The American President McKinley tried to distance himself from the proposal stating that "the question can have for us no practical importance''.^^**^^ France, however, decided to support its ally Russia.
The tsarist government took into account the attitudes of the big powers and, on 30 December 1898, distributed a new circular in which it defined the questions for discussion at the conference. The possibility of arms reduction was actually removed so as to calm Russia's partners. Not only the flexibility of Russian diplomacy, however, assisted the calling _-_-_
^^*^^ L. A. Komarovsky. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899. Moscow, 1902, p. 9 (in Russian).
^^**^^ Merze Tate. Op. cit., p. 261.
31 of the Conference, which has gone down in history as the First Hague Peace Conference. More, if not most, decisive were the apprehensions of ruling circles in Western states that to refuse to hold the conference could strengthen anti-war sentiments and thereby increase the causes contributing to the spread of socialist ideas.Count Witte, who was directly involved in drawing up the Russian proposal, wrote that in conversations with Count Muravyov he explained to him "the kind of harm caused to the entire world and especially to Europe by ever-increasing rearmament, that such expenditure utterly impoverished the population and deprived it of any chance of living comfortably, that it was such a state of affairs that engendered socialist teachings and all propaganda of socialism in Western Europe, which is already even being transferred to us''.^^*^^
The Russian diplomat's concern that the burdens of the arms race made wide sections of the population receptive to the ideas of socialism reflected the general unease in the ruling circles of the great powers. It led them to conclude that it was better to carry out the stratagem of calling the conference than to clash with the growth of the socialist movement. It was thus that the politicians of that era unwittingly recognised that socialism was a firm opponent of militarism.
The First Peace Conference with the participation of 26 states was held at the Hague from 18 May to 29 June 1899. The composition of delegations eloquently revealed the attitude of the great powers _-_-_
^^*^^ F. Notovich. Disarmament of the Imperialists. The League of Nations and the USSR. Moscow, 1929, p. 32 (in Russian).
32 to the conference. The US delegation included Admiral McMahon, notorious in American history as the most ardent advocate of the use of military force in international relations. The British delegation contained a prominent militarist, Admiral Fisher; the Prussian Colonel Schwarzhoff commanded the German delegation, and General Zuccari, the Italian. They quickly found a common language and acted together to prevent a favourable outcome on arms reduction.The head of the Russian delegation Colonel Zhilinsky proposed keeping existing land forces ( excluding colonies) at an unchanged level for five years; not to increase the military budget during that time, except for appropriations for naval armaments, which would not increase for three years. In other words, proposals on disarmament or arms reduction were not introduced at all. But even the proposals on ``freezing'', to use modern terminology, were also rejected.
The German representative Schwarzhoff made outright a concentrated attack on the very idea of arms reduction. He denied that excessive armaments made war more likely and appealed to people to have faith in the wisdom of monarchs. His argument was designed to show the supposedly excessive `` technical'' difficulties of the problem of reduction. His ploy to complicate things artificially by all manner of ``technical'' problems is also a common device used by contemporary opponents of disarmament.
The British Admiral Fisher did not object in principle to reductions when land forces were being discussed. But he was thoroughly opposed to any cutback in naval weapons; he refused even to __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3---2045 33 countenance any reduction in the calibre of naval guns.
The instructions of Secretary of State John Hay to the American delegates emphasised that "in comparison with the effective forces, both military and naval, of other nations, those of the United States are at present so far below the normal quota that the question of limitation could not be profitably discussed''.^^*^^ They were therefore recommended to refrain from any kind of initiative.
Instructions to delegates also stipulated hostility to the possibility of prohibiting new types of warfare, since that might limit the "creative genius" of the American people. Accordingly, when the question came up of limiting means of warfare the American delegation usually took an adverse stance. For example, it opposed the outlawing of such inhuman weapons as exploding bullets. Admiral McMahon was the only delegate to vote against the declaration on prohibiting shells with asphyxiating and harmful gases.
The conduct of the above-mentioned representatives at the First Hague Conference laid the foundation of an approach subsequently adhered to by states in which the spirit of militarism predominated over everything. Its essence can be summed up very concisely: all means are good if they further the attainment of set ends. What this costs the peaceful population is another question.
Because of the position taken by its participants the First Hague Peace Conference was essentially a platform for the imperialist powers to elaborate methods for combatting the ideas of disarmament and the popular disarmament movement. It polished _-_-_
^^*^^ Merze Tate. Op. cit., p. 276.
34 up the methods of political deception: everyone was willing to hide behind each other's back.Delegates nonetheless had to remember the public and produced a face-saving formula, a prototype of those formulas stamped on subsequent negotiations: the Conference "believes that reduction in the military burden, which nowadays oppreses the world, is extremely desirable for improving the material and the moral well-being of humanity''.^^*^^ Similar views took the form of convenient cliches, and we assume that anyone who has sat in the public gallery at subsequent conferences has heard plenty of the same. The Hague Conference, therefore, could not produce any real results in terms of advancing disarmament itself. To its credit, it did ultimately draw up some international warfare regulations inscribed in two ratified conventions on the laws and customs of land war and on applying the 1864 Geneva Convention principles of protection of the sick and wounded to naval warfare.
From a humane standpoint this was not a bad result. However, it is perfectly legitimate to ask what is more humane: not to cause an injury altogether or, after causing it, to be concerned with treating it. The Hague Conference also concluded the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, stipulating the creation of a permanent court of arbitration to be located at the Hague. This alone allows us to proclaim it a ``peace'' conference. As we see, the conference, which was convened, at least in name, for arms reduction, took the form of a conference for drawing up rules of warfare. To regulate war, no matter behind which good or _-_-_
^^*^^ L. A. Komarovsky. Op. cit., p. 47.
35 humane motives refuge is sought, means in practice efforts to legitimate war and, consequently, to facilitate preparations for it and for its unleashing. In fact, subsequent events developed according to just such a scenario.At the Second Hague Peace Conference, convened in 1907 under the pressure of anti-militarist popular sentiment, its participants never found and earnestly never sought a common approach to the problems of disarmament. Consequently, the debates on arms limitation at the Conference, which lasted four months, occupied a total of 25 minutes. From the very start it was proclaimed that this problem could not serve as a subject for discussion. The resolution of the Second Hague Peace Conference only acknowledged the fact that the military burden had grown substantially, and expressed a desire for governments again to undertake a "serious study of the question". Thereupon, the participants turned with a clear conscience to the task of regulating war, especially as a ``major'' war was just round the corner.
The calling of yet another conference was envisaged---the Third Hague Conference---in 1913 or 1914. But World War I put paid to those plans.
Various types of nation took part in the First and Second Hague Conferences, from absolute and constitutional monarchies to republics. This diversity, however, meant little since they all ultimately belonged to a single social system---capitalism.
One consequence of the Hague ``peace'' conferences was the refusal of bourgeois diplomacy to discuss disarmament questions, it preferred to seek ways of ``humanising'' war. Measures designed to put an end to the very possibility of war gave way to measures intended to create conditions for warfare that 36 would arouse as little popular indignation as possible, and with maximum profit for those who needed war.
This ruse of bourgeois diplomacy found a corresponding response in propaganda. On the one hand, this propaganda pointed to the results of the Hague conferences in an attempt to prove that the problem of disarmament could never be solved. The notion was gradually cultivated that disarmament was altogether impossible, and that people should therefore somehow resign themselves to the unrestrained accumulation of arms. On the other hand, the same propaganda did everything it could to confuse the very issue of disarmament. It cobbled together such profoundly different definitions---diverse in content and dimension---as ``disarmament'', ``reduction'', `` limitation'' and, finally, "arms regulation". During the 1960s yet another term appeared---"arms control", which became the core of Western diplomacy. It is the most widely-used term and in all respects replacing disarmament.
Such confusion is not at all accidental. It expresses a definite conception of the limited approach to the disarmament problem. This aspect of the matter is openly admitted by the British authority on international law and international relations Georg Schwarzenberger. Defining disarmament as a `` chimera'', he asserts that in reality the question "boils down to the limitation of existing armaments and to the prohibition of certain types of weapons''.^^*^^
Another British legal expert Lassa Oppenheim _-_-_
^^*^^ See: G. Schwarzenberger. Power Politics. A Study of International Society. Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1951, p. 535.
37 wrote in his treatise International Law, "By what is usually referred to as `disarmament' is meant, not the abolition of armaments but their reduction to limits reasonably commensurate with a State's national safety and the discharge of its international obligations.''^^*^^ Thus, disarmament was reduced to a ``reasonable'' reduction in armaments. Moreover, the definition of the word ``reasonable'' was essentially left to the discretion of a nation (imperialist), which would itself decide how many troops it needed to guarantee its security and discharge its " international obligations". One has hardly to stretch the imagination to think of countries which have assiduously used the above-mentioned formula for justifying the build-up of its own troops and arms.It is appropriate at this juncture to say a few words about the Covenant of the League of Nations. From all points of view it is apparent that its authors had to take into consideration the growing influence of socialist ideas as embodied in Soviet Russia, which arose after the triumph of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. However, it is indisputable that the Covenant of the League of Nations was worked out by the imperialist powers without the direct participation of the Soviet Republic. Its authors therefore had a perfect opportunity to sidestep the principles put forth by young Soviet diplomacy.
The Covenant of the League of Nations was based on the "Fourteen Points" of US President Woodrow _-_-_
^^*^^ L. Oppenheim. International Law. A Treatise. Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1940, p. 97.
38 Wilson, which ran counter to Lenin's Decree on Peace^^7^^ that unmasked the predatory character of imperialist wars. The fourth of Wilson's proposed points envisaged arms reduction to the "minimum compatible with internal security''.This wording entered the Covenant of the League of Nations in an altered form. Article 8 read: "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safely and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.''
The ruling circles of the capitalist countries, shielded by the authority of a universal international organisation, thereby appropriated to themselves the right to determine the size of armed forces as they thought fit. The 1930s showed what happened in practice, especially after Hitler came to power in Germany.
Whether the Covenant's authors liked it or not, Article 8 concerning the "reduction of national armaments" confirmed the Marxist conclusion on the class nature of armed forces. Neither disarmament nor arms reduction or limitation lay behind the Covenant. It was limited to regulating arms, or simply to a regrouping of forces among the imperialist states with account for the changed international situation after World War I.
One more proof of the real intentions of the imperialist powers was the 14-nation Washington Conference of 1921 on naval weapons limitation. We can talk about ``pure'' experience here in the sense that the Conference participants were exclusively imperialist states or their dependencies.
The American Harding administration did not 39 invite Soviet Russia to the conference even though it directly concerned the Soviet state. The Soviet government registered a strong protest. The banning of Soviet Russia from the Conference was an act not only at variance with normal standards of interstate relations, but also expressed the desire of the imperialist powers to isolate a country with a diametrically-opposed social system. The sponsors of the Conference did not relish a confrontation of views and proposals, which would obviously not be to the benefit of those intending to carry on a policy "from a position of strength''.
After lengthy bargaining at the Conference, five powers (USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy) succeeded in signing an agreement in February 1922. The agreement established the following correlation of battleship tonnage for the powers in the above-mentioned order---5; 5; 3; 1.71; 1.75. This correlation reflected the balance of naval power and testified that the United States now rivalled Britain as the leading sea power. This actually resulted from World War I, and was a materialised desire, as it were, to repartition the world.
The press of the participant-states extolled the results, depicting them as a major achievement in the area of disarmament. The actual course of events, however, was not long in showing that the decisions reached in Washington did not in the least decelerate the arms race, they only altered its centre of gravity. "The Washington agreement only stopped the race in certain categories of ships.. .those which the naval staffs then thought the most important," wrote the later Nobel Peace Prize winner Lord Philip Noel-Baker. "Since 1921 it has begun again in other categories, and threatens to assume 40 proportions hardly less dangerous than the race in battleships itself.''^^*^^
The arms race has continually intensified the likelihood of a military clash between imperialist powers in the Pacific Ocean. Lenin's analysis of the situation was corroborated to the full. He wrote, "A most stubborn struggle has been going on for many decades between Japan and America over the Pacific Ocean and the mastery of its shores, and the entire diplomatic, economic and trade history of the Pacific Ocean and its shores is full of quite definite indications that the struggle is developing and making war between America and Japan inevitable.''^^**^^ For the Conference organisers the gains were dubious.
The Washington Conference was, in fact, the last major international conference on questions relating to disarmament held without the participation of a socialist state. The appearance of Soviet diplomats on the international scene abruptly changed the terms of the fight for disarmament.
On 10 April 1922, at the Genoa Conference,^^8^^ the Soviet delegation first put a proposal from the USSR on general arms reduction. The delegation emphasised that any other proposals designed to ease the military burden on the populace and to ensure a cut-back in the armies of all states would be supported. Soviet Russia declared its willingness to reduce its own arms on a reciprocal basis. In short, the task of arms reduction was clearly set without any reservations. The disarmament idea henceforth _-_-_
^^*^^ P. J. Noel-Baker. Disarmament. The Hogarth Press, London, 1926, p. 22.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 31, 1974, p. 465.
41 materialised in the form of concrete proposals set in the real context of the international situation, with account for its conditions and requirements.The Soviet Union's readiness to show an example and take unilateral action in the necessary direction has often confirmed the sincerity and responsibility with which it has approached the disarmament problem.
; .
World War II sharply brought into focus the need for postwar organisation which could reliably safeguard universal peace. Even during the war the Soviet government several times reminded everyone that such tasks could only be settled by establishing international relations of new meaning and character through creating an effective system of collective security and implementing universal disarmament. The Soviet government endeavoured to^ endorse these aspirations in the founding of "a new universal international organisation.
.•-.. - :
The participation of the Soviet Union in drawing up the Charter of the United Nations Organisation secured a further reinforcement* of the disarmament idea as a principal objective towards the realisation of which the international community should strive. The need for disarmament and a ban on weapons of mass destruction was set as a fundamental-aim and principle of the UN Charter intended to safeguard international peace and-security.
The Charter entrusted the task of creating a system of arms regulation to the Security Council which bears major responsibility for upholding international peace and security. It must be stressed that by arms regulation, as -, it ensues directly from the UN Charter, is meant a reduction in arms and numerical strength of armed forces, and not some 42 kind of trimming of the existing troops level and by no means the establishment of a higher level. Therefore, the direct duty of UN members is to help strengthen international stability by military detente, and not to try to violate the prevailing balance of power in an attempt lo gain military superiority.
Socialist diplomacy has done much to give disarmament a proper place in UN activity. Meanwhile, attempts to water down the meaning of `` disarmament'' in the Charter have been made repeatedly and continue to be made. A Brookings Institution report, for example, maintained that the UN Charter "did not call for disarmament as something separate from political action to maintain peace and security''.^^*^^
It would be possible to agree to the idea to subordinate disarmament to the overall task of preserving peace and strengthening security if its proponents did not strive to use the notion as a pretext for not agreeing to disarmament measures. The past provides much food for thought. The thesis " security first, disarmament thereafter" was much acclaimed at the time of the League of Nations. The result is well known---no security, no disarmament, but devastating war.
Attempts to make disarmament secondary to security are associated with Bismarck's renowned expression: if you want peace, prepare for war. In other words, amass as many weapons as possible, at least more than your likely foe. In such an event _-_-_
^^*^^ William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan. Constance G. Goblenz. United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1956, p. 238,
43 the consequences for humanity would not be manifest merely in a war, but in a war with an increasing potential for annihilation. Security through disarmament is the only possible way to interpret the ideas inscribed in the UN Charter, in the substance of resolutions summarising the opinion of the world community.The consistent efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have played a decisive part in ensuring that the main agencies of the United Nations, primarily the General Assembly, have adopted a number of important decisions on the disarmament issue which have furthered the positive development of appropriate provisions of the UN Charter. Particularly important progress was made following the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament in 1959. They became a landmark in making the task of disarmament common for all UN member-states. The General Assembly resolutions on disarmament questions henceforth began regularly to mention the clearly-formulated ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, to which UN members should direct their efforts.
The disarmament idea is therefore no longer merely an international political process, it is acquiring the character of a principle of international law. What then impedes implementation of such a principle? The next chapter will attempt to answer that question.
[44] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter II __ALPHA_LVL1__ THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF MILITARISMOne of the veteran investigators of the disarmament problem, Philip Noel-Baker, came to the most interesting conclusion that false stereotypes have developed---or rather have been created---in the area of disarmament and the arms race; that the arms race has always been burdensome as it is today; that wars, including world wars, are inevitable evils; and that attempts at halting the arms race will always fail.^^*^^
Those who should seek the roots of the arms race and probe why attempts at disarmament have failed are as though self-hypnotised by the continual repetition of such stereotypes, and their repetition leads to a distortion of facts in the perception of a broad public: black is called white and, in the end, the stereotypes are accepted as true.
What is it: an accident, a misconception, or an intended policy line? It would be closer to the truth to say that such stereotypes are made up and used on purpose.
Indeed, the intensity of the popular feeling against war and the arms race does not require proof. It finds expression in the anti-war demonstrations and peace marches that have swept Europe. A peculiar process is under way of personifying arms race politics. It shows more vividly who is making this policy. Hence the desire of circles having an _-_-_
^^*^^ See: Philip Noel-Baker. The Arms Race. A Programme for World Disarmament. Atlantic Books, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1958, p. 7.
45 interest in the arms race to escape from responsibility, to present themselves as victims of a fatal course of events, of the spontaneity of the arms race process. The first step towards this is an attempt to cover up the social roots of the arms race policy. To this end deliberately simplified mechanisms of the arms race are advanced, which are out of touch with the class nature of a state and with the basic principles of its policy. The formula ``action-counteraction'' is offered in this perverse way, for example. It erases the distinction between states with different social systems, between states seeking peace and those pervaded with the spirit of militarism.The origin and development of the arms race is presented according to the following abstract scheme: a move by country ``A'' to increase its level of arms (action) causes a reciprocal move by country ``B'' of the same magnitude (counteraction). The latter move in turn stimulates a new move by country ``A'', and so on to infinity (or until a military clash, which would decide the outcome of the arms race). This logic, although simplified, contains a grain of rationality and is therefore somewhat convincing. But on the whole it is an insidious political trap. This logic disregards the political character of states opposed to one another, equates, without any ground, the various motives of states, ignoring the more important things which determine the position of a state in the world arena.
These motives may be, however, fundamentally different. On the one hand lies the desire to expand; on the other, the concern for preserving sovereignty and independence. Would it be just, for example, to raise an objection to neutral Switzerland's increasing of military potential during the 46 First-and Second World Wars? Or, let us say, to the Angolan people's desire to have the possibility to defend themselves against aggressive attacks from South Africa?
The right to self-defence against aggression is contained within the United Nations Charter, and it is impossible, therefore, to demand that peaceful states should not possess sufficient arms for their defence. A> state's refusal to seek military superiority, possessing only that which corresponds to its defence needs, is the main criterion to judge its peaceful intent. - :,i .-•••'
- The Soviet Union, by the way, has time and again announced at the highest level that it does not and will not seek military superiority. At the same time, one cannot but agree with the position of the Soviet leaders when they suggest that to be objective one must put oneself in the place of the Soviet Union. Of course, the Soviet Union could not look on apathetically as Western-bloc countries' military bases surrounded it from all sides, as missiles and other nuclear weapons delivery vehicles were being aimed at its cities. The Soviet Union took appropriate balanced measures in full conformity with moral and legal norms. Only those who, have lost a sense of reality can blarrie it for such measures. The attempt to put states on an equal ~ footing disregarding their actual policies ultimately can become and frequently does become a factual justification for a country's ruling circles, who dream of expansion at someone else's expense, preparing to this end an aggressive war.
A common ploy of bourgeois diplomacy is to allege that a given war was caused by demands of `` selfdefence''.
47This, of course, involves cases which run counter to norms and principles of the United Nations and which have nothing in common with defence against aggression. A classic example was when in August 1914, the government of Wilhelm II, notwithstanding its own solemn commitments to respect the sovereignty of Belgium, occupied that country under the pretext of forestalling an attack by France.
Hitler also referred to the need to defend Germany from France, Britain, and other European countries when he attempted to justify the feverish rearmament of his country. Even purely defensive installations on the Czech-German border known as the "Little Maginot Line" served Nazi propaganda as a pretext for increasing military pressure on Czechoslovakia, the purpose of which was to put an end to its independence and make it a protectorate of the German Reich. However, the main Nazi propaganda tactic was the invention of the "Bolshevik threat", with the help of which they sought to distract the attention of the Western powers from the then unfurling Nazi war machine. In appealing to the imperialist powers to join the crusade against the Soviet Union, Goebbels and his henchmen hoped to enlist the support of the collaborationists, to dull the vigilance of neighbouring peoples in order to inflict an unexpected blow on them afterwards. Europe cruelly received its due for its credulity.
This is, incidentally, the approach advocated by President Reagan.
Those opposed to disarmament continue to make use of these imaginary ``dangers'' and ``threats''. Take the myth of "Soviet military threat". Despite the abundance of rhetoric on this subject in the Western press, no one has yet been able to cite any 48 convincing evidence of the actual existence of such a threat.
Reality tells us otherwise, viz. that an equilibrium has long since been achieved between the two systems of states. The facts show that in the course of almost four postwar decades the situation in Europe has remained stable. This could not have been so if the balance of forces had been seriously disrupted.
The political activities of those who profit on fabricating a "Soviet military threat" as a foundation for fomenting the arms race reveal the unseemliness of their position. The Soviet Union has repeatedly made proposals directed toward arms limitation and reduction. But what is the reaction of those who are supposedly alarmed by the "Soviet military threat"? They decline these proposals without examining them carefully---and sometimes even without having understood what they are all about continuing at the same time to reiterate that it is necessary to go on arming in order to counter the impending threat. A queer logic indeed!
The consistency with which the notorious " Soviet threat" rises to the surface of international life and the transformations it undergoes are significant. There has been no US Presidential election campaign in the postwar period that has not played up the "Soviet threat" theme. Characteristically, each time the alleged "Soviet threat" takes on a form which surprisingly dovetails the Pentagon's shift of stress on one or another type of weapon: strategic bombers, intercontinental missiles, MIRV-ed nuclear warheads, the neutron bomb, mobile missiles, etc. The "Soviet threat" seems to be made ready to order.
This compels us to stress that the "action-- counteraction" formula allows us to understand the arms __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4---2045 49 race mechanism when it is considered in the context of the real international situation, taking into account the actual policy of every country involved. This inevitably takes us back to the question about the origins of a state's foreign policy, about its class and social roots.
Not all researchers, including bourgeois, give equal treatment to the ``action-counteraction'' formula. Some maintain that a state can carry on and often does carry on an arms race with itself. The opinions they cite are convincing and are corroborated with facts.
The rulers of a state who aim at achieving military superiority always strive to outstrip their real or imagined rival in developing military hardware. So as not to miscalculate, they take their own best military hardware to judge the level and effectiveness of that of their opponents. Hence more sophisticated types of weapons are demanded from military suppliers. As a result, the mainspring determining the tempo and direction of the arms race turns out to be within the military-political system of a certain state. Naturally, this arms race does not remain confined to the system. It affects the international situation as a whole and the policies of other states, activating thereby the formula " action-counteraction' '.
An objective observer will agree that roughly such a scheme characterises the course of events in the modern world. It is common knowledge---and this fact can hardly be denied by anyone familiar with the facts---that in the postwar years the United States has almost always been the leader in introducing new weapons systems, especially in the strategic category. The Soviet Union has only kept pace 50 with the United States in such areas as atomic weapons, strategic means of their delivery, MIRVs and cruise missiles. Here are some examples (for more detail see Whence the Threat to Peace? Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1982, p. 7).
Although a majority of political analysts, including bourgeois, vary in opinion on the causes of the arms race, they all agree on its danger to mankind.
Yet we will return to those maintaining the fatalistic theory of the arms race---and the present world situation can easily be interpreted so as to confirm this theory. The real meaning of this supposedly objective, impartial, supra-class theory becomes clear if we ask for whom it is beneficial. The answer is simple---for those whose interest is to see an unrestrained arms race continued into the future. Consequently, in this case the fatalistic theory has a quite definite political motive. This motive is clearly visible in statements by those political figures and theorists who do not consider it necessary to camouflage the purpose of the arms race. They bluntly say that this race is directed against the Soviet Union and against the socialist community.
Strausz-Hupe, an American diplomat and conservative theorist, asserted that the arms race is "the most effective means" to bring the enemy to reasonable, i.e. American, terms. Such an unequivocal statement is based on the calculation that the "Free World" will forge ahead in the arms competition forced upon the socialist countries.^^*^^
Such views help us to understand better the class roots of the arms race and, despite the desire of _-_-_
^^*^^ See: Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner and Stefan T. Possony. A Forward Strategy for America. Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1961, p. 101.
51 their authors, reveal on which social groups rests the responsibility for the present tense world situation. These views affirm time and again that the arms race is engendered by the contradictions of capitalist society and that the big bourgeoisie of the industrial capitalist countries makes a stake on it. It is not surprising that arms race policy is linked up with anti-Sovietism. Colin Gray from the Hudson Institute, called anti-Sovietism "ideological distaste''.^^*^^ The softening of the wording was probably a result of the fact that Gray analysed the mechanism and after-effects of the arms race at a time when the hopes of the Americans to gain military superiority became dimmer.Researchers who have thoroughly studied the disarmament problem agree that the arms race, in its modern form, began three quarters of a century ago. It has been gathering momentum with each passing decade.^^**^^ This opinion is extremely interesting. On the one hand, it fixes a starting point of the arms race; on the other, it suggests the idea that from that very moment there began to act forces which incessantly stimulated an arms build-up.
These forces were inseparably linked with militarism. Indeed, the concept ``militarism'' also appeared in the middle of the last century. It was first employed to characterise the policies of the French Emperor Napoleon III.
Later Prussia with its characteristic Junker stubbornness and methodical approach stole the honours, and militarism became a synonym of Prussianism in international social consciousness.
_-_-_^^*^^ See: Colin S. Gray. The Soviet-American Arms Race. Saxon House, 1976, p. 3.
^^**^^ See: Philip Noel-Baker. The Arms Race, p. 7.
52What is militarism and what is its relationship to the arms race? The Webster's dictionary defines militarism as "predominance of the military class or prevalence of their ideals; a spirit which exalts military virtues and ideals; a policy of aggressive military preparedness". The not less authoritative Larousse's dictionary calls militarism "a system propped up by the army''.
It is not difficult to notice that both of these definitions are not absolutely exact. Even more vague definitions of militarism are sometimes given by politicians. The American President, Woodrow Wilson, for example, who was famous for his pacifism said in a speech at West Point on 13 June 1916: " Militarism does not consist in the existence of an army, nor even in the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit. It is a point of view.''^^*^^ Close to this is the assertion that militarism is a state of people's minds. If we accept this interpretation of militarism, then it turns out that militarism is like an illness, perhaps unpleasant, but all the same temporary. Today the state of people's minds is close to militarism, tomorrow it changes and here we are---militarism has completely vanished. Such explanations are, of course, anti-scientific and have nothing in common with the actual state of affairs.
Some bourgeois authors claim that it is impossible to .give a general, universal definition of militarism. There could be a grain of truth to their claim, but all the same their position is open to criticism. The cult of force and military virtue existed during the feudal period and even in the era of slavery. But is this single feature, which is far from being _-_-_
^^*^^ John K. Turner. Shall It Be Again? B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, 1922, p. 175.
53 decisive, sufficient to declare, for example, that ancient Sparta or feudal France were militaristic states? Frivolous handling of historical facts, politically, leads to a distortion of the real causes of existing militarism. Ignoring the root difference between socio-economic formations or pushing it to the background reduces all talk about militarism to mere verbiage. Militarism, like any historical phenomenon, is concrete. It arises in a specific period on suitable ground.Modern militarism is a social phenomenon inherent in capitalism. When capitalism grows into imperialism it acquires relative independence. Militarism seeks to prepare material and spiritual conditions for the use of armed violence in order to preserve the domination of the bourgeoisie and advance its narrow class interests. As a "vital manifestation" of capitalism, militarism affects both the basis of capitalist society, which brings about the military-industrial complex, and its superstructure, including the sphere of social consciousness.
Modern militarism developed within bourgeois society and was engendered by its class relations. However militarism was not at all a necessary companion of the bourgeoisie when it emerged on the historical scene. Time was needed for changes brought about by the formation of bourgeois social relations to prepare ground for the appearance of militarism.
The bourgeoisie introduced important innovations in military organisation and in methods of warfare. Of primary importance was the creation of massive armies. The social and political emancipation of the bourgeoisie and the parcel peasantry^^9^^ was a requisite for this purpose.
The means of production created by the 54 bourgeoisie guaranteed a material base for building up massive armies, and such armies were required when the bourgeoisie in its bid for power led a violent struggle against absolutism. In order to conquer the absolutist monarchic regimes, then a strong, experienced and well-organised enemy, the broad support of the masses was required, and this meant that it was necessary to act in a democratic spirit. Such mode of action became an historical regularity practically in all known bourgeois revolutions.
The bourgeoisie simply could not manage without the masses. This was true of the liberation struggle in America against British colonial despotism; this was also true of the Great French Revolution which threw off the Bourbon dynasty. At that time the bourgeoisie needed armed people's masses to come to power.
However, hardly having come to power the bourgeoisie hurriedly took measures to confine the armed forces within a class framework and to assert its own hegemony. The bourgeoisie disarmed the people and armed itself against them.
Let us note inter alia that many bourgeois politicians regard the arms possessed by a modern capitalist state as a necessary requisite to ensure security and claim that the more arms, the better. Their views fundamentally change, however, when a socialist country is mentioned. Contrary to the facts, they contend that the arms possessed by socialist countries for defensive purposes create a danger to international peace.
The powers that be, of course, recruit soldiers from among other categories of the population, preferring not to put their own heads under fire. At the outset of its existence, the bourgeoisie first created a militia system, and then began pursuing a policy 55 (sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly) with the purpose of opposing one section of the people to another. A system of moral and political brainwashing of the army was devised and introduced. While raising armed forces in keeping with its class interests, the bourgeoisie began carrying out extensive measures to spread militarism on all levels of society's life.
Militarism was a reaction of the ruling classes to the demands of democratic masses awakened by the bourgeois revolutions to assert its lawful rights. The people demanded a democratic organisation of the army, which would mean dissolving it within the people. Realising the danger of such a development, the bourgeoisie was bent on dissolving the people within the army, on subordinating the former to the latter.
In Europe, this took the form of the Prussian reorganisation of the militia in 1848. The ruling class abandoned bourgeois freedoms which had attracted the democratic strata of the population to the bourgeoisie, and turned to reaction backed by armed force.
The military reform in Germany accelerated the development of Prussian militarism, which led to war in Europe. The whole adult male population of the country was divided into two parts: "one standing army on service and another standing army on furlough''.^^*^^
In World War I, two imperialist groupings clashed: the Quadruple Alliance^^10^^ headed by Germany and the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente. For both _-_-_
^^*^^ The General Council of the First International. 1870-- 1871. Minutes. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, p. 337.
56 sides the war was a continuation of the imperialist policy of redividing the world. Knowing this, the Marxists regarded opposition to this war as one of the most important tasks of the workers' movement in every country.Prussian militarism, in the person of large landowners and Rhine-Westphalian industrialists craving for new territory, promised Germans "a place under the sun", but in reality brought them senseless sacrifice, inflation, and economic ruin.
