PROGRESS

Guides to the Social Sciences

099-1.jpg

Guides to the Social Sciences

__TITLE__ THE TEACHING
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY

A CRITIQUE
OF NON-MARXIAN __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2009-06-03T12:41:50-0700 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"

THEORIES

Edited by

Prof. A.D. Smirnov, D.Sc. (Econ.), Prof. V.V. Golosov, D.Sc. (Econ.), and V.F. Maximova, C.Sc. (Econ.)

Translated by H.Campbell Creighton, M.A. (Oxon.)

Progress Publishers Moscow

Translated from the Russian Designed by Vadim Kuleshov

Contributors: L. A. Alexandrov, C.Sc. (Econ.); S.B. Alpatov, C.Sc.

(Econ.); O. N. Antipova; Prof. E. M.Bukh, C. Sc. (Econ.); Prof. Y.L. Dostova-

lov, D.Sc. (Econ.); Prof. A. P. Goleva.C.Sc. (Econ.); Yu.P.Goleva, C.Sc.

- .. „ „_,----- „ Q/, nr.cnn.V N. M. Kaltakhchian, C. Sc.

CONTENTS

099-2.jpg

A. M. Kogan, D. Sc. (Econ.); Prof. K.. U. n.orneev», w. .*».. \^~....,, .. .._. rina, C. Sc. (Econ.); V. N. Lebedev, C. Sc. (Econ.); G. A. Ligay, C. Sc. (Econ.); E. A.Maryganova, C.Sc.(Econ,); V.P.Matveev, C.Sc.(Econ.); V.F.Maximova, C. Sc. (Econ.); T. Y. Mikhalkina, C. Sc. (Econ.); M. V. Minaeva, C. Sc. (Econ.); G. G. Mokrov, C. Sc. (Econ.); M. V. Pashkovskaya, C. Sc. (Econ.); A. S. Pikin, C. Sc. (Econ.); K. M. Radaeva, C. Sc. (Econ.); Prof.M. N. Ryndina, D. Sc. (Econ.); M.F. Shchagina, C.Sc.(Econ.), Prof. A.D.Smirnov, D.Sc.(Econ.); Prof. G.N. SorvinavD. Sc. (Econ.); Prof. F. M. Volkov, C. Sc. (Econ.).

Preface Prof. A. D. Smirnov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

9

Parti

THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO

ANALYSIS OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC THEORIES

12

Chapter 1 The Majn Features of Contemporary Western Political Economy, Right-wing Socialist Theories, and Revisionism. Prof. M.N. Ryndina, D. Sc.(Econ.) 12

1. The crisis of capitalist political economy

12

2. The main trends of-modem political economy

17

3. Right-wing socialist and revisionist economic theories

22

Chapter 2 Definitions of the Subject Matter of Political

Economy. Prof. A. D. Smirnov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

25

1. The definition of political economy as the science

of wealth, business, and satisfaction of needs

25

2. The subject matter of 'economics*

28

3. Bourgeois objectivism and its class essence

33

Part II CRITIQUE OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC CONCEPTIONS OF CAPITALISM

3 5 Chapters The TreatmemSof Value and Money

35

1. Principal concepts of the theory of margianl utility. Prof. A. M. Kogan, D. Sc. (Econ.), V. F. Maximova,

C. Sc. (Econ.)

35

2. The methods of the capitalist critique of Marx's theory of value. Prof. A. M. Kogan, D.Sc. (Econ.) 40

3. Present-day ideas of the essence of money. Prof.

V. V. Golosov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

45

4. Western ideas of inflation. V. F. Maximova, C. Sc. (Econ.)

51

Chapter 4 Definitions of Capital and Surplus Value. Prof. A. P. Goleva, C. Sc. (Econ.) and Yuv P. Goleva, C. Sc. (Econ.)

60

1. Non-Marxian definitions of capital

60

2. The interpretation of capitalist exploitation

65

KPHTHKA HEMAPKCHCTCKHX B3rJWflOB

B nPEnOflABAHHH nOJIHTWECKOtt 3KOHOMHH

PenaKUHomiaa Konnenw.

npodp. A.A. CMHPHOB, npodp. B.B. TonocoB, K.3.H. B.<I>. MaKCHMoaa

Ha amnuucKOM aabiKe

«Buemail uixonax, 1981 English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers 1984

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

,. 0603010000-058 ,. R. K 014(01)-84

Chapter 5 Western Views of Wages and Unemployment

1. The 'productivity theory of wages. T. Y. Mikhalkina, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. The `social' interpretation of wages. V. N. Lebedev, C. Sc. (Econ.)

3. The 'inflationary spiral' theory. V. N. Lebedev,

C. Sc. (Econ.)

4. Present-day Western ideas about unemployment. E. A. Maryganova, C. Sc. (Econ.)

Chapter 6 Ideas of Profit and Interest

1. The Marxist and non-Marxist approaches to the analysis of profit. O. N. Antipova

2. Neoclassical theories of profit. O. N. Antipova

3. Institutional-social theories of profit. O. N. Antipova

4. Views on interest. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc.

(Econ.) Chapter 7 Bourgeois and Reformist Agrarian Conceptions

1. Views on rent. E. I. Karpikov, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. Notions of types of agricultural undertaking. A. S. Pikin, C. Sc. (Econ.)

Chapter 8 Interpretations of Reproduction

1. Views of social product and national income. Prof. E. M. Bukh, C. Sc. (Econ.), L. A. Alexandrov, C. Sc.

(Econ.)

2. Keynes' and the Neokeynesian theory of the trade cycle. V. N. Lebedev, C. Sc. (Econ.)

3. The monetarist theory of the business cycle. V. N. Lebedev, C. Sc. (Econ.)

Chapter 9 The Interpretation of Monopoly Capitalism

1. Concepts of monopoly. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

2. The interpretation of finance capital. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc. (Econ.), V. P. Matveev, C. Sc. (Econ.)

3. The export of capital. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc.

(Econ.)

4. The treatment of international monopolies. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

5. Non-Marxian definitions of imperialism, Revisionists' views of the character of today's epoch. Prof. K. G. Korneeva, C. Sc. (Econ.)

ChapterlO The Role of the State in the System of State Monopoly Capitalism. Prof. G. N. Sorvina, D. Sc. (Econ.)

1. State monopoly processes as reflected in capitalist economic thought

2. The place of the state in the system of state monopoly capitalism

3. The apologia for the socio-economic consequences of state interference in the economy

Chapter 11 Theories of Economic Growth. Prof. M. N. Ryndina, D. Sc. (Econ.)

71 71 73 77

80 88

88 89

97 100

110 S110

114 118

118 126

133 137

137 144

150 158

167

171 171 172 175 180

1. Neokeynesian theories

2. Neoclassical theories

3. The crisis of theories of economic growth Chapter 12 The Interpretation of Neocolonialism and the

Economies of Developing Countries

1. The theory of neocolonialism. Prof. Y. L. Dostovalov, D. Sc. (Econ.), S. B. Alpatov, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. Concepts of socio-economic underdevelopment Prof. Y. L. Dostovalov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

3. Interpretations of liberated countries' paths of socio-economic development. S. B. Alpatov, C. Sc. (Econ.)

180 184 187

190 190 200

208

Part III CRITIQUE OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC

VIEWS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

215

Chapter 13 Non-Marxian Views of the Establishment of Socialist Society

215

1. Ideas of the transition period between capitalism

and socialism. M. F. Shchagina, C. Sc. (Econ.)

215

2. Theories of 'co-operative socialism'. T. Y. Mikhalkina, C. Sc. (Econ.)

221

Chapter 14 Capitalist Views on Socialist Properly. T. M. Kosterina, C. Sc. (Econ.), M. V. Pashkovskaya, C. Sc. (Econ.)

225

Chapter 15 Notions of the Economic Laws of Socialism, and

Economic Interests. G. A. Ligay, C. Sc. (Econ.)

233

1. Views of the economic laws of socialism

233

2. Interpretations of economic interest under socialism

237

Chapter ^Interpretations of Planned and Balanced Development of the Socialist Economy. N. M. Kaltakhchian, C. Sc. (Econ.) .

243

1. Planning in the notions of the 'impracticability of socialism' and of 'command economy'

243

2. The theorists of the 'industrial society' on planning 246

3. Balanced development and planning in the ideas of 'Frankfort School' and right-wing revisionists

248

4. Views on improving planned management in socialist countries

250

Chapter 17 Non-Marxian Ideas of Money-Exchange Relations.

Prof. S. A. Khavina, D. Sc. (Econ.)

253

1. The treatment of the substance, functions and theory of money-exchange relations

253

2. Conceptions of the 'second economy' and the interpretation of real socialism as a 'mixed economic system'

257

Chapter 18 Notions of the Distribution of Material Wealth and Incomes under Socialism. Prof. Y. L. Dostovalov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

263

1. Western economists on the distribution of consumer

goods in socialist society

263

2. The Western interpretation of social consumption

268

272 272

276

282 282 287

293

Preface

funds

Chapter 19 Non-Marxian Conceptions of Management Accounting. K. M. Radayeva, C. Sc. (Econ.)

1. The treatment of the socialist enterprise

2. Distortion of the essence and principles of Soviet management accounting

Chapter 20 Non-Marxian Notions of Price and Profit under

Socialism

1. The treatment of prices and price formation.

M. V. Minaeva, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. Ideas of the substance and role of profit under socialism. K. M. Radaeva, C. Sc. (Econ.)

Chapter 21 Western Economists on the Patterns of Socialist

Extended Reproduction

1. The categories of reproduction of the gross social

This critique of non-Marxian views and ideas in the teaching of economics in the West has been written by a group of professors and teachers at the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics and other Moscow colleges. The critique is not a history of economic theory, nor an exposition in detail, or as a whole, of the views of the economists whose work is considered. Attention has been paid mainly to contemporary ideas, which are treated mainly on the logical rather than the historical plane.

The structure of the book has been dictated by the nature of the course of political economy in the higher schools of the USSR, and Western economic views are examined in line with the themes of the Soviet syllabus. It is therefore not so much designed for the general reader as for the student of economics and anyone following a course in Marxist political economy.

Allowance has been made for the fact that the views and ideas of individual economists and economic schools include related ideas on a number of problems of political economy. Keynes' theory of 'full employment", for example, is closely bound up with the theory of reproduction and his ideas on money, credit, and finance; certain general features of his theory are consequently dealt with in different chapters of our book.

Today the ideological battle of labour and capital, and of the two world social systems of socialism and capitalism has become very acute, which makes it particularly important to make a critical analysis of non-Marxian economic views both when teaching political economy and other economic disciplines, especially the economy of socialism, and in research. The point is that there is a great gap and difference between the ideas developed in Western economic journals and the treatment they are accorded in the textbooks commonly used in university and college courses. It must also be noted that the writers of economics textbooks vary their ideas, adapting them to the new conditions evoked by the deepening general crisis of capital-

293

product as treated by Western economists.

L. A. Alexandrov, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. Western authors' views on the reproduction of

labour power in socialist society. Prof. F. M. Vol

296

kov, C. Sc. (Econ.)

3. The problem of the ratio of accumulation and

consumption under socialism. G. G. Mokrov, C. Sc.

300

Chapter 22

(Econ.)

'. Non-Marxian \~uuv.&puv«.u------ the World Socialist Economic System

-• • •-------1~«~~ ^f Wolline i

evelopment of

306

1. The false interpretation of levelling up and convergence hi the community of socialist nations; N. M. Kaltakhchian, C. Sc. (Econ.)

2. Conceptions of socialist economic integration. N.M. Kaltakhchian, C. Sc. (Econ.)

3. Interpretations of the economic co-operation of socialist and capitalist countries. Prof. V. V. Golosov, D. Sc. (Econ.)

Appendix. Western Economists of the Twentieth Century. V. F. Maximova, C. Sc. (Econ.)

306 308

313 324

ism and the steadily increasing impact of the world system of socialism on social development. Our book demonstrates how they endeavour to justify and embellish exploitation and to discredit Marxist-- Leninist theory. The lecturer's analysis of various concepts has an important bearing on the development of progressive views and the tackling of topical problems of social science. It therefore calls for consistent application of a number of methodological principles. One of these is the criteria for selecting the theories to be considered. It has seemed undesirable, for instance, to try and evaluate all the existing anti-Marxian economic theories. A main criterion has been to concentrate attention chiefly on contemporary theories. Earlier views are referred to only in so far as is needed to clarify the sources of

current conceptions.

A second criterion by which we have been guided is how widely theories (i. e. modern theories) are held, and how far and to what extent they affect minds. When ideas are contemporary, but not widely held, they are usually hardly worth bothering about,

A third criterion for choosing theories to examine is closely linked with the foregoing one; it is the place the author of a view holds in the economic literature, and his influence on the development of modern views. We analyse the ideas, in particular, of such leading teachers as Paul Samuelson, John Kenneth Galbraith, Milton Friedman, Gregory Grossman, Raymond Barre, Franfois Perroux and Peter Wiles. It has also been found desirable, from this angle, to analyse the propositions contained in textbooks written by wellknown economists and enjoying considerable popularity in economics teaching (e. g. Samuelson's textbook).

Yet another criterion has been the significance of certain problems for political economy. We have concentrated primarily on views related to such key topics as property, planning, distribution, and commodity-money relations. This is particularly important in teaching, since students become acquainted with the main features of the economic system through their study of political economy and other economic disciplines. It is also improtant to counterpose the MarxistLeninist treatment of these matters to the non-Marxist.

The main principles guiding criticism of economic theories in teaching are methodologically extremely important. They are, basically, to bring out the unsoundness of the methodology of the theories analysed; to criticise the subjective idealist approach of authors to economic phenomena, and the falsity of their unhistorical interpretation of economic processes; and to demonstrate that a number of theoretical constructs are based on a mistaken exchange conception and have either an idealist or a vulgar-materialist character. We have paid special attention to authors' rejection of the determinant role of production, and of the relations of production, in society's economic affairs, and their denial of the operation of objective economic laws. Bourgeois methodology has been countered by a Marxian one that

emphasises the superiority of the method of materialist dialectics.

' Our analysis of non-Marxian economic theories brings out their class essence and socio-political meaning. It was not sufficient for that just to demonstrate the apologist character of one theory or another; it has also been necessary to expose the new methods employed by today's apologists, which are glaringly demonstrated, for example, in the opposing of young Marx to mature Marx, and of Marx's theories to Lenin's, and in the various versions of the theory of the `transformation' of capitalism. We also deemed it important to show that a characteristic feature of modern capitalist political economy is its anti-communism. We have not, of course, completely identified capitalist and petty-bourgeois conceptions when giving students an understanding of their common features.

Certain real facts of economics are treated in a distorted way in Western views, the significance of some being exaggerated and hypertrophied and that of others, on the contrary, minimised or even altogether ignored. Our criticism of this approach brings out the unscientific character of such ideas on the one hand, while making it possible on the other to demonstrate that it is Marxist-Leninist political econoiny that adequately reflects the objective correlation of economic phenomena and processes.

It is becoming methodologically more and more important to criticise economics syllabuses, since they play a big role in modern ideological affairs, and in moulding the outlook of the intellectuals of both developed and developing capitalist countries. Many of the propositions of `Economies' courses provide the theoretical basis of Western propaganda against socialism.

Criticism of the syllabuses helps clarify which capitalist theories are most popular these days, which most mould the class outlook of the intelligentsia, and which play the maximum role in Western propaganda and are the foundation for new economic schools and trends.

The methodological basis of our critique is to be found in the works of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V. I. Lenin. Economic phenomena have been examined, in accordance with this, in their interconnection and mutual dependence, and continuous movement, change, and development, in their contradictory essence, and in the growth of gradual quantitative changes into radical, qualitative ones. When analysing economic processes, and bringing out their deep connections, Marxist-Leninist political economy proceeds from the simplest categories to more complicated ones, and to the concrete whole in all its variety and diversity. Such is the approach we have employed in examining Western views in the teaching of economics.

10

PART I

State management of the capitalist economy has not led, either, to the elimination of unemployment. At the same time it has gone hand in hand with growth of the public debt and inflation. The bankruptcy of capitalist political economy has thus become obvious in both theory and practice.

Many Western economists placed great hopes on the scientific and industrial revolution, thinking it would lead to mass production of cheap goods, an improvement in standards of living, and elimination of social conflicts. Their hopes, however, were not justified. Ideologists of capitalism have been forced to recognise that the consumer society has landed up a blind alley, and that technique is being mobilised to increase the prosperity of who are not in need of it, to the detriment of those who are in need of everything.

There are few economists now who think capitalism an ideal system, but ideologists of capitalism still look for the reasons for its shortcomings in ideology, or engineering and technology, or relations between society and nature, rather than in the mode of production. Some, including the American economist J. K. Galbraith, think the defects of the capitalist economic system to be organic. Galbraith writes, for example, about the American system:

Unequal development, inequality, frivolous and erratic innovation,

environmental assault, indifference to personality, power over the state,

inflation, failure in inter-industry coordination are part of the system as

they are part of the reality. Nor are these minor defects, in the manner

of a misshapen wheel on a machine, which once identified and isolated

can then be corrected. They are deeply systemic. *

These admissions by a leading Western economist in themselves

present a certain interest, for they are evidence that the position in

the capitalist world can no longer be veiled, and that it is becoming

more and more difficult to blame capitalism's defects on human nature.

Much attention is being paid in contemporary Western literature

to the fate and fortunes of capitalism.

There are many versions of its prospects: e. g., ideas about a postindustrial society; a series of myths about the 'transformation of capitalism'; theories of convergence of every possible kind. In all cases, however, there is a single characteristic feature, namely the impossibility of frankly vindicating and defending the principles of capitalism, and forced recognition that the future is not its. Features are ascribed to capitalism, it is especially important to note, that are not in fact inherent in it, namely socialisation of property, equalisation of incomes, elimination of class differences, abolition of exploitation, and so on. These theories reflect both the crisis of capitalism and the crisis of bourgeois ideology. Spokesmen of various currents of futurology suggested that the 70s would be a time of reformation of

THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC THEORIES

THE MAIN FEATURES

OF CONTEMPORARY WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY,

RIGHT-WING SOCIALIST THEORIES,

AND REVISIONISM

1. The crisis of capitalist political economy

Bourgeois ideology, political economy included, is undergoing a deep crisis that is nothing else than an expression of the general crisis of capitalism.

The essence of the crisis of capitalist political economy is comprehensively defined in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as follows:

Bourgeois doctrines and schools have failed in the test of history. They have been and still are unable to furnish scientific answers to the questions posed by life. The bourgeoisie is no longer in a position to put forward ideas that will induce the masses to follow it. More and more people in the capitalist countries are renouncing the bourgeois world outlook.'

An important factor deepening this crisis has been the new qualitative shifts that have taken place in today's stage of the general crisis of capitalism, above all the continuing changes in the balance of power of the two world systems in favour of socialism, the increasing economic and socio-political instability of developed capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement into a fight against all forms of exploitation whatsoever, the intensification of inter-- imperialist contradictions, and the monetary and financial crisis.

One important way in which the crisis of capitalist political economy is manifested is forced recognition of the shortcomings of capitalism. In the 1930s the British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote that the capitalist economy could not generate full employment of people and resources without state direction. In the 1960s and 1970s it had become evident to Western economists that state intervention in economic affairs, though it influenced the character of declines in production, could not, however, eliminate them and ensure steady growth.

~^^1^^ The Road to Communism (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961), p 497.

12

' John Kenneth Galbraith. Economics and the Public Purpose (A Signet Boole, New York, 1973), p 204.

13

capitalism in which its basic contradictions and ills would be overcome. But the 70s were marked by a further deepening of its general crisis.

Some economists, really evaluating the threat from the revolutionary forces, switched from general theoretical arguments to working out concrete programmes and reforms designed to save capitalism. An example is Galbraith's book mentioned above, and his The Age of Uncertainty. He advocates socialisation of certain essential but unprofitable industries, and buying out of the shareholders of arms firms, introduction of progressive taxation, provision of a guaranteed income for everyone, and equal opportunities for education. He does not, however, indicate what social forces could carry out these reforms. He places his main hopes on eliminating false ideas of the essence and functioning of the economic system. His arguments are evidence that his programme does not envisage any radical changes in capitalism, above all, changes in property relations. He does not go beyond certain patching ups and readjustments aimed at softening and mitigating the conflicts of contemporary capitalism, which once more reaffirms that it is impossible to work out a positive programme to save capitalism.

Reformism more and more brings contemporary bourgeois theory closer to the ideologies of right-wing Socialists and Labour, and of right-wing revisionists of Marxism. There is a certain interpenetration of their ideas with the aim of building a united front against MarxismLeninism. At the same time this is a form of social manoeuvring intended to deceive the workers and divert them from revolutionary struggle. Socialist phraseology is also employed to this end. Western ideologists have been forced to allow for the fact that socialist ideas are becoming more and more popular among the masses of the people. Galbraith himself calls his recommendations in the book mentioned above The New Socialism.l

When we trace the history of capitalist political economy of the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism, it becomes obvious that it is a history of retreat before the success and advance of socialism. Recognition of the success of socialism, however, by no means implies a weakening of the fight against capitalist political economy; on the contrary, anti-communism has become the capitalists' main ideological and political weapon; its main content is slander and calumny of the countries of world socialism, falsification of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the policy of Communist and Workers' Parties. Today many Western economists can no longer deny the outstanding advances of the socialist countries and concentrate their efforts on minimising them.

While admitting the achievements of socialism, though in an understated form, non-Marxian ideologists present the reasons for them in a distorted light. They deny that socialism's progress rests on the prole-

tariat's winning of power, socialist ownership of the means of production, and the planned, proportionate development of the economy conditioned by that, and the other advantages of socialism. And they often develop their own models of socialism, and preach a pseudo-- socialism, endeavouring, in order to deceive the masses, to exploit the workers' sympathy for socialism so as to divert them from struggle for scientific socialism.

A feature of the present stage is the spread of veiled and disguised forms of fighting Marxism, ideologists sometimes talk about Marx's contributions to the solution of certain problems of economics. Some even come out in `defence' of Marx, accusing Communists of falsifying Marxism. Others turn to Marx for answers to issues being brought to the fore by historical development, or even try to employ certain tenets of Marxian theory to elaborate recommendations for economic policy, while rejecting the revolutionary conclusions of MarxistLeninist theory.

Because of the growth of the forces of socialism and triumph of Marxism-Leninism, some Western economists are beginning to under^ stand the historical doom of capitalism, and are gradually coming to recognise the inevitability of socialism. They are striving to reach an understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and to make a proper appraisal of the changes taking place in the world. Their striving to analyse the facts objectively leads them to a change of class position, and to rejection of apologies for capitalism. These phenomena are evidence, in themselves, of the disintegration of capitalist political economy and the deepening of its crisis.

An important expression of this crisis is the frequent change in the forms of the apologia for capitalism, the more so that it embraces a broad range of problems and contains a repudiation of several basic tenets and conceptions as well as of certain secondary ones. The reason for this frequent change is primarily that these theories are regularly refuted by life and are not popular among the broad masses of the public. Since modem capitalist political economy is closely linked with economic policy and the working out of advice and recommendations in that area, and with substantiation of economic policy and analysis of its results, the failure of its theories is not only manifested in their having become unpopular with the masses, but is also to be seen in the sphere of economic policy, and in the growth of economic and sociopolitical instability in capitalist countries. The bankruptcy of state monopoly management of the economy, which was glaringly demonstrated in the mid-70s, is most typical in this respect. The deep economic crises of 1974-5 and the early 80s, mass unemployment, inflation, the structural crises of the world capitalist economy, the intensifying monetary and financial crisis, all struck a body blow to capitalist political economy.

In this connection there have been new qualitative swings in its development that have found expression in Western economists'

15

i

John Kenneth Galbraith. Op. cit., p. 213.

14

having to recognise the critical state of their subject and to suggest a need for a radical review of its basic dogmas and main kernel. Doubts have arisen, as well, about the methodology of the prevailing trends and schools. The clashes and discussions among the leading economists are also penetrating university lecture rooms. The point concerns a, radical restructuring of present-day Western political economy. As an, example, we may cite the lecture of Prof. Joan Robinson, of Cambridge University, at the 1971 meeting of the American Economic Association 'The Second Crisis of Economic Theory', in which she said that the first crisis had been in the 1930s, when capitalist political economy had proved incapable of dealing with the problem of employment. It was overcome by the appearance of Keynes' theory. After World War n, however, in new conditions, many of his ideas lost their significance. A thesis was advanced that a certain amount of unemployment was necessary in order to maintain a certain level of prices. In fact, however, prices rose together with the rise in unemployment. Nor did military spending help combat unemployment. Economic growth led to an increase of material wealth but did not lead, as many economists had thought, to the eradication of poverty. And a new problem had arisen, namely, pollution of the environment. Quite contradictory ways of tackling these matters were being proposed. And so far a theory of distribution had not been developed. There was an

evident bankruptcy of economic theory which for the second time has nothing to say on the questions that, to everyone except economists, appear to be most in need of an answer.1 While correctly characterising the present state of capitalist political economy, Mrs. Robinson, like other bourgeois economists, did not see the underlying causes of these phenomena in capitalism's antagonistic contradictions, over-rated the role of economic theory, and hoped that all these ills could be cured through the development of new theories and a new methodology. Great hopes were placed, in this respect, on mathematical methods of research and on the development of econometrics and economic mathematical modelling. It has become evident, however, that the economists' hopes have not been justified; that was not the fault of mathematics, but because mathematics was employed on the basis of an unscientific theory. That, however, is not the main point. The main point is that none of the means proposed can lead to removal of the difficulties being experienced by capitalist political economy in either the ideological or the practical field.

A characteristic feature of the present stage of this crisis is its progressing decay, the appearance of new trends calling for revision of the fundamentals of orthodox political economy rather than of its separate propositions. The attempts to make a new theory 'from the shreds and patches' have proved fruitless.

2. The main trends of modern political economy

An extreme eclecticism, effacing the boundaries between trends and schools, is typical of modern capitalist political economy. Nevertheless, when we take as our basis the character of the theoretical explanation (if economic processes, and the prevailing method of investigating and bating the ways of effecting economic processes, we distinguish two rflain trends in the Western literature: viz., theories of regulated capitalism and theories of free enterprise/or neoclassicism). Since the war an institutional-social trend has also taken shape and acquired increasing significance.

The advocates of regulated capitalism (primarily followers of Keynes, but also including the French dirigistes), while recognising capitalism's shortcomings, have lost faith in an automatic self-- regulating of capitalism. They have brought `macroanalysis' to the fore, i. e. take a survey of the economy as a whole as their basis and of such matters as national income, accumulation and consumption, aggregate supply and demand, and so on. They consider the capitalist state to be the main directing force of economic development. The principal defects of these theories are their ignoring of the class essence of the capitalist state (which is depicted as a national one), their overestimation of its economic role, and the idea that the ailments of capitalism stemming from its essence can be healed by means of the state.

The other trend asserts that balanced growth, i. e. equilibrium between supply and demand, can be ensured through the mechanism of the market and competition. They start from microanalysis, i. e. begin study of the economy with a survey of the motives of the individual firm's or enterprise's behaviour and of the prices of individual commodities, in order later to draw conclusions about the whole economy, which is pictured as nothing more than the aggregate of the business units linked through the market. These economists suppose that the state's role should be reduced simply to supporting and maintaining conditions favouring free competition. The name of this trend also follows from that. Western economists call all authors of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries classical, beginning with Adam Smith, who stood for economic freedom and opposed government interference in the economy, putting forward the idea that natural, universal laws operate in society. Among the classical truths they include, above all, the theories of marginal utility and marginal productivity. The adherents of this trend do not take into account the changes that have taken place in capitalism, and the deepening of the contradictions of capitalist reproduction, as a result of which its economy has lost the property of self-regulation. The best-known spokesmen of this trend are the economists of the Chicago school, above all Milton Friedman in the USA, the economists of the London School of Economics in Great Britain,and the neoliberals in West Germany.

A modern version of the theory of free enterprise is the moneta-

17

~^^1^^ Joan Robinson. The Second Crisis of Economic Theory. The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 2:9-10.

16

rism preached by the Chicago school. Its essence is the claim that the main focus of capitalism's instability lies in the monetary sphere, and that regulation of this sphere is the way to eliminate disturbances of the reproductive process. The global strategy of monetarism for rehabilitating capitalism is to restore confidence in its efficiency, and in the possibility of economic growth withdut stimulating injections

from the national budget.

Representatives of the institutional-social (sociological) trend are sceptical of attempts to find patterns of the development of production in the relationship between incomes, savings, and investment. These economists also question the universal character of the `eternal' dogmas and social values of the neoclassicists. The institutionalists bring to the fore people's social relations and the role of these relations in understanding economic processes, but they interpret them in their own way, and distort them in order to defend capitalism. They omit, for instance, to mention the main point, viz., the relations between classes, relations in the production process, and capitalists'exploitation of workers. The sphere of exchange, forms of organisation of the market, and moral principles are stressed, so that it is concluded that capitalism can be improved by passing to an organised market and perfecting moral and ethical standards.

The supporters of this line also include theorists who make direct changes in the technology of production the basis of society's development, i. e. the technocrats (theories of 'stages of economic growth', 'the industrial society', and the many other theories of the transformation of capitalism). An ignoring of capitalist relations of production and a striving to find some alternative to communism is characteristic of all of them. Some draw conclusions, from their reasoning, about `convergence', i. e. about a coming together of the two world systems of capitalism and socialism. The spokesmen of this trend include th6 American economists J.K.Galbraith, Walt Rostow, and Peter Drucker, and the French scholars Francois' Perroux and Jean

Fourastie.

Thus none of the main trends reflects the real state of the capitalist economy, though each starts from certain real processes. They treat these processes, however, in a one-sided, distorted way, without penetrating to their essence.

Because of the objective developmentof state monopoly capitalism, theories of regulated capitalism have a leading role. But the significant increase in the influence of the institutional-social trend needs, at the same time, to be noted. This is linked (1) with the sharpening of the class struggle and growth of the national liberation mevement and the impossibility of ignoring social relations and social factors and their role in the development of society; (2) with the current scientific and industrial revolution, which is serving as the basis for a whole series of technocratic theories; and (3) with the crisis of the subjective-- psychological approach characteristic of Keynes and his followers, by which

the roots of economic processes are sought in people's psychology.

In the 1970s and 19,80s the neoclassical or neoliberal trend became popular once again, this being brought forth by the crisis of state monopoly regulation. Many of its spokesmen completely support all measures of state interference aimed against the workers. Their objections concern such forms as price control, increase of appropriations for social needs, and so on. Although there are disputes and debates among these trends, it should not be forgotten that they all pursue the same end, viz., defence of capitalism, and a search for new ways of propping it up. Their differences boil down, in the main, to the forms and methods of achieving that end.

The ideologists of the national middle class of liberated countries have a special place in Western political economy. They endeavour to work out ideas of development that would provide the theoretical basis for economic policy in these countries. For that purpose they employ both the theories of regulated capitalism and certain propositions of the theorists of free enterprise, trying to adapt them to the conditions in these countries. As a rule these ideologists pass the interests of the national middle class off as those of the whole country and nation, concealing the worsening position of the masses of the working people. The combination of anti-imperialist and narrow class tendencies reflects the contradictory, dual nature of the national middle class of developing countries.

In the 1970s the differentiation within the trends of capitalist political economy became greater, which reflected the mounting aggravation of the contradictions between monopoly capitalists on the one hand and small to middling businessmen on the other. These disagreements concern both theoretical issues and practical propositions. The most reactionary currents aimed at justifying state monopoly capitalism include neofascist theories.

The influence of left Keynesianism, represented by the British economists Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa, and Nicholas Kaldor, it must be noted, grew (they are called neo-Marxists in the Western literature). They actively criticised the neoclassical trend. Sraffa, for example, exposed the bankruptcy of the thesis of the predominance of free competition, refuted the neoclassicists' claim that the striving to maximise profit ensured optimum use of resources and a `fair' distribution of national income. Basing himself on Ricardo's theory of value, Sraffa criticised the theories of marginal utility and marginal productivity and the neoclassicists' theory of distribution. While not, in principle, refuting the mistaken idea of the productivity of the factors of production, he pointed out the inner contradictoriness of neoclassicists' ideas and also examined the main dogmas used both by neoclassicists and the other trends, especially in treating such categories as prices, wages, profits, capital, etc.^

~^^1^^ See Pieto Sraffa. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (C.U.P., Cambridge, 1960).

19 18

The ideologists of free enterprise, who express the interests of the monopolies, act as apologists of Big Business, call for a lowering of corporation taxes, and justify anti-labour legislation. The spokesmen of small and middling business criticise the dominant influence of the monopolies. Freedom of enterprise, in their conception, is limitation of the monopolies' power, and freedom for small business. At today's stage of the general crisis of capitalism the ideologists of the nonmonopoly bourgeoisie have been considerably revitalised. They expose the monopolies and adduce interesting facts that can be quite well employed to expose the monopolies' apologists. At the same time, however, their critique of the monopolies is limited in character. They also attack socialism and stand for the maintenance of free-- competition capitalism, without realising that free competition gives rise at a certain stage to monopoly.

The growing differentiation within the main trends is accompanied with tendencies for them to come together; that applies in particular to the ideologists of monopoly capital, i. e. to the right wing of both trends. The objective basis for this convergence is the further growth of state monopoly capitalism. In these circumstances the apologists of free enterprise are forced to recognise the necessity of state interference in the economy, albeit on a limited scale.

The possibility of a convergence of the trends in political economy lies in the eclecticism characteristic of all Western economics. Economists of both trends often start from one and the same theories in their treatment of many theoretical problems, e. g. prices, wages, profits. The basis of their tendency to converge is also the aggravation of the ideological struggle, and the fact that' no one trend satisfactorily explains the acute problems or can suggest effective means for achieving stable growth rates.

The clearest expression of this tendency is the American economist Samuelson's theory of neoclassical synthesis. In his view this synthesis will eliminate the gap between macroeconomics and traditional microeconomics. Like all advocates of theories of regulated capitalism, Samuelson assumes that free competition leads to underemployment both of people and of resources. Governmental interference should overcome crises and unemployment, and create full employment, but at the same time keep competition within reasonable limits. As a result a mixed economy is obtained, a combination of private and public enterprise. Given full employment the classical principles formulated in marginal utility and marginal productivity theories (which he takes as the basis of his theory of value and distribution) get full force. In fact, Samuelson employs propositions of the both trends, starting from market conditions.

The rise of a neoclassical synthesis is due to the endeavour of the monopolies' ideologists to mobilise the whole arsenal of capitalist political economy to fight Marxist-Leninist economic theory and save capitalism. The neoclassical synthesis is not some new theory but an

eclectic combination of the main principles of the first two trends above, with a leading role for theories of government regulation of the capitalist economy. Samuelson also includes Galbraith's main propositions in his neoclassical synthesis; the latter attaches great significance to scientific innovation and such forms of regulating the economy as long-term contracts between government, big corporations, and trade unions. The aim of his proposals is to strengthen state monopoly control, and more broadly to employ methods of social manoeuvring to soften social conflicts.

The neoclassical synthesis consequently contains all the defects characteristic of each of the three trends in capitalist political economy considered above. Samuelson also disdained to analyse the whole set of socio-economic relations and elements of today's capitalist system. The crisis of the mid-70s signified the complete collapse of the neoclassical synthesis as a theoretical foundation for capitalist countries' economic policy.

Radical political economy, which arose in the mid-60s and became particularly popular in the USA, is a comparatively new trend in the economic views of capitalist society. Its spokesmen are the American economists Donald Gordon, Earl B. Hunt, and Howard Sherman. The rise of this trend is itself evidence that the crisis of capitalist political economy is deepening and differentiation growing among economists. This trend is not a united one, either in its class nature or in its theoretical ideas. Two wings are distinguishable, viz., bourgeois radical liberals and left radicals expressing the interests of the petty bourgeoisie; among the latter a New Left is distinguished that represents the ideology of that part of the petty bourgeoisie who have been pulled into the ranks of wage labour but have not yet acquired a proletarian ideology. On the whole, radical political economy occupies a position intermediate between capitalist and proletarian political economy. The ideological and theoretical sources of its views are Marxian economic theory, the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, the Utopian socialism of Fourier and Robert Owen, and bourgeois reformism.

A general feature of all shades of radical political economy is their critique of capitalism and orthodox capitalist political economy. A special critique is made of big corporations as the embodiment of all the negative features of capitalism. These economists consider the market economy unable to provide full employment and a human way of life for the majority of the people. A significant feature, too, is their recognition of the valuable contribution made to economic science by Karl Marx, whose work they consider to be one of the sources of the radical school's critical spirit.^^1^^ They cannot, however, be called Marxists. They have not penetrated deeply into the substance of

~^^1^^ Raymond S. Franklin. American Capitalism. Two Visions (Random House, New York, 1977), p 157.

21 20

Marx's theory; for instance, they introduce a category of 'economic surplus' instead of the concept 'surplus value', and give their own erroneous interpretations of exploitation, labour power, and so on.

The New Lefts, unlike the bourgeois reformists who look for a way out in implementing reforms while retaining the basis of the capitalist system, call for its full demolition. Their ideal is a decentralised co-operative society with a hierarchical structure in the spirit of the theories of Fourier, Proudhon, and Owen. Their positive programme, however, is weakly developed, and they do not see the roads to implementing it. By basing themselves on petty-bourgeois ideas of egalitarian communism, they oppose both the theory of scientific socialism and real socialism. Some of their spokesmen think revolutionary strategy should be based on a fight between rich and poor both within a country and in the international arena, rather than on the fight between working class and capitalists. The workers of imperialist countries (`rich'), however, are not enemies of the working people of the former colonies, but their allies. The New Lefts' theory of the `bourgeoisification' of the working class of industrially developed countries does not differ from the views of imperialism's ideologists, and helps them attack trade unions by declaring their 'excessive demands' the main cause of price rises. The opposing of the 'new working class' (in which white collar workers, students, and intellectuals are lumped together) to other contingents of the working class also does great harm, since such ideas are aimed at disrupting the unity of the labour movement.

These theories enjoy the special support of imperialism's ideologists, who see propaganda for them as an obstacle to the spread of Marxist-Leninist theory. Nevertheless the rise of radical political economy reflects the development and sharpening of capitalism's antagonisms.

3. Right-wing socialist and revisionist economic theories

Right-wing Social Democracy is the main conduit of capitalist influence on the proletariat. Its policy objectively helps the monopolies and the capitalist state to resist the proletariat's revolutionary actions.

Right-wing Socialists and Labour propagandise the latest ideas of the ideologists of monopoly capital (the Neokeynesians, Galbraith, and others) in conjunction with the dilapidated, ramshackle dogmas of the Second International. The ideological forerunners of today's Right-wing Socialists (Bernstein, Kautsky, Hilferding, and Otto Bauer) fought Marxism on the soil of formal recognition of it, and raised the banner of a renewal of Marxism while rejecting its main theses and revolutionary conclusions. After World War II social reformists went even further to the right, renouncing, in essence, formal recognition of Marxism. But they continue to employ socialist phraseology, and say that their parties' aim is the Socialist Alternative or Democratic

Socialism. Pleading such processes as the increase in the number of joint-stock companies, development of state monopoly capitalism, and technical innovation, Right-wing Socialists claim that modern capitalism has radically altered in nature and has been converted into a new social system. Right-wing Labour leaders call it the first phase of socialism; other theorists claim it to be something intermediate between capitalism and socialism, i. e. a 'mixed economy'. They consider the driving force of the transition to the new system (Democratic Socialism) to be a strengthening of the role of the capitalist state and the contemporary scientific and industrial revolution, rather than class struggle. In the 70s, especially after the 1974-5 economic crisis, social reformists were forced to modify their theories, and the activisation of the left wing of Social Democracy, reflecting the growth of antimonopolist moods among the masses, played no small role in that. Interest in Marxism has now revived in the ranks of Social Democracy. A new variety of 'legal Marxism' has arisen, whose aim is to block growth of the influence of scientific socialism among the masses. Left-wing Social Democrats, citing the works of Karl Marx, recognise class struggle and talk about the need for revolutionary activity.

Right-wing Social Democrats, while sticking on the whole to the standpoints of a 'mixed economy', now advocate extension of the public sector through the founding of new enterprises and partial nationalisation of private firms, but the right-wing reformist leaders in fact block realisation of these proposals, putting forward a demand for a strengthening of public control over the monopolies' operations and the passing of anti-monopoly legislation. In actual fact that means maintenance of monopoly property, and in those conditions the financial oligarchy exercises a determining influence on the government machinery, and.uses it in its own interests.

In recent years there has been an increase in propaganda for modernised ideas of 'social partnership', `workers' participation' in the management of capitalist firms, `profit-sharing', and so on, all of which are apologetically depicted as a means of transforming property relations.

The leaders of the Socialist International now cannot deny the crisis of world capitalism, and capitalism's inability to deal with the problem of employment. They are calling for reform in the area of social insurance and health services, democratisation of the educational system, and improvement of working conditions, proposals that correspond to the workers' everyday needs, although they cannot radically improve their position. But the fact is that capitalist governments have no interest in financing these measures, as is shown, above all, by the experience of countries where the government is headed by Social Democrats. The incomes policy pursued by them serves the interests of the capitalists.

The progress of socialism is helping increase the influence of socialist ideas among broad strata of the workers. Many Social Democrats

23 22

recognise the achievements of real socialism, but the leading ideologists of Social Democracy, being supporters of capitalism, oppose real socialism. They have taken up the capitalist idea of a plurality of models of socialism so as to mask the historical inevitability of a revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism; by citing certain features they mask the general characteristics of socialism and its radical difference from capitalism.

Revisionist theories that distort Marxism and Leninism have also appeared in some countries that have taken the socialist road. In the latter they take the form, mainly, of a denial of the general patterns of building socialism, of a playing up of national peculiarities, of a counterposing of plan and market, and of developing models of 'market socialism', 'humane, democratic socialism', which right-wing revisionists depict as a third path between capitalism and communism. Ota Sik, for instance, considers the economic basis of 'humane socialism' to be the play of market forces, which assumes a de-socialising of production, i. e. a transition to small private enterprises, which is regarded as equalising property on the basis of individual businesses. This latter-day economic romanticism is aimed against socialist society and in defence of capitalism, private ownership of the means of production, and all the consequences stemming from that.

Rejection of the general patterns of the building of socialism does immense harm to the actual building of socialism, hampers use of the experience of other countries, and leads to isolation from the world community of socialist countries.

The bankruptcy of capitalist political economy, and of modern reformism and revisionism, becomes particularly clear when we compare their conceptions with the development of Marxian economic thinking. The resolutions of the international meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties, and of the Congresses of the CPSU, and the works of Marxist-Leninists provide a truly scientific analysis of modern capitalism, the world system of socialism, and other root issues of modern times.

DEFINITIONS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

1. The definition of political economy as the science of wealth, business, and satisfaction of needs

Political economy arose as the economic doctrine of a new class, the capitalist class. It developed along with the capitalist mode of production, and views on its subject matter, purposes, and methods of investigation also altered with that development.

The mercantilists, for example, devoted their main attention to the sphere of circulation, and political economy was accordingly treated as the science of the balance of trade, which envisaged an excess of exports over imports. The physiocrat school considered the creation of surplus value (net product) in agriculture to be the main subject of political economy. Adam Smith defined it as the science of wealth in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). This understanding of political economy was also inherent in Ricardo. The petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism, like Sismondi and Proudhon, saw the main purpose of political economy in the search for ways of a fair, just distribution of wealth rather than in investigation of its sources.

Paul Samuelson's textbook of economics, widely used at the present time, defines `economies' as 'the study of wealth'.^^1^^ In recent years, however, we must note, this formulation of the subject matter of political economy is very seldom met.

The definition of political economy as the study of wealth cannot be considered correct methodologically. Wealth, of course, is the aggregate of things, of material goods. Political economy-'the study of wealth'---consequently becomes study of the aggregate of things, in the views of some Western economists, study of their production, distribution, and consumption. But political economy, being a social science, does not study things or material goods (that is the business of other sciences), but economic relations, the relations of production between people. In all circumstances production takes place in some

Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973),

p3.

25

social form. People do not exploit nature to produce material goods in isolation from one another, as lone individuals, but do so jointly, in groups and societies. As Karl Marx wrote:

In production, men enter into relation not only with nature. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their relation with nature, does production,

take place.l

By wrongly defining the content of political economy, bourgeois economists leave economic relations and the real contradictions in capitalist society aside, above all the contradiction between labour

and capital.

The definition of political economy as study of wealth, moreover, ignores its historical character. Wealth, i.e. the aggregate of things, is produced, distributed, and consumed, as we know, in various historical circumstances; the relations of production, however, have not been the same at the different stages of development of human society. In some conditions they are relations of comradely co-operation and mutual help; in others, when society is divided into classes and one class is dominant and exploiter, and the other subordinated and exploited, they are relations of exploitation. Bourgeois definitions of the subject matter of political economy, however, speak of wealth in general, irrespective of the concrete forms in which the aggregate of

things is created.

Definitions of political economy as study of the national economy, and of business activity in general, are often met in Western economic literature along with its definition as study of wealth. The economists who take this stand, beginning with Wilhelm Roscher, Karl Biicher, and Pyotr Struve, argued about the essence of the national economy, the individual (single) business, and the social economy. The Russian bourgeois economist Struve wrote:

We define an economy as a subjective, teleological unity of rational

economic activity or the running of business. Ridiculing this definition, Lenin wrote:

This sounds 'awfully learned', but it is really a mere juggling with words.

Economy is defined as economic management! A statement of the

obvious...

Samuelson includes the following, however, among the definitions of

political economy that are often given to students:

the study of men in their ordinary business of life, earning and enjoying a living.^^3^^

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Wage Labour and Capital (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1978)

p28.

~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin. Socialism Demolished Again. Collected Works, Vol. 20 ( Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 198.

~^^3^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 3.

26

Scientifically speaking this definition is unsound.

(1) To define political economy as study of the national economy, or of business activity, is to ignore its true subject matter, namely relations of production.

(2) Such definitions emasculate the historical and class character of political economy. When Western economists speak of business activity in general they in fact have capitalist business in mind. This approach makes it possible to treat the capitalist system as eternal and natural, outside history, which is an apologia for it. In Lenin's

words it is

a denial of science, a tendency to despise all generalisations, to hide

from all the `laws' of historical development, and make the trees screen the wood. l

(3) The national economy cannot be the subject matter of political economy because 'national economy' is a broad, variously interpreted concept. Some economists even include phenomena of the superstructure in it that go beyond the framework of the productive forces and relations of production (ethics, morals, and so on).

A definition of political economy as study of the satisfaction of 'human wants'^^2^^ is also common among Western economists, i.e. they study the forms of human behaviour in dealing with scarce goods, concoct universal formulas of the rational management of business and of the practical behaviour of economic agent operating in isolation from concrete socio-historical conditions, and take as an example the `economy' of Robinson Crusoe. Lone Crusoes, we would note, are also employed by the upholders of other Western definitions of the subject matter of political economy. In the words of the American economist Heinz Kohler,

He [Robinson Crusae-Auth. | is tree to make his own adjustment to this reality. Within the limits of the possible,... he has the power to determine his own life. He is his own master, self-governing, going his own way, choosing his own path, and doing his own thing. No one judges his choices or has to approve his actions.^^3^^

In considering the main job of political economy to be to study the wants and needs of the individual and the means of satisfying them, these authors conclude that consumption has priority over production, and that people's actions are motivated by the psychology of the individual. The psychological factor is thus converted into the main one in economic affairs, while economic laws ultimately become psychological ones.

This definition is also unconvincing from the methodological angle. Above all it substitutes the economic agent's behaviour and

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin.Op. cit., p 199.

~^^2^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Economics, 5th ed. (Harper & Row, New York, 1978),p6.

~^^3^^ Heinz Kohler. Scarcity and Freedom. An Introduction to Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1977), p 17.

27

attitude to things for the relations of production between people, and conceals the historical and class character of political economy. The satisfaction of man's needs takes place, as we know, in concrete historical circumstances, in accordance with certain social relations, but Western economists treat it unhistorically, abstracted from social

relations.

This definition is also unconvincing because economic processes are regarded from an idealist position rather than a materialist one, and from the psychological aspect; the main point becomes the subject's enjoyment of worldly goods. This definition, by pushing the individual's wants to the foreground, ignores the production of material wealth, which is the foundation of society's affairs and determines the opportunities for and degree of satisfying wants of one kind

or another.

A common feature of all the definitions considered above is the absence of any indication of the specific object studied by political economy, i.e. of production or economic relations. Another common feature is their unhistorical character. Instead of investigating changing systems of production relations historically in their connection with development of society's productive forces, general, universal categories of human activity are considered. Finally, these definitions do not mention that political economy elucidates objective laws governing the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of material wealth. Western economists cannot provide a scientific definition of the subject matter of political economy because a scientific approach presumes recognition of the historical character of each mode of production and consequently of the replacement of the capitalist mode of production by a new, communist one.

2. The subject matter of 'economies'

Today, in the colleges of the USA, Britain, and a number of other capitalist countries, the main economic discipline studied is the course in `Economies'. Dozens of textbooks have been published with this title, some running to ten editions. Attempts to introduce a more diffuse, and in the opinion of bourgeois authors, more neutral, course, `Economies', instead of a course in political economy, were already being made at the beginning of the century. In encyclopaedias published in the past 30 or 40 years you will seldom find the term ' political economy'. Everything relating to the content and history of this science is put into articles entitled `Economies'.

The rise of `economies' was due to new moments in the development of political economy. As we have already remarked, Western economists and schools, not having stood the historical test, could not give a scientific answer to the issues being brought up by life. Capitalist political economy now faces an insoluble problem, namely

28

how to prove the viability, stability, and harmonious character of a mode of production that has reached a stage of parasitism and decay, and is torn by antagonistic contradictions.

Western economists try to determine means of regulating the economy, methods of programming, and ways of analysing economic processes, and to study problems of business organisation, means of enhancing their operations, and ways of coping with practical economic issues. `Economies' serves as the theoretical basis for government control of the economy, being adapted to the practical and ideo. logical needs of state monopoly capitalism, and striving to express the interests of Big Business in the most successful way. In capitalist countries, however, works also appear whose authors, while often using the term 'political economy', invest it with a new content-'the political economy of prosperity',^^1^^ 'radical political economy'.^^2^^ Samuelson, moreover, uses 'political economy', 'economic science' and ' economies' as synonyms at the beginning of his book.^^3^^

Sometimes, when defining the subject matter of `economies', Western economists remark that it is a social science, but what aspect of the affairs of human society it studies, and what its subject matter is, are formulated very vaguely. There used not to be a more or less common element in definitions of the subject matter of `economies', but there has been a tendency of late to develop integrated principles and to give a single treatment of its subject matter. More and more often, one finds the notorious law of scarcity underlying definitions of its subject matter. Kohler, for instance, writes:

Since economists are forever going around telling people that ours is a world of scarcity wherein people can never have all they want, economics is often called 'the dismal science'.^^4^^

The 'law of scarcity' is employed to define the substance of economic systems. As Kohler puts it, an economic system is

the institutional mechanism through which people in a society cooperate with each other in allocating scarce resources and apportioning scarce goods among themselves.5 In Samuelson's definition

economics is the study of How men and society end up choosing, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources that could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in society.^^6^^

~^^1^^ Arthur Okun. The Political Economy of Prosperity (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1970).

~^^2^^ Howard Sherman. Radical Political Economy. Capitalism and Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective (Basic Books, New York, 1972).

~^^3^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 3.

~^^4^^ Heinz Kohler. Op. cit., p 8. 5/W</., p513.

~^^6^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 3.

29

L

Tucker writes that

economics as a subject recognizes the problem of scarce resources.

In fact, economics is the study of how to allocate scarce resources

among competing and alternative uses.^^1^^

These definitions indicate that Western economists are endeavouring to lead economic science away from study of social and production relations, and consequently away from study of the decaying, dying relations of production of modern capitalism. Yet, in spite of their striving to give them a uniform interpretation, economics courses have no clearly defined subject matter. Their authors themselves recognise that 'there is no completely satisfactory definition of economies'.^^2^^ The dividing line between its subject matter and that of other theoretical social disciplines is very vague. As Samuelson,

for example, says,

Economics borders on other important academic disciplines. Sociology, political science, psychology and anthropology are all social sciences whose studies overlap those of economics.^^3^^

In the words of Ben Seligman, author of the entry in the American encyclopaedia Marxism, Communism and Western Society,

An increasing stress on technical analysis has been the predominant feature of recent Western economics. This has been by the extraordinary development of input-output studies, econometrics, operations research, game theory, linear programming and certain aspects of contemporary welfare theory. A significant part of current economic theory, however, has been captured by the more technical aspects of these developments, with the consequence that its practitioners appear to have forgotten that economics is a social science the viability of which depends not only on mathematics, but on psychology, anthropology, history, geography, technology, and political science as well.4 While criticising the enthusiasm for the technical aspect of a number of theories, and calling for reflection of the specifically social, Seligman, himself, however, gives a very amorphous definition of

economics as

one way of looking at the total complex of social behaviour. In this sense it is a branch of a general theory of social systems and has as its primary task the study of those processes that are specifically economic, as well as the forms of behaviour that stem from them.^^5^^

Lipsey and Steiner suggest that 'economics today is regarded much

more broadly than it was even half a century ago'.^^1^^ While Bradley

says economics

deals with nearly every aspect of our individual daily lives-from buying a car to taking a vacation, to getting married and having children.^^2^^

And Baumol and Blinder

prefer to avoid any attempt to define the discipline in a single sentence or paragraph.^^3^^

One can, of course, agree that 'it is always hard to compress into a few lines an exact description'^^4^^ of the discipline that would clearly mark it off from allied ones, but when an economist with a great reputation in the West, like Samuelson, asserts that there is no need, essentially, for one,^^5^^ he thereby, in fact, registers the liquidation of the science itself, while Nutzinger's statement even seems quite strange, when he affirms about the subject of economics that

it is perhaps advisable to follow the tautological definition attributed to Blaug or Viner: 'Economics is what economists do.'^^6^^

To define the subject matter of a science is to distinguish the object it studies. The subjects of a science and objects of study can and must be delimited, although there are, of course, interconnections between sciences, since such connections exist between processes in nature and society. Western economists confuse the problems of political economy with those of the economics of sectors (e.g. industrial economics, agricultural economics, transport economics, etc.). But while political economy elucidates the laws governing the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of material wealth in human society, sectoral economics studies their manifestation in a given, concrete field, and so has its own specific tasks, and means and methods of dealing with them.

Attempts to build eclectic constructs in `Economies' lead to the courses lacking a rigorous system, and being turned into a set of various sections or divisions not always organically linked with one another. Samuelson's admission that he tried to set out the material in such a way that the order of study could be altered at will is characteristic.^^7^^ The American economist Lewis Solmon, for example, writes that instructors can resequence chapters in whatever order they choose.

~^^1^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Op. cit., p 12.

~^^2^^ Michael Bradley. Economics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111., 1980), p 2.

3 W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 3.

~^^4^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics. An Introductory Analysis (Me Craw-Hill New York, 1961), p 6.

~^^1^^ James F. Tucker. Essentials of Economics (Prentice-Hall, Englewood

Cliffs, N.J., 1975), p 4.

~^^2^^ John A. Perrow. Economics (University Tutorial Press, London, 1975),

Pi- ,

~^^3^^ Paul A. Samuelson, Op. cit., p 6.

4 Ben B. Seligman. Systematic Presentation. The Character of Western Economics. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society. A Comparative Encyclopaedia.Vo\. 3,(Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 37.

5 ihid

.

~^^6^^ Hans Gottfried Nutzinger. Economic Theory. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 3, p 64.

~^^7^^ See Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p vii.

31 30 1

The micro and macro sections have been designed as self-contained units, so that the order in which they are studied can be reversed at the instructor's discretion.1 He says he is

well aware that there are many differing views regarding a number of economic doctrines, and that each of these views has its ardent supporters, who can present well-documented studies to back up their case. In so far as is possible, this text tries to let each of these opposing groups speak for itself, without any editorializing.^^2^^

Other economists also confuse political economy with other sciences, and combine various schools and trends.

The definitions given above have inherent subjective, idealist features; they are based on a metaphysical and not a materialist method of analysing society's economic affairs, i.e. are unsound methodologically speaking. They ignore the role of social production in the development of human society, and the role of the mode of production and significance of relations of production. Even if economists talk about production (though not always) they predominantly have technological tasks in mind, that arise incidentally, and production in general. But political economy does not deal with `production' but Vith the social relations of men in production, with the social system of production'.^^3^^ It clarifies the 'conditions and forms' in which the production, exchange, and distribution of products take place.^^4^^

A striking example of how analysis of 'production in general' is included in the subject matter of `economies', rather than of historically determined forms of social production, is Samuelson's treatment of this science. In his words

any society, whether it consists of a totally collectivized communistic state, a tribe of South Sea Islanders, a capitalistic industrial nation, a Swiss Family Robinson, a Robinson Crusoe-or, one might almost add, a colony of bees---must somehow confront three fundamental and interdependent economic problems: 1. What commodities shall be produced?... 2. How shall goods be produced?... 3. For Whom shall goods be produced?... These three problems are fundamental and common to all economies.s

The differences in social and production relations and in the forms of property have thus been ignored which reflects a non-materialistic and unrealistic character of this approach.

Many definitions of economics do not, in general, mention production, or the laws governing production, i.e. that which is the main

thing determining the development of a society. As for the distribution and consumption of material wealth and the necessities of life, they speak of that out of context of the concrete historical forms.

3. Bourgeois objectivism and its class essence

When economists deny the Marxian thesis of the class and partisan nature of political economy, they zealously stress their `impartiality'. Back at the end of the nineteenth century John Neville Keynes wrote

that he had

endeavoured to avoid the tone of a partisan, and ... sought, in the treatment of disputed questions, to represent both sides without prejudice.' Samuelson has written roughly the same thing:

To succeed we must make an effort to cultivate an objective and detached ability to see things as they arc, regardless of our likes or dislikes.2 Obviously going against the facts, he declares:

There is not one theory of economics for Republicans and one for Democrats, one for workers and one for employers.3 One must agree that there really cannot be economic theories different in principle for Republicans and Democrats, who are members of different parties of one and the same class, the capitalists. But the working class has its own class interests opposed to those of the capitalists. The working class is interested in abolishing exploitation, and in victory of the new, communist system. The capitalists, on the contrary, are interested in preserving and intensifying exploitation and in saving dying capitalism. The aims and interests of the two are obviously diametrically opposed. That is why the working class has its Marxist-Leninist political economy that is not afraid of the truth and is interested in comprehending and understanding the regularities of economic development of society.

Capitalist economists gabble about being above classes and that 'economics is a somewhat technical subject'.^^4^^ It is here that the capitalist class approach to society's economic affairs comes out, an approach based on an ignoring of relations of production that is good for the capitalists, and on employing a subjective psychological method.

Some economists, while recognising the existence of economic laws, interpret them incorrectly, basing them on people's psychological motives, when it is objective economic conditions, i.e. really existing relations of production, that play the determinant role. In

~^^1^^ J.N. Keynes. The Scope and Method of Political Economy (Macmillan and Co., London, 1891), p vi.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit, p 7

~^^3^^ Ibid.

~^^4^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p v.

~^^1^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Economics (Meredith Corp., New York, 1972), p xvi.

2 Ibid.

^^3^^ V.I. Lenin. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Collected Works, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 63.

4 See Frederick Engels. Anti-Duhring (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), Pl81.

~^^5^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed., pp 17-18.

32

---455

33

Samuelson's textbook such laws are taken to be the law of scarcity, the law of increasing costs, and the law of diminishing returns.

Capitalist political economy defends and justifies the capitalist system, and that is its vital function. Lenin wrote that 'not a single one" of these bourgeois professors of political economy 'can be trusted one iota' in the field of theory, whatever valuable work he might do in special, factual studies, because,

taken as a whole, the professors of economics are nothing but learned

PART II

CRITIQUE OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC CONCEPTIONS OF CAPITALISM

salesmen of the capitalist class.

It is characteristic of the authors of many economics textbooks that they do not hide their class bias. Samuelson, for example, when summing up, was forced to talk about the possibility of improving the working of the market (capitalist) economy.^^2^^ Some have been obliged to admit the impossibility of complete objectivity when analysing economic processes. Solmon, for instance, while noting that

economics is the study of the way man meets the problem of limited resources, choosing among alternative uses as he attempts to maximize his own satisfaction, has, all the same, to admit that it

is limited as a science because complete objectivity is often more difficult for the economist than for the physical scientist.3 Western economics, while defending the capitalist system, at the same time attacks socialism and has a clearly expressed anti-- communist bias. Capitalist class positions, and a standing aside from study and comprehension of the laws of social development are also manifested in definitions of the purposes of economics courses. Solmon answers the question Vhy study economics?' as follows:

Your study of economics can be useful in helping you to understand the causes of many situations you encounter personally, and it can also help you to determine the reasons for events that occur nationally. FQT example, do you know how much it really costs for you to take this economics course? How did the publisher of this text set the price at $10.98 that you paid for it at the bookstore?4 Only scientific, Marxist-Leninist political economy gives a correct answer to why one should study economic theory. Its study is immensely important for workers because study of the economic laws of capitalism equips the masses of the people to fight this exploiter system, while knowledge of the economic laws of socialism is needed so as to apply them successfully in the practice of building socialism and communism.

THE TREATMENT OF VALUE AND MONEY

1. Principal concepts of the theory of marginal utility

Value is the category underlying commodity prices and the deepseated regulator of their movement. It is quite natural, therefore, that theoretical study of value has an important place in capitalist political economy. Western economists who study prices and their content without even using the term `value' are in fact concerned with the concept of value. There are several capitalist theories of value: the labour theory of value of classical capitalist political economy ( according to which only labour creates value); the theory of factors of production, according to which value is created by labour, capital, and land; the theory of marginal utility which in essence is the theory of value of marginalism, one of the commonest trends of the present time. Marginalists interpret the basis of price (value) by means of marginal magnitudes, especially marginal utility. The Italian economist Alessandro Roncaglia stresses that marginalist theory

has been for the past century, and still is, the dominant academic pAradigm... Within such a framework, the objective approach to value (based on the physical costs of production) which prevailed in classical political economy was supplanted by a subjective approach, based on consumers' tastes (utility maps).l

By concentrating on facts appearing on the surface of phenomena, and precisely that commodity producers give a greater preference on the market to some commodities, in accordance with their needs, and less to others, the exponents of marginal utility theory consider subjective utility to be the ultimate basis of value, the regulator of prices. This idea had already been expressed by Fernando Galiani in the eighteenth century, and was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth in the work of the Austrian school (Carl Menger, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser), and by Leon Walras and William S. Jevons, who made wide use of a

A r- !,AIessandro Roncaglia. The Sraffian Contribution. In A. Eichner (ed.). Ai,uide to Post-Keynesian Economics (M.E. Sharpe, White Plains, N. Y., 1979,

35

~^^1^^ V.I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 322.

~^^2^^ See Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 885.

~^^3^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Op. cit., p 15.

d., p!4.

L

mathematical apparatus to substantiate the theory of marginal utility. The theory underwent a certain evolution: theories of choice, preference, games, and a marginal rate of substitution appeared. The latter, in the view of Baumol and Blinder, is the most modern approach to the analysis of consumer preferences.^^1^^ But this evolution mainly concerned the quantitative aspect, namely measurement of marginal utility or consumer preferences. At bottom, however, it retained the former postulate, and the economic essence of utility remained undisclosed. As Baumol and Blinder put it, 'it is marginal not total utility that is directly related to price'/

The main initial premise of the theory of marginal utility reflects a surficial subjective relation of the consumer to the consumed good: as wants are satisfied, the satisfaction from consumption diminishes. Accordingly the last unit of a given type of good consumed has the least utility for the consumer, compared with other units. The least pressing need satisfied by the last of the consumed units of a good of a given kind is called its marginal utility. It is this, in the view of advocates of the theory, that is the main regulator of commodity prices, and figures as the ultimate basis of prices, i.e. as the value of commodities. Hence the name of the theory.

In this section we shall criticise the interpretation of marginal utility theory in present-day Western economics textbooks for college courses (mainly in economics faculties).

The American economist James Tucker writes, characterising the content of the categories `utility' and 'marginal utility':

Utility, itself, means the ability or power of a good to satisfy a want. In other words, utility involves some quantitative measure of how much satisfaction an individual gets from drinking a can of beer or taking a ride on a roller coaster. If an individual drinks five cans of beer or takes five rides on the roller coaster, presumably we can measure the total utility of either act. Marginal utility is the change in total utility resulting from a unit change in the quantity of the product consumed, and may be measured by the following formula:

.. • IIT.-I-* Change in total utility

Marginal Utility =---------:---------:-----------------. 3

Change in quantity consumed

The first thing that strikes one is the absence of arguments justifying the content of the most fundamental concept of this theory, viz., `utility'. Bradley, for example, writes: 'Utility ... is the economist's term for ``satisfaction''.'^^4^^ Since the utility of a commodity is defined as its capacity to satisfy an individual's want, the question naturally arises, what is the economic (and not the biological, aesthetic, etc.) sense of the category Vant'. The writers, how-

ever, in fact avoid answering that. Tucker, having postulated that utility is the ability of a good to satisfy a want, declares by way of explanation: 'in other words, utility involves some quantitative measure'. Instead of an explanation of the qualitative definiteness of utility, the main concept of the theory, a quantitative determinacy is substituted for the qualitative one. But while the economic sense of `utility' is quite unclear, 'marginal utility' is left hanging in the air. The degree to which any edible dish, for example, satisfies, of course diminishes. But this ordinary notion, fixed by the term 'marginal utility', by no means brings out the sense of marginal utility as the regulator of economic processes, as the connecting link between sectors of the national economy.

Let us turn to two other contemporary authors, Richard Lipsey and Peter Steiner. They wrote in their textbook:

The satisfaction someone receives from consuming commodities is called his or her utility... Total utility refers to the total satisfaction from consuming some commodity... Thus, for example, the total utility of consuming ten units of some commodity is the total satisfaction that those ten units provide.^^1^^

Like Tucker, they do not say what is the economic sense of the main concept of their theoretical system, i.e. the satisfaction obtained by the separate individual from consuming a good. Furthermore, their definition of total utility is itself tautological: to begin with they say that satisfaction and utility are identical, then say that the total utility is the total satisfaction.

Defining marginal utility, they write:

Marginal utility refers to the change in satisfaction resulting from consuming a little more or a little less of the commodity... The marginal utility of the tenth unit- consumed is the satisfaction added by the consumption of that unit-or, in other words, the difference in total utility between consuming nine units and consuming ten units.2 The Wonnacotts formulate this idea with greater clarity:

Marginal utility is the satisfaction an individual receives from consuming one additional unit of a good or service.^^3^^

They consider that 'indeed, marginal utility is the key concept underlying demand'.^^4^^ Allowing for the fact that marginal utility, in the view of these economists, is the direct regulator of prices, we need to draw attention to the following proposition of Karl Marx's:

In the case of supply and demand ... the supply is equal to the sum of sellers, or producers, of a certain kind of commodity, and the demand equals the sum of buyers or consumers (both productive and individual) of the same kind of commodity. The sums react on one another as units,

~^^1^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Op. cit., pp 109-110. I Ibid., p 110.

J P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York 1979). p 396. ~^^4^^/AW.

37

~^^1^^ See W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 351.

2/WA, p355.

3 James F. Tucker. Op. cit., p 67.

~^^4^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., p 84.

36

L

as aggregate forces. The individual counts here only as part of a social force, as an atom of the mass, and it is in this form that competition brings out the social character of production and consumption.1 Marginalists, however, do not bring out the main thing, i.e. how and by what mechanism the subjective attitude of the separate individual to consumption exerts (in their view) a determining influence on the relations of the commodity producers, grouped in an industry, i.e. the relations that directly mould prices.

The attention of advocates of marginal utility theory is not concentrated on the relations through which the separate individual acts in the market 'as part of a social force', but on the separate individual himself and his subjective sensations. Following the main argument, illustrative examples and analogies are given based on 'common sense'. The Wonnacotts' textbook is indicative in this respect. Having given the definition of marginal utility quoted above, they write:

To illustrate, consider Lori Escaf, a student who is considering how many skiing lessons she should purchase this month. We ask her to evaluate how much utility or satisfaction she would receive from one lesson, from a second, and a third. Her reply might be: 'The first lesson would clearly give me the most satisfaction... The second would give me considerable pleasure, but not quite so much. And less again for the third, since my appetite for skiing gets a bit jaded after a while.' ...Since eventually this must be true for every good or service, it is sometimes referred to as the law of diminishing marginal utility. 2 Employing these premises, they explain price formation as follows: We ask her [Lori Escaf-Auth.], 'What would you be willing to pay for the first lesson?' When she replies, 'Oh.-SlO', we continue: 'And what would you be willing to pay for the second?' (More precisely, we might ask, 'How low would the price have to fall before she would be willing to buy two lessons?') In this case, her reply is $17.3 The methodological flimsiness of this kind of argument will be seen when we take the following into consideration. As we know, systems analysis has become very common in the twentieth century. Its main methodological principle is that a system is not reducible to the sum of its elements and has a special systems quality that none of its elements has. Today's proponents of marginal utility theory base themselves on a long-outmoded methodological premise that the market is a simple sum of elements, an aggregate of individuals like Lori Escaf. Accordingly, they consider that, knowing the behaviour of the individual in the market, based on his or her commonsense, they can disclose the patterns of market forces and the dynamics of prices. They do not contemplate the point that it is the relations of the commodity producers that convert each of them into part of an

integral system and generate a regular relation in price formation, i.e. the relation of value.

The appeal to the reader's commonsense, fixing the results of direct observation, makes the marginalists' argument very understandable and easily taken in. But understandabih'ty of exposition is not identical with persuasiveness, In this connection we would recall the comprehensibility (based on direct observation and commonsense) of the false thesis that the Sun rotates around the Earth.

When the arguments of modern exponents of marginal utility theory are being considered, the Vicious circle' that Marxist critics of Bohm-Bawerk, Menger, and von Wieser had already pointed out, strikes one. Tucker, the Wonnacotts, Lipsey, and others define the quantity of value by the marginal utility of commodities, while utility itself (including marginal utility) depends on their scarcity. But the volume of production of goods, and correspondingly the degree of their scarcity, depends on value: a high value limits me consumption of commodities and converts them into relatively scarce goods. It thus turns out that value depends on marginal utility which, in turn. depends on scarcit ndscarcli'rP^P^"^^^8^^ nn

must, when criticising marginal utility theory, draw attention

to Lenin's following methodological thesis:

Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated ... development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature...^^1^^

The theory of marginal utility makes an absolute of the external,

subjective appearance of a need, masking its deep, objective content.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Pesenti remarked, when criticising this

theory:

A first, elementary observation, on which subjectivists' treatises on economics insist, but which, on the contrary, it is sufficient simply to mention, is that the needs of the individual represent a different degree of intensity. Although evaluation of the intensity of a need is subjective, it is also possible to distinguish primary and urgent needs, which correspond to the physiological necessity of life objectively from less urgent ones. In any case each of us has needs according to a scale or gradation on the basis of an evaluation that will differ from individual to individual, but which all the same have certain common characteristics in the mass.~^^2^^

j^

are

1 V.I. Lenin. On the Question of Dialectics. Collected Works, Vol. 38 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 361.

~^^2^^ Antonio Pesenti. Manuale di economia politico, Vol. 1 (Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1970), p 95.

39

rarx. Capital, Vol. 111 (Progress Publishers Moscow, 1977), p 193.

2 p Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. at., p 396.

3 Ibid., p 397.

38

L

determined by their class .affiliation, the phase of the capitalist businessj:ycle. and sojm.j.e^bv exclusivelvjihi££tiye_tactojs.

It is important to note that marginal utility theory is also a distorted picture of the natural process of the effect of needs on price formation. This effect, as Marx showed in his theory of differential rent, operates primarily in the sectors of agriculture and the extractive industries, in which the possibilities of producing goods and correspondingly of fully meeting needs are limited. In his tables of differential rent, enterprises located on the worst land as a rule produce the least proportion of the produce of a sector (compared with other groups), and consequently do not express the mean conditions of the production of commodities; the individual outlays of labour in these enterprises, however, figure as socially necessary labour, because of the need for the product, and determine the magnitude of value. The theorists of marginal utility, however, by treating value as a subjective category, completely divorce it from labour, and do not understand that need is one of the factors moulding the social significance and social necessity of labour.

At the same time, adherents of marginal utility theory, when studying the state of the market, structure of consumer demand, etc., by mathematical methods, reflect and systematise certain real aspects of price formation associated with the effect of needs. That, in turn, makes it possible to propose certain practical recommendations to corporations and capitalist governments, that produce an economic effect when carried out. But a certain success that this theory has had in applied research is not in itself evidence of the correctness of theninitial theoretical premises. By analogy^ for example, the progress made in applied astronomy before Copernicus, and used in navigation, cannot be considered evidence of the correctness of the basic thesis of Precopernican fundamental astronomy, namely that the Sun rotates around the Earth.

Marginal utility theory, like other capitalist economic theories, is, naturally, not limited to practical advice for corporations and governments, but also performs a social, ideological function, combating Marxist-Leninist political economy, and above all the labour theory of value. The stress, moreover, is laid on the weakest link in marginal utility theory, namely the determination of value by utility, which (as we showed above) operates as an unproven postulate reflecting the very surface of economic phenomena. It is therefore quite natural that neither the fathers of marginal utility theory nor its modern interpreters have succeeded in refuting the labour theory of value.

2. The methods of the capitalist critique of Marx's theory of value

The apologists of capitalism battle fiercely against Marx's theory of value. The initial technique of their attack on Marxian work, includ-

ing the theory of value, is a distorted interpretation of the theses of Capital. The most sophisticated distortion amounts to the following: to treat the separate propositions of Capital as something absolute, while taking the truth contained in them beyond its actual application.

Any truth, if`overdone' (as Dietzgen Senior put it), if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions.'

This technique was widely used, for example, by Schumpeter, who devoted the first paper in his Ten Great Economists to Marx. While recognising the genius of Marx and his great impact on the development of economic science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Schumpeter at the same time distorted the theses of Capital, and then tried to refute them.^^2^^

Schumpeter focused attention on what is common in the theories of value of Marx and Ricardo, ignoring the difference of principle between them. In particular, he wrote:

Both Ricardo and Marx say that the value of every commodity is (in perfect equilibrium and perfect competition) proportional to the quantity of labor contained in the commodity, provided this labor is in accordance with the existing standard of efficiency of production (the 'socially necessary quantity of labor'). Both measure this quantity in hours of work and use the same method in order to reduce different qualities of work to a single standard.^^3^^

This point of view is shared by the American economist Landreth, who remarks:

As an advocate of a labor theory of value, Marx worked through the various problems inherent in the formulation of a labor theory of value, as Ricardo had before him, and, in essence, followed the Ricardian solutions. Marx was able to give a clearer presentation of the difficulties of a labor theory of value, but he was no more able to solve the problems than Ricardo.^^4^^

When identifying Marx's definition of the value of commodities with Ricardo's, Schumpeter did not even ask what content they gave to the concept `labour'. And it is that question which is decisive.

According to Ricardo the labour that creates value is the process taking place between man and nature, which he treated as outside the system of social relations. Unlike Ricardo, Marx regarded value as a relation between commodity producers, concealed beneath a mate-

~^^1^^ V.I. Lenin. `Left-Wing' Communism-an Infantile Disorder. Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p 63.

~^^2^^ See Joseph A. Schumpeter. Ten Great Economists. From Marx to Keynes (Allen & Unwin, London, 1951), pp 3-73.

~^^3^^ Ibid., pp 27-28.

~^^4^^ Harry Landreth. History of Economic Theory. Scope, Method and Content (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1976), pp 165-166.

41 40

rial envelope,^^1^^ and the labour that creates it-as equalised social labour. He showed that only expression of the equivalence of commodities of various kinds brings out the specific character of the labour that forms value.^^2^^ This approach led him to discovery of the dual character of the labour embodied in a commodity. Marx differentiated labjw^as^Jfaejjrocess ^carried pjLJietwFpn man -and-, oatifre in a~cfirtain concrete fonrHctmcnrt? labour) and p^iali^d so-

points of departure for further development of the theory contained in Capital as a negative feature of Marx's economic theory. When examining one category or another, including value, from the angle of the economic law of the movement of capitalism, Marx specially analysed certain, the most important, aspects of value and only touched on others in passing. The various definitions of value correspondingly serve as the starting points for further development of the theory. Western economists see the various definitions of value and of the law of value as evidence of the flimsiness of Marx's theory. Cutler et al., for instance, write:

There is no simple, comprehensive and unambiguous treatment of Value' or of the 'law of value' (the form of its operation and its different modes of expression) in `Capital'... This concept [value-Auth. ] and the concepts and the problems dependent on it should be rejected.^^1^^

From that standpoint the ideal of scientific character is an ' unambiguous' treatment of value. But such a treatment would only be legitimate if value---the initial category of the whole capitalist systemwere considered to be structurally undifferentiated. Such a presentation of the initial category, however, is refuted by the whole twentieth century development of the science. The ambiguity of the definitions of value, and its characteristic as a structurally complex category, are evidence that Marx had started from the twentieth century level of the science already in the nineteenth. The critics, however, consider this a weakness of his theory of value, and even declare that

many of the central concepts and problems in `Capital', far from constituting a point of departure, are actually obstacles to the new kinds of theoretical work...^^2^^

These economists endeavour above all to refute one of the fundamental, underlying theses of the theory of value, i.e. the equality of commodities in exchange. Its importance is due to the fact that Marx, by relying on it, disclosed the content of Value' in the first chapter of Volume I of Capital, so that, if it could be demonstrated to be erroneous, body blow could be dealt thereby to the whole theory of value. Cutler et al. write in this respect:

It is by no means inevitable that exchange be conceived as an equation. Exchange can be conceived as being equivalent, in the juridical sense, that is, that both parties to it agree to the equity of the terms of the exchange and receive what they were promised, but not as an equation... Likewise, in marginalist theories exchange rests neither on the identity of some property of the things exchanged nor on an identity of the esti-

cial labour (abstract labour), which directly creates value. SchumpeterrTTowever, did not mention this very important and fundamental feature of Marx's theory of value, and ignored the main thing that qualitatively distinguished Marx from Ricardo.

Heilbroner takes essentially the same stand, writing that Values, in Marx's scheme, reflect only the outpouring of labor energies, reduced to some common denominator'.^ Schumpeter, by stating that the capitalism of free competition is theoretically reflected in Capital, ruled out the possibility of employing the Marxian' theory of value in conditions when free competition was limited. Attacks of that kind on Capital are based on complete misunderstanding of Marx's method, i.e. of rising from the abstract to the concrete. As we know, the final aim of Capital was to disclose the economic law of the movement of capitalism.^^4^^ To do that it was necessary to investigate capitalism in the conditions of free competition because that was equivalent to the capitalist mode of production. In making this investigation, Marx disengaged it from the numerous factors, limiting free competition. But not only were the most important problems of the theory of value tackled in Capital, but others were also posed whose solution related to the successive stages of the rise from the abstract to the concrete. His way of viewing things, Engels wrote, was not

a doctrine but a method. It does not provide ready-made dogmas, but criteria for further research and the method for this research.^^5^^

The effect of competition on commodity relations, taken in all its diversity (allowing for the factors that Marx abstracted in his main work), is one of these problems. Schumpeter made absolutes of the theses of Capital and correspondingly assumed that they should directly explain the whole diversity of capitalist commodity relations without the introduction of supplementary theoretical links. By basing himself on this distorted interpretation of Capital, he attacked

Marx's great work.

Cutler et al. resort to a similar methodology, misinterpreting the

~^^1^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. I. Translated by S. Moore and E. Aveling and edited by F. Engels (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p 79.

2 Ibid., pp 57-58.

3 Robert Heilbroner. Marxism: For and Against (Norton & Co., New York,

1980), pill.

4 See Karl Marx. Op. cit., pp 20-21.

5 Frederick Engels. Letter to W. Sombart. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 506.

42

~^^1^^ Anthony Cutler, Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst, and Athar Hussain. Marx's `Capital' and Capitalism Today, Vol. 1 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977), pp 9-10.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p 3.

43

mations of utility concerning them. Exchange is possible because the utility of the things exchanged is different for the parties to the exchange-these different utilities intersect in a definite ratio, say a willingness to part with 1 cwt of iron for the utility of 1 ton of coal and vice versa.^^1^^

The methodological unsoundness of this argument is (1) that solution of the problem of exchange is transferred from the field of economic relations to the juridical field; (2) that it attempts to treat the relations of exchange from the standpoint of subjective utility.

In order fully to disclose the method of the critique of Marx, we would draw attention to two remarks by Mrs. Robinson. She writes:

The contribution that he [Marx-y4uf/i.] made was the conception that labour power also is sold for its value?

and at the same time considers that the definition of value as labour time and of wages as the metamorphosed form of the value of labour power does not make it possible to explain the rise of real wages under capitalism.^^3^^ Her first comment actually ignores the fact that it was Marx, in contrast to his predecessors, who characterised value as a social relation, and boils down the innovation of his analysis merely to application of the labour theory of value to analyse labour power. In her second remark, she cast doubt on the scientific worth of Marx's thesis of the value of labour power. Her statement that his thesis about the value of labour power cannot explain the growth of real wages under capitalism is unsound. According to Marx, the amount of the necessaries of life required for equivalent compensation of labour power expended rises with growth of its expenditure; the value of these necessaries can alter in various ways, but real wages will have to increase in accordance with the law of the value of labour power.

The methods that are employed to misrepresent Marxian methodology can be judged from the argumentation of Richard Carson and Mrs. Robinson. Carson, declaring that the value of a commodity determined by socially necessary time cannot explain price fluctuations occurring through the action of supply and demand, draws the following conclusion:

the existence of a labour-value theory is based entirely on faith. Mrs. Robinson, criticising Marx's theory of value, writes:

According to Marx's own argument, the labour theory of value fails to provide a theory of prices.^^5^^

The `argument' .they have in mind can only `appear' through misunderstanding of Marx's methodology.

Marx characterised price as the money form of value, and showed that value is 'the law of price'. At the same time he revealed the inevitability of deviations of price from value, having abstracted a whole number of complicating circumstances linked with supply and demand and conditioning the deviation itself. He meant to continue investigation of market prices in a special theory of competition.^^1^^

In Marx's plan this theory was to have been treated after completion of Capital, and based on it. Mrs. Robinson and her disciples are quite wrong in concluding that Marx's theory of value is not the basis of his theory of prices, and that the former is an incorrect theory.

Western economists distort Marx's theory of value, ignoring the points of departure contained in it for further research.

3. Present-day ideas of the essence of money

In the conditions of modern capitalism more and more attention is paid to the problem of money in Western economics, since an analysis of the money sphere has become an indispensable prerequisite for building models of the capitalist economic mechanism. At the same time the theory of money has been persistently altered for purely apologetic purposes in order to substantiate the 'inner stability' of capitalism.

The rudiments of many modern ideas of money stem from theories that existed back in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That applies primarily to the nominalist and quantity theories of money, whose development covered several centuries. The old theories of money, however, are now reappearing in a substantially modified form. Whereas Western economic thought gave its main attention, under pre-monopoly capitalism, to problems of the origin, essence, and formation of the value (or purchasing power) of money, under contemporary state monopoly capitalism, theories of money have shifted more and more (in connection with the marked aggravation of the antagonistic contradictions of capitalist reproduction) toward study of its effect on the development of the capitalist economy.

Attention is mainly focused today, especially in textbooks, on study of the mechanism of money's interaction with other factors of the reproduction process, rather than on its essence and function, and on its place in the system of state monopoly management of the economy. Since economists cannot provide answers to the many root problems of the theory of money, they are trying to get away from them and to substitute purely quantitative, empirical research for them.

~^^1^^ Anthony Cutler et al. Op. cit., pp 13-14.

~^^2^^ Joan Robinson. Contributions to Modern Economics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p 183.

