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HISTORY IN THE MAKING
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Fonn363-7J
[BEGIN]
OCT 15 1985
__AUTHOR__
Valentin Berezhkov
__TITLE__
HISTORY
IN THE
MAKING
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-03-23T11:46:00-0800
__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"
__SUBTITLE__
Memoirs
of World War II
Diplomacy
Progress Publishers
Moscow
[1]
Translated from the Russian by Dudley Hagen and Barry Jones
Designed by Vadim Novikov
B. BepewKOB
TAK flEJlAJIACb HCTOPH5I
Ha UHlAUiiCKOM H3blKC
__COPYRIGHT__
© «Me>«,n,yHapo,n,nbie oTHomeHHH», 1982
English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers 1983
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
0801000000--464
B --------------------48--83
014(01)-83
[2]
CONTENTS
MISSION TO BERLIN
Talks at Wilhelmstrasse................
7
The Special Train...............
7
The Purpose of the Pact..............
10
Incident at Eydtkuhnen..............
19
The Bellevue Hotel................
20
In the Reichskanzlei.......,........
22
A Meeting with Hitler...............
23
The Talks Continue................
29
In Ribbentrop's Bunker...............
36
The Nazis Secret Objectives.............
38
Twists of Fate.................
42
Berlin on the Eve of the War..............
50
New Year's Eve in the Griinewald...........
50
Diplomatic Receptions...............
52
Daily Life at the Embassy..............
59
A Box in the Admiralspalast.............
62
Alarming Signals................
65
The Hess Affair.................
68
The Night of June 21...............
73
The Return Home.................
81
In the Hands of the Enemy.............
81
An Argument at the Wilhelmstrasse..........
86
An SS Guard Helps the Bolsheviks..........
88
A Window to Freedom...............
93
Toast to Victory.................
96
The Anti-Fascist Underground............
100
In the House on the Unter den Linden.........
103
In Occupied Europe................
106
Baron Botmann Puts Out Feelers............
109
Waiting at Svilengrad...............
112
In Neutral Turkey................
114
The Return to Moscow..............
115
__PRINTERS_P_3_COMMENT__
1*
3
THE BIRTH OF THE COALITION
The Beginning...................
118
New Objectives.................
118
The Anglo-Soviet Agreement............
123
The Visit of Harry Hopkins............
126
The Needs of the Front and the Prospects for the War ....
130
An Evening at the Metropol.............
134
The First Trial..................
137
The Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission...........
137
Agreement on Deliveries..............
142
A Meeting with Stalin...............
144
Important Decisions...............
150
The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Moves to Kuibyshev
153
The USA Enters the War..............
156
Pearl Harbour..................
156
The Fiihrer's Speech................
160
Anthony Eden in Moscow..............
162
All the Way to Berlin!................
167
1942.....................
168
The Main Partners.................
172
Some Aspects of Soviet-American Relations.......
172
Anglo-American Shipments............
178
The Problem of the Second Front...........
185
Winston Churchill in Moscow............
192
The Balkan Variant...............
196
The Joint Communique.............
198
Months of Concern................
201
The Moscow Conference................
204
A Changed Situation...............
204
The House in Spiridonovka Street..........
208
The Four-Nation Declaration............
212
In Stalin's Office................
214
The. Meeting with Hull...............
216
Some Results of the Conference..........
220
Dinner in the Kremlin...............
227
The Road to Victory and Peace...........
235
THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE
Journey to the Iranian Capital.............
238
The Meeting of ``The Big Three"..........
238
From Moscow to Baku..............
241
International Airline Passengers...........
243
Warning from the Rovno Forests..........
244
Inside the Soviet Embassy.............
251
Stalin Meets Roosevelt................
252
A Dialogue of Two Leaders............
252
4
At the Round Table................
259
Operation Overlord...............
265
Conflict Between the Allies..............
272
Churchill's Balkan Adventure............
272
The King's Sword Presented to Stalingrad.......
274
The Atmosphere Worsens..............
277
A Nazi Spy in the British Embassy...........
282
The Teheran Decisions and ``Cicero''..........
282
A Birthday Cake.................
286
Plans for the Post-War Peaceful Settlement.........
289
The Argument over War Criminals..........
289
The Anglo-American Plan for the Partitioning of Germany . .
292
Post-War Settlement...............
298
``The Big Three" Leave Teheran...........
300
How the Teheran Decisions Were Carried Out.......
304
On the Threshold of 1944.............
304
Back in Moscow................
305
A Visit with Averell Harriman............
307
The Appointment of Eisenhower...........
311
The Question of the Italian Fleet..........
315
A Fundamental Change..............
321
Henry Wallace in Tashkent.............
324
The ``Parade'' of War Prisoners...........
327
Two Conceptions of the UN Charter..........
331
The Controversy over Veto Rights...........
335
THE ROAD TO POTSDAM
Complications in Relations Among the Allies........
340
Military Planning................
340
Scepticism in London...............
343
Special Ties Between the USA and Britain........
345
Crossing the Border...............
349
A Sharp Exchange in the Kremlin.........
353
On the Threshold of Victory.............
356
The Warsaw Uprising..............
356
The Americans Analyse the Situation.........
365
Talks Between Two Leaders.............
369
The Results of the Visit..............
378
Preparations for a New ``Big Three" Meeting......
382
The Yalta Conference................
392
For and Against................
392
Preliminary Sessions...............
396
The British Inheritance.............
399
Understanding About Poland's Borders.........
403
Far-Eastern Affairs................
407
An Example of Equitable Relations...........
411
5
Between Yalta and Potsdam.............
413
The Berne Incident...............
413
Roosevelt's Death................
422
Confrontation in the White House..........
426
Victory Day.................
434
Harry Hopkin's Mission..............
436
Final Preparations................
443
``The Big Three" in Berlin.............
448
The Potsdam Conference..............
451
Stalin's Meeting with Truman...........
451
The Particulars of the Situation...........
453
The First Day.................
461
The Dilemma over the Atomic Bomb..........
465
Social Events During the Conference.........
470
Truman's Unsuccessful Attack...........
476
Continuation of the Discussion............
484
Goings-on Aboard the Cruiser Augusta.........
487
The Lessons of the Coalition.............
490
Experience in Cooperation Between Two Systems.....
490
Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence..........
492
[6]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
MISSION TO BERLIN
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Talks at Wilhelmstrasse
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Special Train
On the evening of November 9, 1940, a special non-scheduled
train left the Byelorussky Station in Moscow. Its carriages were of
European design, but its passengers were the staff of the Soviet
delegation that was being sent to Berlin for talks with the German
government.
Today the Soviet Union has direct rail contact with many
states. A passenger can get on a train in Moscow and travel all
the way to Berlin without having to get off, but before the Second
World War Soviet carriages went only as far as the state border.
There passengers would transfer to another train which would
bring them to the first foreign station, where they had to board
yet another train. This was due to the difference in gauge, for
the present system of changing the bogies was not then in general
use. In this respect the train provided for the Soviet delegation
was also special for it was to cover the whole journey from
Moscow to Berlin, its bogies being changed to the European type at
the border.
That evening I took a leisurely meal in the restaurant car and
returned to my compartment. I was a long time getting to sleep
from all the excitement at the day's events. I had only learned
about the journey the clay before, so I had to finish off my work,
go through passport and visa formalities, hurriedly pack my
things and be at the station an hour before departure.
This was not my first trip abroad. In the spring and summer
of that year I had worked at the Soviet Trade Delegation in
Berlin and had been all over Germany and visited Belgium,
Holland and Poland. Since in addition to my profession as an
7
engineer I had a good knowledge of German I was often invited to
take part in responsible economic talks. In the autumn I had
been recalled to Moscow and appointed to the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Trade. On those occasions when the
Commissar himself (at the time it was Anastas Mikoyan) conducted
talks with German trade delegations I acted as interpreter.
Through my work I knew that in recent months the Germans
had held back deliveries of important equipment to the Soviet
Union while at the same time they had insistently demanded
that we for our part increase supplies of oil, grain, manganese
and other materials. It was to be expected that these matters
would be discussed in Berlin. But the composition of the Soviet
delegation which included diplomatic and military personnel (it
was headed by People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M.
Molotov) suggested that political questions would constitute the
main subject of discussion. It was probably considered that I
could be useful for the talks, and so I found myself among the
passengers of this special train.
The international situation at the time was very strained. The
attempts by the Soviet government over many years to come to
an agreement with Britain and France concerning a joint rebuff
to Hitler's aggression had proved unsuccessful. By the summer of
1939 it had become clear that the primary concern of the
Western powers was to isolate the USSR and turn the Third Reich
against it and then join Hitler in an anti-communist crusade. In
this situation the Soviet government considered it necessary to
accept the German proposal for a non-aggression pact with the
German government. This made it possible for the Soviet Union,
if only for a short time, to avert the danger of war and gain
time to prepare for a rebuff to the Nazi aggression when it
came.
Again, by concluding a treaty with Germany the Soviet Union
was able to frustrate the plans that had long been mooted in the
West for forming a common anti-Soviet front between
AngloFrench reactionaries and German fascism. The fact that such a
bloc was prevented from being formed was the main positive result
of the treaty.
Also of considerable importance was the reunification of the
Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia with Soviet Byelorussia and the fact that Latvia, Lithuania
8
and Estonia had become part of the Soviet Union, for these
developments had resulted in the borders of the Soviet Union being
moved considerably farther to the West.
Meanwhile, war had broken out in Western Europe. One
country after another had fallen before Hitler's Blitzkrieg:
Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and finally France,
whose government had signed the capitulation in Compiegne
and moved out to the little resort of Vichy. Operation Sea Lion
which was the projected German invasion of Britain had,
however, been shelved by the German General Staff and military
operations were now only being conducted in North Africa.
Apart from this, the late summer and autumn of 1940 passed
relatively peacefully.
The Soviet people, of course, were very anxious about what
would happen next. How long would Hitler observe his
commitments under the Soviet-German non-aggression pact? Would
he turn East? By the autumn of 1940 Berlin had taken a
number of steps which resulted in a worsening of Soviet-German
relations. German troops landed in Finland and a German
military mission went to Romania, Berlin began to put pressure on
Bulgaria. The dates of delivery of German equipment to the
Soviet Union were systematically put back. In this situation it
was important to feel out Hitler's real intentions and this was
one of the aims of the diplomatic mission which set out for
Berlin in November 1940 at the invitation of the German
government.
The next day on the train was an ordinary working day. We
were connected with Moscow by radio and were able to follow
international events. Our trip to Germany had already been
announced and commented on both by German, and other foreign
correspondents.
All the information we received was processed and briefs were
prepared for the delegation members to be immediately typed
out in several copies. Meanwhile the various specialists went
through the documents they had taken with them that related
to the history of Russo-German and Soviet-German relations,
noting the points that might be of need in supporting our
arguments during the talks.
Outside the carriage window the autumnal forests of
Byelorussia flashed past. Here it was still warm with the sun peeping
9
out from behind the clouds and shining on the wet grass. Every
four or five hundred metres along the track stood the lone figure
of a sentry, his rifle across his shoulder with the bayonet fixed.
Our route was under special guard.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Purpose of the Pact
The sudden arrival in Moscow in August 1939 of Ribbentrop,
the German Foreign Minister, and the subsequent conclusion of
a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany,
states whose relations had been hitherto strained, if not hostile,
had something of a sensational effect at the time. Many people
did not understand the purpose of the pact and there was no
lack of slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union aimed at
discrediting the policy of what was then the only socialist state in
the world and representing the agreement with Berlin as
virtually tantamount to betrayal on the part of Moscow. The
bourgeois propaganda machine in Britain and France was
particularly vociferous in this respect, and yet it had been the leaders of
these two countries who were primarily responsible for that
situation. It had been due to them alone that the consistent struggle
of the Soviet state for a system of collective security in Europe
and for a joint rebuff to the fascist aggressors had proved
unsuccessful.
Incidentally, even today, many decades after the event, the
same old propaganda theme is often reiterated: in concluding
the pact with Hitler's Germany in 1939 the USSR struck a blow
in the back of the forces of democracy. It is still maintained by
some that Moscow ``suddenly'' and ``for no reason at all" refused
an alliance with Britain and France and did a deal with Berlin
in pursuit of its own ``sinister designs''. This is a theme which
is usually repeated by those who know only too well what the
real state of affairs was. They bring out the old story of the 1939
Soviet-German pact to bolster up the propaganda that they use
today to cast a slur on the peace policy of the Soviet Union and
the other socialist countries, to hinder their struggle for
international security and for the principles of peaceful coexistence
between states with different social systems. Obviously, those who
are descended politically from the Munich men of the 1930s who
10
on the eve of the Second World War frustrated the Soviet
proposals for collective security in Europe will not succeed in their
attempts to revive anti-Soviet hysteria. But even so, attempts of
this nature poison the international atmosphere in one way or
another and distort historical truth.
At the same time, however, there are people who really do
wish to understand the reasons behind events of that period, and
at times this can be no easy task, for the Soviet-German pact of
1939, for instance, is a subject which has been literally drowned
in oceans of misinformation.
One often hears questions like: was it really necessary for the
USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact with Hitler? Would it
not have been more correct to reject even the very idea of such
a pact? Such questions are usually put by the younger
generation who have insufficient knowledge of the facts and have no
idea of what the international situation was like at the time.
In 1939 the leaders of Britain and France were primarily
concerned to turn Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. They
hoped with Nazi aid to do away with the socialist power they
hated and destroy Bolshevism once and for all. They also had
an alternative goal. They hoped that in the course of a conflict
between the USSR and Germany, irrespective of its outcome,
both sides would be weakened considerably, and then London
and Paris might enter into the conflict at its final stage in order
to impose a ``peace'' which would benefit Anglo-French
imperialism. For this short-sighted policy both countries had to pay
dearly---France by being occupied, Britain by being placed on
the verge of catastrophe.
Let us briefly recall the events of the period. Throughout the
spring and summer of 1939 talks were held in Moscow between
the Soviet Union and delegations from Britain and France. In
the course of these talks the Soviet Union insistently demanded
the setting up of a system of collective security and the
organisation of a joint rebuff to fascist aggression. But the Western powers
consistently prevaricated. They set up all sorts of obstacles so as
to prevent any agreement being reached, although the situation
in Europe was daily worsening.
It was obvious that the threat of a German attack hung
primarily over the USSR and the Soviet government was therefore
faced with the urgent task of preventing, or at least putting it
11
off for as long as possible. But the terms put forward by Britain
and France were such as to essentially open the way east for
Hitler's hordes across the Baltic states.
The British plan was for the Soviet Union to aid---i.e. to
``fight in behalf of" any of the USSR's European neighbours---
in the event of them being attacked, provided that such aid was
``desirable''. The USSR's European neighbours at that time were
Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania. The
two last named countries were given British and French
guarantees. Consequently, in providing such aid the Soviet Union could
expect to rely on an alliance with Britain and France against a
potential aggressor. But in the event of a German invasion via
Finland or the Baltic states the Soviet Union could not, under
the British plan, expect any aid from the two great Western
powers. Furthermore, Poland refused to allow Soviet troops to
pass through its territory, which was one of the reasons why the
agreement was wrecked.
The British and French proposals all but prompted Hitler how
the Soviet Union could be forced into a war in conditions of
complete isolation. The Soviet Union was being required to
provide unilateral guarantees of aid to Britain, France and certain
of their allies without any similar obligations being undertaken
by these countries to aid the Soviet state in the event of its being
attacked by Hitler.
What the Soviet Union wanted was the creation of an effective
military alliance capable of protecting the interests of all
European countries and ensuring peace and security on the continent.
On April 17 and April 19, 1939, the British and the French
governments respectively were submitted proposals for the
conclusion of a tripartite equitable treaty that would provide
effective mutual aid in the event of any one of them being attacked
by an aggressor. In particular the Soviet proposal stated:
``England, France and the USSR to conclude with one another
an agreement for a period of five to ten years by which they
would oblige themselves to render mutually forthwith all manner
of assistance including that of a military nature, in case of
aggression in Europe against any one of the contracting Powers.
``England, France and USSR to undertake to render all
manner of assistance, including that of a military nature, to Eastern
European States situated between the Baltic and the Black Seas
12
and bordering on the USSR, in case of aggression against these
states."^^1^^
The British reply which was not received till May 8 showed
that London had made no essential changes in its position. Only
on July 1 did the British government finally agree to the Soviet
proposal to offer guarantees to the Baltic States and Finland, but
it was already too late to implement it. On July 7, Estonia and
Latvia signed treaties with Germany.
British and French reluctance to come to a serious agreement
with the Soviet Union was also shown by the fact that for the
talks in Moscow they sent only junior officials who did not even
possess written authority to sign a pact. The British, for example,
sent William Strang, a third-rate Foreign Office clerk, who was
noted only for his pathological anticommunism. Furthermore,
while the clouds of war were gathering over Europe and time
was running out fast for the organisation of a rebuff to
aggression, the British military delegation headed by the long retired
Admiral Drax set sail from London on a slow passenger-cargo
boat. (This can be contrasted with the fact that in the autumn
of 1938, when the British Prime Minister Chamberlain set
out to sign the Munich deal with Hitler which resulted in the
betrayal of Czechoslovakia, he considered it necessary to fly by
plane). The Soviet delegation, on the other hand, which was
headed by People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov
and, when military matters were discussed, by Commissar for
Defence, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov did have the necessary authority
to sign agreements.
Let us consider the alternatives facing the Soviet Union
towards the end of the summer of 1939 when talks with the
British and French had reached a deadlock, and it had become quite
plain that London and Paris had no intention of coming to an
agreement with Moscow. It was at that time that a proposal had
been made from Berlin for the conclusion of a Soviet-German
non-aggression pact.
It should, of course, be borne in mind that the German
government realised the enormous danger of starting a war against
the USSR. In 1939 the Germans had not yet got possession of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919--1939, Third Series,
Vol. 5, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1952, p. 228.
13
all the resources that they were to have by 1941 through the
invasion of almost the whole of Western Europe. The Nazis had
not yet been intoxicated by the easy victories in the West. They
had not yet ventured to accomplish their aggressive designs by
launching a war against such a powerful opponent as the USSR.
From recently published documents it is clear that Hitler was
even ready to go to Moscow himself if Ribbentrop's mission had
ended in failure. In Berlin it was quite accepted at the time that
Germany should first go looking for plunder in other directions.
With this in mind the German government proposed in early
1939 the conclusion of a trade agreement with the USSR. In the
atmosphere of extreme hostility that then characterised the
German attitude towards the Soviet Union the development of
economic relations between the two countries was considered by
the Soviet government to be a matter of considerable difficulty.
This was pointed out on May 10, 1939, in a conversation
between Molotov and the German ambassador. On May 30 the
German Staatssekretar, von Weizsacker, in a conversation with
G. A. Astakhov, the Soviet Charge d'affaires in Berlin, explored
the possibilities for holding talks on improving relations between
the two countries. The German ambassador in Moscow von
Schulenburg was even more definite on the subject during his
talk with Astakhov on June 17 in Berlin. On June 25, Julius
Schnurre, a high-ranking official from the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, referring to his talks with Ribbentrop, told
Astakhov that political relations between the USSR and
Germany should be improved. All of these probes on the part of the
Germans were ignored by the Soviet government. But the
subsequent course of the talks with Britain and France left the Soviet
side without any hope that a satisfactory agreement could be
reached. What was to be done?
The Soviet government could, of course, decline the German
proposal for a pact, but then Hitler would present such a
refusal as evidence of Moscow's ``aggressive intentions''. He would
declare to the German people that their Fiihrer's desire for
reconciliation with Moscow had bqen ``rudely rejected" and that
Germany had no other alternative than to deal a ``forestalling''
blow to the USSR. In this event the leaders of Britain and
France who had signed the Munich Agreement and who were
utterly hostile to the Soviet Union, would only be rubbing their
14
hands with glee, for their dream of pushing Hitler against the
Soviet Union would be much nearer to realisation.
Could the Soviet Union at that time have expected any help
from London, Paris or Washington in its single combat with the
might of Hitler's Germany? Everything seems to suggest that it
could not even have relied on their neutrality. It was more than
likely that instead of an anti-Hitler coalition in the early 1940s
there would have been an anti-Soviet coalition of the
imperialist powers. The Soviet Union would then have had to face
a Nazi invasion alone with the Western powers if not actually
fighting on Hitler's side, at least supplying him with strategic
materials and arms. After all, when the Soviet Union and Britain
were Allies in 1941, influential quarters in both London and
Washington did not wish to see the Soviet people victorious. So
it would not have been difficult to see with which side the
sympathies of ruling quarters in the Western powers would have
lain, had Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1939. At the same
time the Soviet Union could hardly expect to see the Japanese
militarists keep aloof, since they had long had their eyes on the
Soviet Far East.
Japanese militarists, it should be remembered, were behaving
particularly aggressively. Their invasion of Mongolia was
virtually a test of Soviet military strength. Thus Japanese aggressive
intentions on the one hand and the encouragement given by the
Western powers for Hitler to attack the Soviet Union on the
other faced our country with the threat of a war on two fronts.
The Soviet-German pact, while not removing this threat
completely, at least postponed it indefinitely.
If Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union in June 1939, instead
of in June 1941, our country would have been in a very difficult
situation. It was only in 1940 and 1941 that the USSR began
the production of a number of important modern weapons like
anti-tank guns, T-34 tanks and dive-bombers. Furthermore, there
was the important experience gained in the winter war against
Finland.
Then again, there was the^geographical factor that should be
taken into account. In 1939 the Soviet border with bourgeois
Poland ran close to Minsk and Kiev, the White Finns were near
Leningrad, and monarchic Romania bordered close to Odessa.
Had a war broken out then Hitler in all probability would have
15
had as his allies not only Finland and Romania, as he did in
1941, but also Poland and the bourgeois Baltic states.
Of course, even in these extremely unfavourable conditions
the Soviet people would undoubtedly have eventually emerged
victorious in a war against Nazi Germany. But the casualties and
losses in such a conflict would have been immeasurably greater
and the war itself would have gone on much longer. If, on the
other hand, the Soviet Union had indeed fallen before the Nazi
hordes---and it was this that the ``Western democracies" were
hoping for---Hitler would easily have crushed France and Britain
and, together with Japan, pounced upon the United States. The
history of our planet would have been thrown several centuries
back. This was what the short-sighted policies of the Western
powers were fraught with.
Finally, there was the fact that the German proposal to
conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union suggested that
Hitler had decided that at first other countries would fall victim
to his war machine. From this it followed that a protracted war
could be expected in Western Europe. No one could imagine at
that time that France would fall so soon (it withstood the
Germans for only a few months) and that Britain would prefer the
humiliating retreat from Dunkirk just in order to save its
manpower and would then dig itself in on its home ground
beyond the Channel. On the contrary, there was every reason to
expect a drawn-out conflict between the imperialist powers
from which the Soviet Union---then the only socialist state in the
world---could for a time, if not for the whole war, keep aloof.
Reasoning of this kind could also influence the decision to accept
the German proposal for a pact in 1939.
All these circumstances had to be carefully analysed and
weighed before deciding how to reply to the German proposal.
There was also the very important, and ultimately decisive
consideration that signing the pact would give additional time for
building up the country's defences against an aggressor. And besides
this, the whole of mankind would once again see how consistent
the peace-loving policy of the Soviet state was.
It is worth remembering here how Stalin explained the purpose
of the pact in his radio broadcast on July 3, 1941:
``It may be asked: How could the Soviet Government have
consented to conclude a non-aggression pact with such perfidious
16
people, and such fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was this not
an error on the part of the Soviet Government? Of course not.
A non-aggression pact is a pact of peace between two states. It
was precisely such a pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939.
Gould the Soviet Government decline such a proposal? I think
that not a single peace-loving state could decline a peace treaty
with a neighbouring country even if that country is headed by
such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. But that,
of course, only on the one indispensable condition that this
peace treaty did not jeopardize, either directly or indirectly, the
territorial integrity, independence and honour of the peace-loving
state. As is well known, the non-aggression pact between Germany
and the USSR was precisely such a pact.
``What did we gain by concluding the non-aggression pact
with Germany? We secured our country peace for a year and a
half and the opportunity of preparing our forces to repulse
fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite
the pact. This was a definite advantage for us and a
disadvantage for fascist Germany.
``What has fascist Germany gained and what has she lost by
perfidiously tearing up the pact and attacking the USSR? She
has gained a certain advantageous position for her troops for a
short period of time, but she has lost politically by exposing
herself in the eyes of the entire world as a bloodthirsty aggressor.
There can be no doubt that this short-lived military gain for
Germany is only an episode, while the tremendous political gain of the
USSR is a weighty and lasting factor that is bound to form the
basis for the development of decisive military success of the Red
Army in the war with fascist Germany."^^1^^
In recent years a number of documents have been released
which reveal the real intentions of certain Western politicians
in the late 1930s. In particular, there are many interesting
admissions contained in the official Foreign Office material recently
released in London. They confirm what was known previously
that the Western politicians did not want to come to an
agreement with the Soviet Union on rebuffing Hitler and that, on the
contrary, they did everything to turn him against the USSR,
hoping to remain on the side-track of the conflict themselves.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ J. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1944, pp. 9-10.
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__
2---1996
17
In this situation the Soviet government had no other choice
than to accept the German proposal and conclude a non--
aggression pact with that country.
Of course, the Soviet government could not and did not expect
that the Nazis would abide by their commitments. But even a
temporary prolongation of peace was a matter of extreme
importance to the Soviet Union. The situation was highly unfavourable,
since a war in the summer of 1939 would have put the USSR
at an enormous disadvantage. For, as already mentioned, it would
have been both isolated and faced with an enemy on two fronts
---Germany in the West and Japan in the East.
In averting a war in such a difficult situation, the Soviet
government did its duty not only to its own people, but also to the
international proletariat: it resorted to the only means it had for
ensuring the security of the USSR.
It was entirely through the fault of the Western powers that
no system of collective security was set up in 1939, as the USSR
insisted upon. On the other hand, things did not turn out as the
Munich men would have them either---there was no war between
the imperialists and the Soviet Union. The war began within
the capitalist world, between two antagonistic groups of
imperialist powers.
Postponing the USSR's involvement in the Second World War
gave time for the country to build up its defences, heighten its
combat readiness and modernise its weapons.
From the point of view of foreign policy the gain was great.
The international situation during the initial stage of the Second
World War was such that when the USSR was forced to enter
the war in 1941 it was no longer threatened with isolation as
could have happened in the summer of 1939. Britain was now
fighting Germany and the imperialist contradictions between the
United States on the one hand and Germany and Japan on the
other had now become so acute that the possibility of a deal
between the United States government and the fascist aggressors
was now highly unlikely. Thus the objective prerequisites were
formed for the setting up of an anti-fascist coalition between the
biggest powers---the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.
18
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Incident at Eydtkuhnen
At night our special train arrived at the border and, having
passed through the no-man's-land, came to a halt. The noise of
the wheels stopped and from the outside came a voice calling
``Eydtkuhnen Station!''. For a while it was absolutely quiet and
then we heard the rapid thud of leather boots pounding along
the platform and the sound of excited voices coming from the
distance. There was some sort of an argument going on, but the
words were indistinguishable. I went out on the platform, where
it seemed pitch-black, because of the blackout. But gradually my
eyes got used to the dark and I moved off in the direction from
which the voices were coming. Among the group of those
arguing was the chief of our train, who was trying to explain
something to a German officer in a long leather coat. The
officer's interpreter, a frail little man in civilian clothes, spoke badly
in Russian, so I offered my services.
It turned out that the Germans had prepared their own train
and were asking us to transfer into it. The chief of the train
objected---he had had instructions to take the delegation
directly to Berlin and the bogies had already been changed on the
border. The Germans maintained that the size of our carriages was
larger than the accepted standard on the German railways, but
it was pointed out to them that our train had been specially
made up of European-type carriages. But the Germans would
not have it, and it was finally decided to uncouple one carriage
and put it through a special piece of equipment that measured
its size. A shunting engine was brought up, points were changed
and we found ourselves being taken slowly up a small branch
line in the pitch dark. Here was the equipment which the train
had to pass under without touching any one of the little balls
suspended from it. As the carriage passed under, one of the
little balls did slightly touch the roof, and the German officer called
out in exultant tones:
``There you are, I told you, your train is too large. You will
all have to transfer to German coaches.''
In the end they decided to couple two German saloon carriages
to our train.
The German carriages were very comfortable with one-berth
compartments, an excellent bar and restaurant and salons fitted
__PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__
2*
19
with radios. There were even vases of fresh roses in the
compartments. Obviously, it was not concern for our comfort that
made the German so stubborn in insisting that we should change
trains. Undoubtedly their carriages were not only equipped with
a fine bar, but with a fine lot of bugging apparatus too.
In the early hours of the morning we continued our journey.
The German train moved at a speed which for us at the time
was unusually fast. At dawn we could see soldiers placed all along
the railway embankment. They stood with their legs widely apart,
their backs to the train and their submachine-guns slung over
their shoulders. The morning sun flashed ominously on their
steel helmets.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Bellevue Hotel
In the morning of November 13 the train arrived at Anhalter
Station in Berlin. Outside it was drizzling. We were welcomed
by the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Field Marshal Keitel,
who both shook hands with the Soviet representatives.
Ribbentrop made a short speech in which he said that on behalf of the
Fiihrer and on his own behalf he was pleased to welcome the
Soviet government delegation in the capital of the Third Reich.
Then we all moved along the covered platform to the station
building. In the first hall we entered we saw the Soviet and the
German flags fixed to the wall above a large basket of flowers
draped in pink, all of this being spotlighted from the side.
In the square outside the station the rain was now much
heavier and there were puddles everywhere. The shaggy grey
clouds were so low that they seemed to touch the roofs of the
houses. A guard of honour marched past splashing through the
water. A military band struck up, but everything went very quiet
when they got to the Soviet National Anthem. Then, probably
for the first time since 1933 the loud strains of the ``
Internationale" were heard in Berlin. For singing that song of the
proletariat, people had been thrown in death camps by the Gestapo
and now here, outside the Anhalter Station, German generals
and the high-ranking officials of the Nazi Reich had to stand at
attention while the Communist anthem was played. One other
detail from that meeting outside the station has been etched on
my memory. On our right there was a tall brick building of some
20
sort of factory and I could see the workers waving red
handkerchiefs and scarves from the windows. ..
After the official ceremony was over we all got into black
Mercedes limousines and the whole cortege accompanied by
motorcyclists in steel helmets drove through the half-empty streets of
the city to the Bellevue Hotel, where everything had been made
ready to receive the Soviet delegation. The hotel was an old
palace intended for guests of the German government. Built at the
end of the 19th century and once belonging to the family of the
Kaiser the palace stood in the grounds of a park that was full
of shady trees and exotic plants. A long avenue of limes led to
the entrance. Inside we were amazed at the ostentation of the
rooms. Everywhere we could smell the delicate scent of roses
coming from the bouquets which stood in tall porcelain vases
in every corner. The walls were decorated with tapestries and
paintings in heavy gilt frames. There were statuettes and vases
of the finest porcelain standing all around in exquisitely carved
cabinets. Very likely some of the treasures that had been
plundered by the Hitlerites in the occupied countries had already
found their way here. The furniture was antique and the
servants and waiters were garbed in gold-braided livery. All this lent
the hotel an air of ceremonial pomposity.
We were to be accommodated on the first floor where there
were guestrooms with baths. I was given a modestly furnished
small room with a wooden bed, a simple desk and a wall
cupboard. The only decoration in the room was the Dtirer engraving
on the wall.
Having quickly shaved and changed my clothes I went
downstairs. In the large dark oak-panelled dining room several round
tables had been laid. The breakfast ceremony had been carefully
planned in every detail. Every guest had his own place indicated
by a card. When the whole assembly was seated, waiters in white
gloves brought round the food, wine, coffee, sweet meals under
the direction of a tall, grey-haired maitre d'hotel whose chest
was adorned by a gold chain and a huge medal and who silently
conducted the proceedings with nothing more than a barely
noticeable gesture or look. After we had finished eating cigars and
cognac were brought round.
After rising from the table the Soviet delegates accompanied
by their experts set off immediately for the Reichskanzlei where
21
they were to have their first meeting with Hitler. The
interpreting and recording of the minutes of the meeting was to be
done by V. N. Pavlov, then first secretary at our embassy in
Berlin, and myself.
Leaving the park the line of black limousines under motor--
cycle escort turned on to the Charlottenburger Chaussee and, passing
the Brandenburg Gates, carried on down Wilhelmstrasse. Here
there were bigger crowds which in some places filled the whole
pavement. People looked silently at the little red flag with its
gold hammer and sickle that was fixed to the radiator of the
first limousine. Some of them actually dared to wave.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In the Reichskanzlei
Slowing down the motorcade entered the inner courtyard of
the Reichskanzlei. The building, which had been erected in
a style favoured by the Nazis---a hotchpotch of classical and
Gothic elements and ancient Teutonic symbols---was far from
attractive in appearance. The rectangular courtyard was dark and
forbidding and looked more like a barracks square or a prison
yard. It was encircled with high columns of dark-grey marble and
paved with granite slabs of the same grey colour. The eagles with
their outstretched wings and swastikas in their claws, the smooth
portico that beetled over the columns and the silent, motionless
figures of the guards in their grey-green helmets all combined to
give the place a sinister atmosphere.
The tall bronze-clad doors led into a spacious vestibule and
from there into an enfilade of dimly lit rooms and windowless
hallways which were lined by people in various kinds of uniform.
Like automatons they raised their right arms in the Nazi salute
and clicked their heels. At the main entrance we were met by
Staatssekretar Otto Meissner, who took us by the longest route
so that all this pomposity should not fail to impress us.
Finally we arrived in a round, brightly lit vestibule in the
centre of which stood a table with soft drinks and snacks on it.
Sitting along the wall on sofas were a number of German officials,
specialists and officers of the guard. Waiters moved noiselessly
among them. Our experts were also required to wait here. Only
the head of the Soviet delegation, V. M. Molotov, his deputy
22
V. G. Dekanozov and the interpreters went into Hitler's office,
which was next door to the round hall.
The entry into Hitler's room was invested with the theatricality
that only the Nazis were capable of. Two tall blond SS men in
black tightly belted uniforms with skulls on their caps clicked
their heels and threw open the tall, almost ceiling-high doors
with a single, well-practised gesture. Then, with their backs to
the door jambs and their right-arms raised, they formed a kind
of arch, through which we had to pass to enter Hitler's office,
a vast room that was more like a banqueting hall than an office.
The walls were hung with enormous tapestries, and a thick carpet
lay in the centre of the room. On the right as you came in there
was a kind of lounge with a coffee table, a sofa and some
armchairs. On the left, at the opposite end of the room stood a huge
polished desk and in the corner on a massive ebony stand there
was a huge globe of the world.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Meeting with Hitler
Hitler sat at his desk, and in that vast room his small figure
dressed in a mousy-green tunic was hardly noticeable. On one
arm of the tunic he wore a red armband with a black swastika
on a white circular background. His chest was decorated with
an iron cross.
I had seen Hitler before at parades and meetings. Now I had
the opportunity of viewing him close up. As we entered the
Fiihrer observed us silently for a moment, then, with a sudden
movement, stood up and walked to the centre of the room with
small, rapid steps. Here he stopped and raised his arm in the
Nazi salute, bending his palm unnaturally. Still without a word,
he came up close and shook each one of us by the hand. His palm
was cold and moist to the touch, and his feverish eyes seemed to
bore through you like gimlets. His sharp, pimply nose jutted out
absurdly over his short moustache.
Having briefly expressed his pleasure at welcoming the Soviet
delegation to Berlin, Hitler proposed that we sit at the table in
the lounge part of his office. At that moment Ribbentrop appeared
from behind a curtain in the far corner of the room, which
obviously concealed another entrance. He was followed by
Schmidt, Hitler's personal interpreter, and Hilger, who had been
23
a counsellor at the German embassy in Moscow and who knew
Russian well. We all then went over to the lounge section.
Hitler invited Molotov to take a place on the sofa and then
sat down himself in an arm-chair on the other side of the
table. Hilger sat on his right, then Ribbentrop, and, finally,
Schmidt. Molotov's deputy took his place on his chief's left,
while I sat down on his right. Pavlov occupied the arm-chair
between me and Hitler.
The conversation began with Hitler's long monologue.
Possibly, he had prepared a text, but he didn't use it. His speech
flowed smoothly without any hesitation, like that of an actor
who knew his lines well. Each phrase was pronounced clearly
and he made regular pauses for the interpreters.
On the German side Hilger acted as interpreter. He had
spent many years in the Soviet Union and knew Russian almost
as well as his native language. He even looked a little like a
Russian. When on Sundays he used to don a Russian peasant
shirt and a straw hat and go fishing on the Klyazma River near
Moscow wearing his pince-nez, passers-by would take him for one
of Chekhov's characters. Hilger even boasted that he managed
to get a lot of interesting information from chatting to other
anglers. Now he was sitting, stiff as a board, in the black
fulldress uniform of the German ministry of foreign affairs. Next
to him sat Schmidt with a notepad on his knee, taking down
the minutes of the meeting. Though he had an excellent
command of several European languages, Schmidt did not know
Russian and so had to record the minutes. Pavlov and I took
turns in translating and in taking down the minutes.
The gist of what Hitler had to say was that Britain was now
on its knees and its final capitulation was only a matter of time.
The country, he assured us, would soon be destroyed by bombs.
He then went on to give a brief review of the military situation
pointing out that the German Empire already controlled the
whole of Western Europe. Together with their Italian allies
the German forces were now conducting successful operations
in Africa, from which the British would soon be driven out
once and for all. Thus, he concluded, the victory of the Axis
powers was assured and it was time to think about the
organisation of the world after the victory.
Here he began to speak at length of what was to happen to
24
the British Empire, spread as it was throughout the world, when
the inevitable collapse of Great Britain left it leaderless. The
German government, he stated, had already discussed the
question with the Italian and the Japanese governments and was
now interested to hear the opinion of the Soviet government.
For his own part, he intended to make more concrete
proposals on this matter at a later stage.
When Hitler began to talk about carving up the British
Empire Ribbentrop nodded his head approvingly and made some
notes in his pad. Most of the time he had sat with his arms
folded on his chest, staring at Hitler. Occasionally he would
put both his hands on the table and tap it lightly with his
fingers, and after looking round the table at each of those present
in a a manner that gave none of his thoughts away, would
resume his former pose.
Schmidt rapidly covered the sheets of lined paper that were
held together with a special clip with rows of shorthand.
Neither Pavlov nor myself at the time knew shorthand, but we had
both developed our own system of rapid writing. This system,
although primitive, meant that we could accurately reproduce
the conversation especially if it were deciphered immediately
afterwards.
When Hitler had finished his speech, which, allowing for the
time spent on translation, took about an hour, it was
Molotov's turn to reply. Without entering into any discussion of
Hitler's proposals, he noted that there were more urgent and
specific questions that needed discussion first. Could the
Reichschancellor, for instance, explain what the German military
mission was doing in Romania and why it had been sent there
without prior consultation with the Soviet government? After all, the
Soviet-German non-aggression pact that had been concluded in
1939 stipulated the holding of joint consultations on important
issues that affected the interests of both sides. The Soviet
government was also interested to know why German troops had
been sent to Finland, and why this serious move had also been
undertaken without consultation with Moscow.
The effect of these questions on Hitler was like a cold shower,
and for all his histrionic talents the Fiihrer could not disguise his
confusion. Speaking very quickly he said that the German
military mission had been sent to Romania at the request of the
25
Antonescu government to train Romanian troops. As for the
presence of German troops in Finland, they were not going to stay
for a long time there, he claimed, but were on their way to
Norway.
This explanation, of course, did not satisfy the Soviet
delegation. On the basis of reports from its representatives in both
Romania and Finland, Molotov stated, the Soviet government had
formed a completely different opinion. The troops that had
landed on the southern coast of Finland were in fact not moving
anywhere and obviously intended to stay in that country for a
long period of time. In Romania it was not just a question of
the military mission---German troops were being sent there in
increasingly greater numbers. And there were already far too
many for one military mission. So what then, Molotov wanted
to know, was the purpose of these troop movements? This sort
of thing could not but arouse anxiety in Moscow and the
German government must therefore give a clear and precise answer
to these questions.
Here Hitler resorted to the old diplomatic ploy of pretending
that he had not been fully informed. Having promised to find
out about the questions posed by the Soviet side, Hitler went on to
say that he considered all these matters of secondary importance.
Now, he said returning to his original theme, was the time
to discuss problems relating to the impending victory of the Axis
powers.
Then once again Hitler began to expound his fantastic plans
for dividing up the world. Britain, he declared, would soon be
defeated and occupied by German troops, while it would take
many years before the United States could present a threat to
the ``new Europe''. It was, therefore, time to think of creating
a ``new order" throughout the world. The German and the
Italian governments had already outlined their spheres of interest
in this new order, which included Europe and Africa. Japan was
interested in East Asia. On this basis, Hitler explained, the Soviet
Union might show interest in the territory south of its frontier,
in the direction of the Indian Ocean, which would give it access
to warm water ports.. .
Here Molotov interrupted Hitler to say that he could see no
point in discussing schemes of this kind. The Soviet government
was only interested in preserving the peace and security of the
26
countries bordering on the Soviet Union.
Hitler paid no attention to this interruption and proceeded
to expound his plan for the division of the British Empire now
that it was about to become leaderless. The conversation began
to assume a strange character with the Germans seeming not to
hear what was said to them. Molotov continued to insist upon
discussing specific issues relating to the security of the Soviet
Union and other independent European states and to demand
that the German government explain its recent actions which
threatened the independence of countries that bordered on the
Soviet Union. But again and again Hitler tried to turn the
conversation towards his plans and do everything he could to involve
the Soviet government in a discussion of his madcap schemes.
The conversation continued for two and a half hours.
Suddenly Hitler looked at his watch and suggested postponing the
discussion till the following day in view of a possible air-raid.
Everyone stood up and Ribbentrop asked if there were any
objections to inviting in the press. As there were none, Schmidt
jumped up from his chair and went over to the door leading into
the vestibule. Poking his head out, he muttered something,
and immediately the room was filled with people armed with
photo and cine cameras. They included the newspaper
photographer from the Pravda, M. M. Kalashnikov. At the request of the
reporters the participants in the talks once more took their places
around the table and were photographed from various angles. Then
a few group shots were taken and probably the whole thing would
have gone on indefinitely had not Ribbentrop asked the
photographers to leave.
Hitler said that he hoped the Soviet representatives would
enjoy themselves in Berlin. Molotov reminded Hitler that a
reception would be held that evening in the Soviet Embassy and
invited him to attend. Hitler replied vaguely that he would try
to come. Having bidden our farewells we all left the office and
were once more led through the enfilade of halls to the inner
courtyard of the Reichskanzlei.
The early autumnal twilight had already descended upon the
city. A biting wind was blowing and the streets were deserted.
The black Mercedes cars took us back quickly to the Bellevue
Hotel. There behind the heavy blinds the lights were shining
brightly, it was warm and the air was filled with the scent of
27
freshly cut roses. Immediately upon arrival a report was
prepared on the talks which was encoded and then telegraphed to
Moscow.
That evening at the Soviet embassy on the Unter den Linden
a grand reception was held in honour of the Soviet government
delegation's stay in Berlin. The banqueting table was laid out
in a huge marble hall. It was adorned with gorgeous carnations
and antique silver plate. A banquet service for five hundred
people, which had been kept in the embassy for special occasions
longer than anyone could remember, was brought out. Hitler,
as it turned out, did not put in an appearance, from which it
was concluded that he had been displeased with the course of
the talks. However, Reichsmarshall Goering and many other top
Nazis did attend. His corpulent bulk, which somehow reminded
one of an enormous peacock, attracted the general attention. His
love of ostentation, luxury and theatricality was truly fantastic.
Having been promoted to the rank of Reichsmarschall---the only
title of its kind in the Third Reich---he designed for himself a
special uniform of silver-thread fabric. From shoulder to waist
his chest was covered in medals, other decorations and motley
ribbons, and each of his fingers was adorned with several rings,
all with precious stones. The story was current at the time that
at home he liked to dress in a Roman toga and wore sandals
studded with diamonds. He certainly had numerous astoundingly
luxurious villas.
Goering's extravagance gave him a kind of respectability in
the eyes of Western politicians. They called him a ``sporting type'',
a ``society man" and this made it easier for Chamberlain and the
other Munich men before the war to claim that there was
something ``decent'' in Nazism.
Yet Goering, of course, was one of the worst Nazi criminals.
Both a drug addict and a psychotic, he had spent several years in
a mental hospital before Hitler came to power. When the Nazi
putsch brought him to the crest of power he gave free rein to his
whims and base passions. It was Goering who set up the
concentration camps during the first years of the Nazi Reich (later
Himmler assumed control over them) and it was also Goering
who first proposed the use of foreign slave labour at German
plants and factories.
Also present at the embassy reception was Rudolf Hess, then
28
considered to be third man on the Reich after Hitler and
Goering (at the beginning of the war Hitler declared that in the
event of his death Goering should be made Fiihrer and in the
event of the latter's death, too, Hess should take his place).
The first toasts were hardly over when the sirens sounded the
air-raid warning---British bombers were on their way to Berlin.
The embassy had no air-raid shelter and so the guests
hurriedly began to leave. The first to go were the high-ranking
Nazis. In taking his leave of the Soviet representatives Goering,
despite all his super-self-confidence, was clearly embarrassed. After
all, he had boasted on many occasions that the Luftwaffe under
his command would wipe Britain from the face of the earth. But
the British still continued to bomb Germany. The present raid
on Berlin was particularly embarrassing to the Nazi leaders, since
they had tried to do everything to give the impression that
Britain was finished.
Accompanied by their aides Goering, Hess and Ribbentrop
hurriedly descended the broad marble staircase to the entrance
of the embassy where their cars were awaiting them. When they
had departed the other guests began to leave. Most of these walked
up the Unter den Linden to the Brandenburg Gates where
they took shelter in the underground railway station.
The Soviet delegation returned to the Bellevue Hotel where
a comfortable air-raid shelter had been built in the cellars. Here,
just as in the hotel halls, there were expensive paintings and
tapestries. Waiters brought round soft drinks. Two hours later the
``all-clear'' was given and we all went up to our rooms.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Talks Continue
The next day, November 14, the second meeting with Hitler
took place. The Soviet delegation had already received a coded
reply to our report from Moscow, which also included further
instructions. The Soviet government categorically rejected the
German proposal to involve the Soviet delegation in a
discussion concerning the division of British possessions. The delegation
was once again instructed to insist that the German government
explain the questions relating to the problem of European
security and also other matters which directly affected the interests
of the Soviet Union.
29
This time the conversation with Hitler lasted almost three
hours and at times became very heated.
When after the exchange of greetings we were all seated round
the table in the Reichschancellor's office, Molotov began to
speak.
In conformity with the instructions received from Moscow
he outlined the Soviet position and then went over to the
problem of the German troops in Finland. The Soviet government,
he declared, insisted that it should be informed as to the true
reasons why German troops had been sent to a country which
lay in close proximity to such major industrial and cultural
centre as Leningrad. What did this virtual occupation of Finland
by German troops mean? According to information obtained by
the Soviet Union, the German troops were not going to move
to Norway. On the contrary, they were strengthening their
positions along the Soviet border. Therefore the Soviet government
insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the German troops
from Finland.
Now, twenty-four hours after this question had first been put
to him, Hitler could no longer excuse himself by lack of
knowledge of the situation. Nevertheless, he continued to claim
without producing a scrap of evidence in support of what he said
that the military units were in transit to Norway. Then,
resorting to another old ploy of using attack as the best form of
defence, Hitler declared that the Soviet Union allegedly presented
a threat to Finland.
``A conflict in the Baltic'', he said, ``would put a heavy strain
on German-Russian relations.''
``But,'' replied Molotov, ``the Soviet Union does not intend
to disturb the peace in this region and presents no threat to
Finland. Our only concern is to guarantee peace and genuine
security in this region. The German government should bear this
in mind if it is interested in normal relations with the Soviet
Union.''
Hitler declined to reply to this directly, reiterating that the
measures that were being taken were intended to ensure the
security of Norway and that a conflict in the Baltic might have
``far-reaching repercussions''. This now sounded like a threat
which the Soviet representatives could not leave unchallenged.
``This position,'' said Molotov, ``seems to introduce a new
30
factor into the talks, which could seriously complicate the
situation.''
This made it quite clear to Hitler that the Soviet Union
intended to insist on its demands for the withdrawal of German
troops from Finland.
And there were important reasons why this should be insisted
upon. Ruling quarters in Finland at the time had openly
declared that they considered the peace concluded with the Soviet
Union in March 1940 as just a truce, a respite to be used for
preparing for another war against the Soviet Union when they
would fight together with Nazi Germany.
According to information obtained by the Soviet Union the
Ryti-Tanner government of Finland had in October 1940 signed
an agreement with Berlin concerning the stationing of German
troops on Finnish territory. At the same time a campaign had
been launched in Finland to recruit men who would be sent to
Germany for the subsequent formation of a ``Finnish SS
battalion.
All these preparations gave grounds to think that with the
complicity of the Finnish rulers Hitler intended to use Finland
as a launching pad for his operations against the Soviet Union.
Indeed, when Germany did attack the Soviet Union an army
of four German and two Finnish divisions was concentrated in
the north of Finland with the aim of occupying Murmansk. At
the same time the Karelian and the South-East Finnish armies
comprising 15 infantry divisions (one of which was German)
and one cavalry and two infantry brigades were deployed south
of the Oulujarvi Lakes to the Gulf of Finland. By moving
towards Leningrad and the River Svir these armies were to
aid the German Army Group ``North'' in capturing that city.
When Hitler broke off the treaty and invaded the USSR the
German troops and the Finnish ``brothers-in-arms'' crossed the
Soviet border from Finnish territory...
But let us return to the talks in the Reichskanzlei. The
question of the German troops stationed in Finland had produced a
heated argument which neither Hitler nor his cronies had
counted on. Ribbentrop, considering evidently that it was necessary
to relax the situation, tried several times to get a word in, but
he could not bring himself to actually interrupt Hitler. He kept
getting up from his chair to draw attention to himself. Finally
31
Hitler noticed his Reichsminister's agitation and with a wave
of the hand indicated that he could say his piece.
``Please permit me, my Fiihrer, to express a thought on this
matter,'' he began.
Hitler nodded to him, took a large handkerchief from his
pocket and wiped it across his upper lip. Ribbentrop continued:
``There is actually no reason at all for making an issue of the
Finnish question. Perhaps it was merely a misunderstanding."^^1^^
Hitler took advantage of this remark to change the subject. He
made yet another attempt to involve the Soviet delegation in
the discussion on the division of the spheres of influence.
``Let us turn to cardinal present-day problems,'' he said in
a conciliatory tone. ``After England is defeated, the British
Empire would be a vast auction of 40 million square kilometres.
In this bankrupt estate Russia could get access to the ice-free
ocean. Thus far, a minority of 40 million Englishmen had ruled
600 million inhabitants of the Empire. An end must be put to
this historical injustice. The states which could be interested in
the bankrupt estate should stop controversies over minor issues.
It is essential to deal with the problem of the partition of the
British Empire without delay. This above all applies to Germany,
Italy, Japan and Russia.''
Molotov said that he had heard all this the day before and
that in the present situation it was far more important to
discuss matters that were closer to the problems of European
security. Besides the question of German troops in Finland, for which
the Soviet government was still awaiting an answer, it would
also like to know the plans of the German government
regarding Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. The Soviet government
believed that the German and Italian guarantees which had
recently been given to Romania were directed against the
interests of the USSR and that these guarantees ought to be
revoked.
Hitler immediately declared that this demand was impossible.
Molotov then asked:
``Then what would Germany say if in view of Moscow's
interest in the security of the area adjacent to its south-western
_-_-_
~^^1^^ William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A History
of Nazi Germany, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1960, p. 806.
32
borders the Soviet Union gave Bulgaria guarantees similar to those
which Germany and Italy had given to Romania?''
This statement annoyed Hitler visibly.
``What,'' he almost screamed in reply, ``has King Boris^^1^^ asked
Moscow for such guarantees? I know nothing of this. In any
case I shall have to consult with Mussolini. Italy is also
interested in this part of Europe.'' And then he added
threateningly. ``If Germany were by chance looking for sources of
friction with Russia, it would find them in any region.''
Molotov objected, saying that it was the duty of each state
to show concern for the security of its people and for that of
its neighbouring friendly countries. This was a fundamental
principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet government and it was
therefore particularly concerned at the present moment that
Bulgaria, a country which had long historical ties with Russia,
should retain its independence and not be drawn into any
dangerous conflict. In this way Molotov made it quite
unambiguously plain to Hitler that the Soviet government defended
Bulgaria from the threat of Nazi occupation that was then
hanging over it.
Molotov then went on to say that Moscow was most
dissatisfied with the delay that had occurred in the deliveries of
important German equipment for the Soviet Union. This, he said, was
particularly inadmissible since the Soviet side was fulfilling its
commitments recorded in Soviet-German economic agreements
to the letter. Failure to meet the agreed dates for the delivery
of the German equipment had caused the USSR serious
difficulties.
Once more Hitler began to prevaricate. He said that
Germany was fighting a ``life and death" struggle with England and
that it mobilised all its resources for the final battle against the
British.
``But we've only just been told,'' said Molotov, ``that England
has to all intents and purposes been vanquished. So which side
is fighting for ``life'' and which ``for death"?
A tense silence reigned in the room. Ribbentrop fidgeted in
_-_-_
~^^1^^ King Boris of Bulgaria died subsequently under mysterious
circumstances. Returning home by air from Berlin, where he had had talks with
Hitler, King Boris died suddenly when he was given an oxygen mask. It
is thought that agents of the Gestapo were responsible for his death,
having introduced a fast-acting poison into the mask.
S-1996
33
his arm-chair and looked anxiously at Hitler. Then he shifted
his gaze to his hands which were lying on the table in front of
him. His fingers were shaking slightly. Hilger, sitting up straight,
frozen in his arm-chair. Schmidt stopped writing but remained
fixedly bent over his papers. Evidently they were all expecting a
hysterical outburst from Hitler. The latter, however, retained
control of himself and even began speaking as if he had not
noticed the irony in Molotov's words, but his voice could
scarcely restrain his annoyance. •>
``Yes, that is true,'' he said, ``England has been vanquished.
But there are still a few things left to do...''
Then Hitler declared that he thought the subject of their
meetings had been exhausted and that since in the evening he
would be occupied with other matters, Reichsminister
Ribbentrop would conclude the talks.
Thus ended the last meeting of the Soviet delegation with
Hitler. It was clear that Hitler gave no thought for the
legitimate interests of the Soviet Union which were determined by
the interests of Soviet security and of peace in Europe. But that
the Hitler government had decided long before the Berlin
meeting to attack the Soviet Union and had actually been making
preparations for this was, of course, not known.
From the secret archives of the German government, from the
diaries of the top Nazis and from the documents of the
Nuremberg trials of the Nazi war criminals we now know that even
after the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
in the autumn of 1939 Hitler continued to plot the invasion of
the Soviet Union. Two months after the pact had been signed
Hitler instructed the commanders of his armed forces as to look
upon the areas of Poland that were under German occupation
as a bridgehead for future German operations. A direct reference
to this was contained in an entry dated October 18, 1939, in
the diary of General Haider, Chief of Staff of the German Land
Forces.
On November 23, 1939, Hitler made a lengthy speech to his
generals about the new operations in the West. In the same
speech he also touched upon an operation against the Soviet
Union. There he stated: ``We can oppose Russia only when we
are free in the West."^^1^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 657.
34
At that time Hitler had made invasion of the Soviet Union
contingent upon victory in the West, that is the defeat of
Britain. But as to a war against the Soviet Union, he had already
made up his mind. According to an entry in the diary of General
Jodl, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, even
before his campaign in the West Hitler had announced his
decision to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. On July
29, 1940, at a conference attended by members of the armed
forces' command Hitler declared without any of his former
provisos that he intended to invade the Soviet Union in the spring
of 1941. What is more, he even seemed to be inclined to attack
the USSR even before Britain had been finally defeated. On
July 31, 1940, at a meeting with Wehrmacht representatives at
his residence in Berghof Hitler announced his decision to
postpone the invasion of the British Isles.
``Britain's hope,'' Hitler said, ``lies in Russia and America. If
that hope in Russia is destroyed, then it will be destroyed for
America too because elimination of Russia will enormously
increase Japan's power in the Far East.. . But if Russia is smashed,
Britain's last hope will be shattered."^^1^^
It was decided, General Haider wrote in his diary, summing
up the results of that meeting, that in order to solve the
problem, ``Russia must be liquidated. Spring, 1941. The sooner
Russia is smashed, the better".^^2^^
After this meeting, that is three months before the Berlin talks
between Hitler and Molotov, preparations were begun in secret
for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The threat that had hung
over Britain was past.
Thus the very fact of the existence of such a powerful
socialist state as the Soviet Union averted the danger of a German
invasion of Britain. Hitler decided to finish the Soviet Union off
and then destroy Britain. But there he made his big mistake.
The heroic resistance put up by the Soviet people to Nazi
aggression and the subsequent collapse of the Third Reich buried
these plans once and for all.
Thus Hitler was playing a double game. Having already
decided to attack the Soviet Union, he nevertheless wanted to win
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 798.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
35
time by trying to give the impression that he was ready to
discuss with the Soviet government matters relating to the further
peaceful development of Soviet-German relations.
Evidently, the Nazis hoped that this objective could also be
furthered by holding the Berlin talks in which the German
government began to show great interest in the summer of 1940.
In the correspondence that during those months was carried
on between Berlin and Moscow the Germans hinted that it would
be a good idea to discuss urgent problems by high-ranking
representatives of both countries. In one of the German letters it
was pointed out that since Ribbentrop's last visit to Moscow
important changes had taken place in Europe and the world and
it would therefore be desirable for a plenipotentiary Soviet
delegation to come to Berlin for talks. This being the case, the Soviet
government, which unerringly stood for the peaceful settlement
of international problems, gave a positive reply to the German
initiative for the holding of a meeting in Berlin in November
1940.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In Ribbentrop's Bunker
In the evening of the same day when the talks with Hitler
were over a meeting was held with Ribbentrop at his residence
in Wilhelmstrasse. His office, which was considerably smaller
than Hitler's, was nevertheless luxuriously furnished. The
patterned parquet floor was so shiny that all the objects in the room
seemed reflected in it. The walls were hung with old paintings,
the windows were framed with rich tapestry curtains, and along
the walls bronze and porcelain statuettes stood on stands.
Ribbentrop, who in the presence of Hitler had tried to be in
the shade, now showed himself in a completely different light.
Here in his own home he played the grandee-aristocrat, but his
behaviour could rather be described as over-free than majestic.
He was surrounded by a large entourage which included
cameramen before whom he posed willingly. During the initial
exchange of greetings and general conversation which lasted
several minutes Ribbentrop stood up straight in the middle of the
room with his arms folded across his chest. Finally, turning to
his retinue and to the reporters, he declared:
36
``Gentlemen, I'm afraid I must ask you all to leave. We have
important matters to discuss. I hope you will excuse us...''
Whereupon the whole group bowed and quickly left the room.
Ribbentrop invited those who remained to participate in the
talks to sit down at a round table in the corner of the room that
was adorned with bronze figures and Greek ornaments. When
all were seated he declared that in accordance with the wishes
of the Fiihrer it would be useful to summarise the talks and come
to some agreement ``in principle''. Then he took from the breast
pocket of his grey-green high-collared tunic a sheet of paper
that had been folded four times. He unfolded it slowly and said:
``Here in outline are a few of the proposals of the German
government...''
With the sheet in front of him Ribbentrop read out the
proposals it contained. They boiled down to the same bombastic
assertions about the inevitable collapse of Great Britain and the
need to start thinking about the subsequent reorganisation of
the world. In this context the German government proposed that
the USSR should join the pact that had been concluded between
Germany, Italy and Japan. Furthermore, Germany, Italy, Japan
and the Soviet Union should undertake to respect each other's
interests. All four powers should also undertake not to lend their
support to any group of powers that was directed against any
one of the above-mentioned countries. All participants in the
pact should eventually decide with regard to their mutual
interests on the way the world should ultimately be arranged. . .
Having listened to this statement, Molotov said that there was
no point in any further discussion of these plans, but he asked
if the Soviet delegation could have a copy of the text. Ribbentrop
replied that he had only one copy and that he had not really
intended to convey these proposals in written form. He put the
paper hurriedly back in his pocket.
Suddenly the air-raid siren wailed. We all looked at each
other in silence. There came the sound of a dull thump not too
far away and the window panes of the office shook.
``It might be dangerous to stay here,'' said Ribbentrop. ``Let's
go down to my bunker. It'll be safer there. . .''
We left his office and made our way down a long corridor
to a winding staircase, which led down to the cellars. At the
entrance to the bunker an SS man stood on guard. He opened
37
the heavy door for us and when we were all inside the shelter
locked it from the inside.
One of the rooms in the shelter was furnished as Ribbentrop's
office. On the polished writing desk there were several telephones,
and on one side there stood a round table surrounded by deep,
soft arm-chairs.
When the conversation was resumed Ribbentrop once more
began to talk about the need to study the question of how to
divide the various spheres of influence. There was, he added, every
reason to assume that Britain was virtually finished. At this point
Molotov interrupted, saying:
``If England is finished, why are we sitting in this shelter?
And who is dropping bombs so close that we can hear them
even from here?''
This so fazed Ribbentrop that he could make no reply. Instead
he called his aide and ordered coffee. When the coffee was
brought and the waiter had left, Molotov asked if they would
have long to wait for an explanation as to why German troops
were in Romania and Finland.
Ribbentrop replied without trying to hide his annoyance that
if the Soviet government continued to concern itself with what
he called these ``inessential questions'', they could be discussed
through the usual diplomatic channels.
Once more there was silence. There was nothing more to be
said, but we were compelled to wait in the bunker, since the
British planes continued a massive air attack on Berlin. Again
and again we could hear the dull thuds of bombs exploding
around us. Dry wine was brought round and the conversation
turned to general themes. Ribbentrop spoke about his wineries
and asked about the types of wine produced in the Soviet Union.
The time dragged on slowly and only late at night could we
return to the Bellevue Hotel.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Nazis' Secret Objectives
What was the point of all Hitler and Ribbentrop's big talk
about plans for future cooperation with the Soviet Union? Did
the German government at the time really mean that there would
be no conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union for a long
period of time? Could it be that Hitler really had decided to
38
abandon for a time the plans for aggression against the Soviet
Union, plans that had been proclaimed in his book, Mein
Kampf? The answer to all these questions was clearly no.
Hitler looked upon the meeting in Berlin as nothing more
than a manoeuvre. This can be seen in particular from the
secret instruction No 18 which he issued on November 12, 1940,
that is just before the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Berlin.
The instruction stated: ``Political discussions have been initiated
with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being.
Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations
for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be
continued. Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general
outline of the Army's operational plans has been submitted to,
and approved by, me."^^1^^
What Hitler meant by these ``preparations for the East" was
not too hard to guess.
As for the Soviet Union, its aim was clear. The Soviet
government, which consistently pursued a policy of peace, tried to
prevent, or at least postpone, a war with Hitler's Germany. The
aim was to preserve peace for the Soviet people for as long as
possible and gain additional time for strengthening the economic
and military might of the socialist state. Furthermore, at that
time Hitler's secret intentions were not yet clear and in Moscow
the basis for all negotiations with the Germans was to impose
peace on Germany if only for some time and to give Hitler no
grounds for justifying anti-Soviet aggression. Also of no small
importance was the fact that Stalin believed Ribbentrop's
signature on the non-aggression pact. This may seem surprising but
he believed that Hitler would not venture to start a war.
The Soviet government continued to maintain diplomatic
contact with the German government and probe its intentions.
On November 26, 1940, that is less than two weeks after the
meeting in Berlin, Schulenburg, the German ambassador in
Moscow, was informed that for the talks begun in Berlin to
continue, the German side should meet a number of conditions, in
particular:
German troops must be immediately withdrawn from Finland;
the security of the Soviet Union should be ensured by the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Shirer, Ofi. cit., pp. 799--800.
39
signing within the next few months of a mutual assistance treaty
between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
Schulenburg promised to forward the Soviet statement
immediately on to his government. But no reply was forthcoming
from Berlin, and the silence was highly significant. Now we know
what lay behind it. Hitler rejected these conditions outright
and continued with his preparations for aggression against the
Soviet Union. General Haider's diary contains an entry with the
following words which were spoken by Hitler apropos of
Schulenburg's telegram:
Russia ``must be brought to her knees as soon as possible..."^^1^^
Hitler ordered his general staff to draw up as quickly as
possible a specific plan for the invasion of the USSR. On
December 5, after a four-hour-long conference with Field Marshal
Brauchitsch, C-in-C, Land forces, and General Haider, Hitler
approved the plan. It was then code-named plan ``Otto'', but
this was soon to be changed. On December 18 Hitler signed
directive No 21, which was entitled ``Operation Barbarossa''. The
directive began with the following words: ``The German Armed
Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick
campaign before the end of the war against England. For this
purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the
reservation that the occupied territories will have to be
safeguarded against surprise attacks.. . Preparations . .. are to be
completed by May 15, 1941. Great caution has to be exercised
that the intention of an attack will not be recognized."^^2^^
Recalling now the course of the Soviet-German talks in Berlin
in the autumn of 1940 something must be said of the insinuations
which were spread at the time and which even today appear in
the Western press in relation to that meeting. It was claimed, for
example, that the Soviet delegation to Berlin advanced certain
``territorial claims in the general direction of tihe Indian Ocean"
and that, in this connection, the Soviet Union was willing to
conclude a ``new pact" with Germany. All this is, of course,
either the fruit of idle fantasy or deliberate vicious falsification
aimed at discrediting the policies of the Soviet state.
And this kind of falsification gets repeated year in, year out,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 810.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
40
with astonishing persistence. To take a recent example, in a
speech in April of 1980 to the American Society of Newspaper
Editors Zbigniew Brzezinski, then President Carter's National
Security Adviser, who was considered to be a prominent
historian, spoke extensively of certain new ``documentary evidence"
which was supposed to show the Persian Gulf and the
Indian Ocean as being ``part of long-standing Russian and Soviet
imperial aspirations''. Here Brzezinski referred to ``a secret
protocol in a draft agreement between the Soviet Union and the
Axis powers" and ``an exchange between Molotov and the
German Ambassador in Moscow''. All this was mentioned in
relation to the situation in Afghanistan as ``evidence'' of Soviet
``aspirations in the general direction of the Persian Gulf".
In view of the fact that this blatant attempt to falsify history
was immediately seized upon by the American press, I felt it
necessary to write a letter to the editor of the Washington Post
(especially since I was in the US capital at the time). In the
letter I explained what really happened during the talks in
Berlin in the autumn of 1940 and also during subsequent
SovietGerman meetings. As an eye-witness of those far-off events I
could testify that the Soviet delegation refused outright to
discuss Hitler's proposals for the ``division of the wide British estate"
and that there had been no agreements or secret protocols
signed by the Soviet government. ``Distortions of this kind,'' I
said in my letter to The Washington Post, ``are nothing new. In
the early 19th century when Napoleon was preparing a
campaign against Russia a paper called the 'Behest of Peter the
Great' was fabricated in which he supposedly called upon his
descendants to 'reach out for the warm seas'.'' In conclusion I
noted that anyone, particularly an historian, who engages in
politics, should be especially careful in his treatment of history.
Needless to say, my letter was not published, which only once
more goes to show the hypocrisy of all the talk about the ``
freedom" and ``objectivity'' of the bourgeois press. Anti-Soviet
insinuations can always find space in the American newspapers, but
for the restoration of historical truth there is no room.
The Berlin meeting in 1940 was considered by the Soviet
government as an opportunity for sounding the German position
and for clarifying the subsequent plans of the Third Reich.
Hitler's position at these talks, in particular his stubborn
41
refusal to consider the natural security interests of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe and his virtual refusal to withdraw
German troops from Finland and Romania, showed that despite
all the talk about the ``global interests" of the Soviet Union,
Germany was actually preparing an East-European bridgehead
against the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that Hitler
wanted the Berlin meeting so that the talks with the Soviet
representatives could be used to subsequently tie the hands of
the Soviet government while giving Germany freedom of action,
that is freedom to conclude a possible agreement with Britain.
In the light of the above a very interesting incident took
place at the end of the second meeting between Molotov and
Hitler. As Hitler was accompanying Molotov to the door of his
office in the Reichskanzlei, he said:
``Herr Stalin is undoubtedly a great man. An historical
personality. I too flatter myself with the hope that I shall go down
in history. Therefore, two statesmen like us ought to get together
and I am ready for such a meeting to take place as soon as
possible.''
Molotov simply replied that he would convey the
Reichschancellor's proposal to Stalin, and the conversation did not go any
further. But, one may ask, what were Hitler's motives? He could
not really have imagined such a meeting taking place when all
the preparations for invading the Soviet Union were in full
swing. Nor could he possibly have intended abandoning his plans
at the last moment. Most likely the proposal for a meeting with
Stalin was just one more manoeuvre aimed at blunting the
vigilance of the Soviet government.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Twists of Fate
The day after the final talks with Ribbentrop the Soviet
delegation left Berlin. On the square outside the station the guard
of honour was drawn up once more. But the only one of the
top Nazis there to see us off was Ribbentrop. We left in a Soviet
train which had two German carriages, a restaurant and a
saloon carriage, coupled to it. The latter was for representatives
of the protocol department of the German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who accompanied us to the border.
Several hours later the train reached Poznan. Shortly before
that I had been called into Molotov's saloon carriage and asked
42
to translate into German a prepared telegram that would be
sent to Hitler in connection with the return home of the Soviet
delegation. I was to send this telegram from the Poznan railway
station where the train was due to stay 15 or 20 minutes to
await a change of engine. Getting off the train I saw that the
war-damaged building of the station was quite a long way off
and that furthermore there were a number of goods trains on
the lines between me and it. On the platform I could make out
the silhouettes of tanks and guns standing there covered in green
tarpaulin. I had to climb under the trucks and jump across the
barely filled-in bomb craters before I finally made it to the
station which had been partially gutted by shells. I found the
postoffice and telegraph which was located in the undamaged part
of the station building. The post-office clerk raised his eyebrows
in astonishment as he read the text of my telegram, but he said
nothing and just took the money and wrote out a receipt.
Probably this was the first telegram that had been sent to Hitler at
the Reichskanzlei via the ordinary postal service.
When I turned to go the clerk suddenly found his voice and
started to say something, but I did not hear him as I was
hurrying so as not to miss my train. The engine had already been
coupled and next to my carriage I could see our commandant
and the station master dressed in his railway uniform
with a wide red belt. Just as I put my foot on the steps, the
train pulled out.
Back in my compartment I decided to rest for a while, but
a few minutes later I was again summoned to Molotov's saloon
carriage. As I entered he was sitting at his desk, reading.
Looking up he told me to sit down and I perched myself on the edge
of a seat by the blacked-out window.
``We've had a little discussion,'' Molotov began, ``and have
come to the conclusion that since you have been present at talks
with the leaders of the German government, there is no point
in your returning to work at the Commissariat of Foreign Trade.
What would you say to your being transferred to the
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs?''
``That would be a great honour, but I'm afraid I have no
specialised training.''
``That doesn't matter,'' replied Molotov, ``We've all had to
learn different things.''
43
He looked at me carefully and after a short silence said:
``I'll speak to Mikoyan when we get to Moscow. I think he'll
agree. You'll be working under me as an adviser on German
affairs and as an interpreter. Possibly also Comrade Stalin will
need you when he has talks with the Germans. That's all, you
may go.''
I returned to my compartment. Sleep was now quite out of
the question. What strange twists of fate there are. If someone
had told me before that I would be in the diplomatic service
and even act as an interpreter for the top leaders in the Soviet
Union, I simply would not have believed it. I sat there
remembering how it had all begun.
In 1938 I graduated from the Kiev Industrial Institute and
went to work as an engineer at the Arsenal Plant, which was
famous for its revolutionary traditions. Barely four months later
I was called up for active military service and sent to
Vladivostok to join the Pacific Ocean Fleet. There I was due to serve
for five years---the privileges that had been previously introduced
for persons with higher education did not last long and
graduates were required to serve the full time like everyone else.
I shall not describe our life in the Navy. Having specialised
technical knowledge we worked in the engineering department,
but the rest of the time we were just as all the other Red Navy
sailors who found themselves under the watchful eye of
pettyofficer Mishchenko. Actually, he was not that bad. It was just
that he was very exacting towards new recruits with higher
education, believing that they had to have a strict eye kept on
them. And so the weeks passed and we gradually got into a daily
routine with duties, extra duties, night alarms, which our
pettyofficer loved to spring on us, and rare leaves when we could go
into town, walk along Lenin Street, admire the beautiful views
of the Zolotoi Rog bay or look at the fanciful silhouettes of
the hills that lay beyond the town and that stood out so
sharply on a winter evening against the amazingly clear Far
Eastern skies.
One day in early 1939 the petty-officer called me and said
that the next day I was to report to the Pacific Fleet
Headquarters. I was so surprised that I could not restrain myself from
asking who wanted to see me and why. The petty-officer told
me that instead of asking questions I should get my full-dress
44
uniform ready. This I did, but I could nardly stop wondering
what the call was all about. In the several months that I had
been in the service I had done nothing that could attract the
attention of the commanding officers.
But all my guesswork, as it turned out, was far from the mark.
The real reason why I had been summoned was this: not long
before I had begun my service all the commanding officers of
the Pacific Fleet had been changed and the new C-in-C,
Admiral Kuznetsov, his Chief-of-Staff, Captain Bogdenko and the
Chief of the Engineering Department, Captain Vorontsov, found
that in taking up their commands they were required among
other duties to learn English. But, there were no teachers in the
town who could be allowed inside the HQ building. So the
head of personnel was ordered to find out if any of the
servicemen had a knowledge of English and it was this that brought
my personal record to their attention.
When I was a child, my parents had made me learn German
and English, justly assuming that whatever I should do in my
life a knowledge of foreign languages would always be useful.
Of course, at the time I had a different opinion on this matter.
But no matter how hard I tried to get out of it, I had to study.
Even at school I had a good knowledge of both languages and
then when I left it at 16 I attended special three-year evening
classes in English, German and Spanish. I chose Spanish because
there was a war going on in Spain and all my friends dreamed
of joining the International Brigade. As it turned out, I never
went to Spain, but my knowledge of German and English played
a decisive role in my life.
At the appointed time, my uniform cleaned and ironed, I
reported to the HQ. I was amazed at the corridors there which
were all faced with dark-oak paneling and laid with thick, soft
carpets. I was also pleasantly surprised by the polite and
dignified manner of the guards who checked my pass and the spacious
office of the chief-of-staff which was hung with maps. As I
crossed the threshold I was full of excitement. I had the feeling
that I was entering on some mysterious and alluring journey...
As I entered the office the slightly stout, but still young captain
got slowly to his~ feet from behind his desk. This was Bogdenko,
Chief-of-Staff of the Pacific Fleet. Next to the table in an
armchair Captain Vorontsov remained seated. Bogdenko told me
45
casually to stand at ease and then invited me to sit down in
the vacant arm-chair. Then, taking a yellow file from the table,
he began to look through it.
``It says here you have a good command of English,'' he
began. ``Is that true?''
``Yes, sir!''
``When did you learn it and where did you graduate from?''
I explained to him.
Bogdenko started looking through the file again. He took from
his tunic pocket a carefully folded handkerchief and wiped his
upper lip. Then he said:
``Gould you teach English?''
``I don't know. I never have taught it. I'm an engineer by
profession.''
``We know that, but you probably remember how you were
taught.''
``Yes, I do".
``So you could probably teach others the same way.''
``Well, I've never had to teach, but if it's an order, I can
try".
``That's another matter. The point at the moment is that the
C-in-G, the chief-of-staff and the chief of the engineering
department are required to learn English---on the other side of the
ocean we've got the United States. Do you realise what that
means?''
``I do, Comrade Captain.''
``We want you to teach us English.''
``Aye-aye, sir!" I replied and stood at attention.
``Sit down,'' said Vorontsov. ``Let's discuss the details.''
They told me that each lesson would last two academic hours
and there would be two such lessons per week. For each
academic hour I would receive 25 roubles. My commanding officer
would be instructed to give me time off to work in the town
library where I would prepare for my lessons.
When I left the HQ building I was floating on air. This was
undoubtedly something unbelievable that had happened in my
life, I thought as I went back. Henceforth I would no longer be
totally dependent on my petty-officer and furthermore I would
have a bit of money in my pocket. This was very important since
all we got in the navy was 12 roubles per month.
46
I began to prepare for lessons seriously. Of course, I was
helped by a good knowledge of the language and the fact that
I had not forgotten how I was taught myself. Furthermore, my
pupils were serious and diligent. Things went well and I was
soon able to buy a camera which made me popular among the
other sailors. All in all, life could not be better, but,
unfortunately, nothing lasts forever.
Admiral Kuznetsov was appointed People's Commissar of the
Navy. He left for Moscow and shortly afterwards was followed
by both Bogdenko and Vorontsov. The new C-in-C apparently
had no time to learn English, or at any rate I was no longer
required. Once again I was under the control of the petty-officer
who didn't fail to make up for lost time with a lot of extra
duties. Life went on as before with only the occasional service
trip to the picturesque Russky Island. Sometimes on leave in the
hot weather I was able to go to the place known as 19th
Kilometre where there was a fine beach.
But summer in the Far East is changeable and passes rapidly.
It was soon replaced by the autumn of 1939 which brought with
it the thunder clouds of the Second World War. Events followed
each other with astounding rapidity and millions watched them
with alarm. The talks that had been going on for many months
between Britain, France and the Soviet Union ended without
result. Then there was the non-aggression pact between the
Soviet Union and Germany which was immediately followed by the
Soviet-German trade agreement. This also included deliveries
for our Navy and required people who knew German. There was
no question of training special personnel because time was
pressing. The obligations incurred under the trade agreement had to
be fulfilled as soon as possible, especially since after the German
invasion of Poland and the British and French declaration of
war on Germany the international situation deteriorated
considerably. Thus the personnel department of the People's
Commissariat of the Navy started looking hard for people who knew
German. At this point one of my former ``pupils'' from
Vladivostok remembered me and that I knew German as well as
English, for I suddenly received orders to go to Moscow and report
to the GHQ of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.
The journey from Vladivostok to Moscow on the Trans--
Siberian express took ten days then---which was more than enough
47
time for thinking about things. But however much I tried to
guess what awaited me, I could never imagine a hundredth part
of that which actually did happen.
In early spring, 1940, the People's Commissariat of Foreign
Trade sent a purchasing commission to Germany headed by
I. T. Tevosyan, then People's Commissar for the Shipbuilding
Industry. The commission included many prominent figures in
Soviet industry as well as military experts and scientists. I too
was included in the commission. It was my first trip abroad and
I found it full of interest. We visited Berlin, I remember, and
many other towns as well.
Tevosyan had his own translator, a woman who knew German
very well. But once during talks with the management of a
German company in Essen the conversation turned to technical
details and some difficulty was experienced in translating the
technical terminology. I offered my services and the problem was
soon sorted out. Tevosyan praised me and then took me with
him as a translator on a trip around Germany. We visited the
submarine base at Kiel and the shipyards at Bremen and
Hamburg. In early April we went to Holland where refrigerator ships
were being built for the Soviet Union.
In Holland we learned that the Wehrmacht had invaded
Denmark and Norway. The situation in Western Europe had
deteriorated and Tevosyan was urgently recalled to Moscow. But
many of the members of the purchasing commission remained in
Germany to complete the deals and observe their fulfilment. I
was sent to the Krupp factories in Essen. There, together with
other Soviet specialists, I received the equipment that had been
ordered from the Germans in accordance with the trade
agreement. After the Germans occupied Holland and Belgium in May,
I was instructed to accompany Kormilitsyn, the deputy trade
representative of the USSR in Berlin, on a trip around these
countries to check on the condition of the ships and other equipment
that was being manufactured there in accordance with orders
placed by the USSR. Many of the Dutch and Belgian towns
were terrible to look upon and they were still smoking after the
barbaric attacks of the Luftwaffe.
Back in Berlin I received an urgent call to return to Moscow
and report to the Secretariat of the People's Commissar of
Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan. It turned out that Tevosyan had
48
mentioned me to Mikoyan, and since important trade talks were
due to take place in Moscow with the Germans it was decided
that I should participate as a specialist who knew German. I
thus became an adviser at the Secretariat of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Trade on matters concerned with Germany.
My duties at this new post included translating at talks between
the People's Commissar and German representatives.
But I was not destined to stay here for long. Shortly after the
November holiday I was called at about three o'clock in the
morning---we used to work through the night in those days---by
Mikoyan himself. I went to his office where he told me I had
to report immediately to the Secretariat of the Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars.
``My car is waiting for you below,'' he said. ``Use it so as not
to waste time getting a pass. Go through the Spassky Gates right
to the Council of People's Commissars' building. They are
waiting for you there, so get going.''
Without any questions I quickly left his office and ran down
the staircase. A few minutes later I was standing in one of the
long corridors of the Kremlin in front of a tall oak door on
which was a plate bearing the inscription in gold letters: ``
Reception Room of the Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR''. I hesitated a bit before opening the door.
In the reception room I was met by S. P. Kozyrev, who was
then an assistant of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.
He courteously offered me a seat and then went tlhrough a door
leading into the next room. About five minutes later he came
out and said: ``Comrade Molotov will see you now.''
Entering the room I saw Molotov bending over his desk. I
stopped, not knowing whether to go any nearer or not. Then he
looked up from his work and I saw the face that was very
familiar to me from the portraits, with its brown, slightly screwed up
eyes. He pointed to an arm-chair that was near his desk and
invited me to sit down.
``Mikoyan has spoken about you. He says that you can cope
with the work of an interpreter. Tomorrow a government
delegation of which I am in charge is going to Berlin for important
talks with the German government. We think you will be of use
to us, especially since you have some experience of working in
Germany and of living among the Germans. Do you agree?''
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__
4---1996
49
``I serve the Soviet Union,'' I said. I could think of no better
reply than the one used by Soviet servicemen.
``Very well, you may go. . .''
Molotov rose from his arm-chair, held out his hand and smiled
slightly.
The following morning I received a diplomatic passport and
at TsUM (the Central Department Store) I was given a dark
suit, a dark-grey light overcoat and a wide-brimmed trilby hat.
This dress was de rigueur for all members of the delegation. I
also took a few clothes with me that I had bought during my
earlier stay in Berlin. Thus began my diplomatic career.
The work of an interpreter at high-level inter-governmental
talks, like all other diplomatic functions, requires an extremely
broad general knowledge, and I had to read a lot and improve
my education so as to fill in the gaps that were inevitable in
someone who had graduated from an engineering institute. I
benefited a lot from contact with my colleagues who had special
training and diplomatic experience. I recall with gratitude my
friendship with our political attache in Berlin, I. S. Chernyshev
who had a thorough knowledge of the history of international
relations, and the long conversations I had with V. S. Semyonov,
who on the eve of the war was the counsellor of the Soviet
embassy in Berlin. I was also greatly helped by Ya. Z. Surits,
G. N. Zarubin and also K. A. Umansky (who, soon after his
return from Washington where he had held the post of
ambassador, took charge of the press department of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the early months of the war).
Frequently late at night, when I had finished work, I would call
on him and we would talk about all sorts of interesting, and as
far as I was concerned, instructive things relating either to
history or current affairs.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Berlin on the Eve of the War
__ALPHA_LVL3__
New Year's Eve in the Grunewald
Soon after returning to Moscow I was sent to work at the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as an adviser on
matters relating to Germany. At that time there was a noticeable
lull in Soviet-German relations. The German ambassador,
Schulenburg had almost no contact with Soviet representatives, except
50
to make requests for such things as the whereabouts of German
graves in various parts of the USSR and for other matters which
were most likely suggested by military intelligence in the hope
of clarifying data relative to projected theatres of war. Naturally,
``curiosity'' of this kind was met with evasive replies or simple
refusals. In November Ambassador Shkvartsev was replaced by
Dekanozov but nothing important came from our embassy in
Berlin either, as far as official relations were concerned. Here the
atmosphere was cool.
Meanwhile from reports carried in the Western press and
communications from Soviet diplomats it became clear that the
German government was doing all it could to gain new allies
and draw them into the three-power pact. One after another
there came reports of the signing of treaties and agreements as
the reactionary rulers of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria bent
their heads before Hitler. Berlin was hastening to fortify its
positions in South-East Europe.
In late December I was given the post of first secretary at our
embassy in Berlin. V. N. Pavlov, who had held this post, was
being recalled to Moscow to take up an appointment in the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The choice fell to me,
as I was told, because I had taken part in the November
meetings with Hitler and Ribbentrop and was therefore au courant
with the current affairs.
In the afternoon of December 311 arrived at Friedrichstrasse
Station in Berlin. Quarters had been arranged for me at our
embassy in the Unter den Linden. The building dated back to the
early 19th century and had lost none of its original appearance
(it was destroyed during the bombing at the end of the war).
The great halls of the embassy and the winter garden with its
exotic plants were heated by air-stoves, but the living quarters
had huge white glared-tile stoves. My room was warm and
comfortable.
That evening I decided to take a walk around the town and
then for lack of a better alternative to see the New Year in one
of the local bierkellers. But down in the vestibule I bumped
into an old acquaintance of mine, who invited me to join him.
``There's a whole crowd of us going to the Grunewald. Our
naval attache, Admiral Vorontsov, has a big house there. It'll
make a nice evening.''
51
This was a much better than sitting all evening in a smokey
bierkeller, so I readily accepted the invitation. Furthermore, it
gave me the opportunity of meeting many of my new colleagues.
Besides I knew the master of the house well from the days of
my service in the Pacific Fleet back in 1938--1939.
Like all the houses in Berlin during the blackout, that of our
naval attache looked deserted. But inside it was bright and
warm and there were lots of people. The hostess, a tall,
wellproportioned brunette, brought each new arrival a glass of
vodka to warm him as he stood there shivering from cold and
damp Berlin weather. And a few of the guests had evidently
managed to get this procedure repeated, for soon it became quite
noisy. Everyone felt relaxed. Awaiting the guests in the next
room was a long banqueting table covered with food.
The radio was tuned to Moscow. A few minutes before
midnight our President Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin wished the
Soviet people a Happy New Year. We sat down at the table and
from all round came the popping of champagne bottles being
opened... Everyone seemed to have forgotten their daily cares
and worries. People were making jokes which were accompanied
by bursts of laughter. We wished each other a Happy New Year
and drank to the hope that 1941 would be another year of peace
for the Soviet Union. We had no idea then that this new year
would see the Soviet people plunged in the worst and most
bloody war in their history. On that night the war seemed a
long way away. There were no British air-raids and it was about
six o'clock in the morning when we took our leave and went
home.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Diplomatic Receptions
The grand reception that the German government usually
arranged for the diplomatic corps on the first day of the new
year was cancelled this time ``because of the war''. Instead, on
January 1 diplomats accredited in Berlin put their signatures in
a special book in the Reichskanzlei where in the name of the
Reichschancellor they were welcomed by Hans Lammers, the
tall, dry, thin-as-a-rake Head of the Reichskanzlei.
But among the embassies in Berlin the number of receptions
52
did not lessen. The diplomats tried to take any opportunity to
meet with their colleagues and exchange information, rumours
and forecasts for the future. And in the first months of 1941
rumours in Berlin were rife. They mainly centred around the
future course of the war. Who would be the next victim of German
aggression? When was the invasion of Britain due to begin?
When would the United States enter the war? What was Japan
up to? Would Swedish and Turkish neutrality be violated?
Would the Germans take the oil-producing regions of the Middle
East? All these and other questions were the subject of
arguments, guesses, forecasts and gossip.
At big receptions any new rumour would sweep through the
guests with lightning speed, although it was passed on as ``strictly
secret''. Here one could come face to face with the big
industrial magnates, top-ranking Nazis, famous film stars like Olga
Chekhova, Pola Negri and Willi Forst. Such receptions were
always noisy and full of people and to cross the hall you had to
squeeze your way through the crush and sometimes even use
your elbows. But most of the conversation was society talk.
Far more interesting were the smaller gatherings where each
of those present tried to learn the latest sensational news, which
often was not worth the trouble.
One of those who particularly liked to spread the ``latest
news" was the Turkish Ambassador Husrev Gerede, although he
never insisted on the authenticity of his information and usually
added something to the effect that he could not vouch for the
truth of what he had said, but as anything was possible he had
decided to pass on his interlocutors such and such a piece of
information in strict confidence.
Ambassador Gerede was a tall, dandyish man with thick, dark
eyebrows and a big nose. He would always offer aromatic Turkish
coffee, which was so thick that you felt as if your spoon could
stand up in the cup, Turkish delight and a famous Izmir liqueur.
He was exceptionally talkative, and often a meeting with him
developed into his monologue. On the wall in his office was a map
of the Middle East, and one of his favourite topics was the
analysis of various ways which the Germans might employ to seize
the oil-producing regions of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
``Turkey,'' Gerede would begin, ``declared more than once
that it will never allow German troops to pass through its
53
territory. If Germany tries anything of this kind, we shall resist,
and they know it. . .''
``So they have already made such a proposal to you?"
``Don't put words into my mouth! I didn't say that. It's just
that they know we won't let them through. But they
desperately need fuel for their tanks, their planes and their submarines.
Obviously they'll have to send in the paras to take Mosul. And
for that they need bases---Greece, the Aegean islands, Egypt. If
the Germans make a landing in Iraq, Turkey will be in a vice.
And then things will be very difficult for us, very difficult...''
``Do you mean that in such a situation Turkey might make
concessions to Berlin?''
``I didn't say that. We don't want to quarrel with anyone. The
British are our friends; the Germans are our friends. The British
say that in order to take Iraq the Germans are ready to demand
your consent to let their troops pass through the Caucasus. Of
course, this is nonsense. You would never do such a thing. And
they won't do anything. You've signed a non-aggression pact
with Hitler and I know from competent sources that he has
every intention of firmly abiding by it. It's all quite clear. There's
no point in the Germans attacking us either. Believe me, they'll
now concentrate on Egypt, they'll help Mussolini to take Greece
and then they'll land in Iraq. That's what they'll do, for sure. . .''
While thus expounding his idea, Gerede kept going up to
the map to try and convince whoever he was talking to that a
German landing in Mosul was Hitler's most likely next step. On
parting he would always say:
``If you hear anything about German plans in the Middle
East, do let me know. It's very important.''
But Ambassador Gerede was far from being as simple as he
might appear at first sight. He maintained very close contacts
with the Nazi leaders and possibly had even agreed with
Wilhelmstrasse to help further their misinformation campaign. Talks
about forthcoming operations in the Middle East might well
serve to divert attention from Berlin's real aims.
Another ``character'' among the diplomatic corps in Berlin
was General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador. Although
he was always dressed according to the requirements of
diplomatic protocol and even wore a top hat, this could not hide
his military bearing. In build he was short and stout and his
54
speech was so abrupt that it sounded like military orders. The
energetic gestures he was always making with his right hand as
he spoke gave you the impression that he was cutting down an
unseen enemy with a samurai sword.
Oshima made no attempt to hide his sympathy for the Nazis,
and the Germans were not slow to exploit this. He was often
taken round to see the places where recent battles had been fought
in the West and then, on his return to Berlin, never tired of
extolling the exploits of the German army among his fellow
diplomats. And he was no less enthusiastic about Hitler's ``new
order" in Europe.
``Hitler knows how to hold in leash the countries he's
conquered,'' Oshima would say. ``This is an earnest of the success
of the plans for restructuring the world now being worked out
by the Axis powers. . .''
In talks with Soviet diplomats Oshima never lost an
opportunity to recall that he had once served in the Kwantung army
and knew the Far East well. He would go on to expound his
idea that it was not necessary for the Soviet Union to maintain
large troop formations on the Manchurian border (at the time
Manchuria was under Japanese occupation).
``The main events,'' he would argue, ``are now taking place
in Europe, and it is there that the main interests of the Soviet
Union are focused. But at the same time your attention is also
being distracted by the Far East. Considerable material resources
and military forces are being assigned to this region. The result
is that two large masses of heavily armed troops now confront
each other along the Manchurian border, and this is very
dangerous. As a military man I know well that when two large
armies, equipped with all types of weapons, stand face to face
for a long period of time, anything can happen, even if this is
not what the political leaders want. One of the two sides may
not be able to withstand the tension, an incident will occur and
then it will be too late to stop things from getting out of hand.
I know the esprit de corps of the Soviet Army in the Far East.
But the Japanese Kwantung Army's esprit de corps is high too.
These armies should not be allowed to face each other for any
length of time. This is dangerous. I have already written to my
government that it would be a good idea to reduce the troop
concentrations there and withdraw the troops from the border
55
region so that they are not in direct contact with the Soviet
troops. I should also advise you to express the same idea to your
government, so that steps could be taken in this direction as
soon as possible. ..''
At every meeting with us Oshima returned to this subject.
What was his motive? Perhaps he thought that if his idea were
put into practice Japan would be able to release its forces for
the operations that Tokyo was then planning in South-East
Asia? Or perhaps he was hoping to trick the Soviet Union into
weakening its defences in the Far East so that at a suitable
moment Japan could suddenly attack the Soviet Union? In any
case it is difficult to believe that Oshima seriously thought his
rather primitive agitation might be successful. But he never tired
of propagandising his plan for the mutual withdrawal of troops
in the Far East despite its unreality and even naivety given the
situation at the time. As for discussion of Hitler's future military
actions he tended to evade any kind of involvement in this,
although he undoubtedly knew more about them than other
members of the diplomatic corps.
I should also like to mention a meeting with Andric, the
Yugoslav Envoy, which I remember particularly well. His residence
was in the Tiergarten, a new district which had been assigned to
diplomatic representatives, and was still not completely built up.
The pompose building of the Italian embassy was almost ready
and work was coming to an end on the Japanese mission. But
the house where the Yugoslav legation was located and its
grounds were already completed. It was designed by architects
from Belgrade, and its severe lines and modern decor and
furnishings made a very pleasant impression.
The meeting with Andric took place in early April. The Nazi
newspapers at the time had launched a furious anti-Yugoslav
campaign. Every day Volkischer Beobachter and other papers
wrote about ``persecutions'' of the German minority in Serbia.
There were photographs showing groups of ``refugees'' or, as
they were described in the articles, ``the victims of Yugoslav
terror''. In actual fact, of course, no one was persecuting the
Germans in Yugoslavia---it was all just typical Nazi provocation.
Incidents in Yugoslavia and the flight of German citizens from
that country were specially organised by Nazi agents. On the
pretext of ``protecting'' the German minority Hitler intended to
56
invade Yugoslavia. And, indubitably, the main objective he
pursued in invading ``recalcitrant'' Yugoslavia was to secure his
rear in South-East Europe before invading the Soviet Union.
At the end of March the Yugoslav government under
Cvetkovic had signed a document in Vienna, allying Yugoslavia to
the Axis powers. Immediately afterwards there had been a coup
in Belgrade, and although the government of General Simovic
had proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with
Berlin, Hitler, no longer trusting Belgrade, decided to occupy the
country and at the same time help Mussolini to deal with Greece.
Andric, who was always restrained and outwardly calm, could
not now hide his agitation. He understood what the Nazis were
after and that any day now his country would be invaded.
``What do they want from us?" he said bitterly. ``We don't
interfere with them. All this stuff about the 'persecution' of the
German minority is a put-up job from beginning to end. All
we want is for them to leave us alone. But what they've grabbed
in Europe is no longer enough for them. They're already out for
our blood. They're wrong if they think they can get away with
it. Our people won't give in. We won't stop fighting even if they
succeed in occupying our country. They'll pay dearly for it...''
There was general indignation in Yugoslavia at Hitler's
provocations. Measures were hastily taken to resist the Nazi
aggressor. On April 5, a Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of friendship and
nonaggression was signed in Moscow, which gave rise to an outburst
of hysteria among Nazi quarters in Berlin. But, of course, it was
too late for the Soviet Union to give practical aid to the
Yugoslav people. On the night of April 5, German troops treacherously
invaded Yugoslavia, spreading death and destruction in their
path.
The Yugoslav envoy's words turned out prophetic. His people
did not submit. They fought as partisans and did more and more
damage to the Nazi invaders.. .
Towards the end of April I was invited to cocktails by
Mr. Patterson, the First Secretary of the United States embassy
in Berlin. He was reputed to be a very rich man and rented at
his own expense a luxurious three-storey building in
Charlottenburg where he could easily invite twenty or thirty people to
dinner or throw a cocktail party for three hundred.
Since Patterson lived fairly far from the city centre and his
57
guests usually departed late, I took a car from our embassy
garage. Because of the blackout it was always pitch-dark in Berlin
at night, but that evening the moon was shining and with my
wing lights switched off I was able to drive through the deserted
streets. Berlin looked like a ghost city on some unknown planet.
I soon arrived at Patterson's house outside which stood a whole
line of cars.
In the large drawing-room there were a lot of people and it
was difficult at first to make out all those present, for the room
was lit only by a cheerfully burning fire in the fire-place and a
few dim wall lamps. When my eyes got used to the gloom I
noticed that the guests were standing around in groups, holding
their glasses and chatting convivially.
After welcoming me to the party, Patterson said:
``There's a man here I'd like to introduce you to. . .''
He led me to the fire-place where a tall, lean officer in
Luftwaffe uniform, a glass of whiskey in his hand, stood talking to a
number of American diplomats I knew. His tanned face stood
out among the other guests.
``Let me introduce you'', said Patterson. ``The major has just
come back from Africa on leave...''
The major was evidently an experienced military pilot. He
spoke readily about operations in Western Europe and North
Africa, and made no attempt to hide the fact that despite all
the over-optimistic reports from the Wehrmacht GHQ the
Germans were far from having things all their own way in the
fighting in Africa. It seemed a little strange to me that a
German officer should behave so freely in the house of an American
diplomat, but possibly this was because he had known Patterson
for a long time. From some of the remarks made I got the
impression that they had met in the United States before the war.
Towards the end of the evening I happened to find myself
alone with the German major. Smoking his cigar he looked
straight at me and said, slightly lowering his voice:
``Patterson wants me to tell you something. You see, I'm not
on leave at all. My squadron had been withdrawn from North
Africa and yesterday we received orders to move east, to the
Lodz area. It is possible that does not mean very much, but I
happen to know that many other units have recently been
transferred to your borders. I don't know what this could mean, but
58
I personally would not want anything to happen between our
two countries. I am telling you this confidentially of course.''
This was such unprecedented thing that for a moment I was
at a loss: an officer of the Hitler Wehrmacht passing information
on to a Soviet diplomat, which, if true, would undoubtedly be
classified as top secret. He was risking his life. On the other
hand, it could be some sort of provocation. In any case, I was
not sure how far he could be trusted, and so I decided to answer
in a restrained and fairly stereotyped manner. I thanked him for
the information, which was very interesting, but, I said, I
assumed that Germany would observe the non-aggression pact.
``As for the Soviet Union,'' I said, ``it wants peace to be
maintained between us. So let us hope for the best...''
``Well, as you wish. You know better, I suppose,'' the major
smiled. Soon after that he said his good-byes and left.
Of course, this information, like everything else that was of
interest in our conversations at diplomatic receptions, was
included in a regular embassy report that was telegraphed to Moscow.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Daily Life at the Embassy
Our contacts with the political leaders of the Third Reich
were entirely of an official character and were extremely limited.
Of the top Nazis only Ribbentrop, and then not always, attended
receptions at our embassy. Sometimes field marshals Keitel and
Milch came, but they usually did not stay long, saying they
were busy. Only two persons came to us regularly: the
Staatssekretar, Otto Meissner, a man of the ``old school" (he had held
this post under Hindenburg) and one that was considered close
to Hitler, and a certain Baron von Tschaikowski, whose visiting
card described him as a ``retired diplomat''. Although the latter
held no official post, he had the reputation of being highly
informed and trusted in the Wilhelmstrasse. Both Meissner and
von Tschaikowski were always talking about the need to improve
Soviet-German relations. If one was to believe their words the
German government thought of nothing else but of making
relations between our two countries closer and more sincere.
At a lunch in the embassy in early June 1941, that is some
two weeks before the outbreak of the war, Meissner hinted that
59
the Reichskanzlei was working out some new proposals for
strengthening Soviet-German relations, which the Fiihrer
intended shortly to present to Moscow. This, of course, was nothing
but pure misinformation. Meissner and von Tschaikowski were
out to blunt the vigilance of Soviet people.
A number of German businessmen, however, did maintain
close contacts with the embassy. We were frequently visited by
the directors of such firms as AEG, Krupp, Mannesmann,
Siemens-Schuckert, Rheinmetall-Borsig, Zeiss-Ikon and Telefunken.
Our representatives were also invited to visit their factories in
various parts of Germany. I personally went to the Krupp
plants at Essen, to the shipyards at Bremen and to the
Mannesmann factory at Magdeburg. Of course, the Soviet diplomats
were shown only a part of what the factories were producing.
It is also quite likely that some of these visits were specially
organised as part of Hitler's misinformation campaign. But I am
sure that many ot the industrialists we spoke to really did believe
that the Soviet Union and Germany could do much to
supplement each other economically and that the development of trade
would be to the good of both.
A frequent guest at the Soviet embassy was a certain Herr
Caspar, one of the directors of the Mannesmann Company. He
was a tall, elegantly dressed man of middle age. In his
buttonhole he always wore a red carnation and he used to say that
his nickname was ``red Caspar'', assuring us that this was not
so much to do with the red carnation as with his political
convictions which he described as ``extreme left''. Caspar could permit
himself this kind of extravagance, inasmuch as he was a very
rich man and had great weight in the business world.
At the time the Soviet Trade Mission had put in an order
for Mannesmann to supply a large consignment of steel pipes,
which was one more proof for the directors of the firm that it
was possible to do big business deals with the USSR.
During one of his visits to the embassy Caspar said that he
wanted very much for relations between the USSR and Germany
to develop favourably. His own company, he said, was sincerely
interested in this. But, unfortunately, there were forces in
Germany that did not understand where the true interests of their
country lay. And they could, he said, bring the country to the
brink of catastrophe once again...
60
Gaspar, incidentally, was one of those few businessmen in
the Third Reich who warned us of the danger that threatened
us and of the need for vigilance and caution, although he said
nothing concrete about Hitler's forthcoming attack on the
Soviet Union.
We tried to utilise the temporary normalisation of relations
with Nazi Germany to free a number of progressive writers,
scientists, prominent anti-fascists and communist leaders from
the clutches of the Gestapo. Both in Berlin and in Moscow the
Germans frequently approached us to allow various persons to
return to the Reich. Some of these people were particularly
needed by the Germans, and in those cases where the Soviet
authorities considered it possible to satisfy the German request, we made
counter-requests for persons whom we wanted to be allowed
to go to the Soviet Union. In this way many anti-fascists,
including former International Brigade fighters in Spain that had been
captured by the Nazis in France, were released.
However, these efforts at times took months and were not
always successful. For instance, we never managed to get the
Germans to agree to allow Paul Langevin, the world-famous
French physicist, to leave for the USSR. There was every reason
to fear for the life of this prominent progressive scientist. In 1935
Langevin had been a member of the Popular Front in France
and had been elected an honorary member of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR. He had never attempted to conceal his
anti-fascist views.
For this the Germans never forgave him. In response to our
numerous requests the German ministry of foreign affairs alleged
at first that he could not be found. Then it frankly stated that
since Langevin had been engaged not only in science but also
in activity that was ``hostile to Germany'', the authorities refused
to hand him over. To try and get his release we even detained
a certain character whose exit from the USSR was insistently
demanded by the General authorities. But even this was no use.
Langevin remained in Nazi hands. At the end of 1941 he was
arrested and thrown into prison. Later he was sent to Troyes
under Gestapo surveillance. His life might have ended tragically
had he not been able to escape with the help of resistance
fighters and reach neutral Switzerland. After the liberation of France
in 1944 Langevin returned to Paris and joined the Communist
61
party. He died in 1946 and was buried in the Pantheon as a
national hero.
But the long talks that our embassy in Berlin conducted in
early 1941 with the object of securing the release of Jean-Richard
Bloch were successful. I remember how excited I felt when in
the spring of 1941 I met Bloch at the Friedrichstrasse Station
in Berlin. I can still see in my mind's eye that small terribly thin
figure with a brown bag and a plaid in his hand. I remember
his high forehead, his expressive eyes and face and his sad smile
as he took his first steps to freedom. The Gestapo agent in civilian
clothes that handed him over to me asked me to sign a receipt
as if he were passing over a piece of baggage. We took
JeanRichard Bloch to the embassy, where a room had been made
ready for him. The next day a group of Soviet diplomats saw
him off to Moscow from Berlin. He laughed and joked and was
happy to be going to the Soviet Union.
Jean-Richard Bloch was a great friend of Remain Rolland
and Louis Aragon. He spent the war years in the Soviet Union
and did much to mobilise the world progressive public to fight
against fascism. He published his passionate diatribes in both
the Soviet and the foreign press and frequently appealed on the
radio to the resistance fighters to intensify their struggle against
the enemy. After the war Bloch returned to France where he
died in 1947.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Box in the Admiralspalast
When the La Scala Opera from Milan visited Berlin in the
early spring of 1941 the German foreign ministry arranged a
reception to which all the diplomats accredited in Berlin were
invited. The La Scala tour happened to coincide with the stay
in Berlin of Count Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and therefore the reception was attended by Ribbentrop
and the Reich's top officials as well as the persons who
accompanied Ciano.