Guy de Maupassant in his essays quotes Helmuth von Moltke's reply to pacifist delegates: "War is a saint, divine institution; it is one of the sacred laws of mankind; it keeps up in men all the great and noble sentiments---honour, disinterestedness, virtue, courage; in short, it keeps them from lapsing into a most loathsome materialism." Maupassant comments with bitter irony: "To pillage the cities, burn the villages, ravage the people, and then to encounter another agglomeration of human flesh, to attack it, to make lakes of blood, plains of piled-up bodies mixed with soaked and blood-stained earth, to pile up mountains of corpses, and to be left without arms and legs, with a split skull, to no one's benefit, and to croak somewhere in a field at the very time when your aged parents, your wife and children are dying of hunger---this is what is called not lapsing into a most loathsome materialism.''^^*^^
Having suffered defeat in World War I, Prussian militarism was, however, not rooted out. The rulers of the victorious states did not do this. Much could be said about their motives and above all their _-_-_
^^*^^ Guy de Maupassant. Sur I'eau. C. Marpon et E. Flaminarion Editeurs, S. D., Paris, pp. 75-76.
57 eagerness to spearhead militarism to the East, against the Soviet Republics. However, we will merely mention here that German militarism was not liquidated and feeding ground was preserved for its rebirth when Hitler came to power.The augmentation of German "living space" was proclaimed one of Germany's policy aims, involving the enslavement and even annihilation of peoples neighbouring Germany.
The German humanist, Heinrich Mann, said regarding the man calling himself the Fiihrer: "His efforts pursued a single calculated end---to dehumanise the Germans. For only those who have been dehumanised could carry out his plans to destroy Europe, its population and culture.''^^*^^
The Japanese and Italian fascists share responsibility with the German Nazis for unleashing World War II and for the monstrous crimes committed during the war. This, of course, does not exculpate the ruling circles of the United States, Britain, France and other Western countries, which aspired to direct the attack to the East, against the Soviet Union, while ``appeasing'' the aggressors.
The Japanese military doctrine is most ancient in the world. Similarly to Prussian, Japanese militarism planned to conquer by force of arms the islands and countries neighbouring Japan. The Japanese aggressors also longed for Manchuria, Mongolia, and the Soviet coastal area in the Far East. In the 1930s, Japanese imperialism reorientated itself toward the Pacific Ocean basin, having embarked on the course of arms race. It is hardly accidental that _-_-_
^^*^^ Heinrich Mann. Essays. Bd. 3, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin, S. 394.
58 American policy-makers left unnoticed such a shift in the activity of Japanese imperialism. Can one really close one's eyes, for example, on the corporate attitudes which draw closer together militarists of different stripes?The militarists share the experience and learn one from another. Italian militarism, though self-- conceived, made a poor showing on the battlefield. Yet its "theoretical exploits" furthered the advance of militarism in other imperialist countries. The Italian top fascist, Benito Mussolini, whose life ended ignominiously, was an ardent preacher of war, which, he said, ennobles man.
As regards lasting peace, Mussolini asserted that fascism believed it to be neither possible nor beneficial. This point deserves our attention if only because statements of present-day advocates of the arms race are very close to it in spirit. To say that peace is not the highest blessing is to slide down to that ignominious road taken by fascism.
The roots of militarism lie within the most re^ actionary element of the ruling bourgeoisie. This is its social base and, consequently, its applicability to all capitalist countries. At the same time militarism is specific in each instance, in every country. Indeed, it serves the interests of ruling classes of a certain capitalist state, taken as a whole together with all its peculiarities, history of development, and position in the system of international relations.
The scope and purpose of this book do not allow for a detailed investigation of the historical development of British, French, and American militarism, although such an investigation would be of great academic and political interest. We will note, however, that the transition of American capitalism to 59 the imperialist stage was accompanied by a broader use of armed violence in US foreign and home policy.
Theodore Dreiser wrote, "by wars thus far we have capitalism and imperialism grown, and war it is that creates the first flair for big business and its tremendous undertakings. Under its pressure thousands of listless persons proceed to work and increase incomes.''^^*^^
After World War I, militarism became a factor that increasingly influenced the political life in the United States. After World War II, its influence became so apparent that American sociologists, including those not leaning to the liberal wing, were forced to recognise it. By the turn of the century, American militarism had already caught up with its European counterparts.
This short survey of the historical development of militarism in Germany, Japan, Italy, etc., prompts the conclusion that militarism possesses a general trait, viz. aggressiveness, an urge to expand. Therefore the increased influence of American militarism among other imperialist powers meant that it engaged in active competition with them for spheres of influence, for a redivision of the world and redistribution of colonies.
The growing of capitalism into imperialism, enhanced its tendency to give preference to the power factor, i.e., to the threat of use of armed force, and, in the final analysis, to its use as a form of violence in foreign politics. The desire to make peace but a short respite between wars is convincing proof _-_-_
^^*^^ Theodore Dreiser. Tragic America. Horace Liveright, Inc., New York, 1931, p. 403.
60 that imperialism has firmly tied up its future with militarism.Militarism goes hand in hand with imperialism, yet it would be wrong to suggest that militarism emerges as an inevitable consequence of bourgeois economic development. Historical experience shows that expansion of economic ties and the international division of labour can and indeed do bring nations closer together.
It is the monopolies and those whom they place at the helm of power that turn to militarism and nurture it without considering the consequences for their own people.
One of the first imperialist wars, the AmericanSpanish War of 1898^^11^^, was caused by predatory, aggressive policies of the United States at the turn of the century. American bourgeois historians generally refuse to recognise that US foreign policy was partly responsible for starting World War I. Yet this conclusion is scientifically based and reflects the actual consequences of American foreign policy in the first decade of the 20th century, which was formed under the influence of rising American militarism.
American militarists together with financiers and industrialists waited for a "big war" that would bring them large profits. Although they succeeded largely in building up an American military machine at the turn of the century, direct participation in a world war promised much more. The British sociologist, John Hobson, whose work Imperialism was highly praised by Lenin, remarked that "in war ... militarism becomes absolute within the State". This means that during wartime limitless opportunities exist to inculcate militarism into the policy and economy of 61 the country, and such opportunities were used by American militarism. "The trap which closed so tightly round European nations in 1914," wrote Hobson, "and which since has caught the one great pacific Power of the modern world, America, was not war. It was militarism.''^^*^^
From that moment on, military expenditure became the largest item in the American budget. In 1920, the first year of peace, the upkeep of the army and navy swallowed up 38 per cent of the budget, and together with the payment of war expenditures reached 93 per cent.
This allowed American militarism to retain many of the gains seized during World War I. As the material base of the US armed forces was expanding, new war doctrines were elaborated. The Italian Giulio Douhet is usually considered to be the founder of the "air war" doctrine. Without arguing who was the first, let us note the large role played by the American General, Billie Mitchell, in the formulation and propagation of this doctrine. According to some historians, Mitchell swayed the American public to accept the concept of total war against the population. This led to ``blanket'' bombing and eventually to the atomic attack on Japan at the end of World War II.
In the period between the two world wars, Washington systematically refused to support the proposals, particularly those advanced by the Soviet Union, which if implemented, would have helped avert World War II. Instead American militarists hoped to spearhead the Nazi attack eastward and longed for the revival of a powerful Germany _-_-_
^^*^^ J. A. Hobson. Democracy After the War. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1918, pp. 13, 16.
62 dependent on American corporations. Later Churchill in his war memoirs was compelled to recognise that the United States and Britain reared the "ulcer of militarism" in Germany. __*_*_*__For a long time, Washington has been trying to impress upon the American people that it is uniquely peaceable. "The United States," the American historian Richard Barnet assures, "has always regarded itself as a uniquely peaceable nation.''^^*^^ Declarations to this end have saturated all US presidential platforms. Many Americans, therefore, were shocked by the outgoing US President Dwight Eisenhower's warning about the danger of militarism facing American society. Eisenhower warned about the enormous influence attained by the military-industrial complex and underlined the danger of the wrongly placed power.
Eisenhower did not give his own definition of the concept "military-industrial complex", but American and other investigators who have subsequently occupied themselves with this question are practically
> all in agreement that it denotes the alliance of the military with the largest monopolies interested in an arms build-up and in conducting an expansionist policy backed up by military might. In other words, the military-industrial complex unites groups who stake on militarism.
Eisenhower said that the influence of the military-- industrial complex---economic, political, even spiritual, "is felt in every city, every state house, every _-_-_
^^*^^ Richard J. Barnet. Who Wants Disarmament? Boston, 1961, p. 6.
63 office of the Federal Government", that is, throughout the country.^^*^^Some investigators refuse to see the relationship of the military-industrial complex and militarism and deny that the complex is essentially another guise of militarism. Not recognising the obvious, they allude to the ``democracy'' of the US and its domestic policies and to the principle of division of power which, it is said, precludes constitutionally the possibility of an excessive role of the military in the country.
But is it really so? The American novel Seven Days in May, published in 1962, describes a military conspiracy to seize power in Washington. It immediately became a bestseller, was reprinted ten times and made into a film. If it was only because of the author's power of imagination, why then did the Pentagon, as the American press wrote, "fume with rage"? The age-old proverb "Where there's smoke, there's fire" is very appropriate in this case. It was no coincidence that Senator Eugene McCarthy from Minnessota recommended that this novel should be read with all seriousness.
And then there is Dr. Strangelove, the cynical advocate of atomic bombing, whose name became commonplace; Where was he born? Where did this character ripen? In Britain, France, the Soviet Union, India? Once again in the United States. It can be assumed in advance that freedom of thought, of its expression, and the like will be brought up. But are the creative possibilities in the other aforementioned countries really more restricted than in the _-_-_
^^*^^ The Military-Industrial Complex. Ed. by Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Harper & Row Publisher, New York, 1972, pp. 204-08.
64 United States? Of course, they are not. Such creations are the products of the psychological attitudes of the population and of its spiritual elite, of the influence exerted by the media in the hands of the ruling circles. All this must not be overlooked in analysing modern American militarism.American militarism adopted an inherent trait of American capitalism---its businesslike attitudes, its desire to play big, to squeeze out maximum profits while preserving a democratic facade.
This trait is also peculiar to the American militaryindustrial complex, whose origin can be traced to World War I, when it became important to define the relationship between the government (the arms customer) and the corporations (the arms suppliers). During World War I, the US Defense Ministry, through its War Industries Board, concluded some 30,000 contracts for the delivery of weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, etc. A significant part of the contracts were concluded on the ``cost-plus'' basis. This formula, which today is rarely mentioned, played an ominous role in the development of the American military-industrial complex. It has guaranteed superprofits to military producers at the expense of tax-payers. Essentially, it boiled down to the following. The industrialist claimed from the customer (i.e. the government) the payment of the manufacturing cost of the ordered product plus a profit fixed in advance. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Benedict Growell, the profit margin when the formula was first applied was between 7 and 14 per cent.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ See: Benedict Crowell. Demobilization: Our Industrial and Military Demobilization after the Armistice, 1918-1920. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921, pp. 113, 124-25.
__PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-2045 65In reality, however, real profits could greatly exceed the fixed profit. Since the government guaranteed the payment of costs, the industrialist was not motivated to keep costs down. On the contrary, he was tempted to include as costs expenditures for installing additional industrial capacity. Such artificially accelerated depreciation essentially meant an increase in income for the given corporation.
Owing to this system, enterprises in the war industry had a corruptive effect on the American economy, being a source of inflation and diverting the raw materials and skilled labour needed by other industries.
During World War II the merger of war corporations and the government broadened and deepened. The American sociologist, G. Wright Mills, pointed out that "it had cost some $40 billion to build all the manufacturing facilities existing in the United States in 1939. By 1945 an additional $26 billion worth of high-quality new plant and equipment had been added---two-thirds of it paid for directly from government funds.''^^*^^ In other words, during World War II private companies which participated in arms production were able to increase their fixed capital by nearly 50 per cent at the expense of the government.
Arms production led to a high degree of government control over a number of leading branches of American industry. Bourgeois economists would probably argue that the Reagan administration has adopted an economic programme intended return America to ``pure'' forms of private enterprise. But _-_-_
^^*^^ C. Wright Mills. The Causes of World War Three. Seeker & Warburg, London, 1959, p. 64.
66 who can talk about ``pure'' forms of private enterprise when it is exactly the state which orders, pays for, and uses military products supplied to it. Moreover, the list of suppliers remains practically unchanged. The military-industrial corporations are nothing else than government contractors. And the industrial appendage of the Pentagon is ultimately controlled by the government.The McDonnell Douglas Corporation, which specialises in producing the F-5 Phantoms, F-15 and F-18 fighter-bombers and similar products, is listed as a private company. But to a considerable degree its prosperity depends on the government. Its portfolio of orders, notes Business Week, is essentially the procurement list of the Pentagon. As little as 23 per cent of the sales of this firm in 1978, for example, were of a non-governmental character.^^*^^
The close connection between state-monopoly capital and the war industry affects decision-making when downturns in the economy call for its tighter state regulation. The need for such regulation became especialy pressing during the Great Depression of the 1930s. At that time, too, orientation towards militarism had its say. The US government, besides providing public-work jobs, stepped up arms orders to stimulate the economy and lessen unemployment. Many millions of dollars earmarked for "industrial rehabilitation" were invested in the development of the Air Force and Navy. As a result, this kind of state interference in the economy and the expansion of the sphere of state-monopoly capital fostered the growth of militaristic tendencies.
Given a deep economic crisis, which threw out of _-_-_
^^*^^ Business Week. 23 October 1978.
67 factory gates a wide mass of despondent workers, compelling them to stand in line for a cup of soup, it was necessary to justify somehow the fattening of arms industries. Demand gives rise to supply, and economists were found who were prepared to prove theoretically the expedience of earmarking money to the production of means of destruction.Stuart Chase, who commented on Roosevelt's New Deal policy, declared militarisation to be a chief means of ensuring the needs of the whole of society. "At certain times when unemployment is growing, any spending, anywhere, for any purpose, will help restore equilibrium," he asserted. "At such times thrift is a deadly enemy of financial stability. Spend for machine guns, poison gas, rum, harlots, stone pyramids or Boulder Dams---it makes little difference as far as the financial mechanism is concerned.''^^*^^
It was said cynically, yet frankly. The bosses are not concerned with the suffering working people, with man and his rights. They remember the common man at best when they go hunting for votes. President Jimmy Garter (Democrat) made it to the White House with the help of promises to better the position of ``middle'' Americans and to cut down defence spending. The results of his actions were diametrically different---inflation worsened the economic position of the average American, yet many billions were given over to the Pentagon for weapons. Business Week called the additional defence spending a ``buffer'' against a recession. At the same time the magazine admitted that the Pentagon had piled _-_-_
^^*^^ Stuart Chase. The Tyranny of Words. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1943, p. 198.
68 up a $16 billion backlog of carry-over appropriations from previous years.^^*^^Having inherited a shaky economy---the result of massive unemployment and inflation---President Reagan (Republican) put as his first task its stabilisation. Reagan's method is distinguished from President Carter's by a still greater attack on social needs and by unlimited generosity with respect to the Pentagon. The Reagan administration plans to push defence spendings to the $250 billion mark by 1985.
Some bourgeois researchers fail to distinguish between the military-industrial complex and society at large. This point of view is obviously faulty. It equates those who determine defence policy with those who can and do become its victims.
Generally speaking, the military-industrial complex reflects a certain harmony of interests of certain circles connected in one way or another with militarism. Owing primarily to economic interests---the dependence of personal incomes on arms production--- these circles, consciously or not, support militarism and militaristic ideas. The degree of influence the military-industrial complex can exert on a state's foreign and domestic policy is proportional to the size of capital invested in arms production and the war machine and to the circle of personalities drawn into this sphere of activity.
Adam Yarmolinsky, author of a detailed study of the American military machine, writes that if American foreign policy "became partially militarised, the blame should not be laid primarily on the military establishment but on Presidents, civilian policymakers, the Congress, and [even] the American
_-_-_^^*^^ Business Week. 11 December 1978.
69 people---and on the situation in which they found themselves''.^^*^^In laying the blame for militarism in the United States on external, supposedly objective, circumstances, including the American people, Yarmolinsky exculpates those who actually pushed the United States into the arms of militarism---the ruling circles, major industrialists and the top brass.
Closer to the truth are those who have shown that the military-bureaucratic machine of any imperialist power has three component parts. For example, advancing the term "power elite", C. Wright Mills showed that this is composed of "economic, political, as well as military, men whose interests have increasingly coincided''.^^**^^
The military-industrial complex and its ruling upper crust is comprised of these social groups. But the penetration of the complex into the fabric of contemporary bourgeois society is far deeper. Colonel James Donovan writes about Americans "in uniform, veterans of military service, defense---industry employees and their dependents, defense scientists, Defense Department civilians, businessmen, and politicians---all have direct and personal interests in the nature and scope of militarism and the activities of the defense establishment''.^^***^^
The question of the social make-up of the military, industrial complex is of great significance. It sheds _-_-_
^^*^^ Adam Yarmolinsky. The Military Establishment. Its Impact on American Society. Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 37.
^^**^^ C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, New York, 1956, p. 224.
^^***^^ James A. Donovan. Militarism, USA. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1970, p. 2.
70 light on the degree of influence the arms race has on the formulation and conducting of an imperialist state's foreign policy.Soviet researchers usually highlight the basis that determines the character of the military-industrial complex---the alliance of the military and big monopolies.^^*^^ This alliance did not emerge overnight; it has travelled a lengthy and complex path of development. The union of monopolies and the military---the pivot of the military-industrial complex--- is in fact the centre which spells out the militarypolitical course of the United States, sets the direction and tempo of the arms race. The placing of multi-billion-dollar arms orders is the main lever here.
From the very first nomination to the post of Secretary of Defense---the head of the Pentagon, whose establishment became a landmark in the militarisation of US state-monopoly capital---only those persons who would knowingly preserve the direct links of big business with the military hierarchy were selected. James Forrestall, who headed the Pentagon in 1947, was a partner in the law firm Dillon, Read and Co., closely tied up with the Morgan financial empire. Robert Lovett, another Pentagon chief, had business ties with Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co., a major corporation fulfilling arms contracts. Charles Wilson came to the Pentagon from the post of president of General Motors. He coined the popular phrase in America "What's good for General Motors is good for the country". Robert McNamara was president of Ford Motors before his move to _-_-_
^^*^^ See: for instance, V. M. Ilstein. The Military-- Indusstrial Complex and US Foreign Policy. Mezhdunarodniye CKnosheniya Publishers Moscow, 1975 (in Russian").
71 the Pentagon. Caspar Weinberger, who also belonged to big business before his nomination as Secretary of Defense, has done all he could to inflate defence expenditures, despite all the praise he received for being thrifty. The tendency that has shown up in the aforementioned nominations was summarised by Prof. John M. Swomley, a scholar of the American military establishment, in quoting Congressman J. L. Whitten, who noted that "most of the top people in our Defense Department came from big business''.^^*^^The tradition remained undisturbed when James Schlesinger and Harold Brown became Secretaries of Defense. They rather symbolised a new stage in this tradition; the involvement of scientists into the military-industrial complex, who have either recommended themselves as "civilian strategists" or have participated in developing new weapons systems.
The involvement of small business through subcontracting significantly widens the circle of people who are connected with arms production and who consequently are materially interested in supporting the arms race. According to some calculations, in the 1960s, defence contracts provided jobs for almost 6 and a half million Americans, or about 9 per cent of the work force. Roughly one American family out of six, according to Senator William Proxmire, earns its livelihood on account of amis industry activities. This fact alone does not allow us to include all Americans who receive their pay from arms enterprises as adherents of the arms race. At the same time it undoubtedly influences many of them.
_-_-_^^*^^ John M. Swomley, Jr. The Military Establishment. Beacon Press, Boston, 1964, p. 108.
72The consolidation of the military-industrial complex takes on various converging routes. On the one hand, big business has entrenched itself in the higher echelons of the Department of Defense, on the other, the military have placed their own representatives in the management of corporations.
Prominent American military leaders frequently give up their commands and join major corporations as presidents, vice-presidents, advisors or experts. What is significant, however, is the great number of generals, admirals, and other high-ranking officers who are hired into arm-making firms and corporations. The following is quite indicative. According to a special investigating committee of the US Congress, 261 generals and admirals and 485 officers of the rank of colonel and naval captain were hired by companies producing 80 per cent of US weaponry. As a whole, the management of the Pentagon's 72 leading contractors, according to the same source, included 1,426 senior officers whose yearly salary totalled $16 million.
Sociologists have every reason to concern themselves with the structural swift of the United States towards permanent military economy. But it is not only the economy. The American publicist, diplomat, and former US Representative to the United Nations, Charles Yost, has maintained that the precedent of involving the military in foreign policy decision-making dates back to the Roosevelt administration. This created, in his opinion, "an imbalance of judgement toward military instruments and solutions which gravely distorted US foreign policy over 25 years", that is, up to the 1970s.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Foreign Affairs. Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971.
73The heightened role of the Chiefs of Staff during wartime was not a transient phenomenon, but a reflection of a general process of a deeper involvement of the military in US national politics. The military's meddling in the decision-making process gradually spread even to the lower echelons of diplomacy.
In postwar years, senior officers were given access to important foreign policy-making positions. Leading the way was the nomination of General George Marshall as Secretary of State. According to John Swomley, he "conducted foreign policy like a soldier facing an enemy''.^^*^^ The nomination of General Alexander Haig is a more recent example.
The assignment of military men to diplomatic posts in socialist countries is especially common. The first postwar US ambassador to Moscow was General William Bedell Smith, earlier chief of military intelligence. His successor was Admiral Alan G. Kirk, who was also employed in the intelligence field earlier.
The National Security Council, created at the same time as the Pentagon, must be included in the appraisal of the influence which the military-- industrial complex, as a modern form of militarism, has on US policies. By a 1947 law, which established the NSC, its membership is composed of the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, secretaries of Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and Chairman of the National Securities Resources Board. This alone is convincing proof of how broadly the military have penetrated the higher echelon of power in the United States. The NSC has acted as an "internal _-_-_
^^*^^ John M, Swomley, Jr. Op. oil., p. 141.
74 Cabinet", with a final say in foreign policy decisionmaking and planning the military strategy.In recent years, the NSC has been repeatedly reorganised. But the numerous reorganisations by various Presidents have not altered its essence. CIA and Pentagon reports that pass through the National Security Council ended up on the President's desk in an altered form. The American researchers, Morton Halperin and Jeremy Stone, remark that "through selective disclosure of classified information, it is entirely possible to make a small Soviet threat appear large, and to produce a large US response.. .''^^*^^
In the postwar years, quite a number of instances can be cited when militarist groups tossed about biased, or simply fictitious, information which provoked US political action abroad, seriously complicating the international situation. A pertinent example is the "Tonkin Incident",^^12^^ which Lyndon B. Johnson and the Pentagon fabricated to justify military intervention in Vietnam. The higher authorities and the military went as far as deceiving Congress, the American people, and the entire world community. It is not surprising therefore that American politicians display amazing frivolity with using unverified information, rumours, and even direct slander in order to wreck all measures to halt the arms race. In the autumn of 1979, the Cuban "mini-crisis"13 was invented to hinder ratification of the SovietAmerican SALT-2 Treaty.
The military-industrial complex has gained influential positions in the US Congress, which has considerable powers in working out the budget. The Pentagon maintains a powerful lobby in Congress, _-_-_
^^*^^ Foreign Policy. No. 16, Fall 1974.
75 supported financially by the arms industries. There is at least one lobbyist for every two members of Congress. According to Business Week, among the most energetic and powerful Congressmen are the "50 to 75 legislation-shapers who work for the major military and aerospace manufacturers''.^^*^^ The lobby of the military-industrial complex concentrates on brainwashing the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The lobbyists, as a rule, are well informed, using the services of experienced consultants. Moreover, they can be `` persuasive'' with the help of abundant material wealth generously provided for by their employers.The Pentagon uses the "carrot and stick" method in its approach to Congress. For many years, the largest contracts have been assigned to the most influential members of military committees, who in response usually vote for the Pentagon's programmes.
The increased political role of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the latter half of the 1970s has given the military-industrial complex an additional lever in policy-making. Business Week called attention to the appearance of a new power elite in the defence area in the form of Congressional staffers of the above-named committees. According to a high source in the Department of Defense these staffers, who prepare material for committee members, have become a "relatively new and terribly important part of the Washington decision-making community" .^^**^^
The magazine went on to report the staffers' former professions, which included naval officers, _-_-_
^^*^^ Business Week. 12 February 1979.
^^**^^ Business Week. 27 March 1978.
76 airforce specialists, military laboratory workers, and so forth. They duplicate, as it were, the composition of the lobby.The military-industrial complex is a fusion of socially similar elements. Each element, however, whether it be military circles, industrialists, or even war veterans, also pursues its own, at times selfish, interests. The squabble between US military services over a larger share of the defence budget is a pertinent example. Similar infighting is under way among industrialists who produce various kinds of military equipment, and also among scholars favouring a particular trend in developing weapons systems or military-political strategies.
However sharp the rivalry is at times, the complex would not be worth its name if it were not welded together by common ideas. This forces it, by and large, to act as a united front. One of the manifestations of its influence on national politics is the ruinous arms race.
At the beginning of this chapter we have examined the tendencies to present the arms race as a spontaneous process unfolding according to the formula ``action-counteraction''. This explanation of the arms race mechanism is far from the truth. The UN experts, incidentally, also disagree with this explanations, suggesting instead that the arms race is supported by a multitude of forces acting in accord, and the removal of merely one of these forces is bound to be insufficient for turning back the arms race. The US experts note that in the contemporary form the arms race is becoming a nation's internal process. This conclusion, perhaps, may seem somewhat illogical. Seemingly abstract, it expresses, however, a fully concrete thought: the activities of a state 77 leading the arms race are based on internal motives, on the demands of groups having an interest in the arms race. A pertinent example is the United States, which has initiated all new rounds of the arms race and has been the first to develop new kinds of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Many Western political analysts have also subscribed to the view that the arms race is caused primarily by internal motives in a capitalist country.
The American analyst, Colin Gray, points out specifically that the precise course of the arms race is linked with "calculations and struggles of an intrastate" character. According to Gray, however, the "real dynamo" of the arms race is "a pathological public mood" and "the epidemiological view of an arms race; that a whole population is infected with a war psychosis''.^^*^^
War psychosis is not a spontaneous phenomenon; it is the result of deliberate ideological work. Organisation of mass military psychosis was one of the main methods of the Nazis. With its help, they succeeded in transforming talented German people, or rather those far from politics, into obedient cannon fodder.
Lately the manipulation of American public opinion has been particularly widespread. It has become a normal feature of election campaigns. During practically every election campaign after 1956 the "Soviet threat" and the US "lagging behind" in certain (decisive, of course) weapons, which supposedly threaten US security, have influenced voter psychology. ``Gaps'' were first invented in the _-_-_
^^*^^ Colin S. Gray. The Soviet-American Arms Race, pp. 23, 32.
78 number of bombers, then in IGBMs, then in ABM systems, then in throw-weights, and so on. These ``gaps'' proved ficticious, but each time the stir around them raised the arms race to a new level.Many Western scholars and statesmen point to scientific and technological progress as one of the factors stimulating the arms race. It would be wrong to deny that scientific and technological progress plays an important role in creating material conditions for the development of weapons and military hardware. Yet it cannot be considered the principal vehicle of the arms race. The cause-and-effect relationship is different here.
The caprices of generals and admirals do not bring about scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs. The scientific and technological revolutions develops according to its own laws. The trouble, however, is that militarism can twist these laws. Arms orders of the military-industrial complex, which are sometimes exigent, channel R&D into a military direction, thereby militarising progress in science and technology. It would be instructive to ponder why a socialist country, the Soviet Union, was the first to place at the service of mankind for peaceful purposes two of the greatest scientific and technological achievements of our time---the use of atomic energy and the creation of powerful space rockets.^^14^^ And at the same time an imperialist power, the United States, openly stakes on using these achievements for military purposes.
Militarism was born in Europe and only later spread to America. Today the roles have reversed. American militarism plays the lead role, trying, on the one hand, to increase the militarisation of its military allies and, on the other, to shift on their 79 shoulders as large a part of the common military burden as possible.
Militaristic tendencies in US foreign policy helped draw West Germany into NATO, and later make it NATO's principle bridgehead. The American 7th army---162 garrisons and over 210,000 troops---was stationed in the FRG alongside British, French, and Canadian soldiers. With the direct help and cooperation of the Pentagon, the West German Bundeswehr, numbering more than 450,000 men, became the main shock force of NATO.
A military-industrial complex arose in West Germany, too, with its own peculiar traits; virtually all the leading monopolies in the country participate in arms production, which provides work for more than 500,000 persons, if we include subcontractors.
The West German industrial complex produces more military hardware than the Bundeswehr can assimilate. West German Leopard tanks are used by the armies of Belgium, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, and Turkey. The FRG has become a leading arms exporter and America's serious arms sales competitor. The West German military-industrial complex has claims on equipping all NATO armies, including the US, with Leopard tanks. The Pentagon, however, preferred its own tank, the XM-1.
The differences of opinion did not, however, shake the common desire of both US and German militarists to raise military expenditures. At a NATO Council session in May, 1978, West German representatives actively pressed for its decision to increase the defence budgets of NATO's countries by 3 per cent annually in real terms (that is, after account- ; ing for inflation). Only later, influenced by the 80 worsening political situation, did the West German government call for the percentage to be somewhat lowered during crisis years, yet preserving the 3 per cent level for a more protracted period. The West German military-industrial complex stands at the head of those advocating the integration of all West European arms industries.
In Japan, as of now arms production plays a comparatively modest role in the monopoly activities. But for individual corporations the share of military goods is reaching such a level that there are all signs that a Japanese military-industrial complex is in the making.
American militarism plays the role of ally to the Japanese ruling circles who, contrary to the Japanese Constitution, have taken the course of militarism. With its great military-technological possibilities, Japan is gradually turning into an important military force in the Far East.
In 1976, a general national defence programme was adopted in Japan to strengthen its armed forces by equipping them with the latest technology. Specifically, a decision was made to begin production, under American license, of the F-15 fighter-bomber. The militaristic tendencies in Japan come up, however, against some serious obstacles. They include, besides the constitutional restrictions, the resistance of the masses. Rooted in the minds of the Japanese people is the belief that the low level of defence spendings in Japan (less than 1 per cent of the GNP) is a central factor guaranteeing the speedy growth of the Japanese economy. They justly perceive the demands of American and Japanese arms-race proponents to increase Japan's arms spendings as an attempt to hamper Japanese industry, which has __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6-2045 81 become a serious competitor of American corporations.
Also indicative are increased militaristic tendencies in Britain, France, Italy, and the other NATO countries. The process takes on different courses due to the peculiar position of each country within the Western world system.
National liberation struggles and the disintegration of the old colonial empires broke off the colonial trend in French and British militarism. The consequences, however, were different. French militarism has preserved and even to a certain extent strengthened its aggressiveness toward African countries. British militarism, after a number of failures, prefers a more covert support of racism in Africa.
Considerable differences can be observed in other regions as well. For a long time in the past, Britain had been the leader in the naval arms race. For a time it had also been in the lead in aviation. As a result of the British bourgeoisie's capitulation to the United States, British militarism, within the bounds of its "special relationship" with the United States, plays but second role to American militarism.
Gaullist France, on the contrary, ``mutineered'' against American dominance in NATO, left its military organisation and took the course of military self-sufficiency. That had specific consequences in regard to the formation of French militarism and of its military-industrial complex. Lately, however, outward displays of independence have begun to be combined with a certain gravitation in some aspects of the arms race toward cooperation widi other NATO countries, including the United States.
Not content with supplying weapons for their own countries, the military-industrial complexes of the countries-members of the Western military 82 alliances, attempt to draw into the arms race countries outside these alliances. This, of course, does not merely involve arms sales. A new international political process is under way, brought about by modern militarism. This process has a clear objective: to create a clientele for modern militarism in those countries which have earlier been free from it. Of special concern is the involvement in the arms race of developing countries, which are burdened with problems of developing their national economies. The events in Iran have shown how dangerous is a policy aimed at stimulating militaristic tendencies in developing countries. The Iranian revolution overthrew the anti-popular regime of the Shah, who had established close ties with a number of arms industries in the United States. But the militarisation of that region brought with it negative consequences, having destabilised the situation in the Persian Gulf area. The causes of the destabilisation are, of course, diverse, yet the region's involvement in the arms race was surely one of the principal causes.