3 Ibid., pp 71-72.

~^^4^^ Richard L. Carson. Comparative Economic Systems (Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1973), p 440.

~^^5^^ Joan Robinson. An Essay on Marxian Economics (Macmillan Ltd., London 1949), p 17.

See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill, p 764.

44 45

First of all, Western economic thought cannot say what money is. The American economist Thomas Cargill, for instance, writes:

We have been using the terms money and monetary policy as if everyone knew exactly what they meant. Unfortunately, these terms have no clear and concise definitions...'

The economists in fact give very indefinite, vague definitions of money, that in no way reflect its nature. In most cases they define it as something that makes it possible to buy goods and services, or as assets by which demand for commodities is financed. The American economist Johnson, for example, explains what money is as follows:

Money is anything that is widely accepted in payment for the purchase of goods and services or in payment of debts. Like beauty, money is as money does. Money is property that the owner can use to pay off a definite amount of debt with certainty and without delay. The Indians used beads, the Eskimos used fishhooks, and we use checks and currency.^^2^^

With such an interpretation money is confused in one fell swoop with the universal equivalent in a definite material form (beads and fishhooks) that existed in the primitive stages of the development of commodity exchange; money proper; and the credit money arising from deposits on current account in commercial banks. At the same time the nature of money and its essence are not brought out at all: the expressions 'money is property', and even more *money is as money does', mean absolutely nothing.

The British economists Newlyn and Bootle give another definition of money:

We define money as consisting of those assets the use of which by the owner to finance an excess demand in the market for commodities or factors of production, necessarily has zero in the market for loans.^^3^^

Here money is directly confused with money capital, which can function in the form of various financial assets represented by different securities.

Money, in a scientific definition, is a universal equivalent whose special function is to express the value of all other commodities. The form of the external manifestation of the universal equivalent has altered, of course, with the development of capitalism, which came about primarily through the enormous development of credit and the usurpation of money's place by credit, and the conversion of banknotes into inconvertible money. But such a modification of mon-

ey relations, linked with the very dying of capitalism at its highest stage of development, by no means signifies liquidation of the commodity character of capitalism, and consequently of the commodity character of money itself.

Western economists deduce the essence of money today, as traditionally in the past, from its function. But there is no unanimity among them either on the definition of the number of its functions or their interpretation. In some cases it has three functions---a unit of account, a medium of exchange, and a store of wealth^^1^^; in other cases it has four functions:

a (1) medium of exchange, (2) standard unit of account or standard of value, (3) standard of deferred payments, and (4) store of value.2 They characteristically replace the standard of value by the function of the unit of account, i.e. the scale of prices, and pay exceptional attention to the so-called function of store of value (wealth). This was particularly characteristic of Keynes, who considered money's decisive property to be precisely that of a store of value, i.e. its ability always to preserve ready purchasing power. On this point he disagreed with supporters of the quantity theory, who thought the function of medium of exchange decisive. Beginning with Keynes, economic thought assiduously developed the idea of money's ability constantly to preserve purchasing power, which consisted in its liquidity.

Attempts to deduce the essence of money from its functions inevitably stand the problem oh its head; its functions turn out, in these interpretations, to be not the external manifestation of its essence but, on the contrary, the condition from which its nature is itself deduced. The reason for that approach to bringing out the nature of money is rooted in the vulgar methodology of Western economic science, which studies only the external manifestations of economic processes and sees the substance in these external manifestations themselves. When the essence of money is deduced from its functions, that inevitably leads precisely to vague, amorphous definitions like those cited above emerging in place of a disclosure of the nature of money: money is `something' that can be accepted in payments, take part in exchange, and so on.

The principal methodological mistake of the `functional' approach is that it makes an absolute out of some one aspect of money expressed by a given function. Historically that is how the metallic and nominalist theories of money were demarcated. The advocates of the first, the mercantilists, made an absolute of money's function as treasure and as world money, and on that basis identified it with the noble metals. They consequently made a fetish of the noble

~^^1^^ Thomas F. Cargill. Money, the financial System, and Monetary Policy (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979), p 7.

~^^2^^ Dudley W. Johnson. Macroeconomics. Monev, Prices, and Income ( Wiley-Hamilton, Santa Barbara, 1976), p 3.

3 W.T. Newlyn and R.P. Bootle. Theory of Money (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1978), p 32.

46

~^^1^^ See Thomas F. Cargill. Op. cit., p 7.

~^^2^^ John A. Cochran. Money, Banking and the Economy (Macmillan, New York, 1979), p 6.

47

metals, which are not money by their nature and fulfil money functions only in certain historical conditions. There were recurrences of this theory in the form of `neometallism' in the 1950s and 1960s, when several economists-Jacques Rueff (France) and Michael Heilperin (USA)-advocated a return to the gold standard that existed before World War I. The `neometallists' did not understand that the system of gold exchange was historically limited by certain conditions of the development of capitalism, and that those conditions had already disappeared under state monopoly capitalism.

The making of other functions of money into absolutes-as medium of exchange and means of payment---caused the appearance and development of the nominalist theory of money, which identifies money with symbols of value lacking any material content, with purely accounting units without value in themselves. The fathers of this theory, the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley and the Scottish economist James Stuart, declared money to be a purely arbitrary symbol employed only in order to fix relative values and exchange ratios in the exchange of goods. When disclosing the mistakes of nominalism, Marx demonstrated that they were rooted in a denial of the value basis of money and of its links with the commodity world, on the one hand, and with gold as the universal equivalent, on the other hand. Money is not a 'social convention' but a product of the spontaneous development of commodity exchange and exchange value, and the external form of the manifestation of commodities' value. It pushed its way out of the world of commodities and opposes it primarily as a standard of value.

Elements of nominalism are very typical of all Western conceptions of money today. Just as in the past economists now link money primarily with the functions of a medium of exchange and a means of payment.

The essential function, which enables us to identify money, is that it is generally accepted as a means of payment... Anything is money which functions generally as a medium of exchange.1 From that springs the fetishisation of paper money as the most perfect and completely independent form of money. The essence of money,' Samuelson, for example, says, 'its intrinsic nature, is typified by paper currency.'^^2^^ In fact, of course, paper currency is only one variety of money, and one which, by virtue of the momentary role of money as medium of exchange, arises from that function. Paper currency consequently expresses the intrinsic nature of money only in so far as its nature finds reflection in money's function as medium of exchange.

The fetishisation of money as means of payment and store of value generated another typical feature of Western conceptions of

money, viz., its unusually extended interpretation. Any credit document begins to be treated as money; as modern capitalism's credit system rapidly extended, economists began to look upon money simply as one of the elements of 'liquid assets' of intrinsically the same type, which store value, hi this family of 'liquid assets' money is depicted as the one with the highest liquidity. With that approach, money as the universal equivalent ceases in fact to be the object of independent economic analysis and begins to be considered purely empirically from the standpoint of its finks with other 'liquid assets'. The American economist Fred Leonard, for example, writes:

Money is defined empirically in seven different ways, and the eminent logic of economics gives these empirical definitions the names Mj, M2, and so on through M7. The most widely used definitions, however, use Mj, M2 and M3-'

The cash aggregate M. is regarded as the most acceptable currency medium, which includes banknotes, coins, and the cheques of commercial banks; M2 is regarded as the sum of M j plus short-term and savings deposits in commercial banks; M3 is the sum of M2 plus savings deposits in savings banks and savings and credit associations. Liquidity itself is treated, from the standpoint of these aggregates, as ability to convert assets rapidly into aggregate Mt and without loss of income. Cargill, for example, writes:

M] can be regarded as the most liquid of the financial assets in that it represents immediate command over goods and services...2 Economists thus search for a definition of money mostly by way of a kind of inventory of credit assets and a formal comparison of their liquidity. The whole business of defining money is reduced to a purely quantitative comparison of how far various credit media can be converted into the most liquid form. Money's qualitative side as an economic category is completely ignored with this approach.

This empirical, inventory approach is particularly characteristic of the exponents of modern monetary theory, the best known of whom is the American economist Milton Friedman, who, making an absolute of the function of store of value, considers that the concept 'stock of money' can, at any moment, include financial assets that enjoy a steady demand on the market. Leonard explains that

Friedman uses a different definition of money because he sees the function of money as a temporary abode of purchasing power. In this theory, money is anything that (1) can be held at a fixed market value and (2) can be converted into a medium of exchange with no cost associated with the transformation.

1 Fred H. Leonard. Macroeconomic Theory. Static and Dynamic Analyses (Random House, New York, 1978), p 218.

~^^2^^ Thomas F. Cargill. Op. cit., p 10.

~^^3^^ F.H. Leonard. Op. cit., p 219.

~^^1^^ W.T. Newlyn and R.P. Bootle, Op. cit., pp 1, 2.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 276.

48 49

That interpretation is a quite conscious abstraction from the essential properties of money, because practically any financial asset that is in demand on the money market is reducible to money.

The quantity theory of money has a leading place in Western economics as regards the value basis of money. It was very popular in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries and the first third of the twentieth, until the advent of Keynesianism. And even now it continues to hold strong positions as the basis of modern neoclassical theory's treatment of the influence of money on the capitalist economy. Its supporters consider that the value of the monetary unit and the commodity price level are governed by the amount of money in circulation. The more money there is in circulation, the higher the prices of goods should be and the lower the value of the monetary unit. Karl Marx, exposing the unsoundness of this theory, wrote:

The erroneous opinion that it is... prices that are determined by the quantity of the circulating medium, and that the latter depends on the quantity of the precious metals in a country; this opinion was based by those who first held it, on the absurd hypothesis that commodities are without a price, and money without a varue, when they first enter into circulation, and that, once in the circulation, an aliquot part of the medley of commodities is exchanged for an aliquot part of the heap of precious metals. *

The founder of the modern quantity theory of money is taken to be the American economist Irving Fisher, who gave it a mathematical form. From his mathematical 'equations of exchange' he concluded that the value of money is in inverse proportion to its quantity, and prices are directly proportional to the quantity of circulating money. His methodologically erroneous position stemmed from the fact that he, like 'the supporters of the quantity theory preceding him, on the whole considered the link between money and commodities solely as regards the sphere of circulation and completely ignored the processes taking place in the sphere of production where the value of commodities is, in fact, formed. Arthur Pigou, a member of the Cambridge school, also gave the quantity theory a mathematical form, and he, too, ignored the function of money as standard of value and its role as universal equivalent.

The most typical representatives of the quantity theory today are the monetarists headed by Milton Friedman. While basing themselves on Fisher's conception, they have introduced several new points into the theory: they reject Fisher's idea of the proportionality between the mass of money and market prices, on the one hand, and try to tie up the dynamics of the mass of money with fluctuations of the economy in the process of reproduction, on the other hand. But, while taking their stand on the quantity theory, the monetarists also make an absolute of the role of the mass of money in the

determination of prices and, by abstracting monopoly price formation as it really happens, completely ignore the possibility that monopoly prices themselves make growth of the mass of money in circulation necessary. The monetarists also exaggerate the role of money in the process of capitalist reproduction, ascribing a decisive influence to it on the dynamics of national income and cyclic fluctuations. In fact, however, these processes are governed by quite other factors, lying in the sphere of material production.

4. Western ideas of inflation

All capitalist countries have been engulfed in recent years by mounting inflationary processes. In the 50s and 60s the relatively dynamic development of the capitalist economy was accompanied with a growth of prices of 3 to 4 per cent a year. This was regarded as a moderate price for economic growth and was taken as the normal level of inflation which was labelled `creeping'. In the mid-60s, and especially in the 70s, inflation became `galloping'; and the average annual rates of price rises began to be expressed in double figures. It has not yet become hyperinflation, with a rate of increase of 1,000 per cent per month, disrupting the economic and monetary system,^^1^^ but an unprecedented combination of inflation and deterioration of all the most important indicators of the economic situation has become the rule. The term `stagflation' has been adopted in the Western literature to describe this phenomenon. Stagflation has struck a considerable blow at existing capitalist economic theories and is forcing economists and politicians both to expose the reasons for the steep worsening of inflation and to work out appropriate deflationary measures.

The British economist Lord Kaldor writes:

Nothing of this kind has ever occurred before in peacetime-I mean an inflation of that magnitude encompassing not just one or two countries, but all the leading industrial countries of the world. The other unique feature of this inflation was that it was accompanied by a marked recession in industrial production...

This combination of inflation and economic recession is a new phenomenon, the explanation of which presents an intellectual challenge to economists.^^2^^

Stagflation has revealed the deep reciprocal conditionality of the process of continuing price rises and deterioration of the general conditions of reproduction. There is an aggravation of capitalist contradictions through the stagflation processes, while social tensions are

~^^1^^ See Thomas F. Cargjll. Op. cit., p 495.

~^^2^^ Nicholas Kaldor. Further Essays on Economic Theory (Duckworth, London, 1978), p 215.

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. I, pp 123-124.

50 51

getting worse, and (in the view of Western economists themselves) there is a growing threat to the existence of capitalist society. As Fred Hirsch and John Goldthorpe have remarked:

In the past decade, the problem of inflation has escalated from a continuing irritant to a blight on the stability and efficient performance of the leading economies and to a potential threat to the preservation of democratic societies.^^1^^

Some economists consider the problem insoluble. The American Robert Solow, for example, says:

I do not, however, have an alternative solution to offer. Indeed, I rather doubt that there is a Solution.^^2^^

The growth of inflationary processes, and the incapacity of Western governments to contain inflation are leading to a quest for new theoretical conceptions in order to work out measures adapted to the changing economic circumstances.

There is a host of theories of inflation in Western economic science, the best known of which are the monetarist, Keynesian, and Neokeynesian conceptions; `social' interpretations of inflation have also become common.

The monetarist conception of inflation has become increasingly popular of late among both economists and politicians. The Thatcher Government in Great Britain employed monetarist recipes in its inflation-containing policy, while monetarist recommendations underlay the economic programme of the Reagan Administration in the USA.

Monetarists consider the capitalist system internally stable, in equilibrium, and tending to a `natural' level of employment over a lengthy period of time. All phenomena connected with disturbance of this stability, in their view, are caused by exogenous factors, inflation, in particular, arising from disturbances of the mechanism of money circulation. The chief American monetarist, Milton Friedman, says:

Inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, produced by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.3 Monetarists suggest that short-term price changes can be caused by various factors, while long-term ones are generated only by an excessive injection of money into circulation. Allan Meltzer, a leading monetarist, stresses that inflation depends on the `maintained', or long-term, growth rate of money.^^4^^ He analysed price changes and the

amount of money in the 70s in the leading capitalist countries, and found that inflation was marked by high rates in countries with high rates of expansion of money, from which he concluded that

the average rate of inflation will be governed mainly by the average growth of money, just as it has been here and elsewhere in the past. * Growth of money leads to an increase of its supply over demand. Subsequently inflation develops in connection with a change in the amount of money and the public's demand for it.

Changes in the amount of money the public chooses to hold-changes in the demand for money-may cause prices to rise faster or slower than the difference between the growth rates of money and output.2 Certain supporters of monetarism admit the indirect influence of other factors, as well, on the development of inflation, presenting them as a transmission link in the chain of inflation. Phillip Cagan, a pupil and follower of Friedman, suggests in particular that such factors as trade unions and inflexible prices play an essential role in the development of the initial inflationary impulse, saying:

labor unions do not initiate inflation,... but they exacerbate the problem by perpetuating inflation once it gets started.3 He says further:

inflexible prices do not initiate inflation; but they play a crucial role in transmitting it and in delaying the success of policies to curb it.4 In the models of the `hard-line' monetarists (Milton Friedman, Allan Meltzer, Harry Johnson, and others) growth of money is generated in the USA by the monetary and fiscal policy of the Administration and the Federal Reserve System. The `soft'monetarists ( Friedrich Hayek, Gottfried Haberler, arid others), however, consider that the Administration has resorted to expansion of money under the pressure of the trade unions, which they allege to be trying to raise general wage levels and forcing the government to expand money supply in order to counter the growth of unemployment consequent on excessive wage increases. The spokesmen of monetarism have pushed the idea of 'accelerated inflation', or a continuing speeding up of the rate of inflation, which is linked with their idea of the existence of a firmly established `natural' rate of unemployment under capitalism. At the `natural' rate of unemployment the economy is in equilibrium and no market forces exert pressure on the price level. Given higher demand, which happens in their view when unemployment falls below the `natural' level, inflation accelerates. The mechanism of the development of accelerated rates is presented as follows. A monetary and fiscal policy is followed to raise aggregate demand and reduce unemployment. Firms begin gradually to raise prices, while workers,

~^^1^^ Fred Hirsch and John Goldthorpe (Eds.). Prologue. The Political Economy of Inflation (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p 1.

^ R.M. Solow. The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to Inflation. In R. C. Puth (Ed.). Current Issues in the American Economy. 1980-1981 (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1980), p 77.

3 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman. Free to Choose:A Personal Statement (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1980), p 264.

~^^4^^ See Allan H. Meltzer. Money Growth and Inflation. In R.C. Puth (Ed ) Op. cit., p 94.

52

1 Ibid., p 95.

^^2^^ Ibid., p94.

~^^3^^ Phillip Cagan. Persistent Inflation. Historical and Policy Essays ( Columbia U.P., New York, 1979), p 26

~^^4^^Ibid., p 29.

53

after a certain time lag (usually on expiry of a former collective agreement or contract and the concluding of a new one), demand increased wages to allow for expected price rises or anticipated inflation. The acceleration of inflation is determined by the time lags 'brought about by the influence of expectations derived from past experience'.^^1^^

In the 70s the monetarist conception of 'rational expectations' developed by Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace,^^2^^ became quite common. Its supporters link the movement of prices with all the information available rather than with past experience. Accordingly, the individuals involved in business transactions, and firms, when taking economic decisions, rationally select information, a^^5^^" crucial element in which is estimates of the state of the economy and monetary and fiscal policy. Phelps and Taylor put it as follows:

The information-based reconstruction of employment and inflation theory ... led to the conclusion that... prices and wages adjust... to changes in perceptions and estimates of the current state of the economy.^^3^^

According to the theory of 'rational expectations', the effect of changes in the quantity of money on production, unemployment, and inflation depends on information about these changes. By utilising this information the economic agents of capitalist production can reduce stabilising policy to nought. This policy therefore has to be introduced suddenly, in monetarists' view, without publicity.

An expansionist monetary and credit policy cannot, in the long term, introduce essential changes in the level of unemployment and output. Its sole result is inflation. The monetarists therefore oppose price control. Friedman says:

Don't try to suppress the manifestations by price control, by rigid exchange rates, or by other methods of a similar nature. These measures do not eliminate the basic source of inflation.^^4^^

They see the way to successful curbing of inflation in pursuing a stabilising policy that would limit increase in the amount of money to constant rates, allowing for changes in the velocity of circulation. Fiscal policy should be aimed at balancing the budget; government expenditure should be covered by tax income. The monetarists advocate reduction of the government's economic functions, contrac-

tion of the public sector of the economy, and a lowering of the proportion of the budget in the gross national product by cutting expenditure on social needs.

The monetarist conception of inflation springs from the interaction of commodities and money in the circulation process. It wholly ignores the production processes in which the foundations of value relations are laid, relations realised through money in the price of commodities. It also ignores factors that are rooted in the sphere of the social reproduction, distribution and redistribution of national income. Monetarists do not take account of such a crucial factor as monopoly price formation. Friedman, for example, writes:

What produces the inflation is not trade unions, nor monopolistic employers, but what happens to the quantity of money. Anything else that affects the quantity of money will have the same effect.' Monopoly price formation is characterised by the big monopolies' creation of a system of more or less uniform prices for similar output. For that purpose the practice of 'price leadership' is employed, aimed at providing stable profits for all the major monopolistic companies of an industry. Support of high, stable rates of profit, and sometimes even an increase with growth of production costs, leads to a raising of the general price level. In many cases monopolies resort to secret agreements to keep up prices. A 'special US Congress hearing on the practice of monopoly price formation exposed monopoly associations' deliberate raising of prices, which made for an intensification of inflation.^^2^^

The bankruptcy of monetarist theory has been shown in practice in Great Britain, where the rate of inflation is still running high. Western economists, however, in particular James Lothian, thought the monetarist policy of Mrs. Thatcher's Government had a positive result over a certain period, and that the high British rates of inflation in 1979-80 were a consequence of the policy of the preceding Labour Government.^^3^^

The postwar development of the capitalist economy has shown that the rise of commodity prices took place when there was a critical overaccumulation of capital and considerable unemployment. The bankruptcy of the Keynesian theory of inflation,based on the movement of aggregate money demand and general use of production resources, has been even more marked. Attempts to explain the steady growth of prices with a high level of unemployment and a simultaneous fall in production from a Keynesian position gave rise to theo-

1 David E. Laidler. Essays on Money and Inflation (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975), p 139.

~^^2^^ See Robert E. Lucas. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 4, April 1972, pp 102-124; Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace. Rational Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, April 1975, pp 241-254.

~^^3^^ Edmund S. Phelps and John B. Taylor. Stabilizing Powers of Monetary Policy under Rational Expectations. Journal of Political Economy, 1977, 85, 1: 163.

~^^4^^ Milton Friedman. Inflation. Causes and Consequences (Asia Publishing House, New York, 1963), p 38.

~^^1^^ Milton Friedman. Unemployment versus Inflation? (The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1975), p 33.

~^^2^^ See Hearings on Administered Prices Part 9, Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Washington, 1959.

^^3^^ See James R. Lothian. Britain's Economy Lesson for the United States: To Lower Inflation, Cut Monetary Growth. Money Manager, 1981, 10,11:5-6.

54 55

ries of 'demand-pull inflation' and 'cost-push inflation'. `Demand-pull' was imputed to an increase in aggregate demand in relation to available goods and services. 'One major cause of inflation,' Baumol and Blinder write, 'though not the only one, is excessive aggregate demand.'l Many economists, it must be noted, consider demand-pull inflation as the most dangerous, because with an increase in output there is a rise in expenditure. While increase of output, moreover, is limited by the resources available and the technology employed, there is no such limitation on outlays. With a continued rise in demand there is inevitably a rise of prices.

Economists often link the raising of aggregate demand with growth of the public sector. The British economists Alan Peacock and Martin Ricketts, for example, say that a common view of the cause of inflation is the idea that it is rooted in excessive expenditure by the public sector. Since difficulties also arise in financing public expenditure there is also

the fear that covering such spending by non-inflationary borrowing will raise interest rates and discourage private investment, and that governments will 'take the easy way out through recourse to note-printing'.^^2^^ These economists, however, do not focus attention on what is and remains the main source of the swelling of the budget, viz., military spending, which rose particularly in the mid-70s in connection with expansion of the arms race. NATO countries took on obligations to increase military expenditure by 3 per cent annually, allowing for inflation.

The advocates of 'cost-push inflation' trace the rise of prices to growth of production costs. The Wonnacotts, for example, write:

Cost-push inflation occurs when wages and other costs rise and these costs are passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. Prices are 'pushed up' by rising costs.^^3^^

Western economists often blame trade unions for the inflationary growth of prices, claiming that they have a monopoly market power and that their demands for wage increases cause a rise in costs and correspondingly of prices. In this interpretation the movement of prices is not governed by objective economic laws but by the monopoly power of trade unions, while the true culprit of the impetuous jacking up of prices-capitalist monopolies and Western countries' arms race policy---is ignored. It is also wholly incorrect to identify wages and other costs. While constant capital passes its value to the product, wages form only part of the newly created value. The worker advances labour power to the capitalists and receives wages only after the value created has been realised.

The workers of capitalist countries manage, through bitter struggle, to win a certain increase in wages, but it does not exceed the growth of productivity, on which Western economists insist. The cost of living in capitalist countries outstrips productivity. The rise of money wages has to outstrip the rise of prices considerably in order to raise real wages. The rise of money wage rates is eroded by inflation. Even when inflation is anticipated money wage rates are only regulated with a time lag in relation to the rise of prices. In the 70s real wages fell as a result of the considerable rise of prices; the rise of wage outlays in the unit cost of output also fell substantially in the late 70s and the early 80s, which is all evidence of the bankruptcy of the thesis that wages are the 'triggering factor' in inflation.

Some economists suggest that external factors play a significant role in increasing production cost and, correspondingly, in the inflationary rise of prices. 'One cost-push culprit stood out in the mid1970s,' the Wonnacotts write: 'the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).'l Such views reflect the striving of the ruling circles of the industrial countries of the West to foist the blame for the accelerated growth of prices onto the developing countries that are suppliers of primary products. It would be wrong to deny the influence of external factors on domestic prices. Since the mid-70s there has been an increased `import' of inflation which has been intensified because of the rise of world prices for primary products, farm produce, and energy sources, but it is not the developing countries, which also suffer from inflation depreciating their currency receipts, that are to blame for this.

Supporters of the Neokeynesian approach have developed different variants of incomes policy in the fight against inflation. Experience has shown that the versions that used to be employed ( wageprice guideposts; wage-price controls; wage freezes) did not yield palpable results; so that steps were taken to work out new version's. Great attention has been paid in recent years to the new form of incomes policy developed by Weintraub, Wallich,^^2^^ and Okun,3 which amounts to a lowering of taxes on firms that keep wage rises within the guidelines established for a country, and a raising of taxes on firms that break the established standards. There are already several versions of this type of policy, but none have yet been tried out in practice.

Some Western economists see the road to a solution of the inflation problem in `indexing', i.e. in establishing definite annual indices of wages, pensions, and other fixed income. Economists of the Keynesian trend think that 'a moderately inflationary trend of aggre-

~^^1^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. dr., p 276.

~^^2^^ See Henry C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub. A Tax-Based Incomes Policy. Journal of Economic Issues, 1971,5:1-19.

~^^3^^ See Arthur M. Okun. The Great Stagflation Swamp. The Brookings Bulletin, 1979,54:1-7.

57

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 275.

~^^2^^ A. Peacock and M. Ricketts. The Growth of the Public Sector and Inflation. In F. Hirsch and J. Goldthorpe (Eds.). Op. cit., p 118.

3 P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. cit., p 275.

56

gate demand (involving, say, 1 or 2 per cent inflation) can contribute to a high rate of employment.^^1^^ So they propose a programme of government job provision for those who cannot find work in the private sector, but such a programme gives rise to doubts. The Wonnacotts, in particular, consider it would raise production costs and contribute to developing inflation and also 'might weaken incentives to work in the private sector'.^^2^^

In the 1970s `social' conceptions of inflation became common. Their authors tried to explain it by social rather than economic factors. The English economist Peter Wiles considered attempts to explain the growth of the general price level by economic causes to be mistaken in principle. He associated growth of prices with control of wages. Control of wages in turn was governed by the subjective state of 'trade union mood' and 'trade union jealousy'.^^3^^ In his view the price level depends on

what numbers the trade union leaders pick out of the air when they

make wage claims.4 Another British economist, Andrew Tylecote, thinks that

we must look deeper and wider than a few superficial, economic variables like the rate of unemployment or the supply of money. When we do, we begin to find answers to the most important and mysterious questions about inflation.^^5^^

In his view price rises are generated by wage increases. The essence of wages springs from social rather than economic factors. It would be absurd, he argues, to think that a worker sells labour and receives a wage for it. He receives a wage as a result of the balance of bargaining power between trade unions and managements. The raising or cutting of wages depends on which way the balance tips, and that depends on 'concessions costs and resistance costs'.^^6^^ Corporation managements, he suggests, are obliged to make concessions to trade unions because a cut in wages would lead to a fall in productivity, a rise of absenteeism, hiring difficulties, and so on. The main culprit, he concludes, is the trade unions; consequently it is necessary to wage a relentless struggle against them. 'It seems clear,' he writes,

that anything which tended to increase racialism, and so set workers against one another, would weaken the unions, and tend to reduce inflation. (So the National Front in Britain, the NDP in Germany and Ku Klux Klan in the United States, can proudly call themselves anti-

inflationary organisations, the consumer's friends.) I daresay one pogrom would do more for price stability than a dozen Price Commissions.1 Tylecote's ideas, which are frankly reactionary, reflect the interests of monopoly capital, which is driving to exploit the most ultra-right political forces of modern capitalist society, bordering on neofascism, to fight the labour movement.

John Goldthorpe also tries to explain inflation by social rather than economic factors. He thinks that economists, by treating inflation as a monetary phenomenon, focus attention on the technical aspect, but should treat it as a special manifestation of the 'social division' and 'social conflicts'.

The current inflation is grounded in changes in the form of their [societies'-v4«f/i. ] stratification-in other words, in their structures of social advantage and power.^^2^^

These changes, in turn, are due to the interaction of social forces causing the stratification of society. Since social strata have become freer in their actions in recent years, he thinks, the social conflict between them has been greatly intensified. In Great Britain there are, in his view, three stratified forces; the workers and persons living on wages and claiming an increase in them represent one stratum, whose interaction with the other two leads to a rise in prices. He therefore concludes that inflation has

the advantage of tending to diffuse the efforts of organized labour: a wages `free-for-all' encourages sectionalism rather than solidarity.3 Inflation is thus directly and frankly depicted, in Goldthorpe's conceptions, as good for monopoly capital because it encourages dissociation of the working class and a weakening of it« resistance to the diktat of the capitalist class.

All theories claiming to explain inflation by social factors link up with cost-push theories, because their authors see the source of price rises in a growth of wages caused by the subjective claims of trade unions. These theories have a clearly expressed class character, and their authors unanimously lay the blame for the development of inflation on unions and the working class.

The sterility of Western economists' and politicians' attempts to check inflationary price rises is evidence that the underlying inner causes of this process are grounded in the structure of the modern capitalist economy and are not reflected in a single non-Marxian theory because of their apologetic, class character.

~^^1^^ See P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. cit., p 286. *~^^2^^ Ibid., p 292.

~^^3^^ Peter Wiles. Cost Inflation and the State of Economic Theory. Economic Journal, 1973, 83, 330:392.

~^^4^^ Ibid.

~^^5^^ Andrew Tylecote. The Causes of the Present Inflation. An Interdisciplinary Explanation of Inflation in Britain, Germany and the United States (The Macmillan Press, London, 1981), p 189.

~^^6^^Ibid., p 16.

58

llbid.,pm.

^^2^^ John H. Goldthorpe. The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account. In F. Hirsch and J. Goldthorpe (Eds.). Op. cit., p 196. d., p 208.

DEFINITIONS OF CAPITAL AND SURPLUS VALUE

with free funds, while explaining its self-growth by J.B. Say's vulgar, apologetic theory of `productivity' and Senior's `abstinence', declaring that 'the accumulation of wealth is generally the result of a postponement of enjoyment or of a wafting.for it'.^^1^^

Most Western economists today base their definitions of capital on a conception that is an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Marshall and Bohm-Bawerk. In accordance with Marshall's views it is treated as the aggregate of things needed for production, as

elaborate machinery, large-scale factories and plants, stores and stocks of finished and unfinished materials,^^2^^

as the means of production 'that the economy has accumulated as a result of its productive efforts'^^3^^; as the man-made instruments of production'.^^4^^ The main fault of such definitions is that they mask the class content of capital and the antagonism between it and wage labour. To reduce capital to an aggregate of things, to means of production, is to adopt a fetishistic stand. No things, means of production included, are in themselves capital. They become the material embodiment of capital only within the context of capitalist relations of production. Capital is a historical category which arises where there is exploitation of the hired labour of workers, and which disappears together with abolition of exploitation of man by man. Non-Marxian definitions of capital have a class sense, namely to perpetuate the capitalist system. At the same time this interpretation is exploited today to mask the radical differences between the capitalist and communist systems.

'Productive service' is drawn by Western economists from the concept of Vaiting' and Bohm-Bawerk's idea of the influence of the length of the production period on the self-growth of capital. Samuelson, for example, considers that the deepening of the social division of labour connected with growth of the production of intermediate products-raw materials, semi-manufactures-leads to an increase in the length of the production period and is dictated by the subjective willingness of income-receivers to sacrifice their current interests in order to Vait' for future ones, which provides the allegedly independent productivity of capital.s In fact, capital has no independent productive power; it is only the productive power of labour that it disposes of. And however its role in the process of social reproduction is defined, its nature consists primarily in its being a certain class' monopoly of the means of production, namely the

1. Non-Marxian definitions of capital

The Marxian theory of capital discloses the inner nature of capitalist relations of production, and demonstrates the historical character of the capitalist mode of production. As Marx himself stressed:

capital presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital...

capital and wage labour are two sides of one and the same relation.' Capital expresses the relations of production between the two antagonistic classes of capitalist society, i.e. the capitalists and wage labourers, and so is a historically transient category.

The apologists of capitalism take an opposite stand, and see in capital an eternal category. At the turn of the century there were two lines in economic literature on the problem of its essence, headed respectively by Eugen Bohm-Bawerk and Alfred Marshall. BohmBawerk tried to create a 'positive theory of capital' without socioeconomic content. He looked upon capital as the aggregate of means of production created by man and nature, and explained its selfgrowth by subjective-psychological and technological factors. In the first factors he included the following properties of human psychology: (1) always to hope for a better future and so to value future goods less than present ones; (2) systematically to underestimate future needs, since they are not so urgently felt as existing ones. As a technological factor he put forward the `roundabout' method of production, which he linked with the use of means of production, division of labour, and lengthening of the time taken to produce the end product. The longer the roundaboutness of production, the bigger was the end product and its value; and the shorter it was, the smaller the end product's value.

Marshall defined capital as the things that formed the prerequisites of production. Demand for capital he derived from the production services that capital could render. The supply of capital he linked

~^^1^^ Alfred Marshall. Principles of Economics. 6th ed. (Macmillan & Co., London, 1910), p 233.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973), pp 49-50.

3 Daniel Fusfeld. Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1972), p 715.

~^^4^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Economics, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Reading, Mass., 1976), p 21.

5 See Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., pp 50-51.

61

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Wage Labour and Capital (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978),

p31.

60

capitalist class, which receives unearned income in this way through the exploitation of wage labour. The social division of labour under capitalism, too, is not the result of capitalists' subjective aspirations, sacrificing their current needs, but a consequence of the interaction of a host of objective factors stemming from the level of development of the productive forces reached.

Time conceptions of the grounds for capital's self-growth, taken from Bohm-Bawerk, are common in Western economic literature. The line of the 'Neoaustrian theory of capital', represented by Hicks (Great Britain), Faber (West Germany), and others, became fashionable. Its spokesmen made a fetish of time as an independent source of the growth of capital. The English economist Christopher Bliss says:

The essential ingredient, it might be argued, is time. All outlays of labour or consumption foregone have a date and the benefits will accrue at different dates. What we must capture in our theory to have it encompass capital is this intertemporal aspect of production and consumption. In this view time is the essence of capital. * Such an interpretation, depicting time as an independent factor of business affairs and the essence of capital, is directly opposed to the Marxian theory of capital and surplus value.

Capital is represented in the interpretation of the modern followers of the Austrian school as a phenomenon outside society, capable of yielding an income by virtue of the `productivity' of time itself and an unequal valuation of present and future goods by individual subjects. Marxist-Leninist political economy does not deny the significance of time in the process of capital's movement, because the production process, in the course of which certain use values are transformed into others, the process of the creation and growth of value, takes place in time. But Marxist-Leninist political economy decidedly rejects any explanation of the self-growth of value either by making a fetish of time or by a subjective-psychological evaluation of material goods at various periods of time.;-.

The scientific unsoundness of the various psychological evaluations of present and future goods is very obvious when we examine the form of market relations (the buying and selling of labour power) that is fundamental for the theory of capital. Workers and capitalists are guided by quite different motives in their behaviour from those imputed to them by this theory. Workers cannot compare the utility of the consumer goods purchased by them from their earnings with their expenditure of labour. Work in a capitalist enterprise, both its quantity and quality, is an urgent necessity, an inevitability to which they are resigned so that they can exist. After sale of their labour power to the capitalist they completely lose control over the output

produced by them. Furthermore, they are deprived of the chance to take part in fixing the value of the enterprise's output. Hence the thesis that the individual worker can determine his share in the value of the product, which includes the value of the various means of production, materials, and labour power of others involved in the labour process, is unsound by virtue of the above objective reasons. The subjective evaluation of the difference between present and future consumer goods also does not trouble the capitalist much. He is more interested in the money form of capital and output than in their natural forms, and he wants, moreover, to obtain a greater amount of money now than in the future, because ready cash gives him the chance to obtain an even greater amount of money in the future, through the appropriation of unpaid labour.

The conception of 'human capital', which has become quite common today with the current scientific and industrial revolution, is closely linked with Western ideas of capital. It has come to the fore because of the need to tackle several problems associated with the creation of qualitatively new labour power. By 'human capital' is meant the knowledge, skills, and capacities of a person that raise his productive power. A propos of this the American economist Schultz writes:

It is a form of capital because it is the source of future earning, or of future satisfactions, or of both of-them. It is human because it is an integral part of man.^^1^^

Western authors class the main forms of investment in man as education, production training, medical services, migration, the search for information about prices and incomes, and the birth and raising of children. Education and production training they consider to be means of raising man's level of knowledge, which leads to growth of the volume of human capital. Concern for health, and a lowering of morbidity and mortality, increase the length of man's service. Migration and the quest for information create conditions for the transfer of labour power to industries where work is higher paid, i.e. raise the price for the services of human capital. The birth and raising of children create human capital for the next generation.

These factors of investment in human capital are nothing other than separate aspects of the process of reproducing labour power. Yet, this classification suffers from a number of drawbacks. (1) It does not allow for the fact that the value of labour power depends on many other factors, above all on the value of the worker's means of existence needed 'to maintain him in his normal state as a labouring individual'.^^2^^ (2) It does not allow for the point that most of the

~^^1^^ Theodore W. Schultz. Human Capital: Policy Issues and Research Opportunities. In Human Resources (National Bureau of Economic Research Columbia U.P., New York, 1972), p 5.

~^^2^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. I. Translated by S. Moore and E. Aveling and edited by F. Engels (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 168.

63

~^^1^^ Christopher John Bliss. Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income (North Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1975), p 4.

62

factors adduced belong to stages of the reproduction of labour power of a different order and do not affect its value and price in the same way. Education and health care, for example, are long-term factors. Qualitatively new labour power is created by the effect of education; its qualifications and skill are raised, and also its capacity to perform more complicated work. Health protection increases the intensity and length of the worker's labour. These factors are separate moments in the reproduction of labour power and increase its value and price. In contrast to them, migration and the quest for information are short-term factors that reflect fluctuations of the price of labour power around its value, and are processes of a distributive order.

Western economists try to identify the forming of labour power (human capital) and the forming of the material means of production (physical capital). The Wonnacotts, for instance, write in their textbook:

This human capital has two of the important characteristics of physical capital... During the training period, waiting is involved; the individual cannot directly produce consumer goods or services while occupied in learning. Second, human capital, like physical capital, can increase the productive capacity of the economy, since a trained worker can produce more than an untrained one. * Such a definition, however, does not allow for the fact that the economic and social nature of physical and human capital have a difference in principle, which is that human capital (labour power) creates value, while physical capital (means of production) transfers it. And while the former is the object of exploitation, the latter is the instrument of it.

The concept 'human capital' is employed in modern capitalist economics as a substantiation of the eternity of the capitalist mode of production and a justification of capitalist exploitation. The Swedish economist Assar Lindbeck, for instance, writes that

the return on human capital today is already more, important as an explanation for inequalities in income in the United States than the return on physical and financial capital.^^2^^

From that he draws two crucial conclusions for the defence of capital. (1) People's inequality in modern developed capitalist countries is due to the very uneven distribution of human capital rather than to the fact that most of them receive only wages and a minority rent, interest, and profit. (2) Nationalisation of physical and financial capital does not lead to essential changes in the distribution of income, wealth, and power, since that is now determined by the distribution of human capital. Such a formal approach to identifying human capi-

tal and physical capital leaves this decisive fact aside from which it follows that ownership of the means of production is not simply ownership of a certain quantity of capital goods. The economic dominance of the owners of capital over those who have none, and the subordination of one class to another, i.e. the relationship of exploitation, are ignored. In contrast to ownership of means of production, possession of skills and qualifications, a certain sum of knowledge, and ability is not linked with the exploitation of others' hired labour. The idea of man's capacity as capital distorts the inner nature of the capitalist mode of production.

2. The interpretation of capitalist exploitation

The capitalist class' apologists have been trying for ages to prove that exploitation does not exist under capitalism. J.B. Say asserted that workers were not subjected to exploitation; they could not claim the whole of the product made because two other factors of production (capital and land) were involved in making it. The postulate of the three factors of production and their functions, which is still propagated in modified form by contemporary Western economists, is based on a number of premises with a quite definite class bias.

(1) The theory of factors of production is illegitimately abstracted from the qualitative difference between the `services' of labour and capital. These differences are, in fact, very substantial. Man's labour serves as the source of material wealth, while wages converted into the means of subsistence needed by the worker are a means of compensating him for the physical and mental energy he expends in the process of capitalist production. The capitalist, the possessor of capital, does not in fact expend any efforts in the production process. He may hand over the function of organising and managing production to hired employees, managers. Hence it is obvious that his income represents payment for a monopoly of private property in the means of production and has a parasitic character. This is very clearly manifested in the epoch of monopoly capitalism when ownership of capital is increasingly separated from capital function. The development of the joint-stock form of ownership and credit has generated an enormous mass of fictitious capital, representing titles to receive an income unconnected directly with real capital.

(2) The theory of factors of production stems from identification of the labour process and the process of creating a commodity value. The transmuted forms of capitalist relations of production create the impression that incomes in capitalist society depend on the role that land (natural conditions), artificial means of production ( capital), and labour play in the simple labour process; and that, Marx remarked,

~^^1^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York 1979), p 23.

~^^2^^ Assar Lindbeck. The Political Economy oj the New Left (Harper & Row New York, 1977), pp 57-58.

64

3---455

65

renders a substantial service to apologetics... The different revenues are derived from quite different sources, one from land, the second from capital and the third from labour. Thus they do not stand in any hostile connection to one another because they have no inner connection whatsoever. If they nevertheless work together in production, then it is a harmonious action, an expression of harmony.l (3) The factors of production theory claims to disclose `eternal', `extrahistorical' patterns of distribution, but in fact the character of distribution in every socio-economic formation is governed by property relations. Apologetic ideas of the 'harmony of interests' of the factors of production (the unsoundness of which Karl Marx disclosed) have proved a 'mother lode' for all subsequent Western economic thought.

At the turn of the century vulgar political economy continued to preach this theory, striving to mask and hide the antagonism between the class of workers and the class of capitalists. The American J.B. Clark, having rather altered Say's `triad', claimed that four factors were constantly involved in production: viz., (1) capital; (2) capital goods, i.e. means of production and land; (3) the activity of the entrepreneur; and (4) the labour of the worker. Each of these factors had its specific productivity, which he deduced from the principle of marginal productivity. Each factor therefore had to be made responsible for a specific share of output: so capital yielded the capitalist interest, and capital goods, rent; entrepreneurial activity provided him with profits, while the worker's labour yielded wages. 'In other words,' he wrote,

free competition tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capitalists what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the coordinating function creates.^^2^^

Consequently there is no exploitation under capitalism, and various classes of people who combine their efforts in production cannot have claims on each other. This theory which has come to be called 'the theory of economic imputation'-revenues are `imputed' to the factors of production---was aimed directly against Marxism. Clark tried to free capitalism from the accusation that it was based on the exploitation of hired labour, and to prove that nothing drove the worker to social revolution. The same ideas were preached by the Austrian economist Friedrich von Wieser, the Swede Knut Wicksell, and the German Werner Sombart.

Contemporary Western economics also builds its argument about the absence of exploitation of wage labour under capitalism on this theory. Samuelson, for instance, declares that, from the standpoint

of marginal productivity, the concept 'exploitation of labour' does not exist, because it would mean to admit that the worker has a claim not only to the share of the product created by labour but also to the share created by the other factors of production. In this regard he writes:

It is naive to think that if a word [i.e. exploitation-Xuffi. 1 exists, there must always then exist some obvious real phenomenon corresponding to it.^^1^^

Western economic thought cannot, however, substantiate the absence of a real phenomenon corresponding to the concept ' exploitation of labour', in spite of the efforts it has been making in this respect for more than a century and a half. It is important to note in this connection that the theory of `imputation' cannot demonstrate the absence of exploitation of hired workers by the capitalist. The successive involvement of additional groups of workers in the production process takes place (as the historical facts indicate) on a progressing technical basis, which leads to a raising of productivity, and not to a lowering of it as the theory of 'marginal productivity' postulates. During historical development the organic composition of capital increases, and consequently the volume of means of production per unit of labour. The value of the volume of capital per unit of the value of labour power must also grow correspondingly, and that in turn means that the volume of output, i.e. the mass of use values produced, must also grdw, because the labour created by the additional group of workers drawn into production will function on a more advanced technical basis, which will undoubtedly increase its productivity. Hence it is clear that the successive drawing of additional groups of workers into the production process on an increasingly progressive technical basis leads to a growth of productivity rather than a fall. It turns out, in fact, that the growth of the mass of use values produced should be `imputed' only to labour in its concrete form. When we examine the way value is created, we discover that only labour in its abstract form is the sole source of newly created value. The means of production (capital in Clark's definition) do not create new value. The worker's concrete labour simply transfers their value to the product made during the production process. The wage worker's labour is also the sole source of surplus value. The workers' wages and the capitalists' profits therefore do not have two independent sources, but a single one, i.e. the value newly created by the workers' labour. Hence the imputation of the 'specific products' of labour and capital that is the main content of the above theory pursues the quite definite class aim of justifying capitalist exploitation.

It is impossible to prove the absence of exploitation of wage labour under capitalism. Western economic thought is forced to admit

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Theories of Surplus-Value, Part III (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 503.

~^^2^^ John Bates Clark. The Distribution of Wealth (Macmillan & Co., London, 1925), p 3.

~^^1^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 543.

66 67

its existence as a special case caused by disturbances of the labour market during competition between buyers and sellers. This idea was first put forward by Mrs. Robinson back in the 1930s. The development of monopsony is taken as an example of such a disturbance of competition on the market.

By monopsony these economists mean a market situation, the opposite of monopoly, i.e. a host of sellers facing one buyer. Solmon considered it to be

most frequently encountered in towns and small cities, where one firm employs most of the available labor force. Workers are faced with the choice of working for the monopsonistic firm at wages lower than those on the fully competitive resource market, or not working at all. Some economists call this 'exploitation of labor'.1 Consequently Western economists think capitalist exploitation of wage labour to be due simply to the fact that the capitalist does not pay the worker at a certain necessary standard. As Solmon puts it: A monopsonistic employer may be able to exploit workers by paying them less than their MRP [marginal revenue product- Auth. ].2 It follows from the concept of `monopsony' that exploitation of labour by capital is not the most characteristic feature of capitalism, expressing the essence of this mode of production, but only a phenomenon, seldom encountered, connected with a certain balance of forces of buyers and sellers on the labour market. The apologia of this interpretation is quite obvious. (1) The capitalist's exploitation of the worker takes place irrespective of whether wages are high or low. (2) The exploitation of wage labour is primarily a phenomenon of production and not of the market, as Western economists try to present it. (3) The deviation of wages above or below the value of labour power (the 'marginal product of labour' in Western terminology) in fact signifies merely a decrease in the degree of exploitation in the first case and an increase in the second. Wages, it should be remembered, have a tendency, as a rule, to deviate below the value of labour power.

The treatment of capital's exploitation of labour as a purely market phenomenon leads to the conclusion that it is possible to abolish exploitation in capitalist society by creating a situation on the labour market that is more favourable for the working class. And from that comes the idea, very popular among ideologists of capitalism and spokesmen of Social Democracy and right-wing trade unions, of the decisive role of trade unions in the fight against capitalist exploitation. The Americans Baumol and Blinder put it as follows: When there is monopsony power on the buying side of the labor market, a minimum wage law or a union might succeed in raising wages

without reducing employment. It might even be able to increase employment.^^1^^

Trade unions, in this view, create a more favourable position for workers on the labour market and so promote the abolition of exploitation of man by man, because equality is then established between the 'marginal product of labour' and the size of wages. By ignoring the principal sphere of class relations, the field of production, and reducing the antagonism between workers and capitalists to an economic struggle over distribution, bourgeois economists thereby substitute theories of 'class collaboration' for the issue of class struggle, and divert the proletariat's attention away from the need to develop concrete ways of transforming society in a revolutionary way.

Spokesmen of 'radical political economy' have a special place in the analysis of capitalist exploitation; declaring themselves continuers oif Marx's ideas, they formally admit the existence of the category of surplus value. But some of them, notably Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre Frank, and Ron Stanfield, modify it into the concept of 'economic surplus'. 'The economic surplus,' Stanfield writes, 'is a derivative of Marx's concept of surplus value.'^^2^^ But it subsequently turns out that the modification of surplus value in this interpretation is so substantial that the concept largely loses its social content. Stanfield, for example, considers that one can only speak of surplus value in respect of capitalism before World War I. Capitalism has so essentially altered its character since then that the place of surplus value has been taken by 'the economic surplus'. He links the change in the character of capitalism with the rise of monopoly competition, the development of powerful trade unions, and the growth of government intervention in the economy. The 'economic surplus' itself he defines as 'the difference between potential output and essential consumption' which includes essential personal consumption, social consumption, and capital consumption.^^3^^ The category of labour power as a commodity whose consumption by the capitalist provides a growth of value, i.e. the production of surplus value, quite disappears here.

The 'economic surplus' includes both productive and non-- productive accumulation, and also some of the current outlays associated with the functioning of the non-productive sphere of the economy. This division of the end product into `consumption' and 'the economic surplus' in fact draws a veil over the exploiter essence of the capitalist mode of production. All the parasitic consumption of the exploiting classes is lumped together under the heading `consumption',

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 531.

~^^2^^ Ron Stanfield. The Economic Surplus and Neo-Marxism (Lexington Books, Toronto, 1973), p 2.

3 Ibid., pp4-5.

69

~^^1^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Op. cit., pp 637-638.

2 Ibid., p 703.

68

while 'the economic surplus' includes the part of workers' incomes that they put aside for a rainy day. That not only shrinks the facts about the scale of the appropriation of others' unpaid labour under modern capitalism but also washes out and masks the antagonism between labour and capital. Replacement of the concept 'surplus value' by 'the economic surplus' leads to the conclusion that all classes of capitalist society, including the working class, allegedly have an interest in growth of 'the economic surplus'. It is no accident that some spokesmen of 'radical political economy' basically counterpose to the capitalist class various petty-bourgeois strata and declassed elements of contemporary capitalist society as a revolutionary force, rather than the working class.

WESTERN VIEWS OF WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT

1. The `productivity' theory of wages

The profound crisis experienced by bourgeois ideology is to be seen in the evolution of theories of wages. The "wages fund' and 'iron law of wages' theories have practically disappeared. At the same time relatively early capitalist theories of wages continue in rather modified form, including the productivity theory that came into being in the nineteenth century and has its roots in Say's theory of factors of production. The relay of preachers of productivity theory was taken up in the twentieth century by members of the neoclassical trend in theories of income distribution. J.B. Clark, the leading one, basing himself on the so-called law of diminishing productivity, tried to demonstrate that, if one of the factors of production was increased while the others remained unaltered, productivity would diminish. If the number of workers in a plant rose, for example, while the means of production remained as before, the productivity of the workers newly taken on would consistently fall. The productivity of the last worker engaged would be minimal and should be considered marginal, and the worker a marginal worker. Thus, in Clark's view, wages are allegedly full payment of the product of labour, but established in accordance with the marginal productivity of the worker in the worst conditions of production. If the level of wages were fixed according to the preceding, `non-marginal' worker, part of the product created by capital would go to the worker as wages and the capitalist would not receive the profit due to him by right. Clark thus considered free competition and the market to be, in the main, a fair' regulator of the shares of the product of the participants in production (wages and profits). The theory of marginal productivity has been popularised today as well; the Wonnacotts, for instance, treat wages in their textbook as the marginal product of labour, by which is meant the additional amount of product received from hiring another worker. The value expression of the marginal product is the marginal productivity of the worker's labour. In their view, given competition,

71

a profit-maximizing firm will hire labor to the point where the marginal productivity of labor equals the wage rate.^^1^^

The same point of view is held by Landreth, who frankly says that 'wages will equal the value of the marginal product of labor in competitive markets'.^^2^^ He thinks that if the price of labour rises, a firm will have to employ fewer workers until the value of the marginal product of a worker is equal to the higher price of labour. In that way, today's non-Marxian economists, like their predecessors, base themselves on the law of diminishing productivity, which they employ as proof that the hiring of extra workers is allegedly as unprofitable for the workers as for the capitalists. The unsoundness of the theory of marginal productivity consists in the following.

(1) Like every non-Marxian theory of wages it starts from the fact that the whole labour of the wage worker is paid for rather than his labour power. From that there allegedly follows a direct dependence between wages and growth of labour productivity. In fact, however, as Marx demonstrated, what is paid for is not the labour of the worker but his labour power. The level of wages is therefore not determined by the growth of productivity, but by the magnitude of the value of labour power. Furthermore, with a growth of labour productivity in industries producing consumer goods the value of labour power is diminished, which creates real opportunities for capitalists to lower or freeze wages at a certain level. This trend is particularly clearly displayed in real wages.

(2) Supporters of the marginal productivity theory consider that there are, as a minimum, two productive factors, identical in character, viz., labour and capital, which create the product and its value. They attribute a capacity to produce value (and that means surplus value too) to capital, by which is meant the means of production. At the same time, we know from Marx's labour theory of value, that new value, and that means surplus value too, is created by the workers' labour, while the means of production do not create value, being a condition for the creation and appropriation of value and surplus value.

(3) However marginal productivity theory is modified or modernised, underlying it is the law of diminishing productivity, which contradicts the actual facts: growth of capital, the contemporary scientific and industrial revolution, differences in workers' skill, and so on. It is absurd to deny this actual reality; and it is impossible to explain why the productivity of each newly employed worker, given this new industrial revolution, is lower than that of the preceding one. And how, of course, are the last worker and the preceding one determined in practice?

~^^1^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979V, p 586.

~^^2^^ Harry Landreth. History of Economic Theory (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1976), p 256.

(4) By affirming that the worker receives the full equivalent of his labour, capitalist economists deny the existence of exploitation of the proletariat under capitalism, and maintain that the relationships between labour and capital have a *non-exploiter' character because each receives his due share of the social product through the distribution of incomes^

Finally, marginal productivity theory has a clearly expressed class character since it follows from it that workers can win wage rises not through class struggle but through growth of productivity and the social product, in which they are alleged to be no less interested than the capitalists. In that way these economists endeavour to prove the existence of common class interests of the proletariat and capitalists.

2. The `social' interpretation of wages

As the proletariat's class struggle has sharpened in capitalist countries, Western economic science has had to find a more flexible treatment of the problems of wages and income distribution. Non-Marxian economists, it is important to note, try as a rule to represent Marx's views on this as `obsolete' and `useless' for analysing modern capitalism. The French economist Jacques Lecaillon, for instance, considers that Marx's explanation of distribution,

based on analysis of the capitalism of 1860, is now denied by the facts.^^1^^

Another French economist, Andre Piettre, repeats this, saying that the gap between the different classes 'is being narrowed' and that the workers' standard of living 'is getting steadily better', and so on.^^2^^ In order to neutralise the influence of Marxism somehow, and at the same time adapt Western economic science to the practice of modern capitalism, attempts have been made to `renovate' old wages theories by focusing attention not so much on economic as on various sociological, psychological, legal, and other social factors involved in forming the public's incomes.

These economists, while claiming to have a `new' interpretation of the wages problem, nevertheless employ the old methodological baggage of the founders of the social theory of wages, who are by right considered to have been Sombart, Veblen, and Schumpeter in the early part of this century. In Russia a social theory of wages was developed at that time by the 'legal Marxist' Tugan-Baranovsky, who also considered that wages were not a category of production.

~^^1^^ Jacques Lecaillon. Repartition. In Grande Larousse encyclopedique, Vol. 9 (Paris, 1964), p 166.

~^^2^^ Andre Piettre. Lcs grands problemes de I'economie contemporaine, Vol. \.Ouva lecapitalisme? (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1976), p 157.

73 72

In the early 1960s the social interpretation of wages was revived in a modified form in the views of contemporary economists of the institutional-sociological (neosocial) trend, notably by JX. Galbraith (USA), Gunnar Myrdal (Sweden), Fra^ois Perroux and Jean Marchal (France), and Erwin Scheele (West Germany). The individual elements of this interpretation are also to be encountered among spokesmen of other trends of Western economics but are given very different forms.

In some capitalist countries the collective bargaining theory of wages, for example, is very popular; it follows from it that the category of wages is determined not by its objective economic content but through negotiation and agreements between workers and entrepreneurs, depending on the 'bargaining power' of the two parties. By 'bargaining power' is meant (according to Bradley)

the ability of the unions to achieve theii goals in bargaining. Bargaining power depends on a number of variables-the organisation of the industry (number of firms, degree of competition among firms, etc.), the elasticity of demand for the labor of union members, the ability of the union and the firm to impose and withstand economic hardship in holding out for a settlement, and the influence of community and political pressure on the firm and the union.^^1^^

It is on social, extra-economic factors (government influence, the balance of power of trade unions and employers' associations, etc.) that the fixing of wage rates for the workers of one trade and equal skill depends, in the view of the advocates of this theory.

By shifting the centre of gravity in the treatment of wages from the economic to the political and social sphere, ideologists like Gruchy, Keiser, Solo, Perroux, and Scheele attach great importance to trade unions and other workers' organisations, ascribing the role of monopolies to them.

Economically, a trade union is a form of monopoly .-When union members formally agree to sell their labor at a common wage, they are, in fact, forming a cartel.^^2^^

It is due to trade unions, these writers say, that workers are converted from the object to the subject of economic affairs, and together with capitalists exert a sizable influence on all economic processes. Milton Friedman, for instance, states:

Labor unions are important political and economic institutions that

significantly affect both public and private actions. This fact raises

serious and difficult problems for economic policy.^^3^^

A similar approach to the role of unions in the distribution of

income can be found in the French economist Raymond Barre, who

~^^1^^ Michael Bradley. Economics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview 111. 1980). pp 330-331.

?Ibid., p 326.

~^^3^^ Milton Friedman. Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions. In The Impact of the Union (New York, 1951), p 204.

74

considers unions a major force capable both of influencing the workers' wage level and regulating every kind of social issue (the hiring of workers, permitting of overtime, settling of disputes with capitalists through negotiation, and so on). Unions, he says, not only lead the workers' economic actions but also exert political pressure, and are political organisations operating in the economic area.l The American Bradley also defines trade unions as 'complex political organisations'.^^2^^

Theorists of the institutional-sociological trend exaggerate the role not only of trade unions but also of capitalist governments, considering the latter an institution capable of creating some sort of special system of income distribution that would provide 'social justice' and make it possible to transform capitalism.

The authors of current versions of the `social' theory of wages attach great importance to the psychological factors that, in their opinion, influence the establishment of wage rates and explain the reasons for socio-economic inequality. In that connection the workers are induced to think it necessary to change their psychological attitude to capitalist production-to work diligently, strictly carry out the management's instructions, be loyal to their employers, not take part in strikes, and so on. Lecaillon, for instance, says that there is an effective means of reducing the existing inequality between people, and that the workers themselves possess it. It follows from his logic that the inequality observable is in fact not so bad, because 'it equally has the character' of a `stimulus'.^^3^^ The stimulus is expressed in this, that anyone who is at the bottom of the ladder of the social hierarchy will strive to climb up it in relation to other people.

The psychological factor-the striving to get on'-forces the worker to work more intensively, which leads (in the economists' view) to growth of the whole economy and consequently to a growth of incomes and an improvement in the worker's position. Lecaillon, for instance, writes:

From the point of view of improvement of the community's wellbeing it is obvious that realisation of a higher growth rate represents a more effective means than an equalitarian redistribution of incomes.^^4^^

There is undoubtedly a link between this socio-psychological approach to wages in capitalist society and the theory of 'human relations' in production and that of the 'humanising of work'. These conceptions are essentially aimed at exploiting the psychological and spiritual potentialities of wage workers on a broader scale in capitalist production, as well as their physical ones. Employers, moreover, attach great importance to an organisation of labour that involves the workers themselves, offering them the opportunity of establishing

~^^1^^ See Raymond Barre. Economic politique. Vol. II (Paris, 1970), pp 91-92.

~^^2^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., p 327.

3 Jacques Lecaillon. L'inegalite des revenus (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1970), P 167.

4 Ibid., p 166.

75

the technological regime of work, of finding the most rational ways of using labour power, of distributing the supplementary money remuneration within the production group by results, and so on.

This practice can, of course, lead to a certain rise in wages in capitalist enterprises, and more job satisfaction, but it benefits the employers even more, since job organisation with involvement of the workers themselves leads to a reduction in labour turnover and absenteeism, and gives a steep rise in productivity and the intensity of work, quality of output, and, in the long run, the capitalists' profit. Quite obviously, ideologists of capitalism manipulate workers' consciousness and direct their behaviour into the service of capital, which gets a most effective means of finding and exploiting man's latent potentialities. An illusion of co-partnership in the management of capitalist production is created among the workers, which deceives them into intensifying their work. The goal of the Immanising of work' 'is not so much to limit exploitation as to find the best means of making it easier to admit it'.^^1^^

The same aim is essentially pursued, as well, by the concept of 'human capital', by which the worker's wage is represented as gross income from investment in human capital and depends on changes in the size and rate of this income, just as the employer's profit is income on his investment in capital. Both the wage-earner and the employer are consequently alleged to rank as capitalists, and the motivation of their investment is the same, namely to obtain an income from invested capital. But in backing the striving of employees to get a general or specialised education, for example, so as to improve their 'professional prospects' and pay both now and in the future, the employer in fact pursues a self-seeking goal, namely to make more profit by exploiting more skilled labour power. He realises his right as owner of the means of production and output produced in mounting profits, while the worker receives a wage, as before, i.e. the market price of his labour power or the capitalist's payment for using it. The unsoundness of modern versions of the social theory of wages is displayed in the following: (1) in an ignoring of the prevailing socio-economic relations under capitalism, a pushing of analysis of psychological, political and legal, and other factors to the foreground, and an exaggerating of their role; (2) in treating the worker as an independent factor of production who is said to be transformed from an object of exploitation into a subject of capitalist society; and so wholly ignoring the fact in thus posing the matter that modern workers, like those of the initial development of capitalism, lack means of production and possess only their labour power, which is the object of purchase and sale on the labour market. Nothing has altered in the economic and social status of the modern worker: as before he is the object of

exploitation and cannot exert any real influence on the course of capitalist society's development other than through class struggle for his rights, since it is primarily capitalist relations of production that are reproduced, and not just material wealth and labour power. (3) The conclusion that wage workers have a monopoly in the form of trade unions that are alleged successfully to oppose the capitalist monopolies, and sometimes exceed them in strength, is quite without foundation. Under capitalism, while workers do have trade unions (though not all belong to them), the latter are not nearly as strong as the monopolies that dictate prices on the labour market and consequently determine the level of wages. Capitalist practice demonstrates this. We know, for example; that a wage indexation is an important means of maintaining the level of wages agreed between trade unions and employers (and sometimes government bodies) in accordance with the movement of the retail price index of consumer goods and services. The workers try to defend themselves against the negative effects of inflation on real wages by this means, but even wage indexation does not compensate for losses due to the rise of retail prices. Trade unions also dojiot have great rights in thp control of hiringjuid_ jliejjt labour .power. When it is remembered that the top people of the trade unions as a rule constitute a 'labour aristocracy', it becomes clear that unions cannot oppose capital as 'all-- powerful monopolies'; their possibilities are limited to their operations not touching private ownership of the means of production in any way, i.e. the basic condition of capitalist exploitation.

The socio-economic theories of wages, like all wage theories, have a class character and mask the essence of capitalist exploitation. By exaggerating the role of unions and government institutions under capitalism, they have the purpose of creating an illusion among workers that it is possible to establish class peace between labour and capital. The thesis of the stimulating effect of income inequality on workers' behaviour primarily serves the interests of employers. While encouraging an aspiration among workers to improve their economic position, capitalists widely employ various methods of exploitation that ruin the workers' labour power on the one hand and promote the extraction of a greater mass of profit on the other. Bourgeois ideologists' calls for a change in workers' psychology toward capitalist production need to be treated as an attempt (a) to divert them from the fight for a radical improvement of their position and (b) to justify increasing exploitation.

3. The 'inflationary spiral' theory

At the end of the 50s economists in the West began to propagandise a theory of inflationary spiral of wages and prices, according to which too rapid a rise of wages, by increasing costs of production, inevita-

77

' Claude Poperen. L'exploitation capitaliste des o.s. et 1'action des Communistes. Cahiers du communisme, 1972, 48, 9:41.

76

bly leads to a rise of prices. Price rises forced wage earners to demand new wage increases, which again caused (in the view of supporters of this theory) a kind of 'defence reaction' of employers and governments to the workers' `pressure', a reaction expressed in the next spiral of prices. And so on.

It should be noted [Marx wrote] that in insisting upon a rise of wages, the labourer would only insist upon getting the increased value of his labour [i.e. labour power-/l«r/i.|, like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of his commodities having increased, tries to get its increased value paid.^^1^^

Bourgeois economists had already found a dependence between wage increases and price rises in the last century and were criticised for it by Marx. Although there is a certain indirect connection between a change of prices and wages, the statement that it is the rise of wages that is the main cause of price increases is erroneous. In this case the economists deliberately confuse cause and effect, because wages only adapt themselves (and with a time lag, moreover) to a rise of prices. Furthermore, a change in wages can occur through a change either in the absolute amount of newly created value (v + m) or in the ratio of its components V and `m'.

To support their mistaken position Western economists advance the thesis that wage increases lead to a lowering of employers' profits and that the latter are therefore forced to raise the prices of their output, which is said to be due to the fact that wage increases outrun growth of productivity and that the bigger the gap in the movement of these indicators, the higher prices will rise. The counter-inflation plan (the Barre Plan), for example, adopted in France in September 1976, envisaged a limited growth of wages and incomes in 1977 within 6.5 per cent. But the rise of prices in 1976-7 held at 10 per cent. It was this `leadership' of prices that secured employers steady profits, because it was identical in principle with an increase in the rate of profit, the dependence here being directly proportional. One must also add that employers have great opportunities to manipulate wholesale, import, and export prices, which enables them to fill up with interest a certain overexpenditure on wages.

A certain increase in outlays on wages does not threaten the amount of profits. Because of this wage increases cannot be the main cause of price rises, as the advocates of the wage-price spiral theory maintain. Marx's conclusion about comparative, relative wages, it should be stressed, still holds,

if the income of the worker [he wrote) increases with the rapid growth of capital, the social gulf that separates the worker from the capitalist increases at the same time, and the power of capital over labour, the dependence of labour on capital, likewise increases at the same time...

Even the most favourable situation for the working class, the most rapid possible growth of capital, however much it may improve the material existence of the worker, does not remove the antagonism between his interests and the interests of the bourgeoisie, the interests of the capitalist. Profit and wages remain as before in inverse proportion. l

The thesis of the above theory, which identifies wages with the other costs of production, whose role in the creation of value is different, is also unsound. The value of raw materials, fuel, etc., for example, is transferred completely to the product created during production, which finds expression in both value and price. The value of labour power, however, in the form of wages, is not transferred to the finished product. During the labour process the worker creates new value, one part of which recompenses the outlays on his wages, while the other part constitutes surplus value. The amount of value created by variable capital is not determined by its value but by the amount of labour put into movement by it. A lowering or raising of the value of variable capital is not reflected in the amount of the newly created value unless the amount of working time and of labour power applied is altered. It only affects the size of the surplus value, which is altered in inverse proportion to the size of the variable capital. Wages, being part of the newly created value, only become a cost of production after distribution of the newly created value. But a change in wages does not affejct the change in the total value of the commodity. It is therefore important to stress that the theory under consideration ignores the category 'newly created value', and does not take the category of profit into account as a factor involved in forming the prices of the finished product, but puts the accent on the category of wages.

Some economists point out that, in addition to the adverse consequences caused by a low level of workers' wages (lowering of consumption and consequently a fall in production in industries producing consumer goods), low wages also lead (in their view) to positive results, especially during an unfavourable economic situation. The low level of wages fixed by employers in conditions, for example, of unemployment, encourages a lowering of production costs and an increase in profits. Because of that, it is argued, the employer can rationalise his production, which leads to an increase in its efficiency and provides employment, which ensures a possibility not only of surviving during a recession but also of better conditions during an expansion.^^2^^ A low level of wages thus finds justification in the views of some economists, since it can allegedly secure a rise in the

Karl Marx. Wage Labour and Capital (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978),

p44. 78

P37.

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Wages, Price and Profit (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976),

~^^2^^ See 1. Le Pas. Dynamisme des structures et croissance economique (Genin, Paris, 1968), pp 79-80.

79

economic activity of capitalist enterprises, and a growth of productivity nationally. It is by such arguments that they try ,to justify monopoly capitalists' policy of attacking the standard of living of the working class, and the policy of wage freeze. The following statement by Lecaillon is typical in this respect:

If we want to stop inflation without affecting growth and full employment, we must in that case act at the stage of the very formation of incomes, and limit wage increases ... which could eventually enable us to modify the distribution of national income in a more just direction.^^1^^

Many economists, however, like Keynes in his day, feel---not without justification-that there is social danger in a direct cutting of wages, because it could lead to the 'blowing up' of the capitalist system itself. Instead they propose making a cut in wages hidden from the workers by means of 'controlled inflation', which would, they think, enable money wages to be raised (blunting the edge of social conflict) but their real content lowered by inflationary price rises, which would simultaneously create favourable conditions for an increase of profits and of production as a whole. These apologists think the capitalist economy would consequently be made ' healthier' at the expense of the mass of the workers. They furthermore cynically declare social `harmony' to be possible between wage-- earners and employers, and `collaboration' within the collective agreements concluded between them. Reformist illusions about a restructuring of capitalist society are thus spread.

of relative overpopulation; Marx noted that it exists in all sorts of nuances. But the Marxian approach to analysing them differs radically from that of capitalism's exponents, who, by concentrating on examining the many forms of unemployment, and the specific causes giving rise to it among different groups of workers, try to hide its socio-economic essence and .radical causes rooted in capitalist relations of production. The job of Marxist political economy, when characterising the concrete manifestations of unemployment, is to bring out their links with the operation of capitalism's economic laws. Western economists usually divide the diverse forms of unemployment into two main groups---one including the unemployment that arises from 'deficiency of effective demand', above all cyclic unemployment, and the other consisting of unemployment not linked with changes in aggregate demand (frictional, structural, technological, etc.).^^1^^

Keynes paid special attention to the unemployment associated with economic crises. In pre-Keynesian theories unemployment had been considered as Voluntary', arising either from workers' unwillingness to work for a given wage or as a consequence of troubles and disorders on the labour market connected with the subjective characteristics of the workers themselves. With the unprecedented unemployment of the early 30s, Western economics admitted the existence of `involuntary' unemployment, when workers could not find jobs even when they were ready to work for lower wages. The causes of economic crises and `involuntary' unemployment, in Keynes' view, was a lack of demand caused by people's 'propensity to save' and Veakness of the inducement to invest'/ Capitalism could attain 'full employment', i.e. retain only Voluntary' unemployment, by increasing demand and a growth of investment.

The Keynesian theory presented both the mechanism of the origin of crises itself and the factors directly influencing the level of employment and unemployment in a false light. In explaining their existence by 'insufficiency of effective demand', Keynes sought their source in circulation rather than production. By linking lack of effective demand with the 'propensity to save' and 'insufficient inducements to invest', he explained the phenomena of capitalism by psychological factors rather than by the operation of economic laws.

The Marxian analysis of the economic Jaws of capitalism, confi^rmed Jjy:pjactice; TridMtes" IhaTl Telai^^reluTof "workers is an inevitable result of the capitalist mode of production, and inherent ifi iTjcTurlhg..revivals and booms as well as"duririg crises and depres1 sions^ An increase of investment and expansion of production (which

~^^1^^ See Unemployment: Terminology, Measurement, and Analysis. Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961), p 11.

~^^2^^ See John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan & Co., London, 1936), pp 15', 26, 31.

81

4. Present-day Western ideas about unemployment

Western economics investigates unemployment in two aspects. On the one hand it has the job of explaining the causes of the immense growth of unemployment and suggesting practical measures to alleviate it, since the million-strong army of the unemployed presents a danger to the social stability of capitalism. On the other hand it endeavours to remove responsibility for the existence of unemployment from the capitalist system, and transfer it to the workers themselves, to scientific and technical progress, and to structural shifts in the economy.

When Western authors analyse the causes of unemployment they consider only its external manifestations and the concrete factors giving rise to its various forms. A study made by the Sub-committee on Economic Statistics of the US Congress in the early 60s, for example, named around 70 forms of unemployment, each of which had its own special cause. Marxism does not deny the diversity of forms

1 Jacques Lecaillon. IM politique des revcnus. Kspoir ou illusion? ( Editions Cujas, Paris, 1969), p 139.

80

are the main factor in growth of employment, according to Keynes) go hand in hand with an improvement and perfecting of technology (which Keynes abstracted). This finds reflection in a growth of the organic composition of capital, i.e. a relative reduction of outlays on labour power compared with those on means of production. The relative reduction in demand for labour power caused by growth of the organic composition of capital is the main cause of unemployment. Fluctuations in the ratio of the supply and demand of labour power under the impact of the trade cycle thus take place on a background of the relative overpopulation generated by growth of the organic composition of capital. An example of the ousting of living labour by embodied labour is statement in the magazine Canadian Labour that in the period 1956-60 every million dollars of capital invested in industry meant the creation of 95 jobs. In 1971-5 the same amount of capital (in constant prices) created only 66 jobs.1 When, however, the bulk of investment is directed not to an expansion of production but to modernisation and rationalisation, investment 'eats up' jobs.

Marx not only defined the general basis of cyclic unemployment but also showed the place of cyclic fluctuations of employment in the process of capitalist reproduction as a sine qua non of the cyclic development of production.^^2^^ The sequence of the phases of the cycle, in turn, becomes an important factor affecting the level and length of unemployment.

Keynes' followers, who on the whole adopted the principal theses of his theory, varied it in accordance with new conditions. The Neokeynesians have concentrated on the problem of achieving rapid economic growth, hoping thereby to ensure stability of the economy and full employment. Keynes himself assumed stability of prices before 'full employment' was attained, and his model presumed the existence of creeping, `controlled' inflation only with further growth of demand above that point. His followers, however, came up against the problem of accelerating inflation simultaneously with growth of unemployment. In those conditions A.W.H. Phillips' idea (calculated mathematically and depicted graphically as a curve) of the impossibility of a simultaneous achieving of full employment and stable prices, and of the inverse relationship between them, was widely used as a theoretical substantiation of capitalist governments' economic policy. Hence, a choice had to be made between the alternatives of unemployment or inflation. The American economist Bradley Schiller wrote of it as follows:

As long as the curve is an accurate description of economic performance, then full employment and price stability are not attainable at

the same time. Instead, some point on the curve, a distinct compromise between the two goals, must be selected as a policy target. Neokeynesians enthusiastically adopted this idea as the 'missing link' in Keynes' theory. To combat unemployment they suggested stimulating investment by means of the monetary and credit mechanism, although that would cause a rise of prices. If investment were limited by the credit, monetary, and tax levers, unemployment would grow, but in their opinion inflation would be eliminated.

In the 50s and 60s, when the economies of developed capitalist countries had quite stable growth rates, and crises were relatively shallow (which was linked primarily with the objective conditions of the development of capitalism at that time, and in particular with the scientific and industrial revolution), bourgeois ideologists said that a controlling mechanism had been built on Keynesian theory that protected capitalism against deep crises, significant inflation, and mass unemployment.

Developments in the 70s refuted these assertions. In 1974-5 an unusually acute economic crisis broke in the capitalist world accompanied with huge unemployment and runaway inflation. The economies of capitalist countries were extremely unstable in the following years, as well. As some authors admitted:

Unemployment and inflation are grave social ills; both capable, unless resolved, of changing our economic and perhaps political system. Phillips' thesis, considered for many years to be unshakable, proved discredited. Bradley, for example, writes:

The data showed a very loose and unstable relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of inflation, so that even identifying the trade-off is a siicky problem, furthermore, new theoretical and empirical work in the 1970s suggests that there is no trade-off between unemployment and inflation in the long run-only the choice between higher and lower rates of inflation-and that the apparent trade-off in the 1960s had been a short-run phenomenon.^^3^^

The government's regulating policy, too, based on the thesis of the possibility of reducing `involuntary' unemployment by manipulating inflation, and vice versa, suffered fiasco. In their many attempts to modify Phillips' theory in relation to present-day conditions, the Neokeynesians recanted from examining `involuntary' unemployment, and concentrated on fighting inflation, and put forward incomes policy as a means of curbing it, proposing measures ranging from persuasion and voluntary guidelines to mandatory controls of wages,

~^^1^^ Bradley R. Schiller. The Economy (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), p 276.

~^^2^^ Henry C. Wallich. Stabilization Goals: Balancing Inflation and Unemployment. The American Economic Review, 1978, 68, 2:159.

~^^3^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., pp 633-634.

83

~^^1^^ See Technological Change and Jobs. Canadian Labour, 1978, 23, 2:56.

~^^2^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. I. Translated by S. Moore and E. Aveling and edited by F. Engels (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), pp 592-593.

82

prices, rents, profits, and interest income',l but in fact mainly taking the form of a freezing of workers' wages.^^2^^

The bankruptcy of Keynesian conceptions markedly strengthened the position of the neoclassical monetarist trend. Its leading spokesmen, Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps, suggested their own interpretation of the Phillips curve, according to which unemployment reacts only to an *unanticipated' rise of prices. In their view only unanticipated inflation can keep unemployment below its natural rate, determined by the capacity of labour to adapt itself to market conditions.^^3^^ In this interpretation the Phillips curve has a vertical character: constant anticipated inflation does not cause an increase of employment. As Friedman himself admits, however, this model has not justified itself in practice any more than earlier ones because ever-increasing rather than constant unemployment corresponds to galloping inflation. The neoclassicists think government control policy to be the reason for that, since (in their view) it creates chaos in the spontaneous market mechanism, which is capable independently of ensuring stability of the economy. Concentrating on the fight against inflation they criticise the government policy of 'full employment' but in fact do not investigate 'involuntary unemployment', considering that it will disappear as soon as free functioning of the market mechanism is ensured. At the same time, by_orjgosing state ^pciaMejislatiQnJ_the_fbdng of a minimum wage, and jncpme-- fedistrirnTBrig^rogrammeSj and. recoiDmiendtog jbvernrnents to give_ help tft~4h£"mc^rxMi<kjffld better--off sections of the publicfthey endeavour~to sHjfrthe.Jtuiden-ef the difficulties generated by the,capitalist efipjio3ny]S^staMity_onjp_the_shqulders of the workers. "

The `healthy' economic policy proposed by the neoclassicists, however, like the Neokeynesian, is also ineffective since its ideologists are trying to abolish consequences, and not the causes generating them. Qassical theory, moreover^ even Jn, amended---form, does not cajxespondjajhe objectively esj^bMisd.conditioj^ of the develo£mento£ the capitalist m'arlceT^li^wJiich^aatjnQnopolies and the governnj^rit_cj3njimjappar^jjlirnit the operatian-o£-fteej: ompeJtition. Finally, the. .policy of, attacking the workenT^tandardLof living lo^eis_tEe&=p«Khasing4iQWgrjajid e^aTwrbateTcrisis-phenomena in the-economy.

``"""

Western authors, having suffered natural defeat in the fight against `involuntary' unemployment, have concentrated on analysing the forms of unemployment 'not connected with aggregate demand', which are largely Voluntary' in their view. Under the scientific and

~^^1^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., p 656.

~^^2^^ See Felix Burdjalov. State Monopoly Incomes Policy Translated by H. C. Creighton (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978).

~^^3^^ See Milton Friedman. Inflation and Unemployment: The New Dimension in Politics (The Institute of Econpmic Affairs, London, 1977), pp 10,

industrial revolution, which is causing significant changes in the hiring and firing of labour, the `technological' theory that arose back in the first half of the century has become widespread in Western economic literature. It owes its spread today to the fact that it enables the guilt for the increase in unemployment to be laid on scientific and technical advance as such.

Writers affirm that 'technical unemployment is due to the introduction of better methods of production and mechanisation'.^^1^^ But, while recording the fact that the use of machinery causes unemployment they interpret it in an opposite sense. They do not want to admit that machines in themselves are not to blame for the sacking of workers. Edward Kalachek, for instance, says: 'Some unemployment is a natural concomitant of technical progress and free labor markets.'^^2^^ A Macuan_-aaaly«sTJiQW_ej£ex^show^hat the,.inachine,

whfle itself r«ducini_labourtim£and-making work lighter, and increasing the wealth of society, leads- undet capitalism, when the goal of production, Js-to -maximise profit-through intensification of exploitation, to the sacking of some workers, and to a rise in the intensity of the labour of those employed .

By trying to mask the destructive consequences for the workers of the ase of new technology under capitalism, non-Marxian economists claim that the workers displaced by it are drawn into employment in new industries

partly because besides labour-saving technical development there is also capital-saving technical development, and partly because capital formation creates a demand for labour as well.^^3^^

They thus return again to the theory of `compensation' put forward by economists back in the last century. Marx criticised this theory in Capital, and showed that the introduction of machines in industry was accompanied with an increase in the numbers employed in the industries producing them. But they could not absorb all the workers displaced by the machines, since it was only profitable for capitalists to employ technique when it was cheaper than the labour power displaced by it, i.e. that the outlays of labour on the production of machines must be less than the labour saved by them. The demand of the new industries, moreover, could not, to a significant extent, be met by workers displaced from other industries and having other trades and skills.

The increase in the quality requirements of labour and its standards of professional skill, due to technological development, and the change in the industrial structure of employment, slow down the re-

~^^1^^ John A. Perrow. Economics (University Tutorial Press, London, 1975), P465.

~^^2^^ Edward D. Kalachek. Labor Markets and Unemployment (Wadsworth Publishing Co.,Belmont, Cal., 1973), p 77.

~^^3^^ Arnold Heertje and Brian Robinson. Basic Economics (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, London, 1979), p 212.

84 85

employment of workers even when there are vacancies. These objective phenomena have found reflection in the theories of structural and frictional unemployment. Western economics, however, while recording the structural changes in the army of unemployed, cannot provide a scientific analysis of their real, operative causes.

The `frictional' theory is one of the most common ones in the West. Whatever economic school researchers belong to, they make `frictions' on the labour market the most important cause of unemployment, that is to say, obstacles preventing adaptation of the labour force to changes in the character or location of the demand for labour. Bradley puts it thus:

Specific causes of frictional unemployment include geographic or occupational immobility of labor, the time necessary to find new employment, the time required to acquire new skills, and inadequate market information. Because of these frictions, people don't move instantly from one job to another, and during the time between jobs they are frictionally unemployed.^^1^^

Marxian economic science relates these phenomena in the labour market to the floating form of mass unemployment. In the normal course of capitalist production workers are now sacked from mills and factories and again taken on, but the number of jobs on the whole grows in a constantly shrinking proportion to the growth of production; and in today's conditions, furthermore, many industries are expanding without a growth in employment because of rationalisation and modernisation of plant.

Many Western writers use the term 'frictional unemployment' for cases when there are vacancies but workers for some reason cannot fill them. In the 50s and 60s, according to the official statistics, situations occurred in the major capitalist countries, when the number of vacancies was greater than the number of fully unemployed. That contradiction was examined by Marx when he analysed floating overpopulation:

there is a complaint of the want of hands, while at the same time many thousands are out of work, because the division of labour chains them to a particular branch of industry.^^2^^

Structural unemployment, in the view of Western authors, arises from shifts in the economic structure of capitalist countries, and from uneven development of industries and areas. The difference between structural and frictional unemployment i* not very great, since both reflect a 'qualitative disparity of the supply and demand for labour'.^^3^^ The term 'structural unemployment', however, is used when the changes in economic structure have a deeper character. Some authors distinguish between them according to duration: un-

employment that is relatively short-term, i.e. between being sacked and finding a new job, they call `frictional'.