The guests were informed that they were to come in tail-coats
or full-dress uniforms and the ladies in evening dress. Like the
other diplomats from our embassy I was also required to wear a
tail-coat. At that time there was no dress uniform for members
of the staff of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and
62
so all Soviet diplomats arriving in a foreign country were kitted
up with tail-coats, top hats, white silk scarves and black cloaks
that were fastened with gilded chains, all of which looked very
picturesque. It was not until 1944 that we had our own foreign
ministry uniform, which, incidentally, is no longer worn.
The reception was due to begin at eight o'clock at the
Admiralspalast Theatre, which was on Friedrichstrasse not far from
the railway station. The guests certainly looked magnificent,
particularly the wives of the Nazi dignitaries. In their decollete
evening gowns, their diamonds and expensive furs they were
clearly out to rival each other.
In the centre of the foyer stood Ribbentrop and Ciano,
surrounded by men in dandyish, military-style uniforms. The
diplomats ascended the broad marble staircase, greeted both ministers
and then proceeded into a neighbouring hall, where a large
brightly coloured moving circle of guests had formed, among
whom waiters skilfully wove their way carrying glasses of
champagne on silver trays.
A bell rang and the guests were invited to take their seats.
That evening Wagner's Tannhauser was on. We went up to the
dress circle where a box had been assigned for the Soviet
diplomats. The lights slowly went out and the orchestra struck the
first majestic chords of the overture.
But it was not only the fine performance given by the famous
La Scala singers that I remember about that evening. During
the interval Alfieri, the Italian ambassador, came to our box.
This outspoken fascist, who was a bitter enemy of our country,
was nevertheless emphatically courteous towards the Soviet
diplomats. As it happened, I had remained in the box alone with
the Soviet ambassador, and Alfieri came and sat next to me.
``I am very pleased,'' he began, ``to be able to take this
opportunity of showing you, Mr. Ambassador, and your colleagues the
superb art of our magnificent La Scala. We have heard of the
great Russian operatic school and of the wonderful voices of
the singers at the Bolshoi Theatre, and I therefore consider it a
great honour to be able to present for your strict judgement the
art of Italian opera singers.''
We politely thanked Alfieri for his kindness and assured him
that the performance gave us great pleasure.
The Italian bowed low and said that his country would be
63
very pleased to welcome the company of the famous Bolshoi
Theatre.
``Soon the Axis powers,'' he continued, ``will bring the war
to a victorious end and then a new era will begin in relations
between our peoples. I consider it most beneficial that everything
is going well now. Broad prospects open before us and now is
the time for us to think about the development of Soviet-Italian
cultural ties so that we can be ready to take advantage of the
period that will ensue after the forthcoming victory.''
``But in our view,'' the Soviet ambassador replied, ``a speedy
end to the war is so far nowhere in sight.''
Alfieri was embarrassed; he clearly had not expected such a
reaction.
``You should have no doubts about it, Your Excellency,'' he
replied, after a short pause. ``Perhaps you have in mind the fact
that the Italian army is experiencing some difficulties in Greece
and Albania? It is a pity that I haven't seen you for such a long
time---I should have visited you and explained the situation. The
point is that there are considerable forces in both Italy and
Germany which are getting ready to strike a blow at England
and its positions in the Middle East. And I can tell you in
confidence that this operation has been fully planned and will be
put into effect as soon as the way across the Balkans is clear to
the oil regions of the Arabian Peninsula. Soon the enormous
force that has already been concentrated in the appropriate
areas will come down with all its might against the Anglo--
Saxons. Believe me there will be nothing left for them but to
recognise our victory.''
``I'm afraid my understanding of the situation is quite
different,'' said the Soviet ambassador. ``Furthermore, there seems to
be no indication that considerable forces of the Axis powers are
concentrated to strike against England, rather it's the other way
round...''
``I suppose you are referring to the transfer of certain units
to the east,'' replied the Italian diplomat in state of obvious
embarrassment. ``You should have no doubts on this score. We
simply want to trick the English and at the same time give our
troops the chance of a little rest where things are quiet. After
all they have a difficult operation ahead. Anyway, with the
modern roads and the dense railway system it won't take long to
64
get them to the Channel. As for Greece and Albania, they won't
last long. Unfortunately I cannot go into detail at the moment,
but believe me the way to the oil fields of the Middle East will
soon be clear. We'll be celebrating victory this year.''
The bell rang and the spectators rapidly began to take their
places. Alfieri bowed ceremonially and took his leave. The
curtain rose, but I continued to wonder what was the purpose of the
Italian ambassador's visit. His hints about Greece and Albania
were far too transparent: obviously, Giano had already come to
an agreement with the Germans about the Wehrmacht helping
the Italians out of the hopeless mess they were stuck in in the
Balkans. But what else? Was Alfieri hoping that his ``
disclosures" would make an additional contribution to the
misinformation campaign that had been intensified by the Nazis as
preparations for attacking the Soviet Union were getting underway?
Or did the ambassador really suppose that the next country in
line would be England? It is not beyond the bounds of
possibility that Italian politicians did indeed think that Hitler was
wary of invading the Soviet Union as long as England remained
undefeated in his rear and was supported by the might of
America. After all the more far-sighted Germans had always feared
a war on two fronts. Did Rome foresee that Hitler would ignore
this danger? The fact is, however, that it was only at the very
last moment that Hitler made Mussolini privy to his plans for
invading the Soviet Union.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Alarming Signals
Over a period of several months we at the embassy were able
to observe how Germany was steadily taking steps that were
obviously designed to prepare for operations on the Eastern Front.
Information about these preparations reached us from various
sources.
First of all there were our friends in Germany itself. In
various parts of the Reich and particularly in Berlin we knew that
anti-fascist groups like ``Die rote Kapelle" continued to function
underground. Overcoming immense difficulties and at times
risking their lives the German anti-fascists contrived to warn the
Soviet Union of the danger that threatened it. They passed on
__PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__
4---1996
65
important information about the preparations being made by the
Germans for an attack on the USSR.
In mid-February a German printer came to the Soviet
consulate in Berlin with a copy of a Russo-German phrase-book that
was being printed in a huge edition. The content of the
phrasebook left no doubt as to what it was designed for. For instance,
it contained in Latin transcription such phrases in Russian as
``Where is the collective farm chairman?'', ``Are you a
Communist?" ``Hands up!'', ``I'll shoot!'', ``Surrender!''. The phrase-book
was immediately sent to Moscow.
After the Nazis had occupied Poland only one man, the
superintendent Vasilyev, was left at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw.
He was responsible for Soviet property throughout the whole
territory of the ``Generalgouvernement'', as the Germans called
occupied Polish lands and in this connection he often had to visit
areas that lay adjacent to the Soviet border. Whenever he came
to Berlin on business Vasilyev naturally informed us of
everything he had seen.
Obviously, the Germans tried to restrict his opportunities for
movement and in general did everything they could to hide their
aggressive military preparations in the East. But Vasilyev could
not help noticing that the railways were full of special military
trains, that the Polish towns literally swarmed with Wehrmacht
soldiers and that the number of troops in Poland was steadily
increasing. Vasilyev's observations were supported by
information that reached us from other sources.
Every morning the press-attache (at the time it was A. A.
Smirnov until his recall to Moscow when the post went to I. M.
Lavrov) would give a brief talk for the diplomatic staff on German
and foreign press reports. In the early months of 1941 he
increasingly drew our attention to complaints in the German
newspapers in connection with foreign press reports alleging that the
Soviet Union was making ``military preparations" along the
German border. It was not difficult to see where this
information was coming from. As a rule, it appeared first in the
American reactionary press, often with references to German sources
in neutral countries. Obviously, what we had here was
provocative misinformation that owed its origins to German agents
abroad. Having no real facts on which to base their reports about
a ``Soviet threat" for the simple reason that such facts did not
66
exist, the Nazi propaganda machine fabricated information about
Soviet ``military preparations" on its western borders. These
totally false reports were then fed through the information
agencies and press organs in other countries, so that when they turned
up in American and other foreign newspapers the German press
could refer to them and sanctimoniously complain that reports
of this kind served to ``cloud'' Soviet-German relations. All this
also showed that the German authorities were interested in
spreading throughout the world the false idea that the Soviet
Union was ``threatening'' Germany.
At the same time increasingly frequent references to Hitler's
book, Mein Kampf, were being made in the German press. These
references had almost disappeared during the months that
immediately followed the signing of the Soviet-German non--
aggression pact in 1939. It is true that this gospel of Nazism written
by Hitler between 1924 and 1926, had never been called in
question in the Third Reich. The book with a photograph of
Hitler on the front cover could be seen in the windows of all
bookshops and was yearly published in enormous editions,
bringing Hitler millions of marks. But now German propaganda
began to refer to it more and more often, as it ruminated upon
the further plans of ``Great Germany".
Mein Kampf outlines Hitler's aggressive aims and plans with
particular clarity. It points out that Germany should not simply
limit itself to a demand for the restoration of the 1914 borders.
The country needed more Lebensraum. There were, Hitler stated
in the book, some 80 million Germans in Europe, and in less
than a century this number would, increase to 250 million.
Therefore, he insists, other peoples should make room for them.
Such was Hitler's fundamental premise. And the book is no
less clear and direct about the practical steps needed to achieve
this ``foreign policy" objective. France is referred to as the
``mortal enemy of the German nation'', but its ``destruction'' is
only one of the conditions for the attainment of Hitler's
farreaching aims. Hitler writes about a ``decisive battle" with France,
but Germany, he says, should look upon the destruction of
France as a means enabling Germany to ultimately expand in
another direction...
In which direction? To this question also Mein Kampf gives
a quite unambiguous answer. First, says Hitler, Germany should
__PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__
5*
67
take those regions of the East where the German population is
predominant---Austria, Sudetenland and Poland's Western
provinces, including Danzig.
By 1941 all this had actually been done, although in a slightly
different order, but, on the other hand, on a much grander
scale. So what was to come next? Mein Kampf states it clearly:
the invasion of the Soviet Union.
None of these ideas so unequivocally expressed in Mein Kampf
had ever been refuted or revised by the Nazis. They remained
in force and were used by the Nazi propagandists when in the
spring of 1941, as if at somebody's command, they began to praise
Hitler's gospel...
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Hess Affair
In the middle of May Berlin was aroused by the report that
Rudolf Hess, Hitler's first deputy in the Nazi party, had
unexpectedly flown to England. Hess, who piloted the
Messerschmitt-110 himself, left Augsburg in Southern Germany on May 10
bound for Dungavel Castle, the Scottish residence of Lord
Hamilton with whom he was personally acquainted. However, Hess
had miscalculated the amount of fuel required and 14 kilometres
from his destination was forced to bale out near the village of
Eaglesham where he was detained by local farmers and handed
over to the authorities. For several days the British government
maintained silence, as did Berlin. It was only after London had
eventually made the flight public, did the German government
realise that the secret mission entrusted to Hess has been
unsuccessful. Then Hitler's headquarters at Berghof decided that
Hess's flight should be presented to the public as evidence of
his insanity. The official communique stated that Hess, a member
of the party, had evidently become obsessed with the idea that
through his own personal action he could still achieve mutual
understanding between Britain and Germany. In commentaries
that were clearly inspired the German press went even further
in pointing out that this Nazi leader was a mentally deranged
idealist who had hallucinations as a result of wounds received
in the First World War. The authors of these commentaries had
evidently overlooked the bitter irony contained in the fact that
this ``madman'' had until the day before been the second man
in the Nazi party. Moreover, according to Hitler's will, in the
68
event of his sudden death and the death of Goering, Hess was
to become the ``Fiihrer of the German nation".
Hitler understood the damage that Hess's unsuccessful flight
had done to his own prestige and that of his regime. In a bid
to cover up the traces he ordered Hess's associates to be arrested,
while Hess himself was removed from all posts he had occupied
and sentenced to be shot should he return to Germany. After the
fall of Hess, Bormann was appointed to be number two in the
Nazi party.
There can be no doubt, however, that Hitler pinned great
hopes on Hess's flight. German imperialists believed that they
would succeed in getting Germany's enemies, particularly England
to join the planned ``crusade'' against the ``Bolshevik menace''.
From the documents made available at the Nuremberg
Tribunal and other material published after the defeat of Nazi
Germany it has been established that from the summer of 1940
Hess was in correspondence with prominent British Munich
men. This correspondence was established through the mediation
of the Duke of Windsor, who had formerly been King Edward
VIII but who was forced to abdicate by reason of his
attachment to an American millionairess.
The Duke of Windsor was known for his pro-Nazi sympathies
and at one time Hitler had hoped to exploit him in a bid to
demoralise the British people and induce the British government
to sign a separate peace with Germany. When the Duke of
Windsor was on his way to voluntary exile in the Bahamas (he
had been appointed governor of the islands) he stopped off in
Portugal, where SS Brigadenfiihrer Walter Schellenberg, then
head of Department Six of the Main Security Administration of
the Reich, had been dispatched to contact him. Schellenberg
was instructed to persuade the duke to leave for Berlin and
appeal to the British people on German radio to conclude a
separate peace with Germany. For this service Hitler offered the duke
50 million Swiss francs. If attempts at persuasion should fail,
Schellenberg was to kidnap the duke and bring him to Hitler.
However, Hitler's emissary did not succeed in his objective, for
the former monarch was closely guarded by the British secret
service and Schellenberg was unable even to make contact
with him.
But to return to Hess. He used all his connections to fix up
69
his visit to England. At first this should have taken place in
December 1940, but the visit was postponed until Hitler's
aggressive operations in South-East Europe had been completed. When
Hess finally flew to England in May 1941 and began talks with
high-ranking British representatives the situation in that country
and in the rest of the world had changed radically; the men of
Munich could no longer implement their plans for a deal with
the Nazis.
The more far-sighted politicians in Britain and the United
States realised that Hitler only wanted a peace with them so as
to attack them later at a moment that suited him better. The
ruling quarters in Britain then saw clearly the threat presented
to British positions and British interests by German imperialism
which was trying to subjugate the whole world. Therefore they
were wary of any new deals with Germany, the more so since in
the past political experiments of this kind had invariably turned
to their disadvantage.
Thus, Hess' mission failed. He himself was tried at
Nuremberg among the chief Nazi war criminals. However, he managed
to escape the gallows---psychiatrists pronounced him mentally
deranged---and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In May 1941 we did not know, of course, all the details of
Hess' flight to England. But that it was an attempt to come to
an agreement with London against the Soviet Union was
indubitable. I recall one significant fact. One day in early May I
was at Wilhelmstrasse on my regular business. On some tables
in the reception room of the ministry of foreign affairs I saw a
number of pre-war magazines and brochures on ``Anglo-German
friendship" and its importance for the destiny of Europe and
the whole world (at the time of the Munich deal the Hitlerites
had been nursing this idea). Of course, all the diplomats
arriving at the ministry paid immediate attention to these brochures,
interpreting their appearance as a gesture towards England. And
they gave use to much guesswork, and speculation. The highly
suspicious flight of the ``insane'' Hess, coinciding as it did with
this, and the fact that the Germans were intensifying their
military preparations on the Eastern front could not but attract
considerable attention.
Increasingly alarming news was being received at the time by
the Soviet military attache, General Tupikov, and the naval
70
attache, Admiral Vorontsov. According to their information,
special military trains carrying troops and equipment had begun
to move east from the beginning of February 1941. In March
and April there was a continuous stream of tanks, artillery and
ammunition going in the same direction so that by the end of
May, according to all reports, large German forces and materiel
had been concentrated in the border zone.
At the same time the Germans made brazen attempts to test
the strength of the defences along the state borders of the
Soviet Union. These acts of provocation became particularly
frequent at the end of May and in early June. Almost daily the
embassy received instructions from Moscow to lodge protests
against these violations along the Soviet border. And it was not
only the German border guards, but soldiers of the Wehrmacht
that made systematic incursions into Soviet territory, opening
fire on and killing Soviet border guards. Planes displaying the
swastika brazenly flew deep into Soviet territory. All these facts
with precise indication of time and place were reported to the
German ministry of foreign affairs. At first Wilhelmstrasse
promised to investigate the matter, but then only issued statements
to the effect that the ``informaion has not been confirmed".
Then I recall another significant incident. Not far from the
embassy on the Unter den Linden there was a luxurious
photographer's studio owned by Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's personal
photographer. Eva Braun, Hitler's mistress, had once worked
there as a model. In one of the windows there was a portrait of
Hitler and above the portrait a large map. It became usual from
the outbreak of the war onwards for the map to show that part
of Europe where the fighting was about to begin or actually
took place. Thus in the early spring of 1940 Holland, Belgium,
Denmark and Norway were featured. Then for quite a long
while the map of France hung there. By early 1941 passers-by
could stop and look at the map of Yugoslavia and Greece. And
then suddenly, in late May, walking past Hoffmann's studio I
was surprised to see a large map of Eastern Europe which
included the Baltic states, Byelorussia, the Ukraine---a large part of the
Soviet Union from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. I could not
believe it. Without the slightest qualm Hoffmann was indicating
where the next theatre of war would be. It was as if he were
saying: ``Now it's the Soviet Union's turn".
71
In March rumours began to circulate in Berlin that Hitler was
preparing to attack the Soviet Union. Various dates were
mentioned, which were evidently intended to confuse us. There were,
for example, April 6, April 20, May 18 and, finally, June 22.
Reports of all these alarming signals were regularly transmitted
to Moscow by the embassy. In early May a group of our
diplomats were requested to put aside all their other job and occupy
themselves exclusively with studying, analysing and summarising
all the information reaching the embassy relative to Hitler's
preparations for war in the East...
By the end of May the group, which was headed by the
Counsellor V. S. Semyonov and the attache I. S. Chernyshov, had
compiled a circumstantial report, which, incidentally, included
relevant quotations from Mein Kampf. The main conclusion of
the report was that practical preparations had been completed
by Germany for an invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
ambassador, fearing that such decisive conclusions would not be to
the liking of Stalin, decided to tone down somewhat the text of
the report. But even so the conclusion was inescapable: Germany
was ready to attack the Soviet Union at any moment.
We members of the Soviet embassy staff in Berlin, were puzzled.
On the one hand, we possessed unequivocal information that
war was about to break out; on the other, nothing really seemed
to have happened. The wives and children of persons
employed at Soviet organisations in Germany and in the occupied
territories were not being sent home. On the contrary, new staff
members came almost daily, some with large families and some
with wives who were in the advanced stages of pregnancy.
Deliveries of Soviet goods to Germany continued, although the
Germans had almost completely ceased to fulfil their trade
commitments. On June 14 (a week before the German attack on the
Soviet Union!) the Soviet press published a TASS communique
which stated that ``according to information received by the
USSR, Germany is strictly observing the terms of the Soviet--
German non-aggression pact, as is the Soviet Union, in view of
which, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumours of Germany's
intentions to break off the pact and attack the Soviet Union are
completely unfounded.''
By this statement, the text of which was handed to
Schulenburg in Moscow, Stalin was obviously trying once more to probe
72
the intentions of the German government. But whatever foreign
policy aims this TASS communique had, its publication only
eight days before the outbreak of war could only blunt the
vigilance of our people. Berlin's only reply to the TASS statement
was silence. Not a single German newspaper made any mention
of it.
On June 21, only a few hours before Germany's attack, our
embassy was instructed to make yet another statement to the
German government proposing that the state of Soviet-German
relations should be discussed.
The Soviet government informed the German government that
it was aware of the concentrations of German forces along the
Soviet border and that a military adventure could have
dangerous consequences. But the content of the dispatch also indicated
something else---Moscow was still hoping to avert a conflict and
was ready to hold talks on the situation.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Night of June 21
On Saturday, June 21, weather was fine in Berlin. The
morning promised a hot day, and many of the embassy staff prepared
to spend the afternoon at Potsdam parks or at the Wannsee or
Nikolassee, where the bathing season was in full swing. Only a
small group of diplomats were left in the embassy. That
morning an urgent telegram had arrived from Moscow, stating that
the above-mentioned important statement had to be
immediately conveyed to the German government.
I was instructed to get in touch with Wilhelmstrasse and
arrange with it about a meeting between embassy representatives
and Ribbentrop. When I rang the man on duty at the Ministry's
secretariat, he replied that Ribbentrop was not in town. A call
to the First Deputy Minister and Staatssekretar, Weizsacker,
likewise produced no results. Hour after hour passed and none of
the high-ranking officials could be found. Only at midday did
I contact Woermann, head of the Ministry's Political
Department, but only to hear that neither Ribbentrop nor Weizsacker
were in the ministry.
``There seems to be an important conference going on at the
Fuhrer's headquarters, so I expect they are all there,'' he
73
explained, ``If you have any urgent business, let me know and I'll
try to get in touch with the leadership.''
I replied that this was impossible since the ambassador had
received instructions to hand the statement personally to the
minister, and I asked Woermann to let Ribbentrop know about this.
The matter about which we were trying to get a meeting with
the minister could not be entrusted to anyone lower down. This
was a statement that required an explanation from the
German government as to the concentration of German troops along
the Soviet border.
There were several telephone calls from Moscow that day,
urging us to expedite this matter. But whenever we contacted the
Ministry, the reply was always the same: Ribbentrop was out and
no one knew when he would be back. He could not be reached,
we were told, and no one could get in touch with him to inform
him of our request.
By about seven o'clock in the evening everyone had gone
home, but I had to stay in the embassy and try and get througli
to Ribbentrop. I sat down in my office, put the clock in front of
me and decided to ring Wilhelmstrasse every thirty minutes.
Through the window which opened on the Unter den Linden
I could see the Berliners taking their usual Saturday evening
stroll under the young lime trees which lined the boulevard. The
young girls and women were in brightly coloured dresses, while
the men, for the most part middle-aged, were dressed in dark,
old-fashioned suits. The police guard outside the embassy in his
ugly Schutzmann helmet was leaning against the gate-post and
dosing.
On my desk lay a pile of newspapers, which I had only
managed to glance over in the morning. Now I had time to read them
more closely. Vblkischer Beobachter, the official organ of the Nazi
party, had recently published a few articles by Otto Dietrich, head
of the government's press department. These had been reported
at a recent internal press conference by our embassy press--
attache. In these articles, which were inspired by Nazi quarters,
Dietrich harped on one thing: the alleged threat which faced
the German Reich and which impeded Hitler's plans for making
this Reich last a thousand years. He pointed out that the German
people and the government were compelled to eliminate this
threat before they could start building this Reich. This idea, of
74
course, was being disseminated with a definite purpose. I recalled
his articles published on the eve of Hitler's invasion of
Yugoslavia in early April. Then he had held forth about the ``sacred
mission" of the German nation in South-East Europe, recalled
Prince Eugene's campaign against Turkish-occupied Serbia in
the 18th century, and had made it clear that the same campaign
should now be undertaken by the Third Reich. Now in the light
of the known facts concerning preparations for war in the East
Dietrich's articles about a ``new threat" seemed particularly
significant. And the thought kept coming back to me that the
rumour according to which June 22 figured as the last date for
Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union might turn out to be true. It
also seemed strange that all day long we had not been able to
get in touch with Ribbentrop or his first deputy, although
formerly when the minister himself was not in town, Weizsacker
was always ready to receive our embassy representative. And
what was this important conference held at Hitler's
headquarters to which, according to Woermann, all the Nazi bosses had
been called.
But the next time I rang the ministry I received the same
polite and stereotyped reply from the official on duty at the other
end of the line:
``I regret to say that I have still not yet succeeded in
contacting the Reichsminister. But I remember your request and am
taking the necessary measures. . .''
To my remark that I would therefore have to continue to
trouble him as before since the matter was urgent, he said
politely that this was no trouble at all as he would remain on duty
in the ministry until morning. And I continued to ring and ring
but all to no avail. ..
Meanwhile in Moscow People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Molotov, acting on the instruction of the Soviet government,
invited the German ambassador Schulenburg at half past nine
in the evening and informed him of the content of the Soviet note
regarding the numerous violations of Soviet border by German
planes. Molotov then vainly tried to get the ambassador to
discuss the state of Soviet-German relations and explain German
claims on the Soviet Union. In particular, Schulenburg was asked
what had aroused Germany's dissatisfaction with the USSR, if
this indeed was the case. Molotov also asked the ambassador to
75
explain why more and more rumours were being spread about a
coming war between Germany and the Soviet Union and why
there had been a mass departure from Moscow in recent days
of German diplomatic personnel and their families. Finally,
Schulenburg was asked why the German government had failed to
respond to the peaceful TASS communique of June 14, which
was intended to calm the situation. Schulenburg gave no proper
answer to any of these questions.
While I continued vainly to ring Wilhelmstrasse, a new
dispatch arrived from Moscow. This was about one o'clock in the
morning. The dispatch informed us of the conversation between
Molotov and Schulenburg and listed the questions that had been
posed by the Soviet side in the course of the conversation. The
Soviet ambassador in Berlin was once more instructed to meet
Ribbentrop or his deputy without delay and raise these same
questions. But my next call was just as futile as all the others.
Suddenly at 3 a. m. (it was 5 a. m. Moscow time, and already
Sunday, June 22) the telephone rang. An unfamiliar voice informed
me that Reichsminister Joachim von Ribbentrop was
awaiting Soviet representatives in his office at the ministry of foreign
affairs. The official phraseology and the almost barking voice
seemed ill-boding to me. But in reply I made it out that it must
concern the meeting with the minister that the Soviet embassy
had been requesting all day.
``I know nothing of your request,'' said the voice at the other
end of the line. ``My instructions are simply to tell you that
Reichsminister Ribbentrop requires the presence of Soviet
embassy representatives immediately.''
I said that it would take time to inform the ambassador and
have a car ready, to which came the reply:
``The Reichsminister's personal car has been put at your
disposal and is already waiting at the entrance of the Soviet
embassy. The minister hopes that the Soviet representatives will
arrive without delay...''
As we came out of the gates on to the Unter den Linden we
saw the black limousine waiting for us at the curb. The
chauffeur wore a dark service jacket and a cap with a large lacquered
peak. Next to him sat an SS officer of the Totenkopf division as
we could see from the skull and crossbones emblem on the crown
of his cap.
76
Awaiting us on the pavement stood an official of the foreign
ministry's protocol department in full-dress uniform. He opened
the doors for us with excessive politeness. I had been asked to
accompany the ambassador as interpreter and we were invited to
occupy the rear seats, while the official took the folding seat. The
car sped through the deserted street. On our right the
Brandenburg Gates flashed past, and beyond them the dawn was already
spreading its crimson glow over the lush foliage of the
Tiergarten. It was going to be a clear, sunny day. . .
As we reached Wilhelmstrasse we could see in the distance
that a crowd had gathered by the foreign ministry building.
Although it was already dawning the entrance with its
wroughtiron awning was brightly illuminated with spotlights. All around
there were newspaper photographers, cameramen and journalists.
The official jumped out of the car first and opened the doors
for us. We came out blinded by the spotlights and the cameras
flashing. A horrible thought struck me---did this mean war?
What else would account for such a crowd outside the foreign
ministry building in the early hours of the morning? The
newspaper photographers and cameramen literally stuck to us,
runninp ahead and clicking away with their cameras as we ascended
the carpeted staircase to the first floor. Along the long corridor
which led to the minister's office there were people in uniform
standing at attention. As we appeared they noisily clicked their
heels and raised their arms in the Nazi salute. At last we turned
to the right and came to the minister's office.
On one side of the vast room stood a desk, and in the opposite
corner a round table, a large part of which was occupied by a
heavy lamp under a tall lampshade. Several arm-chairs stood
around in disorder.
At first the room seemed empty, until we caught sight of
Ribbentrop sitting at his desk in his ordinary grey-green ministerial
uniform. Looking round, we saw a group of Nazi officials in the
corner to the right of the door. We had to walk the whole length
of the room to reach Ribbentrop, and while we did so these
officials did not move. They continued to stay there at some
distance from us throughout the whole of the meeting. Very likely
they could not even hear what Ribbentrop said, so spacious was
the old room, which was probably intended by its owner to
emphasise the importance of Hitler's foreign minister.
77
As we came right up to his desk Ribbentrop stood up, nodded
silently, shook hands and invited us to the round table in the
opposite corner. His face was swollen and purple, and his eyes were
red. He walked in front with his head down, and seemed
slightly unsteady on his feet. The thought flashed through my
head that he was drunk.
After we had sat down and Ribbentrop began to speak, I
realised that I was right. He had obviously been drinking heavily.
The Soviet ambassador had intended to read the text of the
statement which we had brought with us, but Ribbentrop,
raising his voice said that we had been invited for quite a different
reason. Stumbling over almost every word he began to explain
in a rather confused manner that the German government had
received information about concentrations of Soviet troops along
the German border. Ignoring the fact that for the last few weeks
the Soviet embassy had on instructions from Moscow repeatedly
tried to draw the Germans' attention to the violations of Soviet
border by German troops and aircraft, Ribbentrop alleged that,
on the contrary, Soviet troops had violated the German border
and invaded German territory. This, of course, was pure
fabrication.
Then Ribbentrop said that he had briefly conveyed the contents
of Hitler's memorandum, the full text of which he handed to
us there and then. The current situation, he continued, can only
be regarded by the German government as a threat to Germany
at a moment when the latter is waging a life-and-death struggle
against the British. All this, Ribbentrop declared, is qualified by
the German government and the Fiihrer personally as the Soviet
Union's intention to stab the German people in the back. The
Fiihrer could not tolerate such a threat and has therefore
decided to take measures to protect the life and security of the
German nation. His decision is final. An hour ago German troops
crossed the Soviet border.
Then Ribbentrop tried to assure us that Germany's actions
were not aggressive, but only defensive measures. Then he got
up and stretched to his full height, trying to look imposing. But
there was no firmness or confidence in the voice when he said:
``The Fiihrer had instructed me to make an official
announcement of these defensive measures...''
We also stood up. The meeting was over. Now we knew that
78
shells were already bursting in our land. After the aggressive,
treacherous attack, war had now been officially declared.. . Now
there was no going back. Before leaving the Soviet ambassador
said:
``This is brazen-faced, unprovoked aggression against the
Soviet Union. And you will pay dearly for it. . .''
We turned round and walked out. And then something
unexpected happened. Ribbentrop suddenly came running up to us.
Speaking fast in a low whisper, he told us that he personally had
been against the Fiihrer's decision. He said he had even tried
to dissuade Hitler from attacking the Soviet Union. He,
Ribbentrop, considered it madness. But what could he do? Hitler had
made up his mind and would not listen to anyone.
``Tell them in Moscow that I was against the invasion. . .'' the
last words of the Reichsminister reached us when we were
already in the corridor.
Again there were the clicking of cameras and the humming of
cine-cameras. On the street where we were confronted by a crowd
of reporters it was bright sunshine. We got into the black
limousine which had been waiting for us all the time by the entrance.
We sat in silence on the way back to the embassy. But my
thoughts kept returning to the scene we had just witnessed in the
office of the Nazi minister. Why had that Nazi cut-throat, who
like all the other Nazi bosses was the sworn enemy of communism,
and pathologically hated the Soviet people, been so nervous?
What had happened to his usual brazen super-confidence? Of
course, he had been lying when he said he had tried to dissuade
Hitler from attacking the Soviet Union. But why did he say those
last words to us? Now remembering it all I think that at
that fateful moment when he officially announced the decision
that was ultimately to lead to the collapse of the Third Reich,
Ribbentrop was probably struck with some dire foreboding. ..
Perhaps that was why he had been drinking. ..
As we drew up to the embassy we noticed that the building
was now under strong guard. Instead of the one policeman who
usually stood at the gates, a whole chain of soldiers in SS
uniform was now strung out along the pavement.
The other diplomats in the embassy were anxiously awaiting
us. They probably still had no idea of why we had been
summoned by Ribbentrop. Something, however, had occurred which
put everybody on the alert: as soon as we had left for
79
Wilhelmstrasse all contact between the embassy and the outside world
was suddenly cut---not a single telephone was working.
At six o'clock in the morning (Moscow time) we switched on
the radio to hear if there was any special news bulletins from
Moscow. But the Soviet stations were only broadcasting regular
programmes, and when the news did come on it was only the
usual reports on industry and agriculture. Could it be that they
still had no idea in Moscow that several hours ago war had
broken out? Or perhaps the fighting was considered only as a
border incident though on a slightly larger scale than those that had
taken place over the last few weeks.
Since the telephone communication was not restored and we
could not ring Moscow, it was decided to send a telegram about
our meeting with Ribbentrop. The Vice-Consul G. I. Fomin was
instructed to take the coded dispatch to the main post office in
an embassy car with a diplomatic number plate. This car was
an enormous ZIS-101, which was usually used for travel to
official receptions. The car left the gates but fifteen minutes later
Fomin returned alone on foot. And he only succeeded in getting
back thanks to the fact that he had had his diplomatic papers
on him. They had been stopped by a patrol, and the driver and
the car had been taken away.
Besides ZIS and M automobiles, in the embassy garage we had
a small yellow Opel Olimpia. This we decided to use for getting
to the post office as it would attract less attention. We worked
out what we would do beforehand. I got behind the wheel, the
embassy gates were thrown open, and I shot out into the street
as fast as I could. This worked perfectly, and once outside I
looked round with a sigh of relief: there was not a single car
outside the embassy building and the SS men just stood and stared at
me in perplexity.
But we did not manage to get the telegram off straight away.
At the main post-office in Berlin all the employees were
standing, listening to a loudspeaker from which Goebbels' hysterical
shrieks could be heard. The subject of his speech was that the
Bolsheviks had tried to stab the Germans in the back and so the
Fuhrer had decided to send his troops against the Soviet Union
thereby saving the German nation.
I called one of the clerks over and gave him the telegram. But
when he saw the address, he exclaimed in astonishment:
80
``You're not sending this to Moscow, are you? Haven't you
heard what's going on?''
Without entering into a discussion I asked him to take the
telegram and give me a receipt. Later, when we eventually
returned to Moscow, we learned that the telegram had never been
delivered.
When on the way back from the post office I turned off
Friedrichstrasse on to the Unter den Linden I saw that there
were four military vehicles standing outside our embassy.
Evidently the SS guards weren't going to let the same thing happen
again.
On the first floor of the embassy a number of people were
standing around the radio as before. But Moscow gave not a word
on what had happened. Going to my office downstairs I saw
through the window some boys running along the pavement
outside, waving the late newspaper issues. I went outside the gates
and bought several papers from one of the boys. Already there
were the first photographs from the front. With grief in our hearts
we looked at the pictures of our Soviet soldiers lying dead or
wounded. A communique issued by the German command stated
that during the night German aircraft had bombed Moghilev,
Lvov, Rovno, Grodno and other towns. It was clear that Nazi
propaganda was trying to create the impression that the war
would be easy for the Germans and would soon come to an end.
Throughout the morning we kept coming back to the radio, but
all that it broadcast was folk music and marches. It was not
until 12 noon that Molotov spoke. He read the statement of the
Soviet government:
``Today at four a. m. German troops attacked our country
without making any claims on the Soviet Union and without any
declaration of war... Our cause is just. The enemy will be
beaten. We will be victorious.''
``.. .We will be victorious.. . Our cause is just...'' These words
came to us in the lair of the enemy, from our far-off motherland.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Return Home
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In the Hands of the Enemy
Immediately on our return from Wilhelmstrasse measures had
been taken to destroy our secret documentation. This had to be
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__
6---1996
81
done without delay because at any moment the SS that were
guarding the building could break in and seize the embassy
archives. At the same time our diplomatic staff in the consulate
began work drawing up an exact list of all Soviet personnel in
Germany and in German-occupied territory.
On that first morning after the invasion on June 22 only those
who had diplomatic passes were allowed to enter the embassy.
This in fact meant not only the embassy diplomatic staff, but
also a few members of the Soviet trade mission. The deputy trade
representative, Kormilitsyn, had gone to the mission
headquarters on Lietzenburgerstrasse, but had not been allowed inside.
It was already in the hands of the Gestapo and he could see
them actually throwing files of documents through the windows.
Black smoke was pouring out of one of the upper windows where
some mission workers had barricaded themselves in against the
SS and were hurriedly burning documents.
Much later one of those who was present in the trade mission
pn that day recounted what had happened. On the night of June
21--22 the duty officers had been K. I. Fedechkin and A. D.
Bozulaev. At first everything had gone as normal, but suddenly
around midnight all incoming telegrams ceased, a thing
which had never happened before. This was the first signal as it
were, which alerted the duty officers. The second signal was a
signal no longer in the figurative sense; but the very real sound
of the alarm going off. As the first rays of the sun came through
the shutters they heard the harsh sound of the embassy alarm
^ystem. Fedechkin lifted the receiver of the telephone which
connected him with the man on duty by the gate.
``Why did you sound the alarm?''
``A crowd of armed SS men are trying to break down the
door,'' came the anxious voice of the duty officer. ``Something's
up. They're shouting and banging and any moment they'll break
the door down.''
The duty officers knew that the glass doors of the mission
headquarters would not withstand any force and the iron mesh
door behind them could not put up much resistance either.
So the Germans could get in at any moment. In minutes they
would be at the closed door of the reception room, which alone
would withstand attack for some time. There was not a minute
to be lost. Fedechkin called his colleagues N. P. Logachev and
82
E.~I. Shmatov, whose rooms were on the same floor as the
reception room. All four of them barricaded the door and then
began destroying the secret documentation.
The stove in the room was too small, it would take only a
small amount of paper. So they had to light a fire on the floor
on the large iron sheet where the stove had stood. Smoke filled
the room, but they couldn't stop for a minute as the fascists
were already trying to break the door down.
The sheet of iron became red-hot and it got unbearably hot
and stuffy in the room. Even the parquet flooring was burning,
but they continued to destroy the documents so that nothing fell
into the hands of the fascists. Every so often one or other of
them would run to the window for a breath of fresh air and
then return to the pile of burning paper that was slowly turning
into ashes.. .
When the SS finally broke down the door and roared in,
everything had been done. All they found was a pile of ashes and
the four men sitting immobile on the floor. The fascists kicked
them up with their boots and searched them. Then they were
made to go downstairs to the hall of the mission building. All
four of them were pushed into a black van and taken off to the
Gestapo. There their watches, money and other personal
belongings were taken from them and they were thrown into separate
cells. Several times a day they were interrogated and beaten in
an attempt to get the secret information out of them. They were
also made to sign some papers. This lasted for ten days. But the
Soviet men held out courageously and the fascists learned
nothing. They fulfilled their duty with honour and were only
released on the day we left Berlin where they were handed over to
us directly at the railway station. They could barely stand up.
Logachev, whom I knew well from work at the trade mission,
was scarcely recognisable, covered as he was in bruises. . .
__b_b_b__
Around 2 p. m. on that same day the telephone in the
embassy suddenly rang. It was the protocol department of the
ministry of foreign affairs ringing to inform us that until it had been
decided which country would undertake to protect the interests of
the Soviet Union in Germany our embassy would have to appoint
one individual for liaison with Wilhelmstrasse. We told them
that we would let them know in fifteen or twenty minutes and
__PRINTERS_P_84_COMMENT__
6*
83
at the same time asked permission to bring the films and part
of the library from the Soviet Community Club.
As it turned out I was the person selected to liaise with
Wilhelmstrasse and we informed the protocol representative of this
when he rang back half an hour later.
After writing down my name, he said that in this case an
exception would be made and one embassy representative would
be allowed to go to the club and bring back whatever the
embassy considered necessary. But this had to be done before six o'clock,
after which all embassy personnel were categorically forbidden
to leave the grounds of the embassy. The representatives
authorised to liaise with Wilhehnstrasse would be allowed out only for
talks with the ministry of foreign affairs and each time this
would have to be agreed upon beforehand. Furthermore the
representative would travel to and from the ministry only in the
company of the guards' commanding officer, a certain
Oberleutnant SS Heinemann. Should the embassy wish to communicate
with the ministry of foreign affairs, this also had to be done
via Heinemann.
After this he hung up.
As we discovered immediately the telephone connection was
one way only: they could ring in, but we could not ring out.
We decided that it was best to send me to the club in an
embassy car. Since there was only time to make one journey we
could only bring a limited number of things, so it was decided
we should bring the films about Lenin---in April, we had been
sent films from Moscow about Lenin and the anniversary of his
birth---as well as the works of Lenin and a few other Marxist
classics. We did not want the fascists to burn them or give them
a reason for another anti-communist demonstration.
But when I got to the club the policeman on duty outside had
not been warned of my arrival and refused to let me in. So I was
forced to ring Wilhelmstrasse again. Opposite the club was a
little shop which sold beer, cigarettes and other small items. We
often used to call in there on our way to the club to drink a cold
foaming beer or chat with old Isidor who owned the shop. I
decided to go there to use the telephone. Isidor met me very
courteously and lowering his voice said that he was shocked at the
news that the Soviet Union had been invaded.
``Now who knows where it'll all end? We've really taken on a
84
fight to the death,'' he grumbled when I gave him a mark for
some small change to use in the telephone. I dialed the number
of the protocol department and complained that despite our
agreement I was still not being allowed to go into the club as the
policeman on duty had received no instructions. They replied
that they were sorry and would take the necessary steps. I was
told to wait outside the club.
Going back to the bar I ordered a beer and started chatting
to Isidor, naturally enough about the war and the hardships that
it brought.
Fifteen minutes later I saw through the open door of the
shop a motorbike with a side-car draw up in front of the club
on the opposite side of the street. An SS officer got down and
went over to say something to the policeman on duty. The
latter came across the street into Isidor's shop and told me that I
could now go into the club. The SS officer drove off and the
policeman came into the club with me. First he stood in silence and
watched me packing the round metallic boxes that contained the
films. But when I began to pack the books he came and, without
saying a word, helped me to tie up piles of books with string and
carry them out to the car. I also said nothing and for a fairly
long time we worked in silence. Only when I had got into the
car and started the engine did he suddenly say:
``All the best, comrade. ..''
Looking round I waved to him. These first two meetings with
ordinary Germans after Hitler's brutal invasion of the Soviet
Union quite amazed me. Neither of them showed the slightest
hostility or enmity. Obviously Goebbels' anti-Soviet propaganda
had not been entirely effective.
I got back to the embassy a few minutes before six---just in
time! The courtyard looked like a gypsy encampment. All the
embassy staff and their families were there with their cases and
bundles. There were children all over the place from tiny babies
to teenagers. As there was no room for everyone in the living
quarters, many families were forced to live in the offices. But
this was only a small part of the total Soviet community that we
were responsible for. According to the lists which we had drawn
up there were about one thousand Soviet citizens resident in
Germany and the occupied territories.
85
__ALPHA_LVL3__
An Argument at the Wilhelmstrasse
The next morning I was requested to go to Wilhelmstrasse for
preliminary talks. This information was communicated to us by
Oberleutnant Heinemann who accompanied me to the ministry
in a car. The main entrance of the ministry building now looked
just as it always used to. The man who met me from the protocol
department declared that he had been authorised to discuss the
question of Soviet citizens still in Germany and the occupied
territories. He had a list in front of him which, I noticed, largely
coincided with the information we had. He informed me that
all Soviet citizens had been interned. However the main problem,
he said, was that there were present in the Soviet Union only
120 German citizens, who were for the most part embassy officials
or other persons working for German organisations in Moscow.
``The German side.'' he went on to say, ``proposes the exchange
of these German citizens for a similar number of Soviet
citizens. The exact composition of the list can be decided by the
embassy.''
I made an immediate protest about this. The fact that there
were only 120 Germans left in the Soviet Union as against almost
one thousand. Soviet personnel was clear evidence of the fact
that it had not been the Soviet Union that had been preparing
to invade Germany, as German propaganda claimed, but
precisely the reverse. Having decided to invade the Soviet Union the
German government had made sure that as many of its
personnel and their families as possible had left the Soviet Union prior
to the invasion. I said that I would inform the ambassador of
the German proposal, but I was sure that we would not leave
until all Soviet citizens in Germany and in the occupied
territories had been allowed to return home.
``I am not authorised to discuss that,'' said the official, ``I can
only convey to you what I have been instructed. And I must also
add that the German government has seized as war trophies all
Soviet ships found in German ports.''
I asked how many this included.
``I cannot tell you precisely,'' he replied, adding with a
malicious smile, ``It would seem that there is not a single German
ship in any Soviet ports. ..''
Much later when we had returned to Moscow we found out
86
that the German ships that had been in the Soviet Baltic and
Black Sea ports, had suddenly left Soviet territorial waters on
June 20 and June 21 without even finishing their loading.
It seemed that no one in the Soviet Union paid much
attention to that. Later I learned something which explained why this
happened. On the eve of the war there were more than a score
of German ships in the port of Riga. Some had only just begun
to unload, others were not yet fully laden. But suddenly on June
21 they all weighed anchor. The port authorities, feeling that
something was wrong, took the risk of detaining the German ships
while they contacted Moscow. The People's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade was informed, but they requested instructions from
higher up. Stalin was immediately informed, but he feared that
Hitler would use the detention of German ships as a pretext for
military provocation and therefore ordered that they should be
immediately released. Evidently for the same reason the captains
of Soviet ships in German ports were not warned in advance.
But to return to the meeting at Wilhelmstrasse. The reaction
of all our diplomats when they heard of the German proposals
was the same: we categorically refused to make an exchange of
equal numbers. At the next meeting I was instructed to state that
we absolutely insisted that all Soviet citizens should be allowed
to leave Germany. The persons interned outside Berlin should be
brought to the capital and handed over to the Soviet consul.
For several days it remained unclear which country would
represent the interests of the Soviet Union in Berlin. Meanwhile
there was no time to lose as we all understood perfectly the tragic
fate that awaited Soviet citizens if they were unable to return
to their homeland together with the diplomatic staff. Somehow
we had to try and find a way to contact Moscow.
Several of the diplomatic staff had contacts among the
German anti-fascist underground. Through them it would be
possible to pass information about the present situation to a Soviet
embassy in a neutral country. The task of making contact with
these people was given to Alexander Mikhailovitch Korotkov
and myself. But how were we to go about it? The embassy was
completely shut off from the outside world. No one was allowed
outside the gates except me and I was closely guarded by
Oberleutnant Heinemann. And in any case I could only leave the
building when summoned from the Wilhelmstrasse.
87
We cudgeled our brains for a long time trying to find a way
in which one of us might break through the SS cordon which
surrounded us. But having carefully examined the situation we
were forced to the conclusion that any attempt to get out of the
embassy secretly under cover of night was doomed to failure. At
night they increased the guard and the outside of the building
was brightly illuminated by spotlights. Outside the wall of the
house that backed on to the embassy there were also SS patrols
with Alsatian dogs. But even so, we could not just sit and wait.
We had to try and find some way of getting out.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
An SS Guard Helps the Bolsheviks
Oberleutnant SS Heinemann was a tall, heavily built,
middleaged man. He was also unusually sociable. By the second day of
our acquaintance I already knew that he had a wife who was
sick, that his brother served in the Reichskanzlei guard and that
his son Erich was about to graduate from military college from
where he expected to be sent to the front. Heinemann was not
too keen on this and he had asked his brother to see if he could
get him posted somewhere in the rear.
This kind of conversation between an SS officer and one
furthermore who was the commander of the guard, and an embassy
official at a time of war put me very much on my guard.
Heinemann might have been trying to get me to give him some
confidential information. But, on the other hand, perhaps in his heart
of hearts he did not feel hostile towards us. Who knows, maybe
he would even help us? At any rate it was worth paying a bit
more attention to him. Talking the matter over amongst
ourselves it was decided that we ought to try to get ``friendly'' with
him, making sure of course to be extremely careful as any false
step could only make things worse for the embassy and give the
Nazis an excuse for provocation.
And so one evening when Heinemann had done his round of
.guard duty and had called in the embassy to find out if there
-was -anything we wanted to communicate to Wilhelmstrasse, I
asked him to sit down and have a rest in the dining room.
``Would you like something to eat?" I asked him. ``You must
be tired after your day's work and it's a long time since lunch.''
88
Heinemann refused at first, saying that he was on duty, but
he finally agreed to have a bite to eat with me.
That evening we had a long and fairly open discussion. After
a few glasses Heinemann began to tell me that according to his
brother the Reichskanzlei was very worried at the unexpected
resistance that the German troops were meeting in the Soviet
Union. In many places Soviet soldiers were fighting to the last
bullet and then going in hand-to-hand. Nowhere had the
Germans yet faced such stubborn resistance and suffered such great
losses. In the west, said Heinemann, everything was much easier,
a ``walkover'' he called it. But in Russia it was different and
even a few people in the Reichskanzlei were beginning to have
their doubts about the wisdom of invading the Soviet Union.
This was indeed extraordinary coming from the mouth of an
SS guard. Perhaps, I thought, Heinemann had not been
completely poisoned by Nazi fanaticism. Furthermore, he seemed to
make no secret of the fact that these communications from the
front worried him about what might happen to his son.
``If he gets sent to the eastern front,'' he said several times,
``there's not much chance that he'll get out alive.''
Being still unsure about Heinemann, I listened in silence,
except that when he started to talk about his son I said that this
war should never have happened and then not only his own son
Erich would not come to harm, but the sons of many other
Germans as well.
``You're quite right,'' he replied. ``What on earth is this war
for?''
Our meal continued for about two hours and Heinemann and
I became fairly friendly.
The next day I invited him to breakfast. This time he did not
even try to refuse. I wanted to find out how far he could be
useful to us and so I had to find the right way to approach him so
that if I got the wrong reaction I could turn it into a joke.
After talking for a bit about the news from the front,
Heinemann returned once more to the thing that most worried him.
``Soon Erich will be finishing military college and according to
custom here in Germany I shall have to buy him a full-dress
uniform and arms. But what with my wife being ill I have had to
spend almost all my savings. ..''
By talking about money Heineman had himself made the first
89
step in the right direction. I decided to take advantage of this.
It was of course risky, because if Heinemann already guessed that
we wanted to get something out of him, it would be natural to
bring up the subject of payment and this could be a way of
trying to find out what we were after. It could also be simply
provocation because an attempt at the bribery of an SS guard
commander on the part of the Soviet embassy would be most
opportune for the Nazi propaganda machine. But on the other hand
there was no time to be lost. Another occasion like this might not
present itself and we had to get through the SS cordon as soon
as possible.
``I could possibly help you out, Herr Heinemann,'' I said in
what I hoped was a casual tone. ``I've been working for a fairly
long time in Berlin and have some money put away for a
radiogram. But there's no point in my getting it now because we
can't take anything with us apart from one suitcase with
personal items and a small sum of money for travelling expenses. So
my savings are useless. It's a bit embarrassing to ask, but if you
like I can give you a thousand marks.''
Heinemann looked at me intently and said nothing. Evidently
he was thinking whether it was worth taking such a step. After
a minute he said:
``Thank you very much for such an offer. But how could I
take such a large sum of money off you for nothing?''
``Well, like I said, the money's useless in any case. I can't take
it with me. It will simply be confiscated together with all the
other money in the embassy. And what is a thousand marks to
the Third Reich? But to you it would really come in handy.
Anyway, suit yourself. I'm not really bothered who gets my
money. ..''
Heinemann lit a cigarette and leant back in his chair drawing
the smoke in deeply several times. I could sense the internal
struggle that was taking place within him.
``Well,'' he said finally, ``if I agree, you understand that not a
single person must know about it.''
``It's my personal savings,'' I said in an attempt to ease
his mind. ``No one even knows I've got the money. I'll give it
to you and that's that.''
I took out my wallet, counted out one thousand marks and
put the money on the table. Heinemann's hand reached slowly
90
forwards. Then he took a large purse out of his back pocket and
stacking the money neatly he put it away in one of its
compartments. Then he put the purse back in his pocket and let out
a sigh of relief.
And so the first step had been taken.
Heinemann said:
``I really don't know how to thank you. If there was some way
I could repay my gratitude...''
I decided there was no point in rushing things. It was better
to wait a bit and consolidate my position.
``Don't mention it. I'm glad to be of some help to you.
Especially since it more or less costs me nothing since the money's of
no use to me.''
We sat on for a short while and when Heinemann got up to
leave I invited him to pop in around midday for a spot of lunch.
For the ten days that we had been interned in the embassy our
provisions had come from a small grocer's shop where we had
previously placed our orders. The shopkeeper, a fat, phlegmatic,
querulous man, who invariably stood behind the counter in a
dirty apron, now came every morning in his little van, dressed
instead in the brown SA uniform. The embassy wives organised
themselves to do the cooking and under the guidance of
Lakomov, the embassy chef, made breakfast, lunch and dinner for
everyone. On this day, however, Lakomov was fully occupied in
preparing lunch for Heinemann. When he came in the table in
the small dining room on the ground floor was laid and in
addition to the local food provided by the SA grocer there were
Russian zakuski (hors d'ceuvre). Cognac, beer and wine were also in
plentiful supply. It was my intention not only to give Heinemann
a good meal but to take the matter in hand a stage further. We
had discussed the whole thing and worked out a plan of action.
Thus when over the dessert Heinemann returned to the
conversation we had had in the morning and once more expressed the
desire to help us, I said:
``Well, thank you Herr Heinemann, but there is nothing really
that I want. However, I do have a friend here and there is
something you just might be able to do for him. It is a purely
personal matter and I have certainly promised him nothing, because
he knows nothing at all about our relationship.'' I added the
last bit to set his mind at rest.
91
``What does he want, this friend of yours? Maybe we could
think up some way of helping him.''
``The thing is that he had become very friendly with a German
girl and the war started so suddenly that he didn't even have
time to say good-bye to her. What he would like is to be able to
get out of the embassy for an hour or so and go and see her for
the last time. You yourself know what being at war means. Very
likely these young people will never see each other again. So I'd
like to help him. But we're strictly forbidden to leave the
embassy, so it looks as though he's going to be disappointed. . .''
``Well, maybe we can think up something,'' said Heinemann.
Lighting up a cigarette he sat back in silence for a few
moments thinking. Then as if speaking his thoughts aloud, he said:
``The embassy guards know that I go with you every so often
to Wilhelmstrasse. They're quite used to us leaving together. They
probably wouldn't pay any attention if a third party came along,
so long as we all returned to the embassy together. What we could
do is to drop him off in the town and pick him up an hour or
so later. That sounds the best way of doing it, what do you
think?''
To be really on the safe side I first tried to assure Heinemann
that there was no point in him running a risk over such a
trivial matter. My friend, I said would get by without saying
goodbye to the girl. But Heinemann seemed set on his plan and so
eventually I let myself be persuaded that this operation could
indeed be carried out.
``If we think about it carefully and plan it all,'' said
Heinemann, now trying to convince me, ``then it will be no problem.''
Of course, there was no question of us being fully confident
that an SS officer would be prepared to give the Bolsheviks
sincere help. Once outside the gates of the embassy he could simply
arrest us, take us to the local Gestapo headquarters and claim
that we had attempted to bribe him. Thus we had to be
continually on our guard. And so when Heinemann got up to go I said
that I was still not sure whether it was worth doing it. As he left
I invited him to call in again in the evening.
As soon as he had gone we had another discussion on the
advisability of going through with it. It was still very risky and could
have serious political consequences. But at the same time, there
was the chance of making contact with Moscow. After a long
92
discussion where we weighed the pros and cons we finally
decided to give it a chance.
Oberleutnant Heinemann was as punctual as ever. But this
time I was waiting for him with Korotkov to introduce him as
the young man with the girl-friend.
``So you've taken a fancy to one of our girls?" said Heinemann
after being introduced and shaking hands. ``Well, perhaps I'll
be able to help you.''
We sat at the table and Heinemann seemed to be in excellent
spirits. He laughed and joked a lot and told us about his son and
how before the war they had gone to the Bavarian Alps for their
summer holidays. Every so often he would tease Sasha Korotkov
about his affair and recollect the time during the First World
War when as a prisoner in France he himself fell in love with a
French girl and then had to say good-bye to her.
``I know I'm not as young as was,'' said Heinemann, ``but I
understand what a chance to see this girl once more must mean
to you.''
We agreed to give the operation a try at eleven o'clock the
following morning when Heinemann came to the embassy after
doing his rounds. We decided to use the Opel Olimpia so as not
to attract too much attention on the streets of Berlin. Heinemann
said that he would first contact the ministry of foreign affairs to
find out if they intended to call me in the morning. Apart from
the discussion of these details everything else looked as though
we were just planning to go out on an innocent picnic. Perhaps
Heinemann really did believe our story about a girl-friend. If not,
he gave a really good impression of someone about to help in
organising a lovers' tryst. But we were still very worried. We said
good-bye fairly late that evening still unsure about what might
happen on the following day.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Window to Freedom
Heinemann did not arrive at the appointed time. We
anxiously worried what would happen if he had deceived us and the
Gestapo already knew of our arrangement with him. It is easy to
understand the state of nerves we were all in when about two
o'clock in the afternoon the bell rang. It was Heinemann. He
excused himself for his lateness, but explained that his wife's
93
health had deteriorated and he had been forced to stay at home.
Then he had spoken to the ministry of foreign affairs and asked
them not to organise any meetings with me for that day because
as his wife was ill he would not be able to accompany me. Thus
we were completely free to put our plan into operation.
We went into the reception room and while Sasha Korotkov
poured Heinemann some vodka I went down to the garage to get
out the Opel. Heinemann found difficulty in squeezing into the
passenger seat next to me especially since his long broadsword
got in the way. Finally he had to undo the buckle, take the sword
off and throw it on to the back seat where Sasha was already
sitting. The guards opened the gates, Heinemann saluted and
we were outside at liberty. But I kept looking in the window to
make sure no one was following us.
On all our journeys outside the embassy so far we had only
gone to the ministry of foreign affairs. So as not to arouse
suspicion I also turned left by the Brandenburg Gate and went a
few blocks along Wilhelmstrasse. But instead of turning into the
foreign ministry building we carried on further. It was strange
being out in the streets of Berlin again. The weather was dull,
warm and dry. The shop windows shone like mirrors and the
people walked along unhurriedly. On street corners they were
selling flowers and ladies were out taking their dogs for a walk,
all as if nothing had changed. But at the same time the
realisation that for several days already war had been raging in the
East and that we were here among our mortal enemies altered
our impression of the seemingly peaceful picture of Berlin.
We had already arranged to put Sasha off by the large
Kaufhaus des Westens department store where it was easy to hide
among the crowd and where there was an entrance nearby to
the underground. We would then pick him up two hours later at
the Nollendorfplatz underground station.
When we stopped he got out and quickly disappeared into the
crowd. We immediately drove on and spent a long time going
aimlessly round the streets. Remembering that I was nearly out
of razor blades 1 stopped at the first shop that sold them. While
I was selecting some blades Heinemann picked up a fine-looking
shaving brush.
``I wouldn't mind one like that,'' he said enviously. ``But you'd
need to have plenty of money to afford it...''
94
I suggested that he accept it from me as a gift. He did not
need any persuading and when I paid for the brush he put it
straight into his jacket pocket. Along the Charlottenburger
Ghaussee we went to the famous Berlin Funkturm, the radio tower
which was a favourite place for Berliners in the evenings but was
almost deserted in the daytime. We decided to spend the time
there.
First we went for a walk in the park. In a little corner near
a rubbish bin we found two benches painted in a sickly yellow
colour. On the backs of the benches painted clearly in black was
the letter ``J'', the first letter of the word ``Jude''. As in all the
gardens and parks all over the Third Reich the benches near the
rubbish bins were set aside for the Jews. When Heinemann and
I passed the sorrowful figure of a woman in black sitting, with
her back bent, on the edge of the bench, I shuddered.
``I know how you feel,'' said Heinemann quietly.
This SS officer was certainly a rare bird.
``I'll tell you a joke that is going round Berlin,'' he said when
we had gone on a bit further. An old woman is sitting in the
underground with a Star of David sown on her front. Next to her
there is a free place. After a bit a German woman comes in
with a little girl and sits next to the old woman, who immediately
gets up to give her place to the little Arian girl. The girl sits
down but the mother makes her stand up again.
`` 'What on earth are you doing,' says the mother annoyed,
'you can't sit on a seat where a Jew's just been sitting...'
``For a while no one sits there. Then an old worker who is
sitting opposite gets up and takes the seat himself. He rubs his
bottom all over the seat and then gets up and says to the German
woman:
`` 'Begging your pardon, madam, but now your daughter can
sit down again. There's nothing to worry about. The place has
been restored to its Arian purity...' "
``Perhaps it's not so much a joke as something that really
happened,'' said Heinemann with a laugh.
We sat down at a table on the terrace of an outdoor cafe at
the foot of the radio tower. Now Heinemann seemed to liven up
a bit and ordered two mugs of Munich beer. He had been silent
almost all the time in the car after we left the embassy, evidently
from being anxious himself. Now he became his usual chatty self,
95
telling all sorts of amusing stories from his schooldays. I listened
to him rather distractedly and wondered how Sasha was
getting on.
Finally it was time to go to the spot where we had agreed to
meet Sasha. As we approached the Nollendorfplatz I could see
him from a distance. He was standing staring in a shop window,
seemingly engrossed in the goods on display. But he knew we
were coming and as I stopped the car he came over to the curb,
casually waving to us. I opened the door, we exchanged a brief
greeting and then he got unhurriedly into the back seat. Anyone
watching would have thought it to be an accidental meeting
between friends. As he settled himself in the back seat Sasha
gave me a hard squeeze on the shoulder and my heart bounded
with joy---the sign meant that he had been successful.
``Well, how was she?" asked Heinemann.
``Fine, thanks very much. She was so glad to see me.''
Heinemann began to make a few jokes, but we weren't
listening to him. We drove through the streets and eventually arrived
back at the embassy building where I sounded the horn for the
gates to be opened. Once inside we sighed with relief.
In the embassy a meal for the three of us was already prepared.
Of course, we could not wait for Heinemann to go, but we
had to sit and listen to his endless stories for more than an hour.
Relaxing after the nervous tension of the day made us somehow
apathetic.
When Heinemann at last went those who had been privy to
the operation held a conference. Everything had gone well and
our friends had been passed a brief communique on the situation
in Berlin for forwarding to Moscow. If all went well it would
actually be there that same evening. But we wanted to be certain
that the message had got through and also receive confirmation
from Moscow that what we were doing was correct. It was
therefore decided to try another journey out using the hole in the
fence that had been given to us by Oberleutnant Heinemann.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Toast to Victory
The next day Sasha and I invited Heinemann to breakfast. He
told us the latest news from the front that was going round the
Reichskanzlei and differed sharply from the victorious broadcasts
96
published by the German newspapers. The situation on the
Soviet-German front was quite different from the way it was being
depicted by the Nazi propaganda machine. Soviet units were
putting up fierce resistance. Many fortified positions, like Brest
Fortress continued to hold out bravely. The Germans were
suffering enormous losses. All of which, according to Heinemann,
was a cause of serious concern in the Reichskanzlei.
Then our conversation turned to yesterday's trip into town.
Heinemann asked jokingly if Sasha would like to see his
girlfriend again.
``Of course I would like to,'' he replied. ``But I don't want to
put you to so much trouble...''
Heinemann said that although there was an element of risk
involved, it nevertheless might be arranged.
``If you agree,'' said Sasha, ``then maybe I could have a bit
more time, say three of four hours?''
``I see your appetite comes with the eating, as they say,'' said
Heinemann. ``Tomorrow is Sunday and the ministry of foreign
affairs is closed, so they won't call us out. Say, we leave at ten
in the morning and return for lunch.''
The next day at the appointed time our Opel was already
waiting by the gates in the embassy courtyard. Heinemann arrived
ten minutes early. As I greeted him I noticed that this time he
was not wearing his broadsword. Instead on the broad belt that
went round his jacket he wore a holster from which could just
be seen the handle of his Walter. My heart missed a beat. All
my former doubts came back. Very likely Heinemann had been
carrying a pistol before, but it had been under his coat and I
had not seen it. Now it was in sight and could be drawn easily.
This gave rise to unpleasant thoughts. Supposing Heinemann had
decided to catch us at the scene of the crime, as they say? What
if the moment we were outside the gates he pulled out his Walter
and ordered us to drive to the Gestapo headquarters? I looked
quickly at Sasha---he was obviously thinking the same thing. So
what should we do, refuse to go? I decided we had to probe
Heinemann and see if he would give himself away.
``What's happened to your sword?" I said forcing
myself to smile. ``It suited
you.''
Heinemann replied casually:
``Well, you see last time it got
in my way in that litle Opel,
__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__
7---1996
97
so I decided to leave it at home today. And according to
regulations, if you are not wearing a sword, then you must wear a
pistol on your belt...''
This made us feel a bit better. We went out into the yard and
got in the car, everyone sitting exactly where they were the last
time.
After leaving the embassy we made for the underground on
Ulanstrasse. Here too there were always plenty of people. I
stopped the car and Sasha got out to disappear into the underground.
We had agreed to meet here at a quarter to two. There was a
lot of time and we decided to have a run out to the city
ringroad. Here we stopped for a while in a wood and then
Heinemann suggested we return for a bite to eat.
Stopping the car at a restaurant on the corner of
Kurfiirstendamm opposite the Gedachtniskirche, we went through the shiny
revolving doors into a large hall to find a table. Suddenly
someone called out:
``Hey, Heinemann! Over here!''
A group of six SS officers were sitting at a large table that was
covered in beer glasses. Obviously they had been sitting there for
a long time because there was a whole pile of beer mats on the
edge of the table which were given out with every glass ordered
and according to which the waiter totted up the bill at the end.
They all seemed to know Heinemann well, for they waved to
him and invited him over to their table. What could we do? It
would not be too pleasant if it was discovered that Heinemann
was going around the streets of Berlin with an interned Soviet
diplomat. But just then I heard Heinemann hurriedly whispering
in my ear:
``I'll introduce you as a relative of my wife from Munich. Say
you work in an arms factory, then no one will expect you to do
too much talking. Your name is Kurt Hiisker. Come on then
and be careful.''
We went up to the table and the SS officers greeted us, some
of them standing up, others barely raising themselves from their
chairs, ``Heil Hitler"s came from all sides and Heinemann
replied in a loud voice while I mumbled vaguely.
After I had been introduced we all sat down again and we
ordered beer for everyone. The talk, of course, was about the
fighting on the Soviet-German front and of the night bombing
98
which Britain had renewed. The SS men spoke about the fierce
battles that were going on in Russia and about the strong
resistance that the Russians were putting up which was more
stubborn than any the Germans had yet encountered. I did not doubt
that my knowledge of the language which had been considerably
improved during my stay in Germany would not let me down,
but was still glad that Heinemann had told me to say I worked
in a munitions factory in Munich, because this gave me an
excuse for remaining silent, and none of the SS men had the
slightest suspicion that I was not the person I claimed to be.
One of the SS men made a short speech in honour of
Germany, the Fiihrer and the German armed forces finishing with
the toast:
``To our victory...''
They all got up. I stood too, draining my glass and thinking
of our victory over the fascist hordes that had treacherously
invaded my land. Putting my glass back on the table, I too joined
in the toast.
``To our victory...''
Heinemann looked at his watch. It was time for us to go. But
the SS men were enjoying themselves and did not want any one
to break up the party. In the end it was two o'clock before we
could get away and I had to put my foot right down to get the
little Opel to Ulanstrasse as quickly as possible. Sasha was already
waiting for us and looking very worried. But when he got into
the car and gave me a squeeze on the shoulder I knew that
everything had gone well. We drove back to the embassy without
any further difficulties.
The last time we saw Heinemann was July 2, the day we left
Berlin. Saying good-bye, he hinted rather strongly that he
understood the real reason for the journeys into town that we had made
with his help.
``There may come a time,'' he said, ``when I have to remind
someone of the services I rendered to the Soviet embassy, so I
hope they won't be forgotten...''
What happened to Heinemann afterwards I have no idea.
Maybe he was killed during the war, maybe he is still alive.
Maybe as an officer in the SS he had the blood of innocent victims
on his hands and is hiding somewhere today from justice or has
already paid the penalty for his crimes. But maybe he managed
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to avoid getting involved in Gestapo brutalities. Who knows, it
could be any of these things. But to do him justice it must be
said that during those days we were in Berlin he did us, albeit
not for nothing, a considerable service.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Anti-Fascist Underground
There was one other reason why it was essential for us to get
Sasha through the SS cordon and into town for at least a couple
of hours.
Now more than fifteen years after his death (he died of a
heart attack while playing tennis) I can say a bit more about
him. Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov was an experienced
Soviet intelligence officer. Before being sent to Berlin he had
successfully completed a number of important assignments and had
earned a reputation for initiative, steadfastness, staunchness and
devotion to duty. Korotkov had an excellent command of
several foreign languages including German, which he spoke with a
marked Austrian accent. His instructions in Berlin were to
maintain contact with the German anti-fascist underground. This
underground had first established contact with the Soviet embassy
in 1936. Seeing the Soviet Union as the only real force capable
of preventing the onslaught of fascism, they decided to pass to us
information on secret German plans particularly those that
related to German and Italian intervention in Republican Spain.
One of these underground organisations became known by the
name ``Rote Kapelle" (Red Choir), which it was called by the
Abwehr (German military intelligence), who discovered its
existence in 1942. In Abwehr jargon the word ``choir'' meant any
underground organisation and secret radio transmitters were
called ``musicians''. The members of such an organisation had
names like ``conductor'', ``pianist'' and ``violinist'' according to the
role they were thought by the Abwehr to play in the organisation.
A radio operator, for instance, was called a ``flutist''. Since this
particular underground organisation was known to have contacts
with Moscow it was given the code name ``The Red Choir''. Many
of its leaders were eventually caught and executed, including
Harro Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack. But for several years
they saw their patriotic duty to lie in doing as much damage as
100
possible to the German military machine by passing valuable
information to the Soviet Union.
And the organisation which included more than 200 people
was extremely well placed to receive such information. Both
Schulze-Boysen and Harnack, for example, who were the leaders
of the Rote Kapelle had access to very secret communications.
Oberleutnant of Luftwaffe Harro Schulze-Boysen came from a
Prussian officer's family and was related to Grossadmiral Tirpitz
He thus enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler's commanding
officers. While still a student, however, he had contacts with
left-wing groups and German communists. In the early thirties
he was chief editor of an anti-fascist magazine entitled Der
Gegner (Opponent), but after Hitler came to power and the SA broke
up the editorial office, Schulze-Boysen was imprisoned. Only
the intervention of his highly placed relatives saved him and his
participation in the anti-fascist movement was put down to ``the
errors of youth".
But on being released from prison Schulze-Boysen still
continued his struggle against fascism, except that now he realised
that the methods of struggle should be different. He became
friendly with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, who liked the
young officer from an aristocratic family and even agreed to be
the best man at his wedding, which, of course, established
Schulze-Boysen's reputation beyond doubt.
Having one of the top members of the Third Reich
favourably disposed towards him opened the doors for Schulze-Boysen to
enter the ministry of aviation and ultimately into the
intelligence wing of the Luftwaffe. However, this brilliant career
did not go to his head or distract him from his main goal which
was the overthrow of the hated Nazi regime.
Another resolute opponent of fascism was Arvid Harnack. A
doctor of both philosophy and law he had, before Hitler came
to power, set up circles and seminars in Berlin to study scientific
socialism. In his lectures and study groups he would call for
friendship with the Soviet Union and warn the German people of
the threat of fascism that was hanging over them. After the Nazis
seized power the group of anti-fascists that centred round
Harnack went underground.
As part of his conspiracy Arvid Harnack joined the Nazi party
in 1935 and went to work in the ministry of the economy
101
where he soon became head of one of the departments. After
establishing contact with Schulze-Boysen it was decided to
merge their two groups into one organisation.
In possession of both military and economic information of a
highly secret nature the two leaders became convinced that
Hitler was planning war on the Soviet Union. They decided to set
up a permanent contact with Moscow that could be kept up
even after the outbreak of war. The most suitable means of
maintaining such a contact was through coded radio transmission.
Despite the difficulties and the enormous risk involved,
everything was in operation by spring 1941.
The information which the organisation considered necessary
to pass on to the Soviet Union in coded form represented an
important addition to information already being received by Soviet
counterintelligence.
The maintenance of this contact was of considerable
importance. A few weeks before the German invasion one of the
transmitters used by the Rote Kapelle had gone out of action. Some
parts had to be replaced and the underground representatives
had asked Sasha Korotkov to help them. A request was put
through to Moscow and the necessary parts arrived at the
embassy literally on the eve of the invasion. But before we had time
to get it where it was needed the embassy was suddennly cut off
from the outside world. And with the outbreak of war it was
essential for the Soviet Union that this radio contact with the
underground be maintained.
Thus the objective was to get Sasha outside the embassy so
that he could meet with our friends from the German anti-fascist
underground and give them what they needed to get their
transmitter working again.
A considerable amount of valuable information was passed to
Moscow from the anti-fascist German underground during the
first years of the war. It covered both the situation in the
Germans' rear and their military plans. Coded information was
transmitted on the air concerning strategic raw materials supplies,
aircraft production and the development of new weapons. In
passing information that was important to the Soviet high command
on such matters as the losses sustained by the Nazi armies, the
planned offensives of the Wehrmacht and the placing of fascist
spies and diversionists in the Soviet rear, our German anti--
102
fascist friends did their duty to the German people and to the
whole of mankind.
It was only with great difficulty that the Abwehr and the
Gestapo were able to uncover the underground anti-fascist
organisation. Around late August-early September, 1942 Harro
SchulzeBoysen, Arvid Harnack and many of their friends were arrested.
They were tried in camera by a military tribunal. On December
22, 1942 they were hanged at Plotzensee Prison in Berlin. On
the gallows they behaved heroically and when the rope was put
around Arvid Harnack's neck, he called out that he regretted
nothing that he had done and was dying a convinced communist.
In his last letter before his death Harro Schulze-Boysen wrote
that everything he had done had been done at the command of
his reason, his heart and his convictions.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In the House
on the Unter den Linden
The break through the cordon that we had effected with the
help of Oberleutnant Heinemann allowed us to be more insistent
in our negotiations with the German ministry of foreign affairs.
Thus the pressure which Wilhelmstrasse continued to exert on
us was to no avail. We were able to demand the evacuation of
the whole Soviet colony, since we knew that the German
diplomats would not be released from Moscow until this demand had
been satisfied. But day after day went by and still the question
remained unsolved.
One day on being called as usual to the Wilhelmstrasse I
noticed that the man from the protocol department seemed very
annoyed about something.
``Well,'' he said sharply, ``have you chosen the people you
want to be evacuated?''
I replied that we had not.
``You know, you are just wasting time. Reichsminister von
Ribbentrop is most displeased. We cannot allow any further delays.
Also we want the staff of the German embassy to leave Moscow
as soon as possible.''
Thus I understood that Ambassador Schulenburg and his
staff had not left Moscow. And the irate tone of the man from
the protocol department was one further affirmation of the fact
103
that Moscow had no intention of releasing them. The conclusion
from this was clear: we had to stand firm and insist on what we
wanted.
``We have no intention of selecting anyone'', I replied
calmly. ``All Soviet citizens ought to be allowed to return to
their country. We will not make any deals, and if you keep
trying to persuade us otherwise, it is you who are wasting your
time. We will not budge until our demands are met.''
Once again he started to tell me that Germany would not
agree to this and that only so many Soviet citizens should leave
as there were German citizens in Moscow. The number of these
persons was 120. Consequently, only 120 Soviet citizens could
leave Berlin and a list of these names should be presented to
the ministry without delay. Then the details of evacuation could
be agreed upon.
To this there was nothing for me to do but repeat that the
embassy would not change its mind: all Soviet citizens must
return home. It was our duty to concern ourselves with all our
people and we would not agree to abandon one thousand of
them. They had all been working in Germany according to
Soviet-German agreements and now we insisted that they all be
sent home.
Each of us repeated our arguments, but we made no progress.
Then the protocol man threatened that if the embassy would
not agree to the German demand, then the German authorities
themselves would make up a list of 120 persons for evacuation
and find ways to compel the Soviet side to agree. At this I
suggested that he should not lose sight of the fact that similar
measures could be taken in respect of the German diplomats in
Moscow. Thus having come to no agreement we parted.
On my way back to the embassy I reflected upon this
conversation and thought that things might well take an unpleasant
turn, because it would be difficult for us to insist on our
position particularly in view of the absence of any permanent
contact with Moscow. But when I got back there was some
pleasant news awaiting me. The embassy staff had been listening to
British radio and had heard a report that an agreement had
been reached for Sweden to represent Soviet interests in
Germany and Bulgaria to represent German interests in Moscow.
My first thought was why the man from the protocol
104
department, who must undoubtedly have known about this agreement,
had said not a word about it. And the answer was very likely
because he had wanted to exert increased pressure on me over
the question of exchange, since he knew that as soon as the
intermediaries began work, it would be easier for us to insist on
our position.
The cyphers and secret documentation in the embassy had
all been destroyed on the first day of the war---a fact which the
Germans undoubtedly guessed from the smoke that poured out
of the embassy chimney. Nevertheless it was always possible that
the Nazis might decide to violate the extraterritoriality of the
embassy and send Gestapo agents into the embassy building.
Therefore we were continually on the alert. We maintained a
duty roster and kept the main gates carefully locked. Whenever
the bell was rung, the man on duty would look through
peephole to see if it was anything suspicious.
One night the bell did ring, loudly and continuously. The man
on watch looked out through the peephole but could see nothing.
He asked who was there but received no reply. Meanwhile the
bell continued ringing. All the embassy senior staff were got out
of bed and a discussion was held as to what to do. If we opened
the gates the Germans might come pouring in, but if we left
them close it meant putting up with the alarm-bell din which by
now had aroused everyone in the embassy. People were
gathering outside in the embassy courtyard and everyone was nervous.
Something had to be done to stop it.
Finally we decided to open the wicket gate. Looking out onto
the street I could see nothing. All was quiet. Some distance
away a few soldiers were standing, but right by me an SS guard
had dozed off to sleep on duty and was leaning against the
bell. I shook him by the elbow and the bell ceased ringing as
soon as he stood up. I pointed out to him what had happened
and then closed the wicket gate again.
This small tragicomic incident is sufficiently indicative of the
atmosphere of nervous tension in which we all were living at
the time. However, throughout the whole ten days of our
enforced stay in Berlin the Germans gave us no provocation
whatsoever. Not the least reason for this was the fact that German
diplomats were still being held in Moscow and the Nazis feared
counter-measures.
105
All in all, despite the large number of people that were forced
to live in the house on the Unter den Linden good order was
maintained. At first, of course, many were anxious, especially
those that had young children, and many others were distressed
at the loss of their belongings, which they had had to leave
behind in their flats. But people had not yet realised the full
extent of the changes which had been brought into their lives
by the war. But gradually things sorted themselves out and our
trade union organisation did much to help this. Groups were
organised to look after the children, to prepare the food, to clean
the embassy, to organise political work and to provide
information on what was happening. A small editorial group brought
out a daily bulletin which contained information from TASS, the
Sovinformburo and other reports from home. The Soviet people
interned in the embassy behaved with dignity and courage. We
all believed firmly in our ultimate victory and in the justness of
our cause.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In Occupied Europe
When the Swedish intermediary finally arrived at our embassy
he was handed the text of a telegram for dispatch to
Moscow. The telegram outlined the steps we had taken to get all
Soviet citizens out of Germany. In the evening of the same day
we received a reply stating that the embassy had acted correctly
in insisting on the return of all Soviet citizens and that this
should be effected in exchange for the release of those Germans
who were in the Soviet Union. The following day, as we were
informed by the Swedish representative, a number of reports
that were highly unflattering to Berlin appeared in the neutral
press concerning the German attempt to detain part of the
Soviet community in Germany. By now it had already become
clear to the Germans that they would have to give in and the
ministry of foreign affairs finally agreed to accept the list of
Soviet workers and their families that were interned in either
Germany or the occupied territories as originally drawn up by
the embassy. We were then informed that all of them,
including the chauffeur that had been detained on the first day of the
war on his way to the post office, would be brought to Berlin
106
within the next few days and allowed to meet the Soviet consul
and the Swedish diplomatic representative.
Two days later this promise was carried out and all the
internees were brought to a camp on the outskirts of Berlin for
our inspection. Housed in barracks and fenced in with barbed
wire they were all hungry and poorly clothed, most of them
being in pyjamas and carpet slippers or even bare-footed. We
learned that on the night of June 21 the Gestapo burst into
their flats and dragged them straight out of their beds. They
were not allowed to take anything with them and they were
sent under convoy straight to a concentration camp.
The Germans allowed us to feed them but not to bring them
any clothes. Then, half-dressed they were loaded in sitting
compartments of another train, which the Germans told us would
follow the train with the Soviet diplomats.
The conditions for the internees were very poor, primarily as
a result of the overcrowding. A person could only lie down when
the other three that were sharing the bench stood up. There
was very little to eat. Many caught colds through lack of warm
clothing and at times, particularly on the journey through the
Alps, it was very cold.
On checking through the list while still in the Berlin camp
we discovered that there were three additional persons---a
woman and two men. They had not been registered at our
consulate and no one knew them although all three claimed that
they were Soviet citizens working in Germany and were now
returning home with the others. The Wilhelmstrasse
representative also claimed that they were Soviet citizens working in
Holland and they were included on the official German lists.
Despite our protests they remained with the internees, and later
it became clear who they were and what they wanted: when
we arrived at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, all three declared
that they refused to return to the Soviet Union. They were
``choosing freedom" and deciding to remain in the Third Reich.
The Nazi propaganda machine made an unbelievable
commotion about this with newspapers and radio giving all the details
of how ``three members of the Soviet community refused to
return to Bolshevik Russia and asked for political asylum in the
German empire.''
The story was subsequently swallowed hook, line and sinker
107
by several press agencies in the neutral countries. But the bubble
was not long in bursting. On our arrival in Istanbul we made a
special declaration unmasking this latest act of Nazi
provocation. We also informed Moscow that no Soviet citizens were
involved, only some suspicious types which the Germans had
managed to foist off on to us so as later to stage their ``flight to
freedom.''
The departure of the Soviet community from Berlin, which
was achieved through the mediation of Sweden, was set for
July 2. The embassy staff were evacuated under normal
conditions, in a special train with sleeper compartments for two. Our
route went through Prague, Vienna, Belgrade and Sofia.
According to the agreement the exchange was to take place
with the Soviet trains crossing the Bulgarian-Turkish border
and the Germans' train crossing the Soviet-Turkish border at
exactly the same time and under the observation of
intermediaries. But when we had crossed Yugoslavia and were in
Bulgaria, a representative from the protocol department of the
ministry of foreign affairs, Baron von Bothmer, (he like the rest
of the group of armed SS men had accompanied us from Berlin)
informed us that he had received instructions from Berlin that
the exchange was to be made not at the Bulgarian-Turkish
border, but at the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border.
``You see, Bulgaria,'' he said, ``is not an occupied country, it
is only allied with Germany. Therefore in crossing into
Bulgaria the Soviet trains are entering territory that is out of the
control of the Reich. But since the German train has not yet
arrived at the Soviet-Turkish border, the Soviet trains cannot
go on any further. They will have to go back to Nil in
Yugoslavia and await further instructions.''
We protested but there was practically nothing we could do.
Soon our train stopped at some local halt, the engine was
coupled from the opposite end and we moved off backwards.
At the approaches to all stations SS men were standing on
guard. They were also waiting for us at Nil, standing as usual
facing the train with their legs apart, helmets on their heads
and submachine-guns across their chests. And behind them the
Yugoslav railway workers stood giving us quiet greetings and
sometimes waving red flags.
At Ni\vs we were put on to a siding and not permitted to get
108
off the train. Soon we learned that the other train with the
Soviet internes on board had also arrived. The passengers were
all taken off and put into a concentration camp that was
located in an old barracks. It was several days before the Soviet
consul and two other members of the diplomatic staff were
allowed to visit them in this camp. During the five days they
had been on the train they had got even thinner, some were
ill and others had stomach upsets, but they were given no
medical treatment. Only after our insistent demands was the
embassy doctor allowed to visit the camp and examine the sick.
We also managed to get some improvement in the diet they
were being given.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Baron Bothmer Puts Out Feelers
The days we waited at Nis we were particularly worried
about having no contact with Moscow. Since there was no
Swedish representative there we could not rely on their
mediation. We were afraid that by some oversight the German train
might be allowed into Turkey. It would then be on neutral
territory, while even if we entered Bulgaria we would still be
to all intents and purposes in German hands, for though
Bulgaria was technically an ally of Hitler's Germany, it was virtually
in the position of an occupied country having powerful
concentrations of German troops on its territory.
I was instructed to go to von Bothmer's carriage and once
more state our protest against the German intention to make
the exchange on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. We demanded
that a Swedish representative be sent to us from Belgrade or
Sofia so that we could communicate via him with Moscow.
Baron von Bothmer, a tall, lean man of middle age with a
monocle in his right eye, was exceptionally courteous. Having
listened to me he said that he would immediately convey our
statement to Berlin and request new instruction. But, he went
on to say, as for getting a Swedish representative this was hardly
likely as there was none in Nis and it was impractical for one
to be sent from Belgrade or from Sofia. Then he said he
understood our anxiety, but could not act otherwise than in
accordance with the instructions he had received from Berlin. As I
109
was about to go, he took out a bottle of Rheinwein and two
glasses from a cupboard.
``I've wanted to have a word with you for a long time,'' he
said as he poured out the wine, ``but somehow I've not been
able to get round to it. Perhaps you'll join me for a drink.
After all, there's nothing else to do. . .''
Since it was clear that Bothmer wanted to tell me something
I agreed to his suggestion. It might be worth finding out the
reason for his excessive courtesy. He began with a bit of
general chit-chat about the difficulties and complexities of our
journey and assured me that he would do everything that
personally depended on him to try and make things easier for us.
He said he would be quite willing to help the Soviet internees
but he was meeting with obstinacy on the part of the SS officer
in charge of their guard. Therefore he could do little at the
moment to improve the conditions of those Soviet citizens who
were not travelling in the diplomatic train. Bothmer then began
to speak about the latest news from the front and said that
the Germans were meeting with strong resistance from the
Soviet armies. Then he said:
``Can I be frank with you?''
``By all means,'' I replied.
``You see, I have always considered that it would be better
for Germany and Russia to live in peace than to fight each
other. The wars between us were always of benefit only to
others and our countries had only suffered.''
I told him that I shared his opinion and that the Soviet
government had done everything in its power to avoid a conflict.
In the present case Germany had begun the aggression and must
bear the full responsibility.
``Let's not argue about who is responsible,'' said Bothmer,
``I want to say something else. In Germany there are people,
some of them highly influential, who do not want this war. At
the moment, of course, when heavy fighting is going on on
the front, this might sound odd. But ultimately we must look
ahead, not back and think about what is going to happen.
Perhaps the time will come when it will suit both sides to stop
the fighting and settle our differences amicably.. .''
I replied again that the Soviet Union bore no responsibility
for the war. Germany had treacherously invaded our country
110
and this left us with no choice but to repel the invader. We,
I said, were convinced that we would win this war and that
those who had invaded the Soviet Union would regret their
actions bitterly. I could not, therefore, understand what
peaceful settlement he had in mind.
``Well, you see,'' he continued, ``I'm talking about a time
which has not yet come, but which may well occur. You say
that you are sure of victory. But the Fiihrer on the other hand,
thinks that it won't take long to finish off the Soviet Union.
Now at the same time there are certain influential circles in
Germany who see the situation differently. They think that
neither side can win and if this happens a moment will come,
(and it is likely to be not too far off) when both sides would
consider it is better to settle the conflict peacefully. These circles
in Germany would like this point of view to be known in
Moscow...
In reply I said that as I saw it there could be no serious
talk on the subject that Bothmer had raised so long as German
troops remained on Soviet territory and at present they
certainly did not look as though they would leave voluntarily. Thus
there was no point in further discussing the point that Bofihmer
had raised.
Of course, I made a report on the feelers that Bothmer had
put out and when I ultimately returned to Moscow completed
a full report to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.
I had several other conversations with Baron Bofchmer on
this subject during the course of our journey and he reiterated
his disapproval of the German invasion of the Soviet Union,
making a special point of stressing that this was not only his
own personal opinion, but that of influential circles in Berlin.
He said once again that as a result of events on the front the
time might come when both sides would find it necessary to
stop fighting and bring about a peaceful settlement and then
those persons to whom Bothmer was referring might have a
definite role to play.
Obviously Bothmer was acting on the instructions of certain
persons in Germany. Otherwise it is difficult to explain the risks
he was taking by holding these conversations with me. He even
went so far as to tell jokes about Hitler. One of these, which
I had actually heard before in Berlin, went like this: Hitler is
111
inspecting a madhouse. All the inmates are lined up and when
he enters they all raise their arms in the fascist salute and cry
``Heil Hitler!" But one man standing on the side gives no
reaction to the appearance of the Fuhrer. Seeing this Hitler rushes
up to him furiously and asks him why he has not greeted his
Fuhrer in the proper manner. ``I'm sorry,'' replies the man,
``but I'm not a madman, I'm the doctor.''
The fact that already during the first weeks of the war
certain influential Germans had decided to put out feelers via
Bothmer seemed to be a fact of great significance.
Baron von Bothmer was undoubtedly one of the old-school
diplomats, of whom there were still quite a few left in the
ministry of foreign affairs. They served Hitler well, being
obviously nationalists and persons who welcomed the Wehrmacht
victories, but in their heart of hearts they were sickened by the
crude methods of Ribbentrop's Nazi diplomacy. It was very
likely that the ideas that Bothmer was putting forward were
shared by many other older-generation politicians who had been
very alarmed at Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union.
This was shown in particular by the tragic fate of the former
German ambassador in Moscow, Count von der
Schulenburg. Pavlov who was present at the Kremlin when
Schulenburg delivered the Soviet government the official
declaration of war, said that the man made the statement with
tears in his eyes. Then apparently he said on his own behalf
that he thought Hitler's decision was madness. Schulenburg was
later executed for his part in an unsuccessful plot against
Hitler.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Waiting at Svilengrad
The last point to which the Soviet internees were accompanied
by their SS guard was the Bulgarian border town of
Svilengrad. Although Bulgaria had not officially declared war on the
Soviet Union its government, being an ally of Hitler, virtually
allowed the Nazis to exercise authority throughout their country.
At Svilengrad we waited for two days while all the formalities
relating to the crossing of the Soviet trains into Turkey were
gone through. These formalities required the presence of our
representatives, the Germans, the Bulgarians and the Turks.
112
Despite the difficulty of their situation, however, the Bulgarians
did try and help us, but they were continually put down by
the Germans.
Our carriages actually stood not at the station but some
distance away from it in an open field near a small stream
overgrown with high reeds. The weather was hot with the sun
burning down on the carriages and the people naturally wanted
to get out for a bit and refresh themselves in the stream. The
Bulgarian officer in charge proposed taking groups of
passengers out in turn to the stream so that they could get a breath
of fresh air and refresh themselves. We were all set to do
this, when suddenly the commander of the SS unit appeared.
A tall, lanky man in a steel helmet with a medal on his chest,
he jumped out of his carriage and waving his arms started
shouting:
``Zuriick! Zuriick!''
``Who gave you permission to get out,'' he screamed turning
to me.
I explained that the Bulgarian officer had allowed us to take
the passengers out of the carriage to the stream and I nodded
in the direction of the Bulgarian who was standing a little way
away, but he remained motionless.
``I give the orders around here,'' bawled the SS man, ``not
him. And I forbid you to leave the carriages.''
``But we are in Bulgaria now,'' I replied, ``a country which
is not at war with us. Here the Bulgarians are in charge and
we've been allowed...''
His eyes flushed with blood.
``I'll show you who is in charge,'' he screamed. His hand
went to his gun and the thought flashed through my mind that
he might start shooting. But he managed to keep control of
himself and only screamed in a spiteful falsetto: ``We'll get you
lot later, don't worry!''
Then turning to his soldiers he issued orders that no one
should be allowed out of the carriages and then marched off
to the end of the train past the Bulgarian officer who continued
to stand there without moving. Only when his lanky figure
had disappeared the Bulgarian officer came up to me, smiling
guiltily and shrugging his shoulders.
``What can you do...''
__PRINTERS_P_113_COMMENT__
8---1996
113
``Nothing, I suppose,'' I replied and got back into my
carriage.
One other event of note happened at Svilengrad. A wife from
the Soviet trade mission in Berlin was due to give birth any
day. She thought she would be able to get to Turkey before
the baby was born, but suddenly there at Svilengrad she went
into labour. The Bulgarians were very sympathetic and offered
to take her to a hospital in the town as the baby could arrive
at any moment. But the same lanky SS man categorically
refused to give permission. So the Bulgarians called their own
military doctor who came up immediately and ordered a tent
to be made of reeds near the railway line. The mother-to-be
was taken there and soon from behind the wall of reeds came
the cry of the newborn baby...
When two days later we moved on and crossed the border
into Turkey the number of Soviet citizens had increased by
one.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In Neutral Turkey
One day after our arrival at Svilengrad the second train
with the remaining members of the Soviet community came.
We once again checked the lists and headed for Turkey.
When we finally arrived at the Turkish town of Edirne we
saw new railway carriages waiting for us there. We were met
by representatives of the Soviet embassy and consulate in
Turkey. The local governor also came out to meet us and in the
evening he held a reception in honour of the Soviet diplomats.
The next day new clothes were brought from Istanbul for
the Soviet internees. In the afternoon we all left for Istanbul,
the Soviet diplomats travelling by car and the rest of us
boarding a train.
It was late in the evening when we arrived in Istanbul and
the streets were already dark and deserted. Only the mosques'
minarets gleamed in the bright moonlight. We stayed in the
Soviet consulate which was situated in the middle of an old
park. The next day was taken up with all the formalities
relating to our evacuation home. In the port the snow-white
steamliner Svanetia was waiting where the ex-internees could have
a short rest before going home. A group of diplomats,
114
including myself, went on to Ankara by train. But before boarding
the night express we had to cross the Bosphorus on a launch.
That evening the waters that separate Europe from Asia were
tranquil and glowing a ruddy pink in the sunset. As we drew
further and further away from the shore the magnificent dome
and minarets of the Hagia Sophia, the largest mosque in
Istanbul and a remarkable monument of Byzantine architecture, grew
taller and taller before us.
At Ankara a special Soviet plane had been laid on for us...
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Return to Moscow
Having circled the roofs of Moscow our plane landed at the
Central Airport, where now the main heliport is situated. It
was in die afternoon of a sunny summer's day. When the
engines died down and we descended the gangway onto the green
grass of the airport, it was difficult to restrain our excitement.
The silence everywhere seemed deceptive. All the time we had
been thinking of nothing else but that our country was day
and night engaged in fighting a bloody war. But here was the
sweet smell of clover and the sight of larks flying peacefully
over the fields. But once out on the Leningrad Highway we
could see the ominous signs of war. Hanging on the butt-end
of a building in such a way that it could not be missed was a
huge plackard showing the stern face of a Russian woman who
was holding in her raised hand the text of the military oath.
The inscription underneath the plackard read: ``Your
Motherland Galls You''. Several times our car had to slow down for
groups of home-guards marching along the road. The fronts
of the houses were painted with green and brown camouflage
and strips of paper were stuck criss-cross across the windows.
Thus the harsh face of Moscow in wartime appeared to us in
the first hours of our return.
At night all the inhabitants of our block of flats were aroused
by an air-raid warning. The women and children went into the
cellar and the men went on to the roof. There I got my first
war trophies---two small incendiary bombs extinguished with
a bucket of sand.
The next day, Sunday, I was called to the foreign ministry.
We had to sort out urgently the diplomatic pouch that we had
__PRINTERS_P_115_COMMENT__
8*
115
brought. Every hour the courier brought in TASS bulletins
that contained communications from the telegraphic agencies.
Most of them concerned the situation on the Soviet-German
front. We could feel the whole world holding its breath as it
followed the titanic struggle that was taking place all the way
from the Barents to the Black Sea. It was not till the evening
of that day that I had time for a break and I decided to go to
the Metropol Restaurant for a meal. The huge hall was full
and many were in military uniform. But on the whole it was
not much different from peacetime.
When I returned we continued to sort out the post. We wrote
reports and notes on the last days of the Soviet community in
Berlin. Around midnight there was another air-raid alarm. I
went out to Dzerzhinsky Square to the bomb-shelter in the
metro. People were making their way down unhurriedly, their
manner calm and serious. On the platform and on the rails
people---mostly middle-aged with children---were already
settling down for the night. But there were no sounds of anti-aircraft
fire or bombs and children slept peacefully.
Finally, the ``all-clear'' was given. I returned to work as the
dawn was already breaking in the east. From my room on the
fourth floor of the foreign ministry building, which was then
located on Kuznetsky Most I had a good view of a house
burning somewhere on the far side of the Moskva River. The black
smoke was rising in a column into the rosy-green sky. At four
in the morning I went home. I drove a small, grey KIM---the
first Soviet compact car to be produced which had only just
come off the production lines at the Communist Youth
International factory and was nothing like the modern Moskvitch---
fast along the deserted streets. Twice I was stopped by military
patrols who checked my documents. And after a few hours of
uneasy sleep I was at work again by nine in the morning.
From the foreign ministry staff a home-guard detachment
was made and every evening we went to the park in Mariina
Roshcha for military exercises. Three times a week we took
the electric train along the Yaroslavl railway for shooting practice
in a small forest, and lying in trenches we would fire our rifles
at plywood targets.
Opposite the metro entrance on Revolution Square a German
Junkers bomber that had been shot down outside Moscow was
116
put on display. Obviously it had come down somewhere soft
or had glided because the plane was almost whole, the only
damage it had suffered was that the fuselage was slightly
dented and one wing was broken. There were also a few large bombs
on display, which had been defused. Passers-by stopped to look
at the fascist plane with its black, sinister crosses and one could
hear remarks like:
``If our boys can bring down a great heap like that, we'll
show Hitler yet. . .''
But the Germans did not give up their nightly air-raids. And
despite the stubborn resistance of our forces they continued to
press further eastwards. The military reports of the
Sovinformburo contained more and more names of towns and villages
which were coming under enemy fire. The front got closer and
closer to Moscow. Now everyone realised that the war would
be a long one and that there were many many months of hard
fighting ahead.
But during these first weeks of the war Moscow had already
learned a lot and the defence of the capital had been
considerably strengthened. Every evening the barrage balloons on long
steel cables were raised over the city. The anti-aircraft flak also
became noticeably stronger. All over the city teams worked
incessantly to extinguish incendiary bombs and there were fewer
fires. The city became active and alert. It seemed to personify
the will of the Soviet people to fight the enemy and the faith
of the people in their ultimate victory.
[117]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
THE BIRTH OF THE COALITION
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Beginning
__ALPHA_LVL3__
New Objectives
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union radically changed the
whole international situation. The Second World War which had
begun as a struggle between two rival groups of imperialist
powers now became a war against fascism for the liberation
of enslaved peoples. And the conditions now existed for the
formation of a military alliance between the USSR, Great
Britain and the United States. But this alliance did not come about
overnight. From the point of view of international law the
antiHitler coalition between the three powers and a number of
other states that were opposed to fascism had gone through
several stages and finally materialised in the first half of 1942.
Throughout that period the Soviet Union worked perseveringly
towards creation of a military alliance between those countries
that were at war with fascism.
From the moment Hitler invaded the USSR Soviet diplomacy
was faced with a number of new objectives. The main goal was
to ensure international conditions that would best promote the
dealing of a serious blow to the enemy and ultimately bring
about the liberation of occupied Soviet territory and a complete
victory over the Axis powers. It was therefore the prime concern
of Soviet diplomacy to ensure that the bourgeois states which
were already fighting Nazi Germany and fascist Italy become
close allies of the Soviet Union. This meant the creation and
strengthening of a coalition of those states that were at war
with Nazi Germany and the rapid opening of a second front
in Europe. It was also necessary to ensure that those states
which maintained official neutrality in the Soviet-German
118
conflict (Japan, Turkey, Iran and a number of others) remained
neutral. And this demanded no small measure of diplomatic
skill.
Another task of Soviet foreign policy at that time was to
assist in every possible way the peoples of Europe enslaved by
fascism, who were fighting for their freedom and restoration
of their sovereign rights. This task was outlined in the address
of Joseph Stalin, head of the Soviet government and Chairman
of the State Defence Committee, on 3 July 1941.
These objectives were also reflected in a declaration which
was presented by the Soviet delegation to the Allied
Conference in London in September, 1941. The declaration pointed
out that all the peoples and states which had had to fight a
war that had been forced upon them by Hitler's Germany
should strive to bring about the rapid and decisive defeat of
the aggressors and mobilise all their forces to this end. It also
mentioned the need for a post-war world settlement which
would deliver nations from the threat of fascism. The Soviet
government expressed its confidence that as a result of the
complete and final victory over Nazism the principles of
international cooperation and friendship would be established in
accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the freedom-loving
peoples.
The achievement of these objectives was complicated by trie
fact that ruling circles in Britain and the United States were
persuing other aims in the war besides the defeat of the Axis
powers. Of course, they wanted to beat Germany and its allies
so as to eliminate the threat of German world hegemony and
retain their own independence. But they also looked upon the
weakening of that country as an imperialist rival and as a
dangerous competitor on the world market, as a means of
extending their own influence throughout the world so as to establish
Anglo-American domination in the post-war world.
And the nearer the defeat of Germany came to being a
reality the stronger these imperialist motives became in the policies
of the Western powers. Churchill, who became British Prime
Minister in May 1940, believed that the war would weaken
the Soviet state and that the end of hostilities would leave the
USSR dependent on Britain and the United States.
The Third Reich's victories in Western Europe and North
119
Africa, the fall of France, the occupation of Greece and
Yugoslavia and the advance of the Axis powers across the Balkans
towards the oil fields of the Middle East presented such an
enormous danger to British imperialism that it became
extremely difficult, if not impossible for Hitler's supporters in
Britain to implement their long cherished plans for a deal with
fascism and the organisation of a joint anti-Bolshevik crusade.
Hitler and Mussolini had gone too far and struck too heavy
a blow to the vital centres of British imperialism for any deal
between the British government and the leaders of the Third
Reich to be possible.
Hitler evidently thought that by launching a war against the
Soviet Union he would atone for all his sins against the Western
democracies. But he sadly miscalculated. The road to a new
deal with the British Munichites was now closed. On June 22,
1941, the very day Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the British
government declared that it fully supported the struggle of the
Soviet people against the enemy that had invaded its soil. This
undoubtedly reflected the efforts of Soviet diplomacy. The
Soviet government had not allowed itself to become involved in
a discussion of the division of the ``British possessions" as
suggested by Hitler at the talks in Berlin in a bid to set Britain
against the USSR and thereby prevent a future Soviet-British
alliance against Germany. Consistently pursuing the Leninist
foreign policy, the Soviet Union avoided international isolation
and paved the way for cooperation with the Western powers
in the struggle against the common enemy.
__*_*_*__
Of the staff of the Soviet embassy in Berlin who had lived
through the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941 in
the German capital a small group were required to stay on
in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, while the rest
either went to serve in the army or home guard, or if they
had some technical skills they went to work at the arms
factories. I was asked to remain in the diplomatic service and work
on matters concerned with Germany's European allies. A little
later after I had been promoted to counsellor I was given
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan as well. Since I knew English as
120
well as German I was often asked to interpret at meetings
between government and foreign ministry officials and British and
American representatives. Thus it happened that I was present
at the talks at which the anti-Hitler coalition was formed.
Of course, I was not able to be present at all the meetings
and talks and therefore in writing about the formation of
military cooperation between the three powers I can only
partially rely on my personal recollections. Furthermore it is not my
intention here to describe all the stages of this process,
preferring to concentrate on just those events which I happened to
witness. Obviously I have tried to retain the proper
chronological order to show the development of relations between the
three powers. In those cases where it seemed necessary and also
where I deal with meetings at which I was- not myself present
I have introduced the appropriate documentation (publications
from the British Foreign Office, the US State Department, the
memoirs of a number of British and American politicians and
also Soviet archive material).
__*_*_*__
In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great
Patriotic War Soviet relations with Britain and the United
States were highly strained. The People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs naturally maintained contacts with British and
American diplomats accredited in Moscow. Similar contacts were
also kept up by the Soviet embassies in London and Washington.
On the whole the period was characterised by attempts on both
sides to probe the position of the other in respect of its attitude
to Germany and its possible future military action.
On the actual day the Germans invaded the Soviet Union Sir
Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, was in
London. He returned on June 27 at the head of a special
military and economic commission.
That day he was received by Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, to whom Cripps
presented the members of his mission. A declaration was read
at the reception which expressed sympathy for the Soviet Union
in its predicament and contained a number of somewhat vague
promises of help.
121
After that Molotov and Cripps held talks in the course of
which the latter was asked how the British government
envisaged that the mission would cooperate with the Soviet Union.
Cripps replied that the members of the mission should have
contact with Soviet military personnel, but he stressed that
the military part of the mission did not depend upon him. As
for economic matters, he thought contact should be made with
Anastas Mikoyan. Cripps made no mention at all of any
political preconditions for the talks between the British mission
and its Soviet counterparts, a fact which was noted by the
Soviet side.
The Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs promised
an early answer and expressed the wish that no furor should
be made in the British press about the mission's visit to
Moscow. Cripps promised to take measures in this respect.
Then the conversation turned to other subjects. The
Ambassador was asked to inform the Soviet leaders about what was
happening to Rudolph Hess and why he had decided to fly to
England. Cripps replied that in the past Hess had been linked
with pro-Nazi circles in Britain and thought that he could do
a deal with these people and conclude a separate peace. Cripps
said that he was convinced that Hess had not come to England
without Hitler's knowledge.
``At the present moment,'' said the Ambassador in
conclusion, ``no one in Britain is interested in Hess. The British
government has allowed various rumours to circulate about Hess
and has purposely made no official declaration so as to keep the
Germans in ignorance...''
In fact Cripps could have said more about the Hess affair,
for in London there was by no means the kind of indifference to
his flight that Cripps would have the Soviet representative
believe.
A serious rift had formed among ruling circles in Britain over
Hess and his mission. And at one stage British politicians were
even ready to make a public announcement that the aims of
his flight were to conclude an agreement between London and
Berlin on the basis of anti-communism and a firm undertaking
from Hitler that he would invade the Soviet Union.
Such an announcement might have brought about a new
situation in Anglo-German intrigues and made a deal between
122
the two countries more possible. But the whole international
situation and particularly the fact that Britain was now at war
with Germany and the British public was becoming increasingly
opposed to fascism made this highly unlikely. Churchill was
hesitant. But Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union had altered
the situation radically. Ruling circles in Britain saw that another
possibility faced them. They could act together with the Soviet
Union not only to avert the threat of Nazi invasion that was
still hanging over Britain, but also to defeat the Third Reich,
which was now seen as offering a serious threat to the interests
of the British Empire.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Anglo-Soviet Agreement
During the course of the talks between Ambassador Cripps
and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov the position
of the United States was discussed. Cripps stated that a week
before the German invasion of the Soviet Union he had asked
Churchill to contact Roosevelt and discuss with him the
possibility of such an invasion. He also mentioned confidentially
that Churchill, himself, and Winant, who had been US
Ambassador in London had together composed the speech which
the British Prime Minister broadcast on June 22 as soon as it
became known that Germany had invaded the Soviet Union.
Winant had been very pleased with Churchill's speech because
it in his opinion reflected the views of Roosevelt. Molotov
asked whether Hess had warned the British about the
forthcoming invasion of the USSR. Cripps said that he had not and that
London had received its information from other sources. Here
it is difficult to believe the British Ambassador.
In the evening of June 27 a second meeting took place
between Cripps and Molotov. The People's Commissar said that
the proposals made by the Ambassador had been conveyed to
the Soviet government which was now interested to learn the
scale and size of the aid which the two sides might offer each
other.
``The British government,'' replied Cripps, ``is prepared to
do everything in its power to effect cooperation between our
two countries. I see nothing which could limit the scope of
123
possible economic aid and I can see no limits to the aid that is
necessary for the achievement of our common goal.''
Molotov stated that mutual aid should be fixed according
to an agreement on a definite political basis which would serve
to bring about a military and political rapprochement between
the two countries. Cripps replied evasively but to the general
effect that it was unlikely that the British government would
be ready to make a political accommodation with the USSR.
This reply was not to the liking of the Soviet side, which
considered that in the present situation when both countries were
faced with a common enemy consideration should be given not
only to the specific issues of the moment, but also to the problem
of broader military and political cooperation. Molotov asked
Gripps whether he correctly understood him to mean that the
British government considered cooperation on special matters
possible at the present moment, but did not intend to achieve
full military and political cooperation. Cripps replied that he
thought it was more necessary to achieve cooperation on
military and economic matters and this would create a base for
political cooperation.
On June 29 Molotov received Cripps once more. Referring
to information from London on recent talks between the Soviet
Ambassador Maisky and Lord Beaverbrook, a member of the
British War Cabinet, Molotov raised the question of increasing
British air attacks against Germany, and in Western Europe in
general, and also about the landing of troops in France, for
it was the possibility of such operations that Beaverbrook had
discussed with Maisky. Cripps had undoubtedly been informed
about the meeting between the Soviet Ambassador and
Beaverbrook and instructed on what to say should such a question be
raised, for without hesitating he replied:
``In principle His Majesty's government is prepared to do
everything it can to aid the Soviet government. However the
Royal Navy is unable to undertake such an operation since we
do not know what it will actually amount to. Consequently, we
can say nothing definite about such operations of our armed
services as would make the situation easier on the Soviet
front.
Thus we can see that despite statements from Churchill and
members of his cabinet to the effect that the British
124
government was ready to render extensive aid to the Soviet Union, in
practice no concrete steps were taken.
During his meeting with members of the British military
mission on June 30, 1941 Molotov again mentioned the desirability
of stepping up British air attacks in West Germany and in
occupied France and also the landing of troops in the region
mentioned by Beaverbrook. This time the reply was given by
General MacFarlane who stated that his task consisted in getting
as soon as possible detailed information on the activity and
plans of the Soviet troops. Then, apparently, the British
chiefsof-staff would work out a corresponding plan of operations.
In the end, however, the Soviet government did manage to
persuade the British government to come to an agreement which
would not be purely technical. On July 13, 1941 the Agreement
for Joint Action by His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in the War against Germany was signed in the
Kremlin. The importance of this document was emphasised by the
fact that on the Soviet side Stalin, head of the Soviet
government, Boris Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the
Red Army, and Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, People's Commissar
for the Navy, together with other officials were all present at
the signing. Present on the British side were Sir Stafford Cripps,
the British Ambassador, members of the staff of the British
Embassy in Moscow and members of the British mission. The
agreement which was written in both Russian and English was
signed on behalf of the Soviet Union by People's Commissar
of Foreign Affairs Molotov, and on behalf of Great Britain by
Ambassador Cripps. The agreement said, in part, that (1) the
two governments undertook to assist each other in every possible
way in the war against Hitlerite Germany; and (2) they further
undertook that in the course of the war they would neither
negotiate nor conclude any armistice or peace treaty except with
their mutual consent.
This agreement can be considered as the beginning of the
anti-Hitler coalition.
And it really was only a beginning. The British were
reluctant to bind themselves to any military and political
undertakings. This was largely due to the fact that the opinion
predominated among British military experts and politicians that the
125
Soviet Union would not withstand the might ol the German
military machine, backed up as it was by the industrial
potential of almost the whole of Western Europe. Military specialists
in London did not believe that the Red Army could hold out
against Hitler for much longer than five or six weeks.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Visit of Harry Hopkins
Similar evaluations of the Soviet Union's ability to withstand
Hitler's Germany were also being made in the United States.
The only difference being that the military strategists in
Washington gave the ``Russian resistance" even less time.
Roosevelt, however, did not entirely trust these forecasts and so in
order to get first-hand information he decided to send Harry
Hopkins as his special representative to Moscow. At the time
Hopkins was in Britain and Roosevelt instructed him to fly
directly to the Soviet Union. After almost a two day flight from
Scotland to Arkhangelsk on a British plane Hopkins arrived in
Moscow in the afternoon of July 28.
At the Central Airport on the Leningrad Highway a group of
diplomats and military personnel gathered to meet Hopkins.
The group included not only official Soviet representatives, but
also staff from the United States and British embassies and
the naval and military attaches from these countries. The
pun was baking hot and the party that had gathered to
meet Hopkins stood in the shade of an awning on the
airport terrace.
Finally, it was announced that the plane was due to land.
Everyone looked up in the sky where we could already hear
the noise of the engines. Circling the airport once the plane
landed and rolling slightly taxied over to the waiting group. As
the engines died down and the doors opened, the gangway
was lowered and the lean figure of a man in a crumpled suit
that was slightly too big for him appeared. His neck seemed
too thin for the great high-foreheaded, balding head it
supported. But the eyes looked intelligent and penetrating and the
big mouth was lit up in a smile. This was Harry Hopkins, the
special representative and personal friend of President
Roosevelt. On the conclusions that this man would draw would
largely depend the subsequent policy of the United States. His brief
126
was to collect on-the-spot information and report to
Washington as to whether the Soviet Union was capable of standing up
to Hitler or whether the war on the Soviet-German front would
turn into the same fascist Blitzkrieg that had been seen all
over Europe. Depending on the answer that Hopkins gave to
these questions the White House would formulate its policy
towards the Soviet Union, which was now the latest victim of
Nazi aggression.
Immediately after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union the
US administration had come out with a statement condemning
it as an act of aggression. In a speech at a press conference
on June 24, 1941 Roosevelt had stated that all those including
the Soviet Union who resisted the Axis powers would receive US
support. But a declaration in words was one thing, concrete
measures to effect that support were something else. In both
the United States and Britain there were influential circles that
had encouraged the fascist aggressors in the pre-war period
and set them against the Soviet Union. Account had to be taken
of the fact that these forces would continue to resist US-Soviet
cooperation or try to ensure that it would be limited to merely
expressions of sympathy while doing all they could to prevent
practical help being given to the Red Army which was
struggling heroically against the fascist hordes. It was as a counterpoise
to the influence of these circles, which, as it happened, was to
make itself felt throughout the whole course of the war, that
Roosevelt hoped to put the conclusions of such an experienced
and prestigious politician as Harry Hopkins and his report was
carefully studied by the State Department.
Hopkins who was accompanied by two military advisers spent
several days in Moscow. During that time he met the leaders
of the Soviet government, received detailed information about
the situation at the Soviet-German front and saw with his own
eyes the determination of the Soviet people to fight for victory.
This determination left a profound impression on him.
In the evening of the day he arrived, Harry Hopkins was
received by Stalin and the conversation which he had with the
Soviet head of state was outlined by Hopkins in his memo which
is now to be found among the White House archives.
``I told Mr. Stalin that I came as personal representative of
the President. The President considered Hitler the enemy of
127
mankind and that he therefore wished to aid the Soviet Union
in its fight against Germany.
``I told him that my mission was not a diplomatic one in the
sense that I did not propose any formal understanding of any
kind or character.
``I expressed to him the President's belief that the most
important thing to be done in the world today was to defeat
Hitler and Hitlerism. I impressed upon him the determination
of the President and our Government to extend all possible
aid to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible time.
``I ... explained my relationship to the Administration in
Washington. I told him further that I just left Mr. Churchill
in London who wished me to convey to him the sentiments
which I had already expressed from the President.
``Mr. Stalin said he welcomed me to the Soviet Union...
``Describing Hitler and Germany, Mr. Stalin spoke of the
necessity of there being a minimum moral standard between
all nations, and, without such a minimum moral standard
nations could not co-exist. He stated that the present leaders of
Germany knew no such minimum moral standard and that
therefore, they represented an anti-social force in the present
world. The Germans were a people, he said, who without a
second's thought would sign a treaty today, break it tomorrow
and sign a second one the following day. Nations must fulfill
their treaty obligations, he said, or international society could
not exist.
``When he completed his general summary of the Soviet
Union's attitude toward Germany he said 'therefore our views
coincide.'
``I told Mr. Stalin that the question of aid to the Soviet
Union was divided into two parts. First, what would Russia
most require that the United States could deliver immediately
and, second, what would be Russia's requirements on the basis
of a long war?
``Stalin listed in the first category the immediate need of, first,
anti-aircraft guns of medium calibre ... together with
ammunition. He stated that he needed such medium calibre guns
because of the rapidity of their fire and their mobility... Second,
he asked for large size machine-guns for the defense of his
cities. He stated that he needed one million or more such rifles.
128
I asked Mr. Stalin if he needed ammunition for these rifles
and he replied that if the calibre was the same as the one used
by the Red Army 'We have plenty'.
``In the second category, namely, the supplies needed for a
long-range war, he mentioned first high octane aviation
gasoline, second, aluminum for the construction of airplanes. . . At
this point in the conversation Mr. Stalin suddenly made the
remark, 'Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminum and we
can fight for three or four years.'
''. . .Mr. Stalin stated that he would be glad if we would
send any technicians that we could to the Soviet Union to help
train his own airmen in the use of these planes.. . Mr. Stalin
said the plane he needed particularly was the short-range
bomber, capable of operating in a radius of 600 to 1100 kilometres
or with a total range of 1200 to 2200 kilometres.
``I asked Mr. Stalin what he thought was the best route to
ship supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Stalin stated that the Persian Gulf-Iranian route was not
good because of the limited capacity of the Iranian railways
and highways. .. Mr. Stalin believed that the Archangel route
was probably the most practicable. . . I told Mr. Stalin that my
stay in Moscow must be brief. I wished to accomplish as much
as possible in the short time which I had at my disposal. I
asked Mr. Stalin whether he wished to carry on the
conversations personally or would prefer that I would discuss some of
the details with other representatives of the Soviet Government.
I said that, of course, I would prefer to confer directly with
him but I realized he had a great many responsibilities at the
moment...
``Mr. Stalin replied, 'You are our guest; you have but to
command.' He told me he would be at my disposal every day
from six to seven. It was then agreed that I confer with
representatives of the Red Army at ten o'clock that night.
``I reiterated to Mr. Stalin the appreciation of the people
of the United States of the splendid resistance of the Soviet
Army and of the President's determination to do everything to
assist the Soviet Union in its valiant struggle against the
German invader.
``Mr. Stalin replied with an expression of gratitude of the
Soviet Government."^^1^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ FRUS. Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Vol. I, pp. 803--805.
__PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__
9---1996
129
The next clay after talks with General (later Marshal of
Artillery) Yakovlev and other Red Army generals Hopkins met
the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps. Their talks
mainly centred round the forthcoming meeting between Roosevelt
and Churchill in the light of recent events on the Soviet-German
front. As Hopkins noted, both men expressed the desirability
of the President and the Prime Minister sending a
communique to Stalin at the end of their conference (the conference at
which, incidentally, the Atlantic Charter was drawn up). The
note which was sent two weeks later contained the following
statement: ``We have taken the opportunity afforded by
consideration of the report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from
Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries
can help your country in the splendid defence that you are
putting up against the Nazi attack.''
In the afternoon of July 31 Harry Hopkins and the US
Ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt had a meeting with Molotov in
the Kremlin. The discussion chiefly centred around the
situation in the Far East. As Hopkins noted in his diary, he had the
impression that the Soviet side was trying hard to prevent the
situation on its Far Eastern borders from deteriorating and to
avoid a war with Japan. Hopkins also drew the conclusions
from these talks that it would be desirable for the United
States to issue some kind of warning to Japan that if it were
to invade the Soviet Union the United States would aid the
victim of aggression.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Needs of the Front
and the Prospects for the War
In the evening of the same day Harry Hopkins was again
received by Stalin and the talks at which Maxim Litvinov
interpreted lasted for three and a half hours.
``I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have
his---Stalin's---appreciation and analysis of the war between
Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as
follows: . . .he believes that Germany can mobilize 300 divisions.. .
Mr. Stalin stated that he can mobilize 350 divisions and will
have that many divisions under arms by the time the spring
campaign begins in May 1942. He is anxious to have as many
130
of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because
then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not
supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence
that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air ... he wants
to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great
campaign which will come next spring. . . The Russians therefore
have many 'insurgent' troops which operate behind Germany's
so-called front line . . . these 'insurgent' troops are proving a
great menace to the German offensive. . . He believes that
Germany underestimated the strength of the Russian Army... He
repeatedly emphasized the large number of men Germany was
forced to use for this purpose, and believes that the Germans
will have to go on the defensive themselves. . . They are burying
many of their large tanks in the ground for defensive purposes.
The Russians have already found 50 such defensive positions.
Mr. Stalin stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has
too many men on the Russian front. [The Germans have exposed
their positions in the West.] He believes that the morale of his
own troops is extremely high, and realizes that this is partly
due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in
familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that
'moving mechanized forces through Russia was very different
from moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France'.
Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a
surprise attack; he himself believed that Hitler would not
strike. . . Hitler made no demands on Russia ... he [Stalin]
took all precautions possible to mobilize his army .. . they were
forced to organize a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians
were counter-attacking at many points. . .
``He [Stalin] believes that his largest tanks are better than
the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown
their superiority. . . He emphasized the fact that Germany has
a strong and powerful air force . . . but the quality of many
of the German planes is not first-class.. . The Russians have
experienced no trouble in destroying these planes. .. He ...
indicated that about 75 per cent of the sum total of his
munitions plants . .. were in the general areas of which Leningrad,
Moscow and Kiev were the centers.. . Stalin said they ... were
moving many machine tools eastward to escape the bombing
attacks ... he believed that they had large reserves of food,
__PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__
9*
131
men, supplies and fuel. .. He thought one weakness the British
had was underrating their enemy; he did not propose to do this.
He, therefore, thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and
fuel are concerned the German Army is capable of taking part
in a winter campaign in Russia. . . He expressed great confidence
that the line during the winter months would be in front of
Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad---probably not more than 100
kilometres away from where it is now...
``He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was
light anti-aircraft guns ... to give protection to their lines of
communications against low flying planes. His second great need
was aluminum needed in the construction of airplanes. The
third was machine-guns. .. He stated that he needed large
antiaircraft guns for the defense of cities.''
Hopkins asked whether the Russians had seen any Italian
divisions or Franco's volunteers at the front, as had been
reported in the Western press. Stalin smiled at this question and said
that Soviet soldiers did not mind meeting Italians or Spaniards
who did not present much in the way of danger. Their main
enemies were the Germans.
Hopkins said that the governments of Great Britain and the
United States wanted to do everything they could in the
coming weeks to provide the Soviet Union with the materials it
needed. But first they had to manufacture them and, secondly,
time was required for their delivery. It was therefore unlikely
that anything serious could be done until late autumn. It was
easier, he said, to make plans for a protracted war. But to
carry out the long-term plans the US government needed to
know not only the military position in Russia, but also the
types, quantity and quality of its weaponry as well as its raw
material resources and production capacities. He added that the
United States and British governments would hardly start
sending heavy weaponry like tanks, planes and anti-aircraft guns to
the Russian front before a conference of representatives of the
three governments had been held to study the respective
strategic interests on each front and the interests of each country
fully and jointly. Since heavy fighting was going on the Soviet
front, it seemed unlikely, Hopkins said, that Stalin would be
able to devote the time to such a conference before the
situation had stabilised. Stalin replied that the front would stabilise
132
not later than October 1. In his diary Hopkins noted that in
the situation as it stood at the time he considered the holding
of such a conference to be inexpedient. He advised postponing
its date and calling it only when the outcome of the battles now
going on became clear.
Thus, although Hopkins did not share the pessimistic
prognoses of the American high command which doubted the ability
of the Red Army to withstand the Nazi attack, he was
nevertheless not confident that the Soviet Union would manage to
stabilise the front in a short time. Therefore he advised
postponing the conference so as not to involve the United States and
Britain in any definite undertakings. Ultimately agreement was
reached to hold such talks between October 1 and 15.
Hopkins wrote of his trip to the Soviet Union and his talks
with the head of the Soviet government that they were the
turning point in relations between Britain and the United States
on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.
At a press conference on July 31, just before leaving Moscow,
Hopkins stated that in his meetings with the Soviet leaders he
had discussed the situation in the Soviet Union in connection
with the war with Germany, and on the instructions of
Roosevelt had informed Stalin that ``Whoever fights against Hitler
is on the right side . . . and the United States will help that
side.''
``I told Stalin,'' Hopkins continued, ``that we were following
the struggle that the Soviet Union was waging in self-defence
with the greatest admiration. . .''
Stalin asked Hopkins to convey his gratitude to President
Roosevelt for the offer of help and said that the President and
the American people could rely on the Soviet people to play
a decisive role in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany.
Harry Hopkins left Moscow with a quite definite and
positive impression about the Soviet Union. Despite the gloomy
warnings of military experts in Washington Hopkins came to
the conclusion that the Soviet Union was capable not only of
withstanding the enemy onslaught, but also of subsequently
inflicting him serious blows. Hopkins' report to the government
and personally to the president did much to determine the
subsequent policy of the Roosevelt administration in aiding the
Soviet Union in its struggle against fascist aggression.
133
His visit opened the way for the American government to take
practical steps in this direction. Nevertheless, the rendering of
real aid, the actual deliveries, still took quite a long time.
Obviously in the conditions that then existed with the long
distances involved, and the fact that hostilities were going on in
the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea and on the European
continent making such deliveries was far from easy. But even so,
the preparations took too long a time, largely due to the
hesitance that was still felt among ruling circles in the West, who
were continually watching events on the Soviet-German front
and who were not as yet fully confident that the Soviet people
were capable of withstanding the Nazi aggression.
Harry Hopkins' visit to Moscow and his sober analysis of
the situation played a positive role ultimately favouring the
development of the anti-Hitler coalition.
Of definite practical importance in this respect was the visit
of General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) Golikov at the
head of a delegation of Soviet military experts to Great Britain
and the United States.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
An Evening at the Metropol
Members of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,
who had returned from abroad and had no place to live in in
Moscow, were housed in the empty buildings of foreign
embassies whose staff had left Moscow, because their countries either
sided with Nazi Germany or were occupied by the Axis powers.
I and a number of other colleagues were given rooms in a
mansion in Ostrovsky Pereulok, which had been one of the
Skandinavian embassies. The former tenants had taken their
furniture with them and we were provided with folding beds,
tables and chairs from the People's Commissariat that were no
longer in use because they were too old. Now they came in
handy for furnishing the empty buildings that had been given
over to the People's Commissariat staff that were without flats.
One evening in August 1941 I went to have dinner at the
Metropol Restaurant. There were many people there and most
of them were servicemen. The orchestra was playing and
several couples were dancing round the pool. Unable to find a
free place I was about to leave when I suddenly heard
134
someone call my name. Under one of the standard lamps to the
right of the orchestra a group of three men were sitting, one
of whom I immediately recognised. This was an old
acquaintance of mine---Valentin Petrovich Seletsky. The other two who
were in uniform I did not recognise, but later it turned out
that we had returned home together from Germany after the
outbreak of the war. They had been in another echelon, among
those who were not on the embassy staff but had worked in
Germany or in one of the occupied countries.
I remembered that we had met in Nis in Yugoslavia when
our two trains had stopped for several days and the consul,
Korolev, and myself had been allowed by the Germans to visit the
Soviet internees who were in the other train.
I sat at their table and ordered dinner. Naturally our
conversation turned to the one subject that concerned everybody---the
situation at the front. These two army officers had returned to
Moscow for several days from the South-Western Front where
they had seen very heavy fighting. In a number of places the
invaders had reached the Dnieper and Kiev was threatened.
But the enemy's advance was bought at a high price and the
Nazis suffered enormous losses.
We could not help thinking, of course, of the terrible fate
of those who had not managed to get out in time and had fallen
under the fascist yoke. Having worked in Germany we had
frequently come across evidence of the pathological hatred that the
Nazis felt for the Soviet people and for Communists. And we
knew all about the brutal reprisals that were carried out in
the occupied territories.
At one time I had worked with Seletsky in the USSR Trade
Mission in Berlin and for several months in 1940 we had
been at the Krupp factory in Essen checking equipment which
had been bought by the USSR under the Soviet-German
economic agreement. On Sundays we frequently went for walks
around the locality.
Since that year May Day (Hitler had announced it a labour
holiday for demagogic reasons) was immediately followed by
Easter we had decided to use the holidays for a trip along the
Rhine. Arriving at Rudesheim by train, we set off on foot across
the vineyards to Godesberg where we arrived late in the
evening. As part of our trip we had decided to stay at the Dresden
135
Hotel, where during the preparations for the Munich deal Hitler
and Mussolini had met their Western partners.
To our surprise when we got to the hotel we saw that the
vestibule was full of SS men. We went up to the desk, showed
our passports and I asked if we could have two rooms for the
night. Before the manager had time to reply a big SS man
was suddenly standing behind me.
``Who are they?" came the rude voice.
The manager nervously handed the SS man our passports
with the hammer and sickle. He took one look at them and
without even turning to us barked:
``They shouldn't be here. Tell them to clear off. There are
no free rooms.'' And he threw our passports down on the desk.
I turned to him and said in an even-tempered voice:
``A little politeness wouldn't hurt, you know. Or perhaps
you've forgotten that normal relations exist between our two
countries. . .''
The bull-neck of the SS man flushed red. He looked as if he
was about to take a swing at me. But he got a grip on himself
and muttered something about how we'd soon find out what
relations existed between our countries. . . Then he turned
abruptly on his heels and walked away.
The manager in an apologetic tone explained to us that a
rally was being held in Godesberg for one of the SS units and
therefore all the rooms in the hotel were taken. But he gave
us the address of a private house where we could get rooms
and we ended up spending the night there.
Having breakfasted in the morning at a small cafe we set
out once again to walk along the undulating banks of the Rhine.
It was a bright sunny day but we were enveloped in a green
haze. Suddenly the quiet of the countryside was shattered by
the drunken cries of a gang of Wehrmacht soldiers and a couple
of girls. They were all pretty far gone and one was drinking
beer as he walked, splashing it all over his tunic. A girl was
poking him in the chest and laughing inanely. We kept well
out of their way, and as they went by Seletsky said that he just
couldn't believe that a crowd of drunken slobs like that might
one day invade our country.
We had no idea that that ``one day" was so near at hand.
Now, sitting at our table in the Metropol we remembered
136
that trip along the Rhine and other things we had seen in
Germany that foreboded a terrible time of trial for the Soviet
people.
When we left the Metropol my companions hurried off about
their business. I still had more than an hour before I had
to return to work. It was a quiet, warm night and the moon
was shining brightly so I decided to go for a walk. I went
along Okhotny Ryad and then on to Mokhovaya, turning
to Volkhonka at the end and returning to the centre by way
of Gogol Boulevard and Frunze Street. Several times I was
stopped by a patrol which checked my documents, and this was
the only thing that suggested that we were at war. Otherwise
Moscow might have been plunged into a deep and trouble-free
slumber. Not a glimmer of light came from the blacked-out
windows and the streets were dark and completely deserted. The
only light came from the moon against which the silhouettes of
the tall buildings, looked pitch-black. But this atmosphere was
deceptive. Out there in the West, the rumble of the guns in
the fierce battles was unceasing, and here, in Moscow, behind
the blacked-out windows people toiled day and night giving
all their effort to the common cause---the defeat of the enemy.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The First Trial
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission
An important stage in the development of relations between
the three major participants in the anti-Hitler coalition was
marked by the talks which were held in late September-early
October 1941 during the visit to Moscow of the Anglo--
American mission which was headed by Lord Beaverbrook (Great
Britain) and Averell Harriman (USA). In essence this was the
first, tripartite conference and it was devoted to discussion
of the practical problems involved in Anglo-American-Soviet
cooperation. Its decisions were to be of considerable practical
importance.
Beaverbrook and Harriman arrived at the port of
Arkhangelsk on the British cruiser HMS Lincoln and were met by
F. F. Molochkov, head of the Protocol Department of the
137
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and by Colonel
Yevstigneyev and Captain 1st Rank Zaitsev, chiefs of the external
relations departments of the People's Commissariats of Defence
and the Navy. On September 28 Beaverbrook and Harriman
arrived at the Central Airport in Moscow to be met by the
First Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs A. Ya.
Vyshinsky, the People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N. G.
Kuznetsov, General F. I. Golikov and the general secretary of the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev together
with other officials.
Before the immobile line of the guard of honour the national
anthems of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet
Union (which was the Internationale then) were played. The
National Hotel in Moscow was put at the disposal of the
delegates while the meetings were held in the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs building on Spiridonovka (now Alexei
Tolstoy Street). In the event of an air-raid the delegation
members could use the Revolution Square Metro station as an
air-raid shelter. All members of the delegation were given
special passes allowing them to be out at night later than the
midnight curfew.
The conference worked daily from 12 noon until 5 p.m. when
there was a short break for lunch. After lunch there was an
extensive sight-seeing programme which included visits to the
cinema, the theatre, concerts, industrial enterprises and various
institutions. In particular the programme included a visit to
the Moscow Automobile Factory, the Ballbearing Plant, the
TsAGI enterprises, a military hospital and a meat factory. The
theatrical programme included: Cherevichki, Swan Lake,
Yevgeny Onegin, Ruslan and Lyudmila and Romeo and
Juliet at the Bolshoi; Anna Karenina and School for
Scandal at the Moscow Art Theatre; General Suvorov at the
Central Theatre of the Red Army; The Forest, Othello,
Uriel Acosta at the Maly Theatre and Field Marshal
Kutuzov at the Vakhtangov Theatre. There was also a football
match at the Moscow Dynamo Stadium.
The official purpose of Beaverbrook and Harriman's mission
was to establish the concrete needs of materiel of the Soviet
Union and reach agreement with the Soviet Government on
possible deliveries.
138
On the very first day of their arrival in Moscow Harriman
and Beaverbrook were received by Stalin and Harriman handed
Stalin the text of a personal message from President Roosevelt
which read:
``My dear Mr. Stalin,
``This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell
Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to
Moscow.
``Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance
of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to
bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.
``Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging
and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled
all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies.
``I am confident that ways will be found to provide the
material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts,
including your own. I want particularly to take this occasion to express
my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail
over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to
be of every possible material assistance.
~ ~ ~ ~ ``Yours very sincerely,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ``Franklin D. Roosevelt."
In the course of the talks which are reproduced in documents
of the US Department of State the Soviet side gave a detailed
report on the position at the Soviet-German front and also set
forth its urgent military requirements. The British and American
representatives said what could be immediately made available
to the Soviet Union from their stocks.
Stalin reviewed the military situation and added that the
Germans would strive for superiority in tanks since without tank
support the German infantry was weak in comparison with the
Soviet infantry. Thus Stalin put tanks as the first essential
requirement of the Soviet Union and anti-tank weapons as the
second. Then came medium-range bombers, anti-aircraft guns,
fighters and reconnaissance planes and barbed wire.
Addressing Beaverbrook, Stalin stressed the significance of
Britain's more active actions and military cooperation with the
Soviet Union.
Stalin also suggested to Beaverbrook that the British might
send troops to join the Red Army in defending the Ukraine.
139
Beaverbrook replied that a build-up of British divisions in Iran
was under way and that these troops might be sent to the
Caucasus in case of need.
Stalin rejected this offer decisively saying:
``There is no war in the Caucasus but there is in the
Ukraine. .. .''
Beaverbrook suggested that the Soviet and British general
staffs might open the strategic discussions. Harriman raised the
question of using Siberian airports to deliver American aircraft
to the Soviet Union by way of Alaska. Stalin agreed that
information about the airports in Siberia should be made
available; but when Harriman mentioned that American crews might
ferry the planes, Stalin objected that it was ``too dangerous a
route".
Then the problem of a post-war settlement was broached.
Stalin said that the Germans had to make good the damage
they had inflicted. Beaverbrook evaded the issue noticing that
first the war had to be won.
During the next meeting between the head of the Soviet state
and the heads of the Anglo-American mission an acute
situation arose. Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction that Britain and
the United States were offering only a very insignificant
quantity of the materials and equipment needed by the Soviet Union
which was bearing the brunt of the war.
Beaverbrook and Harriman offered all manner of
justifications and tried to show that London and Washington were
doing all they could to aid the Soviet Union. The meeting ended
with each side remaining convinced of the Tightness of its own
position.
After this meeting Beaverbrook and Harriman set out for
the British embassy where a discussion was evidently held
regarding the situation. Somehow there was a leak of
information for on the next day the Nazi propaganda machine carried
reports that in the course of discussions in Moscow between
the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Britain and the United
States on the other, serious contradictions had arisen. ``The
Western bourgeois countries,'' Radio Berlin assured its listeners,
``will never be able to reach agreement with the Bolsheviks.''
When at six o'clock in the evening of the same day Beaverbrook
and Harriman had another meeting with Stalin the latter
140
mentioned the German report and then said with a smile that it
was now up to the three of them to show that Goebbels was a
liar. The list of materials that could be immediately sent to
the Soviet Union was then reviewed and the British and
American representatives undertook to increase them. Beaverbrook
asked Stalin whether he was now satisfied with the list and Stalin
replied that he was.
During this meeting Stalin also said that it would be desirable
to have more motorised vehicles, particularly jeeps. And he
added that in this war the country that could produce the most
engines would ultimately be the victor.
Stalin listened to Beaverbrook's account of his talks with Hess
with interest. He said that he did not think that Hess had
flown to England at Hitler's request, though undoubtedly Hitler
knew about the projected flight. Beaverbrook said that Hess
had come to Britain thinking that he could encourage a small
group of British aristocrats to form an anti-Churchill
government which would make peace with Germany. Then Germany
with British help could invade Russia. Stalin said that the
German ambassador, Count Schulenburg, who had been in
Moscow at the time of Hess' flight, had told him that Hess was
unbalanced. Beaverbrook said that his impression of Hess, on the
contrary, was that of a sane, well-balanced man.
Harriman, for his part, noted that relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union would become closer and
more effective in the near future and added that he hoped
Stalin would unhesitatingly contact President Roosevelt directly
on any matter that the Soviet Government considered
important enough. Harriman then said that Roosevelt would welcome
an exchange of telegrams with Stalin in the same business way
as the US President exchanged telegrams with Churchill. Stalin
replied that he would indeed take advantage of this should the
need arise.
Beaverbrook said that it was very important for Stalin and
Churchill to meet face to face.
Concluding the talks Stalin invited both Lord Beaverbrook
and Mr. Harriman to dine with him the following day and the
meeting ended in a very friendly atmosphere. During these talks
important decisions had been taken promoting the further unity
of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. True, London as
141
before refused to undertake active military operations against
Hitlerite Germany, but the logic of the joint struggle ever more
insistently demanded such action, and this led to serious
disagreements among ruling circles in Britain.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Agreement on Deliveries
The Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs was given
the task of drawing up officially the agreement that had been
reached in principle between Stalin, Beaverbrook, and Harriman.
For this purpose six commissions were set up covering the air
force, the navy, transport, the army, industry, and food. The
question of payment for the agreed deliveries was not fixed
since at the time the Lend-Lease did not extend to the Soviet
Union.
The final session of the Moscow Conference held on
October 1, assessed the results that had been achieved. Molotov,
the head of the Soviet delegation, said in his speech that in
the few days of its duration the conference had ``come to a
unanimous decision on all problems facing it".
``During this period,'' he continued, ``we have all had
occasion to see how closely the vital interests and common
aspirations of our great freedom-loving peoples have brought our
countries together and led to close cooperation in the historical
struggle against Hitler's rapacious Germany which lives through
the bloody enslavement of other nations and the predatory
seizure of foreign lands.
``The organisers of the conference set themselves the
twofold aim of aiding the Soviet Union and jointly striving to bring
about the defeat of Hitler. Here it must be particularly stressed
that not only Britain which is at war with Germany, but
also the United States, which is not, equally recognised the
need to destroy Hitlerism and to aid the Soviet Union to this
end with their own rich material resources. In our eyes this
alliance between such great powers as the United States, Great
Britain and the Soviet Union largely determines the ultimate
success of our struggle against the Nazis.''
Referring to the political importance of the conference the
Soviet side noted that henceforth a powerful front of
freedomloving peoples headed by the Soviet Union, the United States,
142
and Great Britain had been organised against Hitler, who had
not yet had to face such a powerful alliance. It expressed
confidence that the great anti-Hitler front would rapidly strengthen
and that there was no force that could break it. Against Nazism
an alliance of such states had been created which would find
the ways and means to wipe it from the face of the Earth.
``It has fallen to the lot of the Soviet Union,'' said the
Soviet delegate, ``to bear the heaviest and the bloodiest blows of
the fascist invaders. But we can see that the great importance
of our struggle against Hitler is being increasingly recognised
throughout the world. And a time will come when these peoples
will express their gratitude for the liberation role which the
Soviet Union is now carrying out in the interests not only
of freeing the peoples of Europe from enslavement, but the
peoples of the whole world as well. . .''
Averell Harriman spoke on behalf of the Anglo-American
mission. He said that the conference delegates had been sent
to Moscow to examine the needs of the Soviet Union in its
war against the Axis powers and find ways to provide the
materials which the United States and Great Britain would send.
He noted that for the period of its duration the conference had
worked continuously examining the present resources of the
Soviet government in combination with the productive capacities
of the United States and Great Britain and went on to say:
``The conference has decided to provide the Soviet
government with practically everything that has been requested by its
military and civilian bodies. The Soviet government in return
will provide Great Britain and the United States with large
quantities of raw materials which these countries need urgently.
Transport has also been fully discussed and plans drawn up to
increase the flow of freight in all directions. . .
``In the name of our governments Lord Beaverbrook and
myself affirm receipt from the Soviet government of large
deliveries of raw materials which will considerably help with the
production of armaments in our own countries.
``We note the cordiality which predominated at the conference
and which made it possible to conclude an agreement in record
time.''
At this meeting Molotov, Harriman and Beaverbrook signed a
protocol for the deliveries and issued a joint communiqu\'e on
143
the work of the conference. This stated that the conference of
representatives of the three powers, the USSR, the United States
and Great Britain had ``successfully fulfilled its work, taken
important decisions in respect of the tasks facing it and shown
complete unanimity of the three great powers and their
readiness for close cooperation that existed between them in their
common efforts to defeat the enemy of the whole of
freedomloving mankind.''
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Meeting with Stalin
At 8 o'clock in the evening of October 1, when the
conference ended, the head of the Soviet government gave a dinner
in the Kremlin in honour of the American and British delegates.
V. N. Pavlov and myself were requested to act as interpreters.
This was the first time that I had ever seen Stalin close
up and that day has been etched on my memory ever
since.
As part of the younger generation we had been taught to look
upon Stalin as a wise and great leader, a man who saw and
knew everything in advance. From his portraits, bronze busts
and marble monuments we were accustomed to seeing him
towering above everyone. And now I was to see him close up,
interpret for him.
Everyone who had been directly connected with the
conference of the Western Allies gathered at 7.30 p.m. in the
Catherine Hall of the Kremlin. The antique decor of the hall have
always amazed notable foreign guests. The luxurious 18th--
century furniture, the chairs and divans with monogrammes of
Catherine the Great, the green watered-silk wall paper, the old
masters in heavy gold frames and the china and table-silver
all of this unusual luxury evidently puzzled many westerners
who had come to the land of the Bolsheviks for the first
time.
At first there was a lot of noise in the hall as the guests in
their various groups conversed loudly. But as it got nearer to
eight o'clock people began to look more frequently at the tall
carved and gilded door from where Stalin was to make his
entrance. The atmosphere naturally became more restrained and
144
during the last few minutes belore the hour there was almost
total silence.
Finally the door opened and Stalin walked in. Looking at
Stalin I experienced an inner jolt. He was quite different from
what I had always imagined. He was shorter than average and
his sallow, tired, pock-marked face looked almost emaciated.
Instead of the shining marchal's uniform with its gold
epaulettes and Hero's stars, he was wearing a military style tunic
which seemed to hang off his wasted frame. I was suddenly
struck by the fact that one of his arms was shorter than the
other---almost the whole of one hand remained hidden in his
sleeve.
That was the worst period of the war when the German
hordes were pouring into our country, advancing eastward.
They were drawing ever nearer to Moscow and Leningrad.
Our troops, though fighting without thought for their own
lives, were still being forced back further and further, but then
at times they experienced an acute shortage of ammunition.
Naturally the heavy burden of responsibility and failures had a
profound impact on Stalin and was causing him great suffering.
It was Stalin himself who had said that we would never yield
an inch of our land to the enemy. And yet now the boots of
the enemy soldiers were tramping over vast areas of Soviet
territory. The Red Army had persistently been trained to deliver
a crushing and immediate rebuff to any aggressor and to carry
on military action on its own territory. And yet on the eve of
the invasion it was Stalin himself who largely chained the
initiative of the Soviet high command with the result that Hitler
was able to drive a sudden wedge right into our country and
then despite all the heroic resistance of our forces continue
his advance. Before the war Stalin had repeatedly said that the
treaty with the Nazis was not to be relied upon, and yet right
up to the last moment he seemed to trust Ribbentrop's signature
in the belief that for all the attempts of the German general
staff to provoke an armed conflict, the politicians in Berlin
were against it.
In Party documents and in the relevant memoirs, a
principled evaluation of the situation that existed on the eve of the
Great Patriotic War has been given. The Party saw the growing
threat of a military invasion by Nazi Germany and tried to do
__PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__
10---1996
145
everything in its power to avert a war and gain time for the
country to build up its defences. However, a number of factors
that existed at the moment of the actual invasion gave the
Germans a temporary advantage. These included mistakes that were
made in foreseeing the possible date of the invasion and failure
to prepare the armed forces for warding off the first blows.
The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says
that ``Stalin was afraid of giving the Nazis a pretext for
aggression, hoping to delay the confrontation by way of diplomatic
negotiations".^^1^^
General Shtemenko, a prominent military authority considers
in his book The Soviet General Staff at War (Volume 2) that
the fact that the date of Hitler's invasion of the USSR was not
determined precisely is ``a sad example of the great mistakes
made by the High Command and by Stalin personally''.
Elsewhere he writes: ``The fact that an invasion would occur was
known and carefully prepared for with all possible steps being
taken to improve the country's defence capabilities. Much has
been written and said about this, in particular in my first book
The Soviet General Staff at War. But that the invasion would
actually come in June was, however, not expected. It was
thought that it would take place much later. Those responsible
tried in various ways to put off the invasion for as long as
possible, but they were unsuccessful and the invasion took
place."^^2^^
To this evaluation I would like to add some thoughts that
arise from the diplomatic aspects of the matter, though, of
course, they cannot claim to give anything like an exhaustive
answer to this problem which requires further study and analysis.
As I see it there are two points to consider. First, the fact that
Stalin most definitely did not want a war evidently had a
considerable influence upon his way of looking at the political
situation as it then existed. Second, the fact that Stalin believed
Hitler to be a treacherous adventurist and warned against any
underestimation of him, yet realised that he was also a clever
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Politizdat,
Moscow, 1980, p. 466.
~^^2^^ S. M. Shtemenko, Generalny shtab v gody voiny, Moscow, Military
Publishers, 1974, p. 494.
146
bourgeois politician who knew how to undertake complex
diplomatic manoeuvres and achieve his objectives with the greatest
advantage to himself. Of course, Hitler's success in the pre-war
years was due in large measure to the fact that Britain and
France were trying to appease him and ready to forgive the
fascists everything in the hope of implementing their proclaimed
plans for a war against the Soviet Union. But at the same
time it could not fail to be noticed that the Fiihrer was
extremely skilful in exploiting the situation.
In 1939 Stalin fully realised the danger of military conflict
with Hitler's Germany, should our country become a prime
object of fascist aggression.
After Hitler's Blitzkrieg victories in Europe and Africa Stalin
evidently tried even harder to avoid a military confrontation
or at least postpone it. This was the time when he frequently
stressed the need to prepare for a war with Germany but at the
same time took great pains to do nothing that Berlin could
interpret as provocation or use as a reason for invading the
Soviet Union.
By the spring of 1941 it became clear that Germany was not
going to invade the British Isles. This, of course, was a
warning. But, on the other hand, it is quite possible that Stalin
assessed the situation differently. He may well have thought that
before getting involved in a war in the east, Hitler would have
to make sure of his rear in the west. As events were indeed to
show, the fact that Hitler had made no prior political deal
with the British led ruling circles in London to consider an
alliance with the Soviet Union against the Third Reich to be
more to their advantage and this meant that Germany had to
fight a war on two fronts simultaneously. Yet, on the
assumption that Hitler was a man who could plan his diplomatic
moves with considerable skill, Stalin may well have believed
that he would try to conclude a deal first with the British
against the Soviet Union. This, of course, demanded a certain
amount of time. The flight of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, to
Britain suggested that the leadership in Berlin was thinking
in this way. But although Hess's mission misfired, other attempts
to bring about the same thing may have been expected and
with feelers being put out and talks being conducted the whole
thing could have dragged on for months, especially considering
__PRINTERS_P_146_COMMENT__
10*
147
the internal political situation in Britain and the strong
antiNazi mood of the British public. This would have to be
neutralised before reactionary forces in Britain could attempt to
make any deal with Hitler.
All this, then, could lead to the conclusion that Hitler was
not about to invade the Soviet Union but would postpone the
war till the spring or summer of the following year. There was
also the question of why Hitler had offered to meet Stalin,
which proposal he had made during the talks with Molotov
in the Reichskanzlei in 1940. Then there was the fact that the
earlier mentioned dates for the German invasion (April and
May 1941) had passed without anything untoward happening.
Furthermore, spring had passed and it was well into summer,
which meant that the Germans had lost several valuable months
of good weather. It hardly seemed likely that they would begin
an offensive with autumn coming up so soon. Thus this kind
of logical thinking coupled with his passionate desire to avoid
war must have confirmed Stalin in the belief that in June
1941, when Britain was still standing firmly on her feet and
supported by American aid, there would be no German
invasion. And indeed, this he subsequently admitted to Harry
Hopkins. Stalin allowed that the Wehrmacht generals wanted war
and that they would try to provoke a conflict with the Soviet
Union, but he evidently believed that Hitler, as a skilful
politician, would not run the risk of such a suicidal act as to involve
himself in a war on two fronts. As it happened, of course,
he was wrong.
In his memoirs Marshal Zhukov says the miscalculation that
was made in determining the date of the German invasion of
the Soviet Union was extremely serious. ``Though it gradually
came to have less of an impact,'' he writes, ``it still functioned
as an extremely grave factor in increasing the objective
advantages of the enemy by giving him additional temporary
advantages and bringing about the very serious condition in
which we found ourselves at the beginning of the war.'' Marshal
Zhukov also admits that ``in the period when the threat of war
was ever growing we in the High Command probably did not
do all we could to convince Stalin that war was inevitable with
Germany and could break out at any moment and to show
him the urgent need for implementing our operational and
148
mobilisation plans.'' At the same time Zhukov points out that
both the head of military intelligence, General Golikov, and the
People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, had
submitted reports that were largely based on important information
from the military attache at the Soviet embassy in Berlin,
General Tupikov, and the naval attache, Captain Vorontsov, about
the dates for Hitler's invasion of the USSR. But the
conclusions that were drawn from these reports belittled their
significance, for they were ascribed to German intelligence, which
had supposedly fabricated them to spread misinformation and
disorientate the Soviet Union.
Even at the very last moment on the night of June 21, 1941
Stalin would not believe that war was inevitable and continued
to think that the military provocations were the work of the
generals and not directly ordered by Hitler. When in the night
of June 21 Stalin received a report that according to a German
deserter the attack would begin at dawn, he dismissed it:
``Maybe the German generals have planted this deserter on
us to provoke a conflict.''
Even after the invasion had begun Stalin demanded to see
the German ambassador before signing the order for military
counteraction. He still hoped that the hostilities on the border
and the bombing of Soviet towns were just provocation on the
part of the German military and that a talk with the ambassador
who had direct contact with the German government would
clarify the situation. But Schulenburg's answer was not that
which Stalin had expected. Returning after their talks with
the German ambassador, Molotov could only find one thing
to say:
``The German government have declared war on us...''
Marshal Zhukov who in his memoirs described this scene
added that ``Stalin sat down, immersed in deep thought. There
was a long and agonising pause.''
Subsequently Stalin only once publicly, and then in a
somewhat indirect way, admitted what a great blow had been struck
against his plans, what a terrible shock he had suffered on
hearing the news of Hitler's invasion and what great fears preyed
upon his mind during the first period of the Great Patriotic
War. He made this admission only later when the Soviet people
were celebrating their victory over Hitler's Germany. Speaking
149
at a Kremlin reception on May 24, 1945 in honour of the
commanders of the Soviet Army and raising his toast to the
health of the Russian people, Stalin said: ``Our government made
mistakes and we went through desperate moments in 1941 and
1942 when our army was retreating and leaving its native
villages and towns in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, around
Leningrad, the Baltic Republics and the Karelo-Finnish
Republic, leaving because they had no other alternative...''
For all their restraint these words that were spoken and
reported in Pravda four years after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union reveal something of the enormous shock that Stalin
must have suffered during the first days of the German
invasion.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Important Decisions
Before inviting everyone to the table Stalin walked slowly
along the long line of guests shaking hands with each one
individually. Reaching the end he turned and made his way back,
silently treading a soft carpet in soft Caucasian boots. He
stopped not far from me and spoke to one of the military
personnel from the foreign relations department. The few words
he spoke were said quietly and slowly and with a strong
Georgian accent. I looked at him out of the corner of my eye trying
to control the feelings I felt inside---there standing right by me
was Stalin, and yet he looked so ordinary, almost unnoticeable. . .
The guests began to sit down at the tables. They included the
American delegation headed by Averell Harriman, the British
delegation headed by Lord Beaverbrook, the US Ambassador,
Laurence Steinhardt and members of his diplomatic staff, the
British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps and his staff. The whole
Soviet delegation was there: Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan,
Malyshev, Kuznetsov, Shakhurin, Yakovlev, Litvinov, Golikov,
and another twenty or so officials from the foreign ministry, the
ministry of foreign trade and the ministries of defence and the
navy.
The first toast was raised by Stalin to successful cooperation
between the Allies and their victory over the common enemy.
Beaverbrook and Harriman made short general speeches in
150
reply. After the dinner Stalin, Molotov, Beaverbrook and
Harriman together with their interpreters retired to an adjoining room
for coffee. Although it was the most difficult period in the
whole of the Great Patriotic War Stalin expessed his firm
conviction that the war would finish on German territory where
the armies of the three great powers would meet up. Harriman
immediately replied that he also shared this conviction.
Beaverbrook nodded his head in the affirmative.
During the remainder of the discussion Stalin stated
categorically that the Soviet Union was ready to continue the war for
as long as it was necessary to defeat the enemy. This evidently
impressed Harriman and Beaverbrook considerably for later
Harriman recalled that both he and Beaverbrook had been
advised by the British and American military attaches not to
remain in Moscow a day longer than necessary since any moment
the city was about to be surrendered to the Germans. But their
talks with the Soviet leaders and the determination of the Soviet
people to defend their capital calmed the leaders of the British
and American delegations. They realised that the fears of the
Western military experts were unfounded.
The Beaverbrook-Harriman mission left Moscow on October
2, 1941. The next day Stalin wrote to Churchill:
``The arrival of the British and American Missions in Moscow
and particularly the fact that they were led by Lord
Beaverbrook and Mr. Harriman, had a most favourable effect. ..
``I admit that our present requirements in military supplies,
arising from a number of unfavourable circumstances on our
front and the resulting evacuation of a further group of
enterprises, to say nothing of the fact that a number of issues have
been put off until final consideration and settlement in London
and Washington, transcend the decisions agreed at the
conference. Nevertheless, the Moscow Conference did a great deal
of important work. I hope the British and American
Governments will do all they can to increase the monthly quotas and
also to seize the slightest opportunity to accelerate the planned
delivering right now, since the Hitlerites will use the pre-winter
months to exert the utmost pressure on the USSR.''
Stalin wrote to Roosevelt:
``I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you the
Soviet Government's deep gratitude for having entrusted the
151
leadership of the US delegation to such an authoritative person as
Mr. Harriman, whose participation in the Moscow Three-Power
Conference was so fruitful.
``I have no doubt that you will do all that is necessary to
ensure implementation of the Moscow Conference decisions as
speedily and fully as possible, all the more because the Hitlerites
will certainly try to use the pre-winter months for exerting
maximum pressure upon the USSR at the front.
``Like you, I am confident of final victory over Hitler for
the countries now joining their efforts to accelerate the
elimination of bloody Hitlerism, a goal for which the Soviet Union
is now making such big and heavy sacrifices.
~ ~ ~ ~ Yours very sincerely,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ J. Stalin.''
In a speech on November 6, 1941 to the Moscow Council of
Working People's Deputies Stalin referred to the importance
of the talks with the Anglo-American mission.
``It is now a fact,'' he said, ``that Great Britain, the United
States and the Soviet Union are allied in one camp, a camp
that has set itself the aim of destroying the Nazi imperialists
and their invading armies. A modern war is a motorised war
and the side that wins it is the side with overwhelming
predominance in the production of engines. If we join together the
engine production of the United States. Great Britain and the
Soviet Union, then we have at least a three-fold superiority
in engine production over Germany. This is one of the main
reasons for the inevitable collapse of Hitler's rapacious
imperialism.
``The recent three-power conference in Moscow which was
attended by Great Britain in the person of Lord Beaverbrook
and the United States in the person of Averell Harriman has
resolved to give systematic help to our country in the form of
tanks and planes. As you all know, we have already begun to
receive some of these tanks and planes and even earlier Britain
began deliveries of such important raw materials as aluminum,
lead, zinc, nickel and rubber. If we add to this the fact that the
United States has just agreed to provide the Soviet Union
with a loan of one billion dollars---then we can say with
confidence that the alliance between the United States of America,
Great Britain and the USSR is real and growing, and it will
152
continue to grow to the good of our common liberation
cause. . .''
The visit to Moscow of Lord Beaverbrook and Averell
Harriman and their first-hand acquaintance with the situation in the
Soviet Union did much to further cooperation between the three
powers in their struggle against the common enemy.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs Moves to Kuibyshev
On the morning of October 16 I arrived at work as usual at
9 a.m. At first everything seemed quiet.
Already during the first week of October the main archives
of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had been moved
to Kuibyshev, where in the event of the situation worsening
around Moscow it was planned to move the Commissariat itself
together with all the foreign embassies and missions accredited
in the Soviet Union. But during the last few days the position
at the front seemed to have stabilised and there was hope that
the evacuation of government offices would not take place after
all. But this hope was dashed at 11 a.m. on October 16, when
the telephone rang in the department in which I worked and
everyone was instructed to take their papers and essential
personal belongings and go to Kazan Railway Station. Although
we had been expecting this, the sudden order to leave Moscow
when it came was like a bolt from the blue. Alarm was written
over everyone's face. While we gathered up our papers,
someone brought the unpleasant news that despite the stubborn
resistance of those units defending Moscow the enemy had
succeeded in breaking through and were at the approaches to the
capital and that because of this it had been decided to
evacuate us immediately.
At the entrance to the Commissariat building on Kuznetsky
Most a row of canvass-covered lorries had drawn up. It was
snowing as the staff began loading up the lorries with papers.
Here too were the members of those families that had not been
evacuated earlier. They had only been allowed to take with
them one small suitcase of personal belongings. We got into
the lorries quickly and orderly and then the line of lorries
moving out onto the Sadovoye Ring set off for the station in
153
Komsomol Square. There were few people about, for many of
the enterprises had been evacuated from Moscow in early
autumn.
In the high-ceilinged waiting hall of Kazan Station a large
number of people had gathered. There was a group from
the Comintern headed by D. Z. Manuilsky. They were also
leaving Moscow but the announcement to board the train had
not yet been made. People were walking about the hall,
gathering in groups and discussing the latest news. I went up to the
group that was standing around Manuilsky where a lively
discussion was in progress. One young man asked Manuilsky what this
sudden departure from Moscow meant. Did it mean that the
capital was threatened and could be surrendered to the enemy?
Manuilsky denied this positively.
``Of course,'' he said, ``the situation is serious. But that is
not the only thing. The decision to leave does not mean that we
intend to surrender Moscow. Furthermore there is nothing
sudden about it. Everything was prepared for beforehand and it
is simply that it has now been decided that better conditions
must be found in which government departments, international
organisations and foreign missions in the Soviet Union can
carry out their normal work.''
``But there are rumours that the Germans are very near,''
said the young man again.
``I am quite sure,'' replied Manuilsky, ``that the defenders
of the capital will do their duty and the Germans will not
pass. But it is a fact that the front is very near and for this
reason only the most essential organs of government are to
remain in the city. At the same time it is important that all
institutions and organisations function normally, especially at the
present difficult time. It is the duty of each of us not to be
excessively alarmed and to move quickly and in an organised
fashion to our new place of work where we can carry on our
duties. ..''
An announcement came that the train for the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs staff had arrived. We went on to
the platform where it was beginning to freeze, for the snow was
no longer melting and the puddles were covered with ice. It
was cold and damp in the train, although the lady guard said
that as soon as the train got going the central heating system
154
would come on. Also by the guard's compartment there was an
iron stove with blazing hotplates. This stove was to be very
useful to us on the journey. We could boil potatoes and make
tea on it. There was of course no restaurant carriage and at
the stations the buffets were closed. All we had to eat was
the food we used to bring to work with us every day, though
we were able to vary this a little with pickled cucumbers and
saurkraut that we bought from the women at the stations
on the journey where at times we had long waits, while troop
trains heading for the front passed us going west. All in all
it took us three days to travel the comparatively short (by
Soviet standards) journey to the Volga.
At Kuibyshev the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs
was housed in the building which before the war had been a
technical college. We were quartered in a building nearby which
previously had been an office. Repairs were going on in both
buildings but we still moved in. At first it was very difficult
without telephones, but these were soon installed. The foreign
embassies in most cases were housed in what had been before
the revolution the houses of wealthy merchants.
The first days there were largely spent in putting our files
into order and sorting out all sorts of immediate, mostly
technical problems.
To mark the 24th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution on November 6 a meeting was held at the
Kuibyshev Opera House. This was also attended by the diplomatic
corps. A speech was made by the First Deputy Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, A. Ya. Vyshinsky. He began on a note which,
as later events were to show, put him in a somewhat
embarrassing position.
``Although the leaders of the Party and the Soviet
government are still in Moscow,'' he said, ``for the first time in the
history of the Soviet state there will be no revolutionary
celebrations or traditional parade in Red Square. . .''
The next day, however, we learned that there had been
celebrations in Moscow at which Stalin had made a speech and
a military parade in Red Square in front of the Lenin
Mausoleum by troops who were going directly to the front to defend
their homeland.
Two days later B. F. Podtserob, V. N. Pavlov and myself
155
received instructions to return to Moscow as part of an
operational working group headed by Molotov who had remained
in the capital.
Early in the morning of November 9 we flew from
Kuibyshev in a twin-engined transport and at midday landed at an
airport near Noginsk, for because of the threat of German air
attack both the Central and Vnukovo Airports had been closed.
It took us some time to get from Noginsk to Moscow by car
along the snow-covered, icy highway. I was in Moscow to
witness both the worrisome days at the end of November and
the rejoicing of the people of Moscow over the brilliant
victory won by Soviet troops at the gates of the capital, which was
part of a counter-offensive launched in the beginning of
December, 1941.
Our working group at the People's Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs had no knowledge of the preparations being made for
this counter-offensive. For us, the news that Hitler's forces had
been defeated outside Moscow came as a pleasant surprise.
I remember arriving in the Kremlin one morning after a few
hours of sleep in the cold cellar of the Commissariat's building
on Kuznetsky Most Street. I opened my copy of Pravda, still
smelling of newsprint, and saw the thrilling headline. Next to
it were photographs: twisted wrecks of enemy guns and vehicles
blanketed in snow, and Nazi soldiers, hands held high in
surrender. All of us had wanted for a long time to hear this news,
had waited for it, had firmly believed the enemy would be
stopped at the walls of the city and thrown back. Now, at last, this
had happened! It is difficult to convey the joy we all felt.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The USA Enters the War
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Pearl Harbour
At first light on December 7, 1941, Japanese airplanes brought
across the Pacific unnoticed on aircraft carriers made a
surprise attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii,
where there was a large concentration of naval vessels. As a
result of the bombing several American ships exploded and sank,
and many planes were put out of commission.
156
The question of how unexpected the Japanese attack was for
the leadership in Washington is still debated in the United
States. Many argue that the White House knew about the
Japanese plans several days---or at least several hours---in
advance. It has been learned, in particular, that American
intelligence had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code and read
the secret telegrams sent from Tokyo to the Japanese
ambassador in Washington.
Robert Sherwood, who held a responsible position in the
White House at this time, recorded an incident that sheds light
on the situation just before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour.
Roosevelt was in the Oval Office of the White House with
Harry Hopkins, discussing the latest developments, when
Commander L. R. Schulz entered the room. Schulz was an assistant
to Captain Beardall, Roosevelt's Naval Aide. He brought in an
envelope with the decoded text of a telegram the Japanese
government had sent to its ambassador in Washington. The
President read it and gave it to Hopkins, who studied it and
handed it back.
``This means war,'' the President said to Hopkins.
Hopkins said that everything seemed to indicate the Japanese
would make a surprise attack. The President agreed, and said
America could not strike a preventive blow.
``We are a democracy and a peaceful people,'' Roosevelt
added. ``But we have a good record."^^1^^
Thus it was decided in the Oval Office that nothing should
be done in forestalling the Japanese attack; the Americans would
wait for events to develop.
Robert Sherwood, commenting on this scene, explains that
Roosevelt knew a Japanese attack was inevitable, but was under
pressure from the isolationists, who were firmly entrenched in
Congress. Even Japan's attack on British and Dutch possessions
in the Pacific could not change this situation; the United States
could only enter the war if the country were held at gunpoint,
faced with the choice of giving blow for blow or relinquishing
forever its status as a great power.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: the Soldier of Freedom,
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York, 1970, p. 161.
157
The only thing the Japanese could do to help Roosevelt solve
the dilemma facing him was to attack US territory---which they
did at one swoop and in so provocative a manner that the
American public, which had been divided and confused, immediately
closed ranks and became united and determined.
It was later discovered that the General Staff also had
information about the upcoming attack. But General Marshall,
who at that time was Chief of Staff, did not telephone the
American naval commander in Honolulu at once, even though there
was a direct-line telephone on his desk. When a Congressional
investigating committee asked General Marshall to explain this,
he said that one of the reasons he did not use his phone was
fear that the Japanese might intercept and decode his
conversation, or at least establish that the alarm had been given by
the American command at the Hawaiian bases. The Japanese,
Marshall argued, might have seized upon this to play the
isolationist segment of the American public against the
administration by claiming that Washington was preparing to take
certain actions that could force Japan to move first. Once the
Japanese had attacked, however, the administration could demand
that Congress declare war on Japan.
The first reports of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbour to reach
Moscow over the wires of foreign news agencies were very brief,
but it was clear right away that one of the main events of the
Second World War had taken place. The strike against Pearl
Harbour meant the United States was certain to enter the war
against Japan---if not, for the time being, against Germany.
But even this was sufficient to significantly change the balance
of forces in the world conflict. Now the reaction of Nazi
Germany, Japan's ally, to what had happened was of particular
importance.
Japan's attack on the USA was not at all what Hitler had
been expecting. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941,
Berlin had been trying in every way it could to get the Japanese
government to move against the Soviet Union. On July 10,
at the very height of the German offensive on the Soviet front,
Joachim von Ribbentrop telegraphed to the German ambassador
in Tokyo: ``Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese
ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse ... it is simply
impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok
158
and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are
completed.. . I ask you to employ all available means in further
insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at
the soonest possible date. . . The sooner this entry is effected,
the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and
Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad before winter
starts."^^1^^
The groups ruling Japan, however, had no desire to pull
chestnuts out of the fire for Hitler. The Japanese politicians had
tried their own ``Siberian campaign" during the intervention of
1918--1922, and remembered the lessons of Khalkhin-Gol and
Lake Khasan; they were therefore wary of getting involved in
a war against the USSR. They were looking more and more
covetously, however, towards South-East Asia and the Pacific,
where they saw the USA as their chief opponent and rival.
Japanese expansion in this direction did not wholly suit Hitler, and
he tried to pressure Tokyo into avoiding conflict with the United
States for as long as possible. At the same time, Hitler feared
that Tokyo and Washington might reach some agreement by
which the USA could ``secure the rear" for actions against
Germany in Europe.
The militarists of Japan were making their own calculations.
While laying plans for an attack on the USA, the Japanese
government sounded out Berlin's reaction. On November 28,
1941, in the course of a conversation with Ribbentrop, General
Oshima, Japan's ambassador to Germany, asked whether a
conflict between his country and the United States would lead to
a German declaration of war on the USA. Hitler's foreign
minister avoided making a direct answer:
``Roosevelt is a fanatic,'' he said, ``so it is impossible to foresee
what he would do.''
This did not satisfy Oshima, and he asked bluntly what
Germany intended to do under such circumstances. Now
Ribbentrop was forced to offer assurances of Berlin's good faith to
its Axis ally.
``Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United
States,'' he said, ``Germany, of course, would join the war
immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 878.
159
entaring into a separate peace with the United States, under such
circumstances: The Fiihrer is determined on that point."^^1^^
Of course the guarantee Hitler's government thus gave to
Japan was kept strictly secret at the time. At the same time,
information from a variety of sources indicated that a struggle
between different groups had long been going on in Tokyo, and
that the direction in which Japan would strike out depended
on its outcome. By all appearances, the Nazis were exerting
diplomatic pressure on the Japanese government to move against
the Soviet Union. There were more and more frequent
indications, though, that Tokyo was inclining towards South-East
Asia. Reports to the same effect also reached Moscow from
Richard Sorge.^^2^^
Sorge's information proved correct. Once the Japanese had
attacked a major US naval base, however, the question arose
of what Nazi Germany would do. Would it remain faithful to
its ally, or would Hitler prefer, now that his efforts to set Japan
against the Soviet Union had come to naught, to remain aloof
for the time being from the Japanese-American conflict?
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The F\"uhrer's Speech
Several days had passed since the attack on Pearl Harbour,
and still there was no news from Berlin about Germany's
position. On December 11, foreign news agencies reported that Hitler
would be making an important speech that evening before the
Reichstag. It was to be broadcast by radio. There was reason
to believe that Hitler would announce his decision to this
session of the Reichstag.
That evening I was summoned by Molotov. He reminded me
that in a few minutes Hitler's speech to the Reichstag would
begin on Berlin radio, and said Comrade Stalin was interested
in the speech and wanted to know its contents as soon as
possible. I quickly tuned the receiver to Berlin. At first there was
march music, and then a flurry of shouts from the ``deputies''
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 888.
~^^2^^
__NOTE__ Error in original! First footnote is "1". 2nd footnote is "*"!
* A Soviet intelligence agent working as a German journalist in
Japan. Sorge was arrested by the Japanese police in 1941 and executed
in 1944.
160
of the Reichstag: evidently Hitler, as was his custom, had
appeared last, when all the others were assembled, and was at
that moment making his way across the pit to the stage of the
Krol-oper to the accompaniment of shrill cries of ``Sieg heil"
from the ``parliamentarians'' he himself had appointed.
Before the war I had worked in the Soviet embassy in Berlin,
and had sat in the diplomatic box during a number of
ceremonial sessions in the Krol-oper---the opera theatre that had
become the seat of the Nazi parliament after the burning of the
Reichstag building. I remembered every detail of those farcical
spectacles. The shouts merged into a solid roar, which continued
for several minutes. Then it became quieter, and Goering, in a
croaking voice, declared the Reichstag in session and gave the
floor to the ``Fiihrer of the German people''. Once again cries
of ``Heil Hitler" and ``Sieg heil" rang out. Hitler coughed into
the microphone a few times, silence descended, and the speech
began.
So once again I was to translate Hitler's speech to Molotov,
as I had a year earlier in the Reichskanzlei in Berlin. So much
had happened since then. But there was no time for reminiscing:
I had to give a simultaneous translation into Russian.
At first Hitler spoke calmly and evenly. Then, little by little,
he began to wind himself up. At times his voice rose to a
hysterical, shrieking treble, and it was difficult to pick out the sense
of his broken phrases over the clamour that would rise in the
hall.
About ten minutes after Hitler had begun his speech, the
green telephone rang on the desk---this was the line used by
Stalin alone. Molotov quickly went over and picked up the
receiver. I could not hear the questions, of course, but even though
my attention was concentrated on the radio receiver I caught
Molotov's answers with some sort of second hearing:
``Yes, he has started already. . . So far just general phrases...
It's not clear yet what they have decided. . .''
Stalin was waiting impatiently to learn what Berlin would
do with regard to the Japanese-American conflict. There was
so much that depended on that. Meanwhile the airwaves
continued to bring the voice of the Nazi dictator from Berlin into
the Kremlin office. Hitler fulminated against Roosevelt, who he
said, was mainly responsible for the war. At last, having raged
__PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__
11---1996
161
to his heart's content, he came down to the main point. He
declared that Japan's action had been met with deep
satisfaction by the German nation and by decent people all over the
world, and then shouted out that he was breaking off relations
with the United States and declaring war on it. To this the
``deputies'' of the Reichstag responded with a fresh outburst of
hysteria.
As soon as I had translated the last phrase, Molotov went
to the green telephone and dialed a number. There was a brief
pause while he waited for an answer. Then he said:
``They have declared war on the United States.. . What will
Japan do?. . . He didn't say anything about that, but of course
it is an important question... I don't think it's likely either.
After the lesson we taught the Germans outside Moscow they
will think long and hard in Tokyo before deciding to move
against us. ..''
The question of whether the Japanese would yield to
pressure from Berlin and join the war against the Soviet Union
was of primary importance. This pressure was greatly intensified
after Germany declared war on the USA, but later events
showed that Tokyo preferred to act cautiously. It was becoming
increasingly obvious that Hitler's Blitzkrieg against the Soviet
Union was failing and the Japanese politicians did not risk to
try their luck in Siberia.
Now that Hitler had decided to join Japan in its war against
the United States, America would become a full-fledged member
of the anti-Hitler coalition. Another step forward was thus made
in bringing about military cooperation among the three great
powers.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Anthony Eden in Moscow
Early in December of 1941, I was included in a small group
preparing documentation for the upcoming visit of the British
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, to the Soviet Union. The
visit had been suggested by London, and the Soviet side
responded favourably. The considerable expansion of Anglo-Soviet
relations and the tasks of fighting together against the common
enemy made it not only desirable but indeed indispensable to
conduct high-level talks. What was more, a number of the
political questions the Soviet Union had raised at the time the
162
anti-Hitler coalition was formed still remained unresolved, and Eden's
meetings with Soviet leaders in Moscow might help clear them
up.
_
The primary goal of the talks with the Foreign Secretary was
to draft an agreement between Britain and the USSR
concerning their alliance during the war and cooperation after it. There
was also hope that during his visit Eden would discuss an
earlier Soviet proposal that British units be sent to the
SovietGerman front to fight against the Nazis alongside the Red Army.
In a message to Stalin of November 22, 1941, Prime Minister
Churchill said the British government would ``be willing in the
near future to send Foreign Secretary Eden, whom you know,
via the Mediterranean to meet you at Moscow or elsewhere. He
would be accompanied by high military and other experts, and
will be able to discuss every question relating to the war,
including the sending of troops not only into the Caucasus but into the
fighting line of your armies in the South. Neither our shipping
resources nor our communications will allow large numbers to be
employed, and even so you will have to choose between troops
and supplies across Persia."^^1^^
Thus Churchill, while not in principle rejecting the idea of
using British troops on the Soviet-German front, had put
forward certain reservations in advance.
The Prime Minister's message further expressed a willingness
to discuss post-war settlement: ``When the war is won, as I am
sure it will be, we expect that Soviet Russia, Great Britain and
the USA will meet at the council table of victory as the three
principal partners and as the agencies by which Nazism will
have been destroyed. Naturally the first object will be to prevent
Germany, and particularly Prussia, from breaking out upon us
for a third time. The fact that Russia is a Communist State
and that Britain and the USA are not and do not intend to
be is not any obstacle to our making a good plan for our mutual
safety and rightful interests. The Foreign Secretary will be able
to discuss the whole of this field with you.^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of
Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941--1945, Vol. I,
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1957, pp. 34--35.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 35.
__PRINTERS_P_163_COMMENT__
11*
163
Stalin replied that Moscow was ready to receive the Foreign
Secretary: ``I fully support your proposal for sending Mr. Eden,
your Foreign Secretary, to the USSR in the near future.
Discussion and approval of an agreement on joint operations by the
Soviet and British troops on our front and the speedy execution
of that task would be of great positive significance. It is quite
true that the discussion and adoption of a plan for the
postwar organisation of peace should be designed to keep Germany,
above all Prussia, from again breaking the peace and plunging
the nations into a new bloodbath."^^1^^
Anthony Eden arrived in Moscow on December 15, and spent
almost a week in the Soviet capital. He was accompanied by
Alexander Cadogan Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign
Office and also by civilian and military experts. During his
visit Eden met several times with Stalin and Molotov, and
exchanged opinions with them concerning joint efforts in the war
against Nazi Germany.
As for the question of sending British troops to the
SovietGerman front, this already had a history of its own. In its
correspondence with Moscow, London had proposed that British
troops be sent to the Caucasus to protect the oil fields, and also
to the northern part of Iran. This, London said, would make
it possible to use the Soviet forces in Iran and the garrisons in
the Caucasus in the active army on the Soviet-German front.
The proposal once again showed Churchill in a most unflattering
light: it turned out that Britain could detail troops for guard
duty in the Soviet Union and Iran, but troops were ``not
available" for combat operations on the Soviet-German front. The
Soviet government had rejected this questionable proposal, and
the talks with Eden yielded nothing new in this regard.
Another problem discussed during Eden's visit in Moscow was
the western boundary of the Soviet Union, including the
question of regarding the Baltic republics as an integral part of the
Soviet Union. In 1940 the three Baltic republics had, at the
express will of their peoples, entered into the Soviet Union;
in time this was formalised through legislative acts both by the
state bodies of the Baltic republics and by the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR.
The British government declined to give official recognition
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 36.
164
to the fact that Soviet power had been established in the Baltic
states and they had become part of the USSR. The remnants
of the overthrown bourgeois regimes of these countries, which
had assembled in London, were taking advantage of this
circumstance. Their steadily increasing activity was inevitably
detrimental to relations between the two Allies, and naturally the Soviet
side was interested in resolving this matter.
When the question came up during the negotiations in Moscow,
Eden did his best to avoid facing it squarely. He claimed he was
not able to say anything specific until the problem had been
considered by his government, and repeated Churchill's declaration
that the British government did not recognise any of the
territorial changes taking place in the course of the war.
Eden said it was possible that this particular change might
be acceptable, but he would have to consult with the British
government first. At the same time, he cited the Atlantic
Charter's provision that no territorial changes be recognised. Thus,
London was claiming in effect the right to judge the validity
of the legislative acts of Soviet power.
``Is it really necessary that the question of the Baltic states
be dependent on the decision of the British government?" Stalin
inquired ironically. ``We are now engaged in a terrible war,
and are losing hundreds of thousands of lives to defend the
cause we uphold in common with Great Britain, our Ally. It
seems to me this question should be regarded as axiomatic, not
requiring any decision.''
Eden, obviously trying to gain time, asked whether Stalin
meant the future of the Baltic states after the war.
``Yes,'' said Stalin. ``Will you support the desire of these
three states to be part of the Soviet Union after the war? After
all, we are demanding no more than that the former
boundaries of our country be restored. I wish to stress that if you refuse,
it will seem that you want to create some sort of possibility of
partitioning the Soviet Union. I am surprised and even astonished
that Mr. Churchill's government should take such an
attitude---in essence, it is the same one as Chamberlain's
government took. I must repeat that I am much surprised by the
attitude of the British government towards the question of our
boundaries.''
Eden offered assurances that he would get the matter settled
165
before Soviet troops had entered the territories along the Baltic.
``I had thought,'' Stalin continued, as if he had not heard
Eden's words, ``that the Atlantic Charter was aimed against
those nations which are trying to establish world domination.
Things now look as if it is aimed against the Soviet Union.''
Eden hastened to protest that this was not so. It was only
that he could not give an immediate answer to some of the
questions that had been raised regarding Soviet borders. He
asked for time to get the answer from his government.
No agreement was reached on this point during Eden's stay
in Moscow. The question was settled later, in the course of
drawing up a Soviet-British Treaty of Alliance in the War Against
Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe and of
Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter. This treaty was
signed on May 26, 1942. Together with other documents of
that period, it helped in a significant degree to strengthen the
anti-Hitler coalition. Some of its propositions and clauses were
widely discussed at the time of Eden's visit.
The situation in South-East Asia and the Far East also came
under discussion. In particular, Eden said Churchill wished to
know the Soviet Union's position regarding Japan. The British
were interested in the prospects for the Soviet Union's entering
the war in the Far East.
``If the Soviet Union declares war on Japan now,'' Stalin said
in reply to Eden's question, we will have to wage a real war---
on land, on sea, and in the air. Therefore we must carefully
weigh and consider the forces that would be thrown into the
struggle. Much depends on how the war against Germany will
go. If the Germans find themselves hard pressed, it is not
impossible that they would push the Japanese into attacking us,
and then we would have to fight. But we would prefer to have
this be as late as possible.''
There was a quite obvious hint here that the whole situation
largely depended on the willingness of the Western powers to
undertake active operations against Nazi Germany. Eden
seemingly understood, and decided not to pursue further a theme
he found unpleasant. At any rate, the question of relations
between the Soviet Union and Japan was not raised again during
the negotiations.
In the course of Eden's talks with Soviet leaders there was
166
also a far-ranging exchange of opinions on problems of
postwar settlement, with special attention to measures that would
make German aggression impossible in time to come.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
All the Way to Berlin!
Eden had expressed a desire to visit the frontline, and was
offered an opportunity to travel to the neighbourhood of Klin,
through the areas from which the Nazis had been driven in
early December by a mighty Soviet counter-offensive.
On returning to Moscow, Eden expressed delight at the
brilliant victory won by Soviet troops, congratulated Soviet leaders,
and offered wishes for further success. But much later, in his
memoirs he confessed that in truth his feeling was not so much
satisfaction at the victories of the Red Army as concern over
what the inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany would mean for
``British interests''. In describing his trip to the frontline
outside Moscow, Eden says he was amazed to see the heaps of
fighting equipment left behind by the fleeing Nazis.
His memoirs contain a lengthy extract from his diary,
describing in detail what he saw on the Soviet-German front in
December of 1941. He makes only the barest mention,
however, of the sufferings Soviet citizens went through under German
occupation. Instead, he gives a highly circumstantial account
of his encounter with three Nazi prisoners of war and of their
conversation. It is plain from the Foreign Secretary's tone that
he sympathised with these men and even felt sorry for them.
Evidently he forgot that they had come with arms in their hands
to enslave the Soviet people.
This way of assessing what was happening on the
SovietGerman front in late 1941, this reaction to the powerful blows
Soviet forces were dealing the hitherto ``invincible'' Wehrmacht,
were highly characteristic of Eden. He saw in this a threat to
the imperialist aspirations of Great Britain and the USA. He
was afraid Soviet victory over Nazi Germany would change
the world balance of forces. Eden wrote in his diary that if
Hitler was defeated Russian troops would be far deeper in
Europe at the end of the war than at its beginning in 1941.
And for this reason he thought the Soviet government should
be bound by appropriate agreements as soon as possible.
167
I remember an exchange that occurred during one of Eden's
meetings with Stalin. They were talking about the further course
of events on the Soviet-German front, and Eden said he thought
the struggle would be long and hard<
``At present,'' he added, ``Hitler is still just outside Moscow,
and it's a long way to Berlin.''
``That doesn't matter,'' Stalin replied calmly. ``The Russians
have been in Berlin twice already, and will be there a third
time.''
Surely Eden was not overly pleased by the confident tone
of the Soviet leader. The two occasions Stalin had in mind
were the entries of Russian forces into Berlin in 1760, during
the Seven Years War, and in 1813, when the troops of tsar
Alexander the First had taken the city as they pursued
Napoleon's army in its retreat from Moscow.
Much later, Averell Harriman was to remember saying to
Stalin during the Potsdam Conference:
``It must be very pleasant for you, after all your country
has suffered, to be in Berlin now.''
``Tsar Alexander,'' Stalin remarked placidly, ``went all the
way to Paris.''
After Eden's visit a joint Anglo-Soviet communique was
issued.
The talks in Moscow during Eden's visit marked a new and
important step forward in consolidating the anti-Hitler coalition.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
1942
The year 1941, which had been filled with epoch-making
events, was coming to an end. Despite the grave trials to which
they had been subjected, Soviet people could look back on the
year with justifiable satisfaction. Hitler's plan for Blitzkrieg
against the Soviet Union had fallen through---that was now
obvious to all. The Fuhrer's boasts that he would quarter his troops
in Moscow for the winter had proven empty. Instead, the
vaunted Wehrmacht had received a crushing blow outside the walls
of the Soviet capital. Thousands of Nazi officers and men had
met their death on the approaches to the city.
A hard struggle yet lay ahead, of course. The enemy was
168
still strong, and was making ready for a new thrust. But it was
clear the factors that had favoured the Nazis at the start,
especially the suddenness of their attack, were no longer at work.
The long-term factors favouring the Soviet Union had now come
into play: the unity of the Soviet people, economic and human
potential, the superiority of the Soviet social system, and the
correctness of Soviet strategic conceptions. The strengthening of
the anti-Hitler coalition was also of great importance. Its further
consolidation was promoted by the United Nations Declaration,
which had been prepared by this time and which was formally
signed on January 1, 1942, by the four powers---the USSR, Great
Britain, the USA, and China---and by twenty-two other
countries. The Declaration proclaimed that total victory over the
Nazi aggressors was necessary to protect the life, freedom and
independence of peoples. Each of its signers pledged itself to
use all its resources, military and economic, against those
members of the Berlin Pact with which it was at war, to cooperate
with the other signers of the Declaration, and not to conclude
a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.
The times were hard, but still there was a desire to celebrate
the coming of the new year---1942. Everyone had a great deal
of work. Naturally no one who remained behind the frontlines
had any days off or holidays. Those working at the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were on a particularly strict
schedule. In essence the entire day, except time for sleep and
for travel to and from home, was devoted to work. On the rare
occasions when free time was available, anyone who planned
to be away from home had to tell the duty clerk in advance
where exactly he would be----even the row and the seat if he
were in a theatre. And when you did get out to see a
performance, it would often happen that a voice on the radio would
announce that so-and-so was urgently needed at work.
But still a few of us were able to get together to greet the
New Year. The working group that the People's Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs left in Moscow after its evacuation to
Kuibyshev was given working quarters in one of the vacated offices
of the Kremlin building that housed the Council of People's
Commissars. We had a direct telephone line to Kuibyshev, and
were in regular contact with various departments of the People's
Commissariat there. The building of the People's Commissariat
169
of Foreign Affairs on Kuznetsky Most Street was practically
empty. It now held only a skeleton maintenance staff, an
archive with the most essential information, and a cafeteria for
employees. A dormitory, which was at the same time a
bombshelter, was arranged in the basement. We spent our nights there,
and there we sat out the air raids that were quite common in
November and December of 1941. True, the German defeat
outside Moscow early in December was such a shock to the Nazi
command that the Luftwaffe's appearances over Moscow became
far less frequent. By the end of the month we were able to
move out of the basement.
I. S. Chernyshov, another member of our working group, was
assigned with me to quarters in an empty office on the second
floor, where we placed our folding cots, a table, and a few
chairs. The building, like almost all of Moscow, was not heated.
We were saved by a fire-place in the office. Wood was obtained
somewhere and whichever of us got back from work first would
hasten to get the fire going.
It was in this room that we celebrated the New Year; that
evening we had a few hours free. Besides Chernyshov and me
the company was made up of Kiselev, a friend of mine from
before the war, when he had been vice-consul in Konigsberg
and our frequent guest in Berlin, and Koptelov, formerly third
secretary at our embassy in Berlin. Koptelov worked in the
consular department, and was in from Kuibyshev for a few days
on business. Kiselev had turned up quite unexpectedly. After
his return from Germany he had, like many others at the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, enlisted in the home
guard. He had been wounded, hospitalised, and was about
to be returned to the active army. But meanwhile the work of
our Commissariat had once again begun to expand and, what
was more, consular and diplomatic ties were established with
countries that formerly had no such ties with the Soviet Union.
Experienced staff was needed, and the personnel department
sought out former employees and took them back into the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Kiselev had been located
while still in hospital. After serving for a time in Kuibyshev
he was summoned to Moscow, where he waited for assignment
to a new post as Consul General in New York.
We gathered shortly after eleven. The fire-place was already
170
ablaze, giving off a pleasant warmth---Chernyshov had gotten
back a little before me and made the fire. We were in high
spirits; it had just been announced over the radio that Soviet
troops had liberated the city of Kalinin---a New Year's present
to our homeland from the heroic Red Army. The outgoing year
had been marked by yet another Soviet victory. All four of
us present in the room had met the year 1941 in Berlin, as yet
unaware of what our country would have to suffer: the
bitterness of the initial losses and defeats, the forced abandonment
of cities and villages, the evacuation of state institutions from
Moscow, the bombing of the capital, the destruction. Now 1941
was coming to an end. The Soviet Union had held out, had
withstood the first desperate onslaught of the enemy---that was
the main thing. The Red Army had dealt the Nazis more than
a few crushing blows---outside Tikhvin, for example, and
outside Moscow---and now had liberated the city of Kalinin. And
coming over the radio was the calm, slightly hoarse voice of
Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, the President of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet, extending New Year's greetings to
the Soviet people and congratulating them on the successes
already achieved and the victories to come.
Together we remembered the comrades who were no more
among the living. General Tupikov, a very nice man who had
served as military attache in Berlin, had been killed near Kiev.
Kormilitsyn, our deputy trade representative in Germany, had
perished in an air accident in Iran, where he was in charge of
the transportation of Allied shipments. We also remembered
many other comrades who had fallen among the war's first
victims. Kiselev told us about the Moscow unit of the home
guard he had served with, most of which had been wiped out
while trying, with inadequate weapons, to hold back a powerful
onslaught of German tanks.
We realised that many trials and sacrifices were still ahead,
but like all the rest of the Soviet people we greeted the
incoming year with optimism: it was clear that Hitler's Blitzkrieg had
come to grief, and that whatever difficulties were still to come
there could be no doubt of the Soviet Union's ultimate victory.
We parted a little after two. Chernyshov, who was to go on
duty at nine that morning, stayed behind to rest a little. Kiselev
and Koptelov went down to the maintenance department, where
171
a hotel had been improvised for visiting employees of the
commissariat. I returned immediately to work. I walked to the
Kremlin through the drifts of unremoved snow, following the
dark tracks that had taken the place of sidewalks. There was a
full moon, and from it and the snow the city, though unlighted,
was bright. On Red Square only the strip of road along GUM
was cleared. All around were hills of snow, with paths winding
among them in different directions. I went along the one that
slanted from the History Museum to the Spassky Gates. The
chimes rang half past two. The first day of 1942 had begun.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Main Partners
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Some Aspects
of Soviet-American Relations
Soviet-American relations had passed through a number of
phases before the anti-Hitler coalition was established. There
can be no doubt that the decisive factor in their development
was the position the Roosevelt administration adopted after
Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.
As soon as it became known in Washington that Hitler had
attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull (as he writes in his memoirs) telephoned President
Roosevelt and then his own assistant, Sumner Welles. To each of
them he said:
``We must give Russia all aid to the hilt. We have repeatedly
said we will give all the help we can to any nation resisting
the Axis. There can be no doubt for a moment that Russia comes
within that category."^^1^^
This point of view gradually gained ground in the weeks that
followed, though not without opposition. As noted above, many
of Washington's military experts misjudged the strength of the
Red Army. The more realistic politicians argued that there
was no risk for the United States in sending arms and other
needed materiel to the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt was
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Cordell Hull, The Memoirs, Vol. 2, Hodder and Stoughton,
London, 1948, p. 967.
172
of the same opinion; even before the Nazi invasion of the USSR,
he had maintained that by taking such a step Hitler would
ultimately bring catastrophe on himself.
The United States had received information early in 1941
from a number of sources indicating that Hitler was
preparing to attack the Soviet Union. In January of that year, Hull
had seen a confidential report by Sam E. Woods, the American
commercial attache in Berlin, who had a friend in Germany
that hated the Nazis despite his ties with the government and
with prominent leaders of the Nazi Party. Early in August of
1940, Woods's friend had informed him that Hitler was holding
conferences concerning preparations for war against the Soviet
Union.
Woods usually met his acquaintance in one of Berlin's
cinemas. Woods would buy two tickets in advance, and send one
of them to his acquaintance. While they were seated side by
side in the darkened theatre, the latter would slip a note into
Woods's pocket. The information Woods sent to Washington
was contrary to the Nazis' public declarations that they were
preparing for an invasion of Britain, but persons connected
with Woods's friend said that the air-raids on England were
only a camouflage for Hitler's true intention, which was to
move against the Soviet Union. The man later told Woods that
an economic staff had been chosen for the Soviet territories to
be occupied, and that counterfeit roubles had been printed.
On the basis of information obtained from persons who
worked in the Wehrmacht's general staff, Woods told
Washington about the main directions of the offensive Hitler was
preparing to make in the north, the south, and the center, where
the immediate goal was Moscow. According to this
information, preparations would be completed by the spring of 1941.
When this information first reached the State Department,
Hull (as he himself later admitted) suspected a Nazi ruse. But
cross-checking confirmed Woods's information, which was then
passed on to Roosevelt. It is possible that this prompted him
to take measures that later facilitated cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In any case, Washington had taken a number of steps in this
direction even before Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR. The
embargo on trade with the USSR, enacted after the beginning
173
of the Soviet-Finnish war in December of 1939, was lifted on
January 21, 1941. In essence this did not change anything:
the goods earlier under embargo had been included in the
system of licenses by a law passed on July 2, 1940, and their
export was strictly controlled. The US measure adopted in
January of 1941 was thus mostly psychological in effect, but
it was to play a role in the future.
The American leadership was certain that if the Soviet Union
was attacked it would defend itself and do everything possible
to crush the aggressor. For this reason small amounts of
certain American goods continued to be shipped to the Soviet
Union. It is worthy of note that this displeased London. Lord
Halifax, the new British ambassador, arrived in Washington at
this time; at his very first meeting with Secretary of State Hull,
he suggested that limits be placed on American shipments to
the Soviet Union. On February 5, 1941, Halifax told Hull that
Britain feared lest a considerable part of the supplies going to
the USSR from the United States should eventually fall into
German hands. He even presented Hull with a special
memorandum pointing out the significant increase in Soviet purchases
from the USA. Hull replied that his government was
keeping a watchful eye on American shipments to the Soviet Union,
and added:
``Russia whether very active or sound asleep, is and will
continue to be a tremendous factor in the war and likewise in
questions affecting peace generally, both in Europe and in
Asia."^^1^^
Reports about this conversation appeared in the British press.
This caused displeasure in Washington: Hull invited Halifax
to call on him, and told him that Britain's demand that
American shipments to the USSR be curtailed should not have been
published.
``I feel,'' Hull said, ``that Britain is tipping the scales when
she presents publicly such proposals as calling on this
Government to impose an embargo against Russia."^^2^^
Hull's memoirs go on to say that on the whole US policy
towards the USSR was firm but friendly. In fact, however,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Cordell Hull, Op. cit., p. 970.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 971.
174
these relations were marked by considerable difficulties at the
time. The delays that regularly took place in the delivery of
various important materials were especially troublesome;
K. Umansky, the Soviet ambassador to the USA, had
repeatedly made representations to the American government
concerning this. For example, in the course of a conversation with Hull
on May 14, 1941, Umansky presented a memorandum citing
concrete instances of delays involving shipments to the Soviet
Union and also manifestations in the United States of hostility
towards the Soviet government, which naturally had a
deleterious effect on relations between the two countries.
Hull tried to object that the government of the United States
was not in the least hostile towards the Soviet Union or its
government; the facts, however, showed otherwise. Indeed, Hull
himself tacitly admitted this in setting forth the USA's
position with regard to the USSR. It was likewise impossible for
him to deny that in a number of instances deliveries had been
delayed; he could only repeat what were essentially the same
arguments Halifax had used.
Here, as we can see, Hull showed a certain inconsistency: on
the one hand he rejected the British demarche presented by
Ambassador Halifax, yet on the other he used the latter's
arguments to justify the American authorities in deliberately
causing delays in shipments to the Soviet Union.
In spite of these frictions and difficulties, however,
Washington's leading politicians, headed by Roosevelt and Hull,
regarded the Soviet Union as a decisive force capable of
resisting aggression by Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, and so
the US government already began to lay plans for supporting
the USSR in a possible conflict with Germany. No doubt a
certain role was played by the circumstance that Germany and
Japan were seen in ruling quarters in the USA as the most
dangerous imperialist rivals.
It should be remembered, though, that isolationism was still
very strong in the United States at this time. What is more,
pro-Nazi lobbyists in Washington were actively exerting every
sort of pressure on American legislators in persuading them to
oppose US involvement in a European conflict. Hitler's secret
service was also at work in the USA, and not without success.
Roosevelt had to overcome serious resistance to his policy of
175
supporting the forces opposed to fascism. It is certain that the
formation of Roosevelt's position at this time was also influenced
by his personal dislike of fascism. He invariably called the Nazis
``Huns''. Evidently he believed that a dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie in a form as extreme as Nazism goes too far towards
discrediting the entire capitalist system, of which he was a
firm supporter.
Step by step, Roosevelt was bringing the country into closer
cooperation with the countries at war against the fascist powers.
In January of 1941, in a meeting at the White House with
his closest advisers, the President declared that one of the
administration's paramount aims was to do everything possible to
keep up deliveries to Great Britain and said that the US Navy
must be ready to convoy vessels across the Atlantic to England.
This course was opposed by the isolationists, and there were
many in Congress who sharply criticised the administration.
The Soviet Union's entry into the war after the Nazis'
treacherous attack further strengthened the position of those
American political leaders who saw the defeat of Hitler---and at the
same time of German imperialism, which had begun to threaten
the interests of British and American capital---as a task of the
highest importance. Among this group, Harry Hopkins and
Averell Harriman were particularly active. This is why Hopkins,
who was in London at the time, was chosen to go to Moscow
in July of 1941 as Roosevelt's personal representative. The
Anglo-American mission to Moscow in the autumn of that year,
headed by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman, and the
important decisions reached during their talks with Soviet
leaders, have already been described above.
Before Harriman's departure Colonel Faymonville, a member
of the American delegation, was appointed to remain behind in
Moscow as head of a group that was to oversee deliveries of
materiel from the USA. This caused displeasure in the
Department of War in Washington, since Faymonville was known as
a supporter of active assistance to the USSR. In the meantime,
a military attache to the US embassy in Moscow at this time,
Major Eton, was sending to his superiors highly pessimistic
telegrams totally at odds with the information being received from
Colonel Faymonville. For example, Major Eton radioed to
Washington on October 10, 1941, that the end of Soviet
176
__CAPTION__The Nazis crossing the border at the River Bug on June 22, 1941
__CAPTION__Winston Churchill and Averell Harriman upon their arrival in
Moscow in August 1942
__CAPTION__The negotiations with Churchill in Moscow in October 1944. Seated
from left to nght: Churchill, Stalin, Eden
__CAPTION__The Moscow Conference of the three
foreign ministers. Seated at the table:
Cordell Hull, Vyacheslav Molotov and
Anthony Eden
__CAPTION__At the ceremony of the presentation of the Sword of Honour to the
defenders of Stalingrad. In the first row from left to right: Anthony
Eden, the interpreter for the British delegation Birse, Voroshilov, Stalin
__CAPTION__Dumbarton Oaks
resistance was near and therefore there was no reason for haste in
shipping materiel to the USSR, since it might end up being
captured by the Germans. The next day a telegram arrived
from Faymonville citing information received from the General
Staff of the Red Army to the effect that Soviet forces had foiled
the German attempt to surround Moscow and that the
situation on the Southern Front, while grave, was not hopeless. From
this, Faymonville drew a conclusion diametrically opposite to
Major Eton's: he urged all possible speed in American
shipments to the Soviet Union. Harry Hopkins noted in his diary
that he distrusted Eton's report and considered more reliable
the information supplied by Colonel Faymonville, which was
later borne out.
Colonel Faymonville's appraisal of the situation on the
SovietGerman front undoubtedly influenced the administration as it
worked out its policy towards the Soviet Union during those
first difficult months of the war. Steps were accordingly taken
in Washington to speed up practical assistance to the USSR.
Many years later---in 1955---I met Faymonville by chance
in San Francisco. By that time he had retired---in the rank of
general---but he was still as energetic and lively as when we
first met. We talked for a long time about the past, about his
work in Moscow, and about the future of Soviet-American
relations. Even in the mid-1950s, at the very height of the cold war,
Faymonville remained a friend of the Soviet Union. I was
saddened when I learned, some time later, that he had died.
Soon after Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union,
Roosevelt ordered the unfreezing of blocked Soviet funds. Early in
August of 1941 acting Secretary of State Welles and Ambassador
Umansky had an exchange of letters in which the American
side promised to give as much economic aid as possible in order
to strengthen the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed
aggression.
On August 13, during a meeting held in the Atlantic,
Roosevelt arid Churchill sent the following message to Stalin: ``We
are at the moment cooperating to provide you with the very
maximum of supplies that you most urgently need. Already
many shiploads have left our shores and more will leave in
the immediate future."^^1^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 17.
__PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__
12---1996
177
Events were to show, however, that this declaration had more
to do with the Western Allies' intentions than with their actual
deeds.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Anglo-American Shipments
After it had been agreed in principle by Soviet, British, and
American representatives in Moscow in the autumn of 1941
that the Western powers would supply materiel to the USSR,
Stalin and Roosevelt exchanged letters on this question. The
President pointed out in his letter of October 30, 1941:
1. That he had seen the protocol of the Three-Power
Conference in Moscow and discussed with the members of the
American mission the data presented in it.
2. That he had approved all the items of military equipment
and munitions and directed that the raw materials be provided
``so far as possible as rapidly as possible".
3. That he had given orders for deliveries to begin at once
and continue in the largest possible volume.
4. That in order to obviate any financial difficulties he had
directed that arrangements be made at once for shipments up
to the value of $1,000,000,000 to be made under the
LendLease Act.
5. That he proposed, subject to the approval of the Soviet
government, that no interest be charged by the United States
on such indebtedness as might be incurred by the Soviet
government arising out of these shipments, and that payments on such
indebtedness, to be made over a period of ten years, begin only
five years after the war had ended.
6. That he hoped the Soviet government would make special
efforts to sell such commodities and raw materials to the United
States as might be available and of which the United States
might be in need. The proceeds of these sales would be credited
to the account of the Soviet government.
7. That he wished to thank the Soviet government for the
promptness with which the Three-Power Conference in Moscow
was conducted by Stalin and his associates, and offer assurances
that the implications of that conference would be carried out
to the utmost.
178
8. That he hoped Stalin would not hesitate to communicate
with him directly if the need arose.^^1^^
As we see, the US government was at this time offering very
extensive aid to the Soviet Union and also promising to deliver
the materials agreed on in the shortest possible time. This
approach was welcomed by the Soviet side. Stalin responded to
Roosevelt's proposals in a letter dated November 4:
``I should like first of all to express complete agreement with
your appraisal of the results of the Three-Power Conference
in Moscow, which should be credited primarily to Mr.
Harriman and to Mr. Beaverbrook who did their best to bring the
Conference to an early and successful conclusion. The Soviet
Government is most grateful for your statement that the
implications of the Conference will be carried out to the utmost.
``Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an
interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet
deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is
accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as
vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendous and onerous
struggle against our common enemy---bloody Hitlerism.
``On instructions from the Government of the USSR, I express
complete agreement with your terms for granting the loan,
repayment of which shall begin five years after the end of the
war and continue over 10 years after the expiration of the
fiveyear period.
``The Soviet Government is ready to do everything to supply
the United States of America with such commodities and raw
materials as are available and as the United States may need.
``As regards your wish, Mr. President, that direct personal
contact be established between you and me without delay if
circumstances so require, I gladly join you in that wish and am
ready, for my part, to do all in my power to bring it about."^^2^^
This exchange officially confirmed the agreement on
deliveries reached during the Moscow talks in which Beaverbrook and
Harriman participated. It thus represented another step
forward in Soviet-American cooperation, paving the way for the
formation of a military alliance among the three main partners:
the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 14.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 15.
__PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__
12*
179
Immediately after the USA's entry into the war against
Germany (December 11, 1941), Secretary of State Hull, made an
important statement on behalf of the US government, in which
it was pledged that effective aid would be given to the Soviet
Union under the new circumstances.
There was also, at this time, no lack of British promises to aid
the Soviet Union in every possible way.
But the realisation in practice of the obligations undertaken
by the British and Americans was a long way from these solemn
promises and declarations. Considerable difficulties, resulting
mainly from consistent failures by the USA and Britain to meet
their obligations, arose over the implementation of the
agreements made.
According to the Moscow protocol, during October,
November, and December of 1941 Britain was to deliver 800
airplanes to the Soviet Union; only 669 were delivered in fact.
Instead of the 1,000 tanks and 600 small tanks promised, 487
and 330 respectively were delivered. The United States did still
worse in fulfilling the protocol. Between October of 1941 and
the end of June, 1942, 900 bombers, 900 fighter planes, 1,125
medium tanks and the same number of light tanks and 85,000
trucks, along with other equipment, were to have been delivered.
In fact, during the period indicated, the Soviet Union received
from the United States only 267 bombers (29.7 per cent), 278
fighter planes (30.6 per cent), 363 medium tanks (32.3 per
cent), 420 light tanks (37.3 per cent), and 16,502 trucks (19.4
per cent). Naturally, all of this made it difficult for the Soviet
command to plan its operations. Thus experience showed that
the Allies' promises were in no case to be relied upon.
In the first months after the Soviet Union became involved
in the war, neither Britain nor the USA undertook any combat
operations against Hitler. Under the circumstances, it might
have been expected that they would do a great deal more to
supply the Soviet Union with various materials needed for its
struggle against the common enemy than is shown by the figures
cited above.
The myth that the British and Americans met their
obligations quickly and completely still survives in the Western press.
But the reality was far from the claims made by Western
propaganda. The arms and other materiel that the Western Allies
180
solemnly promised were not delivered to the Soviet Union on
time; when they were delivered, it was only in greatly reduced
quantities. In quality, these armaments did not come up to
the demands made by the front.
The arms often were of outdated models, or had serious
defects of construction. Britain, for example, persisted in sending
outdated Hurricane fighters to the USSR instead of its new
Spitfires. In several cases the American armaments sent to the
Soviet Union were no better.
The problem of the quality of armaments often came up in
the correspondence among the leaders of the three powers. On
July 18, 1942, for example, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt:
``I consider it my duty to warn you that, according to our
experts at the front, US tanks catch fire very easily when hit
from behind or from the side by anti-tank rifle bullets. The
reason is that the high-grade gasoline used forms inside the
tank a thick layer of highly inflammable fumes. German tanks
also use gasoline, but of low grade which yields smaller
quantities of fumes, hence, they are more fireproof. Our experts think
that diesel makes the best tank motor."^^1^^
President Roosevelt answered:
``I greatly appreciate your report on the difficulties
experienced at the front with American tanks. It will be most
helpful to our tank experts in eradicating the trouble with this model
to have this information. The fire hazard in future models will
be reduced, however, as they will operate on a lower octane
fuel."^^2^^
Stalin also spoke of the low quality of materiel reaching the
USSR from the USA and Britain in a conversation with
Wendell Wilkie, then the Republican Party leader, who visited
Moscow in September of 1942. In the presence of the US and
the British ambassadors, Stalin raised the question of why the
Western Allies were supplying the Soviet Union with inferior
equipment. He explained that he meant especially the P-40's,
which the Americans were sending instead of their far more
advanced Aircobras, and the outmoded British Hurricanes; both
models were considerably inferior to German aircraft. Once,
Stalin added, the Americans had been about to send 150
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 30.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
181
Air-cobras to the Soviet Union when the British intervened and took
the planes for themselves.
``Soviet citizens,'' Stalin went on, ``are well aware that both
the Americans and the British have airplanes as good as the
Germans' or even better, but that for reasons unknown some
of these planes are not supplied to the Soviet Union."^^1^^
Stalin's statement to Wendell Wilkie, the leader of the
opposition to the administration then in the White House---and
made, what is more, in the presence of official representatives
of the USA and Britain---threw the latter into confusion. The
American ambassador---at this time Admiral Standley---hastened
to say that he had no information to this effect. But the British
ambassador, Archibald Clark Kerr, admitted that he knew about
the Aircobras. He attempted to justify their having been
diverted somewhere else by saying that in British hands these 150
planes were ``of far greater value to the Allied cause than would
have been the case had they been delivered to Russia"^^2^^.
The British ambassador's explanation was incorrect in essence
and tactless, to say the least, in form; the main battles against
the common enemy were being waged after all, on the
SovietGerman front, not ``somewhere else".
In his messages to the British and American leaders, Stalin
repeatedly stressed the importance of shipping materials
intended for the Soviet Union speedily and in full volume. On August
22, 1942, Stalin addressed Roosevelt in these words:
``I should like to emphasise our special interest in receiving
US aircraft and other weapons, as well as trucks in the greatest
numbers possible. It is my hope that every step will be taken
to ensure early delivery of the cargoes to the Soviet Union,
particularly over the northern sea route."^^3^^
The Western Allies usually explained delayed deliveries as
resulting from a lack of ships; the Soviet government therefore
consented to a temporary reduction in deliveries of certain types
of arms provided that what was most needed could be supplied
regularly. On October 7, 1942, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt:
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1942,
Vol. 3, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961,
p. 643.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 36.
182
``We should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce
deliveries of tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time,
however, we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern
fighter aircraft---such as Aircobras---and certain other supplies.
It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no match
for the modern German fighter."^^1^^
Roosevelt replied to this appeal by saying that ``urgent combat
requirements" made it impossible at that moment to increase
the number of Aircobras to be sent to the Soviet Union. He
confined himself to a very vague promise to study the question
of increasing shipments of other types of arms needed by the
Soviet Union.^^2^^
During one of the gravest times of the war for the Soviet
Union---the summer and autumn of 1942, when Hitler's hordes
were surging towards the Volga and the Caucasus---the
American and British governments suspended their convoys along the
northern route entirely. On July 16, General Burns of Great
Britain, who was in charge of shipments to the USSR, told a
Soviet representative that the governments of the USA and
Britain had decided to stop sending vessels with cargoes for
the USSR to northern ports. The freight that was to be shipped
by this route was three-quarters of the total. During July and
August of 1942, Britain sent not a single plane to the Soviet
Union.