The events in this region have borne out the conclusion made by the United Nations Association of the United States in a brochure published with the help of Cyrus Vance. "The rapid proliferation of highly sophisticated weapons to the Third World," it says, "may foster militaristic tendencies and encourage national leaders to think of military, rather than political, means for resolving their international disputes.''^^*^^ The influx of modern weaponry into developing countries exacerbates an arms imbalance _-_-_
^^*^^ Controlling the Conventional Arms Race. United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, 1976, p. 6.
83 that in turn whips up a new arms race, prompting various military adventures. __*_*_*__ __NOTES__ "* * *" is *LEFT* aligned for some reason.Back in the World War I years people began to ask themselves who profits by war and who is responsible for starting it. After the war, under pressure from the emerging pacifist movement, attepmts were made to pin down those responsible. People arrived at the conclusion that a larger part of the responsibility lay on the "manufacturers of death", i.e. the military industrialists.
After World War II, it was the war criminals who were brought to trial and punished at Nuremberg and in Tokyo.^^15^^ Yet also tried was militarism in the face of military, political, industrial, and other dealers. That seemed to be a severe lesson for everybody. Yet today militarism has again raised its head. It again recruits new allies and strengthens its base in the form of imperialist military-industrial complexes. The arms race that has swept the globe is the most ominous and clear manifestation of modern militarism. Militarism and the arms race are like Siamese twins---one cannot exist without the other. This is why militarists of all hues take every pain to ensure the continuation of the arms race. They attempt to complicate the arms limitation and reduction talks, to impair the already-concluded disarmament agreements and to block the process of political and military detente. This makes the essence of the confrontation between militarism and disarmament, between the forces of war and the forces of peace, between the two approaches to the organisation of international relations and to the solving of international problems.
[84] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter III __ALPHA_LVL1__ SOCIALIST IDEALImperialist powers perceived in the triumph of socialist revolution in Russia an event that sounded the death knell of capitalism's socio-political system and threatened to deprive them of their international positions. Though not foregoing ideological and other peaceful forms of struggle, imperialism staked principally on force, on armed struggle against the new social system.
That marked a qualitative shift in .the course of militarism. The objective was now common for all imperialist powers: to combat socialism that had taken real form in the young Soviet Republic. How committed those who set themselves a militarist goal were to that objective depended on the world situation. The heightening of militaristic trends in the imperialist camp was to some extent a reaction to the mounting impact of the disarmament idea on world politics.
Up to October 1917 it had not been particularly difficult to combat this notion: after all, there was little enough serious opposition. The supporters of disarmament had not possessed any real power and had recourse only to appeals to public opinion. Even that means was relatively feeble since, being deprived of information on military programmes, they were unable to put forward a realistic and convincing disarmament plan.
The situation altered radically, however, when the Soviet Union became involved in the disarmament campaign. Imperialism was now confronted not by 85 a weak, unorganised, unstable adversary, but by a firm and consistent opponent of the arms race working towards disarmament.
As Lenin put it, "disarmament is the ideal of socialism''.^^*^^ That succinct formula became an integral part of the conception of socialist foreign policy, a main plank in the foreign policy of the socialist state. It pithily spelled out the attitude of socialism and socialist diplomacy to disarmament. The principles of socialism for which the working class is fighting presuppose that humanity should be saved from war as well as from exploitation, tyranny and poverty. Engels had once called disarmament a "guarantee of peace'',^^**^^ thereby predetermining the approach to disarmament as a means of averting wars.
Anti-Soviet Western writers do not hesitate to turn the facts on their head introducing the Marxist approach to disarmament. The principal thesis they usually resort to is that communists regard disarmament merely as ploy or subtle political manoeuvre. Communists, they say, are not chary of disarming legitimate Western governments so as to smooth the way for subversive activity.
Richard Barnet, for instance, claims that Marx "expressed reservations about disarmament", although he adduces no convincing evidence to back up his assertion.^^***^^
In their arbitrary interpretation of a Marxist approach to the link between the campaign of the working class against war and the campaign for _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 23, 1964, p. 95.
^^**^^ Marx, Engels. Werke. Bd. 22, S. 373.
^^***^^ See: Richard J. Barnet. Who Wants Disarmament? Beacon Press, Boston, I960, pp. 59a 60,
86 socialism, right-wing political commentators resort to the calumnous imperialist propaganda notion that communism is interested in wars in so far as they assist the "cause of world revolution''.The paradox is that those who actually do profess such pseudo-revolutionary views (for instance, Trotskyists and suchlike theorists) enjoy the overt sympathy of leaders of imperialist powers. Why should that be? Above all, it is because attempts to impose revolution from without perfectly suit latter-day imperialism, inasmuch as such a form of recklessness undermines the position of the truly revolutionary movement in every country, enabling the powersthat-be to isolate it from the general public and, in certain cases, even physically remove those who head the movement. On the other hand, Trotskyism and other suchlike theories themselves provide arguments in support of the export of counter-revolution: if export of revolution can exist, then it is perfectly legitimate to export counter-revolution as well.
The primitive nature of the ploys used by socialism's foes testifies to the weakness of their positions and their inability to back them up with any really scientific evidence. Hence the endless stream of falsification that replaces the fundamental ideas of Marxism by all manner of nonsense.
The works of the founders of Marxism and their practical activity decisively refute that falsification. Let us take as example Engels' article "The Political Situation in Europe", written at a time when the capitalist powers had become involved in preparing for World War I. In it, he firmly comes out against war, since "once it breaks out, its aim will merely be to hamper revolution". He stresses that the workers "have an interest in maintaining peace, since 87 it is precisely they who will have to pay all the costs of war''.^^*^^
Engels warned the ruling circles of capitalist countries, "If you unleash forces which you will later be incapable of controlling, no matter what happens, at the end of the tragedy you will be in ruins and the victory of the proletariat will either be assured or just as inevitable.''^^**^^
That analysis was borne out by events during World War I unleashed by imperialism: the proletariat triumphed in Russia, while the positions of the world capitalist system were severely shaken.
At that decisive moment in history, the real attitude of various social groups and parties to war, militarism and disarmament was fully exposed. The Lenin-led communists of Russia succeeded in extricating themselves from the war, re-establishing peace and getting on with the job of peaceful construction.
Lenin saw the October Revolution as "the first victory in the struggle to abolish war''.^^***^^ And that was no idle boast; it was a guide to action that became embodied in Lenin's Decree on Peace that caused a sharp turn in the world course of events.
Lenin openly warned bourgeois statesmen that they were wrong to believe they could gain from inflicting aggression on the socialist state: "Any attempt to start a war against us will mean, to the states involved, that the terms they will get following such a war will be worse than those they could have obtained without a war or prior to it.''^^****^^
As continuer of the cause begun by Marx and _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx, Emrels. Werke. Bd. 21. S. 317, 318.
^^**^^ Ibid., S. 351.
^^***^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 33, 1976, p. 56.
^^****^^ Ibid, Vol. 31, p. 490,
88 Engels, Lenin drew on the specific historical material of wars of the imperialist epoch and the new era heralded by the October Revolution; he therefore developed a method for analysing wars and created an integral set of ideas about war, peace and revolution. He uncovered the dialectical relationship between war and the economy and policy, between war and the class struggle.Lenin's ideas played an exceptional part in promoting the active movement of working people for peace and against war; it helped them to merge this movement with the revolutionary struggle of the working class.
The armed forces of the socialist countries in the international situation prevailing today, when two diametrically-opposed social systems confront one another, fulfil a function that is completely at variance with that of the imperialist armed forces. Their function is to safeguard socialist gains, not to seize the land of others, not to conduct a policy of expansion, and not to oppress the working people. Hence the profoundly defensive task of the socialist armed forces, even in the event of them having to combat anti-socialist forces within their own country---i.e., the political support for such forces ultimately lies abroad, in the imperialist camp.
John Reed, an eyewitness to the October Revolution in Russia, showed in his Ten Days that Shook the World that French and British officers took part in the very first armed provocations against the young Soviet Republic. Later on the counter-revolutionary forces were backed up by an open armed intervention, when French, British, American, and Japanese expeditionary forces landed on Russian territory.
In the subsequent period, too, anti-socialist forces 89 found their patrons and well-wishers abroad when preparations were under way to deliver another blow at the socialist countries. Take, for instance, the recent events in Poland.
It is evidently apposite to cite Lenin's statement that "the social character of the war, its true meaning, is not determined by the position of the enemy troops... What determines this character is the policy of which the war is a continuation ('war is the continuation of polities'), the class that is waging the war, and the aims for which it is waging this war.''^^*^^
Communist society will have no standing army. That is the conclusion of the founders of scientific socialism. Engels in particular made this point in comprehensively showing that communist society had no need of standing armies, since the very idea of foreign conquest was alien to it. In the new social situation, the "immense masses of labour power, of which the civilised nations are now deprived by the armies, would be returned to labour in a communist society''.^^**^^
Marxists, however, have never understood disarmament as a unilateral act by the socialist states or oppressed peoples of the capitalist world. We may cite Lenin's warning in his article "On the ' Disarmament' Slogan" that the proletariat can only lay down their arms after disarming the bourgeoisie. In his view, this was the only possible and singularly sensible class tactic, stemming from the objective development of militarism. He wrote that "the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 25, 1977, pp. 366-67.
^^**^^ Marx, Engels. Collected Works. Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 250,
90 bourgeoisie in everything it does, howsoever democratic or humanitarian it may appear, defends first and foremost the interests of its own class, the interests of 'social peace', viz., the suppression and disarming of all oppressed classes''.^^*^^ Once the working class becomes the ruling class, arms are necessary only for safeguarding its interests from encroachments from without. It is ready to lay down arms once that danger evaporates. It therefore stands full square for general disarmament---i.e., the simultaneous disarmament of all states.The stance taken by leaders of imperialist states has been diametrically different. An American leader once expressed their viewpoint eloquently: "Since soldiers are first of all emergency policemen, it would strengthen Bolshevism to have all armies abolished by a stroke of the pen.''^^**^^ Such views predetermined the modes of action of imperialist powers against the first worker-peasant state: both in terms of generous support for internal reaction within the young Soviet state and of organisation of armed intervention. Its participants did not conceal their objective of suppressing the socialist revolution and resurrecting the capitalist order in Russia.
The Soviet government stood firm against armed intervention not because the American, British, French and other interventionists lacked arms or troops, or, ultimately, the will to crush the new state that was class-alien to them. That they had in abundance. The simple fact is that no one can turn back the process of human social development. In explaining the reasons for Soviet Russia's triumph _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 8, 1977, p. 268.
^^**^^ Hoffman Nickerson. Can We Limit War? Frederick A, Stokes Company, New York, 1934, pp. 156-57, 201.
91 over internal reaction and imperialist intervention, Lenin said in November 1920, "While militarism is decaying, we are growing stronger; not we, but they have had the worse of it.''^^*^^The military defeat of militarism meant that the battle shifted onto the plane of politics and diplomacy. Amidst the whole nexus of involved issues was the key one, naturally, of disarmament as the antithesis of militarism and the arms race.
From the outset, imperialism tried to isolate socialist foreign policy. The Harding administration refused to invite Soviet Russia to the 1921 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. We ought to mention here, however, that for the first time in history disarmament was named as a major orientation of the peace campaign in the note of the RSFSR Government on 19 June 1921 to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, USA, China and Japan on convening that conference.
In opening the Conference, US Secretary of State Charles Hughes appealed for an end to " competition in armament" for the sake of economic rehabilitation, progress and "if we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made desperate. . .''^^**^^ This admission sheds light on certain reasons encouraging US leaders to take the initiative in summoning the Washington Conference.
It did not suit the Conference organisers to let their people know the truth about the policy of a state which was seriously posing a question of _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 31, p. 431.
^^**^^ Washington Conference, on the Limitation of Armaments. International Conciliation. No. 169, December 1921, American Association for International Conciliation, New York, p. 23.
92 disarmament and was ready to do all in its power to achieve a settlement. The Conference organisers managed to prevent Soviet Russia from expounding its views on disarmament, but it found other forums for telling the whole world of socialism's principled stand; the Genoa Conference was one such forum.It is now patently clear that fears of the imperialist states about the consequences of wide acclaim to the socialist approach to disarmament goals were more that justified from the viewpoint of their interests. The ruling circles of those powers realised that their approach to the problem would not bear comparison with the disarmament conceptions of socialist diplomacy. And so it turned out. From 1922, when the first session of the Genoa Conference heard the proposals on general disarmament drawn up under Lenin's guidance, socialist diplomacy took the initiative in disarmament talks. Over more than half a century the concept of disarmament formulated by socialism has won millions of supporters and become a powerful moral and political force which the most rabid adversaries of socialism have had to reckon with. The cause lies in the scientific reason and political realism of that conception.
Disarmament is a fundamental and reliable means of ensuring universal peace and security, of averting the outbreak of war on either a local or a global scale. Here lies the qualitative difference between the Marxist approach to disarmament and that of reactionary bourgeois politicians prepared to disarm down to the last soldier of the other side, but unwilling to countenance identical steps binding on themselves. That is why the disarmament campaign is invariably at the centre of Soviet attention.
The attitude of the broad public to disarmament 93 is of exceptional and, ultimately, decisive importance in ensuring a curb on the arms race. It is one thing to regard disarmament simply as an idea; it is quite another for the public to accept it as a goal and invest a vital importance in it for themselves.
Marxists base themselves on the notion that the working class and the poorer sections of the peasants are precisely those social forces whose awakening opens up a stage of genuine struggle against militarism and for disarmament. By virtue of their position within the bounds of social and productive relations, both these classes have no interest in an arms race, not to mention the unleashing of war. Only peaceful work guarantees a real increment in national wealth and, consequently, in material conditions for better welfare for workers and farmers. Lenin called the anti-war movement and popular feeling for peace "the beginning of protest''.^^*^^ The working class has always been the heart and soul of that movement.
As the centre of attraction for all democratic and peace forces, the popular struggle against militarism and for peace provides socialist foreign policy with a lever enabling it to set in motion decision-making on disarmament questions. Soviet foreign policy has always been based on the principle that disarmament is an object of consistent practical action, not a slogan in a political game.
Barnet unwittingly cites facts testifying that ever since 1922, from its first sortie into a big international conference (the Genoa Conference), the Soviet Union has consistently insisted on the need for disarmament, and that the disarmament campaign has enhanced its prestige throughout the world.
_-_-_^^*^^ See: V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 21, p. 315.
94The American author actually assesses the situation with extreme exactitude. People throughout the world can see for themselves that from the very first days of its existence the Soviet government has acted as the standard-bearer of disarmament, has invariably taken the initiative in the campaign for disarmament and has therefore gained for Soviet foreign policy the respect of the broad public.
From the moment the Soviet delegation appeared at the Genoa Conference, imperialist diplomacy has had to adapt itself to new world situation under the impact of socialism. The logic of political struggle dictated that if they were to avoid forfeiting their international influence, the imperialist powers would have to come up with a concept and approach to disarmament negotiations which would enable them to consolidate the positions of bourgeois states. It was no simple matter bearing in mind that the sought-for concept would have to possess propagandist attraction so as to countermand the socialist concept of disarmament.
The choice fell on the formula put forward by French diplomacy: "Security first, disarmament thereafter." It turned out to be extremely effective. Throughout the interwar period and for some time after World War II, Western diplomacy set their formula against the proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which had put disarmament first and insisted on it being free of any preconditions. The concept of "security first, disarmament thereafter" enjoyed the advantage of enabling the West to put over its position in a sufficiently convincing propagandist form, while at the same time shielding it from the likelihood of an early agreement on disarmament questions. The arguments put forward 95 on this basis had the outward appearance of being sound. Indeed, how can a country risk reducing its armed forces whose task is to defend its security if there is no guarantee that other countries will refrain from encroaching upon that security? The answer to that question is undoubtedly in the negative if one were to take a self-centred approach. And that was precisely what the concept's progenitors had counted on in hedging security around with preconditions ensuring a country's security. They reckoned that the aspiration for security had deeply penetrated people's consciousness and that therefore their formula would be accepted at face value and fear fruit. They were also aware that the history of human society was full of examples of ``security'' guarantees as interpreted by some countries often falling foul of the vital interests and security of others.
But the concept of "security first, disarmament thereafter" was unable to stand up to criticism of the other side, sincerely striving to reach a disarmament settlement, especially since it was being confronted by realistic disarmament proposals. It was mentioned earlier that socialist diplomacy regards disarmament as a concerted rather than a unilateral process embracing all countries. With such an implementation of disarmament measures, all countries would enjoy analogous and, moreover, improved security conditions. They would be enhanced because disarmament would lower the level of military confrontation; and that naturally opens up the possibility of improving relations and reducing the likelihood of an armed conflict.
If we approach the concept of "security first, disarmament thereafter" from this sensible standpoint, we can see not only its deficiencies, but also its 96 ulterior motive---of setting back and actually eliminating the very possibility of reaching agreement on disarmament. It is difficult to count on moving towards reducing arms and attaining disarmament when one is confronted with the concept of security which, in any case, is interpreted quite arbitrarily.
After World War II, the situation concerning disarmament markedly changed. The shift in the balance of forces towards socialism put the imperialist powers in a tight corner. They found it more difficult to hide behind the formula of "security first, disarmament thereafter", even though such attempts were actually made in the immediate postwar period when discussing disarmament questions in the United Nations.
The struggle over disarmament took an even more clear-cut character of rivalry between the two opposed social systems. This may be divided into several stages. The immediate postwar years up to the end of the 1950s; the 1960s; the 1970s and, finally, the early 1980s.
At the initial stage, the chief danger lay in the possibility of an atomic war. Imperialism represented by the United States held a serious military-political trump-card of a monopoly of atomic weapons. However, in the initial postwar years, when US atomic stocks were limited, this trump-card was not particularly great in the overall political state of play. It was nonetheless tempting to play the card in the direct, i.e. military, sense of the word. Nowadays, the State Department having released documents of those years, we know that this temptation did exist. A Report to the National Security Council said: "Some Americans favour a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near __PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7---2045 97 future.''^^*^^ But the authors of this document (No. 68) had to take cognisance of the popular mood in favour of peace that abounded among nations after the ending of World War II, the most exacting of all wars. The document-makers, incidentally, admitted that the American people would not have accepted the idea of unprovoked ``preventive'' war.
Since the situation was unpropitious to the plans of the militarists, they bent their efforts on changing it.
``The Army's talk of war and its outspoken hostility toward the Soviet Union during 1947 and 1948 were a cause rather than a result of tension between the United States and Russia.''^^**^^ This assessment belongs to Professor John Swomley who studied the American military establishment. What is interesting about it is that it exposes the part played by military groups in the Gold War at its initial stage.
It was then that the idea of "Soviet military threat" was launched. This has already been dealt with above. Here it should only be emphasised that today it is put about by imperialist propaganda in an entire Pandora's box of devious ideas and mendacities that easily lend themselves to any political conditions and suit the interests of Western ruling circles. The "Soviet military threat" is dragged out at any moment in whatever form that adapts itself to the current political objectives pursued by imperialism.
Whenever Western leaders need to get a decision _-_-_
^^*^^ Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Volume I. National Security Affairs. Foreign Economic Policy. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1977, p. 281.
^^**^^ John M. Swomley, Jr. Op. cit., p. 66.
98 passed on updating NATO weapons, the "Soviet military threat" rears its head in the form of Soviet tank armies ready to appear at the Rhein or Atlantic within weeks, days or hours. No sooner the militarists start thinking about stationing US missiles on the territory of West European NATO allies as the bogeyman changes at once: the "Soviet military threat" is seen in the actions of the Soviet Union in replacing its outmoded missile technology. They only have to require more cash for building up the naval forces and the "Soviet military threat" immediately shifts to the World Ocean. Such examples of how the myth of "Soviet military threat" is manipulated could be multiplied. Anyone who cares to glance through newspapers of recent years will find them in abundance.The ultimate aim of this propagandist juggling act is to justify stepping up the arms race and simultaneously covering up the real motives. And the stronger the popular outcry at the arms race, the louder the militarist propaganda shouts about the "Soviet military threat", poisoning the political atmosphere in the world and creating nervousness and tension.
A threat to peace does exist. But it does not lie in the actions of the USSR. Its source is elsewhere. The above-mentioned document of the US National Security Council referred to Western policy being set the task, in particular, of fostering "the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system''.^^*^^ The way to implement this task is seen as speeding up the building of military power, inveigling tihe USSR in the arms race, including the nuclear arms race.
_-_-_^^*^^ Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Volume I, p. 252.
99 __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END]The fight against the nuclear danger is one component of the integral conception of disarmament that guides socialist diplomacy. The Soviet Union was among the first states to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed the use of the then-known weapons of mass destruction---asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, as well as bacteriological methods of warfare. It should also be noted that the Soviet position on these issues has always been constructive. On 15 February 1928, within the Preparatory Committee of the Disarmament Conference, the USSR put forward a proposal which envisaged, inter alia, complete aerial disarmament and a ban on bomber aircraft as a means of warfare. In an attempt to smooth the way for agreement, the Soviet delegation made appropriate amendments to its draft on 23 March 1928. But the principal idea remained: "All means of warfare, particularly those that menace the civilian population not directly taking part in hostilities (instruments of aerial and chemical warfare) shall be destroyed." The Soviet opposition to atomic weapons of mass destruction, therefore, already at the time of their appearance, expressed the principled and consistent approach of socialism to disarmament issues. This was an expression of the humanitarian concern for human beings and their survival.
The Soviet proposals were tied up with such political steps as a ban on war propaganda, which objectively emanated from the alignment of world forces and a sober account of the nature of the policy of the imperialist powers, their proclivity for reckless military actions. Against the background of the sentences passed at the Nuremberg trial of the Nazi war-mongers, the proposal to ban such propagan-
100da had considerable international political resonance. It tied the hands of those bent on promoting the psychological preparation of cannon fodder for a new slaughter.
For the Soviet Union it was a natural step to take the initiative on an unconditional ban on atomic weapons. This proposal was put before the United Nations in the summer of 1946.
In fact, the question of atomic weapons was first examined at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States in Moscow in December 1945. The Conference recommended that the UN set up a commission to draw up proposals on "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" and to establish "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes".*
The hundreds of thousands of victims of the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened the eyes of people to the danger created by atomic weapons of mass destruction. A torrent of demands to ban those weapons swept the world and that helped gain the adoption of the above-mentioned decision at the Moscow Conference, which stipulated the creating of conditions for using atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. The USA and the United Kingdom were forced to recognise the need to do away with atomic weapons. This signified a singular success for socialist diplomacy and the first postwar political setback for militarism. Although it was not so evident at the time, it is now
* The United Nations and Disarmament. 1945-1970. United Nations, New York, 1970, p. 12.
101in retrospect clearly seen as extremely important in posing the question of banning weapons of mass destruction. It predetermined the main direction of rivalry between socialism and imperialism in the sphere of disarmament.
The recommendation of the Moscow Conference met with the approval of the General Assembly; and in the summer of 1946 the UN Atomic Energy Commission began its work. The Soviet government submitted for its consideration the Draft International Convention on Banning the Manufacture and Use of Atomic Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purposes of Mass Destruction. The entire supplies of existing atomic weaponry were to be destroyed. Any violation of the abovementioned obligations was proclaimed "the gravest crime against humanity".*
This proposal, reflecting humanism inherent in socialism, put the politicians who dealt in militarist categories in a difficult position. In the light of the monstrous power of the atomic bomb, to resurrect the old League of Nations' slogan of "security first, disarmament thereafter" would seem like heresy, if not a mockery. Only the politically blind would not see that atomic weapons themselves presented after the war the chief real threat to international security. They were capable of being that drug which in the circumstances of general war-fatigue could push political morons into military adventures.
An awareness of the danger encouraged a group of world-renowned scientists to issue a warning. A document that has gone down in history as "The
Russell-Einstein Manifesto"^^16^^ stated: "We urge the governments of the world to realise, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them."*
In drawing up a proposal on unconditional banning of atomic weapons the Soviet Union was faced with the question of how to ensure a check on the observation of the pledges adopted by all parties to the future agreement. The military intervention of imperialist powers after the triumph of revolution in Russia, the perfidious attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR and the hostile manoeuvres of imperialist diplomacy with which the Soviet Union had had to cope on more than one occasion again and again demonstrated the vital need to check the actions of parties to any international agreement, and not to rely on declarations which could be thrown into the waste-paper basket the following day.
The Soviet Union had drawn its own practical conclusions from all that it had experienced; consequently, from its first proposals on disarmament it set out a principled approach to testing pledge observance. All Soviet proposals have envisaged effective international control, checking by the public that governments are adhering to the disarmament obligations undertaken. Reliance on public forces has corresponded to the open nature of Soviet foreign policy. It has taken into consideration historical experience when the populace, ordinary men and women, sounded the alarm at the violation of the Versailles commitments for containing the German
* Impact of Science on Society. Volume 26, No. 1/2, January-April 1976, the UNESCO Press, Paris, p. 16.
103* The Foreign Policy of the USSR. 1946. Documents and materials. Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1952, p. 635 (in Russian).
102Reichswehr, while official ``inspectors'' had shut their eyes to the actions of German revenge-seekers.
The Soviet understanding of control over implementation of disarmament measures is simple, logical and scientifically-grounded. It consists, briefly, in the following: control measures must be in strict accord with the disarmament measures being implemented. So, until forms of inspection are worked out it is necessary initially to agree on specific disarmament measures and determine, therefore, the exact amount and nature of obligations of governments. After that there is the possibility of establishing what inspection measures can be applied and what the terms are for carrying them out.
Soviet diplomacy is also based on the premise that a formal, technical approach to resolving the inspection problem is impractical. This is an important and acute political problem which cannot be resolved successfully without account for the overall international situation and the nature of relations between countries, which obliges them circumspectly to have regard to trust between states, not to subject it to unnecessary trials by putting forward superfluous demands capable of infringing another's sovereignty.
By contrast to the Soviet policy on control, that of the imperialist powers is not distinguished by consistency. During the interwar period no accord existed between the principal imperialist powers. Britain and France were content to go along with the inspection system under their supervision. However, during negotiations the United States did not hide its dislike of any international control.
The instructions to Gibson, US representative in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, contained
104the following note from Secretary of State Frank Kellogg: "You should make it clear that the United States would not agree to place the supervision of its armaments or the carrying out of any programme for the limitation of armaments in the hands of the League of Nations or any other international body. The execution of any international agreement for the limitation of armaments must depend in so far as the United States is concerned upon international good faith and respect for treaties. The United States will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in this matter nor be subject to inspection or supervision by foreign agencies or individuals."*
We do not condemn this attitude. On the contrary, we approach it with understanding, inasmuch as it appeals to the principle of international good faith and observance of treaties, a principle worthy of respect. Yet this does not prevent us from drawing attention to the chief aspect of it, viz. inspection or observation by a foreign agency was unacceptable to the United States as a means of ensuring the fulfilment of pledges on disarmament measures that governments had undertaken. What is ^ore, Washington was then objecting to control by countries that were members of a single social system.
World literature contains many commentaries on the stance taken by American leaders. Most frequently they explain Washington's negative attitude to inspection and on-site checking at the time by its unwillingness to submit to the control of Britain and France which ruled the roost in world politics.
When disarmament negotiations were renewed following World War II, the position of the imper-
* Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Volume I, pp. 87-88.
105ialist powers in regard to control altered substantially. Above all, leaving aside certain nuances in the immediate postwar period, the policy became a concerted one, since Washington was now in the driving seat and could impose its own approach upon the other capitalist countries. Changes occurred later, since Britain, for example, came more to look to the USA in negotiations on disarmament, while France moved somewhat away from the USA. All the same, there was no marked difference of opinion among them on control issues.
The concept of the imperialist powers in regard to control over implementation of disarmament measures did not take shape overnight. Their first proposals, put forward when disarmament talks restarted, can hardly be called supervision of the disarmament obligations undertaken by governments. They did not envisage any disarmament measures, therefore the subject of supervision or control didn't exist. There was control per se, which it is more correct to call the exposure (at one time the Western powers actually employed that term) of armed forces and arms of the other side. In circumstances where the parties were not bound by an alliance, and relations between them were strained, exposure was a euphemism for legalised espionage. Any further elucidation on that account would be superfluous.
Later, the Western powers tied up inspection with disarmament steps. But such inspection was conditional in the extreme, and rather resembled a means of justifying the onerous demands made on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, demands which could scarcely be reconciled with a desire to agree on disarmament.
Towards the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it
had become impossible no to deal with the changes in the balance of world forces, a more realistic trend in the policy of the Western powers found a certain reflection in the approach to organising supervision of observance of government commitments. It turned out to be p<- ._-ctly feasible to rely on national control systems backed up by certain international procedures.
This very sketchy description of the transformation in the Western conception of control over disarmament is of some interest, if only because we can clearly see against its background the justification and justice in the approach of socialist diplomacy to this complex issue.
Attempts by bourgeois diplomacy to depict measures for exposing the military potential of the other side as steps leading to disarmament found their most blatant expression in the Baruch Plan. That was the name of the American counter-proposal to the Soviet one calling for an unconditional ban on atomic weapons.
Behind the Baruch Plan lay the US intention to retain the secrets of manufacturing atomic weapons, while simultaneously gaining American domination over world sources of atomic raw materials. It was planned to do so by transferring the rights to own such sources, as well as the enterprises using atomic materials, to an international control body. And this body would have a structure with prior guarantee of US domination.
The USA retained the right to keep its atomic bombs for an unspecified period and to continue to manufacture atomic weapons. The US Army document "The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on National Security", as submitted to Congress, stressed that the
107 106United States "must retain indefinitely ... our knowledge and industrial capacity to produce atomic weapons".* The Baruch Plan was implicitly very closely linked with the "containment of communism" doctrine adopted by the Truman administration. In essence, this was a programme justifying the arms race and intended to exert calculated pressure on the Soviet Union and other socialist states through military, political and economic means.
By imposing a forced tempo of arms race on others, the proponents of this policy maintained that the West was capable of ``bleeding'' the Soviet system, forcing it to keep up with high levels of US arms programmes.** As things turned out, they became captive to false notions of the potential of the socialist economy.
It would be wrong to ignore the adverse effect of having to divert resources to boost the defences of socialist states in the face of the arms build-up by the imperialist powers. Such a diversion of resources, naturally, has held back the rate of socialist economic growth and created certain difficulties and disproportions within the economy. But such difficulties imposed from without have been unable to eradicate the advantages inherent in the planned socialist economy over the capitalist economy. There are no few instances to show that the mobilised potential of the socialist economy is much greater than that of the capitalist economy.
Soviet confidence in the common sense and justice of its position has enabled it energetically to at-
tain a rapprochement of positions and to seek ways of resolving disarmament problems in the interests of security of all nations. This has found its concrete expression in a readiness to take account of the views of other negotiating parties and to thrash out a common agreement.
In focusing attention on atomic disarmament measures, socialist diplomacy made no secret of the fact that it sought a platform on which to unite all peace forces and mobilise their energies for the common goal of consolidating peace, achieved by peoples at considerable cost. In October 1946, the Soviet Union proposed to the UN General Assembly that it recognise a general reduction in arms as a necessary condition of international peace and security.
The tempestuous and tense international events that have occurred in over a third of a century since then may seem to have overshadowed the importance of this step taken by Soviet diplomacy; but any objective historian would surely concur that the Soviet initiative had played an important part in shaping the modern world's international legal norms.
In December 1946, the UN General Assembly unanimously voted for the resolution on principles determining general disarmament, reduction in arms and troops. The Security Council was instructed to draw up measures on these issues. Without overstating the importance of the General Assembly resolution, we should, nonetheless, give it its due. It established the general accord of all UN members on disarmament principles, which testified to the veracity of the socialist conception on these questions and, simultaneously, to a confidence gap, within the UN, as regards the Western approach
109* Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 1947, p. 151. ** World Politics. Volume XXIII, No. 3, April 1971, p. 440.