The scale of unemployment depends wholly, in their view, on labour's opportunities to adapt itself to the changing structure of demand for labour resulting from technical progress, which is hampered by the inertia of the labour force itself, and also by shortcomings in the system of education and training and information about vacant jobs.

The same drive to blame the workers themselves for unemployment is reflected in the theory of 'job search unemployment'.1 Workers sometimes, in the view of Western authors, spend too long' looking for work in line with their desires, since they receive unemployment benefit. Lipsey and Steiner put it this way in their textbook:

Unemployment compensation provides needed protection against genuine hardships, but it also induces some people to stay out of work and collect their unemployment benefits for as long as these last. As a means of combating this form of unemployment, they recommend increasing the price of continued search of employment.

A reduction in unemployment benefits, for example, increases the income loss associated with continued search and makes it more likely that individuals will reduce the time they spend in search of employment.^^3^^

Capital's offensive against the workers' gains is justified in that way. Capital strives to reduce to a minimum the proportion of the unpaid labour it has appropriated that is returned to the workers in the form of benefits. At the same time employers use even their concessions as an additional means of pressure. The threat of loss of benefit obliges the worker to agree to any job, whether or not it suits him.

The blame for unemployment is thus put onto the workers themselves, and onto removable organisational defects, but this imperfection of the labour market is deeply rooted in the very essence of capitalist relations of production.

JThe spontaneous, elemental character of the redistribution of labour, bfitwefin-industries, the-narrow specialisation of a considerable part of thejabour forcer-a discriminatory policy in relation to certain categories ofworkws, -dass-^mL property.privileges in the system of education, the unwillingness of private capital to lay out sizable funds on retraining workers, and public bodies' lack of funds are all factors that are irremovable under capitalism and exacerbate the problem of unemployment- -------

~^^1^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., pp 602-603

~^^2^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. 1, p 600.

~^^3^^ See Unemployment: Terminology, Measurement, and Analysis, pp 6-7.

~^^1^^ Michael Bradley. Op. cit., p 603.

2 R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Economics, 5th ed. (Harper & Row New York, 1978), pp 734-735.

3 Ibid., p73S.

86

IDEAS OF PROFIT AND INTEREST

as a surplus on all the capital advanced. The link between variable capital and surplus value is further masked by the former's figuring in costs as wages, with all the labour of the wage workers represented as paid for.

The fetishistic character of profit is due to its being realised surplus value. Since a commodity may be sold at a price above or below its value in accordance with the market situation spontaneously established, the profit and surplus value do not as a rule coincide in an individual undertaking. It therefore seems to the capitalist that

the surplus-value incorporated in a commodity is not realised through its sale, but springs out of the sale itself.l

This form of manifestation of deep relations and dependencies that masks the real source of profit is very handy for the apologists of capitalism, who try in their theories to refute the 'pith and marrow' of the economic theory of Marxism-Leninism, namely the theory of surplus value. The unsoundness of their theories is that they are limited as a rule (i) to a description and classification of surficial phenomena instead of an analysis of deep-lying economic processes and disclosure of their substance, (ii) to making an absolute out of the forms in which economic processes are manifested, and (iii) to analysing them from an idealist or vulgar materialist standpoint. These objective elements apart, which explain the limited nature of the conclusions of theorists who treat profit, it must not be forgotten that their theories have a class character and pursue the aim of disguising the exploiter nature of profit and hiding its true source.

Modern bourgeois theories of profit have developed along the three main lines established in capitalist political economy, i.e. the neoclassical, Keynesian, and institutional-social, which differ in their methodological approaches to study of the phenomena of capitalist reality. The interpretation of profit in neoclassical theories stems from the basic principles of marginalism in respect of individual enterprises and firms. Keynesians put forward conceptions of aggregate profit viewed in the context of macro-economic theories of the distribution of national income. In institutional social theories, which are distinguished by broad use of sociological methods and a technological approach to economic phenomena, profit is treated from the standpoint of extra-economic social factors.

1. The Marxist and non-Marxist approaches to the analysis of profit

The theory of surplus value, and of profit as its transformed form, has a central place in Marxist-Leninist economic theory. The significance of profit as one of the chief categories of the political economy of capitalism is recognised as well by capitalist economists. In Western economics conceptions of profit are treated both from the angle of problems in the analysis of various aspects of the economy and as a component part of general economic theory, since they are linked with issues of the functioning of the capitalist system as a whole. But the fact that most economists share views on the crucial role of profit in economic science and practice is not evidence of unanimity in their interpretation of this category. They have a host of various treatments of profit.

According to Marx's genuinely scientific definition of profit, it is merely a secondary, derivative, converted form of surplus value, the bourgeois form, in which the traces of its origin are obliterated.1 As the 'transformed form of surplus value' profit is the result of capitalists' exploitation of wage workers, whose unpaid labour is its source. Surplus value as such, however, does not show on the surface; it can only manifest itself as profit, and is represented as engendered by all the capital advanced and by all the phases of its movement. Surplus value is created in the immediate process of capitalist production, through the uniting of constant and variable capital. While the difference of their roles is obvious from the angle of the creation of value, the difference between them is wiped out from the standpoint of the turnover of capital; there is an isolation of constant and variable capital as costs of production, and surplus value appears as a surplus over and above costs. Since all the constant capital advanced is involved in the production process, and not just the part that is consumed in the separate production act, surplus value appears

2. Neoclassical theories of profit

The neoclassical theory of profit was born in the last third of the nineteenth century. Being the fullest and most complete theory, it was the historical starting point of all modern ideas of profit, inasmuch as the Keynesian and institutional treatments took shape in

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 38.

89

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie ( Rolientwurfl (Verlag fur Fremdsprachige Literatur, Moscow, 1939), p 489.

88

conflict with it. In the words of the American economist Kenneth Arrow, 'no really cohesive alternative which aspires to the same level of completeness exists' among bourgeois theories of profit.^^1^^ The neoclassicists' theories are built mainly on micro-economic analysis, i.e. studies are made at the level of the separate firm operating on the market for goods and factors of production in conditions of perfect or imperfect competition, and making the maximising of profit the main aim of its operations.

The specific conditions of free-enterprise capitalism were given a very distorted reflection in the neoclassical model of perfect competition free of elements of monopoly and limitations and restrictions of any kind. The mechanism of perfect competition was due, in the view of neoclassicists (Marshall, Stakelberg, Stigler and Robertson), to the establishment of long- or short-term market equilibrium, and the setting in of `harmony' in social production^ since all the needs of the consumers and the producers taking part in the market were satisfied. Economists starting from conditions of perfect competition build models of a maximising of profit in the form of its functional dependence on volume of output, costs of production, prices, demand, and capital investment, and so explain the process of price formation.

Underlying all modern capitalist conceptions of profit is J.B. Clark's guiding principle of marginal productivity. According to his theory incomes are considered the prices of factors of production and are established by the interaction of supply and demand in accordance with marginal productivity. In Western economists' views marginal productivity is reflected purely quantitatively through the ratio of growth of output to growth of each factor taken separately. The distribution of incomes is thus reduced to `imputation' of the value of output to production factors for the services `rendered' by them to production.

The Austrian neoclassicists (Karl Menger and Friedrich von Wieser) treated profit as the remuneration of a special factor, capital; they identified average profit with interest and reduced the latter to the marginal product of capital. The English neoclassicists ( Alfred Marshall and others) treated profit on the basis of the same theory of marginal productivity as the complex of entrepreneurs' income from all factors of production, including payment for their own work, remuneration for risk, interest on the capital advanced by them, and rent for natural resources. This aggregate income of the entrepreneur is called 'normal' profit by Western economists and classed as a cost of production by them.

Economic costs also include what are sometimes described as normal

profits-the profits necessary to induce people to organise and operate a firm.^^1^^

In essence they mean by 'normal profit' what is in actual fact average profit, i.e. the share of the aggregate social surplus value appropriated by each capital in accordance with its proportion in the aggregate social capital, irrespective of its sphere of application. The obtaining of average profit enables the individual capital to realise a normal course of reproduction. Its identification with costs of production masks its substance, i.e. the relation of the exploitation of labour by capital and the common class self-interest of the capitalists in increasing the aggregate surplus value squeezed from the working class as a whole.

The forming of `normal' or `zero' profit takes place (so neoclassicists think) when long-term equilibrium of a firm is established (i.e. supply and demand for its output are balanced) and is connected with elimination of the differences in the conditions of the securing of income by each firm in the industry. The category of `normal' or `zero' profit is treated in unity with the concepts ' opportunity costs' and 'implicit costs', which are sometimes identified.2 'Opportunity costs' are represented as compensation for the sacrifice the capitalist is alleged to make in investing his funds in a certain business and keeping them there for some time, and thereby losing the opportunity to employ the factors of production at his disposal in another area of entrepreneurial activity where they could bring him a bigger return.

The opportunity cost of an input [of any factor of production-y4u//i. ] is the return that it could earn in its best alternative use.3 A capitalist's obtaining of a given return is thus dictated by the need to keep him from withdrawing production resources from the business he started in order to invest in another sphere of production. The opportunity cost of capital is called normal profit. '^^4^^

By 'implicit cost' bringing in an additional return that is not fixed in accounts and registers but is distinguished only in theory is meant the capitalist's remuneration for his personal involvement in the firm's affairs, interest on his own investment in the business' capital, rent of unvalued natural resources that are his private property. 'Implicit costs are the opportunity cost of being in business.'^^5^^

The concept 'average profit' is thus replaced by that of 'normal

~^^1^^ Frederick L. Golladay. Economics (The Benjamin/Cummines Publ Co Menlo Park, Cal., 1978), p 81.

~^^2^^ See Roger Chisholm and Marilu McCarty. Principles of Microeconomics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111., 1978), p 227; Lewis C. Solmon Economics, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Reading, Mass., 1976), p 99.

3 P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979), p 424.

4 Ibid.

~^^5^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Op. cit., p 99.

91

~^^1^^ See Kenneth J. Arrow. Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis. The American Economic Review, 1974, 64,1:1.

90

profit' in the theory of perfect competition. 'Normal profit' is also obtained by all capitalists, but is now represented as remuneration for the services of factors of production that are the private property of the capitalist (his personal work, capital, and natural resources). By reflecting in economic theory the ostensibility that profit arises in circulation as the outcome of all the parts of capital, the supporters of the idea of `zero' profit ascribe surpluses over and above obvious costs to the services of the capitalist. The relationship of exploitation therefore disappears in their theories and the distribution of incomes seems fair. The neoclassical theory of 'perfect competition', being guided by the principles of marginalism, says that, given market equilibrium over a long period, the gross return of every firm in an industry is exactly equal to its full costs (the sum of obvious and implicit costs) and it has no profit.

Neoclassicists deny the significance of ownership of the means of production, and identify big capitalist entrepreneurs and pettycommodity producers. They make an absolute of the fullness of entrepreneurs' knowledge of future costs and prices and the degree of mobility of production resources. While recognising market competition in the short run, they affirm that, given economic equilibrium in the long term, full harmony is realised in society. The acute character of competition to extract the maximum individual profit and its concomitant ruin and death of some entrepreneurs and enrichment of others is thus masked.

By maintaining `barter' conceptions, neoclassicists treat profit as a phenomenon of exchange. Having abstracted the process of production, they are obliged to look for an explanation of the origin of a surplus over and above `obvious' costs (outlays linked with purchase of means of production, hire of labour, payment of interest on borrowed capital, and rent for the use of rented natural resources) in the sphere of circulation, where it is only realised and not produced. They therefore do not manage to reveal the substance of profit. The treatment of profit as compensation or indemnification for the capitalist's `implicit' costs, and remuneration of the entrepreneur for services rendered, can only serve as an argument to justify the capitalist's appropriation of profit, but in no way explains what source this remuneration is derived from. The question of the source of profit (which is labour, creating surplus value) is replaced by the question of capital as the basis for the appropriation of profit (i.e. of the exploiter's private ownership of the means of production).

The idea of `non-zero', pure or economic profit, is a further development of the neoclassical theory. It is analysed within the framework of the model of imperfect competition, i.e. of a departure from the mechanism of the 'perfect market' model. The theory of imperfect competition of the neoclassicists is based on their theory of perfect competition and is an attempt to reflect the phenomena of modern monopoly capitalism in economic theory. In speaking of

92

`non-zero' or pure profit as a surplus over and above `normal' or `zero' profit, the neoclassicists are in fact talking about monopoly superprofit. 'Profit. In economics, return to capital and/or entrepreneurship over and above normal profit.'^^1^^ It arises through the establishing of higher market prices in breach of the conditions of perfect competition and in the appearance of monopoly in the market. As a result the income of a firm under imperfect competition proves to be bigger than the sum of the marginal costs of factors that would be its revenue under perfect competition.

`Non-zero' profit (in this theory) is the result of imperfection of a firm's internal or external equilibrium. The first happens through changes in the balance of factors of production (primarily capital and labour) within a firm; by varying them the entrepreneur chooses the optimum variant of production and thereby gets an increase in his firm's profitability. External equilibrium is disturbed by the imperfection of the market for commodities and factors of production when separate monopolists appear on it, who can get a higher profit than the `normal' one through monopolistic manipulation of market prices, differentiation of output, advertising, and other methods of non-price competition.

The obvious measure of monopoly profit is the excess of actual profits over long-run competitive returns. For an economy in equilibrium, the competitive profit rate is the minimum profit rate compatible with long-run survival, after making appropriate allowances for risk. Monopoly profit is thus the difference between actual profits and profits consistent with this minimum rate.

Western economists do not differentiate between monopoly profit and monopoly superprofit, exclude the average profit got by all capitalists from the former, so reducing the scale of monopoly returns, do not bring out the essence of monopoly profit as a whole and of profit in general, and do not demonstrate its source. In characterising profit under imperfect competition, neoclassicists link its rise with the manifestations of monopoly solely in the market, reducing the whole significance of that to a firm's opportunity to influence market prices. The degree to which the monopoly price exceeds marginal costs, and consequently the size of monopoly profit as well, depends (in Western economists' thinking ) on how far a firm controls the supply and price of a certain commodity, and on the obstacles to entering an industry in the form of differentiation of product, use of advertising, patents, and other methods of non-price competition.

Monopoly profits, then, are similar to a rent because they represent a return on the firm's unique position ... in the industry rather than

~^^1^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. cit., p 731.

~^^2^^ Keith Cowling and Dennis Mueller. The Social Costs of Monopoly Power Economic Journal, 1978, 88, 352: 730.

93

compensation for cost. If pure economic profit were taxed away, the firm would not be forced to shut down, since it would still be compensated for its opportunity costs.^^1^^

Depending on the nature of the factor that blocks entry of other firms into the industry and breaking of the monopoly, monopoly profit may take the character of

rent on a government license that is granted to one firm (or a few) and that blocks out other potential competitors. Or, it may be rent on a patented product that other firms cannot copy.2 A firm's monopoly profit may also come from the fact that 'it can price its product... higher than under perfect competition, since it makes a differentiated product'.^^3^^

The theorists of imperfect competition, by explaining the origin of `non-zero' profit by a firm's imperfect equilibrium, mask the content of profit by elements influencing the degree of a capitalist enterprise's earning power, i.e. substitute the matter of the causes affecting the rate of profit and concrete size of the mass of profit for that of the origin of profit. They ignore the manifestations of monopoly in the realm of production, although the possibility of controlling price and occupying a leading place in the market is provided precisely by domination of that sphere and depends on how far production and capital have been concentrated and monopolised. The huge scale of monopoly profits owes its origin in the first place to a heightening of the degree of exploitation of the workers directly in the monopolies' enterprises. The most advanced means of production, technique, and technology corresponding to the last word in scientific and technical progress prove to be their property; and they employ the most skilled labour, which enables monopoly capitals to extract more profit than non-monopoly capitals. Apart from these surplus profits monopolies get additional revenues from redistributive processes. These economists also,, while admitting the existence of monopoly profit, often say that it is insignificant, has a tendency to fall, and in general is difficult to calculate. The American, Lafayette Harter, for example, declares in this connection:

Although we cannot estimate monopoly profits with any degree of accuracy, we can say that they are not large in relation to aggregate national or personal income.

In fact, however, the loss inflicted on social welfare by monopolies' domination of the US economy, even by one of the most modest

estimates of Western economists, is 3.2 per cent of the national income, l and in 1980 came to $67.9 billion in absolute terms.^^2^^

The neoclassical analysis of profit under 'imperfect competition' is supplemented by risk theories in which profit figures as the outcome of the activity of capitalists and other economic agents in conditions of risk and uncertainty, which are considered elements of an imperfect market structure. The founder of the risk theory is taken to be Frank H. Knight, the American economist, who came to the conclusion from the conception of 'perfect competition' that profit can only appear as a result of dynamic changes with unpredictable consequences.^^3^^ According to him and his followers profit is due solely to uncertainty. Remuneration for predictable risk, in their view, enters costs as part of `normal' profit. Normal profit is *what has been defined as the opportunity costs of risk taking and capital',^^4^^ while profit, i.e. a surplus over and above `zero' profit, is 'the financial reward to a firm for taking non-insurable risks'.^^5^^ Profit is also treated as payment for the bearing of risk, and as an entrepreneur's remuneration for surmounting uncertainty, i.e. in fact for his ability to orient himself in an economic situation, from which it follows that it is obtained by the most gifted entrepreneurs.

The risk theorists do not see the source of profit in the exploitation of labour by capital but find it in the operations of economic agents of production in situations' of uncertainty, whose role and scale in business affairs they exaggerate, as a rule. The appropriation of profit is explained by the biological nature of the subject, his special gift of provision, and capacity to orient himself in an uncertain situation. While Western economists reflect the phenomena of capitalist reality from an idealist standpoint, they at the same time ignore the objective aspects of uncertainty and risk, and their link with the spontaneity, anarchy, and antagonisms of the capitalist mode of production, and seek the source of profit in the realm of circulation, so distorting the real connection between risk and profit. Uncertainty and risk are not sources of profit, since the latter is a form of the surplus value created by the labour of wage earners in the sphere of production. Risk and uncertainty, however, are factors operating in the distribution and redistribution of surplus value among the various groups of capitalists in the course of competition. As Marx put it: risk 'has nothing to do either with the nature or with the

~^^1^^ Michael Bradley. Economics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111., 1980), p 265.

~^^2^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. cit., p 640.

~^^3^^ A. Heertje and B. Robinson. Basic Economics (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, London, 1979), p 169.

~^^4^^ Lafayette G. Harter. Economic Responses to a Changing World (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111., 1973), p 211.

~^^1^^ Richard L. Carson. On Monopoly Welfare Losses: Comment. The American Economic Review, 1975,65,5: 1008-1014.

~^^2^^ Calculated by the author from Survey of Current Business, 1981, 61, 4: 14.

~^^3^^ See Frank H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1921), p 18.

~^^4^^ R. Lipsey, G. Sparks, P. Steiner. Economics (Harper & Row, New York,

~^^5^^ A. Heertje and B. Robinson. Op. cit., p 311.

95 94

magnitude of the surplus'.^^1^^ It concerns the 'question of the distribution of the surplus-value amongst the different sorts of capitalists'.^^2^^

In one of the modern versions of risk theory, risk and uncertainty are identified with lack of information, and the origin of profit is explained by the fact that

any factor owner possessing information, not fully available to others, on the future demand and supply for his services can earn a surplus over the income expected...^^3^^

The existence of information, in the view of the inventor of this conception, enables the separate owners of factors of production (in which he lumps together capitalists, managers, and shareholders and also workers) to find an application for his factors in a business whose earning power is higher than the market-predicted level of earnings. They therefore get a profit over and above the remuneration agreed in the contract.

By substituting for the question of the character of ownership of the means of production an apologetic thesis of factor owners, among whom the capitalist as the owner of capital and the wage worker possessing his own labour power are equated, Mueller assigns them an identical role in the creation and appropriation of profit. Furthermore he assumes the possibility of exploitation of the owners of other factors, i.e. the capitalist, by the workers themselves.

A factor owner [consequently, possibly a capitalist-Auth. ], who does not know when he joins a firm the extent of his future immobility [i.e. the tying up of his factor in the given business-v4u//i. ] may not secure a contract which allows him to share in both the above and below average revenues of the company, i.e. he is vulnerable to exploitation by other factor owners.

(and consequently by the worker), since 'the factor owners that ``produce'' the surpluses need not receive them'.^^5^^ At the same time it is said that all factor owners receive profit, since each of them may possess valuable information. By creating the semblance that every factor owner has an identical interest in overcoming uncertainty and collecting information with the aim of obtaining extra income, Mueller masks capital's relation of dominance over labour. The authors of these risk theories on the one hand justify the huge profits appropriated by capitalists and top managements, and on the other hand propound the idea of the unity of motivation of capitalists, managers, and workers, and their common interest in creating con-

ditions favouring a firm's prosperity and an increase in its profitability, i.e. propagandising the community of interests of workers and capitalists, and the idea of their class collaboration.

3. Institutional-social theories of profit

In addition to neoclassical conceptions of profit, the theory of functional profit proposed by Schumpeterl has been developed in modern conditions within the institutional-social trend. According to it profit is the entrepreneur's reward for his exercising of the function of innovation, for his introducing the advances of science and engineering in his enterprise, bringing out a new product, applying a new technological process, etc. by which production costs are reduced and profit arises as the difference between revenues and costs. Schumpeter's interpretation of profit is held by many Western economists today.

The dollars earned by the successful innovators are defined by some economists ... as profit. Usually, these profit earnings are temporary and are soon competed out of existence by rivals and imitators. But as one source of innovational profits is disappearing, another is being born. So these innovational profits will continue to exist.2 By treating profit as a temporary phenomenon produced by technical progress, Schumpeter and his followers reduce it in fact to extra profit, in that way rejecting the category of surplus value. By representing revenue from innovations as the sole form of profit, and the innovator entrepreneur as the sole recipient of it, Schumpeter ignored ordinary average profit, concealed the mechanism of capitalist exploitation, limited the numbers of the class of exploiters in capitalist society who live at the expense of the workers, and of course the weight of the burden the latter have to bear. Profit from innovation does not explain profit as such.

The idea of profit as the innovator's revenue borders on the neoclassical interpretation of profit as monopolistic income, since innovations make the innovator entrepreneur a kind of monopolist.

When an entrepreneur innovates, even if his new product or his new process is not protected by patents, he will be one step ahead of his competitors. He will be able to capture many of their customers either by offering them a better product or by supplying his product more cheaply than his rivals can. In either case he will temporarily find himself with some monopoly power left by weakening of his competi-

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Theories of Surplus-Value, Part III (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 357.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

~^^3^^ Dennis Mueller. Information, Mobility and Profit. Kyklos (Basel), 1976, 29,3:425.

~^^4^^/Wt/.,p424. ^^5^^ fbid.,p429.

96

~^^1^^ See Joseph A. Schumpeter. The Theory of Economic Development ( Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1934).

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (MeGraw-Hill, New York 1973) p 620.

---455

97

tors, and monopoly profit will be the reward for his initiative ... the reward for innovation.l

In the theory of functional profit, consequently, it is the outstanding abilities of the entrepreneur and manager that are stressed. Since profit is a special category of 'high temporary earnings resulting from innovation" according to this theory, the genuine entrepreneur receives it, while 'routine management earns wages'.^^2^^

At the same time holders of the functional theory could not ignore the fact that profit is distributed in capitalist society to a large extent in accordance with relations of ownership and control over production and not only in accordance with the innovator's contribution. That is why the French economist Perroux, while sharing Schumpeter's point of view about profit as revenue from the function of innovations, broadens this interpretation, saying that profit is also a reward for the services of economic power. In his view it is a result of the services of the creation or direct realisation of innovations and the services of economic power or the activity of entrepreneurs and managers in ensuring efficient capitalist production. Profit, consequently, is the result of management of the process of capitalist exploitation of wage workers. By calling a broad range of people innovators (from entrepreneurs and managers to engineers and workers) and completely ignoring relations of ownership of the means of production, Perroux^^3^^ classes them all as subjects of economic power and receivers of functional profit. While citing the ownership of shares by some workers and their receiving of bonuses as an example of their sharing of profits, supporters of the functional theory do not see that this `sharing' in fact is aimed at intensifying exploitation of the working class by various `sweating' systems of job organisation and tying of wages to the results of the firm's operations.. All these payments come from the unpaid labour of the workers themselves.

The functional theory, like other contemporary capitalist theories of profit, pursues an apologetic aim, that of concealing the existence of relations of exploitation and antagonistic contradictions in capitalist society. It abstracts the decisive role of ownership of the means of production, and denies the class nature of the distribution of income. By masking ordinary entrepreneurial profit and reducing it simply to extra profit, these economists thereby considerably minimise the scale of capitalist incomes. While showing that a surplus of profit is the result of innovations, they do not see its true source, extra "surplus value, whose form on the surface of phenomena is extra profit.

In addition to `functional' ideas of profit, the institutional-so-

cial trend also includes a development of theories of institutional profit, which is interpreted as income formed outside market patterns during redistributory processes taking place through the operation of extra-economic factors, or social institutions, like state interference, the balance of power between workers' and employers' unions, etc. In the view of supporters of this theory (Jean Marchal, J. Mockers) profit is redistributed according to the strength of various socioprofessional groups, the main criterion for classifying which is the source and character of personal income. These groups are also taken to be the main subjects appropriating profit. With the aim of justifying the huge exploiter revenues in capitalist society employers and capitalist governments are depicted as the most active force directing socio-economic development, and therefore the dominant group exerting a decisive influence on the distribution of national income, in contrast to the inertia of the group of workers and their consequently playing a subordinate role. 'Institutional profit' is assumed to be a surplus of value arising as the difference between buying and selling prices as a result of entrepreneurs' subjective actions. By raising prices and putting pressure on trade unions, the government, landed proprietors, capitalist lenders, etc., entrepreneurs allegedly separate selling prices and cost prices and so create profit, which they themselves appropriate.

In essence this theory is a version of the `exchange' conception. It denies the decisive role of ownership of the means of production and the class nature of income distribution in capitalist society, just like the theory of functional profit. Profit is derived from circulation as the result of entrepreneurs' subjective actions to redistribute it. The process of production is ignored, so that the source of the redistributed profit-surplus value-remains hidden, and the exploitation of labour by capital is camouflaged.

Non-Marxian economics has not been able to build a theory of profit that satisfies even Western economists today. More and more often a crisis in the state of profit theory is admitted. As the Dutch economist Jan Pen, for example, writes:

Any textbook tells us that profits are made up of, say, five elements: (i) a remuneration for uncertainty...; (ii) a remuneration for innovation...; (iii) monopoly profits...; (iv) windfall profits in the small, caused by a sudden shift in demand for the firm's product; (v) windfall profits in the large, caused, for instance, by a general upswing in demand, devaluation, perhaps inflation.' Analysis of these elements, however, leads him to conclude that

notwithstanding the traditional seemingly clear-cut classification, we really don't know what determines profits.^^2^^

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 549.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 625.

~^^3^^ See Fran9ois Perroux. L'economie du 20-e siecle (Press Universitaires de France, Paris, 1961).

~^^1^^ Jan Pen. Profits as a Rich Source of Puzzlement. De Economist (Leiden), 1980, 128, 3: 298. * Ibid., p 299.

99 98

Although there are many views on profit,

the present state of profit theory is unsatisfactory and rather bewildering. And even the facts about profits are controversial.1 One of the reasons for this, he thinks, 'is the ideological nature of the subject',^^2^^ i.e. its link with the dominant ideological situation in capitalist society. But, defending orthodox capitalist ideological, theoretical positions, he sees the way out of the crisis in the need to continue all-round study of this category in the context of capitalist political economy.

We need standardized concepts, more facts, better theories and above all more econometrics. But perhaps what we need most of all is a better use of Marshall's idea of normal profits.

In fact there is not, and cannot be, a single conception of profit among the many capitalist variants of profit theory that will correctly illuminate the nature of this category. There is only one genuine conception, and it is reflected in the Marxist-Leninist theory of surplus value, and of profit as its transmuted form; the source of profit is the unpaid labour of the worker, and the means of obtaining profit is exploitation of the working class by the class of capitalist owners of the means of production.

commercial profit and interest respectively. Since industrial and commercial capitalists always employ borrowed capital as well as their own, they are obliged constantly to isolate a part of their profit as payment for loan capital. This setting apart affects not only the profit obtained on the borrowed capital but also that obtained on their own, for which there are several reasons. (1) The ratio between a functioning capitalist's own and his borrowed capital is constantly altering, so that in the past, for example, even in the nineteenth century, interest often used to be deducted from the total profit and then a share deducted from it proportional to the weight of the loan capital in the total. (2) Historically, even in the heyday of moneylender capital, interest outwardly seemed to be the result of ownership of capital. Industrial capital still accepts this position as a fact, so that the functioning capitalist considers profit to be what remains after the deduction of interest. (3) The existence of a special group of money capitalists who receive an income through the ownership of capital lent out by them inevitably leads to any capitalist, as the owner of capital, also primarily laying claim to receive an income from it, i.e. interest.

Interest is consequently a transformed form of profit, i.e. is the same result of the exploitation of wage labour as profit itself, but outwardly seems to be the product of capital, with its link with surplus value completely hidden (with the exception of those cases when interest is merely a deduction from capital, wages or the value created by a small producer). Capitalist economic thinking, being trapped by external notions of interest, also makes the rate of interest an absolute as the product of capital. It cannot bring out its essence, because that would mean admitting it to be the result of capitalist exploitation. Hence the unresolvable contradiction in which Western economists find themselves when trying to explain the origin of loan interest.

The dispute about the nature of interest continues in present-day Western economic literature. The English economist Bliss remarks that 'always it is the rate of interest which stands in need of an explanation',^^1^^ and which is 'the central problem of capital theory'.^^2^^

Today we can speak of two main capitalist interpretations of interest, or rather of the rate of interest: viz., the `real' and the ' monetary'. The economists in fact avoid the question of what interest is, substituting another problem for it, namely, in what conditions the rate of interest will be positive. There is no hard and fast line between the two treatments. Both assume that the rate of interest is determined by the interaction of supply and demand on the capital market, that interest itself is the capitalist's reward for foregoing consumption

4. Views on interest

The problem of interest is a stumbling block for bourgeois political economy. In spite of economists' more than two centuries of effort the origin of interest is still an unsolved problem that cannot be solved within the context of the fetishistic and subjective-psychological constructs with which capitalist economic thought starts. That is not by chance. Interest, by virtue of the objective process whereby capitalist relations of production are made fetishes and materialised, seems to be directly generated by capital itself. In fact it is a part of surplus value, but that part which is alienated through repeated transformations from surplus value and therefore presented as a property of capital.

In its continuous movement industrial capital is found simultaneously in three functional forms, corresponding to the three stages of its circulation: viz., productive, commodity, and money. The last two forms are differentiated from industrial capital through the further deepening of the social division of labour, subordinate previously existing `ante-deluvian' forms of capital (merchant and moneylender), and begin to function relatively independently as commercial and loan capital, bringing their owners surplus value in the form of

~^^1^^ Jan Pen. Op. cit., p 286

~^^1^^ C.J. Bliss. Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income (North Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1975), p 327.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p 56.

101

3 /Mi, p 311.

100

for the sake of investment, by which is usually meant the buying of securities. The divergence between the two views is over what in fact is the object of supply and demand.

The `real' school, which arose within the neoclassical trend, looks on interest as the price of capital, whatever its form (productive, commercial, money), and declares demand for capital to be the decisive factor. In characterising the source and need for the existence of loan interest, they say (1) that it

can be paid because capital is productive; (2) it must be paid because most men suffer a disutility in saving, i.e. ... they prefer present to future goods.'

The source of interest is thus explained by the productivity of capital, but in fact capital has no productivity because productivity is nothing else than the productive power of the labour that capital commands. It is of interest to note, in this connection, that some economists, for example, the American economic historian, Harry Landreth, have had to admit that capital in itself is not a factor of production and that the marginal productivity theory does not give a satisfactory answer for the existence of interest.^^2^^ Let us examine his line of argument.

Marginal theory holds that under perfect competition the market will impute its marginal product to each factor of production. Leaving aside the coordinating activity of the entrepreneur, for which he is allegedly imputed entrepreneurial income, marginal products will be imputed to the other three factors: viz., to labour (i.e. the worker) wages, to land (i.e. the landed proprietor) rent, and to capital (i.e. the owner of capital) interest. And the question immediately arises, why is interest imputed to capital? As the economists themselves consider, there are only two original factors of production that can produce a product independently of capital. Capital is a derivative, not an original factor and, therefore, can produce nothing unless combined with labour and land. Capital proves to be productive only in the sense that the other two factors of production-labour and land-when combined with capital and employed by it, produce a bigger product than before. The productivity of capital is consequently displayed in reality in a bigger productive return from labour and land, while capital itself can only lay claim to receive a marginal product equal to the cost of its reproduction. Taking the argument further, we discover that any present capital is the product of the activity of past labour, land, and capital. And how did the first capital come into being? Obviously, the answer will be that it is the product of the activity of labour and land. It follows from marginal productivity

theory, however, that the value increasing because of the productivity of present capital is imputed to the factors involved in its production. And only two factors are in fact involved-labour and land-since capital itself is their product. Thus, it follows from marginal productivity theory that a marginal product in the form of interest cannot be imputed to capital. Nevertheless, capital appropriates interest.

This contradiction, as formulated by Western economists, in essence is a vulgarised, fetishistic reflection of the contradiction of the general formula of capital disclosed by Marx in Volume I of Capital. When explaining how the contradiction of the general formula of capital is resolved, he showed that it only happens when the capitalist finds a special commodity-labour power---on the market. When this commodity is used in the capitalist enterprise it is capable of creating more value than it costs. Capitalist economic thought, however, cannot admit this way of resolving the contradiction of capital because it would mean recognising the labour theory of value and the exploitation of wage labour. Western economists are therefore obliged to introduce supplementary constructs into their theories in order to explain interest, constructs of a predominantly subjectivepsychological and technological character.

According to the neoclassical interpretation the rate of interest will be higher, the greater the demand for capital, while the demand for capital will grow as its marginal productivity rises, i.e. a rise in the increment of the `product' of capital relative to the increment of capital itself. The rate of interest is allegedly determined in the interaction of the factor of capital's marginal productivity, on the one hand, and that of 'time preference' Cwaiting', `abstinence'), on the other. Samuelson, for instance, writes:

Both factors operate to determine the time path of interests: the impatience to spend, or the tendency to prefer the present to the future, limits the growth rate and the productivity factor tells us what the interest or net productivity [of capital-Auth. \ is that can be earned.1 Some Western economists have turned again to Bohm-Bawerk's theory in order to explain interest.^^2^^ As a rule they discard those of his postulates of the reasons for interest that are too frankly subjective-psychological, and stress the one about the so-called technical superiority of present goods over future ones. Bohm-Bawerk linked that postulate with what he called the roundabout, indirect, or capitalist method of production. In order to get interest the capitalist consciously postponed consumption to the future, and employed the postponed goods in a roundabout method of production, which allegedly created the source of interest. The English economist Michael Howard, characterising the views of the exponents of the Austrian

~^^1^^ John A. Cochran. Money, Banking and the Economy (Macmillan New York, 1979), p 456.

2 See Harry Landreth. History of Economic Theory (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1976), pp 263-264.

102

~^^1^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 611.

~^^2^^ See Malte Faber. Introduction to Modern Austrian Capital Theory (Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1979).

103

school, writes:

Present commodities which ate not consumed can be employed in capitalistic |i.e. roundabout or indirect -Auth.] methods of production which are more productive than direct production processes. Thus to induce economic agents to exchange present for future consumption, that is to save, they must be paid a premium. The extra productivity of capital-intensive methods of production allows this to be paid. This explains the existence of interest. '•

Here interest is deduced from purely technological conditions of the production process, independent of the social system; use of a more capital-intensive technology, promoting a deepening of the specialisation of production and a raising of its efficiency, in itself provides an increase in the volume of output and growth of its value. In that way it is said that the longer the production process, the higher the productivity of such a roundabout or indirect method of production will be. In fact, however, as we know, the increase in volume of output is not in itself caused by improvement of the technology but by the rise in the productivity of labour arising from application of the technology. It is labour, moreover, that creates the new value. At the same time raising of the efficiency of production does not increase the length of the production process but, on the contrary, leads, as a rule, to a shortening of its time.

An important element of modern `real' theory of interest is that the marginal productivity of capital affects the size of the 'marginal physical product' and thereby also determines the rate of interest in a price set.^^2^^

Some Western economists consider that this rate is also the centre around which the market rate of interest fluctuates in the various loan capital markets. Underlying these fluctuations are the different degrees of risk of loans.^^3^^

The correct idea underlying this conception is that the movement of loan capital reflects the movement of the productive capital and that the source of interest is actually created in the process of production. This thesis, however, is quite incorrectly interpreted.

(1) The source of interest, as we have already said, is the surplus labour of the wage worker and not the 'marginal productivity of capital'. (2) The movement of loan capital reflects the movement of productive capital only indirectly and has its own specific features. The rate of interest therefore cannot be predetermined directly by the process of production itself. No uniform rate of interest exists either, moreover, as the necessary centre of the fluctuation of market rates; it is not the average rate of interest that determines market

~^^1^^ Michael C. Howard. Modem Theories of Income Distribution (Macmillan London, 1979), p 93.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p 76.

~^^3^^ See, for example, C.J. Bliss. Op. cit., p 327; Michael C. Howard. Op. cit p 78.

104

rates but, on the contrary, it is the market rates that are reduced to an average. By the rate of interest is meant its average rate calculated from changes in market interest rates during major industrial cycles and in those spheres of investment in which capital is lent for comparatively long periods.l

Western economists make an absolute of the external phenomena of interest. Marx showed that the rate of interest, unlike the average rate of profit, is an indefinite quantity by its inner nature. The average rate of profit is the relation between the whole mass of surplus value and all the capital advanced. In contrast the rate of interest is the relation of some part of the surplus value to the mass of loan capital, and exists, moreover without any inner laws determining the quantity of this part of surplus value. Everything depends on the ratio of supply and demand for loan capital, which alters during the movement of the phases of the industrial cycle and is liable to various market fluctuations. At the same time the rate of interest functions in its outer form as a precisely established quantity at any given moment, and all capitalists pay interest at a uniform rate according to the period of the loan. The rate of profit, on the contrary, is manifested as an indeterminate quantity, because each capitalist obtains his rate of profit in the course of realisation, and there i's only a tendency toward an average rate, which as a rule is not attained. Since the rate of interest is imposed on the capitalist by external forces, he (and consequently his representative in the realm of theory, the exponent of capitalism) considers it to be predetermined in advance in the value of commodities.

The monetary theory, in contrast to `real' theories of interest, explain interest simply as the price of money capital, and consider the supply to be the main aspect of the interaction of the supply and demand of capital, linking it with the Keynesian conception of `liquidity-preference'. Keynes was the actual founder of the `monetary' theory of interest, but in his interpretation interest figured as the 'price of money'.^^2^^ Present-day adherents of the 'monetary theory', while in the main defending a Keynesian position, consider interest the 'price of credit' and devote their main attention to study of factors affecting the accumulation of capital. The reason for this departure from the orthodox Keynesian conception of interest is due, in the main, to the fact that Keynes' theory of interest is quite contradictory. According to him interest rested on the psychological concept of `liquidity-preference', by which he meant the individual's 'desire to hold wealth in the form of cash'.^^3^^ In his interpretation, the rate of interest reflected the degree of 'unwillingness of those who possess money to part with their liquid control over it'.^^4^^ The rate of

~^^1^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill, pp 358-369.

~^^2^^ See John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan & Co., London, 1936), p 167

3 Ibid.

~^^4^^ Ibid.

105

interest thus depended in direct proportion on `liquidity-preference' and in 'inverse proportion' on the sum of money in circulation. At the same time `liquidity-preference', as a psychological desire to hold cash, varied with different individuals, reflecting the difference in their incomes. And the size of the incomes of the possessors of money depends to a decisive degree, in Keynesian views, on the rate of interest. A vicious circle of sorts is obtained: the rate of interest is deduced from liquidity-preference', the latter is determined by the size of income, while the size of income in turn is associated with the rate of interest.

Keynes' successors in the field of interest theory have tried to correct the very obvious flaws of monetary theory. Hicks made certain modifications to this trend and tried to unite elements of the `real' theory of the neoclassicists with the factors that govern the rate of interest in Keynesian views. He deduced the rate of interest from the interaction of the supply and demand for cash that could be loaned, on the one hand, and the supply and demand of interest-bearing securities on the other hand. The first, in his view, was determined by the amount of money, the second by the ratio of real savings and real investment, hi his interpretation, which is shared more or less by most supporters of the monetary conception today, interest is no longer the 'price of money' but the difference between its price and the price of various classes of securities. The height of the rate of interest is now determined by the amount of money in circulation, the level of income and investment, and the degree of conversion of securities of one sort or another into cash.

A similar point of view is held by present-day monetarists, especially by Friedman. As the American economist John Beare has remarked, '

Friedman also imagines that individuals and business firms will substitute between holdings of money and other assets as there are changes in their relative rates of return.^^1^^

The American economist James Tobin has attempted (in his theory of liquidity-preference) to link the rate of interest with the diversification of securities practised by the individual investor. Economists write of him that, unlike Keynes, he

recognized two possible sources of liquidity preference: (1) the inelasticity of expectations of future interest rates and (2) the uncertainty of the future of interest rates. His risk aversion theory of liquidity preference was designed to explain diversification by a single individual investor between cash and bonds.^^2^^

In Tobin's treatment cash proper was said to be the most liquid asset, on which (by virtue of that) interest need not in general be paid; short-term securities came under the heading Very liquid' and on them less interest was paid, while a higher rate was paid on ' lowliquidity' long-term paper.

Contemporary monetary theories thus, in fact, deduce interest from the capitalist's practical activity in manipulating fictitious capital in order to reduce possible losses through a fall in the prices of securities. Secondary, derivative, psychological factors are pushed to the fore and used to explain primary economic processes. But it is impossible to derive the patterns of economic affairs themselves from the individual's psychological reaction to the manifestation of one objective pattern or another.

The monetary theory of interest therefore proves to be bankrupt relative to the conditions of modern capitalism which are characterised by a rapid development of inflationary processes. The increase in the amount of money in circulation should, according to it, have a lowering effect on the rate of interest but, in fact, the rate of interest on loans is, on the contrary, rising. The economists have therefore been obliged to return to the concepts of `real' and `nominal' rates of interest that differ substantially from the corresponding ideas introduced by Irving Fisher, who distinguished between a nominal or market rate of interest and a real rate that was predetermined (in neoclassical views) by the investor's willingness to save on the one hand and the productivity of capital on the other. But according to the adherents of the monetary conception of interest,

the real rate is the equilibrium rate determined by either loanable funds or liquidity preference, where market participants assume that there will be no price changes in the future. The nominal rate is the actual observed rate in the financial system and is equal to the real rate phis an adjustment to account for the fact that market participants have anticipations about future price changes.' The real rate, consequently, is that which would exist if there were no inflation. The nominal rate is the interest rate established with an inflationary rise of prices. Thus the nominal rate is always positive, but the real rate may be positive, zero, or even negative. This depends on what the ratio of the nominal rate is to the growth rate of prices in a given year. Business Week cites, for example, the following figures on the real long-term interest rate in the USA^^2^^:

Year 1940 1945

Real rate 0 0

Year 1965 1970

Real rate +2.0 + 1.5

~^^1^^ John B. Beare. Macroeconomics. Cycles, Growth, and Policy in a Monetary Economy (Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1978), p 206.

~^^2^^ Hugh S. Norton. Economic Thinkers. In R.N. Waud. Economics (Harper & Row, New York, 1980), p 269.

106

~^^1^^ Thomas F. Cargill. Money, the Financial System, and Monetary Policy (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979), pp 198-199.

~^^2^^ See Business Week International, April 12, 1982.

107

Year 1950 1955 1960

Real rate

0

+3.0 +2.5

Year

1975 1980 1981

(1st six

months)

Real rate -2.0 -2.5

value going in the form of loan interest reflects the increasingly parasitic character of capitalism.

The constructs of adherents of the monetary theory of interest reflect the external manifestation of the actual process of the differentiation of money capital from productive capital. The accumulation of money capital in the main reflects the accumulation of productive capital, but on the whole represents a different form. And although potential money capital operating as loan capital, and productive capital are internally linked and mutually related, they are represented as independent forms of the movement of capital. The ' monetarist', ideas make an absolute of this relative independence with the result that interest is completely severed from its source, surplus value, and the rate of interest proves to be unconnected with the needs of the reproduction of social capital.

Neither the `real' nor the `monetary' interpretations of interest, like the preceding theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, make it possible to explain the essence of this economic category. Interest is not the result of the productivity of capital itself, and is not the capitalist's reward for `waiting', or the consequence of a subjective 'liquidity preference'. It is a special form of capitalist revenue based on exploitation of wage labour by capital, and on the capitalist's appropriation of part of the surplus value by right of ownership of capital.

+9.0

This gives the impression that over 40 years creditors in the USA received almost nothing on capital put out on loan. Furthermore the 40s were characterised in fact by gratuitous investments, and the second half of the 70s by direct losses. But was it so in reality? Take the following case as an example. A creditor lends $100,000 at the 10 per cent per annum, the level roughly corresponding to the interest rate in the USA at the end of the 70s. The interest on his loan (10 per cent on $100,000) is consequently $10,000. Suppose that the prices of goods and services rose by 12.5 per cent during the current year. Then the real interest will be negative: the creditor received a nominal increment of capital of $10,000, but at the same time his original capital has been reduced in real terms by $12,500 as a consequence of the rise in prices. The net loss is $2,500; the rate will consequently be -2.5 per cent.

In fact, however, this does not quite mean that the interest becomes a negative quantity and thereby loses its exploiter essence. What the creditor loses through the rise in prices, the borrower gains: some of the surplus value paid in the form of interest is redistributed through the inflation mechanism to the debtor. The creditor continues as before to appropriate the results of others' labour, but on a reduced scale. In our example he can now acquire, at the nominal amount of annual interest ($10,000), as many goods and services as he got for $888.9 ($10,000 : 1.125) in the preceding year. But with inflation lowering the real rate of interest in capitalist countries there is a rapid increase in interest payments. Since the total of the latter grows much faster than the growth of inflation, a mass of surplus value increasing in both absolute and relative terms is realised in the form of interest. In the quarter of a century between 1955 and 1980 the price level in the USA roughly tripled, while the total of net interest payments rose almost 44 times over.^^1^^ At the end of 70s and in the early 80s interest payments there constituted a greater proportion of the total of statistically recorded exploiter incomes (incomes of non-corporate enterprises, profits of corporations, interest, rent) than ever before in the past. In 1980 net interest payments came to $179.8 billion, or 32 per cent of these incomes, while in 1955, for example, they constituted only $4.1 billion, or 5.5 per cent.^^2^^ The steady growth of the mass and proportion of surplus

~^^1^^ Calculated from Survey of Current Business, August 1972, p 52; November 1981, p 6.

~^^2^^ Calculated from Survey of Current Business, August 1972, p 5.

108

BOURGEOIS AND REFORMIST AGRARIAN CONCEPTIONS

and interest on capital proper. The first ones who tried to substantiate this view included J.B. Clark, who wrote:

Let anything for hire, and whatever you get for it will, in common usage, take the name rent. Whether the thing that is let be a farm, a house, a vehicle, a ship, a tool or any other concrete capital-good, it earns rent.'

And further on: 'Rent and interest describe the same income in two different ways.'^^2^^ The confusing of interest on capital and rent is not accidental. This theoretical construct pursues two goals: (1) It is a method of defending the foundations of capitalist society, of the institute of private property, including landownership; if it is admitted that rent is the income of a parasitic class, it might be concluded that this class was not needed, and then the idea reached (`absurd' from the capitalist point of view) that there was no need for the' whole class of capitalists. (2) Western economists try to prove that the landowner, like the capitalist, receives this income for his Svork' of owning means of production, and hence not from exploitation of workers.

By hiding the exploiter essence of capitalist ground rent, nonMarxian economists also try to prove that it is the product of a factor of production, land, the supply of which is fixed. The class position in this definition is also clearly expressed; it follows from it that rent is not the product of exploitation of the labour of hired workers but the product of land possessing a certain fertility. The landowner, consequently, does not belong to a class of exploiters. But in fact, as Marx stressed many times, 'Rent is a product of society and not of the soil.'^^3^^ Land cannot yield a product unless labour is applied. The capitalist farmer employing the labour of hired workers gives part of the surplus product created by them to the landowner in the form of rent; the landowner consequently also participates in exploitation of the workers.

hi the special works devoted to quantity aspect of the various forms of capitalist ground rent, Western economists try to prove that Ricardo's theory of differential rent did not differ in any practical way from Marx's theory, and that the differences were 'purely technical' (on the plane of method of exposition). Marx's theory of rent is said not to accord with his labour theory of value, since the quantity aspect of rent, based on the worst conditions, fully corresponds to the ideas of marginal utility and marginal productivity. That, in their view, is an additional argument that Marx's theory does not correspond to reality.

1. Vrewsof rent

The investigations of capitalist economists include the category of ground rent. The theory of rent is, as a rule, a component of logical constructs examining problems of the distribution of wealth in society or determining the market price of material wealth. At the same time special works are devoted to the category of rent aimed (1) at proving that it is not the source of income of a class of exploiters, but a `normal' form of income received by the owners of a certain productive force and (2) at an interpretation of sorts of Marx's theory of rent and emasculation of the socio-economic essence of the various forms of capitalist ground rent.

Present-day Western economists, representatives of the first trend, by their own admission base themselves, when investigating rent, on the views of J.B. Clark, Alfred Marshall, and others. Their concepts of rent have not retained the original meaning it had in classical capitalist political economy, above all for Ricardo, who represented rent as a special revenue falling to the landowner during distribution of the social product.

Rent has become a very broad, indeterminate economic category in the notions of non-Marxian economists. The Italian Pesenti, criticising anti-communist economic conceptions, has shown that they confuse the category of rent with any kind of differential income in general, and especially when this income is linked with a cause or factor that cannot be abolished or produced at will. By rent these economists thus understand income received by any owner of a good that is naturally or artificially limited compared with demand.^^1^^

This group tries to avoid mentioning or speaking about the category of ground rent proper, in order to deny its existence; so the landowner's income is often represented as interest on capital laid out to purchase land. Many Western economists have identified rent

~^^1^^ J.B. Clark. The Distribution of Wealth (Macmillan & Co., London, 1925). p 124.

2 Ibid.

~^^3^^ Karl Marx. The Poverty of Philosophy (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973), p 144.

~^^1^^ See Antonio Pesenti. Manuale di economia politico, Vol. 1 (Editor! Reuniti, Rome, 1970), p 95.

110

Ill

This methodological approach is not fortuitous. Ricardo quite incorrectly thought, when explaining the mechanism of the formation of rent, that it was received in connection with the transition from best land to worst, and was linked with the diminishing fertility of the soil. It was Marx, however, and later Lenin, who got over the limitedness of Ricardo's capitalist outlook and treated rent as a historical category, and freed the theory of differential rent from the so-called law of diminishing returns.

The essence of this law is that beyond a certain limit each additional investment of capital in land goes hand in hand with production of a relatively diminishing quantity of produce. Today this law is treated as a special case of the law of marginal productivity. As Solmon writes:

The law of diminishing returns is based on the concept of marginality... It explains what occurs as one unit more is added. The amount of output that is produced when the one extra unit of variable inputs is added is called the marginal product. After the point of diminishing returns is reached, each added unit results in a smaller increase in output (marginal product).'

The founders of Marxism-Leninism demonstrated that this `law' is based on an incorrect theoretical premise, viz., on the assumption of an unchanging level of technique in agriculture. If the extra capital is invested on the basis of an unaltered level of technique, in such cases the 'law of diminishing returns' is applicable to a certain degree, i.e. in the sense that the unchanged technique of production imposes relatively very narrow limits upon the investment of additional labour and capital. Even within these narrow limits, however, 'a decrease in the productivity of each such additional investment will not always and not necessarily be observed'.^^2^^

In practice additional outlays of capital are made, as a rule, with a simultaneous improvement of the technique and organisation of production, with the application of more productive machines and mechanisms and a greater quantity of mineral fertilisers, an improvement of the system of rotation, and so on, that leads to a raising of the efficiency of farm production, which demonstrates that technical progress in agriculture is not a chance or temporary phenomenon, but the general pattern of development of capitalism. Instead of a universal law, we have an extremely relative `law'-so relative, indeed, that it cannot be called a `law', or even a cardinal specific feature of agriculture.^^3^^

That Marx's theory of rent does not contradict the labour theory of value is convincingly shown by his work on absolute rent, the existence of which most non-Marxian economists deny. Their ignoring of this category is also in accord with the class interests of the capitalists since absolute rent is directly linked with the problem of nationalising the land. On that plane it is typical that as soon as some of the economists (Dennis Robertson and Leon Walras) began to consider this category and the possibility of confiscating it in the national interest, their theories were declared socialist, although their theoretical constructs clearly defended the interests of the capitalist class.

Concrete, capitalist reality demonstrates that absolute rent, being the difference between market value and price of production, is levied on all land, including the worst. In the studies of certain modern radical economists this fact is no longer denied, but is interpreted as follows: absolute rent appears with 'the flow of capital onto new lands', depends on the ratio of supply and demand, and is in fact a monopoly rent, since the price of land is established on the principle of monopoly price.^^1^^

It will be clear from this interpretation that it confuses the causes, conditions, and sources of the formation of absolute rent. By identifying absolute and monopoly rent, the authors of this idea in practice are attempting to prove that absolute rent is also the result of natural conditions, though ones associated with monopoly factors. In other words the idea is put forward that absolute rent is generated not by landed property but by the economic mechanism that draws farm land into the economic circulation, so that this form of rent is not associated with relations of exploitation.

When examining this approach we must first note that Marx and

Lenin repeatedly stressed that the direct cause of the formation of

absolute rent is capitalist landed proprietorship. Marx himself wrote:

Where no landed property exists-actual or legal-no absolute rent can

exist. It is absolute rent, not differential rent, which is the adequate

expression of landed property.^^2^^

Lenin, in his exposition of Marx's theory of absolute rent, very categorically criticised the view of capitalist economists that it is obtained because 'the monopoly in land causes price to rise above value to the limits permitted by market conditions'.^^3^^ He convincingly showed that they did not understand

the difference between the influence of the limitedness of land and the influence of private property in land, on the one hand, and the

~^^1^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Economics, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co Reading, Mass., 1976), p 30.

~^^2^^ V.I. Lenin. The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'. Collected Works, Vol. 5 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 109

~^^3^^ Ibid.

112

~^^1^^ See Ben Fine. On Marx's Theory of Agricultural Rent. Economy and Societv, 1979,8,3: 258.

~^^2^^ Karl Marx. Theories of Surplus-Value, Part II (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), pp 330-331.

~^^3^^V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., p. 129.

113

connection between the concept `monopoly' and the concept 'the last and least productive investment of labour and capital', on the other. *

tions in agriculture. Official statistics classify farms only by annual sales and do not publish data on their grouping by type of farm. In the USA, for instance, family farms are grouped as follows by 'sales classes': under $2,500, $2,500 to $4,999, $5,000 to $9,999, $10,000 to $19,999, $20,000 to $39,999, $40,000 to $99,999, $100,000 and over. *

Agriculture censuses prior to 1974 revealed that farms with at least $20,000 in sales were increasing, while smaller farms were decreasing. Beginning with the 1974 census, the dividing point shifted to the sales classes of $40,000 or more.^^2^^

That 'family farm' is a very indeterminate concept including in fact farms of very different types is confirmed by Western researchers themselves. The American economists Gardner and Pope, for instance, say that in the USA

the number of family farms selling over $100,000 increased by 254% from 1969 to 1974 ... family farms selling less than $5,000 decreased by only 23%.^^3^^

But farms with sales over $100 thousand a year are very big farms of a capitalist type, making tens of thousands of dollars net profit. As for the small farms, they are gradually being ousted and ruined. The number of farms in the USA in 1976 was 2,454 thousand, in 1979 it was 2,330 thousand, i.e. had shrunk by 124 thousand.^^4^^ Small farms have neither `stability' nor viability. They cannot stand up either to the competition of big capitalist farms or the economic pressure of state monopoly capital. Capitalist reality refutes the arguments of 'family farm' theorists about the ``benefits' of technical progress for the small farmer. The standard of the technical equipping of small farms is low. As Solmon says, they are

unable to take advantage of the introduction of new seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides; of improved breeds and feeds for livestock; and of mechanization. For them technology has meant a deterioration of their competitive position.s

Reference to government `aid' for farmers also does not help the advocates of the 'family farm'. Capitalist governments' aid has a clearly expressed class character and fully suits the interests of big capitalist farms. The economic policy of Western governments is directed to ousting the small farmer. Philip Raup, for instance, writes:

2. Notions of types of agricultural undertaking

Capitalist and reformist economic thought are aimed today at justifying the measures of state monopoly capitalism in agriculture to consolidate and spread large-scale capitalist forms and displace and ruin small farmers.

By employing the theory of the family farm' the economists try to make the small farmer think he can be prosperous under modern capitalism. Those who hold this theory try to show that there is a consolidation of 'family farms', which are destined to displace the traditional small farm. In their view the 'family farm' is more progressive and economical, capable of employing farm machinery and modern farming methods. From the standpoint of some of them technical progress in agriculture is widely used by and can consolidate the position of the 'family farm'. The American economist Philip Raup, for example, says that these farms are well adapted to technological innovations.^^2^^ Spokesmen of the 'family farm' theory thus try to show that such farms are not being supplanted by largescale capitalist production but are very stable, with a capacity to withstand changing market conditions. Raup, for instance, writes: 'One of the greatest advantages of the single-proprietor or familytype farm has been its capacity to absorb risk.'^^3^^ The American economists Just and Pope explain that

risk is affected not only by price and other market-related phenomena

but also by many technological innovations and government poli-

4 cies.

The 'family farm' theory became very popular in the industrially developed capitalist countries in the 60s and has remained so. Under 'family farms' Western economists include both farms on which all the work is done by the farmer and members of his family and capitalist farms employing hired labour. This lumping together of fundamentally different types of farm and extra-class approach to economic phenomena are characteristic of ideologists of capitalism. Enthusiasm for the technical aspect of agricultural development, and a refusal to analyse socio-economic phenomena, enable them to conceal the differentiation of farmers and the sharpening of contradic-

1 V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., p 129.

~^^2^^ See Philip Raup. Some Questions of Value and Scale in American Agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1978,60, 2:305-306.

3Ibid.,pp 304-305.

~^^4^^ Richard E. Just and Roulon D. Pope. Production Function: Estimation and Related Risk Considerations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1979,61,2:276.

See Status of the Family Farm (Second Annual Report to Congre«i. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979), p 3.

2 Ibid.

~^^3^^ Brigham D. Gardner and Roulon D. Pope. How Is Scale and Structure Determined in Agriculture? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1978, 60,2:299.

~^^4^^ Status of the Family Farm, p 12.

~^^5^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Op. cit., p 551.

115 114

The possibility of a take-over of large segments of American agriculture by nonfarm capital is real; but on present evidence the current threat to smaller family type farms is not from outside investors or nonfarm capital, it is from the larger neighboring farms in the same community.

Conflicting economic forces and public policies have created this threat of economic cannibalism within agriculture, in which the strong consume the weak. We have credit policies that cheapen the cost of credit for large borrowers. We have tax policies that encourage vertical integration, agglomeration, and farm size enlargement.1 Ideologists of capitalism are themselves thus obliged to admit a continuing process of the ousting and ruin of small farms. Modern capitalist practice fully confirms Lenin's conclusions about the inevitability of the ruin and destruction of small peasant farms and the bankruptcy of the capitalist theory of the 'stability of the small peasant farm', of which the modern 'family farm' theory is a variety. Under the influence of technical innovation, intensification of capitalist socialisation of production in agriculture, and its penetration by monopoly capital, there has been a development of new theoretical concepts by agricultural economists, many of whom are straining to give a theoretical foundation to Western governments' measures to stimulate the concentration and centralisation of farm production. The idea of large-scale production, aimed at justifying the intensive ousting of small and average farms and consolidation of capitalist ones, is becoming more and more popular. The West German economist Bergman, for instance, has said that

the leading idea of agrarian policy in the Federal Republic, of the family farm, has become dubious.^^2^^

It is suggested that farm policy should be based on encouraging large-scale production, and extending farm enterprises functioning on principles of capitalist management under state monopoly control. The American economists Hall and LeVeen, propagandising the advantages of the big capitalist farm, say that large farms generally have lower production costs, 'have greater access to high quality resources', and are 'better managed', and stress their 'greater market access'.^^3^^ Finally, the most important advantage is that

mobilization of capital for farming may be more easily achieved by large-scale, nonproprietary, or corporate, units.^^4^^

The rejection of the 'family farm' theory and passage to intensified propaganda for the big capitalist farm give a distorted reflection of the objective processes of development of the productive forces, which call for a widening of the boundaries of capitalist private property in the means of production. The new idea is meant to justify capitalist socialisation of production, which goes hand in hand with mass ruin of farmers, and to defend state monopoly capitalism's measures to expand large-scale production in agriculture in the interests of finance capital.

Monopoly capital has taken the road of active invasion of farm production. Lipsey and Steiner, for example, write:

The newest phenomenon is the rise of corporate farming, representing in 1971 only 1 percent of all farms but a much higher percentage of farm output because they are large. The average farm in the United States is 400 acres; in contrast, Tenneco Oil Company owns or leases 135,000 acres in Southern California for vegetable production.1 Another road of industrial and commercial companies' penetration of farm production-contracting with fanners---is becoming more and more important.

Seven per cent of the farms with annual sales between $2,500 and $10,000, and 65 per cent of those with annual sales of $40,000 or more, were involved in contracting in 1974. The main partners of industrial and. commercial companies are • big capitalist farms with sales of $40,000 a year or more, which constitute 28 per cent of all farms. Small and middling farms with annual sales between $2,500 and $10,000, which constitute 35 per cent of ah^^1^^ US farms, are being drawn more and more into the integrational process.^^2^^ The contract system is gradually turning farms into divisions of a single process of the production and processing of farm produce, and the farmer is ceasing to be the sole owner of the means of production and output. Industrial and commercial companies are becoming co-owners of .farms in accordance with their share in the outlays oil production, which means a steady conversion of the small and middling private owner into a hired labourer or specialist, getting interest on his invested capital. The joint-stock company form of large-scale production in agriculture is a new way of ousting small and middling farms in which the latter are first united under the management of a big company and then the property of the former owner of the farm is completely liquidated.

~^^1^^ Philip Rawp.Art. cit., p 305.

~^^2^^ T. Bergman. Der bauerliche Familienbetrieb-Problematik und Entwicklungstendenzen. Zeitschrift filr Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 1969 2:225.

3 Bruce F. Hall and E. Phillip LeVeen. Farm Size and Economic Efficiency: The Case of California. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1978 60,4:593,596.

~^^4^^ Philip Rsmp.Art. cit., p 97.

116

~^^1^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Economics, 5th ed. (Harper & Row, New York, 1978), pp 102-103.

~^^2^^ Status of the Family Farm, p 12.

8

year, Adam Smith concluded that there was full correspondence between growth of production and of personal consumption. This idea was taken further by J.B. Say, who persistently affirmed that reproduction could be carried on in capitalist society without serious difficulties since there was a complete identity of supply and demand, and since one commodity was always sold in order to buy another. Say's theory of realisation influenced many economists, and Ricardo himself was not free of it. In his theory of reproduction he, like Say, identified simple commodity exchange with exchange effected by means of money.! That completely ignored the possibil-' ity of a non-coincidence of sales of one commodity and purchases of others, which already, as Marx subsequently pointed out, contained the abstract possibility of crises.

When the process of reproduction began to be disrupted by the intensifying contradictions of capitalism and economic crises, capitalist economists, setting out with apologetic aims of defending capitalism, strove to give a false interpretation of the patterns of capitalist reproduction. Like Say they denied the existence of contradictions between production and consumption in capitalist society, but the arguments they advanced for this in some cases differed essentially from those on which he relied. This is particularly noticeable in the views of the prominent Russian economist Tugan-Baranovsky, who said that capitalist production could grow indefinitely not only without a corresponding growth of personal consumption or stability of its level, but even with a fall in it.^^2^^ He tried, for apologetic purposes, to use Marx's schemes of reproduction, giving them a false interpretation.

Lenin, defending Marx's theory of reproduction against falsification, showed that Tugan-Baranovsky's interpretation of Marx's schemes was at bottom incorrect since the schemes' purpose was to define the conditions of realisation with simple and extended reproduction,^^3^^ and since Marx himself never said that these conditions remained constant. Lenin noted that Marx's theory not only did not separate production from consumption but assumed a close interconnection between them, and pointed out that it was just as mistaken to counterpose productive and personal consumption as to identify them. While Say in essence reduced productive consumption to personal consumption, Tugan-Baranovsky, on the other hand, separated the one from the other. In both cases, however, we have to do with theories that deny a contradiction between production and consumption. Their unsoundness is primarily that, in reducing the

INTERPRETATIONS OF REPRODUCTION

1. Views of social product and national income

The first attempt to analyse social reproduction was made in the middle of the eighteenth century by Fran?ois Quesnay, the leader of the physiocratic school, in his Tableau economique. In examining simple reproduction of the social product, Quesnay described both its value and its natural, physical composition, attributing special importance in the value structure to the part that constituted the net product, which had a central place in the Physiocrats' whole system of ideas. Underlying examination of the natural, physical structure of the social product was a breakdown into the product of agriculture and product of industry.

Although Quesnay's analysis was limited and reflected the general deficiencies of physiocratic views, Marx subsequently valued it highly. As for capitalist political economy, it followed a false path after Quesnay when analysing capitalist reproduction.

While Adam Smith made a big advance compared with the Physiocrats in his treatment of several other matters of political economy, he took a step backward as regards reproduction. He mistakenly considered that the value of the annual social product was equal to the sum of the revenues of all three classes of capitalist society (wages, profit, and rent), and that it did not include the value of the means of production consumed in making this product. He thus, in essence, identified the value of the aggregate social product with newly created value, which Marx labelled Smithian dogma.1 This was a consequence of Smith's not having differentiated the dual character of the labour that creates commodities, and not having understood that labour, because of its dual character, at one and the same time creates new value and transfers the old value of the means of production to the new product.

By starting from a mistaken idea of the equality of the aggregate social product and the value newly created in the course of a

~^^1^^ See David Ricardo. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Dutton, London, 1937), p 197.

~^^2^^ See M.I. Tugan-Baranovsky. Periodicheskie promyshlenniye krizisy (Periodic Industrial Crises) (Moscow, 1923), p 194.

~^^3^^ See V.I. Lenin. A Note on the Question of the Market Theory. Collected Works, Vol. 4 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp 55-64.

119

'See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. II (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 395.

118

problem of realisation under capitalism simply to ensuring proportionality between various types of output, they quite ignore the main contradiction of capitalism, i.e. that between the social character of production and private, capitalist appropriation, which is manifested both as a disproportion between industries and as a contradiction between production and consumption. The growth of capitalism's economic contradictions, which were greatly exacerbated by the onset of its general crisis, and especially by the unprecedentedly deep and destructive force of the economic crisis of 1929-33, struck a heavy blow at old capitalist theories of reproduction.

It was in those conditions that Keynes' theory appeared, set out in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. He examined many of the problems of capitalist production, but his attempt to cope with the problem of realisation had a special place in his views. In spite of the notions dominant in capitalist political economy, that supply automatically generated a demand for goods, Keynes had to admit that aggregate demand need not in general coincide with aggregate supply, and that consequently there was a realisation problem not only as regards individual commodities but also as regards production as a whole. The methods of reflecting reproduction of social capital in the indicators adopted by modern Western economics of 'gross national product' and 'net national product' or national income stem from Keynes, the first being distinguished from the second by the size of the annual sum total of depreciation.

In official publications 'gross national product' (GNP) is defined as 'the total national output of goods and services valued at market prices'.^^1^^ Whether this concept reflects objective economic processes taking place in social production, and is the key to understanding the latter, can only be judged by clarifying its methodological principles.

The definition of GNP quoted does not in itself disclose its methodological basis; at the same time it provokes a number of questions, in particular, just what 'the total output of goods' represents in itself, and why it includes services, and what services, and other matters. The legitimacy of posing these questions follows precisely from the fact that everything in capitalist society is bought and sold and consequently takes the form of a commodity. That leads to the conclusion that the prevailing definition of GNP contains the stamp of an indeterminacy. The expression 'total output of goods' is indefinite as well because society produces products of various economic significance---means of production for productive consumption, and consumer goods, which differ from them in leaving the production process and not being reproduced in it.

Baumol and Blinder, defining the content of gross national product, write:

Gross National Product (GNP) is the sum of the money values of all final goods and services that are produced during a specified period of time, usually one year. *

Samuelson also says that both net and gross national product include only 'the sum of final products'.^^2^^ Although these statements make it clear what is meant by total output of goods', they do not wholly clarify the content of the category 'gross national product', since it is defined through a concept 'final products' that itself needs elucidation.

Western authors define final product by final demand, in which they include consumer goods (C), gross investment (I), and government purchases of goods and services (G). Gross national product is written schematically as follows: GNP = C + I + G. From the angle of the methodology of tackling the problems, the following catches one's attention: (1) the concept of gross national product is not deduced from economic circulation and the real relations established in the process of producing material wealth, but is constructed by a mechanical pooling of various phenomena. This conclusion is confirmed by analysis of the definition of gross national product as the sum of all incomes, i.e. wages, interest, rents, and profits.^^3^^

(2) Criteria of technological and exchange conceptions are employed in the definition of final product, by which an individual product is classed as a final one if it is characterised by technological completeness or technological readiness. Otherwise a product is not taken as a final product and consequently is not included in GNP. If 'a good [is] purchased for...use in producing another good'it is classed as an 'intermediate good', and is not included in the gross national product.^^4^^ Seemingly these are the objects of labour.

The mechanistic approach to defining concepts and the technological principle in defining 'final product' determine the parameters of the gross national product.

A concept can be claimed to be a scientific category actually reflecting objective, real, economic processes, if it arises from an analysis of these phenomena and is logically derived from objective reality. Reproduction, as the continuous process of production, organically combines both past and present and in the present also the future. The product is created by men by means of instruments of labour that are employed to transform objects of labour. Tools

1 W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 321 (our italics-iW.).

2 Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill New York 1973) P 188.

3See W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 321 ~^^4^^//>/</., p 316.

121

~^^1^^ Statistical Abstract of the United States (Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 1977), p 425.

120

(instruments of labour) and the objects of labour accomplish their economic circulation in that way. For production to be continuous they have to be compensated for annually. Limitation of the concept of GNP simply to the context of national income plus the annual total of depreciation, and the end product simply to the implements of labour and objects of consumption can only provide compensation for the implements of labour consumed. Western economists' technological conception when defining GNP has led logically to an ignoring of economic circulation in general and to disappearance of the objects of labour as part of the annual reproduction process. Labour power unites the instruments of labour with its objects in the production process, and absence of the objects makes it impossible for the production act, and even more reproduction, to exist. The category of 'gross national product' mechanically constructed on the technological principle contradicts the real processes of reproduction of social capital. Practice is and always has been the criterion of truth for any conclusion of science.

The idea of defining GNP by a summation of all incomes in society, i.e. wages, interest, rents, and profits, and through the total of added value,^^1^^ suffers from even worse misconceptions. Baumol and Blinder make added value equal to the sum of wages, interest, rents, and profits, and write: 'GNP can be measured as the sum of the values added by all firms.'^^2^^ In this definition of GNP not only does the transferred value of the objects of past labour consumed disappear, but so does the value of the instruments of labour consumed, i.e. transferred value as a whole is ignored. One can hardly find a case in the production of goods in business that would support such a version of the theoretical constructs.

It will readily be noted that underlying modern models of 'gross national product' is Adam Smith's idea of reproduction, in which the value of the constant capital expended on producing the social product completely disappeared. In it, as we have said, the value of the annual product is confused with the value newly created in the year, but they, of course, differ essentially from one another. (1) The value transferred is linked with the outlays of the producer's concrete labour, the newly created value with his abstract labour. (2) Although transferred and newly created values actually exist in organic unity in every commodity, and in the annual product as a whole, they belong to different segments of time as regards their origin. The newly created value in the annual product is only the product of the current year, while the transferred value includes, in addition, all the elements of value that have been consumed in producing the annual product, but created in a preceding year, and sometimes means of production of earlier years.

The definition of GNP linked with totalling incomes broadens the sphere in which the social product is created, which is obvious from the list of sectors whose revenues are included in the product. Kohler, for instance, includes incomes from the owning of houses, incomes in the services sphere and art, the incomes of members of the liberal professions, of persons employed in domestic service and in government.^^1^^ The definition consequently combines processes of different orders in one whole; on the one hand it includes material wealth in the form of created goods; on the other hand it includes the results of labour in the production of services that in their economic content largely represent the consumption of the social product already produced.

In fact, not all the labour expended in society, even if it brings in an income, is involved in creating the social product. The social product is created by labour expended in the sphere of material production; its main attribute is its productive character, since expenditure of this labour increases material wealth. Being performed in material production it operates on matter, and transforms it, and its results are materialised in definite use values.

This property is also possessed by labour that does not necessarily or always alter the form or shape of the use value or whose result is the appearance of new material forms of the product (grain, steel, TV sets, etc.). Productive labour includes labour connected with transport of the product, the use of communications, and the activity of scientists and workers involved in the development, setting up, and organisation of the production process involving the introduction of scientific advances. It also includes outlays uf labour aimed at preserving already produced use values as, for example, outlays on repairs, storage, packing, etc.; these outlays of labour are related to so-called material services.

A feature of productive labour is also that the use values created can be accumulated, and exist independently of their creators, thanks to which they serve as a source of maintenance and existence not only for those who create them but also for other groups and classes of society that are not involved in making them. Productive labour expended productively is the main attribute of the delimitation of the sphere of material production, in which material wealth (use values) is produced, whose accumulation in society over a certain period forms the social product. As analysis of the definitions of GNP by final demand indicates, Western political economics considers productive labour to be labour that produces an income.

As for the rendering of services, the outlays of labour on it have quite another character, which it is accepted to call non-productive expenditure in contrast to productive labour, i.e. outlays made in

~^^1^^ See W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op cit p 323

~^^2^^ Ibid., p 322. '

~^^1^^ See Heinz Kohler. Scarcity and Freedom. An Introduction to Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1977), pp 213-214.

123 122

the non-productive sphere. It is typical of the outlays of such labour that they are made simultaneously with consumption. In the services sphere, for example, concert or artistic, scientific, military, and such like activity unites both the outlay of labour and consumption of its result. The results of the outlays cannot exist in the form of a definite fund, consumption of which would be separate in time and space from their production. The production of services thus represents a use activity associated with consumption of an already produced social product. The outlays of labour and revenues obtained from ownership of housing, or in the sphere of services or art, or from the activity of members of the liberal professions or domestic servants, of churches and the capitalist state, or police force, or from the arms race, etc., relate to the consumption of a produced social product. Whatever significance labour expended in the non-productive sphere has, it functions because of labour operating in the productive sphere.

Analysis of the outlays of labour in material production and in the non-productive sphere indicates that it is a matter of the creation of a product in the one case and of its consumption in the other. To the deficiencies already noted in the methodology of defining GNP we must add the illegitimacy as regards both the methodology and practice of pooling outlays of productive and non-productive labour, and uniting the material sphere of production and the non-- productive one; methodologically, because it does not correspond to scientific principles and scientific criteria, and on the practical plane, because confusion of outlays of productive and non-productive labour distorts the indicators of the volume of the social product. The combining of all incomes in the GNP, including those of the non-productive sphere, and of services, overstates both its indicators and those of national income, and reflects certain class interests. Confusion of the sphere of material production with the non-productive sphere muddles the question of the primary distribution and redistribution of national income, masks the sources of the existence of the various groups and classes of capitalist society, and has the aim of theoretically justifying involvement of all of them in creation of the social product and national income, unwarranted swelling of the non-productive sphere, and militarism.

This kind of economic thinking about the distribution and utilisation of national income is based on methodological positions that undervalue the objective economic patterns of society's development. It starts with a subjective-psychological idea that pictures society as an aggregate of mutually isolated producers and consumers of material and spiritual wealth. It ignores the class aspect of the problem of the distribution of national income. Neoclassicists, for example, push the principle of the distribution of income among equal owners of 'factors of production' to the fore. The distribution of national income grants to each factor the sum of the wealth it

124

creates; the methodological basis of this interpretation is the idea of marginal productivity. This method finds reflection in Hicks' model, by which, as the capital-worker ratio rises, the ratio of wages ( earnings) and profits in the national income remains unchanged, given that the elasticity of substitution of labour and capital is unity; if this elasticity is greater than unity, however, the share of profit will rise while the capital-worker ratio will increase; if, however, the elasticity is less than unity, the share of profit will fall.

The problem of the distribution of national income is also made dependent, in neoclassicists' theories, on government control measures, which are seen as an economic factor, and on the role of prices in the reproduction process; monetarism, the modern version of neoclassical quantity theory, has made a 'special contribution' to this.

The Keynesian school links the problem of the distribution of national income in the main with moral and legal relations rather than production ones. Keynes' 'fundamental psychological law'/ which allegedly determines the movement of national income, is built on that basis. The distribution and use of the national income depend, in Keynesian views, on psychological factors like the 'propensity to consume' and the 'propensity to save',^^2^^ unrelated to the class position of the individual. The supra-class approach to and psychological line of argument about the distribution of national income make its interpretation quite useless for a materialist understanding of this category. By concentrating attention mainly on the problem of equilibrium between the propensity to save and the intensity of accumulation Neokeynesians explain differences in incomes according to social and political customs and decisions, market forces, etc., and link redistribution of the national income with recognition of the need for active, purposeful governmental intervention. The national income, they say, is redistributed in favour of the workers through the budget by way of the introduction of 'social justice' into taxation, and broadening of the social infrastructure. They completely leave out of account the enormous unproductive expenditure made by capitalist governments from the national income, especially military spending. The lion's share of the national income in capitalist countries, redistributed through the budget, is directed in fact to financing measures designed to consolidate the dominance of monopolies.

The process of the reproduction of the national income is completed of course by its utilisation. In opposition to Marxist-Leninist theory, which examines the distribution of national income from class standpoints, Western economic science tries to approach this problem from positions 'above class'. The structure of the ultimate use of the national income is as follows in its theories: personal con-

John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan & Co., London, 1936), p 96. ^^2^^ Ibid.,pp 246-247.

125

sumption, government purchases of goods and services and foreign investments. Thus the personal consumption of the workers and of the exploiting classes are lumped together and the distribution and use of the consumption fund in social development are not analysed. The main aim of modern capitalist theories that examine the ultimate use of the national income is to propose ways of resolving the contradiction inherent in capitalism between the social character of production and the private form of appropriation, and primarily one of the most important manifestations of this contradiction, that between production and consumption.

2. Keynes' and the Neokeynesian theory of the 'trade cycle'

From the end of the nineteenth century down to the 1930s the neoclassical theory of 'general equilibrium' prevailed in capitalist political economy, which was based on the idea that the forces of competition operating through the price mechanism automatically established a state of equilibrium with full employment of all the existing factors of production. From the neoclassical standpoint crises could only occur as something purely fortuitous and pathological, not dependent on the normal functioning of the capitalist system. But the unprecedentedly deep economic crises that affected the capitalist world in the 1920s and 1930s glaringly questioned the basic postulate of the neoclassical idea of the unlimited possibilities of the market mechanism. Keynes regarded the changes of phase of the capitalist cycle as fluctuations in the scale of investment caused by a change in optimistic and pessimistic (bull and bear) estimates of the effectiveness of new investment. One can, of course, find certain elements of economic forecasting in the operation of Keynes' ' fundamental psychological law'. The categories on which Keynes based himself, like future rate of interest and 'prospective yield' ( according to him the 'inducement to invest' depends on their ratio) illustrate certain objective processes, but at the same time they have a stochastic character and contain a considerable element of subjectivism. Such a clearly expressed subjective category is 'marginal efficiency of capital', the magnitude of which depends on the short-term expectations of investors reacting sharply psychologically to changes in the economic, social, and political situation. As to the rate of interest, on which the dynamics of investment also depends, Keynes frankly said it was 'a highly psychological phenomenon',^^1^^ since it was influenced by the strength of `liquidity-preference' at any period of time.

The error of Keynes and his followers was that they attributed excessive influence in the capitalist economy to the rate of interest.

~^^1^^ John Maynard Keynes. Op. cit., p 202.

In reality, however, it is the rate of profit (and not the rate of interest) and the general state of capitalist reproduction that have a determining influence on the scale of investment. In the depression phase of the capitalist cycle, for example, investment is insignificant, in spite of a low rate of interest.

One of the main methodological mistakes of the Keynesian conception of `cycle' and `crisis' is that its author could not grasp the essential, deep causes of the cyclic movement of capitalist production determined by the private property character of relations of production, and limited himself to an analysis of people's psychology.

The fundamental psychological law', by which, according to Keynes, consumption is reduced relatively to the growth of income, leads inevitably to stagnation of the economy. The sole way out of the blind alley can be offered by the government, which can create 'effective demand' by its investments and by redistribution of incomes in favour of persons with a greater 'propensity to consume', and so eliminate economic crises and unemployment. The standard, very simplified Keynesian model of the cycle, which explained crises by lack of 'effective demand', became the theoretical basis, as we know, of official counter-cyclic policy, the main instrument of which was the budget. Manipulation of tax rates (lowering them increases demand and promotes growth of production, while a rise slows down the economy) became the chief means of controlling 'effective demand'. The second means was to raise or lower bank interest rates on advances to entrepreneurs. The lower the bank rate, the cheaper money would be and the livelier business activity, and vice versa.

Keynes' theory of the trade cycle was developed further, simultaneously with criticism of it, by his supporters, above all by the American Keynesians, who introduced certain important features into it. Whereas Keynes considered the need for government intervention in the economy only at times of depression to be the main point in his theory, the Neokeynesians consider government intervention a sine qua non of the growth of capitalist production in all phases of the cycle. They suggest that government economic policy should ensure dynamic equilibrium of the economy, rather than static equilibrium, i.e. stable, even rates of growth of the national income. Their distinguishing feature is recognition, in conditions of a `dynamic' economy, of the cyclic, uneven, spasmodic character of its development. But the overwhelming majority of Western economists are inclined to identify the concept `cycle' with that of 'industrial fluctuations'.^^1^^ They look on the economy as a sort of `pendulum' or 'rocking chair'^^2^^:

~^^1^^ See Gottfried Haberler. The Theory of Business Cycles as a Part of Western Economic Theory. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. I (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 347.

~^^2^^ E.Mansfield. Economics. Principles, Problems, Decisions (Norton & Co., New York, 1974), p 215.

127 126

If it [the economy-Auth.\ is subjected to random shocks ... it will move up and down. These random shocks are the bursts of investment that arise as a consequence of a great new invention or of the development of a new territory, or for some other such reason.1 In their opinion, a cycle consists of phases of revival, expansion, recession, and contraction.

Such definitions of the trade cycle are not fortuitous. Once a cycle is just `fluctuation' it can be eliminated within the context of capitalist relations of production. Western economists therefore count on the effectiveness of certain `stabilisers', and also on

policy-makers-and the electorate-know(ing) now that fiscal policy ... and monetary policy ... can be used to push the economy toward full employment.^^2^^

While admitting the cyclic character of capitalist reproduction, they do not, however, understand what determines its length. The American economists Burns and Mitchell, for example, say that 'in duration business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years'.3 And the French economists Bernard et al. give examples of cycles lasting from four months to fifty years.^^4^^ As Marx pointed out, the periodicity of a cycle depends on the turnover of fixed capital:

One may assume that in the essential branches of modern industry this life-cycle [of fixed capital-/lu//i.) now averages ten years. However we are not concerned here with the exact figure.^^5^^

The main point was something else, namely the renewal of fixed capital, which constituted the material basis of the cycle. Marx, moreover, foresaw a reduction in the average period of the turnover of fixed capital in the future. Under imperialism it is eight or nine years, varying one way or the other under the impact of the concrete economic and political factors in separate countries, regions, or the world capitalist economy as a whole. The renewal of fixed capital naturally affects the dynamics of investment as well.