At the same time, the British government sharply reduced the
amount of materiel it was sending to the USSR along the
transIranian railway. Congestion was cited as the reason, although
repeated promises had been made to increase the carrying
capacity of rail routes in central and southern Iran. By August 15,
1942, 34,977 tons of undispatched materiel was tied up in
the ports of the Persian Gulf.
The US and British governments had known as early as March
of 1942 about the scale of the upcoming battles on the
SovietGerman front. They recognised that the Eastern front was where
the outcome of the war would be decided. Nevertheless, they
did nothing to speed up deliveries of materiel to the USSR.
London and Washington explained their cutting of shipments
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 35.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 36--37.
183
along the northern route to a minimum during the summer
months by pointing to the significant increase in the losses of
transport vessels suffered during the period of light inside the
Polar Circle. There was an element of truth in this, of course,
but much depended, too, on the Anglo-American command
and its willingness to overcome the difficulties that arose during
that time.
Take, for example, the story of the PQ-17 convoy, which was
made up of 34 transports and two rescue vessels. The convoy
left Iceland in early June, 1942. Although it was summertime,
the protection was extremely ill organised. The British
Admiralty, which exercised supreme command in that region, had
concentrated large American and British naval forces at various
points along the convoy's route for its protection. But when a
real danger arose (it was learned that the German battleship
Tirpitz was moving to intercept the transport ships) Admiral
Dudley Pound, Britain's First Sea Lord, ordered all protective
forces to withdraw to the west, leaving the transports
completely defenceless. With a top speed of only 9 or 10 knots, they
made easy prey for German submarines and aviation. In the
end, 24 of the 34 transports were lost. The command of the
Soviet Northern Fleet took energetic measures to seek out and
rescue the remaining transports, sending its own ships and planes
to the area of the disaster. The surviving vessels arrived safely
in Arkhangelsk under the escort of Soviet warships.
Stalin wrote to Churchill on July 23, 1942, regarding this
tragic incident:
``The British Admiralty's order to the PQ-17 convoy to
abandon the supply ships and return to Britain, and to the supply
ships to disperse and make for Soviet harbours singly, without
escort, is, in the view of our experts, puzzling and inexplicable."^^1^^
The Soviet government insisted that planned deliveries to the
Soviet Union, including those along the northern route, continue
to be made regularly. London and Washington, however, citing
the case of convoy PQ-17, decided to stop sending transports to
northern Soviet ports. Convoy movements along this route were
resumed only in September.
In speaking of deliveries under Lend-Lease, it is important
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 56.
184
to compare the volume of Soviet arms production with what was
received from the USA and Britain during the war years. Let
us see, for example, where the Red Army's tanks and planes---
the most important types of weapons in those times---came from.
According to official American figures, 14,450 planes and about
7,000 tanks reached the USSR from the USA in all the years
of the war. From the beginning of the Soviet war effort up to
the end of April, 1944, 3,384 planes and 4,292 tanks were
furnished by Britain, and 1,188 tanks by Canada. By comparison,
the average annual output of Soviet industry in the last three
years of the war was more than 30,000 tanks and self-propelled
guns; production of planes went as high as 40,000 annually.
The manufactured goods supplied to the USSR by the Allies
in all the years of the war came to 4 per cent of the Soviet
industrial output.
Nonetheless, the Soviet side always acknowledged that the
materiel received from the Allies was of value to the Red Army
in its combat operations, especially in the first period of the war.
This help was received with gratitude by the fighting men, the
people, and the government of the Soviet Union.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Problem of the Second Front
When he attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler assumed that in
the foreseeable future nothing could threaten him from the west.
France had been prostrated. A considerable part of its
territory was under the heel of the Wehrmacht, and the remainder
was controlled by the Vichy government headed by the
collaborationist Marshal Petain, the obedient servant of Berlin. Britain
had been humiliated by the hasty departure from Dunkirk of its
expeditionary force and subjected to fierce attacks by the
Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941, which had
wrought great destruction in London, Coventry, and other cities;
the country was still in a state of shock. German submarines
plied the waters of the Atlantic with impunity, seriously
impeding the delivery of arms, ammunition, and other materiel to
the British Isles from the United States.
A month before the hordes of the Nazis and their satellites
invaded the Soviet Union, the Fiihrer's first deputy, Rudolph
Hess, left for England on a ``secret'' mission: to persuade the
185
groups ruling that country, through the intercession of his ``
peace-making" British friends, to enter into collusion with Germany
in the name of a ``higher goal"---the struggle against
communism. In the summer of 1941, Hitler was still hoping that ``
faithful Rudolph" would succeed and the British would at least
stand by idly while he undertook the destruction of the socialist
state he so hated. Once he became the ruler of Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals, the Fiihrer would be able to do
whatever he pleased. The fate of humanity, including the British,
would be in his hands.
With such plans in mind, Hitler concentrated against the
Soviet Union all the might of the Third Reich, the economic
potential of occupied Western Europe, and of his satellites. An
army of more than five million, well equipped with the most
modern weapons, was brought together for the invasion. The
absence of active combat operations in the west made it possible
for the German command to send more and more divisions, tank
corps, and air squadrons against the Soviet Union as operations
unfolded on the Eastern front.
Thus it was the primary concern of the Soviet government,
from the very first days of the anti-Hitler coalition, to
persuade its Western Allies to open a second front in Western
Europe. This was the only way to effectively overturn the plans
of the German command, undermine the enemy's morale, and
remove at least some of the burden from the Red Army, which
was heroically withstanding the onslaught of the fascist hordes.
At the cost of enormous sacrifices, the fighting men of the
Soviet Union, staking their very lives in defence of their
homeland, destroyed the best units of Hitler's armies and thereby
made the decisive contribution to the cause of victory over the
common foe. It was the duty of the Western Allies to begin
active military operations on a second front, in Western Europe,
as soon as possible and thus foil Hitler's plans, to make the
nightmare of a war on two fronts, which had always haunted German
strategists, a reality of the war the Nazis had unleashed.
But Britain, and, after Pearl Harbour, the USA, as well, put
off from month to month and from year to year the opening
of a second front, breaking one after the other the promises they
made to undertake an operation across the Channel in 1941,
in 1942, and then in 1943. This was one of the main factors
186
complicating relations between the members of the anti-Hitler
coalition. It was impossible not to see that London and
Washington were intentionally delaying the opening of a second front.
There were influential groups in Britain and the USA that
spoke openly of letting the combatants wear themselves out on
the Soviet-German front so that the Western Allies could enter
the war as arbiters in its last phase and dictate their own will.
These aims, naturally, had nothing to do with the Allied
obligations or with the task of quickly defeating fascism, the
enemy of mankind.
The problem of a second front was discussed constantly both
in talks among representatives---at various levels---of the
countries belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition and in the
correspondence among the leaders of the three great powers---the Soviet
Union, the United States, and Great Britain. This discussion
was particularly heated in 1942 and 1943, when the Soviet
Union's relations with Britain and the USA had been seriously
complicated by their delays in opening a second front.
In the spring of 1942, Roosevelt informed Stalin that he
wanted to exchange opinions with an authoritative Soviet
representative on a number of questions concerning the conduct of the
war against the common enemy. In a personal and secret
message received in Moscow on April 12, the President wrote:
``It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it
practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such
a meeting of minds in personal conversation would be useful
to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things
go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days together
next summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the
meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that
we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views."^^1^^
Roosevelt went on to explain that what he had in mind was
a high-level discussion of an important military proposal for
using the USA's armed forces to ease the critical situation on
the Soviet-German front. The President stressed that he attached
great importance to this aim.
``Therefore,'' the message continued, ``I wish you would
consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 22--23.
187
rely to Washington in the immediate future. Time is of the
essence if we are to help in an important way. We will furnish
them with a good transport plane so that they should be able
to make the round trip in two weeks.
``I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my
friend, Mr. Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but
we can gain time by the visit I propose.
``I suggest the procedure not only because of the secrecy,
which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we
determine with finality the strategic course of our common
military action. I have sent Hopkins to London relative to this
proposal."^^1^^
This message was of signal importance. Nearly a year had
passed since Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and
in all that time the Western Allies, under one pretext or another,
had refused to even discuss the opening of a second front. Now
the President of the USA had suggested quite unambiguously
that Washington, at any rate, was ready to undertake certain
actions with its armed forces in order to ease the situation on
the Soviet-German front, and that he wanted to consult with
the Soviet side on this matter before making his final decision.
In trying to find out just what it was that Washington
intended to do, the Soviet government decided to declare once again
its own desire to see a second front opened in Europe as early
as possible. Therefore, in its positive reply to the President's
suggestion, the Soviet side thought it necessary to stress that
it was expecting such an action.
On April 20, Stalin sent his reply to Roosevelt:
``The Soviet Government agrees that it is essential to arrange
a meeting between V. M. Molotov and you for an exchange
of views on the organisation of a second front in Europe in the
near future. Molotov can arrive in Washington not later than
May 10--15, accompanied by an appropriate military
representative.
``It goes without saying that Molotov will also go to London
to exchange views with the British Government.
``I have no doubt that I shall be able to have a personal
meeting with you, to which I attach great importance,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 23.
188
especially in view of the problems of organising the defeat of
Hitlerism that confront our two countries.
``Please accept my sincere regards and wishes for success in
the struggle against the enemies of the United States of
America".^^1^^
Under the conditions of those times the planned trip, of
course, demanded complete secrecy and appropriate precautions.
In a subsequent letter to Roosevelt informing him that
Molotov's trip had been postponed for several days on account of
unfavourable weather, Stalin wrote that the Soviet government
thought it necessary for Molotov ``to travel without any press
publicity until he returns to Moscow, as was done in the case
of Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow last December".^^2^^ The same
message indicated that the trip to Britain and the USA could be
made in a Soviet aircraft.
The interpreter accompanying Molotov on this trip was
Vladimir Pavlov. The group travelled in a specially refitted
longrange Soviet bomber; they went to London via Scotland, and
then on to Washington via Iceland. To throw the omnipresent
British and American reporters off the track, the delegation
was referred to as ``Mr. Brown's mission''. As later became
clear, certain information about the mission's real head leaked
out, nonetheless, through the official American interpreter, and
became quite widely known in Washington. No reports appeared
in the press, however, until the delegation had returned home.
As has been said, the most important question discussed by
the Soviet delegation in London and Washington was the
opening of a second front.
In London the Soviet and British representatives also
discussed other important matters, including the Anglo-Soviet
treaty which was concluded at that time.
The British government at first declined to make any definite
promises concerning a second front, but after a concrete
agreement was reached during Molotov's visit to Washington, it was
impossible for London to hang back any longer. The British
government had to put its signature to a joint Anglo-Soviet
communique repeating the Soviet-American wording agreed
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 23--24.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 25.
189
upon earlier: ``Full understanding was reached with regard to
the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."^^1^^
Even as it signed the communique, however, the British
government had no intention of fulfilling its commitment. In a
memorandum dated June 10, 1942, it opened a loophole by
which to escape from doing its duty as an ally and opening
a second front. The British government declared that if for some
reason a second front could not be opened in 1942, France
would certainly be invaded by an Anglo-American force of up
to 1.5 million men in the next year, 1943.
Thereafter, events developed as follows. As soon as the talks
in London and Washington were over, Churchill set about
convincing the US government that the agreement just reached for
opening a second front in Europe in 1942 (operation
Sledgehammer) must be abandoned. He told Roosevelt categorically
that there could be no question of landing in France in the
near future. Instead, Churchill suggested considering the
possibility of an operation to liberate North Africa, which was
later given the code name Torch. At first American military men,
including General Marshall, were opposed to Torch; they
argued that it would require so much time, strength, and
materiel as to rule out landing a large Allied force in France not
only in 1942 but even in 1943. Roosevelt was of the same
opinion. He continued to insist on an invasion of Northern France
in the autumn of 1942. The Prime Minister, however,
stubbornly promoted his own idea.
An American delegation headed by Harry Hopkins travelled
to London to discuss with British leaders the question of whether
Torch or Sledgehammer should be given preference. Churchill
argued that the operation in France was impracticable and
demanded that preparations be made for the seizure of North
Africa. At first no common ground could be reached. Hopkins
appealed to Roosevelt, but the President made no move to save
the American plan and follow through on the commitments
made to the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt did not even think it necessary to get in touch with
Churchill at the decisive moment, although the two leaders kept
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Bantam Books, New
York, 1962, p. 297.
190
up a regular personal correspondence. He simply took British
opposition to Sledgehammer as an unalterable fact and
telegraphed to Hopkins and Marshall in London instructions to
find some other land operations against German forces in which
American troops could be engaged without fail in 1942. He
mentioned North Africa and the Middle East as possibilities.
After receiving this reply, Hopkins and Marshall quickly reached
an agreement with the British: the invasion of France was
removed from the agenda.
Churchill had won out. Britain and the USA agreed that there
would be no second front in Europe in 1942; instead they
would launch operation Torch in North Africa. At the same
time the two governments declared that preparations would
continue for a large-scale landing in France sometime in 1943
(operation Roundup). The fact is, however, that even then
Churchill was looking for ways to block the invasion of France
in 1943 as well.
As has been said above, the role President Roosevelt played
in all this was a highly ambivalent one. Many were inclined,
both during the Second World War and after it, to go too far
in idealising Roosevelt as a staunch anti-fascist and a
champion of national self-determination. But this appealing portrait
is not entirely true-to-life. It must not be forgotten that
Roosevelt was first and foremost a son of his own class. During the
world crisis of 1929--1933, a time of grave difficulty for American
capitalism, he overrode the protests of more thick-headed
members of the American big bourgeoisie and resorted to measures
that sometimes seemed radical. Nonetheless, he always acted
in the interests of American capitalism and remained to the
end a representative of the US ruling elite. His New Deal had
just one goal---to help shore up American capitalism.
The principles that guided Roosevelt throughout his career
also manifested themselves in his foreign policy. Although he
entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union in the
name of victory over the common enemy, Roosevelt's attitude
towards the chief questions of this time was always shaped by
the global interests of American imperialism. The President's
son, Elliott, remembers how his father saw the United States'
role in the Second World War:
``Just figure it's a football game. Say we're the reserves,
191
sitting on the bench. At the moment, the Russians are the first
team, together with the Chinese, and, to a lesser extent, the
British... Before the game is so far advanced that our blockers
are tired, we've got to be able to get in there for the
touchdown. .. I think our timing will be right."^^1^^
This point of view repeatedly found expression in Roosevelt's
position regarding a second front. When faced with the
necessity of choosing whether to keep the promise made to the
Soviet Union or to join Churchill---another bourgeois
politician---in working out a tactic that the ruling groups in London
thought more expedient at that time, Roosevelt sided with British
imperialism.
Once he had gotten Roosevelt's agreement, Churchill
announced that he himself would explain to Stalin why Britain
and the USA were going back on their promise to open a
second front in 1942. In his message of July 18 he informed
the head of the Soviet government that the Western Allies would
not invade France in 1942.
Churchill's message, understandably, evoked a sharply
negative reaction from the Soviet side. In his reply to Churchill,
dated July 23, Stalin pointed out that Britain and the USA
had made this decision ``despite the agreed Anglo-Soviet
Communique on the adoption of urgent measures to open a second
front in 1942".^^2^^ The message continued: ``In view of the
situation on the Soviet-German front, I state most emphatically that
the Soviet Government cannot tolerate the second front in
Europe being postponed till 1943."^^3^^
Churchill understood that the situation which had arisen
might seriously complicate relations with the Soviet Union,
and travelled posthaste to Moscow.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Winston Churchill in Moscow
In the first years of Soviet power, when Winston Churchill,
then a member of the British cabinet, championed an anti--
Bolshevik crusade by fourteen bourgeois states, he could not, of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn
1946, pp. 54--55.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 56.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
192
course, have even dreamed that two decades later he would go
to Moscow---the capital of the Soviet state allied to Great
Britain---as an emissary of the groups ruling Britain and the
USA. What was more, he was forced to play the unenviable
role of a politician who had to seek for a plausible excuse after
breaking a solemn pledge.
It may well be imagined that during his first flight to Moscow,
in the summer of 1942, Churchill could not help but reflect
on the lesson he was receiving from history. At any rate, the
Prime Minister wore a most concerned air when, in the
afternoon of August 12, he descended the ramp from a plane that
had just landed at Moscow's Central Airport, on the Leningrad
Highway. The official ceremony of welcome was conducted
according to all the rules. National anthems were played, and
a guard of honour reviewed. The prevailing atmosphere, however,
was rather cold.
The welcoming Soviet officials behaved with restraint. As
he reviewed the honour guard, Churchill, his head pulled down
into his shoulders, looked intently at each soldier as if gauging
the mettle of the Soviet fighting men who were withstanding
a furious Nazi assault along a gigantic front running clear
through the Soviet Union---from the Arctic Ocean to the Black
Sea.
Averell Harriman, who was to be the personal representative
of the President of the United States at the upcoming talks,
and also a group of military men accompanied Churchill to
Moscow.
Harriman was already well-known in the Soviet capital, and
not only from his visit in the autumn of 1941, in company with
Lord Beaverbrook, for important talks concerning arms
deliveries. Harriman first came to the Soviet Union in 1926, when his
family had been granted a concession to mine manganese ore
in Chiatura, in the Caucasus. He had visited Moscow then to
meet with Soviet leaders, and now Stalin jokingly referred to
him as ``our man from Chiatura".
A row of black limousines stood waiting on the green airfield
not far from the plane. As soon as the official ceremonies had
been concluded, the guests were seated in them, together with
welcoming officials, in the following order: in the first car,
Churchill and Molotov; in the second, Harriman and A.
__PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__
13---1996
193
Sobolev, General Secretary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs; then Alexander Cadogan and F. Molochkov, Chief of
Protocol for the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs;
General Brooke and Marshal of the Soviet Union
Shaposhnikov; General Wavell and General Sinilov; General Maxwell
and M. Potrubach, from the Secretariat of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; General Spalding and Colonel
Yevstigneyev, head of the Foreign Relations Department of the
People's Commissariat of Defence. I was asked to accompany Air
Marshal Tedder.
Churchill was taken directly from the airport to the suburban
residence set aside for him in Kuntsevo; Harriman, to the
mansion in Ostrovsky Lane where he was to stay. The other members
of the delegation were put up at the National Hotel. The guests
had little time for rest: Churchill and Harriman were to meet
with Stalin that evening. Also present at that first meeting were
Molotov, Voroshilov, and Archibald Clark Kerr, the British
Ambassador.
It was the first time the head of the Soviet government had
met with the leader of the British Empire. Churchill's agitation
was clearly betrayed by his fidgetiness. He said there was simply
no limit to his joy at being in the heroic city of Moscow. Stalin,
by contrast, was very restrained. His face was impassive, as if
for him this were a routine meeting. But in the first moment
he had sized Churchill up in a glance that seemed to say: ``So
this is him---die pillar of die-hard British Conservatives".
Stalin invited everyone to be seated at that end of the long
table which was nearer to his desk. He himself sat in the
armchair at the head of the table, with Churchill at his right hand
and Harriman at his left. Boxes holding various types of
cigarettes were arrayed on the table, and there were bottles of
mineral water and glasses. Pencils of different colours lay beside
Stalin's place---he had a habit of gathering them into a bunch
and then rolling them across his palm as a sort of exercise for
his weakened hand.
Churchill began the conversation by inquiring about the
situation on the Soviet-German front. Stalin said that it was
relatively normal around Moscow, but that things were going harder
on the southern fronts. The Nazis were advancing with greater
force than had been expected in the direction of Baku and
194
Stalingrad. In some places they had been able to break through the
lines of the Red Army. Stalin remarked that he just could not
understand how Hitler could have gathered so many troops and
tanks together into a single fist.
``I think,'' Stalin continued, ``that Hitler has pumped all he
can out of Europe. But we are determined to hold Stalingrad.
The Red Army is preparing to launch a major attack north of
Moscow in order to draw Nazi forces away from the southern
fronts.''
Churchill became noticeably gloomier. After listening to this
description of the grave situation on the Soviet-German front,
he would now have to present reasons why the promise to open
a second front in Europe in 1942 would not be made good, why
the trans-Channel invasion was being put off once again.
Churchill took a roundabout approach. He began by telling
in detail about the troops, arms, and ammunition that the
British and Americans were concentrating in the British Isles.
Then he spoke about the possibility that a large number of
German fighting units might be brought together in the west,
which, he said, could greatly endanger Allied operations in
Normandy. Finally he said, as if in passing, that preparations for
the amphibious assault would be completed in the following year;
too much haste, he added, would involve great risks.
Stalin protested vigorously against this plan, and disputed the
figures Churchill had cited concerning the size of the German
forces in Western Europe. He maintained that in fact these
forces were considerably smaller, and that the divisions on hand
were not up to full strength. As for the risk Churchill had
mentioned, Stalin said, it seemed to him that someone who was
unwilling to take risks could never win a war. Churchill was
forced to agree in principle, but argued it was senseless to
sacrifice troops that would be needed so badly the next summer.
A heated discussion followed, during which Stalin declared
that he was completely unable to accept Churchill's statement,
although he realised there was nothing he could do to make the
British government act otherwise. He repeated that the Soviet
government disagreed totally. Churchill, in turn, tried to move
away from this unpleasant topic by raising another problem.
He outlined plans for operation Torch---the invasion of North
Africa---which was to be undertaken in October of 1942.
195
Churchill said he thought this operation would take Italy out of
the war.
He took a clean sheet of paper from the stack on the table
and sketched a map of Europe in the shape of a crocodile's
head with the jaws opened towards the British Isles. Churchill
showed his drawing to Stalin, and said:
``I want to attack the soft underbelly of this crocodile.'' With a
pencil he pointed to the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans.
Then he began to speak of the role the United States should
play in the invasion of North Africa. ``My friend Harriman,''
he concluded, ``can tell us about this in more detail.''
Harriman supported Churchill's plan, adding that, as far
as he knew, President Roosevelt wanted to begin the operation
in North Africa as soon as possible.
``Despite our serious problems in the Pacific,'' Harriman said,
``the President's chief concern is the war in Europe.''
Stalin listened patiently to all of this, and asked a number
of concrete questions about the operation in North Africa. In
particular, he inquired about the political reaction it would
produce in France and Spain. Churchill said he thought the
reaction in France would be positive. As for Spain, that
interested him but little.
The conversation then reverted to the problem of a second
front in Western Europe. Churchill stressed repeatedly the
importance of an operation in the Balkans, which, he maintained,
would become possible after Anglo-American forces had
successfully landed in North Africa. The conversation continued late
into the evening, but still Churchill did not obtain Soviet
agreement to the change of the original plan agreed on by the three
powers, which called for the Western Allies to land in
Normandy in 1942.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Balkan Variant
Churchill's idea about launching operations against the ``soft
underbelly" of Europe from North Africa is proof that even at this
time the Prime Minister cherished plans for landing
AngloAmerican forces in the Balkans and thus entering the countries
of South-East Europe before the arrival of the Red Army. The
root motive was to maintain reactionary regimes in the countries
196
that bordered on the Soviet Union, thus setting up once again
a so-called cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism, as the Entente
powers had done after the First World War.
Later, in his memoirs, Churchill denied that he wanted to
substitute an invasion of the Balkans for a landing in France.
But the facts, and the testimony of contemporaries, are against
him in this.
In the end, Churchill's Balkan scheme was foiled by the firm
opposition of the Soviet Union, and also by the stand Roosevelt
took. He evidently understood that the British strategy also had
an anti-American edge, inasmuch as the establishment of British
domination in South-East Europe was not in accord with
Washington's plans for broadening its own influence in this area,
too. It is worthy of note, however, that even after the plan for
an operation in the Balkans had been abandoned, Churchill
tried to pressure General Eisenhower, then commander of the
Anglo-American expeditionary force, into getting US support
for London's Balkan strategy.
Churchill pushed his idea for a Balkan operation with
particular insistence at the end of 1943, when the Big Three met in
Teheran. This was after Britain and the USA had once again
declined to fulfill their commitment to land troops in the north
of France. Churchill had also explored the ground regarding
his Balkan variant a year earlier, during his visit to Moscow;
the idea of landing Anglo-American forces in South-East Europe
was thus one of long standing. It is clear from all this that for
Churchill victory over the common enemy took second place to
strengthening the position of British imperialism in Europe,
with special emphasis on the fight against communism.
It were thoughts such as these which occupied the Prime
Minister of Great Britain while the men of the Red Army fought
and died to defend their homeland, and all of humanity, against
fascist enslavement. During the summer of 1942, the people of
the Soviet Union anxiously followed the developments on the
Southern Front, where the enemy, despite huge losses, was
pushing stubbornly towards the Volga and the approaches to the
Caucasus. No effort was spared by Soviet people to help the
front. Thousands and thousands of fighting men gave their
all to halt the enemy's advance. The Soviet Union was at this
time in especially great need of effective help from its Allies.
197
An Anglo-American landing in France would have played a
decisive role, and this was what the people of the Soviet Union
were expecting. But London and Washington kept postponing
such an operation for motives that had nothing to do with
bringing the war to a speedy end.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Joint Communique
Stalin was in an excellent mood as he received the guests
who had gathered in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin Palace
for dinner at eight. It was as if the preceding day's unpleasant
conversation with Churchill and Harriman concerning a second
front had never taken place. Churchill, however, was feeling
somewhat daunted at the beginning of the evening. Clearly he
had been distraught by the sharp exchange between himself
and Stalin: he puffed nervously on his cigar, and frequently
resorted to the cognac. As the time wore on, though, the Prime
Minister became more animated.
Soon Churchill and Stalin were engaged in a lively
conversation ranging from military tactics to problems of post-war
arrangements. Every so often Harriman would inject some remark.
In particular, it was he who raised the question of a possible
meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt, and asked when and
where this might take place. Stalin observed that such a meeting
would be of great significance, and suggested it might be held
in the winter, when he would be less busy with the affairs of
the front. Various possible sites were named, from the Aleutian
Isles to Iceland.
Stalin then took up current questions. He expressed
displeasure at the delay in sending convoys to Soviet northern ports
and said he would like to see the governments of Britain and
the USA take measures to speed up deliveries. Churchill and
Harriman promised to keep these points in mind.
Towards the end of the dinner, Stalin began to make toasts
in honour of the various branches of the services, addressing
by turns the different marshals and generals who commanded
them. The only foreigner Stalin honoured with a toast was
President Roosevelt. Churchill was plainly offended, but swallowed
the pill in silence.
Coffee was served at a smaller table in a room adjacent to
198
the Catherine Hall. Here the casual talk was resumed; Stalin
and Churchill reminisced about different periods in
SovietBritish relations. The subject of Lady Astor's visit to Moscow
in the 1930s came up. Stalin said Lady Astor maintained at the
time that Churchill was finished finally, that he would never
again play any part on the political scene. Stalin thought
differently, though. He told Lady Astor that if there was a war
Churchill would become Prime Minister.
Churchill thanked Stalin for this compliment on his abilities
as a political leader.
``And I must admit,'' Churchill said, ``that my own attitude
towards the Soviet Union has not always been friendly----
especially just after the First World War.''
``I know that,'' Stalin said in a conciliatory tone. ``There is
no denying that you have been consistent in your opposition to
the Soviet system.''
``Can you forgive me for all that?" Churchill asked.
Stalin, with eyes slightly narrowed, looked at Churchill
silently for a moment. Then he answered calmly:
``It's for God to forgive---not me. In the end, history will
judge us.''
An incident occurred during this dinner which at first
alarmed and then greatly amused everyone present. Stalin, Churchill,
and Harriman were engaged in a lively conversation over
coffee and ice-cream when suddenly they were interrupted by the
crash of breaking crockery and exclamations. Turning round,
we saw a man prostrate on the floor, surrounded by fragments
of china, bottles, and bits of glass. Other guests were crowding
around, hiding him from view.
Stalin, Churchill, and Harriman approached in the company
of their interpreters, and everyone made way. We now saw that
the man stretched out on the floor, face purple and eyes
blinking foolishly, was the Prime Minister's personal bodyguard and
aide Commander Thompson, or Tommy, as Churchill called
him fondly. The figure towering over him was Sir Archibald
Clark Kerr, the British ambassador. He was in his gold--
embroidered frock-coat, and at his side hung a jewel-encrusted sword
of honour, and a moire ribbon was draped across his shoulder.
But what a sight he was! Pink ice-cream was running down his
frock-coat and ribbon, and his sword was speckled with coffee
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grounds. Sir Archibald was visibly struggling to regain his
composure so as to reply to Churchill's troubled and bewildered
gaze.
``May I ask what has happened?" the Prime Minister inquired.
At last the ambassador found his tongue, and blurted out:
``Well, Sir, as you know, Tommy can drink a terrific amount
of wine, and it never makes him drunk. . .''
``That's what I like about him,'' Churchill put in, smiling. He
had guessed already that nothing terrible had taken place.
``But this time he overdid it, competing with his Russian
colleagues,'' Kerr went on. ``And as bad luck would have it,
it seemed to him just at that moment that you, Sir, needed his
protection. He jumped up, lost his balance, and grabbed for
the tablecloth. And as you see...''
Kerr pointed to his soiled frock-coat, and then the still
prostrate Thompson. Everyone laughed. Thompson was quick'y
put on his feet and helped out the door, and that was that.
At break of day Churchill, Harriman, and the persons
accompanying them---including a puffy-faced but already quite
sober Thompson---arrived at Central Airport. At five o'clock,
after the official leave-taking, they left for Teheran, from where
they continued to the capitals of their countries. On August 18,
when they had already arrived at their destinations, an official
Anglo-Soviet communique was issued. It said:
``Negotiations have taken place in Moscow between President
of the Council of the People's Commissars of USSR, J. V. Stalin,
and Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Winston Churchill,
in which Mr. Harriman, representing the President of the
United States of America, participated. There took part in the
discussions the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.
M. Molotov, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, from the Soviet side;
the British Ambassador, Sir A. Clark Kerr, C.I.G.S., Sir
A. Brooke, and other responsible representatives of the British
armed forces, and Permanent Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Sir A. Cadogan, from the British side.
A number of decisions were reached covering the field of
the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe.
This just war of liberation both Governments are determined
to carry on with all their power and energy until the complete
destruction of Hitlerism and any similar tyranny has been
200
achieved. The discussions, which were carried on in an atmosphere
of cordiality and complete sincerity, provided an opportunity of
reaffirming the existence of the close friendships and
understanding between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United
States of America, in entire accordance with the Allied
relationships existing between them."^^1^^
The communique, naturally, did not contain the slightest hint
about the serious disagreements among the Allies on the
question of opening a second front, or about the heated discussions
that had taken place. This was only natural for that period. A
fierce war was being fought against a crafty enemy, and the
Allies, of course, had to appear united and unshakable in their
determination to achieve victory.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Months of Concern
The summer of 1942 was dry and hot. Moscow was stifling,
and the charms of nature seemed especially sweet whenever it
was possible to get out into the suburbs, even if only for a
few hours. The life of our group at the Commissariat was little
by little settling into an accustomed routine. Those of us who
had not had living quarters in Moscow before the war were
given rooms or apartments, and at last were able to move out
of the Commissariat building. Quarters were arranged there for
the increasing number of employees who were being called to
Moscow from Kuibyshev. Some of them remained for a long
time; a few did not go back at all. A few of the cottages were
reopened on the land which the Commissariat owned on the
Klyazma River, and employees took turns spending their free
time there.
Little garden plots appeared in the meadows along the river;
those who wanted could grow vegetables there. The free hours
which could be devoted to these gardens were few, and most
of them were not tended with any skill; nonetheless they yielded
cucumbers, carrots, and cabbage---a welcome addition to our
meagre rations.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Bantam Books, New
York 1962, p. 436.
201
Several theatres which had been evacuated returned to
Moscow. There were organ and symphony concerts in the Grand
Hall of the Conservatoire, and at the Central House of the Red
Army the illustrious Song and Dance Company was once again
performing under the direction of its founder, Professor
Alexandrov. The Front, a new play by Alexander Korneichuk, was
having a successful run at the Moscow Art Theatre. I remember
the premiere. The house was packed. Most of the audience
were military men, officers in field uniform with the green
frontline insignia. Those who came to the capital from the frontlines
on leave or on business tried not to miss their chance to see
this play, which created quite a sensation at the time.
The conflict on the stage was between veteran officers who
had fought in the Civil War and young military specialists. It
was unquestionably topical and understandable to the men from
the front. At a time when the Red Army was still forced to
retreat, the question of authority and competence of commanding
officers was particularly urgent. It took some time to
understand the need for reorganisation that would combine the
experience gained in past wars with the deeper knowledge, energy,
initiative, and quick reaction of the younger experts. The play
appeared at just this moment.
The play's success was also due to the fact that its author, a
renowned dramatist who had worked as a front-line
correspondent since the first days of the war (in 1943 Korneichuk was
appointed deputy to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
and placed in charge of the Slavic countries), had grasped the
deep essence of a problem that arose in the first period of the
war: the old commanders, although rich in experience,
hardened in battle, and selfless, were not always equal to the new
demands being made on them, and this seriously complicated things
in the active army.
Although the play dealt with a complex situation---a sharp
conflict between the old school and the young specialists, it left
its audiences with a feeling of optimism, of confidence in
ultimate victory. It was said that The Front had won Stalin's
approval, and this must have been so, since the script of the play
was printed in Pravda, thus reaching millions of people.
The other outstanding cultural event of this period was
Dmitri Shostakovich's Leningrad Symphony, which was first
202
performed in Moscow in the summer of 1942. The impression it
produced in those days, when the Nazi advance was still
underway, was especially strong.
Everyone, whether at the front or in the rear, was engrossed
in reading brilliant front-line reports and stories by Mikhail
Sholokhov, Alexei Tolstoy, and Ilya Ehrenburg, and poems by
Konstantin Simonov and Alexei Surkov, all of which expressed
the deep patriotic feelings of the people, their burning hatred
for the enemy who was trampling the soil of their native land,
and their determination to stand firm and achieve victory.
In those difficult months during the summer and autumn of
1942, this patriotism helped Soviet citizens to bear all their
misfortunes and to preserve---in spite of setbacks on the front---
their courage, steadfastness, and readiness to give their all in
the struggle.
And in truth this was a hard, a very hard time. After the
brilliant victory won by Soviet forces just outside Moscow at
the end of 1941, the hope had sprung up that although fierce
battles were still to be fought the enemy would advance no
farther, that the fortunes of war had turned in favour of our
country. The second summer of the war, however, brought with
it new and bitter trials. Breaking through our lines of defence
in the south-eastern sector, the enemy took Rostov and pushed
on towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Hitler was in a hurry
to seize the breadbaskets of the Stavropol and Kuban regions,
and rich oilfields of Maikop, Grozny, and Baku. The
communiques issued by the Sovinformburo listed more and more cities
which had fallen into Nazi hands. Their names were like
heartrending cries: Pyatigorsk, Yessentuki, Kislovodsk. ..
We continued to work twelve or fourteen hours a day. There
was a lot to be done: the flurry of diplomatic activity
continued in the People's Commissariat without interruption. But
our thoughts carried us away to the south-east, to the steppes
between the Don and the Volga and the foothills of the
Caucasus, where the Nazis, in spite of their losses, continued to push
back the Red Army. There was a large map of the Soviet Union
hanging in our room, and each day, after reading the latest
communique, we would sadly move the tiny red flags farther
into the heartland of our country.
Everyone was asking himself: when will it end? Can it really
203
be true that there is no force capable of stopping Hitler's war
machine? But the Nazis were defeated outside Moscow, weren't
they? That was plain proof that they could be stopped and
driven back.
We who were involved in the Soviet government's talks with
London and Washington naturally were particularly aware that
the Nazis were taking advantage of the absence of a second
front in Europe to transfer fresh troops from France and other
regions to the Soviet-German front. Thus the Western
democracies had done yet another good turn for Hitler.
All of this forced the Soviet people and the Communist Party
to make a super-human effort, to ``pull themselves together'',
as our newspapers put it back then, in order to block the
enemy's path, to halt the Nazis and then to defeat them, relying
mainly on our own strength. Everyone realised this imperative
need. Only a few, though, knew then of the practical measures
already being taken by the Supreme Command of the Soviet
armed forces which would make it possible, once the enemy
had been stopped at Stalingrad, to launch a sweeping
counteroffensive and begin to drive the Nazi hordes out of our
homeland.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Moscow Conference
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Changed Situation
The need for a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three
leading powers in the anti-Hitler coalition---the Soviet Union,
the United States, and Great Britain---was one of long
standing. The conduct of war against the common foe, the political
problems and disagreements that had appeared in the course
of developing concerted military efforts, the new tasks arising
as victory over Nazi Germany drew nearer, the need to come
to agreement on key questions concerning post-war settlement---
all of these demanded high-level consultations, an exchange of
opinions, and the making of joint decisions.
A number of bilateral meetings at the ministerial level took
place in the first years of the war: between Molotov and Eden,
Molotov and Hull, Eden and Hull. But the three men had not
yet met at the same time, and thus it was natural that practical
204
questions involved in such a meeting began to be discussed in
the summer of 1943.
Churchill initially suggested that the conference be held in
London or another city in the British Isles. Roosevelt expressed
the opinion that it would be better to choose a more peaceful
and out-of-the-way spot. He named Casablanca, Tunisia, and
Sicily as possibilities. Since Cordell Hull would be participating
in the conference the American side insisted, on account of
the advanced age of the Secretary of State, that the meeting
place should be as comfortable and as close to the USA as
possible. Roosevelt even intimated at the start that if a more
distant site was selected he would not risk Hull's health, but
rather send Deputy Secretary of State Wallace.
While the discussion of where it would be best to meet was
still going on (the Soviet side suggested Moscow, and the British
raised no objections to this), the plan to send Wallace in place
of Hull began to raise serious doubts. Many knew that on
more than one occasion Wallace had publicly spoken out
against cooperating with the Soviet Union. When it was
suggested that he travel to Moscow, he declared that he did not
see any sense in such a conference and thought nothing would
come of the talks. Evidently Hull realised the absurdity of the
situation and advised Roosevelt to ``have a second thought"
about sending Wallace. He declared that he was ready to go to
Moscow and take part in a foreign ministers conference. In
the end, Roosevelt gave his consent to this.
It should be noted that the hesitations of Roosevelt and
Hull were also due to Hull's never having been on an airplane
in his life, and to his general prejudice against air travel. His
understanding of the need for the three ministers to meet,
however, won out over his hostility to the airplane. So as to shorten
the flight as much as possible, Hull travelled from the USA
to North Africa on a cruiser. After landing in Casablanca, he
flew to Moscow via Cairo and Teheran.
It had been decided by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt in
their correspondence before the Moscow Conference was called
that what was needed was a broad exchange of opinions on all
questions, without any limitations by a hard-and-fast agenda.
If serious differences remained on certain problems, these could
be settled at the upcoming meeting of the three leaders: it had
205
been by this time generally agreed in Moscow, Washington, and
London that such a meeting should be held, although as yet
nothing had been decided regarding time and place.
The delegations of the United States and Britain arrived in
Moscow on the afternoon of October 18. The weather that
day was uncommonly warm and clear for autumn in Moscow.
The grass at Central Airport was summery green, and the flags
of the three nations of the anti-Hitler coalition were barely
stirred by the breeze. The guests were met by Molotov, Litvinov,
and other Soviet officials. The plane bearing the British Foreign
Secretary was first to arrive. When Eden appeared, the band
struck up the ``Meeting March''. Eden went to the microphone
and said:
``I am very happy to have arrived in Moscow for this
conference and at the same time return the visit Mr. Molotov made
to London last year. I am looking forward to the upcoming
talks with him and Mr. Hull.''
Eden and Molotov then reviewed the honour guard. The
national anthems of Great Britain and the USSR were performed.
The welcoming ceremony had barely been concluded when an
American bomber appeared in the sky. Shortly afterwards the
US Secretary of State stepped onto Soviet soil.
``It gives me special pleasure,'' Hull said, ``to arrive in
Moscow---the capital of a great country which has joined my
country in a common cause. I am also pleased at this
opportunity to pay a return visit to Mr. Molotov, People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs. I am looking forward to the upcoming
talks with him and Mr. Eden.''
Hull was a tall, thin old man. He looked tired, and seemed
to find it a chore to make the speech traditional on such
occasions. Once the ceremony had been concluded by the march
of the honour guard, Hull, smiling wanly, asked Molotov if it
was far to the residence of the US ambassador, where he had
expressed the wish to stay during his visit to the Soviet capital.
The hint was taken, and everyone hurried towards the waiting
cars.
The following is a list of participants in the Moscow
conference:
British delegation: Anthony Eden, William Strang, Charles
Harvey, V. Lawford, D. Howard, J. Ward, D. Garrison, J.
206
Coulson, D. Wilson, D. Dashwood, and also nine military experts
and nine members of auxiliary personnel.
American delegation: Cordell Hull, Averell Harriman, J. Dunn,
G. Hackworth, S. Gray, M. MacDermott, Ch. Bohlen, and also
ten civilian and seven military experts.
Soviet delegation: V. M. Molotov, A. Ya. Vyshinsky,
K. E. Voroshilov, M. M. Litvinov, V. A. Sergeyev, A. A. Gryzlov,
G. F. Saksin.
Experts.: A. P. Pavlov, Ya. Z. Surits, G. N. Zarubin, K. V.
Novikov, A. I. Lavrentyev, S. A. Golunsky, A. M. Baranovsky,
B. F. Podtserob.
The Secretariat: V. M. Berezhkov, Ye. Y. Yerofeyev,
A. A. Khatuntsev.
In accordance with British wishes, Anthony Eden and some
of those accompanying him were housed in the British embassy,
on the Sofiiskaya Embankment, across from the Kremlin.
Cordell Hull stayed in the residence of the American
ambassador. At that time the US embassy occupied a building
opposite the Kremlin, adjacent to the National Hotel. But the
ambassadorial residence was located in Spaso-Peskovsky Lane
off the Arbat---the Americans called it Spaso House. Hull was
later to recall in his memoirs the pleasant stay he had in this
quiet corner of Moscow. Four other members of the American
delegation were at Spaso House as well.
All the others from the British and American groups, and
also the crews of the British and American planes that brought
the delegations to Moscow----in all 45 Americans and 40 British
---were put up at the National Hotel. The conference's work
site was a house belonging to the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs on Spiridonovka Street (now Alexei Tolstoi
Street).
A varied programme was planned in addition to the working
meetings: visits to the Bolshoi Theatre for Swan Lake and the
opera Ivan Susanin; a concert by the Red Army Song and
Dance Company under the direction of Professor Alexandrov;
a screening of the latest newsreels, including coverage of the
delegations' arrival in Moscow, and also of the films The Battle
of Orel and Svejk Against Hitler. If delegation members
wished, they could also visit a collective farm, one of the larger
factories, the university, a school, or a hospital.
207
A preliminary meeting of the three ministers was held the
day before the conference officially opened. It took place in
Molotov's office in the Kremlin. The three men agreed that the
conference should get right to work, without any long speeches.
The first plenary session of the conference was due to open
on October 19, in the afternoon. Earlier in the day Eden and
Molotov, in accordance with protocol, had paid separate calls
on Hull.
As Hull later wrote in his memoirs, he decided to use this
meeting with the British Foreign Secretary to discuss tactical
questions. In particular, Hull suggested that the existence of a
united front beween the British and American delegations be
kept secret from the Soviet side.
``It is important,'' the Secretary of State told Eden, ``that
the Soviets not get the impression that the British and American
groups are conspiring against them to present a united front
against Russia.''
Eden agreed to this.
Hull informed Molotov at their first meeting that he and
Eden had agreed that each of the delegations should be prepared
to conduct talks with either of the others on a completely
equal and independent footing.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The House in Spiridonovka Street
The house on Spiridonovka, which the People's Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs used for receptions, once belonged to the
wealthy textile manufacturer Savva Morozov, well known as a patron
of the progressive writers, artists, and performers of his time.
He frequently came to the aid of the Bolsheviks (he once rescued
Bauman, who was being pursued by the police, by taking him
into his carriage), and would even give considerable sums from
his capital to ``the revolution" when necessary.
The Morozov house is truly a work of art in its architecture
and interior decorations. Surrounded by an old park, it delights
the eye with its severe late-Gothic proportions. The interior
holds works by the best sculptors and painters of the early 20th
century; the stained-glass windows by Vrubel (still extant) and
the wrought-iron railings of the inner staircases, designed by
the same artist, are especially fine. The stately halls, each in a
208
different style, are decorated with pictures by the Dutch masters
and other artists and cabinets filled with fine china, statuettes,
and silver plates---all unique works of art.
The plenary sessions of the conference were held in a white
marble hall in the Empire style. Under the enormous crystal
chandelier stood a round table draped in a cream-coloured
tablecloth. In a wooden stand at its centre were the little flags of
the three participating nations. Arm-chairs for the heads of the
delegations and several rows of chairs for other participants were
arranged around the table.
The working schedule was as follows: a plenary session was
opened each morning at ten and went on until one in the
afternoon. A forty-minute lunch break followed. Everyone went to
the dining room, where a long table covered with a white
tablecloth stood before the high fire-place. Cold snacks, fruit, and
soft drinks were served, as well as coffee and tea. Afterwards
the session continued until five, when there was a break for
dinner. A second plenary session was held in the evening; at
times it went on until after midnight. Several evenings,
however, were left free for visits to theatres and concert halls.
I remember a curious episode I witnessed during a
performance of the opera Ivan Susanin. As usual in such cases, the
central box in the Bolshoi was put at the disposal of the guests
of honour. Eden, Harriman, and Molotov, together with their
interpreters, sat in the first row. Cordell Hull did not usually
attend the evening events. He would say he was tired, and
depart for Spaso House. Above the box hung the national flags
of the three participants. When the scene of a ball at the palace
of the Polish king was being shown, Eden turned towards
Molotov and said with a smile:
``See what nice people these Poles are---it's simply a pleasure
to be friendly with them.''
The Poles whom the British Foreign Secretary had in mind,
of course, were the emigre government in Britain, with which
the Soviet Union had broken off relations over its repeated
acts of anti-Soviet provocation.
Eden's remark brought a frown to Molotov's face. ``In real
life things are more complicated,'' he said icily.
Later in the opera, when Susanin was being murdered by the
Poles on stage, Molotov turned towards Eden:
__PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__
14---1996
209
``You see, our relations with the Poles have had their rough
spots. As for us, we want good relations---with an independent
and friendly Poland,'' he said. After a short pause, Eden
answered:
``I understand you. But you must understand us too---it was
because of Poland that we entered this war, after all.''
The problem of the Soviet Union's relations with the Polish
emigre government was long to remain the object of
discussions, and sometimes of serious disagreements, between the
Soviet Union and its Western Allies.
Representatives of Britain and the USA tried to get the
USSR to restore diplomatic relations with the reactionary Polish
government in emigration. In August of 1942, this government
had withdrawn from the USSR Polish military units formed on
Soviet territory in accordance with the Polish-Soviet agreement
of July 30, 1941. It was demanding that the borders established
by the Riga Treaty be restored, which would have meant letting
Poland keep areas inhabited by Ukrainians and Byelorussians.
As already mentioned, it was not above acting in collusion with
the Nazis. The Soviet government, quite naturally, refused to
have any dealings whatever with such people, who moreover
did not at all represent the people of Poland languishing under
the Nazi yoke.
It was certainly not in the interests of bettering Soviet-Polish
relations that the US and British governments urged the
restoration of relations with the emigre Polish government; their only
concern was to shore up the position of the Polish reactionaries,
whom they saw---with every reason---as reliable agents for
themselves. The Soviet government refused to restore diplomatic
relations with this anti-Soviet government, regarding it as alien to
the people of Poland and unmindful of their fundamental
interests, chief among which was lasting friendship with the
USSR.
But let us return to the Moscow Conference. At its first
plenary session, which opened---as was scheduled---on October 19,
agreement was reached on an agenda. The Soviet representative
distributed among the participants a draft agenda, which listed
as the first item measures to bring the war to an early end and,
as the second, the signing of a declaration by the Allied powers.
He remarked that it would be desirable to agree on a precise
210
date for the Anglo-American invasion of northern France. The
agenda was adopted, and a general discussion followed.
The next session, on October 20, was entirely devoted to
problems connected with the opening of a second front. Britain's
General Ismay, and also the USA's General Deane, presented
in detail the Anglo-American plans for a trans-Channel landing
in the spring of 1944. They noted, however, that these plans
could be realised only on two conditions. The first was that the
Allies achieve a significant reduction in the number of German
fighter planes in North-Western Europe by the time of the
landing. The second was that Nazi Germany's ground forces not
exceed a certain limit at that time.
When asked whether the promise Roosevelt and Churchill
had given in June of 1943 to launch an invasion of northern
France in the spring of 1944 remained in force, Eden and Hull
said that in principle this was so. The two men offered
assurances that the promise would be carried out to the letter, and
added that it had been confirmed at the Anglo-American
conference in Quebec, although it was still contingent on the
conditions just mentioned. At any rate, preparatory measures,
according to the British and American representatives, were in full
swing. But still they did not name an exact date. Molotov
said the Soviet government would take these declarations into
consideration, and also the statements made by generals Ismay
and Deane. He expressed hope that this time the invasion would
really take place.
The opening of a second front, as noted already, was being
put off from year to year by the groups in power in London
and Washington. In both Britain and the USA, however, large
segments of the public were energetically demanding an
immediate landing in France, which would have been a giant step
towards crushing fascism as quickly as possible. While Eden
and Hull were in Moscow they received numerous telegrams
from Britain, the USA, Canada, and other countries calling
for the Western Allies to open a second front as early as
possible. People everywhere had come to realise that by prolonging
the war the governments of the USA and Britain were
condemning nations to new sacrifices and sufferings.
__PRINTERS_P_211_COMMENT__
14*
211
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Four-Nation Declaration
Considerable time was devoted at the October 21 plenary
session to discussing the draft of a declaration by the Allied
powers on the problem of general security. It was doubted
whether the conference had the power to adopt a declaration of
four (the USA, Britain, the USSR, and China), since only
three powers were formally represented. Furthermore, the Soviet
side did not want to complicate its relations with Japan and
thought it would be inadvisable to make it seem that
quadripartite talks, including Chiang Kaishek's China, had taken place
during the Moscow Conference. At the very start of the
discussion, therefore, Molotov suggested that the conference consider
a declaration of three, rather than four. Later, he said, when
the Chinese government had given its approval, this could be
turned into a four-power declaration. Hull objected, stressing
the important psychological effect a declaration by all four
powers would produce. The lively exchange of opinions on this
question continued even during the breaks between sessions.
The weather was fine, and Hull and Molotov strolled about
the grounds, along the paths sprinkled with yellow sand.
Meanwhile they went on with their talk about the declaration. Hull
said that the American government thought it of the highest
importance for the declaration to be made not by three powers
but by four, including China. Molotov continued to express
doubts. He maintained that while the Soviet Union was bearing
the main burden of the war against Nazi Germany it would not
be wise to make China a party to the declaration, since this
might provoke an undesirable reaction from Japan. As things
stood, anything that might worsen relations between Japan and
the Soviet Union should be avoided. And so, the session left
the question of a declaration undecided.
In the days that followed the draft declaration came under
discussion repeatedly. It was only at the end of the conference
(after Hull's meeting with Stalin, described later) that the
Soviet side agreed to a four-power declaration. Molotov asked
whether the time remaining was sufficient to get an answer
from Chongquing (the capital of China during the war years)
and whether the Chinese ambassador in Moscow would be able
to sign the declaration together with the representatives of the
212
other three powers. Hull answered that he would handle the
matter personally, and said he hoped the Chinese ambassador
would be given the necessary powers before the conference was
over. And indeed the answer from Chongquing was received
without delay. On October 30, the three ministers of foreign affairs
and Fu Bingchang, China's ambassador to the USSR, signed
the declaration. It read:
``The Governments of the United States of America, United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China:
united in their determination, in accordance with the
Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent
declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers
with which they respectively are at war until such powers have
laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;
conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of
themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace
of aggression;
recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly
transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining
international peace and security with the least diversion of the
world's human and economic resources for armaments;
jointly declare:
1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the
war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the
organization and maintenance of peace and security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will
act together in all matters relating to the surrender and
disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be
necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed
upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the
earliest practicable date a general international organization,
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
peaceloving states, and open to membership by all such states, large
and small, for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and
the inauguration of a system of general security, they will
213
consult with one another and as occasion requires with other
members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on
behalf of the community of nations.
6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not
employ their military forces within the territories of other states
except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after
joint consultation.
7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and
with other members of the United Nations to bring about a
practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation
of armaments in the post war period.
V. Molotov
Cordell Hull
Anthony Eden
Fu Bingchang
Moscow, October 30, 1943.''
The four-power declaration undoubtedly played an important
role. It laid the foundation for post-war arrangements and set
forth certain basic principles by which the United Nations
Organization would abide in the future.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
In Stalin's Office
During the Moscow Conference the heads of the US and
British delegations were individually received by Stalin, and
discussed with him a broad range of questions relating both
to the conduct of the war against the common enemy and to
post-war settlement. Molotov was present at both talks, each
of which also included the ambassador of the country involved
and translators. I acted as Stalin's interpreter during his
meeting with Hull. Charles Bohlen was the interpreter for the
American side. The meeting took place in Stalin's office, on the
afternoon of October 25.
In preparation for this important conversation, I looked
through the file on Soviet-American relations once again. At
the time I was working as Molotov's assistant on American
affairs, and thus the material was, on the whole, familiar.
Nonetheless it was necessary to review, with special attention, the
documents Stalin had read. He had a phenomenal memory,
and might bring up all sorts of concrete matters with which I,
214
as his interpreter, would need to be familiar in order to arrive
at the most exact translation into English. What is more, Bohlen,
as mentioned earlier, did not know Russian particularly well; at
times he needed help, and for this it was necessary for me to
have a quick grasp of what Hull might say.
Twenty minutes before the appointed time, I locked up my
papers in the safe, put a few pencils into my pocket, picked
up a notebook, and stepped out into the long corridor, where
the high windows looked into the courtyard. Molotov had offices
both on Kuznetsky Most Street and in the Kremlin, and I had
a pass admitting me to both. It was not, however, good for
the wing of the building where Stalin's quarters were: to reach
them one had to go down a separate corridor, guarded by a
sentry. A special pass was required, which had to be obtained
in advance.
The duty officer directed me to a waiting room. There
was a table covered with a white cloth. At its edge stood an
array of bottles---mineral water and fruit drinks. Clean glasses
stood upside down on a large black metal tray with a
bright floral design. The table was ringed with rows of
bentwood chairs. There was nothing else in the room. I sat down
at the table and began to wait. Five minutes before three
o'clock---when the meeting was to begin---the duty officer
entered the room and said I could go on into Stalin's office. As
I was crossing the room, the door opened and Cordell Hull,
Averell Harriman, and Charles Bohlen, stepped in from the
corridor. I greeted them and went right along into Stalin's
office.
The office was functionally furnished. Opposite the door
through which I entered was a desk with telephones of different
colours. Perpendicular to it stood a little table and two deep
arm-chairs covered in dark-brown leather. A longish box,
containing maps that could be pulled out like window-shades,
was fastened to one wall. Beside this stood a long conference
table with a green cloth, and around it a great many chairs.
It was at this table that Stalin usually talked to foreign visitors.
Above the desk was an enlarged photograph of Lenin reading
Pravda; on the other walls were portraits of outstanding Russian
military men---Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Nakhimov.
Several members of the Political Bureau were in the office,
215
and a group of people I did not know. Evidently a conference
of some sort had just taken place. Everyone had already gotten
up from the table; Stalin was pacing the rug. Turning to me,
he nodded briefly and said to the others in the office:
``The Americans are here already. That will have to be all---
I won't keep you any longer.''
Everyone left the room without delay. Only Molotov remained.
I had prepared a brief release for the press on the meeting
with Hull, and now showed it to Stalin. He glanced at a few
lines of it, and then said:
``Show it to Molotov after the talk. He will decide.''
Stalin went over to the desk and pressed the call button,
adding, ``Well, it's time.''
The duty officer entered.
``Call them in,'' Stalin ordered.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Meeting with Hull
A few seconds later Hull, Harriman, and Bohlen stepped in.
Hull, tall and lean, with sparse gray hair, was dressed in a
severe black suit. A dark tie with a bright striped pattern stood
out against his snow-white, stiffly starched shirt.
Stalin advanced towards Hull with his hand held out, and
then greeted Harriman and Bohlen. Taking Hull by the arm,
he led him towards the long table. After greetings had been
exchanged everyone sat down. Stalin took the second chair
from the head of the table, on the side where the maps were,
and offered Hull the chair opposite. Molotov sat at the head
of the table, as if he were to preside. I sat to Hull's right,
and Bohlen and Harriman to his left. Thus the chair to Stalin's
left remained vacant.
Turning to Hull, Stalin welcomed him once again, and asked
how his long trip had gone.
``Very well---despite my expectations,'' Hull answered with
a slight smile. ``This was the first time I've ever travelled by
plane,'' he explained, ``and I was a little wary. I crossed the
Atlantic on a cruiser so as to spend as little time in the air
as possible. In the meantime President Roosevelt's personal
plane, Sacred Cow, which he kindly placed at my disposal,
crossed from the USA to North-West Africa, From there we
216
came to Moscow via Cairo, the Persian Gulf, and Teheran.
The flight went smoothly, and I wasn't the least bit
uncomfortable, despite my prejudice against passenger planes.''
``So you see,'' said Stalin, lighting up his pipe, ``there was
no reason for President Roosevelt to worry about your age
making it difficult for you to come to Moscow. The three foreign
ministers could have met somewhere else, of course. But you
know Molotov is my first deputy. Besides his diplomatic work,
he has many other important responsibilities---some of them
connected with the development of vital types of weapons---and
it would have been very hard for him to leave the country for
long. The conference could only have been very brief. And
of course it would have been impossible for us to meet.''
``I must admit,'' answered Hull, drawing out his words and
evidently weighing every phrase with special care, ``you are quite
right. I highly appreciate this opportunity of meeting you,
Mr. Chairman, and for this I am prepared to put up with any
discomforts connected with the long journey. Let me tell you
in confidence that when it was finally decided that the three
foreign ministers were to meet in Moscow, and President
Roosevelt, considering my advanced years and my present poor health,
suggested in all seriousness that my deputy should make the trip
to Moscow in my stead, I vigorously protested. I said that our
common cause demanded that I meet with Marshal Stalin,
especially since we hope that in the near future it can be
arranged for you to meet with President Roosevelt. I stood firm,
and as you see---here I am!''
``Excellent!" said Stalin. ``I am very glad you have come.''
At first the conversation turned to general topics---the weather,
the prospects for the harvest. The best method for sowing wheat
was discussed, and Hull rather surprised Stalin by saying that
in Tennessee, where he was from, the grains were planted to a
depth of over ten inches. The subject of building rafts came up.
Hull said that in Tennessee huge logs were used, and Stalin
recalled that in Georgia logs were held together with grapevines.
Hull then began to give his impressions of Moscow, saying he
was greatly pleased to be in the Soviet capital and to fulfil his
long-cherished dream of visiting the Soviet Union. He added
that he had attended many international conferences, but had
never before been shown such hospitality and consideration.
217
``I had not expected to hear so much praise from you,'' Stalin
answered with a smile. ``Well, shall we get down to business?"
Hull agreed, and said that in his opinion one of the most
important functions of the present conference would be to
prepare for a meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill.
Such a meeting, he added, would be welcomed by the American
people and the peoples of all countries taking part in the war
against fascism. Hull then gave Stalin a message from
Roosevelt concerning the site for a meeting.
After reading the Russian text of the message, Stalin handed
it to Molotov and remarked that before he could reply he
would have to give the matter some thought and consult with
his colleagues. Molotov, too, looked over the message, and said
that at present, when major military operations were going on
at the front, it was the unanimous opinion of all high-ranking
civilian and military members of the Soviet government that
Stalin should not leave the country at all. At any rate, he could
only travel to a place where it was certain that daily contact
could be made with Moscow.
Stalin nodded in agreement, and said that in view of all
this perhaps the meeting of the Big Three ought to be
postponed a little---at least until the following spring. He thought
Fairbanks, Alaska, might be a suitable place at that time.
Hull objected that both the President and he were firmly
convinced the most appropriate time for such a meeting would
be the present. The international situation called for it. If
such a meeting did not occur, there would be profound
disappointment among all the Allied peoples. The effect of the
meeting would be to unify the three great powers, which would
further their cooperation in the war effort and the development
of their relations in the post-war period.
Hull went on to say that if the powers waited until the end
of the war to formulate a basic foundation for a post-war
international program, peoples in all the democracies would go
their separate ways. Their disagreements would become more
serious, and various elements, groups, and individuals would
take advantage of this. Under such circumstances it would be
very difficult---for the United States, at least---to pursue a
suitable post-war program, and to rally and unite the forces needed
to support it. The situation at the moment was entirely
218
different: any official in the USA, however high his rank, would
be immediately discredited and thrown out of office if he
announced that he opposed working out a post-war program.
Hull added that although President Roosevelt and he
considered such a meeting highly important they understood, of
course, that the task of conducting the war must have first
priority, and thus he was pleased to hear that Stalin would give
the question careful study. He hoped an appropriate decision
could be reached. In this connection, Hull stressed the
importance he attached to the signing of a four-power declaration
at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference.
Stalin said he would think this over. He saw the need for
a meeting of the three leaders. The trouble was that at the
time important military operations were being conducted by
the Red Army; the summer campaign on the Soviet-German
front was gradually developing into a winter campaign.
``Just now,'' Stalin added, ``we have a very rare opportunity.
For the first time in fifty years, perhaps, it is possible to deal
the German armies a serious defeat. The reserves of the enemy
are insignificant, while those of the Red Army would suffice
for a whole year's operations. Obviously the Soviet Union
cannot wage war against the Germans every ten years. This makes
it extremely important to take advantage of the opportunities
we have at present and to accomplish our task of getting rid
of the German threat for a long period. As for the Big Three
meeting, I will have to think about it and consult with my
colleagues.''
Hull replied that he understood the concern of the Soviet
side, but at the same time hoped some way could be found
for the three leaders to meet. He added that according to the
information he had the governments and peoples of all the
Allied countries were waiting impatiently for such a meeting,
hoping that it would bring closer cooperation between the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.
Stalin agreed, and noted that in principle he had nothing
at all against such a meeting.
``But still,'' Hull countered, ``the impression I am getting
is that you, Mr. Chairman, are giving greater thought to
immediate plans than to the more distant future, for which a
meeting of the Big Three is of paramount importance.''
219
Stalin replied that this was not due to stubbornness or
concern for prestige, on his part. It was simply that he could not
understand why the President could not come to a meeting
place closer to Soviet territory---to Teheran, for instance. Why
was it that a delay of two days in delivering important state
documents to the American President was seen as a vitally
important matter, while it was not understood that any false
step in military operations was not just a grammatical error,
which could easily be corrected later, but might cost tens of
thousands of lives? This was the reason for his concern with
maintaining reliable contact with Moscow.
Hull pointed out that if the meeting were held in Basra
the Americans would vouch for the reliability of
communications. Ambassador Harriman caught up this idea immediately,
saying that the heads of state would enjoy complete security.
Each could stay in his own camp in the hills back of Basra,
guarded by troops of his own nationality.
``Thus complete protection will be assured,'' concluded
Harriman.
To this Stalin said that it was not at all questions of
protection and security that worried him, but rather the need for
him to be as close as possible to the Soviet-German front.
The meeting lasted nearly an hour.
Everyone got up. Hull went around the table to where Stalin
stood, shook his hand, and said in Russian:
``Until we meet again.''
Stalin said in reply that he had been greatly pleased to meet
the US Secretary of State.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Some Results of the Conference
The problems discussed at the Moscow Conference comprised
not only bringing the war to a speedy conclusion and the
related task of opening a second front, but also other questions,
on which a significant degree of agreement was reached. The
Four-Power Declaration, mentioned above, was one of the main
results of the conference. Other problems considered included
the German question, the situation in Italy, the fate of Austria,
and the establishment of a European Advisory Commission.
During one of the recesses in the work of the conference,
220
when everyone was strolling in the garden that surrounded the
house on Spiridonovka Street, Hull told Molotov that he would
like to present separately to the British and the Soviet
delegations certain thoughts concerning Germany. Hull explained that
this was not an official proposal by the United States but simply
an indication of the Americans' line of thought---general
suggestions which could be talked over freely. If the Soviet side
wished, Hull added, these ideas could also be discussed with
Eden to get his point of view.
Molotov expressed interest and asked if he might be given
the text of this proposal in order to study it more closely. Hull
gave Molotov a copy of the document at once.
The next day, during another recess in the conference,
Molotov told Hull the following as they were walking in the
grounds:
``I showed your paper to Premier Stalin, and his reaction
was on the whole favourable. In essence the proposal
corresponds to Soviet ideas about the treatment of Germany once we
have achieved victory. Thus we are willing to support this
proposal as a foundation for further work on an appropriate
document.''
It should be said that there were other points in the
document which the Soviet government did not support. In
particular, a plan was presented for the partition of Germany. This
plan was discussed, but the Soviet side treated it sceptically
and stressed that the question required special study. The other
points set forth in the American proposal followed from the
demand that Germany surrender unconditionally. The German
authorities or military representatives were to sign a
document acknowledging that Nazi Germany had been utterly
defeated and giving the victors the rights of occupying powers in
all German territories. The German authorities would be obliged
to give up all prisoners of war and other citizens of the United
Nations who had been taken to Germany. The United Nations
would be empowered to manage the demobilisation of the
German armed forces, and to ensure the release of political
prisoners, the closing of concentration camps, and the
detention of war criminals. Bodies for economic control---and also
their staffs---were to be properly maintained by the German
authorities, and all documentation and equipment was to be
221
preserved for later transfer to the United Nations, which would
be empowered to oversee the German economy.
It was further envisaged that the territory of Germany would
be occupied by British, Soviet, and American troops. Nazi
officials were to be removed from office, and all traces of the
fascist regime eradicated. The Nazi Party would be disbanded.
Germany would be made to pay reparations for the material
damage done to the Soviet Union and the other Allied powers,
and also to occupied countries; the amount of these reparations
was to be determined by a commission to be composed, at the
start, of representatives of the three powers. Germany would
be totally disarmed, and would no longer maintain a standing
army or a general staff. As for the question of boundaries, it
was thought this should be considered in the course of a general
settlement of the German problem.
The discussion of this plan showed that on the whole
agreement existed concerning Germany's status as an occupied
country. Indeed, many of the suggestions advanced at the Moscow
Conference were later incorporated in the framework of a
document concerning these matters which was adopted by the
powers in the anti-Hitler coalition.
It was at the suggestion of the Soviet side that the
situation in Italy was discussed at the conference. By this time, it
will be recalled, the British and Americans had cleared fascist
troops out of a large part of the Apennine Peninsula. Italy
surrendered in the summer of 1943, and the Mussolini regime
had been overthrown, but the forces of reaction had not yet
been completely crushed. It was from these very forces, in fact,
that the American and British authorities were drawing their
support.
Since the very first days of the occupation there had been
serious criticism of the Western powers' activities both from
democratic groups in Italy and from progressive public opinion
in other countries. Thus it was natural that the Soviet
delegation at the Moscow Conference should ask for detailed
information about how the Allies were carrying out the agreement for
armistice with Italy. The Soviet delegation suggested measures
that would ensure the elimination of fascism in Italy and
promote development along democratic lines.
These suggestions gave rise to heated discussion. Eden
222
affirmed that the measures the Western Allies had been taking
were aimed at democratisation. Hull supported his British
colleague and promised that the two of them would compile and
present to the conference a special document giving a detailed
chronological list of all the measures the two governments had
taken in Italy since the invasion of Sicily. Molotov argued
that the three powers should nonetheless make a public
statement on Italy that would also include the Soviet proposals. In
the end this was agreed to and found expression in the
Declaration adopted by the conference.
The Moscow Conference decided that an advisory council---
made up of representatives of the USA, the USSR, Britain, the
French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, and
Yugoslavia---should be created to deal with questions involving Italy.
The recommendations to be formulated by the council would
be used to help coordinate Allied policy in Italy.
This decision undoubtedly had a positive effect. To a
certain extent, it hindered the American and British military
authorities in acting arbitrarily against the interests of the Italian
working class and the country's democratic development.
During the discussion of Austria's fate after the war, the
conference participants emphasised that Hitler's annexation of
that country had been unlawful, and that the three powers did
not consider themselves bound by the changes which had taken
place in Austria since the Anschluss in 1938.
While the discussion of this question was in progress one
of the technical secretaries of the Soviet delegation came in and
handed a sheet of paper to Molotov, who after glancing at
it tapped on the table with a pencil to get the attention of the
others in the room.
``Gentlemen,'' he began, with a note of excitement in his
voice. ``Word has just been received that the Red Army has
liberated Dniepropetrovsk. This victory was attained in the
course of a broad autumn offensive now being pressed by our
troops.''
There was an outburst of applause, after which Hull and
Eden offered their congratulations to the Soviet delegation. In
the days that followed, Molotov was to announce to the
conference several more major victories just won by the Red Army.
After a break, the draft of a Declaration on Austria was
223
discussed and adopted. The conference also considered a number
of questions relating to the post-war settlement in Europe. This
question was of particular significance. The groups in power
in the USA and Britain wanted to see federations of small
and middle-sized countries established in Central and
SouthEastern Europe. It is not hard to guess that the British and
American imperialists would have used these federations as a means
for attaining their own selfish ends; they wanted to recarve the
map of Europe to suit themselves, without considering the
wishes of the peoples inhabiting the countries of that region.
The Soviet government took a negative attitude towards these
plans, and refused to give its consent.
In the course of the discussion, the Soviet representative
objected vigorously against the idea of creating such federations.
Such plans, he declared, were reminiscent of the pre-war policy
of a cordon sanitaire, which had been directed against the
Soviet Union.
Eden hastened to offer assurances that his government had
no intention of throwing up a cordon sanitaire around the
Soviet Union. It was against Germany, he said, that Britain
wanted to apply this measure.
Molotov set forth the Soviet point of view concerning
postwar settlement in Europe. The Soviet government, he said,
regarded the liberation of small countries and the restoration
of their independence and sovereignty as one of the chief tasks
to be accomplished in establishing a post-war European order
and ensuring a lasting peace. The Soviet delegation pointed
out the danger of prematurely and artificially putting small
countries into groupings conceived without consulting the
nations concerned, and declared that after the war the peoples
of Europe must be free to decide their destinies without any
outside interference or pressure whatever. The Soviet
delegation also argued that attempts to federate small countries, if
based on decisions by emigre governments that did not express
the true will of their peoples, would in effect mean forcing
such decisions on nations against their will. In conclusion, the
Soviet representative stressed once more that all efforts to
revive the policy of a cordon sanitaire employed against the
Soviet Union---as was the underlying intent of the federations
being proposed in the west---must be rejected categorically.
224
In taking a firm stand against foisting federations of small
and middle-sized European states in advance, the Soviet
government acted in the interests of security for the USSR and other
states after the war, and in defence of the sovereign right of
the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to decide their own
destinies. But Western politicians, especially Churchill,
nonetheless kept trying to force through the idea of ``federating''
various European countries---for example, of creating a so-called
Balkan federation.
The decision of the Moscow Conference to establish a
European Advisory Commission, with permanent headquarters in
London, was of great significance for the future of relations
between the Allied powers. It may be regarded as concrete proof
that the three powers meant to work together in dealing with
the main post-war problems. The three governments would,
when they thought it expedient, entrust the commission with
studying questions that arose in connection with the cessation
of hostilities in Europe and making joint recommendations on
these questions to the three governments. In particular, the
commission was to work out terms for the surrender of the
enemy states.
Another important subject discussed at the Moscow
Conference was the statement regarding Nazi responsibility for war
crimes. The original draft of this document was elaborated
by the Americans and personally approved by Roosevelt. A day
or two after the conference opened, Hull submitted the draft
to the British and Soviet delegations, asking them to look it
over and make additions if needed. Hull said that the American
side thought the declaration should be signed by the heads of
government of the three powers, and expressed the desire to
see it made public while the conference was still in session.
Molotov and Eden promised to examine the draft declaration
soon.
The text of the draft was later discussed in some detail.
Alterations and additions were made, and it was then sent to
the leaders of the three powers of the anti-Hitler coalition for
their final approval. This took time, and in the end the
declaration was published only on November 2, 1943, after the
Moscow Conference had ended.
It should be noted that during the preliminary discussion of
__PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__
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225
the declaration at the conference Eden had much to say about
the need to establish ``judicial forms" for a ``legal'' handling
of war criminals' cases. Hull's attitude was more decisive. He
said that since there was no doubt that war crimes had been
committed a judicial procedure would only cause delays; persons
guilty of crimes should be punished at once. The Soviet
delegation took the same position. This controversy was, however,
pointless: the text of the statement called for punishment of
those guilty under the laws of the countries where their crimes
were committed. The statement regarding atrocities of the Nazis
established a number of the fundamental principles used in
setting up the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
Later on a number of Western politicians, and particularly
Churchill, tried to take the Nazi criminals under their
protection. This was a clear demonstration of duplicity on Churchill's
part: it was he himself who had said the Allies would pursue the
guilty men to ``the uttermost ends of the earth'', and his words
were incorporated into the statement.
Several technical and military questions were also discussed
at the Moscow Conference in connection with Major General
Deane's report containing a number of concrete suggestions.
One of these was that the Soviet Union make bases available
to British and American bombers for the conduct of ``shuttle''
operations against German industrial areas. This was in fact
done later; the Soviet side made bases in the neighborhood of
Poltava available for such operations. Another suggestion had
to do with ensuring a more effective exchange of information
about weather. This ultimately led to a significant broadening
of such exchanges. A third suggestion was that air
communication between the USSR and the USA be improved. Hull had
a separate discussion of this matter with Molotov, and the
Soviet side agreed to an increase in air traffic. The appropriate
Soviet bodies were instructed to study this question.
During the conference there was an exchange of opinions
on the desirability of Turkey's entry into the war on the Allied
side, and on cooperation with Sweden. The Soviet delegation
maintained that if Turkey joined the anti-Hitler coalition this
would help shorten the war. The participants discussed various
ways of getting Turkey to declare war on Nazi Germany as
soon as possible. As for cooperation with Sweden, the
226
conference discussed the possibility that Allied planes flying in the
north might be permitted to land at bases in that country. After
some discussion it was decided that the three powers should
continue to study these questions.
Several general principles were established with regard to
reparations. These should be exacted from Germany in such a way
as to help strengthen the post-war world economy. This meant
payment in goods and services rather than in money.
Reparations should be apportioned among the victims of Nazi
aggression in accordance with their losses, and limited to a defined
period. It was agreed that a three-power commission on German
reparations should be created; representatives of other interested
states could be included later.
At one of the sessions, Hull raised the question of a
declaration by the United Nations with regard to dependent countries
and the population of colonial and mandated territories. A draft
of such a document had been prepared by the State
Department, and Hull said he had given it to Eden in March of
1943, at the time of his last visit to the United States.
Hull declared that he only wanted to acquaint the conference
participants with Washington's position on this problem. Since
there would be no time to examine the proposals in detail, he
understood that no decision could be reached just then. Eden
said he was not prepared to discuss this question, and added
that his government did not agree with the point of view
expressed in the document. Molotov emphasised that the Soviet
government attached great importance to the question of
dependent countries, and believed the matter merited further study.
At bottom, the US proposal reflected its desire to lay hand
on certain regions controlled by European colonial nations. And
naturally the British were not pleased by the idea of discussing
the fate of colonies and mandated territories.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Dinner in the Kremlin
On the evening of October 30, Stalin gave a dinner in the
Catherine Hall in the Kremlin on the occasion of the
conclusion of the Moscow Conference of foreign ministers. There
were a great many guests. Among those invited were the
__PRINTERS_P_227_COMMENT__
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227
participants in the conference, members of the Political Bureau and
the State Committee for Defense, and various ministers. The
uniforms of high-ranking generals shone with gold and medals.
The overall mood was one of elation. By this time it was clear
that the tide of the war had turned in favour of the anti-Hitler
coalition. Already there had been many triumphs in battle,
brilliant operations by the Red Army command, and decisive
victories for Soviet arms. Hitler's forces had suffered a crushing
defeat at Stalingrad, and then all along the Southern Front.
The Soviet Union had won the hard-fought battle of the Kursk
salient. The Red Army had crossed the Dnieper and was
continuing its rapid advance to the west. Anglo-American forces were
mounting an offensive in Italy that had, in essence, taken Nazi
Germany's most important ally out of the war.
Particularly prominent among the military men present in
the Catherine Hall were several representatives of the brilliant
pleiad of young and talented Soviet commanders who had
demonstrated the superiority of the USSR's strategy and tactics
over those of Nazi Germany. Their names were being repeated
again and again in the orders of the Supreme Commander--
inChief, and salutes in honour of their troops resounded in
Moscow. It was a pleasure simply to look at these officers: energetic,
resolute, trim and smart in their full-dress uniforms. They seemed
to personify the flower of the Red Army marching
unswervingly towards victory.
The largest table stretched along a wall covered in greenish
moire wallpaper. At its center sat Stalin, with Hull on his right
and Harriman on his left. I was seated at Hull's right, and
acted as interpreter. Opposite us, in the same order, sat
Molotov, Eden, and Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador,
together with Pavlov, who translated for them. The places to
either side were occupied by members of the Political Bureau
and the leaders of the British and American military missions.
At the other tables Soviet ministers, marshals, generals, and
high-ranking officials of the Council of People's Commissars,
the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Trade sat intermingled with other
guests---members of the US and British delegations to the
Moscow Conference, diplomats, and Soviet and foreign journalists.
As soon as everyone was seated, Stalin got to his feet, glass
228
in hand. Molotov tapped his knife against the bottle standing
in front of him to get everyone's attention. There were no
microphones on the table, and Stalin spoke quietly, but the silence
that immediately descended on the room was so complete that
his every word could be heard, even in the farthest corner.
Stalin congratulated the participants in the conference on the
successful completion of their work. He expressed confidence
that the decisions just adopted would help bring to a speedy end
the war against Nazi Germany and its satellites in Europe.
``From this time forth,'' Stalin continued, ``there will be even
closer cooperation among the three great powers, and the
atmosphere of confidence in which the work of the conference was
conducted will be preserved as the anti-Hitler coalition takes
further steps together in the name of victory over our common
enemy. As for the Soviet Union, I can assure you that it will
fulfill its obligations honourably. To our victory, my friends!''
Stalin raised his glass high, looked cheerfully around the
room, clinked glasses with Hull, and nodded cordially towards
Eden. Everyone rose to join in drinking the toast proposed.
Cordell Hull asked to speak next. He conveyed greetings from
President Roosevelt to all present, and said his government
would do everything possible for the successful implementation
of the decisions agreed on at the Moscow Conference. In
conclusion he, too, expressed confidence that the enemy would be
defeated by the concerted efforts of the united peoples.
Afterwards Eden, Molotov, ambassadors Harriman and Kerr, and
the heads of the British and American military missions also
spoke.
In the intervals between toasts, Stalin and Hull kept up an
animated conversation, and it was my job to translate for them.
When Ambassador Harriman joined the conversation, Bohlen
provided the translation.
The conversation between Stalin and Hull revolved around
the work of the conference and the situation on the fronts. Hull
spoke of the difficulties the Anglo-American forces were
encountering in Northern Italy and about the Germans' stubborn
resistance. Stalin, in turn, briefly explained how things stood
on the Soviet-German front. He said that before long major
operations would be conducted in the Ukraine, and that
probably Kiev would be liberated soon. Hull listened with great
229
interest, and said he would inform President Roosevelt right
away about the Red Army's plans.
Hull then took the initiative in the conversation. He
apparently decided that the opportunity presented by sitting next to
Stalin must not be allowed to slip by. What was more, he was
leaving for home the next morning and saw this as his last
chance to talk over the various questions that interested his
government with the head of the Soviet government. He began
with the problem of relations between the two countries after
the war. Hull remarked, as if making his own reply to Stalin's
initial toast:
``I must credit the success of the Moscow Conference first
of all to you, Marshal Stalin. This success is due to the
decisive step that your country and your people have taken
towards participating, together with Great Britain and the
United States, in a world-wide program for the future based
on cooperation.''
Stalin smiled, and replied that he was entirely in favour of
a broad program for international cooperation---military,
political, and economic---in the interests of peace.
``It is very important,'' Hull continued, ``that you realise the
great value of personal contact among national leaders, and,
above all of personal contacts between you, President Roosevelt,
and Prime Minister Churchill. Don't you think that such a
meeting might take place in Basra?''
Stalin replied firmly that after long consideration he had
come to the conclusion that for the present it would be
impossible for him to undertake such a long trip. As things stood,
he doubted whether he would be able to leave the country
at all. The American government must believe that he was
speaking in complete sincerity. Stalin said that he could send
Molotov, his first deputy, in place of himself. Under Soviet law
Molotov had the right, when Stalin was absent, to act in his
stead.
``What do you think of the idea?" Stalin asked.
Hull answered that if Marshal Stalin could not come to
such a meeting himself Molotov would, of course, make a
worthy representative both of him personally and of the Soviet
government. Still, in Hull's opinion, the main thing was that
Stalin and Roosevelt meet personally.
230
A brief silence followed; each man was busy with his own
thoughts. Hull fidgeted about with his fork, obviously
disappointed that his eloquence had failed once again.
Then I noticed that Stalin was leaning towards me behind
Hull's back, beckoning with his finger. I bent closer, and he
said in a barely audible voice:
``Listen carefully. Translate this to Hull word for word: The
Soviet government has analysed the situation in the Far East
and decided that as soon as the Allies have defeated Nazi
Germany and the war in Europe is over it will enter the war against
Japan. Hull can tell Roosevelt that this is our official
position, but for the time being we want it kept secret. Speak to
him quietly, so that no one else will hear you. Do you
understand?''
``Yes, Comrade Stalin,'' I answered in a whisper.
While I translated Stalin's words, trying to render them
into English as exactly as possible, Stalin looked straight into
Hull's eyes and nodded from time to time in confirmation.
It was clear that Hull was greatly excited by what he had
heard. The Americans had long awaited this moment. Now
the US government had received from the head of the Soviet
government an official---although, of course, strictly
confidential---declaration on this question, which was of such
importance to Washington.
Stalin announced this decision to a wider audience a month
later at the Teheran Conference of the Big Three, and repeated
his commitment at the Yalta Conference in February of 1945.
But it was at the dinner in the Kremlin on October 30, 1943,
that he first spoke of the Soviet Union's decision to enter the
war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. The news
simply transfigured Hull. Not a trace of his gloom remained.
Writing about this evening later, Hull said he had been greatly
surprised and pleased by this statement, which Stalin had made
entirely of his own will.
Hull records in his memoirs that he dropped in at Spaso
House at dawn on his way to Central Airport to compose a
telegram to President Roosevelt. He took the precaution, of
dividing the message into two parts, the first of which was
sent in the Navy's code, the second in the Army's---the
231
Americans feared that one of the codes had been cracked by
enemy counter-intelligence.
At the same time Hull also sent another telegram, in which
he discussed the prospects for a meeting of Stalin, Churchill,
and Roosevelt. Hull informed the President that Stalin had
firmly decided against going to Basra, and advised Roosevelt
to think again about Teheran as a site, since this was the only
chance left that a meeting could be agreed on.
Hull's telegram evidently did its work. Soon afterwards,
President Roosevelt agreed to a meeting in the Iranian capital.
It was only with some difficulty that Hull contained his
emotion after hearing Stalin's statement at the dinner table in the
Catherine Hall. Rosy spots appeared on the parchment-coloured
skin of his lean face, bespeaking profound emotion.
``Tell Marshal Stalin,'' he said, turning to me and speaking
in a low voice, ``that the United States government is sincerely
grateful for this news. I personally appreciate highly the trust
shown in me. Please be assured that we will keep this important
decision strictly secret. I will, of course, inform President
Roosevelt at once. The American people will always remember with
gratitude the Soviet Union's willingness to help them in this
hard struggle. Knowing full well what immense efforts the
Red Army is making in the name of Allied victory in Europe,
we appreciate this willingness all the more. Once again, my
thanks to you, Marshal Stalin, and to all the colleagues who
stand behind you.''
Stalin nodded in reply, but said nothing.
The conversation then shifted to the pre-war policies of the
. Western powers, and in particular of the American government.
Stalin pointed out that isolationism had nearly brought the
United States to grief, and could have done serious harm to
the Soviet Union. He then began to speak of the need for
collaboration by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Hull agreed, saying that collaboration was an excellent idea
and that the Soviet and American peoples were much alike
and had a great deal in common.
``Each of them,'' Hull said, ``is a great nation, and thus it
is important to assure that understanding, trust, and friendship
develop between them on the basis of a cooperative spirit.''
232
Stalin later set aside the decanter and poured out
Khvanchkara, a sweetish Georgian wine, for himself and Hull. Most
of the other guests, however, gave clear preference to vodka
and cognac. General Deane of the United States got Stalin's
attention and proposed a toast to the day when the armed
forces of the United States and Great Britain met the armed
forces of the Soviet Union in Germany. Stalin rose from his place,
went round the table to Deane, clinked glasses with him, and
clapped him approvingly on the shoulder.
As the dinner continued, Stalin proposed toasts to the
military leaders present, the members of the general staff, and the
different branches of the service. On each occasion, after
making a short speech, he would leave his place at the table, walk
over to the marshal or general he had named, and clink glasses
with him, touching the shoulder of the man being toasted with
his left hand. Sometimes he would pause along his way to
exchange greetings with British or American guests. I followed
behind to translate during these brief conversations.
This continued until shortly after midnight, when coffee was
served in the adjacent room. Stalin, Molotov, Hull, Eden, and
the interpreters were seated around a separate table.
Stalin refuted in sarcastic tones the rumours circulating in
several countries that the Soviet Union might make a separate
peace with Nazi Germany. Hull said that everyone who knew
the Soviet people and the history of their relations with Nazi
Germany even a little was certain they would never conclude a
separate peace. Eden, however, kept glumly silent.
Stalin, glancing briefly at the British Foreign Secretary, said
that he was pleased by Hull's confidence and repeated that the
spreading of such rumours was the height of stupidity.
I think Stalin had deliberately chosen this moment to
mention the rumours about separate negotiations with Nazi
Germany. At this time there were new indications of contacts
between Hitler's emissaries and representatives of Britain and the
USA in a number of neutral countries. In particular, Allen
Dulles, the head of the American Intelligence Service in
Switzerland, was conducting lively negotiations in Geneva with Nazi
agents. In speaking of such rumours, Stalin probably wanted to
feel Hull and Eden out, and possibly to get a definite
statement from them on the matter. But they pretended not to have
233
understood the hint, and neither of them pursued the subject
any further.
Afterwards everyone went along to the screening room for
a showing of The Days at Volochaevka, a Soviet film, released
in 1938, about the liberation of Siberia and the Pacific coast
from the Japanese interventionists. It had enjoyed great
popularity, and drawn protests from the Japanese ambassador in
Moscow at the time. Stalin had chosen this film not by chance,
of course. Its contents reinforced, as it were, what he had just
told the U.S. Secretary of State about the Soviet Union's
willingness to join the struggle against Japan once Nazi Germany
was defeated.
The film showing was for members of the Political Bureau,
the heads of the British and American delegations, and the
ambassadors of the USA and Britain. The screening room was not
large. The screen was in a deep niche, and there was a fairly
wide space between it and the first row of chairs to allow for
comfortable viewing. To the right of the screen stood a grand
piano. Stalin, Hull, the interpreters, Eden, and Molotov
occupied the first row; the other guests sat in the second row.
A short concert preceded the screening. Kozlovsky's
marvellous tenor and Barsova's trills were a pleasure to hear, but
Mikhailov's bass seemed too powerful for the small room. The film
began right after the concert. The atrocities the Japanese
committed on Soviet soil and the heroic struggle of the partisans
of Siberia and the Far East made a deep impression on Hull.
During the film Stalin turned several times to Hull to
comment on various episodes and to reminisce about the time of
the Soviet people's fight against the Japanese occupying forces.
After one episode, Hull leaned over to Stalin and said with
emotion:
``Now I see, Marshal Stalin, that you have accounts to settle
with the Japanese, which you will undoubtedly present in
good time. I understand you, and am confident of your
success.''
He held out his thin, old man's hand to Stalin, who shook
it and said calmly:
``Yes, you're right. We have not forgotten about what the
Japanese militarists did in our country.''
When the screening was over Hull shook Stalin's hand again
234
and again and thanked him profusely for the opportunity to
see an interesting and very instructive historical film.
Stalin accompanied the Secretary of State to the broad marble
staircase leading down into the vestibule of the Grand Kremlin
Palace. They stood for a while at its head, exchanging good
wishes for the future. Stalin shook Hull's hand twice in order
to emphasise his satisfaction with their meeting.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Road to Victory and Peace
Just before its conclusion, the conference approved a joint
communique that was published simultaneously in Moscow,
Washington, and London on November 2, 1943, together with
the conference documents discussed above.
The communique said that ``The Conference of Foreign
Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull;
of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden; and of the Soviet
Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from the
19th to 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings."^^1^^
There followed a list of the other members of the American,
British, and Soviet delegations. The agenda, it was stated, had
included ``all the questions submitted for discussion by the three
governments.''
``The Governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union,'' the Communique said, ``have been
in close cooperation in all matters concerning common war
effort, but this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of
the three governments have been able to meet together in
conference.
``In the first place there were frank and exhaustive
discussions of measures to be taken to shorten the war against
Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the
presence of military advisers, representing the respective Chiefs
of Staff, in order to discuss definite military operations, with
regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already
being prepared, and in order to create a basis for the closest
military cooperation in the future between the three countries.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, World Peace
Foundation, Boston, 1945, pp. 227--29.
235
``Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the
war was the unanimous recognition by the three Governments
that it was essential in their own national interests and in the
interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present
close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war
into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only
in this way could peace be maintained.''
In conclusion the Communique said that in the atmosphere
of mutual confidence and understanding ``consideration was also
given to the other important questions. These included not
only questions of a current nature, but also questions
concerning the treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites,
economic cooperation and the assurance of general peace."^^1^^
The American and British delegations left Moscow early on
the morning of November 1. The day was damp and cloudy.
Central Airport flew the flags of the three powers, and an
honour guard was on hand. Cordell Hull and his delegation were
the first to depart. Stepping before the cameras and microphones
of the Soviet newsreels, the Secretary of State declared:
``I want to say a few words of farewell to the officials and
the people of the Soviet Union. No words can express my
gratitude for the remarkable hospitality and good will and
friendship which the officials and the people of this country have
shown me and my colleagues throughout our stay here. This
international conference testifies to the great possibilities of our
broad plans for the future, and to their practicability. I am
certain that the results of this conference will become clearer
with the passing of time, as it becomes possible to follow
through on what has been decided here. Once again, I want
to thank all those who have helped make our stay comfortable
and successful.''
In reading the documents issued by the conference and the
public statements of its participants, it must be remembered that
they come from a time when a bitter fight was going on against
a crafty enemy who scrutinised such documents in an effort to
find any hint of disagreement among the Allies that could be
used in his own ends. Thus it is natural that the communiques
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, World Peace
Foundation, Boston, 1945, pp. 227--29.
236
and other public statements of this period were so composed
that no shade of conflict could be discovered in them. The
question of a second front and related controversies occupied a
special place, of course, and in fact no great secret was made of
this. It goes without saying, however, that there were still other
serious differences between the USSR and its Allies from the
capitalist world, and that these manifested themselves at the
Moscow Conference.
At the same time, the conference showed it was possible to
reach joint decisions on complex problems involving both the
conduct of the war and the post-war settlement. In addition to
adopting a number of important decisions, the Moscow
Conference paved the way for the first meeting of the Big Three, which
took place in Teheran from November 28 through December 1,
1943.
The results of the Moscow Conference were met with great
approval of the democratic public. There can, of course, be no
doubt that these results, and the whole political atmosphere
that prevailed at the conference, were made possible by the
brilliant victories of Soviet arms on the fronts of the Great
Patriotic War.
[237]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Journey to the Iranian Capital
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Meeting of ``the Three''
The conference of the leaders of the three great powers that
formed the anti-Hitler coalition, which took place in Teheran
in the autumn of 1943, was an important milestone in the
diplomatic history of World War II.
All three of the main participants of the Teheran meeting
have long since died. The last to do so, Winston Churchill,
who lived to the age of ninety, was given an honourable burial
at his ancestral estate in England in 1965. He had retired from
state affairs more than ten years previously. Roosevelt died in
April 1945, virtually on the eve of Germany's capitulation.
Stalin outlived him by a little under eight years. But at the time
of the Teheran Conference all three were the leaders of the
countries which made up the anti-Hitler coalition. In the
agonies of an unprecedented war, the world carefully followed their
every step and hung on their every word. Naturally, the eyes of
all humanity were fixed on the Teheran Conference. It was not
merely the peoples of an enslaved Europe that awaited t)he
decisions of the first meeting of ``the Big Three''. The results of the
conference were just as eagerly awaited by the Axis powers. At
that time, the fate of civilisation and the life of future
generations depended to a great extent on the ability of the three
leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition to act jointly.
In Teheran, on November 28, 1943, three men met for the
first time, whose names have since gone down in history: Stalin,
Roosevelt and Churchill. It is hard to imagine three more
dissimilar men.
Each of these three leaders had his own views on history and
238
the future of mankind, each had his own ideals and convictions.
But despite this, they were brought together in Teheran by the
necessity of fighting a common enemy, and they adopted
significant decisions there.
Many historians regard Teheran as the acme of the
antiHitler coalition, a view I consider quite justified. But the road
to this peak was by no means easy. After Hitler's attack on the
USSR, the ruling circles of Britain and the United States showed
restraint, and were, at first, most unwilling to enter into military
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Whereas the Soviet
government was striving to establish allied relations with the Western
powers as soon as possible, seeing this as a guarantee of success
in the struggle against the fascist Axis, London and Washington
only joined in combined action against the common enemy under
the pressure of circumstances and delayed the fulfilment of their
obligations in all sorts of ways.
After the Soviet Union joined the war, it became a truly
anti-fascist war of liberation. The heroic struggle of the Red
Army brought the hope of deliverance from the ``brown plague"
to people everywhere, and especially the peoples of Europe,
suffering under the yoke of the fascist ``new order''. Even then it
was widely realised that neither Britain nor the United States
could defeat the Axis powers without the Soviet Union. What is
more, at that time, the alliance with the Soviet Union was the
only chance for Britain and the USA to maintain their political
independence and national sovereignty.
By and large, the awareness of this fact pre-determined the
Soviet-Anglo-American cooperation in the war, and the
establishment of the anti-Hitler coalition.
It must, however, be remembered that the Western
participants in this coalition were pursuing their own specific aims in
the war. Without an understanding of these aims it is hard to
comprehend the nature of the relations between the Allies, and
the motives by which the leaders of Britain and the United States
were guided in a number of circumstances, including at the
Teheran Conference.
The duplicity of Anglo-American policy was obvious. On the
one hand, Britain and the USA were trying by the Soviet Union's
efforts to weaken their major rivals, Germany and Japan, and
on the other, maintaining the hope that Nazi Germany, with the
239
aid of Japan, would possibly manage to strangle the Soviet state,
thus opening the way for the restoration of the undivided rule
of capitalism throughout the world.
Naturally, at the height of the war, the leaders of Britain and
the United States did not dare openly express their innermost
aspirations. For, at that time, public opinion in those countries
firmly supported active cooperation with the Soviet Union. The
British and American governments could not ignore the wide
movement of their peoples for an effective military alliance with
the USSR and for determined joint action against the common
enemy.
The anti-fascist coalition formed during the war played a
historical role in the defeat of Hitler's Germany and militarist
Japan. It was also a practical confirmation of Lenin's idea of
the possibility of coexistence and even cooperation between states
with different social and economic systems. The participation in
this coalition of the USSR, which consistently pursued a policy
of peace, and championed the friendship among the peoples
and their right to decide their own destinies themselves, gave new
strength to those fighting for freedom and independence. The
decisions taken at Teheran confirmed very forcefully the
significance of the anti-Hitler coalition.
Correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill on
the possibility of a meeting was carried on over a prolonged
period. All three acknowledged the necessity and importance
of a personal meeting. By that time, that is, by the autumn of
1943, a marked change had become noticeable in favour of the
Allies in the war against Nazi Germany. Therefore it was no
longer merely military considerations, but political ones as well
that dictated the urgent need for a meeting of the three leaders
of the anti-Hitler coalition. The nature of future joint action to
accelerate the victory over the common enemy had to be
discussed and agreed upon, and opinions exchanged regarding
postwar settlement.
The question of where to hold the conference presented
serious problems. Stalin preferred to hold it nearer to Soviet
territory. He pointed out that the active military operations on
the Soviet-German front did not permit him, as the Supreme
Commander-in-Ghief, to be absent from Moscow for any great length
of time. This was, of course, a weighty argument. In his turn,
240
Roosevelt referred to the American Constitution which also did
not allow him to be away from Washington for long.
In the autumn of 1943 when preparations were under
way for the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the
Soviet Union, Britain and the USA, the question of a possible
meeting of heads of government was discussed in the
correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. In principle,
agreement was reached to hold such a meeting between
November 15 and December 15, 1943. But the venue, as I mentioned
above, caused serious disagreement.
On my return to Moscow at the end of November from a
brief business trip I found out that the controversial issue of the
venue of the meeting of ``the Big Three" had been resolved and
that the Soviet delegation had already left Moscow by train on
its way to Teheran.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
From Moscow to Baku
At that time I was a counsellor concerned with Soviet--
American relations in the Secretariat of the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs. Because of my fluent command of the English
language, I had been entrusted with the task of interpreter at
the Teheran Conference. In order to catch up with our
delegation, I had to travel by plane. All the exit documents were ready
and I flew out of Moscow on the night of November 26.
Professor A. F. Miller, an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, flew
with me, also to catch up with the delegation.
A snow-storm was raging on the highway leading to the
airport. It was a pitch-dark night and the large, clumsy ZIS-101
car crept slowly forward. The headlights had been covered with
black cloth, in accordance with the strict blackout regulations. A
feeble light penetrating through the narrow slits lit up a small
section of the road. The chauffeur pressed up close to the
windscreen, was carefully keeping his eyes on the side of the road
trying to steer clear of the ditch. Occasionally he had to stop the
car, get out and wipe the snow off the windscreen.
It was impossible to make out in the dark how far we were
from the airport. But then the car carefully turned off the
highway to the right, then to the left, and the grey block of the
blacked-out building of Vnukovo Airport came into view from
__PRINTERS_P_241_COMMENT__
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241
behind a large snow-drift. By the time the car stopped at the
entrance, there were only fifteen minutes left till departure.
Inside the airport building it was bright, noisy and busy,
despite the late hour. Having registered, we went out on the
airfield. The Douglas cargo plane was already revving up its
engines, and its propellers were swirling round snow-flakes which
pricked our faces like needles. We made our way inside via a
metal step-ladder. Half the cabin was piled up with boxes of
some sort and only up front was a little more roomy. The
collapsible metal bench rivetted to the frame was covered with
hoarfrost. It was cold to sit as our backs leaned against the frozen
metal frame. The heating was switched on after take-off but
that was hardly of any avail: the hot air passed above, making
our heads too hot, while our feet remained cold.
As usual during the war, we flew low, over the very tops of
the trees, in an attempt to avoid Nazi fighter planes. The light
in the cabin was not switched on, and out of the windows one
could see snow-covered fields and dark copses. Just before
morning, we touched down at an airport in the steppes. The tanks
were refuelled and we set off again. Salt-marshes soon appeared
below and there was hardly any snow now. Sand dunes and
patches of dry grass stretched on monotonously. Towards midday
the crew commander came through and said:
``In a few minutes we will be passing over Stalingrad. We are
flying low and you will be able to see what has remained of the
city.''
We pressed up to the windows in silence. First individual houses
scattered in the snow came into view, and then a kind of
unbelievable chaos began: lumps of walls, boxes of half-ruined
buildings, piles of rubble, isolated chimneys. All this rose in
blackand-white zigzags above the snowy desert. It was not yet a year
since the storm of war had raged here, leaving dead ruins behind
it, and yet one could already make out the first signs of life.
Visible against the snow were the black figures of people and
every now and then there was evidence of new buildings. The city
was being reborn and the pulse of life had started up again.
Then the outskirts of Stalingrad disappeared and once again a
gloomy, lifeless landscape stretched out below us. Occasionally
we spotted the rusty skeletons of Nazi tanks and cars. I turned
away from the window, pulled up the collar of my coat and,
242
tucking my feet underneath me in the vain hope of keeping
warm, I dozed.
We arrived in Baku in the late evening. It was warm. We
were met at the airport by a diplomatic agent of the Ministry
of foreign affairs in Azerbaijan, and representatives of the local
authorities. We travelled to town in the diplomatic agent's old,
dark-blue Chevrolet. The narrow road ran through a forest of
oil-derricks and the air was heavy with the rather comforting
smell of crude oil. It gave one a feeling of calm, satisfaction and
even serenity. But we all knew that the people of Baku worked
round the clock in order to provide the fuel that the country
needed so badly. They coped with their task with honour. During
the hardest days of the war, when the Nazis had reached the
Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus, Baku oil supplied the
needs both of the rear and the front without interruption.
We were put up in the Hotel Baku in a room with all modern
conveniences and, most pleasant of all, hot water. During the
early period of the war in Moscow even the Ministry of foreign
affairs building was not heated. We used to work in our coats,
and spend the night in the basement of the Ministry building on
Kuznetski Most, which served as an air-raid shelter. It was
awfully cold there, and we used to scrape the hoar-frost off the
brick walls before going to sleep.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
International Airline Passengers
At dawn we set off through the forest of oil derricks to the
aerodrome. Everything promised a fine day. The bright colours
of a cloudless sky were already shining in the east. Waiting for
us was a plane of perhaps the only Soviet international airline at
the time, Baku-Teheran. It was served by double-engine planes
with excellently equipped interiors. Inside the sound-proof salon
were two rows of soft, comfortable seats with high backs and
snow-white covers stretched over the head-rests. The crew
consisted of military pilots dressed in officers' uniform with shining
golden shoulder-straps. They seemed particularly smart in
comparison with the Moscow officers who wore green field
shoulderstraps with barely visible badges of rank.
The elegant interior of the plane, the smartly dressed crew and
the rays of the sain, streaming softly through the windows all
243
combined to create a festive mood. Soon after the plane had
taken off, one of the crew members came into the salon (besides
Miller and me there were four officers). Fulfilling the role of
stewardess, he informed us at what altitude and what speed we
were flying, what the temperature was outside and of our
expected time of arrival in Teheran. A little later he came through
again, carrying a tray with six little cups of black coffee. After
the previous day in the ice-covered, freezing plane, all this was
like a dream.
At first we flew along the shore of the Caspian Sea, then over
the brown terrain of Iranian Azerbaijan: we passed Tabriz
surrounded by scattered little mud-houses. By noon we reached
Teheran, which looked very beautiful from a bird's-eye view. The
regular squares of the city blocks, the large green expanses and
the avenues trimmed with trees at the edges, made a picture
quite unlike my idea of the eastern town. From the air, it
seemed, to have a totally European look. However, the minarets of
the mosques clearly reminded us which part of the world we
were in. A mountain range was visible to the left of the city
which lay in a valley. In the hills were the Shah's country
residence and villas belonging to the local aristocracy.
Coming out of the plane at Teheran airport, we suddenly
found ourselves in the height of summer, as it were. The trees
with their lush foliage looked odd after snowy Moscow. We had
to take off our coats and jackets and undid our shirt collars.
From the airport we were taken in a military jeep along dusty
streets that looked far less attractive than from a bird's-eye view.
True, the centre of town looked more modern. Finally the jeep
entered the grounds of the Soviet embassy. I was later told that
this estate had previously belonged to a rich Persian magnate.
Left over from that time was a vast shady park with huge cedars,
picturesque willows reflected in ponds and powerful plane trees
with an irrigation ditch burgling refreshingly at the knotted
roots.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Warning from the Rovno Forests
It would, perhaps, have been hard to find a more suitable
place for the secret negotiation of the three wartime leaders
than the Soviet embassy estate in Teheran. There was nothing
244
here to interfere with their work; the noises of the eastern city
could not be heard. The vast estate was surrounded by a stone
wall. There were several light-brick buildings in the green park
in which the Soviet delegation was housed. The main house,
which usually contained the embassy offices, was equipped as a
residence for the President of the United States, Roosevelt.