108which had replaced proposals on disarmament measures by various demands for prior "exposure and supervision" of the level of troops and armaments.
The exacerbation of international tension with the deepening of the Cold War lent particular urgency to the initiatives that paved the way for a businesslike dialogue in the hope of getting moving a decision on the disarmament objective. Such an attempt was made by Soviet diplomacy in September 1948, when the Soviet Union proposed an agreement simultaneously on banning atomic weapons and a one-third reduction in arms and troops by the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The proposal on taking these actions jointly had profound sense in that it showed up, at the same time, the true positions of all parties to this problem. The United States asserted that it could not renounce atomic weapons, since they acted as a counterweight to Soviet superiority in conventional troops and weapons. This assertion actually had no serious grounds whatsoever, but its repetition by the mass media did have a certain effect on public thinking.
The formation in 1949 of the North Atlantic military and political bloc with its blatant orientation against the socialist countries heightened tension within Europe. A substantial group of West European states was now drawn into the sphere of war preparations. The arms race took on a new scope.
The Soviet Union and its friends now had the opportunity and moral right to respond to the actions of the Western powers with similar measures. But the socialist countries, not wishing to heap
coals on the fire and play into the hands of the militarists, displayed caution and endeavoured to find a way of taking the steam out of the situation, operating through the United Nations.
In the autumn of 1949, the Soviet Union appealed to the UN General Assembly to condemn war preparations. It suggested ithat the five great powers, permanent members of the Security Council--- the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and the USSR---conclude a pact on strengthening peace. The very title of the pact would indicate what an impact it could have on the international situation once it was signed. The peace of mind it would bring could facilitate agreement in the sphere of disarmament. However, the Western powers turned down the Soviet offer.
Back in November 1947, the Soviet government had declared that there was no secret about the atomic bomb. Washington regarded the Soviet announcement with obvious circumspection: US ruling circles could not conceive that the USSR had a high enough technology and sufficiently advanced scientists. But the TASS announcement on 25 September 1949 about an atomic test in the Soviet Union and its confirmation by US monitoring agencies left no grounds for doubt: the USA had lost its monopoly of atomic weapons.
In the new circumstances, however, the Soviet government did not slacken attention to issues of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation appealed to the UN General Assembly to recognise the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction as incompatible with membership of the United Nations Organisation. The appeal received lively acclaim from peace
111 110forces in all countries of the world. It was backed up by influential international organisations.
American politicians did not wish to draw the sensible conclusion from the Soviet Union's breaking of the US monopoly on atomic weapons. It would seem that misconceptions of the scientific, technical and industrial capacity of the socialist countries would be bound to force responsible statesmen in the West to contemplate stopping the contest to invent weapons of mass destruction through some form of agreement. After all, its first stage had led not to a strengthening but to a weakening of the country which had regarded itself the bastion of the capitalist world.
Nonetheless, in January 1950 President Truman instructed the US Atomic Energy Commission to continue work on all forms of nuclear weapons, including the hydrogen bomb, then known as the ``superbomb''.* The arms race had entered a new phase: a qualitative leap in the destructive power of weapons. One bomb could now contain not thousands, but millions of tons of potential explosive. The potential was now present to destroy all life on earth.
Against the background of this threat an extremely dangerous situation developed in the autumn of 1950. Under pressure from some bellicose generals, President Truman directly threatened to use an atomic bomb against the Korean people fighting against US armed aggression. The danger of imminent atomic war rallied public groups to make a de-
termined stand in defence of peace. The World Peace Congress in Stockholm^^17^^ played a considerable part in appealing to the conscience and common sense of humanity. More than 500 million people signed the Stockholm Appeal, calling for a ban on atomic weapons as weapons of aggression and mass destruction.
Up to the present day certain writers cannot rid themselves of suspicion in regard to the Stockholm Appeal: they keep silent on the mass nature of the public's response to it, or they try to play down the significance of the Appeal, dismissing it as some sort of "communist propaganda" which, whether they like it or not, betrays their alarm at the popularity of the Appeal.
Bearing in mind the mood of broad sections of the public, the Soviet Union put forward measures for removing the danger of atomic war. It did so in the draft "Declaration on Eliminating the Danger of a New War and Strengthening the Peace and Security of the Nations", which it submitted to the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1950. It qualified the use of mass destruction weapons as a crime against humanity. Another Soviet proposal "On Measures to Combat the Threat of a New World War and to Strengthen Peace and Friendship Among Nations", submitted to the UN General Assembly in November 1951, envisaged, along with an end to the war in Korea and withdrawal of foreign troops, the calling of a world congress to examine questions of considerably reducing troops and armaments, as well as outlawing atomic weapons. At the same time, the USSR called upon the USA, Great Britain, France and China to conclude a Pact of Peace, and for all countries to adhere to it.
* See: Harry S. Truman. Memoirs. Volume 2. Years of Trial and Hope. Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1956, p. 309.
1128---2045
113Realisation of the danger that the flames of the Korean War would spread beyond Korea heightened the anti-war activity of wide sections of the public. This set the governments of imperialist powers a number of problems. One was the loss of their international prestige against the background of the mounting support for Soviet proposals to end the war and to get down to resolving disarmament issues.
Within the United Nations this took the form of searching for ways of ensuring conditions for more productive negotiations. The search ended in the General Assembly establishing a single UN Disarmament Commission. It essentially recognised the validity of the Soviet viewpoint that questions of conventional and nuclear disarmament should require a single approach, and that the chosen approach would not lead to any settlement if it did not take into consideration the interests of each country's security; that would only complicate the issue.
The change in the situation within the UN affected the conduct of Western delegations. While hitherto the United Kingdom, France and Canada had uncompromisingly reiterated the US line and their speeches had actually parodied those of the US delegation, now they began to display a great deal of activity in negotiations, obviously under the influence of the growing pressure of the anti-war forces, and a certain independent note began to appear in their speeches.
On 20 May 1952, the UK delegation submitted to the Disarmament Commission a working document on troop reduction. Its main idea was to set a ceiling of up to one to one-and-a-half million men
114in the Soviet, US and Chinese armed forces, and up to 700,000-800,000 men for the United Kingdom and France. France readily supported the British initiative. The United States did not deem it feasible at that moment to hamper London's diplomatic move.
The UK document had certain drawbacks. All the same, it reflected a small yet positive shift in the Western position. For the first time Western leaders allowed the possibility of real reductions and took account of the principle of equality in the position of all parties. So the Soviet side declared, after careful consideration, its readiness to hold talks on that basis.
The change for the better in negotiations was still only a fairly weak glimmer of hope against the background of the continuing growth in armaments. In November 1952, the USA exploded a hydrogen device in the Eniwetok Atoll; the following August the Soviet government announced that the USSR had carried out an H-bomb test within the Soviet Union. Weapons had now appeared that were thousands of times more powerful than the atomic bomb. This gave the disarmament problem a new scale and acuteness. People were concerned at how governments would react to the new situation, especially those governments on whose actions would depend the future course of events: towards agreement or, on the contrary, towards a further exacerbation of tension. The Soviet Union appealed for a redoubling of efforts to attain agreement. It continued its policy of outlawing now not only atomic weapons, but hydrogen ones as well. As before, Washington staked on the arms race, although now its militarist plans to attain military superiority had failed for the second time. Aid the same
»•
115
the American administration had to reckon with opinions against the arms race.
Discussion in the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1953 bore witness to the shift that had started in the alignment of forces; the Soviet proposals on banning nuclear weapons and reducing armaments had met with a positive response from delegations which had hitherto not displayed any desire for serious discussion. The Soviet draft resolution "On Measures to Avert the Threat of a New War and to Reduce Tension in International Relations" became the focus of attention of session participants.
One indicator of the changing mood was discussion of concrete details of conducting negotiations. Some UN members felt that talks could be more successful if held within a fairly small group with the participation of the major interested states. It was felt that discussion would therefore no longer deteriorate into name-calling and would become more constructive. The idea met with broad support and, with general approval, a subcommittee was set up consisting of the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. Its first session opened in London in the spring of 1954.
Diplomats from the socialist countries did not consider the transfer of talks to such a narrow committee ideal; all the same, they thought it possible to go along. In addition, they took cognisance of the marked improvement in the international situation. The Geneva Agreements on Indochina in 1954 extinguished the flames of war in South-East Asia. The rejection by the French National Assembly of the Paris Treaty on the European Defence Community signified mounting resistance to the rearming of West
116Germany and a growth of anti-militarist moods in Europe.
The Soviet government believed that it should help to promote the favourable trends no matter how weak they were initially. The Soviet delegation told the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1954 that it was ready to seek agreement on the basis of the AngloFrench memorandum of 1954. In spite of its drawbacks, the Soviet government thought it expedient for the sake of agreement to use the constructive aspects contained in it. "The USSR's readiness to accept the Anglo-French proposals as a basis paved the way to breaking the deadlock over disarmament," as the Soviet writer Yefremov put it.* The bulk of UN members evaluated the Soviet move in the same spirit. They publicly expressed satisfaction. For the first time since 1946, the General Assembly had a concerted view of the great powers on the objective of holding talks on disarmament.
Socialist diplomacy endeavoured to make headway on the success already obtained. On 10 May 1955, the USSR took a step which, on the admission of many observers, marked an important milestone in the disarmament campaign. It suggested concluding an internationl convention on reducing over the following two years, in two stages, the size of the armed forces of the USA, the USSR and China to the level of between one and one-and-a-half million men, and of Britain and France to 650,000 men each. These levels had also been mentioned in the Anglo-French memorandum. At the same time the ban on use of nuclear weapons would have to come into force. An excep-
* A. Y. Yefremov. Nuclear Disarmament. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 26.
117tion was made only by decision of the UN Security Council for the purpose of defence against aggression.
There are more than a few admissions by Western politicians that the Soviet step brought agreement closer. Nevertheless, it did not materialise. American diplomacy, which had reluctantly backed the AngloFrench proposals, reneged on them when, for the first time in many years, the possibility appeared of shifting talks onto a businesslike level. The British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, one of the participants in the talks, said with some feeling that "the American reservation had damaged the whole Western position".*
Washington's Pretext for withdrawal was the technical difficulties of control, claiming that they did not facilitate the inspection of material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Hence the ``conclusion'' that nuclear weapons coud not be banned.
This conclusion fit excellently into the "massive retaliation" strategy adopted at that time and relying on nuclear weapons; it presupposed using nuclear weapons where and when the Pentagon deemed necessary. Having taken nuclear ``deterrent'' as the basis of its policy, Washington would no longer entertain the thought of nuclear weapons being banned or destroyed. The notion of the technical impossibility of control was needed to cover the ugly turn-about in American diplomacy.
Incidentally, somewhat later Washington found it advantageous to change its tune in regard to control questions and advanced them to the forefront of its
policy. Not only agreement, but also the actual implementation of control measures were needed as a precondition for launching discussion of the measures of limiting or reducing armaments. The control theme began fully to dominate the arguments of American diplomacy and, in its wake, that of other NATO countries. Accordingly, the bourgeois propaganda media switched to depicting the Soviet Union as an opponent of effective control measures.
Earlier we have dwelt on the Soviet concept of control as compatible with real disarmament measures and enabling nations to find effective forms of control acceptable in specific international circumstances. The ``resistance'' of the Soviet Union to international control is an aspect of anti-Soviet propaganda aimed at distorting the Soviet position.
As testament to that, let us hear the evidence of a man who, although not a direct participant in negotiations, had followed them attentively and often met members of the London Disarmament Subcommittee. Lord Philip Noel-Baker has written that "a careful study of the record shows that since May 1955 the Russians have made considerable efforts to reach agreement including the acceptance, in principle, of a large measure of international inspection and control; while the Western Governments have withdrawn the reasonable `comprehensive' proposal for a first-stage disarmament agreement which they had previously urged".*
The tendentious nature of American diplomacy in attempting to turn control into a sort of vademecum for withdrawing the issue of any measure of disarmament found its expression even in regard to its al-
* Anthony Nutting. Disarmament. An Outline of the Negotiations. OUP, London, 1959, p. 19.
118* Philip Neol-Baker. The Arms Race, p. 9.
119lies. Invoking the idea of technical control difficulties, French diplomacy proposed for its part the formula of "no disarmament without control, controllable disarmament must be implemented". But the French delegation vainly reiterated this formula again and again right up to the 1960s. The Americans ignored the French formula just as assiduously all those years.
They brought their notion of control up to utter rejection of disarmament. With great propagandist pomp at the Geneva Summit in 1955, President Eisenhower proposed an exchange of military blue- I prints between the USSR and the USA, and recipro- | cal aerial photagraphy, which received the name of the "open skies" plan. But it contained no mention of disarmament. At the same time, it demanded the opening of Soviet air space to spy planes, while the military bases of the USA and NATO surrounding Soviet territory were exempted from control. It is hard to fathom for what imbeciles this brainchild of militarist diplomacy was intended.
Considerable shifts in the balance of world forces were taking place by the early 1960s. They were bound up above all with the successes of the national liberation movement which had altered the world make-up with exceptional rapidity. Young national states came into being in rapid succession on the ruins of the vast colonial possessions. The anti-imperialist orientation of their politics meant that forces of peace and progress were growing and strengthening.
The basis of imperialist politics was narrowing. The USA and its allies were now becoming increasingly isolated politically within the UN and, what is more and of particultar importance, on issues of prime international significance, such as that of war and
120peace, disarmament, the elimination of colonial regimes and the respect for sovereign rights of all states.
The consolidation process was deepening in another political area of the world---the community of socialist states. At first it was taking place within the bounds of bilateral, then multilateral relations. One should note that the socialist countries did not force events or artificially overtake historical development. It was six years after the formation of NATO that the Warsaw Treaty^^18^^ was concluded as a response to NATO's aggressive activity and that of other military imperialist blocs. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation became a centre for coordinating the political activity of the socialist countries. Its establishment became an important landmark in the promotion of concerted actions by socialist community members.
The possibility of the peace forces countering the militarist forces was considerably enhanced by the attainments of Soviet science and industry in developing missile technology. The appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) turned the strategic tables on the US position. This paved the way for a new stage in the disarmament campaign. It was now possible to have a wider mobilisation of forces favouring disarmament. New and previously undiscussed or marginal issues now came before the United Nations and its agencies dealing with disarmament issues. These fresh developments were taken into consideration by socialist diplomacy.
The qualitatively new international situation made it necessary to focus attention on other aspects of the general and complete disarmament. A combination of nuclear disarmament measures and reduction in conventional weapons was found which was convincing from the viewpoint of ensuring the security of states.
121A carefully balanced stage-by-stage programme was proposed for implementing these measures, which would facilitate settlement of control issues---- something which the Western powers had particularly become steamed up about. General and complete disarmament guaranteed an equal and identical status of all parties to the agreement. Given the growing membership of the UN, the Soviet proposal demonstrably showed that there was a way of overcoming the difficulties hindering agreement.
Examination of the proposal from the socialist countries on general and complete disarmament lent the 14th UN General Assembly Session an exceptional character. It was one of the most successful sessions in the UN history. The Assembly approved the idea of general and complete disarmament. Examination of the proposed disarmament programme was handed over to the ten-nation Disarmament Commission set up on the agreement of the Soviet, US, UK, and French governments. A specific feature of the new body was the equal representation within it of the two social systems---capitalist and socialist states had an equal number of committee members. On the one hand, this was a tangible success for socialist diplomacy; on the other, it showed the change in the atmosphere of the talks which had now come closer to an effective businesslike dialogue.
Discussion within the UN left no doubt that an overwhelming majority of states appreciated the need to put an end to empty debates and to start responsible talks on disarmament. The Western powers, especially the USA, were now caught on the horns of a dilemma: either they continued to adhere to their previous line and, as a result, lose the initiative and their international prestige, or they shifted ground. The Kennedy
122administration adopted a more realistic course, having begun to improve contacts with the Soviet Union. In the summer and autumn of 1961, Soviet-US meetings took place. As a result, the parties agreed on a joint declaration on the principles of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. It is generally known as "Zorin-McCloy Accord" (after the heads of delegations). This Soviet-US document gained support from all UN members who ratified the principles inscribed within it. All states were now committed to aspire for general and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal. In recent times the UN circles have been recalling that Accord with increasing frequency, regarding it as a good generally-recognised basis for drawing up an all-embracing disarmament programme envisaged in the Final Document of the First Special General Assembly Session on Disarmament.
An all-embracing programme of general and complete disarmament made it possible to involve in the campaign the widest possible spectrum of political and social forces in all corners of the world. The peace and disarmament movement advanced to a higher level and extended its social framework. It became a paramount factor in international development.
Having achieved the objective of defining general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of all popular movements, socialist diplomacy was now able to set objectives of a specific nature. The point of the new tactics was to set out and reach agreement on individual measures for whose implementation conditions were ripe. Preference was given to steps which would bolster trust between states and promote the cause of disarmament step by step. This tactic proved its effectiveness. Discussions during the negotia-
123dons now acquired a more businesslike character, while government actions became more and more determined by an appreciation of the need to bridle the arms race. Of particular importance, naturally, were certain shifts in the US position on which decisively depended whether the Western powers would come to an agreement or not. Washington began to use the NATO mechanism more and more widely in coordinating a concerted view and preventing any of its NATO allies from straying from the fold.
Consolidation of the positions of world socialism, the enhanced defencive capacity of the socialist community and a shift in US strategic position, all forced US political, military, academic and other groups to face up to the need to take a fresh look at the objectives of US foreign policy and the means to attain them. Doubts began to be cast on the extent to which the unbridled arms race corresponded to US national interests.
Among those figures who first began to contemplate the need for the US to revise its approach to disarmament and bring a new concept to the negotiating table was Henry Kissinger. In late 1960, he wrote an article "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack"*, in which he asserted that the danger lay not in armaments themselves or even in their stockpiling, but in the attitude of governments to those armaments. Hence the conclusion that the key to eliminating the danger lay in removing motivation for attack, which could be achieved by establishing arms control. These thoughts were seized upon by other political scientists. As a result, the notion of arms control gradually began to take shape. The formula of such control
expressed the aspiration to adapt American policy to the new situation after overt renunciation of agreement on measures to restrict arms and disarmament had had no effect.
A caveat has to be made at once that the US view of an "arms control" formula creates confusion in people's minds owing to its indeterminate nature, especially those people not well informed on the nature of the struggle over disarmament questions. In embracing measures for testing the fulfilment of attained agreement on limiting and reducing armaments, the idea intended by its proponents also included other actions that would make it possible to keep an eye on everything that referred to arms, their increase, replacement and reduction.
The indefiniteness, not to say ambiguity, of that formula made it possible to bring under one roof various concepts, including utterly contradictory ones. Control could mean both limitation of the arms race and measures that do not at all lend themselves to limitation, let alone reduction. As the US Professor James E. Dougherty noted, from a theoretical viewpoint this formula was extremely broad. A brochure of the American Foreign Policy Association made the point that arms control could include even an increase in certain types of armaments.
Political and scientific circles in the United States came to the conclusion with increasing frequency that the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and the particular danger of the arms race were bound to engender mutual interest in averting a nuclear war and reducing to a minimum the risk of arms competition. Given the existence of such interest, it was assumed that arms control could become a means of restraining the arms race. These ideas lay behind the no-
125* See: Foreign Affairs. Volume 38, No. 4, July 1960.
124don of arms control which in the late 1960s and 1970s determined the official US approach to negotiations. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, after the Reagan administration had come to power, militarist forces had launched an assault on what they termed `` obsession'' with arms control.
In the meantime, people involved in elaborating this notion were guided exclusively by a desire to prevent a worsening of the Western position from the security standpoint. As Jerome B. Wiesner, a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, put it, "there is a growing realisation among knowledgeable people that if the arms race is allowed to continue its accelerating pace, our country [USA---Ed.] will have less security, not more, with each passing year."*
Wiesner advised giving up hopes of winning the arms race, since the Soviet Union was on a par with the United States in level of scientific and technological development and therefore no side would countenance a protracted lagging behind the other in creating and developing any new weapon. Continuation of the arms race in such a situation would invariably have adverse consequences for the capitalist system: the very nature of new weapons increases the vulnerability of the leader of that system---the USA. Hence the conclusion that the task was to find a way to stop the arms race and remove the danger of a nuclear war.
The realisation initially by academics, and then by US leaders, that the interests of the Western powers lay in helping to remove the threat of a global armed
conflict was surely one of the most important factors in breaking the deadlock in the disarmament talks. Additional prerequisites appeared for coordinating steps to curb the arms race. Socialist diplomacy stepped up its efforts to extend these tendencies.
The first agreement was that concluded in 1963: the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The question of banning nuclear tests became of particular intensity after the US Eniwetok Atoll tests which claimed the lives of Japanese fishermen from radioactive fall-out and caused suffering to inhabitants of the Marshall Islands.
Many countries increasingly favoured the need to stop nuclear tests. The trouble was, however, that their position was inconsistent. Even Japan which again was affected by nuclear danger, tried to commit itself to general, noncommital declarations. That enabled the USA and Britain, and then France as well, which tested its first atomic bomb in 1960, to reject proposals by socialist diplomacy to agree on banning nuclear tests.
All the same, the pressure of public opinion and a certain perspicacity in regard to the danger of radioactive contamination of the environment if tests continued at existing rates forced the USA and Britain to come to the negotiating table.
Much could be said about the history of the talks that lasted many years because of the obstructive tactics of Western powers. Their manoeuvring on questions of control so as to hamper agreement became a classical example of stalling.
Nonetheless, the USA and Britain had to conclude the Moscow Treaty. It had a definite restraining effect on nuclear weaponry and methods of its use and
127* Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Special Issue. Arms Control. Fall 1960.
126helped create conditions making it difficult to proliferate nuclear weapons. The Moscow Treaty served as a stage on the way to the conclusion in 1968 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The Moscow Treaty vividly demonstrated that, no matter how complex contemporary problems may be, no matter how great the differences between the social systems, mutually acceptable decisions in the interest of peace can be found given a mature understanding of trends in internationail development and the presence of good-will. Every subsequent agreement on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space, the ban on bacteriological weapons and other agreements have time and again confirmed this conclusion.
The then US President John F. Kennedy regarded the Moscow Treaty from the same point of view. As Theodore Sorensen recalls, "the political change in the atmosphere was even more important than the physical, in John Kennedy's view. The treaty was a symbolic 'first step', a forerunner of further agreements."*
The late 1960s and early 1970s marked an important turning point in international relations. There began a process of reforming the system of those relations, which found expression in international detente that was bound to affect negotiations on disarmament issues. It is perfectly valid to say that from that
moment a new specific stage opened up in the struggle for disarmament. It was at that stage that a number of important agreements confining the arms race to certain areas were concluded and put in force. And the extensive peace movement certainly played its part in bringing this about.
(
Different views exist on detente, sometimes diamet-
rically-opposed to one another: some people would like it to develop as rapidly and widely as possible,
' others no less fervently would like to bury it once and for all. Yet only those who cannot understand the trends of world development are unable to see that the world is on the move and is changing; to try to force it into the corset of the Cold War years, there-
i fore, is a futile and dangerous occupation.
In emphasising the objective conditions for detente, we have no intention of denying the importance of
' the subjective factor---the activity of political parties,
| religious groups and popular movements. Some of them encourage the detente process, others do all they can to undermine it. It is this that explains the complexity, contradictory nature and exacerbation of the present-day international situation.
Disarmament steps taken by socialist diplomacy had an important place in setting up conditions for paramount changes in the international situation. The consistent campaign for their implementation helped to form public opinion against the arms race, in that it ran counter to the interests of all humanity, to expose the various manoeuvres and ploys used by imperialist politicians in fighting shy of agreement. By rendering considerable support to the anti-- imperialist peace forces within the capitalist countries, this campaign helped to step up pressure of democratic circles on bourgeois governments, facilitated the emer-
* Theodore C. Sorensen. Kennedy. Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 740.
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129gence and development of realistic trends in their politics.
Socialist diplomacy has been based on the notion that in the setting of detente, questions of disarmament must be resolved parallel with positive development in other areas of inter-state relations. These processes are closely connected. Political detente leading to stronger mutual understanding and trust between states helps competition between the two socio-- economic systems to take place without the threat of military confrontation and armed conflicts. In such peaceful conditions, of course, it is easier to bring together the positions and to agree on various disarmament questions.
This point of view was also shared by UN experts who had been studying economic and social consequences of the arms race. They had written in a UN report that detente was having a favourable effect on the international situation, reducing the danger of conflicts growing into nuclear war. It defused the atmosphere of the Gold War in relations between the major military alliances, thereby helping to normalise the situation throughout the world. Detente also helped to expand contacts between states.
By creating a firm basis for normal relations, detente improved conditions for mutually-- advantageous exchange between states, for promoting economic contacts and for extending scientific, technical and cultural exchanges.
Given the positive changes, a mounting significance attached to a settlement of issues within the competence of the USSR and the USA---the most militarily powerful countries. When signing the Non-- Proliferation Treaty on 1 June 1968, both governments declared that they were entering upon bilateral ne-
130gotiations on limiting and reducing strategic arms. This fact alone was indicative of the deep changes taking place in the world.
Preliminary meetings began in Helsinki in November 1969. The Soviet Union based its position on the fact that the only possible foundation for talks was the principle of equal security and renunciation of claims to one-sided advantages. This principle emanates from life itself. By the early 1970s a relative or comparative equality existed in nuclear missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States. The then US President Richard Nixon had to admit this when he announced in April 1969 that the gap between the USSR and the USA in strategic arms had been bridged and that it would never exist again. This sober view moved the President to mention in his message to the Congress on 25 February 1971 that only a planned balance of arms could ensure security that would be general and equal, and therefore long-lasting. Thus, the position of the two socio-economic systems and conditions of rivalry between them had changed. While hitherto the main bastion of imperialism (the United States) had been safe from a destructive strike, today the picture is entirely different. It is now in the same boat as the socialist countries---i.e., the military strategic conditions for both systems have reached overall equilibrium.
Considerable time passed by, however, before the realisation of this fact found reflection in practical steps by the US political leadership. The decisive turning point in negotiations came about during the Soviet-US summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972, at which two documents on strategic arms limitation were signed.
The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Mis-
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sile Systems obliged both countries to refrain from deploying national anti-missile defence systems and from creating a basis for such defence. Anti-missile defence above the limit or outside the area stipulated by the treaty, as well as systems outlawed by it, were to be destroyed or dismantled over an agreed period.
The Interim Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms envisaged a fiveyear freeze on all US and Soviet stationary launching pads for ICBMs and for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The terms stipulated for both sides were, as may be clearly seen, identical. They were a material expression of political realism. It is noteworthy that even on the eternally thorny issue of control the sides found a solution that also guaranteed the symmetry of their position---control measures would rely on the national means, whose major element are artificial earth satellites which both the Soviet Union and the USA possess. Thanks to the rapid progress of electronics and telemetries, sputniks make it possible to carry out constant observation reliably.
Soviet diplomacy vigorously tried to extend the zone of agreement with the USA, pursuing the aim of reducing the threat of nuclear war and attaining a lower level of military confrontation. The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed on Soviet initiative during the Soviet-American summit meeting in June 1973. The parties pledged to avoid military confrontations and situations capable of causing a dangerous deteriorations of relations between them. The Agreement was not confined to purely "nuclear"
132bounds, it extended to all cases of dangerous situations capable of leading to nuclear war.
The change of administration in the USA as a result of the notorious Watergate scandal, demonstrating just how far up in the corridors of power contempt for the constitution and legality had reached, raised the natural question of the policy to be adopted by the new President Gerald Ford. This enhanced interest in the Soviet-American summit meeting in Vladivostok on 23-24 November 1974.
Its positive outcome was seen in that both sides were able to agree on a common platform for talks on strategic arms (limitation. It was agreed that the new relevant treaty would be based on the principle of equality and equal security. Specifically, this was expressed in agreement that the USSR and the USA could have 2,400 strategic weapon-carriers each, including 1,320 missiles equipped with MIRVs. In the situation of the stabilised military equilibrium which the Soviet-American agreement ensured, it was now possible fully to devote efforts to overcoming difficulties standing in the way of a treaty on strategic arms limitation.
However, henceforth, a departure from detente policy began to make itself felt with increasing clarity in the actions of the US administration. President Ford did not display the will expected of him to come to agreement. He yielded one position after another under pressure from an enlivened military-industrial complex. The Pentagon and its paymasters tried not only to maintain, but even to extend the potential for increasing strategic arms in both former and new directions. This lay behind the decision to step up the development of cruise missiles, which were seen as capable of ensuring the USA military superiority, so
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as to be able to deal a first, disarming blow to the enemy. That signalled a turn towards intensification of aggressive trends within US policy.
The attempt by the Carter administration to revise the principles of holding talks on strategic arms limitation complicated the situation even more. It may be recalled that at the end of March 1977, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had brought to Moscow proposals at variance with the Vladivostok agreement. Washington had unilaterally renounced the principle of equality and equal security and advanced demands which were obviously designed to ensure US superiority at the expense of Soviet security. Such steps were bound to portray Washington as an unreliable partner liable to depart from already achieved agreement. This, naturally, did nothing to help either create an atmosphere of confidence and trust in international relations, or to consolidate the international prestige of American diplomacy.
On the contrary, the consistent position of the Soviet Union met increasingly extensive sympathy, including among West European states. They well appreciated that there were no sensible alternatives to detente and that attempts to return to the "position of strength" policy in regard to the Soviet Union were hardly likely to meet with success. Such attempts, however, were more than likely to complicate the situation in the world. The 1972 Interim Agreement on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms expired in 1977, and Washington had to agree that each side make a unilateral announcement on its intention not to undertake actions incompatible with the stipulations of the said agreement. From the viewpoint of practical consequences this meant the effective prolongation of the 1972 Agreement, It would be wrong, nonetheless, to
134ascribe this step by the US administration merely to pressure from West European allies which backed the SALT process, or to that from the American public eager to see a normalisation of relations with the USSR. The fact is that SALT-1 met the interests of US security.
The actions of Soviet diplomacy at the SALT talks were coordinated with members of the Warsaw Treaty. The Declaration of the Moscow Conference of the Political Consultative Committee in November 1978 noted the immense importance of an agreement between the USSR and the USA in limiting strategic arms. In a communique issued on 16 May 1979, the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States favoured a speedy conclusion and putting into force of a new treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms and going over to the following stage of negotiations on their reduction. Such a treaty was, finally, signed on 18 June 1979 during the BrezhnevCarter Vienna meeting.
The agreement achieved in Vienna provoked the ire, in the full sense of the word, of military groups. They did not hide their alarm that realisation of the agreement might provide a fresh impulse to the detente process and would be a further step towards strengthening the international legal basis of peaceful relations between states of different social systems.
The Vienna agreement did possess this quality. In the general discussion at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stressed that the treaty was a bridge to further limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. It contained also great potential for exerting a favourable influence on other negotiations on curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.
135All this was at variance with the plans of world reaction and the militarist forces. Hence the virulent attacks on the SALT-2 treaty. Having been defeated in their attempts to cast doubt upon the balanced nature of the treaty, based on the principle of equalitty and equal security, the militarists resorted to a series of political ploys. The theme of this campaign became the assertion that the treaty was unfavourable to the USA and it ought at the least to be compensated for by a sharp increase in American military might. At first the US administration declared that it needed time to make a comprehensive study of the SALT problem. It nominated six months as a minimum period for such a study. Then assertions appeared that the SALT-2 treaty had to be reviewed. The next step was outright refusal to ratify the treaty signed in Vienna.