Neokeynesians see a concrete manifestation of the dynamics of investment and cyclicity in the declining share of consumption in the national income and the activity of the accelerator. Their attempt to explain the cyclic character of the development of capitalist production by a decrease of consumption is not new, of course, and is to be found in the petty-bourgeois theory of underconsumption that Lenin sharply criticised in his day in 'A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism'.^^6^^ Keynes, of course, modernised the old vulgar theory by

1 E. Mansfield. Op. cit., p 215.

^^2^^ Ibid., p 216.

~^^3^^ A.I^^1^^'. Burns and W.C. Mitchell. Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946), p 3.

~^^4^^ Yves Bernard et al. Dictionnaire economique et financier (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975), pp 407-408.

~^^5^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. II, p 189.

~^^6^^ See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 2 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1960), pp 129-265.

128

means of his `multiplier'.

The multiplier expresses the dependence between the increment of investment on the one hand and the increment of income and employment on the other. The essence of this dependence is that

when there is an increment of aggregate investment, income will increase by an amount which is fc times the increment of investment,

i.e. AY = kAI, where I-r-is equal to the marginal propensity to

K.

consume. The size of the multiplier k depends on the level of the 'marginal propensity to consume' and the 'marginal propensity to save'. It can thus be said in general that the higher the propensity to consume, the lower will be the propensity to save, and correspondingly, the greater the multiplier, and vice versa.

Keynes' disciples, seeking to create a dynamic theory of the trade cycle, try to explain growth of the capitalist economy as primarily a process of the economic system's inner self-development. A main feature of this theory is therefore that it attempts to explain 'the switching mechanism' causing the economy's passage from boom to slump and vice versa by reference not to external (exogenous) causes of cyclical fluctuations but to internal (endogenous) ones.

The attempts to make Keynes' theory more dynamic by means of the acceleration principle are well known. The accelerator characterises a reverse connection between the increment of income and employment and the subsequent increment of investment. A steeper dynamics of growth (reduction) of investment relative to the dynamics of income causing them will be observed, moreover, which comes about through the lengthy period of making the equipment, as a consequence of which unsatisfied demand in this period will lead to an expansion of production. The length of the period of use of equipment leads to the percentage ratio of new investment to replacement investment being greater than the percentage increment of output, demand for which stimulates new investments. The accelerator coefficient (V) is expressed by the following formula:

v =

It

where I is investment, and Y is income.

If, for example, with a fixed capital of $200 million, and annual wear and tear of 10 per cent ($20 million), the demand for finished output rises by 15 per cent, not only will replacement investment of $20 million be required but also an additional increase in capital of $30 million to meet the growing demand. As a result, an increase in demand of merely 15 per cent will give a 150 per cent increment of gross investment in equipment ($50 million). A reduction of demand

~^^1^^ John Maynard Keynes. Op. cit., p 115.

---455

129

for output, however, will also cause a steeper reduction in demand for investment. The Neokeynesian model of the business cycle was built on the basis of a combination of the multiplier and the acceleration principle.

Western economists, led by Paul Samuelson and Sir John Hicks, claim that (as Mansfield, for example, writes)

the acceleration principle combined with the multiplier may produce business cycles like those experienced in the real world. The basic idea is easy. Suppose that the economy is moving up toward full employment, NNP is increasing, and sales are increasing at an increasing rate. Because of the acceleration principle, the increases in sales result in a high level of investment. And via the multiplier, the high level of investment promotes further increases in NNP. Thus, the accelerator and multiplier tend to reinforce one another, resulting in a strong upward movement of NNP. The economy is in an expansion.^^1^^

The cause of the cycle in the Neokeynesian model is thus the effect of the accelerator coefficient, which influences the amplitude of the fluctuations of investment positively or negatively, and their spread over time, which also predetermines the rum from growth of production to a reduction causing a protracted depression, fall in employment, and inflation.

When examining this Neokeynesian theory of the trade cycle, we need to note the contradiction in the theoretical substantiation of the categories of `multiplier' and the 'acceleration principle' by Keynes' equations of income. The initial basis for deducing these categories is the equation of the stage of utilisation of income. But at the same time the multiplier and the acceleration principle should bring to light changes in the stages of the production of income. A vicious circle arises, which the Neokeynesians could not explain. One of their main methodological faults is that in investigating the process of reproduction, they put the stress on disclosing its quantitative interconnections, while ignoring its qualitative socio-economic characteristics, which depend on the specific features of the economic system of capitalism. Their ignoring of these features is clear from the fact that they treat the cycle as `self-starting' and `self-finishing'. It is therefore alleged that

one need not look outside the economic system for causes of the upper and lower turning points-that is, the points where the economy begins to turn down after a recovery or begins to turn up after a recession.^^2^^

Having excluded a qualitative analysis of the patterns of the capitalist mode of production, Neokeynesians cannot, because of that,

disclose the cause of the slower growth of consumption compared with growth of production (since consumption is limited under capitalism within the framework of the value of labour power and by the operations of monopolies and governments). During an industrial recovery, capitalist production expands rapidly, but the working people's effective demand is reduced relative to the increased volume of production. An economic crisis therefore inevitably follows recovery, when the overproduction of commodities makes itself felt. It is in cyclic crises that the contradiction between the tendency of capitalist production toward unlimited expansion and the limited character of effective demand is sharply manifested. But this contradiction itself, while the direct cause of crises, is the result and form of manifestation of the basic contradiction of capitalism, which capitalist economists strive to ignore.

Ignoring of the socio-economic characteristics of the capitalist production makes the accelerator-multiplier theory, on which the Neokeynesian model is built, erroneous. Neokeynesians do not correctly understand the link between growth of income and employment and growth of investment, which in turn, according to their acceleration principle, is a function of demand for consumer goods. In this they make two substantial errors.

(1) They seek the motives of the accumulation of capital in the sphere of consumption and in investors' psychology. But the main force pushing capitalists to accumulate capital and extend the scale of production is competition and the drive for surplus value. That is why accumulation of capital and expansion of production become an objective need for them. (2) Even when consumption grows, the effect of the acceleration principle, alleged to be cne of the main causes of cyclic fluctuations, also cannot be realised because a stimulation of consumption does not always have a multiplying effect, i.e. a multiplied growth of investment. Consumer demand, for example, in accordance with the cyclic character of capitalist production, can be satisfied by an unfreezing of `frozen' production capacity and unsold stocks of goods. An expansion of production can also come about, moreover, without taking on additional labour, through growth of the organic composition of capital and of the intensity of labour.

The class-apologetic sense of the Neokeynesian model of the cycle consists in its trying to resolve the problem of dynamic equilibrium of the capitalist economy and crises without abolishing the foundations of capitalism itself, and in presenting the capitalist mode of production as a system with unlimited opportunities for expanding production. That, precisely, is the aim pursued by Neokeynesian counter-cyclic programmes, in which the government plays the main role. The main means of counter-cyclic regulation of the economy became the policy of 'deficit financing', namely increasing government expenditure at a faster rate than public income, i.e. a financial

131

~^^1^^ E. Mansfield. Op. cit., p 213. ~^^2^^/Wd.,p214.

130

policy leading to growth of the amount of money in circulation and to its depreciation. As a rule this policy leads to a rise of prices. Entrepreneurs are interested in that since it gives a bigger return on invested capital and greater profits, insofar as the amount of money grows. At the same time share capital also grows through attraction of the cash of small investors, who prefer not to hold their money in a bank, where it may depreciate, but buy shares carrying increasing dividends. In addition, the increase of government expenditure paid for through an additional emission of money expands production and employment in industries working on public orders and contracts (especially military ones).

The Neokeynesians thus, in order to secure 'dynamic equilibrium', plan a small degree of government-controlled inflation (3 to 5 per cent a year) in advance, which converts a significant part of capital into active productive capital, and encourages accelerated turnover and accumulation of capital. With this creeping inflation 'built into' the process of accumulation, the monopolies strive to increase profits not only by increasing labour productivity, which outstrips growth of money wages, but also through rising prices even with a fall in demand.

Inflation, consequently, while temporarily stimulating an expanded production of capital through a higher yield of profits for capitalists, aggravates capitalism's eternal problem of sales even more, and ultimately leads to an ever greater limitation of the economic growth for whose sake it was 'built into' the system of state monopoly capitalism.

Western economists' main recommendation-expansion of demand via public debt---is extremely contradictory, since growth of the latter inevitably intensifies the inflationary process. Inflation has long since been converted from creeping to galloping and uncontrolled. The Neokeynesians' advice primarily hits the broad masses of the working people while, on the contrary, bringing the monopolies colossal profits, in particular those in the military-industrial complex.

In elucidating the main points of the Neokeynesian counter-cyclic programme, we must stress the great importance that Western economists attach to the policy of freezing wages in their recommendations for stabilising the capitalist economy, becouse many of them make growth of wages a cause of crises. In their view the result is an increase in costs of production, a lowering of capitalists' profits, and with it their 'propensity to invest', which also leads ultimately to a crisis and growth of unemployment. The Phillips curve is quite often used to substantiate these conclusions; according to it a reduction of unemployment involves inflation, which in turn causes a growth of unemployment and crisis.^^1^^ Prof. Phillips' own forecast for the level of

wages and prices, however, amounted to the following: that a stable level of prices would correspond to a level of unemployment a little under 2.5 per cent, assuming an annual increase in productivity of 2 per cent per annum.^^1^^

Thus capitalist economists, in explaining a crisis and unemployment by a fall in prices and contraction of profits, take the consequences for the cause, and slide about on the surface of phenomena, ignoring the main cause. The class bias of their counter-crisis advice is obvious. In the view of the French economist Piettre it is necessary to freeze growth of wages in order to freeze inflation, and for that purpose to keep unemployment at a certain level.^^2^^ Another French economist, Lionel Stole"ru, says that if tough measures are not taken when there is an acute crisis, 'the development of unemployment will throw the social and political structures into disarray'.^^3^^ The measures, of course, would cause a steep worsening in the workers' position. As for price controls, they prove to be ineffect'"e, since they do not in fact touch the main culprits of inflation the big monopolies. Phillips' idea, however, was unsound in practic-;, as well as theoretically, because the increase in inflation since the end of the 60s has gone hand in hand with a growth of unemployment nd stagnation of production. As Gunnar Myrdal has put it:

This is what has been called `stagflation', which is either an actual

reality or a threat in all countries.^^4^^

All this is evidence of the fruitlessness of Neokeynesians' attempts to build an effective counter-cyclic programme since they do not get down to the real causes of the capitalist economy's cyclic character.

3. The monetarist theory of the business cycle

Unlike the Neokeynesians, members of the monetarist school, headed by Milton Friedman, see the main cause of the economy's cyclic development in monetary factors, in a divergence between money demand and unstable money supply. This divergence, in their opinion, is directly due to and intensified by the Keynesian policy of stimulating effective demand. By exaggerating the significance and role of the market mechanism, they see the cause of crises and disproportions in the national economy in mounting government interference, and the mistaken policy of monetary institutions.

The monetarists draw their conclusions about the significance

~^^1^^ See A. W. H. Phillips. The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom. Economics 1958,25,100:299.

~^^2^^ Andre Piettre. Les grands problemes de I'economic contemporaine Vol 1 (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1976), p 287.

3 Lionel Stoleru. L'equilibre et la croissance economique. Principes de macroeconomie (Dunod, Paris, 1969), p 306.

~^^4^^ Gunnar Myrdal. Against the Stream. Critical Essays on Economics (The Macmillan Press, London, 1974), pp 25-26.

133

~^^1^^ See Felix Burdjalov. State Monopoly Incomes Policy. Translated by H.C. Creighton (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), pp 34-47.

132

of monetary factors as the primary cause of cyclic fluctuations of business activity from the shrinking and increase of cash reserves periodically experienced by the US economy. The main destabilising factor in the functioning of capitalism's allegedly 'basically stable' economy is seen as the practice of the US Federal Reserve System, which does not always correctly alter the volume of money in circulation and determine the character of business activity. A depression, in the view of Friedman and his followers, is caused by a steep reduction of money in circulation while an industrial recovery corresponds to an increase.

'•

In Keynesian and Neokeynesian theories the monetary factor is not given primary importance, but in monetarist ideas of the cycle, on the contrary, stability of money demand is of decisive importance, and it in turn is determined by stability of the propensity to save for purposes of obtaining a desired level of income. Consequently, in order to maintain this stability of money demand and so ensure normal functioning of the economy and price stability, a permanent rate of growth of money is needed. The monetarists reject the key importance of investment and the regulating role of the rate of interest in the Keynesian idea of the cycle. The main role in the mechanism of the effect of money on production is assigned to a change in the ratio between the level of national income and the stock of money. Stability of this ratio can (in Friedman's view) be disturbed by such factors as the political situation, government monetary policy, etc., which is a direct cause of the rise of instability in the capitalist economy. The change in the stock of money under the impact of some destabilising factors (e.g. the emission of money or raising of bank rate, causing a reduction of money in circulation) generates a corresponding reaction among the holders of accumulated assets and obligations, which quickly activises stock exchanges and commodity markets. From that there follows a change in the ratio of the prices of various assets and the rate of income yielded by them, which ultimately leads to a change in investment activity and consumer demand. The consequences of a change in the amount of money in circulation can thus be varied and evidence of the onset either of a slump or an industrial boom. But whatever happens, the monetarists say, the causal links have a monetary character.

This one-sided, unconvincing explanation of the causes of cyclic development of the economy does not even satisfy many Western economists; the `quantity' theory of money on which the monetarist theory of the cycle is based has been called `crude' by Gunnar Myrdal because it

quite obviously excludes consideration even of many `economic' factors which already ... were known to have importance, and can therefore not be correct.^^1^^

The dissatisfaction of Western critics with monetarist theory is due to the vague interpretation of this theory's main point, viz., the significance of monetary factors for capitalist reproduction. For the monetarists it depends on the time factor. They consider the effect of monetary factors on the cycle extraordinary only for the short time interval during which the change from upswing to slump occurs; in the longer run the change in the amount of money has no substantial significance for the production process. The monetarists also introduce confusion and muddle into understanding of the length of the short time interval-from six to nine months to five to ten years. In their scheme entrepreneurs who take a decision about the production of goods orient themselves on the quantity of money, evaluated by its actual purchasing power, rather than on the nominal quantity of monetary units in circulation. Any change in the amount of money in circulation therefore brings about a change in the purchasing power of money, allowing for demand and prices, a corresponding decision by entrepreneurs, and a change of the later produced mass of goods in terms of money. The significance of monetary factors is thus reduced, in essence, to a change of prices.

The bankruptcy of the monetarist conception of the business cycle needs to be noted particularly on the methodological plane, which shows up in a subjective idealist approach to economic phenomena. Its adherents try to explain^^1^^ such inherent deficiencies of capitalism as crises, inflation, unemployment, balance of payments deficits, etc., simply by governments' incorrect monetary policy. The cyclic development of the capitalist economy, and all the negative consequences stemming from it, are due in fact not to the mistaken actions of national financial bodies but to deeper processes generated by aggravation of the main contradiction of capitalism. Failure to understand that leads to the search for the causes of cyclic fluctuations being limited simply to the sphere of circulation. This methodological approach---denial of the primacy of production---is typical of the whole of Western economic science as well as of the monetarists.

By not bringing out the deep-rooted contradictions of capitalist production and the circulation sphere, Western economists confuse cause and effect. They rightly note the important role of money for economic development, but exaggerate its significance enormously, which leads to distortion of the cause-and-effect link between the dynamics of capitalist production and change in the amount of money. In fact it is not the change in the amount of money in circulation that governs the cyclic movement of capitalist production, but the converse; an industrial upswing leads, as a rule, to an increase in the quantity of money in the channels of circulation, and a crisis to a reduction.

The apologetic essence of monetarist theory of crises consists in its attempts to demonstrate the viability of the capitalist system, and its possibility of crisis-free, dynamic development through some sort

135

~^^1^^ Gunnar Myrdal. Op. cit., p 27.

134

of `rational' monetary policy. But a policy of monetary control is unable to save capitalism from disproportions of reproduction associated with the economy's cyclic development, generated by the main contradiction of this mode of production, which is confirmed by the ineffective policy of ensuring smooth growth of the amount of money (3 or 4 per cent a year) that was taken into the arsenal of the central banks of capitalist countries at the end of the 60s. On the threshold of the world economic crisis of 1974-5 it turned out that the banks could not follow the advice of the monetarists to control monetary growth rates and so avoid a cyclic crisis. It was the 60s and 70s that had the most acute crisis of the capitalist monetary and financial system, and were characterised by inability to overcome the effect of various elemental factors on the reproduction process, i.e. inflation, steep fluctuations of bank interest rates, and so on.

THE INTERPRETATION OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

1. Concepts of monopoly

Marxist-Leninist and capitalist political economy understand the causes of the development, essence, and socio-economic consequences of the dominance of capitalist monopolies from opposite standpoints.

From the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist economic science the development of monopoly is a normal, regular result of the concentration and centralisation of production and capital, reflecting the immense process of the socialisation of production. A monopoly, by which is primarily meant an industrial monopoly, is a large capitalist undertaking or association of enterprises that concentrates vast means of production, exploits the most developed part of the aggregate labour force, controls a significant part of the production and sale of output in one or more industries, affects prices through that, and secures monopoly profit. A monopoly is created in production, is manifested on the market, and becomes consolidated through the market. Marxist-Leninist political economy treats the dominance of monopoly as a decisive factor in the instability, social parasitism, and decay of capitalism, and in the maturing of the material preconditions for abolishing it.

In capitalist political economy monopoly is investigated by the neoclassical and institutional-social trends. From the standpoint of neoclassicism its development is a consequence of a firm's exceptionally favourable position on the market, which may come about through the action of the most varied factors. Monopoly is treated as a purely market situation in which a firm operates as a monopoly-in the sale of some product, as a consequence of other firms being unable to supply a similar product. The consequences of the prevalence of monopolies are therefore studied only from the angle of their effect on prices.

The institutional-social trend starts its investigation of capitalist monopoly from the organisational and technical advantages of largescale production rather than market relations. The following features are ascribed to monopolies: planning and the overcoming of anarchy;

137

adaptation to the needs of technical progress; high effectiveness of capital investment; exceptional efficiency of the system of management. These advantages are explained as the decisive factor, which is alleged to eliminate the capitalist, exploiter nature of big modern corporations.

The neoclassical interpretation is most common in the specialised and theoretical economic literature and textbooks. Spokesmen of this trend examine three main forms of monopoly power on the market: pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly.

The term 'pure monopoly' was first introduced by Marshall in opposition to the concept 'pure competition', and is interpreted as a situation in which there is only one seller of a certain good or service on the market, and there is no substitute for it. Monopoly is consequently presented simply as a firm's possession of exceptional advantages of some sort rattier than as the outcome of shifts in the system of social production caused by the concentration of production and capital. The causes giving rise to monopoly are analysed accordingly: a firm controls sources of primary products that cannot be obtained anywhere else; a firm has such low costs of production, transportation, or marketing as to wholly control the whole market for a given commodity, which it sells at exceptionally low prices impossible for other companies; a firm sells a commodity the area of whose sale is limited; a firm owns a patent on the production of a certain product, or on a new technology for making a product, that others do not have; a firm receives the exclusive right from the government to supply a certain commodity or service.

The conclusion following from this list is as follows: a firm becomes a monopoly when it acquires certain advantages that it alone possesses, by which it completely eliminates competition. From this exceptional position it gets 'monopoly power', which is displayed in an 'ability to influence the market price by control of the supply of a commodity'.^^1^^ In this interpretation, however, capitalist monopoly is converted in general into an unhistorical phenomenon. (1) The reasons listed for the rise of 'monopoly power' are of a purely technical and economic character without connection with capitalist relations of production. (2) Supply and price were controlled by both the mediaeval guild and the great merchant companies that were granted a monopoly of the right to trade with colonies in the epoch of the `primitive' accumulation of capital.

The term 'pure monopoly', which reflects the most superficial relations on the market, plays a very important role in Western economic literature. It hides the cause-and-effect links between concentration of production, on the one hand, and the forming of capitalist monopolies on the other. 'Pure monopoly' is depicted as the very

rare case of a firm's exceptionally favourable position on the market, and by virtue of that is not extended to the giant corporations that actually monopolise production, financial resources, and markets. Bradley, for example, considers it incorrect to apply the term ' monopoly' to General Motors, U.S. Steel, Alcoa, and other very big firms. At the same time, in his view,

a very small firm can be a monopolist if it is the only firm in the market. The only hardware store and the only barber in a small town, for example, are monopolists. *

Possession of a 'pure monopoly' being a rarity, Western authors counterpose to it the term 'monopolistic firm'. C.L. Cole, for instance, writes:

A monopolistic firm (as distinguished from a firm that is a pure monopoly) is an enterprise that has some degree of monopoly power; that power, generally speaking, is the ability to exercise some control over price.^^2^^

Interpretations of firms like that have found embodiment in conceptions of monopolistic competition and oligopoly.

The theorists of monopolistic competition recognise the existence of many sellers of 'differentiated products', by which they mean a diversity of the use value of goods, a broad development of advertising, and, to some extent, price manipulation. The following are usually taken as the most typical features of monopolistic competition: a large number of sellers and customers on the market; freedom of access to the market; perfect information; a variety of products being marketed. As a result a market of 'competing monopolies' takes shape in which the `classic' form of competition through pnce manipulation loses its significance relatively and opportunities are provided for a certain control over prices.

These features of competition also existed under pre-monopoly capitalism. Lenin, for example, when analysing the development of capitalism in Russia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, remarked that not only capitalists but even cottage craftsmen strove in every way to secure themselves a monopoly position on the market.^^3^^ Under imperialism, however, the significance of product differentiation as a method of competition increases substantially with the general change in the character of competition, the latter being repeatedly emphasised by Lenin. On the one hand this was because of the objective tendency toward an intensified development of needs, which accelerated in the twentieth century; on the other hand, it was due to the acute aggravation of the problem of reali-

1 Michael Bradley. Economics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview Dl 1980), p 260.

2 Charles L. Cole. Microeconomics: A Contemporary Approach (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1973), p 261.

3 V.I. Lenin. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Collected Works Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp 338-339.

139

p80.

~^^1^^ John A.Perrow. Economics (University Tutorial Press, London, 1975),

138

sation, and correspondingly of the monopolies' commercial policy aimed specially at differentiating their products from those of rivals, so as to choke them off.

The founder of the theory of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin, wrote, describing the interconnection of monopoly and product differentiation:

With differentiation appears monopoly, and as it proceeds further the element of monopoly becomes greater. Where there is any degree of differentiation whatever, each seller has an absolute monopoly of his own product, but is subject to the competition of more or less imperfect substitutes. *

Product differentiation is a really sharp weapon of competition, but its relation with monopoly in the theory of monopolistic competition is treated in a one-sided way: monopoly appears as the result of differentiation. In fact, however, the intensification of product differentiation is itself largely the consequence of the biggest corporations' monopolistic dominance. Their monopolisation of the market obliges smaller firms to produce, and correspondingly throw on to the market, goods that differ in some way from those made in the monopoly's plants. Modification of the use value of certain commodities, the making of new or pseudo-new goods, orientation on narrow specialisation so as to adapt to the needs of the market, i.e. product differentiation, become the means of survival of small and mediumsized firms, but cannot become the basis of monopoly market power for them. The monopolies themselves resort to product differentiation as a method of competition in their fight with one another, and as a weapon for choking off outsiders and forcing them out of the market. For the monopolies it is an active instrument for attacking rivals. They have greater opportunities of repeated modification of practically any commodity, which ensures them a sometimes real, but in most cases fancied non-interchangeability with the former product, and a rapid expansion of output of this modified product on a mass scale. In the theory of monopolistic competition, however, these processes are depicted as shaped by monopoly itself, allegedly originating from successful adaptation of the differentiated product to consumers' individual tastes. A firm gets monopolistic control over the market because consumers begin to prefer the individual properties of one type of product to another's-such is the conclusion to which this theory leads. The existence and development of monopolies is thus reduced to the sphere of market relations and interpreted from subjective positions, while the qualitative difference between giant corporations and small companies is wiped out. Samuelson, for instance, treats all companies engaged in retail trade-small producers, sellers of tooth paste, and conglomerates-as a single type of compet-

ition, on a basis of differentiated products. *

The theorists of oligopoly start from the point that conditions develop in an industry by which a few firms share the market between them. The French economist Antoine Cournot is considered the founder of this theory. His central idea was that the decisive feature of oligopoly was the interaction of several rival firms, which can be traced in all subsequent conceptions of oligopoly. Chamberlin first suggested the idea in relation to the conditions of monopoly capitalism. Oligopoly was originally treated as unrelated to the size of the companies involved in dividing up the market, but subsequently, especially since World War II, Western economists have recognised the existence of 'concentrated oligopoly', i.e. of big companies sharing the market between them. The American economists Heilbroner and Thurow, for example, write:

In an oligopolistic market situation, a few sellers divide the market and typically compete with one another by means of advertising, product differentiation, service, etc.^^2^^

The following are usually listed by Western economists as the most important features of oligopoly: a small number of oligopolistic companies; large-scale production (relative to the total volume of the market); the firms' mutual dependence on the oligopolistic market; the existence of barriers to invasion of the market by potential new rivals. These features do, in fact, characterise the real conditions, and the investigation of them in the specialist economic literature is distinguished by an interesting analysis of the movement of the costs of the major corporations, their methods of competition, the organisation of marketing, price-fixing, and so on.

Several of the theorists of oligopoly, e.g., Stigler, Fellner, Scherer, admit certain negative aspects of oligopoly; viz., the striving of oligopolistic firms to reach an understanding with one another on prices or volume of production; the existence of idle capacity; lavish expenditure on advertising, and so on. But oligopoly is evaluated on the whole as a positive phenomenon of modern capitalist reality. On the political-economic plane an oligopolistic structure of the market is considered as the creation of conditions, on the one hand, for eliminating all the negative aspects of monopoly and, on the other, for overcoming the anarchic consequences of free competition through the elimination of small firms. No one big company can be converted into a pure monopoly with oligopoly, or fix a monopoly price and secure monopoly profits for itself. Each firm allegedly endeavours to employ all its resources as fully as possible, to raise labour productivity more quickly, to introduce the latest advances of science and engineering, and to redesign and renew the product.

~^^1^^ See Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill New York 1973), p 489.

~^^2^^ Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow. The Economic Problem 4th ed. (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), p 179.

141

~^^1^^ Edward H. Chamberlin. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1933), pp 8-9.

140

A special trend of oligopoly theory has even appeared in the American economic literature, based on conclusions about the superiority of an oligopolistic structure of the market when there are very big corporations in it, i.e. the idea of effective competition, on the shaping of which the institutional-social trend has had appreciable influence. The originators of the idea of effective competition--- Schumpeter, J.M. Clark, and Abraham Kaplan-said that the existence of a few big corporations occupying a decisive position on the market created conditions of effective competition that provided an optimum basis for the development of social production.^^1^^

The theory of effective competition is very popular among contemporary Western economists. At the same time there are two differing approaches to its theoretical substantiation. One is marked by a frank apologia for the dominance of monopolies and declarations that the modern system of operation of big corporations is effective competition in action. Lafayette Harter, for example, writes:

America's large industries can be better characterized as oligopolies rather than monopolies... It is this fact which is of special significancenot exploitation, inefficiency, or the other usual objections to monopoly.^^2^^

The adherents of this trend oppose the attempts to control the operations of monopolies that are undertaken by Western governments in order to limit the disruptive consequences of their diktat on the economy.^^3^^

A subtler, more disguised defence of monopoly capital is typical of the other approach. Quite a few economists realise that it is a very complicated business to try and present monopoly, with its habit of raising prices and falsifying products, pushing unwanted goods onto the consumer, and exorbitant interest on consumer credit, as a force aimed at raising social prosperity. They are therefore obliged to admit its negative aspects, which are treated as a phenomenon inherited from the past, periodically arising, and in principle easily eliminated. Samuelson, for example, admits that

in appraising oligopoly we must note that the desire of corporations to earn a fair return on their past investments can at times be at variance with the well-being of the consumer.^^4^^

It is concluded from that that, to achieve 'effective competition', it is necessary to eliminate the negative aspects of concentrated oligopo-

~^^1^^ See J.M. Clark. Competition as a Dynamic Process (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1961); A.D. Kaplan. Big Enterprise in a Competitive System (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1954), J.A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (Allen &Unwin, London, 1943).

~^^2^^ Lafayette G. Harter. Economic Responses to a Changing World (Scott Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111., 1973), p 216.

~^^3^^ See B. Greaves (compiler). Free Market Economies. A Basic Reader (The Foundation for Economic Education, New York, 1975), p 163.

~^^4^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 519.

ly and stimulate development of its positive sides. When the undesirable features of the operations of Big Business are finally eliminated, Daniel Fusfeld declares, 'a system of supercorporations may be effective'.^^1^^

.

Western economic thought puts special stress, tor achieving conditions of effective competition, on the use of anti-trust legislation, emphasising that it would be enough to work out 'rational rules' for corporations' operations and make the best use of them in practice, since that would eliminate all the adverse aspects of monopoly, and production would be wholly subordinated to meeting the ne'eds of the public. The contemporary practice of anti-trust control, according to Solmon, for example, assumes that 'monopolies should not exist and should not be allowed to form'.^^2^^ But by monopoly is „ meant, here, pure monopoly, and the very important point is ignored that concentrated oligopoly is in fact a group monopoly with the character of a hidden cartel whose members, while fighting one another for a share of the market and the industry's profit (which also takes place with a different degree of intensity under the classic cartel), at the same time jointly oppose possible new competitors, carry out a joint monopolistic raising of prices, and unite in exploiting the working people both as producers and as consumers. As a consequence of government anti-tryst pressures on Big Business a kind of 'workable competition' should develop (a term introduced by J.M. Clark and now being used more and more for effective competition). But what, concretely, this 'workable competition' should be, Western economists are unable to explain. Bradley's admission in this respect is significant:

Modern anti-trust policies seek to achieve something called workable competition in our imperfectly competitive economy. Workable competition sounds like a reasonable and desirable goal, but defining it in meaningful terms is difficult.^^3^^

Oligopoly theory only outwardly recognises a number of actual features of modern capitalism. In its content, however, it represents a defence of monopoly capitalism. (1) Its adherents quite incorrectly characterise the process of concentration of production, treating it simply in relation to production and sale of the individual product. In fact, however, the typical agent of modern large-scale capitalist production is the diversified concern striving to monopolise ' the production and marketing of not just one product but of dozens and even hundreds of types of item simultaneously both within the national economy and on an international scale. Each of the 200 biggest U.S. corporations operates on average in 20 sub-sectors of industry. The Ford Motor Company, for example, not only produces

1 Daniel Fusfeld. Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1972),p 616.

~^^2^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Economics, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Reading, Mass., 1976), p 619.

.1 Michael Bradley. Op. cit., p 311.

143 142

motor vehicles but also makes tractors, communications and electronic systems for industrial and military purposes, steel, glass, etc.1 General Dynamics Corporation is a producer of military and civil aircraft, missiles, aerospace systems, submarines, commercial ships, computers, telecommunication equipment, asbestos, building materials, etc.^^2^^ Oligopoly theory, consequently, hides the real scale of the concentration of capitalist production. (2) The theorists' stress simply on the market aspect of competition leaves out analysis of the development of very important forms of the monopolistic concentration and centralisation of capital, based on extension of financial links and dependencies. Concerns and conglomerates predominate among the biggest corporations, i.e. forms of monopolistic association based on a system of financial control. Competition therefore also takes the form of a financial strangling of rivals and swallowing of their assets. Thus, whereas the total assets of the major industrial corporations of the USA (with assets of $10 million and more each) absorbed by bigger companies were $32.4 billion in 1948-66, they were already more than $78.1 billion in 1967-77.3 The degree of monopoly power of concerns and conglomerates is consequently determined by their financial power and not just by the level of concentration of production; and their financial power itself largely depends on their connections with banks, insurance companies, and other financial and credit institutions. Finally, oligopoly theory sows the reactionary illusions of capitalist reformism about the possibility of getting rid of modern capitalism's ulcers through anti-trust control.

The term 'finance capital' was first proposed by Rudolf Hilferding, one of the leaders of the Second International, in his book of that title, which he published in 1910 when he was still a Marxist.1 In that work, however, he had already made theoretical mistakes of a kind that subsequently led him to a complete break with Marxism.^^2^^

Hilferding on the whole drew the correct conclusion that the latest phase in the development of capitalism, which set in at the turn of the century, was an epoch of consolidation of the influence of finance capital. But he included a mistaken idea in his concept ' finance capital' for which he was subjected to principled criticism by Lenin.^^3^^

Lenin, of course, saw the history of the rise of finance capital in the concentration of production and monopoly, which arose on the basis of it, and in the merging or coalescence of banking monopoly capital with the capital of industrial monopolies.^^4^^ Hilferding's mistaken interpretation of the essence of finance capital sprang from his ignoring of the decisive significance of the process of production in relation to circulation, and his exaggeration on that basis of the role of banking capital in the economic affairs of capitalist society. By finance capital Hilferding meant

banking capital, consequently capital in money form, which is transformed in practice into industrial capital.^^5^^

This one-sided, absolutised understanding inevitably led him to the incorrect conclusion that banks were 'in the end becoming the masters of industry'.^^6^^ Another vital mistake of his was to deny finance capital's link with opportunism and the split in the labour movement. His incorrect understanding of the essence of finance capital led him to an open break with Marxism, expressed in propaganda for the reformist idea of 'organised capitalism'.

Subsequently neither the ideologists of Social Democracy nor capitalist economists attempted a special theoretical presentation of the essence of finance capital. The problem is ignored by Western economic science since it touches on a holy of holies of sorts of the real dominance of monopolies, namely their monopolistic relations and agreements. At the same time individual economists sometimes publish sensational information on the financial links of certain corporations, banks, and families of the financial oligarchy, disclosing the concrete ways and methods by which they exercise their domination over society. Theoretical excursuses analysing the financial interdependencies created by monopoly capital are very seldom

~^^1^^ See Rudolf Hilferding. Das Finanz/capital (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1955).

~^^2^^ See V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 15.

~^^3^^ Ibid., pp 44-45. Idem. Notebooks on Imperialism, Collected Works Vol. 39 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 202.

~^^4^^ V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, pp 44-45, 83

~^^5^^ Rudolf Hilferding. Op. cit., p 335. ~^^6^^/«</., p 337.

2. The interpretation of finance capital

The term 'finance capital' is employed in Marxist-Leninist and capitalist political economy in relation to different categories. In Marxist-Leninist economic science it is the predominant form of capital under imperialism, arising from the merging of monopolistic industrial and monopolistic banking capital. In the views of Western economists finance capital is the aggregate of the cash and securities (shares, stocks, etc.) at the disposal of a capitalist enterprise. At the same time one sometimes comes across a description, in the works of individual economists, of phenomena of modern capitalist reality that can be defined as the capitalist notion of finance capital, understood as the dominant form of capital.

~^^1^^ See Moody's Indusrlal Manual, 19SO, Vol. 1 (Moody's Investors Service, New York, 1980), pp 1120, 1121.

^^2^^ Ibid., p 2191.

~^^3^^ Calculated from Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions (Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978), p 120.

144 145

met. In the USA, in particular, literally only one or two of the several dozen textbooks of economics published during the 70s contained a cursory description of the financial links and dependencies created by the industrial monopolies and biggest banks, although (by the admission of the writers of the textbooks themselves) this is a very characteristic feature of the American economy. Examples are the textbooks of Daniel Fusfeld and Roger Chisholm and Marilu McCarty. Let us consider how American economists writing for students approach the problem of finance capital, using them as examples.

Fusfeld says first of all that, in the modern capitalist economy, the biggest banks, insurance companies, and private pension funds control big holdings of shares, establish links with one another, and with other, non-financial firms. On that basis 'corporate interest groups' are formed concentrated around major banks. Recognition of the existence of 'corporate interest groups' is nothing else than a capitalist interpretation of the existence of financial monopolistic groups, but Fusfeld does not go beyond stating their existence. What are the causes for the formation of these groups, what is their function, and what their role in society's economic affairs, are all left out of account. The economist, moreover, declares that 'corporate interest groups' were most characteristic of the 30s, but are now simply retained for incomprehensible reasons. Fusfeld writes for instance: Although the economy has changed quite sharply since the years of the Great Depression, and firms have grown, changed, and merged, and whole new industries have appeared, nevertheless the pattern of corporate interest groups continues. *

Great attention is paid to the links between corporations, based on a listing of directorships.

One of the most important ways in which large corporations are related to each other is through a common, or interlocking body of directors.^^2^^

One of the forms of realising the dominance of the financial oligarchy is thus said to be the personal union, but its special features are clarified once more on the whole with the market approach typical of capitalist economic thinking. Fusfeld analyses in what cases such interlocking is legal from the standpoint of market competition, and in which illegal, and explains the cases in which the process is controlled by anti-monopoly legislation. Chisholm and McCarty go further, remarking that the interlocking may not necessarily be direct; it may have an indirect form through a link with 'a financial institution such as an insurance firm or bank'.^^3^^

Fusfeld correctly notes the fact that, in spite of the outward independence of big corporations from the financial markets, the

~^^1^^ Daniel Fusfeld. Op. cit., p 575.

^^2^^ Ibid., p 516.

^^3^^ Roger Chisholm and Marilu McCarty. Principles of Microeconomics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, HI., 1978), p 136.

146

corporation management is nevertheless under considerable influence by the financial sector. He rightly sees the reason in the fact that major holdings of shares are concentrated in banks, pension funds, and insurance companies, which thereby get the opportunity to put pressure on industrial corporations and their managements. But that is only one side of the matter. The other side---namely the effect of industrial monopolies on financial and credit institutions, which, combined with the phenomenon noted above, generates mutual tendency to amalgamation or merging of the two monopolistic forces-remains outside the field of view of this economist. In his interpretations Hilferding's mistaken idea that banks establish domination over industry is conspicuous. In fact it is not the banks by themselves, and other financial and credit institutions, that are the lords of the modern capitalist economy, but it is finance capital and the financial oligarchy, in whose hands these institutions are along with industrial and other monopolies, that are the most important instruments of domination over the economic affairs of capitalist society.

The crowning element of Fusfeld's conception is the Business Elite, which constitutes

a cadre of perhaps five thousand to ten thousand persons: top executives, members of the boards of directors, partners in big law and accounting firms, chief executives of important financial institutions.l This is nothing else, in fact, than recognition of the existence of a financial oligarchy. Fusfeld, however, does not study it by the role that the persons included in the cadre play in the system of finance capital's domination, but by quite other attributes, e.g., domicile, religion, education, etc.

The present-day capitalist treatment of finance capital and the financial oligarchy in fact thus includes recognition only of their outward forms, i.e. what lies on the surface, hits one in the eye, and can no longer be hidden. A propos of this kind of research by capitalist economists Lenin wrote that

the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up, written from the bourgeois point of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture and criticism-petty-bourgeois, naturally-of this oligarchy.^^2^^

The essence of finance capital and its real place in the system of imperialism is, at the same time, carefully hidden by Western economic thought.

One of the most popular conceptions in Western economic literature, that aim at camouflaging the power of financial magnates,

~^^1^^ Daniel Fusfeld. Op. cit., p 578.

~^^2^^ V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, p 45.

147

is the theory of the 'managerial system'. This thesis is based on the idea that a radical `democratisation' of management of the economy takes place under monopoly capitalism with the result that the class of capitalists shirks its responsibilities and leadership, and direction passes to managers, who direct the undertakings in the interests of society as a whole and not for the sake of profit. The directors and executives of joint-stock companies are singled out as a new, ' noncapitalist' class living on salaries, guided by the interests of expanding production and concerned with raising the standard of living of the working people.

These arguments are based on a deep-rooted methodological error: analysis of the relations of production is replaced by an analysis of administrative and technical relations. The decisive relations in the relations of production are those of ownership of the means of production. In spite of the fact that the engineering and technical intelligentsia, lawyers, and economists perform the function of management of joint-stock companies, big capitalists are the owners of them.

The thorough analysis of the nature and essence of managerial work under capitalism made in the works of Marx and Lenin completely explodes the notions of the theorists of the managerial revolution. As Lenin wrote:

It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions. *

This thesis is fully supported by both American and West European reality. The managers of joint-stock companies have only a relatively free hand, and ultimately fulfil the will of the major shareholders and the financial oligarchy.

The adherents of the 'managerial system' say that the owners of capital play only the passive role of drawers of dividends. But in fact,

the business publication Fortune estimates that at least 150 of the nation's [USA's-Auth. ] 500 largest corporations are controlled by one individual or a few members of a single family.^^2^^

At the same time it is quite illegitimate to counterpose managers to capitalists, to consider them a special social class because top executives are closely merged with the financial oligarchy and even included in the latter as a special part of the monopoly capitalist class.

The American economist Frederick Pryor admits that

the managers may have effective control of the corporation but they have a sufficiently large ownership stake in the corporation and their compensation is sufficiently tied to profits that they are encouraged to maximize the same values as the owners.^^1^^

The top echelons of executives also receive other rewards for faithful service to the oligarchy: various kinds of bonuses, grants of big blocks of shares either gratis or at less than the market price, and so on. Thus, on the one hand, the big capitalists often occupy the top posts in management of capitalist business; on the other hand individual members of the 'managerial elite' are converted into big capitalists. It is absurd to say that the administrations of joint-stock companies drive to expand production in order to satisfy the needs of society as a whole. Both the top and the lower executives serve capital, being simply well-paid servants of the financial magnates.

The theory of diffusing ownership has an important place in the apologia of finance capital; its essence is that as capitalism develops, a radical change takes place in the character of ownership, expressed in a diffusion of property among the broad masses through the dissemination of stocks and shares. Solmon puts it thus:

As corporations grew larger, management continued to finance the growth by selling more and more shares of stock to the public.

Slowly, corporate ownership passed from the hands of foundtag owner-managers into the hands of millions of American households, who invested their savings in corporate stocks.2 Such ideas have become common in a number of capitalist countries.

The thesis of the transformation of capitalist ownership into `collective' or 'people's ownership' distorts capitalist reality. The diffusion of shares is largely a specific means of increasing the number of small shareholders and transferring the savings of the working people to the disposition of the magnates of finance capital. Samuelson, for example, stresses that

the most striking feature is the diversification of ownership among thousands and thousands of small stockholders. In the 1970s, more than 3 million different people have shares in AT&T. To be sure, half these people have less than 15 shares each; one-quarter of the shares are held in blocks of less than 100 shares; and no single owner has as much as 1 percent of the total.^^3^^

The spread of 'people's shares' is taken as evidence that the workers, by acquiring a few shares, are being converted into capitalists, `co-owners' of capital. Says Samuelson:

1 Frederick L. Pryor. Property and Industrial Organisation in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Indiana U.P., Bloomington, Ind., 1973), p 117.

^^2^^ Lewis C. Solmon. Op. cit., p 97.

~^^3^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., pp 112-13.

149

~^^1^^V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., p 56.

~^^2^^ R. Chisholm and M. McCarty. Op. cit., p 136.

148

The Stock Exchange has a goal of 'people's capitalism', in which the masses have appreciable ownership of society's capital. While more than 35 million people [in the USA-Auth. ] do own some common stocks, still less than 1 in 10 gets an appreciable return from such ownership.^^1^^

As follows from this, the postulate that broad distribution of shares creates 'people's capitalism' because 'almost everyone is a capitalist' is a direct distortion of the facts.

The crisis of 1974-5 struck a heavy blow at this theory. In the USA, for example, the number of shareholders with an income less than $15,000 a year fell by half between 1970 and 1975, from 18 million to nine million.^^2^^

The system of shareholding does not lead to conversion of capitalist ownership into people's ownership, but to its ever greater concentration in the hands of the financial oligarchy. Lenin, stressing, the apologetic character of the theory of the 'democratisation of capital', wrote (back in 1902):

What the abundance of these small depositors signifies is not the decentralisation of big capital but the strengthening of the power of big capital, which is able to dispose of even the smallest mites in the 'people`s' savings.~^^3^^

3. The export of capital

The methodology developed by Lenin in ideological struggle against the views of spokesmen of capitalist liberalism like Hobson, on the one hand, and outright apologists of imperialism, on the other, is of the greatest importance for analysing the views of non-Marxian economists on the nature and modern features of the export of capital. Characterising the essence, causes, and forms of the export of capital, and its effect on the exporting and importing countries, Lenin showed that the scientific analysis of it is based on clarification of the process and the antagonistic contradictions of capitalist reproduction, and the modifications of them caused by the development of capitalism to a higher, monopoly stage.

The capitalist treatment of the causes and mechanism of the export of capital and its consequences is represented by various theories. The first one historically was the neoclassical theory of the international movement of capital, formulated in the early 1930s in the work of Ohlin (Sweden),^^4^^ Iversen (Denmark),^^5^^ and Nurkse

~^^1^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 113.

2 Calculated from Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Governemcnt Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979), p 544.

~^^3^^ V.I. Lenin. From the Economic Life of Russia. Collected Works, Vol. 6 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 94.

~^^4^^ See Bertil Ohlin. Interregional and International Trade. Revised edition (Harvard U.P.. Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

~^^5^^ See Carl Iversen. Aspects of the Theory of International Capital Movements (Harvard U.P., Copenhagen-London, 1935).

150

(Austria-USA),^^1^^ who eclectically absorbed the views of many economists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and were particularly influenced by the views of Marshall, J.B Clark, Wicksell Bohm-Bawerk, and other marguialists. To explain the causes of the international mobility of capital, they took their stand on the idea of the marginal productivity of capital, emphasising that this expressed in the rate of interest, was mainly caused by umdentical amounts (unidentical `abundances') of capital in one country or another. The `abundance' and corresponding `scarcity' of capital in different national economies generated a constant migration of capital from countries in which its marginal productivity was low to those where it was high, a migration that went on until this marginal productivity was equal in all countries, with the result that there was a rise in the efficiency of the factors of production, a growth of national income, and a convergence of the level of economic development of all countries.

A most important theoretical postulate of this `general' theory, as well, was the thesis that the international movement of capital and world trade were counterposed to each other and interchangeable, from which it followed that the volume of world trade fell when there was an increase in the scale of capital exports, while there would be a diminution of the export and import of capital, on the contrary, when trade between countries rose. This thesis, however, proved to be at variance with the teal development of the world capitalist economy, in which 'the export of capital thus becomes a means of encouraging the export of commodities'.^^2^^ Western economists, while forced to admit a simultaneous growth of both commodity and capital exports, tried to explain this by the existence of restrictions and obstacles of various kinds: an increase of capital exports was explained by limitations on international trade, and an increase in world trade was linked, in turn, with restrictions on the international movement of capital.

Although the neoclassical theory of the international migration of capital reflects certain real phenomena, it interprets their relations of cause and effect in a very superficial, distorted way. (1) When Western economists take a stand of defenders of the capitalist system, they are unable to admit that the need for capital exports is due to the contradictions of capitalist reproduction. The effect of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which is a moire concrete manifestation of the deep antagonist contradictions of capitalist extended reproduction, inevitably causes the development of surplus capital on the one hand, and a surplus working population, on the other. The movement of interest (or of the 'marginal

~^^1^^ See Ragnar Nurkse. Causes and Effects of Capital Movements. In Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy. Economic Essays by Ragnar Nurkse (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1961).

~^^2^^ V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, p 62.

151

productivity' of capital as the neoclassicists term it) is only a very superficial form of the reflection of a surplus of capital. The dominance of monopolies generates a chronic underexploitation of productive capacities, multimillion unemployment, the appearance of a huge mass of surplus money capital seeking profitable application both within a country and abroad. (2) The economists' attempts to get round the socio-economic problems engendered by the export of capital are also quite unsound. Under imperialism the export of capital is a most important instrument of monopolistic domination on an international scale. The whole history of the penetration of underdeveloped countries by foreign capital is evidence, on the contrary, that it intensifies a one-sided development of the economy in them as a rule; they are converted into appendages of the imperialist powers; and they lose immense funds, so necessary to finance national capital investment, in the form of profits and interest transferred abroad. According to available estimates, the grand total of developing countries' investment payments (profits, dividends, interest, and amortisation of capital debt) exceeded 111 billion dollars in 1981. A divergence of levels of economic development rather than a convergence is characteristic of the world capitalist economy.

In today's circumstances the neoclassical conception of the international movement of capital has taken various amended, modified forms aiming to explain the contradictions of the world capitalist economy caused by the imperialist expansion of capital in a way acceptable to the capitalist class, and to prove the possibility of overcoming them. Some versions have disappeared from the literature since they proved to be at variance with the changing interests of finance capital caused by new shifts in world economic relations. Others, especially when they have a quite marked apologetic bias, continue to be popularised. The thesis of neoclassical theory, for instance, that the international movement of capital equalises the marginal productivity of capital in the contracting countries, has served as the foundation for a theoretical model of the 'optimisation of capital exports and imports'. The British economists McDougall and Jasay tried to explain the gains and losses made by foreign investors on the one hand, and the sphere (country) of application of capital on the other, by employing certain variants of J.B. Clark's schemes, in which (depending on the conditions set) income from capital or income from labour functions as marginal product. They ultimately concluded that government control of the international movement of capital, by means of an optimum tax on the interest and profits received or paid, was needed.^^1^^ Another version of the same model is based on the postulate of the opposition and mutual

~^^1^^ See G.D. McDougall. The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach. The Economic Record, 1960, Vol. 36, No. 73; A.E. Jasay. The Social Choice between Home and Overseas Investment' The Economic Journal, 1960, Vol. 70, No. 277.

152

dependence of world trade and the international movement of capital, and the possibility of controlling them by various kinds of restriction. The introduction of government restrictions on the export or import of capital (in the form, for example, of a high tax on profits received from abroad, or on the profits of foreign capitalists in the country) is considered a stimulus to a steep extension of international trade. Conversely, the imposition of artificial barriers to commodity exports or imports (high tariffs or quantitative restrictions) is interpreted as a way of increasing the scale of the international movement of capital.'

The authors of models for 'optimising capital exports and imports' abstract the most important patterns of modern capitalism, namely: the dominance of monopolies and finance capital; and the aggravation of the unevenness of capitalism's development, which cannot be overcome by controls of any kind. They start from the principles of government restrictions on the free movement of capital and consequently are obliged to reject one of the most important theses of neoclassical theory, i.e. that the most rational distribution of the factors of production is established spontaneously as a consequence of the international movement of capital. In the 70s, however, this conception, which is an idealised theoretical model of state monopoly control of external economic expansion, proved to be at variance with the operations of the modern international monopolies, which have sometimes production and marketing branches and subsidiaries in dozens of countries. It therefore began to lose its popularity with economists defending the interests of transnational concerns, who declared that 'restrictive policies towards international investment are undesirable'.^^2^^

Another postulate of neoclassical theory, that the end result of the international movement of capital is an increase in the efficiency of the factors of production and reciprocal growth of national income, has been taken firmly into the arsenal of modern Western economic thought and propagandised in a theoretical model of the 'harmony of interests' of capital exporters and importers. The authors of this model, in particular the American economist RosensteinRodan, say that foreign capital invested in an underdeveloped economy ensures simultaneous growth of the incomes of both the foreign capitalist investors and the local capitalists, landowners, and workers, creating a 'harmony of interests' between them. Economists relying on this theory stress that the contradictions and conflicts, arising because of foreign capital's domination of the national economy, are simply mutual misunderstanding caused by an ill-considered

~^^1^^ Murray C. Kemp. The Gain from International Trade and Investment; A Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach. The American Economic Review, 1966, 56,4, part 1: 788.

2 Michael Beenstock. Policies towards International Direct Investment: A Neoclassical Reappraisal. Thc-Economic Journal, 1977, 87, 347: 541.

153

form of foreign investment because

the present spoken or unspoken rules of behaviour in the field of

international investment are largely based on the economic structure

of the past century.'

They therefore point to a need for changes in the forms of making foreign investments that would conceal and mask their expansionist character, and create an impression of common interests of the imperialist monopoly and developing countries. Ultimately, RosensteinRodan considered, 'harmony of interests' would be secured by reaching the optimum ratio of direct and portfolio investment, loans, and subsidies between them.^^2^^

'Harmony of interests' in the sphere of international investment as a concept records the objective fact that the exports of private capital to developing countries has ceased on the whole to reflect simply the interests of monopolies and is now a form of compromise between the foreign corporation and the national government striving to create conditions for its country's economic development.

Suffice it to say that any foreign investment in a developing country...

must seek and achieve a satisfactory compromise between the purposes

and aspirations of the host country on one part and of the foreign

investor on the other part.^^3^^

Such a compromise, however, or 'mutual confidence', as some Western economists put it, between the exporter of capital and the government of the developing country can only be achieved, in their view, by guaranteeing high profits. A high rate of profit for the foreign investor, guaranteed by the government of the country, 'is a matter of mutual confidence and good faith'.^^4^^ Another aspect of 'harmony of interests' is to stress the need to develop only such industries in countries importing capital that are profitable to the exporters of capital. From the latter's point of view the lending country's investments can be of two kinds: `competitive', or `inimical', and ' complementary'.^^5^^ Investment in a modern sector of manufacturing industry, for example, is `inimical' as regards developing countries, while investment in mining and primary processing is `complementary'. The former intensifies international competition while the latter, on the

~^^1^^ P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan. The Philosophy of International Investment in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century. In J.L. Adler (Ed.). Capital Movements and Economic Development (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1967), p 175.

~^^2^^ P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan. The Have's and the Have-not's around the Year 2000. In J.N. Bhagwati (Ed.). Economic and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s (Macmillan & Co., London, 1972), pp 38-39.

``~^^3^^ W.G. Friedmann and J.P. Beguin, with the collaboration of J. Petersen and A. Pellet. Joint International Business Ventures in Developing Countries (Columbia U.P., New York, 1971), pp 1-2.

~^^4^^ J.F. Maxwell. The Reciprocal Moral Rights of Foreign Investors and the Governments of Less Developed Countries. Development and Change, 1975 6,1: 68.

~^^5^^ I.M. Grossack. The International Economy and the National Interest (Indiana U.P., Bloomington, Ind., 1979), p 174.

154

contrary, creates 'international harmony'. The American economist Grossack writes, a propos of this, that the most important thing is the relationship between the pattern of capital formation by the borrowing country and the availability of [external-Xuf/i. 1 loans. We have shown that competitive investments are inimical to the interests of the lenders while complementary investments are consistent with these interests. Thus, international harmony and a `natural' order are created by complementary investments.'

The class bias of the model of 'harmony of interests' is quite clear: (1) to ensure retention of foreign investors' control over the development of modern industries, and to give them the necessary direcon; (2) by sharing part of their profits with the national capitalist class to convert the latter into a docile, obedient junior partner in joint exploitation of the workers of the less developed country.

The Neokeynesian theory of capital export was formed between the end of the 30s and the early 50s. Its founders (Sir Roy Harrod in England, and Fritz Machlup and Evsey Domar in the USA) attributed great importance to the relation between foreign trade and capital saturation of the national economy. In their view this depended directly on the state of the balance of trade (payments): countries with an active trade balance had a surplus of capital, while those with adverse balance had, on the contrary, a lack of capital. And the surplus of capital, or excess of `saving' over `investment' (in Keynesian terminology), and lack of capital (lack of `savings' compared with the `investment' required) were said to be obstacles to normal economic development. Keynesians always regarded a surplus of `savings' as the most important factor pushing a country's economy toward depression and unemployment, because the supply of goods rather exceeded demand in such conditions, in their view. They put forward the necessity to finance additional exports of goods from the excess of `savings', as a counter-measure, but without a corresponding increase in imports, i.e. to promote export of capital. In countries experiencing a lack of `savings', on the contrary, there would be a tendency toward 'economic stagnation' that could only be overcome through an influx of foreign capital.

The premise of this interpretation of capital export was recognition of the difficulties of realisation (sale) in capitalist society. In this theory the export of capital through growth of surplus commodity exports figures as an attempt to overcome these difficulties, but the problem of realisation and its effect on capital export were regarded in the purely quantitative aspect, and in an extremely simplified interpretation. Neokeynesians characterise tb.e contradictions of capitalist reproduction in a distorted, vulgar apologetic form, abstracting the domination of monopolies and therefore depicting the export of capital itself as a transfer abroad of funds absolute-

~^^1^^ Ibid.

155

ly surplus to the national economy. According to them the main task is to substantiate an alternative that is crucial for an apologia for the domination of monopolies, viz., either depression and unemployment or expansion of capital abroad.

The Neokeynesian theory of capital export served to justify the policy of "aid* for developing countries that became one of the lines of imperialism's external economic strategy in the 60s and 70s. The theorists of imperialist `aid' declare the main aim of an influx of foreign capital into developing countries as provision of the requisite conditions for passing from economic stagnation to ' selfsustaining development', i.e. to extended capitalist reproduction without systematic support from outside. A great variety of economic mathematical models was created to substantiate the benevolent influence of capital imports on the economy of a developing country.^^1^^ They were all, in spite of certain purely outward differences, essentially of one type. Their authors assumed that economic development would be accelerated as a function of the influx of foreign capital and quite ignored the domestic and international conditions under which this happened. The models of `aid' either ignored the unusually rapid rise in the foreign debt of developing countries altogether, and the colossal tribute being transferred abroad as investment payments, which led to decapitalisation of the national economy and an increase in its dependence on foreign monopoly capital, or declared these processes to be comparatively easy to surmount. The foreign indebtedness of developing countries is, in fact, growing at unusually rapid rates: at the end of 1981 their total foreign debt was already $524 billion.^^2^^

The end of the 60s was a turning point in the development of the Neokeynesian treatment of the international movement of capital. The clash between the idealised models of `aid' and the actual process of economic development inevitably led to this conception losing its attractiveness as a theoretical justification of the expansion of foreign capital in developing countries. Criticism of the models by a number of Western economists became sharp; they pointed out the need for an approach to the problem of the effect of ' development aid' on saving, investment, and rate of growth through a more concrete economic analysis rather than a simplified equation of economic dynamics.

Western economic thought advanced several new models of capital export in place of the Neokeynesian ones. Among them was a group of dynamic models of the international movement of capital, so called because their authors considered themselves followers of

Harrod's theory of economic dynamics.^^1^^ Most of these models were devoted to studying the dependence of capital movements on factors controlling the economic growth of capitalist countries, which was examined in relation to cases when a country's position as exporter or importer of capital was rigorously determined, and when the ratio between imports and exports of capital altered and the country was converted from an importer of capital to an exporter. Modern dynamic analysis of the causes of capital exports and imports is consequently characterised by the creation of more complex models than the Neokeynesian ones. While being based, on the whole, on Neokeynesian ideas in their interpretation of the mechanism of international capital movements, the dynamic models differ from the Neokeynesian conception of capital exports and imports, because they rely at the same time on the neoclassical theory of economic growth.

The notion of the 'three factors of production' (capital, labour, and land) is employed by the neoclassical trend both as a vulgar theory of the origin of incomes in capitalist society and as a component of the theory of reproduction (theory of economic growth). The quantitative relationship between outlays of factors of production and the size of the national product is called the production function. In dynamic models the national product is usually treated as the result (function) of two factors only (capital and labour). In their interpretation of surplus capital the authors of the models follow the Neokeynesians,' explaining it by the difference between saving and investment. This difference is deduced, however, from a technical, economic disproportionality between the amount of capital and the available labour resources. The reason for the appearance of surplus capital, and the need to export it, is consequently explained by a shortage of manpower compared with the rapidly growing scale of capital. This scale itself is linked, as with the Neokeynesians, with a positive balance of payments, and primarily with the surplus of investment income over investment payments. Capitalist countries, in. which such income exceeds payments, are net exporters of capital; countries in which payments exceed income, on the contrary, are net importers of capital, because there is a shortage of capital in them compared with the available labour resources. All these models have an econometric form that involves dozens of variables in some cases. The American economists Borts and Kopecky, for example, employ more than 20 variables, and as many algebraic formulas, in their model.^^2^^ This especially complicated mathematical apparatus

~^^1^^ See, for example, Yusuke Onitsuka. International Capital Movements and the Patterns of Economic Growth. The American Economic Review. 1974 64 3: 24.

~^^2^^ See G.H. Borts and K.J. Kopecky. Capital Movements and Economic Growth in Developed Countries. In F. Machlup et al. (Eds.). International Mobility and Movement of Capital (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1972), pp 563-592.

157

Economics °fForeisn Aid (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ~^^2^^ See International Currency Review, 1982, 14, 1: 86.

156

serves to cover the weakness of the theoretical substantiation.

In spite of the outward complexity of dynamic models, their authors actually took a step back compared with the Neokeynesian theory of capital export. They declare the need for such exports, which is deduced in the Neokeynesian treatment from the contradictions of realisation (though presented in a vulgar apologetic form), to be the consequence simply of technical and economic shifts in production. The latter point of view is popularised by supporters of neoclassical theory of economic growth. In fact a surplus of capital takes shape not through a lack of workers, as economists who take a neoclassical stand say, but on the contrary through a surplus. In capital-exporting countries (the USA, Great Britain, West Germany, France, Japan, etc.) there are huge armies of unemployed. Furthermore, the export of capital itself is a cause of the growth of unemployment.

Neoclassical functional analysis, which treats the process of production wholly from a technical, economic angle, cannot give a picture of the formation of surplus capital necessitating its export. On the contrary, the Neokeynesian interpretation, which is based on admission of difficulties of realisation of the social product, concludes that export of capital is inevitable as an attempt to resolve these difficulties through growth of surplus commodity exports. The neoclassical production function is therefore put into the dynamic models simply as a kind of auxiliary mechanism by which it is sought to establish a link between investment income (payments) and capital exports (imports), wholly abstracted from capitalist relations of production. By eclectically combining two conceptions that are not integrally connected, and isolating analysis of the export and import of capital from the contradictions of capitalist reproduction, the domination of monopolies, and interimperialist rivalry, the authors of dynamic models make it impossible to explain either the causes of the international movement of capital or its links with economic growth.

division of labour; (2) to get as big a part of world trade as possible under its control; and (3) to control world economic relations in such a way as to make monopoly profits on a global scale of operation by exploiting the workers of many countries.

Western economics gives quite a different estimate of the international monopoly. First of all, the term 'international monopoly' itself is not normally employed, and other terms are used in relation to the present day, viz., international, multinational, or transnational corporation (enterprise). The substance of an international monopoly is thus deduced from a superficial evaluation of its operations: eithej from the proportion of its sales and profits made abroad; or from the weight of its overseas assets; or from the number of countries in which it has set up branches, and so on. The following definition can be taken as typical: a multinational corporation is

a company, or, more correctly, an enterprise, operating in a number of countries and having production or service facilities outside the country of its origin. A commonly accepted definition of an M.N.E. is an enterprise producing at least 25 per cent of its world output outside its country of origin.^^1^^

Two main theoretical trends 'are distinguishable at present as regards today's international monopolies, one apologetic, the other critical. Neither, however, represents a single whole, but can be broken down into smaller subtrends. Some of the economists of the first trend, for instance, are outspoken apologists for international monopolies, admitting no criticism of them. Most of them are representatives of Big Business. David Rockefeller, for example,

calls for a massive public relations campaign to dispel the dangerous `suspicions' about the corporate giants that lurk in minds not yet able to grasp an idea whose time has come.^^2^^

Another group consists mainly of university dons, speaking as objectivists. While defending international monopolies, they admit certain negative aspects of their operations, i.e. endeavour to give their estimates an appearance of objectivity. They usually list the `merits' of international monopoly, after which comes a list of ' inadequacies', which is wound up with a conclusion like the following: 'In spite of this it seems likely that M.N.E.s have improved world-wide economic efficiency.'^^3^^ The critical trend, too, is heterogeneous, and on the whole has a lower middle class character; some of its spokesmen oppose only the `bad' sides of international monopoly, others adopt a more radical stand.

Most Western economists link the direct cause of the forming

~^^1^^ Graham Bannock, R.E. Baxter, Ray Rees. The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979), p 315.

~^^2^^ R. Barnct and R. Miiller. Global Reach. The Power of the Multinational Enterprise (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1974), p 20.

3 Neil Hood and Stephen Young. The Economics of Multinational Enterprise (Longman, London, 1979), p 362.

159

4. The treatment of international monopolies

The economic division of the world by alliances of capitalists, which Lenin considered the fourth main economic attribute of imperialism, was associated with the development of international monopoly. The most important determinant feature of the latter, therefore, is involvement in the economic division of the world, which may be either direct, through cartel agreements on the division of countries and even whole regions as markets and spheres of interest, or indirect, through the export of capital and forming of an overseas network of subsidiary branches. In both cases, however, an international monopoly strives (1) to seize key positions in the international capitalist

158

of present-day transnational and international monopolies with the growth of overseas direct investments, by which they usually mean the export of capital providing its exporters the opportunity of establishing direct control over production and markets abroad. Direct investments are growing rapidly; between 1967 and 1977, for example, the grand total of direct investments placed abroad by the corporations of all capitalist countries increased from $105.3 billion to $324 billion.

Present-day Western economic thought has already suggested many theoretical models of direct investment. Most of their authors are American economists, although there are also models of a West European and Japanese origin. They all put the stress simply on study of market relations. When analysing the reasons pushing monopolies toward international expansion, for instance, capitalist economists declare, first of all, that it is only possible to expand big companies' production profitably today by winning markets abroad. They do not examine the content of a capitalist monopoly's international expansion, but only its superficial manifestation in the form of a concrete monopolistic situation on the market established by the impact of certain circumstances. A very convenient methodological foundation for that is given by theories of monopolistic competition and oligopoly, in which monopoly is represented as a firm's possession of some special products and services, and is completely reduced to the sphere of market relations. Corporations making direct investments must have such a monopoly, which gives them superiority over foreign competitors and a chance to grab their markets by founding branches abroad. The models of direct investment based on the theories of monopolistic competition and oligopoly differ from one another in what they understand by such a monopoly. Their authors treat an international monopoly as a consequence of the growth and expansion of an oligopolistic firm.

In the idea known as the 'monopolistic advantages' model, which was put forward by the American economist Stephen Hymer,' and widely propagated in particular by Charles Kindleberger,^^2^^ an international monopoly is an investor corporation's seizure of a foreign market through its possession of a differentiated product, special marketing know-how, a modern technology, and skilled management. In the 'product cycle' models developed by Raymond Vernon,^^3^^ direct overseas investments are explained by other monopo-

listic advantages, viz., the investor corporation's constantly maintain superiority over foreign competitors in the field of scientific and technical advance, and on that basis, its retention of the possibility to adapt its goods to the level of demand for them on an international scale. In the 'exchange risk' model proposed by the American economist Robert Aliber^^1^^ a 'market preference' for the securities of corporations of countries whose currencies have a key position in the monetary system of capitalism because of their stability figures as a monopolistic advantage.

Other models are in fact of the same order as these. In Kniperbocker's 'oligopolistic reaction' model^^2^^ the export of direct investments is deduced from oligopolistic corporations' mutual fears, i.e. from their simply following one another in grabbing foreign markets for fear of losing their position in mutual competition. And the 'diversification of risk' model^^3^^ explains the development of international monopoly by corporations' investing in various countries in an analogous way to the 'individual investor choosing a portfolio of risky assets'.^^4^^

In all these models direct investments, and consequently the development of international monopolies, have no connection with relations of capitalist exploitation or the antagonistic contradictions of reproduction, and are deduced from the purely external aspects of the process, i.e. from advantages in the realm of technology and management, from scientific and technical advance, from the degree of stability of currencies, from the psychological reaction of the management of corporations to a rival's behaviour or to the riskiness of business operations. All these factors actually do affect direct foreign investment, stimulating it or making it difficult, but they are not the main cause of the international expansion of monopolistic

capital.

Analysis of surfacial factors only helps Western economists to stress certain positive moments strongly that may be connected with direct foreign investments (the development of a technology new for a given country, or of new methods of management, the possibility of increasing exports of goods, etc.) and at the same time to avoid the issue of their most substantial negative consequences, i.e. international monopolies' grabbing of key positions in decisive sectors of the national economy in the countries where the capital

~^^1^^ Robert Aliber. A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment. In Charles P. Kindleberger (Ed.). International Corporation; R.Z. Alber. The Multinational Enterprise in a Multiple World. In L.H. Dunning (Ed.). The Multinational Enterprise (Allen & Unwin, London, 1971).

~^^2^^ F. Kniperbocker. Oligopolistic Reaction and the Multinational Enterprise (Harvard U.P., Boston, Mass., 1973).

3 G.K.G. Stevens. Capital Mobility and the International Firm. In F. Machlup et al. (Eds.). International Mobility and Movement of Capital.

4 Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson. The Future of the Multinational Enterprise (The Macmillan Press, London, 1976),'p 81.

~^^1^^ Stephen Hymer and Robert Rowthorn. Multinational Corporations and International Olygopoly: The Non-American Challenge. In Charles P. Kindleberger (Ed.). International Corporation. Symposium (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970).

~^^2^^ Charles P. Kindleberger. American Business Abroad. Six Lectures on Direct Investment (Yale U.P., New Haven, Conn., 1969).

3 See Raymond Vernon. Sovereignty at Bay. The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprise (Longman, London, 1971).

161 160

6---455

is applied, intensification of imbalance in the development of the national economy, a depressing effect on control over the economy, growth of the amount of profit transferred abroad. The main cause for the forming of international concerns, due to the overaccumulation of capital by monopolistic corporations, which strive by thennature to dominate and expand internationally so as to overcome their internal contradictions by transferring them to a broader, international sphere, is glossed over.

The apologetic trend of analysis of an international monopoly's operations has three main theoretical theses: (i) depiction of the monopoly as an independent company allegedly formed by persons of many nations; (ii) presentation of the monopoly as a main means of spreading the fruits of scientific and technical advance throughout the world imputing an aspiration to benefit mankind to it; (iii) an attempt to prove that there is a `depoliticising' of international economic relations, and even `elimination' of imperialism, through the operations of international monopolies.

There are obviously no grounds for the argument that if some monopoly carries on production and commercial operations in many countries it already functions as a 'purely international' one, not reflecting the interests of any imperialist power. Any American, British, French, or other monopoly, independently of how many enterprises it has abroad, or what their capacity, or in what country they are located, has to reckon correspondingly with the interests of the finance capital of the USA, Great Britain, Franee, etc., with all the consequences ensuing from that for its international operations.

The idea that international monopolies are a kind of driving force of scientific and technical advance, and a panacea for all the ills and contradictions of capitalism, too, is quite unsound. A report of the service organisation Business International, for example, said: International corporations possess a high proportion of the technology, the managerial talent and private capital required for the solution of the economic and social problems of this planet. They can tackle development of the resources of the sea, economic development of poor countries, new housing everywhere, the protection of the human environment, the training of people for skilled managerial and technical work, and the creation of jobs for underprivileged people.1 There is no doubt that international monopolies have immense scientific and technical, production, and financial power capable of accelerating development of today's productive forces, but it is all directed to one end only, the making of the greatest possible profit. For profit's sake international concerns in fact disorganise both the national economies of many countries and the world capitalist economy as a whole. The unconstrained exploitation of natural resources

typical of them has led to an unusual sharpening of the energy and raw material crisis in the capitalist world economy, and the unprecedented rise in the prices for energy resources, which has had its effect on the general rise of prices in both capitalist and developing countries. The drive for monopoly profit at any price has brought the ecological crisis to a head.

International concerns are one of the main means providing monopoly capital with an opportunity to effect a rationalisation of the international division of labour, perpetuating an international specialisation in conditions of technological advance that is converting developing countries into economic appendages of developed capitalist states. A very typical example in support of this thesis is •the 'macroeconomic direct investment' model of the Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima,^^1^^ based on the neoclassical theory of international trade and movement of the factors of production as developed by Heckscher and Ohlin^^2^^. This model pursues the aim of showing that direct investments in developing countries promote changes in their international trade position that would have a major beneficial effect on their economy. International monopolies' penetration of developing countries would, in Kojima's treatment, promote development of production specialisation in them based on predominant use of the cheapest and most abundant factor, i.e. labour. At the same time there would be a curtailment of production of labour-intensive goods in developed capitalist countries and an expansion of production of capital- and science-intensive ones, which would deepen the international division of labour, expand world trade, and 'increase real income in recipient and investing countries alike'.^^3^^

Kojima's model substantiates the `favourable' effect of international monopoly on the economy of developing countries from the angle of their involvement in the capitalist international division of labour. It assumes that a spontaneous process of international division of labour according to the allocation of the factors of production propagandised by Heckscher and Ohlin^^4^^ is impossible, so that it must be imposed by force, by establishing monopoly capital's direct control over the economies of less developed countries. It characterises, in simplified, abstract form, the actual process of the international division of labour which has begun to develop between imperialism and developing countries on the basis of international monopolies' shifting to developing countries of the labourintensive and undynamic production of yesterday that is compara-

~^^1^^ K. Kojima. Japanese Direct Foreign Investment. A Model of Multinational Business Operation (C.E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1978).

~^^2^^ See Eli F. Heckscher. Utrikeshandels Verkan pa inkomstfordelingen. Nagro theoretiska-grundlinjer. Economisk tidshrift, 1919, 21, 12; Bertil Ohlin. Op. cit.

^^3^^ K. Kojima. Op. cit., p 108.

~^^4^^ Eli F. Heckscher. Op. cit.; Bertil Ohlin. Op. cit.

163

~^^1^^ Cited from R. Barnet and R. Mtiller. Op. cit., p. 61-62.

162

lively weakly linked with today's scientific and industrial revolution, and which pollutes the environment.

Similar ideas, but in another form, are traceable in the conceptions of the Dutch economist Tinbergen^^1^^, the American Vernon,2 and others. The Venezuelan Vaitsos remarks that such a development of the international division of labour through direct investments in developing countries

will lead towards a new form of international specialisation, where (a) capital is raised internationally but controlled at the equity level by transnational enterprises based in the developed countries; (b) labour is provided by the Third World which will proceed on a dependent industrialisation path.^^3^^

It is consequently a matter of the building of a new system of the economic dependence of developing countries. It is proposed to replace the obsolete agrarian-raw material bias of their economies by a one-sided development of manufacturing industry, and to convert developing countries into producers and suppliers of semifinished goods and labour-intensive consumer goods.

The apologia for international monopoly reaches its peak in the idea that it causes the liquidation of imperialism, because it brings a `depoliticising' of international economic relations, acts as a champion of peace, and an opponent of international complications of any kind. Kindleberger, while admitting that the international monopoly primarily strives for profit, asserts just the same that it 'tries to live as a good citizen of each country in which it operates'.^^4^^ Johnson goes even further, declaring that

the multinational corporation ... may well be the harbinger of further evolution of human society out of barbarism towards a more humane, equitable and non-discriminatory civilization s

capable of eliminating 'the imminent danger of catastrophic armed conflict'.^^6^^

The drive of international concerns for undivided sway in the production and sale of output, and toward full monopoly that would give them the opportunity to exploit the workers of various countries 'quietly and peacefully', is thus passed off as the road leading to elimination of interimperialist contradictions. The idea of the 'peace-

making mission' of international monopolies is pushed in every way so as to disguise the class content of the internationalisation of capitalist production that is actually taking place, and today's methods of dividing up spheres of the application of capital and markets. International monopolies do not bring 'peace and quiet' but aggravate the struggle of financial monopoly groups to redistribute spheres of influence and dominate on an international scale, which deepens the internal contradictions and instability of imperialism even further.

The spokesmen of the critical trend put the main accent on analysis of the negative aspects of the operations of international monopolies, and oppose the conceptions of the apologists about the `good' they allegedly bring mankind. Barnet and Miiller write, for example:

Present and projected strategies of global corporations offer little hope for the problems of mass starvation, mass unemployment, and gross inequality. Indeed, the global corporation aggravates all these problems.'

The critical trend pays special attention to the effect of international monopolies on government economic control, and justly notes (a) that international concerns render such instruments of economic policy as taxation, credit and investment policy, foreign exchange controls, etc., ineffective by their operations; (b) that they employ a big arsenal of ways of pressuring the national government, especially in developing countries: namely, the paying of direct bribes, donations to the funds of political parties, a setting of local authorities against the central government, and attempts at coups d'etat ;(c) that they create a new system of domination and subordination similar to the former colonial empires, etc. The American economist Hymer warns that

the present crisis may well be more profound than most of us imagine, and the West may find it impossible to restructure the international economy on a workable basis.^^2^^

There is a clear dividing line among spokesmen of the critical trend in their evaluation of the class nature of international monopoly. Petty-bourgeois reformists, though declaring that monopoly has great drawbacks, say there are no better forms of social organisation yet: 'the most powerful argument voiced in defence of the global corporation is precisely this lack of alternatives'.^^3^^ They therefore propose a reform of the operations of international monopolies in such a way as to eliminate only their 'bad sides' and to regulate the `rules' for the struggle to redivide the world, by setting up an

~^^1^^ See Jan Tinbergen. On the International Division of Labour (Federation of Swedish Industries, Stockholm, 1970).

~^^2^^ See Raymond Vernon. Op. cit.

~^^3^^ Constantine Vaitsos. Power, Knowledge and Development Policy: Relations between Transnational Enterprises and Developing Country. In G.K. Helleiner (Ed.). A World Divided. The Less-Developed Countries in the International Economy (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p 138.

~^^4^^ Charles P. Kindleberger. Op. cit., p 192.

~^^5^^ Harry Johnson. Economic Benefits of the Multinational Enterprise. In H.R. Cahlo et al. (Eds.). Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise Legal Economic and Managerial Aspects (A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973), pp 166-167

~^^6^^ Ibid.

164

~^^1^^ R. Barnet and R. Miiller. Op. cit., p 364.

~^^2^^ Stephen Hymer. The Multinational Corporation and the Uneven Development. In H. Radice (Ed.). International Firms and Modern Imperialism (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), p 59.

~^^3^^ R. Barnet and R. Muller. Op. cit., p 385.

165

intergovernmental body to control their international operations, by drawing up a 'code of conduct', by banning support for them by the respective imperialist power, and so on. The struggle to redivide the capitalist world by the international monopolies and the imperialist powers backing them cannot be regulated, however, by `rules' of any kind, since it is being waged by capital, and by force, the balance of power among the various monopolies constantly changing.

Another group of critics, spokesmen of left-radical political economy, recognise the imperialist character of the operations of the international monopolies but consider imperialism to be simply 'the relation between the national economy and other national economies'.^^1^^ They thus, in essence, ignore the very crucial fact that the development of international monopolies reflects the internationalising of finance capital, and that behind them are various financial monopoly groups (both national and internationally interlocked). While critically evaluating the monopolies as a phenomenon of imperialism, these critics consider that 'capitalism is in a certain sense historically progressive even today'.^^2^^ That means, in fact, that they are only opposed to' the most monstrous forms of the domination of international monopolies but not to the society giving rise to them.

When evaluating the critical trend in general, we must stress that the petty-bourgeois critics of international monopolies take up a position, in essence, of 'blunting the contradictions' of modern capitalism, and of trying to further its `painless' adaptation to the changing situation in the world. It is vital to note, in this respect, that they avoid analysing a most important contradiction of capitalism, namely that between the Intel-nationalisation of capital and the international working class---a contradiction that is being sharpened through the development of international monopolies. Economists of the critical trend do not see the real force that is actually opposing the capitalists' international monopolistic alliances. Their notion that it is possible, within the context of modern capitalism itself, to impose certain limits on the development of international concerns, to hold back their growth, to overcome interimperialist contradictions, and to abolish relations of domination and subordination, is quite unsound. The growth of international monopolies expresses an objective tendency toward Intel-nationalisation of economic affairs in the highest stage of capitalism. It is not the fight against this trend, but the fight against the class forces that embody it under capitalism, that is the only real alternative to the imperialist internationalising of production.

5. Non-Marxian definitions of imperialism. Revisionists' views of the character of today's epoch

The scientific theory of imperialism was developed by Lenin, who showed that imperialism is a special stage of the development of capitalism, the highest and the last, characterised by the dominance of monopolies and finance capital. The economic essence of imperialism is revealed by the five basic attributes formulated by Lenin, viz., (1) concentration of production and capital to such a high degree that it has created monopoly, which plays a decisive role in society's economic affairs; (2) the merging of monopoly bank capital and monopoly industrial capital, and the rise on that basis of finance capital and a financial oligarchy; (3) export of capital, which has become particularly important in contrast to the export of commodities; (4) the formation of international monopolistic alliances dividing the world up economically; (5) completion of the territorial division of the world by the biggest capitalist powers and struggle for its redivision. In characterising imperialism's historical place, Lenin pointed out that it was monopolistic, decaying or parasitic, dying capitalism, and the eve of the socialist revolution.^^1^^

The leaders of the Second International (Kautsky, Hilferding, Otto Bauer, and others) defined imperialism differently. Kautsky gave the following definition:

Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex ever bigger areas of agrarian [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit them.2 This definition was sharply criticised by Lenin who pointed out that its fault was in reducing imperialism simply to a certain form of policy. By so doing Kautsky rejected the principle of the primacy of economics in relation to politics, unjustifiably linked the latter with industrial capital, which led him to an erroneous conclusion about the compatibility of the dominance of monopolies and finance capital with a non-violent, non-imperialist policy. His interpretation of imperialism as the capitalist powers' drive to seize only agrarian countries or regions was also wrong, and glossed over(l) 'a striving towards violence and reaction' characteristic of the stage of imperialism in general,^^3^^ and (2) the imperialist expansion and drive to annex lands of any kind.

Kautsky was also the author of a reactionary theory of ultraimperialism, the essence of which was that capitalism would expe-

~^^1^^ H. Radicc (lid.). Op. cit., p 16. 2/ftW., p 10.

~^^1^^ See V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

~^^2^^ Karl Kautsky. Der Imperializmus. Die Neue Zeit, 1914, 21: 909. Cited from Lenin's Notebooks on Imperialism. Collected Works, Vol. 39 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), pp 264-265.

~^^3^^ V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, p 85.

167 166

rience yet another phase of its development, that of 'super-- imperialism' or `ultra-imperialism', when there would be a peaceful unification of the imperialists of the whole world, with the result that wars would be stopped and the contradictions between imperialist countries would disappear. Lenin brought out the reactionary nature of that theory and showed that it was a decisive and irrevocable break with Marxism.^^1^^ The main fault was that it denied operation of the law of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism. The theory of ultra-imperialism is also faulty as regards methodology. Kautsky, when speaking about ultraimperialism, took only one aspect, the tendency toward internationalisation of capital, and abstracted from the other, i.e. the real contradictions of monopoly capitalism. The class sense of his theory is tfiat it diverts the workers from revolutionary struggle against imperialism, sowing illusions of the possibility of eliminating contradictions and getting rid of them within the context of the capitalist system.

Hilferding, the originator of the theory of 'organised capitalism', drew a reformist conclusion from his definition of finance capital about the role of nationalisation of banks in `socialist' reforms. He thought the proletariat had no obligation to expropriate the expropriators and win all the commanding heights in order to build socialism, but that it was sufficient to build a 'world cartel' headed by a few banks and to regulate capitalist production from a single centre. In his view the capitalist economy was already, in the 20s, subordinated to conscious direction by the monopolies.^^2^^ His theory of ' organised capitalism' is faulty methodologically because it separates two interconnected phenomena, viz., capitalist monopoly and competition. Monopoly, as we know, arose from competition, but having arisen it does not abolish competition but exists alongside it, and competition becomes sharper. Monopolies also do not abolish the anarchy of production and economic crises. The theory of ' organised capitalism' was politically reactionary: its adherents concealed the contradictions of capitalism, embellished the monopoly stage of capitalism, and tried to divert the masses from revolutionary struggle, preaching an anti-Marxian, anti-revolutionary conception of capitalism's evolving into socialism on a world scale.