The question of the American President residing in the Soviet
embassy during the Conference had been discussed beforehand
by the participants in the Teheran meeting. In the end this
decision was taken for security reasons. The American diplomatic
mission in Teheran was situated on the outskirts of the city,
whereas the Soviet and British embassies literally adjoined each
other. It was enough to place a high fence partitioning off the
street and to create a temporary passageway between the two
estates, in order to make them form one complex. In this way the
security of the Soviet and British delegates was ensured, since
the whole territory was reliably guarded. If Roosevelt had stayed
at the American mission, then he and the other participants in
the meeting would have had to travel to negotiations several
times a day through the narrow streets of Teheran, where agents
of the Third Reich could easily hide among the crowd.
Nazi intelligence was planning an attempt on the life of the
participants in the Teheran meeting. In 1966, the well-known
assassin, Otto Skorzeni, whom Hitler entrusted with most
important acts of subversion, confirmed that he had been instructed
to kidnap Roosevelt in Teheran. This operation was planned by
the Nazis in great secrecy.
Hitler started to hatch the idea of assassinating the leaders
of the three countries of the anti-fascist coalition immediately
following the meeting in Casablanca in 1943 of President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Hitler entrusted the
preparation of this operation, called ``Long Jump'', to Canaris, head of
military intelligence, and to Kaltenbrunner, chief of the Reich's
Central Security Department.
For the purposes of greater secrecy, the preparations for the
assassination of ``the Big Three" were carried out in special
military intelligence and SS schools under the code name Operation
Elephant. Nazi intelligence knew that Teheran was a possible
meeting place for the leaders of the three great powers back in
mid-September, 1943, having broken the American naval code.
245
Some time earlier, the leaders in Berlin had remembered, in
connection with another matter, a certain man, Roman Gamota,
who had experience with spying activities in Iran. It was decided
to send him back there to organise subversion and to study the
situation on the spot. In a personal letter to Hitler of May 22,
1943, Himmler wrote: ``Although the enemies have put a high
price on the head of Gamota and his life has been in danger
more than once, after he recovers from malaria, he intends to
return to Northern Iran.'' In August 1943, Roman Gamota was
dropped from a plane not far from Teheran. He found shelter
among local pro-Nazi elements and established a two-way radio
link with Berlin. Later Gamota was joined by detachments of
SS saboteurs. They also included agents of the Gestapo Winfred
Oberg and Ulrich von Ortel. These detachments were dropped
from German planes which took off from the Nazi-occupied
Crimea. Gamota and his group were located by Ernst Merzer, a
secret British spy in Teheran, of Swiss origin. Merzer had been
``recommended'' to the British Intelligence Service by the British
intelligence agent and subsequently a famous novelist, Somerset
Maugham. Later, while working for the Intelligence Service.
Merzer enlisted in German military intelligence with the consent
of his masters in London. Admiral Canaris investigated this new
agent for a long time but never discovered that he was a double
agent. At the end of 1940 Merzer was commissioned by
German military intelligence to settle in Teheran as a representative
of a number of West European commercial firms. When the
Germans were forced to leave Iran in the summer of 1941, Ernst
Merzer became the chief fixed-post spy and liaison agent of
Nazi intelligence in Teheran. With the aid of a radio
transmitter in Merzer's house, and underground radio link with
saboteurs smuggled into Iran, Berlin kept up contact with its agents,
in particular on questions linked with the preparations for an
assassination of the leaders of the three great powers of the
antiHitler coalition. Naturally, Merzer then passed all this on to his
main bosses in Britain.
Few in Teheran at the time knew that vital information
concerning the preparations for subversion against the leaders of
the three powers had also been received from the distant Rovno
forests, where a special group under the command of the
experienced officers, Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander Lukin, was
246
active in the enemy rear. The group also included the famous
intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, who carried out a
number of daring operations in the area of the Nazi-occupied
town of Rovno. With his perfect knowledge of German,
Kuznetsov acted excellently in the guise of Oberleutnant of the German
Wehrmacht, Paul Siebert. The Nazis did not suspect for a long
time that behind the polished exterior of this tall and smart
front-line officer was a Soviet agent. Finally, however, they did
get on his trail and he and his two companions were killed on
April 1, 1944.
Alexander Lukin reminisced how Nikolai Kuznetsov, that
is Paul Siebert, won the favour of the SS Sturmbahnfuhrer
Ulrich von Ortel, who arrived in Rovno, and learned a vital
secret out of him. It had all begun when von Ortel himself
recommended Siebert to transfer to the SS, where it way easy to make
a career. When Siebert and von Ortel met again in the officers'
restaurant in Rovno, von Ortel reiterated the suggestion and
promised in the future to introduce Siebert to Otto Skorzeni,
with whom he, von Ortel, was to carry out a very important
mission. It did not take long for Kuznetsov to find out what this
was about. His tongue loosened by the whiff of brandy, von
Ortel gave the whole game away.
``I'm going off to Iran soon, my friend,'' he whispered
confidentially. ``~`The Big Three' are meeting there at the end of
November. We'll make in Abruzzo jump again! Only this time
it will be a long jump! We're going to liquidate ``the Big Three"
and change the course of the war. We'll make an attempt to
kidnap Roosevelt so as to make it easier for the Fiihrer to settle
things with America. We'll fly in several groups. Personnel are
being trained in a special school in Copenhagen.''
By Abruzzo, von Ortel meant the operation to rescue Mussolini,
which was carried out by Skorzeni on Hitler's instructions. After
the fascist regime in Italy collapsed in July 1943, Mussolini was
arrested and put under reinforced guard, in the alpine hotel
Campo Imperatore, situated in an all but inaccessible locality
near the little township of Abruzzo. The new Italian Prime
Minister, Marshal Badoglio expressed his willingness to conduct
negotiations with the British and the Americans about Italy's
withdrawal from the war. This infuriated Hitler and he decided
to kidnap Mussolini at whatever cost, so as to force the Italians,
247
with Mussolini's help, to continue resistance even if only in the
north of the country. The only access to the Campo Imperatore
hotel from below was by a cable way, the approaches to which
were vigilantly guarded. The other way was from the air, and
this was the option chosen by the Nazi secret service.
Hitler entrusted this operation to the SS Sturmbahnfuhrer
Otto Skorzeni. He already had several acts of sabotage and bloody
operations to his name. The murder in 1934 of the Austrian
Chancellor Dollfuss, the arrest during the annexation of Austria
by Nazi Germany of President Miklas and Chancellor
Schuschnigg and savage reprisals against peaceful citizens of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union---were all the work of Skorzeni and
his band.
Skorzeni enjoyed Hitler's especial favour and rapidly moved
up the ladder of his career. By 1943 he was already the secret
chief of the SS terrorists and saboteurs in the Sixth Section
of the Reich's Central Security Department. He was also
especialy trusted by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the SD and
perpetrator of bloody crimes.
Hitler chose well when he entrusted Skorzeni with
Operation Oak, the rescue of Mussolini. Despite all the complexities
of the situation, Skorzeni achieved his objective. He and a group
of 106 experienced saboteurs unexpectedly landed in gliders of
a special design near the Hotel Campo Imperatore, disarmed the
bewildered guards, freed the Duce and took him to Germany in
a special Fieseler Storch plane. Goebbels used all he could from
Operation Abruzzo for his propaganda. Skorzeni's name was
sensationalised beyond belief, he was surrounded with a halo of
mystic legend and extolled as an idol of the German race.
So it was no surprise that when the plan of sabotage against
the participants in the Teheran Conference, code-named ``Long
Jump'', was being worked out the choice fell once again on
Skorzeni. But this time Hitler's favourite was unlucky.
Having found out about the planned sabotage from von Ortel,
Kuznetsov hurried to Medvedev's detachment. A radio message
was composed there which along with Kuznetsov's description
of von Ortel immediately flew over the air to Moscow. This radio
message confirmed similar information obtained by the Soviet
intelligence service from other sources. Necessary measures were
immediately taken to render the Nazi saboteurs harmless. But
248
all the same the utmost vigilance and carefulness had to be
displayed so as to protect the participants in the Teheran meeting,
in case the Nazis had any other versions to their sinister plan.
At that time the Iranian capital was swarming with refugees
from war-torn Europe. In the main they were wealthy people
seeking to escape discomfort and restrictions, but mainly the
dangers of the war. They had managed to transfer a substantial
amount of their capital to Teheran, and lived there in clover.
One could see them round town in luxurious cars or in
expensive restaurants and shops.
In the majority of countries participating in the war, not to
mention the Nazi-occupied territories, people suffered all kinds
of hardships, whereas in the countries not taking part in the
war, people who possessed capital were able to acquire virtually
anything they wished. In those poor years, the wealth and
diversity of goods in the Teheran market were astounding. These
goods reached Teheran from all corners of the world. The
dealers asked fabulous prices. Although the war did not directly
hit Iran, it led to very high inflation: the price of a bag of flour
was greater than the average Iranian's annual income. But in
Teheran at that time there were also many people who
squandered money and enjoyed life.
Among the mass of refugees were also many Nazi agents.
There were wide opportunities created for them in Iran, not
only as a result of the peculiar circumstances, but also because
of the patronage which the aged Reza Shah, an open sympathiser
of Hitler, had shown the Germans in the pre-war years. The
government of Reza Shah created an altogether favourable situation
for German business men and entrepreneurs, which Nazi
intelligence used to the full by implanting their spies in Iran. When the
wave of refugees swept into Iran after the war started, the
Gestapo used this opportunity to strengthen their secret service in
the country which played the vital role as a trans-shipping point
for Anglo-American supplies to the Soviet Union. It was not
fortuitous that Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and withdraw
to South Africa before conditions for friendly relations between
Iran and the anti-Hitler coalition could be formed.
However, even after this, Nazi intelligence continued secret
work in Iran, and this made the threat of all kinds of
provocation very real indeed. The Nazis had taken steps in advance to
249
ensure that their secret intelligence service remained in Iran.
This was headed, apart from the above-mentioned Roman
Gamota, by experienced officers of the secret service. One of
them, Schultze-Holthus, who occupied the post of German
Consul General in Tabriz, was, in fact, an Abwehr agent. When the
Iranian government decided to deport all representatives of Nazi
Germany, Schultze-Holthus was not repatriated together with the
other German diplomats. He went into hiding and lived illegally
for several years.
Growing a beard and dyeing it with henna, he disguised
himself as a mullah and roamed around the country recruiting agents
from among the local reactionaries. In the summer of 1943, when
Schultze-Holthus settled with the Kashkai tribes near Isfahan,
a group of parachutists with radio transmitters were dropped
down there, thus allowing him to establish a two-way radio
contact with Berlin. The parachutists were from Otto Skorzeni's
special school. They brought with them a large number of
weapons, explosives and gold ingots with which to pay the local
agents.
Schultze-Holthus also maintained contact with a Gestapo
fixedpost spy active in the Teheran area, a certain Mayr from the
SD. Going underground at the same time as Schultze-Holthus.
Mayr had hidden for three months in an Armenian graveyard
in Teheran: he masqueraded as an Iranian farm-hand and worked
as a grave-digger. Then, having set up a whole spy network,
Mayr incited the nomad tribes of Iran to a rebellion against the
central government and organised subversion and acts of sabotage.
He kept up radio contact with Berlin, and not long before the
Teheran Conference six parachutist saboteurs were dropped to
him in the vicinity of the capital.
All these facts which have now become known show that
Teheran was one of the centres of the Axis powers' spy network
in the Middle East. When the necessity of taking serious
measures of precaution for the security of ``the Big Three" was being
considered, representative of the American Secret Service, Michael
Reilly shared the concern of the Soviet intelligence service. He
pointed out in his turn that despite all precautions and measures
already taken, there were still dozens of Nazi agents among the
thousands of refugees which had swept into Teheran from
Europe.
250
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Inside the Soviet Embassy
At first Roosevelt declined the invitation to stay in the Soviet
embassy. He explained that he would feel more independent
if he were not somebody's guest. Besides this, he had already
turned down an invitation from the British and he might offend
them now by accepting the Soviet invitation. But in the end he
was persuaded to agree for reasons of convenience and, mainly,
of the security of all participants in the meeting. The Americans
especially emphasised this circumstance. In particular they
referred to the US Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, who,
apart from anything else, pointed out to Roosevelt that were the
President to decline the Russian offer and then something were
to happen to the British or Soviet representatives on the way to
the American Mission, he would feel responsible.
Judging by everything, the President of the USA did not
regret his decision to stay in the Soviet embassy. Roosevelt's rooms
opened directly on to the large hall where the plenary meetings
of the conference took place, a point of great convenience for
the President whose movement was restricted owing to paralysis
in both legs.
On returning to Washington, President Roosevelt made a
special statement at a press conference on December 17, 1943,
saying that he had stayed in the Soviet embassy in Teheran,
and not the American because Stalin had learned about a Nazi
conspiracy. He added that Marshal Stalin had informed him that
a conspiracy might have been organised with the aim of
assassinating the three main participants in the conference, and had
requested him to stay in the Soviet embassy in order to avoid
the necessity of travelling through town.
The President went on to say that there were possibly about
a hundred Nazi spies around Teheran at the time. He added
that it would have been most advantageous for the Nazis to have
done with Marshal Stalin, Churchill and himself, while they
were travelling between the Soviet and American embassies which
were some one and a half kilometres apart.
The Soviet side did everything possible to make the American
President's stay in its embassy pleasant and comfortable. The
Americans were given a free hand inside Roosevelt's apartments.
As usual, the President's own chef and waiters saw to his meals.
251
The remaining members of the American delegation and the
technical staff stayed in the American Mission and arrived each
day for meetings.
The Soviet delegation consisting of Stalin, Molotov and
Voroshilov was accommodated in the apartment of the Soviet
Ambassador to Iran in a small, two-storeyed house, not far from the
main building.
The Soviet delegation's technical staff were put up in what had
previously been a Persian magnate's harem. The one-storeyed
building in the form of a long rectangle was framed by a terrace
of Moresque columns. The numerous rooms had two doors each:
one on to the terrace and the other on to the long inner corridor.
There was a square pool in front of the building.
The details of this estate's history I found out later. When
Miller and I were brought from the airport to the former harem,
it looked anything but romantic: piles of files and dossiers,
stationery scattered all over the tables and camp beds placed
disorderly in the rooms and covered with grey army blankets.
There was no time either for me to have a look round the
exotic park. I had been warned that at two o'clock Stalin and
Roosevelt would be having talks and I would have to interpret.
However, I did manage to have a bite to eat in the modest
canteen for technical staff in the neighbouring outhouse.
Ten minutes later I snatched up my notebook and ran off
to the main building.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Stalin Meets Roosevelt
A Dialogue of Two Leaders
I had already acted several times as interpreter for Stalin, but
each time I was to see him I became seized with agitation. In my
own observation, even those who worked with him for many
years always felt constrained in his presence.
I tried as best I could to collect myself before Stalin's meeting
with Roosevelt. It required a maximum concentration of one's
strength to interpret for Stalin. He spoke quietly and with an
accent, and asking him to repeat was out of the question. One
had to mobilise one's whole attention so as to catch instantly
252
what had been said and immediately reproduce it in English.
Besides this, I had to note down everything that was said during
the talks. I was saved only by the fact that Stalin spoke in a
measured tone, with long pauses after each phrase for the
translation.
It was also the interpreter's duty to draw up the official
protocol, which had to be dictated to a stenographer, and the draft of
a short telegram. Stalin checked this telegram personally and
made corrections. If the negotiations took place in Moscow then
the telegram was sent in cipher to the Soviet ambassadors in
London and Washington. In this case, an information telegram
of this sort was also sent to the members of the Politburo
remaining in Moscow.
In many countries a great deal of experience has now been
accumulated in simultaneous interpreting. There are now skilled
professional interpreters, who are widely employed at the sessions
of the UN General Assembly and at various international
conferences and meetings. But at that time, at least in the Soviet
Union, there were no specialists in this field. In the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs there were merely a few
people who were invited to interpret at top-level meetings. V. N.
Pavlov and I had to combine the role of interpreter with our work
at the Commissariat. It is true that this had its advantages since
we were usually well up on political issues under discussion.
However, it meant there was very little time to improve our
English. And yet interpreting at diplomatic negotiations demands
special professional skills and tremendous concentration. One
has to keep extending one's knowledge and constantly increase
one's vocabulary. It is also essential to know shorthand, to be
able to rapidly decipher the text after the talks and determine
what is most important for making a short summary.
I personally had no special training for this work and I tried
to improve as I went along.
I was always struck by the diligence and persistence of
V. N. Pavlov. At that time he was responsible for reviewing
the entire sphere of Anglo-Soviet relations. Naturally, there was
a great deal of current work to be done. Our working day usually
lasted for 14--16 hours with a short break from eight till ten in
the evening. But Pavlov never missed one moment to brush up his
English.
253
At this talk only Stalin, Roosevelt and myself, as interpreter,
were present. Roosevelt said beforehand that he would be alone,
without Charles Bohlen who usually interpreted for the American
delegation. Evidently Roosevelt had decided not to take anyone
with him in order to make the conversation more confidential.
I was to interpret the entire discussion on my own.
When I entered the room adjoining the hall where the plenary
meetings were held, Stalin was already there, dressed in his
marshal's uniform. We greeted each other, and, going up to the low
table surrounded by armchairs and a sofa, I put down my
notebook and pencil on it. Stalin slowly paced up and down the
room, took out a cigarette from a box with the name
Gertsegovina Flor on it and lit it. He then screwed up his eyes and looked
at me, saying:
``You're not too tired after your journey? Are you ready to
interpret? The conversation will be important.''
``Yes, I'm ready, Comrade Stalin. I rested well on the
overnight stop in Baku. I feel fine.''
Stalin went over to the table and put down his box of
cigarettes. Then he struck a match and lit his cigarette which had
gone out. He put out the match with a slow movement and
pointed it at the sofa, saying:
``I shall sit here at the edge. Roosevelt will be in his
wheelchair, so let's have him to the left of the arm-chair in which you
will be sitting.''
``Fine,'' I replied.
Once again Stalin began to stroll up and down the room,
engrossed in thought. A few minutes later the door opened and
a Filipino servant pushed in a wheel-chair in which Roosevelt
sat smiling and leaning heavily on the arm-rests.
``Hello, Marshal Stalin,'' he exclaimed cheerfully, holding out
his hand. ``It seems I'm a little late. I do apologise.''
``Oh no, you're right on time,'' objected Stalin. ``I came a bit
early. That's my duty as host, after all you are our guest, on
Soviet territory, as one might say.''
``I protest,'' laughed Roosevelt. ``We firmly agreed to meet on
neutral territory. Besides, this is my residence, so it's you who
are my guest.''
``We won't argue. Tell me instead, how do you find everything
here. Is there anything you need?''
254
``Thank you, everything's fine. I feel quite at home.''
``So you like it here?''
``I'm most obliged to you for making this house available to
me.''
``Would you come a little closer to the table, please,'' invited
Stalin.
Before setting off for this meeting of the two leaders I had
been very anxious as to whether I could cope with my task.
Would I be able to understand what Roosevelt said straight away,
and then be able to convey it immediately to Stalin in Russian?
After all many Americans have a very peculiar pronunciation
and some litter their speech with figurative and even slang
expressions, making it difficult to grasp immediately the sense of
what has been said. But everything went well. Roosevelt spoke
lucidly, distinctly, drawing out his words somewhat, using short
phrases and making frequent pauses. He had obviously had a
great deal of experience of speaking through an interpreter.
The servant wheeled the chair to the place indicated, swung
it round, put on the brake and left the room. Stalin offered
Roosevelt a cigarette, but the latter refused it, thanking him, and
took out his own cigarette case. He placed a cigarette in an
elegant holder with his long thin fingers and lit it.
``I'm used to my own,'' Roosevelt said with a disarming smile
and shrugged his shoulders as if in apology. ``Where's your famous
pipe, Marshal Stalin, the one, they say, you smoke out your
enemies with?''
Stalin screwed up his eyes in a sly smile.
``It seems like I've smoked nearly all of them out already. But
seriously speaking, my doctors have advised me to smoke my pipe
less. All the same I have it here and, to give you pleasure, I'll
bring it with me to the next meeting.''
``Yes, you ought to pay heed to your doctor's advice,''
Roosevelt said seriously. ``I have to do that too.''
``Do you have any suggestions for the agenda for today's
talks?" said Stalin in a more business-like tone.
``I don't think we ought right now to outline clearly the
issues which could be discussed. We could simply limit ourselves
to a general exchange of views regarding the current situation
and prospects for the future. I would also be interested to hear
information from you on the situation at your front.''
255
``I'm willing to accept your suggestion,'' said Stalin. He picked
up the box of Gertsegovina Flor slowly, opened it, selected a
cigarette at great length, as if they differed from each other in
some way, and lit it. Then he continued slowly: ``As regards
the situation at the Soviet front, perhaps the main thing is that
our forces have recently lost Zhitomir, a vital railway junction.''
``And what's the weather like at the front?" Roosevelt
inquired.
``The only good weather is in the Ukraine, but on the other
sectors of the front it is muddy and the soil hasn't frozen yet.''
``I would like to divert some 30--40 German divisions away from
the Soviet-German front,'' Roosevelt said with sympathy.
``It would be very good if that could be done.''
``This is one of the issues which I intend to elucidate in the
course of the next few days here in Teheran. The problem is
that the Americans are faced with the task of supplying troops---
two million men---who are situated at a distance of three
thousand miles from the American continent.''
``Yes, I quite understand your problems. You need good
transport.''
``I think that we'll solve this problem since ships in the United
States are being built at a satisfactory rate.''
Touching on the recent disturbances in the Lebanon, Stalin
asked whether Roosevelt knew what the reasons for them were
and who was responsible. Roosevelt did not answer immediately.
Removing his pince-nez, he wiped it with the white
handkerchief sticking out of his chest pocket, and then replaced it
on the bridge of his nose. Finally he said, as if thinking out loud:
``I think that the French National Committee is to blame.
The British and French guaranteed the Lebanon independence
and the Lebanese obtained their own constitution and President.
Then they wanted to change the constitution a little, which the
French refused them to do, arresting the president and the
cabinet of ministers. Now order has been re-established and
everything is calm in the Lebanon.''
During the discussions, Stalin and Roosevelt touched on many
issues and problems. Roosevelt, in particular, developed in
general terms the idea of post-war cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Stalin welcomed this idea and
pointed out that after the war, the Soviet Union would
256
represent a large market for the United States. Roosevelt reacted to
this remark with interest and stressed that when the war was
over, America would require a great amount of raw materials and,
therefore, he thought that close trade ties would exist between
the two countries. Stalin noted that if the Americans would
supply the Soviet Union with equipment, the latter could provide
raw materials. The conversation then turned to the future
of France. Roosevelt stated that he did not like de Gaulle but
that he considered General Giraud a very nice man and a good
general. Roosevelt also said that the Americans were equipping
11 French divisions, and, in connection with this, touched on the
situation in France and the moods and feelings of the various
sections of the country's population.
``The French,'' Roosevelt remarked, ``are a good people but
they need totally new leaders, no older than forty, who have not
occupied any posts in the previous French government.''
Stalin expressed the opinion that a long time would be required
for such changes. As for certain ruling quarters in France,
he continued, they evidently thought that the Allies would hand
them France on a plate and rather than fighting together with
the Allies they preferred to collaborate with the Germans. And
what is more, without even asking the French people.
Roosevelt said that in Churchill's opinion France would fully
revive and soon become a great power.
``But I don't share this opinion,'' continued Roosevelt. ``I think
many years will pass before this happens. If the French assume
that the Allies will hand them France on a plate then they are
mistaken. They'll have to work very hard before France
becomes a really great power.''
These remarks by the American President concealed a serious
difference of opinion between the United States and Britain on
the issue of who should exercise power on the liberated territory
of North Africa, and later, after the landing in Normandy, in
France itself. As it subsequently transpired, the United States,
which carried out the landing in North Africa, was counting
on establishing military and political domination not only over
this territory, but also over the whole French Resistance
Movement, with the aim of gaining a foothold on the European
continent, in France. In North Africa Washington counted on
Admiral Darlan, who had earlier collaborated with the Germans,
__PRINTERS_P_257_COMMENT__
17---1996
257
instead of General de Gaulle, then in London, heading the
National Committee of Fighting France.
In the end, Washington had to reconcile itself with General
de Gaulle who got the chance of leaving for France soon after
the landing of the Allies in Normandy. But the nature of the
relations formed then between the Americans and de Gaulle
undoubtedly played a definite role in the future.
During Roosevelt's conversation with Stalin, the difference in
approaches of the United States and Britain on the future of
colonial possessions was also revealed. Roosevelt spoke much of
the need for a new approach to the problem of colonial and
dependent countries after the war. Perhaps he was sincerely
thinking of the possibility of gradually granting them self--
government and, eventually, independence, a theme which the
American President returned to time and again during the Teheran
Conference. But speaking in such a way, he was, voluntarily or
not, reflecting the interests of those quarters in the USA who
were preparing the ground for US penetration of the colonial
countries under the guise of the talk about the revision of the
status of the colonial possessions of European capitalist countries.
In this respect the conversation which took place during a
meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt in Teheran was very
indicative. Touching on the future of Indo-China, Roosevelt said
that three or four trustees could be appointed and after 30 to
40 years the people of Indo-China could be prepared for
selfgovernment. He said that the same could be done with other
colonies.
``Churchill,'' continued the President, ``does not wish to act
firmly with regard to the implementation of this proposal on
trusteeship, because he's afraid that the principle will have to be
applied to British colonies as well. When our Secretary of State,
Hull, was in Moscow, he had with him a document drawn up
by me on the establishment of an international commission on
colonies. This commission was intended to inspect the colonial
countries with the aim of studying the situation in those
countries and ways of improving it. The entire work of this
commission would be given wide publicity.''
Stalin supported the idea of establishing such a commission
and pointed out that it could be approached with complaints,
requests, and so on. Roosevelt was clearly pleased with the
258
Soviet reaction but did not conceal his anxiety about Churchill's
possible attitude. He even warned Stalin that it was better not
to touch on India in conversations with the British Prime Minister
because, as far as he knew, Churchill had no thoughts on India
at present. In fact, Churchill was intent on putting this
question off until the war was over.
``India is Churchill's sore spot,'' Stalin remarked.
``You're right here,'' agreed Roosevelt. ``Nevertheless, in the
end, Britain will have to do something about India. I hope to
discuss this in more detail with you, bearing in mind that it is
easier to solve this question for people removed from the Indian
issue than for those directly involved in it.''
Stalin reacted with caution to this comment. All he said was
that the President's remarks were interesting.
Roosevelt glanced at his watch. There was very little time
left before the official opening of the conference, set for 16.00
hours.
``I think we better finish off,'' said Roosevelt. ``We should rest
a little and sort out our thoughts before the plenary session. I
feel we've had a very useful exchange of views and it was very
pleasant to meet you and discuss things so frankly.''
``It was nice to meet you too,'' Stalin replied, rising, and he
bowed slightly to Roosevelt.
I went into the next room to call the President's servant. He
appeared at once and, grasping the handles of the wheel-chair,
took Roosevelt off to his quarters. Stalin went into the next
room where Molotov and Voroshilov were waiting.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
At the Round Table
The plenary meetings of the conference took place in a
spacious hall decorated in the Empire style. In the middle of the
room stood a large round table covered with a cream-coloured
table-cloth. Placed round the table were arm-chairs upholstered
in striped silk and with fanciful mahogany arm-rests. In the
centre of the table was a wooden stand holding the flags of the
three countries participating in the conference. On the table in
front of the arm-chairs lay notebooks and sharpened pencils.
The main delegates and interpreters sat right at the table, while
__PRINTERS_P_259_COMMENT__
17*
259
the remaining members of the delegations and technical staff sat
on chairs placed in symmetrical rows behind the arm-chairs.
The Soviet delegation was the smallest, consisting, as I have
already said, of Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov. The United
States and Britain were represented by much larger
delegations.
From the United States: President F. D. Roosevelt; H.
Hopkins, the President's special assistant, A. Harriman, US
Ambassador to the USSR; General G. Marshall, Chief of Staff;
Admiral Y. S. King, Commander-in-Chief, US Navy; General H. H.
Arnold, Head of the US Army Air Force; General B.
Somerwell, Army Service Forces; Admiral W. Leahy, Chief of Staff
to the President of the USA; General J.R. Deane, Head of the
US Military Mission in Moscow.
From Britain: Prime Minister W. Churchill; A. Eden,
Foreign Secretary; A. Kerr, British Ambassador to the USSR;
General A. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Field--
Marshal J. Dill; A. Cunningham, First Sea Lord; Ch. Portal,
Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Chief of the Air Staff; General
H. Ismay, Chief of Staff; General Martel, Head of the British
Military Mission in the USSR.
To the right of Churchill sat his personal interpreter, Major
Birse. Next to Roosevelt, also in the capacity of interpreter, was
Charles Bohlen. He was then the First Secretary of the United
States Embassy in Moscow. From the Soviet delegation, Stalin
and Molotov sat in the first row along with Pavlov and myself
as official interpreters of the Soviet delegation. Voroshilov
usually sat in a chair in the second row.
The discussions at the plenary meetings were conducted freely,
without a fixed agenda. The delegates spoke spontaneously
without using any papers, simply expressing their ideas on the
issues under discussion. As a result, the discussions
occasionally jumped from one subject to another, then returning to
the original problem. The sides had arranged in advance that
Roosevelt would chair the first plenary meeting. He fulfilled this
task brilliantly, demonstrating his many years' experience as a
leader.
The first plenary meeting opened at 16.00 hours on
November 28, 1943, and went on for three and a half hours. Opening
the meeting, Roosevelt said:
260
``As the youngest head of Government present here I should
like to take the liberty of speaking first. I should like to assure
the members of the new family---the members of the present
conference gathered around this table---that we are gathered here
for one purpose, for the purpose of winning the war as soon as
possible."^^1^^
Roosevelt went on to make a few remarks about the conduct
of the conference.
``We do not intend to make public anything that will be said
here, but we shall address each other as friends, openly and
candidly.''
The mutual commitment not to make public anything said at
the Teheran Conference, taken by the participants, undoubtedly
promoted the free exchange of opinions and helped all sides to
understand the positions of their partners better. This helped
create an atmosphere which made for fruitful cooperation
between the three powers in the fight against their mutual enemy,
and for the strengthening at this stage of the unity of the
antiNazi coalition, despite fundamental differences in the social and
political system of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the
United States and Britain on the other.
Having unleashed their anti-Soviet propaganda campaign
after the war, the ruling quarters in the Western powers violated
their commitment not to make public material from the
Teheran Conference and unilaterally published numerous documents
and memoirs about it. This was done with the aim of falsifying
the Soviet policy and distorting the Soviet Union's stand on the
vital issues of the Second World War period. In this connection,
Soviet recordings of the talks and meetings of the Teheran
Conference were published in Moscow in 1961.
But at the time of the opening of the Teheran Conference,
Roosevelt's words about maintaining secrecy sounded like a
solemn oath.
Going on to speak of the conduct of the conference, the US
President announced that the delegations' staffs could consider
military matters separately, while the delegations themselves
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Here and below documents and materials of the Teheran, Yalta
and Potsdam conferences are quoted from: The Teheran, Yalta and
Potsdam Conferences. Documents, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969.
261
discussed other issues, for instance the problems of the post-war
settlement.
``I think,'' Roosevelt said in conclusion, ``that this conference
will be a success, and that our three nations, which united in
the course of the present war, will strengthen their ties and will
create the prerequisites for the close cooperation of future
generations.''
Before getting down to practical work, Roosevelt enquired
whether Stalin or Churchill wished to say a few general words
on the importance of the meeting and what it meant to
humanity.
Churchill immediately raised his right hand, requesting to speak.
He spoke in a measured voice, articulating words one after the
other, rather like a mason laying bricks. During the pauses for
interpreting he moved his lips silently, as if saying over to
himself the phrase which he was about to utter. It was as though
he was listening in his mind to how it sounded. Then, having
made sure that he had chosen the right words, he once again
articulated them with the well-trained voice of a professional
public speaker. Emphasising the solemnity of the moment, he
stood up at the table and moved his chair back so as to make
room for his bulky figure.
``This is the greatest concentration of world forces that ever
existed in the history of mankind,'' he said. ``We hold the
solution of the problem of reducing the length of the war, the
winning of victory, the future of mankind. I pray that we may be
worthy of this remarkable opportunity granted to us by God, the
opportunity of serving mankind.''
Glancing over all those present, Churchill slowly lowered
himself into his chair.
Roosevelt then enquired of the head of the Soviet delegation
whether he would like to say anything. Stalin began to speak
without rising from his seat. The hall fell silent. This may have
been because the majority of those present had never heard
Stalin's voice before. But perhaps it was because he spoke so
quietly. He said:
``In greeting this conference of the representatives of the three
Governments I should like to make a few remarks. I think we
are being pampered by history. She has given us possession of
very big forces and very great opportunities. I hope that we
262
shall do everything at this conference to make due use, within
the framework of our co-operation, of the power and authority
that our peoples have vested in us. Let us now begin our
work.''
Roosevelt nodded in agreement. Then he glanced round all
the participants in the conference as if inviting them all to speak
first on the matters in hand. But nobody expressed such a wish.
So, opening a black file lying in front of him, the President looked
through the papers, cleared his throat and said:
``May I start with a general review of the war and the
requirements of the war at the present time. Of course, I shall speak
of this from the standpoint of the USA. We, like the British
Empire and the Soviet Union, hope for an early victory. I should
like to start with a review of that part of the war which concerns
the United States rather than the Soviet Union and Great
Britain. I mean the war in the Pacific Ocean, where the United
States bears the brunt of the war, receiving help from the
Australian and New Zealand forces.''
President Roosevelt gave a brief survey of the military
situation in that part of the globe. He touched more specifically on
operations in the region of Burma, reporting on plans to
liberate the northern part of that country from the Japanese. In
Roosevelt's words, all that was aimed at rendering assistance to
China in the war, at opening the Burmese road, and at
securing positions from which it would be possible to defeat Japan
as soon as possible after the rout of Germany. Then the
President briefly described the situation in the European theatre of
operations.
Roosevelt set the tone, as it were, with his review of military
operations. After him, Stalin began his speech with a survey of
the situation at the front.
The head of the Soviet delegation welcomed the United States'
successes in the Pacific Ocean. He added that the Soviet Union
could not at the time join in the struggle against Japan, since
the country's entire forces had to be concentrated for the war
against Germany. The Soviet forces in the Far East were more
or less sufficient to maintain defence, but they would have to
be doubled at least before undertaking any attack. The time for
joining with the Western Allies in the Pacific theatre of
operations would only be after the defeat of Germany.
263
``As for.. . the war in Europe. . .'' continued the Soviet
representative. ``First of all, a few words in the form of a report
about the way we have been and are conducting operations since
the July offensive of the Germans. If I am going into too great
detail I could shorten my statement.''
``We are prepared to hear everything you wish to say,''
interjected Churchill.
Stalin continued:
``I must say, in passing, that we ourselves have been lately
preparing for an offensive. The Germans were ahead of us, but
since we had been preparing for an offensive and had massed
a great force, after we beat back the German offensive, it was
relatively easy for us to go over to the offensive. I must say that
although the opinion about us is that we plan everything
beforehand, we did not expect the successes we scored in August and
September. The Germans proved to be weaker than we
expected. At present, according to our intelligence, the Germans
have 210 divisions on our front, and another six divisions on
the way there. In addition, there are 50 non-German divisions,
including the Finns. Thus, altogether the Germans have 260
divisions on our front, including up to 10 Hungarian, up to 20
Finnish, and up to 16 or 18 Rumanian.''
Roosevelt enquired about the numerical strength of a German
division. Stalin explained that together with auxiliary forces a
German division numbered from 12,000 to 13,000 men. He
added that from 300 to 330 divisions were operating from the
Soviet side.
Going over to the latest events on the Soviet-German front,
Stalin said that this surplus of forces was being used by the
Soviet side for offensive operations. But as time goes on, he
continued, because of this offensive activity, the difference between
the number of Soviet and German divisions was becoming
smaller and smaller. Another great difficulty was that the Germans
were destroying everything as they retreated. That made
ammunition supply more difficult. That was the reason why the Soviet
offensive had slowed down.
``In the last three weeks,'' the Soviet representative went on
to say, ``the Germans launched offensive operations in the Ukraine,
south and west of Kiev. They have recaptured Zhitomir, an
important railway junction. This has been announced. It looks
264
as if one of these days they will take Korosten, also an important
railway junction. In that area the Germans have five new tank
divisions and three old tank divisions, altogether 8 tank divisions,
and also 22 or 23 infantry and motorised divisions. Their goal
is to recapture Kiev. Thus, we are faced with some difficulties
in the future.''
``Therefore,'' said Stalin, ``it would be very important to
accelerate the Allied invasion of Northern France.''
Speaking after Stalin, Churchill immediately turned to the
Anglo-American plans for a landing in France and the opening
of a second front in Europe. This was undoubtedly the most
important issue at the Teheran Conference and was the object
of the most heated discussions, both at official and unofficial
meetings.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Operation Overlord
The question of opening a second front in Europe was given
special attention at the very first plenary meeting of the
Teheran Conference.
As mentioned above, the initiative was taken by Stalin.
President Roosevelt stressed that the operation across the Channel
was very important and of particular interest to the Soviet Union.
He added that the Western Allies had been drawing up the plans
over the preceding year and a half, but that they could still not
decide on a date for the operation because of a shortage of
tonnage.
``We want,'' said the President, ``not only to cross the
Channel, but to pursue the enemy into the heart of the territory. The
English Channel is that unpleasant strip of water that excludes
the possibility of starting the expedition across the Channel
before May 1, that is why the plan drawn up at Quebec was based
on the premise that the expedition across the Channel would
be made on approximately May 1, 1944.''
Pointing out that any landing operation would require special
craft, Roosevelt touched on the question of priority and sequence
of various operations, saying:
``If we undertake large-scale landing operations in the
Mediterranean, the expedition across the Channel will have to be
-4
265
postponed for two or three months. That is why we should like to
have the advice of our Soviet colleagues on the matter, and also
advice on how best to use the forces now in the Mediterranean
area, considering that there are few ships there too. But we do
not want to defer the date of the invasion across the Channel
beyond May or June. At the same time there are many places
where Anglo-American forces could be used. They could be used
in Italy, in the Adriatic area, in the Aegean area, and finally,
to help Turkey if she enters the war. All this we must decide
here. We should very much like to help the Soviet Union and
to draw off a part of the German forces from the Soviet front.
We should like to have the advice of our Soviet friends on how
we could best ease their position.''
Having finished speaking, Roosevelt asked whether Churchill
wished to add anything to what had been said.
Churchill remained silent for a moment, chewing his lip, and
then he slowly said:
``May I speak and express my opinion after Marshal Stalin
has expressed his. At the same time I should like to say that I
agree in principle with what has been said by President
Roosevelt.''
Evidently the British Prime Minister by refusing to state his
position, which in fact differed considerably from the view of
the American President, wanted to sound out the Soviet side so
as then to put forward a corresponding argument. Stalin guessed
Churchill's manoeuvre. Speaking of a second front, he made it
clear that the Soviet side was counting on the Allied landing in
Northern France and, what is more, without further delay, for
this operation alone would ease the situation on the Soviet
front.
``I may be mistaken,'' said Stalin, ``but we Russians thought
that the Italian theatre was important only to the extent of
ensuring free navigation of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean
Sea. Only in that sense is the Italian theatre of operations
important. That is what we thought, and that is what we continue
to think. As for the idea of launching an offensive from Italy
directly against Germany, we Russians think that the Italian
theatre is not suitable for such purposes.''
While this was being interpreted into English, Stalin took a
curved pipe out of his tunic pocket, opened the box of
266
Gertsegovina Flor, took out several cigarettes, broke them up slowly
and sprinkled the tobacco into his pipe, then lit it, screwed up
his eyes and surveyed those present. When his gaze met
Roosevelt's, the latter smiled and winked slyly, indicating that he
remembered Stalin's promise about his pipe. But perhaps this
gesture by Roosevelt had a deeper meaning. Perhaps he wanted to
express his sympathy with the way Stalin had countered
Churchill's unexpressed intention to question the expediency of an
Allied landing in France.
The translation came to an end and, putting his pipe aside,
Stalin continued:
``We Russians believe that the best result would be yielded
by a blow at the enemy in Northern or North-Western France. ..
Germany's weakest spot is France. Of course, this is a difficult
operation, and the Germans in France will defend themselves
desperately; nevertheless that is the best solution. Those are all
the remarks I have.''
Roosevelt thanked Stalin and asked whether Churchill was
ready to speak. Churchill nodded, cleared his throat and began
to talk in his peculiar manner, carefully selecting and weighing
up his words. He said that Britain and the United States had
long since decided to attack Germany via Northern or
NorthWestern France and extensive preparations for this were being
carried out. The British Prime Minister went on to say that many
facts and figures would be required to prove why this operation
had not been accomplished in 1943, but that now it had been
decided to attack Germany in 1944. The place for the attack
had been chosen and the task now facing the British and
Americans was to create the conditions for transferring an army into
France across the Channel in the late spring of 1944. The forces
that could be accumulated for that purpose in May or June would
consist of 16 British and 19 American divisions. These forces
would be followed by the main force, and it was planned that
in the course of Operation Overlord about a million men would
be transferred across the Channel during May, June and
July.
Having given these assurances, Churchill went over to the
problem of using the Anglo-American forces in the other areas
of the European theatre. Carefully choosing his wording and as
though thinking aloud, he repeatedly pointed out that he was
267
putting forward his suggestions only as the statement of a
question. However, concealed behind all these reservations was the
British Prime Minister's firm intention to attack Germany not
from the west, but from the south and south-east, or, as
Churchill liked to say, ``from the soft underbelly of Europe".
Saying that there was still quite some time until Operation
Overlord was due to be carried out---about six months, the Prime
Minister raised the question of using the Western Allied
forces in the Mediterranean in the meantime. This was also
motivated by a desire to help the Soviet Union as soon as possible.
Of course, Churchill said, Overlord would be carried out in time
or, possibly, with some delay. This remark by Churchill once
again, as if by chance, put the date set by Roosevelt for the
start of the operation across the Channel into doubt.
Neither Stalin nor Roosevelt reacted to this move by the
British representative. When Major Birse had finished
interpreting the last phrase, Churchill paused at length, waiting for a
response. He picked up his cigar which had half turned to ash
in the ashtray, carefully brought it to his lips, inhaled and,
receiving no objections, continued:
``We have already sent seven battle-wise divisions from the
Mediterranean area, and also a part of the landing craft for
Overlord. Taking this into account, and the bad weather in
Italy besides, I must say that we are somewhat disappointed at
not yet having taken Rome. Our first task is to take Rome, and
we expect to wage the decisive battle in January and to win
it. General Alexander, the Commander of the 15th Army Group
who is under the orders of General Eisenhower, believes that it
is quite possible to win the battle for Rome. In addition, it may
be possible to capture and destroy more than 11 or 12 enemy
divisions. We are not planning to move on into Lombardy or
to cross the Alps into Germany. We merely plan to move on
somewhat north of Rome up to the Pisa-Rimini line, after which
we could make the landing in Southern France and across the
Channel.''
Addressing the Soviet delegation, Churchill asked:
``Are our operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean,
which could cause some delay in the operation across the
Channel, of any interest to the Soviet Government?''
268
And not waiting for an answer, he added hastily:
``We do not as yet have any definite decision on this question,
and we have come here to settle it.''
``There is another possibility,'' Roosevelt intervened. ``It might
be expedient to make a landing in the northern part of the
Adriatic when the Soviet armies approach Odessa.''
``If we take Rome and block Germany from the south,''
continued the British Prime Minister, ``we would then commence
operations in Western or Southern France, and also extend
assistance to the guerrilla armies. .. A commission could be set
up to study the question and draw up a document in full
detail.''
Listening attentively to Churchill's arguments, Stalin requested
to speak.
``I have a few questions: I understand that there are 35
divisions for invasion operations in the north of France.''
``Yes, that is correct,'' answered Churchill.
``Before the operations to invade the north of France,'' Stalin
continued, ``it is planned to carry out the operation in the Italian
theatre to take Rome, after which it is planned to go on the
defensive in Italy.''
Churchill nodded.
Stalin continued to put questions:
``I also understand that three other operations are planned,
one of which will consist of a landing in the Adriatic area.''
``The carrying out of these operations may be useful to the
Russians,'' said Churchill. His tone reflected disappointment.
Then he began to explain that the greatest problem was the
transfer of the necessary forces. Operation Overlord would be
started by 35 divisions, he said. From then on the number of
troops would be increased by divisions transferred from the
United States, rising to 50--60 divisions. The British and American
air forces, then in Britain, were to be doubled and trebled in the
following six months. Besides this, work was already being
carried on continuously to accumulate forces in Britain.
However, Stalin did not let himself be put off by these
arguments. He asked again:
``Did I understand correctly that apart from the operations to
take Rome it is planned to carry out another operation in the
Adriatic, and also an operation in Southern France?''
269
Avoiding a direct answer, the British Prime Minister noted
that it was planned to carry out an attack in Southern France
at the moment Operation Overlord was begun. Some troops
in Italy could be released for this, but the operation had not
as yet been worked out in detail. As for the plans for a
landing in the Adriatic area, Churchill completely avoided this
point.
Stalin looked fixedly at him and said in a rather gloomy tone:
``In my opinion, it would be better to make Operation
Overlord the basis of all operations in 1944. If a landing were made
in Southern France at the same time as that operation, both
groups of forces could join in France. That is why it would be
well to have two operations: Operation Overlord and the
landing in Southern France as a supporting operation. At the same
time the operation in the Rome area would be a diversionary
operation. In carrying out the landing in France from the North
and the South, there could be a build up of forces when these
forces are joined. France is Germany's weak spot.''
The duel between Stalin and Churchill continued. The leader
of the British Tory had no wish to lay down his weapons. He
stood his ground again and again, making out that by suggesting
the development of operations in South-Eastern Europe, he
was concerned only with achieving a speedy victory over the
enemy.
``I agree,'' declared the British Prime Minister, ``with Marshal
Stalin's considerations concerning the undesirability of dispersing
the forces. .. I'm afraid that in this six-month period, during
which we could take Rome and prepare for big operations in
Europe, our army will remain inactive and will not exert
pressure on the enemy. I fear that in that case Parliament would
reproach me for not giving any assistance to the Russians.''
This was a direct challenge.
``I think that Overlord is a big operation,'' Stalin parried. ``It
would be considerably facilitated and would be sure to have an
effect if it were supported from the south of France. I personally
would go to this extreme. I would go on the defensive in Italy,
abandoning the capture of Rome, and would start an operation
in Southern France, drawing off German forces from Northern
France. In about two or three months I would start the
operation in the north of France. This plan would ensure the
270
success of Operation Overlord; the two armies could meet, and
that would result in a build up of forces.''
Clearly Churchill did not like this suggestion. He replied
sharply that he could adduce even more arguments to support his
opinion but had to point out that the Allies would be weaker
if they did not take Rome. Suggesting that this issue be
discussed by military specialists, Churchill declared firmly that the
struggle for Rome was already going on and a refusal to take
the city would mean defeat. This could not be explained to the
House of Commons. Overlord, in fact, could be carried out in
August.
The atmosphere was becoming tense and Roosevelt attempted
to calm things down.
``We could carry out Overlord on time,'' he said, ``if there
were no operations in the Mediterranean. If there are operations
in the Mediterranean this will defer the date of Operation
Overlord. I should not like to delay Overlord.''
Churchill sat frowning and puffing desperately at his cigar.
The silence lasted several minutes. Stalin was the first to speak.
He stressed again that he considered a landing in France the
most expedient and that there should be simultaneous or almost
simultaneous landings in the north and south. He said that
experience of operations on the Soviet-German front had
demonstrated that attacking the enemy from two sides was more effective,
because he was then compelled to shuttle his forces from one
side to another. The Allies would do well to take this experience
into consideration with regards the landing in France.
It was difficult to object to this but, as before, Churchill
did not want to give in.
``I think,'' he said, ``that we might undertake diversionary
acts .. . regardless of the invasion of Southern or Northern France,
I personally regard the idleness of our army in the
Mediterranean as a highly negative fact. That is why we cannot
guarantee that the date of May 1 will be met precisely. It would be
a big mistake to fix that date. I cannot sacrifice the operations
in the Mediterranean just to keep the date of May 1. Of course
we must come to a definite agreement on the matter. This
question could be discussed by our military specialists.''
Throwing off his disguise, Churchill thus made it plain that
he was intent on fighting for the achievement of his plans in
271
the Mediterranean and was ready for the sake .of this to break
the deadline for the start of operations in Northern France
which had already been agreed in principle. It was evident that
at this stage any further discussion might have led to undesirable
tension and to an exchange of harsh words.
``All right,'' said Stalin firmly. ``We did not expect a
discussion of purely military matters, that is why we did not invite
representatives of the General Staff to come along, but I think
that Marshal Voroshilov and I can arrange something.''
I finished work very late that first evening in Teheran. But I
did not feel tired, and walked unhurriedly along the garden paths
to our residence. The bright moon was peeping through the
leaves on the trees and the air was saturated with the scents of
autumn flowers, dying leaves, the earth and the water plants
growing thdck in the ponds. I went up to the pool and sat down
on a marble seat still warm from the sun. I did not feel capable
of falling asleep because the nervous tension which had built up
during the day had still not eased.
It was only then that I fully sensed the importance of
everything that I had witnessed. While I was interpreting at the
negotiations and then drawing up the protocol and composing draft
telegrams to Moscow, I was so totally absorbed in my work that
I did not think of the fact that here, in the Iranian capital, far
from the frontlines, something was taking place of vital
importance for the future course of the war and for victory. I
suddenly realised that the process of creating history was happening
before my very eyes, in concentrated form, as it were.
Undoubtedly, the events occurring in Teheran then were of immense
historic significance; their importance went beyond the limits
of the current moment and they were destined to leave an
imprint on the future development of world events.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Conflict Between the Allies
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Churchill's Balkan Adventure
In subsequent years Churchill made several attempts to deny
that instead of Operation Overlord, he was planning an invasion
of the continent in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea,
272
primarily in the Balkans. Of course, he was in no hurry with this
either. His plans were connected with the intention of
intercepting the Red Army's course at a corresponding moment and
stopping its further advance towards the West.
Since this plan failed, Churchill later began to assert that
nothing of the kind had existed. In his memoirs, he returns to this
issue time and again, insisting that he was misunderstood. He
even calls these Balkan plans ``a legend".
In reality, as the Teheran talks show, Churchill was pursuing
just such a line. Indeed, it was his main objective. Having
suflered a setback, he was compelled to agree to the landing in
Normandy.
Churchill's real plan was perfectly clear to President
Roosevelt also. Elliott Roosevelt, who was in Teheran at that time,
published soon after has father's death a record of his discussions
with Roosevelt. Mentioning the talks on the opening of a second
front in Europe, Roosevelt told his son that Churchill had a
special position.
`` 'Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through the
Balkans,'~'' explained Roosevelt, ``~`it was quite obvious to
everyone in the room what he really meant. That he was above all
else anxious to knife up into central Europe, in order to keep
the Red Army out of Austria and Rumania, even Hungary, if
possible. Stalin knew it, I knew it, everybody knew it. . .' "
`` 'But he never said it?'
``~`Certainly riot,'~'' Roosevelt answered. ``~`Uncle Joe [Stalin
---Author], when he argued the military advantages of invasion
from the west, and the inadvisability of splitting our forces into
two parts---he was always conscious of the political implications,
too, I'm sure. Never let on, though, by so much as a word.'
``He lay back again, silent.
`` 'I don't suppose. . .' I began hesitantly.
`` 'Hmmm?'
`` 'What I mean is, Churchill. .., well, he isn't...'
`` 'You wondering whether maybe he isn't right? That maybe
it would be advisable for us to hit the Balkans, too?'
`` 'Well.. .'
`` 'Elliott: our chiefs of Staff are convinced of one thing. The
way to kill the most Germans, with the least loss of American
soldiers, is to mount one great big invasion and then slam 'em
__PRINTERS_P_273_COMMENT__
18---1990
273
with everything we've got. It makes sense to me. . . It makes sense
to the Red Army people. That's that. It's the quickest way to
win the war. That's all.'
`` 'Trouble is, the P.M. [Churchill---Author] is thinking too
much of the post-war, and where England will be. He's scared
of letting the Russians get too strong.
`` 'Maybe the Russians will get strong in Europe. Whether
that's bad depends on a whole lot of factors.
`` 'The one thing I'm sure of is this: if the way to save
American lives, the way to win as short a war as possible, is from
the west and from the west alone, without wasting landing-craft
and men and materiel in the Balkan mountains, and our chiefs
are convinced it is, then that's that!' He smiled, but grimly. 'I
see no reason for putting the lives of American soldiers in
jeopardy in order to protect real or fancied, British interests on the
European continent. We're at war, and our job is to win it as
fast as possible, and without adventures. I think---I hope---that
he's learned we mean that, once, finally, and far all.'~^^1^^
I have allowed myself to quote such a long extract for two
reasons. First, it will help the reader to understand better the
aims which Churchill was pursuing by insisting on his Balkan
adventure. Second, it shows that Roosevelt perfectly understood
Churchill's real plans. It is obvious from the fact that the
American President told his son of this, and during the days of the
Teheran Conference at that, that the plans of the ruling
quarters in Britain were divorced from the task of achieving a swift
victory over the common enemy. Apparently Roosevelt genuinely
disapproved of Churchill's line on this matter. But, it should be
borne in mind that there were influential groups in Washington
who, like Churchill, were in no hurry to open a second front
in Europe.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The King's Sword
Presented to Stalingrad
A solemn ceremony took place on November 29, before the
opening of the conference plenary meeting; it was a
demonstration of Allied unity in the struggle against the common enemy.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New
York, 1946, pp. 184--86.
274
Such a demonstration was highly opportune. It dispersed
somewhat the dark clouds which had gathered over the conference
and reminded that the anti-Nazi coalition was still faced with
great and difficult problems which could only be solved through
mutual and concerted efforts.
The presentation to the citizens of Stalingrad of a specially
made sword, on behalf of King George VI and the British
people, was arranged with the utmost splendour. The large,
shining sword with its two-handled hilt and ornamented sheath,
which had been forged by the most skilful, hereditary armourers
in Britain, symbolised a tribute of respect to the heroes of
Stalingrad, the town where the backbone of the fascist beast was broken.
The hall began to fill up long before the ceremony started.
All the delegates and the leaders of the armies, fleets and air
forces of the countries making up the anti-Hitler coalition were
present when ``the Big Three" arrived.
Stalin was wearing a light grey tunic with his marshal's
shoulder-straps. This time, Churchill also appeared in military
uniform. From that day onwards, the British Prime Minister wore
his uniform constantly in Teheran, and everyone regarded it as
his peculiar reaction to Stalin's marshal's dress. At first
Churchill had worn a dark blue pin-striped suit, but on seeing Stalin
in uniform, he had immediately ordered himself a blue-grey
fulldress coat of a senior officer of the Royal Air Force. This uniform
arrived just in time for the ceremony of the presentation of the
sword. Roosevelt, as usual, was in civilian clothes.
The guard of honour consisted of Red Army and the British
officers. An orchestra played the Soviet and British national
anthems and everyone stood at attention. Then the music stopped
and a solemn moment of silence ensued. Churchill slowly went
up to the large black box lying on the table and opened it. The
sword, inside its sheath, rested on a claret-coloured velvet
pillow. Churchill took the sword in both hands and, holding it
suspended, he turned to Stalin and said:
``I have been commanded by His Majesty King George VI
to present to you for transmission to the City of Stalingrad this
sword of honor, the design of which His Majesty has chosen and
approved. The sword of honor was made by English craftsmen
whose ancestors have been employed in sword-making for
generations. The blade of the sword bears the inscription: 'To the
__PRINTERS_P_275_COMMENT__
18*
275
steelhearted citizens of Stalingrad, a gift from King George VI
as a token of the homage of the British people'."^^1^^
Taking a few steps forward, Churchill presented the sword
to Stalin, behind whom was standing the Soviet guard of
honour, with submachine-guns atilt. Stalin took the sword and
pulled it out of its sheath. The blade glinted coldly. Stalin raised
it to his lips and kissed it. Then, holding the sword in his hands,
he said in a low voice:
``On behalf of the citizens of Stalingrad, I wish to express
my deep appreciation for the gift of King George VI. The
citizens of Stalingrad will value this gift most highly, and I ask
you, Mr. Prime Minister, to convey their thanks to His Majesty
the King."^^2^^
There was a pause. Stalin slowly walked round the table and
went over to Roosevelt to show him the sword. Churchill held
the sheath while Roosevelt looked carefully at the huge blade.
Reading out loud the inscription on the sword, Roosevelt added:
``Truly they had hearts of steel."^^3^^
Then he gave it back to Stalin who went over to the table
where the case was lying. Carefully he laid the sword in its
sheath back in the case and closed the lid. Then he gave it to
Voroshilov who carried the sword into the next room,
accompanied by the guard of honour.
We all went out to be photographed on the terrace. It was
warm and there was no wind. The sun lit up the leaves, turned
golden by the autumn. Stalin and Churchill stopped in the middle
of the terrace, where Roosevelt was also brought in his
wheelchair. Three arm-chairs had been brought out there for ``the
Big Three''. The ministers, marshals, generals, admirals and
ambassadors stood behind these arm-chairs. Newspaper
photographers and cameramen scurried about searching for the best
positions. Then the suite moved to one side and ``the Big Three''
remained alone against a background of the tall doors which
led from the terrace to the conference hall. This photograph
was to become historical and world famous.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ E. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 181, 182.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
276
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Atmosphere Worsens
The participants in the conference returned again and again
to the matter of Overlord, but this did not bring them one step
closer to the main issue---the dates and sequence of the invasion
of Northern France. Churchill did not abandon his attempts to
replace Overlord by some other operation in the Mediterranean
or in the Balkans. At one of the plenary meetings he stated again
that the British had a considerable army in the Mediterranean
and wanted it to be in action there in the course of the whole
year and not to be idle. Therefore, he said, he was asking the
Russians to examine the whole problem and the various
alternatives which the British were proposing as to the best use of the
available forces in the Mediterranean. The British Prime
Minister put forward several questions which, in his opinion, were to
be studied in detail.
First, what assistance could be given to Operation Overlord,
using the forces in the Mediterranean? The British would like
to have enough landing craft there to transfer two divisions.
This could help speed up the advance of Anglo-American forces
along the Italian peninsula in order to destroy the enemy forces
there. There was another possibility of using these forces. They
would be sufficient for the capture of the island of Rhodes in
the event Turkey entered the war. The third possibility of using
these forces was that, minus their losses, they could be used in
Southern France in six months to support Operation Overlord.
None of these possibilities was excluded, but the question of dates
arose. The use of these two divisions, no matter which of the
three possible operations they were involved in, could not be
carried out without deferring Operation Overlord, or without
diverting a part of the landing facilities from the Indian Ocean
area.
``There is our dilemma,'' Churchill exclaimed pathetically,
raising his arms to the heavens. ``In order to decide which way
to choose we should like to hear the view of Marshal Stalin
concerning the over-all strategic situation, because we are delighted
and inspired by the military experience of our Russian allies. . .
``.. .The next problem I want to speak of,'' the head of the
British delegation continued, ``is political rather than military. ..
I have in mind the Balkans. In the Balkans there are 21 German
277
divisions apart from garrison troops. Of this number . . . 54,000
German troops are concentrated in the Aegean islands. In
addition, there are not less than 12 Bulgarian divisions in the
Balkans.''
Having pointed to the importance of the enemy forces in the
Balkans, Churchill began to assert that Britain had no interests
or ambitions in the Balkans. All she wanted to do was to tie
down the 21 German divisions in the Balkans and, if possible,
to destroy them.
``We want to work concertedly with our Russian allies,''
Churchill said.
These assurances did not sound very convincing. In response,
the Soviet representative stated again that of the military
problems Operation Overlord should be regarded as the main and
decisive issue.
``Of course,'' Stalin said, ``the Russians are in need of help.
I should like to state that if the question is one of aid to us,
we do expect aid from those who carry out the operations
planned, and we expect real aid.''
He emphasised above all that it was essential that the date of
Operation Overlord was not postponed, and that May should
be the deadline for carrying out this operation. The support of
Overlord by a landing in Southern France should also be
stipulated. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it would be best
to solve all these problems during the Teheran Conference, and
it saw no reason why this could not be achieved.
Roosevelt listened attentively to Stalin and then said that he
attached great importance to dates and that if there was
agreement on Operation Overlord, then a date should be agreed upon
for this operation. In his opinion, Operation Overlord could be
carried out during the first week of May, or postponed
somewhat. The postponement of Overlord could result from one or
two operations in the Mediterranean which would require
landing facilities and planes. If an expedition were to be carried out
in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and were to fail, then
additional materiel and troops would have to be transferred
there. In that case Overlord would not be carried out in time.
Therefore, the American President said, the staffs would have
to work out plans for operations in the Balkans in such a way
that they would not prejudice Overlord.
278
``That is right,'' Stalin said in support and added: ``If possible
it would be good to carry out Operation Overlord in May, say
the 10th, 15th, or 20th of May.''
``I cannot undertake such an obligation,'' Churchill replied.
Stalin shrugged his shoulders, indicating that he considered it
hard to continue the conversation under such circumstances. He
was clearly irritated by the evasive attitude of the British Prime
Minister. But he retained his self-control and said in the calm
tone of a teacher who is trying to explain the essence of a
question to a slow-witted child:
``If Overlord is carried out in August, as Churchill said
yesterday, nothing will come of the operation because of the
unfavourable weather in that period. April and May are the best
months for Overlord.''
Stalin was occasionally irritable. The slightest objection
could provoke a stormy reaction. However, throughout work
at the Teheran Conference, he controlled himself well. He
was restrained and correct even at the most critical moments.
In this sense he differed favourably from Churchill, who
frequently lost his temper, was very nervous and sometimes
completely incapable of controlling himself.
Stalin's calm tone had its effect.
``I do not think,'' Churchill said in a conciliatory way, ``that
we differ in our views, as it may seem. I am prepared to do
everything that is within the power of the British Government to
carry out Operation Overlord at the earliest possible date. But
I do not think that the many possibilities available in the
Mediterranean should be coldly rejected as being of no importance,
just because their use will hold up Operation Overlord for two
or three months. .. In our opinion the numerous British troops
must not be idle for six months. They should carry on
operations against the enemy, and with the help of our American
allies we hope to destroy the German divisions in Italy. We
cannot remain passive in Italy, for that will spoil our whole
campaign there. We must extend assistance to our Russian
friends.''
Thus Churchill once again returned to his idea of launching
operations in the Mediterranean and, moreover, making it out
that this would be the best assistance to the Soviet Union. Stalin
remarked sarcastically:
279
``According to Churchill it would appear that the Russians
want the British to be idle.''
Churchill pretended not to notice the irony, and began to
argue yet again about the necessity of tying down the greatest
number of German divisions in Italy and the Balkans and that
passivity on t)he front in Italy would allow the Germans to
transfer their divisions back to France to the prejudice of Overlord.
Churchill declared that the British were always ready to discuss
all details with the Allies, but that everything depended on the
availability of landing facilities. If these landing facilities were
to be left in the Mediterranean or in the Indian Ocean to the
prejudice of Overlord, then neither the success of Overlord nor
that of the operation in Southern France could be guaranteed.
``The operations in Southern France will require a great
quantity of landing facilities. I ask this to be taken into consideration,''
concluded Churchill significantly.
In this situation, the suggestion of conducting further
discussion in a commission of military specialists looked like a device
aimed at burying this matter completely, for everyone knew that
the time the three leaders could give to the Teheran Conference
was altogether limited.
So, when Roosevelt again proposed entrusting the remaining
unsolved problems to a military committee, Stalin objected
strongly:
``There is no need for any military committee. We can solve
all the questions here at the conference. We must decide on the
date, the commander-in-chief and the need of an auxiliary
operation in Southern France.''
The Soviet representative added that the Soviet delegation was
limited in time to stay at Teheran. The delegation could stay
on until December 1 but would have to leave on the 2nd. After
all, it had been agreed beforehand that the conference was to
last three or four days.
All the same Roosevelt continued to insist on letting a military
committee deal with all problems, but Stalin would not agree.
He explained that the Russians wanted to know the date on which
Operation Overlord was to start in order to prepare their blow
at the Germans.
Churchill supported the President's proposal for a military
committee.
280
``As for determining the date of Operation Overlord,'' he
remarked, ``if it is decided to have an examination of strategic
questions in the military committee. ..''
``We are not demanding any examination,'' Stalin abruptly
interrupted Churchill.
Sensing that the atmosphere was getting hot, Roosevelt
hastily intervened.
``We are all aware that the contradictions between us and the
British are small. I object to the postponement of Operation
Overlord, while Churchill lays emphasis on the importance of
operations in the Mediterranean. The military committee could
clear up tlhese questions.''
``We can solve these problems ourselves,'' Stalin insisted again,
``because we have more rights than the military committee. If I
may permit myself an incautious question, I should like to know
whether the British believe in Operation Overlord or simply
speak of it to reassure the Russians.''
Churchill took the bit between his teeth.
``Given the conditions which were indicated at the Moscow
Conference,'' he said evasively, ``I am quite sure that we shall
have to transfer all our available forces against the Germans
when Operation Overlord is launched.''
The terms which Churchill was referring to were determined
at the Moscow Conference of the three powers which took place
not long before the meeting in Teheran. They determined in
which circumstances the landing across the Channel would be
successful: at the moment of invasion, there had to be no more
than 12 German mobile divisions in France, and for a period of
60 days the Germans were not to gain the opportunity of
transferring more than 15 divisions to France to replenish their
forces.
Churchill made it clear by mentioning these terms, that under
certain circumstances, Operation Overlord could well be put in
doubt. AH in all, after lengthy debate, the problem of Operation
Overlord was once again in deadlock. It seemed pointless to
continue negotiations.
Stalin suddenly got to his feet and, turning to Molotov and
Voroshilov, said:
``Come on, let's not waste our time here. We've got plenty to
do at the front.''
281
Churchill began to fidget in his arm-chair, turned red and
muttered something indistinctly about being misunderstood.
In order to relieve the tense atmosphere, Roosevelt said in a
conciliatory tone:
``We are very hungry now, and I propose that we adjourn
to attend the dinner given for us today by Marshal Stalin.''
__ALPHA_LVL2__
A Nazi Spy
in the British Embassy
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Teheran Decisions and ``Cicero''
When the three leaders met the next day at luncheon,
Roosevelt's elated mood was immediately visible. A smile twinkled
in his eyes and he looked very cheerful. Addressing those
present, he said with emphasised solemnity:
``Gentlemen, I am happy to inform Marshal Stalin of some
pleasant news. Today our JoArut Staffs with the participation of
the British Prime Minister and the American President, adopted
the following proposal: 'Operation Overlord is planned for May
1944, and will be conducted with the support of a landing in
Southern France. The strength of this auxiliary operation will
depend on the quantity of landing facilities available at the
time.'~"
Outwardly, the Soviet representatives received this
announcement calmly. But I think that inwardly we all experienced a
profound excitement: the answer which the Soviet delegation
had so persistently worked for had finally been received. And
though the realisation of this commitment was still a long way
off, it seemed as if the mere fact of obtaining this answer
somehow removed part of the heavy burden lying on the Soviet
people aind would give new strength to those fighting against
fascism. I was seized by a feeling of elation, a lump rose in my
throat and I was barely able to keep myself from applauding.
Stalin's excitement manifested itself only in an unusual paleness
and in his voice, which became even lower when, inclining his
head a little, he uttered:
``I am satisfied with this decision.''
Everyone was silent for a few moments. Then Churchill said
282
that the precise date of the launching of the operation would,
obviously, depend on the phase of the moon. Stalin remarked
that, of course, he did not demand to be told a precise date and
that, naturally, one or two weeks in May would be needed for
this manoeuvre. He said:
``I would like to inform Churchill and Roosevelt that the
Russians will prepare a strong offensive against the Nazis for the
moment the landing operations in France begin.''
Roosevelt thanked Stalin for this decision, pointing out that
this would not allow the Germans to transfer their troops to the
West.
Thus the discussion of the question of opening a second front
in Northern France came to an end.
The commitments given then by the Americans and British
were, as we know, revised yet again with the purpose of delay:
Operation Overlord began not in May, but on June 6, 1944.
It is possible that it might have been postponed even further had
it not been for the successful operations of the Soviet troops,
Which pushed the Nazis back to the West and were already
approaching German territory. The British and Americans were
afraid of being late and so finally carried out the invasion.
For its part, the Soviet command timed a big offensive of the
Red Army on German positions to coincide with Operation
Overlord. On June 6, 1944, as soon as he had received
information from London on the successes of the launching of
Overlord, Stalin sent Churchill and Roosevelt identical telegrams
saying: ``The summer offensive of the Soviet troops to be launched
in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran
Conference, will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the
front. The general offensive will develop by stages, through
consecutive engagement of the armies in offensive operations.
Between late June and the end of July the operations will turn into
a general offensive of the Soviet troops."^^1^^
The Soviet Union fully carried out its commitment to the
Allies.. .
After the question of Overlord had been solved, the conference
participants gave considerable attention to the problem of
maintaining the achieved understanding in strict secrecy. Churchill
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 224, Vol. II, p. 145.
283
pointed out that in any event the enemy would soon learn of
the Allies' preparations, being able to discover them by the great
accumulation of trains, by the activity of ports, etc.
Churchill proposed that the Allies' staffs begin to think how
to camouflage the preparations and mislead the enemy.
In this connection, Stalin gave an idea of Soviet experience.
He told of how in similar cases the Soviet army misled the enemy
by building dummies of tanks, planes and mock airfields. Then
these dummies were set in motion with the aid of tractors, and
the enemy intelligence reported these movements to their
commanders and the Germans thought that the blow was being
prepared in that very place. In several places up to 5,000 or 8,000
dummies of tanks were set up, as well as up to 2,000 dummies
of planes and a large number of dummy airfields. In addition,
the enemy was misled with the aid of the radio. In the areas
wlhere no offensive was planned radio stations exchanged
messages. These were monitored by the enemy who got the
impression that a great force was deployed there. Enemy planes often
bombed these places night and day although they were
absolutely empty. Meanwhile, there was complete calm in the areas
where an offensive was really being staged. All transportation
took place at night.
Having listened to this explanation, Churchill declared
haughtily:
``Sometimes truth has to be protected by bodyguards of lies.''
__b_b_b__
Then he added in a more business-like tone:
``In any case, steps will be taken to mislead the enemy.''
The conference participants agreed that the circle of people
to know of the decisions adopted at the Teheran Conference
should be as limited as possible and that additional measures
would be taken in order to exclude the possibility of information
leakage.
Such measures were taken by the Soviet side. It was even
proposed that we did not dictate the content of the latest talks
as usual, but rather take hand-written notes of the precise dates
of the invasion and other decisions in order to make up protocols
in Moscow. For the purposes of precaution, we were also to give
these manuscript accounts of the Teheran decisions into the
diplomatic bag. They were packed into special thick, black
284
envelopes, placed in canvas bags and stamped with numerous seals,
and they were delivered to Moscow by armed diplomatic
couriers. One must assume that simDar measures were taken by the
British and the Americans. But even so the vital decisions of
the Teheran Conference were not kept secret from the enemy.
After the war it became known that Anthony Eden, on his
return to London from Teheran, informed in detail the British
ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, of the
conference decisions. The coded telegrams contained not only
information about the negotiations, which concerned Turkey,
and which would have been natural, but also information on
other vital issues, including the dates for Overlord. All this
information fell into Nazi hands via the German paid agent Elyasa
Bazna, Sir Hugh's valet. Bazna, who earned the nickname Cicero
for the abundance of vital material that he gave the SS Secret
Service, regularly photographed secret dispatches that came to
the British ambassador and handed them over to the SS agent
in Ankara, Moyzisch. Sir Hugh showed extraordinary carelessness,
frequently leaving his black briefcase with documents in his
bedroom unguarded. Thus the secret telegrams easily fell into
Cicero's hands.
In his memoirs published in 1950, Moyzisch writes how after
spending a whole night in a photographic darkroom developing
films received from Cicero, he discovered that he was holding the
protocols from the Cairo and Teheran conferences. Bazna also
recalls this in his book, published somewhat later. He writes that
from the documents that he photographed for the Germans one
could ``discern the intentions of the British, Americans and
Russians''.^^1^^
The German ambassador to Turkey during the war, von
Papen, wrote:
``Cicero's information was immensely valuable for two reasons.
A resume of the decisions taken at the Teheran Conference was
sent to the British ambassador. This revealed the Allies'
intentions concerning the political treatment of Germany after her
defeat, and showed us where the differences between the Allies
lay. But what was of even greater and more immediate
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See: Elyasa Bazna, / Was Cicero, New York, Harpers & Row, 1962.
285
importance was the intimate knowledge it gave us of the enemy's
operational plans."^^1^^
However, judging by everything, the Nazi leaders did not
make full use of this priceless information. On the one hand,
they continued to doubt whether these documents had not been
planted on them by the British in order to misinform them. And,
on the other, realising the importance of the information obtained
from Cicero, they were afraid of widening the circle of those
in-the-know. Therefore the leaders of the German Wehrmacht
evidently made no use whatsoever of these documents in their
operational plans, and perhaps even knew nothing of them. In
any case, the Anglo-American invasion of Normandy, which took
place at dawn on June 6, 1944, came as a complete surprise
to the German command.
Not even Cicero himself benefited from this operation: the
300,000 pounds sterling which the Nazis paid him turned out
to be fake.
Following the publication of Moyzisch's memoirs, an enquiry
was made in the British parliament as to the leakage to the
Germans during the war of top secret information from the British
embassy in Ankara. London officially confirmed that the Nazis
had received top secret documents, including the highly
important decisions of the Teheran Conference.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Birthday Cake
The guests began to gather just after eight at the reception
given by the British embassy in the evening of November 30
on -the occasion of Churchill's 69th birthday. Stalin, accompanied
by Molotov and Voroshilov, was in his marshal's uniform. He
congratulated Churchill and presented him with an astrakhan hat
and a large china sculpture on a theme based on Russian
folktales. Roosevelt appeared in a dress-coat holding his gifts: an
antique Persian bowl and an Isfahan rug.
Standing motionless and silent on both sides of the main doors,
through which the guests entered, were bearded Indian soldiers
in huge turbans.
It had been a hot day, but by evening a pleasant coolness had
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Franz von Papen, Memoirs, Andre Deutsch, London, 1952, p. 517.
286
come from the old park. By the time we arrived the room had
already filled with a brilliant crowd: officers were parading around
in their gold-embroidered uniforms, rivalled by diplomats in
their dress-coats and snow-white shirtfronts. The only lady
present was Churchill's daughter, Sarah Churchill-Oliver. She stood
beside the beaming birthday host, responding to the greetings
and congratulations addressed to Churchill, rather in the way a
circus performer's partner bows with particular zest to applause.
Meanwhile, Churchill himself smiled cheerfully and puffed away
happily at his cigar.
Soon everyone moved from the hall into the dining-room
where the long tables were laid with all kinds of food. On the
main table towered a vast birthday cake with 69 burning candles.
Pronouncing the first toast, Stalin said:
``My fighting friend Churchill!''
Stalin went over to him, clinked glasses, hugged him by the
shoulder and shook his hand. When everyone had drained his
glass, he addressed the President of the United States in the same
words:
``My fighting friend Roosevelt!''
The same procedure of clinking glasses and hand-shaking was
repeated.
Churchill changed his toast slightly, announcing:
``Stalin the mighty! Roosevelt the President, my friend!"
Then Roosevelt turned to Churchill and Stalin and said:
``To our unity---war and peace!''
Churchill liked the Russian custom of proposing toasts and so
did the Americans. In the end, the guests spent much time on
their feet, because the toasts followed one after another, and
after each speech everyone rose from his seat. Moreover,
Churchill adopted Stalin's manner of going up to each person to
whom a toast had been said to clink glasses with him. So, there
were the two of them, wandering slowly around the room with
glasses in their hands. Everyone was in high spirits and it became
hot and noisy in the hall.
However trivial the toasts were, it seemed that each toaster
put his own special sense into them.
Even here, as he had done in the conference hall, Roosevelt
considered it essential to speak of the post-war world and the
importance of maintaining the unity and cooperation of the great
287
powers not just then, but in the future also. Here, ait Churchill's
birthday table, it seemed that the 'tasks of fighting against the
common enemy and conquering it, which had brought these
people to the Iranian capital at -the height of the terrible war
had, as it were, created a new atmosphere in their personal
relations and in the relations between their countries. It was
as if one large family had gathered in the hall and will be united
forever. But this feeling did not last long. It was shattered by
the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke.
Indicating that he wished to propose a toast---usually each
person would tap his knife against his glass---Brooke rose from
his seat and began to comment on which of the Allies had
suffered most in the war. He declared that the British had suffered
more in the war than any other, had 'lost more, had fought more,
had done more to win the war.
An awkward silence set in in the hall. The majority, naturally,
sensed the tactlessness of General Brooke's words. After all,
everyone knew that the bulk of Hitler's forces was concentrated on
the Soviet-German front, and that the Red Army was liberating
step by step the occupied Soviet territory, turned to ashes by the
Nazis, at the cost of unbelievable sacrifice and effort. Stalin
became gloomy. He got to his feet at once and glanced severely
round those present. It looked as though a storm was about to
burst. But, controlling himself, he said calmly:
``I want to tell you, from the Soviet point of view, what the
President and the United States have done to win the war. The
most important 'things in this war are machines. The United
States has proven that it can turn out from eight to ten thousand
airplanes a month. England turns out three thousand a month,
principally heavy bombers. The United States, therefore, is a
country of machines. Those machines, received through
LendLease, help us to win the war. I would like to propose a toast to
this.''
Roosevelt immediately answered that he valued the power of
the Red Army very highly. Soviet forces, he said, were using not
only American and British military machines, but excellent
Soviet machines as well. He remarked that while they were all
celebrating Churchill's birthday, the Red Army was rolling the
Nazi war machine steadily back to Germany. He proposed a
toast to Soviet weapons.
288
The incident was settled, but the relaxed atmosphere which
had reigned earlier in the evening vanished.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Plans for the Post-War
Peaceful Settlement
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Argument over War Criminals
I would like to tell of one unofficial meeting at which a
serious conflict took place between the Soviet and the British
representatives. It occurred at a dinner of the three leaders and
their closest associates which was very peaceful at first. There was
an abundance of toasts: to the health of those taking part in
the conference, to the success of various forces, to victory over
the common enemy and to post-war cooperation. Some
specifically political toasts were also proposed. For instance, someone
from the Soviet delegation made the following toast:
``I wish to propose a toast to your future deliveries of
LendLease materiel which I am sure will arrive on time in the future,
and will not be arriving late, as have shipments to date!"^^1^^
Towards the end of the meal Stalin rose to his feet and began
to speak of Nazi war criminals.
``I propose a salute,'' he said, ``to the swiftest possible justice
for all Germany's war criminals. . . I drink to our unity in
dispatching them as fast as we capture them, all of them, and
there must be quite a few of them.''
The translation into English had barely finished when
Churchill leapt to his feet as if he had been stung. Previously he had
conscientiously drained his glass of brandy after each toast, and
was already considerably under the influence. The Prime
Minister pushed back his glass with a sharp movement and knocked it
over, spreading a large yellow brandy stain over the 'tablecloth.
Churchill was so inflamed that he did not even notice this. His
face and neck went purple and his eyes were bloodshot. Waving
his arms in agitation, he cried:
``Any such attitude is wholly contrary to our British sense of
justice! The British people will never stand for such mass murder.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ E. Roosevelt, Op. cit., p. 187.
19---1991.
289
I take this opportunity to say that I feel most strongly that
no one, Nazi or no, shall be summarily deadt with, before a firing
squad, without proper legal trial, no matter what the known
facts and proven evidence against him!"^^1^^
Everyone looked in Stalin's direction. He reacted perfectly
calmly to the British Prime Minister's angry speech. Churchill's
agitation even seemed to amuse him. There was a twinkle in
his eyes.
Stalin coolly began to refute Churchill's arguments thoroughly,
which only made the latter even more furious. The Soviet
representative stressed that no one was going to punish Nazi
criminals without trial. The case of each individual had to be
carefully investigated. But already it was evident from the mass
atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis that there must be tens of
thousands of criminals among them, concluded Stalin. Then,
turning to Roosevelt who was silently observing this scene, he asked
for his opinion.
``As usual,'' said the President, ``it seems to be my function to
mediate this dispute. Clearly there must be some sort of
compromise between your position, Mr. Stalin, and 'that of my good
friend the Prime Minister."^^2^^
The Soviet and American delegates appreciated the President's
answer and burst out laughing. But the British sat in silence,
looking sullenly ait their leader. Churchill sat down in his
armchair, but one could sense that he was still boiling with fury.
``Let's brush it off,'' said Hopkins. ``We're still miles and miles
and months and months away from Germany and conquest of
the Nazis.''
But Stalin continued to ask all those present for their opinions.
Finally, he turned to Elliott Roosevelt who was also present at
the meal. He rose rather embarrassed, but said quite firmly:
``Isn't the whole thing pretty academic? Look: when our
armies start rolling in from the west, and your armies are stiM
coming on from the east, we'll be solving the whole thing, won't
we? Russian, American, and British soldiers will settle the issue
for most of those fifty thousand [war criminals---Ed.] in battle."^^3^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ E. Roosevelt, Op. cit., pp. 188--90.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
290
Stalin liked this answer. Walking round the table, glass in
hand, he stopped beside Elliott, flung an arm around his shoulder
and said smiling:
``An excellent answer! I propose a toast to your health, Elliott!"
At this point Churchill exploded once again. Waving an angry
finger across the table at Elliott, he roared:
``Are you interested in damaging relations between the Allies?
Do you know what you are saying? How can you dare say such
a thing?"^^1^^
Elliott plopped into his arm-chair in confusion and covered
his face with his hands so amusingly that everyone present burst
out laughing. The tension was relieved.
Soon we all moved into the next room for coffee. But that
evening Churchill did not approach the Soviet delegates. His gloomy
face was covered with red patches and he puffed away harder
than ever at his cigar.
Churchill's violent reaction to the proposition to punish severely
Nazi war criminals was not fortuitous. In itself this demand
could not have been of any surprise to the British Prime
Minister. He had, after all, signed the Declaration of the heads
of government of the three powers of the anti-Hitler coalition,
which had been published on November 2, 1943, during the
meeting in Moscow of the three countries' Foreign Ministers.
In the Declaration on German Atrocities, which was also
signed by Roosevelt and Stalin, it was stated:
``.. .Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian
officers or in execution of Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian
hostages, Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters
of the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union
which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they
will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on
the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those
who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood
beware lest -they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly
the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends
of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that
justice may be done.''
It would appear that after such a declaration, the suggestion
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_291_COMMENT__
19*
291
to punish severely Nazi war criminals could not provoke
objection. After all it was not a question of vengeance with regard
to the innocent, but of punishment of the Nazi war criminals.
But evidently Churchill regarded the Declaration of the Three
Powers merely as a propaganda gesture and felt quite differently
in fact. As the Soviet forces advanced further to the west and
nearer to the territory of the Third Reich, Churchill was
beginning to wonder how to use the Nazi criminals to achieve
the plan, already playing in his head, of creating a new
cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Anglo-American Plan
for the Partitioning of Germany
It was still a long way from the Teheran Conference to the
victory over Nazi Germany. The Soviet armies had yet to cover
hundreds of miles of fierce battles, force major rivers and take
many towns by storm. And many thousands of Soviet, American
and British soldiers and Resistance fighters were to give their
lives in this titanic combat. Ahead were fierce battles on the
Eastern Front, the landing in Normandy, the bloody fighting
in the Ardennes and the liberation of France and other
Nazioccupied countries.
Everybody in Teheran realised that it was still a long time
till that moment when the Allied forces would cross the German
borders from the north, south, east and west to launch the
final assault on the enemy. But nobody doubted that this
moment would come. Everyone was convinced of the final victory
of the anti-Hitler coalition.
Therefore it was quite natural that the question arose at the
Teheran Conference of how the Allies should deal with Germany
after the war. Everyone agreed that the Axis powers would have
to surrender unconditionally. But measures had to be taken in
order to prevent Germany, which twice in the lifetime of one
generation had plunged humanity into a world war, from ever
unleashing a new aggression again.
This matter was discussed first after a late dinner on
November 28. The day had been rather difficult and Roosevelt, who
looked tired, excused himself and went straight to his rooms
292
after the dinner. Churchill, Stalin, Eden and Molotov moved
into the next room where they were served coffee.
Churchill lit up a cigar and remarked that the Allies should
deal Germany such a crushing blow that she would never be
able to threaten other peoples again. Stalin agreed, but added
that unless special measures were taken, Germany would soon
restore her potential and once again present a threat to the
world. Churchill disagreed with this viewpoint. He said that
Germany's human reserves and military-industrial potential were
already considerably drained owing to huge losses on the Soviet
front and also to the bombings to which the Allies were
subjecting the country. And towards the end of the war Germany
would be dealt such blows and be so ruined that she would be
unable to restore herself rapidly.
``I see you are a great optimist,'' Stalin smiled. Placing his
unfinished cup of coffee down on a small table, he wiped his
moustache with a white handkerchief and added more seriously:
``Unfortunately I cannot share your optimism. The specific
conditions of Germany, with her Junkers and major military
concerns, are such that she can present a threat to the world again
and again. But we, of course, could try to change these
conditions.''
Sensing that Stalin had touched on the question of the social
system of post-war Germany, Churchill abruptly changed the
topic of conversation. That evening the German question was
not mentioned any more.
When Stalin met Roosevelt alone the next day, he told him
of the conversation with Churchill.
``When you had gone,'' said Stalin, ``I had a talk with
Churchill on the maintenance of peace in the future. Churchill
regards this matter very lightly. He believes that Germany could
not rehabilitate herself rapidly. I disagree and feel that this
could happen soon. She would need a mere 15--20 years. If
nothing is done to restrain Germany, I fear that she will soon be
able to regain her strength. The first big war begun by Germany
in 1870 ended in 1871. After only 42 years, that is in 1914,
the Germans began a new war, and again after 21 years, in 1939,
they began another. As we can see, the period required for
Germany's rehabilitation, is decreasing. And it will obviously
decrease still further in the future.''
293
Roosevelt listened without interrupting. He was attracted by
Stalin's reasoning. Only occasionally he nodded in agreement
and lightly tapped the fingers of his right hand on the arm of
his wheel-chair.
Meanwhile, Stalin continued saying how difficult it would be
to prevent Germany from ever becoming a threat to other
peoples again. Whatever bans we could impose, he said, the Germans
would be able to get round them. Whereas the construction of
planes could be prohibited, furniture factories could not be closed
down, and it is well known that furniture factories can be
rapidly regeared to produce planes. Likewise, it can be prohibited
to Germany to produce shells and torpedoes, but watch-making
factories cannot be closed, and every clock factory can easily be
transformed to produce the most vital parts for both shells and
torpedoes.
Thus, Germany can be rehabilitated again and once more
start aggression.
On this occasion Stalin did not mention the social conditions
of Germany. Possibly Churchill's sharp reaction had prompted
him that he could meet only opposition from the British and the
Americans over the issue of the social structure of Germany.
In any case, now he spoke merely of strategic measures that
could help the Allies to keep defeated Germany within definite
limits.
``The planned bodies will not be enough to prevent aggression,''
Stalin said, explaining himself. ``We must have the opportunity
of occupying the most vital strategic points, so that Germany
could not seize them. Such points need to be occupied not just
in Europe, but also in the Far East, to prevent Japan from
launching new aggression. A special body should be set up which
would have the right to occupy strategically important points. In
case of a threat of aggression from either Germany or Japan,
these points ought to be occupied immediately in order to
surround Germany and Japan and suppress them.''
``I agree with you one hundred per cent,'' said Roosevelt. ``I
can be just as firm as Marshal Stalin. Of course, the Germans
could regear their factories for military production but in such
a case it would be essential to act promptly, and if decisive
measures are taken, then Germany would not have sufficient
time to rearm.''
294
``In that case everything is guaranteed,'' smiled Stalin.
The conference participants returned to the question of
Germany during the plenary meeting on December 1. Roosevelt said
that there was a suggestion for Germany to be partitioned, and
this issue needed to be discussed in greater detail.
Churchill took up after the President had finished. Evidently,
he was prepared for the way this question was raised. He
supported Roosevelt vigorously.
``I am for partitioning Germany. But I should like to consider
the question of partitioning Prussia. I am for separating Bavaria
and the other provinces from Germany.''
Churchill's proposal sounded rather unexpected, and there
was a silence in the hall. Then Roosevelt spoke:
``In order to stimulate our discussion on this question,'' he said,
``I want to set forth a plan for partitioning Germany into five
states, which I personally drew up two months ago.''
``I should like to stress,'' interrupted Churchill, ``that the root
of evil in Germany is Prussia.''
Roosevelt nodded in approval and continued:
``I should like us to have a picture of the whole before we
speak of the separate components. In my opinion, Prussia must
be weakened as far as possible, and reduced in size. Prussia
should constitute the first independent part of Germany. The
second part of Germany should include Hannover and the
northwestern regions of Germany. The third part---Saxony and the
Leipzig area. The fourth part---Hessen Province, Darmstadt,
Kassel and the areas to the south of the Rhine, and also the old
towns of Westphailia. The fifth part---Bavaria, Baden,
Wiirttemberg. Each of these five parts would be an independent state.
In addition, the regions of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should
be separated from Germany. These regions would be
administered by the United Nations, or the four Powers. The Ruhr and
the Saar must be placed either under the control of the United
Nations or under the trusteeship of the whole of Europe. That
is my proposal. I must add that it is merely exploratory.''
In the situation prevailing at that time, with almost the Whole
of Europe occupied by the Nazis, Roosevelt's proposal for the
partitioning of Germany sounded rather unrealistic. Moreover,
the doubt emerged at once as to whether in the 20th century
295
the German people could be forced to accept the rebirth o~ the
dwarf states of the Electors' period. It did seem that the
American President's decision to recarve the map of Germany was
too bold.
But Churchill, that cunning and experienced politician, seemed
to support Roosevelt's idea.
``You have said a mouthful. I think there are two questions:
one---destructive, the other---constructive. I have two ideas: the
first 'is to isolate Prussia from the rest of Germany; the second is
to separate Germany's southern provinces---Bavaria, Baden,
Wurttemberg, the Palatinate, from the Saar to Saxony inclusive.
I would keep Prussia in strict conditions. I think it would be
easy to sever the southern provinces from Prussia and include
them in a Danubian federation. The people who live in the
Danube Basin are not the cause of war. At any rate, I would
give the Prussians harsher treatment than the other Germans.
The southern Germans will not start a new war.''
Churchill's arguments introduced a new element into the
question of Germany's future. While advocating the partitioning
of Germany and the suppression of Prussia, he was at the same
time aiming at creating a new formation, similar to the
patchwork Hapsburg monarchy. It was thus that one could interpret
his words about a Danubian federation. It goes without saying
that such federation, as conceived by the British Prime Minister,
could be controlled by the Western powers and wouild isolate
the Soviet Union from Western Europe. This plan obviously had
something in common with Churchill's own idea of an
AngloAmerican landing in the Balkans with the aim of forestalling the
Russians in South-east Europe.
Stalin firmly opposed this plan.
``I do not like the plan for new associations of states,'' he said
icily. ``If it is decided to partition Germany no new associations
need be set up. Whether it is five or six states, and two regions
into which Roosevelt proposes to divide Germany, this plan of
Roosevelt's . .. can be examined. Like us, Churchill will soon
have to deal with great masses of Germans. Churchill will then
see that it is not only the Prussians who are fighting in the
German Army but also Germans from the other provinces of
Germany. Only the Austrians, when surrendering, shout 'I'm
Austrian!', and our soldiers accept them. As for the Germans from
296
Germany's other provinces they fight with equal doggedness.
Regardless of how we approach the partitioning of Germany
there is no need to set up some new association of Danubian
states lacking vitality. Hungary and Austria must exist separately.
Austria existed as a separate state until it was seized.''
Roosevelt agreed with Stalin that there was no difference
between Germans from the various provinces of Germany. Fifty
years previously there had been a difference, pointed out the
President, but now all German soldiers were alike.
After this Churchill again spoke.
``I should not like to be understood as not favouring the
partition of Germany,'' he said. ``But I wanted to say that if
Germany is broken up into several parts without these parts being
combined then, as Marshal Stalin said, the time will come when
the Germans will unite.''
``There are no steps that could exclude the possibility of
Germany's unification,'' objected the head of the Soviet
delegation.
``Does Marshal Stalin prefer a divided Europe?" asked
Churchill caustically.
``Europe has nothing to do with it,'' parried Stalin. ``I don't
know that there is need to set up four, five or six independent
German states. This question must be discussed.''
Roosevelt enquired whether a special committee should be
set up to study the question of Germany or whether, perhaps,
it should be referred to the London Commission of
representatives of the three powers. Stalin agreed with the latter suggestion.
This issue was raised again by the Western powers at the
Yalta Conference in February 1945. But there, too, their idea
for the partition of Germany did not meet with support from
the Soviet side. The Soviet delegate in the tripartite commission
voted down the American and British proposal for the
partitioning of Germany. Meanwhile, the position of the Soviet
Government on this question was clearly defined. Speaking on May 9,
1945, Victory Day, the head of the Soviet Government declared
that the Soviet Union ``neither intended to partition, nor to
destroy Germany".
Western propagandists have a liking for playing a false card,
asserting that the Soviet Union was responsible for the splitting
of Germany. This is malicious invention. On the contrary, it
297
was owing to the principled stand adopted by the Soviet
Government .that the Anglo-American plans for the partitioning of
Germany, first put forward at the Teheran Conference, were
not realised.
At the Potsdam Conference of the three powers, which took
place in the summer of 1945, important decisions were taken on
the denazification, democratisation and demilitarisation of
Germany as a single whole. If these decisions had been implemented
in full, Germany would now have existed as a single state. But
the Potsdam decisions were not implemented in the western zones
of occupation, and failing to achieve the partitioning of
Germany, the Western powers divided the country without
preliminary permission or agreement. The process of remilitarisation
began in West Germany. The military monopolies again began to
gain in strength. The so-called ``bizone'' and ``trizone'' were
established. Finally, the Federal Republic of Germany was proclaimed,
in which militarism and revanchism had since blossomed.
In these conditions, the democratic forces of the German
people in the east of the country created a workers' and peasants'
state, the German Democratic Republic.
Thus appeared the two German states which today travel
along two different historical paths.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Post-War Settlement
The participants in the Teheran Conference only touched in
general terms on the problem of post-war settlement. Despite the
contrasting interests of the powers taking part in the conference,
even at that stage in the war, attempts were made to find a
common language with regard to the maintenance of peace after
the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. The leaders of Western
powers saw that the peoples of the whole world, who had made
enormous efforts to defeat fascism and to save humanity from
the threat of enslavement, were deeply interested in preventing
the repetition of a world holocaust. These sentiments of the
broad public exterted strong pressure on the leaders of capitalist
states then fighting against the Axis powers. Roosevelt was
particularly sensitive to this pressure. He undoubtedly thought a
great deal about the future arrangement of the world.
298
In a conversation with Stalin on November 29, Roosevelt said
that he wanted to talk about the future arrangement of the
world before leaving Teheran. In the American President's
opinion, an organisation should be set up which would really
guarantee lasting peace after the war. Getting a positive response
from the Soviet side, Roosevelt explained that he imagined that
after the end of the war a universal organisation would have
to be established based along the lines of the United Nations.
This organisation would not deal with military questions. It
should not be like the League of Nations. It would include 35
or maybe 50 United Nations, and would merely give
recommendations. This organisation would have no other power.
Roosevelt expressed the opinion that such an organisation
should meet not in one fixed place but in different places. Asked
whether it would be a European or a world organisation,
Roosevelt replied that it should be a world organisation.
Stalin enquired who was to make up the executive body of
this organisation. Roosevelt answered that he supposed the
executive committee should include the Soviet Union, Great Britain,
the United States, China, two European countries, one South
American, one country from the Middle East, one from Asia
(besides China) and one British dominion. He said that
Churchill disagreed with this last point since it would mean that the
British would only have 'two voices---from Britain and from one
of her dominions. Roosevelt then suggested that the executive
committee deal with agricultural, food and economic issues, as
well as questions of health.
Roosevelt considered that there ought also to be a police
committee, consisting of countries that would make sure that peace
was maintained and that no new aggression came from Germany.
The Soviet delegation put forward no specific proposals at the
Teheran Conference on the question of post-war settlement. In
his talk with Roosevelt, Stalin limited himself to asking questions
to clarify some issues and voicing only very general ideas about
them.
Roosevelt's remark about the ``danger of revolution" as ``a
violation of peace" was highly indicative, as was the proposal to set
up a ``quarantine'' for those countries in which a revolutionary
situation had arisen, or even to occupy such a country.
Undoubtedly, the American President was reflecting here the attitude of
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certain Anglo-American quarters who feared that the triumphant
anti-fascist war might lead to the upsurge of revolutionary forces
and to the intensification of the struggle of peoples for social
change.
Stalin ignored all these remarks made by Roosevelt, and it
seems to me that he did so on purpose.
As we know, on the eve of the war and in the course of
it Western propaganda never tired of alleging that the Soviet
Union was pursuing the aim of a ``world revolution" and was
intent on ``exporting revolution" to other countries. This
propaganda campaign, encouraged by Goebbels' department, aimed
to drive a wedge between the Allies, provoke suspicion and
complicate the struggle against Nazi Germany. Realising all this,
Stalin was trying not to give any grounds for such incriminations
or suspicion.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
``The Big Three'' Leave Teheran
The morning of December 2 was dull and grey. It had
suddenly turned cold. Gusts of wind were swirling the yellow
leaves round the park. At the entrance to the main building
of the Soviet Embassy stood three military jeeps. American
detectives were scurrying around, their jackets bulging with the
automatic pistols hidden under their arms. Everything was ready for
the departure of the President of the United States.
It had been agreed at first that the conference would have
lasted till the end of December 2nd. But snow which had
suddenly fallen in the mountains had caused a sharp worsening of
the weather conditions and Roosevelt was forced to depart
ahead of time. Late in the evening of December 1st the final
declaration was hastily agreed upon. There was no time for
typing clean copies of its text in Russian and English or for an
official ceremony of its signing. The signatures to this document
had to be collected rather in the fashion of an enquiry. Each of
the main conference participants hastily put his visa. We were
left with a fairly crumpled sheet of paper with the signatures
done in pencil. The external appearance of the paper did not
correspond to the solemn content of this document, soon to
become world famous as the Teheran Declaration of the Three
Powers. Here is what it said:
``We---Che President of the United States, the Prime Minister
300
of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met
these four days past, in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and
have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work
together in war and in the peace that will follow.
As to war---our military staffs have joined in our round table
discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction
of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as
to the scope and timing of the operations which will be
undertaken from the East, West and South.
The common understanding which we have here reached
guarantees that victory will be ours.
And as to peace---we are sure that our concord will make
it an enduring peace. We recognise fully the supreme
responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace
which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass
of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror
of war for many generations.
With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems
of the future. We shall seek the co-operation, and the active
participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart
and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the
elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will
welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family
of democratic nations.
No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German
armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war planes from
the air.
Our attack will be relentless and increasing.
Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with
confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free
lives, untouched by tyranny, and according -to their varying
desires and 'their own consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here,
friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.
Signed in Teheran,
on December 1, 1943
Roosevelt
Stalin
Churchill
301
Among the other decisions concerning the conduct of war,
agreement was reached on granting comprehensive aid to the
partisan movement in Yugoslavia.
A Declaration on Iran was also agreed upon by the three
powers, guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Iran. The leaders of the three powers pledged themselves to
provide Iran with possible economic aid both during and after the
war.
.. .1 stood opposite the wide, white-columned porch. There
was a bustle of press photographers and cameramen, a/11 trying
to elbow their way nearer to the steps through the cordon of
Soviet and American military guards, in order to be at the front.
The door opened and the President appeared on the porch in
his wheel-chair, accompanied by two Filipinos. A khaki-coloured
waterproof was thrown across Roosevelt's shoulders, over his
black cape that was fixed by a gold chain between two buckles
shaped like lions' heads. An old-fashioned crumpled hat covered
his head. His face was just like his portraits: the pince-nez, a
cigarette in a long holder gripped in the wide, large-toothed
smile. But the imprint of fatigue was on his face. The dreary
morning particularly accentuated 'the President's unhealthy
paleness. One could almost physically feel how difficult this very
sick man was finding it to bear the burden resting on him. But
his strength was supported by an indomitable will and inner
energy.
Two hefty American sergeants went up to the wheel-chair,
carried it up to the jeep and lifted Roosevelt into the front seat.
His legs were covered with a tartan rug. By this time Stalin and
Churchill had joined the group seeing the President off. Stalin
approached the car, gave Roosevelt's hand a hearty shake and
wished him a happy journey.
``I think we've done some great work here,'' said Roosevelt.
``The agreed decisions will assure us victory.''
``No one can doubt now that we shall win,'' answered Stalin,
smiling.
Churchill also said good-bye to Roosevelt. The chauffeur
started the engine and four detectives immediately leapt on to the
running-boards of the jeep. Two of them pulled
submachineguns out of their jackets and lay on the front wings of the car.
It looked as if the President's car was to burst through enemy
302
encirclement. It was the first time I saw how the American
President's security was organised and it seemed to me that the
deliberate demonstration put on by the detectives could only
attract the attention of any malefactors. But Roosevelt evidently
regarded this almost operetta-like performance as something quite
normal. He smiled serenely and, when the jeep moved off, he
raised his right hand and gave the victory sign. Soon the
President's jeep disappeared behind the trees of the park.
Having said good-bye to the Soviet delegates, Churchill
returned to his own embassy and soon left for the aerodrome.
The Soviet delegation left Teheran around midday. Several
twin-engine passenger planes were waiting for us at the aerodrome.
A group of officers went off in the first and Stalin left in the
second plane. We waited until we were informed that he had
landed safely in Baku, and then the rest of the planes took off
one after another at short intervals.
When we left the plane in Baku, Stalin was still there. He was
standing in front of the air terminal no longer in his marshal's
uniform, but wearing an ordinary soldier's greatcoat and cap
without any badges of rank. Next to him was the Airforce
General Golovanov and some other officers. Before long a file of
limousines appeared on the airfield. Stalin got into the second car
next to the chauffeur, and his personal bodyguard sat in the back
seat. The rest of us quickly got into the other cars and the
cortege sped off into town to the railway station, where
a special train, made up of large, long saloon-carriages was
standing ready.
There was only one long stop on the way to Moscow, at
Stalingrad. We remained on the train, but Stalin and a few of his
close associates went on a visit round the town. The train arrived
in Moscow early in the morning of the fourth day. As soon as it
stopped, Stalin got out of the carriage, into a black limousine
parked right on the platform and left for the Kremlin.
Only on the fallowing day, December 7, was a report printed
in the Soviet press about the Teheran Conference of the leaders
of the three powers, along with the texts of the Declaration and
other official information.
Until that day no one in the Soviet Union, save a relatively
smaJl initiated group, knew that ``the Big Three" had met in
Teheran over a period of four days.
303
__*_*_*__
The results of the Teheran Conference demonstrate the
fruitfulness of the military and political cooperation between the
USSR, the USA and Great Britain during World War II. The
conference decisions helped to unite and strengthen the
antiHitler coalition. They could also have been of great significance
for the development of fraternal Anglo-Soviet-American relations
following the war. But, not Jong after the end of World War II
the ruling quarters in the USA and Great Britain moved away
from the agreed decisions and took the course of aggravating
the international situation, a course towards a cold war.
The Teheran Conference was a tremendous success for Soviet
foreign policy. Recalling now the discussions conducted in
Teheran by the leaders of the three powers, and reading over the
decisions taken there, one can see with particular clarity the
historical significance of this meeting.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
How the Teheran Decisions
Were Carried Out
__ALPHA_LVL3__
On the Threshold of 1944
An exultant mood prevailed in Moscow during the last month
of 1943. There were many reasons for this. Confidence in our
ultimate victory had grown. To be sure, heavy righting continued
in various sectors of the vast Soviet-German front, which stretched
from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. We all understood
that enormous efforts were still to be made before Soviet
territory would be rid of the aggressors and the liberation of the
European nations enslaved by the Nazis could be begun. But the
realisation that the initiative in the war had passed to the Red
Army, which continued its irresistible advance to the west, gave
added strength to Soviet fighting men and to those whose work
lay in the rear.
Encouraging news came from the military theatres where
our Allies were engaged. Their victories in Italy, at El Alamein,
in the neighbourhood of Tunis, and on other fronts showed that
there too the fortunes of war had turned away from Hitler's
Germany and its satellites.
Finally, the decisions adopted in Teheran at the recently
304
coneluded conference of the heads of state of the fhree great powers---
Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill---had demonstrated the unity
of the allies and their determination to bring the war to a swift
conclusion and to deal the enemy a crushing defeat. But trie first
meeting of the heads of the three powers also brought out the
difficulties and conflicts inevitable in a military alliance including
states with different social systems, outlooks and ideologies.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Back in Moscow
After our return from Teheran we were quickly drawn once
again into our customary working rhythm. V. N. Pavlov and I
worked as assistants to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs,
in the rank of counsellors, and thus were given an office of our
own right beside Molotov's secretariat, in the Kremlin building
that housed the Council of People's Commissars. To get to this
room you went a little way down a corridor whose tall windows
looked onto a small inner courtyard, triangular in shape and
now sprinkled with snow. Its whiteness seemed particularly
brilliant after the yellow-green halftones of late autumn in Iran.