One reason for the defeat of President Carter at the polls was, according to the general consensus of many observers, the inconsistency of his foreign policy which often caused puzzlement even among the USA's closest allies. Now that time has passed and it is possible to take a cool look at that policy, it is clear that despite all its vacillation it persistently moved in a single direction---towards the development of the arms race at a new level. Carter was digging a grave beneath the SALT-2 treaty; Reagan completed the job with the funeral.
This passing on of the mantle clearly testifies generally to the militarist basis of the politics of the imperialist powers. After all, it goes beyond the American framework and extends to all participants in the system of imperialist military alliances. The most obvious confirmation of that is the activity of militarists in Europe, The NATO leadership launched a feverish
136campaign to justify the build-up of anned forces and arms within NATO. The chief thrust of this campaign is to plant in the minds of West Europeans the idea of the "Soviet military threat", the dangerously mounting military advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Treaty states, the ability of the Soviet Union to put West European governments in a position where they would have no option save capitulation.
The tendentious nature of that propaganda, whose authors do not baulk aft turning the facts on their head, is patently apparent, particularly in the light of actions by countries of the socialist community. The Soviet Union, for example, has insistently been appealing for restraint over strategic arms. The 26th CPSU Congress pledged the Soviet Union's readiness to continue without delay negotiations with the USA to preserve everything positive that had so far been attained in that sphere. The Soviet leaders emphasised that talks could be held only on the principle of equality and equal security. The socialist countries are fully in accord with these pledges. They are not striving to add fuel to the flames of mutual recrimination; on the contrary, they are displaying restraint. Their military budgets are not on the increase, even though they have every right to reach to such actions as the adoption of the long-term programme, scheduled for a fifteen-year span, for updating NATO weaponry, that occurred at the NATO session in May 1978. NATO earmarked an additional 80 billion dollars for the purpose.
The Warsaw Treaty countries have been proposing a different course---to set up guarantees against the outbreak of military conflicts. Above all one has to remember ithe proposal for all countries that took part in the Helsinki Conference to conclude a treaty
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renouncing first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons against one another. This would greatly strengthen, both politically and legally, the principle of non-use of force or the threat of force in Europe.
This is a clear demonstration of the principled approach of socialist foreign policy which combines resolving problems confronting humanity with reducing the threat of war and promoting relations of peace and cooperation among nations, and taking steps towards greater trust between the nations,
The Helsinki Conference in particular debated the question of strengthening trust. As a result, the Final Act contains the "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament". As the document indicates, measures to bolster confidence must help to lessen the danger of armed conflict and to gain a proper understanding or assessment of military activity, which could be likely to cause concern. To this end it was envisaged having advance information on substantial military land exercises, an exchange of observers at military exercises and visits by military delegations. Experience has shown that the implementation of confidence-building measures has helped support the detente process in Europe.
Socialist foreign policy consistently works to extend measures on boosting mutual confidence in Europe and reducing the military confrontation of socialist and capitalist states. The socialist countries have been seeking mutually acceptable constructive solutions at the Vienna Talks on the Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Centra] Europe, within the Disarmament Committee and at other negotiations devoted to curbing the arms race, including a continuation of the Helsinki process, and at the Madrid Meeting
138as well. The socialist states have been calling for reciprocal efforts from Western countries.
The Vienna talks got bogged down in arguments over the size of the armed forces of the two sides in Central Europe, the zone of future reductions. The NATO countries maintain that the Warsaw Treaty countries have superiority, and substantial at that, in land forces. The Warsaw Treaty states demonstrate with ready statistics that this is just not so. In the summer of 1980 delegations of these countries insisted on a fresh exchange of official statistics. The West dragged its feet over this operation, although it had been the initiator of discussion about the size of land forces.
The exchange of updated numerical data showed that the overall size of NATO troops in Central Europe was somewhat greater than that of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. And yet Western delegations continued to talk of a ``disproportion'' in favour of the socialist countries. Whenever they are asked to explain what these inflated estimates of the size of Warsaw Treaty land troops are based on, the NATO representatives refuse to provide an answer.
It is not hard to understand why: their assertions hold no water. There exists an objective and just criterion for determining military balance in a particular region and even throughout the world---stability of the military and political situation, which stems from many factors, including military. None other than the then US President Gerald Ford announced on 1 August 1975 at the Helsinki Conference that military stability in Europe keeps the peace. Reiterating this stability, he said, the time had come substantially to reduce the high levels of armed forces on both sides. The then West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt voiced similar thoughts at the same Con-
239ference, saying that the balance of power needed to be maintained.
Statements by two such major politicians and at such a responsible forum were surely a convincing confirmation that a situation of military balance existed in Europe. Consequently, given a responsible attitude to the question, possibilities existed step by step to reduce the level of troops and arms of the groups confronting one another, without harming mutual security. In such circumstances, the Western dragging of feet at the Vienna talks on land force sizes evidently fulfils the same function as the artificial complication of the control issue---to prevent or, if they do not manage that, to delay agreement. The calculation is obvious: every new day losit for disarmament makes the task of halting the arms race more difficult.
The socialist delegations at the Vienna talks proposed a ``freeze'' on existing levels of armed forces. On 18 February 1982, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR proposed a draft treaty on a mutual reduction of armed forces and arms and the relevant measures in the initial period. On 17 February 1983, they proposed an agreement to reduce the armed forces of the parties in Central Europe to equal collective levels on each side, irrespective of their differences regarding the present number of troops. As a result, no side would have more than 900,000 men, including no more than 700,000 land troops. The NATO countries responded with a refusal, brushing aside direct and honest discussion.
Such behaviour is bound to give rise to the thought that the NATO leadership is afraid publicly to compare their current policy with that pursued by the other side, preferring to take a devious route. Using the po-
HO
werful mass media put at their disposal, the militarists poison people's minds with all manner of misinformation, from legitimate doubt about the desire of the other side to hold talks to slanderous accusations that socialism is encouraging "international terrorism" and violating "human rights''.
But, as the Russian saying has it, lies have short legs. Who is eager for talks, and who is doing everything to run away from them? After all, it is certainly a fact that from the start of this decade the principal feature of the international activity of the USA, Japan, Britain and certain other Western powers has been steps aimed at halting all talks, one way or another, with the socialist countries.
The situation in Europe is indicative. In line with the decision announced in October 1979, the Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew from the German Democratic Republic 20,000 of its military personnel, a thousand tanks, as well as a certain amount of other military weaponry. Under Pentagon pressure, the NATO countries, on the contrary, continue to increase their armed forces and develop technical means for an accelerated transfer of reinforcements from the USA. Washington is insisting on the West European NATO allies agreeing to deploy on their territory an increasing amount of iheavy military weaponry. Is this really a manifestation of concern for the welfare of West Europeans or is it preparation for war? This question ought to be given very serious consideration.
What is particularly worrying are plans to install in Western Europe US medium-range nuclear missiles, the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. The decision on them was taken at the NATO Council session in December 1979 on the grounds that the USSR has
HI
allegedly gained superiority over the West by stationing what Western experts refer to as SS-20 missiles.
But it is not the Soviet Union that holds the initiative in deploying medium-range missiles. Faced with the need to neutralise the danger created by NATO, it stationed in its Western regions mediumrange missiles. But the number was enough only to ensure approximate equivalence of forces and no more. Replying to questions put by the West German magazine Der Spiegel, Leonid Brezhnev supplied figures to show that there was approximate equivalence in nuclear medium-range weapons: the NATO countries have 986 such weapons, the USSR---975. In this connection, implementation of the NATO decision to ``forearm'' would mean the Western alliance gaining a superiority of one-and-a-half times over the Warsaw Treaty states in medium-range weapons. Indeed, such an attempt would be parried by the Soviet Union. As a result, the level of nuclear arms in Europe would sharply jump. Moscow does not strive for this and proposes that the USA agree on parity at a lower level while observing the principle of equality and equal security. What is dismaying is the utter unwillingness of Western leaders to listen to the Soviet Union in inviting them to talks, proposing a mutual search for solution of outstanding issues in the interests of peace, and expressing its readiness to undertake appropriate steps to that end.
Moreover, certain Western groups display contempt for their own promises, for public opinion and the interests of their own people. Common sense and experience accumulated over previous years are forcing West Europeans to be circumspect about NATO actions. How many times have they heard alarmist signals of "the Russians are coming" from the NATO
142headquarters or the Pentagon? However, the NATO warmongers have not followed the example of Secretary James Forrestol who leapt out of his hospital window in fear; they are taking feverish measures to have additional military installations on European soil aimed against their Eastern neighbours. In February 1981, Der Stern published a map of the Federal Republic of Germany showing the location of US nuclear installations. This gaff (or perhaps a desire to blow the gaff of those shrouded in West Germany) certainly upset Bonn officialdom which threatened to persecute those who had betrayed a state secret. The public became alarmed when it saw that West Germany was becoming a launching pad for US missiles aimed at the USSR. The public began to cogitate on the dangerous adventure Washington could involve them in, and the devious thinking behind it.
And there certainly is much to cogitate on. At first West Europeans were calmed by promises that plans for stationing US medium-range nuclear missiles would be accompanied by the taking effect of the SALT-2 and the start of the SALT-3 negotiation process. These promises were thrown overboard after NATO had taken its decision on medium-range nuclear missiles. This decision is normally depicted in Western Europe as ``double-edged''---i.e., the ``forearming'' of NATO and ``talks'' with the Soviet Union. While such double-dealing may suit some politicians in the White House and other Western official residences, it is certainly not going to take in the people of Western Europe who have launched a campaign against the stationing of US nuclear death within their countries. Popular pressure forced Washington to accept taJks with the USSR. The key to success of such talks is observance by both sides of the principle of equality and
143equal security. Both sides of the scales must be equally balanced in real terms.
The Soviet leaders (reiterated that they are in favour of seeking a sound and mutually acceptable basis for solving the most intricate problems, primarily the problem of curbing the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. As Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CG GPSU has noted, "We are for equality, for taking into account the interests of both sides.''
This statement has been backed up by a number of concrete Soviet proposals. In his replies to questions put in May 1983 by representatives of several Finnish public organisations, Yuri Andropov expressed the Soviet readiness to agree on parity of nuclear potentials in Europe, both in regard to carriers and warheads, taking into account, of course, the corresponding armaments of Britain and France. In this way, approximate equality would be maintained between the USSR and NATO in both carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e. missiles and aircraft, and the number of nuclear warheads on them. Moreover, this equality would be at a considerably lower level than at present. The realisation of this proposal of ours would bring Europe much closer to complete freedom from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical.
There must be less playing at proposals that would turn on its head the very concept of justice and mutuality on the question that affects the fates of dozens and hundreds of millions of people. It is naive, if not criminal, to demand unilateral disarmament of the USSR. Clearly, the USSR will rebuff such claims, as past experience has convincingly shown. Those times have passed and the old Soviet Union has gone
144forever. It has become much stronger and therefore it is ridiculous today to insist on what it would not agree to yesterday. And it is absolute folly to entertain the idea of putting military pressure on it.
All the same, American Secretary of Defense Gaspar Weinberger has announced that the USA is reviewing its military doctrine and preparing for two big and a certain number of small wars. Pentagon plans have already marked down a ``big'' war for Europe. In view of the decision on US medium-range nuclear missiles this war obviously acquires the form of a nuclear war. West Europeans are thus being prepared for the role of guinea pigs in the laboratory called "limited nuclear war''.
Such a monstrous prospect, naturally, brings no cheer to the people of Europe who have to become the subject of ``experimental'' nuclear explosions which Washington has decided to carry out. That is why the anti-militarist movement is on the rise again and demands are growing for a stop to the arms race and the beginning of negotiations. The influence of groups favouring the need to preserve and strengthen detente is growing stronger; they are calling for its augmenting by military detente, which would enable the powers to lessen the danger of nuclear war.
But sceptics exist. They claim that nothing positive can be expected in present circumstances from talks on disarmament questions.
Is this so? Is it possible in our time to resolve issues of curbing the arms race and gradually moving towards agreements on effective disarmament measures? The following chapter examines these questions.
Chapter IV
IS DISARMAMENT ATTAINABLE?
posed restrictions on Germany according to the Versailles Treaty subsequently did all they could to help it rearm in the hope of directing fascist aggression eastwards. The reader, one must assume, has not forgotten the miscalculations made by those political figures: all the people of Europe had to pay dearly for them.
The situation following World War II was completely different. Victory over German fascism opened up the realistic possibility of ensuring international security by which people would enjoy a peaceful future. Much work had to be done in destroying German militarism and Nazism, capable of threatening peace in Europe and the whole world. What had to be done was to eliminate the social base of German militarism and reform people's thinking. This process was completed in the German Democratic Republic where life was refashioned on democratic peaceful principles. From being a bastion of Junkerdom and Prussian militarism, Eastern Germany became a standard-bearer of the democratic renaissance of the German nation.
Demilitarisation and denazification in the Western part of the former Reich turned into a farce. The Western powers pursued a policy calculated at preserving the material and technical basis for resurrection of German militarism. Fear of democratic reforms forced them to forget the lessons of history. Reactionary imperialist forces gave the Federal Republic of Germany the role of being the main hotbed of tension in Europe, the bastion of militarism and revanchism.
As a cover for this they advanced the idea that there was no sense in disarming defeated Nazi Germany. Bourgeois historians and political scientists usually avoided exposing the reasons for the failure of
Can the disarmament problem be resolved successfully? This question is at the centre of international affairs today and determines the prospects for future development.
Clearly, diametrically-opposite political situations take shape depending on the answer ito this question. We may recall the bad old adage: "If you want peace, prepare for war." This advice has always been a direct rejection of the disarmament idea.
Weapons have from times immemorial been the symbol of domination. They have gained and preserved power in all social formations built on human exploitation, gradually instilling in people's minds the notion that no one will disarm of his own free will. Even when the possibility of disarmament was contemplated, it was only in the single version of unilateral disarmament when weapons were taken by force from a defeated opponent.
As the experience of many centuries shows, however, unilateral disarmament by a single nation or people has never attained that goal. Even Napoleon I was unable to exact guarantees from defeated Prussia. We are right to assume that the haughtiness of the conqueror played into the hands of Prussian militarism that was then beginning to rear its head.
Unilateral disarmament of Germany after its defeat in World War I similarly failed to bear fruit. Understandably, there can be no complete analogy between the two periods which had profoundly different socio-political content. After all, those who im-
14610*
147demilitarisation. At the same time, they groundlessly spoke also of a certain lack of success in attempts to reach a mutual, voluntarily agreed disarmament by negotiation.
Socialism, on the contrary, is more optimistic about the chances of agreement on disarmament issues. The founders of Marxism-Leninism scientifically substantiated the conclusion of the feasibility of disarmament, on the basis of a study of the general laws of social development.
Marx wrote, "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve ... the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation."* The time that has passed since that conclusion was made has accumulated a mass of evidence to support it. The greatest of all was the victory of socialist revolution in Russia, then the emergence of a number of socialist states and, finally, the taking by many developing countries a socialist path of development. When Marx spoke of the ability of humanity to resolve urgent tasks, socialism existed only in theory and, essentially, was only beginning to rally under its banner the advanced intellectuals and first contingents of workers.
It is possible that some readers will regard reference to existing socialism as too political an example. Let us take then an example from another sphere. Smallpox epidemics between the 15th and 18th centuries carried off hundreds of thousands of people in Europe alone. At the end of the 18th century, the British doctor Edward Jenner discovered a method of vacci-
nation against smallpox. The use of this method enabled the populace of most European countries to be free of the dreadful epidemic. But the material and, most important of all, the social conditions were not yet present for all humanity to be saved from smallpox. These conditions appeared in the 1950s and were connected both with rapid development of exchange between countries in the field of science, medicine, etc., and with the enormous social changes going on in the world. In 1958, the Soviet Union put forward a universal programme for eliminating smallpox. The programme was adopted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and nowadays the danger of smallpox has been wiped off the face of the planet. That was how one of the acute social problems that brought grief to humanity for many centuries was resolved globally.
But let us return to disarmament. Is it really possible in the modern world, when two opposed social systems exist? Back in the 1980s Engels wrote, "I maintain: disarmament and with it the guarantee of peace, is feasible. . ."* Even then this affirmation was not speculative. Here is the example of the fairly successful bilateral agreement on limiting arms, viz. the agreement concluded in 1817 between Great Britain and the United States, limiting the number of naval units of both nations in the Great Lakes. This agreement, known also by the name of its signatories---the Rush-Bagot Convention, led to actual demilitarisation of the US-Canadian border that exists to this day.
We have no wish or intention to gloss over reality. The settlement of the disarmament problem, even of its separate issues, is a difficult business requiring enormous effort and vigorous purposeful action. In such
* Karl Marx. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 21.
148* Marx, Engels. Werke, Bd. 22, S. 373.
149a big affair it is important to have a lucid understanding of where the chief link in the chain is so that the entire chain can be pulled by seizing upon that link.
The arms race is a result of a definite policy. A political decision is above all needed in order to speed up or slow down the arms race, to remove or launch the production of any particular weapons sysitem, to increase or decrease the number of troops. It further requires organisational, economic, financial, etc., decisions. But the point of departure is the political decision, the selection of a political course which decides in what direction all subsequent steps are to be taken.
Disarmament is nothing more than a set of measures to limit, reduce and, ultimately, to banish armaments. That is, we are dealing with a process that is diametrically-opposed to the arms race.
The French political personality of World War I, Georges Clemenceau, once said that war is too serious a business to be left to generals. Paraphrasing Clemenceau, one might say that the curbing of the arms race is too responsible a business today to be left to the military, not to mention individuals serving the militaryindustrial complex. What is required is political and state wisdom as well as the will of peoples who have to pay dearly for the senseless war race.
Opponents of halting the arms race try to play down ithe political objective sought by building up the armed forces. To this end they Jink it to a multitude of other questions---economic, scientific, technical, psychological, and so on. What is more, they make each of them in turn just about the most vital, without a prior solution to which it is impossible even to come close to examining the problem of curbing the arms race, not to speak of resolving it.
Of course, economic, scientific, technical and other
150issues that arise during talks on halting the arms race and moving towards disarmament do have their own, and not insignificant, importance. But no matter how important they are, all these issues are ultimately subordinate, and the very conditions for settling them depend on the attainment of political agreement.
Attempts to pose questions subordinate to the major political issue bear witness not so much to the ill-informed or inexperienced nature of those who resort ito such attempts, as to the approach reflecting a certain policy against disarmament. After all, it is much more convenient to hide behind motives which outwardly seem neutral and remote from politics. In addition, a great variety of such motives could be sought and, switching attention from one to another, one could create the impression that the problem is complex in the extreme.
Through such ploys one can, for example, turn the question of control into a key issue, overshadowing disarmament itself; one can turn control into a means of retarding the attainment of that objective. In actual fact, that is being done at 'this very moment by some Western diplomats. It is hardly surprising that in their jargon arms control is a much more popular term than the very concept of disarmament.
However, no matter how intricate and great in scale the technical and other questions, they are not insuperable. After both world wars countries were faced with the immense task of peaceful reconstruction: they had to turn the inflated armed forces (armies of millions for some countries) into a civilian population and reconvert their industries (which actually meant the wholesale reconstruction of industry). It had to be done quickly and often in conditions of economic ruin as a result of the calamitous war and destruction
151of industrial equipment. Nonetheless, all these major problems were finally resolved quite successfully.
Reconversion of the economy and demobilisation of troops required a great deal of effort and administrative ability, and did not always take place painlessly. Even so, the main thing was that given the political will (and need), the tasks were fully resolvable.
A few words should be said about the readiness of governments to reduce troop numbers at the end of both world wars. Within the imperialist powers, the reduction took place largely under popular pressure, under the impact of ferment among army personnel hankering after civvy street. It is generally known, for example, that an extensive anti-war movement developed after World War I. Soldiers openly demanded a speedy demob. The powers-that-be initially tried to suppress these demands, but then were obliged to listen to the soldiers' voice. They were afraid that "revolutionary contagion" would spread through the troops and then, if they were too slow in returning the soldiers to civvy street, would be brought into the country. Events in Hungary, Bavaria, the ferment among the interventionist troops deployed in Russia reinforced this alarm.
A later example was the failure of US imperialist aggression against the peoples of Indochina. The unwillingness of young Americans to take part in the ``dirty'' war spilled over into open anti-war demonstrations. They took different forms: protest demonstrations, the public burning of draft cards, mass desertion and fleeing abroad to avoid the draft.
One can, of course, evaluate these forms of protest in various ways and take a different attitude towards them. When debates started on an amnesty to those who had refused military conscription, US public opi-
152nion was divided: some favoured a full pardon, others opposed it.
However, irrespective of the different assessments, nobody would seriously object that American young people made an anti-war protest that, despite its immaturity, certainly had its effect. It is hard to measure the extent to which it accelerated the US withdrawal from Vietnam. One thing is utterly irrefutable: it forced US leaders to shift to a voluntary, i.e. hired professional army.
So, no matter what aspect of the disarmament problem we turn to---whether reconstruction of the war economy to peacetime uses (more specifically, reconstruction of the economic war sectors), or reduction in army personnel, 'the main thing is a political decision. It may be twofold from the viewpoint of initial motives. Socialism is ready to make a voluntary decision, since it corresponds to its nature, its overall foreign policy principles. A political decision may also be taken as a result of a realistic evaluation of the international situation and the position in which a given state finds itself. It would be superfluous here, and even harmful, to talk of winners and losers. We need simply to weigh up the situation soundly and see that in our day war negates itself, while the arms race policy inevitably leads to deadlock. The only sensible way is to understand that the key to unlock disarmament problems provides a sober political approach, behind which lies the principle of preserving the existing military equilibrium or, to put it differently, not causing damage to the security of all sides participating in negotiations and treaties.
What country will voluntarily accept an agreement detrimental to its security? None, of course. But to reckon that it can be forced into such an agreement
153(at the negotiating table) is politically mindless and dangerous.
There can be no single answer to the question of what specific forms can express today's only realistic principle of equality and equal security of the participants. Its practical embodiment will depend on concrete conditions: the composition of those taking part in negotiations, the nature of the troops and arms being reduced, and so on.
An approach that maintains the prevailing balance of power between countries was first elaborated by EngeJs in his disarmament plan for Europe, proposed back in 'the 1890s. In the specific historical conditions in Europe at that time the most rational way of disarming was to establish a time-limit for military service in each country with its subsequent reduction. In that event, 'the existing military system would remain intact and, consequently, no organisational reconstruction of the armed forces belonging to the participants would be needed. The entire process could develop by a simple scheme without infringing the security of states in any way whatsoever.
It would be rather silly to shut one's eyes to the fact that many political hindrances (that do not directly enter the sphere of disarmament) may appear (or be created). They could include such acute and sizeable issues as age-old territorial disputes, or petty issues that might even crop up through misunderstanding. But as has already been tested in practice, any political issues and extrusions can easily be smoothed over in a situation of growing mutual confidence. And what can better encourage a growth in confidence than a lowering of military confrontation, peace on borders and the absence of bellicose intentions among neighbouring states?
154We have dwelt on political obstacles that can arise through a country's fears about its security because it is here, ultimately, that major obstructions to agreement lie. Nobody can a priori deprive a country of the right to such fears. But there is an effective way to remove them: to get all sides strictly to adhere to the principle of non-violation of the security of the parties to an agreement being drawn up. It is on this that the socialist concept of disarmament is founded.
Militarism bases itself on another notion---that the development of armaments guarantees security.
Question: is it possible to overcome 'the militarist trend in politics even before the disappearance of the social milieu that breeds militarism? In other words, is it possible to achieve disarmament (at least partially) in the contemporary world? Yes, it is possible, if only because militarism involuntarily engenders phenomena that set it rocking from the inside. While powerful at certain stages, it then enters a state of internal crisis and comes into conflict with the major interests of the world community, above all with the task of supporting universal peace without which it cannot develop. Consequently, conditions appear for changing the militarist orientation of politics even if certain groups are interested in preserving it. For that, of course, certain historical conditions are needed, the corresponding alignment of world forces, ensuring the restraining of aggressive, expansionist aspirations of imperialism, the neutralisation of its military arsenal.
Three major factors undermine militarism from within: economic, military-technical, and social. The first is economic, caused and stimulated by the policy of militarism, the arms race forces governments to spend an ever-increasing part of their resources on non-productive ends. The adverse effects of such eco-
155nomically irrational actions are not readily apparent. Time is needed for the adverse phenomena to be accumulated until they reach a level that produces a qualitative turnaround. This is particularly so because the stepped-up development of individual sectors of industry by artificially increasing the volume of military orders creates an impression (at least in some part of the population) that the arms race is even beneficial. (This is especially true of those who, working in war sectors, gain material advantages from military production.) One should not forget either about propaganda which resorts to infallible `` patriotic'' slogans. Experience of the past is sadly convincing that such propaganda has frequently pulled the wool over the eyes of the common people.
Some Western economists have shown assiduously, particularly after World War II, that a high level of military expenditure is a blessing, insofar as it helps to regulate the economy, guarantees prosperity and obviates recession and depression. Such ``theories'' fulfil a double purpose: on the one hand they have justified militarisation of the economy by a feigned concern for its stable growth; and on the other, by tendentiously chosen ploys they have masked the class nature of the arms race. The proponents of such ``theories'' allege that the arms race is a blessing for all sections of society without exception.
Yet the constant removal from normal reproduction of an ever-increasing amount of material and other resources for the purpose of armament sooner or later has an adverse effect on the economy. Imbalances arise which seriously, if not fatally, undermine the economic health of the country.
A higher pay and other benefits which ithe militaryindustrial corporations may offer lead to a situation
156where the more skilled workers, technicians, engineers and scientists leave the major branches of industry, catering for the population, and move over into the war industry. It is this industry that receives the greater part of 'the most valuable raw materials, plant and equipment.
In order to allay the fears that arise over this process, the arms race supporters have invented the concept of technological ``overspill''. The war business, they assert, has always been a locomotive of technological development. What had been developed for warfare subsequently found application in peaceful sectors and accelerated their progress---i.e., the advances of war technology have ``overspilled'' somehow and found peaceful uses.
The facts, however, give the lie to this logic. All inventions that have created an era in the development of science and technology (save atomic energy, owing to the particular situation and orientation of American imperialist plans) belong to peaceful spheres: the use of steam power, creation of the internal combustion engine, the uses of electricity, discovery of radio waves and laser beams, etc. And something else is noteworthy: imperialism is striving in one way or another to adapt and use inventions and attainments in fundamental scientific research and in applied areas of the peaceful economy for their militarist programmes. A vivid example is the Pentagon's attempts to make capital out of the attainments of the Japanese electronics industry. The upper echelon of US militarism is striving to make Japan a partner of its plans to boost the offensive potential of nuclear missiles.
World literature is long used to the expression "a colossus with feet of clay",^^19^^ taken from ancient Greek
157mythology. In all appearances, this image may in large measure be applied to an economy subordinate to the interests of militarism. Industry is growing overall, but what comprises its normal basis is degrading, being deprived of funds and 'resources taken away for military production.
Military output is either economically wasted lying idle in the bunkers of military hardware and ammunition dumps, or is destroyed in the event of a military conflict. But in one way or the other it is extracted from 'the production cycle, diminishing its active resources. The ultimate result of diverting labour force and means of production to preparation for war is a brake on normal economic development. The systematic and ever-increasing waste of economic reserves cannot remain unpunished. It causes profound consequences that will be hard to eradicate. The arms race imposed in the postwar period by militarism has seriously affected the world's economic health.
The unproductive expenditure of vast sums of money was one reason for the chronic inflation which gripped the Western world in the 1970s and 1980s, with its constantly rising cost of living, reduction in the population's real incomes and fall in living standards. Social problems are intensifying, differentiation is sharply growing in the staitus of various sections of society. Inflation is affecting first and foremost society's least provided-for members, reducing them to the status of outcasts. It is providing hopeless prospects for young people starting out on a working life.
The problem of chronic unemployment among young people has become one of the most alarming in the West. There are not hundreds, but thousands and tens of thousands of cases in the USA, Great Britain and other Western countries where a young man or
158woman, having graduated from college or university, cannot find work for two, three, four or more years, is deprived of the right to work and, therefore, to a normal human life.
Most economists agree that at the present time the governments of the developed capitalist countries do not possess effective means to combat inflation. Up to now not a single one of them has advanced a clearcut convincingly-grounded programme for pepping up the economy. The Reagan administration has resorted to artificially high interest rates, thereby undermining the currency of other capitalist states. The contradictions between the USA and West European countries are intensifying accordingly.
Calculations to facilitate control of the capitalist economy by military expenditure and to avoid cyclic crises have evidently floundered. The arms race has not only been a reason for inflation, it has helped to deepen it and reduced the possibility of curbing it and bringing it under control. An increasing number of researchers in the West are coming to the conclusion that a major source of inflation is the arms race, and that inflation's chief culprit is the group of Western states with the highest military expenditure.
A UN report on economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditure emphasises that military expenditure is essentially inflationary. That is because the growth of purchasing power and demand is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of directly consumable goods or a growth in productive capacity for satisfying future consumption. Excessive demand leads to price increases in all sectors of the economy. Practically all big (and protracted) wars, owing to the above-mentioned regularity, have caused inflation, which has often been
159on a fantastic scale. A distinguishing feature of the present situation is that inflation persists at a high level in peacetime. Having analysed the presentday economic situation in the capitalist countries, the authors of the report write that "there can be little doubt that the effects of sustaining large military expenditures over a long period has contributed to current inflation and its persistence in times of economic recession and high unemployment".*
Almost twenty years ago the well-known French finance specialist Jacques Rueff warned that US military expenditure could cause economic and financial upset in the capitalist world.** His voice was not heeded then; nor were the warnings of other eminent authorities on economic and financial questions.
In one of his first public speeches, President Reagan announced that his predecessor Jimmy Carter had left the US economy in a parlous state. That is hardly surprising: after all, instead of reducing military expenditure, as President Carter had promised on being elected, he had taken the road of pushing it sky-high. The result is well known: a rise in budget deficit and government debt, and a worsening of inflationary trends. Inflation in the USA reached unprecedented proportions and remains at a high level, despite attempts by the Republican administration to reduce it through cutting back expenditure on social programmes.
But the treatment being meted out by Washington is in some ways worse than -the illness: it forces the worst-off members of the community and other coun-
* Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures. New York, 1978, p. 42.
** Jacques Rueff. Le lancinant probleme des balances de paiements. Payot, Paris, 1965, p. 30.
160tries to pay a heavy price. It is doubtful whether this approach will take the steam out of internal social tension and enhance America's standing in the world.
In a special report entitled "The New Cold War Economy", Business Week examined the influence of mounting military expenditure on the country's socioeconomic organism. Attached to the report were graphs which promised a drop in unemployment (this has never come about) and a rise in inflation and corporate incomes (which has materialised).*
Paul Warnke, a prominent US expert on disarmament, warned of the dangers that the senseless arms race had for the United States. "I think," he wrote in a magazine article, "we are spending too much on military arms and manpower and that to continue to do so worsens our economic position and jeopardises out true national security."** Later he was nominated chief of the American delegation at the SALT-2 talks, but subsequently was forced to quit his post under pressure from the ``hawks'' who had turned out to be more influential and outspoken.
In late May 1981, when the policy of the Reagan administration had had time to make itself clearly apparent, the Time's Board of Economists held a discussion on US economic prospects in the light of that policy. The viewpoint was expressed, in particular, that the increase in defence spending would cause "major disruption in the economy" and would "harm US competitiveness abroad".*** And so it turned out.
The high level of defence spending not only diverts
* See: Business Week. 21 January 1980. ** Foreign Policy. No. 18, Spring 1975. *** See: Time. 1 June 1981.
II---204$
161resources urgently needed for economic growth, but it also helps intensify problems confronting the whole of humanity. The vast military expenditure accelerates the exhaustion of natural resources, worsens the monetary crisis and complicates balance-of-payment problems. As a consequence, the world economy is further dislocated and political instability in the world grows. The second factor contributing to the internal crisis of militarism is military-technological. At the present time, scarcely any serious observer, irrespective of political orientation, would question Glausewitz' dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means. This thesis has been borne out with such clarity in international affairs that even its support by Marxists no longer puts off other (theorists, including those hostile to Marxism.
