Rudolf Alexeyev

Progress Publishers Moscow

Translated from the Russian by

Barry Costello- Jones and Lenina Ilitskaya

Designed by Vyacheslav Chernetsov

P. AjieKceee

CCCP-4PF: HOBHH 3TAII B3AHMOOTHOIHEHHH Contents

Ha auenuucKOM mbiKe

Page

Introduction .............

5

A Positive Change in Soviet-West German Relations .

14

Relations in the Latter Half of the 1970s.....

Ill

Soviet-West German Relations at the Turn of the

1970s ...............

151

Mission of Peace............

199

Afterword ..............

237

, 1980

English translation of the revised Russian text ©Progress Publishers 1983

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

. 11105-136

47-83

0801000000

014(01)-83

Introduction

What can we expect of the 1980s? Will they bring peace and tranquillity, prosperity and wellbeing, almost forty years after the most devastating of all wars?

Obviously the groundwork of better relations between countries with different social systems, between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism, took decades to build. Relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany have a long history of almost thirty years. The uninterrupted political dialogue throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, above all the summit meetings and talks was continued by Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in November 1981.

Studying the efforts of the countries of the socialist community to normalise relations with the FRG based on recognition of the existing political and territorial realities in Europe is an endeavour of lasting significance. The attacks on the treaties with the socialist countries by West German reactionary forces, which are especially dangerous in view of the government's weakened internal political position and its manoeuvring and vacillation on key issues of SovietWest German cooperation, continue and every so often intensify.

During World War II, it was the fate of the Soviet people to bear the gruelling trials. Recollection of the sacrifices to ultimately triumph over Nazi Germany still rankles in every Soviet

heart. The memory of twenty million dead and the lessons of the battle against fascism caution us to be vigilant, encourage us to work tirelessly for peace and international security, for ensuring that there will never be another war.

After World War II, despite the Soviet Union's determined struggle for a unified, democratic and independent Germany, and through the fault of the Western powers and the West German reactionary circles, Germany was divided. Two German states eventually arose: the first state of workers and peasants on German soil---the GDR; and the bourgeois FRG. So logically one can assume that it should be a matter of interest to know how relations emerged and developed between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, a country whose policy was for many years a source of international tension, and which caused grave concern to all who cherished peace and European security.

Academic literature and the press in the West have recently indulged in speculations about what they claim is the unresolved German question and about the ways of dealing with it. There is no doubt whatsoever that concealed behind it is the wish, on the one hand---and most important of all---to prevent the USSR and the FRG from further extending and promoting their relations, and on the other, to encourage the pipe dreams of West German politicians.

An analysis of the history of relations enables us to trace the far from easy road that the USSR and the FRG, the countries with different social systems, had to cover to remove many of the obstacles to normal, and goodneighbourly relations, and also enables us to see what impact these relations have made on the settling of issues

pertaining to the consolidation of peace and security in Europe. The extent to which it is possible to prevent the negative tendencies from prevailing, and to entrench, strengthen and extend the positive results will determine the progress of USSR-FRG relations, and much more.

This study examines a wide range of issues affecting Soviet-West German relations. One of these issues, and the one which happens to be most important---recognition by the FRG of the political and territorial realities resulting from the defeat of German fascism and postwar developments, on the basis of treaties signed with the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia---has been resolved. On others, a great deal of progress has been made. And a third group will need a stubborn struggle before being settled.

In this matter, knowledge of the causes of the complications, the ability to deal with them and to focus on those features which bring the two countries and two peoples together are of practical value.

This study covers the period from the turn for the better in the USSR-FRG relations in the early 1970s to their present state and prospects.

Since the significance of twenty years of confrontation and of subsequent cooperation between the USSR and the FRG transcends the limits of bilateral relations, it is logical to consider them against the broad political background of the struggle waged by the USSR and the socialist community as a whole for peace, security and cooperation in Europe and in the rest of the world. In the light of the NATO decision of December 12, 1979 to deploy US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the question

arises of how this decision affects the military and political balance in Europe, and the character and prospects of relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany.

The history of Soviet-West German relations should be divided into two stages. The first is from 1955 to 1969, and the second from 1970 to the present. The foreign policy of the FRG government in the 1950s-1960s was at odds with the real situation in Europe and the world, as well as with the interests of the peoples of Europe; it did damage to the vital national interests of the FRG and was a major source of tension in Europe and well beyond. It took patient efforts on the part of the USSR and other socialist countries and of all forces of peace and democracy to make the West German ruling circles aware that peaceful coexistence with the socialist countries was both necessary and inevitable.

Ever since diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the FRG in 1955, the Soviet Union has proposed a broad constructive programme for developing political, economic and cultural contacts. And for a long time, there was no constructive response from West Germany to the Soviet Union's initiatives for normalising relations.

For almost fifteen years, Bonn refused to recognise the outcome of World War II and the realities of post-war development; it stipulated a host of unfounded "preliminary conditions" before normal relations with its Eastern neighbours could be established. It distorted the meaning and significance of the Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives, which were aimed at strengthening peace and security in Europe.

The imperialist-launched cold war made things

even more difficult. But time marched on. The world situation inexorably changed in favour of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism.

The Peace Programme put forward by the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU initiated a new advance. Leonid Brezhnev, former General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "The main accomplishment is that we have succeeded in breaking the tragic cycle: world war---brief spell of peace--- world war again. We, Soviet people, our friends--- the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and all those who have struggled and continued to struggle for peace, for detente and for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems---have a right to be proud of this historic result.''^^1^^

The Peace Programme was extended and amplified in the light of the changing international situation by the 26th CPSU Congress, and the relevant new Soviet initiatives provide a solid basis for stepping up efforts for peace and for preventing nuclear war.

In the 1970s, the governments of the FRG and other Western countries were finally forced to admit that there was no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. The idea of detente that had been initiated by the Soviet Union was winning increasingly broad recognition.

The sober and realistic position adopted by the Brandt-Scheel government which came to power in 1969 opened up for the FRG, for the first

~^^1^^ On Events in Afghanistan. Leonid Brezhnev's Replies to ``Pravda'' Correspondent, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1980, p. 3.

time, the prospect of establishing peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and other socialist community countries.

One of the landmarks on the road to founding European relations on the principles of peace and cooperation was the Moscow Treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany which was signed on August 12, 1970.

With the signing of this Treaty and those with Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and with the FRG's establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and the FRG embarked on a path leading to goodneighbourly relations and cooperation, although some differences of principle still remain in their approach to certain important political issues. The turn in relations between the USSR and the FRG towards mutual understanding and cooperation became a political reality of great international significance.

Paramount in this respect were the SovietWest German summit meetings, which helped resolve pressing political problems and provide a solid base for normalising relations and laying the ground for permanent cooperation.

This positive shift contributed to the successful outcome of the talks between the FRG and the European socialist countries (GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria) and to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Developing all-round cooperation with the FRG is a major, long-term policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, and they have demonstrated in practice that they are ready to promote cooperation in every area.

``Relations with the FRG," said Leonid Brezhnev

in answer to a question from Vorwdrts, the weekly magazine of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, "constitute a part of the Soviet Union's multiform, world-wide ties, but they are a very important part. After all, in European affairs, and in the wider context, a great deal depends on the position of our two countries and their mutual understanding. The state of relations between the FRG and the USSR is a sensitive barometer of international detente, of peaceful coexistence, not only in Europe, but also further afield.''^^1^^

Inside the FRG the relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are also considered invaluable for strengthening peace in Europe. During Leonid Brezhnev's FRG visit in 1978, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt declared that "the signing of treaties between West Germany and countries of Eastern Europe, including the 1970 Moscow Treaty, was a major step in the policy of detente, and a political achievement.''^^2^^

At the turn of the 1970s, the international situation took a turn for the worse. The Soviet Union and the FRG can do a great deal to clear away the obstacles to detente. It depends largely on them whether detente is continued and consolidated at a time when Western reactionary forces would like to erase the positive results that were won at the price of so much effort in the talks between socialist and capitalist countries in the 1970s, and to drag the world back to the days of the cold war.

In the 1970s, cooperation between the Soviet

L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1979, p. 73.

~^^2^^ The Visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG. May 4-7, 1978. Speeches, Documents, Data, Moscow, 1978, p. 36 (in Russian).

Union and West Germany made great progress, while the area of friction and differences was narrowed, even though they still had different standpoints and took different approaches to international issues.

Talks, political consultations and exchanges of views between the USSR and the FRG on bilateral agreements and key international issues are now regular occurrences. A great deal has been done to extend and intensify mutually advantageous cooperation; and the groundwork has been laid for further progress in Soviet-FRG relations.

At the same time, the dangers must be sounded of the mounting activity of militarist and revanchist forces in the FRG, and the absolute need for strongly opposing those who would act on the favourite imperialist principle that diplomacy without weapons is like an orchestra without instruments must be emphasised. The negative effect of these tendencies on the character and scope of Soviet-FRG relations is obvious.

The outcome of the struggle waged by the USSR, the socialist community and all forces of peace and democracy in the 1980s for peace, security and socialism will determine the perspectives of development in Europe and the rest of the world.

How USSR-FRG relations will develop is certainly important, as these two major European countries play a prominent role in shaping Europe's political climate. The policy of mutually advantageous cooperation was naturally continued by Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in November 1981, which was another piece of conclusive evidence of the Soviet Union's systematic and purposeful pursuit of peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation between countries with differ-

ent social systems, of world peace and security; it is the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence in action.

At the turn of the 1970s, tensions in East-West relations have mounted. The American ruling circles are undermining the foundations of detente. Washington urges other Western states to tear up the material fabric of detente, to curtail their economic and commercial links with socialist countries, and to think in cold war terms.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community hope that the West German government assess all the dangerous consequences of new US medium-range missiles being deployed on the Federal Republic's territory and contribute to finding a solution to the problem that would not infringe upon anyone's legitimate security interests and would ease the military confrontation on the continent. "We would like to see the Federal Republic of Germany," Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister, said on January 18, 1983, "display its individuality and concern for its own interests in building its relations with the Soviet Union, rather than succumb to external influences that go against its interests or the interests of good relations with the USSR.''^^1^^

The Warsaw Treaty member states meeting in Prague in January 1983 stated in their Political Declaration that "a foundation has been created in Europe by the joint efforts of states for the consistent development of relations of good--- neighbourliness and cooperation among them, mutual respect and trust".^^2^^

^lPravda, January 20, 1983. New Times No. 3, January 1983, p. 7.

A POSITIVE CHANGE

IN SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

cooperation are gaining acknowledgement and support by a growing number of countries. The peace initiatives of the socialist countries have helped to create a situation in which it has become possible to consider the questions of security and cooperation in Europe in practical terms. The solution of these problems is a task of historic magnitude.''^^1^^

The realities of life have compelled the West German politicians to make the necessary correctives in their foreign policy.

In a review of the administration of the CDU / CSU the West German political analyst P. Bender admitted that "West German policy of not recognising the GDR, of questioning its existence and eliminating it from the international scene (even to a limited extent) brought no practical benefit". He suggested finding a solution to the problem of West Berlin, which through the fault of the ruling circles in the FRG became a serious cause of international tension, and recognising the GDR and improving relations with all the socialist countries. An attempt to pursue a "sensible policy in relation to the GDR," he stressed, "could only prove successful if it became part of a general effort to start new relations with the whole of the Soviet bloc.''^^2^^

By the late sixties it became apparent that the Western powers were not prepared to show the same enthusiasm as before in supporting Bonn's demands for a review of West Germany's borders with her eastern neighbours. In 1967, K.-H. Flach of the FDP noted that "the fact is that the Oder-

With the coming into office of the BrandtScheel government in 1969 important changes took place in Soviet-West German relations. The new West German government adopted a more realistic attitude in its evaluation of the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole, showing that it understood the importance of maintaining normal relations with the USSR and other socialist countries.

The groundwork for this change, however, had been prepared gradually. The successes achieved by the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries in building a new society, the ever increasing role of the socialist community in international affairs, the collapse of the colonial system, which for many years had been one of the sources of the economic might of the imperialist countries, and the weakening of imperialism generally, all combined to make possible the normalisation of Soviet-West German relations, an achievement which the Soviet Union had been striving for over a period of many years.

The change in the international balance of forces in favour of peace, democracy and socialism, furthermore, made it pointless to consider gaining military superiority over the USSR and the socialist community countries. Summing up the international situation in the early seventies Leonid Brezhnev said: "The ideas of peace, security and the development of broad and varied

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 24.

~^^2^^ P. Bender, Offensive Entspannung. Moglichkeit fur Deut- schland, Kbln-Berlin, Kiepenheuer Witsch, 1965, pp. 113, 150.

14 15

Neisse line is the ultimate border not only for Eastern bloc, but also for all our allies as well. General (de Gaulle---R. A.) has put into words what everyone else is thinking. Since we have renounced (and rightly so) the use of force, and since there can be no change in the borders without the use offeree, then in effect the problem is solved''.

Refusal to recognise postwar political realities in Europe and the openly expressed pretensions of the revanchists have given rise to growing indignation and criticism in both West Germany and abroad. Bonn was faced with the real threat of isolation among its allies. Thus the renunciation of its former policy and the establishment of radically different relations with the socialist countries became a matter of increasing urgency for theFRG.

According to Willy Brandt, the impetus to take a different look at the international situation and the role of the Federal Republic in its relations with the socialist states of Eastern Europe came for him personally and for other SPD leaders in the well-known speech that was delivered on June 10, 1963 by President John F. Kennedy at the American University, in which he recognised that a nuclear war would be suicidal and called for improved cooperation with the USSR. "This speech," Brandt wrote, "carried a lot of weight with us." It was now necessary to "do away with the nuclear balance of terror and set about finding peaceful solutions to problems" in order to "bring about a change in relations between East and West that would be based on no illusions... There was no other prospect for peace than coexistence with the Soviet Union. We had to show the other side quite clearly that (West---R. A.) Germany was interested in

detente and not in maintaining tension.''^^1^^

Brandt was one of the first West German politicians whose views markedly evolved under the influence of changes in world development and in public opinion within the Federal Republic. Brandt believed, and this conviction grew over the years, that the absence of normal relations with the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries was against the national interests of the FRG. "There can be no doubt," he declared in a speech to the Bundestag on June 3, 1953, "that the Federal Republic must resolutely pursue a consistent policy of peaceful cooperation with its neighbours both in the East and the West. West German policy must not be influenced by ... either hatred, or claims upon any of our neighbours, or arrogance towards the Slavs. German policy must strive to overcome its historical burdens and the sad heritage left by National Socialism through the desire for real mutual understanding and the readiness to make a peaceful compromise of interests.''^^2^^

On June 1, 1966, Brandt, speaking at a party congress in Dortmund as SPD Chairman, made a cautious hint at the possibility of a change in the party's position vis-a-vis the Oder-Neisse line. He declared that "certain persons act as if we own the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. In this sense we do not even `own' that which lies between us and the Oder-Neisse line.''^^3^^

~^^1^^ Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 19^0-1975, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1976, pp. 77-78. Willy Brandt, Der Wille zum Frieden, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg, 1973, p. 53.

~^^3^^ Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970. Kontinuitat und Wandel, Dokumentation herausgegeben von Boris Meissner, Koln, 1970, p. 131.

16 ₁₇

2---919

On becoming Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Brandt began a more serious struggle for a change in West German policy towards the socialist countries.

The inadmissibility of blindly following cold war dogmas in relation to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries was also noted by Herbert Wehner, Deputy Chairman of the SPD. In a speech delivered in July 1967, he declared that the West German government was not pursuing a German policy, but engaging in a legal tussel that made West Germans prisoners of their own formula.'

This evolution in the views of the SPD leaders has not come about by pure chance. The majority of the population of the Federal Republic favoured the normalisation of relations with the socialist states, and the rank and file members of the SPD showed a more realistic attitude to this issue. On March 21, 1968 the Nuremberg Congress of the SPD voted in favour of the nuclear non-- proliferation treaty and reaffirmed its support for the "establishment of neighbourly relations between the FRG and the GDR". On the question of the Oder-Neisse line the congress declared that West German policy would be more successful "if we should clearly express our will to respect and recognise the present borders in Europe, particularly the western border with Poland, until such time as the German borders are finally determined by a peace treaty^which is accepted as both just and secure by all parties concerned.''^^2^^

The Bad Godesberg Congress of the SPD (April 16-18, 1969) adopted a resolution demanding that "the Munich agreement, signed under

Stuttgarter Zeitung, July 4, 1967.

duress, unjust and no longer effective now, should be annulled by means of an agreed settlement".^^1^^

During the latter period of the Kiesinger administration the differences between the partners in the "grand coalition" government intensified considerably. This was particularly evident in the respective attitudes of Chancellor Kiesinger and Vice-Chancellor Brandt to the note delivered by the Soviet government in which the Soviet side offered to renew talks on renouncing the use of force. Chancellor Kiesinger alleged that Moscow was demanding the capitulation of the West German government, while Brandt, on the other hand, stressed the non-polemic, business-like tone of the Soviet note. Ultimately, however, the Social Democratic Party came out in favour of normalising relations with the USSR and other socialist countries.

During the latter half of the sixties certain changes also took place in the foreign political concepts of another party, the FDP. At a FDP (Free Democratic Party) Congress, held from April 3 to 5, 1967, in Hannover, Erich Mende, then Chairman of the FDP, managed to get through for the last time the old cold war directives on the question of relations with the socialist countries. But after the congress contradictions arose within the party as a result of statements made to the press by FDP Secretary Schollwer and FDP Treasurer Rubin who called for the recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse border.

By 1968 this new trend had gained supremacy in the FDP. Walter Scheel, the new party Chairman,

Dokwnentation zur Deutschlandfrage, Hauptband V, Siegler Co., Verlag fur Zeitarchive, G.m.b.H.-Bonn-Wien-- Ziirich, 1970, p. 493.

Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970, p. 246.

2*

declared in a speech in the Bundestag that "together with the Federal Republic a second state has arisen on German soil with all the characteristic features essential to a state. This is an undisputable fact.''^^1^^ On January 24, 1969 the FDP submitted in the Bundestag a draft treaty with the GDR, giving it de-facto recognition, and proposed the establishment of diplomatic contacts.

The SPD and FDP party congresses in the Bundestag election year of the 1969 showed that the positions of the two parties on international questions were sufficiently close for them to form a coalition government. The main foreign political demands of the FDP for the 1969 election were the conclusion of a treaty with the socialist countries on the non-use of force, a settlement of relations between the two German states under a treaty and their entry into the United Nations and the holding of a conference on security and cooperation in Europe.^^2^^ These realistic conclusions on the future development of relations between the FRG and the European socialist countries stemmed from the realisation of the fact that the policy from strength had proved bankrupt.

When the SPD and the FDP coalition came to power, they were able to put into practice the new policy towards the socialist countries which was based on goodneighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The decision of the West German government to adopt a new realistic policy towards the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist countries was made plain in a speech delivered by Willy Brandt in the Bundestag on October 28, 1969. "The

German people," he declared, "needs peaceful relations in the fullest sense of these words with the USSR and with all the countries of Eastern Europe. We are ready to make an honest attempt at achieving mutual understanding so as to overcome the consequences of the catastrophe which the criminal clique let loose upon Europe.''

The West German government declared its intention of concluding bilateral treaties on the non-use of force with the socialist countries. "A policy renouncing the use of force," the government declaration stated, "which implies the territorial integrity of those who are partners to it would, in the opinion of the Federal government, make a decisive contribution to detente in Europe. Renunciation of the use of force creates the kind of atmosphere that makes further steps possible.''^^1^^

The positive change that had taken place in West German policy was also to be seen in the fact that the government declaration of October 28, 1969 for the first time officially spoke of "two German states". This showed the realistic attitude adopted by ruling circles in the FRG on one of the main problems that was still the cause of deep divisions of opinion between the FRG, on the one hand, and the USSR and the socialist countries, on the other.

On December 17, 1969 the government of the GDR offered the West German government a draft treaty establishing equal relations between the two states. This eventually brought a constructive response from Bonn, when on January 22, 1970 Chancellor Willy Brandt proposed that the USSR and the GDR should enter into negotiations

Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970, p. 251. IPW Berichte No. 5, 1977, p. 69.

Bulletin No. 132, October 29, 1969, Bonn, p. 1128.

with the FRG concerning a treaty on the non-use of force.

Talks were held in the spring of 1970 between the heads of government of the two German states, first at Erfurt in the GDR (March 19) and then at Kassel in the FRG (May 21). Although they did not succeed in bringing about a normalisation of relations, in view of the fact that the West German government stubbornly refused to give international and legal recognition to the GDR, the foundations for political dialogue between the two states had been laid.

The desire of the Bonn leaders to enter into negotiations met with understanding and support in the Soviet Union. At a meeting held in honour of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship in Moscow on October 27, 1969, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "We would like to believe that these intentions are serious. At any rate the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany have every opportunity to put them into practice.''^^1^^ Leonid Brezhnev went on to outline those problems in future SovietWest German talks which would have to be solved before there could be any normalisation of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries. "It is obvious," he said, "what importance is attached, for example, to West German recognition of the present borders in Europe, particularly the border between the FRG and the GDR, its recognition of the total invalidity of the Munich agreement and its renunciation of the unlawful claims of the Christian Democratic government to speak in the name of the whole German people. Steps of this kind, together with West Germany

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 482 (in Russian).

signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its participation alongside other states in the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, would undoubtedly make a positive contribution to the solution of those problems upon which the peace and security in the world primarily depend.''^^1^^

On October 30, 1969 the West German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walter Scheel, informed the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn that the government of the Federal Republic was ready to enter into negotiations on the normalisation of relations. On November 15, the West German Ambassador to Moscow, Helmut Allardt, handed a note to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressing the desire of his government to begin immediate talks with the Soviet government on the mutual renunciation of the use of force. Speaking in January 1970 in the Bundestag Brandt affirmed that the renunciation of the use of force was the cornerstone of his policy and stressed that it should become the basis for improving relations with all the East European countries.^^2^^

The Soviet Union was well aware of the kind of difficulties that confronted talks with the FRG. Bonn was prepared to recognise the present realities in Europe, but calculated upon being able to bring about their gradual change and ultimately bridging the split in Europe and at the same time the split in Germany. Furthermore, the reunification of Germany was only considered possible on a capitalist basis.^^3^^

Ibid.

^^2^^ Bulletin No. 6, January 15, 1970, p. 51.

~^^3^^ G. I. Rozanov, USSR-FRG: Restructuring Relations, Moscow, 1977, p. 10 (in Russian).

The Soviet Union took account of the fact that the Brandt government would meet the stubborn resistance from reactionary circles within the country in trying to solve the radical problems affecting Soviet-West German relations. But the actual holding of the talks, it was believed, would have a positive influence on the alignment of forces within the FRG between those who supported and those who opposed the normalisation of relations with the socialist countries. And this was in fact the case.

The shadow that had been cast over relations between the FRG and the socialist countries by plans to provide the former with nuclear weapons was finally dispersed on November 28, 1969 when the West German government signed the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby showing its desire to eliminate one of the main obstacles to the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, which looked upon West German ambitions to possess nuclear weapons as a direct threat to world peace exacerbating the danger of a new world war. Despite the provisos which accompanied the West German signing of the treaty (such as the demand for additional guarantees that the treaty would not impede the development of peaceful nuclear power engineering in the FRG), it was still a major international development. The signing of the treaty crowned the struggle which had been taking place within and without the FRG against giving the Bundeswehr nuclear weapons.

This step met with the approval of all West Germany's Eastern neighbours and of all other states interested in eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. It also facilitated talks on normalis-

ing relations with the USSR and the other European socialist countries.

Also of considerable importance for improving relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries as well as for the cause of peace and security throughout the world was the declaration of the West German government which renounced its former territorial claims on its Eastern neighbours. "The Federal Republic," declared Chancellor Brandt, "would no longer make any territorial demands either during the seventies or at any other time in the future.''^^1^^

In December 1969 an intensive political dialogue was underway between a high level Soviet delegation headed by A. A. Gromyko and a similar delegation from West Germany on matters relating to the normalisation of relations. Meetings . were also held in Moscow between Soviet leaders and West German Secretary of State, Egon Bahr to discuss preparations for a treaty between the two countries. From July 27 to August 7, 1970 further talks were held between the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries and agreement was finally reached on the draft of the treaty. On August 12, 1970 the treaty was signed in Moscow by Soviet leaders and a West German delegation headed by Chancellor Brandt.

This treaty signed in Moscow was a major development in the history of Soviet-West German relations. This was due to its political importance and the position of the two sides on the cardinal issues of European security.

The present situation in Europe, the inviolability

~^^1^^ Parteitag der SPD. Protokoll der Verhandlungen Angenommene und iiberwiesene Antrdge. Saarbrucken. 11-14 Mai 1970, Bonn, 1970, p. 470.

of the borders between the various European countries and the existence of two equal, sovereign states---the German Democratic Republic and j the Federal Republic of Germany---are the indis- j putable facts of European reality. Without their unconditional recognition there can be no stable or lasting peace on the European continent.

|

At the Crimean and Potsdam conferences in f 1945 decisions were taken to determine Poland's Western border. It was decided that the territory . lying to the east of the Oder and the Western Neisse and that part of Eastern Prussia, which had not been returned to the Soviet Union, would be given to Poland. The Conference also approved the proposal made by the Soviet delegation on July 20, 1945 relating to Poland's Western border which was aimed at giving de jure recognition to a J de facto situation: the Germans had already moved out of the territories handed over to Poland, which were now virtually under Polish administration.

Thus, according to the Potsdam agreement Poland for the first time in its history was given borders that were adequate and just, determined by historical, ethnographic and geographical factors and accorded with the interests of security in Europe. Subsequently the GDR and Poland concluded the Treaty of Zgorzelec on July 6, 1950 which fixed the border between them along the Oder-Neisse line.

The West German government had finally come to understand that there was no sense in trying to hold on to that which it did not possess. In thus renouncing its demands to alter the results of the Second World War, it showed political foresight. In an article published in the Stuttgarter Zeitung on December 3, 1970 Walter Scheel

wrote: "Those who reproach the Federal government for renouncing its claim to the east German provinces or for disposing of them, falsify the problem. We cannot dispose of that which history has long disposed of itself, we cannot renounce a claim to that which we no longer have... No Federal government can turn back the clock and win the Second World War. For us it can only be a question of admitting what is in fact the case.''^^1^^

After a series of long and hard talks with the West German government the Soviet Union succeeded for the first time in the history of relations between European states with different social systems in endorsing (in the Treaty of August 12, 1970) the principle of the inviolability of the borders in Europe. This principle was expressed in the Treaty clearly and unambiguously. It served as the main prerequisite for the normalisation of relations between the FRG and the socialist states. Article 3 of the Treaty states: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany are united in their understanding that peace in Europe can be maintained only so long as there is no attempt to infringe national borders.

``They undertake to strictly observe the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present borders;

``---they declare that they have no territorial claims on any other country, nor will they make such claims in the future;

``---they regard the borders of all states in Europe as inviolable at present and in the future, as they are on the day this treaty is signed, partic-

Stuttgarter Zeitung, December 3, 1970.

ularly the Oder-Neisse line, which is the western border of the Polish People's Republic, and the border between the Federal Republic of Germany \ and the German Democratic Republic.''^^1^^

'

Ruling quarters in West Germany realised that without their recognition of the territorial , status quo in Europe it would be impossible to \ achieve normalisation of relations with the socialist " countries. In an article published as part of a special collection of papers and documents devoted J to the Moscow Treaty West German Secretary 1 of State, Egon Bahr, wrote: "With this treaty the governments of the FRG and the USSR are under- _t taking, proceeding from the actual state of affairs, ; to improve their mutual relations. One can be ! sure that this, far from harming the interests of t any other country, will be to the advantage of many states and peoples. If peace is to be made more stable in Europe and cooperation to increase, then the borders which now exist, even if they are not entirely to our liking, must be respected and made inviolable.''^^2^^

In conformity with Article 2 of the Moscow Treaty the FRG and the Soviet Union undertook to solve disputes between them affecting European and international security exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain, according to Article 2 of the UN Charter, from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

The conclusion of the Treaty between the USSR and the FRG became possible because the Brandt government recognised the bankruptcy of the Hallstein doctrine and declared its readiness to

build relations with the GDR on the basis of equality, which rules out discrimination against the latter country, and respect for its independence. Recognition of the borders between the FRG and the GDR meant in practice recognition of the GDR as a sovereign and independent state, even though the normalisation of relations between the two states was yet long way off inasmuch as the FRG still spoke of "national unity" and the "special nature" of its relations with the GDR.

The USSR supported the GDR in its attempts to normalise relations with the FRG. The USSR has always considered recognition of the sovereign rights of the GDR, its role in European affairs and the normalisation of relations between the GDR and the FRG as an essential condition for security in Europe and for improving the international climate as a whole. "The German Democratic Republic," declared Leonid Brezhnev on October 6, 1969, "is an important part of the contemporary world. Yet there are still some who hesitate whether to recognise the GDR or not. This is an obsolete, and in our time somewhat ludicrous position, somewhat akin to hesitating whether to 'recognise or not' that the Elbe flows into the North Sea... There can be no doubt that in the near future the GDR will receive recognition under international law by many countries throughout the world.''^^1^^

From the point of view of international law the treaty endorsed the results of the Second World War and postwar developments. Furthermore, it made renunciation of the use of force one of the basic principles governing relations

~^^1^^ Pravda, August 13, 1970.

~^^2^^ Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Der Vertrag vom 12. August 1970, Bonn, 1970, p. 64.

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 461, 462 (in Russian).

between the European states. The Moscow Treaty was the first document to accord international recognition to the borders between the GDR and the FRG in legal terms.

The GDR government welcomed the successful conclusion of the talks between the USSR and the FRG and the signing of the treaty which opened a new page in relations between these two countries. A declaration of the GDR Council of Ministers dated August 14, 1970 stated that the Moscow Treaty strengthened security in Europe, ensured stable peace and promoted the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between all the European states.

In the course of the talks that led up to the Moscow Treaty and during the visit of the West German government delegation to Moscow allround discussion was held on further steps that would become possible after the signing of the treaty. The results of these talks were reflected in a separate document entitled: "Possible Future Agreements Between the Two Sides". The West German government declared its readiness to conclude a treaty with the GDR which would be mutually binding, just like treaties signed by the FRG and the GDR with third countries, and to build its relations with the GDR on the basis of full equality, non-discrimination and respect for the sovereignty and independence of both states in their internal affairs. Measures were proposed that would aid the admittance of both states into the UN and that would settle the issues arising between the FRG and Czechoslovakia as a result of the invalidity of the 1938 Munich Agreement. The Moscow Treaty had great influence on relations between the FRG and the other socialist states of Europe.

The Possible Future Agreements Between the • Two Sides established the mutual understanding that both this treaty and corresponding treaties to be signed by the Federal Republic of Germany with the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia would represent an integral whole. This position facilitated the subsequent signing of such treaties.

The USSR and the FRG expressed their readiness to take steps to relax tension in Europe and do everything in their power for the successful convocation of a conference to strengthen security and develop cooperation in Europe.

It is worth mentioning that the Treaty signed between the USSR and the FRG did not revoke the earlier agreements and treaties aimed at eradicating nazism and militarism in Germany, nor did it affect the rights and duties of parties to these agreements, particularly those signed by the four great powers after the unconditional surrender of nazi Germany. "The main principles of Potsdam," said A. N. Kosygin, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in a message to the President of the United States, the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to mark the 25th Anniversary of the Potsdam Agreements, "are still the foundation of the postwar peace in Europe. The Soviet Union has consistently abided by the peace-loving and democratic principles of Potsdam. Today, just like a quarter of a century ago, we still believe that given increased understanding and cooperation between the states and peoples a stable and lasting peace can be ensured. And to achieve this is our sacred duty to the millions of our citizens who gave their lives for victory over fascism and reaction; herein lies our great responsibility for

the lives and well-being of present and future generations.''^^1^^

Thus the Soviet Union stressed that all claims from reactionary circles to the effect that the Potsdam Agreements were obsolete or had "lost their significance" were utterly groundless.

The treaty between the USSR and the FRG was based on the full equality of both states. It is thus hardly surprising that the West German government in presenting the treaty to the Bundestag noted that it was the only possible basis in the present circumstances for peaceful coexistence between the FRG and the socialist countries and that no other real alternative was possible.

Whatever certain circles in the FRG might think about the new foreign policy, it was the result of a lengthy period of historical development and any attempt to turn back the clock to the days of the cold war would be against the vital interests of the country. On October 2, 1970 the Frankfurter Rundschau noted that "the Moscow Treaty was a breakthrough towards a stronger peace, and in the final analysis no responsible political force in the Federal Republic can ignore this. Certainly it is realised by those in the CDU/CSU who are able to think further than the next election.''^^2^^

The coming into office of the Brandt government also created favourable conditions for the development of economic relations between the USSR and the FRG.

The Soviet Union and West Germany considered the treaty as a necessary political condition for implementing extensive economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation plans. One of

the reasons why ruling circles within the FRG ,were willing to conclude the Moscow Treaty was fear of lagging behind other West European countries in the development of economic relations and the realisation that economic relations with the USSR would help to soften the impact of a possible economic recession in the FRG.

The mood of those who stood for broad economic relations with the socialist countries was expressed by Matthias Schmitt, a director of AEG-- Telefunken, in his book New Paths for Eastern Trade. He described attempts to use trade as a weapon against the USSR as ``childish'' and went on to say: "We must not attempt to make political concessions the price for expanding trade, especially on a one-for-one basis. Trade with West Germany is useful for the USSR, but not essential, and we must either participate on a competitive commercial basis, or be left out completely.''^^1^^

The two countries' mutual interest in the development of economic ties was expressed through a number of concrete agreements. On February 1, 1970 Soviet foreign trade organisations signed an agreement in Essen with Ruhrgas AG to supply West Germany with 52 billion cubic metres of natural gas over a period of 20 years. Supplies were planned to start from October 1973 and to increase from 0.5 billion to 3 billion cubic metres per year. At the same time Mannesmann AG of West Germany agreed to supply the USSR with 1.2 million tonnes of large diameter pipes between July 1970 and December 1972. The financing of this order was arranged by a consortium of 15 German banks headed by the Deutsche Bank

~^^1^^ Pravda, August 2, 1970.

~^^2^^ Frankfurter Rundschau, October 2, 1970.

M. Schmitt, Osthandel auf neuen Wegen, Hamburg, 1968, pp. 87-88.

3---919

which provided the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade with 1.2 billion German marks credit. The agreements made provision for increasing the gas supplies to 80 billion cubic metres and the credit to 1.5 billion marks.