The views of Kautsky and Hilferding are clearly traceable in many of the conceptions of imperialism being created today by nonMarxian theorists. A reduction of the essence of imperialism to a predatory policy and expansion is also characteristic of contemporary reformists (Labour, and right-wing Social Democrats). They consider imperialism, moreover, as a phenomenon inherent in many historical stages of human development rather than as a special stage of capitalism. The reformist definitions of imperialism have nothing that

distinguishes them from those of capitalist economists.

In the American encyclopaedia Marxism, Communism and Western Society, published in New York, imperialism is defined as follows:

In current usage the term `imperialism' is held to mean an expansionist attempt or policy by one state or some of its citizens to influence, exploit and dominate the people of another, usually weaker, country by overt or covert political, military, economic and cultural means. Prof. Anderson of Massachusetts University defines imperialism as follows:

The essence of the new imperialism ... lies in the export of capital from the more advanced capitalist countries to the less developed ones. The international investment of accumulated capital offers the finance capitalist a vast and profitable outlet for the surplus produced by his own working class.^^2^^

All these statements are primarily faulty in their methodological basis; they endeavour to consider any expansionist policy, irrespective of the historical conditions, as imperialism. Today's reformists, like capitalist economists, reduce imperialism in their definition to politics and so separate politics from economics, ignoring the economic features of imperialism due to the dominance of monopolies.

After World War II right-wing Social Democrats put forward a theory of democratic socialism that became particularly common in the 70s. This theory represents, in essence, the old reformist conception of reconciliation of class contradictions and peaceful evolving of capitalism into socialism. 'Democratic socialism' had already been given a theoretical basis by Ferdinand Lassalle, Eduard Bernstein, and Karl Kautsky. Today the term 'democratic socialism' is widely employed by right-wing Social Democrats in order to counterpose it to the socialism actually built in the Soviet Union and being built in other socialist countries.

The programmes of today's right-wing Socialist parties claim that the economic basis of democratic socialism is a mixed economy uniting public and private enterprises. Their theorists and politicians spread the illusion that it is possible to carry out radical economic, political, and social reforms in capitalist society without a class, political struggle. They represent socialism as a general democratic movement and not as a historical necessity. The theorists of democratic socialism deny the very possibility of scientifically demonstrating the necessity for and inevitability of victory of the socialist revolution. They picture socialism as a social system that 'has not been able

~^^1^^ Helmut Dan Schmidt. Imperialism. Origins and Application ot'the Term. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 4 (Herder & Herder New York, 1972), p 211.

~^^2^^ C.H. Anderson. The Political Rconomv of Social Class (Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), p 267.

169

~^^1^^V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., p 105.

~^^2^^ See R. Hilferding. Op. cit., p 120.

168

to pose an efficient alternative' to capitalism. *

Right-wing revisionists say that capitalism is being transformed into socialism, and proclaim that social system truly socialist that arises precisely through transformation rather than as a result of socialist revolution. The scientific and industrial revolution is alleged to be resolving all the social contradictions of capitalist society and leading it to socialism without political struggle. Consequently they find themselves trapped by capitalist economists as regards resolution of the antagonistic contradictions of capitalism and the building of socialism, in particular by those economists who preach the capitalist-apologetic idea of the industrial society. By denying the leading role of the working class in the transformation of modern capitalist society, they affirm that the bearer of revolutionary historical initiative, given technological advance, is the intelligentsia and not the working class, and that only the intellectuals are capable of influencing development of the masses' consciousness and posing new issues and tasks. The social support of the modern revolutionary movement consequently becomes a new historical bloc headed by the intelligentsia, rather than an alliance of the working people under the leadership of the working class.

Marxist-Leninists do not deny the role of the intelligentsia in the struggle for a revolutionary, socialist transformation of society, but they do not make an absolute of it. Right-wing revisionists try to revive the old ideas of the German 'Left Hegelians', long ago demolished by Marx and Engels, about 'critically thinking' intellectuals destined to lead the passive, Inert masses. The current scientific and industrial revolution has stimulated rapid growth of the intelligentsia, and accelerated its stratification to an unusual extent, converting a considerable part of it into hired workers in capitalist conditions, who are coming increasingly closer in their interests to the working class. And that is leading to a heightening of the role of the proletariat as the active, revolutionary, transforming force of modern society. The intelligentsia cannot perform the role of leader and transforming force because many of its members are close to middle class and lower middle class circles in the character of their activity, standard of living, and origin. For that reason it is inconsistent and prone 'to compromise, to sell its oppositional and revolutionary ardour'.^^2^^ By reproducing the mistaken capitalist interpretation of the decisive role of the technical intelligentsia, right-wing revisionists inevitably slide into a position of rejecting the socialist perspective, and making propaganda for reactionary, Utopian theses about the `improvement' of capitalism.

10

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE SYSTEM OF STATE MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

1. State monopoly processes as reflected in capitalist economic thought

In the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism monopoly capitalism is increasingly developing into state monopoly capitalism. In his War and Revolution Lenin defined the latter as 'combining the colossal power of capitalism with the colossal power of the state'.^^1^^ A crucial feature of state monopoly capitalism is the government's active intrusion into the economic affairs of capitalist countries. It has become an indispensable participant in the process of reproduction in all stages of the business cycle. The capitalist state exercises its activity in order to maintain and save capitalism. Its most important jobs are to fight socialism and the labour and national liberation movements so as to enrich the major monopolies.

Western economic thought has reacted to state monopoly phenomena in the development of capitalism. As we have already noted, Keynes attempted a theoretical justificaiion in the 30s of the need for government intervention in the economies of capitalist countries, and tried to work out forms and methods of government management of the economy. After World War II Western economic thought began to pay more attention to developing a theory of government management of the economy.

The theorists of management tried to employ the objective process of the development of state monopoly capitalism to develop new techniques, forms, and methods of ideological defence of big monopoly capital, and to write recipes for making the capitalist economy `healthier' and adapting it to the conditions of the antagonism of the two world systems.

Theories of state management call on the government to promote an increase of monopoly profits by the most varied means. They are an important means of justifying the social policy of capitalist governments, a policy that presumes both social reforms and partial con-

~^^1^^ Gunnai Adler-Karlsson. The Political Economy of East-West-South Co-operation (Springer-Verlag, Vienna-New York, 1976), p 13.

~^^2^^ V.I. Lenin. The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats. Collected Works Vol. 2 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 335.

~^^1^^ V.I. Lenin. War and Revolution. Collected Works, Vol. 24 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 403.

171

cessions to the working class in order to maintain capitalism, and a direct onslaught on the workers' standard of living and social gains. When evaluating the results of state activity, Western theorists carefully disguise its subordination to the interests of monopolies, and endeavour to hide the union of the monopolies' and the state's forces in a single mechanism, and on the contrary try to give state regulation of the economy a kind of supraclass character, ' expressing the national interest'. Government management is often presented as anti-monopoly and capable of fighting the anti-social practices of the monopolies. Many economists, furthermore, say that the state has managed to transform the economic system of private enterprise itself, from 'undiluted capitalism' into a 'mixed economy'. The Marxian analysis of the true class trend of these theories, and exposure of the real socio-economic consequences of state intervention in the economies of capitalist countries are particularly important for combating these views.

The theorists of the mixed economy (Samuelson, Keiser, Gruchy, and others),^^1^^ when developing the idea of support of every kind for private enterprise, stress that the state should not become a rival of private capital. It should not enter all sectors of the economy, but only those that are unprofitable for private enterprise at the moment, for one reason or another, yet are necessary for its profitable operation in other sectors. In this view the government's job is to 'fill the gap' and to do what private enterprise has left undone. But even in those sectors that the state does enter, its role is considered to be primarily the financing of expenditure, while directly entrepreneurial activity is retained by private capital. Such is the theoretical premise for defining the sphere of public economic operations, the direction of budget expenditure, and the establishing of concrete sectors of public enterprise.

In the theory of the mixed economy the traditional public sectors are those of the productive infrastructure, viz., transport, the fuel industry, generation of electricity, the preparation of areas for the building of industrial facilities. In the 50s and 60s the adherents of Neokeynesian theories of economic growth advocated a considerable increase in public expenditure on research, and investment in sectors of the social infrastructure (education, the training and retraining of personnel or, as they like to put it in Western economics 'investment in human capital'). More recently many economists have been calling, more and more urgently for governments to refocus their attention on manufacturing industries. A group of prominent American economists, for example, issued a programme The Reindustrialization of America', and called on the Administration to give every possible kind of encouragement to private capital to modernise the technical base of American industry.^^2^^

Western economics in essence provides a kind of theoretical justification for the division of functions between the monopolies and the state already established under modern state monopoly capitalism, when. governments spend large sums from the budget, and the monopolies make enormous profits from it. Public investments in the productive infrastructure provide optimum conditions for profitable operation of monopoly enterprises. Public expenditure on research makes it possible to employ the advances of fundamental and applied science without corresponding expenditure on it by the monopolies themselves. Public investment in human capital also has great significance for monopoly capital. Under the scientific and industrial revolution the problem of education becomes particularly

2. The place of the state in the system of state monopoly capital

The class bias of Western economists' conceptions comes out when they evaluate the reasons for the extension of government regulation of the economy in the conditions of modern capitalism. When they analyse these reasons they completely avoid going into capitalist relations of production and into the basic contradiction of capitalism and the most important forms in which it is manifested, abstracting from class antagonism, which are becoming more acute in the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism. They ignore all the processes on which state monopoly capitalism actually arises and develops. Keynes and his disciples did not explain the deficiencies of the spontaneous market economy by the action of capitalism's objective economic laws but by `eternal' and `natural' psychological laws. That approach provided grounds for the apologetic conclusion that these drawbacks could be eliminated with state aid, while preserving the foundations of capitalism, i.e. private ownership of the means of production.

The starting point for showing the place of the state in state monopoly capitalism's economic system is determination of the reasons for government action on the economy. Western economists endeavour in every way, on the one hand, to develop and spread the idea that the state's activity is above class. On the other hand, they strive so to direct this activity, by means of their recommendations, that it will fully correspond to the interests of monopoly capital rather than contradict them. And when defining the state's place in the economic system they do not counterpose it to the interests of private business, but on the contrary treat it as a necessary adjunct of the latter's operations.

172

~^^1^^ See Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw Hill, New York, 1973); Norman F. Keiser. Economics: Analysis and Policy (Willey, New York, 1965); Allan Gruchy. Comparative Economic Systems. Competing Ways to Stability and Growth (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1966).

~^^2^^ See Business Week, 1980, 2643: 86-87.

173

important since it is the basis required for training personnel of a skill that meets the needs of modern production. An increase in public expenditure on general and vocational education in principle suits the interests of monopoly capital, ensuring it a labour force of the necessary skill while saving its own means on that purpose. The reindustrialisation programme-if it were carried out-would let the American monopolies renew fixed capital to a considerable extent at public expense, reduce costs of production, and raise the competitiveness of their goods on world markets.

The apologetic aspects of these theories show up very clearly, as well, in regard to the various forms of public intervention in the economy. While striving to hide the antipeople, deeply contradictory character of state monopoly capitalism, Western theorists avoid examining the forms of public economic operations in which the subordination of public operations to the interests of the biggest monopolies is most clear. Many authors, for example, pass over the huge dependence of economic policy on the interests of the militaryindustrial complex in silence and close their eyes to the vast public aid that is being given to the monopolies in overseas economic expansion, aid accompanied with expenditure of large public funds. They also leave out of account the considerable credits and subsidies granted to the major monopolies, while overexaggerating governments' social activity.

The true class bias of Western theories comes out clearly when we evaluate West European economic programming. American economists, for instance, note with satisfaction that the public programmes adopted and carried out in Western Europe have as their aim maintenance and improvement of the capitalist economic system. They see, as one of the most positive features of programming, the full support for public programmes by the major monopolies of France and other West European countries, and single out as a crucial positive feature of French programming the involvement of Big Business in their compiling. As Samuelson put it:

Representatives of different industries sit down together in committees,

presided over by civil servants who serve the plan. Businessmen are

given quantitative information on realizable national goals for the

years ahead; and they respond with information on what these goals

will mean for their own industries. In turn, these replies are made the

basis for a recalculation of the aggregates and details of the plan. *

As a rule these authors do not mention the acute struggle that

develops around the plans outside the commissions and committees,

to which mainly representatives of monopoly capital are admitted.

Among the views of Western theorists on the state's place in the

economy of modern capitalism, we must note the ideas of the ideol-

ogists of 'free enterprise', viz., the neoclassicists. Their views were most fully expounded by Milton Friedman in his book Capitalism and Freedom and developed in subsequent works.^^1^^ In opposition to the Keynesians, the neoclassicists consider that the market mechanism of self-regulation of the economy is capable of `automatically' ( spontaneously) providing full employment of resources, with no need for such active intervention by the state as the Keynesians suggested. The government's role, according to Friedman, should consist solely in maintaining law and order, defending property rights, resolving disputes over interpretation of the rules of business operations, upholding competition, etc. While recognising a need for a public counter-cyclic and counter-inflation policy, neoclassicists propose that it should be implemented by other methods, paying special attention to regulating money circulation.

3. The apologia

for the socio-economic consequences

of state interference in the economy

Assertion of the transformation of the economic system of capitalism as a result of governmental action on the economy is typical of Western economics. Government regulation has led, in the opinidn of many Western economists, to the rise of a mixed economy, by which they mean something other than the 'undiluted capitalism' type of economic system. 'Undiluted capitalism has been evolving into a mixed economy,' Samuelson writes.^^2^^

The mixed economy is regarded as a system based on private property, private initiative, private enterprise, and the motive of private profit. Unlike 'undiluted capitalism', however, the state plays an important role in it, eliminating (in the view of Western economists) the drawbacks and contradictions arising from the spontaneous functioning of private enterprise, and deciding matters that are beyond the power of private enterprise.

The main lines of governmental activity are considered to be the following: (1) combating the unemployment that is inevitably generated by the spontaneous functioning of a market economy; (2) stabilisation of the capitalist economy's cyclic, unstable development. Samuelson puts it thus:

The difference will be this: The age-old tendencies for the system to fluctuate will still be there, but no longer will the world let them snowball into vast depressions or into galloping inflations-no longer

P873. 174

Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973),

~^^1^^ Milton Friedman. Capitalism and Freedom. Problems and Prospects (Chicago U.P., Chicago, 1962).

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 867.

175

will we let OUT banking system fail and out nation go through the most

painful debt deflation and bankruptcy.^^1^^

A third line of government management of the economy is considered to be encouragement of application of the advances of technical progress. A fourth, very important problem calling for government interference is presented by the need to eliminate inequality in the distribution of wealth and income, to improve the'quality of life', and to create a'welfare state'.

There is no unanimity among Western economists on the means by which the state should redistribute national income. Until recently the main means was thought to be the introduction and broad application of a system of progressive taxation, but more and more scepticism has begun to be displayed of late in regard to this way. Samuelson, for example, speaks of the need to take very careful account of the rate of taxation, since if it were too high private enterprise might lose interest in making investments.

The problems of social reform are not easy [he writes)^^2^^ ... If we make

income taxes more steeply progressive, decisions to invest in risky

venture ...will be profoundly affected.^^3^^

These views are an attempt to justify the American Administration's policy aimed at lowering the highest income taxes; their true class sense, which is to defend the interests of monopoly capital, can be distinctly seen in them.

In works of the 60s and early 70s an extension of public social expenditure, especially on education, vocational and professional training and retraining of the labour force, was advertised as the main means of redistributing national income in favour of the poorer strata of the population. This was the medicine recommended as well by the theorists of the 'welfare state' for such a chronic disease of capitalism as unemployment. The crisis processes of the 70s, however, the huge unemployment figures, and the unprecedented, growth of inflation undermined faith in these recommendations of the economists. In their search for new prescriptions of `salvation', the theorists of the mixed economy and welfare state increased propaganda for the idea of 'class harmony' in the modern capitalist economy, which they conventionally labelled: `We're all in the same boat.' Its central thesis was: 'We must all stick together because our country is in a serious position.' Samuelson, in particular, wrote:

the modern mixed economy is in effect a gigantic system of mutual

insurance against the worst economic disasters of life.4 In this way they try to inculcate the idea on workers' minds that since the whole population of the country is equally interested in eliminating the complex problems and conflicts arising, everyone

~^^1^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Op. cit., p 345 ^^2^^Ibid., p 802. ~^^3^^Ibid., p 805. ~^^4^^Ibid., p 808.

should make sacrifices in the fight against this social evil. It is precisely in that way that incomes policy is justified, a government economic policy that proposed a substantial limitation of trade union rights in the fight for higher wages and is advertised by capitalist economists as `counter-inflationary'.

Western economists' and ideologists' calculation on an ' improvement' in the capitalist economy, and creation of a `transformed' capitalism, has not been justified. In recent years there has been a further worsening of the general crisis of capitalism. Adaptation to the new conditions does not signify stabilisation of capitalism as a system. Its general crisis continues to deepen.

The class character of programmes of government macroeconomic regulation is also manifested in the drive to consolidate the position of monopoly capital through worsening the position of the working people. The system of practical measures worked out by Western economists renders support to the monopolies in coping with the most acute issues, viz., the problem of realisation (sales), easing the difficulties caused by cyclic development, and applying technological advances.

At the same time Keynesian macroeconomic theory itself proposed an increase in public spending, deficit financing, and inflation, which inevitably led to an increase in the cost of living, and deterioration of the workers' position. The swelling of public expenditure was accompanied with an increase in taxes on the working people, with the result that their purchasing power was directly reduced. The use of budget funds only slightly stimulated the public's effective demand, since it was directed mainly to military purposes and subsidising the monopolies. So the problem of realisation of the gross national product, which becomes most acute during crises, remains unsolved. Furthermore, new, supplementary taxes on the workers are introduced in order to cover the inevitable budget deficit caused by the growth of public spending. So, instead of increasing the public's purchasing power it is frequently reduced in the long run. And instead of the elimination of the conflicts and defects of capitalism promised by the economists they are aggravated.

The capitalist state's economic operations are aimed at saving capitalism and enriching the monopolies. They may have a temporary, palliative effect on the situation and the structure of the economy, but cannot liquidate the contradictions inherent in capitalism. It is more than obvious that state regulation of the capitalist economy is ineffective. The measures that capitalist governments take against inflation make for stagnation of production and growth of unemployment. What they do to contain the critical drop in production lends even greater momentum to inflation.

Even in the comparatively favourable situation of the 60s capitalist economists sinned against the truth when appraising government counter-cyclic measures. They kept mum about the fact that the

177 176

American economy developed less stably during the postwar period than that of other countries, and that it experienced the greatest number of recessions of production. As evidence of the great possibilities of the mixed economy they cite the facts of the rapid growth of production in West Germany, Italy, and Japan, ignoring the extremely uneven development of the world capitalist economy, for example, the low growth rates of the British economy, and of the American in the 50s.

The upheavals that shook the capitalist world in the 70s and the early 80s shattered the myth of governments' ability to ' improve' capitalism. Many of the economists' propositions proved to be in obvious contradiction with reality when the world of capitalism was hit in 1974-5 by the most severe postwar world economic crisis, which completely refuted ideologists' assertions about the impossibility of deep slumps in the modern capitalist economy.

The crises of the 70s and the early 80s shattered the myth of 'social harmony' in modern capitalist society. The implementation of government economic policy on a basis of maintaining and consolidating private property, and strengthening the position of monopoly capital, inevitably made the basic contradiction of capitalism worse, and furthered its explosion both in old forms (a crisis of over-production, with all the features inherent in it: mounting unemployment; a cut-back in production; bankruptcies) and in new ones (inflationary growth of prices together with falling production; raw material, energy, monetary, financial, and ecological crises). The crisis of 1974-5 laid the basis for a new cycle of development of the world capitalist economy. The following upswing, however, proved to be extraordinarily contradictory. The difficulties experienced, and the general deterioration of the conditions of reproduction are evidence of a continuing crisis of the whole mechanism of state monopoly control of the economy in the 80s.

In these circumstances the conservative wing of capitalist economists, above all the neoclassical trend, has become very active. Neoclassical conceptions have been taken into the book of the British Conservative Government and the Reagan Administration in the USA.

A drive to find a way out of the difficulties created, at the expense of the workers, is typical of present-day capitalist appraisals of the role of the state. To that end propaganda for the idea of 'social partnership' has been trebled in intensity. The working people are told to tighten their belts, and `limit' their existing wage levels, so as to ensure 'continuous economic growth'.^^1^^ The neoclassicists propose to substantially reduce government expenditures on social needs and to increase military spending.

There is no doubt that implementation of such a policy is capable only of aggravating the contradictions of capitalism, deepening the social differentiation of capitalist society, and intensifying the working class' fight. The dialectics of state monopoly capitalism is such that it more and more aggravates the contradictions of capitalism instead of the consolidation of the system on which the capitalist class counts, and shakes it to the foundations.

~^^1^^ Business Week, 1980, 2643: 86, 87, 93.

178 11

And that is the cardinal fault of their theories. Under the heading 'contemporary economic growth' they lump together the economic development of countries with different social systems. There are three main trends in capitalist growth theories: the Neokeynesian, neoclassical, and sociological---and a neoclassical synthesis arising from them.

Neokeynesian growth theories arose from the theoretical conceptions of John Meynard Keynes. The central issue for the Neokeynesians (whose leading figures were Sir Roy Harrod in Great Britain and Alvin Hansen in the USA) is as usual that of realisation: when the movement of demand stimulates full employment of productive resources the economy will be in a state of dynamic equilibrium. Changes in effective demand determine the actual level, of production and its divergence from the potentially possible level. Growth of national income, on which the level of demand depends, is only a function, in the Neokeynesian view, of the accumulation of capital, while demand for capital (at the given capital-intensity) is determined simply by the rate of growth of national income.

Neokeynesians consider investment, or in other words the rate of accumulation of capital, to be the main factor in economic growth. They also put the capital-intensity of production forward as another factor (i.e. the ratio of capital to output). Analysis of statistics indicating changes in the capital-intensity of production presents a certain interest to them. They note a tendency for this ratio to rise during industrialisation and to fall in the period of the economy's `maturity'. Some Neokeynesians, however, taking average figures, conclude that this ratio- remains constant, and can therefore be abstracted. The problem of accumulation is treated in Keynesian theories in connection with saving. When investment equals saving the economy will not experience any difficulties, but an excess of saving over investment leads to underworking of plant and unemployment, while an excess of investment demand over saving causes prices to rise. Examination of the proportions between saving and accumulation does, in itself, have a certain significance in analysis of the use of national income, but Keynesians try to explain the basic economic processes by means of these secondary links, which is at bottom a mistake.

Examination of the quantitative relationship between accumulation and consumption, and the conception of the ' multiplier-accelerator' (the theoretical unsoundness of which was demonstrated above in our analysis of the Neokeynesian theory of the trade cycle) had an important place in Neokeynesian models of economic growth.

The first spokesmen of the theory of economic growth (Evsey Domar and Sir Roy Harrod) treated it in dependence on one factor only, viz., capital accumulation. All their constructs

181

THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

1 . Neokeynesian theories

The objective basis for the spread of Neokeynesian theories of economic growth, which had a central place in postwar Western economic literature, was primarily the growth of the forces of "socialism in economic competition of the two world systems, the development of state monopoly capitalism, the deepening of the contradictions of capitalist reproduction, expressed in slow economic growth rates in several advanced capitalist countries, the existence of chronic unemployment, and so on. Economic growth rates became a particularly acute issue in connection with the development of new national states. Some bourgeois ideologists said that the modern development of growth theories should be considered a continuation of the classical economists' and Marx's posing of the problem of reproduction. In fact there is a difference nf pjinciple between the MajTciajijtheory of reproducjries_oj^^^

_

class_ content But, in addition, economic growth is only one "speciilclorm o~f the movement of capital.

The problem of reproduction encompasses a whole number of connections that are not, and cannot be, included in models of ecpnomic growth. Capitalist economists' endeavour to link the growth theories with Marx's theory of reproduction is due to their efforts to work out more effective measures of economic policy. The experience and high, stable rates of development of the economies of socialist countries have been practical confirmation of the correctness of Marxian theory. These economists therefore turn to Marx and try to employ his theory in their own interests. By concentrating attention on the quantitative characteristics of economic growth they try in every way possible to avoid its qualitative content and socio-economic nature, and to isolate growth of production from the system of relations of production.

180

were ( abstracted from the real conditions of capitalist reproduction.'They digress from capitalist relations of production, which determine the goal of production, profit as the driving motive of accumulation, and ignore the contradictions of capitalism which cause imbalances between the different spheres of reproduction, and completely leave out of account the class content of the categories. Capital accumulation is therefore reduced simply to investment and regarded without connection with the production and distribution of surplus value. The concepts employed in the formulas are extremely vague and indefinite. Accumulation is identified with saving and a difference between productive and non-productive investment is not always drawn. Workers' consumption is identified with capitalists' consumption. Instead of real consumption a 'propensity to consume' is put forward, which is a psychological category. Another drawback of many of the formulas is the constancy of the parameters; with Harrod, for example, the capital-output ratio is constant, although in fact it is altered by technical progress and growth of the productivity of labour.

A new stage in modelling was the development of multiple factor models of economic growth (the British economist Richard Stone) in which they are combined with balance matrices, in particular, with input-output matrices.^^1^^ Input-output analysis is an attempt to reflect the connections existing between the sectors of the economy. The balances are compiled in a chessboard-like matrix in which each sector figures twice: once as a producer and once as a consumer, The distribution of the produced goods and services of each sector is shown along the horizontal, and the input of each sector, being the output of other sectors, on the vertical. These models are aimed at reflecting structural shifts in the economy and providing a basis for economic programming and adjusting sectoral structure. Their value, however, is reduced since they are based on unscientific theories (marginal utility, factors of production, crisisfree development of capitalism).

The idea that crises and unemployment can be eliminated by the state constitutes the core of models of stable, balanced growth. The models ignore the antagonistic contradictions and patterns of capitalism, and do not reflect many important socio-economic factors at all (viz., the class struggle; factors, influencing the size of capital accumulation and the value of labour power; the ratio between money wages and real wages, and so on). It is a very complicated business, of course, to take these factors into account in mathematical economic models, but Western economists assume, in ignoring them, that capitalist relations are optimum ones, and that the socioeconomic environment does not change and so can be abstracted.

Such abstractions greatly reduce the reliability of the models, and make them unsuitable for a correct reflection of the real processes taking place in capitalist society. In effect these models investigate the material, physical structure of social production, and only general dependencies are worked out, whose concrete interpretation differs greatly in each mode of production.

Western economists employ mathematical models and formulas to bring out the existing quantitative patterns, and discover the indices needed in order to achieve certain rates of growth, and for forecasting. At the same time broad application of mathematical methods on the basis of unscientific theories helps them to abstract from the very essence of socio-economic processes by means of formal constructs.

Forecasts did not use to be compiled regularly and were mainly aimed at predicting changes in the economic situation. Now they have the aim of achieving the decisive goals of economic policy, i.e. of ensuring optimum economic growth, full employment, preventing inflation, and so on. They reflect all the methodological ^faults of Western economics. In the 60s and 70s there was a growing awareness among Western economists that governments' corrective measures were inadequate to ensure balanced, stable growth, and they began to pay more attention to studying the experience of 'indicative planning' in France. British and American economists began more and more to voice ideas about the need for government planning, assuming that planning is not connected with the character of ownership of the means of production and that a planned economy can be built on a foundation of private property. Very few of the indices of these plans have necessarily to be met; most of them are very approximate. And there are almost no indications in the programmes as to the means by which the aims set can be achieved. Control over plan fulfilment is indirect. Nevertheless economic programming provides certain new possibilities for capitalist governments to affect the economy. It poses the task of increasing growth rates and stimulating structural shifts. And measures of purposive, specific control are elaborated in connection with it. The monopolies are succeeding in increasing profits and intensifying exploitation of the workers by means of programming.

A comparatively new version of growth theory is the Postkeynesian models of Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. Their feature is that the growth rates are fixed in them according to the distribution of income between wages and profits. A change in this division affects the total volume of saving since the 'propensity to save' among wage earners and profit receivers is different. The distribution itself depends on the rate of accumulation, which determines the rate of profit and its proportion in income. The rest of income is converted into earnings. According to Kaldor's model a rise in growth rates can only be ensured through a redistribution of national income

183

~^^1^^ See Richard Stone. Mathematical Models of the Economy and Other assays. (Chapman & Hall, London, 1970).

182

in favour of profits.^^1^^ These conclusions are exploited to justify the policy of the capitalist state aimed against the working class. Mrs. Robinson assumes that a rise in wages corresponding to the growth in labour productivity will eliminate the difficulties in realisation and be an important stimulus of economic growth. Her views reflect the working class' struggle for an improvement in its position. At the same time she overestimates the significance of this struggle. Growth of earnings cannot eliminate the contradictions and laws of capitalist reproduction. Mrs. Robinson draws the mistaken conclusion from her argument that it is possible for the monopolies and trade unions to collaborate, since they are allegedly equally interested in raising wages.^^2^^

The spokesmen of the Postkeynesian theory of growth and distribution stress the link between it and the Marxian analysis of reproduction. In fact they look for the "basis of the interconnection between growth and distribution in the technical and economic ratios of Departments I and II of social production. But in so doing they avoid such crucial categories of Marxian political economy as surplus value and the value of labour power, and without analysing them it is impossible to get down to the problem of distribution. In themselves these attempts to tie the proportions of the distribution of national income with the basic ones of reproduction present some interest from the angle of the evolution of growth theory, but the conclusions drawn from them by the Postkeynesians do not reflect the real economic processes, and sometimes serve as substantiation of reactionary policies.

of new investment, whereas an increment can be ensured as well by drawing in new workers to work available but underused capacities; and the invariability of the capital-intensity of production, which does not provide a choice between more capital-intensive methods of production and less intensive ones.

The most prominent spokesmen of neoclassical growth theory are the American Robert Solow and the British economist James Meade. The advocates of this version of growth theory start from the dominance of free competition, under which the owners of factors of production are rewarded according to their 'marginal product' (by which is meant wages, profit, and rent). In their view the main factors of production are fully employed, which is achieved by the mechanism of free competition, operating on the prices of the factors of production. If, for example, the rates of capital investment prove to be too high, the prices of means of production will rise, which will compel capitalists to seek ways of reducing capital-intensity, which will lead to a lowering of the price of capital (means of production in their interpretation). A second feature of this theory is that its adherents not only treat capital investment as a growth factor but also other components (labour, natural resources, and technical progress). Technical advance is included either as an independent factor or as a means of affecting the productivity of the other factors.

Unlike the old neoclassical theories, modern neoclassicists reject the old idea that substitution of capital for labour led to a growth in the productivity of labour, and to a lowering of the productivity of capital. Now the task is seen as increasing production through minimum outlays of labour and capital. Another feature of modern growth theories is that their adherents treat growth as a normal condition rather than as a disturbance of equilibrium, it being a matter of 'balanced growth' under which supply and demand are in line with one another. A condition of 'balanced growth', apart from free competition, is a stable currency system. The propagandists of neoclassical theories therefore oppose inflationary public expenditure, considering such government intervention in the economy as a factor disturbing stability.

A central problem in these theories is the potentially possible rate of growth, allowing for the factors of production and their optimum employment. This is most clearly expressed in the ' production function', which is depicted as an equation in which output is the sum of each factor multiplied by its marginal product. Underlying it is the false idea of the productivity of the factors of production and the functional theory of distribution following from it. In the form in which it is treated by non-Marxian economists, the production function does not reflect the true state of affairs since neither the value nor the physical volume of the gross national product is broken down into parts that are functions of the separate factors of production. That does not, however, exclude a certain influence of each

185

2. Neoclassical theories

The rise and spread of neoclassical theories of economic growth was due (1) to the adverse consequences of the practice of state monopoly control based on Keynesian theories (growth of public expenditure and budget deficits, intensification of inflation); (2) to the comparatively favourable economic situation in the 60s in a number of capitalist countries (in those circumstances the issue arose of opportunities for growth of production not only through unutilised capacity but also through the introduction of new technique and a rise in labour productivity); and (3) to the impossibility of recommending £eynesian growth theories to developing countries experiencing a lack of capital and possessing large reserves of manpower.

Neoclassical growth theories re-emerged in the travail of criticising Neokeynesian models, which revealed certain vulnerable features of the Keynesian models, to wit: growth of production as a function

~^^1^^ See Nicholas Kaldor. Alternative Theories of Distribution Review of Economic Studies, 1955-6, 23: 61.

~^^2^^ See Joan Robinson. The Accumulation of Capital (London, 1956).

184

factor on the size of the gross national product, but in order to explain that impact it is necessary to start from a labour theory of value by which the consequences of a change in the factors of production can be determined.

Spokesmen of the neoclassical theories consider growth of profit the source of economic growth. They explain the reason for underworking of plant and unemployment by low rates of investment and technical advance entailed by the fall in profit and lowering of the stimuli of. technical innovation. The neoclassicists' practical proposals are also based on this thesis, and are opposed to the extremely limited government measures aimed at raising wages and increasing outlays on socio-economic needs, and suggest a lowering of taxes on profits and an extension of indirect taxation.

The attempts to 'smarten up' neoclassical growth theory are connected with the inclusion of technical advance in it. The original version did not provide an explanation of changes in the distribution of national income; its advocates assumed that a change in the growth rates of the productive factors should be accompanied by changes in their marginal products-consequently the proportions of the distribution of income remained as before. If changes in fact occurred, it meant that the law of marginal productivity did not operate, and neoclassicists cannot accept such a break with the foundations of their theory. They therefore try to prove that the reason for breach of the proportions in the distribution of national income is technical advance. When this advance, for instance, has a capital-intensive character, the marginal product of capital, and consequently the rate of profit, will grow faster than wages. To that must also be added the elasticity of the substitution of resources (for example, of labour by capital and vice versa). This innovation does not get rid of the faults of the neoclassical ideas of marginal productivity and yields nothing in practice, since it is impossible to measure the operative effect of technical advance itself separately from the effect of the substitution of resources. In this case one can speak only of a change in the productivity of labour. The current version of this growth theory is the monetarist theory of the business cycle about which we spoke above. This theory is being intensively pushed by Milton Friedman, one of its founders, not only in the USA but also in Western Europe and Latin America.

The radical fault of the neoclassical theories of economic growth is that they quite ignore realisation of the product, treat reproduction in a one-sided way, and focus attention on costs of production and on how to get the maximum profit at minimum cost. No allowance is made for the fact that the cutting of wages for that purpose leads to a relative reduction of demand and deterioration of the conditions of realisation. These theories are remote from reality because they are based on ideas of 'stable equilibrium' that exclude economic crises, assume free competition, and abstract from the existence of

186

unemployment and underutilisation of production capacity.

Neoclassical growth theories, like the Neokeynesian ones, treat production in general, ignoring the specific nature of capitalism and its antagonistic contradictions.

3. The crisis of theories of economic growth

In the 70s a crisis struck growth theories, both Neokeynesian and neoclassical. In developing their ideas their authors had assumed that high, stable rates of economic growth would of themselves solve all the difficulties of modern capitalism, to wit, eliminate crises and unemployment, and ease socio-economic conflicts. But very soon the most far-sighted ones began to talk about the 'costs of growth' and of contradictions between the goals of growth and the means of achieving them. The deep world economic crisis of 1974-5 was a convincing refutation of theories of capitalism's 'crisis-free development', and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the growth theory people's proposals in the field of economic policy.

In that connection there was an intensification of discussion between the main trends in economic growth theory. The advocates of regulated capitalism call for a reconstruction of the state monopoly machinery with a view to increasing its effect on social development, while spokesmen for neoclassical theories propose a dismantling of this machinery, and transfer of many of its functions to corporations. Economists of the institutional-social trend propose their own programme of reforms, including a reshaping of the state system itself while maintaining the foundations of capitalism. There is nothing essentially new in these proposals. Yet at the same time these economists no longer consider high growth rates the cure for all ills; rather, allowing for the adverse consequences of economic growth, they ask whether its limits are `rational' and formulate its aims differently, while some advance the idea of 'zero growth'.

Galbraith, for example, called for a certain slowing of growth and its reorientation on development of the services sphere and raising the 'quality of life'. Samuelson suggested renouncing the mistakes of a 'growth policy' that aimed at accelerating the rates of development of production and undervalued the 'quality of life'. But the advice of a number of economists to lower growth rates in order to improve the 'quality of life' were unacceptable to the capitalist class. The logic of competition pushes capitalists to expand production and raise growth rates; and the competition of the two systems also pushes them to this.

Examination of the effect of economic growth on the environment has now been added to the line of reasoning on the deepening of social conflicts given economic growth. A number of Western works have pointed out that ideas of economic growth are incompatible with protection of the environment. A symposium Economic

187

Growth vs the Environment was devoted to this problem; in it it was said that around half of the USA's gross national product was produced without allowing for the real needs of society.^^1^^ These issues were also examined in the report to The Club of Rome^^2^^ The Limits to Growth.^^3^^ Its authors put forward the idea of the inevitability of catastrophic contradictions between the world's mounting population, development of the means of production linked with technological advance and limited natural resources, and the destructive effect of production on the environment. They expressed the idea that the growth phase would end in the course of a century. Subsequently there would be a spontaneous reduction of the population as a result of hunger and famine and a reduction of production because of the exhaustion of resources. Estimates were adduced to substantiate this conclusion. The authors of the report saw the way out in a stabilisation of the population size and suppression of growth of production. It is impossible, of course, to agree with the theoretical basis of their calculations and their methodology. Their pessimism, however, had a certain objective basis, i.e. the predatory exploitation of natural resources under capitalism, and the contradiction between the monopolies' interests and those of the people.^^4^^

At the same time by no means all economists link these phenomena in any way with the capitalist system. Some Western writers consider modern technique in industry and agriculture to be the causes of the damage suffered by nature, or the growth of population and human psychology. In some papers, however, one can find indications, for example, of the contradictions arising between various groups of monopolies during the discussion of what measures should be taken to protect nature and sources to finance them. But no Western economist seeking ways of 'balanced growth' (by which is now meant a lowering of rates of growth of the national product with a simultaneous introduction of strict control over consumption of natural resources) is in a position to clarify the real cause of the situation in the capitalist world, for the cause is the basic contradiction of capitalism, to wit the contradiction between the social character of the productive forces, and their growth during the scientific

~^^1^^ See John Hardesty, Morris C. Clement, C.E. Jencks. The Political Economy of Environmental Destruction. In W. Johnson and J. Hardesty (Eds.). Economic Growth vs the Environment (Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, Cal.,1971),p95.

~^^2^^ The Club of Rome is an organisation of economists and employers of various countries concerned to study the international problems of the contemporary world.

~^^3^^ D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, W. Behrens. The Limits to Growth. A Report for The Club of Rome (A Potomac Associates' Book, New York, 1972).

~^^4^^ For a more detailed examination of the reports to The Club of Rome see also G. Chernikov. The Crisis of Capitalism and the Condition of the Working People (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980), pp 97-105; Hya Novik. Society and Nature (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981), pp 270-286.

188

and industrial revolution, and private, capitalistic appropriation.

The positive programme for adapting economic development to the interests of the environment has a palliative and sometimes Utopian character. The idea of a 'zero growth rate' was rejected from the beginning by developing countries because suppression of industrialisation would have meant maintenance of their economic backwardness. The advocates of this idea started from a false notion of capitalism as a system guided allegedly by the interests of society and not by making profit. The drive for profit, however, pushes capitalists to expand production, so the idea of a 'zero growth rate' is Utopian. But it serves the purposes of monopoly capital. On the pretext of combating the harmful consequences of `excessive' economic growth and repudiation of the excesses of the `consumersociety'itstrengthensthe monopolies' policy of attacking the standard of living of the working people.

In the second report to The Club of Rome Mankind at the Turning Point-^^1^^ its authors stressed that the sources of impending doom should be sought in the maturing contradictions of the contemporary system of international economic relations as-well as in the contradictions pointed out by the authors of The Limits to Growth. They therefore considered there should be coordination of the functioning of all economic systems on a global scale. This idea came to be called the theory of organic growth. It was given subsequent substantiation in the reports Reshaping the International Order^^2^^ and Goals for Mankind,* in which certain very important principles were indicated that should guide mankind if catastrophe was to be avpided. They included inter alia disarmament, and tackling of the food and raw material problems. Their authors, however, were unable to formulate ways of dealing with these problems. In effect a stable equilibrium between nature and society can only be achieved by abolishing private capitalist property, but non-Marxian economists consider simply the relationships of society and nature, abstracting them from the class, social structure of society and the character of the relations of production. Socio-political factors, moreover, have a substantial influence on the interaction of society and nature. Social ownership of the means of production and natural resources, for example, and planned management of the whole national economy, scientifically substantiated plans forthe location of industry, and development of industries and regions provide the objective conditions for protection of the environment and rational use of the resources of nature.

Western economists' passage from searches for ways of raising growth rates to proposals for zero growth is evidence of the difficulties that capitalism-and with it Western economics-is experiencing.

~^^1^^ See Mihailo Mesarovic' and Eduard Pestel. Mankind at the Turning Point (Dutton & Co., New York, 1974).

~^^2^^ See Jan Tinbergen (Coordinator). Reshaping the International Order (Dutton & Co., New York, 1976).

~^^3^^ See Ervin Laszlo et al. Goals for Mankind (Dutton & Co., New York, 1977).

12

THE INTERPRETATION OF NEOCOLONIALISM AND THE ECONOMIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

early 60s, this found expression in ideas very typical of the major capitalist countries: in Great Britain 'transformation and the post-imperial community'; in France 'mutual dependence and cooperation'; in West Germany `partnership' and 'mutual aid'; in the USA 'anticolonialism and responsibility for further development'.

Neocolonialist economists and sociologists endeavour to distort the essence of the national liberation movement and to belittle its significance. It is depicted as an 'explosion of nationalism'; the notion of struggle for national liberation does not exist in practice in their vocabulary. At the same time they try to sell the peoples of developing countries the idea of the `self-liquidation' of colonialism, the Voluntary' granting of independence to the oppressed nations by the former metropolitan countries, and the latter's 'lack of interest' in maintaining colonies. The break-up of the colonial system is treated as `decolonisation' by the West's free will, even as a 'success of colonisation'.^^1^^ In fact the nations of the developing countries achieved political sovereignty through a long, persistent, often bloody struggle. (Suffice it to recall the examples of Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan). In addition, imperialism does not dream of surrendering its positions in the developing countries; evidence of that, in particular, is the frank statement of Rothschild, member of an international financial oligarchy:

Africa is the continent of the future; decolonisation is only a necessary adaptation we must make in order to maintain and develop our, interests in Africa.^^2^^

The tried and tested trick of capitalist economics---reduction of the essence of colonialism exclusively to imperialism's open military and political domination of colonies and dependent countries---gave various ideologists like John Strachey, Murray Brown, Walt Rostow, and Rupert Emerson the chance to deny the fact of the existence of neocolonialism as well as to ignore the economic essence of colonialism. Deschamps, for example, wrote that `neo-colonialism' was a term 'tending to disparage Western decolonisation but which could allow for the fears and complexes of the former colonies'.^^3^^

Authors who say that colonialism is `dead', keep silent about the fact that even with political independence achieved, there is still a chance to exploit developing countries economically, which is the basis of neocolonialism. These ideologists divorce politics from economics, reducing the essence of imperialist exploitation to imperialism's political domination of developing countries. The breakup of the colonial system, moreover, did not mean the `disappearance' of imperialism itself and of monopoly capital's domination of devel-

1. The theory of neocolonialism

A quite definite practical aim has first place in the modern capitalist economic doctrines put at the service of neocolonialism, namely: to justify the need to keep developing countries within the capitalist world economic system, even after they have achieved political independence. But, as the ideology of neocolonialism is primarily aimed at the peoples of the developing countries, neocolonialist theories, while expressing the interests of the monopoly capitalist class in their content, give the appearance in their form of allowing for the urgent needs and problems of these countries. There is no single theory of their further development in non-Marxian economics, it should be noted. Their problems are reflected in a host of ideas, conceptions, doctrines, and views whose purpose is an apologia for imperialism's contemporary expansion, now that the former colonies have political sovereignty.

Neocolonialist theories can be provisionally divided into two main groups. The first includes versions of economic theories and notions created in relation to the imperialist countries themselves that analyse developing countries' problems from the former's standpoint (versions of the theories of the 'transformation of capitalism', `convergence', 'democratic socialism', etc.). The second group embraces theories and conceptions especially developed by the ideologists of neocolonialism (theories of `interdependence', ' partnership', `development', etc.) that are altered in accordance with the evolution of neocolonialism and the development of the national liberation movement.

The various theories employed by neocolonialism have both general and specific aims. On the one hand the ideologists of neocolonialism, while expressing the interests of the international monopoly capitalists, pursue a common long-term aim of keeping developing countries as objects of exploitation. On the other hand they operate from the concrete, immediate interests of their national monopoly capitalists. Right after the break-up of the colonial system, in the

190

~^^1^^ Hubert Deschamps. La fin des empires coloniaux. 5me edition (PUF Paris, 1976), p 118.

~^^2^^ Cited from Modo Ekabeli. L'emprise de Pimperialisme fran?ais. L 'economists du Tiers-Monde, 1977, 20: 25.

~^^3^^ Hubert Deschamps. Op. cit., p 119.

191

oping countries' economies. As Lenin remarked, the ideologists of imperialism usually talk about 'national liberation ... leaving out economic liberation. Yet in reality it is the latter that is the chief thing.'^^1^^ On another occasion, moreover, he wrote:

The domination of finance capital and of capital in general is not to be abolished by any reforms in the sphere of political democracy; and self-determination belongs wholly and exclusively to this sphere.^^2^^

After a big group of Afro-Asian countries had achieved political independence, Western economics was faced with a new task, that of steering the socio-economic processes taking place in them into the channel of neocolonialism. In that connection the HeckscherOhlin theory of comparative costs of production,^^3^^ which is a version of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantages,^^4^^ began to be popularised in regard to developing countries. According to this theory each country should specialise in the production of those commodities for which its costs are lower than those in other countries because of the difference in `advantages' that it has. The `advantage' of developed capitalist countries is the existence of modern technology and capital, while that of developing countries is the availability of primary products and surplus labour, which stimulates the rise of labour-intensive forms of production. Adherents of this theory (like Tinbergen) advocate preservation of the international division of labour that arose back in colonial times under which developing countries served the interests of developed capitalist countries, occupying a position dependent on them. The primary product bias of their economies would thus be preserved, but with the production of individual types of semi-manufacture, i.e. partial industrialisation would be permitted.

The theory of comparative costs was the basis for developing the idea of outward looking development that became popular in non-Marxian economics in the 70s.^^5^^ Its adherents proposed using the export sector of developing countries' economies as the main link in their economic development policy. According to this idea the development of these countries would be tied to modern ad-

vances of science and engineering, and their production would be modernised, which would encourage `self-liquidation' of backwardness. The export industries should therefore become `poles' of development around which a modern economy would take shape. From this point of view Hong Kong, South Korea, and West African countries could be taken as examples, since they

strikingly illustrate the'advantage that can be drawn from commercial integration into the international system of exchange, aid, investments, and currency.1 The same author, moreover, writes that

the introduction of export crops in the colonies-rubber in Malaysia, cocoa in the Gold Coast (today Ghana) and Nigeria, tea in Indiapowerfully stimulated their progress.^^2^^

At the same time a part of Asia, a considerable part of Africa, and the interior of South America, which did not have as many contacts with the West, 'are among the least developed regions of the globe'.^^3^^ The aim of this conception of 'outward looking development' is thus closer integration of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America into the world system of capitalist production.

This idea has also found supporters, we must note, among certain economists in developing countries.^^4^^ The fact is that, on the one hand, the export sector of the economy inherited from the colonial period is very developed in most developing countries, delivering various kinds of raw material and farm produce to the world capitalist market; on the other hand, influential strata of the national capitalist class, whose property is often linked with the operations of the export sector, have an interest in expanding economic ties with developed capitalist countries.

In the late 60s and early 70s the imperialist countries passed from a policy of 'development aid' in respect of developing countries to a policy of 'equal partnership', the main recommendations for implementing which were set out in the report of the Pearson Commission.^^5^^ An idea of the 'interdependence of nations' was put forward as theoretical substantiation of the new policy of neocolonialism, and is still being widely used by Western authors in works on the problems of developing countries.^^6^^ According to it development of

~^^1^^ P. Streetten. L'evolution des theories relatives en developpement economique. Problemes economiques, 1977,1546: 3.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

~^^3^^ Ibid.

4 See, for example, E. Cannage. Capitaux et developpement: role de la firme multinational dans les pays arabes. Mondes en developpement, 1978, 21: 97-128.

5 Partners in Development. Report of the Commission on International Development (Pall Mall, London, 1970).

~^^6^^ See, for example, Francois Perroux. `Independence'de I'economie nationale et interdependance des nations (Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1969); Marina von Neumann Whitman. Reflections of Interdependence (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Penn., 1979).

~^^1^^ V.I. Lenin. The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories. Collected Works, Vol. 18 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973), p 398.

2 V. I. Lenin. The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to SelfDetermination. Collected Works, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 145.

3 See Bertil Ohlin. Interregional and International Trade Revised edition (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

4 See D. Ricardo. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Bell London, 1891), Ch. VII.

5 I. Little, T. Scitovsky, M. Scott. Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (Oxford U.P.,London, 1970); Jan Tinbergen. On the International Division of Labour (Federation of Swedish Industries, Stockholm, 1970); D.S. Paauw and John C.H. Fei. The Transition in Open Dualistic Economies. Theory and Southeast Asian Experience (New Yale U.P., Haven, 1973).

192

7---455

193

the world economy leads to the rise of such a structure of production links that all countries form part of it as interconnected and interdependent units. Its authors back their argument up with references to the objective process of the internationalising of production, which is very intensive given today's technological advance. The process, however, is distorted by Western writers; in their idea the international monopolies are the main vehicles of technical and economic progress and consolidators of economic ties between developed capitalist and developing countries. The striving of the latter for economic independence, therefore, is alleged to contradict the internationalisation of production and exchange as an objective process of the world economy.

These theorists deliberately leave out the fact that the capitalist system of world business took shape in accordance with the economic laws of the capitalist mode of production, which led to the subordination of some countries to others and imposed a production specialisation on economically backward countries that was profitable to the economically more developed ones holding the dominant position. As Marx noted:

A new and international division of labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field. 1

It was the forming of unequal relations between the developed and developing countries of the world capitalist system that entailed.

The aim of `interdependence' is to try and camouflage the subordinate position of the developing countries in relation to the imperialist ones, and to demonstrate a non-existent `dependence' of developed capitalist countries on developing ones, for which attention is focused on Western industries' mounting need for raw materials supplied by the latter; the expediency of a model of 'outward looking development' is advertised in every possible way, and likewise the desirability o'f foreign private capital operations (mainly in the person of international monopolies interested in further exploitation of the developing countries' resources).

The practical conclusions are just as bankrupt. The developing countries' fight for economic independence cannot be identified with autarchy or isolation from the world economy, and is not 'economic nationalism', as the advocates of the `interdependence' idea claim. On the contrary, the consolidation of national sovereignty over its natural resources is a sine qua non of the development of each developing country's foreign trade and economic connections, and a

factor in its involvement in the international division of labour on a truly equal basis.

When the developing countries achieved political independence the national liberation movement entered a new stage in its development, that of the fight for economic independence and liquidation of backwardness. These countries' drive for economic independence has resulted in the struggle to eliminate capitalism's unequal system of international economic relations; acquiring a more and more organised character in the mid-70s, it took the form of a movement for a new international economic order, the principles of which, put for ward by the developing countries with the active support of socialist countries, found reflection, as we know, in a number of documents adopted by the United Nations in 1974-6. The demands in them relate to restructuring of the international trade and monetary machinery, tackling of the problems of developing countries' economic development, and extension of scientific and technical co-operation. The response of capitalist economics became a search for ways of resolving the conflict along the lines of moderate reforms. The apologists of neocolonialism are striving to find a version of reconciling developing countries with imperialism that would satisfy their need for economic development to some extent and at the same time maintain their subordination within the capitalist system, and so this system as a whole.

The need to establish a new international economic order is substantiated by the `interdependence' (economic, technological, ecological, etc.) of developed capitalist countries and developing countries, and by their drive to eliminate the 'differences between rich and poor' countries; but the reasons for these differences are not indicated. In order to understand the true state of things, we would cite the group of economists headed by Jan Tinbergen, referred to above, who noted

that the majority of Western politicians are being driven to the world's negotiating tables, not by the plight of the poor nations, but by the plight of their own economies and by the serious dislocations in the international [capitalist-^//* ] system which has helped make the wealthy nations wealthier.^^1^^

This explains why the imperialist powers do not openly oppose the idea that a new international economic order is needed.

To begin with, their reaction to the ideas put forward by the developing countries was negative. Their ideologists appraised these demands as a new `challenge' to imperialism and resisted a radical reshaping of international economic relations. But, in the face of the developing countries' intensifying fight for economic independence and equitable relations with capitalist countries, Western

1 Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling and edited by F. Engels (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 425.

~^^1^^ Jan Tinbergen (Coordinator). Reshaping the International Order ( Dutton & Co., New York, 1976). p 47.

195 194

economic thinking has been gradually forced to reconsider its views on changes in the existing economic system. It now recognises the need for a new international economic order but only as 'a response of the Western countries intended to channel the demands of the underdeveloped states'.^^1^^

The ruling circles of the USA take a most conservative stand a propos of the new international economic order; at first they refused a `dialogue' with the 'poor South', but later adopted a policy of delaying tactics and insignificant concessions to the developing countries so as to hold back the democratising of international economic relations. In this connection, the evaluation of the US position made by the Brazilian economist Furtado is of interest:

The US government ... has flooded the UN emergency assembly with proposals whose `study' would occupy the international bureaucracy for years.^^2^^

The proposals were of two kinds: on the one hand concessions in the field of finance, transfer of technology, etc., that on the whole altered nothing; on the other hand,

an attempt to reinforce the position of international enterprises and the decision-making centres, the World Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, born of a period when the economic position of the United States enabled it to exercise firm tutelage over the international economy without opposition.^^3^^

In the view of the American economist Michael Hudson, the USA would continue to oppose the creation of a new international economic order:

In short, both the European and Third World economies are to return to their former complementarity with the American economy.4 The members of the European Economic Community, which are major importers of primary products from developing countries and suppliers of industrial goods to them, have displayed a more flexible approach to this problem than the USA. Allowing for the advantages that developing countries offer them, they took a more liberal stand on relations with these countries. At the same time, when the very foundations of the world system of capitalist business seem threatened, the EEC countries make common cause with the USA and the most conservative circles of imperialism.

The neocolonialist ideologists strain to distort the sense and general orientation of developing countries' demands for a new

international economic order. The British economist Sir Arthur Lewis, for example, says:

The phrase 'international economic order' is vague, but nothing would be gained by trying to define it precisely.^^1^^

Ideologists of neocolonialism, appraising developing countries' stand in regard to a new international economic order, present matters as if it were only a question of 'the unequal distribution of the gains coming from international trade' and not of changes in the established capitalist division of labour and unequal economic relations.^^2^^ They try thereby to split the ranks of the developing countries, to artificially counterpose the oil-producing countries to those that have no oil resources of their own, and to prove that the former are getting rich at the expense of the latter.

These ideologists also use a similar trick in order to estrange developing countries from the socialist ones. While trying to demonstrate their loyalty to the former they strive to disparage the latter, saying that they are not making any appreciable contribution to realising the new international economic order. Claude Cheysson, member of the EEC Commission, wrote, for example, that

the countries with a state economy (namely, Eastern Europe and the USSR) are in effect playing an insignificant role in defining the new economic order.^^3^^

As we see, he thus ignores that it was precisely the socialist countries that first supported the developing countries' just demands in the United Nations for a new international economic order.

The operations of monopoly capital in developing countries are the most effective means of neocolonialism today. So its ideologists strive to `sneak' transnational and multinational corporations into the new international economic order, for which purpose they focus attention on such aspects of the corporations' operations as the utilisation of modern technology and managerial experience, the existence of a ramified network of production and marketing branches, the creation of additional jobs, and the payment of taxes and wages as sources of finance for the host countries, i.e. on factors that in their view are decisive for the development of the latter's economies. That is why these ideologists make an absolute of the 'efficient role' of transnationals and multinationals in developing countries and say that they 'can play a positive role in improving the living conditions of the poor masses in the Third World'.^^4^^

More reserved authors see the negative effect of transnational

~^^1^^ Michel Dumas. Qu'est-ce que le nouvel ordre economique international? Revue Tiers-Monde, 1976, 17, 66: 265.

~^^2^^ Celso Furtado. Le nouvel ordre economique mondial. Un point de vue du Tiers-Monde. Revue Tiers-Monde, 1976, 17, 67: 576.

~^^1^^ W. Arthur Lewis. The Evolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton U.P., Princeton, N.J., 1978), p 3.

~^^2^^ La strategic de 1'OPEP et le Tiers-Monde. Problemes economiques, 1980, 11703: 19.

~^^3^^ Claude Cheysson. Quelle Europe attendons-nous face ou Tiers-Monde? Revue Tiers-Monde, 1977,18, 71: 556.

~^^4^^ Jan Tinbergen (Coordinator). Op. cit., p 157.

tutu.

~^^4^^ Michael Hudson. Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order (Harper & Row, New York, 1977), p 257.

196 197

and multinational corporations on the economies of developing countries, most often noting as an adverse factor the subordination of the transnational' and multinationals' branches located in them to foreign 'centres of decision'. * Less often they speak of the negative effect of the transfer of profits out of the country. These consequences of multinationals' operations are put down to the absence of appropriate international legislation. In that connection bourgeois ideologists make various proposals to correct the corporations' operations, which generally boil down to attempts to set up an international organisation to control international monopolies' operations, the drafting of 'codes of conduct' for them that include, for example, proposals on ownership and control, movement \)f capital, taxation, non-interference in the political affairs of the host country, and so on. In this way it is stressed that 'it is not a question of eliminating private property but of controlling private by public rationale'.'1 Obviously it cannot be a question of real control of any kind over the international monopolies, since their operations are based on capitalist governments' respect for the rights of private property and observance of commercial secrecy. In order to evaluate the proposals of neocolonialism's ideologists for controlling the operations of transnational and multinational corporations within the new international economic order, suffice it to recall Lenin's words, still very apposite today:

Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defence of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they obscure its complete domination and its deep-going roots, strive to push specific and secondary details into the forefront and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for reform; such as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc.3 and that

the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a 'pious wish'.4 The economic power of multinationals, moreover, rivals that of whole countries. In the early 70s, for example, the gross national product of the developing countries of Africa (except Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco) was roughly equal to the gross sales of General Motors, while the gross turnover of Royal Dutch Shell was greater than the GNP of any developing country in Africa or Asia, except India and Pakistan.

Since the mid-60s some economists began to invent new economic development models, primarily for Latin American countries, which proposed a strategy for modernising local capitalism on the basis of

an 'open door' policy as regards foreign monopoly capital and integration with it. At the same time it was proposed to accelerate rates of accumulation by intensifying the already savage exploitation of these countries' manpower and natural resources. The Brazilian sociologist Cardoso represented this strategy as follows:

It is characteristic of the dependent relations, that are being imposed on countries like Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico that they are based on a new international division of labour by which part of the industrial system of hegemonist countries is transferred, under the control of international corporations, to peripheral economies that had previously managed to make some progress in industrial development.1 This strategy has been very broadly employed in Brazil.

Brazil's real economic potential is undeniable (it is the fifth biggest country in the world in area and seventh in population). In the 70s a rapid influx of foreign capital gave a steep rise to Brazil's GNP. In degree of concentration of production and capital.saturation of production with the latest advances of technical progress, and in the technical equipping of enterprises, Brazil is much in advance of other Latin American countries. In per capita income it is intermediate between the `poor' countries and the `rich', being the embodiment of the idea of an 'international middle class'.^^2^^ The illusions, however, were quickly dispersed. The foreign debt, by which the balance of payments deficit was covered, is the world highest, accounting for $87 billion by the beginning of 1983. Since the mid-70s growth rates declined, an overproduction crisis set in, inflation increased, while the number of unemployed was more than four million at the end of the 70s, or 8 per cent of the able-bodied population. Galloping inflation and the fall in the public's real incomes caused a relative reduction of demand for consumer goods that seriously exacerbated the problem of the home market.

As the Brazilian sociologist Fernandes has remarked:

The Brazilian miracle ... was much more the effect of propaganda, or rather cynical propaganda. There was no miracle; what happened was a process of Brazil's incorporation in the economy of monopoly capitalism-we were economically incorporated by the hegemonist nations and the superpower that is the United States.3 The crisis of the Brazilian development model indicates the fiasco of the idea that it is possible to tackle the problem of economic backwardness by way of dependent capitalist development. As the Brazilian economist Paul Singer has pointed out:

The price that we are paying for having been drawn into the capitalist

~^^1^^ See Celso Furtado. Le nouvel ordre economique mondial. Un point de vue du Tiers-Monde. Revue Tiers-Monde, 1976, 17,67: 573, 576.

~^^2^^ Jan Tinbergen (Coordinator) Op. cit., p 157.

~^^3^^ V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Progress Publishers. Mocsow, 1975), p 102.

~^^4^^ Ibid., p 103.

198

~^^1^^ Fernando Henrique Cardoso. O modelo politico brastteiro e outros ensaios (Difel/Difusao Editorial, Rio de Janeiro, 1977), p 64.

^^2^^ Nueva Sociedad (San Jose), 1979,41: 109.

~^^3^^ Florestan Fernandes. Pelo desenvolvimento economico com instabilidade politica. Banas, 1977, 1155: 24.

199

international economy is that we are frozen in a position that is always relatively the same, one of underdevelopment. *

In his opinion, 'it is inevitable that Brazil will perform the role of a dependent economy within the international capitalist system'.^^2^^

In spite of its failure, however, the Brazilian experiment continues, and is being taken up by other Latin American countries (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela). The strategy of modernisation in them differs only in the methods and the flexibility or rigidity of the economic policy, the extent to which relations with transnational corporations are disguised, and the different extent to which the development models are balanced. In Mexico, for example, a definite maximum (of 49 per cent) has been fixed for foreign companies' involvement in share capital. The facts indicate that use of this model is not helping overcome the economy's backwardness or ensuring independent development. Refusal to tackle social -problems, and the absence of a real fight against inflation and unemployment, are leading to unprecedented growth of the cost of living and a sharp aggravation of class antagonisms.

The apologetic gambits of the theoretical defence of neocolonialism are altered in accordance with the jobs that become priority in one period or another of imperialism's neocolonial expansion. Their main aim is to promote the most effective forms of imperialist exploitation (from the standpoint of monopoly capital) and maintain the developing countries as an integral part of the world capitalist system.

should employ the same instruments, mechanisms, stimuli, and organisational forms as were used during the industrialisation of capitalist countries. This formula disorients the nations of developing countries, which is particularly underscored by the example of the Latin American countries that achieved independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. A marked one-sidedness of production in some branch of mining, and complete domination by foreign monopoly capital, lead to their perpetuation as raw material appendages of the main capitalist countries. In the opinion of the Mexican sociologist Mauro Marini, the Latin American state acquired capitalist features before a capitalist class as such took shape and the latter always had its sights set on the model of capitalist domination in the countries with which it was linked economically and culturally.^^1^^

Bourgeois economists treat the very concept 'socio-economic underdevelopment' in a distorted light, counterposing it as a rule to the high level of development of the main capitalist countries, comparing them by certain quantitative indices, the most important of which is national income (or gross national product) per head of population. Samuelson, for example, puts it thus:

A less developed country is simply one with real per capita income that is low relative to the present-day per capita incomes of such nations as Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and Western Europe generally.^^2^^

This definition does not bring us one whit closer to understanding the term `underdevelopment', and does not bring out the causes of underdevelopment. On the contrary it completely muddles and garbles the problem of social development. (1) Most countries in the capitalist world have a lower per capita income than those named above. (2) It is wrong to define a country's level of development by average per capita income. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, this indicator is double that of the USA itself, but they are rightly classed as a developing country.

There are many adherents of this definition of underdevelopment, who consider there is no clear difference in per capita income between the poorest developed countries and the richest developing countries. The French sociologist Sales suggests that the inclusion of a country in either group

may depend on chance, on personal points of view, and above all on political pressures. The spokesmen of certain countries are ready to consider them underdeveloped since they are concerned to obtain foreign aid.^^3^^

2. Concepts of socio-economic underdevelopment

Notwithstanding the many long-term studies of the economic backwardness of developing countries, Western economics is not yet able to determine its causes or to give a profound substantiation of the concept, so that the recipes recommended for them do not meet their true interests, i.e, the winning of economic independence, elimination of backwardness and mass poverty, and a rise in the people's well-being. The main point in Western analyses is not the liquidation of socio-economic underdevelopment but adaptation of the old ideas developed by various schools to the specific conditions of liberated countries. Most Western conceptions explaining economic backwardness are therefore based on the theses of Rostow's theory of stages of economic growth, according to which the transition from precapitalist (feudal and semi-feudal) society in developing countries to a developed industrial one, identical with capitalist society is more or less the same. From which it follows that developing countries

~^^1^^ Ruy Mauro Marini. E) Fstado en America Latina (mesa redonda). Revista Mexicans de Ciencias Politkas y Sociales, 1975, 21, 82: 9.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973), p 765.

~^^3^^ Hubert Sales. La croissance des revenues (PDF, Paris, 1972), p 77.

201

~^^1^^ Paul Singer. As duas alternativas brasileiras. Banas, 1976, 1121: 29.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

200

As we see, he employs a subjective approach to the definition of underdevelopment.

At the same time he concludes that 'measurement of per capita income alone can give only a rough approximation of the index of real development'.^^1^^ Gunnar Myrdal also considers that this index does not define development.^^2^^ Under precapitalist and capitalist forms and modes of production, the condition of the bulk of the population of Saudi Arabia and Kuweit (where foreign monopolies and certain classes and strata of the local population get immense profits from oil, and per capita income is considerably above $5,000 a year) is not significantly different from that of the working people in Mali and the Upper Volta (where there are also prosperous strata of the native population, and foreign capital sometimes dominates the main industries, but the per capita income of the population is less than $ 150 per annum).

In Latin America the index of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is highest in Venezuela (the average for the region is considerably higher than in Asian and African countries), but Venezuela cannot be counted a developed country since the proportion of the extractive and manufacturing industries in the GDP is less than 40 per cent.

The use of a few quantitative indices only to analyse a country's development gives a superficial characteristic, does not reflect its inner essence, and consequently leads to distortion of the real process taking place in the national economy. Western theorists deliberately propose such indices to define economic backwardness and underdevelopment, since it is impossible to bring out the latter's real economic and political causes by means of them.

A whole group of economists, when defining 'socio-economic underdevelopment', point to the social aspect, considering that development is a matter 'not only of the accumulation of goods but equally the social, cultural, and human context in which they are accumulated'.^^3^^ Myrdal includes a whole number of qualitative indices in his definition of underdevelopment as a 'social system', namely: productivity and incomes; conditions of production and standard of living; labour relations; social institutions and political measures.4 Baumol and Blinder, citing the existence of an `agreement', formulate the main conditions causing underdevelopment as

lack of physical capital, scarcity of valuable natural resources, rapid growth of populations, lack of education, unemployment, and social

and political impediments to business activity.^^1^^

There is no doubt that a social description is very important for classifying a country as `underdeveloped', but almost the same indices can also be applied to the analysis of highly developed capitalist countries. Baumol and Blinder find quite objective reasons for the existence of `underdevelopment' and lay the blame on the governments of a number of developing countries where 'there are serious inhibitions to entrepreneurship' for according 'relatively low status to business activity'.^^2^^ Their main conditions resemble statements current in the West that "underdevelopment is most often characterised by the poverty of nations'.^^3^^ In fact, more than 60 per cent of the population of developing countries live in poverty, but it is incorrect to call these countries poor in productive resources. The final declaration of an international seminar on the problems of socio-economic reforms in countries taking the road of development, held in Aden in 1978, said:

While 70 per cent of the population living on the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America receive only 30 per cent of world income, they are the source of 80 per cent of world exports of primary materials and farm produce. In spite of their rich resources their share of world industrial production is only 7 per cent.^^4^^

The domination of private ownership of the means of production and exploitation of man by man inevitably lead to economic and social inequality, which has been aggravated in developing countries by the colonial past and neocolonialism, a multisectoral economy, the incompleteness of class development, survivals of tribal and feudal structures, general religious superstition, and a low general level of development of the productive forces, all of which cause mass poverty.

One of the most common theories explaining the causes of underdevelopment is the theory of 'circular traps' of poverty developed in the early 50s by the American economist Nurkse/ A current interpretation of it reads as follows:

The underdevelopment syndrome is reduced to a problem of capital shortage. Limited capital means limited output. And the low level of national income means that capital cannot be accumulated out of normal savings. The LDCs [less developed countiies-Auth. ] are caught in a 'circular trap' of poverty and frustrated hopes for a better life.

~^^1^^ Hubert Sales. Op. cit., p77.

^^2^^ See Gunnar Myrdal. An Approach to the Asian Drama (Vintage Books New York, 1970).

'

~^^3^^ G. Grellet. Tendences nouvelles de I'economie politic/He (Centurion, Pa-

~^^4^^ Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations Vol. 3 (Pantheon Books, division of Random House, New York, 1968), p I860.'

202

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 757. ^^2^^Ibid., p761.

~^^3^^ G. Grellet. Op. cit., p 140.

~^^4^^ Problemes des transformations socio-economiques dans les pays en voie de developpement (Aden, 1978), p 6.

~^^5^^ See Ragnar Nurkse. Some International Aspects of the Problem of Economic Development. The American Economic Review, May 1952.

203

Other circular traps are derivative of capital shortage.1 Galbraith sees the reasons for underdevelopment and poverty in centuries-old backwardness of agriculture in developing countries. He also finds a law of people's existence in poverty along the lines of the theory of 'circular traps', i.e. 'an equilibrium of poverty'.2 In rural areas

people have lived at or near the minimum... And here the conditions persist because they live in an equilibrium of poverty... Life is near the bare level of subsistence, there is no saving.3 Thus it is almost impossible, in the views of these economists, to get out of this `equilibrium'; the poor, not having savings and not trying to save, cannot improve or replace backward technique and technology. The danger and persistence of these 'circular traps' is that they record really existing phenomena and interconnected processes, and not imaginary ones. At the same time this theory as a rule considers the superficial links of economic and non-economic factors (health, educational, demographic, etc.). The recommendations based on these investigations pursue an apologetic aim, viz., to hide the main cause of underdevelopment and poverty. The development of industry and agriculture does not in itself solve the problem of poverty when earlier economic relations are preserved and capitalism is introduced. The main cause of poverty does not lie simply in the backwardness of agriculture, which itself is a derivative of the socio-economic conditions inherited from the colonial past. Poverty and underdevelopment, like unemployment, exploitation, and inequality, are necessary attributes of capitalism that will be reproduced in ever new forms while it exists.

One of the most important factors in underdevelopment, in the view of bourgeois ideologists, is the demographic growth in developing countries.

While in the United States and some countries of Western Europe, net population growth has fallen almost to zero, the population explosion continues in many of the LDCs... The annual growth rate of population continues perhaps ten times as high as it is in the industrialized countries. Clearly, the more closely the growth in population approximates the growth in national income, the more slowly standards of living will rise, since there will be that many more persons among whom the additional product must be divided... The rise in population in LDCs is in fact consuming nearly half the increase in their GNP.^^4^^

The ideologists of imperialism find it very useful to lay the blame for backwardness, hunger, unemployment, and the hard lot of the bulk of the population onto the developing countries themselves. Such ideas are typical of contemporary Western economists who try to explain socio-economic phenomena by biological processes. The demographic explosion is making it difficult to cope with the food problem, but it is not the source of hunger and backwardness. The statistics in fact show that world population has been growing faster, having increased by a factor of 2.6 in the first 77 years of this century. Production of farm produce has increased by a factor of 2.2 in the same period. But it is quite possible to tackle the problem of supplying the whole population of the earth with consumer goods, and especially with food.

The primary cause of hunger and the hard lot of the bulk of the population is archaic production, and long subjection to the aims and interests of metropolitan countries. The population growth rate is high only in comparison to the low level of development of the productive forces and the backwardness of relations of production, which are characterised by an interlacing of many forms of exploitation. To overcome that it is necessary to carry out urgent socioeconomic transformations that will put developing countries on a non-capitalist road of development.

Western economists like to explain the socio-economic backwardness of developing, countries by the dualist character of their economies. Grellet writes that Fra^ois Perroux and his disciples define underdevelopment as an incongruity between the different sectors of economic life. The disjointed or dualist economy is thus characterised by a backward and introverted sector and an extroverted sector.^^1^^ In fact there may be a parallel development of two modes of production in a country, quite unconnected with one another. One, employing modern technique, develops rapidly, broadening its links with foreign markets, and yielding very big profits to the owners of the capital invested in it; the other, as a rule, traditionally carries on simple reproduction with a primitive, backward technique, with a strong foundation of precapitalist relations, and the absolute majority of its practitioners normally satisfied with an income that permits them simply to survive. These conceptions are aimed at proving the need to encourage capitalist development of the modern sector in every way possible. To that end the self-interest of the whole population in this is preached; at the same time the tendency for the income gap to increase between the various types of economy and the different strata of the population as the economy develops is explained in an apologetic way.

The British economist Sir Arthur Lewis, analysing the specific conditions of an enclave developing along capitalist lines and surroun-

~^^1^^ Murray Wolfson. A Textbook of Economics (Methuen & Co.. London, 1978), p 732.

~^^2^^ John Kenneth Galbraith. The Nature of Mass Poverty (Harvard U P Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p 52.

3 Ibid., pp 52-53.

~^^4^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 756.

204

G. Grellet. Op. cit., p 141.

205

ded by traditional structures, counter/poses the aims and character of 'such growth poles', stresses 'the failure of traditional sectors to respond swiftly or significantly to economic opportunities' * offered to the society as a whole by such an enclave. He considers that economic growth in an enclave can promote development and enrichment of the traditional sectors since

It buys commodities and services from the traditional sector ... provides work for people coming into the enclave from traditional sectors ... sells commodities and services to the traditional sector more cheaply than they can be obtained elsewhere ... establishes for its own purposes an infrastructure (railways, ports, electric power, water supplies, roads, hospitals, etc.) which is then used by people in the traditional sector at less than average cost... is taxed, and some part of its taxes provides services used by people in the traditional sectors (schools, courts, agricultural extension, public health, etc.)... serves as an example of the productivity of new techniques, institutions, and methods of organisation. This example helps to modernise the traditional sector.^^2^^

Furthermore, Lewis thinks, if the traditional sector could meet all the needs which the enclave is now forced to satisfy by imports, 'the development enclave would expand rapidly to take in the whole economy'.^^3^^

Judging from Lewis' list of the enclave's `blessings', it takes on the functions of the state in providing the population with objects of common satisfaction of needs, i.e. in the development of a social programme. Lewis furthermore considers what the poor have obtained in the way of social services (viz., the development of education, medical services, water supplies, transport, etc.) to be an immense contribution of enclaves. 'The poor,' he writes, 'have gained much more from development than it is now fashionable to believe.'4 According to his logic, colonialism should also be thanked for building cities, railways and highways, etc., on the bones of the local population, and other objects of the infrastructure needed for the functioning of production organised by the metropolitan countries. The aim of capitalist production, and consequently of the material and manpower resources drawn into it, is not to benefit the local population but to extract profit through unbridled exploitation of it. The traditional sectors operate by other objective laws, which reflect the peculiarities of their relations of production, than the capitalist enclave does. The forms of exploitation of the working people, for instance, are often of a feudal or semi-feudal character. It is this

deep difference that makes it impossible to employ the enclave's methods in the traditional sector; and that is why the idea of dualism by which the non-Marxian ideologists try to prove the possibility of and necessity for industrialisation of the backward traditional economy in a capitalist way is incorrect.

The idea itself is interpreted differently by different economists. Some define it as the coexistence of a capitalist enclave and a precapitalist traditional sector; others divide the economy into separate sectors by criteria of marketability; while still others take the different conditions of hiring labour as the criterion. Dualism is treated, in addition, as the existence of a developing industry and backward agriculture, or of urban and rural economies, etc. It is therefore muddled, and contains serious inconsistencies in each interpretation. In fact there are stagnating and rapidly growing enterprises in both sectors, and in town and country, viz., local national crafts or plantations working for export. The apologetic character of this conception is that economists, considering the dualism a natural phenomenon characteristic of developing countries, do not as a rule touch on the real causes of underdevelopment, examining only its technical aspect, which is giving rise to criticism by economists of the developing countries themselves.

Marxist-Leninist theory has developed clear-cut recommendations, which are being put into practice by countries of socialist orientation, to eliminate economic backwardness, to implement consistent transformations of the developing economy, the longterm aim of which is to reduce and abolish poverty and improve the well-being of the working people.

These include gradual elimination of the positions of imperialist monopoly, of the local big bourgeoisie and the feudal elements, and restriction of foreign capital. They include the securing by the people's state of commanding heights in the economy and transition to planned development of the productive forces, and encouragement of the cooperative movement in the countryside. They include enhancing the role of the working masses in social life, and gradually reinforcing the state apparatus with national personnel faithful to the people. They include anti-imperialist foreign policy. Revolutionary parties expressing the interests of the broad mass of the working people are growing stronger there. *

A carrying out of these measures would enable the concept `underdevelopment' to be relegated to the limbo. Theoretically, 'socio-economic underdevelopment' is a category of political economy that reflects the relation of dominance and subordination in the epoch of imperialism. It is subjection of the national economy to the aims of major capitalist monopolies; it is inequality in position on the

~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981), pp 16-17.

207

~^^1^^ W. Arthur Lewis. Employment, Income Distribution and Development Strategy (The Macmillan Press, London, 1976), p 27. ^^2^^Ibid., pp 26-27.

^^3^^ Ibid., p 27.

~^^4^^ Ibid., p 30.

206

world capitalist market, and dependence on developed capitalist countries; it is the reverse side of neocolonialism, aimed at long maintenance of that position; and it is consequently backwardness of the economy, culture, social structure, and social relations; it is the population's suffering from unemployment and malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease. Underdevelopment can only be ended radically, by shattering old relations and then carrying out a policy of gradual winning of economic independence. It is a long and very difficult path, but the only one that leads to real emancipation and rapid development.

will develop into national communities that are politically, socially, and economically like our own.'

By singling out the developing countries as a Third World bourgeois ideologists thereby ignore the division of the modern world into two opposing socio-economic systems, and also the fact that the transition from capitalism to socialism is the definitive feature of the present epoch, and that there is no objective possibility, therefore, of any 'third path' of development for these countries.

Western views on these countries' path of development are evolving to some extent as the world revolutionary process develops, and as the balance of power shifts in the struggle between the two world socio-economic systems. The ideas being put at the service of neocolonialism now cannot ignore the growing international authority of socialism, and can no longer, too, openly deny the obvious advances of world socialism in the economic field. In that connection there are no longer, with rare exceptions, direct statements in the works of Western authors, that socialism 'does not suit' developing countries as an alternative to a capitalist orientation. Various tricks are employed in order to convince the public of these countries that it is necessary to maintain links with the capitalist economic system. Adler-Karlsson, for instance, recognises the progress of socialist countries in the realm of economic growth. In his view, moreover,

it is impossible to say that the poor nations may not have something to

learn from the socialist experience.^^2^^

But since, he says, the socialist countries are `dependent' on the West in obtaining loans and technology, they cannot actively support the fight of the developing countries of the `South' against Western monopolies. 'The best policy for the poor nations' in order to achieve very rapid development, therefore, he concludes, 'is one of high but very firmly controlled co-operation with the Western nations'.^^3^^ The director-general of the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Research, Claude Gruson, has remarked that

an economic policy that ventures a real development of the Third

World should make it a rule to avoid, or reduce to a minimum, any

break with the initial state of economic activity,^^4^^

having in mind the established system of external links and structures of developing countries' economies. Another author, Thomas Larson, in turn, expresses doubts about the possibility of a socialist orien-

3. Interpretations of liberated countries' paths of socio-economic development

The choice of paths of socio-economic development is now an arena of acute ideological struggle. Bourgeois ideologists are constantly developing ideas that substantiate the need to keep developing countries within the framework of capitalism.

During the intensive breakdown of imperialism's colonial system at the end of the 50s and in the early 60s the term 'Third World' became widely used in Western economics, and is now employed to designate all the countries liberated from colonial dependence and retarded in economic development. The term expresses, on the one hand, the objectively existing unity of these countries, linked by a colonial past, a low level of economic development, the mixed nature of their economies, and a particularly dependent position in the system of world capitalist business. On the other hand it is an attempt to single out developing countries as a kind of Third World allegedly existing side by side with capitalism and socialism, in order to develop formulas for their further development, divert them from socialism, and steer them into the stream of capitalism by means of moderate reforms. This treatment of the position of developing countries in the world economy became the theoretical basis of the concepts 'proletarian countries' and 'capitalist countries',' the 'rich North and poor South' (the 'rich North' including socialist countries as well as capitalist ones).

Gunnar Myrdal's analysis of the problems of Asian countries is very indicative as a description of the drive of imperialist countries to keep the developing countries Within their orbit:

In the West there is also a natural wish, and so a temptation to believe, that the underdeveloped countries in South Asia will come to follow policy lines similar to those of the Western countries, and that they

~^^1^^ Gunnar Myrdal. An Approach to the Asian Drama (Vintage Books New York 1970), p 22.

~^^2^^ Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. The Political Economy of East-West-South Cooperation (Springer-Verlag, Vienna, New York, 1976), p 193.

3/Wrf., p!94.

~^^4^^ Claude Gruson. Une politique de developpement pour le Tiers Monde. Ses donnes technico-economiques. Revue Tiers-Monde, 1977, 18, 71: 477.

~^^1^^ See P. Moussa. Les nations proletaires (PDF, Paris, 1959).

208 209

tation for developing countries, in particular for the most backward countries of Africa.^^1^^

Developing countries' choice of road has also become a subject of close study by their own bourgeois economists, especially as regards their increasing struggle for economic independence and the establishing of a new international economic order.

Among the liberal-radical theories of these countries' economic development the theory of the 'economy of the Periphery' developed by Raul Prebish, Celso Furtado, and other Latin American economists in the 50s deserves notice.^^2^^ Initially it was put forward as the foundation for practical measures in the economic policy of Latin American countries aimed at ensuring their accelerated development. Subsequently economists in other developing countries contributed to it, in particular the African economist Samir Amin.^^3^^

According to this theory the world economy's development has led to its division into a `Centre' specialising in the production of modern industrial goods and technical innovations, and a dependent `Periphery' engaged in the production of raw materials and food. The terms of trade, i.e. the ratio of export and import prices, for developing countries, moreover, are constantly worsening, which leads to part of the value created in the `Periphery' being drained off to the `Centre'. The theorists of the 'economy of the Periphery' reject the thesis of conservative economists about the `beneficial' effect of the established division of labour between developing and developed capitalist countries on the former,^^4^^ and criticise the negative effect of the world capitalist economic system on the economies of developing countries.

At the same time they have a wrong idea of the true essence and mechanism of the action of that system, which is based, by its very nature, on the exploitation of some countries by others. In Prebish's view, for example, only unevenness of technical progress led to the division of the world economy into 'the Centre and the Periphery'; in fact, however, capitalism as a socio-economic system inevitably leads i to the subordination of some countries by others and to an inequitable international division of labour'. The advocates of this theory do not pay due attention to the role of foreign monopoly capital in both the exploitation of developing countries and their one-sided development.

1 See Thomas B. Larson. Soviet-American Rivalry (Norton & Co New York, 1978), p 200.

~^^2^^ See Raul Prebisch. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (U.N.Department of Economic Affairs, New York, 1950); Celso Furtado. Development and Underdevelopment (U.C. Press, Los Angeles, 1964); Idem. Teoria y politico deldesarollo economico (Siglo XXI Ed., Mexico]

3 Samir Amin. Le developpement ineqal (Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1973).

~^^4^^ See P. Streetten. L'evolution des theories relatives en developpement economique. Problemes economiques.Y)!!, 1546.