The continuation of politics by military means, which differ from other by their destructiveness, advances the issue of whether these means correspond to political ends. It is not difficult to understand why. War is an extreme means to attain political ends and is fraught with enormous risk. When the Rubicon^^20^^ is crossed and military actions are begun, a logic comes into play that is by no means diplomatic. The diplomatic struggle possesses a much greater variety of choices and the field for manoeuvre is incomparably wider there.
Despite their wide variety, military options belong to one and the same category---armed violence. The degree of violence may be increased or, as is now commonly said, the level of escalation may be raised. But the escalation process, irrespective of the wishes of those that began it, may easily run out of control and then losses may exceed all possible gains. That was clear enough by the end of World War I, when the
162use on the battlefield of military technology of the time (machine-guns, tanks, submarines, aircraft, chemical warfare, etc.) resulted in human losses that were in no way justified by the war's political results.
The French writer and humanist Anatole France summed up the results of World War I as follows: "This war which big industry of all countries in the world had craved for, this war which was its war, this war in which it had pinned hopes of new riches, has caused such enormous and profound destruction that international oligarchy itself has been consumed by it."* We may recall the great upsurge in the anti-war movement expressing popular protest at the enormous number of war victims. In order to quell this upsurge bourgeois propaganda shouted loudly that World War I was a war to end all wars, that war would never occur again. That was one of the greatest confidence tricks ever played.
The further development of military technology resulted in an even greater gap between the ends which can be set for war, and the socio-political consequences of the use of such weaponry. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was horrific in its convincing proof of thait. Yet there came hydrogen bombs which were thousands of times more powerful. The American atomic scientist Ralph Lapp was first to warn of the monstrousness of the `` overkill'' concept, i.e. the possibility of multiple destruction by using nuclear weapons.
When a killer tears apart and tramples upon the lifeless body of his or her victim, this is called patholog-
* Anatole France. Preface to the first edition of: Jack London. Le talon de fer. Editions Sociales Internationales, Paris, 1933, p. 18.
163ical in medical and judicial parlance, or aggravating circumstances in police files. But how does one describe the thinking of Pentagon .leaders who are concerned to gain the material opportunity of hitting the target again and again? How many times? You can kill a person once only; the opportunity of causing a multitude of strikes has quite a different aim--- to boost the incomes of corporations that manufacture death-dealing weapons. Otherwise, why order and store them in such quantities?
The gap between the likely aims of war and the consequences of using the military means already available to the great powers has increased immeasurably in our time. Indeed, all that is needed to deprive a person of life is 15 grams of explosive. And yet according to some estimates for every living person on earth up to 15 tonnes of explosive, in the form of nuclear weapons, already exist. Consequently, each person can potentially be killed a million times! Furthermore, nobody knows the consequences of a full-scale nuclear war---exactly how many times everything living would be maimed and destroyed through radioactivity. Moreover, the doctrine of ``restraint'' by the nuclear ``deterrent'', which had been put forward by American academic groups and then adopted by Washington as official policy, clearly confirms the gap between the likely aims of the policy and the means to their attainment.
What is the essence of the ``deterrence'' concept? According to its apologists, it consists in creating a situation in which the likely foe would forego any desire to begin a war. By what means? The consequences of war would be made so horrific that any possible gains would be obviously incommensurate with human losses and material damage.
Removed from time and space, this argument may seem persuasive. But truth is always concrete, and therefore in order properly to assess the ``deterrence'' concept and the arguments underlying it one has to see them in a specific historical situation, in the context of the policy being pursued by those desiring to scare their enemy by the threat of a strike and therefore destroying any desire to go to war.
This idea was first put forward in no uncertain terms by John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State, in a speech before the American Council on Foreign Relations on 12 January 1954. He declared that the USA had decided to base its security on the possibility of dealing a massive nuclear strike at the time and place of its choosing, in other words a "massive nuclear retaliation". Dulles made no secret of the fact that he was addressing himself to the Soviet Union, since it was precisely that country which he was intending to ``deter'' by the threat of massive nuclear bombardment.
Although by 1954 the USA had lost its monopoly of nuclear weapons, it still possessed a much bigger nuclear arsenal than the USSR, not to mention an extensive system of military bases ranged along the Soviet border. In such circumstances, the danger of a Soviet attack on the USA could exist only in a sick mind, while the danger of a US air strike on the Soviet Union seemed very real. In addition, the Soviet government was consistently and insistently inviting Washington to agree on disarmament, especialy nuclear.
Why then were threats of "massive nuclear retaliation" necessary? That became clear following the adoption by the USA of a military programme based on deploying nuclear weapons.
165 164Why did the proponents of those arms maintain that the nuclear ``deterrent'' was able to avert war? And here we must again take a look at the facts. On 1 March 1954 an American H-t>omb was exploded in the Bikini Atoll. Japanese fishermen and the inhabitants of some of the Marshall Islands fell victim to radioactive fall-out from that explosion. A wave of indignation swept the world and the demand grew from international public opinion to ban the testing of nuclear weapons and the weapons themselves. Advocates of a continuation of the nuclear arms race thought it necessary to neutralise this upsurge of protest which menaced their plans. To this end they used the idea of nuclear ``deterrence'', and nuclear weaponry had gained a new function.
Time showed how shortsighted were those trying to justify the nuclear arms race by the ``deterrence'' concept. The socio-political aim of ``deterrence'' was also to consolidate the international positions of imperialism and re-establish ithe former position or conserve it in their own interests, and, finally, to justify the arms race in order to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union. But this did not happen. ``Deterrence'' did not stop, nor could it, the progressive processes in the world. Despite the scare of nuclear weapons, socialism was developing and growing stronger, internal contradictions were undermining the imperialist system, its rearguard was being weakened through the collapse of colonialism and the taking of anti-imperialist positions by newly-liberated states. And the nuclear arms race, too, did not resolve the tasks that confronted it. Intercontinental missiles created a new strategic situation, making US territory vulnerable. Another consequence of military^technical development was the enhanced destructive potential
166of war, which outdid all feasible and non-feasible political objectives for which it could have been put into effect. The clash of both sides in a total war would be senseless self-destruction. In that respect, militarism has arrived at its dialectical negation.
In one of his historical essays, Stefan Zweig wrote, "Victory over time and space has eternally united people, and their future would be rosy if it were not for the fateful blindness that again and again forces them to destroy that grandiose unity and use those very means with which they had confirmed their power over nature in order to destroy themselves."*
The turn towards a qualitative arms race, made in the late 1970s by the imperialist powers, is intensifying even more the crisis of militarism in the military-- technical respeot. Clearly, the other side would not permit a disruption of the existing strategic equilibrium. The result of rivalry can only be an even higher level of military danger.
The two factors we have examined---the economic and military-technical---may be termed objective, inasmuch as they are subject to their own laws and do not depend on the will and desire of any particular social groups. The consequences of economic recession as a result of the arms race, of course, differ for the various social sections of bourgeois society; it is the military-industrial complex that suffers least, being a parasite on the arms race. But even it has to moderate its appetite in view of the exhaustion of state resources through the arms race. The difference in degree of influence of the military-technical factor is less markedly expressed, since the danger of a nuclear catastrophe affects all living beings on our planet.
* Stefan Zweig. Sternstunden der Menschheit. Zwolf historische Miniaturen. Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin, 1974, S. 187.
167A third factor stands apart---expressing the attitude of social groups in a particular country to the arms race and to disarmament. It is naturally heterogeneous: there are forces directly interested in the arms race, there are forces increasingly appreciative of the need for decisive struggle against that race. The adverse consequences of the arms race for a country's economic welfare and an increase in the scale of the military danger through the emergence of increasingly sophisticated forms of weaponry are opening the eyes of the public and motivating it to take energetic action.
The task of using existing social conditions in the interests Of disarmament lies on the shoulders of the common people and their political parties.
The social factor is the most salient. Having made the "homicidal industry", i.e. the military industry, the most profitable branch of capitalist production, the bourgeoisie was forced widely to involve the common people in it. In particular, this was achieved through universal military service. Its introduction, forced upon the bourgeoisie by the extension of the scale of wars it engendered, was historically progressive. A consequence was a democratisation of the armed forces in place of permanent ihired professional armies; a large section of the ordinary people was taught to master the ability to handle weapons. At the present time, imperialism is trying to provide a back door and again return to hired professional armies, as the USA has done. Although this resolves some of the problems with which capitalist governments are having to cope, it engenders and intensifies others.
The popular impact on society's political affairs and government policy will depend mainly on the level of the workers' class consciousness. The growth in this
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self-awareness accelerated considerably with the emergence to the forefront of history of the working class--- the most organised and revolutionary class in human history.
Within the capitalist world foreign policy remains the prerogative of the ruling classes who with great assiduity keep the working people out of that sphere altogether. In the past, foreign policy activity was shrouded in a thick cloak of secrecy; the motive forces of foreign policy, the real sources and reasons for conflicts and wars were carefully hidden. Socialist diplomacy brought enormous changes in this procedure. We may recall that one of the first of its acts was to publish the secret treaties of tsarist Russia with imperialist powers.
Stimulation of working people's interests in world politics and in how it takes shape and is implemented became an important requisite for rousing popular movements to the defence of peace. This is particularly obvious in regard to disarmament as part of the war-and-peace problem---the most acute of international problems.
The danger of the threat of war hanging over the world has motivated an enormous number of people from all countries and continents, races and nations, ideologies and philosophies to fight for peace and disarmament. This movement is no chance episode, it is organically bound up with the major directions and trends in social development, making peaceful coexistence an objective requirement. The uniqueness of the movement lies in the fact that the many consequences of the scientific and technological revolution have led to the interlacing of tasks of preserving peace, the campaign against the arms race and for a peaceful settlement of international conflicts, on the
169one hand, with seeking solutions for global problems, on the other. Thanks to that, the popular movement for peace and disarmament has acquired a new quality which, incidentally, finds expression in the variety of directions and forms in which it is developing.
Being the vanguard of ithe working people, communists do not fence themselves off from other social groups interested in preserving peace and curbing the arms race. They are convinced of the need for concerted action which would bring closer a resolution of urgent international problems. The more people join the movement for peace, the more isolated will be aggressively-motivated groups and the more difficult it will be for them to ignore popular demands to end the arms race.
A second, qualitatively new aspect that must be borne in mind in evaluating chances of resolving disarmament problems is the campaign for disarmament being linked by socialist states with that for establishing the principle in international relations of peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different social systems.
For socialism peace is the supreme objective, the most precious thing that has to be safeguarded and conserved by ail means possible. There lies the embodiment of the humanism of socialist ideology---the right to live; and it is a synonym of peace, the only right capable of opening up opportunities for implementing all other human rights. Without the right to live, all other rights become empty declarations or the objects of political speculation.
Napoleon once said in a conversation with Metternich that such a person as he did not give a damn for millions of lives. Today such a cynical statement is daii-
170gerous to the career of any politician. Yet today there are those who allow -themselves to regard peace as less than the most important issue. Is not that cynical? The Napoleonic wars cost Europe ten million lives. The recklessness of those who wish to sweep peace issues under the carpet of their political plans could cost the world the demise of the human race. There cannot be today a more valuable prize than lasting peace on earth.
The policy of peaceful coexistence and the disarmament campaign are elements of a single whole for socialism. They supplement one another. Soviet foreign policy is guided by a thought simple in its lucidity: peaceful coexistence of countries that adhere to different social systems is possible, but not in a situation of feverish war preparations and the arms race. It is only possible in conditions in which the issues of disarmament and detente are being successfully resolved. Disarmament is a sacred affair for socialism, a responsible international objective bound up with the major problem of world politics---that of promoting peaceful relations between states with different social systems.
Peaceful coexistence is an integral part of non-- interference in other people's internal affairs for socialist foreign policy. And that is no simple declaration, it is a paramount international principle, whose implementation sets up a firm basis for friendly peaceful relations between nations, lends weight and conviction to the disarmament slogan advocated by the socialist countries.
The peaceful coexistence policy implies renunciation of the use of force as a means of resolving international disputes. Only thus can countries that differ radically in their social structure live cheek by jowl,
171without thinking of grabbing their neighbour by the throat. Of course, this general obligation may be divided into a number of particular and specific pledges from the viewpoint of international law. The concept of peaceful coexistence includes the pledge not to attack other countries, respect for their territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, i.e. it rests on progressive principles which have taken shape in international relations over many centuries.
By peaceful coexistence we mean the promotion of mutually-advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems in the economic, cultural and other spheres. The peaceful coexistence policy presupposes also joint actions aimed at settling urgent international problems, including disarmament. In that sense, the efforts to affirm the principle of peaceful coexistence in international relations are at the same time a rebuff to militarism.
It is hardly fortuitous that the most stubborn resistance to the peaceful coexistence policy comes from blatantly reactionary politicians. They do not conceal their fear that growing recognition of that principle as the basis of mutual relations between states with different social systems might narrow the sphere of militarist influence in foreign policy and, consequently, establish favourable conditions for restricting the arms race.
The socialist state, in advancing the principle of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet republic and capitalist countries at the very dawn of its existence, has never had any intention of yielding its ideological positions and has never undertaken any obligations on that account. It firmly sticks to its guns of class struggle. Only the forms of that struggle change due to the changing international situation. The princi-
172pal form is becoming peaceful competition and the extensive use of political and diplomatic means.
No matter how fervently the socialist worker-- peasant state desired, during the initial years of Soviet government, to make an invariable law of international intercourse the renunciation of coercive methods of struggle, of war, the use of weapons, it had to assess in a sober fashion the international political situation and the political policy of the imperialist powers. Experience has shown more than once that, in the minds of imperialist politicians, the right to equal and recognised existence has a country only equal in terms of power.
The peaceful coexistence principle would become nothing more than a noble declaration if the government advancing it confines itself to the formulation of an idea, and to its elucidation, without taking at the same time measures to create material conditions for its implementation. It was therefore an urgent task to strengthen the defensive power of the Soviet state, to set up a shield that would reliably protect it from imperialist aggression and restrain the unleashing of war.
Lenin defined the principles of developing Soviet defence, which to this day guide the Soviet government. These principles form the doctrine of defence (and only defence) of the socialist homeland, renouncing aggressive wars of plunder. The main feature of that doctrine is to neutralise the intention of opponents of socialism to resort to armed force, and to baulk their plans for unleashing war.
The consistent nature of Soviet policy in affirming progressive legal norms and principles of international relations is reflected in the new Soviet Constitution. The ten constitutional principles of relations be-
173tween the USSR and other states, inscribed in Article 29, are the ten principles of mutual relations defined by the Helsinki Conference. The action of the Soviet government is not simply an example of observing agreed international norms; it signifies a new stage in the creative development of the principle of peaceful coexistence as applied to the real international situation.
In establishing guidelines for Soviet foreign policy, the Constitution spells out among them "achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems". The juxtaposition of these two objectives is significant. It reflects the unchanging nature of Leninist foreign policy.
The USSR has, of course, military plants and an army. But neither the managers of those plants, nor the army command staff, nor workers or soldiers connect their welfare with war or war orders. The Soviet people would very much like, for the enormous benefit of the whole of society, to switch their military plants to the manufacture of peaceful commodities, to peaceful creative purposes. This is the essence of socialism's approach to questions of war and peace, to disarmament issues. They also have a very direct relation to the possible settlement of the disarmament problem.
The appearance of nuclear weapons of mass destruction strengthened the relationship between the peaceful coexistence problem and that of disarmament. Disarmament and peaceful coexistence became an objective need for humanity in the strictest understanding of the word. Disarmament came to mean guaranteeing peace.
Radical changes in the destructive capacity of weaponry and, therefore, in the nature of war deeply
17.4
imprinted themselves on the requisites and conditions for posing the disarmament problem. While earlier the peoples could exist without disarmament and even, though suffering increasing losses in wars, they somehow continued to make cultural, economic and social progress, nowadays humanity may have to face up to the fact of the destruction of modern civilisation if it does not disarm.
Deep-going international changes have also taken place. The balance of power between the forces of war and peace has altered. It is not now a matter of a simple arithmetical calculation, but of a qualitative change that is extremely important in direction and scale.
Earlier we have analysed at some length approach of the young Soviet Republic to bridling the arms race, to searching for ways to resolve the disarmament problem. This was the approach of the only socialist state at that time. Now the cause of peace is being safeguarded by other socialist states alongwith the USSR. The emergence of a group of countries standing steadfastly on guard of peace, has considerably fortified the front of peace and the campaign for disarmament.
The other important factor encouraging the posing of the disarmament question in a new way relates to the disintegration of the imperialist colonial system. In recent years the young national states of Asia, Africa and Latin America have been playing an increasingly active role in international affairs. They attained their independence at the cost of long struggle and therefore are vitally interested in upholding peace, which would ensure them conditions for implementing their objective of national revival.
The great bulk of newly liberated states have won
175through by armed struggle. Insofar as the colonialists would not cede power willingly, sheer need forced the peoples to take up arms. And even now imperialism is trying by various ways and means to make the newly independent states parties to the arms race. And in some cases it is having appreciable success. But the genuinely national interests of newly liberated states can only be fully satisfied in a situation of lasting peace and disarmament.
Finally, the role of the common people has immea- [ surably grown in international politics. Their struggle, however, varied in form but dictated by a common goal---the safeguarding of peace---has acquired extensive scope. The working class, the communist and ' workers' parties are in the vanguard of the struggle.
Today the social basis of the movement under the disarmament slogan is very wide. The postwar years , have seen marked changes in this sphere too. This i movement includes all detachments of the working i people, the petty and middle bourgeoisie and even members of the big bourgeoisie who have managed to overcome their class preconceptions and make a realistic assessment of the dire consequences of the arms race---this senseless dash towards nuclear catastrophe.
People of diverse political views and convictions are involved in the disarmament campaign: various public organisations, trade unions, women, young people, atheists and religious groups.
If we contrast the nature of the present-day popular movement for disarmament with what it was between the two world wars or (what provides an even greater contrast) prior to World War I, there is every reason to talk of qualitative changes. The front of the popular movement for disarmament has become,
176first, international in the full sense of the word. This lends the movement a particular power and influence.
Second, the popular movement has steadily hammered out a unity of objective. General and complete disarmament has become that final goal. The presence of a generally-accepted goal gives it greater initiative and boldness in choosing slogans and forms of struggle. And this in turn enhances the impact and effectiveness of the movement of the international public against militarism and for disarmament.
Another process is unfolding in parallel with the growing activity of the peace forces. It is a process that is extremely important in answering the question posed in this chapter heading: is disarmament attainable? We are referring to the intensifying crisis of militarism and the militarist policy of imperialism. This crisis started back in the period of World War I and the October Revolution in Russia. The results of World War I meant the defeat and hence the crisis of German militarism and of the other national detachments of militarism associated with Germany.
The downfall of armed intervention against Soviet Russia for the first time showed the futility of the militarist policy in the battle against the incipient socialist system. The results of World War II were highly instructive in this respect: the most reactionary forms of contemporary militarism---Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan---were routed.
American imperialism took their place. For a certain time it was on the upsurge, even though the setback to aggression against the people of North Korea was sufficiently weighty evidence that a militarist policy had once again misfired in regard to socialist
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177countries. American militarism suffered an even more serious defeat in Indochina.
Even a brief survey of the postwar years shows that all the foreign policy doctrines and conceptions, guiding the leading capitalist countries, above all the USA, possessed the common feature of being based on militarism. Behind them lay in one way or another the idea of using military pressure to attain political ends, up to the use of weapons of mass destruction. But the effectiveness of this policy did not live up to expectations.
The very continuity with which plans of using military muscle in interstate relations with the socialist countries were frustrated, and then also in the sphere of relations with the newly liberated countries, occasioned the thought that this was no chance phenomenon, but a law-governed process. The ineffectiveness of militarist means primarily in relations with the Soviet Union, of course, has not escaped the attention of leaders of imperialist powers. And if they had continued to latch on to this policy, apart from political inertia, this stagnant approach may only be explained by the class shortsightedness preventing them from seeing the dominant trends in development and drawing appropriate conclusions.
During the Cold War years, militarism acquired for itself an ally and propagandist in the form of sociophilosophical trends evidencing the need for a "power platform" in successfully pursuing foreign policy. This encouraged the introduction of a form of thinking which hampered a review of the premises that had come into conflict with the changing alignment of world forces.
Real life, however, made it more urgent to re-- evaluate possible steps and permissible methods in foreign
178policy from the viewpoint of the common interests of imperialism. This was prompted, in particular, by the realisation that Soviet attainments in missile technology and space exploration at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s had radically changed the strategic situation. The other circumstance that worried imperialism was that these years marked an unprecedented upsurge in the national liberation struggle. Its successes altered the alignment of forces within the United Nations: it was now the socialist states, not the Western powers, that had gained political allies in the newly liberated states. This factor played a decisive role in the 1959 UN General Assembly discussion of the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament, which is still recognised as the ultimate goal of the international community.
The ruling quarters in the West realised that unleashing a nuclear war was a simple matter, but its most likely outcome would be an unimaginable catastrophe for humanity.
Recognition of the "atomic deadlock", i.e. the impossibility of unpunished warfare against the socialist community, was no easy task for Western ruling circles. It meant primarily admitting the crisis of militarism and ``coercive'' diplomacy, which in itself was no small thing.
The debate on reviewing the role of military power in international affairs developed in the West initially in academic circles least connected with official policy, and only later did the views worked out in the course of debate penetrate government circles.
US theorists belonging to the "political realism" school (specifically, Hans Morgenthau, George Ken-
«•
179
nan and Henry Kissinger) drew attention to the fact that military power was somehow being devalued as a means of foreign policy. US ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland stated that "the forms of military power that cannot be used in reality cannot be used for blackmail either".* Since weapons cannot be used because of their exceptional destructive power, and the threat of such weapons does not justify itself politically, it is better to take the path of mutual reduction of weapons.
Some observers came to the conclusion that events were inclining towards a ``tacit'' non-aggression pact. "If recourse to force has in fact become impossible," reckoned Henry Kissinger, "diplomacy too may lose its efficacy."** Hence his conclusion that a new conception had to be sought which would re-establish the effectiveness of the factor of military power in US foreign policy. Kissinger favoured shifting to a " flexible response" strategy envisaging the commensurability of a response to the ``challenge'' being faced by the USA internationally at that time. General Maxwell D. Taylor was developing analogical thoughts.*** They expressed an attempt to adapt themselves to the new situation in the world. The attempt was uncertain, inasmuch as, on the one hand, they admitted the futility of the policy on which militarist tendencies had forced them, and on the other, they made efforts to preserve the militarist policy in a somewhat modified form.
Proponents of "flexible response" pinned their hopes on the threat of mutual nuclear destruction `` deterring'' governments from a general nuclear war and thus ensuring freedom of political manoeuvre to the imperialist countries. Further, they envisaged political manoeuvring in a direction far from that of agreement with the socialist countries on reducing the level of military confrontation. They continued to seek means of retaining one-sided advantages for the imperialist powers.
Nonetheless, it was becoming more and more evident that nuclear parity between the two socially opposed groups of states harboured the risk of further intensification of crisis in militarism. After all, the parity made obvious the senselessness of the arms race. Why throw money away on arms and divert resources from the peaceful economy if the manufactured weapons brought no advantages and did not help to attain the set political goals? This question naturally worried an increasing number of people in Western countries who were being drawn into the arms build-up.
Fearing that recognition of the "atomic deadlock" might strengthen the grounds for public demands to halt the nuclear arms race, "political realists" advanced the thesis that accumulation of nuclear weapons was supposed to play a positive stabilising role. The assertion was a priori false from the point of view of normal logic. It was evidently ridiculous to think that one could achieve stabilisation built on fear and mutual suspicion. But accumulation of arms enhanced the risk of miscalculation or accident as a result of human error or a technical fault.
In the 1960s, the tenacity of militarist ideas and
181* Harlan Cleveland. NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain. Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p. 39.
** Henry A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 4. *** See: Maxwell D. Taylor. The Uncertain Trumpet. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1960, p. 6.
iao
overestimation of imperialism's potential hampered any switch by leaders in capitalist states to more realistic positions. Fresh international setbacks were needed, primarily the collapse of the "limited war" strategy, before the leaders came to an agreement on disarmament.
The "limited war" strategy was, as it were, a natural cover for the militarists and other advocates of the arms race after the political futility of global nuclear war became obvious, insofar as it had become impossible even to hazard a guess at the scale of consequences of such a war in terms of human and material losses. Bourgeois theorists and politicians latched on to the "limited war" strategy also because it did not diverge from the essence of the "containment of communism" doctrine and the "flexible response" concept, i.e. it seemed to give second wind to the former imperialist policy in regard to the socialist countries. Initially, the West hesitated to talk on a "limited war" with the use of conventional weapons. As the American political scientist Robert Osgood put it, limited war "maximises the opportunities for the effective use of military force as a rational instrument of national policy".*
In order to give more respectability to ``limited'' wars, attempts were made to play on the popular mood, including the popular aspiration for disarmament. "Limited war" was depicted as a form of "arms control"; it was claimed that one purpose of such control was to limit the scope and consequences of military activity.
This piece of casuistry was designed to reconcile the public to the idea of the permissibility of war as a means of foreign policy, convincing them that armed violence could be ``dosed'' and a ``controlled'' war could be waged. By the early 1960s some politicians were saying that they had come up with an optimum solution to the problem of how to use weapons and armed forces in foreign policy. "War had been transformed from an all-embracing national imperative into a selective instrument of foreign policy, to be applied in regulated doses to one small geographic area while the rest of the world remained at fitful peace", wrote the US Democrat John Lindsay.*
So they worked out guidelines on how to dole out "military doses". Behind it lay the ``escalation'' theory based on the premise that the threat to step up the "military dose" could scare a likely adversary, restrain him within certain bounds and thereby maintain one's control of events, achieving at the same time the foreign policy goals that had been set. Though militarist in spirit and content the policy was given the appearance of being moderate; it seemed to be designed to restrain the escalation of conflicts into total
war.
The "limited war" strategy and the ``escalation'' theory were tried out by Washington in Indochina. Aggression of American imperialism against the Vietnamese people developed to a scenario appropriate to the ``escalation'' script. Involvement of US troops in war operations against Vietnamese patriots climbed steadily: from the despatch of military advisers to the
* Robert Endicott Osgood. Limited War. The Challenge to American Strategy. The University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 26.
182* Foreign Affairs. Volume 50, No. 1, October 1971.
183sending of half a million fighting men and large-scale bombing raids with the use of the B-52 strategic bombers. And yet the ultimate results of each stage of escalation politically failed to live up to the expectations of the US leadership. The political objectives remained unattained. Each new stage of escalation meant yet another defeat for militarism as a means of political pressure.
The need to raise military stakes testified to the inefficacy of earlier military efforts. Foreign policy relying on militarism turned out to be incapable of resolving tasks which the biggest imperialist power with its vast military potential was pursuing.
This is a lesson worth dwelling on by those politicians who today talk so glibly of the possibility of conducting a "limited nuclear war". Europe is chosen as the most likely theatre for such a war; it is there that some hotheads in Washington presume to have their ``experimental'' explosions.
While giving the Vietnamese people and their bravery in the face of the aggressor their due, it has to be said that the setback to militarist policy depended on a whole nexus of factors. Objectively, it was due to the change in the world balance of forces which considerably narrowed the opportunities of militarism as a means of implementing imperialist foreign policy. The huge resources at its disposal could not ensure the attainment of its objectives. The foreign policy oriented on militarism ultimately undermined the position of the very country, the USA, that was pursuing it. The crisis of militarism was becoming more evident, even in its outword manifestations.
In a magazine interview, General Maxwell Taylor, adviser to three US Presidents, stated that the Vietnamese war had exposed the weaknesses of American
184society.* The General was not far from the truth, since the major ``weakness'' of the USA was the dominance of militarism with its predatory, aggressive policy.
In the light of the failure of US aggressive policy in Vietnam, the intensifying crisis of US militarism gained the name of "Vietnamese syndrome". Some latter-day politicians in Washington would have given much to erase this term from the American lexicon.
During the 1950s only a relatively small group of politicians in capitalist countries took account of the inefficacy of the aggressive foreign policy; even fewer appreciated the futility of the militarist policy in regard to the socialist community countries and to newly liberated nations.
In the 1960s the group expanded considerably. Successive setbacks in the world forced many people in the West to face up the problem of why the growth in military power of the imperialist states and their military alliances was not being accompanied by a rise in imperialism's political influence in the world; indeed, it was declining.
As a result, a situation was forming in the capitalist countries where opposition to militarism began to grow into a mass movement.
Back in the 1950s, US imperialist aggression against the Korean -people set a fresh seal on the question of a soldier's attitude to war. Samuel Huntington of the Columbia University had noted that the mood of soldiers was at variance with the political objectives of the administration. This chasm was even wider and clearer during the war in Vietnam which "demanded that young Americans kill and die where they can see no
* U.S. News & World Report. 27 November 1972.
185clear connection between personal sacrifice and national interests".*
As a result of the latent and mounting feeling that the war did not accord with the national interests of the American people, an anti-war mood gripped the US troops who had been despatched to deal with the peoples of Indochina. The garrison of the ``Pace'' base in Vietnam disputed their commanders' orders as unconstitutional; the crew of the Coral Sea aircraft-- carrier sent a petition to Congress demanding that the ship not be sent to Vietnam on a fresh battle mission.
Parallel with the growth in anti-war feeling in the Western countries, their economics increasingly began to feel the cumulative adverse effects of diversion of national resources to the unproductive ends of arms accumulation, which was politically unjustified. What the USA was having to face up to was that the gap between the desirable and the real, between the country's foreign obligations and its possibilities, was growing wider all the time. As the report of the United Economic Committee of the US Congress put it, "Expenditures of unnecessary sums for defense leads to misallocation of our own resources and, therefore, weakens this nation in the long run."** Such a statement by scholars who had hitherto bent all their efforts to justifying the arms race was extremely symptomatic of the new situation.
The exorbitant costs of the arms race, the maintenance of a network of military bases overseas, the military aid and participation in military adventures
were all shaking the financial and economic positions of the USA in the world. The forced devaluation of the dollar and its dropping exchange rate in the early 1970s upset the financial system of the capitalist world.
By the early 1970s part of the Western monopoly bourgeoisie (obviously not that which made up the military-industrial complex) began to take stock of what was happening. It was concerned about both the declining profits and other symptoms of economic and socio-political instability that was intensifying as a result of the militarist influence. An understanding was growing that the country could not go on endlessly committing means and resources to foreign policy adventures and the arms race.
It merits attention to see how states adhered to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare. As long as public pressure was high in the late 1920s, most West European countries adhered to the Protocol and ratified it. Then we entered a barren period. In 1952 the Soviet Union put before the UN General Assembly a proposal that those states that had not yet ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol should now do so. The Western members of the Security Council then got together to prevent the Soviet proposal from being adopted. All the same, during the 1960s the Geneva Protocol was again thrust into the limelight. The Hungarian proposal in 1966 was instrumental in that it spelled out even more succinctly the "disarmament significance" of the Protocol, and gained support from the UN General Assembly members. In the mid-1970s, that is with a delay of half a century, the USA finally ratified the Geneva Protocol. The international Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap-
187* Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Violence: America in the Sixties. The New American Library, New York, 1968, p. 65.
** See: Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle. The Strategy of Technology. New York, 1970, p. XXV.
186ons and on their Destruction, which we shall dwell on later on, was a definite continuation of the Protocol.
The Moscow Treaty of 1963 on Banning Nuclear Tests in Three Spheres: the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water was the first agreement on disarmament concluded since World War II. Talks that led to this agreement were particularly indicative for comprehending the meaning of the struggle between militarist tendencies and factors operating in favour of disarmament.