Thus the FRG had finally renounced its policy of issuing ultimatums demanding that the solution of political problems should precede the expansion of economic ties on the firm basis of long-term agreements. The decision of both sides, as stated in the Moscow Treaty, to improve and expand cooperation in a variety of areas including economic relations and scientific, technological and cultural ties represented a new stage in the development of Soviet-West German relations.

a radical turn towards detente and peace on this .continent. To ensure the convocation and success of an all-European conference.''^^1^^

The conclusion of the Soviet-West German Treaty on August 12, 1970 was the direct result of the implementations of the Peace Programme and an organic part of its practical application.

The Soviet Union was ready to fulfil all its obligations undertaken through the signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty. Even before ratification the treaty began to play an important role in Soviet-West German relations, constituting as it did a real factor in the furtherance of international detente. Willy Brandt noted in his memoires that "from the summer of 1970 bilateral relations took a turn for the better. There was more trade and less polemics. Political contacts were more fruitful. Although the treaty was still not ratified, it was beginning to function.''^^2^^

The ruling circles in West Germany now realised that without the Eastern treaties there could be no understanding with the Soviet Union and the other East European states. Refusal to conclude treaties with the USSR and Poland at a time of detente and expanding trade between East and West would mean international isolation for West Germany. Without the treaties it would be impossible to conclude or bring into force the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, which was the cornerstone of efforts directed at peace and cooperation in Europe.

Naturally, after a long period of strained relations

The constructive approach of the USSR to the development of relations with the FRG as reflected in the signing of the Moscow Treaty was once more demonstrated during the period preceding the ratification of the treaty when a tense political struggle took place between those who supported the normalisation of Soviet-West German relations and those who opposed it. True to its principled policy on detente and on the development of broad cooperation between states with different social and political systems the Soviet Union has successfully implemented the Peace Programme which was adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress. This Peace Programme set forth a fundamental objective in the active defence of peace and the strengthening of international security: the need to "proceed from the final recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of the Second World War. To bring about

~^^1^^ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, p. 31.

Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975, Hoffman und Campe, Hamburg, 1976, p. 463.

3*

between the USSR and the FRG the maximum 1 persistence and the sincere desire of both sides I were necessary to overcome attitudes instilled j during the cold war and to give practical im- 1 plementation to the principles of peaceful coexist- > ence.

A new step forward in the matter of normalising Soviet-West German relations and giving substance to the Moscow Treaty came with the meeting in Oreanda in the Crimea between Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt in September 1971. Here questions were discussed that affected the ratification of the treaty by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the West German Bundestag. The participants in the talks expressed their firm conviction that the coming into force of the treaty between the two countries and also the treaty signed between Poland and West Germany "would make possible a real turning point in relations between these countries, promoting extensive, stable and long-term cooperation to the great benefit of present and future generations both in these and neighbouring countries, and strengthening peace in Europe".'

At the first meeting of the Soviet and West German leaders it was possible to speak of guidelines for cooperation. The two sides came to the conclusion that there were enormous opportunities for bilateral links between the USSR and the FRG and spoke out in favour of an expansion of trade relations, of greater scientific, technological, cultural and sporting contacts and of exchanges between youth organisations. It was with the aim of putting these relations on a firm footing

that the partners at the talks affirmed their readiness to conclude the appropriate agreements as soon as possible.

At the Crimean talks matters were also discussed that related to the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin. For many years West Berlin had been used by reactionary forces as a centre of subversion against the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist countries. The successful conclusion of the talks on matters relating to West Berlin made it possible to eliminate to a considerable extent one source of friction and tension in the heart of the European continent and on this basis improve the position of the population of West Berlin.

The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin removed one of the arguments the West German opposition had tried to use in order to obstruct the development of Soviet-West German relations. This agreement, The Times wrote on August 24, 1971, would pave the way for ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties by West Germany.

The meeting in the Crimea affirmed the need for high level meetings between the two countries to solve the complex problems affecting SovietWest German relations. Many of these unsettled questions required direct contact between the leaders of the two states. In this connection both Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt considered it useful to conduct exchanges of opinion on the most important issues affecting international relations in general and bilateral relations in particular, and agreed to maintain such contacts in the future.

In his book Meetings and Reflections Willy Brandt recalls an unofficial working meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in September

yf

Pravda, September 19, 1971.

1971. He describes the enormous impression made upon him by the Soviet leader's clear and deep understanding of the problems and by his frankness in setting them out. After a series of long conversations (Brandt calculates that over a twoday period the leaders spent some 16 hours in discussion) the future prospects for the development of Soviet-West German cooperation were outlined. Returning to Bonn, Brandt writes, he was fully justified in declaring that "the frankness of the talks which were held in an atmosphere of complete loyalty to the allies of both sides showed that since the signing of the treaty progress had already been made. Direct bilateral relations would now be improved and expanded".^^1^^

Soviet diplomacy looks upon political consultations as an effective means for solving the most important and urgent international problems and thereby for strengthening detente as a whole. At a meeting held in New York on October 28, 1971 between the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs Walter Scheel discussion took place on matters affecting bilateral relations, European security and various other international problems of mutual interest. This was followed up by Scheel's visit to the Soviet Union between November 25 and 30 of the same year on an invitation from the Soviet government.

From one meeting to the next the representatives of the two sides discussed an increasingly wide range of subjects. The November 1971 talks were devoted to the practical matters of cooperation. Of particular importance here was the agreement on air traffic, which was concluded

on November 11, 1971 and the decision to open Consulates General in both Leningrad and Hamburg at the easliest possible time. The sides confirmed their readiness to conclude at an early date a trade agreement in the interests of fuller cooperation in this sphere. They also showed interest in concluding cultural exchange agreements and in expanding scientific and technological cooperation.

The contacts on normalising bilateral relations and the consultations on international problems were resumed in June 1972 during the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to West Germany.

For the first time in many years Bundestag deputies paid a visit to the USSR. During their visit in September 1971 the leaders of the Bundestag group responsible for maintaining parliamentary ties with the USSR, who were headed by Werner Mertes, the chairman of the group, had talks with the Chairman of the Soviet Parliamentary Group A. P. Shitikov on plans for the subsequent exchange of parliamentary groups. In June 1972 this visit was reciprocated when a delegation of the Soviet Parliamentary Group's section on parliamentary ties with the FRG visited West Germany and had talks with representatives of all factions in the Bundestag. A broad and frank exchange of views on many issues took place.

It was clearly realised in both the USSR and West Germany that to overcome the furious resistance from those in West Germany who opposed the treaties with the Eastern countries it was essential to do the utmost to expand ties between Soviet and West German public organisations. The meetings, debates and discussions which were held convinced many West German

Willy Brandt, op. cit., p. 470.

citizens that mutual understanding between the two countries was possible. They have helped to spread the truth about Soviet reality in West Germany and about the peace-loving character of the Soviet state. An example of the kind of numerous meetings held after the signing of the j Moscow Treaty was the colloquium on cooperation j and security in Europe (June 4-6, 1971) in the town j of Gummersbach. On the invitation of the Society j for Promoting Relations Between the FRG and the USSR politicians, scientists and correspondents attended the colloquium. During broad discussion the participants spoke highly of the treaties signed between the FRG and the USSR, and the FRG and Poland, and expressed their conviction that recognition of the real situation in Europe and renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations were imperatives of the times and that no other way existed to mutual understanding.

The expansion of contacts at all levels, including the summit meeting in the Crimea, was a convincing demonstration of the positive changes that have taken place in relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany since the signing of the Moscow Treaty on August 12, 1970. At the same time, given the complicated internal political situation in the FRG, the SovietWest German treaty could by no means be regarded as the final stage in the normalisation of relations between the USSR and the FRG. It was merely the starting point. The full normalisation of relations would have to depend much on the way in which the FRG would in practice fulfil its obligations according to the treaty and on how it would approach the settlement of outstanding problems affecting its relations with the socialist countries.

The Federal Republic of Germany abided by its promise contained in the agreement on further steps of the sides to begin the process of normalising relations with its neighbouring European socialist states.

The recognition of the political and territorial realities in Europe, upon which the Moscow Treaty is based, served also as the foundation for a treaty between Poland and West Germany on the basic principles governing the normalisation of their mutual relations, signed on December 7, 1970 in Warsaw. The treaty created the conditions for Polish-West German relations to develop. It fixed, under international law, the territorial and political realities in Europe---the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border---and the renunciation of territorial claims from either side. In an interview on West German television the Federal Minister of the FRG, Horst Ehmke, stressed that "from now on the lands that lie east of the OderNeisse line belong to Poland... We can do nothing to change this and whoever cherishes the hope of changing it, or encourages the young to believe that they must wait for such a change, must be made to realise that he is playing with fire".^^1^^

The Polish-West German Treaty is based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and provides for the solution of contentious issues exclusively by peaceful means. Like the treaty between the USSR and the FRG it provides for the renunciation of the threat or use of force in relations between states.

In relations between the two German states

~^^1^^ Der Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen, Bundesdruckerei, Bonn, 1970,

p. 231-32.

progress was also made. The government of the German Democratic Republic had, of course, been trying for more than two decades to normalise relations with its western neighbour, and numerous initiatives had been made in this sphere. But during the fifties and sixties these initiatives were all stubbornly opposed on the West German side. The Moscow and Warsaw treaties, however, did much to ease the task of normalisation of relations between the GDR and the FRG.

In the course of the talks between the FRG and the GDR agreement was reached on a wide range of issues with the result that on December 21, j 1972 representatives of both sides met in Berlin to sign a treaty on the basic principles of their relations. The treaty laid the foundation for the development of normal, equal relations between the two German states and did much to promote the broad international recognition of the GDR.

In late December 1971 the West German government submitted to the Bundestag the treaties it had signed with the USSR and Poland thereby initiating the process of ratification which was intended to be completed in May-June 1972. After ratification it would, in the opinion of the Soviet side, be possible to sign a final four-power protocol on bringing into force the West Berlin settlement.

determine the destinies of its people and the attitude of other countries towards it for many years to come. The choice is between cooperation and confrontation, between relaxing and building up tensions; in the final analysis it is a choice between a policy of peace and a policy of war.''^^1^^

The difficult political struggle for the ratification of the Moscow Treaty showed clearly just how influential the opposition forces were and how tenacious were revanchist and antiSoviet moods in West Germany. The Christian Democrats who wanted a return to the cold war and who for more than 20 years had steered the helm of West German politics refusing to normalise relations with the USSR and those forces which supported the leaders of that party in fiercely resisting the achievement of mutual understanding with the USSR and the socialist countries, suffered a defeat through the signing of the treaty, but they were still ready to do battle with the government coalition.

The ratification of the Soviet-West German Treaty and the Polish-West German Treaty was thus the centre of a fierce political struggle in the Federal Republic of Germany, a struggle which was to decide an exceptionally important and difficult question---was the population of West Germany willing to recognise the current and future political importance of a policy that was aimed at improving relations with the socialist countries and would West Germany consistently implement this policy, or would it return, as the reactionaries demanded, to the policy of inflaming enmity between peoples, the policy

The ratification of the Moscow Treaty in West Germany took place amid an atmosphere of intense political struggle between those who supported and those who opposed the normalisation of Soviet-West German relations. In a speech on March 20, 1972 Leonid Brezhnev stressed: "The FRG today is facing a crucial choice, which will

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 26.

of revanche, which ran counter to the interests \ of the nation.

The realistic foreign policy of the BrandtScheel government was supported by the overwhelming majority of the West German population. The treaties were supported by the working class and other sections of the working population as well as by a considerable part of the soberminded bourgeoisie. It was opposed by the more aggressive and nationalist circles of big business and its political parties, the CDU/CSU, the NPD and the many revanchist organisations.

In his book on Strauss (1972) and those who support him, Reinhard Kiihnl, Professor of Marburg University, wrote in connection with the campaign of the reactionaries against peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the USSR that at least in this central issue of West German politics there already existed a political and ideological union between the neofascists and those forces which Strauss represented, although it had not yet been given an organisational form.

The Christian Democrats, one of the largest West German parties comprising together with their youth and student organisations some 600,000 persons, were the nucleus of the anti-- government opposition. They received generous help from military and political circles and reactionary, pro-fascist revanchist forces and secured stable positions in the state apparatus. They extensively exploited the press, radio and television, doing everything to discredit the government policy of mutual understanding with the socialist countries.

The main attacks against the treaty came from Reiner Barzel, chairman of the CDU and the official opposition candidate for Chancellor. Among

Barzel's circle of close adherents and advisers were politicians notorious for their extremely reactionary views on the issue of Soviet-West German relations. These included Werner Marx, chairman of the CDU/CSU working group on foreign policy in the Bundestag, who incidentally was infamous among political scientists for his falsification of the history of relations between the USSR and the FRG and a fierce opponent of the Moscow Treaty, and a certain Olaf von Wrangel, a political analyst of the same ilk as Werner Marx and a Bundestag deputy.

The Soviet Union made attempts to explain to the Christian Democratic leaders the essence of Soviet foreign policy and, in particular, its approach to the development of Soviet-West German relations. Barzel had the opportunity during his visit to the Soviet Union to discuss all the questions that interested him, but the Christian Democratic politicians did not possess a sufficient sense of reality to realise that the old anti-Soviet policy had collapsed and to come out in support of the Moscow Treaty.

Christian Democratic policy was also supported by reactionary immigrant communities. " According to official data," writes 1.1. Orlik, "immigrants and their families amounted to a total of some 14 million. These included fairly widespread revanchist elements that opposed the settlement of relations with the East European countries and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.''^^1^^

During the struggle for the ratification of the Soviet-West German Treaty the leaders of the

'l. I. Orlik, The Politics of the Western Powers in Relation to the East European Socialist States (1965-1975), Moscow, 1979, pp. 99-100 (in Russian).

National Democratic Party and the revanchist groups launched campaigns to frighten the population with "reds under the bed". They inflamed nationalist feeling, accused the Brandt-Scheel government of "betraying German interests", disseminated literature in the towns and villages calling upon the people to boycott the government's eastern policy and frequently threatened reprisals against those who did not agree with their views. The members of the Landsmannschaft Schlessien demanded the "tearing up of the Moscow Treaty" and the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft loudly renewed their claims for Czechoslovak territory.

The CDU/CSU and revanchist groups received enormous financial and political support from the West German military-industrial complex, which is an alliance of monopolies and banks involved in military production, died-in-the-wool militarists and reactionary politicians. The West German military-industrial complex which flourished during the years of the cold war still remains an influential force today in the West German state and was the main organiser of attacks on the treaties signed with the USSR and Poland.

The Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which in effect only serves the interests of the monopolies and revanchist groups, adopted a hostile, reactionary position vis-a-vis the socialist countries and showed no scruples in its choice of ways and means to oppose the policy of detente in Europe.

<

The Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union came into confrontation with the government on the question of the Moscow Treaty even before it was signed. The negative position adopted by these parties towards the

treaty was at first justified on the grounds of failure to settle the West Berlin problem. A resolution adopted by the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag on May 26, 1970 declared that the two parties opposed settling the border problem. In their opinion the treaty to be negotiated with the Soviet Union should be made dependent on progress in the four-power talks on West Berlin.^^1^^

The opposition ostentatiously spurned the invitation of Foreign Minister Scheel to include one of its own representatives in the delegation that was being sent to Moscow to conclude the talks. Will Rasner, executive head of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag declined this invitation, declaring once more that in the opinion of his colleagues initialling a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force ought to be preceded by the achievement of satisfactory results in the fourpower talks on West Berlin.^^2^^

After the talks had begun in Moscow and Warsaw the former Chancellor Kiesinger accused the West German government of not taking an independent position and simply taking its orders from Moscow.^^3^^ The government was further accused of rushing to make an agreement at any price with the Soviet Union.

The opposition distorted the Soviet position on West Berlin. It alleged that the USSR was out to isolate West Berlin, change its social and economic structure and ultimately take it over. In fact, of course, all the declarations of the Soviet govern-

Der Vertrag vom 12. August 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrenubliken, Bonn, 1970, pp. 152-153.

Stuttgarter Zeitung, July 21, 1970.

Deutscher Bundestag. 53. Sitzung, den 27. Mai, 1970, Bonn, 1970, p. 2729.

ment have stressed the desire to make firm guarantees for the status of West Berlin as an independent political entity and ensure that the city has unimpeded communications with the outside world. The attempts of the West German side to include in the Moscow Treaty articles concerning the status of West Berlin were unsuccessful. Der Spiegel noted that despite the considerable efforts of the West German side, the USSR strongly rejected the inclusion of a "Berlin clause" in any form. In a letter to one of the Bundestag deputies Hilger van Scherpenberg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote: "I believe you share my opinion that it was preferable to draw up a treaty without a Berlin clause than to have the talks collapse.''^^1^^

The struggle for the recognition of the status of West Berlin as a separate political entity and for the normalisation of the situation around the city has been an inalienable part of the common struggle of the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist community countries for peace and security in Europe. The Quadripartite Agreement which was signed on September 3, 1971 by representatives from the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France together with the various other agreements signed between the FRG, the GDR and the West German Senate^^2^^ made an

important contribution to the normalisation of the situation in Europe and to the restructuring of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence between states with different social and political systems.

The implementation of all these agreements made it possible to reduce in the main tension surrounding West Berlin and created the conditions whereby this city ceased to be a source of political and military confrontation in the very centre of the European continent. The principal approach adopted by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries to the question of West Berlin amounted to this: the city was to be considered as a special entity lying within the territory of the GDR; it was not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany nor was it to be governed by the latter. The practical implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement showed that henceforth this principle would be considered basic to the solution of all problems affecting West Berlin including its ties with the Federal Republic of Germany.

With the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement the signing and ratification of the West German treaties with the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other socialist countries assumed special importance. Attempts on the part of West German reactionaries to prevent their approval by the Bundestag were a cause of grave concern in the Soviet Union and among its friends and allies. In answer to questions from deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on April 12, 1972 Andrei Gromyko stressed that "... the agreement on West Berlin and the other settlements connected with it are aimed at promoting detente in Central Europe, and the normalisation of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries. Without

4-919

~^^1^^ Der Spiegel, No 38, September 3, 1976, p. 41.

~^^2^^ These agreements are: the agreement on civilian passenger and freight traffic between the FRG and West Berlin (December 17, 1971); two agreements between the GDR government and the West Berlin Senate on facilitating and improving passenger traffic and visits to the GDR by permanent residents of West Berlin (December 20, 1971); and the agreement between the GDR government and the Senate on settling the question of enclaves by means of an exchange of territories (December 20, 1971).

coming into force of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties the process of improving the situation in the region would be threatened. Therefore the Agreement on West Berlin can only come into force simultaneously with the ratification of the Moscow Treaty".^^1^^

The signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin took away from the opposition one of i its main arguments for opposing the Moscow Treaty. Now the CDU and the CSU openly declared that they could not accept the treaties signed with Moscow and Warsaw in their present form.

One of the conditions they made for ratification was the demand that the USSR recognise the EEC. The Soviet government naturally could not consider recognition of the EEC to be a condition for the ratification of its treaty with the FRG. It did however recognise the reality of this organisation's existence, but relations with EEC member countries depended on the degree to which the latter reckoned with the interests of the CMEA countries.

The CDU/CSU leaders---Barzel, Strauss, Kiesinger, Stucklen, et al.---each in his own way, but with the single aim of defeating the Moscow Treaty in the Bundestag, tried to show that it contradicted the interests of West Germany, did not guarantee a genuine detente and did not bring any "real improvements for the people". Through the mass media the reactionaries repeated over and over again that the treaty was an instrument for Soviet interference in the internal affairs of West Germany

and in the political life of Western Europe. And in each case their aim was identical: to use coldwar methods to confuse and frighten the people.

With the aid of the crude falsification of historical facts and blatant, shameless slander against the USSR they tried to create the impression that the Soviet Union was the enemy of the German people, allegedly to blame for all their misfortune brought on by the Second World War. Alfred Dregger, Chairman of the Hessen CDU local, called upon the people to live in "permanent confrontation with the USSR",^^1^^ to destroy the GDR and to resurrect the 1937 borders of the Reich.

Under the pretext of ``clarifying'' certain clauses in the Moscow Treaty the opposition parties tried to emasculate its essence. They questioned the legality of the clauses relating to the inviolability of borders, thought up all kinds of ambiguities in the wording of the treaty and tried to present as vague the obligations on renouncing the use of force in view of articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.

Behind all these manoeuvres lay the clear reluctance of the opposition to come to terms with the existing political and territorial realities of postwar Europe. The rejection of the treaties by the CDU/CSU showed up the falseness of their claims to peace and cooperation and ran counter to the interests of detente in Europe.

The CDU and the CSU tried to instill in the minds of the West German burghers the notion

The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and Its Implementation, 1971-1977. Documents, Moscow, 1977, p. 77 (in Russian).

~^^1^^ Die Welt, September 9, 1971.

4'

that their government would conduct better relations with the USSR than the SPD and the FDP, because ultimately, they claimed, the Soviet Union would yield to West German pressure and agree to cooperate with West Germany without the signing of any treaty. Putting forward the viewpoint of the West German war industry and the revanchist and militarist forces that opposed the signing of the "eastern treaties", Strauss submitted to the Bundestag the draft of his own treaty between West Germany and the USSR. In this draft he made much of what he called the "unsettled German question" and again raised the question of borders, demanding that the Bundesrat and the Bundestag make an official declaration to the effect that the border issue had not yet been finally solved. In his speech to the Bundestag on February 24, 1972 Strauss justified the agressive policy of the Adenauer, Erhardt and Kiesinger governments. His argument against ratification contained a disguised version of all the basic negative elements in the policies of these governments towards Soviet-West German relations---i.e., refusal to recognise the existence of the two German states and demands for the review of the borders. In the heat of the struggle Strauss even went so far as to claim that the " eastern treaties" were specially designed by the Soviet Union to bring the Federal Republic of Germany "under its system of domination" and to use the country to promote the achievement of the aims of that system.^^1^^ Strauss' speech and his draft treaty were, in effect, attempts to prevent the eastern treaties from coming into force and designed to disguise subversive activity against detente in

Europe. This draft, as the West German bourgeois Siiddeutsche Zeitung forecast, was destined to play no political role.

The opposition sought to create the impression that refusal to ratify the Soviet-West German treaty would change nothing in relations between the USSR and the FRG. In a speech to a joint session of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet on April 17, 1972, at which the question of ratification of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was discussed, M. A. Suslov, Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said in reference to the importance of the treaty: "Refusal to ratify the treaty signed between the USSR and the FRG would have extremely negative consequences, particularly for West Germany herself. The policy of the West German government would lose credibility not only in the eyes of the USSR, but also among the other European countries. The whole course of the development of Soviet-West German relations would be threatened and serious damage done to detente on the European continent and to the cause of peace and security throughout the world. Obviously if the treaty does not come into force, West Germany will not only lose its credibility, but also its importance to the Soviet Union as a serious partner in economic relations.''^^1^^

An increasing number of West Germans began to understand that the CDU/ CSU line on reviewing the results of the Second World War and on encouraging counfrontation with the USSR was both dangerous and fruitless for West Germany. The

Bulletin No. 27, February 26, 1972, Bonn, p. 427.

Pravda, April 18, 1972.

well-known West German political observer, Sebastian Haffner, wrote after the signing of the treaty that one thing could be said for certain--- "the party that refuses to support the treaty will be out of touch with reality and exclude itself for a long time from the ranks of those who determine federal policy".^^1^^

Even among the CDU leaders there was no unanimity on the eastern treaties. One of the oldest members of the Christian Democratic Union, the former Minister of Culture in the BadenWurttemberg government, Wilhelm Simpfendorfer spoke against the position of the Christian Democratic leadership. Many prominent figures of the CDU supported ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland in view of the contribution they made to detente, the contribution which was now demanded from West Germany by the course of historical development.

A positive position towards the treaty was also taken by the leadership of the Christian Democratic youth organisation, the Junge Union, and particularly its president, Jiirgen Echternach.

At the extraordinary congress of the Christian Democrats, which was held in Dusseldorf in January 1971, delegates from the Junge Union presented a draft resolution demanding recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR.

Soon after the signing of the Moscow Treaty Walter Scheel declared: "The most astonishing thing for me in duscussing the eastern policy of the Federal Government is the fact that even

experienced politicians among the opposition are incapable of comprehending the positive influence of our policy on the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in Europe and in the rest of the world".^^1^^

Ignoring this obvious fact, the opposition claimed that the treaties "violated Atlantic solidarity", led to the FRG being cut off from the Western world and ultimately ``neutralised'' which would be tantamount to its suicide.

All these claims that the USSR would use the Moscow Treaty to ``neutralise'' or even ``Sovietise'' West Germany were totally fictitious. They were sheer blatant demagogy aimed at people who knew little about politics. After all, irrespective of the policy pursued by the FRG, political relations in West Germany can be described primarily as an intertwining of power between the monopolies and the state which defends their interests.

In answer to the false claims of the opposition the West German Federal Chancellor made an interesting reply: "We have not," declared Willy Brandt, "become friends of the USSR or of its system, but rather have become partners in a business-like contract, just as other Western States who are treaty partners of the Soviet Union.''^^2^^

Ruling circles among the FRG's Western allies showed no signs of apprehension that the country's new eastern policy would result in its separation

₂ Bulletin No. 142, October 21, 1970, p. 1495.

Germany and Eastern Europe Since 1945. From the Potsdam Agreement to Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik" New York 1973, p. 301.

Stern, 1970, Heft 35, p. 152.

from the Western world. Furthermore, American politicians were less concerned by Bonn's eastern policy than by its western policy, since Brandt's desire to push ahead with the creation of a "united Western Europe" with West Germany at its head was far from always in line with the interests of the American monopolies.

During the visit of the West German Federal Chancellor to the United States President Nixon emphasised the community of interests between the two countries on questions of detente. As was noted in Der Spiegel, during the course of his talks with Brandt the US President tried to let it be known to American conservatives who attacked his policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union that the. further participation of the United States in detente was essential.

The eastern policy of the FRG and the eastern treaties to a considerable extent removed many of the problems connected with German affairs, and this in turn made talks easier between the Western powers and the socialist countries.

The prominent American politcian, Averell Harriman called upon the US government to lend its support to the eastern treaties, in so far as they were in the United States' interest. He considered that "they (the CDU/CSU---R. A) should understand that if they come into power by blocking the treaties this will adversely affect our relations".'

Of course the position of the Western countries on this issue was not unanimous everywhere. They were ready to support the FRG in its moves

to normalise relations with the Soviet Union to the extent that these corresponded with their own interests and the interests of the imperialist world in general. Thus US Secretary of State Rogers declared that "...we don't think there is anything at all inconsistent about a strong NATO and an attempt to improve the relations between Western European countries and Eastern European countries".^^1^^

The opposition literally bent over backwards to encourage West Germany's NATO partners to oppose the eastern policy of the Brandt government. In March 1972 R. Barzel went to Paris, while his deputy Gerhard Schroder met with Prime Minister Heath and members of the British government.

At the same time Kurt Birrenbach, a prominent Christian Democrat, went to the Netherlands, while Walter Becher, leader of the revanchist union of Sudeten Germans went to the United States in search of support. Their talks confirmed that the almost unconditional support that had once existed for revanchist ambitions was now almost entirely non-existent. The French analyst, Alfred Grosser wrote that "the Federal Republic's allies consider the Oder-Neisse line to be absolutely final, even if General de Gaulle is the only one to have declared it".^^2^^

When Nixon became US President in 1968 disarmament talks were made one of the most important aspects of his foreign policy. He recog-

~^^1^^ The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIII, No. 1610, May 4, 1970, p. 567.

~^^2^^ Alfred Grosser, Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945. Eine Bilanz, Miinchen, 1974, p. 465.

~^^1^^ International Herald Tribune, May 5, 1972.

nised that in the sphere of strategic arms there , was parity between the USSR and the United , States. This recognition of the nuclear status quo j reflected the viewpoint which was then dominant [ among US ruling circles that rivalry in the arms j race had reached such a point that the United States could hardly expect to gain strategic supremacy. '

According to Dieter Dettke, a member of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, "the military balance between East and West had stabilised during the mid fifties with the result that the opportunity to reach the objectives of the political offensive became increasingly doubtful. In the face of a nuclear pact between the two superpowers ... the status quo in Europe could not be changed in favour of the West.''

At a time when the United States did not desire a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, Central Europe needed, according to Dettke, "a change from a policy which was diplomatically centred on making measures towards detente dependent on progress in the question of German reunification, to an active policy of detente".^^2^^

Thus Brandt's realistic eastern policy on the whole met with support in the West even if that support was not entirely unconditional.

At a press conference in August 1970, a representative of the British Foreign Office indicated that the British government supported the policy of

the West German government towards the socialist states.

After the preliminary discussion of the treaties in the Bundestag the French Council of Ministers noted that the French government considered ratification of the treaties desirable.

The CDU/CSU opposition thought to get support from those circles in the West that were against international detente and improving relations with the socialist countries. Such well-known reactionary US politicians as Dean Acheson, Thomas Dewey and John McCloy, who were not at the time in office, lent their support to the West German opposition. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the new eastern policy and Dean Acheson even demanded a check to Brandt's "mad race to Moscow".^^1^^ Certain persons in the West did not like the fact that the eastern policy allowed the FRG to take a more worthy place in international politics that was in accordance with its economic potential. According to the American analyst Lawrence Whetten, the new eastern policy brought the FRG's political weight into conformity with its economic potential as the third or fourth country in the world. Furthermore, he pointed out, the possibilities for the Western countries to bring pressure to bear on the FRG, on the one hand, and West German concern for Western support for its eastern claims, on the other, had both been reduced.^^2^^

While the United States was on the whole positive in its appraisal of Bonn's new eastern policy,

~^^1^^ Europa Archiv No. 17, 1970, p. 639-53.

~^^2^^ Aussenpolitische Perspektiven des Westdeutschen Staates. Band 3. "Der Zwang zur Partnerschaft", Miinchen-Wien, 1972, p. 17.

~^^1^^ International Herald Tribune, December 11, 1970.

Cf., Orbis (A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs), Vol. XV, 1971, No. 3, p. 861.

it nevertheless tried to influence the scale and rate of the talks between the FRG and the socialist countries. It wanted to be the mouthpiece of the West as a whole in the talks with the USSR, and interpreted the normalisation of relations between the FRG and the USSR and the other socialist countries as a desire on the part of the West German government to take the initiative in the development of relations between East and West.

For the Nixon government it was a matter of concern that the FRG continued to maintain close, friendly relations with the United States once it had normalised its relations with the East. But the West German government gave no cause for such concern. The Brandt-Scheel government gave practical demonstrations of its loyalty to the "Atlantic ideals''.

In the early 1970s the United States began more than ever before to take note of political realities and the new treaties and agreements signed in Europe. Since the United States wanted to reach agreement on West Berlin, it was concerned that Bonn should ratify the treaties with the USSR and Poland, because the final protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement could only be signed simultaneously with the ratification of the treaties.

The conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin substantially improved the political climate in Central Europe. It showed that it was possible to solve acute problems in international relations by peaceful means. The close connection between the problems affecting a settlement in Europe showed just how complex was the process of adapting the foreign policies of the Western powers to the realities of the seventies. European

detente and American-Soviet relations were interconnected. The May 1972 meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the USSR and United States helped to win US support for the treaties signed by the FRG with the USSR and Poland and aimed at the strengthening of peace and security. The successful development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became an added stimulus to improving relations between the FRG and its eastern neighbours.

But the West German opposition would not come to terms with the changes that had taken place in the world. By legal and not so legal means it set out to overthrow the Brandt-Scheel government. The reactionaries were ready to go to any lengths to stop the process of detente between the USSR and the FRG. The CDU Chairman Reiner Barzel's speech at the Christian Democratic Congress (October 3-4, 1971) in Saarbriicken amouted to an open call to bring down the government.

At the meetings of the Sudeten Germans (May 30-31, 1971) in Nuremberg and of the Selesian Community (July 9-11, 1971) in Munich sharp anti-government speeches were made and there were even calls for Brandt to be removed by force, if necessary.

Western journalists, including those who sympathised with the CDU and the CSU, condemned the bribery and enticement of SPD and FDP deputies practised by the Christian Democrats in a bid to break the government coalition and bring down the government. At a press conference on November 4, 1972, the editor of the rightwing Cologne newspaper Das Deutsche Wort, W. Sinnemann declared his readiness to swear an oath that Siegfried Zoglmann, a former FDP

deputy and follower of Strauss, offered a number i of FDP deputies sums ranging between 250,000 and 500,000 marks on condition that they defect from their party. Sinnemann went on to read letters that proved Strauss' implication in the bribery, and he listed names and companies involved. One of these, according to the Hamburg magazine Konkret, was Fritz Ries, millionaire, owner of the linoleum firm Pegulan-Werke. Ries was closely linked with Strauss whose wife, Marianna, owns 10 per cent of the shares in PegulanWerke, as well as the Dyna-Plastik Works in Berisch-Gladsbach, which is part of the PegulanWerke concern.

Zoglmann, former FDP Bundestag deputy and later leader of the reactionary German Union, met with Franz-Josef Strauss at Ries' villa to discuss the suborning of at first four and later eight deputies among the ruling coalition. As compensation for their services they were to be given consultancies in a number of major concerns and guarantees of future deputy mandates in the Bundestag.

According to the magazine Stern, Strauss urged Barzel into taking decisive action. Counting on support from the defectors, the opposition leader tried on April 27,1972 to get a vote of no-confidence in the government in the hope of becoming Federal Chancellor himself without calling a general election. But this was pure political adventurism.

The bid to split the FDP also failed. With the departure of Mende, Zoglmann and others the Free Democratic Party faction became more effective. More than one thousand new members joined the party which more than compensated for the hundred or so that had left. The government majority in the Bundestag, though minimal, was sufficient for the SPD/FDP coalition to continue its policy.

On April 25, 1972 there was a wave of mass demonstrations across the country in support of the Brandt government. The Chancellor received hundreds of telegrammes expressing support for his foreign policy.

The voting in the Bundestag on April 27, 1972 affirmed that the opposition's attempt to bring down the government had failed. The Brandt government was now free to begin the final stage of the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties.

The struggle to ratify the eastern treaties increased the influence of the democratic forces in the FRG. The German Communist Party, the left-wing trade unions, the Association of Victims of Nazi Persecution, the German Peace Union and the progressive women's and youth organisations actively aided the transition of the FRG from confrontation to cooperation with the socialist countries. The opinion poles showed that in January 1972, 56 per cent supported the government's eastern policy.^^1^^

The Communists worked daily to ensure that the ideas of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries were given the maximum support from the different sections of the population and that the ruling circles in the FRG recognised the political and territorial realities in Europe as well as the necessity for and the advantages of peaceful coexistence with the socialist countries.