The courtyard was so small that through the identical tall
windows on its opposite side we could see the officers of the
Supreme Command General Headquarters bending over their field
maps. Things were going well at the front, and as we looked at
the officers we all felt curious and a little envious.
Our office held two desks, several chairs, a bookcase, and two
big safes, the work of pre-revolutionary Moscow craftsmen. We
listened to BBC broadcasts in order to broaden our knowledge
of English idiomatic expressions and political terminology, and
Pavlov supplied us with a Webster's, in two weighty volumes,
which we perused in our spare moments to build our
vocabularies. Around one o'clock each afternoon we would go over to
the next building (where the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet is now located) to have tea and hot piroshki in the
cafeteria of the Kremlin War College.
We also listened to German radio broadcasts. Things on the
front were getting steadily worse for Nazi Germany, but
Goebbels' propaganda was as boastful as ever. The growing alarm of
Nazi top quarters could nonetheless be felt in the Fiihrer's own
speeches, which became more and more hysterical.
__PRINTERS_P_305_COMMENT__
20---1996
305
Work began for us at ten in the morning, and ended late
at night---the exact hour depended on when Molotov went home.
There was ordinarily a break for dinner between five and seven,
but either Pavlov or I, by turns, remained in our office, since
something unforeseen might always come up.
As before, my job was to make reports on American affairs,
and thus I was brought into contact most of all with S.
Tsarapkin, who at that time was head of the US department in the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Pavlov continued to
keep his eye on relations with Britain. And since Molotov's first
deputy, Andrei Vyshinsky, was in charge of the US and British
departments (among others), those papers which he directed to
his superior that had to do with American or British matters
usually passed through our hands. It was our task to see they
were properly made up and to supply necessary facts and other
documentation Molotov might need in deciding the question or
making his report to Stalin, as was ordinarily the case for the
more important questions. I might add that at this time Stalin
was paying the greatest attention to relations with the United
States and Great Britain, and a copy of every document of any
importance having to do with those countries was sent to him.
Most of the papers Molotov passed along to Stalin for
approval came back with no marks except the familiar initials in
blue pencil in the upper left corner. But sometimes, too, there
would be corrections or comments in the text, and, occasionally,
slanting across the typewritten page, directions for how the
document should be drawn up anew.
Our task within the secretariat was to 'translate immediately
into Russian messages to Stalin from the President of the United
States or the Prime Minister of Great Britain, as well as letters,
documents, notes, and memoranda from the US or British
embassies addressed personally to the People's Commissar of Foreign
Affairs. Sometimes these documents came provided with a
Russian translation made in the embassies, but most often an
English version alone was sent. In either case we made our own
translation at once and dispatched the correspondence to the
addressees. Replies from the Soviet leadership were sent in Russian,
but when the matter was especially important or urgent we
would make an unofficial translation for the convenience of the
ambassadors of the allied powers.
306
Sometimes these messages came with a brief covering letter
from the ambassador. Averell Harriman, the US ambassador,
sent his letters typewritten on ordinary embassy stationery, but
the British ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (later Lord
Inverchapel), was a diplomat of the old school---he wrote with
a goose quill on watermarked blue paper. The decipherment of
these missives cost Pavlov considerable labour.
In addition to this, we interpreted during Molotov's
conversations with ambassadors and other high-ranking foreign visitors
and served as interpreters for Stalin. (Pavlov was usually called
upon for meetings with the British, and I for meetings with the
Americans.) We also kept minutes and drafted telegrams on the
substance of talks for the Soviet ambassadors in London and
Washington. At times Molotov would send one or the other
of us to the embassy we dealt with on some errand.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Visit with Averell Harriman
Shortly after returning from Teheran, I had occasion to visit
Ambassador Harriman on a somewhat unusual mission.
Roosevelt had been very taken by the porcelain sculpture,
treaiting a Russian fairy-tale theme, presented by Stalin to
Churchill on the occasion of the British Prime Minister's birthday,
which fell during the Teheran meetings. Evidently Stalin decided
at that time to present something like it to the President. On
returning to Moscow he entrusted Vladimir Kemenov, President
of the USSR Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries and a connoisseur of the fine arts with selecting suitable
works. Stalin made the final choice personally---a rather large
group in bright tones reminiscent of the Palekh masters. This
was accompanied by a print of the well-known photographic
portrait of Stalin with his pipe, with the inscription: ``To my
wartime friend---President Roosevelt''. I was to take both the
sculpture and the portrait to ambassador Harriman for shipment to
Washington.
After announcing my visit by phone, I arrived at the
appointed hour at Spaso House, the ambassadorial residence, not far
from the Arbat. The sculpture, packed in a cardboard box made
the trip on the back seat of a roomy ZIS-101. The driver and I
lifted it out carefully and brought it into the drawing-room. The
__PRINTERS_P_307_COMMENT__
20*
307
doorman followed with the portrait, which was wrapped in
thick brown paper. Shortly afterwards Harriman came downstairs
to say hello. The ambassador wanted to have a look at the gifts,
and together we unpacked the sculpture and portrait. Delighted,
he suggested that we celebrate the occasion. At once a Chinese
houseboy appeared with a tray and fixed us whisky on the rocks.
We sait down at a low table in a semicircular part of the room
that looked out onto the snow-covered lawn. Harriman inspected
the portrait (I translated the inscription for him) and said that
the President would be very pleased. He asked me to convey to
Marshal Stalin his heartfelt gratitude for the expression of
friendly feeling and for the generous response to the President's
admiration of the gifts made to Churchill in Teheran.
Then Harriman began to speak of the great significance he
attached to the recent personal meeting between Marshal Stalin
and President Roosevelt.
``I feel certain,'' he said, ``that the decisions made in Teheran
will not only help in achieving military success but also have a
positive effect on cooperation between our countries after the
war.''
Not long afterwards Roosevelt sent a brief telegram thanking
Stalin for the gifts. He also sent his own portrait in a slender
metal frame, with a friendly inscription.
There can be no doubt that Harriman played an important
part in the development of Soviet-American relations, and not
only in the war years but in the following period as well. He
invariably spoke in favour of normalising and strengthening ties
between the two countries. Those in the USSR who knew him
always said as much, and Harriman has the same reputation in
the USA. In speaking of Harriman as a consistent advocate of
peaceful Soviet-American dialogue, however, it should not be
overlooked that he is a staunch defender of the American way
of life and the capitalist system, and makes no secret of his
antipathy towards socialism. He himself, after all, comes from a
wealthy family, and has increased his fortune through his own
business success. He has persistently favoured the development of
normal relations with the Soviet Union, inasmuch as he
considers this to be in the interests of his own country. At the same
time, though, he has always regarded ``service to country"---that
is, to the USA's ruling elite, to which he himself belongs---as a
308
social duty which must be fulfilled under any circumstances.
His recently published book, Special Envoy to Churchill and
Stalin: 1941--1946, contains a chapter with the title ``How to Be
'Something and Somebody' '', which recalls the following.
Originally a member of the Republican Party, Harriman had gone
over to the Democrats in 1928. After Franklin Roosevelt
assumed the presidency in 1933, at the height of an unprecedented
economic crisis, Harriman became interested in the New Deal
and began to support it actively. ``The average Wall Streeter,''
writes Harriman [who himself belongs to that caste.---Author],
``was utterly opposed to almost everything Roosevelt tried to do
and wouldn't even go down to Washington to consult with the
government on recovery measures. I couldn't understand their
attitude. The country was in appalling condition.'' Harriman was
ostracised by his business colleagues for that. ``When I walked
down Wall Street,'' he tells us, ``men I had known all my life
crossed to the other side so they would not have to shake my
hand."^^1^^
Another incident is no less revealing. In 1946 Harriman was
the US ambassador to Great Britain. By that time the Truman
administration in Washington had already begun to move away
from the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and
towards that of cold war. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace,
who had been Vice-President under Roosevelt, publicly came out
against this trend. Truman asked for Wallace's resignation, and
immediately phoned Harriman in London to offer him the newly
vacated post. Harriman writes that he was glad to accept. This
says a great deal about his political attitude: although he might
not always agree with every one of the administration's actions,
he would not dissociate himself from it as long as the Democrats
held the White House.
In the years that followed I often had occasion to visit wi£h
Averell Harriman. Whenever I am in Washington I drop in on
him at his Georgetown house for an interesting and useful talk.
The red-brick building, with its tall, snow-white door, fitted with
handles of gleaming brass, is the Washington residence of the
venerated diplomat. It is surrounded by a shady park descending
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin: 1941--1946, Random House, New York, 1975, p. 54.
309
in terraces to a swimming pool. He and I have often sat
together in wicker-work chairs on the green lawn that frames the
pool, talking over the distant past, the problems of today, and
prospects for the future. Harriman has set forth his opinion on
Soviet-American relations in these terms:
``In looking back over my experiences of some fifty years with
the Soviet Union, I find that my basic judgements remain little
altered, although conditions have changed radically. . . I continue
to maintain, as in 1945. that on ideology there is no prospect of
compromise between the Kremlin and ourselves, but that we
must find ways to settle as many areas of conflict as possible in
order to live together on this small planet without war."^^1^^
The value of the little digression I have made here is, I believe,
that it may help the reader form a better understanding of the
role Harriman played in the years to which this book is devoted.
His convictions as a defender of the interests of his class, the
social system prevailing in the United States, and the good of
the country (as he saw it) must be kept in mind when
considering his actions and his attitudes towards the main events of the
Second World War.
At the same time, what Harriman has to say about those
historic events, in many of which he was a direct participant, is of
great interest, especially as regards Soviet-American relations.
Harriman has been interested in the USSR for many years. He
first set foot on Russian soil in 1899---as a boy of eight---during
one of the grand journeys his parents took him on. They landed
on the Siberian side of the Bering Sea. When he recounted this
adventure in the Kremlin, and added that none of them had a
visa, Stalin noted:
``You couldn't do that now"^^2^^
After the October Revolution, Harriman decided to establish
business contacts with Soviet Russia. During the years of the
NEP, his family obtained the Georgian Manganese concession in
Chiatura, and Harriman made a number of visits to Moscow and
the Caucasus on the concession's business, meeting with many
Soviet leaders.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and
Stalin: 1941--1946, Random House, New York, 1975, p. VI.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 40.
310
The evaluation of Stalin as a statesman and diplomat given
in Harriman's recent book is not without interest. Quite
predictably, he does not miss the chance to stress the well-known
negative sides of Stalin's character. But Harriman also speaks of
``his high intelligence, that fantastic grasp of detail, his
shrewdness and the surprising human sensitivity.. . I found him better
informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill, in some
ways the most effective of the war leaders".^^1^^
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Appointment of Eisenhower
In December of 1943 the Allies took certain practical steps
towards carrying out the Teheran decisions.
On December 7, Harriman visited Molotov in order to give
him an important message from President Roosevelt. Mr. Bohlen
accompanied Harriman as his interpreter, and I performed the
same function for the Soviet side. The President's telegram was
short, but contained an important piece of information: General
Eisenhower was to be appointed immediately as commander of
Overlord, the operation for a landing on the northern coast
of France.
The ambassador wanted to know Stalin's reaction as auicfcly
as possible, especially since the Americans had gotten the
impression that General Marshall, whom Stalin knew personally, was
preferred in Moscow. When Molotov had read the telegram,
Harriman asked:
``When can we expect to know Marshal Stalin's reaction to
this news?''
``I'll call him right now,'' Molotov answered readily.
He got up from the long table at which we were all seated,
went over to the telephone table, and stood silent for a moment
before the green instrument, which connected directly with
Stalin's private office. Then he dialed the number.
``I di-didn't interrupt anything important?" He stuttered more
than usual when he was agitated, and talking with Stalin
always disturbed him, even though they had known each other
well for many years. ``Mister Harriman is with me; he came to
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 536.
311
deliver a message addressed to you from the President. General
Eisenhower has been appointed commander of Overlord.''
He held the receiver tightly to his ear, listening.
``Yes, I understand,'' said Molotov. He waited for the click
at the other end of the line, carefully put back the receiver, and
returned to the long table.
``Marshal Stalin is satisfied with this decision,'' he told
Harriman ``He considers Eisenhower a general of experience,
especially in directing large forces and amphibious operations.''
Harriman was pleased. Apparently he found it agreeable to
inform us that a commander had been appointed; after the many
delays in the past, here was confirmation that the Western Allies
were serious about opening a second front at last.
Eisenhower's appointment did much to shape his career in
times to come, which ultimately led him to the White House.
The Kremlin also received another secret message on
December 7, this one signed by Roosevelt and Churchill. It dealt with
a number of measures connected with preparations for the
Anglo-American operation in Western Europe, and also other
operations, against Nazi Germany. It said that in order to disrupt
the German military, economic, and industrial system, to
destroy the enemy air force, and to prepare for the cross-Channel
landing, strategic priority would be given to bombing attacks on
Germany. Further, the message said that in accordance with
the Teheran understandings the scale of the operations planned
for March in the Bay of Bengal would be reduced to make more
landing craft available for an operation in Northern France.
Production of landing craft would be increased in the USA and
Britain to reinforce the upcoming operations.
The Soviet side expressed gratitude for receipt of this
information. Stalin informed Roosevelt that he welcorned the
appointment of General Eisenhower, and wished him success in
preparing for and carrying out the decisive operations ahead.
And so the Western Allies had finally begun to prepare in
earnest for an invasion of northern France.
As for the Soviet Union, it continued to contribute to the
realisation of the Teheran decisions by its actions at the front.
Despite fierce resistance from the Nazis, Soviet forces moved steadily
westward, clearing the aggressor out of more and more
territories, pushing it back irresistibly towards the frontiers of our
312
homeland. Operations in the Ukraine and the north-western
sectors of the front were proceeding particularly well.
The Red Army's victories won recognition from the Western
Allies. In a joint message to the head of the Soviet government,
dated April 18, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill wrote: ``Since
Tehran your armies have been gaining a magnificent series of
victories for the common cause. Even in the month when you
thought they would not be active they have gained these great
victories. We send you our best wishes and trust that your armies
and ours, operating in unison in accordance with our Tehran
agreement, will crush the Hitlerites."^^1^^ The message also said that
in keeping with the Teheran understanding the ``general crossing
of the sea" would be undertaken at the appointed time and
``at our fullest strength''. At the same time a ``maximum strength"
offensive was to be launched on the Italian mainland.
On April 22, Stalin sent a reply to Washington and London.
It read: ``The Soviet Government is gratified to learn that in
accordance with the Tehran agreement the sea crossing will
take place at the appointed time . . . and that you will be acting
at full strength. I am confident that the planned operation will
be a success.
``I hope that the operations you are undertaking in Italy will
likewise be successful.
``As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new
offensive at the same time so as to give maximum support to
the Anglo-American operations."^^2^^
Thus a fair start had been made towards carrying out the
Teheran decisions. But there were also serious difficulties, caused
largely by the backstage manoeuvring of London
politicians. The British Prime Minister had been an unwilling party
to the Teheran decisions, and in the months that followed he
intrigued ceaselessly to impede their realisation or to shirk them
altogether. Even though the Western Allies had, it would seem,
already exhausted every excuse for delay in opening a second
front, Churchill was not above engaging in petty machinations
involving this vitally important matter after the meeting of the
Big Three.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 138.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 138--39.
313
But there was no time left for further postponements. The
Soviet forces were advancing swiftly. In the south, Sevastopol
and Odessa had been liberated, and the Red Army was
approaching the borders of Romania. The prospect loomed large that
Soviet forces would be the first to enter German territory. The
Western powers could not take that risk; they were forced, at
last, to become more active in Western Europe---otherwise they
might not land before the coming downfall of Hitler's Reich.
London and Washington were forced to devote themselves in
earnest to preparations for the invasion. On May 14, Roosevelt
and Churchill informed Stalin: ``In order to give the maximum
strength to the attack across the sea against Northern France,
we have transferred part of our landing craft from the
Mediterranean to England. . . In order to keep the greatest number of
German forces away from Northern France and the Eastern
Front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a
maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat
against the Mediterranean coast of France."^^1^^
The Soviet side too took measures to make ready for yet
another offensive against Hitler's forces. On May 26, Stalin informed
Churchill that the Soviet high command was engaged in
intensive preparations for major new operations.
The Anglo-American forces entered Rome in early June. On
June 6, the long-awaited operation Overlord was begun. That
morning Churchill, who understood that all attempts to
sabotage Overlord would now be in vain, wrote to Stalin: ``
Everything has started well. The mines, obstacles and land batteries
have been largely overcome. The air landings were very
successful and on a large scale. Infantry landings are proceeding rapidly
and many tanks and self-propelled guns are already ashore. The
weather outlook is moderate to good."^^2^^ To which Stalin
immediately replied: ``Your communication on the successful
launching of Overlord has reached me. It is a source of joy to us all
and of hope for further successes.
``The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, to be launched
in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran
Conference, will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the
front....
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II p. 140.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 223.
314
``I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the
operations."^^1^^
And so a second front has finally appeared in Western Europe.
One of the most important decisions adopted jointly by the Big
Three had been enacted almost at the time planned. This inspired
confidence that the war would soon be ended, and at the same
time destroyed the hopes of those who wanted to draw out the
fighting and exhaust the Soviet Union in single combat with the
Axis powers. The nightmare of large-scale warfare on two fronts
had become a reality for Hitler's Germany. Churchill's ``Balkan
variant" had proved a pipe-dream, and he was forced to drop
it; he worked even more frantically, however, to derail the other
Teheran decisions.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Question of the Italian Fleet
Churchill writes in his memoirs that after the Teheran
Conference he was much worried over the question of dividing the
Italian fleet. During the discussion of this matter at the Big
Three meeting a general understanding had been reached that
the Italian fleet seized by the Anglo-Americans would be divided
among the three powers. Roosevelt, in one of his conversations
with Stalin, said that the Soviet Union could count on having a
third of these vessels. There was also agreement that the
vessels would be handed over to the Soviet side no later than the end
of January 1944. If Turkey refused to let the captured Italian
ships pass through to the Black Sea, they were to be delivered to
northern Soviet ports.
In his usual figurative style, Churchill noted that this was a
``delicate matter'', and that it was necessary to go about it ``like
a cat with a mouse''. Delayed in Cairo on account of illness,
Churchill pondered ways to create obstructions or to refuse, under some
plausible pretext, to carry out the promises made. He was
especially concerned by Roosevelt's mention of ``one third".
The question of handing over part of the Italian ships to the
USSR had first been raised at the Moscow Conference of the
three foreign ministers in October of 1943. At that time one
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 224,
315
battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and
merchant vessels with a total displacement of 40,000 tons had
been discussed. ``One-third'', however, amounted to a great deal
more, and this particularly irritated Churchill.
On January 8, 1944, Roosevelt informed the British Prime
Minister in a telegram that he intended, as previously, to
transfer one-third of the captured Italian vessels to the Soviet Union,
and that he had told Harrirnan, his ambassador to Moscow, to
discuss this question with the Soviets. In the same telegram,
Roosevelt said that Harrirnan had advised against haste in this
matter, as up to now the Russians had claimed less than a third
of the vessels. Harrirnan had pointed out that the President's
remark about one-third had not been officially recorded.
Consequently, no mention need be made of it, and the question of
handing over additional tonnage to the Russians would not arise.
Roosevelt further indicated that Harrirnan had ``emphasized the
very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships.
For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse
suspicion in Stalin and his associates as to the firmness of other
commitments made at Tehran."^^1^^
The President's telegram further noted that the chiefs of the
Anglo-American staff had objected on several counts to handing
over the ships, and spoken of the possible negative effect of
this action on upcoming military operations. The chiefs feared,
Roosevelt said, that they might thereby lose the Italian naval
and military cooperation. Furthermore, they also feared the
scuttling or sabotage of valuable ships that might be used for Anvil
and Overlord. The President addressed this question to his
British colleague: ``Do you believe it wise to present to U. J. [Uncle
Joe; Roosevelt usually referred to Stalin by this name in his
personal correspondence.---Author] the possible effect on
Overlord-Anvil .. . and suggest a delay in assigning Italian ships to
him until after the launching of Overlord-Anvil?. .. It is patently
impracticable for either of us to act singly in this matter, but
I think you will agree, that we must not go back on what we
told U.J."^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,
E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1975, Doc. N 279, p. 412.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 413,
316
Churchill says in his memoirs that he found this message
somewhat ambiguous. It is not difficult to guess, however, that
Roosevelt's suggestion was close to the British Prime Minister's own
point of view. He hastened to communicate that he thought only
the vessels mentioned at the Moscow conference should be
discussed, and that under no circumstances was the figure to be
``one-third''.
London and Washington exchanged views on this question for
some time, and ultimately arrived at a joint conclusion that is
reflected in a message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin
that arrived in Moscow on January 23, 1944. The two leaders
said that difficulties had arisen in the way of handing over to
the Soviet Union the Italian vessels, the question of which the
Soviet government brought up at the Moscow conference, and
on which agreement had been reached at Teheran. The
AngloAmerican chiefs of staff had issued a memorandum setting forth
important points which had led the USA and Britain to
conclude that ``it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually
to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the
Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational
importance."^^1^^
This was followed by the polite reservation that if the Soviet
side nonetheless wished this, the Western Allies would, of course,
open confidential negotiations with the Italians ``with a view to
concluding the necessary arrangements".^^2^^
``We are, however, very conscious,'' continued Churchill and
Roosevelt, ``of the dangers of the above course for the reasons
we have laid before you and we have therefore decided to
propose the following alternative, which from the military point of
view has many advantages."^^3^^
The alternative offer was that the Western allies temporarily
loan the Soviet Union the Royal Sovereign, a British cruiser
recently refitted in the United States, and an American light
cruiser. These two ships would fly the Soviet flag until, ``without
prejudice to military operations, the Italian vessels can be made
available".^^4^^ The British and US governments each pledged
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 186.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 187.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
~^^4^^ Ibid.
317
further to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping ``to be available
as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can
be obtained without prejudice to the projected essential operations
Overlord and Anvil."^^1^^
The message concluded: ``This alternative has the advantage
that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of the vessels
at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted
and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus, if our efforts
should take a favourable turn with the Turks, and the Straits
become open, these vessels would be ready to operate in the
Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this
alternative, which we think is in every way superior to the first
proposal."^^2^^
This appeal could not be seen as anything other than an
attempt to renege on the understandings reached just two
months earlier in Teheran. The circumstances to which
the leaders of Britain and the USA referred did not, after
all, arise overnight. They could and should have been foreseen,
but no one was worrying about them when the decision was
made. Now considerations of a different sort had come into
play. The degree of advantage to be gained by the Western
powers as a result of increasing the USSR's military might was
being weighed in London and Washington. Evidently certain
influential groups in those countries believed that there was, in
any case, no need for haste. Furthermore, the Italian fleet
included new, very modern vessels, and this was doubtless not
overlooked. The British and Americans wanted to keep these
Ships at their disposal, and offered older ones to the USSR. It
is also revealing that, as may be seen from the message cited
above, the leaders of Britain and the USA showed a strange
forgetfulness---they did not even mention the destroyers and
submarines. All of this, naturally, created surprise in Moscow.
``I must say,'' Stalin wrote in his reply, dated January 29,
``that after getting your joint favourable reply to my question
in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the Soviet Union
before the end of January 1944 I had considered the matter
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 187.
318
settled; it never occurred to me that that decision reached and
agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any way. All
the more so because we agreed at the time that the matter
would be fully settled with the Italians during December and
January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing
has been said to the Italians on this score."^^1^^
It was obvious that in the situation that had arisen there was
little sense in insisting that the Teheran decisions be followed
in full. The message from the Western leaders made it clear that
if this were done they would hold lengthy negotiations with
Marshal Badoglio, who, in turn, world ``talk it over" with the Italian
navy. All this meant a delay of many months in handing over
the promised ships. Therefore the Soviet government agreed to
the temporary loan of the British battleship and the American
cruiser, and also of 20,000 tons of merchant shipping from the
British merchant marine and the same from the American. In
doing so, the Soviet side emphasised the importance of avoiding
delays; the shipping agreed on was to be transferred to the
Soviet Union during the month of February. Stalin then pointed
out the following: ``There is no mention in your reply of the
transfer to the Soviet Union at the end of January of the eight
Italian destroyers and four submarines to which you, Mr. Prime
Minister, and you, Mr. President, consented in Tehran."^^2^^
Stalin stressed the importance of this question: the cruiser and
the battleship would be of no value without the accompanying
vessels. The USA and Britain, he argued, had the entire Italian
navy at their disposal, and so had no difficulty in turning over
for Soviet use the eight destroyers and four submarines agreed
upon. ``I also agree to accept,'' Stalin continued, ``instead of
Italian destroyers and submarines, as many U.S. or British
destroyers and submarines for the Soviet Union."^^3^^ Moreover,
attention was drawn to the fact that the question of the transfer
of these vessels could not be postponed, but should be settled
simultaneously with the transfer of the battleship and the
cruiser as had been agreed upon in Teheran.
The resolute tone of the Soviet government's answer had a
sobering effect in London and Washington. In their new message,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 190.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 191.
319
received in Moscow on February 24, they declared that there
was ``no thought" of not making the transfers as agreed at
Teheran. All that they wanted, the two leaders said, was to do this
``without hazarding the success of Anvil and Overlord''. They
promised, moreover, that ``an effort will be made at once to
make available from the British Navy the eight destroyers''; and
said that ``four submarines will also be provided temporarily by
Great Britain".^^1^^
While he was in the Kremlin submitting one of the messages
on this question to Stalin, the British ambassador, Clark Kerr,
remarked that all the destroyers his country was offering were
old. In consequence, Stalin sent the following message to
Roosevelt and Churchill on February 26, 1944: ``I have misgivings
about their combat qualities. It seems to me that the British
and U. S. Navies should find no difficulty in assigning, out of
the eight destroyers, at least four modern, not old, ones. . . As
a result of military operations by Germany and Italy we have
lost a substantial part of our destroyers. It is, therefore, very
important for us to have that loss repaired at least in part."^^2^^
But London and Washington refused to reconsider their
decision even though, along with everything else, this clearly looked
like an unfriendly act towards their Soviet Ally. On March 9 a
joint message from Churchill and Roosevelt, addressed to Stalin,
was received in Moscow. It said: ``Although the Prime Minister
instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers
we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of
absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite
efficient for escort duty."^^3^^ This was followed by the assertion
that the entire Italian navy had only seven fleet destroyers, which
could not in any case be used in the north, that the British
fleet had suffered great losses, that vitally important landing
operations were coming up in connection with Overlord, and so
on. For all of these reasons, the message said, ``the Prime
Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the
present time".^^4^^
To make a long story short, January passed, and February,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 197--98.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 206.
~^^3^^ Ibid., pp. 208--09.
~^^4^^ Ibid.
320
and March came, and still the exchanges on the transfer of
vessels continued. The Western Allies, plainly, were in no hurry
to shoulder the obligations they had undertaken in Teheran.
They did so unwillingly, under pressure, and after a
considerable delay.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Fundamental Change
The decisive influence on the development of political events
in this period was, without a doubt, the military situation. By
the end of 1943, a fundamental change has occurred in the
course of the Second World War. The Soviet armed forces, and
the whole anti-Hitler coalition, had won signal victories. An
irreversible shift was taking place in the balance of forces of the
Allies and the Axis in the military, political, and economic
spheres. The strategic situation in the war theatres was undergoing
key changes. The offensive strategy of Hitler's Germany had
met with catastrophe; after the defeat at Stalingrad, the armies
of the fascist bloc were unable to achieve a single major success.
In the second part of 1943, they were forced to take the
defensive.
The chief reason for these important changes were the historic
victories won by the Soviet armed forces in the summer and
autumn of 1943. The Red Army, fighting alone against the
main forces of the Axis, dealt the enemy a series of crushing
blows; the result was that by the end of 1943, long before the
second front was opened in Europe, a fundamental change had
taken place in the balance of forces in the Second World War.
In his speech at the meeting to mark the 26th anniversary
of the October Revolution, Stalin, as Chairman of the State
Defence Committee, noted that the year then drawing to a close
had been a turning point in the war primarily because the Red
Army had been able, for 'the first time since the fighting began,
to carry out a major summer offensive; another reason was that
in a relatively short time the more experienced units of the Nazi
forces had been beaten and destroyed, while at the same time
Soviet forces were reinforced and battle-tempered in the course
of the year's successful offensives.
At the same time, the actions of our Western Allies were also
__PRINTERS_P_321_COMMENT__
21---1996
321
having their effect on the course of the war. The defeat of the
Italian-German armies in North Africa, the landing of the
Anglo-American forces in Italy and then in France, the successes
achieved by the USA and Britain in the Atlantic and in the
war in the Pacific---all of these blows took their toll on the
common enemy. The battles on the Soviet-German front,
however, were the key ones; they were the biggest, and the most
fiercely fought. From November 1942 up to the end of 1943,
Soviet armies destroyed 218 of the divisions of Nazi Germany
and its satellites. During the same period, the Red Army pushed
its lines forward by distances from 500 up to 1,300 kilometres
and liberated nearly half of the occupied territory of the USSR,
moving steadily toward the western borders of the country. The
attempts of Nazi commanders to withstand the onslaught of
the Soviet forces met with no success.
The defeat of the Italian-German forces in North Africa
improved conditions for the US and British navy and aviation
based on the Mediterranean, and opened for the Allies new
lines for communication with the Middle East, India, and their
armed forces active in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
In offensives undertaken in the summer and autumn of 1943,
Anglo-American forces occupied Sicily and the southern part of
the Apennine peninsula. Italy surrendered, and the Italian army
ceased to exist. This considerably weakened the fascist bloc and
gave the Allies dominance over the Mediterranean. A large part
of Italy, however, was still held by the Wehrmacht, and the
forces of the Western Allies, so urgently required for opening
a second front in Northern France, were still tied down in the
Mediterranean theatre.
By the end of 1943, important changes had taken place in
the Pacific theatre as well. Here, too, events at the Soviet--
German front had a great influence on the way things went. The
quantitative and qualitative superiority of the Allied forces over
those of imperialist Japan grew steadily.
Throughout this time, however, the greatest number of
German infantry and aviation units continued to be concentrated
on the Soviet-German front.
It was not only the course of the armed struggle and the
improving strategic position of the armed forces of the anti-Hitler
coalition, though, that underlay the fundamental change in the
322
fortunes of war. A whole complex of factors determined the
outcome, among them economic and political factors.
The economic successes of the Soviet people were of prime
importance. Despite the temporary loss of important economic
regions, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, was
able to produce more materiel than Nazi Germany, which
exploited the resources of a large part of Europe. At the same
time, the plans of Western leaders---especially Churchill---to drag
out the war were becoming more and more plainly unrealistic.
The Wehrmacht had exhausted much of its strength already in
battles along the Soviet-German front, and the Western Allies
were able to effect a landing on the continent without large
losses. In ruling quarters in Britain and the USA, interest began
to be shown in coordinating strategy with that of the Soviet
Union and carrying out concerted operations in Europe. But
even at this stage in the war, forces hostile to the Soviet Union
continued to exert a palpable influence on the main political
and military organisations of Britain and the USA.
The approach of the victorious Red Army to the frontiers of
the USSR had a significant effect on the overall international
situation. The resistance movement became more active in all
countries. The year of the radical change, 1943, was marked
by an upsurge in the anti-fascist struggle in all occupied
countries. Throughout Europe, patriots united on a national scale.
Central and local organisations were created within the resistance
movement, and the front of armed struggle against the fascist
aggressors and their henchmen was broadened. Leftist forces,
led by national Communist parties, came to exert a stronger
influence in the resistance movement.
At the same time, diverse forms of cooperation between the
Soviet Union and the national contingents of the liberation
movement were also developing. The Soviet government lent its full
support to this movement. By destroying the chief forces of the
Hitlerite bloc on the battlefield, the Red Army greatly assisted
the peoples of enslaved countries in their fight against the
fascist aggressors and promoted the growth of the liberation
movement.
Finally, the debacle suffered by the Wehrmacht on the
SovietGerman front, and also the defeat of German and Italian forces
in North Africa and Italy, aggravated the crisis within the
__PRINTERS_P_323_COMMENT__
21*
323
fascist bloc, causing serious political complications within the
aggressors' camp. Defeat on various fronts and the bleak prospects
for the battles that lay ahead undermined the morale of the
people and the army alike. Nazi Germany was faced with a
grievous lack of confidence in its political and military leadership.
Ultimate victory, though, was still a long way off. The
struggle would still be hard, and demand new efforts. The countries
of the fascist bloc still had a mighty military machine at their
disposal, and great material resources with which to continue
the war. Unity within the anti-Hitler coalition, and among all
freedom-loving forces, was indispensable.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Henry Wallace in Tashkent
During this time one of the most stalwart supporters of
American-Soviet cooperation was Henry A. Wallace, Vice-President
of the United States. He called repeatedly for extending the
positive experience gained in joint ventures within the anti-Hifler
coalition to the post-war period as well. Wallace was with
Roosevelt when the latter had to stand against those who favoured a
``hard line" towards the Soviet Union. It is not surprising,
therefore, that far-right elements within the USA's ruling elite had
a dislike of him. When Wallace was scheduled to go to the
Soviet Union on a good-will mission, Roosevelt was pressured
into keeping Moscow off the vice-presidential itinerary, thus
depriving him of the opportunity to meet with top Soviet leaders.
Reactionary politicians in the USA feared that Wallace might
express too cordial a sympathy for the Soviet people; in their
opinion, this would be harmful to ``American interests''. It was
decided that Wallace should visit only Central Asia, afterwards
returning to the USA through Siberia.
Wallace was to arrive in Tashkent from Chongquing (
Chungking) in mid June, 1944. Ambassador Harriman flew to the
Uzbek capital to meet his Vice-President.
While in the USSR Wallace gave particular attention to
agricultural problems---a field in which he had a personal interest.
He and Harriman visited a number of state farms and collective
farms, and also several experimental stations where scientists were
developing new varieties of cotton, potatoes, and melons.
Wallace was in his element: ``All his life, Wallace has been trying
324
to get American fanners to accept science,'' wrote Harriman in
one of the telegrams he sent to Washington after his return to
Moscow. ``In the Soviet Union he saw scientific methods being
forced on the farmers, and it was heaven for him. Here he found
capable agricultural scientists with the authority to compel
farmers to follow their orders."^^1^^
Unlike Wallace, Harriman and Tommy Thompson, a first
secretary of the US embassy in Moscow who accompanied him,
were more interested in the social and political conditions of the
region, which, as Harriman noted, was usually closed to foreign
diplomats.^^2^^ The ambassador noted in his diary that the people
were exceptionally 'hospitable, that an abundance of the earth's
gifts was to be found at the local markets, and 'that he himself
saw proof of the economic progress made by Soviet Central
Asia, which formerly had been an isolated and backward region.
On the eve of the Vice-President's departure for the USA, a
gala evening was held in the Tashkent Opera and Ballet Theater.
Wallace made a short speech in Russian stressing the importance
of continued American-Soviet cooperation. Harriman writes, not
without a certain envy, that the audience ``managed to
understand him".^^3^^ Afterwards the American visitors saw the first
Uzbek-Language production of Bizet's Carmen.
Wallace returned to the United States via Omsk, Krasnoyarsk,
Yakutsk, Markovo, and Uelkal, then on through Alaska and
Canada. His trip to the Soviet Union left a strong impression
on him, and everything he had seen made him an even more
steadfast friend of the Soviet people, an even more dedicated
advocate of continuing the cooperation born in wartime. His
clearly defined position on these questions led the ``hard liners"
to work against his renomination to the vice-presidency in the
1944 elections. Wallace's enemies tried to convince Roosevelt
that the Vice-President's popularity was declining, and warned
that to keep ihim on the ticket might cost the Democrats the
White House. Wallace had the support of certain leaders of the
Democratic Party, of the trade unions, of many liberal
newspapers and magazines, and also of those closest to Roosevelt,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 331--32.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
325
including his wife, Eleanor. Nonetheless, a considerable number
of Democratic leaders favoured the nomination of some other
candidate. Byrnes, Rayburn, Truman, Winant, Justice Douglas,
and several others were mentioned as possibilities.
That during this complicated discussion of different
candidates Roosevelt sent Wallace off to China and the Soviet Union
was seen by some as evidence that he was ready to yield to
those pressing for a different vice-president. Roosevelt held a
caucus of Democratic leaders at which strong objections to
Wallace's candidacy were voiced. The list of possible nominees was,
in essence, brought down to two: Byrnes and Truman. By the
end of the caucus, though, Truman's supporters had obtained
written acknowledgement from the President 'that their
candidate was the most suitable.
When Wallace returned to Washington, it was hinted to him
that he would not be on the ticket. He refused to discuss the
matter with anyone but the President himself, and broached the
question on his next visit to the White House. He cited polls
showing that he had considerable support as the vice--
presidential candidate among the delegates to the upcoming Democratic
convention in Chicago. Roosevelt seemed impressed, and
promised to send a letter giving his personal support. ``I hope it's
the same team again, Henry,'' he told Wallace.^^1^^
The letter promised came soon afterwards to the chairman of
the Democratic convention. Roosevelt wrote of Wallace, ``I like
him and I respect him and he is my personal friend. For these
reasons I personally would vote for his renomination if I were a
delegate to the convention."^^2^^
It is possible that at the time Roosevelt really thought he
could overcome the resistance of Wallace's enemies and keep him
as Vice-President. Many American authors, however, maintain
that the President had already settled on Truman in the belief
that only his candidacy could ensure him the support of the right
wing of the Democratic Party and thus guarantee victory at
the polls, but was unwilling to make his decision public. At any
rate, when Byrnes, who had also been given to understand he
would not be on die ticket, spoke to Roosevelt on the telephone,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ James M. Burns, Roosevelt: the Soldier of Freedom, p. 505.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 506.
326
the President denied that he had written him off. Indeed, he
advised Byrnes to press his candidacy. But when the convention
opened in Chicago, Roosevelt telephoned from San Diego to
say that Truman was his choice. He was at last convinced,
apparently, that this decision was most likely to win him the White
House for another four years. ``Tell the Senator,'' the President
said during that call, ``that if he wants to break up the
Democratic Party by staying out, he can; but he knows as well as I
what that might mean at this dangerous time in the world."^^1^^
Truman did not hold out long, and the question was settled.
After winning re-election, Roosevelt offered Wallace the post of
Secretary of Commerce in his new cabinet. But Wallace was
not to hold the job for long. Roosevelt's death in April of 1945
brought Truman to the White House, and signalled an abrupt
pull-back in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Wallace
publicly opposed the USA's slide towards cold war, and Truman
lost no time in removing him from the new administration.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The ``Parade'' of War Prisoners
That sunny July morning in 1944 I was free: my duty shift
did not start until two. Thus I was able to witness an unusual
sight. The previous evening it had become known that German
prisoners of war would be convoyed through Moscow the next
morning. They were to be marched from the Dynamo Stadium
past the Belorussky Railway Station, and then along the
Sadovoye Ring. When I got to Samotyochnaya Square a crowd of
Muscovites had already gathered there. The overpass that now
looms over the square had not yet been built; the broad street
descended gradually from Petrovka to Tsvetnoi Boulevard. Soon
we saw the first ranks in the distance. They filled the whole road;
mounted guards rose along the sidewalks to the left and right.
The gray-green mass slowly drew nearer, and more and more
ranks appeared in the distance. The officers came first; they
were still trying to keep some measure of smartness and military
bearing. But the soldiers who came after were a sorry enough
sight. Their unbuttoned, sun-bleached field shirts sagged from
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
327
their shoulders. Almost all of them stumbled along listlessly, heads
down; some wore crumpled forage caps, others were hatless.
The onlookers stood motionless on the sidewalk, eyes riveted
to the passing prisoners. The war had entered its fourth year,
and many of the people who had come here to look had already
paid a bitter price---friends and relatives lost, trials and
hardships suffered. All of them, however, remained calm and
dignified, although their eyes were full of grief and reproach. No
one shouted, no one made threats.
I remembered how not long before Wehrmacht units had
goosestepped down 'the Champs Elysees. Soon afterwards, returning
from their Blitzkrieg campaign to the west, they marched in a
victory parade in Berlin. That was the summer of 1940. I was
in the Tiergarten, not far from the bedecked reviewing stand
where the self-confident Fiihrer stood, arm raised in a Nazi salute
to his ``invincible armies''. How arrogant and haughty they were!
Already they could see the whole world at their feet. It was at
that time that intensive work was begun on the Barbarossa plan:
preparations were underway for a treacherous attack on the
Soviet Union. In June of 1941, the Nazi hordes turned their full
might to the east, driving towards Moscow. In the autumn of
that year Hitler boasted that the cupolas of the Kremlin
cathedrals could be seen from the Wehrmacht's frontlines.
And here they were, in Moscow. I stood on the Sadovoye
Ring, watching the gray-green stream. My two-year-old son,
Sergei, sat without stirring on my shoulders, watching this strange
spectacle. He had been told that these were captured enemy
soldiers, but of course did not understand the real meaning of
what he saw. How much that ``parade'' of war prisoners said
to me! It filed past for a half-hour, an hour, two. There were
thousands of them, tens of thousands. They had invaded our
land with weapons in their hands, burning and destroying
everything in their path. Their orders were to raze the capital of
the Soviet Union, to hand over all our riches to German
concerns. But the task had proved beyond their strength, impossible.
They had been able to enter Moscow only as prisoners of war.
And now they were being led through the streets of Moscow, the
city they had moved towards so eagerly, which now had become
the symbol of the invincibility of the socialist state.
What were they thinking about as they plodded along the
328
Sadovoye Ring? Did they realise that Hitler had duped them
into a hopeless venture, that now their own country was on the
brink of disaster, that the Nazis' criminal aggression, and
everything they had done in the countries and regions they had for
a time enslaved, would have to be paid for?
I looked into their faces. Many of them were staring glumly
at the pavement underfoot, indifferent to everything. But there
were some who threw angry looks. Probably they still believed
in the ``wonder weapon" with which Hitler had promised to
reverse the course of the war. But that was the raving of a
maniac, overcome with defeat and fear of the future. There
would be no more lightning victories for the Wehrmacht---that
was obvious to everyone who watched, on July 17, 1944, as
57,000 prisoners were marched through Moscow, a city full of
sunshine and people, a city confident of the Tightness of its
cause and its ultimate victory.
In later years, in West Germany, I happened to meet several
men who had marched in that memorable ``parade''. Their
reminiscences were not without interest. Knowing about the
atrocities of Gestapo men and the inhuman treatment the Nazis
gave Soviet prisoners of war, they were very alarmed when a
large mass of prisoners was brought together outside Moscow.
They were afraid that they would be targets for vengeance, that
they would be ``driven like cattle clear to Siberia'', where they
would all freeze to death. But first, they feared, they were to
be marched through a raging crowd, which would vent on them
its fury and hatred. Recalling the terrifying picture their
imaginations had painted, the men would always say they were
surprised by the restraint and calm of the Muscovites who had
turned out to look at them.
A joke was born at this time: A German prisoner of war,
returning to his camp from Moscow, looks at the map of the
hemispheres hanging on the barracks wall and asks his buddy,
``What's that little brown spot in the middle of Europe?''
``That's Germany.''
``And that huge pink stretch that goes all the way out to the
Pacific?''
``That's the Soviet Union.''
``Did the Fiihrer see that map before he sent us here?''
This joke was often to be heard in West Germany after the
war.
329
The procession of prisoners was instructive not only for those
who marched in it but also for foreign diplomats in Moscow,
who also witnessed it. They could not help but see in that unusual
spectacle the might of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people's
fortitude, determination, and faith in their forthcoming victory.
Without a doubt, the sight of thousands and thousands of men
from Hitler's Wehrmacht, which not long before had been
thought invincible, being led as prisoners through the streets of
Moscow had an enormous psychological impact. It goaded the
leaders of the Western powers yet again to take a more sober
look at the facts: victory over Hitler's Germany and its allies was
not far off. The war was coming to an end, and the Soviet
Union, despite the enormous casualties and destruction it had
suffered, would emerge still more robust and powerful than
before. It was obvious too that the USSR would play a vastly more
active role in the post-war world than it did between the two
world wars, and that its international prestige would reach new
heights. Lastly, the politicians of the West were compelled to
ponder the circumstance that the success of the resistance
movement in countries occupied by the Axis powers, which had been
greatly advanced by the brilliant victories of Soviet arms, would
necessarily change the political situation in Europe, given the
important part played in that movement by progressive forces,
and especially by the Communists, who had shown immense
courage and staunchness in the struggle against the aggressors.
The conclusion logically to be drawn from all of this was that
a new approach towards the socialist state ought to be worked
out, that new paths must be sought in international politics and
a new mechanism be created for cooperation between states with
different social systems. As for the Soviet Union, it had never
deviated from Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence between
countries with different social systems, and urged that problems
arising be resolved through negotiations rather than armed force,
and that mutually beneficial cooperation be undertaken. The
way to such cooperation would have been open, had the Western
Allies been willing. In London and Washington, however, forces
hostile to the idea of cooperating on an equal footing with
the Soviet Union continued to hold sway, and sought to resume
the pre-war anti-Soviet course. In essence, they hoped to exert
pressure on Moscow while the Soviet people was still embroiled
330
in a bloody and bitter struggle against the main force of Nazi
Germany and its allies, and thereby bring about post-war
arrangements suited to the expansionist drives of US and British
monopolies.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Two Conceptions of the UN Charter
On August 21, 1944, a three-power conference opened in
Dumbarton Oaks (Washington, D.C.); its purpose was to draft a
charter for a new international organisation. The work of this
conference and the discussions that took place at it showed that
the goals of the organisation to be created were seen differently
by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the USA and Britain,
on the other.
In Moscow, political thinking had long since addressed itself
to the problem of protecting mankind securely from the threat
of a new world-wide conflict. A great deal might depend on the
structure of an international organisation for maintaining peace
and security in the world. The Soviet government stressed
emphatically that such an organisation must act promptly and
effectively. The unity of the great powers was the cornerstone on
which the lasting edifice of peace was to be raised. It was from
precisely this position that the Soviet government proceeded
during the working-out of the new organisation's structure.
Moreover, particular attention must be paid to the negative
experience with the League of Nations, which in its time had been
connected with quite a few illusions in the West.
The chief defect of the League of Nations was that it proved
incapable of taking effective measures against violators of the
peace. There was nothing coincidental about this: the League's
founders were not, at bottom, interested in an effective mechanism
for stopping aggression, because to a large extent they saw the
League as a cover under which to prepare for an attack on the
Soviet Union---the only socialist state existing at that time.
The participants in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference could
not, of course, overlook the failures of the League of Nations as
they elaborated a structure for an international security
organisation. The problem was discussed several times in the course of
the conference, and special attention was given to voting
procedure in the governing body of the proposed organisation, since
331
it was recognised that unity must be maintained among the
great powers, for they were to bear prime responsibility for
maintaining peace in the world.
It was on just this question, however, that serious differences
arose at the conference, reflecting conflicting views of the
proposed security organisation's goals. For the Soviet Union, the
chief concern was achieving lasting peace; the ruling elites of the
USA and Britain, on the contrary, regarded the new international
organisation mainly as a tool for achieving their imperialist aims.
When the Americans spoke of consolidating peace, they meant
a peace in which the United States would dominate. Even
President Roosevelt, in stressing the importance of concerted action
by the great powers, had something in mind that might be
expressed by the formula ``equality for all, but more equality for
some than others''. Undoubtedly, it was believed in American
ruling quarters at this time that after the war the USA would
be the world's strongest power, exerting a decisive influence on
international affairs. The thought of a ``Pax Americana" was
already being cherished by some in Washington. The idea that
the United States was to have a ``starring'' role perceptibly
affected the American conception of a charter for an international
organisation to maintain the peace.
I had the honour to be part of the Soviet delegation to the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which was headed by Andrei
Gromyko, then the USSR's ambassador to the USA. The work
of the conference and its atmosphere are described in my book,
At the Birth of the United Nations. I will confine myself here to
just a few observations.
Each delegation brought to Dumbarton Oaks a draft for the
charter, or ``fundamental document'', of the new security
organisation. The conference began with a comparison of the positions
held by the different participants based on a point-by-point
discussion of the texts submitted. In brief, their content was as
follows.
The British proposals, which consisted of five sections, started
off with a statement of the principles and aims of the new
organisation, and also of its structure. In addition to
maintaining peace and security in the world, the organisation, was to
undertake the task of improving economic conditions throughout
the world and performing other positive functions. Emphasis was
332
placed on the need to ensure a special role for the four powers
which were to found the organisation: the USSR, the USA,
Britain, and China. The main bodies were to be a world
assembly and a world council. The second section contained
suggestions for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and for
measures to maintain peace and security. The world council was
to be responsible for settling political disputes; its resolutions
would be adopted by a two-thirds vote, including the votes of
the four great powers. The following section was devoted to
military questions. It was proposed that a military-staff--
committee be made up of representatives of the four powers. Garrisons
were to be stationed in several specified regions.
The American proposals which were very detailed, contained
the following sections: 1. General character of the international
organisation; 2. The General Assembly; 3. The Executive
Council; 4. The International Court of Justice; 5. The peaceful
settlement of disputes; 6. The definition of a threat to peace and
violations of peace, and actions to be taken in consequence;
7. Regulation of arms and armed forces; 8. Measures in the field
of economic and social cooperation; 9. General administration
and the secretariat; 10. Procedure for creating the organisation
and setting it into action.
The section on the General Assembly stated that all members
of the organisation were to have one vote in that body. On
questions of budget and finance, however, each country was to
have a number of votes proportional to its financial contribution
to the organisation; this was calculated to ensure greater
influence for the USA. According to the American proposals, the
Executive Council was to have eleven members, including the
four founding powers and France. Resolutions would be adopted
by majority vote including the concurring votes of all the
permanent member-countries. The Economic and Social Council
was to have broad powers, in particular for coordinating the
activities of various specialised agencies working in the
socioeconomic field. The new organisation was to have a general
director with a five-year term of office, to whom the secretariat
would be subordinated.
The Soviet proposal stressed that the leading role in the new
organisation should belong to those powers which had borne the
main burden in the war against the fascist aggressors. It was
333
they who would be chiefly responsible for maintaining peace. For
that reason all the great powers should be represented in the
central body, and their unanimous vote required for the
adoption of resolutions. The Soviet proposals stated that the new
organisation was to have international armed forces at its
disposal. It was further urged that since the organisation's prime
aim was security, other questions---economic, social, etc.---should
not be included in its competence, but rather entrusted to a
separate organisation.
Although the draft charters agreed or were similar on many
points, even a preliminary comparison made it clear that they
were founded on fundamentally different conceptions, and this
difference was likewise reflected in the discussions at Dumbarton
Oaks. The British and American proposals laid emphasis on
the all-embracing character of the new organisation, while the
Soviet side gave prominence to the basic and most important
task---repulsing the aggression and maintaining peace and
security. Through the efforts of the Soviet delegation, the United
Nations Charter as ultimately adopted particularly stressed this
chief task.
A few aspects of the discussions on these draft charters may
now be explored.
Much light was thrown on the positions of the participants
by the discussion of the term ``aggression'', which appeared in
the Soviet proposal. The British and the Americans suggested
that the term should not be used because it ``might cause
difficulties''. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the head of the British
delegation, expressed the opinion that in many cases two countries
went to war without it being clear which was the aggressor.
Gromyko rejected this sort of thinking decisively, pointing out
that one of the organisation's main functions would be
determining, in every given situation, which country was the
aggressor. ``This will be the sacred duty of the future organisation for
international security,'' Gromyko said. ``If we do not speak of
it plainly, we shall be making it easier for a potential
aggressor to go about his ugly work.''
The Americans and British nevertheless continued to object
to the term ``aggression''. Seeking to prevent the concept from
being precisely formulated, they raised sundry formal and'
technical questions. Cadogan took the line that the important thing
334
was not how aggression was defined but the new organisation's
ability to put an end to conflicts. Protracted debates over which
country was the aggressor, he claimed, would only waste time.
James Clement Dunn, an American delegate, referred to the
many years of debate in the League of Nations over the
concept of aggression, in which no agreement had ever been reached.
It was obvious that the Western powers were doing their best
to exclude defining aggression from the organisation's
competence. The Soviet side vigorously opposed every attempt to do
this. As a Soviet delegate pointed out, it was precisely the lack
of a clear definition of aggression that had prevented measures
from being taken in the past against violators of the peace. The
League of Nations had been unable to reach agreement on the
term in question because influential political groups in the West
had not wanted it clearly defined. Thus they had encouraged
fascist rulers by creating a loophole that made it possible to
commit acts of aggression with impunity.
After a long and sometimes rather heated discussion, the
concept of aggression remained without any firm definition; the
document agreed on at Dumbarton Oaks did, nonetheless, make
mention of ``acts of aggression".
Now, looking back, it is clear why the representatives of the
USA and Britain at Dumbarton Oaks resisted so stubbornly the
inclusion in the UN Charter of a definition of ``aggression''.
Flagrant acts of imperialist aggression and interference in the affairs
of others that have taken place since the war plainly show who
did not want aggression to be defined in the UN Charter, and
why. The position US and British representatives took on this
question at Dumbarton Oaks shows that in agreeing to the
creation of an international security organisation, Washington and
London also wanted to keep a free hand; they foresaw that the
lack of a clear definition of aggression would leave the way
open for imperialistic adventures of every sort.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Controversy over Veto Rights
During the preliminary exchange of opinions among members
of the anti-Hitler coalition on past-war settlement the need for
unity among the great powers was not doubted if the proposed
organisation for international security was to work effectively.
335
Nevertheless, there was heated discussion of .this question as well
at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. This began when the
American and British representatives suggested that the general rule
of unanimity be inapplicable if the dispute involved the interests
of one of the permanent Council members. The Soviet
delegation took a negative attitude towards this proposal. The
controversy on voting procedure went on throughout the conference,
and a great deal of pressure was brought to bear on the Soviet
delegation. Edward Stettinius, the head of the American
delegation, said that the US Senate would never approve a document
that allowed a party to a dispute the right to vote on it. He
expressed concern that the Soviet Union's ``rigid'' position might
keep the United Nations Organisation from being created at all,
since the smaller countries, he claimed, would not agree to the
procedure proposed by the USSR. The disagreements that had
arisen, Stettinius warned, might become known to the press, and
then there would be a ballyhoo about the ``failure'' of the
conference. The American position was upheld by the British
delegation.
Despite these pressures, the Soviet delegation stood firm.
Gromyko declared that no exceptions could be allowed to the
principle of unanimity among the great powers. He recalled that
this principle had been fundamental since the very beginning of
the talks. It was only natural that the great powers should have a
special position in the organisation, inasmuch as they would be
chiefly responsible for maintaining peace. The Soviet delegate
expressed confidence that the smaller countries would accept this
principle; such an approach had always been envisaged.
``One should not suppose beforehand,'' Gromyko said, ``that
the great powers, who bear the main responsibility for the
security of nations, will immediately become involved in disputes.
On the contrary, one must hope that their successful cooperation
during the war and their present struggle for the security of
mankind will be of great significance for the maintenance of
peace in time to come.''
The Soviet Union, of course, had weighty reasons for
adhering firmly to the position on this matter that had been agreed
on earlier. It was not difficult to see that to accept the
AngloAmerican proposals would be to undermine the unity df the great
powers which was so vital to the cause of peace. A serious blow
336
__CAPTION__The Soviet delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Left to right:
S. V. Krylov, S. A. Golunsky, S. K. Tsarapkin, A. A. Sobolev, A. A.
Gromyko, V. M. Berezhkov, Lieutenant-General N. V. Slavin, Rear Admiral
K. K. Rodionov, G. G. Dolbin, M. M. Yunin
__CAPTION__Churchill being seen off at Moscow Airport
in October 1944
__CAPTION__The Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow
would be dealt to cooperation among them if one of the
permanent members of the Council were denied the right to take
part in the voting and the Security Council passed a decision
without it---let alone against it. The Soviet Union could not
allow the Western powers to make use of numerical majority
for dictating their will to it as a socialist state.
In proposing that a party to a dispute not be allowed a vote in
the Council, the Americans and British were certainly not being
disinterested and objective, as they pretended. At that time the
Soviet Union was the only socialist power, and Washington and
London were confident that in the case of any serious
disagreements they would have an absolute majority in the Council and
the Assembly of the new organisation. Thus, they could safely
pose as being prepared to submit to the rules they were
proposing. At the time, it even did not occur to them that any of the
Council's members (except the USSR), bound as they were by
a multitude of economic, political, ideological, and military ties
to the USA and Britain, might dare to vote against them. They
wanted to deprive the Soviet Union of the right to take part in
the voting on any possible dispute or conflict that immediately
affected its interests.
The talks at Dumbarton Oaks had practically reached a dead
end on this fundamental matter, and so the Americans decided
to take the discussion beyond the framework of the conference.
President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Stalin expressing
concern over the progress of the talks. ``One issue of importance
only apparently remains on which we have not yet reached
agreement,'' Roosevelt wrote. ``This is the question of voting in the
Council. We and the British both feel strongly that in the
decisions of the Council parties to a dispute should not vote even
if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council
whereas I gather from your Ambassador that your Government
holds a contrary view.''
Roosevelt explained that he could not abandon the principle
the Americans were upholding, referring to the position of the
smaller nations, which, he maintained, would see any other
solution as an attempt by the great powers to put themselves above
the law. ``I hope for these reasons,'' he wrote in conclusion, ``that
you will find it possible to instruct your Delegation to agree to
our suggestion on voting. The talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be
__PRINTERS_P_337_COMMENT__
22---1996
337
speedily concluded with complete and outstanding success if this
can be done."^^1^^
Roosevelt's appeal did not lead to a solution of the problem.
In his reply, Stalin recalled the Americans' initial proposal, by
which a special voting procedure was to be established for
disputes directly involving one or several members of the Council
who have the status of permanent members. After emphasising
that this suggestion seemed to him the right one, Stalin
continued: ``Otherwise the agreement we reached at the Tehran
Conference, where we were guided by the desire to ensure above
all the four-Power unity of action so vital to preventing future
aggression, will be reduced to nought. This unity implies,
naturally, that there must be no suspicions among the Powers. As to
the Soviet Union, it cannot very well ignore the existence of
certain absurd prejudices which often hamper a genuinely
objective attitude to the USSR. Furthermore, other countries should
likewise weigh the likely consequences of lack of unity among the
leading Powers."^^2^^
The caution about the possible consequences of confrontation
among the great powers was very much to the point. By this
time many political figures in the West were expressing doubts
about the Anglo-American formula. Differences cropped up even
among the American delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Some of
the American delegates felt that failure to reach agreement on
the question of voting in the Council could have an immediate
and negative effect not only on the development of military
operations in Europe but also on the prospects for the Soviet
Union's entry into the war against Japan. They argued that
this could ultimately condemn to failure the attempt to found
an international security organisation. Finally, they seriously
doubted that the Senate would agree to a limitation of the
United States' vote in a dispute which the country became
involved in. Charles Bohlen, an American diplomat who took part
in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, admits in his book Witness
to History:1929--1969 that ``there was also a good deal of
sentiment in the United States against joining an organization which,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 159.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 160.
338
under certain circumstances, would be able to force its will on
us."^^1^^
In view of this, many members of the American delegation
suggested the adoption of the Soviet position, which they thought
reasonable and which, in essence, had been the American
position earlier. Soviet firmness on this question heightened the
dissension in the Western camp.
The point of view held by many of US military and political
leaders at the time played a certain part in the ultimate
settlement of the question of voting in the United Nations Security
Council. It proved impossible, however, to reach agreement on
this at Dumbarton Oaks. The final document indicated only that
the three governments would continue to look into the matter.
Two and a half months after the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference, Roosevelt sent a message to Stalin setting forth a new
idea, which involved differentiating the voting procedure
depending on the nature of the problems being considered by the
Security Council. The Soviet government studied this proposal,
but the question remained open until the three-power conference
in Yalta, where the current procedure was finally settled on.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929--1969, W. W. Norton
and Co., New York, 1973, p. 159.
__PRINTERS_P_339_COMMENT__
22*
[339]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
THE ROAD TO POTSDAM
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Complications in Relations
Among the Allies
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Military Planning
Further work was required on the question of military planning
that had been, raised in Teheran. This work was undertaken
mainly by the Soviet and American sides, and was based on an
exchange of opinions between Stalin and Roosevelt that had
taken place in Teheran. In particular, this involved ``shuttle''
flights by American aircraft: after taking off from the West and
dropping their bombs on Germany, American squadrons could
land in Soviet territory to refuel and take on a new load of
bombs, so as to accomplish the same mission again on their way
back. On February 2, 1944, Ambassador Harriman visited Stalin
in the Kremlin to discuss this plan; the essence of their
discussion is given in Harriman's memoirs.
In stating the main points, the ambassador stressed that if the
American airforce could use landing strips in Soviet territory it
could take off from England and Italy to bomb Germany. Up to
that time bombing raids had been limited mainly to peripheral
areas, and if distant targets were attacked pilots often had to
make their way back by the same route they had come,
sometimes in damaged planes, pursued by a whole flock of German
fighter planes.
``Stalin asked Harriman how many planes would be involved.
'One to three flights of 120 planes at a time,' the
Ambassador replied. 'Would the Russians have to supply fuel?' 'No---
fuel, bombs and spare parts would be supplied by the United
States...' 'Would Americans or Russians be used to service the
planes?' Harriman replied that a number of Americans would
have to be brought in, men who were specialists in servicing the
340
B-17 and B-24 bombers. If the Russians could supply ground
personnel to work under the supervision of American specialists,
that would be an excellent arrangement."^^1^^
After thinking a little, Stalin gave his approval to the plan,
adding that it ought to make the Nazis feel the Allied blows even
more.
The shuttle bombing operation was given the code name
Frantic. Stalin suggested that for a start landing facilities on Soviet
territory be made available for 150 to 200 heavy bombers. He
also gave permission for American photo-reconnaissance planes
to land daily on Soviet territory; one such plane was to arrive
from Italy, the other from England.
``The pilots would photograph German targets as they flew
in and out,'' Harriman explained, ``and they would gladly give
special attention to any area^ of particular interest to the Red
Army."^^2^^
Stalin thanked the ambassador, and then asked about the
octane rating of the fuel used by the American planes, about how
air-to-ground communication would be maintained, and about
the language barrier to be overcome. Harriman said that he
would put General Deane, the head of the American military
mission, in charge of settling all these practical matters with
Soviet specialists.
Thus the Soviet side gave a prompt and favourable answer
to a question that the American government considered highly
important.
The second question on Harriman's mind during this talk had
to do with air bases along the Soviet Union's Pacific coast. The
Americans wanted to use such bases to step up air attacks on
Japan. The Soviet government, however, was not yet ready to
dascuss the matter.
``Stalin said he was still fearful of provoking a Japanese
attack before his forces in the Far East were re-equipped and
reinforced. He talked of transferring four infantry corps ... to the
Fair East, but that could not be done, he said, until German
resistance in the west had begun to falter. 'As soon as these forces
_-_-_
^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 296--97.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
341
are transferred,' Stalin said to Harriman, 'the Soviet Government
will cease to fear Japanese provocation.' "^^1^^
Stalin gave a positive answer to the question of whether the
Soviet side was prepared to exchange intelligence data on Japan
with the USA; he added, however, that the information Moscow
had was not extensive.
Stalin then told Harriman that Sugiyama, the chief of the
Japanese General Staff, had expressed to a Soviet representative
at an official reception in Tokyo a desire to meet with the head
of the Soviet government.
Sugiyama had told him that ``the Germans meant nothing
to the Japanese and that their treaty with Germany was only a
scrap of paper''. The Soviet leader, of course, had no intention
of meeting with Sugiyama, and no reply had been made to the
Japanese.
Nonetheless, Stalin regarded this overture by the Japanese as
an indication of their fear for the future---a fear so great that
high-ranking Japanese officer had approached an ordinary Soviet
representative on so delicate a question.
``Another straw in the wind, Stalin said, was the sudden
willingness of the Japanese to sell the Russians their oil and coal
concessions in the northern part of Sakhalin Island. The sale had
been provided for ... in April 1941. It was to have been
completed by October of that year but the Japanese had stalled for
more than two years. Now they were eager to conclude the
bargain, Stalin said, and he read this as another sign of
nervousness in Tokyo."^^2^^
Stalin also informed Harriman that the Soviet government
had received reports according to which the Japanese might soon
begin a retreat from the extensive territories they had seized.
Harriman asked Stalin where the new line of defence would
run. Stalin said he was not sure about the details, but he thought
it would run through Shanghai, the Shangdun Peninsula,
Manchuria, and around the Japanese Islands. ``The Japanese, he
added, would not engage their main forces to defend their outer
perimeter but would withdraw to the inner line which was more
convenient and easier to defend."^^3^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 297.
~^^2^^
Ibid., p. 298.
~^^3^^
Ibid.
342
As is readily apparent, Harriman had received valuable
information about Japan. By agreeing to an exchange of intelligence
data, the Soviet side had demonstrated its readiness to cooperate
actively. It is not surprising that Harriman was highly pleased
by the meeting. Returning to his embassy, he drew up a detailed
account of it for Roosevelt, adding that Stalin ``could not have
been more friendly".^^1^^
The Soviet Union also showed its good will by awarding the
Order of Suvorov to Generals Marshall and Eisenhower.
On February 10, Harriman met with Anastas Mikoyan, the
People's Commissar of Foreign Trade. Their conversation dealt
with American shipments to the Soviet Union. Mikoyan said he
was satisfied with the success of deliveries by the southern route,
across the Persian Gulf. He added that the Soviet government
would like to present awards to several Americans for their
services in organising those deliveries. Harriman promised to
consult with Secretary of State Cordell Hull to make sure that
US laws on receipt of foreign awards by American citizens were
observed.
This question was quickly settled, and on April 15, by decree
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a large group of
American officers received awards for organising deliveries of
foodstuffs to the Soviet Union and for their aid to the Red Army
in its struggle against the fascist aggressors. Major General
Donald Connolly, who was in charge of the entire operation,
received the Order of Suvorov, Second Class.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Scepticism in London
At this same period negative tendencies were becoming more
and more noticeable in relations between Moscow and London.
Churchill and many of his colleagues, seeing that the military
situation was rapidly changing in favour of the USSR, showed
an increasing nervousness. They hoped that by pressuring the
Soviet Union they might keep their positions in Eastern Europe
and the Balkans.
The British were seeking to get American support in this,
as can be seen with particular clarity from Harriman's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 299.
343
recollections of his talks with British leaders in London early in May
of 1944. President Roosevelt had summoned him to Washing-ton
for consultations, and he made a brief stopover in the British
capital.
At a late luncheon to which Harriman was invited by the
Prime Minister, Churchill complained that the Russians did not
understand his position. He had done his utmost, he said, to
smooth out disagreements between the Polish emigre government
and Moscow, and had not been met halfway. With much effort
he had persuaded the Poles to accept new boundaries, but had
gotten nothing in exchange. Harriman did not agree. He said
the Soviets had every reason not to trust the London Polish
government as then constituted, since, as Harriman said, it was
influenced by Sosnkowski and the military who saw no other future
than a war against the Soviet Union.
Churchill continued to stand his ground: he was quite content
with the stand adopted by the London Poles, which made it
possible for him to use Poland as a weapon for intriguing against
the USSR. The next day, in the course of yet another long talk,
Churchill told Harriman again that it was impossible to deal
with the Russians. The same line was taken by Sir Anthony
Eden, the British Foreign Secretary: he said that he seriously
doubted whether Britain could ever again work with the Soviets.
Harriman tried to reason with Eden, arguing that ``by patience,
understanding and readiness to be firm on matters of principle,
the Western Allies could still develop 'reasonably satisfactory
relationships' with the Russians".^^1^^
Thus, as early as the beginning of 1944, London was moving
away from its alliance with the USSR and towards confrontation.
Harriman notes in his diary that he observed a ``sharp swing
in official British opinion'', and reports that Lord Beaverbrook
told him that ``everyone in the British government . .. was
antiRussian now".^^2^^
Churchill and his closest associates continually made such
representations to the Americans, seeking to arouse in them distrust
and suspicion of Soviet policy goals. At this time everything
was focused on Poland, but in fact the question was much
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 328.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
344
broader: the ruling quarters in Britain were preparing the ground
for a review of the decisions jointly adopted by the members
of the anti-Hitler coalition, leading ultimately to abandonment
of plans for cooperation among the three great powers after the
war.
There were, of course, influential groups in the United States
that wholeheartedly agreed with Churchill's point of view.
Among them was Senator Truman, who became Vice-President
in the 1944 election. Inevitably, the intrigues of these groups
clouded the atmosphere within ithe anti-Hitler coalition.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Special Ties Between
the USA and Britain
The foreign policy of the USA and Britain continued to be
wholly directed towards creating conditions favouring the
attainment of definite military and political ends in the war against
the fascist bloc. Washington and London gave special attention
to ensuring that the terms of the post-war settlement would be
advantageous to the American and British ruling classes.
The development of cooperation between the USA and Britain
within their alliance was dictated by the interests of monopoly
capital. Anglo-American summit conferences were held in
Washington in May of 1943 and in Quebec in August of that year.
The inequality of the partners was plainly perceptible at these
conferences. The growing economic and military potential of the
USA put it in the forefront, giving it a greater voice in settling
political and strategic questions.
Under these circumstances, the British ruling quarters sought
to broaden political and military cooperation with Washington. On
August 19, Churchill and Roosevelt signed a secret document on
cooperation towards creating the atomic bomb. The USA, which
had taken the lead over Britain in this field, agreed to resume,
although on a limited scale, the exchange of information with
Britain which had been interrupted. The USA and Britain
pledged not to use atomic weapons against each other, and to use
them against a third country only by mutual agreement.
The conditions of the Quebec agreement, and especially the
stipulation that no information about the atomic bomb be given
345
to other countries without consent from both parties, clearly
reflected the intention of ruling groups in the USA and Britain
to strengthen their domination in the world arena. During his
visit to the United States in May of 1943, Churchill propounded
the idea of ``common citizenship" between the Anglo-Saxon
countries and suggested that the structure of their military
alliance be kept after the war and that the two countries
collaborate closely on the chief questions of foreign policy.
On September 12, summarising the results of his recent talks
with Roosevelt, the British Prime Minister telegraphed to London
that plans for an international security organisation did not place
under the slightest doubt the special relationship that naturally
existed between Britain and America.
The radical change that had taken place in the international
and military situation in favour of the forces of democracy and
progress made it difficult for the Western Allies to realise their
separate military-strategic and political plans. Certain obligations
were placed on the governments of the USA and Britain by
their countries' participation, together with the Soviet Union, in
the anti-fascist coalition. The notable victories of the Soviet
armed forces helped to strengthen that coalition, and broad
publicity given by the Western press to the heroic struggle of the
Red Army and the steadfastness of the Soviet people forced
hostile elements to soften their tone. Anti-Soviet statements of
various kinds began, little by little, to decline in number. The
publication in the USSR of detailed information on the military
aid made available through Lend-Lease and on the work of
different public funds for assistance to Russia in the USA and
Britain also 'helped to create a more favourable atmosphere.
The positive attitude that President Roosevelt personally took
towards cooperation with the Soviet Union was also of
importance. He understood how vital the USSR's continuing active
struggle against Nazi Germany was for the USA. At the same
time, though, Roosevelt had to reckon with pressures from certain
elements in the American ruling elite that opposed a realistic
course towards the Soviet Union. This explains a certain
ambiguity in British and American relations with the Soviet
Union. All things considered, the leaders of the USA regarded
cooperation with the USSR the best policy. This was^what foiled
the plans of those groups in the West that wanted to set Nazi
346
Germany and the Soviet Union wear each other down to
exhaustion.
Relations among the main members of the anti-Hitler coalition
continued, nevertheless, to be complicated. After the
fundamental change in the course of the war, the ruling quarters in the
USA and Britain strove wherever they could to hinder the growth
of leftist forces and of the resistance movement, and to prevent
democratic revolutions. The Western Allies strengthened their
ties with those social groups within the resistance movement that
wanted to restore the old, bourgeois regimes. Alarmed by the
struggle in which the masses of the people were engaged, they
cut their aid to those patriotic forces that favoured a renovation
of the entire state structure after the invaders were driven out.
The US and British governments hoped to shape relations
between the USSR and East European countries that might be
liberated by Soviet troops in a way favourable to themselves.
John Winant, the US ambassador to Britain, said in a
telegram to Roosevelt on July 26 that as the Soviet forces advanced,
London and Washington ``might well want to influence their
terms of capitulation and occupancy in Allied and enemy
territory".^^1^^
The Western Allies gave preference to monarchist,
conservative elements in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and thus
placed their hopes in forces hostile to democracy and socialism.
In Yugoslavia, for example, the British government, even after
establishing ties with the partisans led by Josip Broz Tito in May
of 1943, continued to support the royalist emigre government and
the Cetniks of Draja Mihailovioh. The aims of such tactics were
apparent: as a British official explained in the spring of 1943,
London wanted to have an armed force at hand to prevent
anarchy and communist chaos after the withdrawal of tlhe Axis.
The Western Allies sought to prevent fundamental democratic
transformations in Italy after the fall of Mussolini. Even before
the Anglo-American forces landed in the south of Italy, they
had established contact with conservative and monarchist groups
that had an interest in preserving the domination of monopoly
capital in the country.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevch, Stalin. The War They Waged
and the Peace They Sought, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957,
p. 167.
347
In relation to France, Washington and London pursued a
policy that actually delayed the cohesion of anti-fascist forces. The
Western Allies, particularly the USA, had reacted negatively
from the very beginning to the request for recognition of the
French Committee for National Liberation. The ruling quarters
in America intended to place France and its colonies under
their own influence. It was believed in Washington that France
would be a second-rate power for a long time after the war,
thereby making it easier to carry out plans for establishing
American sway in Western Europe. The USA, not wishing a real
rebirth of France, opposed the formation of centralised French
governing bodies. It was Roosevelt's view that when the Allied
armies entered France it should be regarded as an occupied
country, subordinate to the American and British military
authorities. The ruling groups in the USA were patently trying to
split the French Committee for National Liberation, force out
the supporters of General de Gaulle, and create a committee
subservient to the Western Allies.
The heroic efforts of the French resistance and the firm stance
of Soviet diplomacy for the recognition of the French Committee
for National Liberation finally compelled the United States to
yield. All the same, neither the British nor the American drafts
for an act of recognition were acceptable to the Soviet
government, inasmuch as both infringed on the national interests of the
French people. Thus it was agreed that the USSR, the USA, and
Britain would make their relevant statements separately, but on
the same day---August 26, 1943.
The Western Allies also pursued their own aims in the
conduct of the war in the Pacific, the East and South-East Asia.
Despite earlier decisions to regard Nazi Germany as the greatest
enemy, certain prominent figures in the USA insisted very
energetically that efforts be concentrated on the Pacific theatre. But
Roosevelt, who had a realistic understanding of the prospects
for the development of the Second World War, refused to accept
the arguments of those who upheld the ``Pacific strategy''; he
considered such conceptions a danger to the entire American
policy. The politicians who stood with the President realised that
Hitler's Germany was much stronger than Japan, and that it was
the Nazis who must be crushed first.
The ruling quarters in the USA planned to make the
348
greatest possible use of the resources of countries in the East and
South-East Asia in the war against Japan, and hoped
eventually to lay their hands on these rich areas. They indulged in
demagogic sloganeering about anti-colonialism, but could not
make up their minds to press their British partner on
independence for India and other British possessions. As for Churchill,
he openly favoured preserving Britain's colonial overlordship.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Crossing the Border
In the first half of July, 1944, the forces of the First Baltic Front
advanced as much as 140 kilometres, opening up the approaches
to East Prussia. The German command concentrated large forces
in this sector and assembled in the region of Vilnius units from
the Third Panzer Army that had been forced to retreat. The
city's garrison numbered 15,000 officers and men, and several
additional divisions were brought up. But all efforts to halt the
advance of the Soviet forces were unsuccessful; in five days of
hard fighting, units of the Red Army destroyed the enemy's
grouping and on July 13 liberated Vilnius.
Thereafter the enemy's strategic front collapsed. Pursuing the
retreating foe, the Red Army liberated nearly all of Byelorussia
and a large part of Lithuania, advancing to the west as much as
500 kilometres.
The forces of the First Byelorussian Front, after liberating
Byelorussia, moved in the general direction of Warsaw. On
July 31, the Second Tank Army joined battle on the near
approaches to Praga, Warsaw's suburb. The 8th Guards' and the
69th Armies of the First Byelorussian Front's left wing forced
the Vistula south of Warsaw and seized a bridgehead on the
river's western bank in the days between July 27 and August 4.
Fierce battles ensued to reinforce and enlarge these footholds.
During July and August, the First Baltic and Fust, Second,
and Third Byelorussian fronts achieved notable successes.
Fighting determinedly, they advanced from 260 to 400 kilometres and
extended the length of the offensive front to 1,000 kilometres.
But increasing enemy resistance, together with our greatly
extended lines of communication and the fatigue of the troops, who
had been fighting their way forward for more than two months
without any respite, made it necessary to halt the offensive. On
349
August 29, the forces of the four fronts received an order from
Supreme Command General Headquarters to take the defensive on
the front from Jelgava to Jozefow. The grand offensive begun on
June 23 in the central sector of the Soviet-German front had been
concluded. Only a small part of the forces of the First and Second
Byelorussian fronts continued offensive actions in September.
According to the August 29 directives from Supreme Command
General Headquarters, the armies of the Second Byelorussian
Front's left wing were to reach the Narew River on September 4
or 5, seize a bridgehead in the neighbourhood of Ostroleka, and
go over to the defensive. At the same time the armies on the right
wing of the First Byelorussian Front were to advance throughout
its entire length to the Narew, seize bridgeheads to its west, and
take the defensive. Both fronts had fulfilled their assignments by
mid-September, by which time Soviet forces had liberated Praga,
a suburb of Warsaw.
One of the main results of the victories won in the central
sector of the front in July and August of 1944 was the liberation
of nearly all Polish lands east of the Vistula by the Red Army,
with the Polish army fighting at its side. This territory made
up one-fourth of Poland; its population in 1944 was some
5.6 million.
Soviet troops entered Polish territory under political
conditions that were largely favourable thanks to the long struggle of
the population against the Nazi aggressors. The patriots of
Poland had refused to accept the blood-stained fascist occupation
which had destroyed their national independence.
By 1943 the Polish Workers' Party, by directing its efforts
towards the consolidation of democratic forces, had brought about
conditions making it possible to form an anti-fascist national
front. Meanwhile, significant changes had taken place in Poland's
class make-up. Having become convinced that the Polish
Workers' Party was pursuing the right policy, broad masses of
workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia gave it ever more vigorous
support in its struggle for unity of action in the national
liberation movement.
In November of 1943, the Polish Workers' Party issued the
declaration ``What We Are Fighting For''. This historic
document set forth a programme for creating a new Poland,' a country
belonging to the Polish people. On December 15, 1943, on the
350
initiative of the Polish Workers' Party, the country's democratic,
public, political, and military organisations published a
Manifesto that spoke of creating a supreme governing body for the
Polish people and set forth its overall political platform.
In the early hours of January 1, 1944, the Krajowa Rada
Narodowa (KRN) was formed on the basis of that platform.
The KRN was the highest representative body of the country's
underground democratic forces. Its principal organiser was the
Polish Workers' Party; among the others who had a part in
creating it were members of the left wing of the Workers' Party of
Polish Socialists and representatives of the Stronnictwo Ludowe
(Peasants' Party), of democratic groups, youth organisations,
trade unions, and other public organisations. Boleslaw Bierut, one
of the leaders of the Polish Workers' Party, was elected chairman
of the KRN.
The extensive organising and political work of the Polish
Workers' Party and the KRN raised the national liberation
movement to a new level; it began to develop into a popular--
democratic revolution. The armed struggle of the Polish patriots
intensified, in no little measure due to the formation of the Armia
Ludowa by a decree of the KRN of January 1, 1944.
In the spring of that year a delegation representing the KRN
came to Moscow. It acquainted the leaders of the Soviet
government with the situation in Poland, the course of the struggle for
national liberation, and the prospects for its development, and
also spoke of the urgent need of the Armia Ludowa for arms and
ammunition. Questions concerning cooperation between the Red
Army and the Armia Ludowa, and all-round assistance for the
latter, were discussed. Beginning with April of 1944, the Polish
patriots received from the Soviet Union large consignments of
submachine-guns, ammunition, and explosives as well as heavy
machine guns and anti-tank weapons. All of this was delivered
through the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement, and
also through Soviet partisan units and detachments operating in
Polish territory occupied by Hitler's armies.
At the same time, another major armed organisation existed
in Poland: the Armia Krajowa, under orders from the emigre
government in London. Its leaders were rabid reactionaries who
wanted to restore the old order in the country under the
domination of the bourgeoisie and the land-owning aristocracy. The
351
Polish Workers' Party and the Armia Ludowa called repeatedly
for unity of action and an effective concerted struggle against
the fascist aggressors; the answer of the Armia Krajowa's
leadership was to step up actions against the Polish Workers' Party
and the country's democratic forces. It tried to make a show of
fighting against the fascist armies of occupation while husbanding
its strength for an armed seizure of power when the Germans
withdrew from Polish territory. Openly reactionary elements,
headed by Kazimierz Sosnkowski (the commander-in-chief of
the emigre government's armed forces), and the leaders of the
Armia Krajowa in Poland, intended to break off the struggle
against the Germans and prepare all forces for armed resistance
to the approaching Soviet forces.
Under the cover of demagoguery about ``protecting the people
from subversive elements'', the reactionaries of the Armia
Krajowa and of the Narodowy Sily Zbrojne, a fascist organisation
incorporated into the Annia Krajowa in March of 1944,
murdered genuine Polish patriots.
The emigre government was supported in its subversive
activities by the ruling quarters in the USA and Britain, who wanted
to bring back the old, bourgeois Poland and turn it into an
antiSoviet stronghold. On November 16, 1943, the emigre government
sent a memorandum to Churchill asking for a guarantee of its
right to take power in Poland as the country was being liberated.
On January 5, 1944, it demanded that it be allowed to set up its
administration in the western regions of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia immediately after the Nazi occupying armies were driven
out. The USSR decisively rejected these claims. In a special
statement made on January 11, 1944, the Soviet government
exposed the anti-people policies of the Polish emigre government,
which had drawn away from the people and proved unable to
lead them into an active struggle against the Nazi aggressors.
The statement said that both Poland and the Soviet Union had
an interest in establishing a lasting friendship between their
two peoples and uniting them in the fight against the common
enemy, as was also demanded by the common cause of all the
Allies.
It was precisely at this period that the Western powers were
doing their best to pressure Moscow on the ``Polish question".
352
__ALPHA_LVL3__
A Sharp Exchange in the Kremlin
Averell Harriman devotes much space in his memoirs to the
problem of Poland. Thus he writes that during his visit to the
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs on January 18, 1944, he
was primarily interested in what possibilities the Soviet
government saw for settling the Polish question.
Molotov answered that the emigre government in London
would have to be reconstructed to include Poles living in
Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Its members,
he said, must be ``honest men'', who were ``not tainted with
fascism'', and had a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union.^^1^^
As possible members of the new Polish government Molotov
mentioned Professor Oskar Lange, a Polish economist who at
that time was lecturing at the University of Chicago;
Orlemanski, a Catholic parish priest in Springfield; and Krzycki, a trade
union leader who was then national chairman of the American
Slav Congress. Molotov added that Mikolajczyk could remain in
the government, but expressed doubts about Tadeusz Romer,
then Poland's minister of foreign affairs. Harriman promised to
inform Washington of these views.
Soon afterwards the US government issued Lange and
Orlemanski passports for a trip to the Soviet Union. The two men
visited Moscow and took part in a discussion concerning the
new make-up of the Polish government.
On March 3 Harriman visited Stalin, once again on the Polish
question. After an exchange of greetings, Harriman said that the
President had instructed him to talk about Poland. It was the
opinion of the US government, he said, that the problem had
become urgent. He promised to be brief.
Stalin objected, saying it was ``not a question of time''. The
Soviet government, he said, had taken its position and would
stand by it. Moscow insisted on the Curzon line. But the London
Poles evidently ``took the Russians for fools": they were now
demanding Wilno and Lwow. Fortunately, though, the Polish
people, who should not be identified with the emigre government,
had a different attitude. The Red Army would be welcomed as
a liberator by the Poles.
_-_-_
^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 322.
23---1996
353
Harriman, of course, understood the essence of this matter.
He himself, as recently as January of that year, had told W.
Lawrence of The New York Times that ``the Soviets don't trust the
Polish Government in London at all and, from their standpoint,
I think, they are reasonable in this distrust".^^1^^
Harriman also told American reporters at that time: ``I don't
know what the Poles in Poland think. We know very well what
the Polish Government in London thinks. It is predominantly a
group of aristocrats, looking to the Americans and the British
to restore their position and landed properties and the feudalistic
system of the period before and after the last war. They have a
basic suspicion of the Soviets. . . They think the only future of
Poland lies in Great Britain and the United States fighting
Russia to protect Poland. I don't see that we have any interest in
getting back to that kind of thing."^^2^^
In this conversation with Stalin, however, the American
ambassador, acting on instructions from Washington, tried to get
Moscow to resume negotiations with the London government,
whose political platform he had characterised so penetratingly
for the press not long before. Harriman now decided to invoke
the authority of his president. Roosevelt, he said, was worried
that if the problem were not solved quickly a civil war would
break out in Poland. Stalin answered that he saw no such danger.
Civil war with whom? Between whom? After all, Mikolajczyk
had no troops.
Harriman then asked about the underground force known as
the Armia Krajowa, and Stalin replied that the Polish
government might have a certain number of agents in Poland, but the
membership of its underground organisations was insignificant.
When Harriman asked what sort of solution Stalin could
envisage, this was the answer: ``While the Red Army is liberating
Poland, Mikolajczyk will go on repeating his platitudes. By the
time Poland is liberated, Mikolajczyk's government will have
changed, or another government will have emerged in Poland."^^3^^
Harriman said Roosevelt was worried that a new regime
formed on the basis of the Soviet proposals might turn out to be a
``hand-picked government with no popular movement behind it".
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 290.
^^2^^ Ibid., p. 291.
~^^3^^ Ibid., pp. 315--16.
354
To this Stalin answered that all he thought necessary was to
keep the Polish landlords, the ``Polish Tories'', from coming back.
``Poland needs democrats who will look after the interests of the
people,'' Stalin said, ``not Tory landlords".^^1^^
He added that he did not believe Churchill, who himself was
a British Tory, would succeed in persuading the London Poles
to reorganise their government and change their policies. He was
sure, however, that Roosevelt would agree Poland needed a
democratic government.
Harriman was later to complain that high-placed politicians in
Washington did not show sufficient energy at this time. Secretary
of State Hull was not inclined to heed Harriman's advice about
the need to get concessions from the Kremlin before it was too
late. Roosevelt was looking ahead to the 1944 presidential
election. Fearing the predictable wrath of voters of Polish origin,
he avoided taking any clear-cut position.
The same could certainly not be said of Churchill. In a
series of messages from him to Stalin, and likewise in statements
by British Ambassador Clark Kerr, repeated threats were made
against the Soviet Union. The Soviet government was forced to
react. In a letter to Churchill dated March 23, a copy of which
was sent to Roosevelt the same day, Stalin pointed out that such
a tone was inappropriate.
``I was struck by the fact,'' Stalin wrote, ``that both your
messages and particularly Kerr's statement bristle with threats against
the Soviet Union. I should like to call your attention to this
circumstance because threats as a method are not only out of place
in relations between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead
to opposite results.''
The letter further noted that in one of his messages the Prime
Minister had characterised the Soviet side's upholding of the
Curzon line as a policy of force. Moreover, the British
government, despite the agreement reached in Teheran, was now
claiming that the question of the Soviet-Polish border was not
settled and would have to be held in abeyance until the armistice
conference was convened.
``I think there is a misunderstanding here,'' Stalin wrote. ``The
Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to wage war
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 316.
355
against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish people and
considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish people. That is why
it is shedding its blood to free Poland from German oppression.
It would be strange, therefore, to speak of an armistice between
the USSR and Poland. But the Soviet Union is in conflict with
the Polish emigre government which does not represent the
interest of the Polish people or express their aspirations."^^1^^
Referring to Churchill's declaration that he intended to tell
the House of Commons that all territorial changes had been set
aside until the armistice or until a peace conference was held
among the victorious powers and that Britain would not
recognise ``any forcible transferences of territory'', Stalin warned the
Prime Minister against such actions. ``As I see it,'' he wrote,
``you make the Soviet Union appear as being hostile to Poland,
and virtually deny the liberation nature of the war waged by the
Soviet Union against German aggression. That is tantamount
to attributing to the Soviet Union something which is non--
existent, and, thereby, discrediting it. I have no doubt that the
peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion will evaluate
your statement as a gratuitous insult to the Soviet Union."^^2^^
The excerpts cited show how heated polemics on the Polish
question sometimes became. And of course this could not help
but poison the atmosphere within the anti-Hitler coalition.
Churchill had run into stout resistance and was forced to
soften his tone. Nonetheless, the Western Allies continued to
pressure Moscow on the Polish question in the months that followed.
But the Red Army's successes on the front and the ever
growing military might of the USSR made it useless for the Western
Allies to try to extract concessions from the Soviet Union by
means of threats.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
On the Threshold of Victory
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Warsaw Uprising
After his brief visit in London Harriman arrived in
Washington, where he was immediately received by the President.
Roosevelt listened with attention to the ambassador's account of the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 212--13.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 213.
356
mood in the British capital, particularly in regard to the Polish
problem. It made no particular impression on him, however:
in the course of the discussion that followed, Roosevelt repeated
to Harriman his previous position, the essence of which was that
the Polish emigre government must be reorganised so as to bring
about conditions favourable to lasting friendship between Poland
and the Soviet Union.
Harriman returned to Moscow, and on June 3 met with
Molotov, who asked whether the President's position on the
Polish question had changed since it was discussed in Teheran.
Harriman said everything remained as before, and added that the
President hoped Marshal Stalin too would continue to adhere to
the position agreed on at the Big Three conference.
In the latter part of July Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Romer
came to Moscow as representatives of the Polish emigre
government. Mikolajczyk met with Molotov, and asked at once to see
Stalin. It was recommended to him, however, that first he talk
with the representatives of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, who,
as Molotov stressed, were best informed about conditions in
Poland.
The Moscow talks with representatives of the Polish
government in London began in a businesslike and constructive
atmosphere, but were immediately complicated by a new circumstance
that was fraught with serious consequences. A rebellion had
begun in Warsaw. It was inspired by the emigre government, and
clearly timed to coincide with the Moscow visit of Mikolajczyk
and his colleagues.
On August 3, Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Romer were received
by Stalin. The official communique issued afterwards said that
``the conversation concerned the state of affairs in Poland and
Soviet-Polish relations. Comrade Stalin expressed the desire to
see questions related to the situation in Poland resolved by the
Poles themselves, and urged Mr. Mikolajczyk to discuss them
with the Polish Committee for National Liberation".
Harriman gives a more detailed account of the meeting based
on what Mikolajczyk told him. Mentioning the uprising that
had just begun in Warsaw, the Polish emigre leader told Soviet
representatives that ``Warsaw will be free any day".
``God grant that it be so,'' Stalin replied. After a pause, he
continued: ``What kind of an army is it---without artillery, tanks,
357
air force? They do not even have enough hand weapons. In
modern war this is nothing.. . I hear that the Polish
Government instructed these units to chase the Germans out of Warsaw.
I don't understand how they can do it. They don't have
sufficient strength for that.''
Mikolajczyk asked whether the Soviet Union would aid the
uprising by supplying arms, and was told that the emigre
government would first have to reach an understanding with the Polish
Committee for National Liberation.^^1^^
Thus the emigre leaders received clear warning that
unwarranted actions by them in Polish territory could not result in
anything good. The Warsaw rebellion was precisely such an
action. It represented an attempt to ignore the way events were
unfolding in Poland and to bring about a situation whereby the
Red Army, upon entering Warsaw, would be confronted by
emissaries of the government which had sat by in the safety of
London while Soviet soldiers shed their blood in the name of
freedom and independence for the Polish people.
Meanwhile, there had been important changes in the way
things stood in Poland. On July 21, the Krajowa Rada
Narodowa had promulgated a law forming a Polish Committee for
National Liberation---a central governing body for the country.
The committee was made up of representatives of the Polish
Workers', Socialist, Peasants' and Democratic parties, of persons
without party affiliation, and members of the Union of Polish
Patriots in the USSR. On July 22, 1944, the committee adopted
a manifesto that played an historic role in the building of a
democratic Poland. The document set forth a programme for
revolutionary transformations and outlined the prospects for a
popular revolution.
The Polish Committee for National Liberation declared that
the Red Army had entered Poland as an army of liberation,
and called on the people to render it all possible aid. The
manifesto proclaimed firm alliance and friendship with the Soviet
Union as the foundation of the new Polish state's foreign policy.
``For 400 years,'' the manifesto said, ``there have been
ceaseless conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians, Poles and
Byelorussians, Poles and Russians---all to the detriment of both sides.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 333--34.
358
An historic turning point has now been reached in these
relations: conflict is giving way to friendship and cooperation
dictated by the vital interests of all sides. Friendship and combat
cooperation founded on the comradeship-in-arms of the Polish
Army and the Red Army should develop into a lasting alliance
and good neighbourly cooperation after the war.''
On July 26, 1944, the government of the USSR and the Polish
Committee for National Liberation concluded an agreement on
relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Polish
Administration after the Red Army's entry into Polish territory.
The intent of the agreement was to ensure concerted action on
the battlefield by the Polish and Soviet peoples. It stipulated
that as the enemy was driven back the Polish Committee for
National Liberation would set up administrative bodies and guide
them, at the same time taking measures to organise and build up
the Polish armed forces. Polish units formed on the territory
of the USSR were to be active in Poland. Article 6 of the
agreement stated that ``as soon as any part of the liberated
territory of Poland ceases to be a zone of combat operations, the
Polish Committee for National Liberation will take full control
of civil administration".
But work towards creating and strengthening administrative
bodies for Poland and towards developing the Polish armed
forces, encountered serious difficulties. This was to a
considerable degree due to the country's grave economic situation after
the long years of Nazi occupation. The hostile machinations of
the Polish reactionaries were also a factor. The emigre
government and its adherents within the country tried to keep Poles
from joining the army, urged them to boycott the measures of
the Polish Committee for National Liberation, and encouraged
desertion. The London emigres sent their men to join the army
with the intent of undermining its fighting capacity.
At the same time, the Polish reactionaries hastily took a
number of countermeasures, chief among which was organising the
Warsaw uprising. The high command of the Armia Krajowa,
which was controlled by the London emigre government, wanted
to establish itself in Warsaw at least twelve hours before Soviet
forces entered the city in order to claim political and
administrative authority for itself.
The Warsaw uprising began on August 1, just a few days
359
after the premier of the emigre government, Mikolajczyk. came
to Moscow for negotiations with the Polish Committee for
National Liberation concerning a reorganisation of the government.
Reactionary groups in Poland hoped that the uprising in Warsaw
would strengthen Mikolajczyk's position at the Moscow talks.
This explains his intractability: refusing to reckon with the
radical political changes that had taken place in Poland by the
summer of 1944, he demanded that the emigres be given 80 per
cent of the places in the new government and insisted that the
reactionary constitution of 1935 be preserved. Naturally, the
Polish Committee for National Liberation could not agree to
these unrealistic claims.
As for the uprising in Warsaw, the hopes that Polish
reactionaries placed in it proved vain. This was primarily because the
uprising itself was a sheer gamble. It was not prepared either
militarily or technically. The rebels did not have enough arms,
and their ammunition was sufficient for only two or three days.
Furthermore, many underground organisations were not aware
of the time for which the action was planned. As a result, only
40 per cent of the forces which the Armia Krajowa had at its
disposal in Warsaw were involved at the start of the uprising. It
is not surprising that the effort misfired in its very first hours.
The rebels were unable to win the capital's key positions or to
seize railway stations and bridges across the Vistula; this made
it possible for the German command to bring up its forces.
And yet the fighting went on. It burst forth with new strength
as the people of Warsaw joined in. Residents of the capital and
ordinary soldiers in the Armia Krajowa, ignorant of the real
aims behind the rebellion, fought courageously against the Nazi
forces of occupation. Although the command of the Armia
Ludowa units had not been informed by the leadership of the Armia
Krajowa of the upcoming uprising, they also took part in the
fighting. Polish Communists, seeing that an armed uprising was
hopeless under the circumstances, nevertheless decided to fight
in it so as not to separate themselves from the mass struggle of
the people. The Polish patriots displayed heroism and selflessness
in their fight against the German aggressors. Even the German
high command was forced to acknowledge, in a secret directive
dated August 21, 1944, that the rebels were fighting, ``fiercely
and fanatically".
360
But the forces were too unequal. The rebels suffered grievous
losses because of their lack of heavy guns and of combat
experience. In the latter half of August their situation rapidly
deteriorated. The Nazis barbarically destroyed the city; Hitler had
ordered that Warsaw be razed.
The memoirs of some Western politicians contain not a few
charges and accusations against the Soviet Union for not
immediately coming to the aid of the Warsaw rebels, and thus
leaving the Poles to fight against overwhelming Nazi forces. Such
recriminations are groundless, however. The Soviet government
had no advance knowledge of the action, and learned of it only
when the fighting broke out. Having received and studied the
first data on the uprising, the Soviet government adopted an
unambiguous stand. A message to the British government on
August 16, 1944, said that ``the Warsaw action is a reckless and
fearful gamble, taking a heavy toll of the population. This would
not have been the case had Soviet headquarters been informed
beforehand about the Warsaw action and had the Poles
maintained contact with them".^^1^^
Such was the Soviet government's principled stand on the
Warsaw uprising. However, seeing that tens of thousands of
Warsaw's patriots were involved---having been led into mortal
peril by Polish reactionaries pursuing their own selfish aims
---the Soviet government did everything it could to help
the rebels.
Western publications likewise contain a good many
imputations to the effect that the Soviet command intentionally halted
its forces outside the walls of Warsaw and thus condemned
the uprising to failure. Charges of this sort have no basis in the
facts, and anyone who takes the trouble to consider carefully the
position and possibilities of the Red Army at the time the
uprising began will be forced to admit as much.
In the second half of July, 1944, the forces of the First
Byelorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts entered Poland and
began to develop an offensive in the direction of the Vistula in
accordance with the plans of Supreme Command General
Headquarters. By the end of the month---before the start of the
uprising in Warsaw---this drive had begun to slow down. The German
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 254.
361
command had placed considerable reserve forces in the way of
the Soviet armies, which were meeting with ever greater resistance.
The pace of the offensive was also affected by the heavy losses
that Soviet infantry divisions and tank corps had suffered in
previous battles. Artillery and logistic services were lagging
behind, and the troops did not have enough ammunition or fuel.
The infantry and tanks were not receiving fire support from the
artillery, and the effectiveness of the air force had been reduced
by the move to new bases.
After their forty-day offensive, the Soviet armies, faced with
increasing resistance, were not capable of pushing forward
rapidly and actively supporting the rebels. This was apparent even to
the German command; General Kurt von Tippelskirch, for
example, writes that ``the rebellion broke out on August 1, when
the force of the Russian advance had already spent itself".^^1^^
Nonetheless, despite the difficult situation, the Soviet command
took measures to aid the rebels. At the beginning of September
it concentrated a considerable force on the eastern bank of the
Vistula in the neighbourhood of Praga, a Warsaw suburb where
enemy forces had been weakened by transfers of tank divisions
meant to destroy Soviet bridgeheads south of Warsaw. On
September 10, the 47th Army of the First Byelorussian Front,
reinforced by one Polish division, took the offensive. The enemy
was crushed after fierce fighting, and on September 14 Soviet
forces liberated the Praga suburb of Warsaw. The situation in
the Warsaw sector of the front thus improved markedly, and it
became possible to aid the rebels directly. This task was entrusted
to the First Army of the Woisko Polskie. On September 15 it
entered Praga and began preparations for forcing the Vistula and
seizing a bridgehead in Warsaw.
On the night of September 15, the First Army began to force
the Vistula. From September 16 through 19, as many as six
infantry battalions were landed in Warsaw. The officers and men
of the Polish army fought heroically and selflessly, but the enemy,
making use of strong defences, prevented the units that had
crossed the river from broadening the footholds they had gained
into an extensive bridgehead. Another reason for the operation's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Ziveiten Weltkriegs, Berlin,
Athenaum-Verlag, 1956, p. 472.
362
failure was that the leaders of the uprising were unwilling to
organise joint actions between their own forces and the Polish units
fighting on the regained bridgeheads. The enemy launched
furious counterattacks using infantry and tanks, and in the end
succeeded in splitting the units that had made the crossing and
depriving them of mutual support. The situation became so grave
that the command of the First Army decided to evacuate its
forces from Warsaw onto the eastern bank of the Vistula. This
evacuation had been accomplished, with great losses, by
September 23.
Meanwhile the Soviet command, after the capture of Praga,
gave continual material and technical aid to the rebels. On the
eve of the forcing of the Vistula in the Warsaw area the Council
of War of the First Byelorussian Front charged the 16th Air
Army with the task of delivering arms, ammunition, foodstuffs,
and medicines to the rebels. Once contact had been made with
the rebels, the Soviet air force, beginning from September 14,
made regular airdrops in the neighbourhood of Warsaw.
At the very time that units of the First Army of the Woisko
Polskie were shedding their blood in battle so as to aid the
rebels, the command of the Armia Krajowa refused to conduct
joint actions with the Red Army. A representative of the Soviet
command visited the rebels' headquarters to look into the
possibility of lending them assistance, but the commandant of the
Warsaw district of the Armia Krajowa was reluctant to discuss
coordinated actions with the Red Army. Seeing that the position
of the rebels had become utterly hopeless, the Red Army's
commanders suggested that the rebel leaders take the only reasonable
way out: a breakthrough to the Vistula under the cover of Soviet
air and artillery support. But the rebel leaders forbade their
forces to go out to meet the Red Army. Only a few units refused
to comply with this suicidal order and succeeded in fighting
their way out of Warsaw. On October 2, 1944, the Armia
Krajowa's commander signed an act of capitulation to the Nazis.
The Polish people paid a high price for the unconscionable
gamble of the emigre government. Huge losses were suffered by
the Armia Krajowa, the Armia Ludowa, and the civilian
population. The destruction to which the city was subjected was
indescribable. On the one hand, the Warsaw uprising
demonstrated the selflessness and heroism of the rebels in the struggle
363
against the occupying forces; on the other, it was a criminal act
of an anti-Soviet policy pursued by the government of
Mikolajczyk and those leaders of the London emigre government who
were in Poland.
The Vistula-Oder operation, in which the liberation of
Warsaw was included, was one of the largest strategic actions of
the war. It was conducted in the principal Warsaw-Berlin sector
by the First Byelorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts, and by
a part of the forces of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. The First
Army of the Woisko Polskie also took part in it, and vigorous
assistance was furnished by the Second Byelorussian Front,
whioh was active in the direction of East Prussia.
The political aim of the operation was to complete the Polish
people's liberation from oppression by the Nazi invaders and
help them build a strong, independent, and democratic state.
The accomplishment of this at a time earlier than planned
served as yet another proof of the Soviet Union's unswerving
faithfulness to its obligations as an ally.
While preparations were being made for a new offensive,
active work was conducted among the Polish population. The
fundamental document that determined the content and form
of this work was the July 26, 1944, statement of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the Soviet
Union's attitude to Poland and the agreement between the
government of the USSR and the Polish Committee for National
Liberation on relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief
and the Polish Administration after the entry of Soviet forces
into Polish territory. The agreement helped to establish friendly
relations between the Soviet forces and the government bodies
created by the Polish Committee for National Liberation.
Soviet forces were engaged in combat operations on the
Vistula from 12 to 15 January, 1945. The enemy put up a
stubborn resistance, but the Soviet forces succeeded in breaking
through the defences. Artillery destroyed all the main enemy
targets. In four days of offensive actions, the strike force of the
First Ukrainian Front advanced 80 to 100 kilometres. The First
Army of the Woisko Polskie broke through into Warsaw in the
morning of January 17, together with units of the 61st and 47th
Soviet armies. That same day, after intense fighting within the
city itself, the Polish capital was completely liberated by the
364
Polish and Soviet troops. The scene which confronted them was
one of horror: the Nazis had turned whole regions of the city
into heaps of rubble. It was difficult even to imagine that one
day Warsaw would rise again from those ruins.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Americans Analyse the Situation
The confrontation that had arisen from polemics over the
Polish question prompted the Americans to consider how they
should proceed in their overall relations with the Soviet Union,
and what the prospects were for those relations. In analysing
the situation, the men in Washington could not fail to see that
attempts to put pressure on Moscow had fallen through. The
Soviet government, despite all the attempts of American and
British politicians, had stood resolutely by its principles: the new
Poland that was to be born of the ashes and ruins must be a
truly independent and democratic state, friendly towards the
Soviet Union and free of the intrigues of the Western powers, who
still clung to their idea of setting up a cordon sanitaire and
fomenting discord, in their own selfish interests, among the states
of Europe. The failure of attempts to carry out this plan in
relation to Poland disconcerted statesmen in Washington and
London. They had not expected that the Soviet Union, which had
suffered severe trials and terrible destruction, and lost millions
and millions of its citizens in the fight against the Nazi
aggressors, would resist pressures from the Western powers so resolutely.