210

The main practical conclusion drawn is affirmation of the need to industrialise developing countries and to employ tariff protection to defend the national economy against outside penetration. The positive aspect of this theory is the attempt to combat neocolonial exploitation.

During the 70s new, `practical' theories of development were put forward in developing countries that became popular in those countries and had a certain response in the radical wing of economics in developed capitalist countries. They were mainly theories of `self-reliance', 'satisfaction of fundamental needs', and 'ecological development'.' These concepts also have a leading place in one form or another in the dialogue between developing and developed capitalist countries.

The idea of `self-reliance' has become the one most widely accepted. It follows from the abstract premise that every individual should count primarily on his own forces in order to shake off poverty. In practice it signifies a drive for economic independence by any local community (be it the individual household or village). These economic cells, having pooled their efforts, material resources, and manpower, should achieve economic, political, and social independence. From the economic angle `self-reliance' is aimed at maximum exploitation of local resources to meet domestic requirements. External links are admissible only when there is a surplus, or when self-sufficiency is impossible. The choice of technology is made within the economic unit and cannot be imposed from outside. On the political plane local unity is achieved through the involvement of all the members of the community in decision-making. Co-operation is only possible between the separate economic units when they do not give rise to relations of dependence. On the basis of these principles what is called 'collective autonomy' may arise at the national, regional, and inter-regional level.

The policies of a number of developing countries are based on this idea; they are demanding 'collective self-reliance' which would protect them against external dependence in the economic, technological, and financial fields. An example of a policy of 'collective self-reliance' on a regional scale is the help being given by oil-- exporting countries (Algeria, Venezuela) to countries on their continents that do not have oil of their own. At international conferences at various levels (e.g., UNCTAD) developing countries have repeatedly declared the need for wider use of the possibilities of 'collective self-reliance', in particular as regards energy and technology transfer between Third World countries, in order to develop their economies.

Underlying the idea of the 'satisfaction of fundamental needs'^^2^^

~^^1^^ See Pierre Clary. Les subtils detours de 1'ideologie dominante. AfriqueAsie, 1981, 240: 42.

~^^2^^ See Pierre Clary. Art. cit.

211

L

is the assertion that each country's development programme should have satisfaction of the needs of the poorest strata of the population as its primary task. In fact the poorest strata of the urban and rural population of most developing countries do not have access to the main, vitally important necessities of life. Determination of these necessities is therefore, in the view of advocates of this idea, the paramount task of this model of development. The idea was a reaction to the real situation in most developing countries, where a limited privileged stratum of society enjoys the bulk of material wealth and services to the detriment of the very poor majority. Its supporters consider that its task is to encourage the development of a type of consumption corresponding to the habits of the populations of developing countries. This new model of consumption should reject the Western way of life and, in particular, the waste inherent in the 'mass consumption society'.

The idea of 'ecological development' (or `ecodevelopment') in a way combines the main propositions of both the `self-reliance' idea and those of 'satisfaction of fundamental needs'. Its aim is to fix the attention of the leading bodies and politicians of developing countries on the need for rational use of available resources, and to make practical recommendations for the use of certain types of technology and for exploitation of the environment. As an example we may cite the application of `cautious' types of technology in various spheres of the economies of developing countries, the use of locally produced materials and machinery, and so on.^^1^^

All three of these ideas reflect the endeavour of the liberal trend in Western economics to draw the attention of world opinion to the most important current problems of developing countries, and to devise new development models for them aimed at winning economic independence. They thus border on the anti-imperialist trend of the contemporary stage of the national liberation movement as a whole.

At the same time these ideas suffer from a mistaken methodology and Utopian character. Their adherents pass over in silence the problem of the social forces that can pull developing countries out of backwardness and dependence. They examine the difficulties of these countries, and ways of eliminating them, in isolation from the world economy of which they form a component part. They do not, moreover, even attempt to draw anything from the practical experience of other countries' economic development, in particular that of socialist countries. At the same time the authors of these ideas start from a division of the world into poor and rich countries, including socialist countries without justification among the exploiter countries, so distorting their place and role in the world economy. The new `practical' ideas claim, in their authors' views, to develop

models of some sort of `third' path of development distinct from capitalism and socialism. In some cases those who hold them in developing countries completely reject (at least in words) both capitalism and socialism as the goals of their development on the grounds that these models were developed in corresponding groups of countries and are applicable only in the conditions of these industrially developed states.

One practical application of these `liberal' notions is the idea that a harmonious marriage is possible between private initiative and public participation, between capitalism and socialism,'

for which it is simply necessary to set up more enterprises with mixed, public and private capital. That is to say a development model is recommended on a basis of state capitalism, an idea that has taken root in such African countries as Senegal and Cameroun. This road leads to a strengthening of dependence on imperialism and the forming of a 'dependent capitalism' in these countries. So the adoption of the new `practical' conceptions cannot lead to the development of effective measures for fighting for the economic independence of developing countries. Their separate aspects and recommendations can only be employed in very narrow fields or to tackle concrete problems, but they cannot claim to provide the guiding levers of economic policy adaptable to the needs of developing countries 'because they are subtle dodges for preserving the dominant ideology' (i.e. bourgeois ideology).^^2^^

The growing dependence of developing countries on imperialism, on the one hand, given their existence in the world capitalist system, and the progress of socialist countries that used to be dependent or were colonies (Mongolia, Vietnam, Cuba), on the other hand, are demonstrating to developing countries the effectiveness of the non-capitalist path of development. In that connection spokesmen of the liberal-radical trend in economics in developing countries are forced to admit the impossibility of further development of backward countries within the capitalist system. The African economist Samir Amin, for example, notes that

the world capitalist system is too powerful for it to be possible for

'developing countries' to advance within that system; and that means

that the condition for their development is to get out of that system.^^3^^

And so, in his opinion, developing countries' exit from the capitalist

system is the means for restructuring it on another basis, which can

'only be a socialist one, in order to break with the logic of profit

and capital accumulation'.^^4^^

~^^1^^ Alfred Obama. Quel developpement pour 1'Afrique? L'Economiste du Tiers-Monde, 1980, 47: 49.

2 See Pierre Clary. Art. cit.

~^^3^^ Cited from Alain Birou and Paul-Marc Henry. Pour un outre developpement (PUF, Paris, 1976), p 131.

~^^4^^ Ibid.

1 See for example, Ignacy Sachs. Strategies de 1'ecodeveloppement ( Editions ouvrieres, Paris, 1980).

212 213

L

Only the socialist countries, which provide an example of the forming of international economic relations of a new type, can be the real external force capable of drawing developing countries out of the world capitalist system. Only the all-round aid of socialist countries will enable the countries that have won liberation to tackle their economic problems along lines of genuine sovereignty. Co-- operation between developing and socialist countries, and relations of mutual assistance between them are a historical necessity that is corroborated by the trend of the postwar development of international economic relations.

PART III

CRITIQUE OF NON-MARXIAN ECONOMIC VIEWS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

13

NON- MARXIAN VIEWS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY

1. Ideas of the transition period between capitalism and socialism

The multilevel problem of the transition period between capitalism and socialism faces bourgeois ideologists first and foremost with the question of the legitimacy of the socialist revolution. Some Sovietologists treat it as a historical accident. R. W. Campbell, for example, considers that Marx's theory was built for the developed capitalist countries of the end of the nineteenth century and was not applicable to Russia. The 1917 Revolution was due in his opinion to the outstanding capacities of Lenin as a politician: 'Lenin and the Communist Party he led were not made by the revolution-rather, they made the revolution.'^^1^^

Others admit the necessity and progressive character of the socialist revolution (E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies in Great Britain, the Americans P. R. Gregory and R. C. Stuart, and others), but in thenview the revolution in Russia was premature because slow rates of economic growth, and the agrarian character of the economy did not favour rapid formation of a working class, the main driving force of the revolution.

The various views of Western scholars are based on absolutising some one aspect of the contradictory economic reality of Russia. Lenin, who saw this contradiction, did not exaggerate the role of the country's productive forces and attached decisive importance to the degree of maturity of capitalism: in Russia, in his words, there was 'the most backward system of landownership and the most ignorant peasantry' and 'the 'most advanced industrial and finance capitalism'.^^2^^ The highest stage of capitalism, he thought, had brought about 'a new social order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete socialisation',^^3^^ which was also the main

~^^1^^ Robert W. Campbell. The Soviet-Type Economies. Performance and Evolution (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1974), p 4.

~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin. Political Notes. Collected Works, Vol. 13 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972), p 442.

^^3^^ V. I. Lenin. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 25.

215

material basis for 'the inevitable advent of socialism'.^^1^^ Imperialism in Russk did not differ in its main features from imperialism in other countries. When concluding that victory of the revolution was possible in one capitalist country, taken separately, he did not exclude Russia, considering that the whole capitalist system was ripe for the socialist

revolution.

This important proposition of Lenin's, however, is distorted in the Western literature. R. Daniels, for example,'says that when Lenin spoke of a country taken by itself, he had only a very advanced one in mind.^^2^^ Arun Bose says, when examining the USSR's experience of building socialism in relation to contemporary conditions, that the `breakdown' of capitalism and transition to socialism may be impossible 'even if all workers want socialism'.^^3^^ Starting from Marx's tenet that the movement of the productive forces is decisive for society's development, he writes that today's level of their development and the working class' struggle help perfect the relations of production within the context of capitalism; in that way, too, he tries to substantiate the pointlessness of the struggle for the carrying out of radical socio-economic reforms.

Ideologists of capitalism consider the transition period (with the exception of the stage of War Communism in the USSR, i.e. 1918- 20) as a process of capitalist evolution. Most of them think that the first socio-economic reforms of the dictatorship of the proletariat--- both those it made 'in passing' (solution of the agrarian problem) and those that were important in principle for building the new mode of production (the establishing of social ownership of the means of production)---had a capitalist character. This is backed by references to capitalist countries' experience of nationalising industries, banks, railways, etc., which they think leads to consolidation of state monopoly capitalism rather than to socialism. By not thinking about who carries these reforms out (the proletariat or the capitalist class), and in whose interests it is done (the people's as a whole or only the monopoly capitalists'), and by ignoring the economic basis of the nascent society, they confuse two fundamentally different types of reform, which both become possible at a certain level of the socialisation of

production.

The Soviet Government of that period is treated as a capitalist, exploiter one, since, while nationalising, it `alienated' the means of production from group ownership by the workers and appropriated part of the surplus product produced in the country. In their view, nationalisation gave industry a state-capitalist character and turned the workers in objects of exploitation.

Another group of Western economists, while admitting the socialist character of nationalisation, advocate slower rates of socialisation and prolongation of the transition period. Bose, for example, who considers Marx's schemes of the reproduction of social capital inapplicable 'to explain historical strategies of revolutionary step-by-step transitions to socialism',^^1^^ introduces a third department, i.e. ' semibasics' (in his terminology), into them in order to show that different variants of nationalisation allow to establish a ratio between these departments and economic modes of production such as will ensure 'survival and growth of both the socialized and the exempted ( capitalist) sectors'.^^2^^ In the model that he suggests, the 'revolutionary step-by-step transitions to socialism' are thought of as a 'partial socialization of the national economy' while 'socialization of all the principal means of production [is] put off to an infinitely remote future'.^^3^^ The model is justified by a thesis that full employment of labour can only be ensured by a combination of a `socialized' and an `exempted' economy.

The success of each sub-economy will become independent of the success or survival of the other, and, in principle, either sub-- economy could "wither away" and atrophy as the result of "economy competition".'^^4^^

By not going into the socio-economic essence of socialisation of the means of production in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, non-Marxists in that way prepare the ground for asserting that there is no need for socialist transformation of the economy, and try to minimise its role and significance.

Western economists' present ideas about the policy of War Communism and the New Economic Policy (NEP) draw on the literature on it written by Russian Mensheviks. Lenin's Menshevik opponents, without going into his definition of 'War Communism' as a forced, temporary policy, criticised it on the grounds that it was Utopian, and allegedly expressed the true spirit of Bolshevism. Sovietologists have not made any advance in their `theoretical' understanding of War Communism. Nove, for example, writes that it was a 'naive attempt to leap quickly into socialism .^^5^^

Others, in particular Pethybridge, say that War Communism was a Utopia based on the Bolsheviks' vulgarised comprehension of Marxism. They see its Utopian character in the fact that a rational choice of the social path of development was impossible in conditions of 'violent revolution and war'.

~^^1^^ Ibid.,p2lS. llbid., p214.

~^^3^^ Ibid., p 224.

^^4^^ Ibid., p225.

~^^5^^ Alec Nove. The Soviet Economic System (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), p 17.

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. Karl Marx. Collected Works, Vol. 21 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 71.

~^^2^^ R. Daniels. Left Communists. Problems of Communism, 1967, 16: 68. Arun Bose. Marxian and Post-Marxian Political Economy (Penguin

Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), p 201.

216 217

War Communism took shape in the emergency conditions of wartime. It was a strict centralisation in management of the economy by predominantly administrative methods. At the same time it was a departure from the economic policy drafted by Lenin in the spring of 1918 and intended for peacetime^^1^^; a policy of gradual nationalisation of large-scale property, tolerance of state capitalism, and a food tax in kind as an instrument for relations with petty peasant production. This policy, as we know, was implemented for a very short time, and was interrupted by the Civil War. But its implementation, and the actual return to it later, in 1921, are proof of how prejudiced Western economists' statements are that War Communism was allegedly the Bolsheviks' first experiment in economic policy, and their ideal. The concentration of production and distribution in the government's hands, and the change in the forms of exchange in the period of War Communism were necessary to defend the country at a time when the building of socialism was only being started.

The New Economic Policy was introduced `unexpectedly' and `unforeseeably', in the opinion of most Sovietologists. Its essence was both a return to capitalism and 'the restoration of the law of value', i.e. the basic law of capitalism, in Richard Day's view,^^2^^ to a capitalist order after the "`chaos' of the War Communism period caused by centralised management, as Nove thinks.^^3^^ Campbell explains the 'return to capitalism' by the country's unreadiness for socialism and the fewness of the working class.

The transition to NEP was due, in fact, to the mixed nature of the economy and the predominance of petty-commodity production, the need to develop effective methods of managing the growing socialist sector, and the need to establish proper economic relations between the socialist and petty-commodity sectors. NEP was an economic policy of the transition period between capitalism and socialism aimed at gradual socialist transformation of the whole economy in peacetime conditions. The nature of socialism and the principles of building it, however, are both alien to Sovietologists, while objective investigation of this field contradicts their class interests.

Western economists and sociologists- write a great deal about the `costliness' of socialist industrialisation, singling out the following as its main features: 'the absolute ``primacy'' of production over consumption, of industry over agriculture, and of heavy industry over processing industries.'^^4^^ It was necessary in the USSR, of course, and

possible, to ensure priority development of heavy industry in the initial period of industrialisation. Processing (light) industries had reached a relatively high level in pre-revolutionary Russia, and had been fully restored in the USSR by 1925. At the same time certain branches of heavy industry had only been restored by 25 per cent. An initial building of light industries has been characteristic of the industrial development of Mongolia and Cuba.

Non-Marxists see the main source of socialist industrialisation in a reduction of peasant consumption.

In a country where the agricultural population represents more than 80 per cent of the total population, the accumulation necessary for the creation of industry can come only from agriculture.' Socialist industrialisation was financed from internal resources. Some of the funds came from the peasantry, freed from paying rent and mortgages. But the mobilisation of funds from agriculture for the needs of industrialisation was 25 to 30 per cent less during the First Five-Year Plan than in 1913.^^2^^ In 1930-32 prices of foodstuffs were raised, with the result that the peasants gained 914 million roubles. In 1926-31 the village received 7,703 million roubles from the government. In the same period tax revenue from agriculture was 5,801 million roubles.^^3^^ The net gain of the countryside was thus 1,902 million roubles.^^4^^

The socio-economic content of socialist industrialisation was provision of the requisite material and technical basis for steady growth of the people's well-being and culture, and the provision of material conditions for eliminating the opposition between town and country, and between mental and physical labour. Western economists, not seeing all that, stick a label of 'industrialisation for industrialisation's sake' onto it.

Two trends can be traced in study of the experience of socialist industrialisation. One concentrates on a search for differences between the Soviet and Western ways of industrialisation, which is seen in `bureaucratisation', 'authoritarian government', 'elements of force', 'suppression of the individual', and so on and so forth, in socialist countries, on the one hand, and `natural' and `evolutionary' development of industry in the West, on the other hand.^^5^^ The other trend is an attempt to find features in common between the two types of industrialisation. It is claimed that the methods of socialist industrialisation are identical with capitalist ones. Since the publication of Ros-

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government. Collected Works, Vol. 27 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965), pp 237-277.

~^^2^^ Richard Day. Laws and Lawlessness in Marxist Political Economy. International Journal, 1976-77, 32, 1: 107.

3 Alec Nove. Op. cit., pp 17-18.

~^^4^^ Jan Marczewski, Crisis in Socialist Planning. East Europe and the U.S.S.R. (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), p 238.

218

1 Ibid., p 2.

~^^2^^ See A. A. Barsov. Batons stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnei (The Balance of Value Exchange between Town and Country) ( Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1969),pp 74, 186.

3 Ibid., p 150.

~^^4^^ S. G. Strumilin. Selected Works, in five volumes, Vol. 2 (Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1963), p 242.

~^^5^^ See, for example, Robert W. Campbell. Op. cit., pp 20-21.

219

tow's The Stages of Economic Growth in I960, his theory of the ' industrial society' has become the methodological basis for study of socialist industrialisation as one of the variants of man's historical development, and for rejection of assertions about the `anomaly' of the Russian road. Galbraith came to a similar conclusion in his The Age of Uncertainty from the theory of convergence of the two systems.

Western economists make a particularly close study of the experience of the socialist reform of farming. When investigating it in different socialist countries, however, they do not look at its general patterns, but concentrate on its variety of forms,^^1^^ which they do in order to justify their conclusion that every country has a national experience of the development of agriculture that allegedly has no significance for others.^^2^^

They try to base the carrying out of collectivisation in the USSR on a coincidence of circumstances rather than on underlying economic advisability. Nove, for example, cites the following as the reasons for it, in his opinion: (1) the desire of the majority of Party members, dictated by 'doctrine and ideology'; (2) industrialisation, which used peasant incomes as a source of accumulation; (3) the price policy, which undermined NEP (NEP being considered the alternative to collectivisation); (4) the political atmosphere, a prejudice against markets and Nepmen, and a 'leap forward' psychology, etc.^^3^^ Day explains it by the need to prevent a conflict between the working class and peasantry, inevitable, in his opinion, in conditions of lack of attention to light industry. Only collectivisation and terror, he concludes, could

prevent a clash.^^4^^

The denial of the objective patterns of collectivisation as a form of the socialist transformation of agriculture, and over-emphasising of subjective factors, down to psychological ones, are a calculated attempt to give collectivisation a forced character. Western writers adopted a term about the carrying out of collectivisation 'from above' from Soviet literature, in which it is defined as a revolution carried out from above, on the government's initiative, with the direct support of the million-strong masses of the peasantry. Sovietologists keep mum about the support from below, representing the revolution from above as coercion of the masses.

The patent tendentiousness of Western studies of collectivisation is displayed in a contradictory position on the economic factors for creating large-scale socialist agriculture. Wittfogel, in particular, con-

siders a collective farm an artificial formation, inefficient because of its large size,^^1^^ and counterposes it to large-scale mechanised farming on a capitalist basis, which he explains as the `natural' process of development of farming. Nove compares collective farming with barshchina (the old Russian term for corvee), since he considers its object to consist in meeting state needs for farm produce, which inevitably leads, in his view, to a minimum subsistence for collective farm members.^^2^^

Attacks on Soviet economic policy in the countryside during the transition from capitalism to socialism are thus not based on any deep analysis of economic reality, but have their source in ideological struggle.

The methodological basis for distorting the building of socialism is to analyse the development of the productive forces out of context of the social form of their movement, i.e. socialist relations of production, which inevitably leads to false conclusions with a clearly expressed class bias.

2. Theories of 'co-operative socialism'

The theory of 'co-operative socialism' is a variant of petty-bourgeois ideas that propagandise the possibility of passing from capitalism to socialism without class struggle. Its founder was the English Utopian socialist Robert Owen, whose views were taken up in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by spokesmen of petty-bourgeois socialism in Western Europe and Russia. When we lump the ideas of all the schools and currents of 'co-operative socialism' together, they look rather as follows: abolition of capitalist profit; development of cooperatives as supra-class organisations uniting the interests of all strata of society in the person of the `consumer'; peaceful development of co-operation into socialism through reforms and transformations in the sphere of circulation; and the creati6n, as a result of reforms in the co-operative sector, of a society in which the interests of all working people will be harmoniously developed.

This theory was taken further in modern capitalist ideology, which was promoted by the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, conversion of the world socialist system into the decisive factor in the evolution of human society, and the wide spread of socialist ideas, which are more and more gripping the masses of the people in capitalist and developing countries. The theory of 'co-operative socialism' is preached in one form or another by economists like Kempe Hope and R. Goodman (USA), Paul Lambert (Belgium), B. Mathura (India), and political leaders like Leopold Senghor (Senegal). The leitmotif of

~^^1^^ See, for example, T. Bergman. Farm Policies in Socialist Countries ( Lexington Books, Westmead, 1975).

2 See Arthur E. Adams and Jan S. Adams. Men versus Systems. Agriculture in the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia (The Free Press, New York, 1971).

~^^3^^ See Alec Nove. The Decision to Collectivize. In W. A. Douglas Jackson (E;d.). Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1971), p 78.

4 Richard Day. Art. cit.,p 111.

1 See V. A. Wittfogel. Introduction. In W. A. Douglas Jackson (Ed ) Op. cit.,p5T.

~^^2^^ Alec Nove. The Soviet Economic System, p 120.

220 221

the present-day versions of this theory remains the idea that co-- operatives free the workers in capitalist countries from the yoke of the monopolies, are able to realise a number of measures of a social character, alter the form of property, and ultimately bring about peaceful development into socialism.

The American economist Hope considers that

co-operative socialism means basically a system of partnership among consumers, producers and the State ... in which [the] means of production are managed by direct and indirect representatives of consumers and producers in association with the State. It is much more revolutionary than the State socialism... The theory of co-operative socialism rests on the principle of the subordination of production to consumption... The consumers' control and their need is the motive of economic activity.^^1^^

In his opinion incomes have a labour character in co-operatives, while the co-operative system loses its capitalist content, though it retains the market economic mechanism, which is not, however, an obstacle to a radical change in the distribution of national wealth.

Hope's views on the form of property and distribution of incomes in co-operatives are shared by Ivor S. Mitchell and Harold W. Lucius, who suggest that the co-operative system combines the 'best of two worlds of individualism and collectivism, or democracy and socialism... The co-operative system seeks a deliberate and conscious reconstruction of the economy and of society.'^^2^^

Georges Lasserre, a theorist of the co-operative mevement, also considers that co-operation is not an element of capitalism because its aim is to provide 'services for its members---not only economic, but also in the form of human satisfaction (security, freedom, dignity, fellowship, etc.)'.^^3^^ His view confirms Lenin's thought that

co-operative societies, not being organisations for the direct struggle

against capital, are capable of engendering and do engender the

illusion that they are a means of solving the social problem.^^4^^

The ideas of 'co-operative socialism' preached in the USA and

capitalist countries of Western Europe began to penetrate deeply into

the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the

1960s, because of the drive to divert the attention of the working

people of former colonies away from class struggle, and to substantiate

the possibility of there being a 'non-proletarian socialism' based on cooperation. In some African countries the idea of 'co-operative socialism' has been converted into 'African socialism', the basis of which is said to be the African community.

The vitality of the idea of 'co-operative socialism' is explained by the fact that co-operation is a quite broad organisation of the working people today in both industrialised capitalist countries and developing states. Fanners' co-operatives have become common in the USA. Their main function is to market farm produce; some of the big ones are business complexes with considerable capital. The proportion of co-operatives in the wholesaling of farm produce in the USA rose from 29.4 per cent in 1965 to 34.7 per cent in 1976, while the proportion of co-operatives in the wholesaling of dairy produce rose from 65 to 80 per cent in the same period.^^1^^ Agricultural marketing cooperatives have also developed widely in several West European countries. And the co-operative movement has attained a considerable scale in developing countries.

The fact that co-operation do^s to some extent lessen the oppression of monopolies in capitalist countries, removes middlemen from the sphere of circulation, provides opportunities for members to acquire habits of joint work, and demonstrates the advantages of collective labour, must be considered. Praising high co-operation, Lenin attached great importance to workers' active involvement and favoured the uniting of co-operatives with other forms of the labour movement. His concepts for a class alliance of the proletariat and middle strata of the population, and theory of the diversity of the forms of the transition to socialism in different countries, underlie the programmes of Communist and Workers' parties of several capitalist countries for the building of a united anti-monopoly front in which co-operatives are given a prominent place as mass organisations of the working people.

At the same time it is impossible to build socialist society without class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. When Karl Marx appraised co-operative factories back in the middle of the last century, he wrote (noting that co-operation was a precondition of socialism within capitalist society):

The co-operative factories of the labourers themselves represent within the old form the first sprouts of the new, although they naturally reproduce, and must reproduce, everywhere in their actual organisation all the shortcomings of the prevailing system... They show how a new mode of production naturally grows out of an old one, when the development of the material forces of production and of the corresponding forms of social production have reached a particular stage.2 But the preconditions are not yet socialism. And Marx himself pointed out that co-operation by itself could not transform capitalism

~^^1^^ Kempe R. Hope. Co-operative Socialism and the Co-operative Movement in Guyana. Review of International Co-operation, 1975, 68, 2: 58-59.

~^^2^^ Ivor S. Mitchell and Harold W. Lucius. Co-operative Transformation Process: Adaptation Strategies and Programmes. Review of International Cooperation, 1979, 72,4: 279.

~^^3^^ Georges Lasserre. The Co-operative Ethos. Review of International Co-operation, 1979, 72, 3: 159.

4 V. I. Lenin. Draft Resolution on Co-operative Societies from the Russian Social-Democratic Delegation at the Copenhagen Congress. Collected Works, Vol. 16 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 265.

~^^1^^ See l.S. Mitchell and H. W. Lucius. Art. cit.

^^2^^ Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 440.

223 222

into socialism, but that a change in the foundations of the social system was necessary for that.^^1^^

The character of co-operation, as Lenin stressed, is determined by the relations of production prevailing in a given society. Under capitalism a co-operative is a capitalist collective enterprise.

Finance capital, spreading its domination to agriculture, is subordinating agricultural co-operatives to itself. The monopolies conclude contracts with co-operatives for the delivery of farm produce just as they do with big farmers, make contributions to the development of co-operation, which provides them not only with the opportunity to obtain high dividends, but also helps them control the business activity of the co-operatives. Co-operatives in turn are often converted into joint-stock companies with considerable assets. The assets of the American co-operative Farm Land Industry Inc. were more than $400 million in the early 70s,^^2^^ which confirms Lenin's conclusion that under capitalism co-operatives,

being purely commercial establishments and subject to the pressure of competitive conditions, have a tendency to degenerate into bourgeois share companies.^^3^^

Co-operatives strive to make profits, and co-operators, especially the prosperous ones, own shares in the corporations with which their co-operative is collaborating. The co-operative share contribution is involved, as a rule, in credit operations, and yields the member co-- operative interest. Co-operatives also make commercial profits, which are distributed on a purely capitalist basis. All the main,attributes of the capitalist enterprise are characteristic of co-operatives, viz., competition, exploitation of hired labour, the making of profit, class antagonisms, differentiation of members, and so on.

Lenin wrote as follows of the Utopian character and reactionary nature of 'co-operative socialism': 'That is why we are right in regarding as entirely fantastic this ``co-operative'' socialism, and as romantic, and even banal, the dream of transforming class enemies into class collaborators and class war into class peace (so-called class truce) by merely organising the population in co-operative societies.'^^4^^ Lenin's pointers on the capitalist character of co-operation when capitalist relations prevail still hold for modern capitalism.

14

CAPITALIST VIEWS ON SOCIALIST PROPERTY

Property, in Marx's definition, has always been a vital issue for one class or another. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party he and Engels remarked that 'the Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations'.^^1^^ The abolition of capitalist property relations is a vital matter for the working class, so that it is no accident that distortion of the essence of ownership of the means of production plays an important role today in capitalist, reformist, and revisionist falsifications of socialist economic relations. The apologetic character of Western economics deprives its spokesmen of the possibility of examining property as an economic category. Analysis of property as an economic relation is slyly replaced by its analysis as a legal, volitional relation. Engels long ago criticised bourgeois economists' striving to see only the external, juridical form of economic relations when he remarked that for them 'the juristic form is ... everything and the economic content nothing'.2 With that approach property relations are reduced to a person's relations to things, and by property is meant the right of the property owner to dispose of things that belong to him. The following statement by the American economists Furuboth and Pejovich is typical of this approach:

By general agreement, the right of ownership in an asset consists of three elements: (a) the right to use the asset (usus), (b) the right to appropriate returns from the asset (usus fructus), and (c) the right to change the asset's form and/or substance (abusus).^^3^^

The West German economist Liibbe, developing this position, concludes that socialist and capitalist ownership are identical from

~^^1^^ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. Collected Works, Vol. 6 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 504.

~^^2^^ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 55.

~^^3^^ E. Furuboth and S. Pejovich (Eds.). The Economics of Propertv Rights (Billinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p 4.

~^^1^^ See Karl Marx. Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council. The Different Questions. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works, in three volumes, Vol! 2 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), pp 81-82.

~^^2^^ News for Farmer Cooperatives, 1973, 40,1; 9.

~^^3^^ V. I. Lenin. Op. cit., p 265.

~^^4^^ V. I. Lenin. On Co-operation. Collected Works, Vol. 33 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 473.

1---455

225

the angle of property as the right of disposal. He writes as follows:

Public property-whether its form is capitalist or socialist-can thus, because of the right of disposal inherent in it, be associated with an identical, or similar, position of the direct producers in respect of their conditions of production.1 And further on:

state-established socialism has not yet transcended the barries of capitalist society.^^2^^

The weakness of this interpretation of ownership is understood by even some Western economists, who try to modify it, but in fact complicate it and muddle it, by synthesising the often incompatible positions of various conceptions of it. In the 1950s, for example, there were indications in the economic literature that the concept of ownership of the means of production was not restricted to man's physical relation to things but was defined as the capacity to dispose immediately of means of production. This refinement did not introduce any changes of principle into the juridical conception of property since it did not presuppose analysis of the content of the economic relations arising in the process of production.

The legal interpretation of property is now being criticised by some Western economists. The American F. L. Pryor, for instance, accuses its adherents of a superficial view of property and of not understanding its economic essence, justly pointing out that the latter holds no interest for them as a subject for investigation. Noting that Western 'economic science is not yet sufficiently advanced for a general theory of property'^^3^^ he suggests his own definition, broader, on his submission, than that of other economists, saying that he considers property an economic category and putting the stress 'on relations between men, rather than on particular goods, services, or ``things'' involved in the economic process'.^^4^^ His definition of property treats it as 'a bundle of rights or a set of relations between people with regard to some good, service, or ``thing'' '.s Clearly, he identifies the right of property and property as an economic relation.

This methodologically complicated problem of the boundary between property and the right of property is scientifically illuminated only in Marxian political economy. Marx said:

The legal conception of definite property relations, however much it springs from them, is nevertheless, on the other hand, not identical with them, and cannot be.~^^6^^

~^^1^^ Peter LUbbe. Der staatlich etablierte Sozialismus (Hoffman und Campe, Hamburg, 1975), p 23.

And Engels wrote, in connection with Marx's use of the term ' property right':

In Marx's theoretical investigations legal right, which always only reflects the economic conditions of a given society, on the whole plays only a secondary role.

In Soviet economic literature the legal conception of property is heavily criticised. Marxian political economy treats a person's relation to things, i.e. his legal relation, as an external one, whose content is determined by the economic relation.

Capitalist and reformist economic theories are at one in thendrive to deny the secondary, derivative character of legal relations compared with economic ones under both capitalism and socialism. Capitalist limitations prevent critics of the legal interpretation of property from being consistent in their analysis of property as an economic category.

The apologetic bias of anti-Marxian economic theories leads, in Lenin's apt expression, to their authors' giving us

instead of an analysis and study of a definite system of production relations ... a series of banalities applicable to any system, mixed with the sentimental pap of petty-bourgeois morality.^^2^^

This proposition of Lenin's splendidly defines the essence of nonMarxian views of the place of property relations in the system of relations of production.

Marxian political economy treats property relations in the means of production as the most important attribute of any socio-economic formation, for they express the mode of uniting labour power with the means of production, and define the whole system of relations of production established in all spheres-production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. While private ownership of the means of production objectively determines the exploitation of others' hired labour by capital, socialist ownership completely rules out exploitation of man by man, ensures people's equality vis-a-vis the means of production, and abolition of the commodity labour power, and provides equal scope for work and distribution on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Ownership of the means of production is thus a fundamental category determining the specific character of an economic system and the socio-economic structure of a given society.

Some Western economists, especially proponents of theories of a 'centrally administered economy', 'command economy', and 'market socialism', try to demonstrate the dependence of property relations under socialism on political relations. The fact that an absence of any kind of theoretically substantiated criterion defining the substance of

.,.

~^^3^^ Frederick L. Pryor. Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Indiana U.P., Bloomington, Ind., 1973), p 4. ~^^4^^7Z>W.,p9.

~^^5^^ Ibid., p 2.

~^^6^^ Karl Marx. Marx an Ferdinand Lassalle in Berlin, 22. Juli 1861. In Marx/Engels. Werke, Vol. 30 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1964), p 614.

226

~^^1^^ Frederick Engels. Juristen-Sozialismus. In Marx/Engels. Werke Vol 21 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973), p 501.

~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin. What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966), p 89.

227

an economic system is characteristic of Western economics need to be pointed out.

While some economists agree that there are economic systems determined by the form of ownership of the means of production, that by no means signifies that they recognise the objective role of ownership of the means of production as the foundation of an economic system. Pryor, for example, says that the determinant of a system is arbitrarily selected by the authors of various conceptions of economic systems. He himself thinks that

socialist and capitalist nations ate often contrasted in a number of ways other than by ownership of the means of production.1 His view is shared by many other economists. An example of the subjective approach to this very important matter is the `analysis' of various economic systems given by Lipsey and Steiner in their textbook. On the one hand they try to systematise contemporary countries, distinguishing between capitalist and socialist ones; on the other hand they remark that each country may give an arbitrary description of its economy from purely external indicators lacking any economic sense.^^2^^ Such an approach makes it possible to deny the need to abolish private property of the means of production if only to disparage the significance of one of the root advantages of socialism, viz., social ownership of the means of production.

In essence, non-Marxian views on the role of property relations in the economic system amount to asserting that forms of ownership, whatever their political significance, are not of decisive importance for an economic system. Theorists who base themselves on that premise inevitably distort the substance of socialist property. This shows, in the first place, in their confusing and identifying of the concepts of social and national (public) property, on the one hand, and in their counterposing of co-operative/collective farm property and public (national) property on the other hand.

Socialist social ownership of the means of production arose and has developed historically in two forms, viz., public (national) and cooperative/collective farm. Both are of one and the same socio-- economic nature since all the working people are joint owners under socialism of the means of production and use them in the interests both of society as a whole and of each of its members.

Public (national) property, however, is the chief form of socialist property, and is a higher type of socialist property than co-- operative/collective farm property. Public property reflects socialisation of the means of production on the scale of the whole national economy. The essence of national property is that the means of production are owned by society as a whole and that all its members are related to one another as joint owners of the means of production.

~^^1^^ Frederick L. Pryor. Op. cit., p 21.

~^^2^^ See R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. .Economies, 5th ed. (Harper & Row, New York, 1978), p 831.

By public property Western theorists mean the property of any state irrespective of its class essence. That enables some of them to treat public property both in the USSR and in Great Britain, Sweden, and other capitalist countries as socialist property.^^1^^ In their view nationalisation of certain sectors of the economy (capitalist nationalisation) is the normal result for all countries of the socialisation of production, and the natural road to socialism. Pryor, for instance, writes:

as economic development proceeds, the relative degree of public ownership in an economy rises because of shifts in the relative proportion of labor and assets in the different sectors of the economy, other things remaining equal: an automatic 'march into socialism', as it were.^^2^^

The myth of the `socialisation' of property under state monopoly capitalism feeds theories of `transformation', `convergence', ' democratic socialism', and 'the welfare state' (in which features of socialism are already 'to be discovered'). The Utopian character of these ideas was demonstrated by Engels and Lenin long before they were even formulated in modern ideas.^^3^^ The desire to gloss over the differences of principle between socialist and capitalist public ownership comes primarily from denial of a qualitative difference between capitalist and socialist relations of production, and serves the ends of defending modern state monopqly capitalism by means of socialist phraseology. The idea of identifying capitalist and socialist property relations itself is also manifested in attempts to present socialist ownership, above all public (national) ownership, of the means of production, as a variety of state capitalist property.

Anti-Communists endeavour to prove that property relations have a purely political character under socialism. The theories of the 'command economy', 'totalitarian regime', etc., are built on that foundation. The American economist Sharlet, for instance, says:

Nationalisation made the Soviet state the largest industrial property owner in the society, necessitating the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus to administer the vast holdings.^^4^^

He counterposes the state as a property owner to society as a whole, a falsification widely held by many Western ideologists for whom

~^^1^^ See Roger Chisholm and Marilu McCarty. Principles of Microeconomics (Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, HI., 1978), p 38.

2 Frederick L. Pryor. Op. cit., p 16.

~^^3^^ See, for example, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. Selected Correspondence (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 447; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, in three volumes, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), pp 144-145; V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 24 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), pp 309-310; Vol. 25 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), pp 335- 339, 360-363.

~^^4^^ Robert Sharlet. Law in the Political Development of a Communist System: Conceptualizing from the Soviet Experience. In R. E. Kanet (Ed.). The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (The Free Press, New York, 1971 ),p 263.

228 229

conscious distortion of the essence of public management under socialism is characteristic.^^1^^ They take as the determinant feature of management of public property under socialism an exceptionally high degree of centralisation that almost completely eliminates money-- exchange (commodity-money) relations, and- excludes the business autonomy of enterprises (hence their term for the Soviet economic system 'command economy')?

Brus distorts the economic substance of socialist ownership of the means of production in a similar way. By drawing a line between public and social ownership, he distinguishes tWo models of socialismetatist and self-management-defining the latter as a dynamic understanding of socialisation on the basis of which the economy is transformed into a union of self-managing producers of goods and services. In his view only collective property arising in that way is really national property. Doing the errand of anti-Marxism, Brus asserts that there has been really no socialisation of the means of production in European socialist countries, and that all the problems of a socialist economy can only be resolved by decentralising its system of operation.^^3^^

The holders of this point of view, which proclaims slogans of fighting `etatism', call for the elimination of public form of ownership of the means of production and their transfer to the direct producers.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism considered propaganda for the priority of group ownership a breach of the economic foundations of socialism and of its greatest advantages over the economy of capitalism. Under socialism production has a directly social character which gives rise to a need for its balanced regulation. Centralised planned direction both of the national economy as a whole, and of its separate economic links, is a sine qua non of the normal development of a socialist economy, but it does not exclude a certain business autonomy of socialist enterprises, which finds expression in the development of management accounting relations. It is through centralised planning and management of the economy that highly developed productive forces, and an advanced science and culture have been created in socialist countries, that the well-being of the working people has risen, and that the tasks of all-round development of the individual are being more and more fully tackled.

The advances of real socialism are determined above all by the

predominance of socialist social ownership of the means of production, which is the basis of socialist society's economic system.

The limited character of the capitalist outlook on the world and of the methodology of capitalism's defenders does not help them to understand the socialist nature either of the other form of social ownership, viz., co-operative/collective farm property. Most nonMarxian works treat it as something intermediate between the capitalist and socialist forms of ownership of the means of production. Pryor, for example, says that there are always

three possible patterns of ownership: predominantly private ownership (`capitalism'), predominantly government ownership (`socialism') and predominantly nongovernmental, nonprivate ownership such as cooperatives. '

Western economists consequently endeavour to see features of what they call a 'mixed economy' in co-operative property. By basing themselves on an unscientific idea of the similarity of socialist and capitalist co-operation, they quite exclude socio-economic content from their analysis, and put their main stress on external, formally common features, while reducing all the differences to the forms of distribution of the output produced by a co-operative's members. Lenin convincingly showed that the essence of co-operation is determined by the socio-economic system of society, and that co-operative property under socialism is a form of social property.^^2^^

Critics of the co-operative/collective farm form of property are particularly zealous in counterposing it (a) to the public, governmental form of property, and (b) to the property of the farm member's household (the member's personal small holding). Despite the incontrovertible facts of the development of co-operative/collective farm property in socialist countries, versions of the limitation of this form of property, and of attacks on it by the government, and of the prospects of its complete absorption by governmental property are put forward.^^3^^ In fact the government encourages the development of co-operative/collective farm property in the USSR and its convergence on public property; and a system of measures has been developed to consolidate the economies of collective farms that call for substantial supplementary government expenditure.

Bourgeois ideologists' statements about the private property character of personal allotments, and their incompatibility with collective farm property, also have no relation to reality.^^4^^ They do not take into account that the personal allotment exists, and is being developed, on the basis of the collective farm, and that it is a natural

~^^1^^ Frederick L. Pryor. Op. cit., p 385.

~^^2^^ See V. I. Lenin. On Co-operation. Collected Works, Vol. 33 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 473.

~^^3^^ See R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Op. cit., p 837.

~^^4^^ See P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979), p 703.

~^^1^^ Hans Raupach. Zur Stellung des Betriebes im Kapitalismusund im Sozialismus (Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1970), p20.

~^^2^^ See Lewis C. Solmon. Economics, 2nd ed. (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Reading, Mass., 1976), p 460; E. Mansfield. Economics. Principles, Problems, Decisions (Norton & Co., New York, 1974), p 707.

~^^3^^ See W. Brus. Socialist Ownership and Political Systems (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975).

230 231

supplement to the farm at the present level of development of social production. They also pay no attention to the absence of private property in land and the basic means of production. The fact that the personal allotment plays only a subsidiary role in creation of the subsistance funds needed for society, promotes evening up of the standard of income of country and town, and is not a separate, independent sector of the socialist economy, is also important.

The unsound character of the Western analysis of the forms of socialist property is due both to its anti-communist bias and to the limitations of Western methodology, which denies the underlying role of the relations of ownership of the means of production in the development of society, and which substitutes the political superstructure for the economic basis.

IS

NOTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS

1. Views of the economic laws of socialism

Exposition of the content of economic laws represents a very high level of abstraction in the scientific sense; and since Western economics characteristically investigates only the surface of economic processes in the concrete, observable ways they manifest themselves, it seldom investigates these laws as reflections of essential links in the relations of production. Even when it deals with 'economic laws', however, the term is often given a sense rather different from that in Marxist-Leninist economic theory: `laws' are interpreted only as a reflection of quantitative dependencies between various economic phenomena, and not of the substance of relations of production.^^1^^

In addition to that approach there has been another trend of late in Western literature that is reflected in the term 'social science laws'.^^2^^ In the interpretation of the substance and operation of these laws under socialism, two main trends can be distinguished: (1) identification of the economic laws of socialism with those of capitalism; and (b) denial of the operation of objective economic laws in actually existing socialism.

Adherents of the first trend do not always specially stress the single-type character of the economic laws of socialism and capitalism, but one is forced to that conclusion when the determining role of the type of relations of production and property is not posed in the investigation of socio-economic laws, and the concept 'economic law' is defined in a very general way.

A social science `law' must above all be robust [as Friedman puts it], i.e. be able to prove itself in many different situations and in very

~^^1^^ See, for example, L. Lambert. Preambule: objectifs, methodes et problemes de la science economique. In Encyclopedic de 1'economie (Larousse Paris 1978), p 10.

~^^2^^ See, for example, W. Meger. Erkenntnistheoretische Orientierungen und der Charakter des bkonomischen Denkens. In Zur Theorie marktwirtschaftlicher Ordnungen (Paul Liebeck, TUbingen, 1980, pp 80-110, 121; K.G. Zinn. Wirtschafts- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Erkenntnisse und Praxis fiir Betriebs- und Volkswirte (Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe, Berlin, 1976).

233

different boundary conditions. This demand means that an economic law must have ... a very high degree of universality (and accordingly a very small content)-like the principle of use or rationality.1 Capitalism and socialism are apparently to be understood as these

'boundary conditions'.

The identification of the economic laws of socialism and capitalism is based on a peculiar approach to the subject matter of political economy in general that rules out analysis of the content of relations of production. Definitions of political economy as a science studying the forms of human behaviour in the disposal of scarce goods are common in Western literature, and the laws that govern this behaviour are interpreted through the theory of 'marginal utility'.

The attraction of this theory for defenders of the capitalist system is that the universality of the economic laws and motive forces operating in society, and their eternity and immutability are

derived from it.

The drive of Western economists to justify their identification of the economic laws operating in capitalist and socialist society is quite understandable. It is largely explained by the increase in the force of attraction of socialism, when it demonstrates its superiority over capitalism not only in theory but also in practice. However great their desire, they cannot demonstrate what does not in fact exist; the^e cannotjbe identical driving forces and impelling, inotives of productive activity in antagonistic capitalist society (based qn^griyate ownership of the means of production, wage labour, anAexploitation) and in socialist society (in which social ownership predominates).

The epistemological roots of all versions of the interpretation of the single-type character and universality of economic laws lie in the economic theories of a subjective-idealist trend that became common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which suggest psychological motives as the underlying foundation of man's economic activity. Man's natural instincts, conditioned by nature itself, and a striving for profit, pleasure, etc., were advanced as the driving forces of economic activity and the factors determining the character of the relations established in it (Schmoller, Jevons, Menger, von Mises, Pareto, and others). From this interpretation of the driving forces of production it was concluded that they were eternal and immutable, since human nature did not change. While such an anthropo-psychological approach to the explanation of economic processes used to predominate and was openly displayed, in the past, it is now becoming less and less popular; and in that connection the forms of the argument are changing. The authors of studies of socioeconomic laws now, as a rule, stress their objective character but in fact remain trapped by ideas in the spirit of 'marginal utility' theory, when the singleness of the economic laws of socialism and capitalism

is deduced from an identical level of development of the productive forces, while ignoring the difference in the relations of production. Toffler, for example writes:

In both its capitalist and communist variants, industrialism was a system focused on the maximization of material welfare. Thus, for the technocrat, in Detroit as well as Kiev, economic advance is the primary aim; technology the primary tool.^^1^^

Raymond Aron took a similar stand, stressing that different socioeconomic systems reaching the stage of industrial society begin to develop according to economic" laws of a single type.^^2^^

The flimsiness of arguments identifying the economic laws of real socialism and capitalism comes from an incorrect method of research, in which there is no analysis of the inner content of property relations under capitalism and socialism, or of the content of the economic laws; only their outer forms are described.

The founding fathers of Marxism-Leninism demonstrated scientifically that the level of development of the productive forces reached requires relations of production corresponding to it, and consequently economic laws that express their essence. One economic formation gives way to another only as a result of a revolutionary transformation of ownership of the means of production; on that basis a transformation of the whole system of relations of production, and of the economic laws inherent in it comes about. There is no single model in economic laws, and cannot be, when they are understood really materialistically, in economic systems based on opposing types of ownership of the means of production.

The idea of a 'single model of the economic laws' of various social formations is one of the constituent links of the theory of `convergence' of opposing socio-economic systems, and serves as the methodological basis for many of the other theories of capitalist political economy that try to depict capitalism as an economic system without contradictions, or with contradictions stemming from human nature itself and so unresolvable by changes in the system. That is why socialism is depicted as a system developing according to the same laws as capitalism, and therefore having the same contradictions. Not only are its theoretical principles distorted in that way but the facts of socialist reality are ignored as well.

A second trend in treatment of the economic laws of socialism is to deny the objectivity of their content under socialism. There are many varieties of this trend in bourgeois and revisionist economic theory, but all have an inherent unity of initial premises, viz., identification of free manifestation of economic laws solely with the

~^^1^^ Alvin Toffler. Future Shock (Bantam Books, New York, 1971), p 448.

~^^2^^ See Raymond Aron. Les disillusions du progres (Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1969), p 48. See also Alec Nove. The Soviet Economic System (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), p 228.

~^^1^^W. Meger. Op. cit., p 121.

235 234

spontaneity of commodity-money relations and free enterprise. One trend pictures things as if contemporary Soviet economic theory is not even tackling the problem of the objective content of economic laws, and is only concerned with matters of economic (business) law. The encyclopaedia Marxism, Communism and Western Society, for

example, says:

The Russian equivalent of the term 'economic law' (khoziaistvennoe pravo) is commonly used in the USSR to denote the sum of those rules of law which govern the planning of the economic system, the relations between administrative authorities and economic organizations, and among economic organizations themselves. Others assert that the operation of objective economic laws is recognised only in words in socialist countries, but that they do not, in practice, operate.^^2^^ Centralised planning, and especially its directive character are depicted as a barrier to their operation. Typical of this sort of view is a counterposing of some 'political centre' (and of political interests that centralised planning is claimed to serve, leaving no room for the operation of economic laws) to the producers'

economic interests.^^3^^

Here, on the one hand, we have a complete ignoring of Lenin's theory of the relation of economics and politics, and of politics as the concentrated expression of economics. Politics is counterposed to economics, and directive planning to economic methods of management. On the other hand, no attention is paid to the fact that under socialism, with a predominance of social ownership of the means of production, conscious regulation of social production through centralised planning is itself an objective necessity. The directive character of planning is a form of the operation and application of objective laws governed by the peculiarities of the socialist stage of the communist formation. Under socialism there are still differences between the classes and social groups of society, socio-economic differences in work, and various economic interests due to that. In these circumstances the directive character of planning guarantees that productive activity is directed to realisation of the national economic interest. Thorough allowance for, and deep-going analysis of, all the various objective conditions of each period in the country's development, and the working out of forms and methods of managing social development in accordance with them, are the correct political approach to the economy. It was in that sense that Lenin meant the primacy of

~^^1^^ Edward L. Johnson. Economic Law. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 3 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 29.

~^^2^^ See, for example, Nicolas Spulber. Organizational Alternatives in Soviettype Economies (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp 41-42.

~^^3^^ See Alec Nove. Political Economy and Soviet Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1979), p 145; Ludwig Bress and Karl Hensel (Eds.). Wirtschaftssysteme des Sozialismus im Experiment (Plan Oder Marktj (AthenSum-Verlag, Frankfort on the Main, 1973), p 61; FriedrichttaSfnei.SystemkontriireBeziehungeninder sowjetischen Planwirtschaft (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1978), p 226.

236

politics over economics.

Certain capitalist authors' ignoring of Marxian theory, which scientifically substantiates the objective character of the economic laws of socialism and the possibility of applying them consciously, is explained by their keenness to discredit socialism in the eyes of all nations, especially of those that have won political independence or are facing the choice of the road for future development.

Right-wing revisionists display a special predilection for this trend in treatment of the economic laws of socialism. Attention needs to be drawn to a certain feature of their approach to this matter, compared with most capitalist economists. Right-wing revisionists do not deny the operation of objective economic laws in general under socialism, but only under really existing socialism, which has proportionately developed its national economy on the basis of social ownership of the means of production.^^1^^ The aims of such ideas are obvious. According to them socialist countries should, in order to clear the way for objective necessity, reject planned and balanced development of the economy and introduce the anarchy of market relations. To follow those `recommendations' would mean to reject the main advantages of socialism and could ultimately lead to the degeneration of socialism.

2. Interpretations of economic interest under socialism

Economic interests, stimuli, and the direct producers' self-interest in work are links in the mechanism of the operation of economic laws; investigation of them is therefore a logical continuation of investigation of the laws themselves. The objective cause-and-effect connection that constitutes the content of economic laws comes into people's consciousness in the form of impelling motives of economic activity. The problem of the motivation of this activity has largely engaged the attention of the social sciences (and still does), but has had a particularly important place in economic science. The whole content of political economy is often reduced by Western writers to study of the interests, stimuli, and motives of people's economic activity. These matters have a corresponding place in capitalist investigations of socialism and were particularly widely discussed by Western investigators of the socialist economy in connection with the economic reforms carried out in socialist countries in the 60s. But one finds a complete opposition of the views of Western writers

~^^1^^ See, for example, O. §ik. Fur eine Wirtschaft ohne Dogma (List Verlag, Munich, 1974), p 115; Rudolf Bahro. Die Alternative (Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus) (Europaische Verlagsanstalt, Cologne, Frankfort on the Main, 1977), p 184; Helmut Leipold. Einftlhrung: Entwicklung und gesellschaftspolitische Bedeutung der sozialistischen Marktwirtschaften. In Sozialistische MarktwirtschaftenCVeilag C. H.Beck, Munich, 1975), pp 9-11.

237

and the Marxists of socialist countries on economic laws and their content, and character of operation and application, which has also been noted in Western literature. The American encyclopaedia cited above writes, for example:

There is hardly any field of political and social theory in which there is less consensus of opinion between the scholars of capitalist and of socialist countries than on the subject of the pluralism of interests and interest groups.^^1^^

This is because the system of economic interests takes a form in which the essence of the relations of production and economic laws is manifested directly. 'The economic relations of a given society present themselves in the first place as interests.'^^2^^

The bourgeois and revisionist interpretations of economic interests under socialism reflect their approach to the operation of economic laws, and are based on the same methodological principles. In non-Marxian economic science there are considerable differences •on matters of the content and manifestation of economic interests in general, and all the more so in socialist society, but all Western ideas of economic interests have a common methodological basis, which is to ignore the objective character of the relations of production and the decisive role of ownership of the means of production, and which openly or covertly, but inevitably, leads to a subjectivepsychological interpretation of the impelling motives of economic activity.

The most frankly psychological approach is manifested in theories that put forward selfish, personal (individual), material interest, understood as a striving for gain and a money income, as the universal impelling motive and most powerful driving force of social progress, operating identically in any society.^^3^^ This is a human, economic law, it is said, that is true for all systems. Thus the existence of national and collective economic interests under socialism is denied.

The idea of the `universality' of individual material interest is a most reactionary one, and is counted on, above all, to falsify real socialism. That is why it has been taken into the armoury of rightwing revisionists and reformists in propaganda for 'market socialism'. It is really nonsense to suppose that a society which is still divided into substantial interest groups can bring their general interests to a scientific common denominator,

Bahro writes of socialist society.^^4^^ Spokesmen of this trend do not limit themselves just to denying national and collective economic interests operating under socialism, and the advantages in the eco-

nomic field linked with that, but try to prove that socialism is losing out in comparison with capitalism because (they say) the existing system of economic relations in socialist countries, having abolished private entrepreneurial interest, does not secure the rise of a corresponding interest in efficient development of production in 'either government planning and management bodies or works managements, or the mass of the producers'.^^1^^ Stobbe echoes Sik, saying: The abolition of the efficient stimulus-function of private property in the means of production creates new problems.'^^2^^ The socialist economy is depicted in this case as a `command' or `totalitarian' one in which orders from the top suppressing the interests of the members of socialist society and production collectives operate instead of economic stimuli. But socialism, with a predominance of national ownership of the means of production and affirmation of socialist principles of distribution of the product, gives rise to a national economic interest aimed at developing production so as to meet the needs of all members of society .as fully as possible, which corresponds completely to the personal interests of each of them. Collective economic interests take shape on the basis (a) of the relative economic autonomy of socialist public enterprises, and (b)i of co-operative/collective farm property. The personal economic interests of the members of socialist society also have an inherent character, different in principle from those under private ownership of the means of production which isolates all the producers economically. Every person in socialist society understands that his personal well-being and happiness depend directly on society's economic progress as a whole, so that realisation of the national interest never contradicts personal interests. But that, of course, does not mean that personal and collective interests fully coincide with the national interests; the forms in which the individual or collective tries to satisfy them may not meet the interests of society. Therefore the government, as the representative of the interests of society as a whole, and not of its individual citizens or groups, creates conditions through a system of legal norms, methods of directing the national economy, economic and moral stimuli, etc., in which an individual or collective can realise its own interest in forms of activity appropriate to their common interests. But the system of management and stimulation defining the forms of realising collective and personal interests may have deficiencies and shortcomings, so that contradictions develop between society's interests and those of the workers and their production collectives. These contradictions are removed by perfecting the system of management and stimulation, which is done as changes occur in the economic conditions of running the economy.

~^^1^^ Ota Sik. Der dritte Weg. Die marxistisch-leninistische Theorie und die moderne Industriegesetlschaft (Hollmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1972), p 69.

~^^2^^ Alfred Stobbe. Gesamtwirtschaftliche Theorie (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975), p 363.

~^^1^^ Klaus von Beyme. Interest. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 4 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 325.

~^^2^^ Frederick Engels. The Housing Question (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 86.

~^^3^^ See Klaus von Beyme. Op. cit., pp 312-326.

~^^4^^ Rudolf Bahro. Op. cit., p 289.

Z38

239

Western investigators of the system of economic interests of socialism often limit themselves to analysing only the material incentives shaped by the operation of commodity-money relations, the forms of organisation of management accounting, stimuli, plan and evaluation indicators of work, etc., while paying no attention to the deep, essential relations of production of socialism that generate a unity of fundamental economic interests.

Ignoring of the determinant character of the system of relations of production, and substitution of the external forms of the realisation of interests for their inner, objectively conditioned content, provide broad opportunities for an arbitrary interpretation of the interaction of various interests under both capitalism and socialism, in accordance with specific aims. Either real socialism is depicted as a society in which economic laws and national interests do not operate, and individual economic interests are suppressed by centralised planning, or an attempt is made to identify socialism with capitalism by ascribing contradictions to it like those of the capitalist system. The first line is typical of the open opponents of socialism and of spokesmen of right-wing revisionism, the second of adherents of the theory of convergence. In the latter case the existence of national interests under socialism is not denied, but it is suggested, at the same time, that they also exist in capitalist society. Since it is impossible to substantiate the thesis of a 'harmony of interests' in capitalist society, an attempt is also made to depict socialism as a society with the same contradictions as capitalism. Antagonistic contradictions in society are depicted as inevitable, generated by man's natural individualism and therefore inherent in any type of socio-economic formation. Helmut Leipold, for example, writes:

Personal and specifically group interests, and opposition of interests, however, are operative here, as in the practice of all societies, and must therefore be evaluated as a systems-indifferent set of problems. They are a part of activity between people.'

The contradictions of interests do not, in fact, arise from ' individualism', and do not stem from human nature, but are the consequence and visible manifestation of an antagonism of relations of "production. As Engels wrote,

class-war is indistinguishable as long as the various classes with their opposed and conflicting interests and social positions are in existence.2 In socialist society, in which private property in the means of production and exploitation of others' labour have been abolished, there are no grounds for an antagonism of economic interests, even though differences remain between them.

Conceptions in which the existence of an interest in the effi-

~^^1^^ Helmut Leipold. Op. cit., p 16.

~^^2^^ Frederick Engels. Real Causes Why the French Proletarians Remained Comparatively Inactive in December Last. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. Collected Works, Vol. 11 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979), p 216.

240

cient development of production is not denied are typically all aimed at discrediting socialism by ascribing contradictions to it that do not in fact exist. This is done by a double methodological `forgery'. (1) Only the political leadership of the country is depicted as the vehicle of interests that are in fact inherent both in society as a whole, given national ownership, and in each member of it. (2) The substance of the interests of the workers and their production collectives is reduced simply to obtaining profits and bonuses. Hensel, for example, writes:

The principle of plan fulfilment corresponds to the purposes of the political leadership and the bonus principle to the purposes of the employees in enterprises. *

By reducing the interests of the members of socialist society simply to getting a money income, the authors of these views slyly substitute the concrete forms of realisation of these interests for their objective content, and both middle class investigators of socialism and spokesmen of reformism and revisionism conclude from this that, as socialism develops,

the contradiction of interests becomes more intense between the political central authorities, who are concerned to get as big an exploitation of national economic resources as possible, and the production units, which are striving for high bonuses.^^2^^

In fact there is no antagonistic contradiction between the interests of society and the working people, though there are shortcomings and inadequacies in the management machinery that does not always give enterprises sufficient material self-interest to adopt tight plans, produce high quality output, and so on. But that does not mean that there are antagonistic contradictions inherent in the system of interests under socialism, as contemporary Sovietologists try to represent it.

As to the socialist system of material and moral incentives aimed at combining personal and collective economic interests with society's, Sovietologists often distort both its theory and its practice. Wilczynski, for example, presents things as if Marx and Lenin considered only moral incentives the main stimuli, and says that 'material incentives were considered by them to be essentially anti-social, a relic of capitalism that would wither away',^^3^^ and that the present-day practice of economic incentives is 'in contradiction of Marxian and Leninist views',^^4^^ which bears no relation whatsoever to the truth. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx substantiated the necessity

~^^1^^ Karl Paul Hensel. Systemvergleich als Aufgabe (Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1977), p 86.

~^^2^^ Bernd Windhoff. Darstellung unter Kritik der Konvergenztheorie (Peter Lang, Frankfort on the Main, 1971), p 112.

~^^3^^ J. Wilczynski. The Economics of Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), p 108.

^^4^^Ibid., p!09.

241

for payment according to work throughout the whole first phase of communist society. And Lenin, from the very start of Soviet power, stressed the significance of material incentives and self-interest for the building of socialism and communism: 'Everey important branch of the economy must be built up on the principle of personal incentive.' *

Not only is the operation of economic interests and material incentives under socialism distorted in Western economic theories, but the role of moral incentives to work is obviously underestimated. While spokesmen for capitalism as a rule consider them not very effective for securing the common interest, the spokesmen of revisionism completely distort their role,^^2^^ representing them as means of suppressing the economic interests of the members of socialist society.^^3^^

In reality, however, material and moral incentives operate in the same direction and supplement one another. The role of the latter is constantly rising as socialism develops, and they are becoming more and more operative.

16

INTERPRETATIONS OF PLANNED AND BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY

1. Planning in the notions of the 'impracticability of socialism' and of 'command economy'

Relations based on planned and balanced development inherent in socialism are a specific feature of it, and its greatest historical advantage over capitalism. They have an objective basis, viz., socialist socialisation of production, which gives rise to the operation of economic laws specific to the system, laws that include that of planned, proportionate development of the economy, which expresses the objective necessity for co-ordinated management of the national economy as a single whole through deliberate maintenance of a proportionality corresponding to social needs between the various types of production.

Socialist society accordingly plans the economy through appropriate bodies. The determinant role of planning in the direction of socialist production is set down in the Constitution of the USSR. But the system of national economic planning, it must be added, is a mobile one, its principles and methods being pcrfected, and the level of planning in society raised, in accordance with the needs of continuing development of the economy.

The Soviet Union was the first country to plan on the scale of the whole economy; and both the theory and the practice of socialist planning, it must be said, have been the object of criticism from the moment the First Five-Year Plan was adopted right down to the present. This criticism has too often had a hostile, unobjective character, which is largely due to the initial theoretical and methodological stand of Western theorists, who treat planning as a means of compulsion and political control and consider the market economy the sole alternative to such planning. While a planned economy was being built in the USSR, and even today, epithets like `command', ' centrally controlled', and 'centrally administered' have been applied to the planned economy in contradistinction to the 'free market economy'.

This approach is typical of spokesmen of the liberal and neoliberal trends in bourgeois political economy. Alongside it, however, there is another approach, typical of theorists of the industrial society

243

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments. Collected Works, Vol. 33 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 70.

~^^2^^ See, for example, Daniel Fusfeld. Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1972), p 541; J. Wilczynski. Profit, Risk and Incentives under Socialist Economic Pfenning (Macmillan & Co., London, 1973), p 213.

3 Ota Sik. Der dritte Weg, pp 77-91.

and convergence, which attributes an important role to planning in society's economic affairs. As we shall see below, however, for all the active opposition of their views on planning and its role and limits, all the spokesmen of modern capitalist political economy treat relations of planned and proportionate development in isolation from the objective conditions associated with differing economic systems and arising from differences in the types of ownership of the means of production.

One of the first critics of the socialist planned system was Ludwig von Mises; regarding capitalism as the natural state of society and only possible form of the rational functioning of an economy, he considered socialism an artificial system that stifled the producers' freedom and disrupted the `natural', i.e. market, nexus between them. He looked upon centralised, planned guidance as the main sin of socialism, since it allegedly prevented trie very possibility of rational management of the economy as it did not provide for economic calculus, i.e. for spontaneous accounting of the costs of production in and through the market. On those grounds he argued, for example, that socialism was impracticable as an economic system.

The ideas of the `impracticability' and `unviability' of socialism put forward immediately after the October 1917 Revolution were the theoretical foundation on which anti-communists of all persuasions prophesied breakdown of the USSR's five-year plans. But the unprecedented rates of its socialist industrialisation and the defeat of Hitler Germany demonstrated the indisputable superiority of the planned system of economy. The liberals' thesis of socialism's ' ineffectiveness' was quite discredited, so that it was no accident that the neoliberals' idea of the `totalitarian' or `command' economy became predominant in the 40s and 50s among the many capitalist interpretations of planning and balanced development. The neoliberals, in contrast to ideologists of the old liberalism, consider that operation of the mechanism of free market competition is ensured by government intervention rather than automatically. They therefore do not reject a certain positive significance for centralised planning under socialism, since it makes it possible to secure high economic growth rates. Of course, they also argue at the same time, this is achieved at the expense of suppression of the individual consumer's interests and infringement of his sovereignty. The planned system, they say, suppresses the consumer's sovereignty because it starts from the interests of expanding production and not from those of individuals, and because it is incapable of responding to the rapidly changing structure of needs.

These views reflect the exaggeration of the role of the market typical of `barter' conceptions, and a striving on that basis (a) to belittle the possibility of meeting consumer demand under a planned economy, and (b) to counterpose personal consumption to productive accumulation and productive consumption. The `command' economy,

244

the neoliberals try to show, has only one merit, the possibility of mobilising resources (which are said to be used irrationally).

Present-day ideologists of the neoliberal trend, following von Mises, employ the notion of 'command economy' to criticise real socialism. In spite of what actually exists, planning decisions are interpreted as purely administrative and subjective, and plan indicesin both value and physical terms---are counterposed to one another. The main reason for that is seen to be in the planned, rather than spontaneous, character of price formation.

Notions like that clearly reveal a desire to saddle socialist countries with the self-discredited market model of the economy, with its inescapable features of overproduction crises, unemployment, and anarchy of production. The actively obtruded market economy, moreover, is counteiposed to a 'centrally controlled' model of the socialist economy as guaranteeing not only rationality and efficiency but also freedom from bureaucracy. In this case Weber's theory of bureaucracy as a form of management adequate to an industrial economy is reproduced, so as to represent centralised management of the socialist economy as bureaucratic.

Apart from unfailing advice to give the market economy freedom as the sole way of securing economic efficiency of socialist production, one can ako find notions in our day, it is interesting to note, that have been held without change since the 20s. In a journal published in West Germany in 1981, Werner Gumpel, for instance, categorically declared himself against the economic 'notion of market socialism, for the following reason:

We know how to define the idea 'market economy' and equate it with the economic form of capitalism. We also know how to define the concept `socialism', and know that it is a matter of a certain form of centrally administered economy... The market economy system is characterised, for the most part, by a democratic political system with decentralisation of economic decision-making, the socialist system by a totalitarian political system, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and centralisation of economic decision-making. Socialism and the market economy are mutually exclusive.^^1^^

That conclusion is a highly concentrated expression of the ideas of liberalism, but is not typical of today; more characteristic now is an apologia for the market that is not only isolated from the real conditions in which the economies of socialism and capitalism develop, but also contains substantial faults of theory and methodology. In spite of certain substantial divergences in their approach to the evaluation of plan and the role of government in the economy, the theoretical and methodological platforms of the liberals and neoliberals coincide. They have a built-in apologia for the capitalist market system and

~^^1^^ Werner Gumpel. Sozialistische Marktwirtschaft. Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 1981,26,2:79.

245

ignore such manifest ills of capitalism as crises; they also ignore the decisive role of ownership of the means of production (private capitalist objectively hampers planning, while socialist facilitates planning on the scale of society); and interpret planning under socialism in a subjective psychological way as a form of political coercion, and a bureaucratic system's imposition of its will on the economic subjects. Reality has dealt the concept of 'command economy' a knockout blow: on the one hand, by the practice of capitalist economic management, with its continuous chain of contradictions and conflicts grounded in crises recurring periodically with growing destructive force, inflation, and the growth of strikes; on the other hand, by the practice of socialist economic managemen^, and the planned, dynamic development of real socialism.

2. The theorists of the 'industrial society' on planning

J. K. Galbraith, one of the leading exponents of the institutionalsocial trend of Western political economy, employs the counterposing of market and plan characteristic of the ideas considered above from an opposite standpoint. He treats the market as an obstacle to planned and proportionate development of the economy, and prefers and counterposes planning to it. Galbraith and other Western theorists, while deducing the necessity for planning equally from the needs of technical progress, ignore the deep qualitative differences between the economic systems of socialism and capitalism, and the objective character of economic laws, especially the law of planned and balanced development of the socialist economy and its dependence on social ownership of the means of production. From an imaginary identification of the socialist and capitalist economies, and reduction of the economy to technique and technology (which are declared to be 'ideologically neutral'), they try to prove that the scientific and industrial revolution itself, irrespective of the social system, not only calls for planning but also creates the material and organisational conditions necessary for carrying it out.

In his The New Industrial State Galbraith argued that the systems of capitalism and socialism, being forms of the industrial society, 'are subject to the imperatives of industrialization. This for both means planning.'^^1^^ Unlike the adherents of liberalism and neoliberalism, he considers the economy of the industrial state, since it is based on modern technology, to require a superseding of the free market mechanism, and that

in areas of most exacting and advanced technology the market is most completely replaced and planning is therefore most secure.^^2^^

Analysis of the role and significance of the `technostructure' has an important place in Galbraith's notion of planning; in his view the `technostructure' performs a similar function under both capitalism and socialism. He developed this idea later, though amended somewhat, in Economics and the Public Purpose, in which he analysed the 'planning system' instead' of the 'industrial state', opposing it, as before with the 'industrial state', to the market system.

The planning system is the most highly developed part of the economy, the market system the least developed. *

The market is thus arbitrarily excluded from the planning system, represented by the big corporations in which, as he says, the traditional stimuli of economic activity are no longer applicable or are pushed into the background, while tasks of economic growth take first place.

At the same time Galbraith does not deny that the 'planning; system may play a reactionary role in society and have aims different from public purposes. While not denying the contradictory character of the `planning' system or the fact, for example, that

during the decade of the sixties, the planning system and the associated public bureaucracy accepted the Vietnam war as they had long accepted the pplicy of resisting communism by military and other means in the less developed countries,^^2^^

he considers it enough to set up a governmental planning body under control of the legislative authorities, hi order to overcome the negative aspects of the `planning' system.^^3^^ It will be readily understood that Galbraith hopes to introduce such planning within the context of capitalism, without altering property relations, which would be 'hi the name of society and hi the interests of society'^^4^^; but it can only be implemented through social ownership of the means of production, and is absolutely impossible while capitalist corporations exist. It is also necessary, when describing the views of Galbraith, not only to stress the polarity of his estimate of centralised planning and that of the theorists of neoliberalism, but also to point out the inner contradiction in the notion of planning he develops.

Another theorist of industrialism, Heilbroner, pays much attention to problems of planning, which he treats as an important means of influencing the economy; like other Western theorists, however, he too leaves aside the socio-economic differences of principle in the scale, amis, and consequences of planning operations. He quite ignores the basic principle of socialist planning, viz., democratic centralism. Planning, he writes,

~^^1^^ John Kenneth Galbraith. Economics and the Public Purpose (A Signet Book, New York, 1973), p 308.

2/&K/..P 162.

* Ibid.,p 318.

~^^4^^ V. I. Lenin. Notes on Plekhanov's Second Draft Programme. Collected Works, Vol. 6 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 52.

247

~^^1^^ John Kenneth Galbraith. The New Industrial State (Houghton Mifflin Boston, Mass., 1967), p 332.

'

~^^2^^/«</., p 31.

246

arises in the advanced market societies to offset their inherent goalsetting weaknesses, just as the market mechanism arises in advanced command societies to offset their inherent motivational weaknesses.1 Such conclusions reproduce the postulates of the long outmoded theory of 'planned capitalism' that proposed radical methods of ridding capitalism of economic crises, which in spite of that periodically shake the capitalist economy with the regularity already pointed out by Karl Marx. And planning cannot eliminate these `weaknesses' given technological progress, as the economic crises of the mid-70s and early 80s have demonstrated on an exceptional scale. Heilbroner, employing the jargon of the neoliberals who treat the economy of capitalism as a `market' one and the socialist as a `command' one, suggests that the latter has inherent 'motivational weaknesses' that can be overcome by means of the market.

The old argument against centralised planning, that it ignores economic factors, is thus revived. But in actual fact planning relies on the objective laws of socialism, which operate as an interconnected system. The economic law of distribution by labour is therefore taken into account in the planning process, and a flexible system of material incentives is established in a planned way, a system that is being constantly improved, not to mention that the motivation of economic activity under socialism regularly includes moral incentives arising from the socialist character of work free of exploitation and oppression.

capitalist countries, who demand the right to take part in the management of production. Under socialism management and planning are carried out on the principles of democratic centralism. The involvement of the workers not only in management of production but in administration of the state, and the immense role in the latter of people's control, are determined by the character of the ownership of the means of production, and have long been a reality.

In their critique of planning and balanced development under socialism the 'Frankfort School' people base themselves on the ideas of Max Weber who, like von Mises, was among those who criticised socialism. But while von Mises saw socialism's main sin in the absence of an economic calculus, Weber argued the inevitability under socialism of bureaucratisation of the management apparatus, which would bring all aspects of public affairs under its control, subordinating people's activity to its aims. The 'Frankfort School' people, in accepting these premises, give the principles of centralised socialist planning quite an arbitrary interpretation. Since the aim of centralised planning is the organisation of production on rational lines over the whole of society, they treat it as a threat to freedom of the individual.

Their views on rational organisation prove to be close to the conceptions of the 'command economy', the most reactionary and outmoded school of economic liberalism.

The various trends of vulgar political economy and sociology prove, when criticising socialism for its inherent planning relations, and distorting and falsifying them, to have a common platform. And it. is not fortuitous that the same views about planning are expressed in the work of modern right-wing revisionists, who count themselves theorists of scientific socialism, as are held by anti-- Communists or by advocates of democratic socialism of a reformist hue. This explains the element in common between Sik's theories of 'market socialism' and the models of 'democratic socialism' developed by right-wing Social Democrats. Neither the former nor the latter contain anything constructive; their sense consists solely in criticism of real socialikrfi, and denial of the constructive role of conscious, scientifically grounded, planned guidance of the socialist economy.

Reformists as a rule draw the arguments for their critique of the theory and practice of socialist planning from capitalist sources. Many of them, for example, deny the connection between national economic planning and social ownership of the means of production, considering state reforms of capitalist ownership as socialist, and any form of government regulation of the economy to have the character of recommendations rather than directives. Although reformist notions of democratic socialism, and estimates and descriptions of socialist planning, have undergone substantial changes because of the failures of programming of the economy in capitalist countries, reformism continues to babble about the 'totalitarian character' of centralised management of the economy.

249

3. Balanced development and planning in the ideas of the 'Frankfort School' and right-wing revisionists

The 'Frankfort School' unites such well-known sociologists and philosophers as Marcuse, Adorno, and Habermas, who have built up a theory of 'bureaucratised socialism'. While criticising modern state monopoly capitalism, which they call 'highly developed industrial society', they turn their critique at the same time against real socialism; their critique of the capitalist system of the period of late industrialisation (into which the working class is alleged to be integrated) transferred automatically to developed socialism. For them the contrast in forms of ownership and the specific way the objective laws inherent in them are manifested is a matter of indifference.

Despotism in management, and its frankly bureaucratic character, are actually typical of capitalist private ownership. This bureaucracy is reproduced in all the structural elements of capitalist society, in both the basis and the superstructure. It is opposed by the working class of

1 Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow. The Economic Problem 4th ed. (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), p 647.

248

Anti-Communists who claim to develop the theory of socialism bury in oblivion the objective process of the socialisation of production, which really calls for social regulation. The `industrialists', however, have long recognised this need, though they do not link the possibility of such control with socialist socialisation of the means of production, and in any case realise that market forces long ago revealed their bankruptcy from the standpoint of the needs of social progress.

4. Views on improving planned management in socialist countries

The stage of developed socialism is introducing substantial changes into the theory and practice of planned regulation of the economy. The mounting degree of socialisation of production has brought to the fore the problem of perfecting the whole economic mechanism under the new conditions. An objective necessity and possibility have developed to raise the standard of planning at the level of the individual enterprise, firm, and industry, and in the whole economy. None of these changes and problems escape the notice of Western specialists in the socialist economy, who try to give them an antiCommunist interpretation, which is particularly complicated in view of the marked deterioration of the economic situation in developed capitalist countries. The economic crises or 1974-5 and the early 80s, the steady growth of unemployment, mounting inflation, and the strike movement, leave no doubt that technical progress within the context of capitalism cannot rid it at all of the ills inherent in its nature. Planning, advertised as a radical means of curbing anarchic market forces, has proved quite useless for the purpose. The most reactionary section of Western specialists in the socialist economy, however, try to propagate the thesis of a latent crisis allegedly developing in the economy of the USSR, citing as evidence the measures being taken to perfect planning and management, and the sharp criticism of existing shortcomings in this sphere.

At congresses of the CPSU and plenary sessions of its Central Committee, and in directives of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, there is, in fact, a developed criticism of existing shortcomings, but a criticism of a constructive character stemming from the need to ensure further movement along the line of increasing the balanced development of social production.

The Western press has paid much attention to the problem of the Soviet economy's current development and the outlook for possible changes in the system of planning and management. Again, as dozens of years ago, old ideas of the 'command economy' have cropped up. Boris Meissner, Director of the Institute of Eastern Law of Cologne University, for example, tried to find evidence of the compulsory character of centralised management of the economy in the new Constitution of the USSR. Citing Article 16, which states

250

that the economy of the USSR is an integral economic complex comprising all the elements of social production, distribution, and exchange on its territory, he treated it as restricting the interests of the separate nations.

Such a conception, which subsumes not only the leadership but also the management of the whole economy under a single standpoint, must, naturally, in a federally organised multinational state, meet with resistance from the separate nations, which are interested in maintaining their economic independence.

It will be readily seen that this statement contradicts the full text of Article 16, which continues as follows:

The economy is managed on the basis of state plans for economic and social development, with due account of the sectoral and territorial principles, and by combining centralised direction with the managerial independence and initiative of individual and amalgamated enterprises and other organisations, for which active use is made of management accounting, profit, cost, and other economic levers and incentives.^^2^^

That excerpt not only provides the answer to how the principle of centralism is implemented-in organic unity with democracy---but also shows that immense significance is attached in a planned economy to the mechanism of commodity-money relations.

The perfecting of economic instruments and levers associated with operation of the law of value has a vital place both in the resolutions of congresses and plenums and in the economic literature of the USSR and other socialist countries. Concrete measures are employed to this end: improvement of the principles of planned price-fixing and optimisation of the system of material incentives are treated by specialists in the socialist economy simply from the standpoint of whether or not they can be considered real steps toward market socialism. It is in that key, for example, that the Soviet planning system is analysed as a 'centrally administered model' by the West German Sovietologist Hans-Hermann Hohmann, whose argument has an openly anti-Communist, anti-Soviet character.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that the central administrative planning and management system in its present institutional model (i.e. in the form of an economic administration through industrial ministries) is the effective and at the same time very silent means of a policy of Russian hegemony within the USSR.3 For all the absurdity of the statement about an alleged policy

~^^1^^ Boris Meissner. Die Ergebnisse des XXVI. Parteikongress der KPdSU. Europa-Archiv, 1981, 3: 82-83.

~^^2^^ Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977), p 27.

~^^3^^ Hans-Hermann Hbhmann. Das sowjetische Planungssystem. Determinanten, Funktionsprinzipien, Wandlungstendenzen (Bundesinstitut fllr ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Cologne, 1978), p 49.

251

of Russian hegemonism for which centralised planning is the instrument, it should be noted that the statement is not fortuitous and expresses quite clearly an emerging line of intensifying anti-Soviet propaganda through direct falsification of Lenin's nationalities policy in the USSR. In willfully treating centralism as naked coercion without economic content, Western critics of real socialism have no desire to see the organic connection inherent in planned management between centralism and democracy, which constitutes the substance of the principle of democratic centralism. This principle is basic in the management of the socialist economy, and combines the principles of centralism and democracy in a dialectical unity. As the socialist economy develops, both these principles are strengthened pan passu as production becomes more and more socialised. Centralised planning is improved by raising the standard of the economic substantiation of plan targets; and inseparable from that there is a broadening of the area of responsibility of enterprises and firms (associations), and a development of socialist emulation.

The modern conditions of managing the socialist economy have become considerably more intricate, so that the significance of centralised planning in particular is growing, but Western theorists have not ceased arguing the necessity for socialist countries to decentralise management of the economy so as to overcome the elemental spontaneity allegedly inherent in centralism. A whole system of proofs has been worked out for this purpose which is constantly being corrected as the system of management is perfected and the efficiency of planning increases. The American Sovietologist Campbell thinks that centralised planning and management were necessary for the period in the development of socialist countries when tasks of ensuring rapid economic growth were being tackled, but that now, when problems of efficiency have come to the fore, it is necessary to pass to a version of the new industrial state, for which he recommends production associations to keep in touch with one another and by-pass the central planning agency.^^1^^

Thus, however the conditions of the development of socialism have changed, Sovietologists of various hues see its main `sin' as planned, centralised management of the economy, scientifically based on the objective laws of socialism.

17

NON-MARXIAN IDEAS OF MONEY-EXCHANGE RELATIONS

1. The treatment of the substance, functions and theory of money-exchange relations

In the Western literature on the economic problems of socialism, the alternative 'plan or market' dominated almost completely until the early 60s. Underlying it was the thesis that social ownership of the means of production and centralised planning of the economy ruled out the possibility of employing relations of commodity production and circulation. Socialist planning, moreover, was treated as supercentralised and all-embracing, while only relations of the spontaneously functioning market were considered genuine money-exchange (commodity-money) ones.

The present-day evolution of non-Marxian treatment of the relation of balanced development and money-exchange relations is characterised by a gradual reconsideration of the 'plan or market' alternative, and rejection of any absolute counterposing of planning to money-exchange relations. Some authors say outright that the 'plan or market' alternative is out-of-date, and does not correspond to the realia of state monopoly capitalism and mature socialism. The American Sovietologist Feiwell relates the rise of a tendency to reconsider the 'plan or market' alternative to the early postwar period.

Whereas before World War II, both East and West economists usually considered plan and market as self-contradictory, in the postwar, the tendency has been to consider plan and market as 'a central theme of every modern economist's work'.'

Attempts to re-examine the 'plan or market' alternative in fact only began to have any substantial significance in the 60s. They were a refracted reflection of the real structural shifts taking place in the economies of capitalist countries, and of improvements hi the economic mechanism in developed socialist society.

Sovietologists often justify the need to reconsider the 'plan or

~^^1^^ See Robert W. Campbell. The Soviet-Type Economies. Performance and Evolution (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1974).

~^^1^^ George R. Feiwell. Economic Development and Planning Reforms in Eastern Europe. Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 1974, 4: 273-274.

253

market' alternative by quotations from the economic literature of socialist countries. The Australian economist Jan Wilczynski, for example, writes:

Traditionally in Socialist economic thought plan and market were commonly regarded as antagonistic and mutually exclusive... The majority of Socialist thinkers and policy-makers now believe that in the advanced stages of economic development an organic coalescence of the two mechanisms is not only possible but in fact highly essential for intensive-based growth.^^1^^

Several theorists who admit the possibility of money-exchange relations being employed under centralised planning reproduce the 'plan or market' alternative in an original form. The West German Sovietologist Haffner notes that the model of a 'centrally managed economy' that assumes supercentralised, all-embracing planning has the same hypothetical character as 'perfect competition' under capitalism. By analogy with 'imperfect competition', and an ' imperfect market economy', he introduces the term 'imperfect planned economy'. This idea, he suggests, 'presumes the existence of a marketmechanism element and its inclusion in the planning system'.^^2^^

His term 'imperfect planned economy' cannot be thought successful. It is a contradictio in adjecto, because socialist planning of the economy has never been considered by Marxist-Leninist political economy as full, absolute centralisation of economic management.