The German Communist Party worked with

Siiddeutsche Zeitung, January 22-23, 1972.

great fervour organising meetings and discussions and disseminating various forms of literature. The party leaders---Kurt Bachmann, Herbert Mies, Herman Gautier, Manfred Kapluck---all spoke at gatherings and meetings and at discussion evenings and explained the party position through the pages of its central organ Unsere Zeit. The German Communist Party realised that considerable effort was needed to give practical implementation to the basic clauses of the Moscow Treaty. "The Presidium of the Board of the German Communist Party," it stated in a declaration, "welcomes the conclusion of the treaty... between the FRG and the USSR. It is a step forward in the development of our relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and also towards peace in Europe... The treaty could mark the long desired beginning of a change in foreign policy if it puts an end to the aggressive eastern policy that has hitherto been conducted against the interests of detente and if it becomes a basis for the unconditional recognition of all present borders in Europe including the Oder-Neisse line and the borders between the Federal Republic and the GDR. That is why this foreign policy step by the Federal government has received such a positive response from the population.''^^1^^

West German Communists considered the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties as being of practical value for both the present and the future, insofar as the struggle against the opponents of the treaties who had still not conceded defeat and against nationalist and revanchist propaganda was still going on. A declaration of the Presidium of the Board of the German Communist

Party to mark the anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty noted: "During the first year that has elapsed since the signing of the treaty the political record has shown that it has opened new possibilities for improving relations between our countries, for cooperation and friendship between our peoples, and for peace and security in Europe.''^^1^^

The German Communist Party exposed the attempts of reactionary quarters to revive the "Soviet threat" idea and their stubborn desire to distort Soviet foreign policy. It called for the unification of all democratic forces for a struggle against anti-communism in the FRG, showing that campaigns against peace and democracy are always waged under the slogan of anti-- communism. "At this serious moment," said the appeal, "the Board of the German Communist Party calls upon all those who want peace, all democrats and all the millions of white and blue collar workers in our country: Strauss and Barzel, the neo-nazis and the revanchist leaders have launched a massive attack on the policy of peace and detente in Europe.''^^2^^

Shortly before the Bundestag voted on the Moscow and Warsaw treaties the Board of the German Communist Party appealed to working people and youth of the country to support the ratification. The appeal stressed the connection between the treaties with the USSR and Poland and the creation of better conditions for promoting democracy in the FRG, reducing arms spending and raising living standards.

The working class in the FRG was the force

' Unsere Zeit, August 15, 1970.

Ibid., August 21, 1971. Ibid. March 17, 1972.

5---919

that exerted a decisive influence on the outcome of the struggle to ratify the treaties. The organised workers' action showed that the working class was both ready and able to lead the struggle for peace. At the GCP Congress in November 1971 A. Ya. Pelshe, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the CPSU delegation, said that "... if relations between our countries are now developing in a favourable direction, then this is due in large measure to the services of the West German Communists, who have always resolutely and consistently opposed anti-Sovietism and revanchism and stood for good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany".^^1^^

The West German trade unions also supported the realistic steps taken by the Brandt government. On February 1, 1972 the Federal Committee of the German Trade Union meeting in Dusseldorf called upon all Bundestag deputies to support the government's eastern policy. They organised numerous meetings and demonstrations in cities all over West Germany to call for better relations with the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist countries.

Active support for the normalisation of relations with the USSR also came from the West German youth organisations like the Socialist German Working Youth and the Hamburg organisation of Young Democrats, which is affiliated to the FDP. The Bundesjugendring, which is a union of 16 youth organisations (including the Young Christians and the Young Democrats), called upon parliament to ratify the treaties, while the

Marxist Union of Students (Spartakus) openly supported government policy aimed at normalising relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The German Peace Union did much to explain the importance of the Moscow Treaty both for West Germany and for peace in Europe. At its Fifth Federal Congress in Cologne (October 31- November 1, 1970), which was held under the slogan: "Ratifying the Treaty Is a Blow to the Right", a member of the directorate, Arno Berisch declared: "The treaty of August 12, 1970 marks the beginning of a new era in the history of Europe.' Josef Weber appealed to all democrats to "popularise the ideas of European security and its advantages for our people and bend every effort to ensure that the treaty is ratified".^^2^^ The German Peace Union demanded the immediate ratification and implementation of the treaty and called upon the West German government to resolutely oppose all attempts to distort it.

The treaty was also supported by prominent members of the Evangelical Church in the Federal Republic. More than 250 clergymen in BadenWiirttemberg addressed a letter to the Bundestag pointing out the negative consequences for the Federal Republic if the treaty should fail to be ratified. In their opinion this would be a serious blow to attempts to normalise relations with the socialist countries and the FRG would end up isolated internationally.

The strengthening of those forces in West Germany that supported cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the FRG was

~^^1^^ A. Ya. Pelshe, Selected Speeches and Articles, Moscow, 1978, p. 483-84 (in Russian).

, Deutsche Volkszeitung No 46, November 12. 1970, p 18 ~^^2^^ Ibid.

reflected in the formation of the Society for the Development of Relations Between the FRG and the USSR. Its vice-president, the prominent public figure, Pastor Herbert Mochalski described the main task of the society as broadening contacts between the FRG and the USSR and mutually expanding knowledge of the two countries' political, economic and cultural life with the aim of overcoming the sad heritage of the past and bringing the peoples of the USSR and the FRG closer together.

Realising their responsibility for the destiny of their country more and more democraticallyminded people from all sections of society showed solidarity with the German Communist Party's declaration that the future of West Germany depends on peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and on peaceful cooperation between all states in Europe. Many prominent public figures including Hans Werner Bartsch, Helmut Ridder, Wolfgang Abendroth, Lorenz Knorr and others came out against manifestations of anti-communism and anti-- Sovietism. They openly declared that the new wave of anti-socialist and anti-communist propaganda undermined the basis of the policy of detente.

Another great contribution to showing up the dangers that threatened West Germany from involvement in the arms race, which created additional barriers to complete normalisation of relations with the socialist countries, was made by a group of progressive scholars. The groups, which comprised Horst Afheldt, Philipp Sonntag, Utz-Peter Reich, Hellmuth Roth, Erwin Rahner, A. Pfau, Klaus Rajewski and Hans Kiinkel published a 700-page work entitled The Consequences of War and the Prevention of War. In the introduction

the editor, the well-known physicist and philosopher, Carl Weizsacker, noted that the citizens' responsibility for the general good would not allow them just confine themselves to pointing to the dangers of war. They had to state that West Germany could never withstand a war and therefore must rely exclusively on the avoidance of war. These bourgeois writers, who could hardly be considered sympathetic to socialism, expressed strong doubts as to the wisdom of West German military policy and convincingly disproved the official NATO and Bundeswehr point of view concerning the outcome for West Germany of a military conflict.

On May 17, 1972 the Bundestag passed a decision to ratify the treaties signed between the FRG and the USSR and the FRG and Poland. Before the final voting members of the government and SPD and FDP deputies directed once more the attention of the opposition to the international position of West Germany if the treaties should fail to be ratified. Walter Scheel, the Foreign Minister, stated that refusal to ratify the treaties would disappoint people throughout the world.¹ Professor Carlo Schmid, a SPD deputy, stressed that the historical past and the geographical position of West Germany in the centre of Europe obliged it to make this contribution to the cause of peace.^^2^^ The FDP Bundestag faction chairman Wolfgang Mischnick stated the "rapprochement with the USSR and Poland is essential" and that it was time to be rid once and for all of "the mentality of revenge" and pursue a policy of peace.

~^^1^^ Suddeutsche Zeitung,M&y 18, 1972.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

``Dreams," he declared, "should give way to

reality.''^^1^^

For all the complexity of the internal political situation in West Germany, there has been a particularly marked trend to realism in foreign policy and particularly in relations with the USSR and the socialist countries. The Brandt-Scheel government, which had the support of the overwhelming majority of the population in signing the treaties with the USSR and Poland, also managed to achieve their ratification by the Bundestag. The final voting on the ratification of the USSRFRG treaty was 248 votes for, 10 against and 238 abstentions, and on the Poland-FRG treaty: 248 for, 17 against and 230 abstentions.

The CDU/CSU leadership realising the general mood decided on the eve of the voting that they would abstain. The refusal of the opposition to approve the treaty could not detract from its political importance.

Just how important the Moscow and Warsaw treaties were for the FRG can be seen from the declaration of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt in connection with the ratification. "The approval by the Bundestag," he stated, "of the treaties signed with Moscow and Warsaw marks a new stage in West German history. After our difficult disputes we have gone the way of reason, the way that lies ahead to the future... The Federal Republic of Germany will be guided by the letter and the spirit of the treaties... We are now faced with the task of giving these treaties practical implementation...

The West German newspaper Siiddeutsche Zei-

tung wrote in connection with the ratification of the treaties that only from this moment was the Federal Republic of Germany a truly sovereign state. Simultaneously with the ratification of the treaties, the country has recognised itself. According to Le Monde, the ratification of the treaties marked the transition to a new concept of Europe. Chancellor Adenauer, the paper went on, must have turned in his grave kt the Federal Republic virtually recognising its present borders and the existence of two German states.

After the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties the way was open for new steps towards normalising relations between the FRG and the socialist countries. In a speech at a press conference in Bonn on May 18, 1972 Foreign Minister Scheel noted that the ratification of the eastern treaties by the Bundestag marked a turning point in West German history. He went on to declare the government's intention of signing a transport treaty with the GDR, of beginning an exchange of views on signing a Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG, of establishing diplomatic relations with Poland, of continuing talks with Chechoslovakia and of establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.

•, The Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet at joint sessions held on April 12 and April 17, 1972 considered the Council of Ministers' proposal presented to them by the USSR Supreme Soviet to ratify the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970. They approved it and made recommendations for its ratification

Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 18, 1972. Bulletin No 73, May 19, 1972, p. 1049.

by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On May 31, 1972 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the treaty between the USSR and West Germany.

On June 3, 1972 an exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Bonn. "The entry into force of the Treaties the Soviet Union and Poland have concluded with the Federal Republic of Germany is a landmark in history. These political instruments are based squarely on the recognition of the postwar political and territorial realities and they formalise the inviolability of the existing European borders, including the border between the GDR and the FRG and the Western border of the Polish People's Republic. This proved to be the basis which made it possible to overcome the impasse that used to plague our relations with the FRG," Leonid Brezhnev said in his speech of June 5, 1972.^^1^^

On June 3, 1972, after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, a final protocol was signed, in accordance with which the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin came into force.

The completion of the process of ratification meant that the political and legal base had been created for goodneighbourly relations and peaceful, mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in the interests of peace in Europe. Now the advantages of signing the Moscow Treaty became fully apparent.

The communique that the Treaty had been ratified was received in Europe and the rest of the world with profound satisfaction. In a speech to the National Assembly on May 23, 1972, the

Prime Minister of France Jacques Chaban-Delmas noted that France could only be pleased at the ratification of the treaties between the FRG and the USSR and between the FRG and Poland. The Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, the Danish Prime Minister J. O. Krag and the governments of Finland, Belgium, Sweden and many other countries considered the treaty to be of historical importance. They noted that the successes of the USSR, Poland, the GDR and the other socialist countries in the sphere of foreign policy were the natural outcome of years of struggle for peace in Europe and represented an invaluable contribution to the cause of strengthening international security. In a speech in December 1972, the Indian Foreign Minister, S. Swaran Singh welcomed in the name of the Indian government the signing of the treaties as an important landmark on the road to peace and security in Europe. He added that India would continue to lend its full support to any steps designed to promote detente in Europe. The Indian Foreign Minister expressed the thoughts of many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America when he stressed that it was in the interests of the whole world to ensure that the European continent never again became a hotbed of world war.

The ratification of the Moscow Treaty was met with satisfaction by all those who were sincere in their desire that the European continent should be a continent of peace, mutually advantageous cooperation and mutual understanding. This extensive approval for the treaty put the opponents of detente in a difficult position. Certain circles in the West that looked back with longing to the days of the cold war, preferring confrontation to cooperation, were compelled to hide their

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1974, pp. 8-9 (in Russian).

discontent at the positive changes that had taken place in Europe, but this did not mean to say that they would not try with reactionary circles in West Germany to change the country's foreign policy and hinder the development of cooperation and goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

At a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31,1972, M. A. Suslov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet of the Union, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted: "It is likely that the forces of reaction in the FRG and in other capitalist countries will continue even after the ratification of the treaty with their policy of putting spokes in the wheel for those who sincerely desire mutual understanding and cooperation. This fact should not be lost sight of. Therefore it is essential in the future to show vigilance towards these reactionary forces.''^^1^^

various fields were one of the most important results of putting the Moscow Treaty into practice.

In October 1972, during the visit to Moscow of the State Secretary of the Federal Chancellery Egon Bahr, discussion was held on matters affecting bilateral relations and the course of their development after the signing of the Moscow Treaty. Particular attention was paid at the talks to the prospects of mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states in politics, economics and other spheres with regard for the political possibilities and the industrial, scientific and technological potentials of the two countries. During the talks fundamental agreement was reached on the exchange of military attaches from the two countries and on the opening on November 1, 1972 of a Soviet Consulate General in Hamburg, numerically the largest city in West Germany, and an analogous West German representation in Leningrad.

In connection with the forthcoming multilateral consultations in preparation for the holding of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe exchange of opinion was held on many questions relating to the contemporary situation in Europe and particularly the implementation of further steps to strengthen European security, trust and cooperation.

Regular contacts were set up between the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the West German Bundestag. Since February 1971 a working group has been functioning within the Bundestag for relations with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which brought together representatives of all parties' factions. In May 1971, a section of the USSR Parliamentary Group for parliamentary ties with the FRG was formed, and in June 1972

After the ratification of the Moscow Treaty consultations between the Soviet and West German governments became more extensive. Throughout 1972 and 1973 meetings and talks were held between the West German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs. Contacts were also made between the heads of various ministries from both countries and between business, scientific and cultural representatives. These broad contacts at various levels and in

Pravda, June 1, 1971.

a delegation from this group visited the FRG. In September-October 1973 a West German parliamentary delegation made its first visit to the USSR and had meetings and talks with the leaders of various Soviet government departments and organisations. In October 1974, a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet visited West Germany and Soviet parliamentarians met the new West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the leaders of the parties' factions in the Bundestag.^^1^^ In September 1972 a delegation from the City Council of Diisseldorf headed by Oberburgermeister Willi Becker came to Moscow at the invitation of the Moscow City Soviet.

Tourism also was successfully expanded. In

1971 alone 100,000 West Germans visited the Soviet Union and 35,000 Soviet tourists went to West Germany. The West Germans began to learn more and more about the cultural achievements of the Soviet people. The Moscow Orchestra and performers from the Leningrad Philharmonia appeared in Bonn and Nuremberg. In November

1972 a week of Soviet films was successfully held in Wiesbaden.

The development of relations between the USSR and the FRG took place under conditions of normalising relations with the other socialist countries. It was the outcome of many years of struggle on the part of the socialist community for the strengthening and all-round recognition under international law of the territorial and political realities of Europe that the treaty between West Germany and Poland came into force on December

7, 1970, that the treaty between the GDR and the FRG was signed and that new conditions were created for the building of a stable system of security on the European continent.

The coming into force of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties facilitated the normalisation of relations between the two German states. On the basis of the West German government's recognition of the political and territorial realities in contemporary Europe, and particularly the borders with the socialist countries, the GDR was able to assert more successfully its legal interests, rebuff attempts to damage its national security and sovereignty and establish equal relations with the FRG.

The first agreements signed between the GDR and the FRG came as the natural result of the conclusion of treaties between the FRG and the USSR and the FRG and Poland. In implementing the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin the GDR and the FRG reached agreement on many aspects relating to communications between the FRG and West Berlin and West Berlin and the GDR and later signed their first interstate treaty--- the transport treaty.

Fraternal support and aid from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries allowed the German Democratic Republic to conclude the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG. The preamble to this treaty, which was signed on December 21, 1972 by representatives of both German states in Berlin, declared that "both states will be governed in their relations with one another by the aims and principles of the sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right to self-determination and the observance of human rights''.

~^^1^^ See G. L. Rozanov, USSR-FRG:Restructuring Relations, Moscow, 1977, p. 29 (in Russian).

The plans of the West German reactionaries to isolate the GDR internationally through the notorious Hallstein Doctrine were thus frustrated. The German Democratic Republic is recognised by and has diplomatic relations with the overwhelming majority of states in the world. These were now joined by the FRG. According to the treaty between the FRG and the GDR the two states "have established normal goodneighbourly relations with each other on the basis of equality". In the future they "will be guided by the aims and principles enshrined in the UN Charter" (Art. 2). Both states affirm the inviolability of their common border both now and in the future" (Art. 3). The contracting powers pledged to decide all disputes by exclusively peaceful means to refrain from the threat or use of force. In conformity with Article 4 neither of the two states can represent the other in international affairs or act in the other's name". Both the GDR and the FRG undertook to promote peaceful relations between the states of Europe and to make their contribution to peace and cooperation on the continent.

It was also agreed that both states would open permanent representations in Berlin and Bonn. On the basis of the treaty the two sides agreed to develop and encourage cooperation in economics, science, technology, transport, legal relations, postal and telegraphic communications and in health, culture, sport, environmental protection and other areas (Art. 7).

The historical importance of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG consisted in the fact that after several decades of no relations at all between them it now became possible to lay the groundwork for settling relations

between two independent states with opposite social systems.

Simultaneously with the signing of the treaty Michael Kohl, the GDR State Secretary, and Egon Bahr, a West German minister with special portfolio, exchanged letters in accordance with which the GDR and the FRG agreed to take the necessary steps for both their countries to join the United Nations Organisation.

Questions relating to a German peaceful settlement were solved gradually, stage by stage, as the treaties signed by the FRG with the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin came into force (September 3, 1971). Thus there was no longer a German question and an end was put to the Second World War once and for all.

One more question must still be mentioned.

Ruling circles in the FRG still try as before to deny the existence of a socialist nation in the GDR and continually harp on the so-called unity of the German nation, which ultimately amounts to a continuation of the old and doomed imperialist policy of drawing the GDR into the sphere of imperialism. These delusions are based on the idealistic concept of a nation as an entity independent of classes, the class struggle and a social system. The content and character of the nation inhabiting the GDR is determined by socialism, socialist relations of production, the political power of the working class under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party, Marxist-Leninist ideology and close bonds of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries

The position of the Soviet Union on the existence of two independent, sovereign German states is

well known. The GDR and the FRG are states with different social systems. Their existence is a political reality. Their development proceeds along completely different social lines.

On November 19,1972 elections to the Bundestag were held. During the election campaign the parties of the government coalition showed by concrete example the advantages of a peaceful international policy for the FRG and for the West German population. They directed the attention of the electorate to the dangers that might occur if the CDU / CSU opposition came to power. During the election campaign the latter directed their main attention to internal political difficulties. Playing on the popular dissatisfaction with spiralling inflation and price rises in the country, they hoped to come to power under the slogan that internal change was necessary.

The election to the Bundestag on November 19, 1972 was characterised by great political activity on the part of the population. The government coalition won an impressive victory. The SPD received 45.8 per cent of all the votes and 230 seats (six more than at the 1969 elections). The I FDP also strengthened its position. The ruling | coalition now had 271 seats, which was 46 more I than the CDU/CSU opposition. For the first » time in West German history the SPD became the largest party in the Bundestag.

Of decisive influence on the election results was the changed mood of the electorate, which was largely brought about by the policy of detente and peaceful coexistence. The West German electorate gave its decision in favour of continuing the foreign policy of the Brandt-Scheel government. The results of the election were a clear vote of no confidence in the CDU/CSU and their revanchist

policies. At the same time the electorate expressed the hope that given another term of office the Brandt-Scheel government would implement the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and complete the normalisation of relations with the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

The election was the ultimate affirmation of the positive changes that had been made in West German foreign policy. It did much to decide the question: who wins whom? No longer could the old dogmas of the Christian Democrats retain the blind support of the majority. They now gave way to a more realistic policy towards the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist states.

The West German government could now continue its efforts to develop relations with the socialist countries. Brandt's government declaration to the Bundestag on January 18, 1973 stated that "the conclusion of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, the Quadripartite Agreement on [West ] Berlin and the relevant agreements between the GDR and FRG have made it possible to improve relations between East and West. We (the FRG---R. A.) wish to develop broad cooperation in economics, science, technology and culture with the countries of Eastern Europe".^^1^^

At the same time representatives of the German Communist Party, the German Peace Union and other democratic West German organisations justly turned the attention of the people to the dangers presented by the reactionaries through their attempts to oppose the government's realistic foreign policy. The CDU/CSU alliance remained an influential political force, behind which "stood

Bulletin No 6, January 19, 1973, p. 46.

those forces which opposed detente---the forces of reactionary military-industrial capital".^^1^^

But no matter how powerful the opposition and the forces supporting it, they were unable to check the advancement of Soviet-West German relations. These relations now expanded and developed on a sound material basis and this in turn had a favourable effect on the solution of problems connected with ensuring a lasting peace on the European continent.

ment for metal-rolling, food production equipment, refrigeration and air conditioning equipment, building equipment, equipment for the chemical and textile industries, equipment for the timber, cellulose, paper, woodworking and polygraphic industries, compressor-pumps, pumps, laboratory instruments, medical equipment and instruments, ships and marine equipment.^^1^^

On June 6, 1972 the USSR and the FRG signed a long-term agreement on trade-economic cooperation. For the first time in the history of economic relations between the two countries the agreement covered not only trade but other fields of economic cooperation. According to the terms of this agreement the two sides undertook to expand cooperation between the appropriate organisations and firms of both states to include the setting up of industrial complexes and the exchange of patents, licenses and technical documentation.

Among the Soviet Union's trading partners there were some that were already well acquainted with the market. Companies like Siemens had traditional ties and considerable experience of economic cooperation going back to the days of pre-revolutionary Russia. Thus, for example, it was with the participation of Siemens that telegraphic communications between Petersburg and Moscow, Moscow and Kiev, Kiev and Odessa were made. The Soviet Union now concluded an agreement with this firm on scientific and technological cooperation. Siemens established good contacts with the Soviet organisations, particularly the Ministry of Instrument-Making, Means of Automation and Control Systems and the ministries of Communications, Radio Industry, Power

The development of economic relations between the USSR and the FRG was affected by many factors. The most important of these---the improvement in political relations---created a political atmosphere favourable to cooperation in business such as had not existed for more than two decades.

After the signing of the Moscow Treaty trade relations moved rapidly forward. West Germany considerably surpassed other Western countries in supplying the USSR with machinery, equipment and means of transport. In 1972, these supplies were fifty per cent more as those of Japan, which held second place among the Western trading partners.^^2^^

West Germany sold the USSR lathes, hammerpresses, automobile plant equipment, electrical engineering and ore-enriching equipment, equipment for underground and open-cast mines, equip-

~^^1^^ H. Adamo, Die CDU/CSU. Wesen und Politik, Frankfurtam-Main, 1976, p. 73.

^^2^^ In 1972 West Germany's trade with the USSR came to more than 302 million roubles, whereas Japan's was around 200 million roubles. USSR Foreign Trade for 1972. Statistical Review, Moscow, 1973, p. 92 (in Russian).

See. Ibid., pp. 92-100.

Engineering and Electrical Engineering. The firm participated in the holding of symposia and exhibitions and helped to set up a training centre in the USSR for Soviet specialists.

Good contacts were also established between J Soviet foreign trade organisations and the electronics concern AEG-Telefunken. Another German company Farbwerke Hoechst, began to sell chemi- ; cals to the USSR and buy in return phosphates , and pyrites. Cooperation with Farbwerke Hoechst also included the holding of symposia, the exchange of delegations of chemists and the undertaking of joint research projects. Thus in June 1973 a joint symposium was held in the Ministry of the Medical Industry in which West German specialists took part. The USSR also buys equipment from the firm BASF. Bayer supplied the USSR with machines for making polyeurethane and polyester and machines for making polyeurethane seats and upholstery for Zhiguli (Lada) cars.

One indication of the interests shown by West German industrial, commercial and financial circles in trade with the USSR is the active participation by West German companies in the international exhibitions and fairs held in the USSR. At the same time the Soviet foreign trade organisations significantly expanded their participation in various specialised exhibitions and fairs held in the FRG. All this made it possible for both countries to know each other's export potentials better and to overcome the ingrained prejudices that the USSR was only of interest to the West German economy insofar as it could supply raw materials and semifinished goods. The results of the economic cooperation between the two countries were a good counter argument against this thinking. Soviet shipments of machines, equipment and transport

vehicles to West Germany rose to such a level that already in 1971 they accounted for 21.8 per cent and in 1972 23.6 per cent of total Soviet exports.

The expansion of economic cooperation with the USSR brought great benefit not only to the West German economy, but also to broad sections of the West German people. Economic and trade relations with the USSR created additional jobs and made it possible to raise the living standards of the working people in West Germany.

When in summer 1972 a huge contract was signed in Dusseldorf to supply the USSR with large diameter pipes Franz Euler, Chairman of the Production Council of the pipe-rolling factory of the West German Mannesmann concern, in a speech to the Soviet delegation, headed by the Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev, expressed in the name of all the workers satisfaction with the agreement, which for many years ahead guaranteed them work.

The successes achieved in expanding economic, scientific and technological ties between the USSR and the FRG offered favourable prospects for further cooperation in this field in late 1972. Economics Minister Hans Friderichs stated that he saw excellent prospects in East-West trade, particularly between the FRG and the Soviet Union.

The improvement in the general climate of Soviet-West German relations had a positive effect on the development of trade. The overall turnover for 1972 amounted to 3.2 billion marks, some 20 per cent higher than in the previous year. The Federal Republic had now become one of the major trading partners of the USSR among the capitalist countries.

The turn towards normalising relations, which found its expression in the development of broad political, economic and other ties between the USSR and the FRG, became possible thanks to the consistent implementation on the part of the socialist community countries of a policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and as a result of their constant struggle for peace and security. A role of no small importance was also played by the realism and political boldness of the new West German government in understanding the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole and by realisation of the value of normal relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. "The people in the Soviet Union," Leonid Brezhnev noted, "appreciate the realism, will and far-sightedness displayed by the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, above all, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, in working for the conclusion and bringing into force of the treaties with the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic, which marked the beginning of your country's new relations with socialist Europe.''^^1^^

Having concluded a treaty with West Germany the Soviet Union was determined to see it fully implemented in practice and to solve the problems that still existed in Soviet-West German relations, deepening and strengthening thereby the results already achieved. Life has shown that the best way of solving difficult problems is by means

of a well-prepared meeting between the heads of state of the countries concerned and a frank exchange of opinion. Thus, from May 18 to 22, 1973 Leonid Brezhnev visited Bonn. As a result of this visit a new impulse was given to positive changes in Soviet-West German relations in the course of the implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt noted in their declarations that through their meeting and talks they intended to continue the work that was begun on August 12, 1970 (the day of the signing of the Moscow Treaty) and developed as a result of the talks in Oreanda in 1971.

The two leaders discussed the radical problems of bilateral relations and devoted considerable attention to relevant international problems, particularly the prospects for ensuring peace in Europe and throughout the rest of the world. The two sides expressed their readiness to work consistently for the improvement and development of relations and stressed that a special role in this belonged to the meetings and exchanges of opinion between the leaders of the two countries. It was therefore planned that the practice of holding summit meetings would be continued.

As a result of these talks agreement was reached on a number of points under discussion and these were reflected in the documents and agreements signed by the two sides. In his interview to West German television in May 1973 Leonid Brezhnev said: "We may already say confidently that the development of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic is no longer an abstract hypothesis, a theoretical plan or emotional wish, as it appeared not very long ago, but perfectly

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1975, p. 148.

real thing, which exists and is gaining in scope and strength.''^^1^^

In the area of economic ties and of industrial, technological and cultural cooperation the change in relations was expressed in the adoption of a number of long-term and broad agreements. These stated that the USSR and the FRG would strive to expand and deepen economic, industrial and technological cooperation between the appropriate organisations and enterprises in the two countries on the basis of mutual advantage and, within the framework of their respective capabilities, do what they could to promote such cooperation.

The agreement came into force on May 19, 1973 for a term of ten years. The USSR and the FRG could now work out proposals for economic, industrial and technological cooperation on a longterm basis irrespective of any temporary fluctuations which might occur in the world and in one way or another affect relations between the states.

Both sides expressed their desire to continue expanding their relations and to conclude new agreements in addition to those signed during the visit. They welcomed the commencement of negotiations on a number of major industrial projects including the building of a metallurgical combine in the USSR to produce iron directly from ore, in which a number of West German companies were to participate. They agreed to encourage cooperation over the development of advanced technology and the building of new production facilities in the USSR for lathe, instrument and engine construction. They expressed their interest in the further development of the

chemical industry, in the peaceful use of atomic energy, in the production of electrical power and in the joint development of various types of mineral deposits in the USSR. The Federal government also showed interest in buying more oil from the Soviet Union.

On May 19, 1973 Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Walter Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, signed a Supplementary Protocol to the agreement of November 11, 1971 on air communications. This protocol significantly increased the possibilities for cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of air communications. It provided for mutual expansion of the number of air services between the FRG and the USSR. Also included in the protocol were arrangements for West German air companies to fly to Japan via Siberia, thereby reducing flying time by 5-6 hours. Conversely the Soviet Aeroflot was also given permission to fly to other countries via Frankfurt-am Main.

Long-term cooperation between both sides was also important from the point of view of building confidence between the two states, allowing a more rational utilisation of international economic ties. It is hardly surprising that Brezhnev's meeting with West German businessmen during his visit received such a wide and positive response. As was justly noted in the West German press, economic cooperation was impressive not only economically, but politically as well.

The conclusion of agreements between the USSR and the FRG met with approval by the majority of the West German population. Of course, there still were forces in the FRG which continued to disapprove of closer economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties with the USSR. And

~^^1^^ L.I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1975, p. 148.

they did everything they could to make the development of these ties more difficult, arguing that cooperation was more necessary for the Soviet Union and only served to strengthen it. An example of this was the slanderous campaign launched against cooperation with the Soviet Union by the Springer press during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. In Die Welt Axel Springer declared that the Soviet Union was creating a "sham detente" so as to exploit West German economic potential to overcome its own "economic difficulties". In this context, of course, it must be remembered that Springer was hardly being original and was just coming out with the worn-out anti-Soviet ideas of the past.

Just how completely out of touch Springer was can be judged from the admissions of a number of West German journalists. An article in the Suddeutsche Zeitung on Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn by Franz Thoma stated that "those who would claim that export and industrial cooperation only serve to strengthen our `enemy' are way off the mark. The Soviet Union does not need weapons from West Germany. The improvement of living standards, on the other hand, reduces the possibility of conflict, since people who live well are not inclined to aggression.''^^1^^

Trade cooperation with the USSR was supported by the overwhelming majority of the population in the FRG. Having concluded a broad long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation, the West German leaders were now moving with the times, realising that such cooperation offered great opportunities and that it was pointless to foist any preliminary conditions on the USSR. Evaluating the prospects for Soviet-

~^^1^^ Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 22, 1973.

West German cooperation, the Suddeutsche Zeitung wrote during Leonid Brezhnev's visit: "The times when the Soviet Union was still building up its industry, importing machinery from prewar Germany and paying for it with agricultural produce have long passed. Today the USSR is a vast industrial power stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific. It is a power which only needs that which can supplement its own industrial programme. It is not interested only in an exchange of goods, but in economic cooperation of a higher order, which would lead to major joint projects.''^^1^^

An agreement on cultural cooperation was also signed in Bonn. It provided for the two sides promoting ties between governmental organisations, academies, higher and secondary specialised educational establishments, schools, vocational and technical colleges, research institutes and other educational establishments. Article 3 of the agreement provided for such an important measure as cooperation in "teaching the history, geography and culture of the other side in such a way as to promote better mutual understanding''.

The establishment of normal relations between the USSR and the FRG was closely linked with the general international situation. During the talks in Bonn it was stressed that cooperation between the two countries was a very important part of the whole system of international relations, which could do much to strengthen European security. Whereas during the earlier summit meeting in September 1971 discussion was centred round the possibility of calling a European Conference, by 1973 the convocation of this conference had already become a reality. In a speech at a dinner given in honour of the West German

Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 22, 1973.

Federal Chancellor in Bonn on May 21, 1973 Leonid Brezhnev said: "What is meant is to establish, through collective efforts, a generally acknowledged reliable system of principles that would help to establish a genuinely calm atmosphere in future not for several years ahead, but over a whole historical period. This, at least, is how we in the Soviet Union understand the task of an all-European conference. And we are gratified to note that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany approaches this issue aware of its great importance.''^^1^^

Discussion of matters relating to strengthening security in Europe, and particularly talks on the preparations for and conducting of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation were particularly important in view of the active support given by the USSR and the FRG for the holding of such a conference. A Joint Statement from the two sides stressed that they were both "fully resolved to contribute to the success of the conference with the aim of creating a firm foundation for peace, security and cooperation in Europe".^^2^^

Given the successful development of international relations it was important to supplement political detente with military detente. In the course of discussion related to mutual armed forces and armaments reductions in Central Europe the partners in the talks, as their Joint Statement noted were "unanimous in that agreement settlements conforming to the principle of not jeopardising the security of the participating states,

would answer the purpose of strengthening European peace".^^1^^

Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brandt were also unanimous in their agreement that strict observance and full implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin were essential. They declared that successful conclusion of the talks between the FRG and Czechoslovakia would be of great importance for furthering detente in Europe. Both participants also stressed the importance of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG for detente in Europe. They welcomed the forthcoming entry of the two German states into the United Nations.

The results of the talks in Bonn confirmed the desire of the Soviet and West German leaders to strengthen detente and endorsed the positive change that had taken place in relations between the two countries. A resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR entitled "On the Visit of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany" stated: "The Talks Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Chancellor Willy Brandt held, the Soviet-West German accords signed during the visit, the Joint Statement on the outcome of the visit open new vistas of good relations and neighbourly cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany in the interests of peace. This also applies fully to economic ties between the two countries, to the industrial, technical

L.I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1974, p. 35. ~^^2^^ New Times No. 21, May 1973, p. 28.