The question of halting nuclear tests was first raised in the United Nations on the initiative of the Indian Government. Its proposal received the support of socialist countries. Western powers ignored it. But the movement to ban nuclear tests, which were an initial step in the nuclear arms race and a source of radioactive pollution of the environment, acquired increasing scope.
In the given situation, the proposal made by the Soviet Union in June 1957 on the immediate ending of nuclear tests for 2-3 years under appropriate control evoked a lively response from international public opinion. In a calculated attempt to stall, Western powers proposed holding a meeting of experts on the question of detecting nuclear tests. That took place in July and August 1958 and its conclusions confirmed what the socialist states had said when proposing a halt to nuclear weapons tests---that it was possible reliably to detect test explosions and, consequently, to control their banning.
After that, the West had no alternative but to sit at the conference table with the Soviet Union. The talks in Geneva, begun on 31 October 1958, ended as early as 29 January 1962 without reaching an agree-
188ment. Two Western participants, the USA and Great Britain, stubbornly refused to come to any agreement. Washington even went so far as to review the conclusions of experts on control, making play of ``ideas'' on methods for covering up test explosions on which the Livermore Laboratory specialists in the USA had worked. Under the pretext of the possibility of camouflaging nuclear explosions, they put forward the widest possible demands largely on holding inspections in situ which could not be justified by interests of the cause, yet opened the door for ``legitimate'' military espionage.
Moreover, it was in this period that the idea took shape of developing the neutron bomb. A desire to test it undoubtedly played a negative role in the talks, strengthening the Pentagon's desire to leave underground nuclear explosions outside the ban.
The Caribbean crisis^^21^^ came as a great shock to international public opinion. To many Americans a nuclear war first became a real danger threatening their own welfare and existence, rather than a debating point for observers. The idea now emerged that it was urgent to curb militarism and limit its influence before it was too late.
Miscalculations of US policy in accumulating overseas obligations---and they were predominantly of a military nature since they were bound up with an urge to keep in power discredited pro-imperialist regimes---became combined with a biased approach to the socialist countries, an unwillingness and inability to assess soberly the possibilities of the socialist economic system. As John F. Kennedy stated, "we have underestimated as a nation the capacity of the Russians to compete with us militarily and economically".* * Foreign Affairs. Volume 36, No. 1, October 1957.
189The strengthening support within the UN for Soviet proposals on banning nuclear tests, public pressure for their immediate acceptance and a realisation that a continuation of tests would not bring the West any advantages, all combined to force the USA and Britain to review their position. Impediments to agreement were removed. When the appropriate political will appeared, it took only ten days of talks---from 15 to 25 July 1961---to come to an agreement and initialling it. The Moscow Treaty was signed on 5 August and came into force on 10 October.
Assessment of the Treaty would be one-sided if we did not note that it involved not only positive hopes. The Pentagon had calculated that keeping underground tests outside the ban would give the USA advantages as holder of more experience in conducting such tests. The American military-industrial complex cherished these hopes in secret when agreeing to the treaty. To a certain extent they mitigated its importance as a brake on the arms race.
If we turn to another international agreement signed in 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we can see here too that its conclusion became possible through the impact of factors operating in favour of settlement of disarmament issues.
The USSR had first advanced proposals to avert the proliferation of nuclear weapons back in 1956. The imperialist powers had turned them down. What is more, within NATO plans were nurtured for setting up a joint nuclear force. Implementation of these plans would mean access to nuclear weapons for the non-nuclear NATO members, including West Germa -2 nyWorld public opinion was alarmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would bring in its wake
190an intensification of the threat of a nuclear conflict. The movement to prevent such a train of events began to gather momentum. At the Thirteenth UN General Assembly the Irish delegation drew members' attention to the danger of nuclear proliferation. After debates, this question crystallised into an independent issue of the disarmament campaign.
The socialist countries from the very outset favoured an agreement on effective measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. The imperialist powers were inclined to drag out any settlement of the issue. To this end they proposed undertaking various `` studies'' and ``researches''.
In the meantime the demand to put a stop to nuclear proliferation acquired more and more allies. Small NATO member-states, having seen the threat of nuclear proliferation to themselves, opposed the creation of a joint NATO nuclear force. France took up an overtly hostile stance in regard to the plans. Within the USA and Britain fears intensified that nuclear proliferation was not such a good idea; on the contrary, it might have uncontrollable adverse consequences.
In this situation the socialist countries suggested a specific programme of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. An overwhelming majority of the UN member-states at the 20th UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1965 backed the main idea of the socialist concept of nonproliferation of nudear weapons. It was emphasised that a treaty on this question should not contain any loopholes that would permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly, in any shape or form.
That was how the way was paved to conclude the
191treaty. By early 1968 the main provisions of the document had been hammered out in the Disarmament Committee. And it was open to signature on 1 July 1968 simultaneously in Moscow, Washington and London. On 5 March 1970 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force. Like the 1963 Moscow Treaty, it had more than a hundred signatories, thereby confirming the possibility of attaining international agreement in an area affecting disarmament. Sceptics can claim that both treaties are peripheral: the 1963 Moscow Treaty outlaws certain forms of nuclear tests, but does not contain pledges on stopping the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals, not to mention their reduction. The 1968 Treaty is ``preventive'' from the viewpoint of the steady creeping of nuclear weapons across the world, but neither does it ensure measures for reducing nuclear weapons. Such claims may be made, too, in regard to the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, and the 1971 Treaty on the NonEmplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor.
True, these agreements cannot be classed as disarmament agreements. But it is also valid to say that taken together, they limit the arms race in a direct physical sense.
But it goes further than that. In 1971 the UN General Assembly approved the text of the Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The Convention came into force in 1975. This international document envisages a complete ban on bacteriological weapons and toxins. In accordance with Articles 1 and 2, the signatories pledge not to
192develop, produce, stockpile or acquire in any other way microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities that do not have peaceful uses. Within a three-month period after the Convention's coming into force the states were pledged to destroy all types of such weapons at their disposal. At the same time, it envisages a ban on auxiliary equipment and means of delivery of bacteriological agents and toxins. Thus, we are talking of a ban on and elimination of an entire category of lethal weapons.
The Convention banning bacteriological weapons was being drawn up in the setting of tense struggle between advocates of disarmament and its opponents. Relying on the 1925 Geneva Protocol which had proved its efficacy over the years, the socialist countries advocated a simultaneous ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons. The proposal received wide backing in the UN. But the imperialist powers put up resistance and went out of their way to separate any ban on bacteriological weapons from a ban on chemical weapons. Having shown flexibility for the sake of keeping up the momentum on disarmament issues, the socialist countries compromised and agreed to the separation. That made it possible to complete the elaboration of the relevant Convention. It should be said that a part was played here by the military-- technical factor relating to the specific nature of bacteriological weapons. The relative ease with which such weapons can be manufactured makes them accessible to a considerable number of countries, including those which cannot have nuclear technology. At the same time, these are weapons of a non-elective nature and their use runs the risk of starting epidemics which may spread to any country, even those outside the
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193conflict. This circumstance helped to bring the capitalist states to agreement.
The situation with chemical weapons is different. In the early 1980s, the problem concerning a ban on chemical weapons became more complex owing to increasing activity in the West of opponents to averting the arms race. Forces came to the fore which were striving to confront humanity with a qualitatively new twist in the chemical arms race. President Reagan announced a chemical rearmament programme within the USA. In justifying this dangerous step he used the same old ploy, dragging up the myth of the " Soviet chemical threat", the "falling behind" the USSR in chemical weapons.
Throughout the history of international relations not a single state has used chemical weapons so widely as the United States, in particular during its aggression against the Vietnamese people. It is known from official admissions that over 45 million litres of various chemical substances were sprayed over Vietnamese territory. They caused victims not only among Vietnamese soldiers and peaceful inhabitants, but also among US army personnel. An increasing number of press reports appear about ex-US soldiers poisoned by the "orange agent''.
American chemical weapons were used in Kampuchea and Laos. The Afghan counter-revolutionary bands, fighting the lawful Kabul government, were also supplied with US-made means of chemical warfare. The US continues developing such weapons, having amassed their vast stockpiles. The Pentagon, however, is demanding mass production of binary nerve gases, the effect of which begins when combining two non-toxic components at the moment of explosion or spraying.
194Everything points to the fact that the US is making large-scale preparations for chemical warfare. And once again Europe is the centre of attention, since it is there that American strategists intend to station their new chemical weapons.
Meanwhile, American representatives in the Disarmament Committee and other UN agencies are blocking a convention on banning chemical weapons. The growing danger makes it necessary for people to redouble their efforts to prevent war with the use of chemical weapons.
Objective factors are preparing fertile soil for attaining disarmament objectives. But they cannot be attained automatically, all by themselves. Purposeful effort is needed from all states interested in disarmament, all sections of the public and all movements fighting to preserve peace.
The factors favouring disarmament are of an objective nature. This does not mean, however, that imperialism is powerless to counter them, unable to restrain their effect. It has at its beck and call a vast army of economists, scholars, design engineers, political scientists and propagandists who are analysing these factors within the scope of their specialisation and putting forward measures to play down their effect. As a result, progress in the field of disarmament does not move in a straight line; it is crooked, rather like the complex picture in which the progress made in the 1970s was interspersed with delays and even retreats. But this must not detract us from the need to work for progress.
Just as one may not see the wood for the trees, so current events may create an incorrect impression of the overall law-governed process. Therefore, we must take a broad view of this struggle if we wish to see
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the law-governed process in the disarmament campaign; we must track the emergence and development of the disarmament problem and the introduction of disarmament into the popular political struggle. If that is done people will see clearly the prospects ahead, convinced that no matter how complex the situation may be at a particular moment in the disarmament struggle, victory is possible.
Today's difficulties in the way of disarmament must be a constant reminder that we need constantly to encourage all forces standing for an improvement in the international situation, for peace and disarmament. For these are the forces that express the common human aspiration to prevent a nuclear conflict and to do away with the burden of armaments.
The socialist countries are striving to draw public attention to the fact that at present it is particularly important and urgent to alleviate the threat of war and bridle the arms race in view of the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and the growing bellicosity of imperialism. And this has already brought a marked growth in international tension.
Anyone sincerely concerned about the mounting danger of war cannot today sit idly by; it is vital to do everything possible to help create effective barriers in the way of war.
Essentially, a new political force has emerged, capable of having a great influence on world politics and the international situation. The scope of the present-day anti-war movement is revealed by the fact that nearly 20 million activists took part in major peace demonstrations throughout capitalist countries in the spring of 1982, as compared to the 5 million who did so during the whole of 1981.
Taking part in the peace movement are all classes,
196all sections of society, not only working people ( workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the middle strata), but also members of the bourgeoisie and part of the ruling circles of capitalist countries. The movement encompasses an unusual orray of political forces, from communists, socialists, and social democrats to Christians, liberals, environmentalists, and certain groups of conservatives. All these groups having different causes and interests have been brought together by the natural longing for survival on earth and for the guarantee of a future existence for their own children and grandchildren.
The present-day anti-war movement stems from the awareness by an overwhelming majority of people of the real and growing threat which is being posed by the irrational and self-seeking policies of reactionary circles to their national interests and very existence. A central factor in the anti-war movement is the wish to preserve the fruits of detente which was further strengthened by the Helsinki Final Act and by other international agreements. Other results of detente applauded by the people are political consultations among states belonging to different social systems, the development of economic cooperation which helps to give employment to workers during economic crises, and wider contacts among peoples.
The Soviet public organisations and the whole of Soviet people are active participants in the anti-war movement. They have every reason to say that not only lately, but always---both before and after World War II---they have invariably championed the cause of peace and resolutely fought for the implementation of the most energetic measures which would prevent the unleashing of a new war. The Soviet people are not only themselves taking every possible step so as
197to preclude the possibility of war but are receptive to all initiatives leading in that direction. They are prepared to start a comprehensive and candid dialogue with all the proponents of peace and opponents of war. They have acknowledged their earnest interest in peace by the warm welcome they have extended to the participants in the Peace March, when it was held on Soviet territory.
These marches, just like other peace initiatives, are an indication of the new feeling of deep solidarity among peoples in the struggle for peace in our nuclear age, as well as their heightened sense of their common responsibility for the fate of the world. It is precisely this which explains why the movement has taken up so broad proportions.
An indicator of how influential public organisations involved in the peace struggle have become is the fact that more than 80 such organisations set forth their views at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in the spring of 1982, as against 31 like organisations taking the floor at the first such session in 1978.
The scope of the present-day anti-war movement forces even those who are used to ignoring public opinion and giving priority to the interests of the military-industrial complex to lend an ear to the demands put forth by this movement, demands which are being more loudly and distinctly voiced at international forums.
The results of the 1981 and 1982 sessions of the UN General Assembly offer convincing proof that the world community urgently demands the resumption of the broken-off arms limitation talks, the invigoration of those in progress, and the opening up of new ones. The proposals made by the socialist countries
have been supported by the overwhelming majority of the UN member-states. They share the opinion of the Soviet Union and its allies that there exists an overriding need to resume talks on a comprehensive and total ban on nuclear tests and the use of chemical warfare, as well as on the demilitarisation of outer space. A resolution was adopted at the 36th UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1981, calling for a ban on neutron weapons, whose deployment would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war and give a new impulse to the arms race.
This and other UN resolutions have registered the fear of the participants in the anti-war movement that the fate of nations, the fate of human civilisation has been placed today on the map of world politics. The Soviet people are deeply aware of this and on their part strive to promote joint efforts by all forces that support the preservation of peace.
The mass anti-war demonstrations that have swept most of Western Europe have marked a new stage in promoting a popular movement against the arms race and threat of a new war. The movement has rolled on from Western Europe to other continents.
The years of struggle for international detente have also had their imprint on social democracy. A positive shift has been made in their position in favour of disarmament and cooperation between capitalist and socialist countries; that is paving the way for extensive contacts and dialogue. One testimony to this shift was the visit of members of the Socialist International's Advisory Council on Disarmament to the USSR between 1 and 4 February 1982. They were received at the Kremlin by Soviet leaders who stressed that the situation had never been so grave in all the years since World War II, and that it was mere madness for any
199state to build its policy on nuclear war and victory in it; that was irresponsible and reckless playing with the fate of humanity.
The talks in Moscow showed common views on the removal of the threat of nuclear war as the supreme goal of the world community. Both sides agreed that an end had to be put as soon as possible to the arms race and a start had to be made to the disarmament process. That could be achieved only through honest and equal negotiation based on a desire to reach success in the search for mutually-acceptable solutions. It was admitted that any differences of opinion should not overshadow the main question of concern for maintaining and strengthening world peace.
Another example of the possibility of fruitful cooperation was the meeting between the Soviet leader and British Labour Party leaders in September 1981. Both sides expressed their conviction that it was possible to avert exacerbation of the situation. That objective had to be in the forefront of the activity of both governments and social groups.
International public opinion over recent years has more than once convinced itself that the disarmament programme being advanced by the socialist countries headed by the USSR is no set of slogans dictated by expediency or wishful thinking, that it is a realistically substantiated plan worked out on the basis of an objective analysis of the current situation in the world.
Basing itself on the principled objective of limiting the arms race and moving over to effective disarmament measures, socialist diplomacy is trying to focus the attention of negotiators on the most important problems, to obviate unnecessary procedural wrangles, consistently to strive for tangible results through a
200generally-recognised balance of interests of all sides. Invariably working in the spirit of honest partnership and cooperation, diplomats of the socialist countries at the arms limitation and disarmament talks have frequently stated on behalf of their governments that their countries are ready to go as far as their partners to the talks will. All now depends on them.
The Peace Programme adopted by the 24th and developed at the 25th CPSU Congresses spelled out the paramount aim, clear-cut global and regional directions, the priorities in solving individual disarmament problems, and the ways and means of implementing them. The concrete proposals put forward by the Soviet Peace Programme were submitted to the UN. At the 24th UN General Assembly in 1971, the Soviet Union proposed convening a World Disarmament Conference. Subsequently, in 1972, it submitted-to the 26th UN General Assembly a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.
Consistently pursuing its foreign policy of disarmament in accord with the Peace Programme, the USSR followed this up in 1973 with a call to adopt a decision on cutting the military budgets of the permanent members of the UN Security Council by ten per cent and to use part of the saved funds for helping the developing countries. The 30th UN General Assembly in 1975 included in its agenda a Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons, and on the conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Both were intended to consolidate the positive trends in the international situation and supplement political detente with military detente.
201The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples, adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress, became a source of fresh Soviet disarmament initiatives. They embraced all the major aspects of the campaign to avert the threat of world nuclear war and to stop the arms race, to consolidate political and international legal guarantees of peace, to deepen detente and extend it to all areas of the globe. At the 31st UN General Assembly in 1976 the USSR proposed the conclusion of a World Treaty on the NonUse of Force in International Relations. The 32nd UN General Assembly examined on Soviet initiative the question of deepening and consolidating detente and averting the danger of nuclear war. At the 33rd UN General Assembly in 1978 the Soviet Union submitted a proposal on concluding an International Convention on Strengthening Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear States and an agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries where there are none at present.
The special UN General Assembly on disarmament, held between May and June 1978, was an important stage in the search for ways of halting the arms race. The USSR put forward a number of constructive initiatives for restraining the arms race. They were set forth in the document "New Soviet Proposals for Practical Steps to End the Arms Race" and covered all major aspects of the disarmament problem. Among others, the USSR raised the important question of a complete end to further quantitative and qualitative growth of arms and troops by states possessing large military potentials. Many ideas advanced by the Soviet Union were included in the final document adopted by the UN General Assembly.
202When new difficulties arose with regard to settling international issues on which the destiny of the world depended, the 26th CPSU Congress (1981) once again focused attention on the problem of curbing the arms race. The Soviet government demonstrated once again that it was consistently striving to preserve world peace and consolidate political and military detente.
Socialism is countering the policy of whipping up tension and building up arms, the doctrines and concepts that spread the cult of war and military force with measures to mitigate the military threat, to curb the arms race and strengthen political, legal and other guarantees of peace. Socialist diplomacy is demonstrating its readiness to move forward, ultimately to effective disarmament.
The 26th Party Congress adopted a platform for further efforts by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and for all peace forces in the fight to maintain peace, to continue the process of international detente and curbing the arms race. Based on this platform, the USSR put forward at the 36th UN General Assembly in 1981 a programme of specific joint actions by states to remove the threat of a nuclear war. On Soviet initiative, the Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, according to which statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity. Wide support was also given to the Soviet proposal to adopt effective measures to prevent the spreading of the arms race to outer space.
The socialist countries believe that a responsible approach guided by a desire to ensure success is expected of states that take part in disarmament negotiations. For that to happen, all states need to cast aside narrow, short-term considerations of an internal
203or external nature, they need to renounce chasing after the illusion of military-strategic superiority, and become clearly aware that the really vital interests of all nations consist in removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.
The socialist community is consistently pursuing a foreign policy aimed at bringing favourable changes in international relations. Relying on accumulated experience, socialist foreign policy is searching for ways of political detente reinforced by military detente that would subsequently facilitate the implementation of effective disarmament measures.
Detente and the arms race are incompatible concepts. The arms race intensifies mutual distrust, nullifies everything achieved in the political and economic sphere of inter-state relations through detente, constantly causes destabilisation of the international situation, thus engendering a threat to universal peace and security. Unfortunately, the early 1980s have seen a clear trend to heightened tension. Leaders of the NATO states, and above all of the USA, have obviously set themselves the aim of disrupting the existing military-strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO. The Washington leadership does not hide its desire to bury detente, to erase the very word ``detente'' from the international vocabulary. It sees it as a communist contagion, even though the term was originally proposed by General De Gaulle.
The Republican administration, in speeding up the arms race, reckons on the new types of weapons of mass destruction giving it the chance to dictate its will to the rest of the world, and primarily to the socialist countries. How else can one interpret the declarative
204intention of that administration to hold talks only from a position of superior strength?
This brand of declaration is neither new nor original, like the forecast of a speedy and inevitable end to world socialism. Today it testifies either to a lack of elementary knowledge of history or to political blindness.
Those who pin their hopes on halting or at least putting the brake on what for them is an unwelcome course of world development, to regain the role of arbiters of people's fate, reckon on military force and a policy of aggression and military adventures. To act thus is to stand in the way of objective laws of social development, of progressive changes in the world.
Despite the expectations of the ruling groups of imperialist powers, their imposed rivalry in developing nuclear weapons has brought nothing like the results they had counted on. Imperialism has had to face the fact that global war with the use of existing strategic weapons may end in utter obliteration of capitalist society as an organised whole. Socialism will not begin a war, it does not need war and is not preparing one. It is the imperialist forces who are hankering after war; this is understood by peoples no matter what imperialist propaganda says. Those who would settle disputes by war should not forget that the means of warfare have in their destructive power far exceeded the motives, causes and goals, i.e. everything that could justify the unleashing of a global nuclear conflict.
Referring to the improvement of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, the propagandists of the military-industrial complex endeavour to prove that nuclear war could spare the civilian population. This is what is meant by the much-vaunted "hu-
205manising" nuclear weapon through its selectivity and ability to inflict so-called surgical blows to speciallyselected military targets. Among such ``humane'' weapons they include the neutron bomb which is supposed to be effective against tank crews and harmless to civilian population.
In these circumstances immense importance attaches to the proposal, made at the 26th CPSU Congress, to tell people the truth about nuclear war by setting up an international committee of authoritative scientists. The truth about nuclear war and its irredeemable disastrous consequences for humanity must be conveyed---and will be conveyed---to the widest number of people on earth. This proposal received wide acclaim among world public opinion, insofar as it echoed the mood prevailing more and more deeply in people's minds.
Some politicians, treating disarmament as small change for bargaining, reckon on gaining concessions from the socialist countries on political problems as ``payment'' for agreement on disarmament. It is hard to understand what the advocates of such ``reasoning'' hope to gain. The socialist countries do not conceal their interest in disarmament, but to demand from them some additional payment for agreement on disarmament is politically beyond the pale.
The limitation and reduction of arms is an independent task requiring solution irrespective of the state of affairs and progress on other international issues. An appreciation of that is becoming obvious to wide sections of the public. That is why demands are mounting for a speedy agreement on urgent matters, without burdening them with side issues that complicate the attainment of mutual understanding between states.
Socialist diplomacy appeals to the other side to hold disarmament talks on all priority issues in parallel, including appropriate confidencejbuilding measures, striving for those talks to supplement one another and to lead to a speedy attainment of a breakthrough on disarmament.
A military settlement of inter-state disputes and differences is alien to socialist foreign policy built as it is on the principles of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence, respect for peoples' national rights and fraternal mutual assistance. That is why they so consistently advocate the cause of disarmament and insist on the method of concord.
The cogency of the approach of socialist countries, resting on a balanced judgement of objectively developing international processes, is gravely disturbing militarist groups. Hence their heightened activity. Seeing how the positions of those who rely on force in world politics are being eroded, they try to shore up the militarist platform through whipping up tension, speeding up the arms race and drawing more and more countries in it.
The military-industrial complexes of the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and other capitalist states do not hide their satisfaction about such development. After all, the growth in overseas clients for arms enables them, first and foremost the powerful American military-industrial complex, to expand their industrial base even more, to draw into the arms production process an increasing number of people who live by selling their labour power. The reckoning is simple and devious: anyone whose income depends on arms production will hardly protest against war preparations.
The disarmament programme of the socialist coun-
207 206tries is designed for a practical constraint on the arms race with subsequent move to disarmament. It is based on the awareness of the need rapidly to move over from what has been achieved to the next stage.
By its consistent proposals on disarmament the Soviet government has confirmed that it really is not thinking of infringing upon the approximate strategic balance that prevails between the USSR and the USA. At the same time, it is vain to imagine that the USSR would be reconciled to any disruption of that balance; even less so to the realisation of Washington's plans to gain a decisive military advantage. The prevailing military-strategic balance between socialism and capitalism is an attainment of paramount, historic significance. It serves as a factor restraining aggressive aspirations of imperialist forces and corresponds to the vital interests of ail nations. Any attempt to upset this balance is doomed to failure.
One may only register amazement at the ease with which some politicians believe that only after the forearming of the USA and NATO, after the establishment of superiority will it be possible to hold successful talks with the socialist states. Why, indeed, should the Soviet Union and other members of the socialist community agree on being in a weak position? They have already demonstrated that they are capable of eradicating the superiority of the other side and achieving equality in military power in situations that were mudh less propitious for them than the present one.
In situations where the militarists openly boasted of Western preponderance in bombers, aircraft carriers, missiles, bases, etc., imperialist diplomacy did not succeed in its manoeuvres in international forums. The initiative invariably remained with socialist diplomacy;
208its proposals gained the support of public opinion and millions of people joined the disarmament struggle.
Security, both international and national, may be only ensured by consistently lowering the level of military confrontation, renouncing the efforts to gain military superiority and implementing effective disarmament measures. To follow that course will ensure material guarantees for consolidating the system of international peace and security.
Nuclear disarmament has a special role to play. After all, in no past war or conflict did the possibility exist of destroying the populations of whole countries and continents, of catastrophic genetical consequences both for the living and for many generations of people not yet born. Nuclear weapons, their improvement and accumulation have posed just such a question. The future of humanity directly depends on its solution.
On 16 December 1981, a delegation of scholars from the Pontifical Academy of Science, concerned with a study of the consequences which nuclear war could have for humanity, were received at the Kremlin. The Soviet side noted that prevention of nuclear war was the supreme responsibility of state leaders to their people, to humanity, to their descendants, and that the Soviet leadership fully appreciated that responsibility. It has been doing all it can to avert nuclear war.
The fact cannot be denied that it is mainly thanks to the initiative, insistence and flexibility of Soviet policy in the latter part of the 1960s and during the 1970s that a series of multilateral and bilateral treaties were signed, in one way or another restraining the nuclear arms race in certain dangerous areas. However, these agreements were only first steps. Decisive measures to stop peace slipping away towards nuclear war are needed today more than ever before.
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209The danger of the world slipping over the precipice of nuclear war is a direct result of attempts by US imperialism to halt the historically inevitable process of progressive development of human society, to turn it back to the "good old days" when capitalism had undivided sway in the world. To these ends the most aggressive groups of US imperialists, together with their confederates in some other Western countries, have gone on to the offensive against international detente, against equal, mutually-advantageous cooperation between nations.
Having seen in detente a hindrance to their hegemonist designs, these groups have begun a planned inflation of military expenditure, a militarisation of the NATO countries, a deliberate deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. They see one possibility of resolving that task in undermining Soviet-US agreements signed during the 1970s.
The plan of such actions, as latest events demonstrate, has been drawn up well in advance and agreed among various sections of imperialist reactionaries. They only sought a suitable excuse to be able by launching a powerful propaganda machine, to deceive public opinion, lead people astray, and free their own hands for carrying out provocative acts against international peace and security. Events in Afghanistan, and then in Poland, exposed the miscalculations of international and internal reaction in those countries and were latched onto as just such an excuse. Having raised the smoke-screen of a slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-socialist campaign, aggressive imperialist forces went into action.
Ratification of the SALT-2 was aborted, even though it is to the detriment primarily of the USA itself, which
is now exposed to the world as a partner whose word cannot be worth the trust expected of a great power. US diplomacy is not displaying delicacy even in relations with America's close allies. The Pentagon plan to attain military superiority includes shifting nuclear war to the territory of Europe---a strange repetition of the scenario of the two world wars when it was largely Europeans who died on the field of battle, while America turned their blood into gold. This is the essence of the NATO forearming plan and the emplacement of US medium-range nuclear missiles in West European countries enmeshed in NATO obligations. Washington has succeeded in getting some NATO countries to accept these missiles on their territory, having promised to ratify SALT-2 and commence negotiations on the SALT-3. The promises were then thrown overboard and the ``twofold'' NATO decision became just one more deceit of the West European people.
How does such duplicity menace Europe? A reply to that question becomes obvious if we take a closer look at the US strategic concept of a "limited nuclear wair", which is supposed to prepare West Europeans psychologically for the notion that it is `` thinkable''. Such preparation began with the notorious Directive 59 signed in July 1980 by the then President Garter.
The essence of that Directive is to bring US military strategy in line with assault on detente, with the policy of altering the strategic balance on global and regional scales in the US favour. Those and other like conceptions are designed to make nuclear war an ``acceptable'' means of attaining the foreign policy objectives of US imperialism, of extending the spectrum of international political situations in which it
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210might be possible, with minimum risk to themselves, to use armed force in both conventional and the nuclear varieties.
Propaganda of the feasibility of a "limited nuclear war" has yet another, so to speak applied, aspect. It serves the aims of creating a situation which would make it easier for the military-industrial complex to develop a nuclear arms race, above all for their further qualitative refinement. The changing generations of weapons mean pre-guaranteed orders and, therefore, profits.
The development and realisation in the United States of the strategic cruise missile programme have given push to the strategic nuclear arms race. The next, even more dangerous, step was the US decision to develop a new kind of nuclear weapon---the neutron bomb. The monstrous nature of that decision is evident because this weapon is designed specifically for destroying human beings with as little as possible harm to material objects.
The sinister chain of misanthropic plans of US strategists and politicians is continued by plans to launch the manufacture of yet another type of weapon of mass destruction with the same aim of exterminating people---the binary nerve gases.
The Soviet Union is strongly opposed to the development of the neutron bomb. The Soviet leaders have seriously warned that "if such a bomb were developed in the West---developed against us, a fact which nobody even tries to conceal---it should be clearly understood that the USSR will not remain a passive onlooker. We shall be confronted with the need to answer this challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people, its allies and friends. In the final analysis all this would raise the arms race to an even more dangerous level.. . We do not want this to hap-
212pen and that is why we propose reaching agreement on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb so as to save the world from the advent of this new mass annihilation weapon''.
On 9 March 1978, the socialist countries that are members of the UN Disarmament Committee---the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia---submitted for the Committee's examination a Draft Convention banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. But the USA and its NATO allies refused to hold talks on concluding such a convention.
On 6 August 1981, President Reagan, expressly on Hiroshima Victims Memorial Day and cynically flouting the interests of all humanity, adopted a decision to launch the fuM-scale manufacture of that weapon. The natural response was anger, indignation and alarm among the peoples of all countries and continents.
The TASS Statement issued on 14 August 1981 roundly condemned this militarist act by the US administration. Once again it emphasised the need to conclude an international convention on mutual renunciation of production of neutron weapons and their banning. The statement said that, "The appearance of neutron weapons in military arsenals could lead to a dangerous lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, or more simply, to increasing the risk of nuclear war, and the entire responsibility for this will lie with the United States of America.''
Thus, the early 1980s have been marked by heightened international tension and war danger. Once
213again imperialism has shown itself to be the source of a war threat, intervention in other countries' affairs and suppression of the liberation struggle. Once again it has been confirmed that socialism is the genuine vehicle for ideas of peace and disarmament.
The USSR has no illusions about the intentions of imperialist reaction which plays a key role in defining US foreign policy, and it is fully determined to show restraint and firmness in not yielding to provocation. At the same time it does not hide the fact that it will unhesitatingly rebuff any form of hostile campaign like the slander spread about the "Soviet war threat" and the hypocritical "human rights campaign", or attempts to blame Moscow for duplicity in "international terrorism". No intrigues by peace opponents will divert the Soviet government from the pivotal direction of its foreign policy, determined by Lenin, i.e. the campaign to remove the threat of war and curb the arms race.
The Peace Programme for the 1980s that the USSR is advocating expresses its wish and readiness to hold talks on all urgent questions of peace and security, to give urgent attention to any constructive ideas and suggestions from the other side. This preparedness is not simply declarative, it is backed up by the Programme content which includes measures for limiting both conventional and nuclear missile weapons; it is putting forward proposals for settling existing and averting new conflicts and crises; it is permeated with an aspiration to support and intensify detente and it favours the promotion of peaceful coexistence on all continents. There are no ways to consolidate peace that the Soviet Union would refuse to take.