Given the way things had turned out, though, the question arose
of how the USA and Britain ought to approach the question of
relations with their Soviet ally in the future.
The most reasonable course would have been to recognise the
need for cooperation on an equal footing, taking into
consideration the legitimate interests of all sides. Such was, indeed, the
tenor of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which held firmly
to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states
with different social systems. As the facts show, however, the
leaders of the Western powers at that time were not prepared to
adopt this policy, even if it was the only realistic one. Some
influential figures in Washington, and likewise their British
colleagues, were prisoners to the illusion of American ``greatness'';
they were incapable of setting aside the double standard they
365
applied to themselves on the one hand and to the Soviet Union
on the other. This attitude was very clearly reflected in a
telegram that the US ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman,
sent to Washington on September 10, 1944. Harriman formulated
his thoughts after carefully analysing the current state of
American-Soviet relations and thinking over the different steps the
Western powers might take in the future in order to make
Moscow more ``tractable''.
Harriman pointed out in this telegram, which was
addressed to Harry Hopkins, that as the end of the war drew nearer,
the question of relations with the Soviet Union took on
paramount importance. ``I have been conscious since early in the
year,'' Harriman wrote, ``of a division among ... Stalin's advisers
on the question of cooperation with us [i.e. the USA---Author].
It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of
cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the
policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to
accept all Soviet policies, backed by the strength and prestige of
the Red Army.
``Demands on us are becoming insistent. You have seen a part
of it in the negotiations over financial terms of the (Lend-Lease)
Protocol in Washington. We have other examples here. The
general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation to help Russia
and accept her policies because she has won the war for us."^^1^^
It is an interesting premise that Harriman proceeds from here.
As an experienced diplomat and a man with a historical
perspective, understanding that a day will finally come when his
secret messages become publicly known, he avoids speaking
directly about what is troubling him. Even in a personal telegram
to one of the President's closest advisers, Harriman shrinks from
committing to paper his innermost thoughts on the limitations
that the Soviet Union might place on the unbounded dominance
of the USA after the war. A diplomat of vast experience, he
veils the true meaning of his words with allusions to putative
divisions within the Soviet government and the supposed
ascendancy in Moscow of those who oppose the cooperation after the
war that Washington ostensibly desires. He is sure, though, that
Hopkins will understand him: the crux of the matter, after all,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 344.
366
is the basis on which such cooperation is to develop. And that
is readily apparent from the rest of the telegram's text.
``I am convinced,'' writes Harriman, ``that we can divert this
trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the
Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have
misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness,
and acceptance of their policies. Time has come when we must
make clear what we expect of them as the price of our goodwill.
Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every
indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever
their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and
the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that
direction. No written agreements can be of any value unless they
are carried out in a spirit of give and take, and recognition of
the interests of other people."^^1^^
The meaning Harriman attached to talk about a ``spirit of
give and take" and ``recognition of the interests of other
people" was a narrowly particular one, of course. For example, the
far-flung possessions of the USA and Great Britain, including
those in the Pacific, lay outside the question, as he saw it, as
did their global economic and financial positions and their having
long since made certain that their neighbours were mainly ``
friendly" countries. All of this was taken for granted, so to speak.
But when the Soviet Union undertook measures to guarantee its
security and national interests, the Western powers, rather than
recognising these natural aspirations, insisted that Moscow would
have to give something in return. Essentially the same attitude
continues to exist even today. Washington is ``indignant'',
for example, when Cuban troops come to the aid of the people of
Angola in their just struggle at the request of that country's
lawful government, while considering it quite natural for American
troops to be maintained on Cuban territory at the base in
Guantanamo.
Let us return, however, to Harriman's telegram. He wrote:
``I am disappointed but not discouraged. The job of getting
the Soviet Government to play a decent role in international
affairs is, however, going to be more difficult than we had hoped.
The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety per cent of the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
367
Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the
interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. It is our problem
to strengthen the hand of those around Stalin who want to play
the game along our lines and to show Stalin that the advice of
the counsellors of a tough policy is leading him into difficulties."^^1^^
In the same message, Harriman asked permission to come to
Washington and personally present to Roosevelt his ideas about
the further conduct of affairs with Moscow. But at the time the
White House was more concerned over the difficulties of fighting
the Japanese militarists in the Pacific. Roosevelt considered it
highly important to obtain the help of the Soviet Union in this
struggle, and thus showed no particular interest in Harriman's
suggestions for working out a ``hard line" towards the USSR.
Hopkins answered Harriman on September 12. He said that although
both he himself and the President were disposed to listen to
Harriman it would be a mistake for the ambassador to leave Moscow
at that moment. Hopkins advised Harriman to wait for the ``green
light" from Washington.^^2^^
Meanwhile the ``Russian question" had been taken up an the
State Department. Cordell Hull was not especially disturbed by
the dispute over Poland. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference,
however, made it plain to him that the Soviet Union would have
to be taken seriously; there, despite the objections of the USA
and Britain, based on their awareness that most of the UN
members at that time were following in the wake of Anglo-American
policy, the Soviet Union insisted on a rule of unanimity among
the great powers in the Security Council.
This prompted Hull to ask Harriman for his thoughts on
trends in Soviet policy. In his detailed reply, dated September
20, Harriman wrote:
``I believe the Soviets consider that we accepted at Moscow
their position that although they would keep us informed they
had the right to settle their problems with their western
neighbors unilaterally... It can be argued that American interests
need not be concerned over the affairs of this area. What
frightens me, however, is that when a country begins to extend its
influence by strong-arm methods beyond its borders under the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 345.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
368
guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn...
At the present time I believe they certainly expect us to give
them a free hand with their western neighbors. They are
therefore most suspicious that this policy will be affected if they agree
to refrain from voting [in the international organisation---
Author] on disputes in which the Soviet Government is
involved."^^1^^
In Harriman's opinion, the USA's response to all of this should
be a foreign policy that would show a definite interest in the
resolution of problems involving each country as those problems
arose, rather than giving the Russians ``a free hand''. This, he
wrote, might result in. some unpleasant situations, but if the
United States stood firm Moscow wouild be forced to give in.
Thus in his recommendations to the State Department,
Harriman returned once again to the idea that the USA should take
a ``tougher'' attitude towards the Soviet Union. The opinion of
the British government was similar, as was demonstrated in the
course of Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Moscow in the
autumn of 1944.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Talks Between Two Leaders
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, his
Foreign Secretary, arrived in Moscow on the afternoon of
October 9, 1944. A meeting with the head of the Soviet government
was scheduled for the evening of that same day. Nonetheless,
Churchill thought it necessary to meet with the American
ambassador beforehand. During that meeting, Churchill expressed
disappointment that Washington had declined to participate
officially in the talks in Moscow. He promised to keep Harriman
up to date despite this, and see to it that the American
ambassador was invited to meetings including a broader range of
participants. Still, Harriman was not present at most of the talks
between Churchill and Stalin. Neither was he present at the first
meeting, which took place in the Kremlin late in the evening
of October 9, and which was to have considerable international
repercussions. It was at this meeting that the Prime Minister
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 345--46.
__PRINTERS_P_369_COMMENT__
24---1996
369
undertook an action that he himself was later to call dirty and
crude.
Churchill and Stalin met as old acquaintances: indeed, this
was their third conference, and they had been in regular
correspondence as well. Stalin inquired how the trip had been, and
listened attentively to Churchill's account of the long flight. From
this they went over to the Polish question, and agreed without
any great difficulty that Mikolajczyk should be invited to
Moscow for talks with representatives of the Polish Committee for
National Liberation. Then Churchill took up the question that
interested him most of all.
``Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans,'' he said. ``Your
armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions,
and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways.
So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do
for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for
us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty
about Yugoslavia?"^^1^^
While this was being translated into Russian, Churchill
jotted down the percentages on a sheet of paper and held it out
to Stalin over the table. Stalin glanced at the page and gave it
back to Churchill. There was a pause. The sheet of paper lay on
the table. Churchill did not touch it. Then he said:
``Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had
disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such
an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.''
``No, you keep it,'' Stalin answered.^^2^^
Churchill folded the paper in half and tucked it into his pocket.
This incident was reflected in the message Churchill sent from
Moscow to President Roosevelt two days later (October 11) only
by the following remark: ``It is absolutely necessary we should
try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may
prevent civil war breaking out in several countries when,
probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J.
with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing
will be settled, except preliminary agreements between Britain
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged
and the Peace They Sought, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957,
pp. 448, 449.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
370
and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting down with
you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to
have a full meeting of minds with the Russians."^^1^^
On October 12, Harriman called on Churchill in his Moscow
residence. It was late in the morning but the Prime Minister,
as was his habit, was still in bed, dictating a letter. Harriman
recalls: ``He read me a letter he drafted for Stalin, giving his
interpretation of the percentages.'' Harriman said that Roosevelt
and Hull would react negatively to such a letter if it was sent.
At that moment Eden came into the bedroom, and Churchill,
turning to him, said: ``Anthony, Averell doesn't think that we
should send this letter to Stalin."^^2^^ And thus the latter was never
sent.
Afterwards there was a great deal of speculation, taking every
possible form, with regard to the notorious sheet of paper
Churchill had jotted on during the meeting in the Kremlin on
October 9. It was claimed that London and Moscow had come to
an understanding on the division of spheres of influence in the
Balkans, and that this governed the conduct of the parties to the
understanding in the course of later events. There are even some
who conclude that if it were not for this understanding
Southeastern Europe as a whole would have looked completely
different after the war. In reality, there is no basis for giving such
an interpretation to the incident. Even Churchill's description
of what happened makes it clear that there was no hint of an
understanding, let alone a formal agreement.
What actually occurred? Churchill wrote his percentages on a
sheet of paper. Stalin glanced at them, and gave the sheet back
to the Prime Minister without saying a word. Churchill
suggested burning the paper, apparently thinking that if Stalin agreed
this would make them accomplices in destroying a compromising
document. Stalin, however, gave the British leader no grounds
for this. He answered casually that Churchill might keep the
paper, thus showing that he attached no particular importance
to it. And that was the whole of it!
What conclusions can be drawn? Undoubtedly, Churchill
wanted to create the impression that some sort of understanding
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,
Doc. 443, p. 584.
^^2^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 358.
__PRINTERS_P_371_COMMENT__
24*
371
had been reached with the Soviet Union in order to justify the
British government's attempts to establish its own influence in
several regions of Europe. The long years of war and the
horrors of fascist occupation had brought about an unprecedented
upsurge in the liberation movement. Communists headed
resistance forces everywhere and showed themselves to be the most
stalwart foes of Nazi tyranny, thus winning the sympathy of the
broad masses of the people. All this made it possible that after
the occupying armies were driven out, the power in a number of
countries might go to Communist parties that had the confidence
of the popular masses. This frightened Churchill. His
correspondence from this period with Eden and other members of the
British cabinet contains not a few references to the possibility
that Italy, France, Greece, and other countries might be ``
communised''. He urged that action be taken to prevent this. It
may well be that Churchill's motive in making his disreputable
suggestion was to have a formal pretext for future meddling in
the internal affairs of some countries and stamping out
progressive movements. This is what actually happened in Greece, for
example.
The Soviet Union, however, could never have been party to
any such questionable ``understanding''. This would have been
contrary to the fundamental principles of the Soviet Union's
Leninist foreign policy, and first of all to the principles of non--
interference in the internal affairs of other nations and of respect
for their sovereign rights. It was, of course, impossible for the
Soviet Union to accept the Prime Minister's suggestion, and thus
to sanction the British imperialists' attempts to dictate their own
will to liberated peoples.
It is also indicative that in the telegram Stalin and Churchill
sent ito Roosevelt on October 10 (the only joint message the two
leaders sent to Washington during their talks in Moscow), they
said only: ``We have to consider the best way of reaching an
agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and
Turkey."^^1^^
Harriman remarks in his memoirs that in the first draft of
the joint message to Roosevelt the words, ``having regard to
our varying duties toward them'', suggested by Churchill,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 357.
372
concluded the sentence just cited. On Stalin's insistence, they were
dropped from the final version. Harriman writes that he told
Stalin, during an official luncheon, that he knew about the first
draft of the message and that Roosevelt would certainly be pleased
that Stalin had suggested these words be deleted, since the
President regarded it as highly important that all major
questions be decided together by the Big Three. Harriman writes:
``Stalin said he was glad to hear this and, reaching behind the
Prime Minister's back, shook my hand."^^1^^
The letter Stalin sent to Roosevelt on October 19, the day of
Churchill's departure from Moscow, spoke only of an exchange
of views. The letter said in part: ``Ambassador Harriman will
assuredly have informed you of all the important talks. I also
know that the Prime Minister intended sending you his
appraisal of the talks. For my part I can say that they were very
useful in acquainting us with each other's views on such
matters as the future of Germany, the Polish question, policy on the
Balkans and major problems of future military policies. The
talks made it plain that we can without undue difficulty
coordinate our policies on all important issues and that even if we
cannot ensure immediate solution of this or that problem, such
as the Polish question, we have, nevertheless, more favourable
prospects in this respect as well. A hope that the Moscow talks
will be useful also in other respects, that when we three meet
we shall be able to take specific decisions on all the pressing
matters of common interest to us."^^2^^ Neither at the Big Three
Conference in Yalta nor in subsequent correspondence among the
leaders, however, was the question of ``percentages'' touched
upon.
All of this shows that the Soviet side had no intention of
making a deal with London on dividing spheres of influence.
Harriman writes of this episode: ``I don't understand now, and
I do not believe I understood at the time, just what Churchill
thought he was accomplishing by these percentages. I know that
he wanted a free hand in Greece, with the support of the United
States, and that he wanted to have a hand in the development
of the new Yugoslav Government, combining the
governmentin-exile in England with Tito and his group. Churchill
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^
Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 165.
373
certainly knew that President Roosevelt insisted on keeping a free
hand and wanted any decision deferred until the three could
meet together. The interesting thing is that when they did meet,
at Yalta, the question of percentages was never again raised."^^1^^
During Churchill's visit to Moscow, representatives of the
Polish Committee for National Liberation met several times with
Mikolajczyk, who had come to the USSR for this purpose. The
delegation of the Polish Committee for National Liberation,
headed by Boleslaw Bierut, expressed willingness to reach
agreement with representatives of the emigre government provided
that the fascist-like constitution of 1935 was repealed and the 1921
constitution, which proclaimed elementary democratic freedoms,
restored. Bierut remarked that his delegation had always seen
the unification of the Polish people as its chief task and that in
the name of that principle it was ready to support any genuine
striving to realise this idea.
The delegation declared its desire to have a strong Poland,
friendly towards the Soviet Union, with the Curzon line as its
eastern boundary and a western boundary that would take in
the lands historically belonging to Poland. It agreed to the
formation of a Polish government of national unity headed by
Mikolajczyk, provided that the majority of places in the
government went to the Polish Committee for National
Liberation. The Soviet government supported these positions.
Mikolajczyk and the others who represented the emigre government,
however, rejected these proposals out of hand. In order to win
the day for their own ideas about the make-up of the new
government, they attempted to engage in haggling over the
SovietPolish border.
The stand the British Prime Minister took during these talks
was an ambiguous one. On the one hand, Churchill declared
that his government supported the proposal for establishing the
border between the USSR and Poland at the Curzon line, and
even said that this question had already been settled. When
the Allies meet at the peace conference, he maintained, Britain
would uphold Russia's claim to the border, which had been
agreed upon in Teheran. He added that this position had the
support of the British cabinet.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 358.
374
On the other hand, Churchill (on October 16) submitted for
consideration by the Soviet government the draft of an
agreement that reflected only the views reached previously
concerning the western Polish boundary. As for the eastern boundary,
the draft proposal said that ``the Polish Government accept the
Curzon Line as the line of demarcation between Poland and the
USSR."^^1^^
The Soviet government could not agree to such an
interpretation of the question. To call the Curzon line only a line of
demarcation was unacceptable, since this would leave open the
question of the border. As a result, no agreement was reached
on the Polish question.
It should be noted, however, that the talks helped clarify
positions on the Polish question, and raised hopes that a just
settlement could be reached in the future.
In this connection the declaration on Soviet-Polish relations
made by the government of the USSR as early as January 11,
1944, should be cited: ``On January 5 in London the declaration
of the emigre Polish Government was published on the question
of Soviet-Polish relations, in which there are a number of
incorrect assertions, including an incorrect assertion about the
Soviet-Polish frontier. As is known the Soviet Constitution
established the Soviet-Polish border in accordance with the will of
the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia,
expressed in a plebiscite which was carried out on a wide
democratic basis in 1939. The territories of Western Ukraine, in
which Ukrainians constitute the overwhelming majority of the
population were incorporated in Soviet Ukraine, and the
territories of Western Byelorussia, in which Byelorussians constitute
the overwhelming majority of the population were incorporated
in Soviet Byelorussia.
``The injustice committed by the Riga Treaty of 1921, which
was imposed upon the Soviet Union in regard to the Ukrainians
inhabiting Western Ukraine, and the Byelorussians inhabiting
Western Byelorussia, was in this way rectified. The
incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in the Soviet
Union not only did not violate the interests of Poland, but on
the contrary---created a reliable basis for a solid and permanent
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939--1945, Vol. II, London,
Heinemann, 1967, p. 428,
375
friendship between the Polish people and the neighbouring
Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian peoples."^^1^^
With regard to the Curzon line, the declaration further stated
that ``Poland's Eastern frontiers can be established by agreement
with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government does not regard
the 1939 frontiers as immutable. These frontiers can be modified
in Poland's favour so that areas in which the Polish population
forms the majority can be turned over to Poland. In this case
the Soviet-Polish frontier could pass approximately along the
socalled Curzon Line which was adopted in 1919 by the Supreme
Council of Allied Powers and which provides for the inclusion
of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in the Soviet
Union."^^2^^
Let us review the history of the Curzon line.
The question of Poland's borders on the east was discussed
at the Paris peace conference, which opened on January 18, 1919,
and ended with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. A special
commission for Polish affairs, headed by Jules Martin Cambon,
the French ambassador to Germany, was set up at the
conference. In working out a solution on the question of the
PolishRussian border, the commission was guided by the decision of
the delegations from the principal Allied powers---Britain,
France, the United States, Italy, and Japan---that only territories
that were ethnically Polish should be included in Poland's
territory.
On this basis the territorial commission of the Paris peace
conference worked out an eastern border for Poland that was
agreed on by the Allied powers after the signing of the Versailles
Peace Treaty and published in the Declaration of the Supreme
Council of the Allied and United Powers Concerning the
Provisional Eastern Border of Poland (December 8, 1919), over the
signature of Georges Clemenceau, the chairman of the Supreme
Council. In July of 1920 this same line was confirmed as
Poland's eastern boundary at a conference of the Allied powers in
Spa; a note based on this decision was sent to the Soviet
government on July 12, 1920, by George Curzon, the British
Foreign Secretary.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939--1945, Vol. II, London,
Heinemann, 1967, pp. 132--33.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 133,
376
In determining the Soviet-Polish border, the Supreme Council
and the Spa conference proceeded from an ethnic principle:
districts inhabited mainly by Poles were to fall to the west of
the line, while districts inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and
Byelorussians were to fall to the east of it.
The groups holding power in Poland, however, also laid claim
to territories in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. In
1920, taking advantage of the economic and military difficulties
of the newly formed Soviet republic, Poland attacked Soviet
Russia. But Poland was given a powerful rebuff; when it was realised
that the war which had been undertaken was hopeless, an
appeal was made to the Allied governments to act as mediators in
talks with Soviet Russia. It was at this time that Curzon sent
to the Soviet government the note mentioned above, which
proposed a Soviet-Polish border following what became known as
the Curzon line.
The Polish government, however, refused to accept a border
running along the Curzon line, and continued its war against
Soviet Russia. At peace talks in Riga during March of 1921,
Poland, by exploiting the difficulties confronting the Soviet
republic, managed to impose another border, seizing for itself the
western parts of the Soviet Ukraine and of Soviet Byelorussia.
The injustice the Riga treaty represented to the Ukrainians
inhabiting the Western Ukraine and the Byelorussians inhabiting
Western Byelorussia was rectified only in 1939, when a new
Soviet-Polish border was established in accordance with the will
of the people living in these regions as expressed in a plebiscite
conducted on a broad democratic basis.
The talks that took place between Polish leaders in Moscow
during Churchill's visit opened the way to resolving this
problem. Mikolajczyk, however, again adopted a negative position.
He refused to recognise a Soviet-Polish border along the Curzon
line, saying that he would have to consult with his colleagues in
London. Moreover, he demanded not only the post of prime
minister for himself but also 50 per cent of the places in the
new government for the emigres. Here, too, he was supported by
Churchill. The representatives of the Polish Committee for
National Liberation decisively rejected such importunities. In the
end Mikolajczyk returned to London without any agreement
having been reached.
377
Soviet leaders also exchanged views with Churchill on the
conduct of military operations against the common enemy; on
the whole, this had a positive effect on the further development
of cooperation between the Allies.
During Churchill's stay in Moscow Stalin accepted an
invitation to lunch at the British embassy, which at that time was
on the Sofiiskaya Embankment, as it is now. As a rule, Stalin
did not visit foreign embassies, but on this occasion he had
evidently decided to show special favour to Churchill.
The atmosphere at the lunch, at which Ambassador Harriman
was also present, was cordial and high-spirited. Stalin made a
toast to the President of the USA, who was absent from the
celebration; he gave a high appreciation to the contribution of the
United States to Allied victory. There had been a time, Stalin
said, when Great Britain and Russia could, in cooperation,
regulate the affairs of Europe. Together they had defeated
Napoleon; together they had fought against the Germans in the
First World War. In the Second World War, however, the
contribution made by the United States had proved particularly
important.
The unstated meaning of these remarks was quite clear: Stalin
was hinting to Churchill once again that he had no intention
of making a separate deal with him on the future in Europe.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Results of the Visit
The chief military and political outcome of the talks held in
Moscow in October of 1944 between the USSR and Britain was
the understanding which was reached on the need to make,
every effort to destroy the German forces withdrawing from the
Balkans. Churchill was assured that the government of the
Soviet Union was not planning to send its forces into Greece or
onto the shores of the Adriatic Sea and that it would withdraw
its forces from Yugoslavia once their tasks had been
accomplished.
The two heads of government also discussed many unsettled
questions involving the Balkan states and came to agreement on
them. The terms of armistice with Bulgaria were considered.
During the discussion on creating an Allied control commission
for Bulgaria, Churchill and Eden argued that the representatives
378
of Britain and the USA should have equal status on it with
those of the USSR. The Soviet government refused to accept
this, citing as examples the Allied control commission for Italy,
where leadership had been given to a representative of the
AngloAmerican command, and for Romania, where the chairmanship
had gone to the Soviet representative. It was only natural that
a representative of the Soviet Supreme Command should be
chairman of the control commission for Bulgaria. In the end, an
agreement on the terms of armistice with Bulgaria, acceptable to
both sides, was reached.
The situation in Yugoslavia was also discussed. The British
declared that it was necessary to pursue a concerted policy
towards that country, and Eden recommended that a message
be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they meet on
Yugoslav territory to discuss the formation of a Yugoslav government.
The Soviet government did not object to this.
The British representatives also wanted to discuss the future
of Germany: they said that in Teheran this question had been
considered only ``very superficially''. Churchill and Eden brought
forward a plan for partitioning Germany into three states:
Prussia, a Zone of International Control made up of the Ruhr,
Westphalian, and Saar regions, and an Austro-Bavarian state that
would incorporate the south-German provinces. In explaining
the reasons that underlay this plan, Churchill said that Prussia,
in his opinion, was the root of the problem, and that therefore
``Prussia should be detached from Germany."^^1^^
The British motivated their proposal for creating a Zone of
International Control by maintaining that Germany must be
deprived of the industrial might which had made possible the
country's resurgence after the First World War. Churchill
declared he thought it would be just to restore the economy of the
Soviet Union's western regions by confiscating equipment from
German enterprises.
It was not difficult to guess that the real aim of the plan to
partition Germany was the elimination of Germany as a
dangerous competitor for Britain. At the same time, Churchill
brought up the idea of uniting Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria,
and Hungary in a single group---a confederation or federation.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harrirnan and Abel, Op. cit., p. 281,
379
The Soviet government, while agreeing that Germany's
military-industrial potential must be destroyed in order to ensure
the security of Europe, refused to commit itself to any sort of
partitioning. Further discussion of the German question was
postponed until the leaders of the Big Three met again.
As for Churchill's idea of uniting a number of states into a
confederation or federation, this could not be seen as anything
other than an attempt to set up an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire
after the war. During the discussion of this proposal Stalin told
Churchill and Eden that it was impossible to think about such
unions at the time, especially since different nations, after
liberation from the Nazi yoke, would want a full national life without
any encumbrances.
The prospects for the conduct of military operations were also
considered during the talks. The representatives of Britain and
the USSR reviewed the situation on the different fronts and
reported that the military plans agreed on in Teheran had been
carried out. Firm confidence was expressed in the success of Allied
operations on all fronts.
Also discussed was the future contribution of the USSR to
the defeat of Japan. Military operations in the Pacific were, on
the whole, going well. The Western Allies had won important
naval victories that had greatly weakened Japan. The enemy's
drawn-out lines of supply were coming under attack. More than
half of Japan's merchant fleet had been sunk. The British and
American chiefs of staff understood, however, that total victory
could be won only by crushing the powerful Japanese armies in
China, Manchuria, and the Japanese islands themselves. The
Soviet armed forces were to play the decisive role in this final
campaign.
Ambassador Harriman was present at the preliminary exchange
of opinions on this matter; he insisted that the Americans
should take part in the consultations: inasmuch as the USA was
bearing the main burden of the war in the Pacific, it should
take the most active part in the upcoming talks on this problem.
Churchill finally agreed to this, and during the October 14
meeting with Stalin an American general, John R. Deane, was asked
to review operations in the Pacific theatre. Having reported on
the situation, General Deane, acting on instructions from the US
Supreme Command, put three questions before Stalin:
380
1. How much time would be needed after Germany's defeat
before the Soviet Union could enter the war against Japan?
2. How long would it take after that to build up Soviet forces
so that they could begin an offensive?
3. How much of the capacity of the Trans-Siberian railroad
could be used for the build-up and support of an American
strategic air force?
As the British and the Americans were leaving the Kremlin,
Churchill said to Deane in a patronising tone: ``Young man, I
admired your nerve in asking Stalin those last three questions.
I have no idea that you will get an answer, but there was
certainly no harm in asking."^^1^^
Churchill was mistaken. Stalin gave his answer the next day.
He said that it would take three months after Germany's defeat
for the Red Army to be ready to undertake an offensive against
Japan. Supplies sufficient for a three-month operation would
have to be stockpiled in Siberia first; in view of the limited
capacity of the Trans-Siberian line, supplies to the air bases made
available to the Americans on the USSR's Pacific seaboard would
have to be brought by the Americans themselves across the
Pacific. Stalin explained that for this the Americans could use the
port of Petropavlovsk, in Kamchatka. Repeating that the Red
Army could begin military operations three months after Hitler
was defeated, Stalin added that two conditions for this would
have to be observed: the United States would have to help in
building up a large supply stockpile in Siberia, and certain
political aspects of the Soviet Union's participation in this war
would have to be clarified.
``The Russians would have to know what they were fighting
for,'' Stalin said. ``They had certain claims against Japan."^^2^^
Back at the time of the Teheran Conference, when the
discussion turned to the prospects for the war against Japan, Stalin
had asked Roosevelt and Churchill what the Allies were prepared
to do for the USSR in the Far East, where the Soviet Union
had no free access to the ocean. Roosevelt mentioned the
possibility of turning Dairen into a ``free port''. Churchill's reply was
more general in form; he said that the legitimate needs of
Russia should be satisfied.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 363.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 363--64.
381
Neither Washington nor London had been surprised when, in
October of 1944, Stalin posed this question on the political, as
well as military, level and made it clear that the USSR needed
to have free access to the ocean. Moreover, British and
American politicians could not have failed to notice the Soviet public's
heightened interest in the Far East and in certain aspects of
that region's history. Stepanov's Port Arthur became a best-seller
in the Soviet Union just at this time; essentially the book was
the reminiscences of a participant in the Russo-Japanese war of
1904--1905 clothed in novel form. All those who read this lengthy
book at the time were brought into contact, as it were, with the
events of forty years earlier, when the soldiers, sailors, and
officers of the Russian army and navy, who performed their military
duties heroically, were defeated on account of the negligence of
the tsarist authorities. The citizens of the Soviet Union also
remembered well the years of intervention in the Far East, and
all the harm the Japanese militarists had done to their homeland.
When the Red Army joined the war against imperialist Japan,
it was said in the Kremlin that the older generation had waited
forty years for that moment.
The discussion of these questions by Stalin, Churchill, and
Harriman in October of 1944 helped to clarify positions and
undoubtedly had an important effect on the decisions made later
by the three Allied powers.
In 1944, on the occasion of the anniversary of the October
Revolution, a large group of us who worked in the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was recommended for government
awards. I received the Order of the Red Star. The decorations
were presented to us by Mikhail Kalinin. My field continued to
be the same: Soviet-American relations, plus work as a
translator.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Preparations for a New ``Big Three'' Meeting
The question of a new meeting of the heads of the three great
powers began to be heatedly debated in the autumn of 1944.
Many important events had taken place since the Teheran
Conference. The armed forces of the Allied powers had won new
and brilliant victories. The Red Army had swept the aggressors
out of Soviet territory and was in the last stages of driving them
382
out of eastern Europe. The hour was approaching when the
anti-Hitler coalition would emerge victorious from an armed
struggle of unprecedented scale and cost. And although hard
battles with both Nazi Germany and militarist Japan still lay
ahead, the problem of post-war settlement was assuming ever
greater importance.
At the same time, conflicts within the anti-Hitler coalition
were becoming more and more perceptible. They were connected
to a considerable degree with attempts by imperialist forces to
retain their dominance in the world, and with this in view to
weaken as far as possible the Soviet Union and to lessen its
influence on world affairs. An important element of this course
was the effort to suppress progressive movements in the
countries being liberated from fascist enslavement and to foist onto
the peoples of these countries reactionary regimes obedient to
the Western powers. Lastly, various tendencies within the ruling
groups in the West were of no little importance. These were
especially evident within the top leadership of the United States,
where a split was taking place between those who favoured
cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war and those who
wanted a ``hard line'', confrontation, or even war against the
USSR.
Under these circumstances a Big Three meeting was of
particular importance. There were two factors, though, which
complicated preparations for such a meeting: the presidential
election to be held in the USA in November of 1944, and the
difficulties in agreeing on a meeting place.
Harriman, acting on Roosevelt's instructions, told Stalin on
September 23, 1944, that the President was thinking of
November as a possible time for a meeting. Since that would be too
late in the year for Alaska, which the Americans had proposed
for a site, he now proposed that the meeting be held somewhere
in the Mediterranean. Stalin replied that he considered such a
meeting desirable, but was afraid his doctors would not permit
him to make such a long journey.
Stalin complained that his age was beginning to take a toll
on him. In the past, he said, he could get over the grippe in
two or three days, whereas now it took him a week, or
sometimes two.
Harriman mentioned the salubrious effect of the
383
Mediterranean sun, but Stalin said that his doctors thought any change of
climate might be dangerous. He offered to send Molotov, in
whom he placed complete confidence, to the meeting in his
stead. Molotov was present during this conversation, and objected
that he could never take the place of Marshal Stalin.
``You are too modest,'' Stalin told him.
Harriman then said that although the President was always
glad to meet with Molotov he hoped that there would be second
thoughts in the Kremlin.^^1^^
The talks with Churchill in the Kremlin in October were no
substitute, of course, for a Big Three meeting. The American
ambassador spoke once again of such a meeting during
Churchill's Moscow visit, and moreover hinted that Roosevelt could
come to the Black Sea. He said further that Harry Hopkins had
told Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, the
same thing.
This suggestion suited Stalin perfectly, and on October 19,
1944, he wrote to Roosevelt: ``Ambassador Gromyko has informed
me of his recent talk with Mr. Hopkins, who told him that you
could arrive at the Black Sea late in November and meet with
me on the Soviet Black Sea coast. I should very much welcome
your doing so. My talk with the Prime Minister convinced me
that he shares the idea. In other words, the three of us could
meet late in November to examine the questions that have piled
up since Tehran. I shall be glad to hear from you about this."^^2^^
The President's reply was received in Moscow on October
25. It expressed confidence that what had been accomplished
by the Soviet and British leaders during Churchill's recent visit
to Moscow would ``facilitate and expedite our work in the next
meeting when we three should come to a full agreement on our
future activities, policies, and mutual interests".^^3^^
As to preparations for such a meeting, Roosevelt pointed out
that it was necessary to ``investigate the practicability of various
places where our November meeting can be held, i.e., from the
standpoint of living accommodations, security, accessibility, and
so forth. I would appreciate receiving your suggestions.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 352--53.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 165.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 167.
384
``I have been considering,'' Roosevelt continued, ``the
practicability of Cyprus, Athens, or Malta in the event that my
entering the Black Sea on a ship should be too difficult or
impracticable. I prefer travelling and living on a ship. We know that
security and living conditions in Cyprus and Malta are
satisfactory. I am looking forward to seeing you again with much
pleasure.
``I would be pleased to have your advice and suggestions."^^1^^
Four days later the head of the Soviet government sent the
President a reply in which he continued to press for his own
idea. He emphasised that conditions on the Soviet Black Sea
coast were quite agreeable and expressed the hope that by the
time of the meeting it would be possible to ensure safe access to
the meeting place for the presidential ship. Thus the site of the
Big Three meeting remained' an open question.
Soon after, the presidential election was held and Roosevelt
emerged the winner. In his congratulatory message on this
occasion, Stalin said he was sure that under Roosevelt's experienced
leadership the American peope would, ``jointly with the peoples
of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the other democratic
countries, round off the struggle against the common foe and
ensure victory in the name of liberating mankind from Nazi
tyranny."^^2^^
Later Roosevelt had new thoughts on the date for the meeting
of the Big Three. In a telegram to Stalin received in Moscow
on November 19, he said it would be more convenient to
postpone the meeting until after his inauguration on January 20.
Thus it was proposed that the meeting be held in an appropriate
place on January 28 or 30 of 1945. Roosevelt said that the
American naval authorities were strongly opposed to the Black Sea.
He explained that they did not want to undertake sending a
large vessel through the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles since
that would require a very strong escort, while these forces were
urgently needed elsewhere. The President further said that
Churchill had suggested Alexandria, Jerusalem, or Athens as a
meeting place, and that the date ought not to be later than the
end of January or the beginning of February. He expressed hope
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 168.
__PRINTERS_P_385_COMMENT__
25---1996
385
that by that time Stalin would be able to travel to some Adriatic
port. ``Almost any spot in the Mediterranean,'' the message said,
``is accessible to me so that I can be within easy distance of
Washington by air in order that I may carry out action on
legislation---a subject you are familiar with."^^1^^
After this exchange, the question of a time and place for the
Big Three meeting was less clear than ever. It was thoroughly
obvious that the broad offensive launched by the Red Army on
the Soviet-German front and the fierce battles being fought in
a number of its sectors made it impossible for the head of the
Soviet government, who was also Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Soviet armed forces, to undertake lengthy and exotic trips
like those which Roosevelt described so alluringly.
Incidentally, the President himself realised that his arguments
were not very convincing. He was making new suggestions more
with an eye to placate the opponents of his own policies in
Washington itself. Hopkins writes very frankly about this:
``All of the President's close advisers were opposed to his going
to Russia; most did not like or trust the Russians anyway and
could not understand why the President of the United States
should cart himself all over the world to meet Stalin. This
argument carried no weight with me. The all-important thing was
to get the meeting. There was not a chance of getting that
meeting outside of the Crimea. The President's advisers gave me
a lot of acid criticism when they found out that I was the one
who had talked to Gromyko about the possibility of going to the
Crimea. When they descended on the President to urge him not
to go the President wavered again and cooked up a lot of
counter proposals, none of which made any sense. I was sure the
President would wind up by going to the Crimea, the primary
reason being that it was a part of the world he had never visited
and his adventurous spirit was forever leading him to go to
unusual places, and, on his part, the election being over, he would
no longer be disturbed about it for political reasons."^^2^^
On November 23, Stalin sent the President a brief and firm
reply: ``It is too bad that your naval authorities question the
advisability of your original idea that the three of us should meet
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 168--169.
^^2^^ Henry Adams, Harry Hopkins. A Biography, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
New York, 1977, p. 371.
386
on the Soviet Black Sea coast. There is no objection, as far as I
am concerned, to the time of the meeting suggested by you---
late January or early February; I expect, however, that we shall
be able to select one of the Soviet sea ports. I still have to pay
heed to my doctors' warning of the risk involved in long
journeys."^^1^^
Finally, Roosevelt announced that he agreed. On December 27,
he instructed Harriman to inform Stalin that he was ready to
come to a Big Three meeting in Yalta in February. It was
decided that thenceforth the meeting would have the code name
Argonaut (it was later renamed Magneto).
Active preparations for the Yalta Conference were begun. The
participants agreed not to invite members of the press, with the
exception of newspaper photographers.
Preparations in the Crimea were in full swing. Most of the
work fell to the Soviet side, although the British and the
Americans took part in getting ready the residences intended for their
respective leaders. Roosevelt was given quarters in Livadia,
where the plenary sessions were to take place. The Vorontsov
Palace in Alupka was placed at Churchill's disposal. Stalin was
to reside in a villa in Koreiz.
It must be remembered that the Crimea had been freed of
the Nazi aggressors only a short time before. The traces left by
their destruction and brigandage were still to be seen everywhere.
An enormous amount of work had to be done to make ready the
buildings that had been designated for the conference and
delegations. Furniture had to be selected and delivered; major
repair work had to be done on buildings and plumbing systems; the
surrounding territory had to be cleared. Finally, the necessary
measures had to be taken to ensure the safety of the Big Three
and other participants in the conference. The Soviet authorities,
in a very brief time, accomplished all of this with distinction.
Many of the participants in the Yalta Conference later paid
tribute in their memoirs to the work done to provide good working
conditions for the delegations.
Together with the technical preparations for the new Big
Three meeting, the weeks preceding it also saw an intensive
exchange of opinions on fundamental political problems.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 170.
__PRINTERS_P_387_COMMENT__
25*
387
The talks during Churchill's visit to Moscow were part of this
exchange. Afterwards there was lively correspondence, and the
US and British ambassadors also met with Soviet leaders. The
Americans showed a particular interest in reaching agreement
with the Soviet government on when the Soviet Union would
enter the war against Japan; the Soviet side, in turn, stood firmly
by its own interests in the Far East.
The Soviet position was clarified somewhat during Harriman's
visit to Stalin on December 14, 1944.
Acting on instructions from the President, Harriman asked
what the Soviet Union's demands were in the Far East. Stalin
took a map, and said that Lower Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands
should be returned to Russia. He stressed that as things stood
the approaches to Vladivostok were entirely in Japanese hands,
and said the USSR was entitled to protection for its
communications to this major port, whereas at the present time all
outlets to the Pacific were blocked by the enemy. Lastly, said Stalin,
the Soviet Union would want once again to take a lease of
Dairen and Port Arthur, and the area surrounding them.
Harriman answered that, as he remembered it, this question
had been discussed in Teheran, and Roosevelt had agreed then
that the Soviet Union needed to have access to warm-water
ports on the Pacific. Harriman added that he thought the
President had in mind not the leasing of these areas to the Soviet
Union but rather their transformation into international free
ports.
Stalin replied by saying that the Soviet side would also like to
rent the railroad, built by the Russians, from Dairen to Harbing
and from there north-west. He explained that the USSR had no
intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China or of
violating its sovereignty in Manchuria.
There were, of course, certain elements within the American
leadership that wanted to prevent a strengthening of Soviet
influence in the Far East. They argued that control over railways
in that area could lead to the stationing of Soviet troops there,
which might affect the development of the political situation in
China and bring success to the ``Chinese Red Army" in its
struggle against the Guomingdang. In view of the leverage these
groups had, Harriman recommended that Washington ask
Moscow for further details on the USSR's claims in the Far East.
388
But the ambassador received no reply to this suggestion. The
administration in Washington thought it expedient to go no further
than the information received at the recent meeting in the
Kremlin.
Apparently some part in this was played by Washington's
desire to see the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan as soon
as possible. Another factor was that at precisely this time the
German command launched a powerful offensive in the
Ardennes which placed General Eisenhower, the commander of the
Anglo-American forces in Western Europe, in a very grave
position. American and British generals were bombarding
Washington and London with questions about the Soviet plans: in
essence, they were calling urgently for help.
On December 24, Roosevelt sent Stalin a message asking that,
in view of the pressing business at hand, a high-ranking officer
from General Eisenhower's headquarters be allowed to visit
Moscow to discuss Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its
relation to the Eastern Front. The Soviet government immediately
agreed, and British Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder was sent
to Moscow. On January 6, before Tedder had arrived in the
Soviet capital, Churchill dispatched a special message to Stalin.
``The battle in the West is very heavy,'' he wrote. ``It is General
Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you
plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major
decisions. Our Envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night
reported weather-bound in Cairo... In case he has not reached
you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can
count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or
elsewhere, during January. . . I regard the matter as urgent."^^1^^
The next day Stalin answered: ``We are mounting an offensive,
but at the moment the weather is unfavourable. Still, in
view of our Allies' position on the Western Front, GHQ of the
Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at
a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale
offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than
the second half of January. Rest assured we shall do all in our
power to support the valiant forces of our Allies."^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 294.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 294--95.
389
The Soviet command had been making thorough preparations
for this operation, the goal of which was to complete the
liberation of Poland. Now it was decided to reduce the time of
preparation for this operation to a minimum. On January 12 through
15, the Red Army moved westward along a front 700 kilometres
in length. By February 1, Soviet forces had pushed forward 500
kilometres in the direction of the main thrust, liberated Warsaw,
and reached the Oder River.
When Tedder and his group finally arrived in Moscow on
January 15, the offensive on the Soviet-German front was in
full swing. At his first meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin he was
informed that the Soviet command had committed a large force
which was capable of maintaining offensive for two months,
and possibly longer. Afterwards there was an exchange of
information on various matters: the state of the German reserves, the
Luftwaffe's shortage of trained pilots, and the synchronisation of
spring operations on the two fronts. Tedder expressed gratitude
for the aid given to the Allied forces in their difficulty.
``We have no written agreement,'' Stalin answered, ``but we
are comrades-in-arms. It is reasonable and proper, and in the
interests of both sides, for us to help one another in difficult
moments. It would have been stupid for me to stand aside and let
the Nazis destroy you. In the same way, it is in your interests to
do everything possible to prevent the Nazis from destroying us.''
It may be supposed that Marshal Tedder had little pleasure
in hearing these words, which contained a veiled reproach to the
Allies for their long delay in opening a second front and for
standing on the sidelines when the Soviet Union was faced with a
critical situation.
Immediately after this meeting, Stalin sent Roosevelt a
telegram that read as follows: ``Today, January 15, I had a talk
with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. In
my view the information we exchanged was complete enough.
Both parties gave exhaustive answers to the questions. I must
say that I was most impressed by Marshal Tedder.
``After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German
front I am now in a position to inform you that our offensive is
making satisfactory progress despite unfavourable weather. The
entire Central Front---from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea---is
moving westwards. The Germans, though resisting desperately,
390
are retreating. I feel sure that they will have to disperse their
reserves between the two fronts and, as a result, relinquish the
offensive on the Western Front. I am glad that this circumstance
will ease the position of the Allied troops in the West."^^1^^
In the course of the consultations that preceded the meeting
in Yalta, questions involving post-war settlement were also
touched upon. Since no agreement had been reached at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference on voting procedure in the Security
Council of the new international organisation, efforts were now
made to bring positions closer together and to work out a
formula acceptable to all. A good deal of hope was placed on the
personal contact between top leaders at the upcoming conference.
Meanwhile, an exchange of opinions was going on in
Washington on future bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States. This problem was of special concern to
Roosevelt, who had repeatedly spoken in favour of mutually beneficial
cooperation and of creating a solid economic basis for relations
between the USSR and the USA. On January 10, 1945,
Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau sent to the White House the
draft of a plan for extending credits to the USSR on very
favourable terms: 10,000 million dollars at two per cent annual
interest, with a repayment period of thirty-five years. A week later
Morgenthau visited Edward Stettinius, the new Secretary of
State, to discuss the plan with him. In presenting his ideas,
Morgenthau said his aim was to show the Soviet government that
the USA was resolved to work together with the USSR in the
post-war period.
A short time later Assistant Secretary of State William
Clayton informed Harriman that the President was extremely
interested in the idea of extending a sizable credit to the Soviet
Union, but nothing should be done until Roosevelt had discussed
the whole question personally with Stalin at Yalta.
As for Churchill, his particular concern in preparing for
Argonaut was to conduct preliminary talks with the Americans so
as to form a united front against the Soviet Union at the
upcoming conference. Knowing that this idea left Roosevelt cold, he
proposed that a conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of
Britain and the USA be held in Malta; the Prime Minister and
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 184.
391
the President could also take part in this on the eve of their
departure by air for the Crimea. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that
the two of them ought to discuss certain ``matters which do not
affect the Russians".^^1^^
The President declined this suggestion. He said that even with
the best weather he could not arrive at Malta with enough time
at his disposal. He would have to continue at once on his
journey if he was to arrive in Yalta at the time agreed. But still
Churchill continued to press for his own idea. On January 8, he
sent another telegram to the President, arguing that it was
imperative to hold a preliminary Anglo-American conference on
the foreign ministers' level at least. To placate the Americans, he
added that Molotov too might be invited. Thereupon the
President conceded to send three American generals---King, Arnold,
and Marshall---to meet with their British colleagues several days
before the conference in order to discuss matters of common
interest. He rejected the idea of a meeting of foreign ministers,
however.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Yalta Conference
For and Against
The Yalta Conference, which was held from February 4
through 11, 1945, had an important place in the diplomatic
history of the Second World War. It was the second meeting of
the leaders of the three great powers in the anti-Hitler coalition---
the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain. Its overall thrust, like
that of the Teheran Conference, was in the direction of reaching
agreed decisions on ultimate victory and post-war settlement.
Afterwards, during the cold-war years, opponents of
cooperation with the Soviet Union on both sides of the Atlantic
exerted themselves not a little to discredit the decisions adopted at
Yalta. They tried to depict the Western powers as having given
in at the conference, as having allowed the Soviet side to seize
all the benefits---to the detriment of the West. It was then that
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill, Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,
Doc. 497, Op. cit., p. 644,
392
the legend of the ``sick man at Yalta" was created, according to
which President Roosevelt, because of poor health, was altogether
unaware of what he was doing and unable to evaluate the
consequences that the conference's decisions would have.
This legend still has its believers, although it has been refuted
by the best authorities. It is true that when the Big Three met in
the Crimea Roosevelt had less than two months left to live. But
the rapid deterioration of his health took place only in the last
few weeks. As for the Yalta conference, the President's personal
physician, Doctor Howard Bruenn, who was with him in
Livadia, said that Roosevelt's health was perfectly satisfactory, ``his
lungs clear and his heart and blood pressure unchanged".^^1^^ The
President's wife, Eleanor, testified to the same: ``Franklin had
high hopes that at this conference he could make real progress
in strengthening the personal relationship between himself and
Marshal Stalin. . . He knew that negotiation invariably involved
some give and take, but he was a good bargainer and a good
poker player, and he loved the game of negotiation. I am sure
that even at the Yalta conference, the necessity of matching his
wits against other people's stimulated him and kept him alert
and interested, no matter how weary he may at times have
been."^^2^^
Another fiction disseminated by the apologists of the cold war
ought to be mentioned here. This is the claim that the Soviet
Union violated the Yalta decisions and thus brought about the
alienation of the wartime Allies. The inconsistency here is patent:
if the decisions made at the Yalta Conference favoured the
Soviet Union, why did the USSR later find it necessary to violate
them? It would be senseless to look for logic here, though. Such
fabrications merely serve the ends of a definite social group; they
are intended solely to discredit, by any means, the agreements
which the wartime Allies arrived at together in the Crimea. The
bottom line is that these agreements became a thorn in the side
of those in Washington and London who wanted to turn
sharply away from cooperation with the Soviet Union and towards
confrontation.
Even as the Yalta meetings were about to begin, there were
_-_-_
~^^1^^ J. Burns, Op. cit., p. 573.
~^^2^^ Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember, New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1949, pp. 339--40.
393
forces actively at work in the USA and Britain to prevent the
three chief participants in the anti-Hitler coalition from reaching
agreement. The crushing blows dealt the Nazis by the Red Army,
the rapid westward advance of the Soviet forces, the liberation
of the territory of one East European state after another by the
Red Army---all of this was cause for worry among those who
regarded any strengthening of the role played by the Soviet Union
as a threat to their own social privileges and imperialist ambitions.
As they saw it, the time had come to adopt a ``tough'' line
towards Moscow.
It was precisely in this spirit that George Kennan, who was
then a counsellor at the US embassy in Moscow, conceived the
note which he sent to Yalta. Kennan is now inclined to look
critically at some of his youthful mistakes, but in the 1940s he was
widely known as an ideologist of the cold war. Here is what
Kennan had to say to the American participants in the Yalta
Conference :
``I am aware of the realities of this war, and of the fact that
we were too weak to win it without Russian cooperation. I
recognize that Russia's war effort has been masterful and effective
and must, to a certain extent, find its reward. . . But with all of
this, I fail to see why we must associate ourselves with this
political program, so hostile to the interests of the Atlantic
community as a whole, so dangerous to everything which we need to
see preserved in Europe.''
Kennan went on to offer his own alternative program:
1. Plans for creating a United Nations Organisation must be
buried ``as quickly and quietly as possible'', since its only
practical result would be to commit the United States to the defense
of ``a swollen and unhealthy Russian sphere of power".
2. The American people must be corrected of the ``dangerously
erroneous impression that the security of the world depends on
our assuming some formal blanket engagement to use our armed
force in some given set of circumstances, as set forth in some
legal documents''. The USA must retain for itself the right to
determine where its armed forces should be used.
3. The United States should ``write off" Eastern and
SouthEastern Europe unless it was willing to ``go the whole hog" and
oppose with all its physical and diplomatic resources Russian
domination of the area.
394
4. The United States should ``accept as an accomplished fact
the complete partition of Germany" and begin consultations with
the British and French on creating a West-European federation
to include the western parts of Germany.^^1^^
In essence, this was a programme for splitting the world into
two opposing camps. President Roosevelt and his closest advisers
did not heed Kennan's call; they continued along their course
towards developing cooperation in arms and building together
the post-war world.
On February 4, the Big Three talks opened in the Livadia
Palace. Churchill made haste to express his deep admiration of
the might demonstrated by the Red Army in its offensive. To
this Stalin answered that the Red Army's winter offensive which
Churchill had spoken of so gratefully was an act of duty done
by a comrade-in-arms. The decisions adopted in Teheran had
not obliged the Soviet government to undertake a winter
offensive, but the Soviet command had launched an offensive, and
done so even before the planned date. The Soviet government
had considered this its duty, the duty of an ally, even though it
was under no formal obligations in this respect. Stalin suggested
that the leaders of the Allied powers keep in mind that Soviet
leaders not only fulfilled their obligations but were also prepared
to do their moral duty to the best of their ability.
This was a reminder to the Western politicians of the events
of the recent past. In the first years of the war, when the Red
Army was fighting terrible battles against the superior forces of
the Wehrmacht, London and Washington had not only ignored
their moral duty to their Ally but reneged on their own repeated
promises to open a second front. The Western leaders had
nothing to say in answer; Churchill could only express his wish that
the Soviet armies' offensive might continue with the same
success. By the time of the Yalta Conference, the situation at the
front left Western politicians no alternative but to acknowledge
that without the active participation of the Soviet Union, the
United States and Britain would not have been able to overcome
Nazi Germany.
Another, no less important, military problem also had its effect
on the atmosphere at the Yalta meetings: the desire of the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Charles Bohlen, Op. cit., pp. 175--76.
395
Western Allies, and especially the United States, to get a definite
commitment from Moscow on the USSR's entry into the war
against Japan. At the time, the USA regarded reaching
agreement on this question with the Soviet Union as its principal aim.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Preliminary Sessions
Before the official opening of the conference, preliminary
meetings took place between the leaders of the three powers. At
three o'clock in the afternoon of February 4, Stalin arrived at
the Vorontsov Palace for a conversation with Churchill. The
Prime Minister says in his memoirs that they had an interesting
discussion concerning the further course of the war against
Germany. Stalin said that Germany did not have enough grain and
coal, and that its system of transportation had been seriously
damaged. Germany's entire military organism was gravely ill. The
best generals had vanished from the scene. And although Hitler
still had significant panzer forces, his Reich was no longer a
world power, able to maintain troops wherever it saw a need.
After listening to these remarks, Churchill turned to the military
situation in Western Europe. Using a map, he went over the
movements on the different fronts, with particular attention to
the situation in Italy.
At four o'clock Stalin paid a visit to Roosevelt at the Livadia
Palace. The President remarked on the destruction he had seen
along the way to Yalta, and said that now he was even more
``bloodthirsty'' towards the Nazis than he had been in Teheran
in 1943. Stalin replied that the destruction in the Crimea could
not compare in any way with what the Nazis had done in the
Ukraine, where they had deliberately and methodically set about
wreaking havoc. The conversation then turned to Roosevelt's
voyage across the Atlantic aboard the cruiser Quincy; the
President said he had made a bet on whether the Russians would get
to Berlin before the Americans liberated Manila. Stalin
expressed the opinion that the Americans would take the Philippine
capital before the Red Army entered Berlin, since the battles
along the Oder were going very hard. The Soviet forces had been
able to set up several bridgeheads, he said, but the enemy was
putting up a fierce resistance.
Touching on the situation on the Western front, Roosevelt
396
said that General Eisenhower did not expect to cross the Rhine
before March, since earlier than that the current was too swift
and ice floes would hinder pontoon operations. And so,
Roosevelt concluded, the decisive offensive against Germany would
apparently have to be put off until spring.
The time had come to move to the ballroom of the palace,
where the first plenary session of the conference was scheduled
to open at five. A Marine appeared from the next room to push
the President's wheel-chair. Stalin walked alongside. Before
moving into the ballroom, Stalin asked whether the President did
not think the French should be given a zone of occupation in
Germany.
``That's not a bad idea,'' Roosevelt said. After a pause, he
added that if this were done it would be ``only out of kindness''. He
disliked de Gaulle, and this showed in his attitude towards French
affairs. Stalin agreed that kindness was probably the only
possible reason for giving the French a zone of occupation.
The first plenary session of the Yalta Conference was opened
by President Roosevelt, as Stalin had suggested.
``Neither in law nor in history,'' he began, ``is it envisaged that
I should open conferences. It was only by chance that I opened
the Teheran Conference. But I consider it a great honour to
open the present conference. I would like to start by saying how
grateful I am for the hospitality that has been shown me.''
The President paused briefly and looked around the large,
round table at which the participants were seated. At its centre
were the three little flags of the powers in the anti-Hitler
coalition.
The leaders of the three powers, he continued, already
understood each other well, and the mutual understanding among them
was growing. They all wanted a rapid end to the war and a
lasting peace. This was why the participants had been able to
begin their unofficial talks. Roosevelt said he thought it was
necessary to talk frankly. Experience had shown that frankness in
negotiating made it possible to reach good decisions more
quickly. The participants would have before them the maps of Europe,
Asia, and Africa. But the session that day, he said, would be
devoted to the situation on the Eastern front, where the Red Army
was advancing with such success. The President then asked for
a report on the situation on the Soviet-German front.
397
At Stalin's suggestion, this report was made by Army
General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
He described in detail the course of the offensive begun by the
Soviet forces on January 12 to 15 along a 700-kilometre front---
between the Niemen and the Carpathians, and indicated the
chief thrust of the various groupings.
Afterwards General Marshall of the USA spoke about
operations on the Western front, and described the difficulties
connected with the situation in the Ardennes, where the Germans
had concentrated ``rather big" forces. Marshall also said that the
Germans would probably resume their submarine offensive soon,
since they had developed an improved type of vessel. The trouble
was that devices the Allies had at the time were unable to
detect these submarines. For this reason the operations of British
and American heavy bombers had lately been directed against
the yards where these submarines were being built. Nonetheless,
Marshall declared, these operations had not detracted from
Allied air strikes against German industry.
When General Marshall had finished his report, Churchill said
that before the participants moved on to non-military matters
he would like to bring up a question concerning the forcing of
rivers. The officer who was in charge of studying this problem for
the Western Allies was present in Yalta, Churchill said, and the
Allies would be grateful if he could receive information from the
Soviet military on the forcing of rivers. It was well known, the
Prime Minister added, that the Russians had great experience
in this, and especially in forcing ice-bound rivers.
Stalin promised to help in this matter, and asked a number of
questions about the Allies' upcoming military operations. He
enquired about the length of the front along which the breakthrough
was to be made, about enemy fortifications in that sector, and
about the adequacy of Allied reserves. He attached special
importance to having enough tank divisions. General Marshall
replied in detail to these questions, and said the Allies would have
ten or twelve tank divisions to thirty-five infantry divisions.
Afterwards there was an exchange of opinions on the
coordination of military actions. Stalin remarked that Allied operations
were out of phase. The Allies had begun their offensive in the
autumn, when the Soviet forces had halted theirs. Then the
mistake had been repeated in reverse. Emphasising the need to
398
avoid such errors in the future, Stalin suggested that plans for
further operations be discussed. Churchill said he would prefer
to let the military men deal with such questions while the leaders
discussed political problems. This suggestion was agreed to.
Churchill said he thought the next plenary session should be
devoted to political questions, namely the future of Germany.
``If Germany has a future,'' he added.
To which Stalin replied:
``Germany will have a future!''
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The British Inheritance
During the plenary session on February 9, an incident took
place that centred on Churchill. Everything went along as usual,
in calm and dignity, until Edward Stettinius, the American
Secretary of State, who was speaking about preparations for the
upcoming United Nations conference, touched on the problem
of trusteeships. There was actually no reason for the British to
take offense: Stettinius only mentioned that before the
conference began the future permanent members of the Security Council
should consult through diplomatic channels regarding trusteeships
over colonial and dependent peoples.
Churchill, however, saw this as an encroachment on the
interests of the British Empire. The mere mention of the matter
of trusteeship flustered him in the extreme.
The Prime Minister exclaimed that he vigorously objected to
discussing this question. He said Great Britain had been waging
a hard struggle for long years in order to preserve the integrity
of the British Commonwealth and the British Empire. He was
confident, he said, that the struggle would end in complete
success. As long as Britain's flag flew over the territories of the
British Crown, he continued, not one bit of British soil would be
put up for auction before forty states. The British Empire would
never be placed on trial before an international court on the
question of trusteeship over under-age nations.
This tirade burst like a storm into the calm atmosphere of the
talks. Stettinius hastened to assure Churchill that he had not at
all meant his remarks to apply to the British Empire. The
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American delegation, he explained, only wanted the world organisation
to establish trusteeship over territories taken away from the
enemy, where this was necessary.
Churchill then declared in a conciliatory tone that if it were
a question of enemy territories he had no objections. Perhaps it
would be appropriate to place such territories under trusteeship.
Stettinius repeated that the conference of the three ministers
of foreign affairs had recognised the desirability of discussing
the question of trusteeship at the United Nations conference.
But Churchill well understood what the Americans were
aiming at. This was why he insisted on a special qualification in the
text of the decision saying that the discussion of trusteeship was
not in any way related to the territory of the British Empire.
Churchill had long suspected the Americans of deviously
plotting to lay their hands on some of Britain's possessions. And not
without cause. It was foreseen in Washington that Britain would
emerge from the war considerably weakened and prove incapable
of dealing with the movement for national liberation that was
developing. Moreover, it was the prevailing opinion in the USA
that the old colonial methods of dominance were outmoded and
might be unsuitable for the mid-twentieth century. Hence
Washington's keen interest in the so-called system of international
trusteeship, which would enable American imperialism to use
the United Nations as a screen for establishing a neo-colonialist
system with the USA as the beneficiary. Also involved of course,
was the idea of world dominance for America, the realisation of
which was hampered by the ``old'' colonialism, including that of
Great Britain.
London and Washington had repeatedly been at loggerheads
over this matter, as can be seen from the secret correspondence
between Churchill and Roosevelt. Early in 1944, for instance, the
President informed the Prime Minister that he had instructed
the State Department to consult with experts on the question of
oil. On February 22 of that year, an American inter-agency
committee drew up the first draft of a paper on US foreign policy
with respect to oil. The document said that the first task facing
the United States was extending the stipulations of the Atlantic
Charter about ``free access" to the question of oil.
Roosevelt sent assurances to Churchill: ''. . .Please do accept
my assurances that we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil
400
fields in Iraq or Iran.'' Nevertheless, he continued, ``I cannot hold
off conversations much longer."^^1^^
The Prime Minister was greatly unnerved by the Americans'
plans. On March 4 he wrote to the President: ``Thank you very
much for your assurances about no sheep's eyes at our oil fields
at Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest
assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon
your interests or property in Saudi Arabia. My position on this,
as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage,
territorial or otherwise, as the result of the war. On the other hand
she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her
after having given her best services to the good cause---at least
not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct
of her affairs."^^2^^
The British lion, as we see, had shown its claws. But they were
already much blunted, as Washington well knew. Churchill
realised this as well, although he refused to admit as much. And so,
fearing for the future of the empire, he sought repeatedly to
extract from Roosevelt a promise to shore up Britain's positions.
Washington, however, was undertaking no such obligations. On
November 28, 1944, shortly after Roosevelt had been elected for
a fourth term in office, Churchill sent to the White House a long
secret message in which he gave voice to his worries and
concerns. He was especially troubled by the Americans' suggestion
that British bases all over the world be put at their disposal.
``I have never advocated competitive 'bigness' in any sphere
between our two countries in their present state of development,''
Churchill wrote. ``You will have the greatest navy in the world.
You will have, I hope, the greatest air force. You will have the
greatest trade. You have all the gold. But these things do not
oppress my mind with fear because I am sure the American
people under your reacclaimed leadership will not give themselves
over to vainglorious ambitions, and that justice and fair play will
be the lights that guide them."^^3^^
With this rather flattering missive Churchill was hoping to
``soften up" his friend across the water and obtain from him
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,
Op. cit., p. 459.
~^^2^^ Ibid., Doc. 322, p. 459.
~^^3^^ Ibid., Doc. 468, p. 611.
__PRINTERS_P_401_COMMENT__
26---1996
401
appropriate assurances. But Roosevelt remained firm. His reply
could, perhaps, serve as an epitome of diplomatic documents in
the heyday of the ``American dream" of world dominance.
``I have given careful thought to your 836 and to the problems
which you cite,'' the President said in his letter of November 30,
1944. ``You know that I have no desire for any arrangement by
which our people would profit from the sacrifices which yours
have made in this war. Your confidence in the justice and fair
play of the American people is, I am sure, justified. I have equal
confidence that your people have the same qualities in the same
measure. I know that they want equal opportunity in the air
and unquestionably they should have it. I cannot believe that
they would want aviation, in which you as well as we have a
great future, stifled and suffocated because they were for a
moment in a less favorable competitive position.
``You say that the British Empire is being asked to put bases
all over the world at the disposal of other nations. Of course it
is. Would you like to see a world in which all ports were closed
to all ships but their own or open to one foreign ship, perhaps
two, if they carried only passengers and cargo bound all the way
from Liverpool to Shanghai? Where would England be if
shipping were subjected to such limitations?. . . I am unable to believe
that you do not want an agreement at this time.
``I cannot agree that the answer is to hold every one back. It
must be rather to go forward together. I know the handicaps
under which your aviation industry has labored during the war.
We have found ways to help you before and I am confident that
we can find ways to help you in overcoming this. We are
prepared to make transport aircraft freely available to you on the
same terms as our own people can get them. Our only stipulation
is that aviation must be permitted to develop, subject only to
reasonable safeguards, as far and as fast as human ingenuity and
enterprise can take it.
``We have no desire to monopolize air traffic anywhere. I do
not see how increased frequencies on long routes would
dominate traffic on short ones, when all lines would have the same
right to increase their frequencies on the same basis. Nor do I see
how in the long term such an arrangement would favor us over
others, despite our head start.
``You asked that I give further consideration to the
402
fundamentals of your position and that I state the issues as I see them.
I have done both and I am more convinced than ever that the
answer is not to hold back but to go forward together."^^1^^
The question of air transport was, of course, only one of the
elements in American imperialism's struggle to take over the
British inheritance. But at that moment it was probably the question
that expressed in the highest relief the essence of the conflict
between Britain and the USA. It is odd to find references, in this
connection, to fair play, equal opportunities, and the like. It is
completely obvious, after all, that in the conditions existing then
the overwhelming might of America's monopolies placed them
above all competition; they expected to take all the benefits for
themselves. This aspiration can be plainly perceived through
Roosevelt's rather transparent arguments.
The British Tories were hoping at this time, however, that
their country would long continue to rule the waves and be the
leading colonial power. It was not four years after the end of
the war, though, that the Commonwealth of Nations so dear to
Churchill's heart began to come apart at the seams. More and
more pieces split away from the empire. America's ruling groups
were also unable to realise in full their neo-colonialist plans.
Hundreds of millions of former subjects of the British empire,
and of other colonial empires, including France, Holland, and
Belgium, embarked on the road of independent development.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Understanding About Poland's Borders
The discussion of the Polish question began at the February
6 plenary session of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt, speaking
first, recommended that Poland's eastern border be drawn along
the Curzon line. He added, however, that it would be well to
consider making concessions to the Poles with regard to the
southern part of that line. He had in mind the Lvov area, although
he did not say as much. Roosevelt further suggested that a
Presidential Council, made up of ``a small number of outstanding
Poles'', be set up to undertake the task of forming a provisional
government of Poland. The President added that it was hoped
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,
Doc. 470, pp. 612--13.
__PRINTERS_P_403_COMMENT__
26*
403
in the United States that Poland would have most friendly
relations with the Soviet Union.
Here Stalin put in that Poland would have friendly relations
not only with the Soviet Union but with all the Allies.
Roosevelt then invited Churchill to comment on his
suggestions. The Prime Minister declared that he was authorised to
express the British Government's favourable attitude towards
them. He added that he had always publicly declared, in
Parliament and elsewhere, the British Government's intention to
recognise the border as interpreted by the Soviet Union---that is, with
Lvov remaining in Soviet territory. He had always thought,
Churchill said, that after the tragedy the Soviet Union had lived
through in defending itself from German aggression and
after the efforts the USSR had made to liberate Poland, Moscow's
claim to Lvov and to the Curson line was based not on might
but on right. As for the problem of forming a Polish government,
Churchill declared, he favoured Roosevelt's proposal and would
like to see a provisional government created that would be
recognised by the USSR, the USA, and Britain and that would
exist until the Polish people could elect a government for itself
freely. Roosevelt had no objection to this, and so agreement was
reached concerning the eastern border of Poland.
The American and British leaders' position on the question
of Poland's borders---which incidentally they had also set forth
earlier, at the Teheran Conference---merits special attention, since
afterwards the Western powers tried to move away from it
and to depict the Soviet Union as having violated the decisions
jointly adopted on this question. In actuality, the USSR stood
firmly by its principles and insisted that what the Big Three had
agreed upon be carried out.
At that same session, on February 6, Stalin clearly stated
Moscow's point of view:
``For the Russians,'' he said, ``the question of Poland is not
only a question of honour but also a question of security. A
question of honour because in the past the Russians have
committed many wrongs against Poland. The Soviet government wants
to make amends for those wrongs. A question of security because
the major strategic problems of the Soviet state are connected
with Poland.
``The point is not only that Poland is a neighbour country.
404
That is important, of course, but the heart of the matter lies
much deeper. Throughout history, Poland has been a corridor
through which the enemy passed to attack Russia. It is sufficient
to recall the past thirty years: in that time the Germans have
twice went across Poland to attack our country. Why have our
enemies until now passed so easily through Poland? Primarily
because Poland has been weak. The Polish corridor can be
reliably locked only from the inside, by Poland's own forces. For this
Poland must be strong. This is why the Soviet Union has an
interest in creating a strong, free, and independent Poland. The
question of Poland is a question of life and death for the Soviet
state.''
As for the Curzon line, Stalin reminded those present, it had
not been invented by the Russians. Its authors were Curzon,
Clemenceau, and the Americans, who had participated in the Paris
Conference of 1919. The Curzon line had been adopted on the
basis of ethnic data contrary to the will of the Russians. Lenin
had not agreed to it; he had been unwilling to give to Poland
the city of Bialystok and the surrounding region, as the Curzon
line required.
``Do you want us to be less Russian than Curzon and
Clemenceau?" Stalin continued. ``You will disgrace us that way. What
will the Ukrainians say if we accept your proposal? They might
say that Stalin and Molotov turned out to be less reliable
protectors for the Russians and the Ukrainians than Curzon and
Clemenceau did. .. No, it would be better for the war against
the Germans to go on a little longer, but we must be able to
compensate Poland in the west, at Germany's expense.''
Turning to the question of Poland's western border, Stalin
said that it must run along the Western Neisse. He asked
Roosevelt and Churchill to support him in this.
Stalin then touched on the question of the composition of the
Polish government. He recalled that the previous autumn, when
Churchill had come to Moscow, he had brought along with him
from London Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Romer. Representatives
of the Lublin government had been invited to Moscow at that
time too, and there had been talks among the Polish leaders. As
Churchill knew, certain points of agreement had taken shape.
Mikolajczyk had then left for London, intending to return to
Moscow soon to complete steps towards organising a Polish
405
goveminent. Mikolajczyk had been expelled from the Polish
government in London for insisting on an agreement with the
Lublin government.
``The present Polish government in London,'' Stalin continued,
``headed by Arcyszewski and led by Razkewicz, is opposed to an
agreement with the Lublin government. What is more, it is
hostile towards such an agreement. The London Poles call the
Lublin government a bunch of criminals and bandits. Naturally, the
former Lublin government---now the Warsaw government---has
paid this back in kind, calling the London Poles traitors and
turncoats. How can they be united under these circumstances?''
The leaders of the Warsaw government, Stalin declared, would
not hear of any unification with the Polish government in
London and they were strongly opposed to Mikolajczyk as prime
minister. Stalin said he was ready to undertake anything in order
to bring the Poles together, but only if the attempt had some
chance of success.
Referring to Churchill's suggestion that a Polish government
be created at the present conference, Stalin said he thought this
must have been a slip of the tongue: how could a Polish
government be created without the participation of the Poles?
Stalin remarked that many considered him a dictator, not a
democrat, but that he had ``enough democratic feeling not to
try to create a Polish government without the Poles. That
government should be created only with the Poles' participation
and consent.''
Stalin expressed the opinion that a decision on the question
of the Polish government should be put off until it had been
discussed with the Poles. He emphasised that among the Poles were
people of differing views.
Churchill, sensing that he had got into an awkward position,
hastened to assure everyone that all he wanted was to be able
to get the question of Poland's eastern border through
Parliament on his return to Britain. He believed that would be possible
if the Poles could decide among themselves the question of the
government. He added that he himself, however, was of no high
opinion about the Poles.
Everyone felt that Churchill had committed yet another lapse
from tact. Stalin reacted to his words at once, saying that there
were some very good people among the Poles. The Poles were
406
brave in battle, he said, and the Polish people had produced
outstanding scientists and artists. In reply Churchill said only that
he was trying to give all sides equal opportunities.
Stalin declared that all non-fascist and anti-fascist forces would
have equal opportunities.
Considerable time throughout the conference was devoted to
the Polish question. In the end the American idea of a
presidential council was rejected. The participants agreed that Poland
would receive compensation at the expense of East Prussia to the
south of Konigsberg and in Upper Silesia right up to the Oder.
The American delegation presented a proposal that became
the basis for a document adopted after lengthy discussions. The
declaration On Poland, published after the conference, said that
``the Provisional Government presently functioning in Poland
should be ... reorganised on a broader democratic basis so as
to include democratic leaders from Poland itself and also Poles
from abroad''. As for Poland's borders, the Curzon line was
adopted on the east, and a new border drawn along the Oder and
Western Neisse in the west. The declaration dealt with this only
in a general way, saying that ``the eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some
regions of 5 to 8 kilometres in favour of Poland''. It was further
stated that the three heads of government thought ``Poland must
receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west'',
and that the opinion of the new Polish Government of National
Unity would be sought in due course on the extent of these
accessions.^^*^^
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Far-Eastern Affairs
The preliminary exchange of opinions on the USSR's entry
into the war against Japan and related questions considerably
facilitated the examination of this problem in Yalta. Another
factor was that just before the meeting in the Crimea the Joint
Chiefs of Staff of the USA had presented to Roosevelt a rather
pessimistic report on the prospects for American military
operations against Japan. In their opinion, it would be at least a year
_-_-_
~^^*^^ Translation from the Russian made according to the official Soviet
text.
407
and a half after Germany's capitulation before victory could be
won. They did not at all expect that Japan would surrender
early on, and planned an invasion of the Japanese islands to
begin no earlier than the winter of 1945--46. And if there should be
a delay in the European war, which would hold up the transfer
of forces to the Pacific theatre, it was suggested that the
invasion be postponed altogether until sometime later in 1946. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped that help from the USSR would
reduce American losses in this operation, which General
MacArthur pictured as an extremely fierce campaign to invade and
occupy the industrial heart of Japan across the Tokyo lowlands.
The views of the American high command undoubtedly had
considerable weight in determining Roosevelt's position at the
Yalta Conference. The question of the war against Japan was
discussed at a meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt on
February 8. Molotov and Harriman were present, but besides the
interpreters no one else was included. In his account of this meeting,
Harriman says that Stalin, in his introductory remarks, referred
to the conversation he had with the American ambassador in
Moscow and said the Soviet side would like to discuss the
political conditions under which the USSR was prepared to enter
the war. He continued by outlining the views presented to
Harriman in December of the previous year.
Roosevelt replied that he saw no difficulty in returning south
Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union. As for
Dairen, he had already said, in Teheran, that the USSR should
certainly have free access to a warm-water port in the terminal
sector of the Manchurian Railroad. At the present, however, he
could not speak for the Chinese government. He might possibly
put before the Chinese the question of leasing Dairen, which
would become a free port under international control. Roosevelt
said he would prefer this method in relation not only to Dairen
but also to Hong Kong. As for the Manchurian Railroad, he
would prefer to see it operated jointly by the Russians and the
Chinese, rather than leased.
This evasive answer did not at all satisfy the Soviet side, and
Stalin continued to press his demands. If his conditions were
not met, he declared, it would be difficult for the Soviet people
to understand why the USSR was entering the war against Japan.
They well understood the reason for the war against Germany,
408
which had threatened the very existence of their country, but they
would not see why the USSR needed to attack Japan. If,
however, his political conditions were met, it would be much easier
to explain things both to the people and to the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, since then it would be a question of the country's
national interests.
Roosevelt, for lack of other arguments, began to say that he
had not had time to discuss this matter with Chiang Kai-shek,
and that, on the whole, it was difficult to speak frankly with the
Chinese, since anything you talked to them about would be
known everywhere in the world, including Tokyo, in
twentyfour hours.
Stalin remarked that there was no need for hurry in informing
the Chinese. All he wanted was for his suggestions to be set forth
in writing and to receive Roosevelt's and Churchill's approval
before the conference was over. Roosevelt did not object to
this.
On February 10, Molotov invited Harriman to the Villa
Koreiz, the residence of the Soviet delegation, and gave him the
English text of the Soviet proposals concerning the political
conditions for the USSR's entering the war against Japan. After
looking the document over, Harriman said he thought the President
would want the following amendments: Port Arthur and Dairen
should be free ports, and the Manchurian Railroad should be
operated by a joint Russian-Chinese commission. Furthermore,
the entire agreement would have to be approved by the Chinese.
On his return to Livadia, Harriman received Roosevelt's
approval of the amendments he had formulated. The whole
question was settled finally after the plenary session of the conference
in the evening of that same day. Stalin, left alone with
Roosevelt, said he agreed to the operation of the Manchurian
Railroad by a joint commission. Likewise he did not object to having
the agreement reached confirmed by the Chinese. He added,
however, that he also wanted the Chinese to confirm the status quo
in the Mongolian People's Republic. Stalin also agreed that
Dairen be a free port, but insisted that Port Arthur be leased for
use, since there would be a Soviet naval base there. Roosevelt
accepted this change and declared he would take on the
responsibility for consulting Chiang Kai-shek when Stalin let him know
that the time was ripe.
409
On the basis of the agreement reached, a document was drawn
up and signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill on February
11. The leaders of the three great Powers, it said, had agreed
that ``in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and
the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter
into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition
that:
``1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian
People's Republic) shall be preserved;
``2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
``a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
``b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalised,
the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being
safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the
USSR restored,
``c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian
Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly
operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company,
it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet
Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full
sovereignty in Manchuria;
``3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.''
The document further stated that the agreement on Outer
Mongolia and the ports and railroads mentioned above would
require the consent of the Chinese side, and that the ``claims of
the Soviet Union should be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan
has been defeated".
Harriman writes in his memoirs that he objected to the
wording used with regard to the pre-eminent interests and rights of
the Soviet Union, and even tried to convince Roosevelt to oppose
this formulation. But the President refused; he considered
it perfectly natural that in this matter the interests of the
Soviet Union were pre-eminent over those of the USA and
Britain.
410
__ALPHA_LVL3__
An Example of Equitable Relations
The conference in the Crimea between the leaders of the USA,
the USSR, and Great Britain had a great historic significance.
It was one of the most important international conferences held
during the war, and an outstanding milestone in cooperation
among the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition in the conduct of
the war against the common enemy. The adoption of agreed
decisions on important questions at the conference demonstrated
yet again that effective cooperation is possible among states with
different social systems. Addressing Congress immediately after
his return from Yalta, President Roosevelt declared:
``The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point---I hope
in our history and therefore in the history of the world... The
Crimea Conference .. . ought to spell the end of the system of
unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of
influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that
have been tried for centuries---and have always failed. We
propose to substitute for all these, a universal organisation in
which all peace-loving Nations will finally have a chance to
join."^^1^^
The essence of the Yalta decisions was that they considered the
interests of all sides. The meeting in the Crimea might well serve
as an example of equitable relations in the international arena.
In effect, it signalled recognition of the principle of peaceful
coexistence by states with different social systems.
Harry Hopkins summed up the Yalta Conference in these
words: ``We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn
of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about
for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won
the first great victory of the peace---and, by 'we' I mean all of
us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved
that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't
any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we
could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as
far into the future as any of us could imagine."^^2^^
The decisions of the Yalta Conference helped to strengthen
_-_-_
~^^1^^ J. Burns, Op. cit., p. 582.
~^^2^^ Henry H. Adams, Harry Hopkins. A Biography, p. 380.
411
the anti-fascist coalition in the final stage of the war and to win
victory over Hitler's Germany. To carry out these decisions fully
and in every respect was one of the chief goals of Soviet foreign
policy not only at the end of the war but also in the years after.
While the conference was in session the Soviet armed forces
continued to be active in offensive operations all along the
Soviet-German front. In February and March of 1945, the Red
Army concentrated its efforts on making a decisive advance
towards Berlin. To this end Soviet forces launched offensives
against the enemy's flanks in East Pomerania, Lower and Upper
Silesia, and East Prussia, and fought stubbornly to broaden the
bridgeheads they had captured on the left bank of the Oder in
the neighbourhood of Kostrzyn and Frankfurt.
The enormous growth of the Soviet Union's international
prestige could not help but have its effect on the course of the talks
in Yalta. The brilliant victories of the Soviet armed forces
ensured that the decisions made would be in the interests of
freedom-loving peoples. It is highly indicative that The Economist,
a conservative British magazine, wrote on February 3, 1945, that
the most important questions were being settled not in embassies
but on the battlefields of Pomerania and Brandenburg.
On the whole, the work of the Yalta Conference proceeded in
a constructive spirit, in an atmosphere of mutual understanding
and cooperation. The participants had full right to declare: ``Our
meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common
determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that
unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible
and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that
this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our
peoples and to all the peoples of the world.'' The declaration
of the three leaders ended with these words:
``Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed
international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all
history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of
such a peace.''
The goals proclaimed in Yalta by the leaders of the anti-Hitler
coalition were, however, not at all to the liking of those who
were preparing to unleash a cold war, and this explains their
subSequent attacks on the Yalta Conference.
412
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Between Yalta and Potsdam
The Berne Incident
In the latter half of February, 1945, the Office of Strategic
Services of the USA (the American intelligence service,
headed at that time by General William Donowan) received word
from neutral Switzerland that General Karl Wolff, the
commander of the SS in Italy, was trying to establish contact with the
Western Allies regarding terms for ending Germany's resistance
in Northern Italy. Following a preliminary check on this
information, General Wolff was invited to Zurich for a meeting with
Allen Dulles, the head of the American intelligence service in
Switzerland. After this meeting, Dulles sent a message to
Washington recommending that the talks be continued; they took
place in Berne, under the greatest secrecy.
It was only on March 12 that the American ambassador in
Moscow was instructed to notify the Soviet government of the
talks that had taken place. Harriman met with Molotov and told
him that General Wolff was discussing with representatives of
the American and British armies in Berne the question of
capitulation by the German armed forces in Northern Italy. The
ambassador added that British Field Marshal Alexander had been
told to send officers to Berne for talks with German emissaries,
and inquired about the Soviet government's views on this matter.
On the same day, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Molotov replied that the Soviet government did not object to the talks
with General Wolff in Berne, but that officers representing the
Soviet military command should take part in them as well. At
the time the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with
Switzerland, and Molotov expressed the hope that the United States
would help to arrange for three Soviet officers to go there and
join the talks in Berne.
The Americans refused. Harriman claims the initiative in this;
he writes that when he reported to Washington on his meeting
with Molotov he advised that Moscow's request be turned down,
since there would be no political advantage for the Western
Allies in bringing the USSR in. He warned that if the Russians
were admitted to these ``highly delicate" talks they might
complicate things by making embarrassing demands. It is difficult to
413
say whether at this stage Roosevelt was told about the problem,
but it is certain that General Marshall supported Harriman, and
that instructions to this effect were sent to him in Moscow.
On March 16, the US embassy sent Molotov a letter saying
that the government of the United States had formally declined
the Soviet request. The same day, Molotov sent Harriman a
letter saying that ``the United States government's refusal to have
Soviet representatives take part in the Berne talks was totally
unexpected for the Soviet government, and is incomprehensible
in view of the alliance between our countries. The Soviet
government therefore considers it impossible to give its consent to talks
in Berne between American and British representatives and
representatives of the German command, and insists that the talks
begun be broken off.''
The Soviet government also insisted that in future it should
be made impossible for separate talks with the Germans to be
held by one or two of the Allied powers without the
participation of all.
In a letter dated March 21, the American side made every
effort to justify itself, offering assurances that the talks in Berne
were purely military and claiming that the Soviet government
had misconstrued the aim of the contact. The Western Allies
tried to pretend that the talks dealt with the capitulation of
German forces in a limited sector of the front only, and that
therefore the question fell within the competence of the military
command concerned. But the refusal of the USA and Britain to
admit Soviet representatives to these talks showed otherwise: there
is no doubt that what took place was an attempt to make a deal
with the enemy behind the back of one of the three chief
members of the anti-Hitler coalition. Molotov drew attention to this
in his March 22 letter to Harriman: ``I must say that I see no
basis whatever for your statement that the Soviet government has
misconstrued the aim of the contact in Berne between the
German general Wolff and representatives of Field Marshal
Alexander. What we have here is not a misconstruction of the aim
of the contact, and not a misunderstanding, but something
worse.
``It is evident from your letter of March 12 that General
Wolff and the persons accompanying him came to Berne for
talks with representatives of the Anglo-American command
414
concerning the capitulation of German forces in Northern Italy.
When the Soviet government declared it would be necessary for
representatives of the Soviet Military Command to take part in
these talks, this was rejected.
``And so for the past two weeks talks have been going on in
Berne---behind the back of the Soviet Union, which is bearing
the main burden of the war against Germany---between
representatives of the German command, on the one hand, and the
American and the British command on the other. The Soviet
government considers this completely inadmissible and insists on the
demand set forth in my letter of March 16 of this year.''
This affair had become so serious that President Roosevelt
entered into the correspondence. On March 25 a personal, top--
secret message from him to Stalin was received in the Kremlin. In
it Roosevelt said that he had learned of the exchange of letters
between Harriman and Molotov concerning the talks in
Switzerland, and expressed the opinion that ``the facts of this matter ...
have, through a misunderstanding, not been correctly presented
to you''. Then Roosevelt set forth in some detail the American
version of the history of the talks, which purportedly came to
nothing more than an attempt ``to arrange with any competent
German officers for a conference to discuss details of the
surrender with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters in Italy''.
Having thus depicted the situation, Roosevelt added that ``if
such a meeting could be arranged Soviet representatives would,
of course, be welcome''. Saying that up to that time attempts to
arrange a meeting had met with no success, the President
assured Stalin he would be glad to have ``at any discussion of the
details of surrender by our commander of American forces in the
field the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your
officers who can be present''. At the same time, Roosevelt declared,
``I cannot agree to suspend investigation of the possibility" of
capitulation.
The message ended on a conciliatory note: ``I hope you will
point out to the Soviet officials concerned the desirability and
necessity of taking prompt and effective action without any
delay to effect the surrender of any enemy military forces that are
opposed to American forces in the field."^^1^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 198--99.
415
It is impossible not to see that those who helped compose this
message were trying to present in an innocent light talks that
could have ruinous consequences. Furthermore, it was pretended
that all that was involved during the contacts with General Wolff,
was merely a technical matter---the organisation of a meeting in
Caserta, at Field Marshal Alexander's headquarters. Data that
the Soviet government had from other sources made it clear,
though, that serious talks were already underway; the Americans
were only trying to obscure the facts. The Soviet side could not,
of course, ignore this.
Stalin informed Roosevelt in a message dated March 29 that
he was not against, but rather entirely for, making use of cases
of disintegration in the German armies to hasten their
surrender in any sector and to encourage them to open the front to
Allied forces.
He continued: ``But I agree to such talks with the enemy
only ... if the opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and
to use the talks for switching troops to other sectors, above all
to the Soviet front, is precluded.
``And it was solely with an eye to providing this guarantee that
the Soviet Government found it necessary to have
representatives of its Military Command take part in such negotiations with
the enemy wherever they might take place---whether in Berne
or in Caserta. I cannot understand why the representatives of
the Soviet Command have been excluded from the talks and in
what way they could have handicapped the representatives of
the Allied Command.
``I must tell you for your information that the Germans have
already taken advantage of the talks with the Allied Command
to move three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front."^^1^^
Stalin went on to say that it had been declared in Yalta that
coordinated thrusts should be made against the Germans from
the west, south, and east, the intention being to pin the enemy
down and make it impossible to effect necessary transfers of
troops. This was what the Soviet command was, in fact, doing.
He pointed out that the German forces at Danzig and
Konigsberg were encircled, and could not open the front to Soviet
forces because the front had moved far to the west. The position of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 200--01.
416
the Germans in Northern Italy was completely different, he said.
They were not surrounded. And if in Northern Italy they were
seeking negotiations so as to open the front to the Allied forces,
this meant they ``must have some other, more far-reaching aims
affecting the destiny of Germany".^^1^^
Meanwhile, the separate talks in Berne were being continued.
As it became more deeply involved, the American government
realised it must somehow account to the Soviet side for the
situation. Moreover, it was not impossible that information might
leak out.
On April 1, another message was received from Roosevelt. It
said that ``an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and
mistrust" had arisen around the ``possible future negotiations with
the Germans for surrender of their forces in Italy''. Roosevelt
offered assurances that ``no negotiations for surrender have been
entered into, and if there should be any negotiations they will be
conducted at Caserta with your representatives present
throughout''. He said the entire episode had ``arisen through the
initiative of a German officer reputed to be close to Himmler and
there is, of course, a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to
create suspicion and distrust between the Allies".^^2^^
This was getting closer to the truth, but the Americans still
had not revealed the true meaning of the talks in Berne. For this
reason the Soviet side found it necessary to give Roosevelt a
more detailed description of the information it had. This was
done in Stalin's telegram of April 3, 1945:
``You are quite right in saying, with reference to the talks
between the Anglo-American and German Commands in Berne
or elsewhere, that 'the matter now stands in an atmosphere of
regrettable apprehension and mistrust'.
``You affirm that so far no negotiations have been entered into.
Apparently you are not fully informed. As regards my military
colleagues, they, on the basis of information in their possession,
are sure that negotiations did take place and that they ended in
an agreement with the Germans, whereby the German
Commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, is to open the
front to the Anglo-American troops and let them move east,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 204--05.
__PRINTERS_P_417_COMMENT__
27---1996
417
while the British and Americans have promised, in exchange, to
ease the armistice terms for the Germans.
``I think that my colleagues are not very far from the truth. If
the contrary were the case the exclusion of representatives of the
Soviet Command from the Berne talks would be inexplicable.
``Nor can I account for the reticence of the British, who have
left it to you to carry on a correspondence with me on this
unpleasant matter, while they themselves maintain silence, although
it is known that the initiative in the matter of the Berne
negotiations belongs to the British.
``I realise that there are certain advantages resulting to the
Anglo-American troops from these separate negotiations in Berne
or in some other place, seeing that the Anglo-American troops
are enabled to advance into the heart of Germany almost without
resistance; but why conceal this from the Russians, and why were
the Russians, their Allies, not forewarned?
``And so what we have at the moment is that the Germans
on the Western Front have in fact ceased the war against
Britain and America. At the same time they continue the war
against Russia, the Ally of Britain and the USA.
``Clearly this situation cannot help preserve and promote trust
between our countries.
``I have already written in a previous message, and I think I
must repeat, that I and my colleagues would never in any
circumstances have taken such a hazardous step, for we realise that
a momentary advantage, no matter how great, is overshadowed
by the fundamental advantage of preserving and promoting trust
between Allies."^^1^^
The Americans, though, were still unwilling to admit they had
conducted separate talks with the Nazis behind the back of their
Soviet Ally. Roosevelt's reply was full of indignation at Moscow's
lack of belief in the American version. The President reiterated
that there had been no negotiations in Berne and that the
meeting that took place there was not at all political. At the same
time, the message contained certain new elements. Roosevelt
declared that if any enemy armies in Italy were to capitulate, the
Allies would not violate their agreed principle of unconditional
surrender. This was undoubtedly a belated attempt to explain
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 265--66.
418
the fact that the German command had in actuality opened the
front in Italy, where only an insignificant number of troops
remained, and was using the talks as a smokescreen for rapidly
transferring its most battle-worthy units to the Soviet-German
front.
It later became known from German archival documents that
many of the Third Reich's bosses, sensing their ineluctable
ruin, saw a last hope in making a deal with Britain and the USA:
they would cease resistance in the west and concentrate all their
forces in the east so as to hold back the Red Army for as long
as they could. Furthermore, the Nazis were prepared to
surrender as much German territory as possible to the Western Allies.
A memorandum to the Fiihrer from Minister of Munitions
Albert Speer spoke of the catastrophic consequences that would
follow from Soviet occupation of the Silesian industrial region.
``The war is lost,'' the memorandum began. Speer based this
conclusion on the following circumstances: as a result of the
destruction caused by bombing in the Ruhr, Silesia was supplying
sixty per cent of Germany's coal; the Reich's railroads, power
plants, and factories had only a two weeks' supply; the loss of
Silesia would thus bring complete disaster.
Hitler refused to discuss these unpleasant facts. But his closest
advisers were trying more and more feverishly to find a way out
of the desperate situation. On January 25, 1945, General
Guderian, fully understanding the hopelessness of Germany's
position, suggested to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop that
an attempt be made to reach agreement with the Western
powers on an immediate armistice in the west so that the military
command's remaining forces could be concentrated in the east.
Two days later, at a situation conference in the Reichskanzlei,
there was a curious exchange of opinions. It is clear from
the minutes that Hitler, Goering, and other German leaders
thought it possible to make a separate deal with the Western
powers, and that moreover the German side would not even have
to take the initiative: the British and the Americans themselves
would be looking for a chance to join forces with the Reich
against Bolshevism.
It is worthwhile citing the minutes:
``Hitler: Do you think the English are enthusiastic about all
the Russia developments?''
__PRINTERS_P_419_COMMENT__
27*
419
``Goering: They certainly didn't plan that we hold them off
while the Russians conquer all of Germany.''
``Jodl: They have always regarded the Russians with
suspicion.
``Goering: If this goes on we will get a telegram (from the
English) in a few days."^^1^^
But the Nazi bigwigs did not confine themselves to waiting
passively for proposals from the West. Himmler, through agents in
Switzerland, established contact with Allen Dulles in order to
come to terms with the Western Allies on an armistice and
letting the Anglo-American forces into the heart of Germany, while
all German forces were concentrated against the Red Army in
the east. Somewhat later Goering established contact with the
Western Allies through a Swedish emissary, Count Bernadotte.
It has long been no secret that Churchill, and certain highly
influential American politicians too, were inclined to the idea of
joining the Germans in their fight against the Soviet Union.
The willingness of the British and the Americans to engage in
separate negotiations was, of course, a glaring contradiction to
their obligations as allies. This was why they reacted so skittishly
when the Soviet side uncovered their intriguing. Roosevelt's next
telegram on this matter ended on a sharp note: ``Frankly I
cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers,
whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions
or those of my trusted subordinates."^^2^^
The possibility cannot be excluded, of course, that President
Roosevelt was in fact not aware of the whole truth about the
Berne talks, that his trusted subordinates were hiding their real
intentions from him. With all that we now know about the dirty
doings of the CIA, it may be supposed that its predecessor,
the Services, conducted some of its clandestine operations without
the President's knowledge. At any rate, the Soviet side thought it
needful to explain patiently once again to Roosevelt how it
understood the situation that had arisen:
``My point,'' Stalin wrote, ``is that in the course of our
correspondence a difference of views has arisen over what an Ally may
_-_-_
~^^1^^ William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A
History of Nazi Germany, p. 1098.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, p. 208.
420
permit himself with regard to another and what he may not. We
Russians believe that, in view of the present situation on the
fronts, a situation in which the enemy is faced with inevitable
surrender, whenever the representatives of one of the Allies meet
the Germans to discuss surrender terms, the representatives of
the other Ally should be enabled to take part in the meeting.
That is absolutely necessary, at least when the other Ally seeks
participation in the meeting. The Americans and British, however,
have a different opinion---they hold that the Russian point of
view is wrong. For that reason they have denied the Russians the
right to be present at the meeting with the Germans in
Switzerland. I have already written to you, and I see no harm in
repeating that, given a similar situation, the Russians would never have
denied the Americans and British the right to attend such a
meeting. I still consider the Russian point of view to be the only
correct one, because it precludes mutual suspicions and gives the
enemy no chance to sow distrust between us."^^1^^
Stalin pointed out that the Germans had 147 divisions on the
Eastern front, and could without detriment to themselves send
15 to 20 divisions to the aid of their forces in the west. They were
not doing this, however, but continued to fight ferociously for
every little station; meanwhile, in the west, important cities in the
heart of Germany---such as Osnabriick, Mannheim, arid Kassel---
were surrendering without any resistance whatever. ``As regards
those who supply my information,'' Stalin continued, ``I can
assure you that they are honest and unassuming people who carry
out their duties conscientiously and who have no intention of
affronting anybody. They have been tested in action on numerous
occasions."^^2^^
The question was closed by a conciliatory telegram from
Roosevelt that reached Moscow on April 13. It said:
``Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of
view on the Berne incident which it now appears has faded into
the past without having accomplished any useful purpose.
``In any event, there must not be mutual distrust, and minor
misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future.
I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 208--09.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 209.
421
join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi armies will
disintegrate."^^1^^
This was not only the final dispatch on the Berne incident but
indeed the last telegram ever written by President Roosevelt. It
was sent on April 12, just a few hours before he died.
Roosevelt's Death
At about one o'clock in the morning, during a reception being
held in honour of a member of the Moscow embassy's staff who
was departing for Washington, Ambassador Harriman received
word that the President had died. Without telling his guests what
had happened, he bade them good night. When the last of them
had left Spaso House, he telephoned Molotov in the Kremlin to
tell him the sad news and ask for a meeting. Molotov, however,
insisted on coming to the ambassadorial residence himself, despite
the late hour. Soon he was entering the main hall of the mansion,
where a large portrait of Roosevelt, framed in black crepe, stood
on a marble pedestal. Beside it stood the United States flag to
which a black ribbon had also been attached.
In his report to Washington on this meeting, Harriman said
that Molotov ``seemed deeply moved and disturbed. He stayed
for some time talking about the part President Roosevelt had
played in the war and in the plans for peace, of the respect
Marshal Stalin and all the Russian people had had for him and
how much Marshal Stalin had valued his visit to Yalta."^^2^^
Harriman then brought the conversation around to President
Truman. He assured Molotov that the new administration would
continue President Roosevelt's policies.
As he was seeing Molotov off, Harriman asked that a meeting
be arranged between himself and Marshal Stalin. In his message
to the new President, Harriman said he wanted to assure Stalin of
the continuity of US policy and that the USA would ``make every
effort to get us back as far as possible to the spirit and atmosphere
of the Crimea Conference".^^3^^
It is plain that such assurances were mostly pro forma:
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, p. 214.
~^^2^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 440.
~^^3^^ Ibid., p. 441.
422
Harriman could not fail to see that a new man in the White House,
and especially one like Truman, whose antipathy towards the
Soviet Union was widely known, would mean changes in the way
American policy was carried out---changes in the direction of
harshness.
This was why, in the same telegram,
he raised the
question of coming to Washington to acquaint himself with how
things stood. In a few hours a message arrived from Secretary of
State Stettinius in Washington, who had meanwhile consulted
with Truman; it said ``now of all times" it was essential that
Harriman be present in Moscow. The ambassador was a little
discouraged by this answer; he thought it important to establish closer
contact with Truman. But since his own trip to the USA was to
be postponed, Harriman decided to use the upcoming meeting
with Stalin to raise once again the question of Molotov's travelling
to San Francisco in the next few days for the United Nations
conference; on his way there the People's Commissar of Foreign
Affairs could stop over in Washington for a talk with the new
President.
The heads of the Soviet and the American governments had
been discussing Soviet representation at the first UN conference
in their correspondence for some time already. Stalin said it would
be impossible for Molotov to go to San Francisco in April of
1945, pointing out that the People's Commissar was very busy in
connection with the approaching session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, and had other duties as well. Roosevelt insisted, arguing
that ``Mr. Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world
as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this
Conference on the part of the Soviet Government".^^1^^
To this Stalin answered on March 27:
``We highly value and attach great importance to the San
Francisco Conference to lay the foundations of an international
organisation for peace and security of the nations, but present
circumstances preclude V. M. Molotov's attendance. I and Molotov are
very sorry about this, but the convening, at the instance of
Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, of a session of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR in April, at which Molotov's attendance is
imperative, makes it impossible for him to attend even the opening
session of the Conference.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, p. 197.
423
``You are aware that Ambassador Gromyko successfully coped
with his task at Dumbarton Oaks, and we are certain that he will
ably head the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco.
``As to the different interpretations, you will appreciate that
they cannot determine the decisions to be taken."^^1^^
Here the matter had been dropped. But now, with the
inauguration of a new President, a different situation had come about:
a trip to the USA by Molotov might be perceived as an
expression of the intent to continue the policy of cooperation between
the two powers. ``This was a very serious emotional moment,''
Harriman recalls. ``Before I went over to see Stalin I had thought
hard about what I might ask him to do. So it was no accident."^^2^^
The meeting took place at eight o'clock in the evening of
April 13. Molotov was also present. Here is how the conversation
is described in Harriman's memoirs:
``Stalin greeted Harriman in silence . . . holding his hand for
perhaps thirty seconds before asking him to sit down. He appeared
deeply distressed and questioned the Ambassador closely about the
circumstances of Roosevelt's death. He did not believe, Stalin
said, that there would be any change in American policy under
Truman. Harriman agreed that this would be true in those areas
where the President had made his plans clear, such as the war
and foreign policy. Truman had been a Roosevelt man in his
Senate days, faithfully following the President's lead. He was a
man whom Stalin would like, Harriman added, a man of action,
not of words."^^3^^
Harriman then moved to his main concern. He said that
President Truman could not, of course, enjoy the great prestige
President Roosevelt had. Until he became Vice-President, he had been
little known either in the United States or abroad. This, said
Harriman, could not help but cause a period of uncertainty, both
within and outside the country---not only regarding the conduct
of the war, but on all questions of foreign and domestic policy.
The conference in San Francisco, for instance, might cause more
difficulties. America did not know whether President Truman
could carry through Roosevelt's programme. The American
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 199--200.
~^^2^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 441.
~^^3^^ Ibid., pp. 441--42.
424
people, Harriman continued, knew that President Roosevelt and
Marshal Stalin had close personal relations and that this had
significantly influenced American-Soviet relations.
Here Stalin interrupted Harriman to say that although
Roosevelt had died his cause must live on. ``We will support
President Truman with all our strength and all our will,'' he
declared, and asked the ambassador to say as much to the new
President.
Harriman promised to do this at once, and added that he
thought the most effective way to convince American public
opinion and the whole world that the Soviet Union wanted to
continue its cooperation with the Americans and the other
United Nations would be for Molotov to go to the United States
at once. He could stop over in Washington to meet with the new
President and then proceed on to San Francisco and spend at
least a few days there.
After a brief exchange between him and Molotov on the dates
of the San Francisco conference and of the session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, Stalin inquired if the ambassador was
expressing his personal opinion only. Harriman answered that this was
so, but went on to say he was confident this was also the view
of the President and the Secretary of State.
``I felt sure that they would be ready to confirm what I had
said,"^^1^^ Harriman writes.
Stalin then said that although it would be very difficult for
Molotov to go to the United States at that time he thought it
might be arranged nevertheless.
That same day the head of the Soviet government sent his
condolences to Truman:
``On behalf of the Soviet Government and on my own
behalf I express to the Government of the United States of
America deep regret at the untimely death of President Roosevelt. . .
``The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its heartfelt
sympathy with the American people in their grievous loss and
its confidence that the policy of cooperation between the Great
Powers who have borne the brunt of the war against the
common foe will be promoted in the future as well."^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., p. 443.
~^^2^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, p. 214.
425
Soon afterwards, as a token of the Soviet people's respect for
this great American, one of the main thoroughfares in Yalta was
renamed Franklin Roosevelt Street.
Berlin had its own reaction to the death of Roosevelt. As the
end approached, it was still hoped there that a miracle might
occur. Hitler was suffering more and more frequently from
attacks of hysteria, and to calm him on those April evenings
Goebbels read selections from Carlyle's History of Frederick the Great
to him. There it was told how during the Seven Years' War
King Frederick had found himself in a desperate position, and
had even declared that if things did not take a turn for the
better by February 15 he would take poison. But on February 12
Empress Elizabeth of Russia died; her successor, Peter the Third,
was a friend and admirer of Frederick's. Thus Goebbels read
that the House of Brandenburg had been saved by a miracle,
and old horoscopes were brought out that predicted a change in
favour of Germany in mid-April, 1945.
On April 13, when Goebbels learned of Roosevelt's death,
he immediately telephoned Hitler, who was hiding in the bunker
of the Reichskanzlei.
``My Fuehrer,'' Goebbels exclaimed, ``I congratulate you!
Roosevelt is dead! It is written in the stars that the second half of
April will be the turning point for us. This is Friday, April
the thirteenth. It is the turning point!"^^1^^
The miracle, however, never came.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Confrontation in the White House
By agreeing to send People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
Molotov to the United States, the Soviet government had made
a gesture of good will towards the Truman administration. There
was also, of course, a clear practical reason for sending a
highranking Soviet official to Washington. Immediate, personal
contact with the new President would make it possible to determine
the mood in the White House and to exchange opinions on the
future of Soviet-American relations. There were also concrete
areas which it would be useful to discuss on a high level: the
final stage in the war against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 1110.
426
upcoming entry into the war in the Far East, and the problems
involved in post-war settlement. At the same time it was to be
expected that the American side would raise once more the
question of Poland, and in particular of the formation of a
government including the London Poles.
As can be seen in the correspondence between Washington
and Moscow, this question was posed again and again during the
last weeks of Roosevelt's life. In a message sent to Stalin on
April 1, 1945, dissatisfaction was expressed that the commission
set up according to the decision of the Yalta Conference and
composed of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR and the ambassadors of the USA and Great Britain in
Moscow had not moved forward on the question of forming a
Polish government. The President upheld the American and
British ambassadors' demand that an essentially new government
be created, even though it had been decided in Yalta that the
provisional government in Warsaw should serve as the base for
such reorganisation. Roosevelt also supported the Commission's
Western members in their claim that each of them had the right
to invite as many persons as they liked to the talks, whether from
Poland itself or from London, and that these persons should be
allowed to nominate to the commission further candidates for
the new government of Poland.