Ibid.

and cultural cooperation on a long-term basis.''^^1^^

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn contributed greatly to advancing the cause of detente and to strengthening peace and security in Europe. The growing cooperation between the USSR and the FRG showed once more the triumph of the Leninist policy of the CPSU for peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. It came as the logical result of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet state and the implementation of the Peace Programme, adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

* * *

The USSR-FRG summit meeting in Bonn in 1973 created favourable conditions for the further development of relations between the USSR and the FRG. On the firm foundations of the Moscow Treaty the two countries began to cooperate with each other actively and in various fields.

Efforts to reduce the area of disagreement with the USSR and the other socialist countries and expand those fields where all-round and mutually advantageous cooperation were possible, were considered by a large part of the population of West Germany as one of the positive achievements of the Brandt government. "Whereas the voter could not always fathom the essence of the socioeconomic promises offered by the opposing parties, he could clearly see the difference in their foreign policies. Here the CDU/CSU were trying to put back the clock to the days of the cold war, while the SPD and FDP promised lasting peace and active cooperation with their neighbours in the

East. Thus the majority of the electorate came out in support of the coalition.''^^1^^

In an article published in the January 1974 issue of Vorwarts which emphasised the necessity for maintaining the constructive policy of improving relations with the socialist countries, SPD Deputy Giinther Slotta wrote: "The eastern policy of the Federal Republic is a policy of a special kind, which continually requires fuel to feed it... This constructive and dynamic eastern policy with its eastern treaties and Quadripartite Agreement on [West] Berlin is the foundation for the foreign policy of the FRG. It is the guarantee that the Federal Republic can act independently in its own national interests within the framework of the Western system.''^^2^^

After Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn both sides concentrated their efforts on deepening relations on the basis of the agreements and treaties concluded in May 1973.

A special place in Soviet-West German relations was occupied by West Berlin. As participant in the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin the USSR was concerned to see it strictly observed and fully implemented, and this it demanded from all the other participants. The Quadripartite Agreement together with the West German treaties signed with the USSR, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia was an important part of the whole complex of international settlements which virtually drew a line under the postwar settlement in Europe and laid the foundations for the allround development of relations between the states in Europe on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

~^^1^^ V. D. Yezhov, From Cold War to Detente. Essays on the Federal Republic of Germany, Moscow, 1978, p. 189.

~^^2^^ Vorwarts, January 24, 1974, p. 3.

~^^1^^ The Visit of Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany. May 18-22, 1973. Speeches and Documents, Moscow, 1973, p. 75 (in Russian).

The atmosphere surrounding West Berlin changed for the better, losing much of its explosive nature. The USSR and the GDR fulfilled their obligations to the letter, a fact which received official recognition from the West German government. In answer to a parliamentary question raised on December 5, 1974 the West German government replied that the transit agreement between the FRG and the GDR was functioning well. West Berliners took immediate advantage of the opportunity offered them of visiting the GDR with the result that between 1971 and 1973 the number of visits made by West Berliners to the GDR rose from 85,000 to 3.3 million, i.e., approximately 40-fold.

Together with the opening of a Soviet Consulate General in West Berlin, according to the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement, a number of other Soviet offices were also opened there. Thus in summer 1973 a Bureau of Soviet Foreign Trade Organisations was opened to promote economic and trade contacts between the USSR and West Berlin and on one of the main streets of the city the offices of Aeroflot were installed.

Millions of citizens from West Germany and West Berlin learned from their own experience that the treaties and agreements signed served the interests of detente.

But unfortunately the favourable opportunities for turning West Berlin from a source of tension into a constructive element of peace and detente were not sufficiently exploited. The Soviet Union and the GDR were highly concerned at the attempts of the West German side to increase the powers of the observers from the West Berlin Chamber of Deputies in the West German Bundestag and even give them equal rights with Bun-

destag deputies. Alarm was also felt at attempts to extend some of the laws of West Germany to West Berlin, where, if the spirit and the letter of the Quadripartite Agreement are adhered to, they cannot be allowed to apply, and to institute in West Berlin a federal department of environmental control.

The attempts of the West German side to make ``corrections'' to the Quadripartite Agreement in those parts which relate to the fact that West Berlin is neither a part of, nor subordinate to the Federal Republic created a threat to the normal functioning of the Agreement. They undoubtedly served to divert both sides---the USSR and the FRG---from the constructive development of Soviet-West German relations as a whole, and on a number of issues actually hindered their development.

In the opinion of the Soviet side the future of West Berlin can only be guaranteed through strict observance of the agreements signed. Any attempt to display the "Federal presence", or, in other words, claims on the city, which neither belongs to the Federal Republic nor can be governed by it, run counter to the interests of the population of West Berlin and the normalisation of the situation in the area.

Undoubtedly, the signing of the Moscow Treaty and the other treaties with the socialist countries marked an important, an essential step forward in relations between the FRG and the socialist countries, and the normalisation of these relations had a positive effect on the political climate in Europe. The only people who could not or would not recognise this were those for whom socialism was like a red rag to a bull. They tried to cast shadows on the results achieved in 1971 and 1973

7---919

in Soviet-West German relations and compromise the whole concept of broad, mutually advantageous cooperation.

In May 1974 Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, whose name stood for the new realistic policy adopted by the Federal government, resigned. Vice Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs Walter Scheel was elected to the office of President of the FRG. As a tribute to Willy Brandt, who did much to improve relations between his country and the socialist countries, it must be said that he was the man who took the first step in this direction.

The main reason for Brandt's resignation was the internal political difficulties faced by the ruling coalition in early 1974. At the time there were some 750,000 unemployed and a sharp increase in the number of reduced working days which hit the West German workers very badly. The machinations of the West German and the international monopolies led to a sharp price rise, and the blackmail practised by the international oil monopolies only served to exacerbate the otherwise serious economic situation in the FRG.

This situation was exploited by the forces of reaction for attacks on the Brandt government. For many months a campaign was directed personally against the Federal Chancellor, the aim of which was to shake the government majority, undermine confidence in the ruling parties and sow the seeds of panic.

Furthermore, inconsistency in pursuing a policy of detente in relations with the socialist countries undermined the prestige of the government parties. Many people in the FRG believed that detente would help to reduce their tax burden as a result of reductions now being able to be made in arms spending. In 1973 military expenditure had reached

a record level of 25.8 billion marks, and, as was noted in the Ministry of Defence White Paper entitled On State Security and the Development of the Bundeswehr. 1973/1974, by 1977 this sum was to be increased to just 30 billion. From 1970 to 1974 the annual military budget had been rising by 8.3 per cent. In 1974 it rose by 1.7 billion marks to reach 27.6 billion.^^1^^

The West German military frequently came out with statements that were directly opposed to the letter and the spirit of the Moscow Treaty. According to Frankfurter Rundschau (October 19, 1973) one of the Bundeswehr chiefs declared that "you can only hold talks with the Russians when you've got a stick in your hand". But this declaration was only a specific interpretation of the statement made by Admiral Zimmermann, General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, that "raising our defence capacity ... can only be used to demonstrate our political resolve".^^2^^

The West German population were concerned with the continuous attempts of the forces of reaction to cast doubts on the present borders with the socialist countries. In accordance with the terms of the Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and Berlin treaties the West German government gave its recognition to the present borders and to the political realities of the region. However, as before the revanchist calls still echoed, frequently without any rebuff. Moreover, a number of publications like the West German Statistical Yearbook continued to refer to the "German borders as of

~^^1^^ Weissbuch 1973/11974. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, Koln, 1974, PP₂ 214-15.

Wehrkunde, Munchen, February 1973, p. 60.

7*

December 31, 1937", whereas West Berlin was illegally described as "part of the FRG". And yet on February 9,1972 Scheel declared in the Bundestag: "Naturally, from the point of view of the Federal Republic and with regard for the clause on the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers in Germany as a whole, the provinces that lie beyond the Oder-Neisse line can no longer, after the coming into force of the Warsaw Treaty, be considered as a part of our country.''^^1^^

It is interesting to note that in those instances where the West German government pursued a consistent policy for normalising relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries, it received the greatest support from its population. Thus in May, 1973 during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG the prestige of the SPD was high---it was supported by 50 per cent of the population, according to opinion poles. But when in October and December of the same year the West German government was engaged in delaying tactics in normalising relations with Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the prestige of the SPD fell to 38 per cent (January 1974).^^2^^

Against a background of internal political difficulties and at a time of anti-communist and antidemocratic campaigns and intrigues the CDU/ CSU launched an offensive against the policies of detente in a bid to block further progress in this direction and hamper the normal development of relations with the socialist countries. In connection with Brandt's resignation from the office of Chancellor, Karl Carstens, Chairman of the Parliamentary Faction of the CDU/CSU, and

Strauss, Chairman of the Christian Social Union, demanded that the government coalition radically review its foreign policy and harden its position in relation to the socialist countries, particularly the GDR.

These attempts met with a rebuff from the government coalition. The chairmen of the two parliamentary factions that formed the coalition, the SPD and the FDP, Wehner and Mischnick declared that in the interests of the FRG they would not only continue with the policy laid down under Brandt, but would give practical implementation to the Moscow Treaty and the other treaties with the socialist countries.

On May 15, 1974 the Federal Convention (comprised of both the Bundestag deputies and representatives of the Lander) elected Walter Scheel to the post of Federal President by 530 votes to 498. On May 16, 1974 Helmut Schmidt, who had actively participated in conducting the government's eastern policy, was elected by 267 votes to 225 to the office of Federal Chancellor. In a government statement delivered in the Bundestag on the following day Schmidt stated the government's intention to maintain continuity in foreign policy and to concern itself over "good relations with the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty and to continue the policy of peace and detente".^^1^^

On June 20, 1974 the West German Bundestag ratified the Treaty on Mutual Relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia (signed in December, 1973). This treaty solved the main issue by nullifying the Munich Agreement, establishing the inviolability of common borders and creating a basis

~^^1^^ Bulletin No 20, February 12, 1972, p. 210.

~^^2^^ See Der Spiegel No 14, April 1, 1974, p. 26.

Bulletin No 60, May 18, 1974, p. 597.

for the development of goodneighbourly relations. Permanent representations of the two states were set up in each country.

The Soviet Union welcomed the declaration of Federal Chancellor Schmidt and the other West German leaders on their intention to adhere to the policy of cooperation with the socialist countries, to strengthen peace in Europe and to maintain continuity in foreign policy.

These realistic steps in the foreign policy of the FRG had to be implemented against the fierce resistance of the CDU/CSU. The change of Federal Chancellor served them as an excuse for a new surge of anti-Soyietism. During the Congress of the Christian Social Union in Munich in July 1974 Strauss advocated the views and demands of revanchist, militarist and neo-nazi circles and tried once again to revive an atmosphere of political instability.

government to improve relations with the socialist states or increase the role of their own country in developing peaceful cooperation in Europe would always be met with support and understanding from the Soviet Union. As Leonid Brezhnev noted, "a solid and firm foundation underlies our new relations. One can, of course, only talk of the significance of the work done and admire its results. But there is little use in it. The task now is, apparently, to expand it in a strong fabric of mutually advantageous links in most diverse fields. Opening a new chapter in the mutual relations of our states and giving it a new positive meaning also call for much strength, persistence and, I would say, political courage.''^^1^^

The West German side for its part declared its desire to continue the policy of developing relations with the USSR, which was begun with the signing of the Moscow Treaty on August 12, 1970. In an address on Soviet television on October 30, 1974 Helmut Schmidt said that he considered his meeting with the Soviet leaders and his visit as a whole as the essential continuation of the work that was begun four years ago.

During the visit an agreement was signed between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Further Promotion of Economic Cooperation which ensured further progress in the development and expansion of mutually advantageous economic, industrial and technological links, particularly through cooperation in the extraction of raw materials and production of electrical power. A new agreement was

The desire of both sides to develop their relations further found concrete expression in the official visit of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to the USSR on October 28-31, 1974. The talks between the leaders of the USSR and the FRG reaffirmed that summit meetings had become a good tradition. They enriched relations between the two countries and allowed them to make new steps forward in developing and deepening mutually advantageous cooperation.

During the talks the Soviet leaders declared that the development of all-round cooperation with the FRG was a principled and long-term policy and that any efforts by the West German

L.I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Part 7, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1975, p. 86.

also signed to provide the FRG from 1978 to the year 2000 with some 60 billion cubic metres of natural gas and the USSR with large diameter piping and equipment for the gas industry.

But cooperation between the two countries was not exhausted by purely commercial advantages. The wider and more full-blooded became the cooperation between the two countries, the more their confidence grew in each other and the stronger and more varied became their political contacts.

The summit talks in Moscow allowed many questions of international politics to be discussed and were unanimously considered to be useful and constructive. Particular attention was naturally devoted to the situation in Europe. Both leaders welcomed the further strengthening of detente and of cooperation between the European states.

Soviet diplomacy at the time was making an intensive study of ways to solve problems related to the final stage in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Talks with the West German leaders led to a better understanding of the West German position and helped to define points of common interest that would make the holding of the conference more successful. At a dinner given in honour of the West German Chancellor in Moscow on October 28, 1974 Leonid Brezhnev said: "It is necessary to learn to value what reflects the common views of states and leave out what lies beyond the limits of reality and has nothing to do with the central issue.''^^1^^

The Joint Statement of both sides said that they would "make the necessary efforts to find a solution for the as yet unsolved issues on the

' L.I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Part 7, op. cit., p. 89.

basis of the positive results already achieved and in cooperation with all the other participants in the talks".^^1^^

Both sides stressed the importance of the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces, and armaments in Central Europe that were taking place in Vienna and expressed their readiness to actively cooperate in looking for solutions acceptable to all participants and to contribute to the success of these talks so that they would meet the requirements of undiminished security of the sides and promote more stable relations, peace and security in Europe.

During the talks the USSR and the FRG reaffirmed their resolve to continue joint efforts aimed at improving relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany in various fields. They were unanimous in their belief that regular and extensive exchanges of opinion and meetings between the leaders of both countries would do much to promote this.

The forming of new relations, as events were showing, was by no means an easy task, in view of the continued pressure on the FRG government by those politicians, whose views were conditioned by the cold war, and all those who were opposed to recognising the political and territorial realities in Europe.

The results of the visit offered new opportunities for expanding and deepening cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in various fields in the interests of both states and in the interests of strengthening international security and peace.

Active cooperation in foreign policy within the socialist community undoubtedly resulted in

Pravda, October 31, 1974.

a vast increase in the prestige of socialism and in its influence on international affairs in Europe and in the rest of the world. The concrete results of this cooperation were the strengthening of peace and security on the European continent and broad, mutually advantageous ties between states with different social and political systems.

The level and character of relations between the USSR and the FRG were directly dependent on the extent to which ruling circles in the FRG pursued a realistic policy towards their eastern neighbours, and the extent to which they were guided in practice by the treaties and agreements signed with the GDR and Poland, on their position regarding the full normalisation of relations with Czechoslovakia and on their attitude to establishing relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.

On June 21, 1973 the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG, signed on December 21, 1972, came into force. In the History of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany the Treaty was described as a "significant result of the coordinated foreign policy of the USSR, the GDR and the other socialist states".^^1^^

Of considerable importance for the development of relations between two sovereign German states for both the present and the future were those clauses of the treaty which related to renunciation of the use or threat of force in the settlement of interstate disputes, the inviolability of the borders between the FRG and the GDR and the obligation to fully observe territorial integrity.

The Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG, a number of bilateral agreements signed between them and the entry

of the FRG and the GDR into the UN were a clear demonstration of the fundamental change that had been brought about in relations between these two Central European states. They were now based on treaties which allowed the two states to live peacefully side by side and to take advantage of economic and other cooperation.

The entry of the GDR into the United Nations was the expression of that country's increasing role and prestige. It rid the world of one of the vestiges of the cold war period and promoted peace and security in Europe. The GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in a speech to the UN General Assembly on October 1, 1973 said that the entry into the United Nations of both the GDR and the FRG, two sovereign Central European states with different social systems, marked a new step forward on the road to improving the international situation both in Europe and the rest of the world.

There were those in the FRG who thought that expansion of contacts between the two German states would eventually result in an "erosion of the borders" between the imperialist FRG and the socialist GDR. The Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany stressed in its resolutions in June 1971 that between the socialist GDR, in which a socialist German nation is developing, and the imperialist FRG there cannot and will never be so-called intra-German relations. The GDR and the FRG, these two independent states with different social systems, the congress went on to point out, are drifting apart.

The principled approach of the GDR to overcoming difficulties in relations with the FRG and the support provided for it by the Soviet Union and other socialist states, have also played an impor-

Geschichte der SED, Berlin, 1978, p. 595.

tant role. Ultimately the West German authorities were convinced that normalisation was only possible on the basis of respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR. In a Note on May 6, 1974 the West German government announced that the head of the permanent GDR representation, Michael Kohl, had received agrement. On June 20 of the same year the permanent representatives of the two states began work in Bonn and Berlin.

After lengthy negotiations, complicated by attempts of the West German side to foist upon Czechoslovakia clearly unacceptable conditions, ruling circles in the FRG were forced to return to a constructive approach to the settlement of Czechoslovak-West German relations. Work on the treaty to normalise relations between the two countries was completed and during Chancellor Willy Brandt's visit to Czechoslovakia, on December 11, 1973, the treaty was signed. In June 1974 it was ratified by the West German Bundestag and agreement was reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

As noted in the preamble to the treaty, Czechoslovakia and the FRG were resolved to put an end once and for all to the harsh legacy of the past in their relations. Both sides agreed that the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 had been foisted upon Czechoslovakia by the nazi regime under threat of force. The two sides stated their intention to create a stable basis for the development of goodneighbourly relations.

One of the main obstacles to normalising relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was the refusal of ruling circles in Germany to annull the Munich Agreement of 1938, which allowed fascist Germany to seize Czechoslovakia and unleash the Second World War, and their refusal

to recognise the just demands of Czechoslovakia to declare the Munich Agreement null and void from the very start, with all this recognition entailed.

The treaty finally put an end to the injustice the nazis inflicted on the Czechoslovak people. Article 1 declared the Munich Agreement as "null and void" from the moment of its signing. This was so because it was signed under threat of force and in violation of international law as established by the UN Charter, one of the principles of which is the principle of the sovereign equality of states.

The Munich Agreement was part of the criminal conspiracy perpetrated against the world by Hitler and was therefore invalid from the start.

The Czechoslovak-West German Treaty contains an obligation by both sides to observe the inviolability of their joint borders and to renounce territorial claims against one another. Article 4 states that neither side has any territorial claims on the other nor will it ever have them. The two sides resolve to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force.

In spirit the Prague Treaty is akin to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. It is fully in accordance with the forward movement to normalise relations between East and West.

After the signing of the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the FRG in late 1973, the way was open for normalising relations between the latter country and Bulgaria and Hungary, particularly since between these countries there were no historical disputes. Thus on December 21, 1973 the FRG reached agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations with both Bulgaria and Hungary.

Thus the final link in the normalisation of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries was forged. The work that had taken years of uncompromising struggle on the part of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries, work that was designed to remove the vestiges of the Second World War and strengthen the results of the victory over fascism, was finally completed.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was completed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the adoption of the historic Final Act, reaffirmed on a multilateral basis the existing territorial and political situation on the European continent which had formed as a result of the defeat of fascism and the whole course of postwar development. The Conference completed the normalisation of relations between the European states and outlined a broad long-term programme for international cooperation.

RELATIONS IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 1970s

The first half of the 1970s witnessed important achievements in normalising and promoting relations between the socialist and the capitalist countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence; this found expression in the shift from confrontation to detente and cooperation in consolidating peace and security. Soviet foreign policy effectively contributed to the positive changes on the world scene, and the Peace Programme advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress was a catalyst in furthering this process.

At the same time, the positive tendencies in international relations are not yet irreversible. In the latter half of the 1970s, the more reactionary elements of imperialism increased their efforts to try and erase all the good results it had cost so much to gain during bilateral and multilateral talks between countries with different social and political systems.

The new relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany, based on a realistic foundation, made progress in the latter half of the 1970s, although their onward movement was somewhat slowed down by the German side's inconsistent policy and by its attempts to demonstrate a tough approach to the practical matters that cropped up. As for the Soviet Union, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government still continued to concentrate on promoting Soviet-FRG relations, which was reflected specifically at the 25th CPSU Congress (February-March 1976) and in its Programme

ill

of the Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for Peoples' Freedom and Independence.

Between the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses (1971-1976), the Soviet Union and West Germany went a long way towards fundamentally restructuring their relations on the basis of the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970. Reporting on behalf of the Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said: "A significant shift occurred in USSR-FRG relations on the basis of the 1970 Treaty. They have been normalised, and this on the only possible basis---- abandonment of the ill-founded intentions to tear down the existing European frontiers. Now the FRG is one of our major partners in our mutually beneficial business cooperation with the West. Our talks with Chancellor Brandt in Oreanda and Bonn, and likewise the negotiations in Moscow during the visits of Chancellor Schmidt and President Scheel, made it possible to improve mutual understanding and enabled us to further cooperation with the FRG in the economic and other fields.''^^1^^

The tensions over West Berlin created by the reactionary intrigues were eased greatly by the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and the understanding on several points reached between the governments of the GDR, the FRG and the West Berlin Senate. "We shall insist on strict and complete observance of all understandings," Leonid Brezhnev told the 25th CPSU Congress. "The Soviet Union favours a tranquil and normal life for West Berlin.''^^2^^

*L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CC CPSU on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 21-22.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state of promoting economic relations with the Western countries opened up great opportunities for those business communities which wanted to cooperate. Facts showed that the claims spread by the opponents of Soviet-FRG business partnership that the Soviet Union had a one-sided interest in economic cooperation were utterly without grounds. The report of the Economics Ministry of the FRG for 1975 published in early 1976, pointed out that West German trade with the USSR had reached record heights. Exports to the USSR had risen by 45.5 per cent, and the volume of business between the two countries for the first time exceeded 10 billion marks.

There was a favourable response in the FRG to the foreign policy programme adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress. Both governing parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, expressed satisfaction that its aim was to continue the policy of detente and cooperation.

But not everyone in the FRG found the progress in Soviet-FRG relations to their taste. The bitter political struggle over the FRG's relations with the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe continued unabated. The opposition parties attacked and obstructed the government's policy of extending relations in every way possible. In his report to the 25th CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said: "In the FRG, for example, the course of normalising relations with the socialist countries is being attacked by Right-wing forces who essentially cling to revenge-seeking positions. And, evidently, their pressure is affecting certain aspects of the Bonn Government's policy.''^^1^^

Ibid., p. 23.

8---919

The West would like to force the socialist countries to accept detente as the social status quo. Hence, for instance, the wrong interpretation of events that relate to the mounting workingclass struggle and the successes of the national liberation movement.

Sadly enough, some FRG politicians in the ruling coalition supported the clamorous overseas propaganda campaign around the alleged ``discrepancy'' between detente and Soviet support for the national liberation struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to make detente a reality, and to extend and consolidate it, were based on their conviction that it helped create an international climate favourable to the cause of construction in the socialist community countries. "We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction," Leonid Brezhnev told the 25th CPSU Congress. "This only confirms that socialism and peace are indissoluble.''^^1^^ As far as the national liberation movement and the class struggle waged by the oppressed people are concerned, these processes are determined by the objective laws of historical development which nobody can abolish or prohibit.

Realistically-oriented West German political leaders realised how important it was for the FRG to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the grave dangers posed by the policy of confrontation with the USSR which West German reaction sought to impose.

Democratic forces in the FRG strongly opposed

reaction's attempts to misrepresent the objectives of Soviet peace policy, explaining to their compatriots that the Soviet Union was, as always, the major factor in instituting the turn from dangerous confrontation and cold war to detente and fruitful cooperation between countries with different social systems. They spoke highly of the Peace Programme adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress, which they said was fully in the interests of the people of the FRG. The Statement issued by the Presidium of the Board of the German Communist Party in March 1976 in Diisseldorf following the 25th CPSU Congress called on West German democrats to oppose all anti-Soviet propaganda and support broader economic, scientific and cultural contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and demanded that the FRG make a constructive contribution to disarmament.

They have always believed in the Soviet Union and their policy proceeded from the indisputable truth that the future of Soviet-FRG relations lies in peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation. It is a policy that meets the basic interests of the peoples of the USSR and the FRG, a policy which has stood the test of time and proved correct. The Soviet Union, as the 25th CPSU Congress clearly demonstrated, was determined to pursue the policy of promoting allround Soviet-FRG cooperation which it considered favourable to European and world peace.

The process of detente, of firmly entrenching the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems as the foundation of international relations was vividly manifested in the 1970s. At the same time, the more aggressive imperialist interests tried even harder

~^^1^^ L.I.Brezhnev, Report of the CC CPSU on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress

of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 21-22.

than ever to turn world development back into the cold war orbit---they whipped up the arms race, and engaged in ideological sabotage against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Between 1975 and 1978, the ruling SPD/FDP coalition continued to support the extension of Soviet-FRG relations, although not always consistently. Federal Chancellor Schmidt and other West German leaders pointed out that there was no alternative to detente and that only by pursuing a policy of peace and good neighbourliness could the FRG guarantee itself the place it merited in the system of international relations and avoid international isolation. Just before the 1976 Bundestag elections, the SPD and FDP considered the advance in Soviet-FRG relations one of the major results of their time in office.

On October 3, 1976, the election^^1^^ confirmed that the ruling coalition was supported by the majority of the West German population.

In a policy statement, the new West German government formed at the end of 1976 confirmed its intention to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Assessing the West German election results, Leonid Brezhnev told the October (1976) Plenum of the CC CPSU that "even though the government coalition had been slightly weakened, its victory could still be seen as proof that the majority of West Germans favour peace and detente and are

• for the improvement of relations with the socialist countries. This obviously provides conditions for the normal development of mutually advantageous relations which the Soviet Union clearly favours".^^1^^

The policy of detente and, as its practical expression, the further development of West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries was supported by the SPD. The SPD Congress which met in Dortmund on June 18-19, 1976 expressed firm support for detente, noting that detente was not a fad but a reflection of vital interests. Once again, the significance of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties was evaluated highly.

The Dortmund congress, as well as the next SPD Congress in Hamburg in November of the following year, confirmed that the SPD would continue to work to preserve, consolidate and promote the recent beneficial changes in FRG foreign policy which were supported by the overwhelming majority of other countries and peoples.

The SPD leadership knew that the successes it had achieved while in office and the party's popular prestige, as well as the international prestige, were the result of its policy of realism towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The FDP, like the SPD, declared its support for detente and goodneighbourly relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries.

But those members of the FDP who held nonrealistic positions on detente were gaining influence. They saw that, contrary to their hopes, detente could not be used to reinforce the positions of West German imperialism, so they tried to change

~^^1^^ The coalition parties won enough votes to let them form the government, although their Bundestag majority dropped from 46 seats in 1972 to 10. CDU/CSU had 243 of the 496 seats, 190 of them being held by the CDU and 53 by the CSU. The government coalition had 253 seats (the SPD with 214, or 16 seats less than in the previous Bundestag, and the FDP with 39, or a loss of two seats).

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol. 6, p. 166 (in Russian).

party policy. This current was already evident in the document The Perspectives of Liberal German Policy, adopted at Meinz by a FDP congress in October 1975. The FDP again flaunted the "right of self-determination" as the way to achieve the "unity of the nation" within the framework of capitalist Europe. In contradiction to the Quadripartite Agreement, the FDP sought to create a "federal presence" in West Berlin, and issued a statement on the alleged "growing Soviet threat".^^1^^

The FDP platform on relations with the GDR is keynoted by the speech of FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher at the 30th UN General Assembly Session on September 24, 1975, where he declared that, as far as the GDR was concerned, the aim of West German foreign policy was to "achieve a state of peace in which the German people will be able to regain their unity through free selfdetermination".^^2^^

Genscher was subsequently active in the propaganda campaign against the GDR initiated by the CDU/CSU. In an interview given to the West German newspaper Die Welt in January 1977, he allowed himself to use phrases and definitions amounting practically to overt interference in the GDR's internal affairs.

That kind of approach clearly took no account of the European political and territorial realities, and clashed with the FRG's commitments under the eastern treaties. It also clashed with Chancellor Schmidt's official statement in the Bundestag on December 16, 1976, in which he said that the

policy of goodneighbourly relations with all East European countries had not changed, and that the FRG wanted to attain as high a measure of detente and cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe as possible.

Detente was widely supported by the West German people, and the tendency to align itself closer to the non-constructive stance of the CDU / CSU on West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union definitely had an effect on the votes cast for the Free Democrats in the elections in Lower Saxony and Hamburg in the summer of 1978.

The West German government's diminished efforts to promote and extend relations with the socialist countries can be explained by the pressure the reactionaries exerted on the government. The opponents of detente in the FRG have ample means of influencing public opinion. They are broadly represented in parliament, and occupy important positions in the mass media. They are able to get support from revanchist unions and reactionary organisations of displaced persons that are still financed by the government. They have the powerful political and economic backing of the military-industrial complex. As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's Statement of May 22, 1976, "it is conspicuous that certain interests in the FRG which are still steeped in 'cold war' dogmas and are at odds with reality are trying to frustrate the good results that have lately been achieved in Soviet-FRG relations, shamelessly misrepresenting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and spreading all sorts of lies about the Soviet Union's aims and intentions.''^^1^^

The CDU/CSU continued to be the main polit-

^^1^^IPW Berichte No. 5, 1977, p. 70. ~^^2^^ H.-D. Genscher, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, Stuttgart, 1977, p. 120.

~^^1^^ Pravda, May 22, 1976. 119

ical force in opposing Soviet-West German cooperation and even limited steps towards political and military detente in Europe. As K.-H. Flach wrote, the CDU/CSU "are sitting on the mountain of their own illusions and are not coming down".^^1^^

The CDU Congress in Mannheim on June 23-26, 1975 called for a change of the course pursued by the government coalition towards detente and further developing relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The CSU took an even more openly reactionary position.

Asked by Time about the prospects of the Ostpolitik, should the CDU/CSU be returned to office, F.-J. Strauss declared: "We should now concentrate on improving relations with our friends instead of our enemies.''^^2^^

The CDU/CSU group opposed the concrete steps towards detente, particularly West Germany's signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It came to the 1976 Bundestag elections with a programme that was openly hostile to peace and understanding among peoples, and there was ample reason why the majority of the West Germans refused to give them their confidence or to support their policy.

But that did not persuade the opposition to change that policy. In January 1978, the CDU gathered at a military-political forum at Kiel, which confirmed that the CDU still refused to recognise the political realities in Europe, and was still hostile as ever to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Naturally, the CDU

programme was generally regarded as posing a danger to peace.

The CDU/CSU leaders were aware that the ideal of detente and goodneighbourly relations are now a solid component of political life and could not just be ignored. So the CDU/CSU set forth their point of view on relations with the Soviet Union in the political document Considerations About the Policy of a CDU j CSU Government Vis-d- Vis the Soviet Union which was released on February 25, 1978.

In what was obviously a concession to public sentiment, the document declared that there are areas in which the interests of the two countries coincide or run parallel, and that relations with the Soviet Union are of great significance for West Germany.^^1^^ It also pointed out that the policy of the CDU/CSU should be distinct from that of the Brandt-Scheel and Schmidt-Genscher governments, and that it would take the aims, repeatedly and openly proclaimed by Moscow, more seriously. The document presented a distorted picture of Soviet foreign policy by repeating the lies about the Soviet Union's ``expansionist'' intentions and concluding, in effect, that goodneighbourly relations are impossible without ``changes'' in Soviet policy.^^2^^ In this document, the CDU/CSU reiterated their old demands, based on non-recognition of the political and territorial realities in Europe, as a pre-condition for relations with the Soviet Union.

The struggle to extend detente and establish the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems in international

~^^1^^ K.-H. Flach, Liberaler aus Leidenschaft, Miinchen-- Gutersloh-Wien, 1974, p. 156.

' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24, 1978, p. 2. Ibid.

Time, November 25, 1974, p. 14.

relations has been consistently advocated by the German Communist Party.

At its Bonn Congress on March 19-21, 1976, the Party put forward a programme for all democratic forces in West Germany, on the basis of which they can join together against reaction and for democracy and peace; it also called on all peace forces to encourage detente and convince West Germans of the legitimacy of the ideas of peace and friendship among nations.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries responded with deep concern to the activities of West Germany's revanchist Right-wing forces which were trying to erect obstacles to resolving concrete problems in Soviet-West German relations and to impose discussions about the meaning and purposes of the Ostpolitik and the approach to detente and key international issues. The development of Soviet-FRG relations had to continue and the Soviet Union was ready to do so. The Soviet government declaration of May 22, 1976 pointed out that the "Soviet Union intends to look patiently and perseveringly for new ways of promoting peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation between countries with different social systems and of settling controversial issues at the negotiation table. As far as this point is concerned, the Soviet Union will, as before, have dealings with the Federal Republic of Germany".^^1^^

The Soviet Government considered that, based on what had already been achieved, it was possible to "achieve a great deal in bilateral cooperation in the political, commercial, economic and other fields. That could be furthered by encouraging the practice of political consultations, building

up the negotiation base of our relations, and the steady development of cultural, scientific, tourist, sports and youth exchanges".^^1^^

Everything that had been achieved in SovietWest German relations was subjected to a serious test. The ongoing pressure on the government by opponents of detente both inside and outside the country mounted. But even in that situation the SPD/FDP government continued to display political realism. One example was the interview given by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the magazine Stern where he said: "The curtailment of detente amounts to a return to the policy of tension, to the arms race being certified on both sides, to conscious acceptance of new conflicts, and to the dangerous possibility that one day those conflicts will be settled by military means.''^^2^^ And that, the Chancellor concluded, would be suicide for the West. On a visit to the Soviet Union, West Germany's Foreign Minister, H.-D. Genscher pointed out: "On the whole, I would like to say this: If we examine the state of our relations, we can safely say that we can be satisfied with previous results. We agree with General Secretary Brezhnev, who said in this January in Tula that detente implies a readiness to resolve differences of opinion not by force but by peaceful means at the negotiating table. Detente also implies a certain degree of trust and the capacity for considering each other's legitimate interests. Let us develop and extend relations between our countries in this spirit in the future as well.''^^3^^

The Soviet-West German talks resulted in decisions which encouraged the relations between

Ibid.

Stern No 9, February 1977, pp. 64, 70.

Bulletin No. 64, June 21, 1977, p. 604.

~^^1^^ Pravda, May 22, 1976.

the two sides and promoted important exchanges of views on a wide range of international problems.