Two main, though modified, standpoints prevail in contemporary non-Marxian ideas of the socialist economy as regards moneyexchange relations under socialism. Those who hold the theory of 'command economy' continue to deny the possibility of employing money-exchange forms effectively given the predominance of social ownership of the means of production. Analysis of the mature socialist economy from the standpoint of theories of the 'industrial society' and `convergence' ignores the specific nature of the form and content of the operation,of money-exchange categories under the predominance of social ownership of the means of production. Both these standpoints are common in the literature of Soviet studies, and as a rule employ the whole set of the above ideas.

In the theory of 'command economy' money-exchange relations and value categories are treated as purely external forms with no real content (i.e. as not expressing relations of equivalent exchange between commodity producers), but perform only an accounting, auxiliary function, and play the role of instruments of administrative management. Grossman, for example, stresses, in a symposium on the

socialist price mechanism, that

the use of the price tool is not only selective and limited of specific areas of the economy, but is primarily a supplement to the existing structure of administrative controls of resource use.^^1^^

Mainhold et al. see in underutilisation of market relations the main cause of the difficulties that the developed socialist economy comes up against; they write:

It cannot be expected that such a complicated planning system could function in these highly developed economies without friction, particularly since the socialist market relations and the monetary and credit systems are still too strongly restricted and frequently fulfil only supplementary functions.^^2^^

Denial of the significance of money-exchange relations and belittling of their role run counter to the real development of the Marxist-Leninist political economy of socialism and the practice of socialist economic management. Although the commodity form of producers' relations is not the sole and predominant form of relations under socialism, it operates as an integral element of the economic mechanism of socialism, and expresses its essential characteristics, since relations of commodity production and exchange are immanent in socialism and are a component of the system of socialist relations of production.

The majority of Western economists consider only the market, subject to the laws of competition, to be real and genuine. The British economist Alfred Zauberman, complaining that the 'concept of market is itself undefined and as a matter of fact remains very vague', stresses that only a mechanism controlling the distribution of resources through competition is a genuinely market one.^^3^^ Haffner introduces two concepts of the market, viz., `technical' and `economic', the market in the economic sense being, in his wor4s,

a mode and kind of economic co-ordination between the separate effective, decision-taking market partners... To the economic concept of the market, fully developed in a market economy system, only a purely technical concept of the market can be counterpoised in a centrally managed economy.

~^^1^^ Gregory Grossman. Price Control Incentive and Innovation in the Soviet Economy. In Alan Abouchar (Ed.). The Socialist Price Mechanism (Duke U.P., Durham, N. C., 1977), p 166.

~^^2^^ H. Mainhold, U. Teichmann, G. Frenzel, J. Skolka. Social and Economic Policy. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 7 (Herder & Herder New York, 1973), p 396.

~^^3^^ Alfred Zauberman. Wirtschaftsreformen und neue Planungstechniken in Osteuropa. In Hans-Hermann Hohmann, Michael Kaser, Karl Thalheim (Eds.). Die Wirtschaftsordnungen Osteuropas im Wandel, Vol. 2 (Verlae Rombach Freiburg,! 972), p 37.

~^^4^^ Friedrich Haffner. Marktbeziehungen im sowjetischen Wirtschaftssystem. In Friedrich Haffner (Ed.). Beitrdge zur Theorie und Praxis von Wirtschaftssystemen (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1970), pp 86-87.

255

~^^1^^ J. Wilczynski. Socialist Economic Development and Reforms (Macmillan &Co., London, 1972), p 56.

~^^2^^ Friedrich Haffner. Systemkontrare Beziehungen in tier sowjetischen Planwirtschaft. Kin Beitrag zur Theorie der mixed Economy (Duncker & Humblot Berlin, 1978), p 192.

254

in that case, Haffner thinks, the market is converted exclusively into the technical executant of the plan's orders and is the concluding phase of economic circulation. It is the technical conception of the market, he stresses, that underlies the majority of definitions in socialist countries.^^1^^

In reality, the market, being an economic category, expresses real relations established in the sphere of commodity circulation. How far these relations are balanced varies according to the type of market and the subjects of commodity exchange. The market relations between state enterprises, suppliers and consumers of output, established through economic contracts and agreements concluded within the context of centrally established parameters, are highly plannable. The 1979 joint directive of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers on improving and strengthening the effect of the economic machinery in raising the efficiency of production and quality of work provided for completing the transfer of production associations (enterprises) to direct long-term economic ties in the main in 1980. Contracts are concluded on that basis for a five-year period between industrial production associations (enterprises), and between these enterprises and agencies of USSR Gossnab,^^2^^ transport organisations, and state and co-- operative trading organisations. On that basis trade enterprises conclude annual contracts in which allowance for the public's demand is concretised in the volume and assortment of goods and'conditions of delivery.

On the unorganised collective farm market as well, however, relations between buyers and sellers are built up under the impact of government regulation, in particular through the prices of the organised market.

From the standpoint of 'industrial society' theory, the improvement of planned use of money-exchange relations is interpreted as a component of the moulding of the complex economic and social structure of the industrial state common to all highly developed industrial countries. The American economists Neuberger and Duffy, expounding a theory of the `convergence' of the two systems, support the thesis put forward by its advocates that the growing interdependence and complexity which attend economic growth in both Western and Eastern countries force 'a greater reliance on "costless co-- ordination" of some activity through markets while increasing the need for planning for major changes'.^^3^^

The theorists of `industrialism', and Sovietologists who employ their ideas to analyse the developed socialist economy, start from the

incorrect proposition that the need to use money-exchange forms is dictated by the inadequacy of the centralised planning to the level of economic development reached at the stage of mature socialism. The sole and `universal' mechanism for meeting current needs for consumer goods in any highly developed industrial economy, they assert, is spontaneous, elemental market competition (the need for it being dictated by the impossibility of obtaining information for the centralised distribution of resources in a large-scale developed economy). Hence they conclude that the role of the 'free (universal)' market will increase in the Soviet Union in response to the requirements of economic efficiency, and the role of centralised planning will decline.^^1^^

Major changes in the volume, structure, and quality of personal consumption in accordance with the growth and complication of personal needs is a characteristic feature of developed socialist society. These shifts call for a decisive change of attitude to everything linked with meeting everyday needs. The organised market in consumer goods has a vital role to play in realising them. The need to increase production of goods and services, and in particular to improve their quality and assortment so as more fully to meet consumer demand, is dictated by definite requirement for an improvement in the functioning of the circulation sphere. These include the following: allowance in planning for the features of the consumer goods market; better co-ordination of the centralised plan and market requirements; basing of the planning work of enterprises producing consumer goods and services on systematic study of the demand for certain groups of goods and flexible adaptation of production plans to consumers' changing requirements; systematic analysis of the state of the market and improvement of the organisation of information services; a differentiation of prices for new (fashion) goods and things in everyday demand.

All these measures, and others, however, to perfect the circulation sphere and increase its influence on production do not alter the specific nature of the market in consumer goods under developed socialism. Its distinguishing feature is planned regulation of the production of consumer goods and volume of retail turnover, growth of the public's cash incomes, and planned price-fking.

2. Conceptions of the 'second economy' and the interpretation of real socialism as a 'mixed economic system'

The broadening of the economic independence of enterprises and firms (associations) during perfecting of the economic mechanism

1 Friedrich Haffner. Op. cit., p 87.

~^^2^^ State supply organisation of the USSR.

~^^3^^ E. Neuberger and W. Duffy. Comparative Economic Systems A Decision-Making Approach (Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Mass., 1976), p 124.

256

~^^1^^ G. Fromm. Discussion. American Economic Review, 1977,1: 70.

257

leads Western ideologists to admit the existence of the interests of the primary links of the economy and their work forces as an independent form of economic interest under socialism; in so doing, however, they make the autonomy of these interests an absolute, looking on them as a group form of the interests of individual collectives and a partial form of the interests of the separate workers, which are alleged to be in irreconcilable contradiction with public interests, and are treated from subjectivist standpoints as 'subjective targets'.'

From the economic autonomy that realises the interests of the primary links of the economy (firms, associations, enterprises) and their work forces, Sovietologists deduce the operation of a spontaneous market which, as we have already said, they recognise as the only market in the economic sense. Haffner, for example, writes that although production is centrally planned as before, as a result of the reforms, and not controlled by the market, there are gaps in planning that enterprises exploit in their own interests, taking independent decision primarily as regards the range and quality of output.

Here we have a mass-market behaviour that is not centrally planned, and contains elements of spontaneity for the Centre, and can only be explained by maximisation of subjective (individual and enterprise) target functions.^^2^^

*

Becker says almost the same thing, stating that

the traditional planned economy has at no time managed entirely without competitive market-regulation... Regulation through competition has a particularly important function in controlling the provision of both work and consumer goods for individuals. In both cases the link has to be established between central plans and the actions of private individuals.^^3^^

The proportionate, on the whole, form of economic movement under socialism does not completely rule out the possibility of elements of disproportionality arising. This possibility is due to several objective and subjective factors, the most important of which are infringement of the operation of the economic laws of socialism in certain concrete, internal and external, conditions through inadequate comprehension of and allowance for their objective requirements, the countervailing influence of extra-economic factors, and unforeseen consequences of the elemental forces of nature. Hence there is a possibility of breach of the optimum combination of social (public), collective, and personal interests expressed in an imbalance of production and consumption plans. The use of money-exchange relations in planned management of the socialist economy is not, therefore, and cannot be, a principal cause of the retention of elements of dispropor-

~^^1^^ Friedrich Haffner. Op. cit., p 100

tionality under socialism. On the contrary, these relations, which are not plannable directly from a single centre, also ultimately proceed in a balanced way because they are realised through plans worked out by enterprises, and the contracts concluded between them, and are regulated by the socialist state.

The idea of the 'second economy' developed in American literature in relation to the stage of mature socialism is linked with this interpretation of spontaneity as the sole possible form of the movement of money-exchange relations. It has been put forward by Grossman, Herbert Levine, and other Sovietologists. Grossman, for example, writes:

The so-called 'second economy' also referred to by Western observers BS `counter-economy', 'unofficial economy', 'parallel market', and 'private enterprises'... comprehends a vast and varied set of activities1 in production and exchange that satisfy one of the following two requirements: (a) they are carried on with the aim of making a direct profit; (b) they obviously run counter to the existing legislation. The proponents of this idea include the so-called black market in the 'lecond economy", encompassing some of the operations on the collective farm market linked with use of the personal allotments in order to make a speculative income. They exaggerate the scale of these phenomena and their role in the economic functioning of socialism.

In declaring the 'second economy' to be an integral by-product of the use of money-exchange relations under allegedly rigid and inefficient centralised planning, Sovietologists proclaim that a system of two price levels and personal incomes is a characteristic feature of the developed socialist economy. The controlled prices are lower, and the free prices of the collective farm and black markets, which allegedly cover a quite broad range of goods and services, are higher. As we know, there are three forms of trade in consumer goods in the USSR, and correspondingly three price levels: viz., the prices of state, co-operative, and collective farm trade. In 1979 the proportion of state trade was 69.7 per cent, of co-operative trade 27.7 per cent, and of the collective farm market 2.6 per cent of the total retail turnover (in actual prices of state, co-operative, and collective farm trade. The figures as regards food were, respectively, 95.3 per cent for state and co-operative trade, and 4.7 per cent for the collective farm market.^^2^^

The bulk of the principal consumer goods are thus sold through the channels of state and co-operative trade, i.e. at the prices of the organised market.

~^^1^^ Gregory Grossman. The 'Second Economy' of the USSR. Problems of Communism, 1977, 5: 25.

~^^2^^ See Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1979 g (The USSR Economy in 1979) (Moscow, 1980), pp 452,453.

259

..

~^^3^^ Rudolf Becker. Market Economy. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 5 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1973), p 323.

258

The structure of personal incomes, and the differentials between them, are based on application of the economic laws of socialism, above all of the law of distribution according to work. The income of each member of society is set in accordance with his or her labour contribution to social production and the end resuhs of the operation of the local link in social production in which he (or she) is engaged. Incomes from individual work, being earned incomes, are also determined by the laws of socialist distribution.

As for speculative prices and incomes, graft, and embezzlement of socialist property, they are anti-social phenomena that contradict the very essence of socialism. When correspondence is not achieved between production and social needs, and the economic interests in which they are expressed, and production, distribution, and consumption plans are not successfully co-ordinated, partial disproportions and contradictions arise. The main way of overcoming these undesirable phenomena is to raise the scientific standard of planning and management, and to regain balanced production plans and their close co-ordination with purchasing power, and to improve the use of money-exchange forms and of the instruments of economic regulation. As Article 17 of the Constitution of the USSR says: 'The state makes regulations for such work [the personal work of individual citizens] to ensure that it serves the interests of society.'^^1^^

By interpreting the economic relations between economically autonomous enterprises, and purchase and sale on the collective farm market, as elements of a spontaneous market, and declaring the 'second economy' to be immanent in the socialist economy, Sovietologists apply the idea of the 'mixed economy' to real socialism, treating the economic mechanisms of modern capitalism and developed socialism as `mixed', combining plan and market in various proportions. The combination of these two methods of distributing resources is said to depend solely on the level of economic development reached, and its aims, and the concrete conditions characterising the dynamics both of the economy as a whole and of its separate spheres and sectors, and considerations of economic expediency.

The British Sovietologist Alec Nove says that economists in many Western countries are discussing the fundamental question:

What sort of controlled market models are feasible, what sort of mix

between central planning and managerial autonomy? Can the two

principles coexist?2 Further, he says:

In practice there has to be an inteipenetration of microdemand and

the aggregated plans, both influencing each other.^^3^^

And Haffner writes:

Markets exist in both systems, however, and the economic systems do not correspond to abstract models but function on the basis of different systems of control (having in mind planned and market distribution of tesouices-Auth. ]. l

Advocates of this idea stress that the relation between the diilerent systems of co-ordination of economic activity are characterised by interpenetration rather than coexistence. Nevertheless, since money-exchange relations are still treated as spontaneous market ones, the economic mechanism of developed socialism figures in them essentially in the form of the sum total of two opposing principles of regulating social proportionality. From that it is concluded that mature socialism, like modern capitalism, is to be counted among the `mixed' economic systems.

Haffner's book devoted to analysing money-exchange relations under socialism is thus entitled Systemkontrare Beziehungen in der sowjetischen Planwirtschaft. Bin Beitrag zur Theorie der mixed Economy (System-contrary Relations in the Soviet Planned Economy. A Contribution to the Theory of the Mixed Economy).

Western theorists argue that the use of value forms, and instruments of indirect economic regulation, to establish social proportionality is in irreconcilable contradiction with centralised determination of the principal proportions of reproduction. Thus is the standpoint from which Sovietologists evaluate the system of measures to improve the USSR's economic mechanism developed in the directives , of the CPSU and Soviet Government. The West German economists Hohmann and Seidenstecher, for example, write: 'It remains open in the main which institutions and methods will bridge the contradictions between different, but difficult to reconcile, principles.'2 These mutually exclusive principles include the requirements (which in fact constitute an organic unity), on the one hand, of strengthening centralised planning, and, on the other hand, of an increase in the initiative of lower economic instances, use of money-exchange relations, improvement of the quality of output, and satisfaction of the consumers' demands; raising of the stability of plans with a simultaneous increase in their flexibility, and so on.^^3^^

The interpretation of plan and market under socialism as opposing principles of regulation reflects an absence of monism in analysis of the economic mechanism of socialism, and the inner contradictoriness and inconsistency of the analysis. The single economic mechanism of socialism cannot include antagonistic principles of regulation,

~^^1^^ Friedrich Haffner. Market Economy. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 5, p 310.

~^^2^^ H.-H. Hohmann and G. Seidenstecher. Sowjetische Wiitschafts Politik; Reformaiinahmen. Aber keine Reform. Osteuropa, 1979, 29, 11:937.

5" F. Altaian, Entwicklungsaussichten und Probleme der RGW-Staaten in Berucksichtigung der UdSSR. Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 1980, 2:143.

261

~^^1^^ Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977), p 27

~^^2^^ Alec Nove. Recent Developments in East European Economics In Bo Gustafsson (Ed.). Post-Industrial Society (Croom Holm. London 1979) p 127

~^^3^^ Ibid., p 129.

'

260

since its separate elements (plan and money-exchange relations, plan and management accounting) reflect relations that are components of a single system of socialist relations of production. National appropriation of the means of production, and their proportionate distribution between sectors and industries, and between the structural links of the national economy (enterprises and firms), and elimination of the socio-economic heterogeneity of labour all determine the need for direct movement of the factors of production, centralised definition of the principal proportions of reproduction, and their assignment to firms and enterprises in the form of plan targets.

The predominant role of the direct form of economic relations stemming from public (national) ownership of the means of production governs the fundamentally new content and character of the operation of commodity (i.e. equivalent) relations, on the basis of which movement of the social product is realised. At the same time, since non-equivalent movement of the factors of production is interwoven with equivalent movement of the social product, direct economic links also have a money form of expression. The economic mechanism of socialism is thus an intricate unity of mutually supplementary principles and forms of control.

The development of public (national) property relations, and consolidation of the structure of social production through the formation of big production complexes in industry and agriculture, are giving rise to new opportunities for gradual solution of the nonantagonistic contradictions of public, collective, and personal interests, and improvement of the co-ordination of social production and needs. In that way conditions are provided for increasing the proportionate use of money-exchange relations. The conversion of associations (firms) into the main structural link of the economy signifies the formation of large-scale socialist commodity producers with fundamentally new opportunities as regards study and control of demand, planning nomenclatures and range of output, and drawing up plans on the basis of consumers' orders. The creation of new subjects of economic circulation is thus making it possible to perfect the structure and organisation of the sphere of commodity circulation, and is giving rise to new forms of the proportionate functioning of money-exchange relations specific to the stage of developed socialism. All that makes it illegitimate to apply the theory of the 'mixed economy' to analysis of the nature, form, and role of money-exchange relations under developed socialism.

18

NOTIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION

OF MATERIAL WEALTH

AND INCOMES UNDER SOCIALISM

1. Western economists on the distribution of consumer goods in socialist society

Every social system forms its own special modes of distributing products among the members of society inherent in it, and corresponding to the essence of the relations established in the production process. Under socialism social ownership of the means of production presupposes modes and forms of the distribution of material wealth that promote ever fuller satisfaction of the working people's growing needs as production increases. Socialist production and distribution rule out exploitation of man by man and the possibility of parasitic classes; when Western economists analyse socialist distribution, therefore, they try and isolate it from production and socialist property, and distort its character. We can clearly trace two main ideas in their views of socialist distribution: (1) denial of its objective character and depiction of it as a subjective, arbitrary act of the state; and (2) identification of distribution under socialism and capitalism.

Adherents of the 'command economy' theory say that, with the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, distribution loses any connection with production, and that the methods of distribution are arbitrarily fixed by the state. Ideologists of capitalism suggest that people's `natural' relations in the economy are abolished in socialist countries by the predominance of social ownership; that there is no market distribution of labour between the sectors of the economy; that the law of supply and demand does not operate for labour power, and that the dependence of remuneration for work on the individual's labour contribution is therefore lost. By treating socialist social property as a legal category rather than an economic one, they conclude that socialist distribution has a subjective character. Lipsey and Steiner, for example, say in their textbook:

Income distribution in the USSR is very much a matter of conscious policy decisions. Through wages, allowances, free and subsidized goods, and the turnover tax ... the central authorities ... can effectively

263

impress on the economy their views as to the appropriate pattern of goods and income distribution.'

In actual fact, distribution under socialism takes place on an objective basis, in accordance with the law of distribution by work and basic economic laws, which presumes the use of material incentives for production. Lenin taught us to build communism not directly on enthusiasm, but by means of the enthusiasm born of the great revolution, on material self-interest, and economic calculus.

Western economists who identify distribution under capitalism

and socialism (Raymond Barre, Theo Suranyi-Unger, J. K. Galbraith,

and others) usually refer to the similarity of wages in any society,

'which fulfil similar functions' in stimulating workers to expend

labour. There are often times when they ascribe some feature or other

inherent in capitalist society to socialism, asserting, for example, that

workers are paid in two distinct ways; one that corresponds to the

value of theii labour power and the other to a fraction of the profits

that are used for personal consumption, which they get as co-owners

of the means of production.^^2^^

In fact it is only under capitalism that wages represent the transformed form of the value and price of the commodity labour power. Under socialism labour power ceases to be an obiect of purchase and sale and has no value; social ownership of the means of production eliminates capitalists and relations of exploitation, and tjie whole national income created by the workers belongs to them, and the part of it, distributed according to the quantity and quality of work, takes the form of earnings which express the socialist relations of production, and the unity of personal, collective, and national interests.

Western economists often concentrate on technical progress and analyse its impact on distribution in socialist and capitalist countries, trying to find common features, and to demonstrate that the processes and trends taking place are of the same type. Suranyi-Unger, comparing the effect of technical progress on wages in the USSR and Western countries, specially stresses that the processes are of a single type: (1) an equalising of the education and professional training of new entrants to industry, which leads to a lowering of pay differentials; (2) retention of types of work performed by unskilled workers, but which require work stimuli; (3) a need to substitute time payment for piece rates because of the difficulty of determining individual productivity. According to him,

these reasons are the result of economic development and are common to Western and Eastern economic systems. They are thus not due to

differences in economic organization.^^1^^

In point of fact, however, because of the level of development of the productive forces reached in the USSR, there is a process there that presupposes a gradual levelling up of the material well-being of the whole population, a raising of the earnings of lower-paid categories of workers, the reduction and subsequently elimination of this category, and more rapid growth of social consumption funds compared with earnings, which is initially raising the incomes of less well-off families. Technical progress, naturally, has increased the proportion of workers who are paid by time rates, especially in automated industry and on conveyor assembly lines. There is moreover a process of replacing heavy work by machines, and of a rise in the cultural, technical, and general education standards of the working people.

A favourite trick of Western ideologists is to compare the inequality of incomes in the USSR and the USA (or other Western countries). Their views on this are extremely varied. The English economist Peter Wiles, for instance, considers the income gap in the USSR to be considerably greater than in capitalist countries. He divides the population of the USSR into rich and poor, who do not have the same access to the country's material wealth. In his view the additional, supplementary incomes of families should be included in the public's earnings in order to get a true picture of the inequality.

As to sheer accountancy, wages should, but often do not, include fringe benefits and expense accounts. Family income should, and usually does, include social services in money, income from capital, earnings from moonlighting, auto-consumption in kind and the imputed rents of owner-occupancy.^^2^^

In fact, however, the division of the population of the USSR into rich and poor is itself at bottom wrong. In the country of developed socialism work is guaranteed by law for all able-bodied persons, and also equal pay for equal work (by quantity and quality). The low rent fixed by the government, and the stability of prices for the basic, mass consumer goods, provide a firm basis for an increase in the material welfare of all the working people. As for the incomes listed by Wiles, one of them (income from capital) does not exist under socialism; another (incomes from the auto-consumption in kind) is taken into account and planned; while the third group ( incomes from owner-occupancy) does not have any significant place in the structure of people's incomes.

The following views will be found in Lipsey and Steiner's textbook:

Household incomes come from the state principally in the form of wages and salaries. To each according to his need' was the Marxian

~^^1^^ Theo Suranyi-Unger. Economic Philosophy of the Twentieth Century (Northern Illinois U.P., DeKalb, 111., 1972), p 179.

~^^2^^ Peter Wiles. Distribution of Income: East and West (North Holland Publishing Co.. Amsterdam, 1974), p 6.

265

~^^1^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Economics, 5th ed. (Harper & Row, New York, 1978), p 840.

~^^2^^ Economic politique de la planification en systems socialiste (Economica. Paris, 1979), p 191.

264

ideal, but in the Soviet Union scientists and engineers, ballet danceis and athletes apparently need more than do laborers and teachers. Wage differentials are in fact very much larger than in the United States; skilled workers characteristically earn three or four times the amount earned by unskilled workers (in contrast to 50 per cent more in the United States).'

Their statements are contrary to the facts. They attribute the principle of distribution of communist society to socialism, and simply distort the relation between the earnings of skilled and unskilled workers; in the USSR, even with overfulfilment of work quotas, which is usually higher among the skilled workers, the differential does not exceed 2.5:1. Baumol and Blinder, in contrast to Lipsey and Steiner, consider that

income distribution under socialism is naturally more equal than under capitalism simply because the profits of industry do not go to a small group of stockholders but instead are dispersed among the workers or among the populace as a whole.^^2^^

At the same time they, too, assume a high degree of income inequality in socialist countries 'if supply and demand rules the labor market'.^^3^^ Suranyi-Unger also compares the structure of incomes of the highest and lowest income families in the USSR and the USA. Such a mechanical comparing of the structure of household incomes in the USSR and the USA is in itself improper. Under socialism the sole source of incomes of the populace is work, while in any capitalist country the income of some of the people (especially for the top 5 per cent of families) is the result of the functioning of the capital they own.

Adherents of the `convergence' theory say that there are trends in the sphere of income distribution that are bringing the two systems together: (a) the income gap is being closed; (b) the level of incomes, on the contrary, is rising. This idea has become very common in textbooks and teaching literature. In one textbook we read:

We have been attempting through our tax and welfare system to reduce • income differences; at the same time, the Soviets have been allowing

greater differences in income in their system.^^4^^

In another textbook the authors say that under both capitalism and socialism the state is carrying out identical measures to reduce inequality. Capitalist governments, for instance, are said to have

many ways... to alter the distribution of incomes without destroying either free markets or private property (for example, through progres-

give income taxation or a negative income tax).1 The same textbook says that governments thereby try

to mitigate the degree of income inequality that capitalism and free market! tend to generate. Planned economies do the same thing, only more so, For instance, they may try to tamper directly with the income distribution by having the planners, rather than the market, set relative wage rates... Thus, even in the Soviet Union... relative wages are established more or less by the laws of supply and demand.2 As we see, Western economists try to prove the possibility of altering the relations of distribution, without going into the relations of production, through redistribution of the incomes of the various classes. But, as Ensels wrote in Anti-Diihring,

to expect any other division of the products from the capitalistic mode of production is the same as expecting the electrodes of a battery not to decompose acidulated water, not to liberate oxygen at the positive, hydrogen at the negative pole, so long as they are connected with the battery.^^3^^

Inequality of incomes is generated by economic inequality, i.e. by the different relation of classes to the means of production. Socialism, first of all, abolishes this inequality. In socialist countries the working people are equal as regards the means of production and national wealth. Socialism has established the right of working people for the first time ever to receive their share of the common product according to their labour contribution; under socialism only labour determines the size of the income received by each, and his (or her) place in society.

It is also a mistake to speak of an increase in the spread of incomes in the USSR. On the contrary, the conditions are gradually being created under socialism for a person's all-round development of his or her physical and mental capacities, which is manifested in a mass raising of workers' skills and cultural and technical standards. On that basis there is also a convergence of the incomes of the members of socialist society through a steep reduction of unskilled work and manual labour. The following facts are evidence of the growth of workers' incomes in the USSR: in 1965 only 4 per cent of the population had an income above 100 roubles a month for each member of the family; in 1970 such constituted 18 per cent of the population, and in 1980 it was 50 per cent.

The Western thesis of the existence of exploitation in the USSR, so zealously preached by Professors Abott, Preiser, Lavigne, and others, has been taken up by the new Sovietologists, who assert that in the Soviet Union

surplus labour is unpaid, forced,,, The structure of the relations of

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder, Op. cit., pp 790-791

\Ibid.,w 791-792.

~^^3^^ Frederick Engels. Antt-Diihring (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977),

1 R. Lipsey and P. Sterner. Op. cit., p 839.

~^^2^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy ( Barcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 793.

3 Ibid.

~^^4^^ P, Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Economics (McGraw Hill, New York, 1979), p 707.

266 267

production or form of exploitation enables us to determine the nature of the relations and elements by virtue of which surplus labour is first deducted... In the Soviet system accumulation proceeds mainly through the state's budget expenditure. That is why we consider that the surplus product is first deducted by the state institutions, which collect it and redistribute it through the channels of public finance. Furthermore, the state is the owner of all the production of the public sector at the end of the production process, viz., the bulk of the products... The workers cannot forebear from being employed by the state.1

The preachers of `exploitation' of labour under socialism do not want to admit the objectivity of socialist distribution. Optimum proportions between production and consumption, accumulation and consumption, etc., are determined through the operation of economic laws, in accordance with which the whole system of distribution of consumer goods is organised according to work and from the social consumption funds. A division of the product into necessary and surplus takes place in any society, but under capitalism it has an antagonistic character because of capitalists' exploitation of the workers. The surplus product is appropriated by the class of owners and used in their interests. Under socialism the surplus product created by the workers cannot be used by some one group of the population; as Lenin pointed put, it does not go to a class of property owners but to all the workers, and only to them. Under socialism the surplus product belongs to all society and is used to expand production and further the well-being of each member of society. As Karl Marx wrote,

what the producer is deprived of in his capacity as a private individual benefits him directly or indirectly in his capacity as a member of society.^^2^^

old-age pensions are provided free to those who qualify. State housing is provided at very low cost. Large families receive special money allowances and special housing. Thus standards of living in the Soviet Union are somewhat less unequal than wage differentials suggest.' But the most important function of these funds, viz., the provision of increasingly equal conditions for the whole population in priority satisfaction of those needs that ensure a person's harmonious development, is either passed over in silence, or doubts are thrown on it. Ascribing the following thesis to contemporary Soviet economic science,

the individual consumption fund is distributed on the principle 'to each according to'his work', and the social consumption fund on the principle 'to each according to his needs',^^2^^

bourgeois ideologists attack it and try to prove that it is impracticable and that 'the fact of belonging to a society consequently does not ipso facto give an equal right to participate in the social consumption fund'.^^3^^'Very often this fund is counterposed to distribution according to work.

Are not the relative shortage and high price of private consumer goods compensated by the cheapness, when not free, of .the goods and services of collective consumption?4 The American economist Janet Chapman writes:

On the macro level, major policy goals of wage policy have been to restrain the level of personal consumption in the interest of increased communal consumption, investment, and defense; to prevent the inflation in the consumer rharket that the first policy is likely to lead to; and to increase participation in the labor force.5 In actual fact the social consumption funds are a form of socialist distribution that not only ensures growth of people's material wellbeing and standard of living but also promotes closing of the income gap that is a consequence of the different sizes and composition of families, and an evening out of the conditions for raising the young generation. Under developed socialism the main purpose of social consumption funds is to provide equal opportunities for all strata of the population to get an education (secondary education is compulsory in the USSR), obtain medical care, and develop each individual's physical and mental capacities. The ever increasing growth of the productive forces makes it possible steadily to direct an ever greater part of the national income to social consumption funds, as

2. The Western interpretation of social consumption funds

Western economic thinking strives to present the essence and trend of development of social consumption funds in a distorted light.

In Western textbooks the levelling function of social consumption funds, which 'smooth out' the inequality of incomes generated by wages, is, as a rule, pointed out:

Many goods and services such as medical care, higher education, and

~^^1^^ R. Tartarin. Le mode de production de 1'economie sovietique. In Economic et societes. Economie en URSS. Analyses et etudes, 1979, 13, 7-8-9-10: 1622-1623.

~^^2^^ Karl Marx. Marginal Notes to the Programme of the German Workers' Party. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works, in three volumes, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 17.

~^^1^^ R. Lipsey and P. Steiner. Op. cit., pp 839-840.

~^^2^^ Economie politique de la planiflcation en systems socialist e. p 191

3 Ibid. ,p .207.

~^^4^^ Andre Piettre. Les grands problemes de 1'economie contemporaine. Vol. 2. Les pays socialises (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1977), p 107.

~^^5^^ Janet G. Chapman. Soviet Wages under Socialism. In Alan Abouchar (Ed.). The Socialist Price Mechanism (Duke U.P., Durham, N.C., 1977), p 251.

269 268 1

will be seen from the following table:

ing the working people's health, and on education, the upbringing of children, social security, and culture.

Many Western economists see no difference between the socialist and capitalist systems of social security. It is an old trick of Western political economy to identify the two systems of social security, and the social funds under socialism and the outlays of capitalist society on education, culture, insurance, and health services. Apologists for capitalism do not see any difference between the relations of production of capitalism and socialism. Social consumption funds are inherent only in socialism, reflect socialist relations of production as regards proportionate distribution of the part of the national income that belongs to society as a whole among its members. Capitalist governments' outlays on education and health services are primarily forced by the working class' struggle to satisfy social needs, and by production's need for skilled personnel. The outlays are returned to the capitalist class in an increase in the mass of surplus value during the process of reproduction. The aim of creating and using social consumption funds under socialism, and their very nature, are different in principle from capitalist governments' outlays on social needs under capitalism. While the purpose of the first is to provide conditions for all-round development of the members of society, the second are reduced to the amount necessary for normal reproduction of capital.

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 (plan)

Benefits and allowances

(billions of roubles)

13.0 41.9 63.9 90.1 116.5 138

Same per capita

(roubles)

72 182 263 354 438 500

Source: USSR in Figures, 1980 (Moscow, 1981), p 171 (in Russian).

It is a mistake to identify distribution from social consumption funds and communist distribution. The level of development of the productive forces does not permit the creating of social consumption funds that would fully satisfy the populace's needs. The standard of the services provided does not always correspond to the needs of the public and the advances of the pure and applied sciences; and socialist society does not bear all the outlays on educating the youth. At the same time one can evaluate these funds as a sort of embryo of communist distribution, since the whole populace receives benefits through them, the benefits are granted over and above remuneration for labour, and bring the real incomes of workers closer together, and so on.

Finally, it is quite wrong to counterpose individual and social consumption, distribution according to work and the granting of material and spiritual wealth through social consumption funds, the interests of the public and of the socialist state. In point of fact, the growth of wages reflects the growth of production and the productivity of labour, and the rising volume of the national income. The policy of the Soviet government as regards the distribution of material wealth is aimed at ensuring ever fuller satisfaction of the populace's needs, and all-round development of the individual, and for these purposes all forms of distribution are, in fact, proportionately employed. The rather faster growth rates of the social consumption funds compared with individual earnings does not mean a holding back of individual consumption. (1) Waees will remain the main form of distribution of consumer goods during the whole course of developed socialism; (2) around half of all the social consumption funds is directed to increasing individual consumption (pensions, benefits, and other cash payments). Socialism, which aims at providing the conditions for all-round development of all members of society, grants them equal rights to use the funds for joint satisfaction of needs. One of the most notable features of the Soviet way of life is the mounting benefits people get from social consumption funds. During the quinquennium 1976-80 these funds increased by a third; the immense sums go to improving living conditions and protect-

270 19

NON-MARXIAN CONCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING

1. The treatment of the socialist enterprise

The primary, basic unit in the unified economic complex functioning under developed socialism is the enterprise (production association), whose interests and needs are objectively subordinated to the interests of society as a whole and are organically united with them, and which operates on the basis of management accounting ( khozraschet).

The interaction of the social economic organism and its structural links, and the conditions that ensure efficient operation of enterprises, its motive forces, etc., cannot help catching the attention of Western economists and Sovietologists of various hue. Although the term 'management (or business) accounting' is relatively seldom mentioned in their treatment of these problems, the whole system of khozraschet relations and the elements comprising it are in fact subjected to detailed scrutiny, viz., the state's control over the operations of enterprises, economic autonomy and its limits; the material responsibility of the enterprise, and of its authority and workers, for the results of its running; the degree of diffusion of money-exchange relations and use of categories associated with them (prices, costs, profits), etc.

Western economists' different approach to interpretation of the substance of management accounting and the conditions of enterprises' profit-and-expenses operation is largely determined by their views of the economic nature and functions of the socialist enterprise and of its place in the system of socialist society's production relations. The causes and substance of further socialisation of production in present-day conditions (as expressed in the forming of production associations and industrial firms) are interpreted in accordance with these views.

In the view of the spokesmen of the neoclassical economists, who construct models of the 'command economy', 'centrally administered economy', etc.,

the roles of the basic component of any advanced industrial economy,

272

the enterprise, differ widely between a market-directed and a centrallyadministered Soviet-type economy.^^1^^

Socialist enterprises, they think, are simple technical and production components and have too few rights to be primary economic units. Underlying these views is the idea that only the relations of the 'free market' have an economic character, relations that are built on the absence of any centralised control, that presume `freedom' in decision-making with the necessity of risk and competition as their most important attributes. The absence of these elements in the socialist economy is said to mean that the relations between enterprises and government, and between separate enterprises, are administrative or technical in character. Socialist enterprises, therefore, have no impelling motives to develop and improve production and realise technical progress. The French economist Marczewski, for instance, writes that the element that is lacking in socialist countries is what, in capitalist countries,

constitutes the most effective spur to research in the enterprise ... the competition, actual and potential, national and international, of firms producing articles that meet the same category of needs.2 In trying to discredit the socialist system of running business, these theorists talk about

the impossible scale of centralized micro-economic planning, the fact that subordinate units adjust their actions to the plan targets laid down from above, and not to the needs of other enterprises or to the revealed preferences of the citizens.^^3^^

Centralised state 'administration, they consider, cannot ensure high efficiency of running the economy either at the level of society as a whole or at enterprise level, since

enterprises do not usually have at their disposal the information necessary for the formulation of production and price policies that would meet the demands of the economy as a whole; the central planning authorities do not, on the other hand, possess adequate knowledge of the particular situation of the individual enterprise.4 The operations of the enterprise are thus counterposed to the functioning of the economy as a whole.

The flimsiness of the views of those who deny the economic nature of socialist enterprises (and the reality of the relations of production established at their level) consists primarily in their exag-

~^^1^^ Nicolas Spulber. Organizational Alternatives in Soviet-type Economies (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p 46.

~^^2^^ Jan Marczewski. Crisis in Socialist Planning (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), p 237.

~^^3^^ Alec Nove. The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects. New Left Review, 1980, 119: 14.

~^^4^^ Hans Gottfried Nutzinger. A System-Neutral Theory of the Firm: Its Possibilities and Limitations. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society Vol. 3 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 190.

273

10-455

geration of the technical (technological) aspect of enterprises' operations. Being part of a single socialist economic system, the enterprise is first and foremost the primary structural element of the functioning of the productive forces of socialist society. And in that sense it can be regarded as a 'technical cell' of the national economy, a separate link in the system of the social division of labour. But at the same time, and this is the main point, the socialist enterprise is the primary structural element of the system of socialist relations of production in which the direct production, and initial distribution, exchange, and consumption of the social product take place.

Western economists also treat the process of the concentration of socialist production in a distorted light; an expression of this concentration is the rise of a new form of socialist enterprise-the production association or firm, and the formation of middle links in the system of management, the industrial association. These phenomena, in their view, show

the obvious difficulty to perfect in practice a type of firm which is appropriate to the Soviet centrally administered economy.1 They reduce the reasons for the forming of firms to a need to reduce the autonomy of enterprises and preserve the possibility of rigid control over them. They emphasise that enterprises have no autonomy in a 'command economy', and that they are 'not a place where free entrepreneurial decisions are taken, but a sphere for the fulfilment of state plans'.^^2^^ In their endeavour to discredit the system of centralised planning and management of the operations of socialist enterprises (firms), Western economists come to the conclusion that

all aspects of the firm's activity ... are determined primarily by the central authority and guided by political factors (which in some cases are harmful to the firms).^^3^^

As a result the enterprise 'is caught up in the conflict of interests between political administration and control by the state and economic administration and control'.^^4^^

The conversion of production associations (firms) into the main profit-and-expenses link of the economy, and the creation of industrial firms that include economically autonomous enterprises (production associations), in fact reflect the needs of the present stage of development of the socialist economy, the need to perfect the organisational structure of administration of the national economy, and not the difficulties and contradictions of its development. The firm is a qualitatively new phenomenon in the management of Soviet industrial

production. It is not a mechanical combining of enterprises, but a single production and management complex in which science and production are integrally merged and specialisation and co-operation broadly developed. Through its formation there has been a deepening of the specialisation not just of the main production unit but also, and no less important, of the auxiliary and service units as a most important factor in increasing its productivity; pooling of the resources of separate enterprises makes it possible for them tp cope with production and management problems, pursue a single technical policy on the scale of a subsector and branch of the economy.

From the standpoint of spokesmen of the institutional-social trend of Western economics, the enterprise is an economic category, but its essence and functions do not depend on the socio-economic system; in both socialist and capitalist society it has common features, and patterns and objectives of development of its own. Enterprises, the American economist Peter Drucker writes,

do not exist for their own sake, but to fulfil a specific social purpose and to satisfy a specific need of society, community, or individual.' Hans Nutzinger says that since

in the capitalist market economies ... the safeguarding of social welfare and individual jobs lies largely in the hands of private enterprises,2 they play a more important role in the development of the economy, and have a greater responsibility for it, than under socialism. Western economists, moreover, painstakingly avoid the problem of the substance of the economic relations established in capitalist enterprises, of capitalists' exploitation of wage labour, and of the real impelling factor of capitalist production, i.e. the drive for profit.

Western economists allege that there is a 'conflict between the Marxian centralized system and the mounting need for decentralization'.^^3^^ The Soviet economic system, they consider, is much more decentralised than is commonly recognised in the West, which is also evidence, so they say, of a `converging' of the capitalist and socialist economic systems.^^4^^

The main fault of these views of the socialist enterprise is their unsocial, unhistorical approach to analysing economic relations; they ignore the fact that the general patterns of development have specific forms of manifestation in different economic systems and lead to a different socio-economic result.

Recognition of the enterprise- as an economic category means recognising that it is not only a production complex but also a link

~^^1^^ Peter F. Drucker. Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices ( Heinemann, London, 1974), p 39.

~^^2^^ Hans Gottfried Nutzinger. Art. cit. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 3, p 195.

~^^3^^ Nicolas Spulbei. Op. cit., p 52.

~^^4^^ See, for example, Arnold Heertje and Brian Robinson. Basic Economics (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, London, 1979), p 298.

275

1 Wolfgang Forster. Enterprise. Historical Aspects. Structure and Functions. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 3, p 206.

~^^2^^ Gert Leptin. Business Administration, (c) Comparative Remarks. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 1 (Herder & Herder, New York 1972), p 345.

'

274

in the system of relations of production. The radical differences in the foundation of these relations, viz., ownership of the means of production, under capitalism and socialism govern their different content in capitalist and socialist enterprises, and the opposite nature of the aims of their development. The concentration and centralisation of production, and on that basis the creation of production and industrial associations (firms), are regarded by `convergence' and 'industrial state' people as a new argument for their thesis of the convergence of the capitalist and socialist economies. It is said that

authors both of the relevant socialist and of capitalist literature ...

concentrate on optimization problems, with the object of securing

optimal operation of the economy as a whole.'

By making an absolute of the production, technical aspect of the matter, Western economists try to prove that the trends of development of the social division of labour and of the concentration and centralisation of production are identical and do not depend on society's socio-economic system. For all the similarity of the technical basis, however, which reflects today's level of scientific and technical advance, these processes have in fact a different socio-economic content under capitalism and socialism. Under capitalism they serve ends of a further rise in the degree of monopolisation of production, and the ensuring of monopoly profits on that basis. Under socialism concentration and centralisation of production promote (a) better allowance for social needs, (b) the provision of conditions for realising technical progress, and improving the efficiency of production in both separate enterprises (firms) and the economy as a whole, and (c) the latter's achieving of optimal end results.

agement accountancy and should be viewed as only one of the most important means for supervising and furthering implementation of the khozraschet system.^^1^^

It is most characteristic of these definitions that the essence of khozraschet (management accounting) is reduced to a system of accounts, and the enterprise's relations (`practices' in Western authors' jargon) to organisational and legal ones, and their economic character denied. This idea is based on the recognition of 'market relations', built on the criteria of the 'free market', as economic. They treat management accounting itself, moreover, as a system of administration, observation, and control over enterprises by superior agencies aimed at limiting their activity.

The management accounting character of the functioning of socialist enterprises, in the view of Western writers, is not determined by internal objective factors, proper to a socialist economy, but is alleged to be due to difficulties arising because of the absence of the 'single criterion' of management. This interpretation is the logical consequence of their ideas of the socialist economy as an irrational system built on the arbitrary actions of superior agencies that monopolise business activity.

It is characteristic of these interpretations of Soviet management accounting to counterpose it to centralised planned direction, which cannot (allegedly) take either the needs and the interests of enterprises or of society as a whole sufficiently into account.

The microeconomic plans drawn up by the authorities, even if they are frequently modified, cannot take account of all the variations in demand and production conditions.^^2^^

According to Marczewski the state is indifferent to how efficiently the enterprise runs its economy, since it is interested only in quantitative indices of enterprises' activity while the enterprises seek for easier ways to achieve these indices. He continues: 'The question whether the products concerned meet consumer needs is of secondary importance.'^^3^^

Planned direction of the operations of enterprises by the state is reduced by theorists of the 'command economy' to a system of

multi-million instructions as to what to produce, to whom deliveries should be made, from whom inputs should be received, and when. All this must be made to cohere with plans for labor, wages, profits, investment, financing, material-utilization norms, quality, productivity, for each of many thousands of productive units. In practice this task can never be completed.^^4^^

2. Distortion of the essence and principles of Soviet management accounting

Incorrect notions of the essence of the socialist production enterprise lead bourgeois economists and revisionists of various types logically to an incorrect understanding of the economic relations that are expressed by the category 'management accounting' (khozyaistvennyi raschef).

They look upon it as a system of 'independent cost accounting' in industry.^^2^^ They also explain that

khozraschet is a generic term for the most diverse specific financial, organizational and legal procedural practices, which in the USSR have evolved from experience as the most suitable form of enterprise man-

1 Gottfried Frenzel. Concentration. Critical Appraisal. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 2 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p!54.

~^^2^^ Steven Rosefield (Ed.). World Communism at the Crossroads. Military Ascendancy, Political Economy and Human Welfare (Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, Boston, Mass., 1980), p 276.

276

~^^1^^ Wolfgang Fprster. Accountancy in the Soviet Union. Concept and Functions. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 1, p 17.

~^^2^^ Jan Marczewski. Op. cit., p 233.

^^3^^ Ibid.

~^^4^^ Alec Nove. Art. cit., p 4.

277

While stressing the `command' character of the government's actions, Western economists at the same time consider the enterprises themselves to lack any autonomy, and say that their 'management is rewarded primarily for plan-fulfilment (i.e. obeying orders)'.^^1^^

The very principle of managerial incentives determined by independent cost accounting (khozraschyot) testifies to the inadequacy of the command principle.^^2^^

Theorists of the 'command economy' consider it a 'distinct advantage' that 'possible extensions of direct relations among enterprises within the centralized framework have been approached very gingerly'.^^3^^ They thus deny the objectivity of such principles of management accounting as the economic autonomy of enterprises, material self-interest in the results of business activity, and material responsibility for them.

Western economists naturally cannot avoid noticing the changes that are taking place in the socialist economy in connection with improving the system of planning and economic stimulation, but they appraise them not as a reflection of its further progressive development, extension of the sphere of management accounting relations, and consistent use of management accounting principles in the work of enterprises, but as a 'crisis in socialist planning',^^4^^ and proof of the alleged inefficiency of socialist methods of directing the economy.

Management accounting is in fact a real economic category and expresses the system of objective economic relations of reproduction of socialist enterprises (and other economic units). It is realised in money-exchange forms and presupposes the self-sufficiency nature and profitability of enterprises and their material self-interest and responsibility for the results of their operations. Management accounting relations are economic relations between enterprises and society (rather than shareholders as in capitalist corporations), between separate enterprises, and within enterprises, arising during the direct production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of material wealth. The idea of it as an extra-economic activity, as control and limitation of the autonomy of enterprises, is employed by capitalist apologists as 'evidence of the non-viability of the socialist system and of the impossibility of rational running of the economy under socialism.

Those who make an unsocial, unhistorical interpretation of management accounting under socialism think it expresses general principles of running the economy allegedly inherent in human nature, and therefore proper to all epochs of social development, and consists

in a need to produce more in order to distribute more and to distribute well in order to produce more. In linking the existence ot management accounting with the existence of money-exchange relations, they say that

a visible expression of the monetary and price elements of the system [of planned economy-/luf/i.]'are the khozraschet principle and the principle of material interest. Under the former, enterprises are obliged to cover their costs and reduce them as far as possible within the set plan targets and-recently-also to achieve a specified profitability; it is thus a kind of management accounting.

Thus khozraschet is equated with the business (`management') accounting of capitalist enterprises. By masking the differences of principle in character of the functioning of the economy as a whole and its separate divisions (enterprises), capitalist economists say that 'an ideal socialism would have to solve the same equations as competitive capitalism'.^^2^^

Implementation of the measures of the CPSU and Soviet Government to improve planning and consolidate management accounting (khozraschet) is treated as 'decentralisation of leadership', as definite steps toward bringing socialist methods of management closer to capitalist ones, while these steps, in turn, are characterised as increasing centralisation and growth of government interference in the economy. Wilczynski, for example, writes that in socialist countries

central authorities have been relieved of some details of administration, allowing a greater scope and independence to the lower administrative levels. On the other hand, capitalist economies have been experiencing centralisation and increasing State intervention.3 When Western economists compare the efficiency of management under capitalism and socialism at various levels, they are forced to admit that the

socialist economy is in a favourable position to tackle macrosocial issues [but] has neglected the problems of the management and utilisation of resources at the operational level.^^4^^

This thesis is employed to prove the inefficiency of management accounting in its 'socialist version' because of the absence of 'free enterprise' and 'insufficient effective competition' as regards 'both enterprises and persons' since 'there is hardly any fear of unemployment'.5 `Convergence' theorists see realisation of the 'general principles of

~^^1^^ Friedrich Haffner. The Market in Centrally Administered Economics. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 5 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1973), p 309.

~^^2^^ Cited from Pareto by Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973), p 640.

~^^3^^ J. Wilczynski. The Economics of Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), p 214.

~^^1^^ Alec Nove. Art. cit., pp 6-7.

2 Steven Rosefield (Ed.). Op. cit., p 276.

~^^3^^ Nicolas Spulber. Op. cit., p 57.

~^^4^^ This is precisely how Marczewski, one of the theorists of the 'command economy' school, entitled his book: Crisis in Planning in the USSR and Eastern

278

Ibid., p212.

279

business operation' in the introduction into the system of managerial accountancy methods under socialism of such elements of the, market economy as the existence of private enterprises, freedom of market relations, and competition.

The methodological basis of these conceptions of management accounting consists in masking the differences of principle between the socialist and capitalist systems and the economic relations inherent in them. Behind the external similarity of the methods of economic management (which are manifested in the fact that capitalist enterprises cover their costs of production and make a profit, while the socialist enterprise with managerial accountancy autonomy must cover all its outlays and enable society to obtain a net income) there is a radical, fundamental difference, which consists primarily in the substance of the relations of production, which are expressed by the categories 'business accounting' under capitalism and khozraschet (management accounting) under socialism.

Under capitalism management accountancy expresses relations of exploitation during the process of direct production (relations in regard to production and the appropriation of surplus value, relations of exchange between private producers during the purchase and sale of commodities). Under socialism management accountancy ( khozraschet) expresses relations that arise in the planned and balanced process of production, distribution, and exchange of material wealth, the basis of which is social ownership of the means of production, which rules out the possibility of the rise of the antagonistic contradictions inherent in the capitalist economy (i.e. unemployment, crises, cutthroat competition). Socialist management accounting has different aims and tasks, whose solution it serves; it ensures continuous growth of social production for all-round satisfaction of the people's constantly growing material and cultural needs.

From the standpoint of the theorists of 'market socilism', management accounting relations are associated with market relations that give enterprises unlimited struggle and economic independence. The dilemma 'plan or market' is in fact modified into a counterposing of plan and management accounting. The national economic approach to defining the main directions of enterprises' operations and the criteria of their efficiency (in the view of the authors of models of 'market socialism') contradicts the enterprises' aims and interests. They thus make an absolute out of such management accounting principles as enterprises' economic autorjomy and material self-interest, and make profit the sole motivating force of their operation. The determining feature of these ideas is their denial of the most important inner element that characterises cost-accounting (khozraschet) relations, viz., plan and proportionality.

Centralised determination of the main parameters of enterprises' operations, and a national economic approach to the adoption of managerial decisions does not contradict the interests of the separate

280

enterprises, since it is combined with broad economic autonomy. A most important accounting instrument, is the contract signed between enterprises. Its role is growing, especially today, since it concretises the national economic plan, and makes it possible to deliver output to the consumer in accordance with the latter's requirements. The system of appraising enterprises' economic operations presupposes therefore their fulfilling of the obligations they have undertaken under all their contracts. In this connection the 26th Congress of the CPSU posed the following task:

To develop and strengthen in every way management accounting, based on the assignments of the five-year plan and long-term economic standards... To improve the forms of management-accounting relations and to enhance the mutual interest of suppliers and consumers as well as of clients and contractors in, and their responsibility for the fulfilment of plan assignments and contractual commitments.l

~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981), p 238.

20

NON-MARXIAN NOTIONS OF PRICE AND PROFIT UNDER SOCIALISM

determination under capitalism and under market socialism.1 (Yunker, it should be noted, includes the Soviet economy under 'market socialism'.) He further notes that

the prices which the state sets or approves are analogous to the prices of non-socialist economies...^^2^^

Joan Robinson and John Eatwell say that the idea of the determination of prices by labour value 'was derived from a model of competitive capitalist industry'.^^3^^

This interpretation of prices is linked with the fact that opponents of Marxism isolate them from the economic relations whose expression they are. The following statement by Yunker is typical in this respect; he considers that their function is

to keep supply and demand more or less constantly in equilibrium...

Further, the equilibrium price of a commodity in a market is the true

value of the commodity. Values are not inherent in commodities, but

are established by the interplay of supply and demand. Any other

approach to value can have no empirical foundation.^^4^^

This statement clearly displays an unhistorical, vulgar approach to

price and a one-sided interpretation of its functions, which is not

surprising, since the idea of equilibrium of supply and demand as the

main aim of market regulation permeates the whole non-Marxian

theory of distribution and exchange.

According to Marxist-Leninist political economy, the equilibrium price reflects the connection between the movement of social value, market price, and supply and demand in the course of spontaneous market regulation of the proportions of social production under capitalism. Essentially it is the market price in conditions of coincidence of supply and demand, reflecting the fact of correspondence of the amount of social labour expended on the production of a certain commodity to the scale of the social demand being satisfied. The category of equilibrium price is not inherent in a planned socialist economy. In it regulation of social production is ensured not by spontaneous operation of the law of value. It is effected through the operation of the basic economic law, the law of planned, proportionate development, together with use of the law of value; balance of the economy is achieved through planning of the national economy. As for the function of balancing supply and demand, that is not the sole function of price and not even the chief one (which is the main point). The chief function that directly reflects the essence of price is that social accounting for the labour materialised in a commodity and its results is realised through it.

~^^1^^J. A. Yunker. Socialism in the Free Market (Nellen Publishing Co New York, 1979), p 52.

~^^2^^ Ibid.,p 98.

~^^3^^ Joan Robinson and John Eatwell. An introduction to Modern Economics (McGraw-Hill, London, 1973), p 267.

~^^4^^ J. A. Yunker. Op. cit., p 98.

1. The treatment of prices and price formation

Western economists pay much attention to matters of prices and price formation in their analyses of the socialist economy, and try to prove that the prices are imperfect, irrational, and inefficient. But there is no unanimity on this in the views of socialism's opponents, as was seen, for example, at the conference on the socialist price mechanism held in Toronto in 1974. At the same time they have certain points in common, namely: a subjective methodological basis; a bourgeois, class approach; a striving to disparage the progress of socialist countries in the realm of planned price formation and to exaggerate the difficulties, declaring them to be inevitable and of paramount importance; an offering of advice of various kinds for improving price formation that would lead, of course, to 'capitalist evolution'. But Western economists avoid an open denial of the successes of socialist planned price formation and are forced to

question some of the traditional criticisms concerning the inherent

weakness of the price mechanism under socialism.1 One can trace two trends in Western economists' statements about prices and price formation under socialism. One is associated with the treatment of prices as an eternal, general economic form, independent of socio-economic conditions. The second trend can be taken to include statements that prices are inflexible and irrational, which is associated with the absence of a free, spontaneous market and with the planned nature of price formation under socialism.

Economists of the first trend treat price as a category of the ' general logic' of the economic process. That is how, for example, the statements of American economist Yunker can be evaluated:

There are questions that apply equally to capitalism or socialism.

In effect, there should be no observable difference between price

~^^1^^ Alan Abouchar. The Consistency and Efficiency of Interest and Economic Rent. In Alan Abouchar (Ed.). The Socialist Price Mechanism (Duke U. P., Durham, N.C., 1977), pp 90-91.

282 283

In treating prices as eternal, general forms, opponents of Marxism are critical of conscious application of the labour theory of value as the basis of socialist planned price formation. They either say that the theory and practice of socialist price formation ultimately contradict Marx's theory,^^1^^ or they make efforts to prove the inapplicability of the labour theory of value to socialism, trying to ascribe all the deficiencies of planned price formation to that. The rationality of the socialist system of prices is evaluated from the standpoint of 'marginal utility', and equilibrium of supply and demand. An example is the following statement by Brabant, who wrote, a propos of the irrationality of the price system of a centrally planned economy, that

the main problem with 'socialist prices' is that they do not represent

scarcity values.2 Another economist, Mansfield, writes:

This [the function of prices-Auth. ] is no different from capitalism.

But in the USSR, prices of inputs do not reflect the relative scarcity

of inputs as they do'in capitalistic economies.^^3^^

And Wilczynski, too, remarks that 'socialist prices are not usually indicative of scarcity'.^^4^^

The Marxist theory and practice of socialist price formation is based on the point that prices should reflect not 'the scarcity of commodities relative to plan assignments' but the socially necessary inputs of labour and changes in them. At the same time it is absolutely wrong to think that the Marxian theory of value and prices does not in general allow for society's need for some good or another and its utility, as Nove, for example, says, who writes that a rational price system cannot be built on the basis of Marx's theory of value since it pays no attention to 'considerations of relative scarcity and utility'.^^5^^

These views reflect an incomprehension of the essence of the concepts 'socially necessary labour', 'socially necessary labour time', developed by Marx. Western economists also give the categories of utility and use value an interpretation fundamentally different from the Marxist one, accusing Marx, without grounds, of a 'careless attitude' to them. Yet, Marx abstracted from utility only when inquiring into the substance of value, in which he made a distinction between

the natural side of use value and its economic aspect.'

When dealing with social use value in all its complexity and historically conditioned nature, he stressed its importance for economic inquiries, and used it as an economic category.^^2^^

Denial of the objective, historical character of utility, and recognition solely of its subjective, psychological character, which depends only on the consuming subject's attitude to the properties of the consumed good, and is not dependent either on the objective nature of the product or on the mode of production in which the consumption takes place, are typical of non-Marxian economists. Marx and Engels treated utility as a social relation determined by objective processes of social development, rather than as the consuming individual's purely subjective evaluation. Marx gave a special place in his theory of value to use value and utility when he considered the processes of the formation of market value and price of production, in which it became one of the objects of inquiry.^^3^^

The statements of Western authors belonging to the second trend contain assertions about the a'bsence of price flexibility and mobility, which they link with the absence of private ownership of the means of production and the mechanism of market forces associated with it. Yunker, for example, writes: 'Prices are certainly not as flexible as they would be if firms could act autonomously.'^^4^^ Leipold puts it even more concretely: 'This flexibility and reactibility [as in the case of prices freely established on the market by independent economic units-Auth.], however, cannot be expected when prices are set by the authorities.'^^5^^

It would be wrong to present the current price system under socialism as ideal, with no shortcomings of any kind. But it is quite foreign to Marxism to think that it is possible to achieve an ideal state, and that there is a limit to development (which also applies to the development and perfecting of economic instruments, of which the price system is one). And if such an 'ideal state of affairs' were achieved at some time, it could not exist permanently, since the productive forces, dynamically developing under socialism, would generate new phenomena and new contradictions in economic affairs. These contradictions are not antagonistic and consequently can be resolved, and are resolved, by further improvement of the relations of production and of the economic mechanism of socialist society.

~^^1^^ Karl Marx. Letter to Engels in Manchester, April 2, 1858. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. Selected Correspondence (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975), pp 98-99:

~^^2^^ See Karl Marx. Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners 'Lehrbuch der politischen Okonomie'. In Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 19 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962) pp 370-371.

~^^3^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p636.

~^^4^^J. Yunker. Op. cit.,p 98.

~^^5^^ Helmut Leipold. Art. cit., p 137.

285

~^^1^^ See, for example, Helmut Leipold. Planungskomplexitat und okonomischer Entwicklungsstand. Bemerkungen zur ideologischen Kritik der Wirtschaftsreformen im Sozialismus. Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 1976, 2: 136.

~^^2^^ Jozef M. Brabant. The Program for Socialist Economic Integration. Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, 1972, 4: 287.

~^^3^^ E. Mansfield. Economics. Principles, Problems, Decisions (Norton & Co., New York, 1974), p 705.

4 J. Wilczynski. Comparative Monetary Economics (The Macmillan Press London, 1978), p 65.

~^^5^^ Alec Nove. Political Economy and Soviet Socialism (Allen & Unwin London, 1979), p 140.

284

As regards planned price formation, one of the lines of improving it today is to ensure greater flexibility of prices, which presumes price stability on the one hand, and a certain mobility on the other. This is achieved through planning a lowering of wholesale prices with an indication of the year of introduction (and level) of the new prices, and a price index in all sectors of the economy. A more precise allowance for changes in the socially necessary labour input, and their reflection in prices, is thus ensured. In order to use prices as a means of stimulating scientific and technical advance, and the output of improved types of product, there is also #ie practice of setting graded temporary prices. As for retail prices for consumer goods, the policy pursued is to keep them stable, which is part of the programme for raising the Soviet people's standard of living.

Many Western economists, while denying the advantages of socialism stemming from the possibilities provided by social ownership of the means of production, and of balanced use of objective economic laws, identify objectivity with spontaneity and say that socialist prices are arbitrarily set. Joan Robinson, for example, wrote: 'One of the sharpest objections to the present system is the arbitrariness of prices.'^^1^^ A passive role of *units of account' that do not provide information for taking managerial decisions is thus ascribed to prices.^^2^^ The reason for these views is rooted in the non-Marxian ideas of price formation considered above, and correspondingly in a denial on that basis of the real content of prices under socialism. In point of fact the products of socialist enterprises are produced and sold as commodities, although their socio-economic content is radically altered. An instrument of money-exchange relations like price, which does not function just as an accounting conception but has a concrete economic content, is therefore retained. The basis of the prices under socialism is the value of goods.

As regards the 'passive role' of prices under socialism, the following can be said. If by an 'active role' of prices is meant their fulfilling (and that of the law of value underlying their movement) of the role of spontaneous regulators of the proportions of social production, then Western economists are right to deny such a role to the prices established in a planned way under socialism. At the same time prices are a very important element of management under socialism, and it is impossible, without full use of them, to ensure the balancing of production and consumption plans and choice of the most effective variants of economic management. The relative `passivity' of socialist prices is not a shortcoming of them, nor a manifestation of the Voluntarism of Soviet planning', but on the contrary is objectively due to the essence of social ownership and the

~^^1^^ Joan Robinson. Contributions to Modern Economics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), p 248.

~^^2^^-Jan Marczewski. Crisis in Socialist Planning (Praeger Publishers, New

286

planned character of the functioning of all economic processes inherent in it.

As for the `arbitrariness' of prices, about which Mrs. Robinson speaks, planned, conscious management of the economy as a whole and of price formation is not arbitrary but is based in fact on knowledge of objective economic laws. Rational criteria for the running of relatively separate, autonomous production units are provided in this way. Elements of planning are also characteristic of the modern capitalist economy, including price-fixing (the transfer prices established by transnational corporations), but planning can only be achieved (within the economy as a whole) when private property is abolished and the means of production are transferred to the workers themselves.

Although academic economists and the staff of price agencies both face the problem of how further to improve prices along the line of bringing them closer to the socially necessary outlays of labour, of raising their stimulating effect on the quality of output, reducing unit consumption of materials in output, and speeding up the introduction of technological advances, it is impossible to get that improvement by rejecting _ Marxist-Leninist economic theory and centralised planned management of the economy, or by granting absolute freedom in the setting of prices to individual economic units. The improvement will come from deeper understanding of the essence of the economic laws of socialism, and the mechanism of their operation and use in the first phase of the communist mode of production.

2. Ideas of the substance

and role of profit under socialism

The special attention that Western economists pay to the problems of profit under socialism is governed above all by the role it plays in capitalist society. In spite of their heterogeneous approach to treatment of the essence and role of profit in the socialist economy, the spokesmen of the various trends of non-Marxian political economy are at one in striving to stress the superiority of, and perpetuate, the system whose impelling motive is the making of profit, and so to prove socialism's lack of viability.

As with the problem of management accounting, the main antiMarxian interpretations of the nature of profit under socialism can be divided into two trends: (a) denial of the possibility of there being profit in a socialist economy, and assertion of its symbolic character, and (b) an anti-historical interpretation, based on demonstrating the similarity of this category under capitalism and socialism.

UD to the mid-60s a denial of profit as an economic category under socialism, recognition of a purely symbolic role for it, and

287

a counterposing of `plan' and `profit', were typical of 'command economy' theorists. Wiles, for instance, asserted that

in a centrally planned economy, an establishment may be asked to follow any course of action, any policy by the central planning organ, and the latter will ensure the physical survival of the establishment, whatever its profit.'

The development and deepening in the 60s of the system of management-accounting relations in the socialist economy, which came from implementing measures to improve the system of planning and economic stimulation of production, forced the adherents of this theory to recognise the substantial growth of the role of profit in the socialist economy as a 'certain advance'. The Wonnacotts, for instance, wrote:

Profits do exist in the Soviet Union and can be calculated just as in any economy where the prices of all outputs and inputs are given. But profits tend only to be a piece of accounting information and are often not even a very meaningful one at that, since they are calculated from output and input prices that are set by planners.2 Regret is also expressed that

the enterprise is not entirely free to choose either its output or its inputs. It does not have full control over the maximization of profit.3 On the whole, however, Western economists think that

profits do not provide the same incentive to produce as in our [i.e. the capitalist-v4uf/i.] system; therefore, they do not play the same key role in allocating resources.^^4^^

They wrongly interpret the directions of the distribution and use of socialist enterprises' profits. 'The state takes the lion's share of profits in the form of taxes,' Heertje and Robinson write,^^5^^ thereby alleging that the enterprise's interests contradict those of the state. According to Lipsey etal. enterprises have no interest in the efficiency of production because 'planned profits go to the state; part of overplan profits may be retained in the firm and used for the benefit of the employees'.^^6^^ These arguments are based on notions about the existence under socialism only of accounting, technical categories that lack any real economic sense. From denial or depreciation of the role of profit under socialism it is concluded that it is an economy without prospects of development, since it has no objective criterion and motive force for production (for which profit is the only possible motive).

'Peter Wiles. The Political Economy of Communism (Harvard U.P., Harvard, Mass., 1964), p 76.

~^^2^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wdnnacott. Economics (McGraw-Hill, New York 1979), p 704.

~^^3^^ J. Marczewski. Op. cit., pp 233-234.

~^^4^^ P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott. Op. cit., p 704.

~^^5^^ Arnold Heertje and Brian Robinson. Basic Economics (Holt Rinehart & Winston, London, 1979), p 289.

~^^6^^ R. Lipsey, G. Sparks, P. Steiner. Economics (Harper & Row, New York, 1973), p 576.

Under socialism profit is, in fact, a category directly linked with the money-exchange relations that exist in it, and expresses one of the most important elements of the nature of socialist enterprises' management-accounting relations, viz., the efficiency of their functioning from the standpoint of assessing the result of their operation by its outlays. In contrast to capitalism, where the profit-making is an indicator of the viability and competitiveness of each separate firm and is itself the property of the owners, profit under socialism is national property belonging to all the people, and is distributed between the state and the enterprises. The socialist state's regulation of the level of profitability of enterprises' work through planned prices is not a fault but an achievement of the socialist system, since on the one hand it provides control over the development of production in accordance with society's needs, and, on the other hand, evens out the effect on the results of enterprises' work of factors that do not depend on the level of organisation of production, such as differences in the natural factors of production, demand for output, shortage of various types of product, etc.

The great significance of profit under socialism is primarily that it is the socialist state's main source of accumulation. In 1980, for instance, the proportion of profit in the state's total accumulation was 49.6 per cent. Enterprises owe their interest in increasing their profitability to the fact that a sizable part of the planned profit (and not just the overplan profit) remains at their disposal and is used to provide material incentives for the workers, for social and cultural needs, and to improve and modernise production and provide for technical re-equipping. In 1980, for instance, 40 per cent of the profit created in industry was left at the disposal of enterprises, and 17 per cent of it was paid into the funds for economic stimulation.^^1^^

From the standpoint of the ideas of the 'mixed economy', ' convergence', the 'industrial state', etc., the general principle of rational business management finds its most actual expression in profits. Wilczynski, for example, writes that

profit is the mainspring of economic activity. Private enterprises are set up in search of profit, and in pursuing this objective production becomes a means whereby employment is provided to labour in conjunction with other resources.^^2^^

Profit itself is thereby considered not only as a mainspring and objective but also as 'a fixed point of orientation' by which capitalist management 'can quantify and evaluate business activity',^^3^^ a criterion of the effectiveness of capitalist production. The essential drawback

~^^1^^ See Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1980 g (The USSR Economy in 1980) (Moscow, 1981), pp 503-504.

~^^2^^ J. Wilczynski. The Economics of Socialism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1977), pp 55-56.

~^^3^^ Gert Leptin. Business Administration, (c) Comparative Remarks. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 1 (Herder & Herder New York, 1972), p 345.

289 288

of socialism, in the view of spokesmen of these theories, is that it lacks such a point of orientation and needs 'suitable output-criteria just as free entrepreneurs do'.^^1^^

The measures taken in socialist countries to improve the planning and management of production, which envisaged raising of the role of such economic instruments as profits and profitability, caused a great furore in the West from the angle of these theorists, and were regarded as `failure' and a dismantling of the socialist economy, and rejection of Marxism.

At the same time non-Marxian economists were forced to admit that their hopes that the growing role of profit under socialism was a return to capitalism were not justified, and that profit itself is different under socialism than under capitalism, and in particular that it is a flexible tool in the hands of the state, which, by manipulating economic levers for influencing production, can ensure stability of the latter.

Western economists also interpret the category 'profitability of production' incorrectly, counterposing it to the plan, and especially to the latter's physical indices. Profitability is treated, for example, as a taking of consumer demand for a certain product into account. Samuelson, for example, wrote:

In recent years, meaningless physical quotas are beginning to be replaced by `profitability' criteria of performance that do involve economic evaluation of diverse goods-a modest step in the direction of Western pricing methods.^^2^^

Spokesmen of so-called market socialism, who count on the implementation of measures to extend the economic autonomy of enterprises leading to transformation of profit into the motivating force of the socialist economy, cannot hide their chagrin that 'profit has not become a direct goal representing success for the enterprises as in the market economy system'.^^3^^ By attacking the planned character of the formation of profit, they try to prove that profitability in itself, and the profitability of production in existing conditions, play no role for socialist enterprises, since 'what is decisive is to fulfil the profit plan, not the absolute size of the volume of profit achieved'.* The spokesmen of market socialism, while stressing the inadequacy (in their view) of the role of profit in the socialist economy, consider that

profits cannot be a true motivating force in a socialist economy. Unlike his capitalist counterpart, the manager of a socialist enterprise does not take real financial risks.l

That sounds a call to abandon the main gains of socialism, i.e. social ownership of the means of production and government regulation of the economy, and to unleash free market forces.

The bankruptcy of these views consists primarily in their unhistorical approach to the analysis of categories like commodities, money, and profit. Western economists look upon them as 'attributes of the market economy'; and since they also exist under socialism, the socialist economy ipse facto does not differ in principle from the capitalist. Antihistoricism is also seen in their denial of the general nature of profit, which represents an increment of the value advanced and in that sense functions as an index of the effectiveness of the outlay. This general nature is inherent in profit in other economic systems besides the capitalist. Marx showed that profit arose historically long before the appearance of capitalist production.^^2^^ Qne of its first forms was commercial or merchant's profit.

The category that expresses the specific nature of the capitalist mode of production is not profit as such, but only capitalist profit, i.e. the result of exploiting wage labour, the form of manifestation of surplus value on the surface of production that masks capitalist exploitation, its source. The concrete content and socio-economic nature of profit under socialism differs radically from it, a fact that Western economists try to gloss over. In socialist society the surplus product, the money expression of a part of which is profit, is created by the labour of workers who are free from exploitation, and who jointly own the means of production and the product produced. While profit is formed under capitalism in bitter competition as a result of spontaneous variations of market prices, under socialism it is formed in the course of proportionate realisation of the output of socialist enterprises at prices set by the state.

In the socialist economy profitability is a category of production, and is formed in the production sphere although, naturally, the product's conditions of sale also affect it. In the first place profitability expresses the effectiveness of an enterprise's use of production funds (assets), which does not rule out the need to take output into consideration (when establishing the profitability of production) that meets socialist society's needs in the highest degree, and consequently to pay attention to the demand for this product.

There are also radical differences in the use of profit. Under capitalism it is the source of accumulation of capital, a means of

Gert Leptin. Business Administration, (c) Comparative Remarks. In Marxism, Communism and Western Society, Vol. 1 (Herder & Herder, New York, 1972), p 345.

~^^2^^ Paul A. Samuelson. Economics, 9th ed. (McGrow-Hill, New York, 1973), p878.

3 Hans-Hermann Hbhmann, Michael Kaser, Karl Thalheim. In The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe (Hurst & Co., London, 1975), p 37.

4 Ibid.

~^^1^^ Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl (Ed.). Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vol. 1 (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), p 60.

~^^2^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. Ill (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), pp 323-337.

291 290

extending the scale of capitalist exploitation, but is also used for the needs of the capitalist class' personal consumption. Under socialism profit does not contain an antagonistic contradiction between the necessary and surplus product; it is placed at the disposal of society as a whole and is the source of extending social production, growth of satisfaction of the needs and all-round development of all the working people. In that connection the attempts of theorists of market socialism to present profit as the aim of socialist production are clearly unsound. Profit and profitability (as the ratio of the mass of profit and the operative productive assets) are, of course, important planning and evaluating indices of the profit-and-expenses operation of socialist enterprises and a determination of the effectiveness of that activity. Profit is a form of distribution of the national income and a source of both the socialist state's accumulation and that of the enterprises themselves. But socialist society does not need just any kind of profit, but only profit that is the result of efficient work by the work forces of enterprises utilising available production reserves to produce output needed by the economy. Under socialism profit therefore cannot be formed as a result of anarchic variations of market prices or a relation of competition between enterprises. It is an important source of growth of people's well-being, and a means of attaining the objective goal of socialist production, i.e. increased satisfaction of the needs and all-round development of all members of society.

21

WESTERN ECONOMISTS

ON THE PATTERNS OF SOCIALIST

EXTENDED REPRODUCTION

1. The categories of reproduction

of the gross social product

as treated by Western economists

Western economists, when analysing the theory and practice of socialist extended reproduction, set themselves the aim of playing down the achievements of socialist countries, or of passing them over in silence. Whenever they are forced to evaluate the categories of socialist extended reproduction their efforts are directed to finding a `gap', imaginary contradictions, between the theory and practice of socialist reproduction,' and to fobbing off onto the reader the idea of an alleged priority of bourgeois economic thinking in dealing with a number of theoretical problems of reproduction.

Until recently economists in the West still rejected gross social product as a category and index of social reproduction utilisable in the planning and accounting practice of socialist countries. Their critique of the gross (aggregate) social product was based mainly on the point that, as an index of social production, it contains 'double counting' of the means of production. In fact, however, their denial of this category was associated with their superficial approach to analysing it. The specific character of any category always stems from the features of the economic processes in which it takes shape. Before a product can be used for consumption it completes an economic circulation or rotation in the system of the social division of labour. In those conditions the production results of one link in the social division of labour enter the next as an object of transformation. In the succeeding links the labour inputs of the preceding ones function as part of the material inputs of the newly created products. The gross social product forms the whole aggregate of the movement of the material wealth created in society's national economy. The whole aggregate of the links between its enterprises and industries arising from economic turnover in the production, exchange, and consumption of material wealth is materialised in the gross social product.

Under capitalism private ownership of the means of production rules out conscious regulation of all the economic connections arising simultaneously in social production at enterprise, sector, and national

293

level. This feature of the economic basis of capitalism finds reflection in social consciousness, and in the theories of Western economists, as a denial of gross social product. Bourgeois economics, as we have already said, employs indices to evaluate the results of social production that are formulated through a mechanical summation of separate quantities rather than on the basis of economic turnover, in the realm of reproduction Western economists concentrate on the 'gross national product'. But the `input-output' matrices developed in capitalist countries for a certain flow of output have forced practical economists to go over, in fact, contrary to the theorists' statements, to an index of gross product. The point is that the circulation of material resources within the production sphere is reflected in the intersectoral balance that forms the `skeleton' for this balance. But that again confirms the far-fetched character of Western economists' denial of the categories of extended reproduction formed from the turnover of means in the national economy.

It has become quite typical of capitalist economics to try and show that there has been a convergence of late among its spokesmen and Marxists of views on economic problems in general, not excepting the field of the theory of reproduction. They see this convergence of views on the categories of reproduction in the fact that an index of the end product equal to the sum total of annual depreciation and value of the national income is employed in socialist countries' planning and accounting practice when striking intersectoral balances. Taking the external coincidence of the components of the end product and 'gross national product' as their starting point, Western experts conclude that there has been a convergence of points of view both in understanding the social product and in defining its volume. They persistently stress the idea in their publications that the category of the final social product became known to Soviet economists quite recently, being borrowed from the capitalist economic arsenal.

In fact, however, the classical works of Marxism-Leninism show that Marx gave a scientific substantiation of the categories of reproduction more than 100 years ago. He indicated the physical-material and value forms of both the gross and the final social product, and his is the priority of having described the components of these forms of the product, which are separated out during reproduction.^^1^^ He also pointed out the shortcomings and mistakes of his predecessors and contemporaneous economists.

A practical realisation of the index of the final social product was first used in the USSR during striking of the national economic balance in 1923/4. It has been repeatedly noted in the Soviet literature that Soviet economists had already posed the problem, before the

war, of a wider use both of gross and end product in socialist management practice. After the war this idea was developed on the theoretical plane and on that of practical use, but at a higher qualitative level than in 1923/4. The 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 noted that managerial activity, and above all planning work, should be oriented on national end results. The end product thus first appeared in Marxian literature as a tool for analysing the most general patterns of reproduction and later as a planning instrument, long before it was developed by capitalist economists.

That is how matters stand from the angle of history. But when we compare the concepts of 'gross national product' and final, end product, as regards their essence, we have to note an essential difference between them.

The `net' and `gross' national products include only the final (end) products in their physical-material form. Samuelson puts it as follows:

Net national product is the sum of all final products ... including also net investment. And further:

Gross national product (GNP) is defined as the sum of final products ... and gross investment.^^1^^

At the same time the Marxist-Leninist concept of gross social product assumes that this idea reflects the circulation and turnover of assets within the system of the social division of labour in material production.

Both the theoretical basis and the methodology of defining gross social product and 'gross national product' are quite different. The former is based on objective economic processes and has a scientific character; the latter rests on a subjective foundation.

The Marxist-Leninist idea of the final product also differs essentially from Western economists' views of this category. They treat it in a one-sided fashion, understanding it only as conventional net product. From their point of view, therefore, the final material product is greater than the net material product by the amount of depreciation.

The limitation of final product to the conventional net product is linked with the fact that their political economy analyses facts lying on the surface of phenomena, and so prefers statistical analysis, when analysing the processes of reproduction, to socio-economic, so that the concepts of reproduction thus figure solely as statistical indices.

The concrete forms in which an economic category is manifested, can differ, of course, from its generic concept. Lenin's criticism of Struve is of interest in this respect; Struve confused Marx's abstract

~^^1^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. [I (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1978) PP 380-381; and Theories of Surplus-Value (Volume IV of Capital), Part I (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 141.

294

1B,PaUloA' Samuelson- Economics, 9th ed. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973), PP 1 o7, loo.

295

theory of realisation with the concrete historical conditions of realisation of the capitalist product.

This is just the same [Lenin wrote] as confusing the abstract theory of ground rent with the concrete conditions of the development of capitalism in agriculture in some one country.

This comment of Lenin's fully applies to the final product and the forms of its manifestation. It can be expressed, for instance, by a number of indices, depending on the practical needs of planning. The index of conventional net product, for example, must be regarded as a concrete form of manifestation of the final product. It is employed when intersectoral balances are being struck. Soviet economic science also inquires into this form of the final product in connection with perfecting the system of socialist planning. Capitalist economic thinking not only failed to resolve the problem of the ratio of gross to final social product, but even to pose the issue. Marxian political economy, when distinguishing between gross and final product, in accordance with real economic processes, at the same time notes the connection between them. Formation of the gross national product is linked, of course, with the movement of the social product within the system of the division of labour. But the movement of social labour has an outcome, a real result that stems from the annual labour input.^^2^^ This real result is expressed by another form of social labour, viz., the final social product. The gross product necessarily posits the final product, because the process of transforming one and the same objects of labour within the system of social division of labour cannot be indefinite.

the alienation of labour power from the means of production and ensured a direct, planned uniting of labour power with them. The labour power of each individual worker is part of the social, associated labour power in socialist society, and is manifested as an integral part of directly socialised labour on the scale of society. All that eliminated the possibility of and the need for purchase and sale of labour power and led to labour power's ceasing to be a commodity. The worker of socialist society is no longer a hired proletarian selling his labour power to capitalists, but a free working man realising his labour power in free labour for himself and socialist society. With the change in the character of the uniting of labour power and the means of production, the latter ceased to be an alien, hostile force for the working people, embodying oppression and exploitation. They were converted into means of emancipating the workers, into means capable of raising their well-being and the individual's all-round development. The workers are actively involved in the management of production, in drawing up current and long-term plans, and in tackling all urgent, pressing economic tasks. It is in that capacity, as master of the country, that the working man of socialist society takes part in the process of socialist reproduction.

Western economists, when considering the reproduction of labour power under socialism, pay special attention to the character of the use of labour power in socialist production, trying to convince their readers that it is similar to the use of labour power in capitalist enterprises, and that socialism has not only made no marked advances in this respect but, on the contrary, has intensified existing difficulties and contradictions in some cases.

Western theorists give a leading place in arguments on this plane to the version that socialism has not succeeded, when using labour power, in guaranteeing all members of society the right to work or in ensuring full, rational employment for the able-bodied population. The existence of `seasonal', frictional, structural, and technological unemployment, and various forms of underemployment, is as typical of the reproduction of labour power under socialism, they say, as under capitalism.^^1^^ Not content with asserting their clearly far-fetched thesis of the existence of unemployment in socialist society, they go further and claim that this unemployment (1) is not less than that which exists in capitalist society, and (2) shows a tendency to increase.

When Western economists write that the use of labour power under socialism is characterised by less than full employment and that there are various forms of unemployment, they resort to direct distortion of the facts. The everyday practice of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community incontrovertibly demonstrates that

2. Western authors' views on the reproduction of labour power in socialist society

The starting point of Western interpretations of the reproduction of labour power under socialism is denial of a radical transformation of the socio-economic nature of labour power during the transition from capitalism to socialism. Western theorists claim, too, that a market for labour power remains under socialism.^^3^^

In transferring to labour power under socialism the properties inherent in it in capitalist society, bourgeois economists pay no attention to the obvious fact that the character of the worker's uniting with the means of production and his place in the system of the social division of labour have been altered in a radical way with the establishment of socialist ownership. Socialism put an end forever to

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. Once More on the Theory of Realisation. Collected Works, Vol. 4 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 75.