Soviet foreign policy initiatives apply to all vital
214problems of present-day international affairs. They possess both immediate and long-term significance as a basis for practical activity of socialist diplomacy.
The Soviet proposals made at the 26th CPSU Congress, just like those submitted to the 36th UN General Assembly regular session and its second special session on disarmament, are subordinate to a single abjective and express a single thought---to ensure universal peace. They concern a curbing of the arms race and a shift to real disarmament of all countries in Europe and the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa, the Far East and South-East Asia. Soviet proposals, concepts and ideas open up the possibility of adopting mutually-acceptable decisions based on equality and equal security; and they do not contain anything whatsoever that would envisage the gaining of one-sided advantages. They include readiness to conduct an active dialogue with the USA and continue constructive cooperation with France, West Germany, Italy and other West European states, and with Japan.
Questions of arms limitation and reduction, and the need to move over to real disarmament stand at the centre of the Peace Programme for the 1980s.
Most prominent are measures intended to save humanity from the threat of nuclear war, to stop and then turn back the nuclear arms race, to destroy means of nuclear warfare and, simultaneously, to renounce the use of armed force in international relations.
Concern for peace and prosperity of all nations has motivated the Soviet Union, which was and always will be opposed to weapons of mass destruction, to declare unilaterally that only exceptional circumstances---aggression against it or its allies by another
215nuclear power---can force it to resort to this extreme means of self-defence. The USSR has solemnly pledged never to use nuclear weapons against those countries which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of such weapons and do not deploy them on their territory. It has stated its readiness to conclude special agreements to this effect with any such country. Moscow has appealed to all nuclear powers to adopt similar obligations.
The Soviet proposal for a radical solving of the nuclear arms problem has been on the agenda of international talks for several years. It was recalled once again at the 26th CPSU Congress. This is not simply a ban on nuclear weapons, it is their exclusion from the arsenals of countries, with the simultaneous strengthening of political and legal guarantees of international security.
In February 1979, the socialist countries taking part in the Disarmament Commission's work, put forward specific proposals on holding talks on nuclear disarmament, the subject of which was to halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons in all forms and steadily to reduce their supplies until they were fully eliminated. At various stages of the talks the sides were to examine such issues as a halt to qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; an end to the production of fissionable material for military ends; a gradual reduction in existing stocks of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery. Of course, it remains to agree also on necessary control measures. At all stages the sides have to keep inviolate the existing balance of nuclear power while steadily lowering its level. Nuclear arms reduction is to be accompanied by measures to strengthen security of all states.
The aggravation of the international situation
216caused by heightened aggressive trends in US policy is not removing from the agenda the task of preparing for the above-mentioned negotiations, on the contrary, it is making it even more urgent and vital. There are more than sufficient grounds for commencing such talks without delay. All that is required is the political will of the nuclear states to undertake real steps to save their own peoplle and the rest of humanity from nuclear war.
The halting of the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals and the subsequent quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of strategic nuclear weapons systems is greatly important for reducing the threat of nuclear war. The state of affairs in this area, involving the very heart of US and Soviet military power, affects Soviet-US relations and the entire international situation in the most direct fashion. Recognising the exceptional importance of restraining the strategic arms race, the Soviet Union is prepared to continue appropriate talks with the United States while preserving everything positive so far achieved in this area. No other path exists to enhancing <the security not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of the rest of humanity as well.
The 26th CPSU Congress once again spoke out in support of the Soviet proposals to make Africa and the Middle East nuclear-free zones along with Latin America. The Soviet government is ready to take part in discussing the Finnish proposal to set up a nuclearfree zone in Northern Europe and, together with other nuclear powers, to guarantee the status of that zone.
In his replies to questions put by representatives of several Finnish public organisations, Yuri Andropov said that in June 1981 the Soviet Union pledged
217not to use nuclear weapons against countries of Northern Europe which became members of the nuclear-free zone. This Soviet guarantee could be formulated in a relevant multilateral treaty or in bilateral treaties with each of the zone's member-states.
Of course, the importance of such a nuclear-free zone for the countries in it would be greater if the NATO nuclear powers were to adopt similar obligations. To facilitate the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe the USSR does not preclude the possibility of examining the question of some other measures concerning its own territory adjoining the nuclear-free zone. It is ready to discuss this problem with all interested countries. The ball is therefore now in the court of the NATO nuclear powers and, first and foremost, the USA, which is farthest away from the proposed zone and, consequently, should least of all be likely to object to its establishment.
The concern of the Soviet Union for Europe, its desire to succeed in making the situation there peaceful and stable is perfectly understandable. Indeed, Europe is the most compact and vulnerable of all the ``homes'' of mankind which would inevitably fall victim to a nuclear conflagration.
That is worth remembering, particularly since the situation in Europe is threatened by a sharp exacerbation, owing to the plans imposed by the USA on its NATO allies for the stationing in several West European states of almost 600 new US medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at targets in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member-states.
The USSR suggests building the political and military security in Europe on the foundation of allEuropean economic, political, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, which has shown its advantages
and viability since the Helsinki Conference in 1975. The White House and the Pentagon see Europe as a war theatre in which to test their theories of a "limited nuclear war". This is precisely the reason for complication of the European situation. Reactionary imperialist groups are striving to resurrect there a political climate of the Cold War era, to implement Washington's designs to isolate East from West Europe and therefore restore inviolate US control over the West European nations, drawing them into the NATO snare.
The Soviet Union has made and continues to make huge efforts to avert a worsening of the military-- political situation in Europe. We may recall that in October 1979 it announced that it was prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Western part of the USSR as long as similar types of US nuclear missiles were not additionally installed in Western Europe. Under Washington pressure the NATO countries in fact ignored the Soviet proposal, thereby demonstrating their open contempt for the interests of security of West Europeans.
One year later, in 1980, guided by the same desire to save Europe from the intensifying nuclear danger, the Soviet Union put forward a new proposal: to discuss simultaneously and organically questions concerning both medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and US forward-based missiles. It was understood that possible agreement on these questions would only be reached after the Soviet-US Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT-2) had come into force.
The Soviet Union is in favour of the process of strategic arms limitation on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. That requires the continuation of businesslike talks calmly and without cheap propaganda and pressure attempts. The Soviet
218 219side has underlined the expedience of preserving everything positive so far attained in preparing SALT-2, and proposed that this prime issue should not be bound up with others, no matter how important they might be.
The Soviet Peace Programme for the 1980s contained yet another attempt to direct the search for a solution to the nuclear arms problem in Europe. The USSR proposed establishing a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by both sides, i.e. a quantitative and qualitative freeze at the existing level, including, naturally, the US forward-based missiles in that area. The moratorium could be effective until a permanent limitation treaty was signed or, better still, until such nuclear missiles in Europe were reduced.
The USA wishes to make Western Europe a testing range for its aggressive nuclear doctrines, putting peopile in immense danger. It is only logical that to neutralise mobile rockets would require retaliation of great power at presumed areas of their deployment. That was a severe warning based on a sober assessment of the logic of warfare and military operations, on a responsible attitude to questions of war and peace. It utterly destroyed the calculations of all manner of political scientists, sociologists and theorists in the West, especially the USA, who so carelessly commit to paper their diverse ``researches'' and ``scenarios'' for so-called limited, selective and other types of nuclear war in Europe by gentleman's agreement.
The Soviet government approaches these issues from an entirely different position. It insists only on the USA and NATO measuring Soviet security and that of Soviet allies by the same yardstick as they do their own.
At the 17th Soviet Trade Union Congress on 16
220March 1982 it was announced that the Soviet government had decided unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the development of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, in an attempt to facilitate attainment of a just agreement on a sizeable reduction in nuclear weapons by both sides in Europe and in a desire to show a good example. Such weapons already stationed there would be frozen numerically and qualitatively; there would be no replacement of outmoded missiles known as SS-4 and SS-5 by the newer SS-20.
This moratorium will operate either until the reaching of an agreement with the United States on reducing medium-range nuclear missiles scheduled for Europe, on the basis of equality and identical security, or until such a time as the US leaders, indifferent to the security of Europe, will nonetheless actually prepare to locate in Europe the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.
In December 1982 Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CG GPSU, declared Soviet readiness to slash the USSR's strategic weapons by more than 25 per cent, if US arms, too, are reduced accordingly, so that the two states have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. The USSR also proposed that "the number of nuclear warheads should be substantially lowered and that improvement of nuclear weapons should be maximally restricted". These proposals " refer to all types of strategic weapons without exception, and envisage reduction of their stockpiles by many hundreds of units. They close all possible channels for any further arms race in this field". And while the negotiations on limiting strategic nuclear arms in Europe were under way the USSR proposed that the strategic arsenals of the two sides be frozen.
Yuri Andropov emphasised, "No programmes of a
221further arms build-up will ever force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the American side by deploying corresponding weapons systems of our own--- an analogous missile to counter the MX missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are now testing, to counter the US long-range cruise missiles." "Any policy directed to securing military superiority over the Soviet Union has no future and can only heighten the threat of war."*
Other Soviet initiatives also favour a normalisation of the international situation and the creation of favourable conditions for disarmament.
The Soviet Union has advocated mutual restriction of naval fleet actions. This, understandably, is not a disarmament measure, but such a show of restraint on both sides is valuable from the viewpoint of inducing calm and establishing an atmosphere of greater trust between states.
In general, questions of trust or, rather, of carrying out measures capable of strengthening trust and thereby facilitating agreement on more far-reaching steps, have acquired importance of late. Figuratively speaking, one may say that yet another prospective direction has been opened up in the area touching upon disarmament. Here again socialism, its politics and diplomacy have shown the way.
Measures of trust envisaging the mutual exchange of information on certain forms of military activity serve primarily therapeutic objectives of sounding the * Y. V. Andropov. Report at a Jubilee Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to Mark the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. December 21, 1982. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 22, 24, 25.
222alarm when hotbeds of military conflict and complication appear.
Such measures agreed on in Helsinki proved their usefulness and had a positive effect on inter-state contacts in the intricate military sphere. It is noteworthy that they are being put into effect both by the socialist countries and the Western side which, one presumes, has appreciated their vallue. At the present time confidence-building measures are being carried out in European states, including a 250-kilometre zone of Soviet territory along its Western borders. We should add in parenthesis that the US leadership, which is so fond of talking of trust and other moral categories, loses enthusiasm when American territory is mentioned.
The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are ready to move further on confidence-bulding measures. They are in favour of exchanging information oft military exercises going on in the area established by the Helsinki Final Act, involving 20,000 plus men, rather than the Helsinki 25,000 plus, and with a month rather than a three-week notice. In their opinion, it would also be expedient to notify the other side of any movement of land forces, from a level of 20,000 and over, to extend the notification principle to air force exercises as well as big naval manoeuvres conducted by states---participants in the Helsinki Conference close to the territorial waters of its other participants, and to limit the scale of such military exercises to a level of 40,000-50,000 men. NATO's reservation on these proposals is hardly surprising. It confirms the fear that the approach of the NATO countries to the issues of military detente is being dictated by an unwillingness to seek ways to reduce the level of military confrontation, and by an urge one way or another to obtain military superiority: if they cannot
223manage it in military technology, they reason, they might do better in the diplomatic battle.
The socialist countries do not idealise confidencebuilding measures and know that they have to be combined with real steps to disarm and strengthen state security guarantees in international law. To this end, in particular, they are proposing to persuade all parties to the Helsinki Conference to sign a treaty on the non-first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons against one another. That would be a form of non-aggression pact essentially in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.
The European Conference made a start to promoting good-neighbourly relations between European states. In striving to deepen this process, the socialist countries proposed, at their May 1979 Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Warsaw Treaty Member-States, summoning a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. In a number of joint documents, the socialist countries explained this concept of the conference, spelled out their understanding of the major features relating to its content. The energetic activity of the socialist states has borne fruit: the convocation of such a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe became a key issue at the Madrid follow-up meetings of 1981 and 1982. Analysis of Western press statements clearly shows that American diplomacy had pinned its hopes on the speediest curtailment of the Madrid meeting. It acted in this vein and urged its allies to do likewise. The socialist community stood firm and destroyed such hopes.
It was stated at the 26th Party Congress that, "by safeguarding peace we are working not only for people who are living today, and not only for our children and grandchildren; we are working for the happiness
224of dozens of future generations".* The ideological, not propagandist, inherent humanity of socialism and the countries that have chosen it as their path of development was shown once again during the work of the Second Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. Those who appreciate the danger threatening the world as a result of the senseless arms race policy pursued by the US administration---and their numbers are continually growing as the scope of the anti-war movement testifies---had put great hopes on this session.
On the day marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the Soviet leadership announced new initiatives directed at strengthening universal peace and lessening the danger of nuclear war. These initiatives were spelled out in a report read by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, at a meeting at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 21 December 1982. The following proposals were put forth:
---the Soviet Union, which has made a commitment not to be the first to launch a nuclear attack, is prepared to reach an accord which would oblige both sides not to be the first to use not only nuclear, but also conventional weapons;
---the Soviet Union offers to close all possible channels for any further arms race and to reduce the strategic arsenals by hundreds of units. This should be a starting point for a further major reciprocal arms reduction;
---the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce its missile forces in the European part of the country by
* Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 40.
li---2045
225hundreds, including the SS-20s, and to maintain as many missiles as had by both Great Britain and France, and not a single missile more. An accord should be reached on the mutual reduction at an equal level of the number of aircraft equipped to carry mediumrange nuclear weapons.
These proposals are a direct answer to the doubts, vacillations and various comments being made in the West. The Soviet Union heeds them and is attempting to remove all obstacles which in one way or another have blocked the reaching of accord. A big step forward has thus been made to meet the Western powers half-way.
At the Kremlin meeting an Appeal was adopted "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and Peoples of the World", which underscored that the demand for peace becomes especially important in today's world when governments possess arms capable of destroying human civilisation and the very life on earth. "All efforts by states, the activities of governments, of organised political forces, of all the citizens of every nation," the Appeal reads, "should be focused on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe." In the Appeal, the Soviet Union invites the United States and other Western powers to take avail of the opportunity while it still exists to reach a just accord echoing the interests of peace.
Every nation, every government, as Yuri Andropov said at a Kremlin reception, will meet on the part of the Soviet Union a good will, an open heart and an extended hand. The ideal of socialism has been and remains a world without arms. A military rivalry is not the choice of the people in socialist countries, they are willing to exchange this rivalry for competition in the realm of peaceful labour and for mutually-- beneficial cooperation.
NOTES
1. The European Conference or, fully, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose participants included all the European states (except Albania which had refused to take part), along with the USA and Canada, convened on the initiative of the socialist community countries. It met in three stages. The first stage took place in the Finnish capital Helsinki from 3 to 7 July 1973 at a foreign-- minister level. The second stage was in Geneva between 18 September 1973 and 20 July 1975 at the level of foreign-minister representatives. The third, final, stage was in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975 at the level of heads of state and government. A Final Act was signed establishing the fundamental principles of mutual relations between states. By the Helsinki process is understood implementation of the Final Act in its entirety.
2. ``Export'' of revolution is a propaganda term resorted to by imperialist politicians who try to depict revolutionary and national liberation movements as the result of outside interference. It is normally ascribed, unsubstantiated, to the Soviet Union or other socialist countries, despite the fact that the ideology on which socialist foreign policy is based precludes such action. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries base their policy on the tenet that revolutions and popular struggle for national liberation are a consequence of internal social processes and therefore their instigation is dangerous as well as senseless, since it can lead to a break away between revolutionary forces and the main mass of the people and, as a result, to the former's defeat. The myth of `` export'' of revolution was thought up for the purpose of justifying the export of counter-revolution, the policy typical of the imperialist powers.
15*
2273. Shooting in Sarajevo. On 28 June 1914 the town of Sarajevo in Bosnia was the scene of a shooting by Serbian nationalists of the Austro-Hungarian heirapparent Franz Ferdinand. This assassination was used by Austro-German imperialists as an excuse for attacking Serbia, which signalled the start of World
War I.
4. Yevgeny Vuchetich, a Soviet sculptor, whose sculpture of a blacksmith beating a sword into a ploughshare was presented by the Soviet Government as a gift to the United Nations. The sculpture is on display at the UN Secretariat in New York.
5. "Ultima ratio regum"---Latin phrase which, on the order of the French King Louis XIV, was engraved on his artillery cannons.
6. The National Workers Union of the United States was set up in August 1866 at the Baltimore Convention; it stopped functioning in 1872.
7. The Decree on Peace was one of the first decrees of Soviet power, setting peace and friendship among peoples as the foundation of Soviet policy. It was adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd (now Leningrad) on 8 November 1917. It contained a proposal from the Soviet government to all peoples in the war and their governments to begin talks on stopping the war and concluding a just and democratic peace. This first diplomatic document of the Soviet government was signed by Lenin and set forth fundamentally new forms and methods of diplomacy, in particular making it open and public.
8. The Genoa Conference on economic and financial issues took place in Genoa from 10 April to 19 May 1922. It was attended by representatives from 29 states ' and five British dominions. The USA declined to i take part in the Conference, in particular because So- [ viet Russia was supposed to have shown an example to other European nations not to pay their debts to America by its refusal to recognise debts. Georgi Chicherin, head of the Soviet delegation, pointed out that attempts at economic revival after World War I were doomed to failure as long as the threat of war was to hang over Europe and the whole
228world. Therefore Russia intended to propose at the Conference general arms reduction and to do all it could to support any proposal easing the burden of militarism.
9. Parcel peasantry, engaged in strip farming which involves small-scale farming methods using primitive means to work a small strip of land.
10. The Triple Alliance was concluded between Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. The war coalition, put together between 1879 and 1882, subsequently was spearheaded against the Entente. It fell apart with the entry of Italy into the war in 1915 on the side of the Entente. The name "Quadruple Alliance" is sometimes used, since Turkey took part in World War I on the side of Germany on the basis of the German-Turkish Alliance Treaty signed on 2 August 1914.
11. The American-Spanish War of 1898. An explosion on the American cruiser Maine at anchor in Havana Harbour served as the pretext for launching the war. In fact, the USA initiated the war to seize Spanish colonies. The Spanish-American Peace was signed in Paris on 10 December 1898. Spain renounced its claim on Cuba which formally was proclaimed `` independent'', but actually became a US colony. The United States also got Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The American-Spanish War was the first war for repartition rather than partition of the
world, i.e. it was an imperialist war.
12. The Tonkin Incident. On 2 August 1964 the American destroyer Maddox entered the Gulf of Tonkin on a spying mission, having violated the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and opened fire on its patrol boats. In self-defence, the latter returned the fire, driving the destroyer into the open sea. Two days later Washington announced that Vietnamese naval units had attacked the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy in international waters. Taking advantage of these provocative incidents, the US administration pushed through Congress the "Tonkin Resolution" giving US President Lyndon Johnson carte blanche for unleashing an aggressive war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, including
229barbaric massed bombing raids. It later turned out that the "Tonkin Incident" had been earlier prepared and that the White House had deliberately led Congress astray.
13. Cuban ``Mini-Crisis''. In the autumn of 1979 the artificially created tension in the relations between the USA, on the one hand, and the USSR and Cuba, on the other, was caused by the alleged "presence of Soviet troops" in Cuba. Thus was depicted the presence of Soviet military personnel at a military training
centre in Cuba, although their number had remained the same for all preceding years. The whipped-up hysteria was necessary to the US authorities to justify stepped-up military preparations in the Caribbean Sea basin (the permanent HQ of a Caribbean Operational Unit had been set up at Key West in Florida) and to hamper ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty, signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter on 18 June 1979 in Vienna.
14. The first atomic power station and first rocket for peaceful space research were built in the Soviet Union. On 27 June 1954 the world's first atomic power station for industrial purposes with a capacity of
5,000 kilowatts was commissioned. The world's first artificial earth satellite was launched on 4 October 1957.
15. War Criminal Trials. Between November 1945 and October 1946 the trial took place of the top war criminals at Nuremberg. Twelve men were sentenced to death by hanging, and seven were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Between November 1946 and November 1948 the trial was held in Tokyo of Japanese war criminals: the seven top criminals were given death sentences and 18 others received various terms of imprisonment.
16. "The Russell-Einstein Manifesto" was signed on 23 December 1954 by eleven of the world's greatest scientists who drew attention to the threat to the very existence of humanity by nuclear weapons.
17. The World Peace Congress is a public body uniting and guiding the international peace movement. It was formed organisationally at the first Congress, which was held simultaneously in Paris and Prague
230between 20 and 25 April 1949. The Congress took place under the slogan "Defence of Peace Is the Cause of All the Peoples of the World". It set up a Standing Committee comprised of representatives from 72 countries under the chairmanship of the outstanding French scientist Frederick Joliot-Curie. The World Peace Council was instituted at the second World Peace Congress (16-22 November 1950) for guiding the public campaign to preserve and consolidate peace.
18. The Warsaw Treaty was signed on 14 May 1955. Its entire content is subordinate to the task of strengthening peace. Its participants pledge, in line with the UN Charter, to restrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations and to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means. The Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty was set up in 1976.
19. Colossus with feet of clay. According to legend, the huge statue of Apollo, one of the Seven Wonders of the World, stood on the Island of Rhodes and crumbled as the result of an earthquake.
20. The Rubicon. In antiquity, the river marking the frontier between Gallia and Italy. In crossing it with his troops in 49 BC against Senate wishes, Julius Caesar thereby precipitated civil war in Italy. Since then the expression "to cross the Rubicon" has meant an irreversible decision.
21. The Caribbean Crisis arose in October 1962 as a consequence of American imperialism's urge to deal with revolutionary Cuba. The aggressive US actions brought the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe; but the firm stand of Cuba and the Soviet Union forced the White House to compromise and pledge not to attack Cuba. The USSR, in turn, refrained from deploying certain types of weapons in Cuba.
SUBJECT AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDEX
Caribbean crisis---189
China---92, 11, 113
Conceptions---•
---of "arms control" (of controlled arms race)---17, 37, 124-26, 151, 182
---of "arms regulation"---37, 42
---of "security first, disarmament thereafter"---43, 95-97, 102
---of technological ``fatalism''---13
Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States in Moscow, 1945---101
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe ( Helsinki Conference)---\37, 138, 174, 218, 223, 224
---Final Act of the Helsinki Conference---138, 223, 224
Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its foreign relations decisions relating to disarmament---
---24th Congress of the CPSU---201
---25th Congress of the CPSU---201, 202
---26th Congress of the CPSU---137, 203, 206, 215, 216, 225
Constitution of the USSR, 7977---173, 174
Control over implementation of disarmament measures--- 103-07, 118, 119, 151, 216
Conventions---
---Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972---187, 188, 192, 193
---Draft Convention banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons, 1978---213
---Draft International Convention on Banning the Manufacture and Use of Atomic Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purposes of Mass Destruction, 1946---102
---Geneva Convention of 1864 on the principles of protection of the sick and wounded---35
---Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes---35
---Rush-Bagot Convention on the limitation of the number of naval units in the Great Lakes between Great Britain (later Canada) and the USA in 1817---149
Czechoslovakia---48, 213
Africa---175, 215, 217
Agreements---
---Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the USSR and USA, June 1973---132
---"Zorin-McGloy Accord" (after the heads of delegations) on the principles of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, 1961---123
America Latin---175, 217
America North---18, 41, 51, 55, 60, 62, 66, 68, 71, 79, 161, 211
American Council on Foreign Relations----165
American Foreign Policy Association---125
American-Spanish War of 1898---61
Arms race, struggle for and against---5-9, 13, 14, 16-19, 22, 27, 28, 41, 45, 46, 49-53, 59, 70-73, 75, 77-79, 98-100, 108, 110, 111, 116, 133, 134, 150, 156-59, 165-69, 182, 186-88, 194, 196-99, 204, 209, 210, 212, 214
Asia---175
Atlantic---98
"Atomic deadlock", parity of nuclear armaments of the USSR and USA---179, 181
Austria---24, 26
B
Baruch Plan (an American proposal on the control of
atomic energy, 1946)---107, 108 Bavaria---152 Belgium---48, 80 Bikini Atoll---166 Bonn---142
Brookings Institution---43 Bulgaria---213
Canada---114, 116 232
233D
Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd (now Leningrad), 8 November 1917---88
Denmark---80
Detente---129-31, 133-36, 138, 139, 144, 171, 172, 196-99, 201-04, 208-10, 214, 215, 224
Disarmament, struggle for and against---5-9, 11-16, 18-27, 29-31, 34-38, 40-45, 85, 86, 90-97, 100-03, 118-21, 123, 128-30, 146-51, 153, 154, 169-71, 173-77, 191, 192, 195-204, 206-08, 214-16, 222, 223
---general and complete disarmament---44, 121-23, 174, 179
---nuclear disarmament---101-03, 109, 115, 116, 188-92, 201, 203, 206, 212-22
Doctrines, US foreign policy doctrines---
---of "containment of communism"---108, 182
---of "flexible response"---180, 182
---of nuclear ``deterrence''---118, 164, 166
£
Eniwetok Atoll---115, 127
Entente---56
``Escalation'' theory---183
Europe---12, 21, 24, 25, 32, 45, 48, 49, 56, 79, 87, 110,
116, 138-41, 144, 148, 149, 154, 171, 184, 195, 199,
211, 215, 217-21 ---Central Europe---138-40 ---Northern Europe---217 ---Western Europe---32, 143, 199, 219, 220
F
Far East---81, 215
"Fourteen Points" of US President W. Wilson---38, 39 France---IB, 31, 40, 48, 54, 58, 64, 82, 92, 104-06, 111,
113-17, 122, 127, 191, 215
ical methods of warfare---99, 100, 187, 188, 193 Geneva Summit in 1955 (meeting of the Big Four)---120 Genoa Conference, 1922---41, 92-95 German Democratic Republic---141, 147, 213 Germany (before the World War II)--- 39, 48, 56, 58, 62,
63, 103, 146, 147, 177 Great Britain---20, 23-26, 40, 48, 58, 63, 64, 82, 92, 101,
104, 105, 111, 113-17, 122, 127, 140, 141, 149,
158, 189-91
Great French Revolution---55 Great Lakes---149 Great October Socialist Revolution---38, 85, 88, 89, 177
H
Hague---32, 35, 36
Hague Peace Conferences---
---First---32-37
---Second---36, 37
---Third (plans of convocation)---37
Helsinki---10, 131, 139, 174, 223
Helsinki process (implementation of the decisions of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe)---
10, 138
Hiroshima---101, 163, 213 Hudson Institute---52 Hungary---152, 187, 213
India---64
Indochina--- 64, 178, 183, 186
"International terrorism" (formula, used by the US administration in undermining actions against the national liberation movement)---11, 140, 214
Inter-Parliamentary Union---30
Iran---83
Italy----28, 40, 80, 92, 215
Geneva---8, 20, 188
Geneva Agreements on Indochina in 795^---116 Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriolog-
234Japan---40, 41, 58, 62, 81, 92, 127, 141, 157, 177, 215
235K
Kabul---194 Kampuchea---194 Korea----113 ---North Korea---177 Kremlin---199, 225, 226
Pacific Ocean---41, 58
Pact of Peace (Soviet proposal on strengthening peace)---
111, 113 Peace Programme adopted by the 24th and developed by
the 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU---20\, 202,
214, 215, 220
Peaceful coexistence, policy, principle in international relations between states belonging to different social systems---
170-74, 207 Pennsylvania---19 Pentagon---8, 49, 67-69, 71, 73-76, 80, 118, 133, 141, 142,
144, 157, 164, 189, 194, 211, 219 Persian Gulf---83 Poland---210, 213
Pontifical Academy of Science---209 Preparatory Committee of the Disarmament Conference---•
100 Prussia---26, 52, 146
Laos---194
League of Nations---20, 38, 39, 43, 102, 105
London---116, 192
M
Manchuria---58
Marshall Islands---127, 166
Mediterranean---215
Middle East---12, 215, 217
Militarism---52-65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 79-84, 88, 91, 155, 162,
177-86, 189 Military-industrial complex---13, 63, 64, 69-77, 150, 189,
190, 205, 207, 212 Mongolia---58, 213 Moscow---101, 131, 134, 142, 192, 200, 214
N
Nagasaki---101, 163
National Security Council---74, 75, 97, 99
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)---80-82, 99,
110, 119-21, 124, 136, 137, 139,43, 180, 190, 191, 204,
210, 211, 213, 218-20,223 Netherlands---80 New York---16 Norway---80 Nuremberg---84, 100
O
"Open skies" plan (President Eisenhower)---120 236
Q
Quadruple Alliance---56
R
Republic of South Africa---47
Rhein---99
Roman empire---17
Romania---213
Russell-Einstein Manifesto---103
Russia--- 24, 30-32, 85, 88, 103, 148, 152, 169
Sarajevo city in Yugoslavia, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina---13
Sardinia, Sadinian kingdom i Italy, 1720-1861---27
Socialist International's Advisory Council on Disarmament--- 199
South-East Asia---\2, 116, 215
Soviet Far East coastal area---58
237Sparta, ancient Greek (aristocratic and slavery) city in Peloponnesus---54
St. Petersburg (now Leningrad)---31
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (between the USSR and USA)---
---SALT-1 (first stage of the talks resulted by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1972)---131-35
---SALT-2 Treaty---136, 161, 210, 211, 219, 220
---SALT-3 Treaty---143, 211
Strategy---
---of "limited war"---182, 183
---of "limited nuclear war"---212, 219
•---of "massive retaliation", American strategy directed to the massive use of nuclear weapons---118, 165
---Final Document of the First Special UN General Assembly Session on Disarmament---123, 202
---Security Council---42, 109-11, 117, 118
----Disarmament Commission---114
---Disarmament Committee (Geneva)---138, 192, 213, 216
---Disarmament Subcommittee in London---116, 119
---ten-nation Disarmament Commission---122
---Atomic Energy Commission---102
USA, approach to disarmament problem---29, 31-33, 38-40, 48-51, 58-80, 82, 83, 97, 98, 101, 104-07, 110-17, 119-21, 123-27, 130-37, 139-44, 149, 152, 153, 158-61, 165-68, 178, 180, 184-87, 189-92, 194, 195, 206-08, 210-14, 216-21, 223
US United Nations Association---12, 83
US War Industries Board---65
USSR, approach to disarmament problem, initiatives---11, 38-44, 46-51, 62, 64, 79, 85, 91-95, 97-123, 126, 127, 130-38, 140-43, 149, 165, 169, 170, 175-79, 187-90, 199-203, 210, 212-24
Tokyo---84
"Tonkin Incident"---75
Treaties---
---Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963---
127, 128, 188, 190, 192 ---Treaty on the Non-Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, 1971---192 ---Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
1968---128, 130, 190, 192 ---Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1966---192 Turkey---80
U
United Nations Organisation---6, 16, 42-44, 47, 48, 77, 101, 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120-23, 130, 159, 179, 187, 188, 190-92, 195, 201, 202
---General Assembly of the UNO---44, 102, 109, 111, 113, 116, 117, 122, 135, 187, 191, 192, 201-03, 215
---First Special UN General Assembly Session on Disarmament, May---June 1978---202
238Versailles commitments (the limitation of the defeated Germany's armed forces and armaments under the Versailles Treaty)---103, 147
Vladivostok---133
Vienna---135, 136, 140
Vietnam---75, 153, 184-86, 194
W
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO)---121, 135, 137, 139, 218, 224
Washington---8, 40, 63, 64, 76, 105, 106, 111, 115, 118, 124, 134, 143, 144, 160, 164, 183, 184, 192, 208, 219
Washington Conference of 1921 on naval weapons limitation---39-41, 92
Weft Point (UN military academy)---53
White House---68, 143, 219
World Health Organisation (WHO)---149
World Peace Congresses---30
World Peace Congress in Stockholm---113
REQUEST TO READERS
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