Nevertheless, discussions in Moscow in June 1977 indicated some differences on several points of Soviet-West German relations. Speaking during H.-D. Genscher's stay in Moscow, A. A. Gromyko said that "not all is smooth and even in relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG. It would be hypocritical not to mention it. There are some points on which the political attitude of the two sides diverge or do not fully converge. There are also some outstanding practical issues. Nevertheless---and one would like to give it the fullest emphasis---the existing difficulties must not be an insuperable obstacle to mutually advantageous cooperation, as long as both sides are willing. We are steadily looking for, and finding, a common language on the widest range of problems, and we expect the same from our partners."'

Meetings and talks between ministers and representatives of different ministries and departments became a refular occurrence. The diplomatic contacts established after the signing of the Moscow Treaty continued to develop and expand. Examples are the first Soviet-West German inter-- parliamentary symposium in January 1976 in Bonn, and the visits to the USSR by CDU Chairman Kohl (1975), Minister-President of Hesse A. Osswald (1976), Chairman of the Bundestag FDP faction W. Mischnick (1976), and others.

Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and West Germany continued to grow. It rested on a solid foundation provided by the agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation and an intergovernmental agreement on further economic cooperation. Mutually advantageous

cooperation in the trade and economic, scientific and technical fields was becoming an increasingly important factor in the extension of relations. In an official statement to the Bundestag on December 17, 1976, Chancellor Schmidt said: "Relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany have been developing positively ever since the beginning of the decade. The volume of trade has quadrupled since 1970. Thanks to the substantially larger volume of Soviet exports, there has been a reduction of about 40 per cent in our trade surplus. We welcome this, as it will have a positive effect on future opportunities for trade with the Soviet Union. Like the Soviet Union, we favour a steady continuation of cooperation.''^^1^^

The high level of economic development of the Soviet Union and the FRG opened up great business opportunities. The rapid trade growth which began at the outset of the 1970s reached its peak mid-way through the decade. The FRG became the Soviet Union's biggest trade partner in the West, while the USSR rose to be one of West Germany's major trade partners. The volume of trade between the USSR and the FRG was worth nearly 3 billion roubles in 1977.^^2^^

West Germany was far ahead of other Western countries in the amount and growth of its foreign trade with the Soviet Union.^^3^^ For West Germany

~^^1^^ Bulletin No. 135, December 17, 1976, p. 1303.

^^2^^ Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1977, Moscow, 1978, p. 10.

~^^3^^ The USSR's trade with the industrialised capitalist countries amounted to 18.7 billion roubles in 1977, accounting for 29.6 per cent of overall volume. Trade with Japan, Finland, Italy, France, the USA, and Britain was worth 2.3, 2.2, 1.9, 1.7, 1.5 and 1.3 billion roubles respectively (BIKI N. 48, 1978, p. 1).

Pravda, June 15, 1977.

it was of special significance, as the country found it difficult at that very time to sell abroad. The metallurgical, engineering, chemical, shipbuilding and other industries in the West were only operating on an average of no more than 83 per cent of capacity.

According to a study made by the Kiel Institute, since the 1970s the USSR and other socialist countries fared increasingly well on the West German market as purveyors of manufactured goods. They proved to be more competitive in the industries making standardised products and those requiring intensive labour expenditures and capital investments, such as the production of wood pulp, cellulose, paper and cardboard and sawn timber, oil-refining, the building materials industry, food-processing and non-ferrous metal industry.^^1^^

Cooperation in science and technology was expanding. Over twenty agreements were concluded with Hoechst, BASF, Heikel, AEG-Telefunken, Krupp, Otto Wolf-Konzern, Daimler-Benz AG, Ruhrkohle and other West German companies. Twenty more major projects in the iron-and-steel, chemical, engineering, electrical engineering and mining industries were undertaken jointly by West German and Soviet organisations.

Compensation agreements yielded good results. As of the beginning of 1978, hundreds of largescale projects were in progress. Sales back and forth of patents and licenses increased, and the first attempts at bilateral cooperation in third countries were made.

Economic ties between the Soviet Union and

the FRG could have developed even more successfully were it not for certain obstacles arising from the FRG's membership in the Common Market, which adopted several decisions hampering the progress of these ties. Long lists of "strategic goods" not to be exported to the USSR were drawn up, and West German manufactured products and capital goods were often overpriced, obliging Soviet foreign trade organisations to look elsewhere. Soviet plant exports to West Germany were kept lower than they might have been. Customs tariffs on Soviet finished goods, especially machinery and plant, reached twenty and more per cent of original value.

Opponents of Soviet-West German cooperation continued to try and hinder business with the Soviet Union. They clamoured for restricting cooperation, claiming that it only benefited the Soviet Union and helped it build up its military strength, while the West German economy lost out on the deals. The CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag even came out with the demand to ban credit on transactions with the Soviet Union.

The West German government and the business community pointed out that credit was a common part of business, especially with large, long-term agreements. The President of the West German Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Wolf von Amerongen, wrote that the business community was well aware of the importance of economic relations of West Germany with the Soviet Union, and was ready to continue them.

In an interview which appeared in the magazine Die Neue Zeit in January 1978, Minister of the Department of the Federal Chancellor HansJurgen Wischnewski said: "Economic relations between our two countries are good, and we are

~^^1^^ Die Welt , August 8, 1977.

satisfied that they have assumed a lasting character because of the constantly expanding number of cooperation areas. Previous contracts, as well as those now being drawn up, and the major projects being discussed are anyway forming a solid foundation for this, so that trade between our two countries should also develop positively and to mutual advantage in the future.''^^1^^

Based on agreement on cultural cooperation signed in 1973, during the visit to Bonn by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, cultural, scientific, arts and sport contacts greatly expanded. Wischnewski told Die Neue Zeit that satisfying contacts and important steps forward had been made in these areas.

Events of the period leading up to and during the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution deserve special attention. West German progressives organised a week-long festival dedicated to the Anniversary. Regional FRG-USSR societies held meetings in Hamburg, Munich and Saarbriicken. A huge exhibition in Dortmund, "USSR---a Land of Peace and Construction", was co-sponsored by the USSR-FRG Society and TASS. Georgian, Kazakh and Ukrainian song-and-dance and other companies gave performances.

The Soviet exposition---"1977, the 60th Birthday of the Great October Socialist Revolution"--- at the International Book Fair in Frankfort on the Main (October 1977), was a huge success. Publishing houses of the Soviet Union and of its constituent republics displayed about 2,000 books and periodicals covering a host of subjects in politics, economics, culture, science and the arts.

In the autumn of 1977 the FRG-USSR, Society

in the Saarland sponsored exhibitions, lectures and performances by Georgia's Rustavi songand-dance company. Days of the Soviet Union, held in Saarbriicken, helped make West Germans more familiar with Soviet life. The Premier of the Saarland, F. J. Roder, wrote that by sponsoring these Days of the Soviet Union, the FRG-USSR Society in Saarland made a positive contribution to better relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. Regardless of political or ideological differences, it was extremely important and necessary for peace and understanding among the peoples of Europe and the world to build and develop mutual trust through personal contacts.^^1^^

The events in the Soviet Union in order to acquaint Soviet people with life in the FRG attracted a great deal of attention. One was the exhibition---"Bavaria: Land and People"---in February 1978. Big successes of the previous year were the Saarland Week in Georgia, which included theatre performances, concerts, exhibitions and lectures; an exhibition from the Saarland in Armenia; the 1978 exhibitions from the Saarland in Azerbaijan and Lithuania; guest performances of the Munich symphony and chamber orchestras and the Dusseldorf Puppet Theatre; performances by celebrated West German musicians; a West German Film Week and a book exhibition.

Cultural, arts, scientific and sports exchanges helped the two peoples to get to know each other better. This was extremely important as the distorted conceptions of life in the Soviet Union are still widely current in West Germany. The West German journalist Fritz Pleitgen, who spent

Pravda, June 15, 1977.

i

9---919

Neue Zeit No. 15, 1978, p. 7.

six years in Moscow as correspondent of the ARD radio and television corporation, wrote in July 1977 that West Germans' ideas of the Soviet Union were totally divorced from reality, and that the West German press could hardly be proud of the way it presented the USSR to its audiences, always spreading fear of the Soviet Union's allegedly aggressive intentions by all sorts of sensational conjectures such as the notorious claim that the "Russians can reach the Rhine in 48 hours''.

The cold war spirit continued to pervade the activities of radio stations Liberty and Free Europe, the centres of ideological subversion against the USSR and the other socialist countries. Although these radio stations are run, bought and paid for by those across the ocean (according to the West German magazine Der Spiegel, the USA allocated 69 million dollars for Liberty in 1977), the FRG government is equally accountable for the activities of these subversive radio stations aimed at intervening in other countries' internal affairs. The West German authorities have regularly renewed the broadcasting licenses and leases of Liberty and Free Europe. This is in contravention of the Constitution of the FRG, which proclaims that actions committed with the purpose of violating the peaceful life of peoples must be punished. The activities of these radio stations also contravene the Final Act of the European Conference, which bears the signatures of the United States and West Germany.

The Soviet Union and the FRG are countries with different social systems. Although they may develop cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields, they are still irreconcilable ideological opponents. But ideological antagonism

is not at all equivalent to using methods of ideological confrontation of the cold war epoch, nor should it be an obstacle to international cooperation. The Soviet Union has always favoured broad contacts and the spread of humanist ideas which serve the interests of peace and friendship among peoples.

In the late 1970s, relations between FRG and the European socialist countries continued to develop. There were exchanges of visits by the leaders of these countries, and their talks covered a wide range of bilateral relations. The results of this development were a positive contribution to easing tensions and to extending relations between European countries in line with the Helsinki Final Act.

Speaking on April 12, 1976, G. Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, President of Czechoslovakia, said: "It is of special importance to us that the situation in Europe be settled, and particularly that relations between the socialist countries and West Germany be normalised on the basis of recognition of the indisputable realities and of renunciation, above all, of any claims to change by force the borders now existing in Europe. The treaty on relations between Czechoslovakia and West Germany declares the Munich diktat, imposed on Czechoslovakia under duress, null and void, and contains the mutual commitment to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders between Czechoslovakia and West Germany.''^^1^^

The West German government's approach to

~^^1^^ 15th Congress of the CzCP. Prague, April 12-16, 1976, Moscow, 1977, p. 86 (in Russian).

relations with the German Democratic Republic was undoubtedly an essential factor influencing--- as it still does and will continue to---the character and rate of development of Soviet-West German relations. It was realised in the FRG that detente helped to improve relations with the German Democratic Republic. Following the treaty on the principles of relations signed by the FRG and the GDR they concluded agreements in 1975-1976 on improving communications (highways and navigation) and regulating their postal and telegraph communications.^^1^^

But at the same time, on the West German side there were a series of actions which unfortunately violated the spirit of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG and of the Final Act of the European Conference. During the talks, it was obvious that West Germany wanted to slow down the settling of fundamental political issues affirming the sovereignty of the GDR, and to turn questions of relations with the GDR into a means of influencing that country's policy. The decision of the FRG's Federal Constitutional Court of July 31, 1973, on the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG, confirmed the purpose of drawing the GDR into West German imperialism's sphere of domination. In particular, it was claimed that in the eyes of the FRG the GDR was not another country, the border between the two Germanics was the same as the boundaries between West German provinces.

When concluding consular treaties with other

countries, Bonn wants citizens of the GDR to be considered citizens of the FRG, and also claims the right to exercise consular representation of the interests of citizens of the GDR. The FRG openly put pressure on other governments to try and prevent them from concluding treaties recognising citizenship of the GDR.

Of course, the leaders of the German Democratic Republic, firmly rejected these absolutely unfounded claims, and the GDR confidently continued along the path of building a developed socialist society.

The close fraternal ties between the USSR and the GDR made further progress with their signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid on October 7, 1975. The core of this treaty is the "policy of the further drawing together of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, of enhancing the strength, unity and international influence of the world socialist system, and of concentrating their efforts in putting the ideas of scientific communism into practice".^^1^^

The common objective of the foreign policy moves of the USSR, the GDR and other countries of the socialist community is to secure a lasting and just peace. The prime condition of peace and security in Europe is the inviolability of postwar borders.

The unequivocal statement by the USSR and the GDR that they "shall make joint efforts to counteract any manifestations of revanchist sentiments and militarism and insist on the unfailing

~^^1^^ The post and telegraph agreement, supplemented by agreements regulating postal and telegraph communication between the GDR and FRG came into force on July 1, 1976.

The Visit to the Soviet Union of the Party and Government Delegation of the GDR. October 6-13 1975, Moscow 1975, p. 55 (in Russian).

implementation of the treaties, concluded for the purpose of consolidating European security, serves the cause of world peace and security.''^^1^^

Bonn's attempts to circumvent the Quadripartite Agreement did not wane. These attempts often assumed acute forms, which naturally did nothing to improve the situation in the area, and undermined the constructive efforts to observe the agreement. Understandably, it had an adverse effect on the relations between the FRG and the socialist countries, as well as on the situation in Europe as a whole.

The Western powers' unfounded pretensions to "Greater Berlin" which, as they claimed, still had quadripartite status, were challenged in the Statement of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was presented to the ambassadors of the United States, Britain and France in Moscow on March 10, 1977. "As for the assertions made by the American side about 'Greater Berlin', which allegedly still has quadrilateral status," the document states, "the Soviet standpoint on this is well known and has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the three Western powers. The Soviet side considers it necessary to stress once again that the United States, Great Britain and France have never possessed any `primary', extratreaty rights with relation to Berlin. Berlin, in a territorial sense, was never separated from the former Soviet occupation zone in Germany, which was reflected accordingly in the quadrilateral agreements concerned. The joint postwar administration of Berlin was ended at a certain point by the three Western powers themselves, which broke the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement and decisions, and separated the Western sectors of Berlin from their natural surroundings.''^^1^^

plementation. 1971-1977. Documents, Moscow, 1977, p. 287 (in Russian).

~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 299. 135

During the 1970s, progress was made in implementing the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin. The West Berlin situation was stabilised, and many questions ensuring its normal functioning were resolved.

Unfortunately, the actions of the FRG did not always conform to the spirit and letter of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The declarations that West Berlin was a part of the FRG were nothing if not provocative. And they were heard often enough. Thus, speaking in May 1977 in West Berlin at a meeting of the Working Circle for Berlin, State Secretary of the Federal Interior Ministry Gunter Hartkopf declared: "Berlin is a land of the Federal Republic of Germany." He said one should not forget the denotation "Berlin Land". And that denotation made it clear to him that "Berlin belongs to our state".^^2^^

It must be said that the FRG has no right to define the status of West Berlin in this way and that the decisions handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court are invalid. The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, of September 3, 1971, under which West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and may not be administered by it, is an act of international law and any attempts to disregard it are without foundation.^^3^^

~^^1^^ The Visit to the Soviet Union of the Party and Government Delegation of the GDR. October 6-13, 1975, Moscow, 1975, p. 24, (in Russian).

~^^2^^ Die Welt, May 24, 1977, p. 1.

~^^3^^ See Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and Its Im-

Thus, both "Greater Berlin" and the quadripartite status of "Greater Berlin" have long since ceased to exist. What there is is Berlin, the capital of the GDR, which is an inseparable part of that republic and has the same status as any other area of the GDR. And there is West Berlin---a city with a special status. These are the legal and actual realities which are recognised and observed by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world and on which the Quadripartite Agreement is founded.

The Agreement on West Berlin represents the only possible balance of the interests of all the parties concerned in present conditions. That is why to maintain this balance and to reject any attempts aimed at ``rectifying'' or interpreting it one-sidedly are the only way for effective functioning of the Agreement as a whole, and of each of its particulars. That is just how the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries approach the Quadripartite Agreement, and this approach is undoubtedly in the interest of all the parties to it, primarily West Berlin itself.

was swept by a second big wave of armament; never before had the arms manufacturers received as many orders as they were getting now.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries indicated the dangers entailed in the American plans to develop and deploy the neutron bomb, which, if implemented, would threaten the future of the peoples of Europe and the entire human race. This was something people in the FRG were also bound to recognise.

Egon Bahr wrote in Vorwarts on July 21, 1977: "Reduced to a brief formula, this is a weapon which causes little or no damage but kills people `cleanly'. And is this to be the latest advance? Is the human race going crazy? It is the question of the human race, for never yet has a new weapon remained the monopoly of one country.''

A broad movement to ban the neutron bomb has developed throughout the country, and its influence was especially felt at the time of the SPD Congress in Hamburg in November 1977. Draft resolutions proposed by many SPD branches demanded the flat condemnation of the neutron bomb. Even so, the SPD leadership moved might and main to prevent the congress from taking a clear stand on so sensitive a question.

Some West German politicians found the American plans for producing the neutron bomb very much to their liking. They began attacking the government for its failure to lend these plans its "most solid" support. The US President, receiving no consent from his allies for the go-ahead, postponed a decision.

Peace in Europe, just like peace for the people of the FRG, can only be guaranteed by promoting goodneighbourly relations, and through arms limitation and disarmament. In a feature article,

One other issue with a large bearing on SovietWest German relations is the vexing question of the FRG's active role in military preparations conducted by the North Atlantic bloc. The Soviet Union has noted on many occasions that genuinely goodneighbourly relations were incompatible with West Germany's steps to expand its military budget, which has its highest level ever, and to acquire more and more new types of weapons. Halfway through 1977 the West German weekly Wirtschaftswoche wrote that West Germany

``The Battlefield Is Germany", the West German magazine Der Spiegel wrote that Bundeswehr analysts had recently found that a war fought by conventional methods for twenty days would cause just as much damage as a five-day war fought with tactical nuclear weapons. The inevitable loser in any such battle would always be the Federal Republic, even if the Americans, as their strategy foresees, were to recapture the lost territory. A war that twice rages over the people and turns the already half-destroyed area into an utter wasteland would claim millions of lives and turn the Federal Republic into a field of ruins. The then Minister of Defence and later Chancellor Helmut Schmidt admitted that when he said that the Federal Republic was only to be defended "at the cost of its total destruction".^^1^^

Despite these realistic appraisals, it was impossible not to see West Germany's ever greater involvement in the arms race, which clashed with the government's official declarations that it was committed to detente and prepared to work for reducing military confrontation in Europe. Serving to justify calls for arming the FRG was again the "Soviet threat" myth. Using it as a screen---as history has witnessed more than once---the utterly reactionary imperialist interests were preparing new provocations against peace and security. The GDR historians Ernst Becker and Klaus Thurow wrote that the "Soviet threat" is one of the central ideas in the ideological arsenal of German monopoly capital. It was used to prepare the German people for intervention in young Soviet Russia, for the arming of nazi Germany, and finally for

World War II, which claimed 50 million lives.^^1^^

Those shrieking about the "Soviet threat" totally disregarded the Soviet Union's commitment---of which it has given practical proof on many occasions---to peace and detente and to ending the arms race. At the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in May-June 1978, the Soviet Union presented a new comprehensive disarmament programme including an end to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the banning of all other weapons of mass destruction. The USSR is ready to limit or ban any type of weapon whatsoever provided it is done on a reciprocal basis with other countries. The important thing is that it be done without harming anyone's security and on the basis of complete reciprocity by the countries possessing the weapons concerned. The desire to end the arms race has to be sincere and not merely ostentatious. Speaking at the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on May 26, 1978, A. A. Gromyko said: "It is essential to make full use of the favourable conditions obtaining at present. Political detente should merge with military detente, otherwise the positive gains in international relations achieved through the years of hard effort by many peoples and states may well vanish. To admit that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of detente, which is actually the case, means admitting that there is no reasonable alternative to disarmament."² Disarmament would strengthen international

~^^1^^ See E. Becker, K. Thurow, "Der 60 Jahrestag des Roten Oktober und die imperialistische `Kommunismusforschung'" in: IPW Berichte. No 2, 1978, p. 47.

~^^2^^ Andrei Gromyko, Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 362.

~^^1^^ Der Spiegel No. 38, September 12, 1977, pp. 74-76.

security. Astronomical sums of money could be saved and used to build a better life, once disarmament was instituted. The Soviet Union sets a good example in this respect. West Germany could also raise its authoritative voice and take initiatives leading to real disarmament. This would make people respect it more and let its eastern neighbours stop worrying about its military preparations. But Bonn's foreign policy continued to be rather inconsistent.

Both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany felt that the time had come for a new summit meeting to discuss the results of their relations, to resolve some of the practical issues blocking progress, and to allow a broad exchange of views on key international problems.

The preparations for Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG took place in a complicated situation, marked by the heightened activity on the international scene of those calling for a return to the cold war and to confrontation between countries with different social systems. A campaign around "human rights" was unleashed in the West, which gave the United States a transparent excuse to try and interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Under the pretext of the imaginary "Soviet threat" there were calls for an intensified arms build-up. Through the fault of the Carter administration, serious complications arose in Soviet-American relations.

Given the situation, Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG was extremely significant.

ready to extend the areas of cooperation. The resolution of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany points out that the talks with leading statesmen and public figures in the FRG on a wide range of European and international issues and problems of bilateral relations, and the documents adopted during the visit were a big step forward in promoting detente and goodneighbourly relations, and consolidating peace.^^1^^

The fact itself of summit talks in Bonn showed that the USSR and the FRG felt that extending relations and exchanging views on a wide range of international issues were important to know more exactly the attitude of each side, to find out what they had in common, and search for ways to resolve outstanding questions.

Important issues of both bilateral and international relations were discussed in detail. The two sides declared their satisfaction with the existing level of Soviet-West German relations, and again underlined the significance of the Moscow Treaty as a major international event. It was one of the cornerstones in the edifice of detente and subsequent agreements and accords, owing to which the relations between the USSR and the FRG had acquired an essentially new character, cooperation had become the norm, and there was now confidence in each other's word and signature on joint documents. The communique on Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the

The new meeting of the two heads of state in May 1978 confirmed that the two countries were

~^^1^^ The Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG. May 4-7, 1978, Moscow, 1978, p. 75 (in Russian).

FRG pointed out that in the period since the visits to the USSR of Federal President Walter Scheel and Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, relations between the two countries continued to improve and expand. Political dialogue became more intensive. Cooperation on international issues became closer, and contacts in many areas were extended. The two sides, proceeding from the Treaty of August 12, 1970 declared their determination to apply patient and constructive efforts in order to steadily promote and extend relations between the two states. They consider this task to be of great political importance.^^1^^

The Bonn talks resulted in the signing of documents which made an important contribution to the development of relations. There was a Joint Declaration, and an Agreement on Promoting and Extending Long-Term Cooperation Between the USSR and the FRG in the Economy and Industry. The Soviet and West German leaders' determination to defend the achievements already made in normalising relations between countries with different social systems was welcomed by the forces of peace and democracy around the world. The Joint Declaration is based on the two countries' common view that further energetic efforts are required to ensure peace, to extend detente and to make progress in disarmament and arms limitation. At a time when influential Western interests were hoping to erase the hardwon results achieved in relations between socialist and capitalist countries and drive the world back into the grip of the cold war, the Soviet Union and the FRG declared that they saw no reasonable alternative to peaceful cooperation between them,

no matter how different their views on certain key issues and their political, economic, and social systems were.^^1^^

Realising how important it was to strengthen peace on the European continent, the USSR and the FRG declared that they were determined to see all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act become fully effective in relations between all countries---those in Europe and those which attended the Conference---in the interest of cooperation and for the good of the people, and would make constructive use of the coming period to promote the success of the proposed joint plans and meetings of the countries participants in the Conference.^^2^^

There was also a detailed exchange of views on problems related to arms limitation and disarmament, as well as on efforts to end the arms race. The two sides said they would use every available opportunity and every means at their disposal to ensure real progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control extending to nuclear and conventional weapons alike. The Joint Declaration points out that agreements on further steps in disarmament and arms limitation should be speeded up so that detente sustains no loss on account of military developments, but is, on the contrary, supplemented by it. It goes on to state that the two sides consider it important that nobody seek military superiority. They believe that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to ensure their defence requirements and believe that appropriate measures towards disarmament and limiting

~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 59.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 60.

~^^1^^ The Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG. May 4-7, 1978, Moscow, 1978, pp. 68-69 (in Russian).

nuclear and conventional armaments, which conform to this principle are of very great significance. '

The Vienna Talks on the Reduction of the Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe were discussed comprehensively, and the two sides confirmed that the object of the Vienna Talks was to achieve, on the principle of not endangering the security of the parties, a more stable situation at a lower military level than at present.^^2^^

When discussing international problems, the two countries set forth their standpoints and intentions, and although there were often great divergences, it was still possible for them to get a better grasp of each other's arguments and motives, to isolate the main points on which their approach converged, and to try and find points of contact. The Joint Declaration states that the two sides regard the active and practical exchange of views as an important means of establishing better mutual understanding and greater confidence and, because of this, will continue these exchanges, which will also take the shape of regular consultations on all appropriate levels in order to extend the basis of agreement.^^3^^

An important and necessary component of USSR-FRG relations is economic cooperation, and during Leonid Brezhnev's visit the USSR and the FRG took a further step to expand it. On May 6, 1978, an Agreement on Promoting and Extending Long-Term Cooperation in the Economy and Industry was signed.

This 25-year agreement stipulates that the USSR and the FRG will further their economic, industrial and technological cooperation as an important and indispensable part of consolidating relations on a stable and long-term basis. Given the longterm character of the projects, particularly in the area of raw materials and power-engineering, the two countries will try to further intensify cooperation on the basis of mutual advantage.^^1^^

Article 2 of the Agreement defines some of the areas of cooperation: the building, enlarging and modernising of industrial complexes and enterprises; the joint development and manufacture of certain types of equipment and other items; the production and processing of certain raw materials, including off-shore mineral development; banking and insurance; and transport. Also envisaged is cooperation with enterprises and organisations in the third countries; cooperation in the engineering, metallurgical, chemical, electrical engineering and electronic industries and the manufacture of consumer goods.^^2^^

Key to ongoing successful cooperation in the economy and technology is the carrying out of joint large-scale projects, the organisation of production cooperation and cooperation in new sectors of the economy. The two countries were pleased at the progress of the Oskol electrometallurgical and Mogilev synthetic fibre projects, as well as the progress of other projects in the chemical, power and engineering industries. Article 4 of the Agreement declares that given mutual interest, cooperation in carrying out large-scale

~^^1^^ The Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG. May 4-7, 1978, Moscow, 1978, p. 60 (in Russian).

~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 61.

~^^3^^ Ibid.

~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 64.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

10---919

and long-range projects may be linked to deliveries of the products of such cooperation.^^1^^

Under Article 5, the two countries will exert efforts to arrange available medium- and longterm credits within the laws of each country on most favourable terms.^^2^^

The Soviet-West German Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation has done some useful work to expand business cooperation. Under the Agreement, the Commission was to extend and supervise this area, and work with the competent and interested economic bodies on a long-range programme of the guidelines of cooperation (Article 6).

Implementation of the ambitious programme mapped out by the Agreement is certain to put business cooperation between the two countries on a qualitatively new level. The resolution of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers stated: "Broader cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in trade, industry and technology as envisaged by the documents signed will greatly reinforce the material foundations of detente and will promote the systematic, stable and mutually advantageous growth of goodneighbourly contacts for the benefit of the peoples and for the good of the working people in both countries.''^^3^^

The Soviet bodies concerned were instructed to do everything they could to place the mutually advantageous agreement on a solid material foundation, and fulfil their commitments promptly

and efficiently in order to substantially increase trade and implement major joint projects.

This is not to say that there are no outstanding problems in USSR-FRG relations. These problems were also discussed, and ways to settle them sought. Speaking on May 5, 1978, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Everything that both sides have considered to be of vital importance in their joint affairs and in the sphere of world politics they have brought up for discussion---moreover, not dodging acute issues. After all, realism is the only reliable basis for constructive work. And we---I think I can say this for both sides---want to build the edifice of our relations so that it will stand not on sand, but on firm ground.'"

The Bonn talks of May 1978 had important results. In his address telecast on West German TV, Leonid Brezhnev said: "From our point of view, now the task is for the accords reached to be embodied in real deeds, in real joint efforts in the international arena. Let us advance, in a worthy manner, the historic cause started by the signing of the Moscow Treaty of 1970.''^^2^^

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG was a major international event, and another substantial contribution to the foreign policy course of the 25th CPSU Congress and to the Leninist peace policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government.

The results of the talks were positively assessed by the parties in power and government of the FRG. During the parliamentary debate on the Soviet-West German talks, the then Chancellor

The Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG. May 4-7, 1978, Moscow, 1978, p. 65 (in Russian). \ Ibid. Ibid., p. 76.

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1979, p. 84.

~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 91.

T47

10*

Schmidt said on behalf of the government that the expectations that the visit would have great political significance were fully justified. He went on to say that the Joint Declaration specified the direction for the enduring future development of relations, and ensured that they would be lasting and stable... Schmidt added that the Joint Declaration did not conceal the fact that there were differences in Soviet-West German relations and limits to which they can be developed, but it stated that the two sides, irrespective of their different standpoints on many key issues and the difference in their political, economic and social systems, saw no alternative to peaceful coexistence.

The Chancellor also pointed out the fundamentally important and extremely promising character of the points of the Declaration attesting to the two countries' determination to promote the implementation of all principles of the Helsinki Final Act and their readiness to respect the indivisibility of peace. Particularly significant to the FRG, said the Chancellor, was that the two countries agreed that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to ensure their defence requirements.

The Agreement on Promoting and Extending Long-Term Economic Cooperation Between the USSR and the FRG was considered very important. Schmidt said: "The long-term economic agreement records that both sides are ready to consider each other's interest. I am also pleased from the political point of view that we could sign this agreement. It demonstrates... the long-term aspects of economic cooperation between these two important European industrial nations. The aspects and the perspectives of this agreement reach beyond the end of the century. Both governments have made it clear that they are willing to base the develop-

ment of economic relations dependent not on individual projects, however important or spectacular they might be, but that their aim is to give them a firm foundation for decades.''

Attacks on detente followed fast and furious in the speeches of opposition leaders, who spouted the oft-repeated allegations that the USSR was trying to undermine "Western unity" and drive a wedge between the FRG and its allies.

But these lies were disproved by life itself. During the Soviet leader's visit to the FRG, millions of West Germans were again able to see for themselves that the Soviet Union, in keeping with the very nature of socialist society, was vigorously and steadfastly pursuing the basic principle of its policy---that everything has to be done for peace, for preventing a nuclear catastrophe, and for improving international relations.

The results of the Soviet-West German summit meeting were assessed highly by the German Communist Party, the German Peace Union, and many other progressive democratic organisations. They said that a key aspect of Leonid Brezhnev's visit was that it put the development of political and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG on an enduring basis, helped improve the entire international climate, especially in Europe, and strengthened and encouraged international detente.

The Board of the German Peace Union said that Leonid Brezhnev's visit was an example of peaceful coexistence and a major contribution to closer relations, greater confidence and mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of two of the largest countries in Europe. The German Peace Union statement pointed out that at a time when (if detente was to continue) there

had to be specific disarmament measures taken, and when the threat of war was growing because of the US plans to produce the neutron bomb and arm NATO with it, Leonid Brezhnev's visit would help to tip the scales in favour of peace.

The 25-year USSR-FRG agreement on cooperation in the field of the economy and industry, and the Joint Declaration, the German Peace Union statement went on, showed that when the principles of peaceful coexistence were respected, all problems between countries with different social systems could be settled by mutual consent.

The results of the Bonn talks attracted world attention. It was noted that the significance of the visit went far beyond the limits of bilateral relations. All supporters of peace and cooperation between nations considered it a politically significant event.

The Soviet Union continued to pursue its policy of cooperation with all Western countries, which would help to improve the general situation in Europe and beyond it, to extend detente, and to consolidate world peace and security. Leonid Brezhnev's visit and talks with FRG leaders were a new expression of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, and of the Soviet Union's desire to see Europe a continent where peace and security reign supreme.

SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS AT THE TURN OF THE 1970s

As the 1970s drew to a close, clouds again darkened the international situation. The imperialist forces viciously attacked detente in the attempt to destroy the material groundwork of the comprehensive links between countries with different social systems, to sow the seeds of new military conflicts, and revive the ugly days of the cold war. Yet people had become committed to detente, to which there is no reasonable alternative. That critical period produced especially vivid evidence of the Soviet Union's farsightedness which, ever since after the war, had tried to firmly establish peace and cooperation in Europe, preserving and multiplying all that had already been achieved.

The 26th CPSU Congress adopted a Peace Programme for the 1980s, whose principal purpose is to defend peace. "... Consolidation of peace--- that is the clue to the future," Leonid Brezhnev told the Congress.^^1^^ This task was successfully tackled by the Soviet Union in close unity with the fraternal socialist countries and all other peace forces.

The FRG leaders have to shoulder special responsibility for the future of Europe and their own people. It is in West Germany where, as of the end of 1983, most of the US Pershings 2 and cruise missiles (108 and 96 respectively) are

~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th CPSU Congress, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 40.

planned to be deployed and trained on the USSR.

Again, as during the cold war, the forces of the extreme right reared their head. Leaders of the numerous revanchist organisation openly clamoured for a revision of the existing European borders.

In the strained international situation, the Soviet Union firmly supported implementation of the accords reached during the summit talks in West Germany. "Our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, based on the 1970 treaty and later agreements, have on the whole developed favourably," Leonid Brezhnev told the 26th CPSU Congress. "The meetings with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1978 and 1980, like the earlier ones with Willy Brandt, have made a useful contribution to European detente, and have extended the horizons of mutually advantageous Soviet-West German ties.''^^1^^

The more than a quarter of a century history of Soviet-West German relations has never been cloudless. Serious differences prevailed on several important issues, primarily those of peace, ending the arms race, and supplementing political detente with military detente. As international tensions mounted, these differences heightened, casting a shadow over relations between the USSR and the FRG.

But on the basis of the 1970 Moscow Treaty and subsequent agreements, these relations proceeded. Meetings and talks between the leaders of two countries broadened the horizons of mutually advantageous Soviet-West German ties. At the same time, the difficulties caused by the deteriora-

ting international climate and West Germany's inconsistency in carrying out the accords were making themselves felt, hindering the progress of these relations.

Ever since the West German state was founded, its policies were influenced, on the one hand, by its general dependence on the United States, which had made it a major zone of concentration of US troops and armaments in Europe; by its strong NATO bonds; and, last but not least, by its own ambition to play first fiddle in Western Europe and NATO. On the other hand, there was also the strong influence of national interests which found expression in the shift of policy towards peace and cooperation with its eastern neighbours, the Soviet Union above all.