~^^2^^ See Karl Marx. Capital, Vol. II, pp 449-450.

~^^3^^ See, for example, Wolfgang Teckenberg. Labour Turnover & Job Satisfaction. Soviet Studies, 1978, 30, 2: 193.

296

Morns Bornstem. Unemployment in Capitalist Regulated Market Economies and Socialist Centrally Planned Economies. American Economic Review 1978, 68, 2: 39, 43.

'

297

the right to work is not simply proclaimed, but is firmly guaranteed by their constitutions. Unemployment was finally abolished in the USSR in 1930. The development of the socialist economy ensures the involvement of all citizens of employable age in social work, which enables them to get jobs in accordance with their training, and the needs and necessities of the national economy. No member of socialist society is deprived of this possibility, and no one is threatened by the prospect of remaining without work that faces millions of people in the capitalist world. As the population grows in socialist countries, so, too, does the number of jobs in the national economy.

An important feature of the bourgeois interpretation of the use of labour power under socialism is the endeavour to prove that it has a forced character, and blocks the possibility of choosing work one wants and of working according to one's inclinations. Roger Garaudy, for instance, claimed that the working class as a whole had been put into a condition of compulsion in the Soviet Union, and that methods of compulsion leading to loss of interest in work were used in the Soviet national economy. Similar statements have appeared in the books of other authors. To give their arguments a semblance of truth, they try and link alleged use of forced labour (a) with the need to ensure high rates of development of socialist production and to create conditions for a rapid growth of output and (b) with a whole number of other economic processes.

These views on the character of the use of labour power under socialism have nothing in common with the real economic processes developing in socialist countries. Whether Western authors like it or not, there is no forced or rapacious use of labour power in socialist society. When the citizen of a socialist country realises his (her) capacity to work, he (she) is free and not subject to compulsion of any kind. His (her) work is filled with an ever increasing creative content and is being transformed into genuine conscious creativity of the masses.

Western theorists are beginning to pay more and more attention, to the training of skilled labour power under socialism, as well as to its use. In trying to depreciate socialist achievements in the eye of the world, Sovietologists interpret the social nature and tasks of the socialist system of training personnel incorrectly, writing reams about its not being democratic, its being imposed on the workers from above, and its contradicting their interests, and ascribe to socialism a drive to ensure political passivity of citizens, paralyse initiative, and limit independence. In support of this thesis, they say that the training of personnel under socialism is one-sided in some cases, does not provide the requisite standard of knowledge, and gives a low qualification. Sovietologists approach literally all forms and types of education with that measuring rod, and in particular declare that it has become a characteristic feature of Soviet public education that the graduates of secondary schools have neither

298

real knowledge nor the interest and capacity for independent thinking. They also attribute a whole series of faults and shortcomings to the Soviet system of training diplomaed engineers and specialists.

The views outlined above on various aspects of the training of personnel in socialist countries reflect the drive of capitalist economics to present the socialist system of the reproduction of skilled labour power in a false light, and to belittle its achievements. They do not take into account the real facts existing under socialism, indulge in wishful thinking, and completely ignore the fact that socialism, for the first time in human history, has created the most developed and perfect system of education and training of personnel, and made it accessible to all working people. Socialism abolished all forms of discrimination as regards getting an education, guaranteed all citizens the right to education, displaying special care so that all sections of the population that had been alienated from knowledge in capitalist society could acquire it. That applies above all to workers and peasants, and members of previously oppressed races and nationalities, i.e. precisely to those whom Western writers consider, by analogy with capitalism, to be also prevented under socialism from getting an education. Much has been done in recent years in the USSR to ensure an increasingly broad intake of young workers and peasants in institutions of higher learning, as fully follows from the policy of the CPSU, which is directed to bringing the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia closer together and consolidating the social unity of society.

Western writers' arguments that the individual interests are not taken into account in the reproduction of skilled labour power under socialism, and that the individual's possibilities of development are limited, will also not stand up to criticism. Socialism is, in fact, building a system of education and training that allows for the possibility of providing ever fuller, all-round, harmonioi's development of the person. This goal is fixed in statutes on public education and in Party programme documents. It is achieved by the constant raising of the standard of compulsory education in all socialist countries, the increasing involvement of the population in all forms of education and extension of access to higher and specialised secondary education, the constant improving of syllabuses, curricula, teaching methods, etc. Socialist countries have attained a high qualitative level of training of all categories of skilled personnel, in no way inferior to the highest world standards. And socialism, without restricting itself to what has already become reality, is working to improve all the basic elements of the system of reproduction of labour power, and all the links of public education, striving to ensure, while passing to communism, the education and training of conscious people, capable of both physical and mental labour, and of active participation in various fields of social and public affairs, science, and culture.

299

3. The problem of the ratio of accumulation and consumption under socialism

It is characteristic of present-day capitalist economic thought to depict one of the most important proportions of extended socialist reproduction, that between accumulation and consumption, as a fatal dilemma facing the economies of socialist countries. Bourgeois economists claim that either accumulation grows and then limits the resources for consumption, or the proportion of consumption increases and then throws the capacity of the socialist economic system to accumulate into doubt. Baumol and Blinder, for example, write:

Through saving, the public gives up some consumption, which is the price it must pay for the accumulation of plant, equipment, and infrastructure. Without this sacrifice, growth generally cannot occur... Ever since the Russian revolution in 1917, the Soviet leadership has been determined to promote rapid economic growth and has imposed on the general public whatever sacrifices of current consumption were deemed necessary for the purpose.^^1^^

This statement shows that views on the ratio between accumulation and consumption have undergone practically no change across the decades in the economic science of capitalist countries. The main trends that have been expressed in non-Marxian theories and textbooks over the whole period of the rise and establishment of socialism, and the building of developed, mature socialist society, have in fact been repeated again and again. In the early 70s, for example, Fusfeld stated categorically that 'the Soviet economy maintains high growth rates because its living standards are kept low'.^^2^^ This and many other such claims, however, are not distinguished by either novelty or originality. At best they repeat the views, with certain variations, of the opponents of the Communist Party's general line in the 20s, who claimed then, in the early years of Soviet government, that the young Land of Soviets was using methods of primitive accumulation of capital.

The essential methodological fault of all ideas that mechanically counterpose `donor-consumption' and `recipient-accumulation' comes from their authors' refusal to employ the dialectical materialist method to analyse concrete, historical types of economic system. In the view of bourgeois economists the amount of the means diverted from the social product for the needs of socialist accumulation is determined by political, psychological, moral, and other subjective factors. Walt Rostow, for example, explaining the methodological basis of his understanding of the problem of economic growth, writes:

There were Marx's propositions linking the economy and the technical relationships within it to politics. I found these challenging, while reacting against his underlying view that politics was essentially a superstructure to economic life.^^1^^

The position of Marxist-Leninist theory as regards the relation between the economic basis and the ideological superstructure was aptly put by Engels:

Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic situation is cause, solely active, while everything else is only passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.2 The possibility of socialist accumulation is due to objectively real economic relations, i.e. to social ownership of the means of production and planned development of the national economy. Material phenomena underlie the necessity for socialist accumulation; the inner causes are integrally linked with the creation of a highly developed industry, and in the first place of heavy industry, which is a sine qua non of the building of socialism's own material and technical basis. The external reasons are the rapid development of socialist economic integration, the progress in economic competition with capitalism, and consolidation and extension of socialist countries' economic ties with countries emancipated from colonial oppression.

Another methodological drawback of the views being considered here consists in a metaphysical, unhistorical approach that identifies the mechanism for establishing the ratio between accumulation and consumption under capitalism and socialism. Galbraith, for example, writes:

The result in all of the industrial countries, socialist and nonsocialist, is an unprecedented demand on economic resources. This manifests itself in the Western industrial countries in wage claims and resulting inflationary pressures.

...In the Soviet Union the pressure of competing claims, by all

outward evidence, is even stronger. Popularity there too accrues to

those who can offer more civilian consumption.^^3^^

Socialist accumulation is governed in fact by the specific nature

of the historically determined type of relations of production and

differs in principle from the accumulation of capital; it is not based,

as Galbraith says, on 'an unprecedented demand on economic re-

~^^1^^ Walt W. Rostow. Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge U P Cambridge, 1971), p X.

' '"

~^^2^^ Frederick Engels. Letter to W. Borgius in Breslau, January 25, 1894. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works, in three volumes Voi 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p 502.

~^^3^^ John Kenneth Galbraith. The Age of Uncertainty (Houghton Mifflin Boston, Mass., 1977), p 256.

'

1 W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Economics. Principles and Policy ( Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1979), p 659.

~^^2^^ Daniel Fusfeld. Economics (Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1972), p 104.

300 301

sources', but on the relations of social ownership of the means of production, which provide the possibility of concentration and planned distribution of the resources of accumulation, and ensure a balancing and stable rates of development of all sectors of the economy. The aim and character of accumulation are also altered under socialism: there is no 'pressure of competing claims', as Galbraith says, but a planned realisation of extended reproduction of the aggregate (gross) social product in the interests of ever fuller satisfaction of society's constantly growing productive and personal consumption as a whole, and of the consumption of each of its members individually. Western economists, who counterpose 'the criteria of growth' and 'the criteria of well-being' under socialism, reduce the purpose of the accumulation fund in extended socialist > reproduction mainly to growth of heavy industry. Baumol and Blinder, for example, write: To achieve such rapid growth and industrialization, it was necessary to limit consumption severely; so the Russian consumer was asked-or rather forced---to make sacrifices.'

But it is important to remember that socialist accumulation not only does not exclude consumption, but on the contrary presumes it. One part of the accumulation fund, passing into the sphere of material production (the fund of productive accumulation) and being realised through capital investment in the building of new enterprises and the re-equipping of existing ones, not only does not generate a reserve army of labour as under capitalism, but on the contrary causes a need for additional jobs, ensures full employment of the able-bodied population, and provides the necessary material preconditions for a further steady growth of the Soviet people's well-being.

Another part of the accumulation fund, going to the sphere of non-material production (the fund of non-productive accumulation or, in other words, the consumption accumulation fund) and realised through capital investments in the building of housing, schools, hospitals, sanatoria, rest homes, palaces of culture, sports facilities, and other objects of non-productive use, directly furthers satisfaction of the needs of all members of society for education, health care, and cultural services. In addition, a certain part of the accumulation fund is spent on increasing state reserves and replenishing insurance funds.

The scale of productive accumulation cannot be extended by reducing accumulation for consumer purposes or by reducing personal consumption. The point of view that 'the Russian economy is characterised by ... a stress on growth, industrialization, and military power, with corresponding downgrading of consumption'^^2^^ is based on an underestimation of the dialectical interconnection of the value and physical-material structures of the aggregate social product. The

surplus product, from which it is possible to expand production, is divided into two parts as regards its physical-material form: the consumable, which serves to meet the growing needs of the workers of the non-material sphere of production and provides the basis for increasing the wages fund and growth of the social consumption funds for the additional workers drawn into social production; and the accumulative, which consists of means of production that can only be consumed productively, i.e. that serve as a source of extended production. It is the productive use of a certain part of the surplus product to develop socialist production, form reserves and insurance funds, and expand funds in the sphere of non-material production that is called accumulation in the strict sense of the term. Western economists who say that the 'Soviet economy maintains high growth rates because its living standards are kept low'^^1^^ ought to be shown how the resources of the consumption fund, which consist of means of subsistence (bread, clothing, etc.), can be directed to expanding the accumulation fund, which consists of means of production (machinery, steel, oil, etc.).

It will readily be seen that the many exponents of the theory of forced accumulation at the expense of consumption on the whole copy the theory of accumulation of the Swiss petty-bourgeois economist Sismondi, whose views were convincingly criticised by Lenin back in the nineteenth century:

We can now fully appraise Sismondi's view of accumulation. His assertion that rapid accumulation leads to disaster is absolutely wrong and is solely the result of his failure to understand accumulation, as are his repeated statements and demands that production must not outstrip consumption, because consumption determines production. Actually, the very opposite is the case, and Sismondi simply turns his back on reality in its specific, historically determined form and substitutes petty-bourgeois moralising for an analysis.^^2^^

The more than 65 years' experience of developing the Soviet economy is convincing evidence that the national economy can only be successfully developed on the basis of a scientifically substantiated ratio between accumulation and consumption; yet, Western economists still deny even the very posing of the point about optimising accumulation and consumption in the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice of extended socialist reproduction, which is why they allege that 'the Soviet planners for a long time did not even conceive of planning as an optimizing process'.^^3^^ Such statements are usually backed by figures and statements like the following:

Yet, even now, investment in the USSR is still 25 percent of GNP, while in the United States the figure stands at about 12 percent. As a

1 Daniel Fusfeld. Op. cit., p 104.

~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin. A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism. Collected Works, Vol. 2 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 156.

~^^3^^ Robert W. Campbell. The Soviet-Type Economies Performance and Evolution (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass., 1974), p 39.

303

1 W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 801.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

302

result, Soviet living standards have been rising very slowly, particularly because the demands of the military forces have joined those of the growth planners in competing for resources, that might otherwise go into consumption.^^1^^

(1) The comparison of the rates of accumulation made by Baumol and Blinder is not legitimate, because the figure cited for the USSR is the ratio of the accumulation fund to the national income, calculated by the Soviet methods, while that for the USA is calculated by the method employed in that country. If one method is used, say the Soviet, then the rate of accumulation in the USA has to be increased by at least 50 per cent.

(2) The higher rate of accumulation under socialism compared with capitalism is due not to the fact that

the Soviet economy, in comparison with the American economy, simply allocates a larger proportion of its GNP to investment,2 but to the indisputable advantages of the socialist economic system, hi the Soviet Union around three-quarters of the national income now go to the consumption fund; and when allowance is made for the building of housing and social and cultural amenities, roughly fourfifths of the total national income go directly to raising the well-being of the people.

(3) With the coexistence of the two world systems, socialist countries are in fact forced to allocate a certain part of the gross social product to the defence fund, one part of which goes to meet the individual needs of servicemen and another to material equipping of the army. But the nature of expenditures on defence does not follow from the essence of socialism and its striving to apply 'resources to the goal of rapid industrial development with emphasis on heavy industry, particularly armaments'? but is caused by the military threat from imperialist countries, which have taken the road of militarism and are diverting resources on a large scale to the arms race, so narrowing opportunities for further development of their economies. In these conditions socialist countries are also forced to divert funds for defence.

Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but consolidation of peace-that is the clue to the future.^^4^^

Many spokesmen of capitalist political economy note the advances of socialism in their works, but deprive them of their economic basis. Reality forces them to recognise that socialist society greatly outdoes capitalist society in volume of accumulation, but they explain

this superiority by 'total discipline' and 'the command of the central authorities'. Socialism's successes in economic competition with capitalism are due, in actual fact, not to the subjective will of planners but to the objective advantages of the socialist economic system, i.e. to social ownership of the means of production, the planned and balanced nature of the development of the economy, elimination of parasitic consumption and extravagance, and so on.

The practice of building the economy demonstrates that restricting personal consumption can only lead to a slowing of the rates of growth of labour productivity and social production. On the other hand, when society allocates more resources to current consumption than is called for by objective necessity, that causes an imbalance of reproduction and leads to a lowering of its rates with the result that it later proves impossible to meet the people's constantly growing material and spiritual needs. It is a matter, consequently, of a constant search for the optimum, i.e. the best ratio between accumulation and consumption under socialism. Acceleration of the development rates and improvement of the efficiency of socialist production (which in the long run guarantee a further rise in the material well-being and cultural standards of the Soviet people) largely depend on progress along this road.

~^^1^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 659.

~^^2^^ Daniel Fusfeld. Op. cit., p 104.

~^^3^^ W. Baumol and A. Blinder. Op. cit., p 801.

~^^4^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 1981, p 40.

304 22

NON-MARXIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM

his lack of objectivity, gives a quite incorrect interpretation of this process. In an article tendentiously entitled 'Specific Changes in the East-Pact System', he surveyed a number of the bilateral agreements on economic co-operation between CMEA countries, comparing them with earlier agreements, and wrote:

It is specially noteworthy that the convention between the USSR and the GDR of 7 October 1975 is the first treaty in which the preamble speaks of 'the further coming together of the socialist nations'... On the other hand, it is a formula through which readiness for a process of assimilation the same as the model of development of the Soviet multinational state is given expression.^^1^^

The conclusion that convergence is a natural process was drawn by the 25th Congress of the CPSU and by the subsequent congresses of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; and it is included in other documents of the fraternal parties. They point out the concrete direction of the process: an interaction in politics, economics, and culture, and an increasingly common way of life. There is nowhere any indication of assimilation as the content or aim of the process of convergence, and of course cannot be. The convergence of nations and their merger are different processes. Marxist-Leninist theory developed this point long ago and, as we know, linked the merging of nations with the transition to mature communist society. Nevertheless, we run across awkward statements that at the present stage of development of the community of socialist nations their merging is being posed. Meissner, for example, writes:

It is noteworthy that the concept of integration, which used to be remote, has now found its way, with the formula 'socialist economic integration', into the new agreements. By its means it is not simply the aim of a federal union of states on the basis of a close economic community that is pursued; it also aspires to a gradual fusion of the nations concerned.2 Everything in that is wrongly put.

(1) Earlier, i.e. before 1971 when the Comprehensive Programme was adopted, the term `integration' was not used, because the conditions for passing from the stage of co-operation to that of integration were still not ready. (2) In any case integration does not mean the abolition of state frontiers, or rejection of the sovereignty and independence of the integrating nations. Socialist economic integration is being developed on an inter-state basis; it is an important factor in the convergence of fraternal countries, but it must be remembered that this pattern operates in close connection with another pattern of

~^^1^^ Boris Meissner. Spezifische Wandlungen im Ostpakt-System. Aussenpolitik, 1979, 30, 3: 287.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

1. The false interpretation of levelling up and convergence in the community of socialist nations

The convergence and equalising of the levels of economic development of the countries of the socialist community are fundamental patterns specifically inherent in socialist socialisation of production. The objective character of these patterns does not mean that they operate spontaneously. On the contrary, as the experience of the multinational USSR indicates, the line of levelling up taken from its very beginning and implemented through direct aid to the nations that were backward in social development, and also the rich experience of levelling up within the socialist community now available, indicate the correctness of Communist and Workers' parties' policy on this matter.

The CMEA Comprehensive Programme of Integration reads:

The gradual drawing closer and evening out of the economic development levels of the countries in the socialist community is an objective historical process in the development of the socialist world system. This process is determined by the socialist nature of the relations of production in the socialist countries, and the development between them of political, economic, scientific and technological co-operation and mutual assistance.^^1^^

What was written in the document is being actively implemented in relations between the nations of socialist countries. The results of planned control over convergence and levelling up are clear: whereas the difference in level of per capita national income was 1:3.2 in 1951, it had been reduced to 1:1.4 by the mid-70s.

These results are not limited to the economic sphere, but also embrace a complex of relations in politics, ideology and culture, and are the content of the process of convergence.

The West German Sovietologist Boris Meissner, well known for

~^^1^^ The Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Co-operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration by the CMEA Member-Countries (CMEA Secretariat, Moscow, 1971), p 18.

306 307

the development of world socialism, namely, the flourishing of each socialist nation and consolidation of its national-state sovereignty.

The flourishing and convergence of socialist nations are not antagonistic processes but mutually encouraging ones that condition each other. Socialist economic integration expresses their connection in a particularly graphic way. The CMEA member-states, being guided by their own national interests, enter into relations of mutually profitable co-operation in the field of integration, modernise their economies, and cope more effectively with the tasks of social development. The general result becomes a convergence of production complexes and their structures, and of standards of living, and an internationalising of the parameters that define the socialist way of life. Allowing for all that, one must also see the difference of principle in the way these processes develop in an individual multinational state, like the USSR, and within the context of co-operation and integration between independent sovereign states. In the first case it is a matter of relations between nations (peoples) and in the second of relations between states. The transition to the stage of socialist economic integration is thus evidence of progress in the development of world socialism, and of the fact that the co-operation between CMEA member-states has been raised to a qualitatively higher level, and that integration is opening up new horizons for it. But there is nothing in any CMEA document that indicates that now or in the distant future it is proposed to take steps toward their organisation along the lines of a federation. And there are no such indications in the documents of the Communist and Workers' parties.

Integratiorial processes are not just developing, of course, between socialist countries, but also in various regions of the capitalist world. This is a new phenomenon, whose effect has only come to the fore in recent decades. Naturally, therefore, the theory and methodology of integration are still being developed as a new subject of scientific inquiry and not all the issues connected with defining the essence of the process and peculiarities of its functioning in different social systems, future prospects, etc., have been completely solved. It is also possible that there are disagreements in the points of view of various experts who are conscientiously searching for the truth, but there are also other theorists whose aim is not the search for truth but its concealment. They use new phenomena in economic affairs, and in relations between socialist countries to update their old ideas, the core of which now, as years ago, is falsification of the CPSU's home and foreign policy. This also shows up in their evaluation of integration in CMEA.

2. Conceptions of socialist economic integration

The theory and practice of socialist economic integration is a subject of acute ideological struggle. The advantages of the socialist principles

308

of running the economy are being displayed on an international scale, as a result of the dynamic development of socialist countries without the crises and anarchy of production inherent in the capitalist economy; and the prestige of world socialism is growing in the eyes of millions of people. The USSR is building relations of a new type between states, which are really just, equal, and fraternal relations, and world socialism is advancing confidently in economic and cultural development, and in the perfecting of social relations and socialist democracy. The further the socialist community advances along the road of social progress, the stronger and sharper are Western ideologists' attacks on both the theory of scientific socialism and real socialism.

It is therefore not fortuitous that some spokesmen of the various trends of capitalist political economy and sociology take the process of socialist economic integration as the target for their ideological attacks, the aim of which is to throw doubt on the real gains of CMEA integration and to `prove' their bankruptcy in the future precisely because it is guided by socialist principles and methods.

Special efforts are made to call in question the principles of socialist internationalism underlying the co-operation and integration of socialist countries, which are interpreted arbitrarily and distorted as contradicting the national sovereignty of member-countries. Some West German authors used to say that the principle of subordination of socialist internationalism clashes with the structural barriers of the CMEA members. In fact, however, there is no such principle. Socialist internationalism is based on*principles of equality, comradely mutual help, and mutual benefit in economic co-operation and integration, irrespective of whether the country involved in them is large or small, developed or relatively Jess developed. But these writers have to invent such a `principle' in order to "`prove' that relations within CMEA are unequal, and that there is a certain hierarchy of interests in it. Understandably they claim that CMEA was setiip so that the USSR could cope with 'its internal difficulties'. That is echoed today by another West German Sovietologist, Hohmann, who says that

the official planned economy of the centrally administered type is also treated as an instrument of integration policy within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and so at the same time serves as an instrument of Soviet hegemonic policy.^^1^^

And he sees in just that an obstacle to transferring the economies of the European socialist countries onto market rails, and writes:

The transition to the socialist market economy in East European countries, and the possibility of a free choice of trading partners on Western markets associated with it, would endanger the economic and

~^^1^^ Hans-Hermann Hohmann. Das sowjetische Planungssystem. Determinanten, Funktionsprinzipien, Wandlungstendenzen (Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Cologne, 1978), p 47.

309

foreign policy supremacy of the USSR in the sphere of CMEA.^^1^^

This is refuted by the real practice of economic co-operation between these countries, each of which independently decides matters both of its participation in integrational measures within CMEA and of choice of trading partners on the world market. The experience of recent years is evidence, moreover, of what adverse consequences unwarranted close economic ties with the West can have for a national economy. In such cases the ills of the capitalist market economy, viz., anarchy and instability of money circulation, can be infectious should the planning principles of management of the economy be weakened.

The effectiveness of the principles of socialist internationalism is that it ensures equality in the relations between the partners in the division of labour, and unity of national and international interests, and so consolidates the sovereignty of each country actively involved in the socialist international division of labour.

Interestingly, diametrically opposite views are expressed among bourgeois economists as to how matters stand within CMEA a propos of the relation of integration and sovereignty. Some, like Knirsch, think that sovereignty prevents integration. He writes that the voluntary character of the participation of each member-country, guaranteed by the CMEA Charter, makes integration difficult by its very working, and that progress toward integration depends on the extent of the countries' involvement.

This rule no doubt serves members' sovereignty as regards economic policy, but it essentially hampers integration within CMEA.2 Others, on the contrary, try to ascribe the character of a supranational organ to CMEA, although its Charter clearly witnesses to the contrary.

The counterposing of plan to market, as noted above, is one of the oldest tricks of the critics of socialism. It is employed most often when socialist integration is being critically reviewed. Spokesmen of the neoliberal, neoclassical school, as we know, interpret the market as an alternative to plan. That is why this trend's ideas of economic integration are based more or less on an apologia of the market. Its spokesmen relate the essence, driving force, and outlook for interstate integration to certain optimum conditions for the functioning of the market mechanism, viz., degree of freedom of movement of capital, goods, services, and labour. The 'market integration' of the European Economic Community is counterposed from that standpoint to the 'plan integration' of CMEA. Plan integration, moreover, is treated as ineffective and limited in scale and outlook.

Similar points of view were expressed by several Western speakers

~^^1^^ Hans-Hermann Hohmann. Das Sow/etische Planungssystem. Determinanten, Funktionsprinzipien, Wandlungstendenzen (Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und international Studien, Cologne, 1978), p 47.

~^^2^^ Peter Knirsch. Bemtihungen um eine Wirtschaftsintegration in Osteuropa EuropaArchiv, 1972, 27, 10:23.

310

at the Fourth Congress of the International Economic Association held in Budapest in 1974. The American Prof. Gottfried Haberler, for instance, criticised integration practice within both the EEC and CMEA. In a co-paper with J. P. Hardt, he pointed out the discriminatory character of tariffs, and other barriers to a free flow of goods and services that prevented effective division of labour in the EEC, and at the same time said that 'protectionism and discrimination appear, although in different forms, in a regional association of planned economies such as the CMEA'.^^1^^ He went on to say that, in his view,

in contrast to the case with the EEC, protection may be assured by the supply plans of CMEA countries without resort to tariffs, quotas, or other controls used in market economies.^^2^^

As will be seen in this case, when the factors preventing successful development of integration seem to be analysed objectively, the authors' orientation on the market preordains a falsity of the initial premises and correspondingly of the conclusions.

It is impossible to try and evaluate the two types of integration (socialist and capitalist), ignoring the radical differences between these socio-economic systems and reducing them to peculiarities of management, and without going deeply into what determines these peculiarities.

The planned character of socialist integration is determined by the objective patterns of socialist relations of production, both national and international. The way relations of proportionality are manifested in the international sphere cannot be identical with the form in which proportionality is manifested in an individual country. In international conditions, therefore, there is no single planning process in CMEA countries' integrational practice, but a co-ordinating of their economic plans. That, however, does not mean that protectionism and discrimination are practised during the co-ordination of these plans, as Haberler and Hardt tried to demonstrate when they drew the following incorrect conclusion from their argument:

The test of the extent of this protection can be provided by assessments of the CMEA products and processes that are noncompetitive in price and quality in Western markets.^^3^^

The position of another speaker, the American Prof. B. Balassa, was somewhat different, but the difference concerned the forms of exposition rather than the essential content, since he too criticised socialist integration from the standpoint of an apologia of the market, and in particular gave a negative appraisal of the operations of the'

ii, i J 9°ttfried Haberler and John Hardt. Comments on 'Economic Integration Worldwide, Regional, Sectoral'. Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the International Economic Association held in Budapest, Hungary (The Macmillan Press London, 1976), p 318. ~^^2^^ Ibid.

~^^3^^/6iy.,pp318-319.

311

International Bank of Economic Co-operation. 'The limited impact of IBEC,' he said, 'is explained by the lack of automatic clearing of bilateral balances and the low level of credits.'^^1^^ On the one hand, of course, there are shortcomings in the operation of the credit and financial machinery within CMEA, which are being overcome as integration is improved. But that does not apply to what constitutes the fundamental basis of the integration, its planned character, which rules out automatism of operation on a market basis, and the unacceptability for socialist integration of an arbitrary raising of interest rates for credit, which are actually much lower than in the West. That is an advantage of the credit, however, rather than a drawback.

We can thus say that, on the whole, both Balassa and Haberler tried to show the superiority of the market type of integration in appropriate conditions, viz., with the elimination of such discriminatory measures as customs barriers, the EEC common tariff, or the CMEA countries' monopoly of foreign trade. In the absence of such measures, they claimed, market integration is superior to planned. This proposition evoked criticism not only from the economists of socialist countries, but also from certain Western theorists of integration, who justly pointed out the unsatisfactory character of the operation of the market mechanism and the growing impact on integration of non-market factors like taxes and administrative measures. The practice of interstate integration of the EEC convincingly demonstrates the adverse effect of the market mechanism in such important spheres of capitalism's international relations as foreign exchange and finance.

The socialist integration of CMEA countries is treated as inefficient because there is no freedom of price formation in the trade between them. Just as the theorist of liberalism, von Mises, used to argue the impracticability of socialism because of the absence of economic calculations (possible in his view only in the market), so today the prices of the products exchanged between CMEA countries are treated as irrational and lacking in economic content. The explanation is quite incorrect, however, why world prices are used in the trade between socialist countries.

In socialist countries both home and export prices are planned on the basis of the labour theory of value, i.e. in accordance with the socially necessary expenditure of labour. But the scale of the determination of these outlays differs within a country and outside it. In contrast to trade within a country, commodities are sold not at their national value in international exchange, but at their international value in accordance with the socially necessary outlays on an international scale, i.e. averaged from the national socially necessary outlays.

Many Western economists pay a great deal of attention to an imaginary convergence of capitalist and socialist integration. But various authors treat this convergence differently. Some think it is enough to switch socialist integration to market lines; others, on the contrary, start from a need to create supranational integration agencies with broad powers in the planning sphere. In any case, whatever road of convergence proves to be possible, and whatever evidence is adduced from the experience of integration, it is characteristic of Western theorists to use the methodological trick of ignoring the decisive role of ownership of the means of production.

A proportionality in external economic relations is inherent in social ownership of the means of production, both in today's conditions and in the future; so long as there are two types of ownership of the means of production, there will also be two basic types of integration. Any projects of co-integration are Utopian, however noble the aims their authors pose. Indicative in this respect is the report to The Club of Rome made in 1976 under the guidance of the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, entitled Reshaping the International Order. It drew a picture of a rational world division of labour based on the setting up of international organisations empowered to take decisions of principle, i.e. 'functional confederations of international organizations'.^^1^^ This criticism of the market aspect of integration cannot be ignored. The report justly noted that 'at the national level, the market mechanism tends to mock poverty, or simply ignores it', and further that 'this is even more true at the international level'.2 Certain other parts of the report also merit attention. At the same time we must note the Utopian character of its main idea, which assumes the possibility of organising a proportionately regulated world division of labour in spite of the fact that there are actually two main types of international division of labour, quite opposite in their socio-economic content, modes and methods of regulation, and consequences for the workers, as a comparison of integration within CMEA and the EEC shows.

3. Interpretations of the economic co-operation of socialist and capitalist countries

The economic rivalry of the two world systems does not mean rejection of economic co-operation between them. On the contrary, it presupposes utilisation of the advantages of the international division of labour on a world scale, which makes it possible to obtain separate types of raw material, a number of foodstuffs, and new modern

~^^1^^ Bela Balassa. Types of Economic Integration. Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the International Economic Association..., p 25.

~^^1^^ Jan Tinbergen (Coordinator). Reshaping the International Order (Dutton & Co., New York, 1976), p 84. 1 Ibid., p 16.

313 312

machinery and equipment for the socialist economy. Firms of capitalist countries thereby secure big, Jong-term orders, and get important industrial equipment and raw materials from socialist countries. The increase in the scale of economic co-operation between the two opposing social systems is a factor stabilising international relations, and promotes materialisation of international detente, the basic line of the foreign policy of the countries of the socialist community.

The accelerating growth and extension of the forms of economic co-operation between the socialist and capitalist world economic systems, which began at the end of the 60s, found broad reflection in the works of contemporary Western economists. Some of them, expressing the interests of the most reactionary circles of monopoly capitalists, remained adamant in the complete denial of any need to develop economic ties between capitalist firms and socialist countries, seeing it as a threat to continuation of the arms race, and a breach of the conditions for the military-industrial complex's colossal monopoly profits. Others took a much more realistic stand and tried to give a theoretical substantiation both of the need for economic co-operation of the two systems and of the conditions of co-- operation most profitable for capitalist companies.

But while justifying the desirability of extending economic co-operation with socialist countries, some spokesmen of this trend also started from a false idea of the possibility of exploiting international economic ties to overcome the social differences between capitalism and socialism, and for a `convergence' of the opposing world systems. The Swedish economist and sociologist Adler-Karlsson, for example, says:

East-West economic relations could just as well lead to a shift of functional control away from the private owners in the West, as well as to a shift of functional control away from the public owners in the East.^^1^^

It is often openly admitted that economic ties with the world of socialism are vitaily necessary for capitalist society as an important .condition promoting easing of the contradictions of capitalist reproduction. At the international conference on problems of EastWest economic relations held by the International Economic Association, the significance that extension of economic co-operation with socialist countries has for capitalism was characterised as follows:

The great advantage for market economies lies in the benefits of expanded exports, especially during a period of recession and slackening internal demand.^^2^^

At the same time, however, many Western economists think the threat of a curtailing of economic relations with socialist countries could force them to make concessions to capitalism. One study says outright that capitalism always has as the aim of those ties

to resolve its own economic difficulties, as well as to attempt to modify the socialist system in a capitalist direction.'

An American government-sponsored survey says that socialist countries must, in order to broaden co-operation with the capitalist world economic system, start with an actual liquidation of the state monopoly of foreign exchange, a breach in the monopoly of foreign trade, and limitation of social ownership of the means of production.2 According to these conclusions extension of economic ties between the two social systems is hampered by the social system of the socialist countries itself, which they would like to alter, which, of course, is absolutely unreal.

Extension of these relations is a compromise whose substance is determined by the partners' purely technical and economic selfinterest. There can be no question of concessions by the socialist countries in the field of soqal relations. At the same time an increase in economic ties between socialist countries and capitalist firms does not mean changes in the social nature of the latter. As before, they are enterprises based on relations of exploitation that are striving to increase their profits at any price, and to extend and consolidate capitalist relations. Socialist countries, however, dispose of all the conditions necessary to paralyse the pressure of Big Business completely (the whole system of state monopoly capitalism included) and to utilise their trade and economic ties as a means of consolidating socialism's economic potential.

The forms of economic co-operation of the two systems that most attention is paid to in the Western literature are foreign trade, production co-operation, scientific and technical co-operation, and financial and credit relations.

The American economists Lauter and Dickie, for example, while stressing the need to expand capitalist firms' trade with socialist countries, note that this is because of the existence of a considerable market in socialist countries connected both with intensive economic development (which presents a demand for 'sophisticated industrial equipment') and with the 'higher standards of living [which] have resulted in new, more sophisticated consumption patterns'.^^3^^ But the

~^^1^^ Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh. Paradoxes in the Political Economy of Detente. Theory and Society, 1978, 5, 3: 303.

~^^2^^ Western Investment in Communist Economies. A Selected Survey on Economic Interdependence (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974), p 29.

~^^3^^ See G. P. Lauter and P. M. Dickie. Multinational Corporations and East European Socialist Economics (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975), p 66.

315

~^^1^^ Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. The Political Economy of East-West-South Co-operation (Springer-Verlag, Vienna-New York, 1976), p 72.

2 See Nita G.M. Watts (Ed.). Economic Relations between East and West. Proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association at Dresden (GDR) (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1978), p 48.

314

arguments about expanding trade are very often accompanied with a whole number of reservations.

(1) The idea of the need for a faster export of goods to socialist countries and, on the contrary, a slowing down of growth of imports from them is dragged in. It is presented in various forms. On the one hand it is said, for example, that the industrial goods of socialist countries are 'poor competitors on world markets',^^1^^ and are therefore not needed by the Western customer. On the other hand one hears diametrically opposite statements, that the industrial exports of CMEA countries undermine the competitiveness of capitalist firms, especially as regards the automobile industry: 'Comecon exports threaten Western motor producers.'^^2^^ In this approach we clearly see a striving to justify various kinds of limitation to block the exports of socialist countries to industrially developed capitalist countries. And such restrictions are widely practised in the West, and not just in the USA, where they are greatest. In the EEC, for instance, increased duties were imposed in the mid-70s on 329 types of commodity imported from the USSR and other European socialist countries.^^3^^

Subsequently 'Western governments increased protectionist measures against the CMEA countries' exports'.^^4^^ While forecasting a probable growth in trade between socialist and developed capitalist countries in the 80s, even the soberest-minded experts who realise the need for a mutual expansion of trade start all the same from the point that its development on the one hand should

allow Western exports to the East to grow at a reasonable rate ...

[but] not unduly disturb Western markets by excessive imports from

the East.^^5^^

(2) A contrary thesis is put forward of the expediency of limiting the range of goods exported by industrialised capitalist states to socialist countries, because, it is alleged, some of them can serve as the basis for growth of socialism's military-industrial potential. This thesis got its fullest expression in the embargo policy pursued by the US in relation to a number of commodities for socialist countries, primarily for the USSR.

The proposition that it is necessary to limit imports from socialist countries propagandised by some Western economists is a reflection of the well-known Keynesian dogma that a capitalist country's exports are always a good thing because they stimulate growth of national production, while imports on the contrary are

always an evil because they always allegedly prevent this growth. This dogma gets its fullest expression in regard to trade with socialist countries, since it is given a clearly class bias in that respect. Some of a capitalist country's total imports really do compete with goods produced by national capital, and in some cases can check production of them. But a considerable proportion of imported goods ( various types of equipment, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and consumer goods) are themselves a necessary condition for extended reproduction. The goods of socialist countries, especially raw materials in which?*there is no direct competition, are an important factor for the development of production in. the West. Equipment and products of the engineering industries are also becoming more and more important. Wilczynski, for example, admits that many people in capitalist countries

will be surprised to know that multinational corporations are now

amongst the importers of Socialist-produced materials, tools, machinery,

means of transport and even industrial plants.'

Socialist countries, and in particular the USSR, are involved in carrying out large-scale projects in capitalist countries (France, Finland, etc.), which are being effected by deliveries of technology, sets of equipment, and technical documentation.

We must also stress the complete bankruptcy of the views still hanging over from the cold war that capitalism can hold back development of the socialist economies by limiting exports of various machinery, equipment, etc. The socialist economy, being based on a powerful industry, can itself, independently of capitalist countries, fully provide for the production of those goods that are at present imported from the West, although that would naturally call for big outlays of funds and take time. Some Western economists already understand this quite well. It was noted at the conference on East-West economic relations referred to above that 'for- socialist states, the import of Western technology plays a limited role in overall growth'.2 Wilczynski makes an even more striking admission:

It is rather ironical that some of the items imported by them [i.e.

multinationals-Xuf/i.Jwere at one stage on the Western strategic lists,

barred from being exported to the Socialist bloc.^^3^^

Admissions like that splendidly illustrate the complete fiasco of ideas that growth of socialist countries' technical and economic potential can be retarded by limiting exports to them.

The line of making the limitations on economic links with.the USSR and certain other socialist countries tighter, actively propagandised by the most reactionary Western economists, needs to be judged from that standpoint. It is no less unsound to count on its success,

~^^1^^ J. Wilczynski. The Multinationals and East-West Relations (The MacMillan Press, London, 1976), p 61.

~^^2^^ Nita G. M. Watts (Ed.). Op. cit., p 48.

~^^3^^ J. Wilczynski. Op. cit., pp 61-62.

317

~^^1^^ Peter Knirsch. Current Problems in East-West Economic Relations. West-Ost Journal, 1977, 4: 30.

2 Financial Times, 18 February 1976.

~^^3^^Acta Oeconomica (Budapest), 1977, 19, 1: 64.

~^^4^^Benedykt Askanas, Gerhard Fink, Friedrich Levcik. East-West Trade and CMEA Indebtedness in the Seventies and Eighties (Zentralsparkasse und Kommerzialbank, Vienna, 1980), p 5.

~^^5^^ Ibid., p 6.

316

because it will hurt the capitalist countries themselves first ot all, as has been recognised, incidentally, by Western economic thought. Adler-Karlsson, for example, characterising the consequences of the embargo policy earlier pursued by the United States, writes:

In East-West relations the embargo policy has clearly been a great

irritant factor to both sides, and implying profits of trade foregone also

in Western Europe. But it is not possible to show that it has improved

the Western position in the power struggle. Inside the Western alliance

itself, the embargo policy has evidently been a great nuisance, and the

United States has lost much political goodwill because of its stubborn

insistence and the harsh methods used in persevering with its policy.l

In today's conditions, when the economic might> of the Soviet Union

and the whole socialist community, and their political influence in

the world, have multiplied compared with the 50s and early 60s,

attempts to pursue a limitation of economic relations in regard to

them are doomed to complete failure.

Western economic thought attaches great importance to theoretical development of the problems of production co-operation between capitalist and socialist countries. Agreements on this are very diverse in form and include deliveries of sets of equipment for enterprises and technological production lines with payment in output of the equipped plants (barter or offsetting contracts); joint production of output and specialised sub-contracts; joint research, design, and the building of projects, etc.

In the 70s the Western economic literature listed a number of very important factors stimulating capitalist firms to production co-operation with the socialist community, including the following:

(1) planned development of the national economies of socialist countries, which guarantees stability of economic conditions and relations, big, long-term orders, and complete elimination of risk of any kind;

(2) the existence of well-qualified staffs of engineers, technicians, and skilled workers, capable of making high-quality goods; (3) price stability, and absence of the inflationary processes common to the economies of the capitalist system; (4) a large internal market; (5) the opportunity to obtain fundamentally new technologies developed in the socialist countries.^^2^^

The list of reasons promoting Western firms to co-operate with socialist countries is essentially recognition of the advantages of the socialist economic system. Some Western economists, however, claim that production co-operation cannot assume a broad scale because,

' say, it restricts the interests of the capitalist partners. In one - ay, for example, it is said that from the standpoint of capitalist

companies public ownership represents

a serious obstacle in promoting investments in direct participation in the business activities in socialist countries. Unless the government of a socialist country provides a special legal framework for the setting up of an enterprise with the participation of foreign capital and guarantees property and management rights of investors, their legal position is uncertain and in constant jeopardy.'

It is suggested, consequently, that CMEA countries should grant capitalist firms the right to make direct foreign investments in their economies.

Co-operation of production with the involvement of partners from the two opposing economic systems is being created in both capitalist and socialist countries. When it is organised in a capitalist country, the partnership is agreed in line with the legal norms operative in the capitalist economic system, and therefore predominantly takes the form of a joint-stock company. The conclusion of a contract for co-operation in production in a socialist country naturally follows the quite different legal norms existing in it, which reflect socialist relations of production. An enterprise of the type that is organised in capitalist countries therefore cannot exist in socialist countries: in them the predominant form is based on a contract.

Most of the forms of production co-operation arranged between capitalist firms and socialist countries do not include a sharing of ownership of the joint plant or project, i.e. a sharing of risk and profit, but assume that the partners function independently of each other within their own socio-economic systems. They do, however, give the capitalist firms the opportunity to exploit the results of production indirectly; and by providing for long-term mutual deliveries, raise the efficiency of both partners' production activity. Such cooperation also promotes higher utilisation of the Western partner's plant, broadens the output of new items, and fosters the setting up of separate plants working on orders from socialist countries.

Western economists make an absolute out of capitalist relations and the corresponding legal norms. Hence their incomprehension of the fact that capitalist firms, entering into relations of economic co-operation with socialist countries, find partners of a quite new type. They sign contracts not with another capitalist company that needs a stronger partner in order to remain competitive vis-a-vis pressing rivals, and not with a developing country endeavouring to create the conditions for industrialisation, but with a socialist country that has a quite different social character and relies on a powerful economic potential, a planned national economy, and • a modern technique and technology of production.

Many Western economists, when analysing problems of scientific

~^^1^^ Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967 ( Stockholm, 1968), p 9.

~^^2^^ See G. P. Lauter and P.M.Dickie. Op. cit., pp 60-73; Jan Zoubek. Prospects of East-West Joint Ventures (Brussels, 1974), pp 30-31; J. Wilczynski Op. c/f.,pp 34-35, 61-62.

318

~^^1^^ Robert Starr (Ed.). East-West Business Transactions (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), p 263.

319

and technical co-operation between the two systems, start from an unsound thesis of the alleged superiority of capitalism over socialism in science and technology; on that basis they put forward ideas of maintaining a 'permanent technological gap', the essence of which is that capitalist corporations should transfer only that technology to socialist countries during co-operation that has already largely lost: its novelty. In that way, Zoubek argues, it might be possible tc9 'maintain the technological gap at the present level, or... even enlarge it'.^^1^^ Conditions would thereby be created in which the socialist economy would become a kind of technological appendage of capitalist firms, and any changes in relations between them could 'only be undertaken on the initiative or willingness of the technologically superior Western partners'.^^2^^

The idea of a 'permanent technological gap' is quite unsound (1) because it represents a patent apologia for capitalism, and (2) because it ignores the pattern of development of scientific and technical advances. For a whole number of reasons the development of science and the extent of its technological application cannot proceed simultaneously and evenly in all its sectors in various countries, even with an approximately equal degree of economic development. One is the historically established structure of scientific and industrial potential and the various urgent tasks facing science in that connection; another is the dissimilar directions of quests to realise similar scientific problems and the ways of applying them in technology. It is therefore unreal in practice for one and the same technological innovation to be made in all countries simultaneously. Hence the immense significance that international scientific and technical co-operation has acquired today, which presents an opportunity to avoid duplication in research. Noting that, the US research company Rand Corporation has said (in its report on the significance of scientific and technical co-- operation between the USSR and the USA) that because of co-operation in the field of research and development

the United States might seek to import more basic and applied ideas and inventions, while the USSR might seek to import finished products and production facilities.^^3^^

This idea is clearly traceable as well in the symposium on SovietAmerican trade, published in Washington in 1979:

There should be increased technological cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has more scientists and engineers at work than any other country, and it is producing vast amounts of basic technology... Western countries have emphasized the application of technology to production. There is, then, the basis for a natural

division of work in what can result in very productive cooperation. *

The American journal Science published an interesting analysis of the importance of Soviet-American scientific exchange. Prominent scientists were asked how they evaluated their experience of scientific exchange with Soviet scientists. An absolute majority of the 350 scientists polled had a high opinion of scientific co-operation between «cientists of the two countries: nearly 75 per cent said the results ef co-operation were outstanding or very good; 19 per cent considered them quite satisfactory.^^2^^ But Western economic thought, which as we know is usually prone to make absolutes of separate aspects of economic processes and phenomena, strives to present the absence of synchronisation of scientific discoveries characteristic on the international scale, and of their technological application in different countries, as capitalism's superiority over socialism, and from that deduce the notorious idea of maintaining the 'technological gap'.

Problems of financial and credit relations have a special place in the treatment of East-West economic co-operation. The financial aspect of trade, production, scientific and technical links gets special attention because it has a very direct bearing on the capitalist partner's main aim in these relations, viz., the making of profit. It is precisely from the financial standpoint that many Western economists try above all to criticise, and sometimes simply to discredit East-West business relations. The main attack is directed, as a rule, against the credit side of trade deals connected for the most part with barter or offsetting, and licensing, contracts.

It is often said that deals of this kind contradict the practice of international commercial co-operation and increase the degree of risk of foreign trade operations. But in fact the change in the commodity structure of world trade, linked with the rapid growth of exchange of industrial equipment, has everywhere involved a raising of the proportion of deliveries on credit. Furthermore, credit competition is becoming more and more important, and a major supplement to price competition. The credit form of carrying out this kind of contract therefore in no way contradicts the general trend of development of international trade, but on the contrary corresponds to it.

Western economists also frequently oppose the granting of longterm credit to socialist countries at comparatively low rates of interest by capitalist countries' public crediting institutions, saying that it is a direct loss for the capitalist economy and 'an unrequitable subsidy to the socialist countries'.^^3^^ In practice, however, the crediting of

~^^1^^ William C. Morris. Transfers of Commercial Technology: Harmful or Helpful. In Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Trade (American Committee on EastWest Accord, Washington, 1979), p 29.

~^^2^^ Loren R. Graham. How Valuable Are Scientific Exchanges with the Soviet Union? Science, 1978, 202, 4366: 386.

~^^3^^ Boris S. Fomin. Monetary and Financial Aspects of East-West Economic Cooperation. In C.T. Saunders (Ed.). Money and Finance in East and West, Vol. 4 (Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 1978), p 102.

321

~^^1^^ Jan Zoubek. Op. cit., p 31.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p 32.

~^^3^^ John H. Douglas. Soviet Technology for American Companies. Science News,\911, 111,9: 140.

320

private firms' export operations by state banks is above all a subsidising of these firms, because it increases their competitiveness. As David Rockefeller, for example, has recognised:

the extent of the U.S. Eximbank's participation in East-West trade will largely determine the ability of U.S. companies to step up sales of capital goods and technology to the Soviet Union.' The credit form of offsetting or licensing contracts only contains an element of subsidy in the sense that it 'improves the terms of the deal'. The availability of capital as such [i.e. credit, as a condition of accumulation->4ur/i.] is not a factor limiting Soviet economic growth.'^^2^^

In recent years the problem of public external debt has become a subject of theoretical speculation for many Western economists. Practically all countries have a public external debt that has arisen from various causes: credit and foreign trade operations; lack of home accumulation; the debts of big cities; regulating of the balance of payments and rates of exchange. In socialist countries external state debt arises only from foreign trade operations within CMEA and in regard to firms and banks in capitalist countries. Some developing countries, in turn, and many firms and banks of capitalist countries, become indebted for the same reasons to the USSR and other socialist countries. This mutual indebtedness has a temporary character. The delivery of pipes on credit for the gas industry of the USSR, for example, under barter agreements with firms in Austria, Italy, West Germany, and France causes a deficit in Soviet trade of 2.5 billion roubles. At the same time Soviet earnings from the sale of gas to those countries will come to a sum ten times as great as the temporary indebtedness. Western economists often deliberately dramatise the existence of socialist countries' external debt. Many, moreover, are not too acute in calculations of the scale of indebtedness:

The figures characterizing the volume of credits usually make no distinction between the credit lines opened and the credits actually used; ... the credit total as a rule includes those whose repayment, under the terms of the credit, is provided for in the form of deliveries of goods turned out by jointly-built enterprises; ... figures contain no classification of the terms or the purpose of the credits, which substantially distorts the actual state of affairs.^^3^^

The gross indebtedness, moreover, figures as a rule in the estimates, i.e. no allowance is made for the fact that socialist countries are themselves creditors of developing countries and of banks and firms in capitalist countries.

The real reason for Western speculation about socialist countries' external credits is very far removed from the problems of economic co-operation and has a clearly political colouring. In that connection we must stress that master and servant relations, relations of economic diktat and political blackmail, are unacceptable in regard to socialist countries. They stand for the normalisation of business relations between the two world economic systems. A further extension of reciprocal trade and industrial, scientific, technical, credit, and financial ties between them is the only possible alternative in today's international economic and political situation making it possible to lay a firm foundation of equal economic co-operation and consolidate relations of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems.

~^^1^^ David Rockefeller. Financing US-Soviet Trade: Political Cooperation, Economic Gain. Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Trade, p 18.

~^^2^^ Philip Hanson. East-West Technology Transfer and Western Policy. In Friedrich Levcik (Ed.). International Economics: Comparisons and Interdependences (Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 1978), p 151.

3 Boris S. Fomin. Op. cit., p 103.

322

APPENDIX

mathematical techniques in economic research. Publications: Economic Dynamics; Economic Theory and Operations Analysis; Economics (with A. S. Blinder); Public and Private Enterprise in a Mixed Economy; Selected Economic Writings; etc.

BLINDER, Alan Stuart (1945-). American economist. Professor of economics, Princeton University. Research: income distribution, macroeconomic theory. Publications: Fiscal Policy in Theory and Practice; Towards an Economic Theory of Income Distribution; Economics (with W. J. Baumol); etc.

BLISS, Christopher John (1940-). British economist. Professor of economics, Essex University. Research: problems of the theory of capital and income distribution. Publications; Advanced Textbooks in Economics; Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income; contributions to the Economic Journal and Review of Economic Studies; etc.

BOHM-BAWERK, Eugen von (1851-1914). Austrian economist. Head of the Austrian school, professor of Innsbruck University from 1881 to 1914. Research: the development and elaboration of theoretical propositions of the subjective theory of value and problems of capital and interest. Publications: Rechte und Verhdltnisse vom Standpunkt der volkswirtschaftlichen Giiterlehre; Einige strittige Fragen der Kapitalstheorie; etc.

BORTS, George Herbert (1927-). American economist. Professor of economics, Brown University. Research: problems of the international movement of capital and economic growth. Publications: Growth and Capital Movements among US Regions in the Post-war Period. In John F. Kain and John R. Meyer (Eds.). Essays in Regional Economics; Capital Movements and Economic Growth in Developed Countries. In Fritz Machlup (Ed.). International Mobility and Movement of Capital; Economic Growth in a Free Market (with Jerome L. Stein); Regional Cycles of Manufacturing Employment in the United States 1914-1953; etc.

CAGAN, Phillip David (1927-). American economist. Professor of economics, Columbia University. Research: monetary aspects of economic fluctuations, inflation. Publications: The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates; The Hydra-headed Monster. The Problem of Inflation in the United States; Persistent Inflation: History and Policy Essays; etc.

CHAMBERLIN, Edward Hastings (1899-1967). American economist. Professor of economics at several American universities. Research: analysis of the ratios of monopoly and competition on the capitalist market. Publications: Towards a More General Theory of Value; The Economic Analysis of Labour Union Power; The Theory of Monopolistic Competition; etc.

CHAPMAN, Janet Goodrich (1922- ). American economist. Professor of economics, Pittsburgh University. Research: comparative economic systems, manpower economics, income distribution in socialist countries. Publications: Real Wages in Soviet Russia since 1928; Wage Variation in Soviet Industry: The Impact of the 1956-60 Wage Reform; etc.

CHISHOLM, Roger Kent (1937-). American economist. Professor of economics, Memphis State University. Research: problems of the approach to the inter-organisational decision-making process, forecasting supply and demand for skill levels in the labour market. Publications: Forecasting Methods (with Gilbert R. Whitaker); Interorganizational Decision-Making (Ed. by Matthew Tuite); Principles of Microeconomics (with Marilu H. McCarty); etc.

CLARK, John Bates (1847-1938). American economist. Professor of economics, Columbia University (1895-1923). Founder of a number of theories, in particular of marginal productivity. Publications: The Philosophy of Wealth; The Distribution of Wealth; The Control of Trusts; The Problem of Monopoly; Essentials of Economic Theory; The Theory of Economic Progress; etc.

CLARK, John Maurice (1884-1963). American economist. Professor of economics, Columbia University (1926-53), professor emeritus (1953-63). Research: problems of competition and the business cycle. Publications: Strategic Factors in Business Cycles; Economics of Planning Public Works; Economics

325

Western Economists of the Twentieth Century

ALIBER, Robert (1930-). American economist. Associate professor, University of Chicago. Research: international finance and trade. Publications: The International Money Game; Uncertainty, Currency Areas and the Exchange Rate System; Stabilizing World Monetary Arrangements; The Political Economy of Monetary Reform; etc.

ARON, Raymond (1905-). French sociologist and economist. Professor of economics, College de France (1970-78) and Ecole practique des hautes etudes, Paris, since 1960. Research: problems of industrial society, planning, labour resources. Publications: D'une Sainte FamiUe a I'autre; Etudes politiques; Histoire et dialectique de la violence;Penser la guerre. Clausewitz, Vol. 1. L'Age europeen; Vol. 2. L'Age planetaire;Plaidoyer pour I'Europe decadente; etc.

ARROW, Kenneth Joseph (1921-). American economist. Professor of economics and operations research, Stanford University since 1979; Nobel Prize, 1972. Research: financial and budget policy, theory of risk, the functioning of the economy, theory of economic equilibrium, econometrics. Publications: Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing; Public Investment and the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy (with M.Kurtz); Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing; The Limits of Organization; Studies in Resource Allocation Processes (with L. Hurwitcz);etc.

BALASSA, Bela (1928-). American economist. Professor of political economy, Johns Hopkins University. Research: international economics, economic development, economic planning in socialist and developing countries. Publications: Theory of Economic Integration; Trade Liberalization among Industrial Countries; The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries; Economic Progress, Private Values and Public Policy; Policy Reform in Developing Countries; The Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy; etc.

BARAN, Paul (1910-1964). American economist. Professor of economics, Stanford University. Research: problems of developing countries and modern capitalism. Publications: The Political Economy of Growth; Monopoly Capital (with Paul Sweezy); Problems of Economic Dynamics and Planning (with Paul Sweezy);etc.

BARRE, Raymond (1924-). French economist. Professor at Institut d'etudes politiques, Paris, since 1961. Prime Minister of France (1976-81). Research: general theoretical problems of political economy, economic development, and the distribution of incomes. Publications: Economic politique, 1955 and 1974; Le Developpement economique. Analyse et politique; Rapport sur {'execution de la loi d'orientation du commerce et de I'artisanat (with Pierre Brousse); etc.

BAUMOL, William Jack (1922- ). American economist. Professor of economics, Princeton and New York Universities. Research: problems of the operation of firms, environmental economics, economic dynamics, and applied

324

of Overhead Costs; Demobilization of War-Time Economic Controls; Economic Institution and Human Welfare; Competition as a Dynamic Process; etc.

COLE, Charles Leland (1927- ). American economist. Professor of economics, California State University, Long Beach. Research: microeconomic theory, economic thought. Publications: The Economic Fabric of Society; Microeconomics: A'Contemporary Approach; etc.

DOMAR, Evsey David (1914-). American economist. Professor of economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research: comparative economic systems, economic growth. Publications: Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, and numerous papers.

DRUCKER, Peter Ferdinand (1909-). American sociologist. Professor of social sciences, Claremont Graduate School. Research: problems of economic policy, and questions of management. Publications: The New Society; America's Next Twenty Years; The Concept of the Corporation; The Age of Discontinuity; Management: Tasks, Practices, Responsibility; Men, Ideas and Politics; Technology, Management and Society; Neue Management Praxis, Vol. 1 -2; etc.

FELLNER, William John (1905- ). American economist. Professor of economics, Yale University. Research: the theory of induced innovations, problems of competition, unemployment, and inflation. Publications: Monetary Policies and Full Employment; Probability and Profit; Economic Policies and Inflation; A New Look at Inflation; etc.

FISHER, Irving (1867-1947). American economist and statistician. Professor of political economy, Yale University (1898-1935); first president of the Econometric Society (1931-33). Research: econometric analysis, theory of money circulation and credit, theory of index numbers. Publications: Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices; Elementary Principles of Economics; The Making of Index Numbers; The Nature of Capital and Income; The Theory of Interest; The Rate of Interest (1907 and subsequent revisions); 700% Money; etc.

FOURASTIE, Jean (1907-). French economist. Director, Ecole practique des' hautes etudes, Paris (1949-77). Research: problems of prices, wages, and economic growth. Publications: L'Eglise a-t-elle trahi; Comment man cerveau s'infprme; Le grand espoir du XX-e siecle; Le long chemin des homm.es; La realite economique: vers la revision des idees dominantes en France; etc.

FRANKLIN, Raymond (1930-). American economist. Professor of economics, Queens College, New York University. Publications: The French Socio-Economic Environment in the Eighteenth Century and Its Relation to the Physiocrats; American Capitalism: Two Versions; etc.

FRIEDMAN, Milton (1912-). American economist. Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, since 1976; professor of economics, Chicago University (1948-76); Nobel Prize, 1976. Research: monetary theory and statistics. Publications: Capitalism and Freedom; A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 (with A. J. Schwartz);Inflation: Causes and Consequences; An Economist's Protest; Monetary Statistics of the United States (with A.J.Schwartz); Price Theory; A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis; Free to Choose (with Rose Friedman);etc.

FURTADO, Celso (1920-). Brazilian economist. Professor of Yale and Paris Universities. Research: the economic development of Latin America and problems of the operations of foreign capital in Latin American countries. Publications: A economia brasileira; Uma economic dependente; Developpement et sous-developpement; Theoria y politico del desarollo economico; La economia latinuamericana; etc.

FUSFF.LD, Daniel Ronald (1922-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Research: history of economic thought, problems of economic theory. Publications: The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings (with Morris Bornstein); The Age of the Economist; Economics; etc.

326

GALBRAITH, John Kenneth (1908-). American economist. Professor of economics, Harvard University (1949-75); professor emeritus since 1975. Research: general economic problems and problems of the development of modern capitalism. Publications: A Theory of Price Control; American Capitalism. The Concept of Countervailing Power; The Affluent Society; The New Industrial State; Economics and the Public Purpose; The Age of Uncertainty; Almost Everyone's Guide to Economics; etc.

GARDNER, Brigham Delworth (1928-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Utah. Research: problems of resource economics and of agriculture. Publications: Rates of Return to Improvement Practices on Private and Public Ranges; A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Residence Shifts of Farm Families; etc.

GORDON, Donald Flemming (1923- ). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Rochester. Research: history of economic thought, business economics. Publications: The Role of the History of Economic Thought in the Understanding of Modern Economic Theory; Primary Products and Economic Growth: An Empirical Test;etc.

GROSSACK, Irvin Millman (1927-). American economist. Professor of economics, Indiana University, Bloomington. Research; industrial economics, relations of business and government, international economic relations. Publications: Managerial Economics; The Concept and Measurement of Permanent Industrial Concentration; The International Economy and the National Interest; etc.

GROSSMAN, Gregory (1921-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of California, Berkeley. Research: comparative economic systems, history of economics. Publications: Economic Systems; Soviet Statistics of Physical Output of Industrial Commodities; Essays in Socialism and Planning; The Industrialisation of Russia and the Soviet Union. In Carlo M. Cipolla (Ed.). The Fontana Economic History of Europe; etc.

GRUCHY, Allan (1906-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Maryland, College Park. Research: economic systems, the economics of national planning. Publications: Modern Economic Thought; Comparative Economic Systems; Contemporary Economic Thought. The Contribution of Neo-institutional Economics; etc.

HABERLER, Gottfried (1900-). American economist. Professor emeritus, Harvard University. Research: theory of cycles, problems of international trade. Publications: A Survey of International Trade Theory; Money in the International Economy; Inflation, Its Causes and Cures; etc.

HANSEN, Alvin Harvey (1887-1976). American economist. Professor of political economy, Harvard University. Research: theory of economic growth, cycles, monetary theory, problems of employment. Publications: Business Cycle Theory; Principles of Economics (with Frederic Benjamin Carver); Economic Policy and Full Employment; Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy; A Guide to Keynes; Economic Issues of the 1960s; The Dollar and the International Monetary System; etc.

HARRIS, Seymour (1897-1974). American economist. Professor emeritus of economics, Harvard University. Research: the politics of the functioning of the economy, problems of counter-crisis and counter-inflation policy, international relations. Publications: The New Economics; The Market for College Graduates; The Dollar in Crisis; Statistical Portrait of Higher Education; etc.

HARROD, Sir Roy (Forbes) (1900-1978). British economist. Professor at Oxford University and several American universities. Research: the theory of economic growth, the business cycle, and international trade and money. Publications: International Economics; The Trade Cycle; Economic Essays; Towards a New Economic Policy; Towards a Dynamic Economics;Policy against Inflation; Essay in Dynamic Theory; The Life of John Maynard Keynes; Economic Dynamics; etc.

HARTER, Lafayette George (1918-). American economist. Professor of

327

economics, Oregon State University. Research: social security and manpower; economic history. Publications: Economic Responses to a Changing World; Criteria for Impass Resolution in the Public Employment Sector; etc.

HAYEK, Friedrich August von (1899-). British economist. Professor of economics, University of Freiburg (1962-70). Nobel Prize, 1974. Research? theory of cycles, mathematical economics. Publications: Prices and Production; The Mirage of Social Justice; The Denationalisation of Money; New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas; etc.

HEERTJE, Arnold (1934-). Dutch economist. Professor of economics, Amsterdam University. Research; the theories of welfare, oligopoly, and economic growth. Publications: Economics and Technical Change; De Kern van de Economic; Basic Economics (with Brian Robinson); etc.

HEILBRONER, Robert (1919-). American economist. Professor at the New School for Social Research, New York. Research: general economics and problems of the development of modern capitalism. Publications: Future as History; Limits of American Capitalism; The Economic Problem; An Inquiry into the Human Prospect; Marxism: For and Against; Five Economic Challenges (with L. C. Thurow); etc.

HEILPERIN, Michael Angelo (1909-). American economist. Professor of international finance, University of California, Los Angeles. Research: monetary relations, theory of money, and international finance. Publications: International Monetary Economics; International Monetary Reconstruction; The Bretton Woods Agreement; Studies in Economic Nationalism;Money, Financial Institutions and the Economy; etc.

HICKS, Sir John Richard (1904-). British economist. Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Nobel Prize, 1972. Research: theories of wages, value and capital, interest, economic growth, economic dynamics. Publications: The Theory of Wages; Value and Capital; A Theory of Economic History; A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle; Capital and Time; The Crisis in Keynesian Economics; Critical Essays in Monetary Theory; Essays in World Economics; Capital and Growth; Economic Perspectives; etc.

HIRSCH, Fred (1932-1978). British economist. Professor of international studies, Warwick University. Research: international finance and inflation. Publications: Money International; Newspaper Money; Social Limits to Growth; The Political Economy of Inflation (joint editor with J. Goldthorpe); The Role and the Rule of Gold (with Jacques Rueff); etc.

JOHNSON, Harry Gordon (1923-1977). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Chicago and London School of Economics. Research: international economic relations and monetary economics. Publications: Essays in Monetary Economics; Economic Policies towards Less-developed Countries; Economics for the Business Man; The Theory of Income Distribution; Technology and Economic Independence; Selected Essays in Monetary Economics; etc.

KALDOR, Nicholas (Baron Kaldor) (1908-). British economist. Professor of economics, Cambridge University (1966-75); Fellow of King's College. Research: general economic theory, problems of economic policy, distribution of income, and economic growth. Publications: Essays on Economic Policy, Vols. I, II; Essays in Economic Stability and Growth; Essays in Value and Distribution; Further Essays on Economic Theory; Conflicts in Policy Objectives; Reports on Taxation, Vols. I, II; etc.

KEYNES, John Maynard (1883-1946). British economist. Founder of one of the most significant trends in economic thought---Keyncsianism. Publications: The Economic Consequences of the Peace; A Treatise on Money; A Tract on Monetary Reform; The End of Laissez-Faire; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money; How to Pay for the War; The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (28 volumes); etc.

KINDLEBERGER, Charles Poor (1910-). American economist. Professor

328

of international economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research: problems of international economic relations, finance, and money. Publications: International Economics; Europe and the Dollar; Power and Money; The World in Depression, 1929-1939; America in the World Economy; Economic Response; Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance and Growth; International Money; etc.

KOHLER, Heinz (1934-). American economist. Professor of economics, Amherst College. Research: urban economics and the economics of socialist countries. Publications: Scarcity Challenged: An Introduction to Economics; Economics: The Science of Scarcity; Economics and Urban Problems; Scarcity and Freedom: An Introduction to Economics; etc.

LAIDLER, David (1938- ). British economist. Professor of economics, Manchester University. Research: the theory of money and inflation. Publications: The Demand for Money---Theories and Evidence; Introduction to Microeconomics; The Phillips Curve Expectations and Income Policy. In H. G.Johnson and A. R. Nobey. The Current Inflation; Essays on Money and Inflation (ed. by D. E. W. Laidler and J. M. Parkin); The Demand for Money; Theories and Evidence; etc.

LECAILLON, Jacques Jean-Marie (1925- ). French economist. Professor at the University of Paris. Research: problems of macro- and microcconomic analysis, economic theory, national income, wages. Publications: Analyse macroeconomique; Analyse monetaire; Les salaires; Elements de theorie economique. Initiation, applications, revisions; La crise et I'alternance; Analyse economique; etc.

LEWIS, Sir (William) Arthur (1915-). British economist. Professor of political economy, Princeton University since 1968. Nobel Prize, 1979. Research: economic policy, economic growth, the new international economic order. Publications: The Principles of Economic Planning; The Theory of Economic Growth; The Evolution of the International Economic Order; Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913; etc.

LIPSEY, Richard George (1928- ). Canadian economist. Professor of economics, Queen's University. Research: general economic theory, positive economics, and mathematical economics. Publications: An Introduction to Positive Economics; The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis; Economics (with P. Steiner); Mathematical Economics; etc.

MACHLUP, Fritz (1902-). American economist. Professor of economics, New York University; professor emeritus of economics and international finance, Princeton University. Research: problems of international regional monetary relations, integration, methodology of the social sciences, the economics of technical progress, and the economics of education. Publications: The Political Economy of Monopoly; International Payments, Debts and Gold; Essays on Hayek; A History of Thought on Economic Integration;Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences; etc.

MANSFIELD, Edwin (1930-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Pennsylvania. Research: economics of technological change and econometrics. Publications: The Economics of Technological Change; Economics: Principles, Problems, Decisions; Principles of Microeconomics; Statistics for Business and Economics; etc.

MARCHAL, Jean (1905- ). French economist. Honorary professor of the University of Paris. Research: problems of national income, money circulation, price formation. Publications: Le mecanisme des prix; Cours d'economie politiquc; La repartition du revenu national (3 volumes); Monnaie et credit; Comptabilite nationale franfaise; Analyse monetaire; etc.

MARSHALL, Alfred (1842-1924). British economist. Professor of political economy, Cambridge University (1885-1908); professor emeritus, 1918. Founder of the Cambridge school of political economy. Publications: Principles of

329

Economics; Elements of Economics; Industry and Trade; Money, Credit and Commerce; etc.

MEADE, James Edward (1907- ). British economist, FBA. Honoured Doctor, Universities of Basel, Bath, Essex, Hull and Oxford; Honoured Fellow, London School of Economics; Oriel College and Hertford College, Oxford; Christ's College, Cambridge. Nobel Prize, 1977. Research: economic growth, the theory of indicative planning, and world trade. Publications: A Neo-classical Theory of Economic Growth; Principles of Political Economy (4 volumes); The Theory of Indicative Planning; The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic Policy; etc.

MELTZER, Allan Harold (1928- ). American economist. Professor of economics and social sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University. Research: the theory of money, problems of inflation, economic policy. Publications: An Analysis of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy-making (with Karl Brunner); Money, Debt and Economic Activity; etc.

MIKESELL, Raymond (1913- ). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Oregon. Research: international economic relations and foreign investment. Publications: Public International Lending for Development; The Economics of Foreign Aid; etc.

MISES, Ludwig Edler von (1881-1973). American economist. Professor emeritus of economics, Vienna University (1913-34), New York University (1945-69). Research: economic history, the theory of money and credit. Publications: The Theory of Money and Credit; Geldwertstabilisierung und Konjunkturpolitik; Human Action: A Treatise on Economics; Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution; The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science; etc.

MYRDAL, Karl Gunnar (1898-). Swedish economist. Professor emeritus, Universities of New York, California, Madison, etc. Nobel Prize, 1974. Research: problems of the world economy. Publications: An International Economy: Problems and Prospects; Challenge to Affluence; Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations; Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Economics; etc.

NOVE, Alexander (1915- ). British economist. Professor of economics, Glasgow University since 1963. Research: the economies of socialist countries. Publications: Socialist Economics (joint editor with D. M. Nuti); Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries; The Soviet Economic System; Political Economy and Soviet Socialism; etc.

NURKSE, Ragnar (1907-1959). American economist. Professor of economics, Columbia University. Research: international currency, inflation, capital. Publications: Internationale Kapitalbewegungen; International Currency Experience; Conditions of International Monetary Equilibrium; Course and Control of Inflation; Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries; etc.

OHLIN, Bertil Gotthard (1899-1979). Swedish economist. Professor emeritus of economics. Stockholm School of Economics. Nobel Prize, 1977. Research: problems of international economics. Publications: Interregional and International Trade; International Economic Reconstruction; The Problem of Employment Stabilization; The International Allocation of Economic Activity (Ed.); etc.

OKUN, Arthur (1928-1980). American economist. Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute. Research: short-term forecasting, fiscal and monetary policy, and problems of inflation. Publications: The Battle against Unemployment; The Measurement and Significance of Potential GNP; The Political Economy of Prosperity; Equality and Efficiency; The Big Tradeoff; etc.

PEACOCK, Alan Turner (1922-). British economist. Professor of economics, York University. Research: financial and budget policy and problems of

330

expenditure of the public sector. Publications: Economics of National Insurance; The Growth of Public Expenditure in the U.K. (1890-1955) (with J. Wiseman); Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy (with G. K. Shaw); etc.

PIETTRE, Andre (1906-). French economist. Professor emeritus, University of Paris. Research: the history of economic thought, problems of the development of modern capitalism. Publications: Les grands problemes de I'economie contemporaine, Vol. 1, Oil va le capitalisme?, Vol. 2, Pays socialiste et pays du tiers monde; Eglise missionnaire ou eglise des missionnaires?; etc.

PREBISCH, Raul (1901-). Argentinian economist. General Director of the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planning. Research: problems of the economies of Latin American countries, theory of the 'economy of the periphery'. Publications: The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Problems; Moneda sana e inflacion incontenible. Plan de restablecimiento economico; Toward a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America; Introduccion a Keynes; Fur eine bessere Zukunft der Entwicklungslander. Ausgewahlte okonomische Studien; Transformacion y desarollo; etc.

PRYOR, Frederick (1933-). American economist. Professor of economics, Swarthmore College. Research: comparative economic systems, foreign trade of socialist countries, problems of property. Publications: The Communist Foreign Trade System; Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations; Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations; etc.

ROBBINS, Lionel Charles (Baron Robbins of Clare Market) (1898-). British economist. Professor of economics, London School of Economics (1929-61); Chairman of the Financial Times (1961-70); First Chancellor of Sterling University (1968-78). Research: problems of economic theory, economic policy, the trade cycle, history of economic thought. Publications: An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science; The Great Depression; The Theory of Economic Policy m English Classical Political Economy; Politics and Economics; Robert Torrens and the Evolution of Classical Economics; The Evolution of Modern Economic Theory; Money, Trade and International Relations; Political Economy. Past and Present: A Review of Leading Theories of Economic Policy; etc.

ROBINSON, Joan Violet (1903-). British economist. Professor of economics, Cambridge University (1965-71). Research: the theory of value, competition, and economic growth. Publications: Economics of Imperfect Competition; Essay of Marxian Economics; The Accumulation of Capital; Collected Economic Papers (5 volumes); Economic Heresies; After Keynes (Ed.); Economics: An Awkward Comer; Introduction to Modern Economics (with John Eatwell);etc.

ROSTOW, Walt Whitman (1916- ). American economist and sociologist. Professor of economics and history, University of Texas, Austin. Research: economic history and the theory of stages of economic growth. Publications: The Process of Economic Growth; The Stages of Economic Growth; The Diffusion of Power; How It All Began: Origins of the Modern Economy; The World Economy: History and Prospect; Getting from Here to There; etc.

RUEFF, Jacques (1896-1978). French economist. Chancellor of the French Institute. Research: problems of money circulation, finances, credit. Publications: L'Age de I'inflation; Le peche monetaire de I'occident; Combats pour I'ordre financier; La reforme du systeme monetaire international; etc.

SAMUELSON, Paul Antony (1915- ). American economist. Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Nobel Prize, 1970. Research: general problems of economic theory. Publications: Economics (11 editions); Readings in Economics; The Collected Scientific Papers; etc.

SCHERER, Frederic Michael (1932- ). American economist. Senior Research Fellow of the International Institute of Management, professor of economics, University of Michigan (1969-72). Research: industrial economics and vertical integration. Publications: Industrial Market Structure and Economic

331

Performance; Research and Development Resource Allocation under Rivalry; Market Structure and the Stability of Investment; etc.

SCHUMPETER, Josef (1883-1950). American economist. Professor at Harvard University (1932-50). Author of the conceptions of economic dynamics, the dynamic conception of the business cycle, and of the theory of effective competition. Publications: Business Cycles (2 volumes); The Theory of Economic Development; Ten Great Economists; Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy; History of Economic Analysis; etc.

SELIGMAN, Ben Baruch (1912-1970). American economist. Professor of economics and Director of the Labor Relations and Research Center of the University of Massachusetts. Research: problems of social relations, history of economic thought, statistics. Publications: Main Currents in Modern Economics; Poverty as a Public Issue; Most Notorious Victory: A Man in an Age of Automation; Permanent Poverty. An American Syndrome; etc.

SHERMAN, Howard Jay (1931-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of California, Riverside. Research: the economics of planning, economic fluctuations and growth, the radical trend in Western political economy. Publications: Macrodynamic Economics; The Soviet Economy; Radical Political Economy; Economics; etc.

SOLMON, Lewis Calvin (1942- ). American economist. Staff Director of the Board of Human Resources, National Research Council. Research: economic history, effects of human capital on economic growth. Publications: Estimation of the Costs of Schooling in 1880 and 1890; Economics; etc.

SOLO, Robert Alexander (1916-). American economist. Professor of economics and management, Michigan State University. Research: organisation and control in the political economy, theory of social change and economic development. Publications: Economic Organizations and Social Systems; Inducing Technological Change for Economic Growth and Development (Ed.); Organizing Science for Technology Transfer in Economic Development; etc.

SOLOW, Robert Merton (1924-). American economist. Professor of economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research: economic theory and macroeconomics. Publications: Capital Theory and tin' Rate of Return; Growth Theory; etc.

SPULBER, Nicolas (1915- ). American economist. Professor of economics, Indiana University, Bloomington. Research: the economics of socialist countries. Publications: Socialist Management and Planning; The Soviet Economy: Structure, Principles, Problems; The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe; Organizational Alternatives in Soviet-type Economies; Issues in the Theory of the 'Socialist Economy': A Survey; etc.

SRAFFA, Piero (1898- ). British economist. Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge since 1939. Emeritus Reader in Economics, Cambridge University. Research: criticism of the neoclassical theory of prices. Publications: The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions; The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (Ed.); Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory.

STEINER, Peter (1922- ). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Research: economic theory and the economics of industry. Publications: Economics (with R. G. Lipsey);.Pu6/ic Expenditure Budgeting; Choosing among Alternative Public Investments; etc.

STIGLER, George Joseph (1911-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Chicago. Research: the organisation of industry, problems of distribution and of price formation, history of economic thought. Publications: Production and Distribution Theories; Theory of Price; Essays in the History of Economics; The Organization of Industry; etc.

STOBBE, Alfred (1924- ). West German economist. Professor of economics, Mannheim University. Research: econometrics, income distribution, economic accounting. Publications: Untersuchungen zur makrookonomischen Theorie der Emkommensverteilung; Volkswirtschaftliches Rechnungswesen; Gesamtwirtschaftliche Theorie; etc.

332

SWEEZY, Paul Marlor (1910- ). American economist. Editor of Monthly Review. Research: economic history, theory of comparative economic systems. Publications: The Theory of Capitalist Development; Principles of Marxian Political Economy; Modern Capitalism and Other Essays; etc.

THUROW, Lester Carl (1938- ). American economist. Professor of economics and management, Massachusetts - Institute of Technology. Research: problems of income distribution, financial and fiscal policy. Publications: Poverty and Discrimination; Disequilibrium and the Marginal Productivity of Capital and Labor; A fiscal Policy Model of the U.S.; Five Economic Challenges (with Robert Heilbroner); etc.

TINBERGEN, Jan (1903- ). Dutch economist. Professor at Rotterdam University (1933-73), University of Leiden (1973-75). Nobel Prize, 1969. Research: problems of the trade cycle, modelling of economic development, theory of optimum structure. Publications: Selected Papers; Shaping the World Economy; Development Planning; Income Distribution; Reshaping the International Order. A Report to The Club of Rome (Coordinator); etc.

TOBIN, James (1918- ). American economist. Professor of economics, Yale University. Research: macroeconomic theory and policy, theory of economic growth, monetary economics. Publications: National Economic Policy; Financial Markets and Economic Activity; The New Economics One Decade Later; Essays in Economics; Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity; etc.

VEBLEN, Thorstein (1875-1929). American economist. Founder of American institutionalism. Publications: The Theory of the Leisure Class; The Theory of Business Enterprise; The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts; The Engineers and the Price System; etc.

VERNON, Raymond (1913- ). American economist. Professor at Harvard University, Director of the Centre of International Affairs. Research: international economic relations. Publications: Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems; Manager m the International Economy; Sovereignty at Bay; etc.

WALLICH, Henry Christopher (1914-). American economist. Professor of economics and Fellow of the Timothy Dwight College, Yale University. Research: credit, monetary and fiscal policy and economic theory. Publications: Monetary Problems of an Export Economy; Public Finance in a Developing Country (with John Adler); Mainsprings-of the German Revival; The Cost of Freedom; etc.

WALRAS, Leon (1834-1910). Swiss economist. Founder of the mathematical school in political economy; one of the founders of the theory of marginal utility; professor at Lausanne University (1870-92). Publications: Theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale; Theorie de la monnaie; Etudes d'economie sociale, ou theorie de la repartition de la richesse sociale; Etudes d'economie politique appliquee;etc.

WEINTRAUB, Sidney (1914-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Research: problems of economic analysis, the theory of prices, income distribution and employment. Publications: Price Theory; Theory of Income Distribution; Classical Keynesianism, Monetary Theory and the Price Level; Modern Economic Thought (Ed.); Keynes, Keynesians and Monetarists; Capitalism's Inflation and Unemployment Crises: Beyond Monetarism and Keynesianism; etc.

WHITMAN, Marina von Neumann (1935- ). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Pittsburgh. Research: international capital movements, international monetary relations. Publications: Government Risk-sharing in Foreign Investment; Economic Goals and Policy Instruments; Policies for Internal and External Balance; etc.

WICK.SELL, Knut (1851-1926). Swedish economist. Professor of political economy, Lund University (1900-26). Founder of the credit theory of market forces. Research: problems of finance, credit and the circulation of money.

333

Publications: Ober Wert, Kapital, und Rente; Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Schwedens; Geldzins und Guterpreise; Lectures on Political Economy (two volumes); Vorlesungen iiber Nationalokonomie auf Grundlage des Marginalprinzipes (Vol. 1-2); Selected Papers on Economic Theory; etc.

WIESER, Friedrich von (1851-1926). Austrian economist. Professor at the University of Vienna (1913-23). One of the founders of the theory of marginal utility and theory of impunity. Publications: Ober den Ursprung und die Hauptgesetze des Wirtschaftlichen Wertes; Der natUrliche Wert; Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft;etc.

WILES, Peter John (1919- ). British economist. Professor at the University of London. Research: the economies of socialist countries. Publications: Price, Cost and Output; The Political Economy of Communism; Communist International Economics; The Prediction of Communist Economic Performance; Economic Institutions Compared; etc.

WONNACOTT, Paul Gordon (1933-). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Maryland. Research: the economics of international relations, theory of money, and macroeconomics. Publications: The Canadian Dollar 1948-1962; Free Trade between the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects (with R. J. Wonnacott); U.S.-Canadian Free Trade: The Potential Impact on the Canadian Economy (with R. J. Wonnacott); Macroeconomics; Economics (with R. J. Wonnacott); etc.

WONNACOTT, Ronald Johnston (1930- ). American economist. Professor of economics, University of Western Ontario. Research: the economics of international relations, econometrics. Publications: Free Trade between the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects (with P. G. Wonnacott); Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics; Economics (with P. G. Wonnacott); etc.

ZINN, Karl Georg (1939- ). West German economist. Professor at the Aachen Technische Hochschule. Research: planning in socialist countries, problems of prices and profit. Publications: Sozialistische Planwirtschaftstheorie; Preissystem und Staatsinterventionismus; Niedergang des Profits; Wirtschaft und Wissenschaftstheorie; Allgemeine Wirtschaftspolitik; etc.

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications. Please send all your comments to 17, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.