The FRG government said that it was still committed to detente and to promoting relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. During the Bundestag debate on security and disarmament on March 9, 1979, Helmut Schmidt condemned the CDU/CSU policy as one working against detente. He said: "We, on our part, are thoroughly convinced that the official leadership in Moscow is pursuing a fully responsible policy and does not intend to attack in Europe." This conviction, he said, stemmed from his participation in many negotiations, many personal conversations, and the treaties concluded in the past ten years.^^1^^

The Bundestag election in October 1980 showed once again that Schmidt's SPD/FDP government was supported by the majority of West Germans. Referring to the election results, Schmidt said

~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th CPSU Congress, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 32.

~^^1^^ Deutscher Bundestag Stenographischer Bericht. 142. Sitzung, March 9, 1979, p. 11244.

that the positions of the coalition government had been reinforced, and it could continue the policy of mutual understanding with the FRG's neighbours, including those in the East.

In observing the accords, treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the FRG had a double-edged approach. On the one hand, the West German government coalition considered the promotion of relations with the Soviet Union a major plank in its foreign policy; on the other, it was a vociferous proponent of the NATO plans to make the FRG, Britain and Italy a launching pad for the new American nuclear missiles poised against the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries.

The negative aspects of the FRG's policy caused legitimate concern to the Soviet Union and its allies, as they led them away from the far-reaching, historic effort of developing broad cooperation in which the two countries were engaged since the 1970 Moscow Treaty. Nevertheless there was so much public support for peace and cooperation with the socialist countries, and the benefits were so obvious that despite the internal opposition's constant attempts to discredit Soviet-West German cooperation and overseas pressure, the FRG kept to its policy of peace and cooperation.

Further high-level meetings and talks on a wide range of questions, first of all those concerned with promoting bilateral relations, made it obvious that the two countries wished to cooperate both on questions of mutual interest and international issues in general. In this connection, the importance should be stressed of the results of the exchange of views on June 25, 1979, in Moscow, when Chancellor Schmidt met A. N. Kosygin, CC CPSU Political Bureau Member, Chairman of the USSR

Council of Ministers; A. A. Gromyko, Political Bureau Member, Foreign Minister of the USSR; and N. A. Tikhonov, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the time the two sides expressed their satisfaction with the progress of mutually advantageous cooperation. The report on that talk pointed out that the economic exchanges between the two countries, which had lately become increasingly stable and diverse, had good prospects and helped improve the situation in Europe. Both countries said they were determined to continue to raise the quality and level of their relations in every area, and completely observe the accords reached during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in May 1978.^^1^^

The high points in the Soviet-West German relations, reached in the 1970s, saw their durability tested in a difficult international situation. The two countries proceeded from the assumption that regardless of the increasingly strained international climate, detente was necessary, useful and possible. At the same time, relations were adversely affected by the FRG's actions which speeded up the arms race, and by its adherence--- if not without reserve---to the Carter Administration's provocative international policy. The question was whether the West German government would show enough realism in preserving the positive achievements in relations with the Soviet Union and in preserving all that had solidified as a result of the joint efforts of the 1970s, or whether it would resume the barren confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries.

~^^1^^ Pravda, June 26, 1979.

The invitation to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union, extended to Federal Chancellor Schmidt and Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the FRG Genscher by the Soviet leaders was a vivid expression of the USSR's constructive foreign policy and its desire, as Leonid Brezhnev told the CC CPSU Plenary Meeting held in June 1980, to "preserve detente and all the good results achieved in the 1970s, to effect a turn towards disarmament, to support the right of free and independent development for all, and to preserve and consolidate peace".^^1^^

Chancellor Schmidt's decision to visit the Soviet Union came in difficult political circumstances, at a time when the US President attempted to impose a diplomatic ``quarantine'' on Western talks with the USSR---although he did not succeed.

The significance to the FRG of dialogue with the USSR and the reasons why it was unwilling to blindly follow the United States were set forth in a Deutschlandfunk radio station interview with Chairman of the Bundestag SPD group Wehner on March 23, 1980. He said that he was sincerely concerned about the future of peace, as it was not clear when the two superpowers would get down to talks. The conflict over Afghanistan could extend to other areas besides the nearest. If one great power tells another that it must be punished and feel the brunt of that punishment for a long time, that was not what he would consider dealing cleverly with one another.^^2^^

Following France, the FRG refused to sacrifice

its vital national interests to the ambitions of its overseas partner, and showed it was unwilling to allow any further aggravation of international tension, and was ready to begin looking for ways to continue constructive cooperation.

When in Moscow on June 30-July 1, 1980, Schmidt and Genscher held talks with the leaders of the USSR. The CC CPSU Political Bureau, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers evaluated the results as a "valid contribution to strengthening peace and security, improving the international climate, and promoting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the FRG".^^1^^

Speaking in the Bundestag about the summit talks, Chancellor Schmidt said the primary object of the visit had been to intimately acquaint the Soviet leaders with the FRG's views on the current international situation and also to learn the Soviet point of view in detail. He pointed out that the visit had made it clear that direct negotiations in an international situation marked by a series of grave crises were both profitable and necessary.

The leaders of the USSR and the FRG discussed a wide range of political and economic issues affecting Europe and the world, as well as the relevant points concerning the state and prospects of their bilateral relations. The principal result of the talks was that the USSR and the FRG confirmed that they would base their policies on prior treaties and agreements, particularly the Treaty of August 12, 1970, and the Joint Declaration of May 6, 1978; that they went on record in favour

~^^1^^ Materials of the Plenum of the CC CPSU. June 23, 1980, Moscow, 1980, p. 9 (in Russian).

~^^2^^ Die Welt, March 24, 1980, p. 1.

~^^1^^ Valid Contribution to Strengthening Peace and Security, Moscow, 1980, p. 37 (in Russian).

of extending the contractual framework of their cooperation; and that they restated their commitment to detente and their determination to do all they could to continue detente as the key trend in international relations, as there is no alternative to peaceful and equal cooperation.

The Soviet side subjected to well-founded criticism the West German government's attitude to military detente in Europe, its part in the NATO decision to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, its assessment of the developments in Afghanistan and absolutely irrelevant suggestions for a political settlement there. Nevertheless, as a result of the talks, the two sides were able to say that their differing assessments of the reasons for the worsened international situation was not an obstacle to constructive negotiations.

The Joint Communique put the two countries on record in favour of steadily continuing developments inaugurated by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and implementing all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. In this context they discussed the preparations and prospects for the meeting in Madrid. They also expressed their hope that all the participating countries would exert every effort to contribute to its success.^^1^^

During the Moscow talks, the Soviet Union put forward more proposals to get disarmament negotiations off the ground. After confirming its previously stated position on the most proper ways of dealing with the question of mediumrange weapons in Europe, it said it was ready to begin---without waiting for ratification of the

SALT-2 Treaty---discussions on medium-range nuclear missiles simultaneously and in intrinsic relationship with the question of the US forwardbased nuclear weapons. What this meant is that any possible understandings can only be carried out after the SALT-2 Treaty has come into effect. During the discussion on the Vienna Talks on the Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe, the Soviet side made some concrete observations in the hope of achieving progress. In an article on the Soviet-West German talks, Pravda wrote on July 8, 1980: "If the NATO countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, really do want productive talks on limiting the arms race, such talks---fair and honest---are possible. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to resolve all issues on the basis of equality and equal security. But it rejects any attempts by the USA or other Western countries to obtain privileged terms and endanger the security of the socialist countries.''

During the visit, the USSR and the FRG signed a long-term programme of the main trends of cooperation in the economy and industry.

Membership in different military-political alliances is not an insurmountable barrier to a frank practical and constructive discussion of key issues. Leonid Brezhnev said on June 30, 1980: "Despite the differences in our social systems and the fact that we belong to different alliances, the two countries can be natural partners in solving the big and complex tasks which are set by life itself before the international community.''^^1^^

The discussion participants pointed out the

Bulletin No 44, May 9, 1974, p. 429.

L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 51.

urgent need to steadily pursue the policy of strengthening peace and detente and carrying out effective disarmament measures. Helmut Schmidt welcomed the signing in Vienna of the USSR-USA Treaty on limiting strategic offensive armaments. The two sides unanimously agreed that this treaty would provide an important stimulus for more rapid progress on other aspects of military detente and for further improving international relations.

In an official statement in the Bundestag on July 4, 1979, Chancellor Schmidt praised high the talks with the Soviet leaders. "It is essential and profitable indeed," he said, "that a comprehensive and open exchange of views on urgent issues of world politics, the world economy and bilateral relations has been for many years a regular and permanent part of German-Soviet relations.''^^1^^

After the visit, the American press began to do a snow job on the USA's ally. Several articles written by political leaders claimed that Bonn had chosen a path independent of both East and West. In answer, the then State Secretary of the FRG Foreign Ministry, Boiling, said that the FRG would never allow itself to be divided from America.^^2^^ The tenor of the American press particularly irritated Genscher, who, according to Stern, had upheld America's interests to such an extent that he lost his party a considerable number of votes in the election.^^3^^ "Anyone who interprets the trip to Moscow as weakness denies the necessity of talks" was Genscher's reply to American criticism of the FRG's decision to go to Moscow.

Bulletin No. 87, July 5, 1979, p. 807.

When in a special message to Helmut Schmidt the US President reminded the FRG of its NATO commitments Schmidt retorted with sharp criticism. '

Further evidence of the continuity of the highlevel political dialogue was the official visit to the FRG on November 21-24,1979 by A. A. Gromyko, CC CPSU Political Bureau Member and Foreign Minister of the USSR. The visit fell into the framework of regular consultations as the Joint Declaration of May 6, 1978 stipulated.

In their consideration of a wide range of bilateral problems, the two sides noted that Soviet-West German relations had developed fruitfully on the basis of the 1970 Moscow Treaty and subsequent joint documents signed at the summit level, in the political, economic and cultural fields as well as in the realm of scientific and technological cooperation.

A. A. Gromyko's visit was of great significance from the point of view of a discussion of key issues, above all, of strengthening peace and security in Europe and the world. Frank discussions were held in connection with NATO's plans to deploy new types of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Gromyko told a Bonn press conference on November 23: "Regrettably enough, we are compelled to state that the government of the FRG, as can be seen from our negotiations here in Bonn, has been favourably disposed towards these plans. We did all we could to show, presenting suitable arguments, that the deployment of these weapons is not a path to detente and a better situation in Europe. Quite the contrary, it is a path to straining the situation in Europe and to whipping

Stern No. 27, 1980, p. 151. Ibid.

i

Ibid.

11---919

up the arms race. It is the beginning of another stage, another spiral, in the arms race. After all, it is not something to do with toys, but with nuclear missiles.''^^1^^

Commenting on Gromyko's visit, the West German press claimed that the Soviet Union was trying to isolate the FRG from its allies, and even to neutralise it. Obviously, the objective was to make public opinion suspicious of Soviet foreign policy whether towards the FRG or other Western countries, and, under the pretext of strengthening Atlantic solidarity, to adopt plans that would threaten peace and international security.

A. A. Gromyko told at his Bonn press conference that the "Soviet Union is not trying to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany from the other NATO countries. What we are trying to prove to the government of the FRG, and what we are trying to persuade it of is exactly what we are trying to prove to other NATO countries as well. It is usually not our custom to drive wedges between countries. And we have never driven such wedges or prepared any in connection with my visit to

the FRG either".^^2^^

The West German side thought the visit to be very significant. Speaking at a dinner given in honour of A. A. Gromyko on November 22, 1979, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher said that meetings between West German and Soviet statesmen, which made possible a comprehensive and indepth exchange of views on West German-Soviet relations and other matters of common interest, had become an indispensable part of relations between the two countries.^^3^^

Active political contacts making a further contribution to bilateral relations took place when SPD Chairman Brandt (July 1981), Premier of the Northern Rhineland-Westphalia and SPD Board Presidium Member Rau (October 1981), and other West German political leaders visited the Soviet Union, and during the visit to the FRG of a CPSU delegation led by B. N. Ponomaryov, Alternate Member of the CC CPSU Political Bureau, CC CPSU Secretary and Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (June 1981).

Although the West German representatives had their own point of view which differed from that of the USSR on several questions, the two sides did nevertheless agree that in the current situation no efforts should be spared to continue the policy of detente, extend it to the military sphere, and preserve and consolidate peace. They also agreed that the sole and the only reliable way of resolving controversial international issues was through serious negotiations based on a genuine interest in achieving constructive results and the readiness of each side to contribute in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security.

There were and still are outstanding problems in Soviet-West German relations. But if the two countries both take a constructive approach and display willingness, the difficulties are not insurmountable. High-level political meetings have been of significance in developing and extending relations between the USSR and the FR.G.

Relations had developed to a point where they benefitted the entire system of international relations, on the one hand, while, on the other, they were less likely to be affected by fluctuations of

~^^1^^ Pravda, November 25, 1979. Ibid. Ibid., November 23, 1979.

the international climate. As an article in the magazine Stern on the 30th anniversary of the FRG pointed out, the Social-Liberal coalition under Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel had at the beginning of the 1970s finally gained freedom of action in the East, and by recognising the postwar borders obtained a voice in the policy of East-West detente. If something did not go right in Soviet-American relations, it did not automatically follow that Bonn also had to quarrel with Moscow.^^1^^

In the notably more complicated international situation, the policy of cooperation continued to be the only correct and effective policy. It was dictated by the vital interests of both countries--- the interests of consolidating peace in Europe. The Soviet Union has always regarded trade and economic cooperation with the FRG as an important component and material foundation of Soviet-West German relations. It was mutually profitable and promoted better understanding between the two peoples.

A big contribution in that period was made by the USSR-FRG Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The Commission helped to implement agreements and accords, remove obstacles and reveal unused opportunities in bilateral economic cooperation. At its 10th Session, which met in Moscow and Novosibirsk on September 24-28,1981, the Commission evaluated the results of economic cooperation and "stated that the operative agreements and understandings, including the long-term Agreement of May 6, 1978, were being implemented successfully and that economic cooperation between the two

countries has strengthened still further during the inter-session period.''^^1^^

The USSR and the FRG have concluded 35 scientific and technological agreements which are now in operation, covering the engineering, machine-tool, instrument-making, electronics and electrical engineering, chemical and metallurgical industries, and agriculture. Joint research with the Salzgitter company led to the development of equipment for polyethylene production. Comprehensive cooperation, from the designing to the manufacturing stage, was undertaken with Gildemeister for the production of advanced semi-automatic lathes; Kieserling und Albrecht (presses); Pittler (automated multispindle machines) ; Macho (milling machines); Elbschliff ( grinders); and Stetter (concrete pumps).

Scientific and technological cooperation with the Siemens concern embraced electronics, measuring instruments, communications engineering, exchanges of medical experts and equipment, joint seminars, etc.

A big contract for large-diameter pipes was awarded in 1979 by the Soviet Promsyryeimport Association to Klockner and Co. which started working on it that same year. The pipes are intended for the gas pipeline that will bring Siberian gas to customers in Western Europe, including the FRG. The Soviet foreign trade organisations Tekhmashimport, Soyuzkhimexport and others have been doing business with Klockner and Co. for a long time. The contracts signed with it involve exports of vinyl and polyvinyl chloride and other items to the FRG, and of chemical plant, metallurgical products and chemicals to the USSR.

~^^1^^ Stern No. 13, March 22, 1979, p. 150.

Foreign Trade No. 11, 1981, p. 3.

Soviet projects are usually too large for even the largest Western concern to cope with singlehanded and entire groups of large associations are needed. These, in their turn, subcontract out to dozens of medium-sized and small specialised enterprises. This was the pattern for what could be called a division of labour between the engineering company Schlbmann-Ziemag and the electrical engineering concern Siemens. The first will supply the entire mechanical part of the rolling mill, while the second will provide the electrical equipment for the Novolipetsk metallurgical works.

Further evidence of the constant efforts to find new forms of production co-operation is that Soviet organisations and West German companies have begun to jointly construct projects in third countries. The Soviet-West German consortium (Energomashexport of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and BBZ and Mannesmann of the FRG) is building electric power stations in Greece, while Siemens is cooperating with several Soviet organisations to put up a nuclear power plant in Finland.

Certain West German interests, however, are opposed to closer business cooperation with the USSR. There are still attempts to revive the myth of the allegedly unilateral advantages derived by the Soviet Union from "Eastern trade" and calls that credits for purchasing machines and plant from the FRG be tied to Soviet political concessions. Certain people would like to turn credit from a normal means of promoting cooperation into an instrument of political blackmail.

There are other obstacles hindering the growth of economic cooperation, some being associated with West Germany's membership in the EEC. First, there is a system of special regulation of

trade with the socialist countries, which erects artificial barriers to FRG's imports from the USSR, whereas no such barriers exist with similar imports from EEC countries. Import quotas are still imposed on hundreds of items on the FRG shopping list, such as certain ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy products, chemicals, clothing, etc.; there is a tight system of control of processed fruit and vegetable products imported from the socialist countries, with special import papers being required. Soviet products---especially finished goods, primarily machines and equipment--- have onerous custom duties of 20 per cent or more imposed on them. There are also restrictions on the export to the USSR of electronic articles classed in the "strategic goods" category.

The level attained in the economic relations between the USSR and the FRG provided favourable conditions for their further extension, and in the strained international situation was a crucial factor affecting Soviet-West German relations in general.

To move to another area. Whereas immediately following the signing of the Moscow Treaty, simply establishing contact between the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftbund) and the Ail-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) was the main question, now there is an intensive exchange of delegations on different levels. Also encouraging closer contacts is the fact that the DGB leadership, expressing the will of its members, supports the government's policy of cooperation with the USSR. In July 1979, an AUCCTU delegation visited the FRG on the invitation of the DGB. That same month a Soviet-West German trade union seminar met in Moscow to discuss journalists' working conditions and the role of the mass media in

strengthening friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the FRG.

In assessing soberly and realistically the results and prospects of Soviet-West German relations, we must note that there are several factors inhibiting cooperation which have their own history and continue to be as important and acute as ever. The USSR is ready to contribute its share to resolving problems. It favours strict and complete observance of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, which has made it possible for that city to function normally.

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have always conscientiously fulfilled their commitments on West Berlin. They saw the Quadripartite Agreement as essential to European detente and security. The Agreement has led to real improvements in the situation in and around West Berlin over the past ten years.

The FRG has continually sought to unilaterally avail itself of the advantages accruing from the Quadripartite Agreement and also to undermine its key provision that the city is not a part of the FRG and would never be governed by it. The July 1979 election of West Berlin members of the European Parliament was an obvious attempt to violate the Quadripartite Agreement, to make West Berlin appear to be a part of the FRG, to involve the city in West European political integration and extend EEC jurisdiction to it. This was incompatible with the special status of West Berlin. West German federal offices illegally continued to function in West Berlin, while various Bundestag and Bundesrat bodies repeatedly held meetings there to discuss questions which had nothing to do with the maintenence of normal relationships between West Berlin and the FRG.

The FRG claimed universal representation of West Berlin in the international arena, seeking to extend the operation of its own international treaties and agreements to the city irrespective of their content, even though under the Quadripartite Agreement it can do so only where no questions of the status or security of West Berlin are concerned.

Unfortunately, the Western partners, who have undertaken not only to observe the accords reached in the Quadripartite Agreement, but to ensure that they are honoured by the FRG, far from always take steps necessary to prevent Bonn from committing such violations.

The attempts to test the strength of the Quadripartite Agreement have created needless friction.

Relations between the two German states continued to affect European affairs, as well as the rate of progress of USSR-FRG relations. The Soviet Union was bound to take into account the West German ruling circles' inconsistent behaviour in carrying out the Eastern treaties, including the' Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG. On the one hand, the FRG maintained its policy of developing relations with the GDR, and as recent years made clear, this line was considered to be of great importance to its Eastern policy. On the other hand, the FRG's ruling circles have never stopped trying to impose ``special'' relations on the GDR which would in effect erode the GDR's sovereignty. And as far as the practical side of the matter is concerned, the West German domestic legislation has still not been brought into conformity with the provisions of the treaties signed with the USSR and other socialist countries.

The Western press also published tales that

the Soviet Union was going to propose to the FRG the gradual unification of Germany in exchange for neutrality. Instead of studying the Soviet position---taking into consideration the will of the people of the GDR to follow socialist path---Western writers built conclusions on the illusory hopes cherished by the FRG's ruling circles that the country may ultimately absorb the GDR and abolish socialism on German soil.

The GDR is ready to cooperate with the FRG on the basis of the principles contained in the Final Act of the European Conference, namely, the recognition of the inviolability of borders, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. The talks at which this approach was taken were successful, and led to the GDR and the FRG signing about 20 agreements on cooperation in various areas.

Thus, on November 29, 1978, after difficult and prolonged talks following from nearly six years of work by a border commission, the governments of the GDR and the FRG signed a Protocol, which is in the nature of an inter-governmental, international treaty. For the first time ever, the 1,300-kilomitre national border between the two countries was officially demarcated. On December 5, 1978, Neues Deutschland commented that the signing and coming into effect of the government agreement on the demarcation of the national border was a substantive contribution to honouring the commitments on the border between the two states contained in the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG.

Attention to the document, signed in Bonn, was not restricted to the two countries concerned, as the border between the GDR and the FRG also

marks the dividing line between socialism and capitalism, and between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries. As the Protocol points out, guaranteeing the inviolability of this border is of particular significance to peace and detente in Europe.

Agreements between the two countries have shown that the social systems of the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG do not hinder the development of normal inter-state relations. Simultaneously, the GDR government has always rejected the Right-wing West German politicians' thesis of "keeping the German question open", their attempts to regard better relations between the two countries as a "sort of rapprochement" or restoration of the national community. The government of the GDR correctly pointed out that the policy of peaceful coexistence between the GDR and the FRG was the sole basis of the further normalisation of relations.

As far as "keeping the German question open" is concerned, the position of the Soviet Union and the GDR, which is shared by the other countries of the socialist community, is that the German question has already been fully and ultimately resolved by history in the wake of the formation of two states on German soil. Therefore, the real problem concerns the positive development of relations between these two states in the interests of European peace and security. Kurt Hager, Political Bureau Member and Secretary of the CC Socialist Unity Party of Germany, wrote that in West Germany, in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations Between the GDR and FRG, international recognition of the GDR has been called into question, as expressed above all in the denial of citizenship of

the GDR and in the arbitrary and arrogant claim of a "uniform German citizenship." Hager calls it a specific form of the counter-revolutionary struggle, an attempt to provide a legal justification j for the policy of aggression against the GDR and , other socialist countries. West German imperialism , is openly fanning nationalism among the German j people with the object of spreading the illusion that the "national community" of all Germans is what really counts, irrespective of the social and political system.

In accordance with the agreement on transit passenger and goods traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, an understanding was reached that transit would be facilitated and conducted in the "simplest, fastest and most convenient manner". Each side undertook to curtail all abuses of the agreement. The GDR's transit lines are used by millions of people, and a greatly simplified system of border control has been introduced. Even so, criminal organisations have sprung up in the FRG and West Berlin with the express purpose of smuggling individuals and goods out of the GDR, and engaging in espionage. This and many other aspects of the policy that the ruling circles of the FRG pursue are aimed at undermining the foundations of socialism in the GDR; they damaged relations between the two German states.

Imperialism's hopes of absorbing the GDR are now more illusory than ever. The GDR is among the world's ten leading industrial countries. It has diplomatic relations with more than 130 states, and is active in the United Nations and many other international bodies. It has reliable allies and friends in the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. Despite the enemy's vehement attacks, Honecker told the

10th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the first state of workers and peasants on German soil, has proved its political strength and built up its economic power.^^1^^

Discussions on ``unification'' still flare up ever so often. Speaking at the congress of the German Communist Party in Mannheim on October 20, 1978, Party Chairman, Herbert Mies, said: "All attempts designed to falsify history and kindle nationalist sentiment by propaganda about what they call 'keeping the German question open' are merely designed to divert the people from the necessity of solving the urgent problems of our own country. All the demagoguery about the allegedly still existing single German nation makes the necessary normalisation of relations with our socialist German neighbour state more difficult. Any sane policy today which merits the name of a national policy has to proceed from reality ... from the existence of two sovereign German states independent of one another---the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist German Democratic Republic.''^^2^^

Realistic West German political leaders saw that the FRG was powerless to alter the situation, or to prevent the tendency of further delimitation. Especially as, historically speaking, the period of Germany's existence as an integral state was infinitesimally brief. As recently as the 17th century, there were hundreds of small principalities scattered throughout Germany, some of them "no bigger than the sole of a boot". The GDR

~^^1^^ Pravda, April 12, 1981.

~^^2^^ H. Mies, Zur Politik der DKP. Ausgewahlte Reden und Aufsatze, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1979, p. 389.

and the FRG have already existed for over thirty years, or just a little less than Kaiser Germany.

Whereas the West German government---and Chancellor Schmidt pointed out this fact in the Bundestag on May 18, 1979---recognised that the existence of the GDR and the FRG was an "element of the European balance of forces which secures peace in Europe" and that the FRG "cannot afford any political schizophrenia, with a realistic peace policy being promoted on the one hand, and delusive reunification debates being carried on, on the other,"^^1^^ some influential forces in the FRG, principally the CDU/CSU, would like to persistently drum up nationalist sentiment, and found their policy on the quicksand of Pan-Germanic illusions. "We strove tenaciously and determinedly," Helmut Schmidt told the Bundestag, "for goodneighbourly relations with our Eastern neighbours including the other German state... The Eastern treaties have created contractual obligations which are progressing despite the many setbacks. The Quadripartite Agreement and the Bases of Relations Treaty provided the political preconditions for the Helsinki Conference. Relations between the two German states and the Berlin situation have since been part of the policy of detente in Europe. It has benefitted Berliners, the Germans in the GDR, the Germans here, and all peoples of Europe.''^^2^^

However important the specific areas of cooperation may be, the principal objective of cooperation between the USSR and the FRG is to have the two countries work together to resolve the cardinal questions of war and peace. The

character of Soviet-West German relations and the rate of their development will depend on how successfully this problem is dealt with.

There is no shortage of nice words in favour of detente or professions by West German leaders of the commitment to supplementing political by military detente. Yet the arms race is threatening to nullify the achievements in the political sphere of relations between European countries with different social systems that have been won during the past decade in the hard struggle for peace and security in Europe. And the ruling circles of the FRG bear much of the responsibility for it.

Top-level declarations in favour of detente and disarmament, made in the FRG, have been combined with those that clashed with the FRG's officially proclaimed interest in disarmament, and furnished propaganda support for another spiral in the arms race.

The FRG's attitude has prevented any progress at the disarmament talks. In addition, the FRG is still one of those countries which annually increase their military spending year after year and manufacture or buy more and more new types of weapons. Its total military expenditures in 1982 far exceeded 60 billion DM.

The capitalist press is not squeamish about the means it uses to scare the man in the street. Springer's Die Welt has cited fantastic figures about Soviet tanks in Central Europe that were ready to rush to the Rhine, each instance raising the number by hundreds or even thousands than in the previous estimate. The CDU/CSU leaders need this atmosphere of fear heightened by the crudest methods of misinformation to carry out the plans for drawing the FRG into the new stage of the arms race which they claim is needed "in the in-

~^^1^^ Bulletin No. 64, May 18, 1979, p. 603.

~^^2^^ Ibid.

terests of security". Helmut Kohl told a CDU Congress at the end of March 1979 that "for the CDU, security comes before disarmament".^^1^^ On questions of military policy, the positions of the government and opposition parties tended to converge somewhat. Whereas the CDU / CSU wanted the neutron bomb and medium-range missiles targetted on the Soviet Union to be deployed in the FRG immediately, the Schmidt-Genscher government, while not rejecting these plans in principle, insisted that the decision be adopted on a collective basis within the NATO framework, i.e., that it also involve other members of the NATO bloc. Whereas the CDU/CSU demanded unilateral concessions from the socialist countries at the Vienna talks, the FRG delegation, objectively speaking, did nothing other than artificially slow down the talks, despite all the government's promises to be ``flexible''.

The French member of parliament Serge Boucheny made this comment about the identity of the standpoints of the government and opposition parties: "Thanks to its economic power ... the FRG has now put the strongest conventional army in Western Europe back on its feet... Today the FRG has come to play a very important role in the military domain and, as a consequence, in the totality of European affairs... The Christian Democratic Union, the CDU, has found itself in perfect harmony with the Social Democratic Party, the SPD, in the realising of the key objective of German imperialism: 'A strong Bundeswehr, the central element of the military alliance of Europe'.''^^2^^

The FRG responded readily to the American call to increase military spending. But even for a country as economically advanced as the FRG, military expenditures are a gruelling weight. They place a heavy burden on the shoulders of working people. Those who buy weapons for the Bundeswehr had at their disposal over 45 billion DM in the five-year period of 1978-1982 to purchase new weapons systems. Total expenditures for the armed forces for the same period---starting with ordinary pencils and ending with fuel and ammunition---have been estimated at 90 billion DM. And all indications are that this will not suffice. Defence Minister Apel and his armed forces continually spring additional demands on the Bundestag. CDU defence expert Willi Weiskirch warns: "We must think of something to stem the mounting tide of expenses immediately.''^^1^^

Members of the government coalition also criticised the West's attitude to disarmament talks, pointing out that the West is still underestimating the East's readiness for detente. Der Spiegel quotes Willy Brandt as saying that the world may be able to avoid serious catastrophe in the 1980s if military spending, which now exceeds 400 billion dollars a year, can be reduced. W. Brandt thinks that unless disarmament talks are successful, his Ostpolitik will not continue. It was proposed to terminate the deadlocked discussion on the figures and proceed to the stage of political decisionmaking at the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. SPD Bundestag Chairman Wehner, for instance, wrote in October 1978 that the disarmament and armament control talks were finally at a stage

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 26, 1979, p. 2. ~^^2^^ France nouvelle, January 29, 1979, p. 23.

i

Stern No. 28, July 5, 1979, p. 108.

12---919

where they should no longer be a matter for specialists alone.

Many in the SPD criticised Foreign Minister Genscher for his advice not to rush ahead and to continue the discussion on figures until it was resolved, and also criticised Chancellor Schmidt for accepting this approach after having derided publicly such "piddling arithmetic'" just a short while before.

Der Spiegel questioned the authenticity of the figures on the Soviet Armed Forces given by the press and quoted by West German politicians. It wrote that as things turned out, all new entries of weapons were carefully registered in intelligence reports, but the weapons withdrawn were not, and that State Secretary of the Defence Ministry von Billow had said that all secret services obviously manipulated figures upwards.^^2^^

On February 5, 1979, Wehner told the Bundestag that the Soviet Armed Forces were defensive, not offensive. He also said he regretted that some people in the government were impeding the Vienna talks. General Bastian, the commander of a tank division, said publicly that he shared the view that the Soviet Army was defensive^^3^^ and so left Wehner's critics, who accused him of being ignorant in military matters, with nothing to say.

Understandably this statement, which was supported by a high-ranking officer, made Wehner the object of vehement attack by the CDU/CSU, because, as Stern wrote, it called into question one of the underlying principles of West German policy for over thirty years---the hostile image of

an essentially aggressive, war-thirsty Soviet Union, and hence, the political incontestability of the Bundeswehr.^^1^^

An article, ``Disarmament'', which appeared in Der Spiegel, noted that Wehner's misgivings about a new East-West arms race were shared not only by a large section of the SPD Bundestag faction, but also by the great majority of the party at large.^^2^^

As the curtain fell on the 1970s, plans were framed by the Pentagon and NATO which if they were to be realised could dash all hopes for military detente and bring the already dangerous military confrontation nearer to the explosion point. Late in June 1979, the USA asked its NATO partners in Europe to deploy in the early 1980s up to 600 Pershings-2 and medium-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The FRG, the Netherlands and Belgium were to be the principal sites. The West German government was especially vociferous in favour of the American medium-range missiles for Europe, under the very strange pretext that they were needed to rescue detente.

It is very obvious that the rulers of the Western countries are determined to overturn the established balance of forces in Europe in order to ensure the North Atlantic alliance military superiority. Speaking in Berlin on October 6, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said: "The socialist countries would not, of course, watch the efforts of the NATO militarists indifferently. In such a case we would have to take the necessary steps to strengthen our security. There would be no other way left for us. One thing is absolutely clear: realisation of NATO's

~^^1^^ Der Spiegel No. 52, December 25, 1978. p. 22.

~^^2^^ Ibid. No 41, October 9, 1978, p. 44.

~^^3^^ Stern No. 28, July 5, 1979, p. 54.

' Ibid. Der Spiegel No. 41, October 8, 1979, p. 23.

12*

plans would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and vitiate in many respects the international atmosphere in general.''^^1^^

The FRG is to play the principal role in the NATO plans for deploying the new types of nuclear weapons. The West German rulers who are harping on "Soviet superiority" in medium-range missiles, use clearly inflated figures on the means of delivery of these Soviet weapons.

Meanwhile, the SPD leadership, Der Spiegel writes, has been given documents questioning the figures on Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles, which were presented in the government's White Paper on Security. The West German expert Hans Brauch points out that, curiously enough, the West has several pictures of the Backfire bomber, but not a single one of the mobile mediumrange SS-20 missile or any of its launching pads.^^2^^

Brauch feels the figures published in the West on the number of Soviet missiles are so inexact that no objective conclusions can be drawn from them. Thus, the White Paper on Security says that the Warsaw Treaty has at its command more than 1,370 missiles and aircraft which can deliver nuclear weapons in arrange of over 1,000 km while NATO only has 386. But according to the London Institute of Strategic Studies, there are 1,039 missile-carriers on the Eastern side and 960 on the Western side. Paul Doty of Harvard University, President Carter's adviser on arms control, used official and secret documents to give the figures as 2,135 delivery systems with a range of over 1,000 km for the Warsaw Treaty, and 1,428 for

NATO. "This fooling around with figures shows that the Western analyses are simply not to be believed. In addition, they lead one to suspect that the figures alleging on the East's superiority often serve only to justify their own armaments decisions... It is little wonder that many Social Democrats are just as skeptical about the arguments advanced by the military as Brauch is.''^^1^^

The US intelligence service is well able to assess the state and level of the Soviet Armed Forces, and especially nuclear missiles. But the figures presented by the USA to its NATO allies has caused them to doubt their authenticity. Stern quotes an SPD expert as saying that Bonn is "often more than skeptical" of American data. Other experts supposed that in view of the decision on ``armament'' taken by NATO in December 1979, Washington deliberately exaggerates the data so as to dispose its partners to act as required.^^2^^

US imperialism is prepared to turn the continent of Europe into a desert scorched by nuclear fire to achieve its ends. Citing official US documents Senator Nino Pasti of Italy, who in 1966- 1968 was Allied Supreme Vice-Commander of the NATO forces in Europe for nuclear affairs, pointed out in an interview that the purpose of deploying the American nuclear weapons in Europe was to make it possible to conduct a nuclear war in Europe without any immediate damage to the USA. "The price of the United States defence is the destruction of Europe," the Senator concluded.~^^3^^

The USA considers it preferable to have the

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, op. cit., p. 81.

~^^1^^ Ibid.

~^^2^^ Stern No. 48, November 22, 1979, p. 232.

~^^3^^ Cited from Izvestia, November 19, 1979.

^^2^^ Der Spiegel No. 41, October 8, 1979, p. 23.

deployment of the missiles undertaken by an SPD/FDP government, as this will help to keep the protest movement in the FRG, impressive as it may be, under control. During the period leading up to the December 1979 NATO session, the United States took steps to ``persuade'' its partners by fair means or foul. Z. Brzezinski, who decided that the FRG was not doing enough to increase its military spending, turned to one of the West German opposition leaders and asked him to put the suitable pressure on the government. People like CDU Deputy Alois Mertes, CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl and others attacked leading SPD politicians---Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner and Egon Bahr, for in their comment on the Soviet peace initiatives they called for a new East-West dialogue to end the arms

race.

Harangues on the "Soviet threat" enabled the capitalist war industry to rake in fabulous profits, made the general atmosphere of capitalist society more belligerent, caused people to take militarism in their stride, and whipped up the arms race.

A hundred years ago, the German philosopher and disciple of Schopenhauer, Eduart von Hartmann wrote that it would be better for the humankind to commit mass suicide in a body than to go on living and struggling. Obviously the contemporary ultra-imperialists, who are prepared, for the sake of their astronomical profits, to bring the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, are thinking on much the same lines as the mad Hartmann.

Should the new types of nuclear missiles be deployed in the FRG, its situation would obviously be greatly impaired. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences should those new weapons one

day be fired. The London Times wrote on November 16, 1979, that "Bonn can never for a moment forget that the ugly line which divides East from West runs right down the middle of Germany. Large numbers of each side's men and weapons are stationed on German soil and Germans would probably suffer first and worst if war broke out".^^1^^

Some people interpret the Soviet Union's appeal to the FRG and other NATO countries to be rational, as ``pressure'', ``threat'' or even as an `` ultimatum'', but it is nothing of the kind. The appeal to the FRG is an appeal to a partner in detente with which it has been agreed in principle that no one should strive for military superiority in Europe. That is why, as Le Figaro wrote on October 30, 1979, the FRG was faced with a dilemma: it had either to reconcile itself to being, as it has been, the privileged instrument of American policy and strategy on the old continent, or to seek for ways of playing a part in its own right, consistent with its own long-term interests.

Behind the Pentagon's declarations about trying to defend Western Europe is its desire to make the continent the target of a retaliatory nuclear strike and the theatre of "limited nuclear war". Heiner Bremer, the editor of Stern, writes that the United States' behaviour can only be viewed as the wish to proceed from the assumption that nuclear war can be contained within Europe.

The Soviet Union demonstrated its dedication to peace, detente and disarmament by a new initiative to stop the stockpiling of nuclear missiles in Europe, made by Leonid Brezhnev in a speech in Berlin, on October 6, 1979. The Soviet Union

The Times, November 16, 1979, p. 6.

expressed its readiness to reduce the number of the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in its western areas from its present level provided that no additional medium-range nuclear weapons were deployed in Western Europe.

Upon agreement with the GDR leadership and after consulting with the other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty, the USSR decided to make unilateral reduction in the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe and withdraw from the GDR up to 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment.

In conformity with the Final Act of the European Conference, the USSR expressed its readiness to fix the limit of troops taking part in military exercises at 40,000-50,000 men and to take further steps towards reciprocal exchange of information not only on military exercises, but also on troop movements involving more than 20,000 men, and to consider other measures for building up confidence between states. The most suitable venue for discussing a broad complex of measures towards military detente in Europe was, in the Soviet Union's view, the European Conference. In connection with the proposals advanced in Leonid Brezhnev's speech in Berlin, Der Spiegel wrote: "The Soviets were the first to demonstrate their will to talk...''^^1^^

The Western countries showed no inclination to follow the Soviet Union's example and support their words about striving for peace by concrete action. While acknowledging the positive character of the Soviet initiative, the NATO leaders tried to find far-fetched arguments in furtherance of their dangerous plans. They showed no sincere interest

in the Soviet Union's proposal on limiting mediumrange nuclear weapons in Europe. The statement of SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, published in the newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau on October 13, 1979, runs: "German and European history over the last hundred or at least the last fifty years is full of lost opportunities. The reactions of some leaders to Brezhnev's East Berlin speech give reason to fear that another chance of talks on securing peace might be wasted.''^^1^^

The Soviet Union energetically persevered to free the eighties from suspicion and fear and, primarily, to prevent a new spiral of the arms race. "In Europe, just as in all other parts of the world, we want peace, a lasting peace," Leonid Brezhnev said in Berlin. "This is the fundamental basis of our foreign policy, its backbone. We are pursuing this policy consistently and undeviatingly.''^^2^^

Advancing far-fetched arguments, the government of the FRG supported the dangerous plans for deploying new types of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, with the object of upsetting the balance of military forces there. The Soviet Union laid stress upon the responsibility which the NATO countries bore for the consequences of their decision, calling attention to the fact that the "most active role in realising the sinister NATO plans has been assigned to those whose armies, even within the memory of this generation, committed aggression against many countries of Europe, sowing death and destruction all over the continent".^^3^^

Frankfurter Rundschau No. 239, October 13, 1979, p. 2. L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Moscow, 1980, p. 82. ~^^3^^ Izvestia, December 21, 1979.

Der Spiegel No. 46, November 12, 1979, p. 20.

Sober-minded political leaders, progressives and, above all, the German Communist Party, have exposed the dangerous plans entertained by West German reactionaries and especially the CDU/ CSU, the main opponents of goodneighbourly relations and mutual understanding between the FRG and the USSR and other socialist countries. In connection with the plans for siting new US nuclear missile systems on the territory of the FRG they stressed that that policy threatened the future of the peoples of Europe, including the West Germans. From the standpoint of the Federal Republic's national interest, it was a suicidal policy putting the country in deadly peril. Its implication was not greater security but greater uncertainty both for West Germans and the other European peoples. It ignored the most important lesson of the century, that the FRG depended more than any other state on normal, peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.

The policy of stepping up the arms race and the FRG's position at the talks on military detente and disarmament caused grave concern among broad sections of the public.

Noted trade union leaders, many democratic, religious, youth, and social-democratic organisations called for concrete steps to be taken towards limiting armaments. They demanded that the policy of detente be implemented consistently and the treaties and agreements concluded with the socialist countries put into action.

Detente and the policy of cooperation and disarmament are winning more and more supporters in the FRG. Their influence is growing. The forces who support a consistent policy of developing relations between the USSR and the FRG are led by the German Communist Party.

While criticising those aspects of the government's policy which clash with the interests of the people of the FRG and stand in the way of ensuring a lasting peace and security on the continent of Europe, this party supports the realistic policy of goodneighbourly relations, and of promoting broad, mutually advantageous cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

US policies are arousing mounting discontent in the FRG. The decision to site new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and in the Federal Republic in the first place, the adoption of the notorious Directive No. 59, providing for `` limited'' nuclear war and the decision to make the neutron bomb are seen by many in the FRG as a direct threat to their country's security. The aggressive, militarist policy of the US in which Washington is trying to entangle the FRG, is encountering mounting opposition from broad sections of West German opinion.

In an appeal, adopted on November 6, 1980, at Krefeld, the West German peace fighters demanded that the government retract its consent to US Pershings-2 and cruise missiles being deployed in Europe, and also that it adopt a position in NATO such as would clear the FRG in future of the suspicion that it wants to take the lead in the new phase of the arms race which would be to the detriment of all the Europeans. This appeal was signed by the two million West Germans. The anti-missile movement in the FRG culminated in a 300,000-strong rally in support of the Krefeld Appeal, which took place on October 10, 1981, at Bonn.

The success of international detente, as CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev stressed

in his speech at the European Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, "alerted and activated the forces of reaction and militarism, who would like to drag Europe and the entire world back to the 'cold war' and the period of nuclear brinkmanship. It has alarmed those who wax fat on the production of weapons of death and destruction, who cannot envisage any other political career except that of launching `crusades' against the socialist countries, against Communists...''^^1^^

It was just these forces that Leonid Brezhnev had in mind when he spoke of the difficulties and obstacles in Soviet-FRG relations: "They ( difficulties and obstacles---R. A) are due to the calculated activities of forces which have an agressive attitude towards socialism and which look back longingly to the period of the cold war. It is these forces which, under various invented pretexts, systematically organise anti-Soviet campaigns, stir up trouble, try to interfere in our internal affairs, and seek to accelerate the arms build-up. The actions of these forces, which are quite influential in the FRG, hinder the smooth development of relations between our two countries and reduce the possibilities of our cooperation in world affairs.''^^2^^ "And, evidently, their pressure is affecting certain aspects of the Bonn Government's policy.''^^3^^

The CDU/CSU stubbornly resisted the SPD/

FDP Ostpolitik aimed at easing tensions in Europe and establishing normal relations with the socialist countries. Althouth they declared that they recognised the government's treaties with the socialist countries and were ready to fulfil them should they come to power, and even though they have begun to refer recently to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, the signing of which they opposed, the CDU/CSU continue, as before, to make territorial claims which, of course, is incompatible with the Eastern treaties.

The CDU/CSU did everything to prevent any alleviation of tensions in the world and hinder the development of Soviet-West German relations. No other conclusion can be drawn from their incessant criticism of the treaties signed between the FRG and the socialist countries and their attacks on the positive steps taken by the Federal government when guided by the spirit of realism in its relations with these countries.

One important aspect in the struggle between supporters and opponents of international detente in the West is what has become known as playing the anti-Soviet "Chinese card" against the USSR and other socialist countries, trying by the same token to make the Federal Republic adopt a policy which is nothing but short-sighted and dangerous.

It is no accident that this policy is resolutely denounced by all democratic and peace forces in the FRG. The FRG government, too, would have nothing to do with it. Chancellor Schmidt told the Bundestag early in February 1979 that the Federal Republic of Germany considered its relations with the Soviet Union to "take precedence"

~^^1^^ For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe. Berlin, June 29-30, 1976, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, pp. 6-7.

~^^2^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, op. cit., p. 73.

~^^3^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, op. cit., p. 23.

over its relations with China. In an interview given to the Christian Science Monitor, Helmut Schmidt "flatly ruled out West German arms sales to China".^^1^^

The CDU/CSU demanded that the government deploy new US missiles in the FRG and equip the NATO armed forces with neutron weapons; insisted that the Soviet Union make no less than unilateral concessions, which amount to a substantial reduction in its defensive capacity, while US forward-based weapons and British and French nuclear weapons remain intact.

The spearhead of West German reaction--- such revenge-seeking organisations as the Sudeten Germans' Association, and the Silesian Germans' Association; etc., poison the general political climate by their actions and brazen declarations. Thus, the head of the Sudeten Germans' Association, W. Becher, a CSU Bundestag deputy, set forth, in June 1979, a frankly revanchist `` manifesto'' which received the approval of a Sudeten Germans' rally in Munich. He went so far as to say that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic could not lay claim to such territories (an inalienable part of it) as Bohemia, Moravia and Sudeten Silesia and demanded the restitution of damages allegedly sustained by the "Sudeten Germans", to an amount of 130 billion marks. Becher obviously meant his ``manifesto'' to undermine the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the treaties concluded by the socialist countries including Czechoslovakia, in which the FRG recognised the inviolability of existing borders and which had provided the basis for the develop-

ment of normal relations between these states and the Federal Republic.

Territorial claims were presented to the Polish People's Republic in a speech made at a rally of Silesian Germans' Association, in June 1979, in Hannover, by Herbert Hupka. That and many other similar facts demonstrate the tenacity of revenge-seeking tendencies in the FRG. The actions of revenge-seekers, the Czechoslovak journalist G. Schmidt wrote, "contrast more and more with the spirit of the times, as if they lived by a clock with broken hands. More than thirty years have passed since the defeat of fascism, the Potsdam Conference and the Nuremberg Trial. Over these years, the world has changed out of all recognition.

They alone, however, remain the same, denying everything: the results of World War II, the soundness of the four Allied Powers' decisions, the thaw on the continent of Europe and the world at large. Their position among the ranks of antisocialism is always on the right. Their thirst for revenge has not slackened to this day.''^^1^^

The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries could hardly overlook the fact that the neo-nazis practically have a free hand in the FRG. Jobs, and sometimes important posts, are held by those responsible for fascist crimes. "It is nothing but scandalous to see the persistent ' reactivation' of inveterate propagandists of nazi ideology. How could the CDU leaders ... encourage---and since 1947 at that!---one of those individuals who can plead neither the 'errors of youth' nor the considerations of a legal career? ...

The Christian Science Monitor, October 31, 1978.

Izvestia, September 25, 1979.

The above refers to a CDU representative in the Strasbourg Assembly, Hans-Edgar Jahn, Bundestag deputy since 1965, lecturer, journalist, prolific writer, propagandist of `democratic' ideas in the Bundeswehr, and prophet of the restoration of 'Great Germany'. Admitted to the nazi party in 1930 (three years before Hitler's coming to power), he counted among his laurels an absolutely despicable anti-Semitic production. And here he is, topping his party's list in Lower Saxony, for election to the European Parliament---a fact that looks almost like a provocation..." wrote Le Monde in its editorial on May 25,1979.

Thirty years after the defeat of fascism, after the signing of treaties between the FRG and the socialist countries that recognise the historical results of victory over fascism, the activities of these forces are a dangerous relapse into the cold war period. The neo-nazis direct their main attack at those who want peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the socialist neighbour states. According to the Frankfurter Rundschau, there are about a thousand neo-fascist groups in the FRG: German Action, the Committee for Germany's Liberation from Communism, the OderNeisse Action, the League of Youth True to the Fatherland, the Imperial Soldiers' Union, the Resistance Campaign, and so on. The largest nazi organisation in the FRG is the National Democratic Party, operating legally in the FRG, which descends directly from Hitler's National Socialist Party. Its purpose, as defined by one of its leaders, F.-J. Roder, is to stamp out communism in Europe.

The neo-nazis are dangerous not just because they are trying to exonerate fascism. They are getting ready to take real action.

In March 1979, the West German Attorney General's Office announced the arrest of five neonazis charged with preparing a terrorist act against SPD Chairman Willy Brandt. It was not by chance that the terrorist act was directed at Willy Brandt. He had headed the first SPD/ FDP coalition government which effected the shift from confrontation to the policy of detente in international relations. Reports of the Ministry of the Interior quote facts indicating that neo-nazi organisations are stockpiling weapons and ammunition and staging terrorist acts against democratic organisations and political figures.

The neo-nazis' activities in the FRG, their demonstrations against peace and mutual understanding between peoples develop against a background of open publicity for the views of former nazi criminals.

This is causing grave concern to the peoples of the socialist countries, and the states of Western Europe alike. It is their legitimate right to set their face against those who have committed crimes against humanity and those who would like to ``rectify'' history ex post facto.

The FRG government recognised the results of the historic victory over fascism, to which the Soviet Union made the decisive contribution. In connection with the signing of its treaty with Poland, the FRG government undertook to sponsor the introduction of changes in the interpretation of the history of German-Polish relations just before and during World War II in studies and textbooks published in West Germany. The demand to present history truthfully in order to promote better understanding between peoples is stipulated also in the Soviet-West German agreement on cultural cooperation. Even so, anybody in West Ger-

13---919

many can buy at bookshops reminiscences and notes of Himmler and Ribbentrop, Manstein and Doenitz, von Schirach and Speer, Goebbels' diaries, and books on the history of the Wehrmacht and the SS. Prominent among these publications are two ponderous productions: Hitler. A Biography, by J. Fest, of 1,200 pages; and Adolf Hitler, by J. Toland (first published in the USA and then translated into German), of 1,216 pages. The writers deliberately try to conceal the class nature of fascism and to whitewash the war monopolies and the nazi General Staff. For years they have been trying---some covertly, others quite openly--- to persuade West German opinion that the nazi crimes were exaggerated by the victims out of vengeance and inflated by political opponents to the present Federal Republic of Germany. It is no wonder that the younger generation does not know much and has a poor understanding of what fascist ideology really is. The Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) wrote on April 7, 1979, that "now, almost thirty-four years after the defeat of nazi Germany, there is no firm policy of condemning the crimes committed by fascism or of cutting short the glorification of the nazi past. That this is so can be seen from the daily proceedings of the mass media, official institutions, including the courts, and school history books.''

This is further borne out by the efforts exerted by the West German right to preserve the 30-year period of limitation for the prosecution of murder and thus practically pardon all nazi criminals after December 1979. Replying to a question in the Bundestag West German Minister of Justice H.-J. Vogel said early in 1979 that out of the 84,403 nazi criminals investigated or prosecuted in West

Germany following the war, only 6,432 had been punished. Some nazi criminals guilty of especially grave crimes have escaped punishment, finding shelter in the FRG and other capitalist countries. Pleading that one had to maintain the "legal peace" in the country and that it was ``impossible'' to prove the guilt of the accused, CDU and CSU deputies urged the Bundestag to end the prosecution of nazi crimes.

The policy of absolving nazi criminals outraged opinion both in the FRG and abroad. It is tantamount to letting the most heinous crimes of nazism sink into oblivion. But one cannot expunge history. This policy is vigorously opposed by world opinion, recalling the commitments ensuing from the Allied Powers' international documents. In October 1943 the Allied Powers adopted the Moscow Declaration on German Atrocities which sounded the following grave warning: "Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice be done." The Moscow Declaration is not the sole warning to the criminals. Of great importance in this connection were the principles of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and its judgement at the Nuremberg trial of major nazi war criminals, confirmed by a resolution of the UN General Assembly.

In response to public pressure, the West German Bundestag abolished the statute of limitation for the prosecution of murder by adopting, on July 4, 1979, a law which was passed by a narrow margin with 225 deputies voting for, and 222---mainly

CDU/CSU opposition deputies---voting against. The Bundestag decision speaks of murder purely in terms of criminal law while to millions of men and women both in the FRG and the countries which suffered from fascist aggression, it is the question, above all, of retribution and punishment for the nazi crimes, and genocide.^^1^^

The Bundestag decision was a success for the democratic and anti-fascist forces which now had a legal basis for their efforts to have the culprits subjected to just punishment, to counteract attempts at rehabilitating fascism in the FRG, and to clamp down on the neo-nazis. The abolition of the statute of limitation for the prosecution of nazi crimes affords a feeling of satisfaction to all honest people. It is evidence of West Germany's desire to be on a goodneighbourly footing with the peoples of Europe and to enjoy their confidence.

In February 1981, the standing conference of Cult Ministers of the Lands approved the so-called "principles of representing Germany in school textbooks and on maps designed for school instruction". These principles are in glaring contradiction with the political and legal European realities. It is prescribed, for instance, that maps show the "border of the German Reich as of December 31, 1937", that the name ``Germany'' be applied to the territory of the FRG and the GDR ``together''; and that the border between the FRG and the GDR be designated as a "border of a special kind''.

As was pointed out in the Memo of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, presented to the FRG

Embassy in Moscow on March 17, 1981, this resolution was an ill-judged attempt to dodge the FRG's territorial and political commitments under the treaties and agreements in force. Such actions had nothing in common with the determination, expressed in the Joint Declaration of May 6, 1978, to help the ideas of better mutual understanding and respect take root and grow in people's minds, especially young people's.

The Memo stressed that the Soviet side expected the FRG to take steps to prevent the occurrence of any actions in national practice which run counter to the international obligations of the FRG, prejudice the legitimate interests of other countries, and can only cause West German policy to be viewed with distrust.

In an interview to Der Spiegel, Leonid Brezhnev said: "... At the beginning of the eighties, just as it was at the beginning of the seventies, the FRG is faced with decision of a cardinal kind.

``Is the course which has added so much to the FRG's weight in European and world politics to be continued and developed further or is the capital accumulated over those years to be squandered in fruitless and dangerous confrontations...''^^1^^

The policy of promoting relations with the FRG, steadily pursued by the Soviet Union, yielded the expected results. In the complicated international situation, their progress slowed down. The attempts of West German ruling circles to modify the accords reached some time ago and occasional-

~^^1^^ Pravda, June 5, 1979.

~^^1^^ Pravda, November 3, 1981. 197

1%

ly to depart from them were beginning to make themselves felt.

It was all the more important, therefore, not to interrupt the political dialogue and try to find solutions to outstanding problems, and this, as previous experience suggested, put another summit and talks high on the agenda.

MISSION OF PEACE

In a complex international situation, the significance of political dialogue---especially at top level---is greater than ever. The USSR and the FRG have never interrupted their dialogue. This alone is sufficient to show that the knowledge of each other gained over the years, the degree of trust felt towards each other, and, lastly, the material basis on which the relations between the USSR and the FRG are shaped, have helped to resolve seemingly hopeless deadlocks.

The constructive role of Soviet foreign policy for strengthening peace and international security and promoting and extending cooperation between countries with different social systems, was elicited most fully during the visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG, on November 22-25, 1981.

The document adopted by the CC CPSU P9litical Bureau, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, stressed that "at this tense and crucial juncture in international relations, when they may take sharp turn for the worse or be channelled in a better direction, Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG is assuming special significance both for bilateral Soviet-West German relations and for the whole complex of East-West rela-

tions and the general trend in world politics".^^1^^

Soviet-West German summit meetings always riveted the attention of the whole world. After all, these two large countries of Europe, the USSR and the FRG, can do much if they join their efforts for peace and international cooperation. Their desire to see how they could settle between them difficult problems could not be ignored by those who would like to turn back the clock to the cold war.

The new talks during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG made it possible for the two countries to avoid accumulating ``explosive'' material and carrying matters to the point where it would be hard to prevent a sharp deterioration of relations and enabled them to sit down at the negotiation table, state their positions and try to find ways of dealing with sensitive situations. Their relations have their complications, both those that have been there for decades and those of a more recent origin, which it would not pay either side to aggravate further.

What prompted the leaders of the USSR and the FRG to sit down at the negotiation table was, above all, their common desire to rescue the gains of ten years of cooperation and not to allow any erosion of the constructive framework which had been instrumental in the 1970s in turning SovietFRG relations into an influential factor of peace and detente on the European continent.

It would be hard not to agree with the article on the results of the summit talks in Bonn in November 1981, published in Der Spiegel, where it says that

~^^1^^ To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations. On the Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany. November 22-25,1981, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, pp. 48-49.

both sides were interested in making the talks a success.

Characterising the international situation, Leonid Brezhnev said in an interview given to Der Spiegel: "The situation in the world today is disquieting. Hot sports are emerging in different parts of the globe. The build-up of stocks of lethal weapons continues. New types of weapons are being devised, and they are particularly dangerous because, as the experts put it, they lower the threshold of nuclear war, i.e., make its outbreak more probable.''^^1^^

The ruling coalition of the FRG was active in carrying out the NATO plans for turning the FRG, Britain and Italy into a launching pad for the new US nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries. Deputy Chairman of the German Communist Party H. Gautier declared in connection with Chancellor Schmidt's official statement late in May 1981 that while millions of people in the FRG and other West European countries voiced growing concern about the new US Eurostrategic missiles Chancellor Schmidt in the United States was expressing his complete unanimity with the US policy of building up armaments and stressing his complete agreement with NATO's sinister nuclear missile decisions. That reckless, anti-national policy had been confirmed in Helmut Schmidt's official statement too. By the same token, the Chancellor was acting in defiance of common sense. He had no respect for the demands put forward by millions of voters and supporters of the SPD, Christians and nonparty people, Social Democrats and Communists taking part in the sweeping public drive for peace,

New Times No. 45, November 1981, p. 28.

protesting against new American nuclear missiles, and, at the same time, the Chancellor's foreign policy line, inimical to peace, was acclaimed by the opponents of detente from among the CDU/ CSU and the right-wing circles of the monopoly and war capital.^^1^^

It is therefore quite logical that the talks in Bonn should have focused on how to avert the threat hanging over Europe in connection with the plans for deploying new types of American nuclear missiles in several West European countries, particularly the FRG, and prevent the balance of forces being changed in favour of the NATO bloc.

The Soviet Union considers that the plans for siting new American nuclear weapons in Western Europe and, above all, on the territory of the FRG, constitute a heretofore unprecedented menace to the continent. Leonid Brezhnev called the attention of the other side to the threat to peace posed by the deployment of new American mediumrange nuclear systems and neutron weapons in Europe, and to the adventurism of those who advocate ``limited'' nuclear war. Speaking on November 23, 1981, in Bonn, he said: "It turns out that the possibility to use nuclear weapons in the 'European theatre of war' is being elevated to the status of a military doctrine. As if Europe, where hundreds of millions of people live, were already doomed to becoming a theatre of war. As if it were a box of little tin figures which do not deserve a better fate than being melted in the flames of nuclear explosions.''^^2^^

The Soviet Union called on the West to have talks to try and find a solution acceptable to both sides. In order to facilitate dialogue, Leonid

~^^1^^ Unsere Zeit, May 27, 1981.

~^^2^^ To Promote Peace and Good-Neignbour Relations, op. cit.,

p. 16.

Brezhnev advanced new, far-reaching proposals. The Soviet proposal on a moratorium on deploying new and updating the available medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe for the duration of talks on these types of armaments, was supplemented with the proposal of the Soviet side to reduce unilaterally a certain part of its medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR, moving towards the lower level on which the USSR and the USA might agree as a result of talks.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conduct talks on a radical reduction---not by tens, but by hundreds, of units---of the medium-range nuclear weapons by both sides, taking into account, naturally, both the US forward-based weapons and the corresponding nuclear weapons of Britain and France. Of course, the best thing to have, from the standpoint of security of the peoples of Europe---and that was what Leonid Brezhnev stated at the talks in Bonn--- would be a situation where nuclear weapons were altogether absent from Europe.

The Bonn talks have shown that the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries on the one hand, and of NATO, including the FRG, on the other, continue to differ a good deal. The Soviet Union countered the attempts of NATO and especially the USA to secure advantages and upset the existing military equilibrium, with a programme for curtailing nuclear armaments in Europe. The Soviet leadership is strongly convinced that this programme is realistic, concrete and constructive, proceeding, as it does, from the principle of equality and equal security. It meets the interests of all peoples and the demand of the masses to avert the menace of nuclear war. The

document issued by the CC CPSU Political Bureau, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR stated: "The question of nuclear weapons in Europe is not only a question of the future of the continent and of the destinies of hundreds of millions of people living on it. It is also a question of the destinies of universal peace. The Soviet Union advocates negotiations to seek a solution that will not prejudice the security of any side while lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe.''^^1^^

Making an official statement in the Bundestag on December 3, 1981, Helmut Schmidt said that the FRG took a special interest in the Geneva talks, stemming directly from the geographical and political situation.^^2^^ He reaffirmed the FRG's position at the talks with Brezhnev that should Soviet-US Geneva talks fail to produce tangible results late in 1983 the FRG would stick to its commitments, taken in two-track decision, i.e., the deployment would be carried out as planned.^^3^^

The FRG supported the US line for securing military advantages for the West. Looking from the FRG's standpoint, the Soviet Union should, unilaterally and without any material concessions from the West, disarm.

K. Krause, a former Bundeswehr general, writes that the "all or nothing" attitude is quite obvious; in this way, the failure of talks has been predetermined, and the siting of Pershings-2 and cruise missiles largely provided for.^^4^^

During his visit to the FRG, Leonid Brezhnev firmly and clearly stated: "The Soviet Union will not agree to this. The Soviet people, the Communist Party will never forego the security interests of our country, of our allies and friends.''^^1^^

Approval or renunciation of the plans for deploying new types of nuclear missiles shows unequivocally whether the true intentions of the ruling circles of the FRG are to help strengthen peace in Europe and promote peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation between European countries in the spirit of neighbourliness and growing mutual confidence, or to assist in bringing about a fresh aggravation of the situation in Europe and the world by having deployed on its territory US nuclear missiles trained on the USSR and its allies.

The very fact of the talks in Bonn---even though on a point as important as the prevention of deployment of new US nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries the positions of the sides continue to differ---is significant from the standpoint of readiness and willingness to hear each other and to know better the reasons underlying the decisions made. The talks made the West set about determining its own position, without postponing it indefinitely, which was a dangerous possibility, urging those who would like to carry out the NATO decision on rearmament to come to the negotiation table.

The USA's reaction to the Soviet-West German talks in Bonn is indicative in this respect. As the Time magazine wrote, Schmidt had said he was merely an ``interpreter'' of US policy, and in

~^^1^^ To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op. cit., p. 51.

~^^2^^ Bulletin No. 116, December 4, 1981, p. 995.

~^^3^^ Ibid.

~^^4^^ Der Spiegel No 51, December 14, 1981, p. 33

To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

order to dispel any doubts of his loyalty to NATO he scrupulously informed Washington about the progress of the talks.

Washington was indignant at the news that West German and Soviet diplomats were to keep regular contacts on Euromissiles during SovietAmerican talks in Geneva.

The US continued to exert strong pressure on its NATO allies, particularly the FRG. It would like to cut them off from authentic information on the progress of Soviet-US talks and to supply their own interpretation of the Soviet standpoint.

Leonid Brezhnev's talks elicited a similarity of views on the significance of maintaining political dialogue between countries in the worsened international situation. The common destinies of both parts of Europe, the socialist and the capitalist, are an objective factor which must be reckoned with by any realistic policy. "Whatever may divide us," Leonid Brezhnev stressed in his speech in Bonn, "Europe is our common home. Common fate has linked us through centuries, and it links us today, too.''^^1^^

Making an official statement in the Bundestag on December 3, 1981, on Leonid Brezhnev's visit, Chancellor Schmidt said: "Despite serious differences, despite basically divergent conceptions of society and politics, the common denominator of these talks was our mutual concern for peace.''^^2^^

The talks were none too easy, as was only to be expected given the complex international situation. The sides set out their views on the causes

of international tension, discussed problems of international security, limitation of the arms race and disarmament, the state of affairs at the Madrid meeting of the member countries of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. They also discussed measures for fulfilling the obligations following the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin of September 3, 1971, and other matters.

The differences which came to light concerned exceedingly important matters. It was all the more necessary---and this was what the Soviet side urged---not to lose sight of the identity of longterm interests of the USSR and the FRG. It is possible to achieve positive results in strengthening peace and international security, if peace is given priority.

As for the Soviet side, Leonid Brezhnev reaffirmed at the talks the Soviet leaders' firm adherence to the peaceful foreign policy evolved by the 26th CPSU Congress---a policy of averting the menace of war, especially nuclear war, and for detente and peaceful cooperation between countries with different socio-political systems.

In connection with Leonid Brezhnev's visit the West German realistically-minded political leaders and progressive organisations expected a constructive development of the USSR-FRG relations as an important element of world politics. These expectations were justified.

The Christian Science Monitor (USA) had to acknowledge that the talks between Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Brezhnev were not prompted by any wish to intimidate or oppose the other side, but were truly businesslike. Both leaders admitted

To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op.

cit., p. 16.

~^^2^^ Bulletin No 116, December 4, 1981, p. 995.

that there were differences, the newspaper wrote, but shared the opinion that the object of the talks must be detente, peaceful and equal cooperation. The visit served to build up USSR-FRG relations which rest on the mutual interest of both countries in cooperation. The joint USSR-FRG communique states that "Aware of the importance of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany to both states, to Europe and also to ensuring peace and achieving progress in international cooperation, the Sides reiterated their resolve to continue consistently and firmly to base their policies on the existing treaties and agreements, primarily on the Treaty of August 12, 1970, and on the Joint Declaration of May 6,

1978".'

The visit yielded impressive results in the area of economic cooperation. The sides proceed from the assumption that the favourable development of economic collaboration is in their mutual' interest, has a beneficial effect on relations as a whole and promotes international stability and lasting peace. They declared their intention to make every effort for the onward development of economic relations meeting their mutual interests on the basis of existing agreements, primarily the longterm agreement of May 6, 1978, and the longterm programme of July 1, 1980.^^2^^

The Soviet Union has always consistently supported the development of mutually advantageous economic relationships with capitalist countries. The Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1981-1985 and

the Period up to 1990 set the following task: "Proceeding from the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the need to strengthen detente, to maintain stable mutually beneficial trade, economic, scientific and technical contacts with capitalist countries showing interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union, to continue the implementation of the agreements in force and the conclusion of new agreements on carrying out large-scale projects in the fuel, metallurgical and chemical industries and other branches of the national economy, to explore other avenues for promoting cooperation with these countries.''^^1^^

Highly influential economic circles in the FRG have increasingly engaged in cooperation with the Soviet Union. The volume of trade between the USSR and the FRG from 1970 to 1980 increased ten-fold, amounting to 5.8 billion roubles in 1980. Trade in 1980 was practically balanced.² More than 1,500 large, medium-sized and small West German enterprises maintain economic contacts with the Soviet Union. It enables many of the smaller enterprises to sustain competition from big West German concerns.

Economic relations between the USSR and the FRG have good prospects. Realisation of joint projects is designed for many years or decades ahead. The gas agreement is successfully under way. The USSR bought 66 per cent of the largediameter pipes made in the FRG and supplied to it about 10 billion cubic metres of gas annually. In connection with the general agreement on co-

~^^1^^ To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op. cit, p.41.

i

Documents and Resolutions. 26th CPSU Congress on

__^Tr 't.^

°

' "

cit., pp. 235-36.

Foreign Trade No 11, 1981. 209

14---919

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

operation in building a large metallurgical works at Stary Oskol, based on direct reduction process, arranged during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in 1973, orders were placed in the FRG, including a contract signed with SchloemannSiemag for a rolling mill worth more than 600 million DM.

On the eve of the visit, November 20, 1981, the West German firm Ruhrgas and the Soviet foreign trade association Soyuzgazexport signed an agreement for 25 years, under which the FRG will, starting in 1984, receive gas at the rate of 10.5 billion cubic metres a year, which is a major departure in solving energy problems in the European context. The agreement is of exceptional significance in dealing with the employment problem in the FRG and is also profitable to the Soviet Union, which will be able to develop more quickly the vast deposits of gas in those areas of West Siberia that are not easily accessible and improve gas supply for the central parts of the country. After it has supplied enough gas to repay the credits, the Soviet Union will have a new major source of hard currency earnings. The latter will be used also to finance imports from West European countries, which will promote the further growth of mutually beneficial trade. It is equally important that carrying out the project will help to enhance the climate of confidence on the continent and to consolidate detente.

``The Sides attach considerable importance to the solution of energy problems both within the European framework and on a world-wide scale," the Joint Communique points out. "They welcome the conclusion by firms, banks and organisations of the two countries of contracts on deliveries of Soviet natural gas to the Federal Republic of

Germany and other West European countries, and of deliveries of pipes and equipment for gas pipelines to the Soviet Union. By agreement with I the government of the German Democratic Rei public, natural gas from the Soviet Union will also be supplied to Berlin (West---R. A.). They stated their readiness to facilitate as much as i possible the implementation of the above project."¹ I

The idea of getting gas from the Soviet Union

i and organising the distillation of liquid fuel from i brown coal attracted the interest of West German businessmen. Linde AG offered to take part in developing plant for subliming coal in the KanskAchinsk Basin, equip the future gasline with refrigerating plant and supply complete plant for an ethylene factory capable of producing 250,000 tons annually.^^2^^

It is worth noting that just before the visit there was broad discussion on further economic cooperation between the USSR and the FRG. The opponents of broader business cooperation, whose influence should not be underestimated, sought to shake the West Germans' confidence in the stability of economic ties with the USSR. They stressed the allegedly ``unilateral'' benefit for the Soviet Union, called for using these ties as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the USSR in political matters, and spoke ominously about the FRG's becoming dependent on Soviet energy sources. The Washington administration, too, wanted very much to see trade with the Soviet Union cut back. Economic cooperation between the USSR and the FRG was attacked in an article, "German

To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op. cit., p. 42.

~^^2^^ Pravda, November 20, 1981.

14*

Technology for the Russians", that was published during Leonid Brezhnev's visit. Contrary to the acknowledged opinion of influential West German business circles, the author of the article, J. Jeske, warns against the "risk of making some firms dependent on cooperation with the Soviet Union" and says that "we (the FRG---R. A.) are invigorating thereby our ideological deadly enemy". Criticising the West German government, and even the Americans, for not being consistent enough, Jeske urged the Western governments, and the West German government in particular, to revise thoroughly the framework of business dealings with the East and extend the list of prohibited strategically important export goods, and exhorts the Federal Republic to remember its economic strength and to demand a suitable political price for economic concessions.^^1^^

The Soviet Union has always fulfilled its obligations to West German business circles completely and uninterruptedly. As an article in Die Welt, published at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, rightly observed, the supply of Soviet gas to Western Europe had gone on for thirteen years (reaching a total of 130 billion cubic metres), without a single day's interruption.^^2^^

West German businessmen firmly turned down the calls of the US administration to subject the USSR to economic boycott. Replying to a question asked by the Editor-in-Chief of the economic magazine Ost-West Kommerz, G. Dietze on the prospects of USSR-FRG economic co-operation in connection with Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, Chairman of the Board of Gutehoff-

nungshiitte concern M. Lennings, Chairman of the Board of Saltzgitter concern E. Pieper, Chairman of the Board of the firm Uhde H. Gieseler, and head of the Helling concern N. Riss supported the Chancellor's statement about the intention to build up and promote economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.^^1^^

Besides, it is clear to everybody that the question whether or not the Federal Republic should promote economic relations with the Soviet Union, is a matter of principle affecting national sovereignty.

The Observer wrote on January 10, 1982: "When the West Germans mutiny at American suggestions that they should drop their £ 5 billion contract to supply steel pipes for the Soviet natural gas pipeline to West Europe, they are defending their nation's right to act independently. The right to sell steel to Russia (Lex Mannesmann) is almost the unwritten clause of the Basic Law, the West German constitution.''^^2^^

During his visit to the FRG, Leonid Brezhnev met the leaders of all parties represented in the Bundestag---Willy Brandt (SPD), Chairman HansDietrich Genscher (FDP), Helmut Kohl (CDU), Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU), and Federal President Karl Carstens.

As a matter of fact, there is at present no significant political force in the FRG which would openly dispute the necessity and usefulness of the USSR-FRG summit. In the course of the talks between Leonid Brezhnev on the one hand and Helmut Kohl and Franz-Josef Strauss on the other, the opposition could see for themselves

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 23, 1981. ~^^2^^ Die Welt, November 23, 1981.

~^^1^^ Pravda, January 12, 1982.

~^^2^^ The Observer, January 10, 1982.

that the Soviet Union's intention to promote relations with the FRG was serious. The Soviet side stressed that only concrete steps such as recognition of the Eastern treaties and a realistic foreign policy aimed at strengthening peace and international security could provide the basis for cooperation between the USSR and the FRG.

Speaking in Bonn, Leonid Brezhnev said: "I should like to think that after our talks West German politicians will be less inclined to believe and support those who ascribe all sorts of wicked designs to the Soviet Union. We are not going to attack anybody at all. We do not set out at all to be stronger than everybody else, and have never done so. We have no weapons of whatever type that we would be sorry to part with, certainly if it is done on a reciprocal basis. This is no rhetoric. We are ready to back every word with deed and transFate it into the language of specific commitments, whether in Geneva, Vienna or anywhere else.'"

The Political Bureau of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, after considering the results of the visit of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the Federal Republic of Germany on November 22-25, 1981, approved the results of the talks held by Leonid Brezhnev with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the FRG and other West German statesmen and political leaders.

The new initiatives advanced by Leonid Brezhnev at the talks in Bonn created favourable conditions for averting the menace of nuclear war. As far

as the Soviet Union was concerned, it was, as usual, as good as its word in international affairs. On the basis of Leonid Brezhnev's talks in West Germany, the Soviet delegation at the SovietAmerican talks was given relevant instructions. The Soviet side expressed its hope that the new Soviet initiatives would meet with due attention in the West.

The Soviet leadership also instructed the ministries, departments and organisations concerned to carry out scrupulously and to the full the accords in the economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other areas, ensuing from Leonid Brezhnev's talks.

The results of the USSR-FRG summit were highly praised during Bundestag debates on Chancellor Schmidt's official statement of December 3, 1981. Chancellor Schmidt said that the Federal Republic had kept up the dialogues between Bonn and Moscow even in a very difficult period of East-West relations; bilateral cooperation between the FRG and the USSR was rated highly on account of its great economic benefits to both sides as well as its significance to political detente in Europe. After the signing of the Moscow Treaty eleven years ago by Federal Chancellor Brandt, Foreign Minister Scheel and the same Soviet partners, a solid basis was provided for cooperation, on which the Federal Republic had shaped, and would continue to expand mutual relations.

Although the government and the opposition parties differed on concrete points in that respect, they unanimously noted the positive worth of maintaining a dialogue between the USSR and the FRG, especially important in the worsened international situation since the end of the 1970s.

Under the positive impact of the results of the

Pravda, November 26, 1981.

USSR-FRG talks, the predominant tendency of the debate was for dialogue, rather than confrontation, with the Soviet Uni&n, for explaining each other's attitude and seeking agreements which would help to remove tension from international relations and reduce the hazard of nuclear war. Particular satisfaction was expressed with the advance of the economic ties and the gas-pipes deal was characterised as new evidence of the parties' willingness to follow the road of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Soviet Union's position on key international issues, including disarmament, and its willingness to promote mutually beneficial SovietFRG relations were highly appreciated by millions of West Germans. In their statements, government coalition leaders and progressives drew the conclusion that the recent Soviet-FRG summit was a major contribution to strengthening and promoting detente and to the further progress of neighbourly relations between the two countries. They stressed that the Soviet Union does not want to deepen the gaps but, rather, to build bridges, in East-West relations. The assessment of the results of the visit mirrored the struggle of two trends in West German foreign policy. One of these would like to remove the obstacles to the further progress of USSR-FRG relations, something which is perfectly within the bounds of possibility. In the first place, there are the new Soviet initiatives which help to make headway in settling the problems of disarmament and consolidating peace and security on the European continent. The second tries to stall on an issue as important as preventing American missiles from being deployed in Western Europe. This would mean a worsening of the international situation,

and a new spiral in the arms race. Reiteration by the West German side of hackneyed phrases about the imaginary ``threat'' from the USSR certainly cannot promote mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and the FRG.

The visit helped consolidate the positions of those forces in the FRG which realise that the international situation is dangerous and are ready to look for solutions which meet the interests of both sides.

The magazine Der Spiegel published, on November 23, 1981, the results of an opinion poll on peace and disarmament. Some 55 per cent of West Germans welcomed Leonid Brezhnev's visit and thought it had been useful; 54 per cent were against the manufacture and deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe; and only a mere 36 per cent supported NATO's "two-track decision".^^1^^

The state of USSR-FRG relations continued to be affected both by the inconsistent behaviour of the ruling coalition on the issues of peace and international security, which resulted from the infighting in the SPD and the FDP, and by the opposition instigating a fresh round of the arms race and straining the international situation further, by negative influences from the outside, above all from the USA's influence, and by the generally tense situation in the world.

Speaking on November 23, 1981, CDU Chairman Kohl claimed in connection with Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG that the CDU had always supported a policy of mutual understanding and collaboration with the Soviet Union---and repeated in the same breath the CDU's old cate-

~^^1^^ Der Spiegel No 48, November 23, 1981, pp. 56-59.

gorical demands to end the split in Europe and Germany and the situation in West Berlin, etc.

That the opposition's views are unrealistic and its hopes of restoring German imperialism in all its glory by swallowing up the GDR groundless clearly followed from the opinion poll taken in 1981. Only 8 per cent of the West Germans believe that Germany can be reunified by the end of the century.^^1^^

``For the West German public, and to a large extent for West German politics," wrote G. Schweigler, "although it has not yet been able to adjust fully to the public mood, the reunification of Germany is a dead issue.''^^2^^ This is demonstrated in particular by the evolution of SPD's position on the reunification of Germany. Immediately after the Second World War it opposed the formation of the Federal Republic as a separate state albeit closely linked to the West on the grounds that this would hinder the unification of Germany and make the split in the country permanent. But later during the fifties and sixties it took a position that was in all essentials close to that of the revanchist CDU and CSU. Since the early seventies, however, the SPD leaders have assumed that the question of reunification was something for the future not the present to decide. "For the West Germans," Schweigler concludes, "the German nation has shrunk to the Federal Republic; for them the German Question has been answered.''^^3^^ Although preferring the existing social, political and economic system in the FRG

~^^1^^ Time No 51, December 21, 1981, p. 24.

~^^2^^ G. Schweigler, "Whatever Happened to Germany?" In: The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents, Ed. by E. Krippendorff, V. Rittenberger; German Political Studies, Vol. 4, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1980, p. 114.

to any other, the West Germans no longer tried to foist their system upon the GDR. The special bonds between the FRG and the GDR will gradually weaken and, as Schweigler put it: "if they were to become good neighbours, such as Austria and Germany are today, an optimal answer to the German Question would have been found".^^1^^

The GDR came out for promoting relations with the FRG on the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social and political systems and strict observance of the provisions of the Final Act of the European Conference. Speaking at the 10th SUPG Congress, Honecker said: "In the policy between the two German states it is not a question of proclaiming hackneyed allGerman slogans. Nor should one seek to avoid in political discussion every mention of the fact that there exist two German states which had long since proved to each other that they are independent subjects in international law. To draw the necessary conclusions from it in political practice and to get the FRG to abandon the supercilious pretense of speaking on behalf of 'all Germans'---that is in the national interests not only of the GDR, but also of the FRG.''^^2^^

The results of the visit are likely to have a lasting positive impact on the trend of international affairs. The constructive nature of the Soviet proposals, and the Soviet Union's clearly expressed readiness to obtain concrete radical moves in the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, facilitated the search for and discussion of the

^^1^^ Ibid., p. 119.

Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den X. Parteitag der SED, Berlin, 1981, p. 27.

Ibid., p. 117.

ways to prevent a new spiral of the nuclear-missile armaments on this continent.

There has been a reactivation of political and diplomatic contacts in the Western world. The interest in the results of the visit was unusually keen. They were thoroughly discussed by Federal Chancellor Schmidt and US President Reagan. The State Secretary of the Bonn Ministry for Foreign Affairs was sent to Washington to report on the results of the USSR-FRG talks. A meeting of the heads of state and government leaders of the EEC countries, held in London, expressed its full agreement with the assessment of the significance of the summit meeting. Particular emphasis was laid on the need to keep open at all times the lines of contact between East and West. Der Spiegel wrote that Leonid Brezhnev's visit had improved the atmosphere for disarmament talks between Moscow and Washington.^^1^^

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG put it beyond doubt that the seventies---the decade of detente---had not been fruitless. Much useful experiences had been accumulated in USSR-FRG relations and mutually advantageous cooperation had become an essential factor of stability in Europe and international life generally.

Detente is a dynamic state of relations between countries, based on the new alignment of forces in the world, when countries are prepared to settle their disputes at the negotiation table and to promote reciprocal relations in every area. It is a new qualitative level of development of relations between states with different social and political systems since the period of cold war, marked by a fuller utilisation of the opportunities inherent in the policy of peaceful coexistence and by a realistic approach to the problems of preventing war and consolidating peace.

The outcome of the fight for peace, security and socialism, which is waged by the USSR and the other socialist countries and all peace-loving and democratic forces in the 1980s, will determine the prospects of the development of the European continent and all mankind. "To safeguard peace," Leonid Brezhnev said, "no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world.''^^1^^ And it is certainly important how relations will develop between the USSR and the FRG, which play a major role in the formation of a political situation on the European continent.

The easing of international tension in the seventies brought about major changes in international relations. These changes are tangible and concrete. They lie in the recognition and international formalisation of what may be described as a code of rules of honest and fair relations between countries with different social systems, which puts up a legal, moral and political barrier to those

Since the end of the war, the international scene has often changed, and it has changed quickly, producing most acute situations. But, throughout these shifts, the Soviet Union kept working steadily for detente and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Der Spiegel No 49, November 30, 1981, p. 17.

~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th CPSU Congress, op. cit., p. 40.

prone to military gambles. They lie in the first, as yet modest, attempts to block some of the channels of the arms race. They lie in a ramified system of agreements covering many areas of peaceful cooperation of states with different social systems.

The peoples of Europe have become more confident that the peace they now enjoy is not a brief episode, a respite between two wars. They believe that war can be prevented and that in the circumstances of peace cooperation can be developed for the good of the peoples, and that such cooperation may and must be a constant, not a transient, feature of international relations.

The well-known West German journalist Theo Zommer wrote in 1980 in Foreign Affairs that detente with the East is vital to the prosperity of Western Europe.

The normalisation of relations between the USSR and the FRG, the shift from confrontation to cooperation, have become a stabilising element in the international situation in Europe, which has had a favourable effect on the entire spectrum of relations between states with different social systems. It has not been easily done. The path was long and thorny. They have always believed in the Soviet Union that healthy forces in the FRG shall get the upper hand, and a sober, realistic attitude to relations with the Soviet Union, with the European socialist countries, will prevail in the end. The policy of revenge for the lost war, which the FRG ruling circles conducted for two decades and which was a dangerous potential source of East-West conflict, is now receding into the past.

For twenty years, the USSR and the FRG were polarised on almost all major issues. It took no

small effort to turn the development of relations in a favourable direction. Being in favour of normal relations with the FRG, the Soviet Union stated that the past should not always hang over the two peoples, and hinder the establishment of peace and mutual understanding. The horrors inflicted on Soviet people and the peoples of Europe by fascism are not forgotten and shall not be forgotten, and that is precisely why it has become the paramount object of Soviet foreign policy to prevent any repetition of the tragic past and erect insuperable barriers to the forces of aggression and revenge.

The USSR criticised the FRG for refusing to accept the territorial and political realities in Europe, and for refusing a policy of peace and goodneighbourly relations with the socialist countries, of respect for other peoples' interests and rights, and recognition and strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The foreign policy of the FRG was in conflict with reality, with the real situation in Europe and the world, and with the interests of the European peoples, and it harmed the national interests of the FRG itself. "The crisis of the Federal Republic's foreign policy has been so deep as to make it anathema even to the capitalist powers of Europe," Leonid Brezhnev told the 7th SUPG Congress on April 18, 1967. "Bonn is threatened with the prospect of complete political isolation on the continent. The Bonn policy has reached a dead end.''^^1^^

The obvious futility of the old political line and the changed internal and external factors

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol. I, Moscow, 1973, p. 534 (in Russian).

influenced ruling circles in the FRG. While a part of the monopoly bourgeoisie---mostly those connected with the military-industrial corporations--- continued to bank on power politics, there emerged a growing tendency among the other part to take a realistic view of the FRG's position.

The sober, realistic attitude taken by the Brandt government, which came into office in 1969, opened up the prospects for establishing, for the first time, normal relations, such as should exist in peace time between the FRG, on the one hand, and the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and other socialist community countries, on the other. After the conclusion of the 1970 Moscow Treaty and the treaties with Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria, the FRG embarked on a path leading towards good-neighbourly relations and cooperation with the socialist countries, although there still remained fundamental differences of approach to major political problems. The shift in relation between the USSR and the FRG towards mutual understanding and cooperation became a political reality of great international significance.

The Soviet government's message of greetings, issued on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Moscow Treaty on August 12, 1970, states: "The years that have elapsed have fully borne out the historical significance of the Treaty, which provided a solid basis for the normalisation and development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.

``The principles of inviolability of borders and non-use of force, recorded in the Treaty, and its clear orientation towards peaceful good-neigh-

bourly cooperation, have determined reliable, longterm prospects for relations between our countries.''^^1^^

Renunciation of the old, obsolete and barren dogmas and the shift towards detente afforded the FRG indisputable and obvious benefits. But even so, the government coalition pursued a policy that was often contradictory and inconsistent.

Late in 1979, the FRG acceded to Washington's abruptly sharpened anti-Soviet line, although it ran against its own national interest. The editor of Stern was quite right when he wrote that the instigators from the White House and the Adenauer House think that unconditional solidarity with Washington was a demand of the times and they called upon people to toe the line and support the American viewpoint unreservedly. It was, however, foolish, he added, not to see that solidarity also means keeping the partner from mistakes which he might make in his excessive zeal. And, moreover, loyalty to the alliance cannot take the place of concern for one's own interests.

The pressure the United States exerted on the FRG in order to make it accede to the policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union in connection with the events in Afghanistan, the situation in Poland and the plans for stepping up the arms race, was crude and obvious. It made many West German politicians think about the consequences of following their Western ally in matters of major significance to European peace and security and to the security of the FRG. In an interview given to Stern, Willy Brandt said: "We have held until now that we settle our problems ourselves. And so it will remain. And if it is necessary, it will be

~^^1^^ Pravda, August 12, 1980. 225

15---919

pointed out to Washington leaders that we want it to remain so.''^^1^^

While not underestimating the weight of the pressure exerted by the NATO allies of the USA who declared that professions of solidarity were not enough and required the FRG government to lend a hand in fanning anti-Soviet hysteria and -winding up political and economic ties with the Soviet Union, one cannot fail to see that Bonn does much to help the USA to involve Europe in a new round of the arms race, thereby endangering the future of European detente. The plan for deploying American missiles in Western Europe, adopted largely with the help of the FRG, is a blow on detente. In supporting dangerous militaristic plans, the FRG revives the misgivings and suspicions of its eastern neighbours.

There can be no doubt that the policy of the ruling circles of the FRG is based on the class interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie and that the ruling circles' long-range object is, as before, the desire to squeeze out socialism from Europe, liquidating the GDR in the first place. The foreign policy of the ruling circles of the FRG is a direct continuation and sequel of their home policy. Nor is it surprising, as the home and foreign policies of any ruling class make up a single whole. Lenin wrote: "It is fundamentally wrong, unMarxist and unscientific, to single out 'foreign policy' from policy in general, let alone counterpose foreign policy to home policy.''^^2^^

The government coalition pursued a policy which was often contradictory and inconsistent.

For all that, the 1970s saw notable changes in the FRG, and chiefly in foreign policy. The FRG's renunciation of the policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries strengthened its foreign policy positions and furthered the national interests of the people of the FRG.

In its issue of January 10, 1982, The Observer wrote: "Towards East Europe and the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic could now act with an independence and sovereignty impossible in its Western dealings. Bonn's relationship to Moscow especially ensures that West Germany is no longer a satellite but a powerful free agent. This is why West Germany, once the very igloo of Cold War, is now the most passionate defender of detente.''^^1^^

It is no matter of indifference to the socialist countries which forces in the FRG set the course--- those supporting a military solution or those favouring a settlement along the lines of peaceful coexistence. Lenin stressed the significance of making use---from the standpoint of the socialist state's foreign policy---of the conflict between "those people from the bourgeois camp who are inclined to settle the problem by war" and "those who are inclined towards pacifism, even the worst kind of pacifism, which from the communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism".^^2^^

With the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, the Soviet Union and the FRG embarked on a path leading to good-neighbourly relations and cooperation. It was not an easy path. Not all went smoothly. There remained fundamental differences in the

^^1^^ Stern No 39, September 17, 1981, p. 38.

V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 43.

~^^1^^ The Observer, January 10, 1982, p. 7.

~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, 1976, p. 264.

15*

approach to some political issues, very important ones at that. But the main thing is that the shift towards mutual understanding and cooperation in relations between the USSR and the FRG has become a political reality of world-wide significance.

The positive result of the development of relations is the regular character of talks and political consultations, and the exchange of views between representatives of the USSR and the FRG on problems of bilateral relations and urgent international issues. The desire to promote political cooperation between the USSR and the FRG on a solid and permanent basis is recorded in the Joint Declaration, signed in Bonn during the May 1978 summit meetings, and that decision is being carried out successfully.

Meetings and talks between Soviet and West German leaders have become a good tradition. They have invariably enriched the relations between our countries, helping them to attain new frontiers in developing and extending mutually advantageous cooperation. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1981 naturally continued the line for mutually advantageous cooperation and the constructive development of Soviet-West German relations founded on the 1970 Moscow Treaty.

Summing up the results of this extremely important visit, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, stated: "One of the main conclusions to be drawn from Leonid Brezhnev's talks in the FRG is that states, irrespective of their social system or participation in one military alliance or another, should make every effort and continue

to work jointly for the sake of strengthening peace and restoring the climate of detente and trust.''^^1^^

Notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear by Washington to make the FRG wind up trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, many in the West German business community want these relations to be advanced further.

It is highly satisfactory that in the past few years the scope of economic cooperation has sharply increased as have scientific and technological contacts. Steps are being taken to work out the more promising lines of economic, scientific and technological cooperation. Contacts in the fields of culture and the arts have become wider. There is more confidence and a greater understanding of the fact that good neighbourly relations are in the interests of both countries.

In early 1980 the United States declared itself to be in favour of increasing the restrictions imposed on export to the USSR. Washington puts continued pressure on West Germany in a bid to damage the latter's economic cooperation with the USSR. This was not only due to the US government's intention to ``punish'' the USSR, which, as many American politicians themselves realised, was hardly realistic, but also to its desire to pull West Germany away from its eastern market and thereby weaken the position of West Germany as a competitor.

But this policy of disrupting mutually advantageous ties with the USSR is not acceptable to the West German government. Together with its European partners the West German government showed great concern and dismay at the decision

' To Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations, op. cit., p. 52. 229

of the US government to interfere with the SovietEuropean gas pipeline deal by banning the export of important components and preventing the use of licenses already issued. The EEC Council stated that "this act, carried out without any prior consultation with the community, amounts to an extra-territorial application of American laws in contradiction to the principles of international law and is consequently not acceptable to the community, nor in all probability will it be accepted by the courts of the EEC countries.

``Like our other European partners," declared Helmut Schmidt in a government declaration to the Bundestag on June 24, 1982, "we will firmly abide by the terms of the gas pipeline deal, because this deal is essential to our diversification of energy resources programme. There is a full guarantee that we will not become dependent as a result of this deal. We shall and must be faithful to our treaties, and we have never given our American partners any grounds to think otherwise.''^^1^^

Finally, in November 1982, hard pressed by the West European allies and, indeed, the public outcry in the United States, Ronald Reagan had no choice but to repeal his ``sanctions''.

The objective interest of both the USSR and the FRG and the high level of mutually advantageous cooperation already achieved between the two countries create favourable conditions for the expansion of such cooperation in the future.

There is much the USSR and the FRG could do acting jointly on behalf of peace and security and

on behalf of detente and disarmament. It is no exaggeration to say that they play a great part in clearing away obstacles from the path of extending detente. It depends on our countries to a large extent whether the positive processes that started in international relations in the seventies are allowed to take root and develop.

The position the Soviet Union supports is that every diplomatic move, every agreement concluded with the FRG should be followed up with tangible measures and that there should be no marking time nor any return to the earlier confrontation over problems that have already been settled so that it only remains to act on the commitments undertaken by the sides.

For the Soviet Union, the policy of normal relations with the FRG is a long-term course embodying the thoroughly consistent and principled character of Soviet foreign policy. It is not subject to situational changes. It is of a strategic character.

The Soviet Union has shown itself as a conscientious partner, infallibly prompt and steady in carrying out its international commitments. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognised principles and rules of international law is a constitutional principle of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. It is recorded in Article 29 of the Soviet Constitution.

This gives the Soviet side a moral right to insist on the same kind of attitude to treaties and agreements from the FRG. The level that has been attained is our common asset. This asset should be duly prized and there should be no withdrawal from the positions already won, no stagnation, but a steady advance towards closer cooperation.

This approach is right also because relapses

Bulletin No 66, June 30, pp. 552-53.

of the past make themselves felt from time to time in the FRG. Some aspects of the Bonn policy are affected by the pressure of the right-wing forces which adopt, in fact, a revenge-seeking approach, while the views held by these cirles are, of course, alien to the political and social realities of contemporary Europe and to the vital interests of the people of the FRG.

In connection with the internal political situation in Poland, which worsened late in 1980, the West German press began to give prominence to the problem of Polish frontiers. This is yet another attempt to question the existing frontiers.^^1^^ Much has to be done still to overcome resistance to the development of Soviet-West German relations on the basis of equality, mutual understanding, respect for sovereign rights and confidence, and effective utilisation of the advantages afforded by economic cooperation.

Relations between the USSR and the FRG are founded on peaceful coexistence which, of course, does not abolish the battle of ideas. The USSR and the FRG are countries with different social systems, which makes the class and ideological struggle inevitable. The more so as, "when the bourgeoisie's ideological influence on the workers declines, is undermined or weakened, the bourgeoisie everywhere and always resorts to the most outrageous lies and slander".^^2^^

This, however, does not mean that the ideological struggle is carried over mechanically to the sphere of relations between countries, nor does it imply any impossibility of maintaining normal, and probably even good, political relations for the

benefit of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the FRG. Ideological differences are not incompatible with mutual concern for peace nor do they rule out the possibility for peoples to join their efforts in order to settle the vital issues of the age.

There are many complicated and nagging problems in Soviet-West German relations, but it is safe to say that there is no problem the answer to which could be found along the lines of intensifying international tension. Ideological differences by themselves can in no way be an insuperable obstacle to political cooperation on specific questions, least of all with reference to strengthening peace and security.

In the historical contest between the two systems, the superiority of socialism will be demonstrated. Lenin wrote: "We have said, and still say, that socialism has the force of example. Coercion is effective against those who want to restore their rule. But at this stage the significance of force ends, and after that only influence and example are effective.''^^1^^

The inconsistency of West German government policy towards the USSR continues to affect the level and character of Soviet-West German relations. This inconsistency is the result of a conflict between two tendencies. The first consists in the class solidarity of imperialist circles and in their desire to ally with the United States in a bid to constrict the position of the USSR and the other socialist community countries. The second results from the fact that the interests of the West German state and its people as a whole, and this is realised by realistically-minded politicians, demand a continuation of the policy of detente, an

See Der Spiegel No 52, December 22, 1980, pp. 132-53. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, 1964, p. 485.

V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, 1974, p. 457.

improvement in relations and the development of mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technological ties with the country's eastern neighbours. The conflict between these two trends is acute. It has led to the polarisation of political forces and a worsening of the political situation in West Germany.

One important factor helping to preserve what has been achieved by detente is the movement against the deployment of US missiles on West German territory, which has the united support of a large proportion of the working people of the FRG. The main reason for the enormous size of this movement was thus formulated by K. Bredthauer, a West German political scientist: " Armament threatens us as Europeans, because in each of the crises Washington causes throughout the world and which at times develop into a global challenge to the Soviet Union, we can be reduced to the role of hostages of American nuclear strategy.''^^1^^

Relations between the FRG and European socialist countries were making headway though not without interruption. Relations between the GDR and the FRG made notable progress since the signing, in December 1972, of the treaty on the basic principles of relations between the two countries. During the Federal Chancellor's visit to the GDR on December 11-13, 1981, the sides stated their desire to work for detente, regardless of their belonging to different social systems and military-political blocs. They expressed their firm belief that henceforth war should never spring from German soil.

Erich Honecker pointed out the great value of the new Soviet initiative on medium-range weapons, advanced by Leonid Brezhnev at the time of his visit to Bonn. Concerning the NATO conference in Brussels, on the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, Honecker said that good-neighbourly relations could not develop in the shadow of American missiles. It has been a timely warning and if Bonn wishes to promote further its relations with the GDR, it will have to take this into account in its policy.

The main problem which cannot be postponed is reducing the danger of war, and a key part of this problem is lowering the level of nuclear arms in Europe. The United States is clearly trying to calm public opinion by referring to the SovietAmerican arms talks which have begun in Geneva, but in fact the US delegation simply hampers progress to an agreement that is based on the principles of equality and equal security. The much vaunted "zero option", which the Americans have put forward is in direct contradiction to these principles. It does not provide for any reduction in the number of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, takes no account of the nuclear potential of Britain and France and virtually presupposes the unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the other socialist countries have any need for international tension or the arms race. "The Soviet leadership," as Leonid Brezhnev declared at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, "has taken a decision to introduce, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR... The Soviet Union intends already this year, unless there is

~^^1^^ Blatter fur deutsche und Internationale Politik, Book 2, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Cologne, 1982, p. 167.

a new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce a certain number of its medium-range missiles on its own initiative.''^^1^^

This step was one more demonstration of the Soviet Union's concern to make progress in solving the key question of European security.

In the name of its own interests and the interests of all peoples throughout the world the USSR is striving to avoid a nuclear war and is sparing no effort to strengthen peace. The latest demonstration of this was the solemn obligation undertaken by the USSR not to be the first to use nuclear weapons which was announced by Leonid Brezhnev to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. The USSR belives that if the other nuclear powers undertake the same obligation, this would be virtually equivalent to banning the use of nuclear weapons and a major step in strengthening peace and security.

The practice of developing Soviet-West German relations shows that there are no easy paths, but nor are there any insuperable difficulties in establishing normal relations. Ample experience has been accumulated in settling complicated problems and working out solutions, acceptable to both sides. It is necessary now to look ahead, focusing on the most important things so as to keep up the rate of dynamic development of Soviet-West German relations, irrespective of any casual changes. Further progress depends a good deal on the realism of the ruling circles of the FRG, on how far they have come conscious of the futility of ultimatums and are guided by the interest of their country and people in safeguarding peace and security in the world and developing fruitful cooperation in every area.

~^^1^^ Moscow News, March 21, 1982.

Afterword

The countries of the socialist community are determined to safeguard peace. In face of the attempts of aggressive imperialist quarters to upset the prevailing military-political equilibrium between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, to push nations onto a path of hostility and military confrontation and to saddle them with a new round of the arms race, the socialist countries are displaying the greatest possible vigilance and restraint, working resolutely to promote detente and disarmament and to head off from humanity the threat of nuclear war.

The Leninist policy of peace pursued by the Soviet Union has proved itself timely, viable and effective both when the detente process, which it greatly furthered, was making good progress and in the colder political climate when all forces have got to be mobilised to combat the reckless designs of the enemies of peace and to ensure humanity's peaceful future.

Soviet foreign policy is imbued with optimism. Socialism is calling on the nations to take the only sensible road of peace and cooperation, to search jointly for the correct solution to all acute and burning problems. This broad and constructive platform is summed up in the concept of peaceful coexistence, a concept first defined by V.I. Lenin, which is the fundamental foreign-policy guideline of the countries of the socialist community in

regard to states with different social and political systems.

In the West, the passing of Leonid Brezhnev gave rise to no few conjectures about the future course of the Soviet Union in international affairs. The fundamental aims of Soviet foreign policy will be the same as they always were: to ensure lasting peace, and to safeguard the right of nations to independence and social progress. The Soviet Union's fidelity to peace was forcefully reaffirmed by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CC CPSU Plenary Meeting on November 22, 1982: "I can say with full responsibility that Soviet foreign policy will continue, as it did, to conform with the decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th congresses of our Party.''^^1^^

Yuri Andropov reaffirmed Soviet readiness for open and honest cooperation with all countries that reciprocate in kind. "Differences of social system should not, and do not, get in the way where both sides display the requisite goodwill," the General Secretary of the CC CPSU said. "Convincing proof thereof is the visible progress of peaceful cooperation between the USSR and many countries of Western Europe.''^^2^^

The bitter political infighting in the FRG that marked the thirteen years of the SPD/FDP government culminated in the break-up of the socialliberal coalition in October 1982. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his cabinet resigned, ending the sharp crisis of more than a year within the ruling coalition.

On March 6, 1983 the election to the Bundestag was held before the appointed time. A coalition government based on an alliance between the CDU/CSU and the FDP came to power.

It is not our purpose to comment on the activity of the SPD/FDP coalition. But we are entirely within our rights to note what we think is its main achievement in the international arena: the so called Eastern policy of the FRG, which has made a notable mark in the history of postwar international relations. The New York Times was entirely right in observing in September 1982 that the most memorable and important attainment of the coalition was its Eastern policy of the 1970s, which improved relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, paved the way to the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin in 1971, relieving the tensions that had built up there during the cold war period, and acknowledged the country's division by establishing relations with the government of the German Democratic Republic. The policy won the backing of the majority in West Germany and approval among those in Europe and the rest of the world who genuinely aspired to detente and broad mutually beneficial cooperation between states with different social and political systems.

The SPD and the FDP sustained substantial losses in the election. But the Green Party which favours disarmament and opposes the siting of new American missiles on West German territory managed to get its representatives be elected to the Bundestag.

The Soviet Union and the FRG have accumulated a great deal of experience in their cooperation. If it is applied in practice, it will benefit the peoples of both countries and the cause of universal peace and international security. As for the Soviet

Pravda, November 23, 1982. Ibid.

Union, it by its policy and fidelity to its international obligations has proved its commitment to peaceful coexistence and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The desire expressed by the FRG government to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and new meetings and negotiations will not prevent stagnation, even regress, in bilateral relations unless they are backed by the FRG's firm intention to deal with the USSR on the principles of peaceful coexistence, recognising and abiding by concluded treaties and agreements. This and only this approach will guarantee good-neighbourly, mutually beneficial relations between our countries.