Roosevelt took a rather harsh tone in setting forth these claims.
``I wish I could convey to you,'' he wrote, ``how important it
is for the successful development of our program of international
collaboration that this Polish question be settled fairly and
speedily. If this is not done all of the difficulties and dangers to
Allied unity which we had so much in mind in reaching our
decisions at the Crimea will face us in an even more acute
form."^^1^^
Stalin replied to this on April 7. He agreed that things had
reached a dead end on the Polish question, and said he thought
the reason was that the US and the British ambassadors in
Moscow, as members of the Moscow commission, had departed from
the theses of the Yalta Conference by introducing new elements.
``At the Crimea Conference,'' he explained, ``the three of us
regarded the Polish Provisional Government as the government
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, p. 204.
427
now functioning in Poland and subject to reconstruction, as the
government that should be the core of a new Government of
National Unity. The US and British Ambassadors in Moscow,
however, have departed from that thesis; they ignore the Polish
Provisional Government, pay no heed to it and at best place
individuals in Poland and London on a par with the Provisional
Government. Furthermore, they hold that reconstruction of the
Provisional Government should be understood in terms of its
abolition and the establishment of an entirely new government. ..
``Obviously this thesis of the US and British Ambassadors
cannot but be strongly resented by the Polish Provisional
Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot
accept a thesis that is tantamount to direct violation of the Crimea
Conference decisions."^^1^^
After a concrete examination of the demands being made by
the American and British ambassadors, Stalin indicated that it
was their position which was preventing a settlement of the
Polish question. The Soviet side suggested a number of practical
steps. First of all, it should be established that reconstruction of
the Provisional Government did not mean its dissolution but
rather its expansion, and that it was the Provisional
Government which should be the core of the future Government of
National Unity. It was suggested that only eight Polish leaders be
invited to Moscow, as had been envisaged at the Crimea
Conference: five from Poland and three from London. Furthermore,
only such persons should be invited who recognised the Crimea
Conference's decisions on Poland and were really seeking to
establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.
It was also proposed that the reconstruction of the Provisional
Government be carried out by replacing a certain number of its
ministers with Polish leaders who had not been included earlier.
``I think if these comments are taken into consideration,'' Stalin's
message concluded, ``the Polish question can be settled in a
short time."^^2^^
The reply to these Soviet proposals was made after the death
of Roosevelt, on April 18, in a joint message from Churchill and
Truman. The two men continued to insist adamantly on
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence, Vol. 2, pp. 21
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 213.
428
conditions that were completely unacceptable both to the Soviet
Union and to the Polish Provisional Government, and that
represented a clear departure from the theses agreed on in Yalta.
Under Truman, moreover, this negative position took on an
even greater obduracy.
On April 13, immediately after Truman became president, he
sent a telegram to Churchill saying that he looked upon the
Polish question as a ``pressing and dangerous problem" and that he
was prepared for ``another go" at Stalin. Thus, in the very first
days of his presidency, Truman had decided to do battle with
the Soviet Union over the Polish question. It was at this same
time that Harriman was instructed to tell Stalin at their next
meeting that Washington attached the utmost importance to the
Polish question.
It must be said that the moment was not particularly
favourable for an American demarche of this sort: the crew of
one of the American planes that had landed at an airfield
near Poltava after a bombing mission deep into Germany
had tried to take a young Pole, dressed in the uniform of an
American soldier, out of the USSR illegally. The attempt had
been foiled, and the Soviet side naturally reacted to it in a most
vigorous manner. All the American planes in Poltava were
grounded, and an appropriate representation was made to the
American embassy.
Stalin mentioned this incident to Harriman at their next
meeting, and accused the Americans of giving support to the
reactionary Polish underground in its struggle against the Red Army.
Harriman seized the opportunity to point out that ``Poland
had become the principal issue clouding Soviet-American
relations".^^1^^ He went on to say that ``Roosevelt had been trying to
resolve it at the time of his death ... and Truman was just as
determined to reach an understanding".^^2^^ The ambassador
suggested that Stalin authorise Molotov to try to reach an
agreement on this matter with Stettinius and Eden during his visit
in the United States.
Stalin, without any further inquiries, said that Molotov would
receive relevant instructions.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 445.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
429
Soon after this conversation, Harriman left Moscow; he was
anxious to meet with the new President before the Soviet People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs arrived in the US capital. He
departed on April 17 and travelled by plane across the Balkans
and Italy to the Azores and on to Washington, arriving in only
forty-eight hours---record time for those days. Molotov chose the
longer route across Siberia and Alaska, and arrived in
Washington considerably later. Harriman made use of the interval to
prepare Truman for the meeting.
Harriman had his first talk with the new President on April 20.
It can be seen from Harriman's own description of this meeting
that he tried his best to move Truman towards a ``firmer''
attitude towards the Soviet Union. The ambassador acknowledged
that Moscow was pursuing a policy of cooperation with the
United States and Britain, but he strongly condemned the
political developments taking place in Eastern Europe. At the time,
of course, nothing else could have been expected from Harriman,
who represented the interests of big business and finance in the
USA.
Needless to say, the Soviet Union had not in any way broken
the understanding reached earlier. The problem lay elsewhere:
Soviet interest in the establishment of friendly regimes in diis
region, and particularly in those countries that directly bordered
on the USSR, evoked a negative reaction in capitalist quarters
in the 'West, who saw in this a threat to their own social and
political positions. It was this which guided Harriman in his
presentation to Truman. He said that the Russians would need
American help for reconstruction after the war, and so would
not want a break with the USA; thus Washington could, without
serious risk, to ``stand firm" on all the major issues.
This pleased Truman. He remarked complacently that he was
not afraid of the Russians, that he would be ``firm but fair" with
them. ``Anyway,'' he said, ``the Russians need us more than we
need them."^^1^^
Harriman then said that despite all the difficulties, he thought
it possible to achieve ``a workable relationship with the
Russians'', and added that ``both sides would have to make
concessions in the process of give-and-take".^^2^^ Truman agreed it would
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 447.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 448.
430
be unrealistic to expect 100 per cent Soviet cooperation with
American proposals, and said he hoped for 85 per cent; by this
he meant that he intended to force Moscow into making serious
concessions. ``I gained great respect for Truman at once,''
Harriman writes in summing this part of the conversation.
Next the Polish question was discussed. The ambassador,
mentioning the demands of the Western powers, warned that further
pressure on Moscow might cause complications---the USSR
might refuse to be part of the new international organisation. He
asked whether Truman would be prepared to go ahead with
plans for the United Nations even without the Russians.
Truman understood what the ambassador was asking about,
but declined to make a direct answer. He said that the truth was
that ``without Russia there would be no world organization".^^1^^
It is likely that there were some in the USA who were thinking
at the time that the international organisation could operate
without the Russians and indeed, against them. It goes without
saying that the United States would have had unlimited sway in
such an organisation, which might be called internatio»al but
certainly not universal.
While in Washington, Harriman also met with the top
officials of the State Department. He told them the time had come
to remove the element of fear from American dealings with the
Soviet Union and to demonstrate that the USA was determined
to stand firm. When Harriman was asked about the British
position, he answered that ``London felt even more strongly than
Washington. . . But the British could not go it alone."^^2^^
All this could not help but heighten the anti-Soviet mood
already in full flower in Washington. At this point, the Soviet
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs arrived in the capital.
Molotov's first meeting with Truman, on April 22, was formal
and polite. Truman expressed admiration of the Soviet people,
offered assurances that he intended to observe the agreements
the USSR and the USA had made, and promised he would try
to make it possible for the two countries to continue along the
path marked out by Roosevelt. Matters connected with the
creation of a new world-wide security organisation were then touched
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 449--50.
431
upon briefly, and there was a preliminary exchange of opinions
on the Polish situation. Each of the sides set out its already
familiar position.
The next day, April 23, Truman called a special conference
in the White House that included Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal,
Leahy, Marshall, King, Harriman, and General Deane, the head
of the American military mission in the USSR. In his
introductory remarks, Secretary of State Stettinius declared that a ``
complete deadlock" had been reached on the Polish question.
In a few hours Truman was to meet once again with Molotov,
and he wanted to play out his scenario of the upcoming
conversation for his advisers and try his arguments out on them.
Truman began by saying he must stand up to the Russians now, or
never. He intended to go ahead with the plans for a new
international organisation under any circumstances; if the Russians
would not join, they could ``go to hell".
The President, as we see, had made up his mind he could get
along without the Soviet Union in the new international
organisation. He may even have thought that without the USSR he
would be full master of the United Nations and could easily use
it against the Soviet Union. Having formulated this new thesis,
Truman invited his advisers to give their opinions.
Secretary of War Stimson was the first to speak. He urged a
more cautious approach, pointing out that in big military affairs
the Russians had always kept their word and often done more
than they had promised.
Stimson was particularly shocked by the ``rather brutal
frankness" Truman intended to show in his conversation with
Molotov. He expressed concern that strong words from the President
on such an important problem might seriously complicate
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He
meant, in particular, the American side's interest in Soviet help
in the Far East.
General Marshall also favoured more circumspection, but
James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, supported the
President. He said Poland was not the only example of Russian
unwillingness to reckon with the interests of the other Allies.
Admiral Leahy's position was midway between Stimson's and
Forrestal's. He had been certain even at Yalta that the Soviet
Union would insist on its own position, and argued that the
432
Yalta agreement on Poland ``could be read two ways''. He
opposed a break with the USSR at that time.
At the end of the discussion Truman said he did not mean to
present Molotov with an ultimatum. He would be ``firm though
not offensive".^^1^^
When Molotov walked into the President's office in the White
House that evening, Truman ``went straight to the point'', as
Harriman says in his memoirs. The President expressed regret
that no progress was being made on the Polish question. The
United States, he declared, had gone as far as it could to meet
the Russians' demands, but it ``could not recognize a Polish
government that failed to represent all democratic elements".^^2^^ He
reminded Molotov that Roosevelt has warned Stalin, in his
message of April 1, that ``no American policy, foreign or domestic,
could succeed unless it enjoyed public confidence and support".^^3^^
Truman went on to say that Congress would have to approve
allocations of funds for any economic aid after the war and
that he saw no possibility of getting such measures through
Congress unless they had public support. He hoped the Soviet
government would keep this in mind.
To this thinly veiled threat, Molotov replied that the only
acceptable basis for cooperation was for the governments of the
three powers to treat each others as equals. One or two of them
must not be allowed to attempt to force their will on a third. All
the United States was demanding, Truman countered, was that
the Soviets carry out the Yalta agreements on Poland.
To this Molotov answered that the Soviet government could
not be accused of violating the agreement, since the other
parties had abrogated it. Truman repeated in a sharp voice that the
United States was prepared to carry out faithfully all the
agreements signed at Yalta. He would demand the same of the
Soviet Union, he said, and wanted this clearly understood in
Moscow. Molotov answered that the Soviet government had always
kept its promises in the past, and would continue to do so.
Harriman concludes his description of this scene with the
following remark: ``I was a little taken aback, frankly, when the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 451--53.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 453.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
__PRINTERS_P_433_COMMENT__
28---1996
433
President attacked Molotov so vigorously. I suppose it was true
that Molotov had never been talked to so bluntly before by a
foreigner.. . I did regret that Truman went at it so hard because
his behavior gave Molotov an excuse to tell Stalin that the
Roosevelt policy was being abandoned. I regretted that Truman gave
him the opportunity. I think it was a mistake, though not a
decisive mistake."^^1^^
After this confrontation in the White House, Molotov
continued on to the West Coast to take part in the United Nations
conference in San Francisco. He spent only a few days there,
however, before returning to Moscow.
Victory Day
That Wednesday in May of 1945 began like any other
working day. But the events that were to make May 9 Victory Day---
a national holiday in the Soviet Union---had been underway for
forty-eight hours. At 1:30 in the morning of May 7, Admiral
Doenitz---whom Hitler had named as his successor before
commiting suicide in his bunker in the Reichskanzlei---thelegraphed
to General Jodl from Flensburg the order to sign an act of
unconditional surrender. This was done at 2:40 in a little school
building in Reims, where General Eisenhower's headquarters
were located. General Smith of the United States accepted the
surrender for the Allies. The signature was witnessed by General
Susloparov of the Soviet Union and General Savez of France. The
German signatories were Admiral Friedenburg and General Jodl.
The latter asked permission to say a few words, and this was
granted. ``With this signature,'' Jodl said, ``the German people
and the German Armed Forces are, for better or worse, delivered
into the hands of the victors.. . In this hour I can only express
the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity."^^2^^
So at last the Nazi general had remembered the word ``
generosity'', which up to that time had not figured in the lexicon of
the Nazi butchers. Those present heard Jodl out in silence and
made no reply. The ceremony was soon over.
The fighting did not cease at once, however. Throughout
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., pp. 453--54.
~^^2^^ William L. Shirer, Op. cit., p. 1139.
434
May 7 and 8, a few of the Wehrmacht's units continued to resist.
People were still dying, even in the last days of the Reich's death
agony. It was only early in the morning of May 9 that the last
guns fell silent in Europe and the bombings stopped. An
unaccustomed---and long desired---silence descended for the first time
since September 1, 1939, when Nazi Germany had unleashed the
Second World War. In the five years, eight months, and eight
days since then tens of millions of people had perished on
countless battlefields, in bombed-out cities, and in Nazi concentration
camps. Such was the awful harvest brought in by Hitler's mad
dream of world domination.
The modest ceremony in Reims was entirely out of scale with
the titanic armed conflict that had just ended. Furthermore, it
was unthinkable that the Soviet Union, which had made the
decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler's Reich, should be
represented only by an observer. The Soviet government insisted
that the act of capitulation be signed before representatives of
the supreme commands of all the powers in the anti-Hitler
coalition. Berlin, the centre of Nazi aggression, would be the
appropriate place for the signing. It was decided by the Allies that the
Reims act of capitulation should be regarded as a preliminary
protocol.
The act of unconditional surrender was signed in Berlin, in
the Karlshorst, at forty-three minutes after midnight on May 9.
The German signatories were Field Marshal Keitel, General
Stumpf, and Admiral Friedenburg, who had received
authorisation from Doenitz. This was announced in Moscow on the
morning of May 9, which at the same time was proclaimed as Victory
Day.
We had grown so accustomed, during the years of the war,
to working without days off or vacations that no one seemed to
know what to do with those first free hours. I phoned around to
my friends, and we agreed to meet in Red Square that evening.
Huge crowds converged there that night; the joy and merriment
were beyond description. Strangers hugged one another, laughing
and crying. Joy at our magnificent victory filled everyone, young
and old alike. The exulting crowds overflowed from Red Square
and filled Okhotny Ryad, Manege Square, Mokhovaya, and
adjoining streets.
__PRINTERS_P_436_COMMENT__
28*
435
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Harry Hopkins's Mission
Harry Hopkins, a close friend and associate of Roosevelt, had
long been ill, and his health deteriorated still further after the
President's death. He retired to a modest house in Georgetown,
a fashionable section of Washington. He never went out, and
received hardly any visitors. Most of his time was spent lying in
bed. But when, shortly after the UN conference in San
Francisco, Harriman called on him to suggest that he go to Moscow,
Hopkins agreed without a minute's hesitation.
The idea behind this unusual mission has a history of its own.
The perceptible deterioration in Soviet-American relations after
Truman took over at the White House caused widespread and
serious concern among the American public and also within the
cabinet, which for some time after the new President took office
continued to be made up chiefly of men who had worked with
Roosevelt. There were heated debates in top government
echelons about policy towards the Soviet Union in the future. The
exchange of opinions that had taken place between Truman and
his closest advisers during Molotov's visit to Washington in April
showed that many influential members of the administration did
not support the President's intention to make a sharp turn
towards confrontation. The prevailing mood in the mass media
was also in favour of continuing the policy of cooperation with
the USSR. Harriman had a chance to see this for himself in
San Francisco when he addressed journalists who were covering
the first United Nations conference. His ``hard-line''
pronouncements were met with indignation, and many of the journalists
walked out in protest.
These conditions made it necessary for Truman and his
supporters to resort to stratagems. In reviewing Washington's actions
at this time it becomes obvious that simultaneous efforts were
made along several lines. First, the White House decided to
pour oil on the troubled waters with a public demonstration of
willingness to continue cooperating with the Soviet Union.
Conditions were to be made, however, which were patently
unacceptable to Moscow. Hence the second line: to blame the Soviet
Union for making it impossible to continue Roosevelt's policy.
The third line of effort was to instil antagonism towards the
Soviet Union into public opinion through the mass media.
436
Here, though, a difficulty arose: Truman, as we have seen,
had already let the cat out of the bag with the inexcusable
rudeness he had shown in his conversation with the People's
Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The new President
committed another hostile act against the USA's Soviet Ally on
May 8, 1945, when he signed an order for sharp reductions in
Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union. This was done
without any prior consultation with Moscow, and in a most
insolent way. The day after the act was signed, orders were given
to stop the loading of materials for the USSR in American ports
and ships already en route were called back. Many Americans
in high places, including Harriman, were shocked by Truman's
crude tactics, which were clearly aimed at winning political
concessions by using economic pressure. The President was urgently
advised to revoke his order, and after some time he did so. But
a significant blow had already been dealt to Soviet-American
relations, and this fact did not fail to register in Moscow.
In the light of what has been said, it is not difficult to guess
Washington's real motives or to see the true worth of Truman's
declarations of good intent. It was at this point, evidently, that
the idea of sending Harry Hopkins to Moscow arose. There is
reason to believe that Hopkins himself was not privy to all the
details of Washington's backstage manoeuvrings, although he was
briefed by Truman before his departure. He agreed to make the
trip, in spite of his poor health, because he was a firm advocate
of Soviet-American cooperation. Seeing that relations between
the two countries were rapidly deteriorating, he ardently hoped
that the situation could still be remedied. He was ready to make
a personal contribution to this cause. The reason why the White
House settled on Hopkins as its emissary is plain to see. He had
been a close and trusted adviser of Roosevelt, and had helped
lay the plans for post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union. He
was trusted by the Soviet government and by Stalin personally,
and moreover it was well remembered in Moscow that in the
dark days of July 1941, it was Hopkins whom Roosevelt had
sent to the Soviet capital to find out whether the Soviet Union
would be able to withstand the Nazis; after acquainting himself
with the situation, he had expressed the firm conviction that
Hitler would not get through. Lastly, Hopkins was a strong
proponent of post-war settlement under which cooperation on an
437
equal footing could develop among all nations, and especially
between the United States and the Soviet Union; thus he could
speak without duplicity of the importance and necessity of
continuing the political course Roosevelt had worked out with his
participation.
Hopkins's stay in Moscow is described in considerable detail in
his biography and in Harriman's memoirs.
Hopkins arrived in Moscow on May 25. At eight the next
evening he and Harriman were received by Stalin in the
Kremlin. Stalin greeted Hopkins as an old friend, and listened with
attention to his account of Roosevelt's last days. Hopkins then
began to speak of the late President's great confidence that
America and Russia, having fought together in wartime, would
be able to work together in peacetime. He referred to Roosevelt's
great respect for Stalin, and recalled his own mission to Moscow
in the summer of 1941 and Roosevelt's speedy decision to help
the Soviet Union, even though many thought at the time that
Hitler would smash the USSR in just a few weeks. Now,
Hopkins said, the Russians and the Americans, together with the
other Allies, had smashed Hitler's Reich.
Stalin listened to all of this with complaisance.
Satisfied that he had made enough compliments and said
enough kind words, Hopkins moved on to the existing situation.
He began by saying that in the past two months a number of
new trends had appeared which gravely concerned all Americans
who believed in Roosevelt's policies. This was why he, Hopkins,
had risen from his sickbed to fly to Moscow at Truman's request.
The reason Truman had sent him, Hopkins continued, was
precisely the alarm and concern many Americans were feeling
over these recent trends in relations with the Soviet Union. The
concrete cause of the change, he said, would be hard to isolate,
but the heart of the matter was that Truman was having difficulty
in continuing Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet
Union. Hopkins, though, attributed this not to Truman's views
but to a ``deterioration in popular support" resulting from ``our
inability to solve the Polish question".^^1^^ Unless the Polish matter
was cleared up quickly, Hopkins said, the situation would get still
worse.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 464.
438
Stalin remarked that responsibility for this failure lay with
the British Conservatives. All that the Soviet Union was
demanding was a friendly Poland; the British, however, were trying to
restore the pre-war cordon sanitaire.
Hopkins answered that neither the government nor the people
of the United States had any such intentions, and Stalin repeated
that he was speaking only of Britain, whose Conservative leaders
did not want to see Poland friendly to the Soviet Union. Hopkins
in turn assured Stalin that the United States did not object to
Russia's having friendly nations along its borders, but on the
contrary, desired this.
``If that is so, it will be easy for us to come to terms,'' Stalin
said.
The talks in the Kremlin continued from May 26 to June 6,
with most of the time being devoted to the Polish question. The
prevailing atmosphere was on the whole favourable, and the two
sides set forth frank views on a wide range of questions. The
Soviet Union also lodged serious complaints against its Western
Allies.
During the second meeting, on May 27, Stalin raised the
question of Argentine representation at the conference in San
Francisco. The Big Three, he said, had agreed in Yalta that
only governments which had declared war on Germany before
March 1 would be invited to San Francisco. Nonetheless
Argentina, which had declared war only on March 27, was represented
at the conference. What was the value of agreements among the
main powers, Stalin asked, if they could be cast aside so lightly?
Hopkins tried to explain what had happened. Stettinius, he
said, in accordance with the agreement reached in Yalta, had
asked the Latin American delegations in San Francisco to
support the admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia to the United
Nations Organisation. They had agreed, and had kept their
word. Ambassadors from the Latin American countries, however,
sought to get America's support for Argentina's admission in
return for their voting in favour of the Soviet republics. Stettinius
tried to persuade them that the Argentine question should be
deferred, but without success. In the end there was nothing he
could do but join his vote to those of the Latin Americans.
``What has been done cannot be put right,'' Stalin said. ``One
way or the other, the Argentine question is behind us now.''
439
Stalin then turned to the make-up of the reparations
commission. The agreement reached in Yalta had called for a
threepower body, but now the United States was insisting that France
be included as a fourth member. France, Stalin remarked, had
been defeated. If France was to be a member, then why not
Poland and Yugoslavia, which had fought bravely and suffered far
more at German hands? Hopkins answered that the inclusion
of France seemed to him a logical step, inasmuch as France
would be one of the four occupying powers, but if the Soviet
Union objected he thought the United States would not insist
on French participation.
Stalin also expressed concern over the suspension of
LendLease deliveries. The manner in which it had all been done, he
said, was crude and awkward. If the decision had been made
in the hopes of bringing pressure to bear on Russia, this was a
fundamental error. Although Truman's order had later been
reversed, it had greatly perturbed the Soviet government. He said
he must tell Hopkins frankly that if the Russians were treated
in an honest and friendly way there was much that could be
done, but any attempt to push them around would lead to just
the opposite result.
Hopkins sought to justify the actions of the US government by
speaking of a ``technical misunderstanding" by one agency, which
did not at all represent a political decision.
Stalin remarked in a more conciliatory tone that when the war
ended in Europe the United States would no doubt have to
review its Lend-Lease programme. He agreed that throughout
the history of Lend-Lease the United States had kept its promises,
and said he fully understood the USA's right to limit its
LendLease shipments to the Soviet Union under the present conditions,
since the obligations the Americans had undertaken were
completely voluntary. The problem was in the way it had all been done:
an attempt had been made to destroy, in an unworthy and abrupt
manner, an agreement existing between the two governments.
Had the Soviet government been informed in advance, there
would have been no bad impression.
Hopkins answered that what troubled him most about Stalin's
remarks was that Moscow, it seemed, could believe that the
United States was prepared to use Lend-Lease to express displeasure
with the Soviet Union. He said that however unfavourable an
440
impression the incident had made, the Soviet government should
not regard it as indicating that the USA was trying to apply
pressure, or even wanted to.
Stalin then brought up the matter of the German war and
merchant vessels, and said that a third of the tonnage captured
by the Western Allies should be handed over to the USSR. ``It
would be unpleasant,'' he warned, ``if the United States and
Great Britain were now to reject this Soviet claim.''
Hopkins said the United States had no objection to handing
over the captured German vessels, and added that he thought
the matter could be finally settled at the upcoming meeting of
Truman, Stalin, and Churchill.
Poland continued to be the most vexing question. Stalin
himself raised the issue at one of the later talks and said he could
not understand the American position. At the conference in
Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that the Polish
government should be formed on the basis of the existing
regime.
When Hopkins referred to American public opinion, Stalin
answered sharply: ``I would not advise you to hide behind public
opinion. I am speaking of a feeling that has arisen in the Soviet
government. That feeling is that as soon as the war ended the
Americans started to act as if they did not need the Soviet
Union any more.''
The discussion of the Polish question continued right up to
the last meeting, on June 6. Hopkins stressed again and again
that Poland was important primarily ``as a symbol of our ability
to work out problems with the Soviet Union".^^1^^ Hopkins denied
any special American interest in Poland, but nonetheless
continued to press the Soviet government on this issue. At a dinner
given in the Kremlin on June 1 in honour of the American guests,
Harriman said Stalin must believe him when he said that the
whole relationship between the two countries was threatened by
the deadlock over the Polish question.
There was no way, however, that the Soviet side could yield
to Washington's demands, since this would have meant, in
practice, the restoration of a reactionary Polish regime hostile to
the Soviet Union. The dangerous consequences such a concession
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op. cit., p. 467.
441
would have for peace in Europe, the security of the USSR, and
the national interests of the Polish people themselves were plain
to see. At the same time, the Soviet side made every effort to
demonstrate that it desired continued cooperation with the United
States. This was apparent even in personal gestures.
During the screening of newsreels that Stalin arranged for
his guests after dinner on June 1, Harriman expressed admiration
of the horse on which General Antonov had reviewed the May
Day parade. When he learned that Harriman was a skilled
horseman, Stalin said he would make a present to the ambassador
of two Russian horses. At first Harriman took this for a joke,
but two days later a cavalry general appeared at his residence
with a folder handsomely bound in red morocco, containing the
pedigrees of two fine horses and photographs of them. Now
Harriman and his daughter Kathleen, who lived with him in
Moscow, were faced with a new worry: where to keep the horses.
But a highly satisfactory arrangement was arrived at. The horses
were stabled at Moscow's cavalry school, and both the ambassador
and his daughter were able to ride them at any time they liked.
When Harriman left Moscow the horses were sent to the United
States by ship; they lived out their lives on the Harriman estate
outside New York.
Late on the night of June 6, Harry Hopkins said farewell to
Stalin and other Soviet leaders; the next morning he flew from
Moscow to Berlin. There he was the guest of Marshal Zhukov,
who organised a tour of the bombed-out city for him. During the
breakfast given afterwards the upcoming Big Three meeting was
discussed.
On the whole, Hopkins's visit to Moscow could well have been
the point of departure for restoring friendly relations between
the two powers. This was declared more than once by the Soviet
side, and Hopkins himself, looking back on his talks in the
Kremlin, concluded that the further positive development of
SovietAmerican relations was quite possible, even if certain
complications were inevitable. He did not at all foresee a cold war. Rather,
he maintained that despite all the difficulties, the USA and the
USSR must find a road to cooperation acceptable to both sides.
On his return to Washington Hopkins discovered that the press
was taking a very positive view of the results of his trip, saying
that the talks he had conducted in Moscow marked the beginning
442
of a new era of mutual understanding and cooperation with the
Soviet Union.
On the day after his return, Hopkins had breakfast with
President Truman. He described his conversations in Moscow in
detail, trying to give the President as much information as
possible about Stalin's personality and way of carrying on a discussion.
Hopkins thought this would be of service to Truman at the
conference in Potsdam and in all his later contacts with the Soviet
leader.
The press was predicting that Hopkins, after his notably
successful mission, would receive a high post in the administration
or even become personal adviser to Truman, as he had been to
Roosevelt. But the situation was changing rapidly and
fundamentally. In the two months since Roosevelt's death, people of a
completely different sort had appeared in the new administration.
Hopkins's services were not wanted. He had done his job---had
gone to Moscow in an attempt to give the impression that
Washington still meant to follow Roosevelt's course. This had relieved
the new master of the White House of undue pressure from
American and world public opinion, which favoured continued
cooperation, and given him a free hand to take a ``tough'' line
towards the Soviet Union. Truman did ask Hopkins to take part
in the Potsdam Conference, but the invitation was declined.
After Truman's appointment of James Byrnes as Secretary of
State in place of Stettinius, Hopkins understood that it would
be better for him to leave government service altogether.
A little more than half a year later, on January 19, 1946,
Harry Hopkins died in the hospital where he had spent the last
months of his life.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Final Preparations
This time there were no disagreements on the date and site for
a new meeting of the three heads of government. All were agreed
on mid-July, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Berlin. After
great trials, the members of the anti-Hitler coalition had at last
achieved victory over their common enemy, and their decision
to come together in the capital of the defeated Reich was, in
addition to everything else, highly symbolic.
443
The Soviet command concluded that the most appropriate
place for the Big Three meeting would be Potsdam, a once
fashionable suburb of the German capital. Many of the buildings
there remained in relatively good condition, including the
Cecilienhof Palace, which had been built for the crown prince by
the Kaiser in the years of the First World War. The palace was
surrounded by a large park and enclosed by a stone wall, and
thus was well suited for a meeting of the three heads of
government from the point of view of security. Nearby, in Babelsberg,
many of the villas formerly belonging to the German elite had
survived; these were put at the disposal of heads of delegation
and the personnel of the participating countries. The suggestion
that the meeting be held in Potsdam was accepted without any
particular discussion, and the Soviet command began at once to
prepare and equip the buildings set aside for working sessions
and accommodations. The conference was to begin on July 17,
and although there was but little time left, the Soviet command
managed not only to complete all necessary preparations but also
to make improvements in the surrounding territory.
Meanwhile, final preparations for the Big Three meeting were
also underway on the political level. In some ways---at least as
far as Churchill was concerned---these were of a most peculiar
character.
All during May and June of 1945, Churchill had urged
Truman to move up the date for the new Big Three conference.
Time, he argued, was on Stalin's side, since large contingents
of the American army were being withdrawn from Europe and
redeployed for the final attack on Japan. The Prime Minister
also tried to persuade Truman not to give back the German
territory that the Americans had seized on the other side of the
line marked out for the Soviet zone of occupation.
Taking up the fabrications that Gpebbels's propaganda
machine had circulated in the last days of the Reich, Churchill
wrote Truman that withdrawal of the US army from .these
territories would mean ``the tide of Russian domination sweeping
forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles".^^1^^ He
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The
Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Vol. 1, United
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, pp. 6, 7.
444
maintained that Allied forces should not be pulled back ``until we are
satisfied about Poland and also about the temporary character
of the Russian occupation of Germany".^^1^^
In Washington a battle was still being waged over the political
heritage of Roosevelt. Some influential figures were trying to
convince the new President of the need to take an intermediate
position between Britain and the Soviet Union. Given these
circumstances, Truman was unable to follow Churchill, and
answered that he would like to avoid making it possible for the
Russians to accuse London and Washington of conspiring against
Moscow. In the end Churchill was forced to agree to this,
although he continued to express concern over the withdrawal of
American troops from Europe. On May 12 he sent yet another
message to Truman, in which for the first time he availed himself
of Goebbels's idea about an ``iron curtain" running through the
centre of Europe.
``What will be the position in a year or two,'' Churchill
wondered, ``when the British and American armies have melted and
the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when
we may have a handful of divisions, mostly French, and when
Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active
service? An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do
not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that
the whole of the regions east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-Corfu
will soon be completely in their hands. To this must be added
the further enormous area conquered by the American armies
between Eisenach and the Elbe, which will, I suppose, in a few
weeks be occupied, when the Americans retreat, by the Russian
power... It would be open to the Russians in a very short time
to advance if they chose to the waters of the North Sea and the
Atlantic."^^2^^
In Washington, however, the departments of State and War
alike objected to using the territories held by American troops
and designated for Soviet occupation as a bargaining tool.
Hopkins strongly advised the President to show restraint and warned
that a refusal by the USA to withdraw its forces from their
advanced positions would look like a violation of the agreement
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid.
~^^2^^ Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 489, 490.
445
freely reached by all sides half a year back, and would not find
favour either in Russia or in the United States itself. Following
these recommendations, Truman wrote Churchill on June 11
that he could not postpone the withdrawal of American forces
from the Soviet zone in order to use them as a lever in settling
other problems.
Meanwhile the Soviet side made it clear that agreement would
not be given for the Allied Control Commission to begin
functioning in Berlin until American and British forces had been pulled
back from the Soviet zone.
While Truman crossed the Atlantic on the cruiser Augusta en
route to the conference, he plunged into a study of the problems
to be discussed in Potsdam. Each day in the wardroom the
President held a conference of his closest advisers, including James
Byrnes, his new Secretary of State; Benjamin Cohen, a State
Department counselor; Freeman Matthews, head of the State
Department's European division; Admiral Leahy; and Charles Bohlen,
who at that time was considered the best-informed expert on
Soviet affairs.
Among the questions the American delegation discussed just
before the Potsdam conference, the problem of the USSR's
participation in the war against Japan occupied a special place. The
Combined Chiefs of Staff presented a written report to Truman
and Churchill, listing the steps that should be undertaken for
the earliest possible defeat of Japan. The document said that
any aid that would heighten Russia's fighting capacity should
be given. The President had no doubts about the soundness of
this advice. ``Of course my immediate purpose was to get the
Russians into the war against Japan as soon as possible,'' he later
wrote in his memoirs.^^1^^ Secretary of War Stimson was of the same
opinion.
By the time the Potsdam Conference opened, many Americans
who formerly held influential positions had been dismissed. The
role played by Averell Harriman was also a very modest'one.
Although he was present at all the plenary sessions, he was not
party to the chief decisions made within the American
delegation. James Byrnes, the new Secretary of State, kept not only
Harriman but even Secretary of War Stimson out of the councils
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, Doubleday and Co., New York,
1955, pp. 322--23.
446
of power, evidently because the latter had reacted negatively to
attempts to steer United States policy away from cooperation
with the Soviet Union. Harriman, sensing that he was not
wanted, told Truman he would like to retire soon.
``I'm ready to stay in Moscow, if you want me to, until the
Japanese war is over,'' he told the President. ``Then I want to
get out and go home."^^1^^
The President did not object, and Harriman saw this as
evidence that the new administration was not very desirous of his
services.
It should be said that peculiar relationships existed between
Truman and Byrnes. The new Secretary of State found it quite
impossible to forgive Truman for his, Byrnes's, not being
President. When the Democratic National Convention opened in
Chicago in 1944, Byrnes was completely confident that Truman
would nominate him as Vice-President. As things turned out,
however, Truman himself got the job, and Byrnes was never really
reconciled to Truman's having ``fooled'' him. Byrnes had a high
opinion of himself, and indeed was regarded by others too as an
experienced politician. He had first been elected to the Senate
in 1930, and gained considerable power there. It is said that
Roosevelt always won his battles in Congress when Byrnes
supported him, and always lost when the senator took the other
side. But Byrnes had no experience whatever in international
affairs, and had only a vague idea of what was going on abroad.
Formally, Truman's military adviser at the Potsdam
Conference was Admiral Leahy, who had long served as one of
Roosevelt's closest aides. But Truman seldom consulted him on practical
affairs. Leahy's book, / Was There, is mostly occupied with
matters of protocol, and it appears that the admiral did not see very
deeply into what was taking place around him. Leahy remained
faithful to the new President, even if he was practically of no
use as an adviser.
The new administration had already started its reorganisation
in Washington, and Truman excluded from the Potsdam
Conference many political figures who in the past had actively assisted
Roosevelt. This was an important indicator of the fundamental
changes in the course of US foreign policy.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Harriman and Abel, Op, cit., p. 488.
447
__ALPHA_LVL3__
``The Big Three'' in Berlin
The American and British delegations arrived in Berlin before
the Soviet delegation, and Truman, yielding to Churchill, agreed
to exchange opinions with him before meeting with Stalin.
Churchill had seen Truman only once before, during his visit
to Washington for talks with President Roosevelt. Thus the
Prime Minister was not quite sure how he should deal with the
new President. Evidently Truman had similar feelings. At any
rate, while preparations for the Potsdam Conference were still
underway he sent Ambassador Davies to London to get the lie
of the land. At his first meeting with Churchill, Davies spoke
of the President's ``concern'' over the serious deterioration in US
and British relations with the Soviet Union. It may be
supposed that Davies, who was always a firm supporter of
Roosevelt's policy of rapprochement with the USSR, took Truman's
expression of ``concern'' for the real thing. Thus he told
Churchill that without continued unity among the Big Three he saw
no reasonable prospects for peace. He pointed out the mistrust
and suspicions of all sorts that had arisen since the victory in
Europe, and said the situation was being further complicated
by the Soviet view that Britain and the United States were trying
to ``gang up" on the USSR. In view of all this, he continued,
and of the new President's never having met Stalin previously,
Truman would like to have an opportunity to talk to the head
of the Soviet government before the planned Big Three meeting.
Churchill, who had long since set a course for confrontation
with the Soviet Union, had a different understanding of the
President's ``concern''. He regarded it rather as a hint that the
policy of confrontation could be pursued further as relations with
the USSR deteriorated. But he sensed a danger in Truman's
desire to meet separately with Stalin. It smacked of an attempt
to exclude London from ``big politics'', or at least to force the
British into a secondary position. Striking an indignant pose,
Churchill said he was ``surprised and hurt" at this desire to leave
him out of the first meeting with Stalin since victory had been
won.
Had he not supported the United States throughout the war?
Was this to be his reward? Had he not supported the American
formula of unconditional surrender, when he could have made
448
a separate peace with Hitler? What was the meaning of this?
Such a meeting had the look of a shady deal. He would never,
never agree to it.
It seemed to Churchill that the Americans did not intend to
take him seriously. First Washington had turned down his
proposal that American troops be left in the German territories which
were to be occupied by the Soviet Union. Then Truman, despite
the Prime Minister's urgent recommendations, had decided to
withdraw a significant part of the American contingents from
Europe. And now this proposal for a separate meeting between
Truman and Stalin. Did Washington mean to abandon its old
ally altogether? Did the United States intend to deal separately
with Moscow, after all Churchill's efforts to convince the
Americans that the Soviet Union presented a terrible threat to the
United States? The Prime Minister asked Davies in a dramatic
tone:
``Are you trying to say for the President that the United States
is withdrawing from participation in European affairs?"^^1^^
Davies declined to give a direct reply, and thereupon Churchill
gave free reign to his emotions. He boasted that if the Americans
did not understand the threat Russia held for Europe, Britain
would stand alone. His nation was not a factor to be treated
lightly in world affairs. It could still protect itself and would
stand alone, as it had before.
Ambassador Davies refused to be put off by such blustering.
He reminded Churchill that the Soviet Union had made an
enormous contribution to the cause of victory over the common
enemy, and added that old suspicions ought not to be revived.
In conclusion, Davies declared that many people thought
Britain, now having no rival power on the continent whose aid could
be enlisted in offsetting the growing might of Russia, was bent
on using the human resources and economic potential of the
United States to support the classic British policy, ``divide and
rule".
Davies had fathomed Churchill's true motives with such
penetration
that the latter, for all his resourcefulness, did not know
what answer
to make. He only remarked that he would like to
present his ideas to
President Truman as soon as possible.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam, Evans and Company,
New York, 1975, pp. 34--36.
__PRINTERS_P_449_COMMENT__
29---1996
449
By all appearances, Truman found Churchill's forcefulness to
his liking. He raised no further objections against a preliminary
meeting with the Prime Minister before the Soviet delegation
arrived in Potsdam.
The two Western leaders met on the morning of July 16 in
the parlour of the villa in Babelsberg where the President was
staying, and which was dubbed the Little White House. The
discussion began with Japan. Churchill declared he could supply fresh
British troops for the war in the Pacific, but Truman made it
clear he would not need Britain's aid. Indeed, he told Churchill,
despite the official Yalta agreement concerning the Soviet Union's
entry into the war against Japan after the capitulation of Nazi
Germany, he did not intend to ``ask'' the Russians to join that
war. This somewhat sweetened the pill Churchill had been forced
to swallow. His spirits lifted, and he launched into his
favourite theme: the ``threat'' the Soviet Union supposedly presented
to Europe and the United States alike. On the whole, Churchill
was satisfied with the meeting. He noted in his diary that he
was greatly impressed with Truman's firmness and ability to
make decisions.
In the afternoon of that same day, Secretary of War Stimson
went to Churchill's villa to inform him of the preliminary data
from the atom-bomb test in New Mexico. Churchill was unable
to conceal his delight. He exclaimed that here was ``a speedy
end to the Second World War'', and added, after a little pause,
``and perhaps to much else besides".^^1^^
Later Churchill wrote in his diary:
``Up to this moment we had shaped our ideas towards an
assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and
by the invasion of very large armies. We had contemplated the
desperate resistance of the Japanese fighting to the death with
Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles, but in every cave
and dug-out. . . To quell the Japanese resistance man by man
and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the
loss of a million American lives and half that number of British. . .
Now all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was
the vision---fair and bright indeed it seemed---of the end of the
whole war in one or two violent shocks. . . Moreover, we should
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 545--46.
450
not need the Russians. . . We seemed suddenly to have become
possessed of a merciful abridgment of the slaughter in the East
and of a far happier prospect in Europe. I have no doubt that
these thoughts were present in the minds of my American
friends."^^1^^
Stimson tried in vain to persuade Churchill of the need to
inform the Soviet side in detail about the new weapon. Churchill
refused to hear of it. His reaction was the same as that of
Byrnes, with whom Stimson had spoken earlier.
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Potsdam Conference
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Stalin's Meeting with Truman
At noon on July 17, a limousine bearing the head of the
Soviet government pulled up at the entrance of the Little White
House in Babelsberg. Harry Vaughan and James Vardaman,
close advisers to the President, came out to greet the guests.
Stalin was uniformed as Generalissimo in a white high-collar tunic
with reddish-gold epaulettes. He had recently been awarded this
rank in the recognition of the success and historic victories of
the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. Molotov and
S. A. Golunsky, a counselor in the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs who served as interpreter, accompanied Stalin.
The Soviet representatives climbed the carpeted stairs to
Truman's office on the first floor, where the President, Secretary of
State Byrnes, and Charles Bohlen, who acted as interpreter for
the American side, awaited them.
The President's interpreter noted that Stalin was calm and
cordial, and that his voice was gentle and friendly.
In the course of their conversation, Truman and Stalin
discussed the agenda of the conference, to which Stalin made
several additions, including the question of the Franco regime in
Spain. Truman, as if not hearing the remarks made about
Franco, asked at what time Stalin would find it convenient to meet
for the first plenary session. Stalin answered that Molotov and
Eden had agreed on five in the evening of that day, July 17.
Byrnes jokingly referred to Stalin's well-known habit of working
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 544, 545.
__PRINTERS_P_451_COMMENT__
29*
451
late into the night and getting up late the next morning. Stalin
replied in the same tone that his habits had changed since the
end of the war.
``As concerns the Franco regime,'' Stalin continued in a serious
tone, ``I would like to make my point of view clear. The Franco
regime was not the result of internal development in Spain. It
was forced upon Spain by Germany and Italy, and thus
represents a threat to the United Nations. The Franco regime is
dangerous and harmful, since various remnants of fascism are given
shelter in Spain. For this reason we think it should be done away
with.''
Truman answered that he did not have sufficient materials
on Franco, but he would certainly study the question. Truman
then decided to give the conversation a less official turn.
``I came here,'' he said, ``to establish friendly relations with
you and to deal with you personally, so I could get a yes or no
answer right away on different questions---especially since I'm
no diplomat.''
Stalin answered that frankness was a good thing, and would
be helpful to the Soviet Union in dealings with the United
States.
Truman said that if relations between the USA and the USSR
were friendly, any differences that might arise could be settled
quickly and in an atmosphere of openness.
``Of course,'' Stalin agreed, ``there may be differences, but
they must be settled.''
Truman mentioned, as if casually, that he had already met
with Churchill. Stalin received this with equanimity, saying only
that the British position with regard to the war against Japan
was not sufficiently clear. The Russians and the Americans, he
continued, would fulfil their obligations, but the British seemed
to think that the war was more or less over.
Truman told how the Prime Minister had offered him aid
for the war in the Pacific.
``That is a rather strange idea,'' Stalin remarked. ``It was the
Germans who bombed England, after all, not the Japanese. Their
own war is over, and the feelings of the British people may work
against the Prime Minister. The American people helped Britain
in the first stage of the war. Maybe now Churchill is thinking of
helping the Americans in the war against Japan?''
452
``We are not in such dire straits as England was in relation
to Germany,'' Truman said.
``As for us, we will be ready by the middle of August,'' Stalin
said firmly.
Truman was clearly embarrassed by this remark. He was, by
this time, opposed to having the Soviet Union enter the war in
the Far East, since he no longer thought the USSR's help was
needed. He was displeased that Stalin now spoke so definitely
about America's request and his own promise to enter the war
against Japan once Germany was defeated.
At the same time, Truman understood that now it was too
late to change anything; the Soviet Union would enter the war
no matter what he did or said. And so the President chose to
remain silent.
Stalin took this opportunity to pass on to another subject.
He informed Truman about the talks the Soviet Union was
conducting with the nationalist government of China on questions
that had been agreed upon at the Yalta Conference. Stalin said
that things were not going smoothly with the Chinese, and they
had now gone home for consultations.
After this conversation, Truman invited Stalin to stay for
lunch. The talk at table remained general, but nonetheless Stalin
and Truman had time to take a better look at one another.
Truman wrote in his diary about this first meeting with Stalin:
``What I most especially noticed were his eyes, his face, and
his expression. . . He looked me in the eye when he spoke. . . He
seemed to be in good humor. He was extremely polite. . . I was
impressed by him and talked to him straight from the shoulder."^^1^^
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Particulars of the Situation
The third and last conference of the leaders of the three
powers in the anti-Hitler coalition was different in many ways from
the two preceding. The salient feature of this conference was
that it took place shortly after the victorious conclusion of the
European war against Nazi Germany and its satellites. This
created a buoyant atmosphere which should have made it easier
to resolve the questions facing the conference. At the same time,
however, centrifugal forces were beginning to make themselves
_-_-_
~^^1^^
Harry S. Truman, Op. cit., pp. 341--42.
453
felt, pulling the participants in different directions and hindering
concerted action.
Another feature distinguishing the conference in Potsdam
from those in Teheran and Yalta was its make-up. The United
States was now represented by Truman, whose methods and
views were considerably different from Roosevelt's. The British
delegation was headed by Churchill only during the first part
of the conference. On July 28, following the Conservatives'
defeat in the general election, Clement Attlee, head of the victorious
Labour Party, replaced Churchill. The appearance of these new
Western political figures naturally had its effect on the work of
the conference in Potsdam.
Unlike the two previous meetings of the Big Three, where
many questions were dealt with for the first time, the Potsdam
Conference already had at its disposal many important Allied
decisions regarding both the further conduct of the war (the
Soviet Union's entrance into the war against Japan, for example)
and questions involving post-war settlement. In a number of
instances, therefore, it remained for the participants in the Potsdam
talks only to confirm or make more concrete the agreements
already existing in principle. This proved to be no simple matter,
though. The Western participants attempted to revise some of
the agreements made earlier, and the resulting diplomatic clashes
were at times intense. And, of course, new problems also arose
that had to be discussed and settled.
Probably the most important question considered in depth
was the reorganisation of Germany after the unconditional
surrender. Recommendations on this undertaking had already been
worked out by the European Advisory Commission created by a
decision of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1943.
But since the end of military operations in Europe a new situation
had come about. The ruling groups of the Western powers
were more and more attracted to Churchill's idea of using
Germany's human and economic potential in a war that might
sometime be fought against the Soviet Union. Thus the plans
laid earlier for the complete demilitarisation and democratisation
of Germany no longer suited the politicians of London and
Washington. The Soviet delegation to the Potsdam Conference
was forced to put up a determined struggle against tendencies
of this sort. This was a struggle for European security and at
454
the same time for the peaceful future of Germany and the true
national interests of the German people.
The Soviet Union succeeded in getting the conference to adopt
joint resolutions on the denazification, democratisation, and
demilitarisation of Germany as a single entity. It is well known
that during the war years the USA and Britain had developed
plans for dividing Germany into several---mostly agricultural---
states. By doing this, Washington and London wanted at a single
blow to do away with a dangerous rival and to create favourable
conditions for imperialist intrigues in the heart of Europe. But
these plans were never to be realised; the USSR took a negative
stance toward them from the very start. Stalin declared on
May 9---Victory Day---that the Soviet Union had ``no intention
to partition or destroy Germany".
The Potsdam Conference confirmed the Agreement on the
Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of
Germany in the Initial Control Period, which set the following
goals: the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of
Germany; the elimination of all German industry that could be used
for military production, the destruction of the National Socialist
Party and its affiliates, the dissolution of all Nazi institutions, the
prevention of all Nazi and militarist activity and propaganda,
and preparation for the eventual reconstruction of German
political life on a democratic basis. The section on economic principles
clearly indicated that Germany was to be regarded as a single
economic entity and that the German economy should be
decentralised ``for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive
concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by
cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements".^^1^^
This agreement was later broken by the Western powers.
Confronted with the impossibility of using all of Germany for
their imperialistic ends, they decided, contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Potsdam agreements, to turn its western part into
a bridgehead for the aggressive acts they were planning against
the USSR and the People's Democracies. A course was set for
the remilitarisation of West Germany and its inclusion in the
NATO military bloc. The working people of the country's eastern
part then created their own, socialist state---the German
_-_-_
~^^1^^
The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, p. 323.
455
Democratic Republic---which became a bastion of peace in Europe and
of social progress in the land of Germany.
In the years since the Potsdam Conference much has been
written about it, both in the USSR and in other countries. The
credit should go to those Western investigators who have tried
to evaluate objectively its work and the developments that
followed. There have been a good number of biased treatments,
too, though. In the American and British literature on the
conference, the memoirs of men who had a part in the events of
that time occupy a special place. Their purpose is clear: to
present their own actions in as favourable a light as possible and
to malign the policy of the Soviet Union by ascribing to it all
sorts of disreputable motives.
The third meeting of the Big Three was of particular
significance for the Soviet Union. The war brought to a triumphant
conclusion less than three months earlier was one of the gravest
trials ever undergone by our homeland. The fate of the world's
first socialist state, and the future of world civilisation, of
progress and democracy had been at stake. To win it, the Soviet people
had borne the brunt of the burden and made enormous sacrifices.
With the war in Europe over, the main tasks facing Soviet
diplomacy were to consolidate the victory so dearly won, to
guarantee the Soviet state and other freedom-loving peoples against
further encroachments by the forces of reaction, and to create
conditions that would ensure lasting peace.
In essence, this was the same fundamental policy which the
Soviet Union had pursued throughout its history, including the
years of the war. The trilateral agreements reached at summit
conferences and other international meetings during the years
when combined military operations were being conducted
reflected the interests of all sides. Then, too, of course, the Western
powers had their own ideas about concrete problems involved
in the conduct of the war and also about post-war settlement.
Heated arguments often arouse between the Allies in the course
of the elaboration of their decisions. But while the struggle against
the common enemy was still going on---and, especially, since the
Soviet Union was bearing the main burden of the war against
Nazi Germany---there was no alternative to arriving at positions
acceptable to all participants in the talks. All this demanded
considerable effort, a positive approach, a willingness to make
456
reasonable compromises, patience, good will, and a desire to
reach agreement. Another important factor was that Roosevelt,
a politician of realistic views, stood at the head of the US
government during the years of the war. His outlook was far more
sober than Churchill's, and this more than once helped to bring
about a reasonable decision on the most vexed and crucial
questions.
What was important here was not only Roosevelt's striving to
understand and consider the position and interests of his
negotiating partner, but also his fundamental idea that the cooperation
with the Soviet Union which had taken shape during the war
ought to be continued afterwards. In essence, this meant giving
up the policy pursued by ruling groups in the Western powers
between the two world wars, which called for confrontation with
the Soviet Union and, if possible, the elimination of the socialist
system, which many influential politicians in Washington.
London, and Paris had deemed a ``mistake in history" when it
appeared in October of 1917. They had even been prepared to use
the services of Nazi Germany to correct this ``mistake''.
One of the most important political results of practical
cooperation among the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition was precisely
that many influential figures in the West, and particularly in
the USA, demonstrated willingness to cooperate with the Soviet
Union on an equal footing both during the war and after it.
Churchill's readiness to take this decisive turn is a different
matter, but in any case he found himself compelled to uphold the
principles of this policy, and in particular the fundamental
principle of unanimity among the great powers, on which the
United Nations Charter is based. As for President Roosevelt,
it is well known that he repeatedly expressed his determination
to take this turn and thus drastically transform the relations
with the USSR which had existed before the war.
Roosevelt was aware that this new approach had highly
influential enemies in the United States who would not want
under any circumstances to extend into peacetime the cooperation
with the Soviet Union practised during the war. This was why
he wished to see, without delay, practical agreements with the
USSR concerning the post-war period.
Roosevelt and those who shared his opinions undoubtedly
showed foresight in the considerable efforts they made, while the
457
war was still going on, to conduct a series of conferences among
the Allies at various levels and thus lay the groundwork for
political and economic cooperation in peacetime. The momentum
of this course, and likewise the desire of the broad masses of
the American people to go on cooperating with the USSR, forced
the American delegation at the Potsdam Conference to confirm
the decisions the Allies had made earlier and come to agreement
on a number of other questions, even though the new leadership
in Washington was already turning the wheel of American
policy in another direction. But momentum was not the only
factor behind this, or even the main one. The positive decisions
finally adopted in Potsdam were above all the result of the
determined struggle waged by Soviet diplomacy and supported
by the might of the USSR.
Another reason the new American leadership could not as
yet venture to break with the wartime practice of cooperation
was, perhaps, a certain lack of confidence: the new administration
had come to power just a few months before the Potsdam
Conference. Charles Bohlen, who was present as an interpreter at all
the meetings of the Big Three, writes that ``Potsdam was different
from the two previous wartime conferences---different in tone,
style, and substance".^^1^^ He characterises the moods of the Western
delegations as follows:
``While everyone was outwardly friendly, there was a certain
reserve on both sides that symbolized basic distrust. . . In addition
to the President, the American team had other important
changes. . . From the President on down, the American delegation was
feeling its way.. . Truman's personal goals at Potsdam were quite
simple. He wanted to prove to Stalin that he was his own man, a
real leader, in firm command of the United States government. . .
``Churchill, the old war horse, had turned nearly 180 degrees
in his attitude toward the Soviet Union. . . Like British leaders
before him, he wanted no other power to dominate Europe. . . So
strong were Churchill's fears that he was ready ... to walk out
of the proceedings if the Soviets did not agree to a more eastward
boundary between Poland and Germany."^^2^^
It may be recalled that at the Teheran and Yalta conferences,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Charles E. Bohlen, Op. cit., pp. 27--29.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
458
where the Americans and British had raised the question of
partitioning Germany, Washington and London had agreed that
Poland's western boundaries should be changed to take in
territories that had formerly belonged to Germany. Among the
other reasons this position was adopted was that at the time
influential groups in Britain and the USA were still hoping to
create a bourgeois Poland that would serve as a ``barrier against
Communism''. By the time of the Potsdam Conference, however,
American and British politicians had come to see that
developments were tending towards the rise of a people's democratic
Poland friendly to the Soviet Union. Hence their change in
position: if Poland was lost, they now hoped that Germany might
become a bastion of reaction and a weapon that the forces of
imperialism could use to their own ends.
To make this picture more complete, we may cite the account
of another American diplomat, Robert Murphy, who was very
close to the new President and took an active part in shaping
his policies. Murphy writes that although Truman ``had publicly
undertaken to honor all of FDR's commitments'', he never felt
``responsible for the Grand Design . . . the task of following through
with the Russians".^^1^^
Thus another feature distinguishing the Potsdam conference
is that although in theory it might well have crowned a whole
series of military conferences and signified the triumph of the
policy of cooperation among the powers in the anti-Hitler
coalition, in fact this possibility had vanished even before the first
session. Two of the three participants---the delegations of the USA
and Great Britain---came to Berlin with diametrically opposite
aims. They had already made up their minds to bury the very
idea of cooperating with the Soviet Union, and headed down
the road to confrontation. Setting aside the plans made under
Roosevelt, they were returning to their pre-war course of trying
to isolate the USSR and to exclude it from decisions on world
affairs. Their concern was to achieve a ``position of strength"
from which they could dictate their will to the Soviet Union.
Even at this time, the messianic conception of American world
leadership was being cooked up somewhere in the depths of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Robert Daniel Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, Doubleday,
New York, 1964, p. 301.
459
Washington's policy kitchen. Soon after he took office, Truman
declared with his characteristic crude forthrightness and swagger
``that the Russians would soon be put in their places; and that
the United States would then take the lead in running the world
in the way that the world ought to be run".^^1^^ These dreams were
fostered by the atomic bomb, work on which was nearing
completion. In April of 1945, Byrnes had informed Truman that this
weapon ``might be so powerful as to be potentially capable of
wiping out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented
scale''. He added that he believed the bomb would make it quite
possible ``to dictate our own terms at the end of the war".^^2^^
It was becoming more and more apparent that the politicians
in Washington had set their course for confrontation---and under
certain conditions for war---with the Soviet Union. On May 18,
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew remarked in private
that ``a future war with Soviet Russia is ... certain'';^^3^^ and
therefore American policy towards the USSR ``should immediately
stiffen, all along the line''. He said that war might come ``within
a very few years'',^^4^^ and thus the USA would do well to keep up
its fighting strength.
At this stage, however, the Truman administration could not
yet venture to openly proclaim its new course, and thus it took
part in the Potsdam Conference. The reasons for this were, first,
that an open break with the USSR would at that time have
been too great a shock to world opinion, and, second, that this
sudden shift in US policy would have met with strong resistance
within the country. Byrnes wrote that at the time of the war's
end ``the hopes of our people were high and there would have
been great disappointment, if not resentment, had we not tried
to work with the Russians".^^5^^ To a significant extent, however,
such attempts were made for appearances' sake only.
There were disagreements about the line foreign policy should
_-_-_
~^^1^^ William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,
The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1959, p. 168.
~^^2^^ Harry S. Truman, Op. cit., p. 87.
~^^3^^ Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty
Years. 1904--1945, Vol. II, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1952, p. 1446.
~^^4^^ Ibid.
~^^5^^ James F. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime, Harper and Brothers, New
York, 1958, p. 389.
460
take in the future even within the US government. Many of the
cabinet members appointed by Roosevelt doubted the correctness
of the anti-Soviet course.
Charles Mee's Meeting at Potsdam, published in the USA in
1975, gives many details about the course of the conference.
Although in a number of instances the book gives a highly
objective presentation of the problems discussed in Potsdam, the
author tries to make it seem that none of the participants was
willing to continue with the sort of relations that had taken shape
during the war. While this may be true in regard to the Western
leaders, it is completely at odds with the position of the Soviet
side. The Soviet delegation came to Potsdam ready to make a
positive contribution to the work of the conference. The Soviet
Union unfailingly strove to carry further the cooperation with
the Western powers which had been fruitfully practised in
wartime. In his appearance on American television in June of 1973,
Leonid Brezhnev declared: ``It was to be expected that the
wartime alliance would launch a new era of broad peaceful
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. I can say
with confidence that our country strove for that----we wanted to
consolidate and develop the good relations for which the
foundation had been laid during the war.''
As everyone knows, however, it takes the desire of at least
two partners to reach agreement, but the will of only one side
to make a quarrel. Moreover, anyone who takes the road towards
confrontation and war needs to arm himself accordingly. Truman
and those around him were placing their hopes in the atomic
weapon. As he travelled to Potsdam, the President waited
impatiently for the results of the first test, and the cruiser Augusta,
which took him across the Atlantic, regularly received coded
messages on the progress of the preparations being made in New
Mexico.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The First Day
At around five o'clock in the afternoon of July 17, the quiet,
shady park of the Cecilienhof Palace resounded with the roar
of engines and the squeal of brakes: participants were arriving
for the first plenary session of the Potsdam Conference. The
British were the first to arrive. Churchill, accompanied by
461
plain-clothes men, stepped out of his car and headed for the apartments
set aside for the British delegation's working quarters. A few
minutes later Truman arrived to the accompaniment of wailing
sirens. First a motorcycle escort appeared on the pebble-strewn
path, then an armoured jeep, and, finally, the President's car,
with plain-clothes men on the running boards. An armoured
carrier loaded with armed men brought up the rear. All of them
leapt out in front of the palace with their pistols and
submachineguns at the ready. They formed a living corridor along which
Truman and Byrnes, smiling broadly, walked towards the palace.
Then the cars with the Soviet delegation arrived. Stalin still
wore his white tunic and Generalissimo's epaulettes. Everyone
gathered around a large round table covered with a cream--
coloured cloth, with the flags of the three powers at its centre.
The heads of the delegations and their closest advisers sat
just around the table, the former in arm-chairs, the latter in
ordinary chairs. The other members of the delegations and the
experts took places behind them. Beside Stalin sat Molotov,
Yyshinsky, Gromyko, and Pavlov, his interpreter; beside Truman---
Byrnes, Leahy, Davies, and Bohlen, his interpreter; beside
Churchill---Eden, Cadogan, Attlee, and Birse, his interpreter. Attlee
had been invited by Churchill as an observer; as the leader of
the Labour Party, he would become head of the British
government and hence of the delegation if the Conservatives were
defeated in the upcoming Parliamentary elections---as in fact
happened.
Photo-correspondents were allowed ten minutes to record this
historic occasion. When they had left, Churchill asked:
``Who is to be chairman of our Conference?''
``I propose President Truman,'' said Stalin.
``The British delegation supports this proposal,'' Churchill
hastened to concur.
Truman was clearly flattered, but his outward reaction was
restrained, even dry. He said only that he accepted the
chairmanship.
The first session began with a discussion of the agenda. After
the preliminary exchange of opinions. Truman, already
experiencing awkwardness at not having reacted with more emotion to
his election as chairman, decided to correct his slip.
``Because I was unexpectedly elected Chairman of this
462
Confcrence,'' he said, ``I was unable to express my feelings at once.
I am very glad to meet you, Generalissimo, and you, Mr. Prime
Minister. I am well aware that I am now substituting for a man
whom it is impossible to substitute, the late President Roosevelt.
I am glad to serve, even if partially, the memory which you
preserve of President Roosevelt. I want to consolidate the friendship
which existed between you.''
Then Churchill, on behalf of the British delegation, thanked
Truman for accepting the chairmanship and paid tribute to
President Roosevelt's memory. Stalin added briefly that the
feelings Churchill had expressed were fully shared by the Soviet
delegation.
Returning to the agenda, Truman suggested that consideration
be given to setting up a Council of Foreign Ministers for
preparing a peace conference. He went on to say it was necessary to
discuss and confirm the principles that were to guide the Control
Council for Germany. Turning to the question of the obligations
undertaken by the Allied powers at the Yalta Conference, the
President observed that many of these obligations remained to
be fulfilled, in particular those that were set forth in the
Declaration on Liberated Europe. He suggested that the conference
consider this question, and also that of Italy's admission to the
United Nations Organisation. In conclusion Truman said:
``The matters which I have put before you are, of course, highly
important. But this does not exclude the placing of additional
questions on the agenda.''
``I think,'' Churchill said, ``we should now . . . elaborate some
kind of programme for our work to see whether we are able to
cope with this agenda ourselves, or whether we should refer
a part of the items to the Foreign Ministers. I do not think we
should lay down the whole of the agenda at once, but can confine
ourselves to an agenda for each day. For instance, we should like
to add the Polish question.''
Stalin expressed doubts about the procedure Churchill was
suggesting.
``Still,'' he said, ``it would be well for all the three delegations
to set forth all the questions they consider necessary to put on the
agenda. The Russians have questions on the division of the
German navy and others.. .
``The second question is that of reparations.
463
``Then we should discuss the question of trust territories.''
Right away Churchill was on the alert.
``Do you mean the territories in Europe,'' he asked, ``or all
over the world?''
Stalin declined to make a direct answer. He said he did not
know yet just what the territories were, but added that ``the
Russians would like to take part in the administration of trust
territories''. Stalin then continued with his views concerning the
agenda, saying that the question of restoring diplomatic
relations with Germany's former satellites ought to be discussed.
There was also a need to talk about the regime in Spain, and
problems involving Tangiers, Syria, and the Lebanon might also
be discussed. As for the Polish question, Stalin said he thought it
should be considered with an eye to solving the questions arising
from the establishment of the Government of National Unity in
Poland and the consequent need to dissolve the emigre
government in London.
These suggestions met with no objections. The participants
agreed that the three ministers of foreign affairs should meet
regularly to select specific questions from the agenda to be
discussed by the heads of government at the following plenary
session.
During the discussion of the functions of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, Stalin asked:
``Will it be a Council preparing questions for the future
international peace conference?''
``Yes,'' Truman replied.
``The peace conference which will end the war,'' Churchill
intoned.
``In Europe the war is over,'' Stalin pointed out. ``The Council
will determine and suggest the date for the convocation of a
peace conference.''
Truman did not want a peace conference at all, but was
unwilling to reveal this at the time---hence his unwavering ``Yes''
to Stalin's question. Probably the only thing that slightly betrayed
his position was that he made a point of saying that ``the
conference should not be called before we are duly prepared
for it".
At Truman's suggestion, the participants agreed to begin their
plenary sessions at four in the afternoon rather than five.
464
``If that is accepted, let us postpone the examination of
questions until 4:00 p.m. tomorrow,'' Truman said.
But before the session came to an end there was an interesting
exchange which it seems important to give as recorded in the
minutes:
Stalin: There is only one other question: why does Mr.
Churchill deny the Russians their share of the German navy?
Churchill: I have no objections. But since you have asked me
this question, here is my answer: this navy should be either sunk
or divided.
Stalin: Do you want it sunk or divided?
Churchill: All means of war are terrible things.
Stalin: The navy should be divided. If Mr. Churchill prefers
to sink the navy, he is free to sink his share of it; I have no
intention of sinking mine.
Churchill: At present, nearly the whole of the German navy
is in our hands.
Stalin: That's the whole point. That's the whole point. That
is why we need to decide the question.
The Soviet government had already had one unpleasant
experience with the Italian vessels captured by the Western
powers, and thus naturally thought it needful to show insistence
in regard to the German navy.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
The Dilemma over the Atomic Bomb
At 1:15 in the afternoon of July 18 Truman arrived at
Churchill's villa. The Prime Minister had invited him to lunch.
Truman brought with him a telegram just arrived from Washington
about the results of the atomic bomb test in New Mexico. After
he had acquainted Churchill with its contents, the President
raised the question of how the news should be conveyed to Stalin.
Truman, of course, did not have it in mind---as Stimson did---to
show good will towards the Russians. He was thinking of
something else: how to avert accusations of having shown bad will.
Truman feared that to tell the Soviet representatives the
details about the test would only hasten their entry into the war
against Japan, which he would have preferred to avoid altogether.
Both the Western leaders thought that since there was no more
__PRINTERS_P_465_COMMENT__
30---1996
465
need for Russian aid in the Far East it would be best not to tell
the Russians anything at all. This might have undesirable
consequences later, though. Of course it would be a good idea, the
two men agreed, to wait until fuller data on the test arrived from
Washington. But the central question remained: How, and just
what, to tell Stalin. To inform him in writing would seem too
official, and would attract too much attention to the news. If
Stalin were told at some special session, on the other hand, he
might take a more serious attitude towards the potential of the
new weapon than the Western leaders wanted, and speed up the
transfer of Soviet troops to the Far East. Both Truman and
Churchill were in fact cherishing the hope that with the help of the
atomic bomb the war against Japan could be concluded before
the Soviet Union had entered it.
After weighing the different options it was decided that the
best thing would be to tell Stalin about the bomb casually, as if
in passing, at a time when he was occupied with his own thoughts.
Truman summed up:
``I think I had best just tell him after one of our meetings
that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite
out of the ordinary (without mentioning the word atomic), which
we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to
continue the war."^^1^^
After a little thought, Churchill agreed.
The Western leaders were especially worried that Japan might
surrender through Russian diplomatic channels before the
Americans had a chance to ``win'' the war. Churchill told Truman
about the Japanese peace feeler Stalin had described to him
the preceding day.
The substance of these overtures, Churchill explained, was
that ``Japan could not accept `unconditional surrender', but might
be prepared to compromise on other terms".^^2^^
Truman asked why Stalin had said nothing about this to the
Americans, and Churchill expressed the opinion that perhaps
Stalin did not want to give the Americans the impression that
he was pressuring them. The British, Churchill continued, also
did not want the Americans to think Britain was reluctant to
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Charles L. Mee, Jr., Op. cit., p. 110.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
466
join the war against Japan. But the enormous number of lives
that the Americans, and to a lesser extent the British, would
have to lose to impose unconditional surrender on Japan must
not be overlooked. Thus, Churchill concluded, it might be
worthwhile to think of putting things some other way, so that the
Allies could get the essentials of what they sought while giving
the Japanese some chance to save their military honour.
The President unhesitatingly rejected this suggestion. He feared
that if the demand for unconditional surrender was modified
Japan might surrender, using Moscow as an intermediary, and
the victory would thus slip out of America's hands. What
Truman wanted was for the Japanese, for the time being, to keep
up their fierce resistance. This would justify using the atomic
bomb against them and thereby demonstrate America's might to
the whole world---not least to the Soviet Union. At the same
time, it would be the best way for Washington to reap all the
fruits of victory. As the moment when the atomic bomb was
dropped on Japanese cities drew nearer, the strategy of the
White House manifested itself more and more clearly: to win
the war before the Soviet Union was able to enter it.
As for Churchill's remarks about Japanese military honour,
they failed to make the slightest impression on Truman. He said
Japan had long since lost its military honour---in the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor.
This entire conversation made an unpleasant impression on
Churchill. He sensed ``decisiveness and aggressiveness" in the
new President; the power of the United States had grown, and
already Truman began to handle things as if the world had
already entered ``the American century".^^1^^
But Churchill was still hoping to get something for his country.
He spoke of the ``melancholy position" of Britain, which had
lost more than half of its investments abroad in its singlehanded
fight for the common cause. Truman said that America owed
much to Great Britain. If Britain had collapsed like France, he
told Churchill, America might by the time they were speaking
have been fighting the Germans on its own coast. Thus
relations between the USA and Britain were not to be considered
from the financial point of view alone.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 110--12.
__PRINTERS_P_467_COMMENT__
30*
467
After these consoling words, Truman turned the conversation
to the air bases America had built, ``at enormous cost'', in
British territories. America, he said, could not simply give up these
bases. Some sort of fair arrangement for their joint use ought to
be worked out. Churchill said he was prepared to arrive at a
mutually acceptable agreement on British and American use of
airfields and other bases around the world. Britain was now a
lesser power than the United States, the Prime Minister
continued, but still had much to give from what remained of the
empire of greater days.
``Why should we not share facilities for defence all over the
world?" Churchill asked. ``We could add 50 per cent to the
mobility of the American Fleet."^^1^^ Just below the surface here was
a hint that London might demand to use America's possessions.
Truman was put on his guard by what seemed to him an
excessive willingness on Churchill's part to come to terms. He noted
dryly that ``any plan would have to be fitted in, in some way,
with the policy of the United Nations".^^2^^
Truman was hoping that the USA would play the leading role
in the United Nations and throughout the world. America's
monopoly on the atomic bomb was to be a means to the
attainment of this goal, and thus the President's thoughts returned
again and again to New Mexico, where the first atomic bomb
test was conducted.
It was only on the fourth day of the conference, July 21, that
a detailed report on the experiment reached Potsdam. Here is
how Truman's daughter, Margaret, described this moment in
her lengthy book on her father's political career: ``In the midst
of this complicated wrangling [the conference---Author] came
the detailed report on the atomic explosion at Alamogordo Air
Base... Secretary of War Stimson brought it to the little White
House. At his suggestion my father had invited Secretary of
State Byrnes to join them. Mr. Stimson began reading the report
aloud but he was so excited, he frequently stumbled over words.. .
Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary that my father was
'tremendously pepped up' by these details and said that it gave
him 'an entirely new feeling of confidence'.. . This freed my
_-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Churchill. Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 539--40.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
468
father to negotiate with far more boldness and bluntness... The
stage was now set for some very hard bargaining at Potsdam."^^1^^
Truman was elated at the news of the successful test and of
the new bomb's destructive power. Robert Murphy noted in his
memoirs that ``as Truman presided over the fourth day of plenary
sessions, we noticed a decided change in the President's manner.
He seemed much more sure of himself, more inclined to
participate vigorously in the discussions, to challenge some of Stalin's
statements. It was apparent that something had happened."^^2^^
This was the very day on which Truman raised objections
to taking lands from eastern Germany and giving them to
Poland.
Truman was impatient to let the Soviet side know about the
ace he had up his sleeve. He waited till July 24 and then, after
the conclusion of the day's plenary session, followed through
with the plan he had arrived at earlier. Margaret Truman writes:
``My father now tackled the sticky question of how and what
to tell Stalin about the atomic bomb. He decided to tell him as
soon as possible, but to confine his remark to a very general
description... Dad strolled over to the Russian leader and told
him that the United States had created a new weapon 'of unusual
destructive force'. Prime Minister Churchill and Secretary of
State Byrnes stood only a few yards away, studying Stalin's
reaction. He was remarkably cool. . . My father, Mr. Churchill,
and Mr. Byrnes concluded that Stalin had failed to grasp the
significance of the statement."^^3^^
In fact, Stalin was only pretending not to have understood.
Marshal Zhukov, who was also present at Potsdam, remembers:
``On returning from the session, Stalin told Molotov, in my
presence, about a conversation that had taken place between
him and Truman.
`` 'They're trying to drive their price up,' Molotov said at once.
``Stalin laughed. 'Let them try. I must talk to Kurchatov today
about speeding up our work.'
``I understood that they were talking about the creation of
the atomic bomb.''
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, Pocket Books, New York,
1974, pp. 296--97, 302.
~^^2^^ Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 273 .
~^^3^^ Margaret Truman, Op. cit., pp. 300--01.
469
Truman was clearly at a loss about what to do next. He was
disheartened that the first attempt at atomic blackmail had gone
wide of the mark. The conduct of the Soviet delegation remained
unchanged, as if nothing had happened. Truman still wanted
to take advantage of the superiority which he thought
possessing the atomic bomb gave the United States, but at the same
time he did not want to reveal too much---the new weapon
had yet to be used on the battlefield. Truman gave orders to his
military leaders to drop the bomb on Japan as soon as possible
but not, under any circumstances, before he had left Potsdam.
He wanted to be far away from the Russians and their questions,
on his way home, before the first bomb dropped.
Truman's attempt to make use of ``atomic advantage" at
Potsdam may be considered a failure.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Social Events During the Conference
In addition to the discussions conducted at the plenary sessions,
the three heads of government engaged in an intensive exchange
of opinions during unofficial meetings, including the two- and
three-way conversations over breakfasts and lunches. In this more
informal atmosphere many questions were gone over in a
preliminary way.
An interesting example is the conversation, described above,
that took place between Truman and Churchill over lunch on
July 18. From the Prime Minister's residence, the President
went straight to the villa where Stalin was staying.
Truman had decided to pay a short visit in return for Stalin's
call at the Little White House on the previous day. The President
was accompanied by Secretary of State Byrnes. They found
Stalin with Molotov. After greetings were exchanged, Stalin said
he had some news for the President. He handed Truman a copy
of the message from the Japanese Emperor that the Soviet
government had received through the Japanese ambassador in
Moscow. Truman pretended to read it, but he already knew
about the message from his recent talk with Churchill. Stalin
had made no mention of it at their previous meeting, and
Truman may have wondered why he was being informed now.
Perhaps Stalin wanted to find out how much Churchill had told
the President, and whether the Prime Minister had tried to
470
convince him that it would be wise to change the formula
calling for Japan's unconditional surrender. Some American
historians maintain that the Soviet side already had some knowledge
about the atomic bomb test in New Mexico, and theorise that
Stalin decided to tell Truman about the Japanese appeal at this
point in the hope of gathering further confidential information.
But the President, as we have seen, felt that the time was not
yet ripe to reveal his secret.
Stalin asked if any answer should be given to the message.
Truman did not reply directly, but said that he doubted the good
will of the Japanese.
``It might be expedient,'' Stalin said, ``to put the Japanese
off their guard by giving them the most general and indefinite
answer possible, saying only that the character of what they are
suggesting is not sufficiently clear.''
Truman said nothing. He was evidently thinking over the
situation.
``There are other alternatives as well,'' Stalin continued. ``The
message could be ignored completely, left without any answer
at all. Or, finally, a definite refusal could be sent.''
Truman said that the first suggestion seemed preferable to
him.
``Certainly,'' Molotov remarked, ``that would be correct, in
fact. After all, it isn't at all clear what the Japanese have in
mind.''
And so it was decided. Truman rose and began to say his
goodbyes. The daily plenary session was soon to begin.
In the evening of that same day, July 18, Stalin invited
Churchill for a late supper. Churchill arrived at Stalin's villa at 8:30
and remained until 1:30 in the morning. The Prime Minister
was accompanied only by Major Birse, his interpreter.
Later on Churchill was to describe this meeting in detail. He
noted in his diary that Stalin was in very good spirits. The
British visitor brought with him a box of the big Burmese cigars of
which he himself was so fond. In accepting the present, Stalin
said that he was smoking far less than before, and sometimes
just sucked on empty pipe out of habit. That little crooked pipe,
like Churchill's enormous Burmese cigars, became widely known
and even acquired a certain symbolic significance.
Many years later, in 1968, I had occasion to visit the Shan
471
State---a remote mountainous province in the north of Burma.
We made a long journey by motorboat across a splendid
mountain lake, and towards noon arrived at a little island where a
picturesque and exotic bazaar was humming that Sunday.
Everything imaginable was offered for sale to the inhabitants of the
neighbouring villages scattered along the shores of the lake. As
I passed among the gaudy rows of vendors, I caught sight of
some big cigars laid out on a mat. A sign written in English and
the local language advertised them as ``Churchill's cigars''. And
just beside them crooked brown pipes in cardboard boxes were
offered to buyers as ``Stalin's pipes''. It was surprising to find
this curious reminder of the time of the anti-Hitler coalition,
long since vanished into history, on that far-away island.
At the supper table, Stalin evidently felt a desire to say
something pleasant to his guest. At that time the Prime Minister
was particularly concerned over the outcome of the
Parliamentary election to be held soon, and Stalin, knowing this, said he
hoped Churchill would emerge the winner. He probably thought
it unlikely that a military leader who had brought his country
to victory would be turned out by the voters in the hour of
triumph. At the Yalta Conference, when Churchill remarked
half in jest that if he did anything that caused displeasure in
Britain he would probably be ``driven out'', Stalin replied, in the
same vein, that ``victors are not driven out''. Churchill, though,
was well aware of the mood at home, and felt far from certain
of his success. When he asked for a break in the work of the
Potsdam Conference so that he and Attlee could travel together
to London, where they would learn the outcome of the election,
Churchill said: ``We shall have to leave here on Wednesday
July 25, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But we
shall be back by the afternoon sitting on July 27.'' He paused for
an instant, and then added: ``Or at least some of us will.''
As for Truman, it may be supposed that he would have
preferred to see Churchill win. The two of them had seen eye to
eye right from the start. Margaret Truman writes, ``Friendship
was instant between Mr. Churchill and Dad."^^1^^ She also reports
that Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician, made this
notation in his diary: ``Winston has fallen for the President."^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Margaret Truman, Op. cit., p. 292.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
472
The Conservatives went down to defeat, and Clement Attlee
returned to Potsdam with a new entourage. Ernest Bevin became
Britain's Foreign Secretary. There was no essential difference,
however, between Churchill's foreign policy line and that of the
Labourite Prime Minister and the new head of the Foreign
Office.
After his victory in the election Attlee had to form a new
government, and thus was delayed in London for an extra day.
As a result, the conference was resumed not on July 27, as had
been planned, but on July 28.
All of this was still in the future, however, as Stalin and
Churchill continued their conversation over a late supper. Churchill
was still nursing the hope that he would be elected once again,
and now he set about convincing Stalin that it would be his
policy ``to welcome Russia as a Great Power on the sea."^^1^^
Churchill went on to say that he ``wished to see Russian ships
sailing across the oceans of the world".^^2^^ He declared that up to
that time ``Russia had been like a giant with his nostrils pinched
by the narrow exits from the Baltic and the Black Sea".^^3^^
Stalin listened calmly without interrupting.
Churchill, encouraged by Stalin's attention, continued to
develop his idea. He said he would personally support an
amendment to the Montreux Convention that would exclude Japan
and give Russia access to the Mediterranean. He would welcome
Russia's appearance on the oceans, and by this he meant not
only the Dardanelles but also the Kiel Canal, which ought to
have a regime like that of the Suez Canal and the warm waters
of the Pacific.
There is no telling how far Churchill's imagination would have
carried him if Stalin had not let the wind out of his sails with
a down-to-earth question. All these promises were remote from
the way things actually stood. The Soviet Union had suffered
huge losses at sea, and the building of a new navy would require
time and great expenditures. Churchill, who had once been head
of the Admiralty, understood this perfectly. He could be liberal
with promises, knowing that for the moment they were of little
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ch. Mee, Op. cit., pp. 117--18.
~^^2^^ Ibid.
^^3^^
Ibid.
473
practical significance. Moreover, the Western Allies, far from
helping the USSR to establish itself as a power on the seas, were
doing all they could to prevent this by delaying the transfer to
the Soviet Union of its rightful share of the enemy warships
they had seized. Stalin, of course, thought the moment suitable
for bringing this up.
``What about the German ships?" he asked. ``The Soviet Union
would like its share.''
Churchill stopped short. He realised at once that he had
gotten carried away with his own rhetoric. He had to find some
way out, avoid a direct answer. He said that some people were
seriously worried about what Russia's intentions might be. All of
the capitals of Eastern Europe were now in Russian hands, and
it looked as if the Soviet Union was planning to move farther
westward.
Stalin expressed amazement at such suppositions. He said
the Soviet Union was withdrawing its forces from the west. Two
million men were to be sent home and demobilised within the
next four months. The Soviet Union, he continued, had suffered
enormous losses and needed to bring as many soldiers as possible
home to help in rebuilding what had been destroyed. After
hearing this Churchill turned the conversation to other
matters.
All in all Churchill did everything he could, during the few
days that he headed the British delegation, to attract public
attention. At one of the plenary sessions he announced that there
were nearly 180 correspondents in Berlin constantly demanding
information about the conference. When it was denied they
became irritable and indignant. This mood, he said, might be
conveyed to the public through their reporting.
``That's a whole company,'' Stalin remarked. ``Who let them
in?''
``They are not here, in the zone, of course,'' Churchill
explained, ``but in Berlin. Of course, we can work calmly only if there
is secrecy, and we are duty bound to ensure this secrecy. If
both my colleagues agree with me, I could, as an old journalist,
have a talk with them and explain to them the need for secrecy
at our meeting; I could tell them that we sympathise with them,
but are unable to tell them what is going on here. I think we
should stroke their wings to calm them.''
474
Truman, who also had experience in dealing with the press,
was naturally unwilling to let Churchill gather laurels and strike
poses for the journalists.
``Each of our delegations has special press officers,'' he
observed coldly, ``and it is their duty to protect us from the claims
of the correspondents. Let them do their job. We can authorise
them to talk to the journalists.''
Churchill was clearly distressed to see his suggestion
rejected.
These unofficial meetings were not without their curious
moments. At one of the dinners Stalin gave, violin virtuosos and
two excellent pianists ^performed for the guests. Truman, who
wanted to be the first in everything, decided he should compete
in this field also. The noted American pianist Eugene List was
summoned posthaste from Paris, where he was serving in his
country's armed forces. Truman had given orders that List's
program should include one of the Chopin valses, but no copy
of the music could be found in Babelsberg. A coded message was
sent to the American military command, and the music was
obtained in Paris and sent to Berlin by air. By evening it was
in the Little White House. Churchill, irked by all this, boasted
to Admiral Leahy that he would ``get even''. He sent orders to
London forthwith that the whole Royal Air Force Band was to
be sent to Babelsberg to play at the dinner to which he had
invited the Soviet and American leaders.
In the evening of July 23 Churchill played host to Stalin and
Truman. Everything went along as usual until the band struck
up. The guests almost had to shout to make themselves heard
as British, American, and Russian marches were performed. After
a while Stalin, glass in hand, strolled over to the conductor,
proposed a toast in honour of the musicians, and asked them to
a few quieter pieces.
At the end of the evening, Stalin took up his menu card and
asked everyone to sign it. Churchill and Truman followed suit.
The menu passed from hand to hand to the accompaniment of
jokes and laughter, and the atmosphere became completely
informal. Shortly after midnight the orchestra played the three
national anthems, and the guests began to depart.
In addition to the meetings among heads of government, other
conferences also took place in parallel to the plenary sessions.
475
The three ministers of foreign affairs had regular exchanges of
opinion, and there were also meetings of military experts and
groups of advisers on various problems.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Truman's Unsuccessful Attack
On July 21, General Groves's detailed report on the atomic
bomb test arrived from Washington. Only now did it become
clear to Truman what a formidable weapon had come into his
country's possession. Secretary of War Stimson, who acquainted
the President with the report, later wrote in his diary that
Truman and Byrnes were overjoyed. Truman said that the news
gave him an altogether new sense of confidence, and thanked
Stimson for having helped him by coming to the conference.
Stimson did not realise that by intentionally reducing his
function to bearing these tidings from New Mexico, Truman had in
fact discharged him from the cabinet. When Stimson met the
President again two days later and complained that he was being
excluded from confidential talks on political questions related to
the new bomb, Truman interrupted him rudely and said he could
leave for home whenever he chose. After receiving the
information about the atomic bomb, Truman had no further need of
Stimson. Moreover, knowing that Stimson insisted the Soviet
government should be told the details of the test, Truman was
eager to see him quit the scene. Stimson left Potsdam for the
USA on July 25, and resigned soon afterwards.
Meanwhile the question of using the bomb to intimidate the
Russians in Europe was being intensively discussed in private
among the top leaders of the American delegation in Potsdam.
During the plenary session of July 21---the very day the report
arrived from Washington---Truman tried to launch an attack
against the Soviet Union, using as a pretext the question of
Poland's new western border.
I cite the minutes of the conference:
``Truman: Allow me to make a statement concerning Poland's
western border. The Yalta Agreement established that German
territory is to be occupied by the troops of the four Powers---
Great Britain, the USSR, the USA and France---each of whom
is to have its zone of occupation. The question of Poland's
borders was touched upon at the conference, but the decision said
476
the final solution of the question was to be made at a peace
conference. At one of our first sittings we decided that as the
starting point of a discussion of Germany's future borders we
take Germany's borders as of December 1937.
``We have delineated our zones of occupation and the borders
of these zones. We have withdrawn our troops to our zones as
had been established. But it now appears that another
Government has been given a zone of occupation and that has been
done without consulting us. If the intention was to make Poland
one of the Powers which is to have a zone of occupation, this
should have been agreed upon beforehand. We find it hard to
accept such a solution of the question because we had not been
consulted about the matter in any way. I take a friendly attitude
to Poland and will possibly fully agree to the Soviet Government's
proposals concerning her western borders, but I do not want to
do this now, because there will be another place for doing this,
namely, the peace conference.''
As has been pointed out already, however, Truman had firmly
decided by this time that there was not to be a peace conference
at all. In suggesting that the problem be tabled until the peace
conference, he was putting it off till the Greek calends, as they
say. At the same time he was, in essence, accusing the Soviet side
of violating an agreement among the three powers by unilaterally
deciding a question that had been placed within the competence
of the peace conference. This was intended to make it easier
for him, in turn, to abrogate the agreement on calling a peace
conference. In doing so, he was hoping that the atomic bomb
and America's might in general would in time make it possible
for the United States to recarve the map of the world and settle
international problems to suit itself, without undertaking any
obligations.
But let us return to the plenary session. Truman's sortie was
immediately answered by the Soviet side:
``Stalin: The decision of the Crimea Conference said that the
Heads of the Three Governments agreed that Poland's eastern
border was to run along the Curzon line, which means that
Poland's eastern border was established at the conference. As for
her western border, the conference decisions said that Poland was
to receive substantial accretions to her territory in the north and
the west. It was further stated: they, that is, the Three
477
Governments consider that at the appropriate time the new Polish
Government of National Unity will be asked for its opinion on the
question of the size of these accretions and that the final decision
on Poland's western borders would then be put off until the
peace conference.
``Truman: That is how I understood it myself. But we did not
have and do not have any right to give Poland a zone of
occupation.
``Stalin: The Polish Government of National Unity has
expressed its opinion on the western border. Its opinion is now
known to all of us.
``Truman: No official statement has ever been made on this
western border.
``Stalin: I am now speaking of the Polish Government's
opinion. Now we all know what it is. We can now agree on Poland's
western border, and the peace conference is to take the final
formal decision on it.
``Truman: Mr. Byrnes received the Polish Government's
statement only today. We have not yet had any time to study it.''
The problem, however, was not in the least that the American
delegation had not had time to study these proposals. Truman
was hardly interested in them at all. His aim was different: to
demonstrate ``firmness'' in regard to the Soviet Union. He was
already prepared to scuttle the understanding reached earlier,
and wanted to make it clear that he did not intend to consider
the opinion of anyone else if it did not suit America. True, he
had not yet revealed the reason for his sudden intractability, but
he felt the incredible power of the new weapon behind him and
was looking forward with pleasure to the moment when he could
stun the Soviet representatives with the news of it.
There can be no doubt that the Soviet side took note of the
President's ``toughness'', but it continued with imperturbable
calm to explain its own point of view.
``Stalin: Our proposal boils down to expressing our opinion
concerning the Polish Government's desire to have a western
border running along a certain line. It makes no difference
whether we express our opinion today or tomorrow.
``As for the question that we have granted the Poles an
occupation zone without having the consent of the Allied Powers, it has
not been stated correctly. In their notes, the American
478
Government and the British Government have repeatedly suggested
that we should not allow the Polish administration to enter the
western regions until the question of Poland's western border
is finally settled. We could not do this because the German
population had gone to the west in the wake of the retreating
German troops. The Polish population, for its part, advanced
to the west, and our army needed a local administration in its
rear, on the territory which it occupied. Our army cannot
simultaneously set up an administration in the rear, fight and clear the
territory of the enemy. It is not used to doing this.. . .
``That was the spirit in which we replied to our American
and British friends at the time. We were also inclined to do
this in the knowledge that Poland was getting an accretion of
land to the west of her former border. I don't see what harm
there is for our common cause in letting the Poles set up their
administration on a territory which is to be Polish anyway...''
The President evidently sensed that he had gone too far. At
any rate, he took a more conciliatory tone. At the same time,
he hastened to bring up a new problem, reparations, and tried
to claim that establishing Polish administration in the areas
under discussion would make it difficult for Germany to pay
them.
``Truman: I have no objections to the opinion expressed
concerning Poland's future border. But we did agree that all parts
of Germany must be under the control of the four Powers. And
it will be very hard to agree to a just decision of the question
of reparations if important parts of Germany are under an
occupying Power other than one of these four Powers.
``Stalin: Is it for reparations that you are apprehensive? In
that case, we can waive reparations from these territories.
``Truman: We have no intention of receiving them.
``Stalin: As for these western territories, there has been no
decision on this, and it is a matter of interpreting the Crimea
decision. There has been no decision on the western border, the
question has remained open. There was only the promise of
extending Poland's borders to the west and north.
``Churchill: I have quite a lot to say about Poland's western
border line but, I understand, the time for it has not yet come.''
Truman made use of Churchill's remark to refer once again
to the peace conference:
479
``Truman: It is up to the peace conference to determine the
future borders.''
Stalin repeated that it would be very difficult to restore
German administration in the western strip, since everyone had run
away.
``Truman: If the Soviet Government wants to have help in
re-establishing the German administration in these territories,
this question could be discussed.''
It seemed as if Truman was prepared to raise the question
of returning the German population that had fled from
territories which, by the agreement made earlier, were to be handed
over to the Polish state. But his remark was left hanging.
``Stalin: Our concept, the Russian concept during a war, in
the occupation of enemy territory, is as follows. The army fights,
it goes forward and has no worries except winning the fighting.
But if the army is to move on it must have a tranquil rear. It
cannot fight with the enemy at the front and simultaneously in
the rear. The army fights well if the rear is tranquil and if the
rear sympathises with it and helps it. Consider for a moment the
situation in which the German population is either on the run
behind the retreating troops, or is engaged in shooting our troops
in the back. Meanwhile, the Polish population follows in the
wake of our troops. In such a situation the army naturally
desires to have an administration in its rear which sympathises with
it and helps it. That is the whole point.
``Truman: I understand this and sympathise.
``Stalin: There was no other way out. This does not mean,
of course, that I lay down the borders myself. If you do not
agree to the line which the Polish Government has proposed,
the question will remain open. That is all.
``Churchill: But can this question be left without solution?
``Stalin: It has to be solved at some time.''
The attack by the Western leaders had been repulsed, and
Churchill decided to resort to a flanking movement. He raised
the question of supplying the population of defeated Germany
with food, which he intended to tie in once again with the
problem of the western border.
``Churchill: There is also the question of supplies. The question
of food supplies is a highly important one, because these areas
are the chief sources of foodstuffs for the German population.
480
``Stalin: Who in that case will work there and raise the grain?
There's no one to do this except the Poles.
``Truman: We can reach an agreement. I think the substance
of the question before us, with which we are concerned, is the
kind of administration that will be set up in these areas. We
are also interested in whether these areas are to be part of
Germany or part of Poland in the period of occupation. Here is the
question. We have an occupation zone. France has an occupation
zone, the British and the Soviet Union have an occupation zone
each. I want to know whether the areas now being dealt with
are a part of the Soviet zone of occupation. I think that at the
appropriate time we shall be able to reach agreement concerning
Poland's future borders, but now I am interested in the question
of these areas during the occupation period.
``Stalin: On paper they are still German territory; actually,
de facto, they are Polish territory.
``Truman: What has happened to the local population? There
must have been some three million of it.
``Stalin: The population has gone.
``Churchill: If that is so, it means that they will have to obtain
food in the areas to which they have gone, if the areas the
Germans have abandoned are not handed over to Germany and are
not at Germany's disposal. I understand that according to the
Polish Government's plan, which I understand is supported by
the Soviet Government, a quarter of all the cultivated land in
1937 Germany is to be taken away from her.
``As for the population, it turns out that three or four million
Poles are to be moved from the east to the western areas.
According to Russian data, Germany's pre-war population in these areas
totalled eight and a quarter million. This means that apart from
the serious hardships connected with the displacement of such
a great number of people, a disproportional burden will be laid
on other parts of Germany, and still the food problem will not
be solved.''
Once again, from another direction, Truman returned to the
question of Poland's border. He seemed to be thinking aloud:
``France will want to have the Saar and the Ruhr, and if we
let France have the Saar and the Ruhr, what will be left of
Germany?
``Stalin: There is no decision on this, but in respect of Poland's
__PRINTERS_P_481_COMMENT__
31---1996
481
western border there is a decision, and it is that the territory
of Poland must receive an accretion in the north and the west.
``Churchill: .. .We were speaking of the border and have now
switched to the question of Germany's food supplies. But I only
mentioned it because the border question creates some great
difficulties for us in the solution of certain other questions.
``Stalin: .. .Anyhow, Germany cannot do, and has never done,
without grain imports.
``Churchill: Of course, but she will be even less able to feed
herself if the eastern lands are taken away from her.
``Stalin: Let them buy grain from Poland.
``Churchill: We do not consider this territory to be Polish
territory.
``Stalin: The Poles live there, and they have cultivated the
fields. We can't demand of the Poles that they should work the
fields and let the Germans have the grain.''
Again Truman decided to play on the Soviet Union's
legitimate desire to receive from Germany reparations for the
enormous losses and destruction caused by Nazi aggression. He
adopted the posture of having accepted the transfer of the disputed
area to the Polish administration, but at the same time put into
doubt the very possibility that reparations could be made.
``Truman: It seems to be a fait accompli that a considerable
part of Germany has been handed over to Poland for occupation.
What in that case remains for . .. reparations? Even we in the
United States are short of coal. However, in spite of this, we
are sending 6.5 million tons of coal to Europe this year. I think
this part of Germany, namely, the coal basin, should be regarded
as remaining with Germany both in respect of reparations and
in respect of food supplies. I think the Poles have no right to
take over that part of Germany. We are now discussing the
question of Poland's future borders. But I believe we are in no
position to solve the question here and that it must be settled at
a peace conference.''
Thus the participants in the talks had once more returned
to the starting point. Truman's attack had misfired. The Soviet
delegation had stood firm, resolutely defended its principles. At
the end of the session, Truman made yet another attempt to
link the question of turning lands in the east of Germany over
to Poland with that of reparations.
482
``I want to say frankly,'' he declared, ``what I think on this
question. I cannot agree to the alienation of the eastern part
of 1937 Germany in as far as it bears upon settling the
reparations question and supplies of food and coal for the whole
German population.''
This was a quite definite hint that the USA might demand,
as the price for handing these lands over to Poland, that in
practice no reparations be exacted from Germany. In this case,
Washington thought, it would be possible to leave the industrial
potential of the Ruhr intact and use it in the interests of the
United States. But the Soviet delegation remained undaunted,
and argued persistently and convincingly that representatives of
the Polish government in Warsaw should be invited to Potsdam.
Finally the Western powers agreed to this.
The delegation from the Polish government was headed by
Boleslaw Bierut, with whom the Americans and British held
detailed talks. The Polish representatives thoroughly grounded their
point of view about the western boundary: it should run from
the Baltic a little to the west of Swinemiinde, taking Stettin into
Poland, then along the Oder to the Western Neisse, and along
the latter river to the border with Czechoslovakia. The
delegations of the Western powers, however, still refused to recognise
this line, and pressed for a revision of the understanding reached
in Teheran and Yalta. Let us cite the minutes once again:
``Truman: There was a suggestion yesterday to continue
discussion of Poland's western frontiers today.
``Stalin: All right.
``Truman: I remember that Mr. Churchill had an additional
proposal.
``Churchill: I have nothing to add. I have had a talk with
the Polish delegation, and this morning had the pleasure of
meeting Mr. Bierut once again. Mr. Eden had a talk with the Polish
delegation yesterday. . . I consider that this question is also
connected with that of reparations and also with the question of the
four Powers' zones of occupation in Germany.
``Truman: I consider Mr. Churchill's remark correct. Mr. Byrnes
also met the Polish delegation and intends to do so again. Allow
me to make a suggestion on a point of procedure. Since
these talks of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden will continue, I think
__PRINTERS_P_483_COMMENT__
31*
483
it will be better to postpone our discussion on this question until
Friday.
``Stalin: All right.''
The British and Americans, as we see, were eager to tie the
question of Poland's western boundary with entirely different
problems: reparations and zones of occupation in Germany. The
discussion of this matter was resumed after the recess which was
called so that Churchill and Attlee could make the trip to
London.
The Western delegations now put the Polish question into a
``package'' that included not only the question of reparations
but also the problem of admitting new members into the United
Nations Organisation: while insisting that Italy be admitted, they
wanted to keep Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania out. When
the Soviet delegation pointed to the lack of any connection
between these three problems, Byrnes and Ernest Bevin, Britain's
new Foreign Secretary, declared they would make ``concessions''
in regard to Poland's western boundary only if agreement on the
other two matters could be reached at the same time. In the
end, an understanding was reached on all three problems,
including the western border of Poland as proposed by the Polish
delegation. The United States and Britain thus failed to get a
revision of the principles on which agreement had been reached
earlier.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Continuation of the Discussion
While actively seeking to have their own way in the countries
liberated by the Red Army, the representatives of the Western
powers also tried to deny the Soviet Union any part in deciding
problems involving regions and states occupied by American
and British forces. An example of this is the discussion of
problems in Italy.
It is well known that sizable Italian contingents were active
on the Soviet-German front. They advanced as far as the Volga,
and took part in the devastation of Soviet territory. It is
therefore natural that the Soviet Union was not indifferent as to how
Italian problems were resolved. In particular, the Soviet side
was interested in the question of reparations from Italy, and
484
in the fate of Italy's former colonies. Even in the period
immediately after Italy's surrender, the American and British military
authorities had tried to decide everything without consulting the
Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commission. Now
an attempt was made to repeat that tactic on a higher level,
as is evident from the discussion of trusteeship that took place
at Potsdam. The question arose when the Soviet delegation raised
the issue of the fate of Italy's colonial possessions in Africa
and the Mediterranean. Here is what the official minutes
record:
``Churchill: Of course, it is possible to have an exchange of
opinion on any question, but if it turns out that the sides differ
in their views, the only result will be that we shall have had a
pleasant discussion. I think the question of the mandates was
decided at San Francisco.. . We agreed with what was adopted
at San Francisco but rto more than that. Since the question of
trusteeship is in the hands of an international organisation,
I doubt the desirability of an exchange of opinion on the
question here...
``Stalin: We learn from the press, for instance, that Mr. Eden,
in a speech in the British Parliament, declared that Italy has
lost her colonies for ever. Who has decided that? If Italy has
lost them, who has found them? [Laughter.] That is a very
interesting question.
``Churchill: I can answer it. By steady effort, at the cost of
great losses and through exceptional victories, the British Army
alone conquered these colonies.
``Stalin: And the Red Army took Berlin. [Laughter.]
``Churchill: I want to finish my statement,. . I have in mind
the following Italian colonies: Italian Somaliland, Eritrea,
Cyrenaica and Tripoli, which we conquered alone and in very
difficult conditions. . .
``Now about the statement made by Eden in Parliament, in
which he said that Italy has lost her colonies. .. This does not
exclude any discussion, during the preparation of the peace treaty
with Italy, of the question of whether a part of her former
territories should be returned to Italy. I do not support such a
proposal, but we do not object to the question of colonies being
discussed.. .
``At present, all these colonies are in our hands. Who wants
485
to have them? If there are any claimants to these colonies round
this table, it would be well for them to speak out.
``Truman: We have no use for them. We have enough poor
Italians at home who need to be fed.
``Churchill: We examined the question as to whether some of
these colonies could be used to settle Jews. But we consider that
it would be inconvenient for the Jews to settle there.
``Of course, we have great interests in the Mediterranean and
any change in the status quo in that area would require a
long and thorough study on our part.
``We do not quite understand what our Russian Allies want.''
In the end, this question was turned over to the three ministers
of foreign affairs. As things turned out, the fate of these
territories was not at all the one Churchill had in mind. Nonetheless, it
is interesting to note how he tried to avoid discussing with other
members of the antifascist coalition the question of trusteeship
over the former colonies of an Axis power, how he sought---as
an old ``empire builder"---to divide the spoils according to the
right of the conqueror, and finally the astounding manner in
which he disregarded the native peoples of these territories as
if the lands were uninhabited.
There were heated arguments over quite a few matters
considered at the conference, but on the whole the discussions and
exchanges of opinion resulted in the adoption of important
positive decisions. An enumeration of the documents agreed on and
confirmed at the Potsdam Conference shows that a very wide
range of questions was examined, and that the decisions taken
on them could have been of great significance for the
development of the whole international situation. A Council of Foreign
Ministers was set up; participants in the conference worked out
political and economic principles to be followed in treating
Germany during the initial control period; agreement was reached
on reparations to be exacted from Germany, on the German
war and merchant fleets, on the transfer to the Soviet Union of
the city of Konigsberg and the surrounding area, and on the
trial of war criminals. Joint statements were made on Austria,
Poland, the conclusion of peace treaties, the admission of new
members to the United Nations, trust territories, and so on. The
official communique on the outcome of the meeting said it had
``strengthened the ties between the Three Governments and
486
extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding''.
It was declared that the governments and the peoples of the
three powers, ``together with the other United Nations, will
ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace".
The importance of the decisions adopted at the Potsdam
Conference is hard to overestimate. But as one reads over the
speeches made by Western delegates at the conference, it is
impossible not to feel that they were performing a mission they did not
find particularly pleasant, one that had devolved on them from
a time that was alien to them and already receding into the
past---the period of wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union.
It was as if they were in a hurry to put this inheritance behind
them, to disembarrass themselves of it.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Goings-on Aboard the Cruiser Augusta
President Truman had closed the Potsdam Conference with
the words: ``Until our next meeting, which, I hope, will be soon.''
This is not at all what was in his mind, however. James Byrnes
writes that as Truman crossed the Atlantic aboard the cruiser
carrying him from war-torn Europe to the shores of a ``
prosperous" America that had already dropped the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, the President resolved to bar the Soviet Union from
any participation in establishing control over Japan. ``Force'', he
thought, ``is the only thing the Russians understand.''
The question of how the advantage of possessing the atomic
bomb might be used against the Soviet Union was already being
considered in the United States. Some of the American scientists
involved in the creation of the bomb encouraged the ``global''
fanaticism of politicians with assurances that although the
Russians would learn the secrets of the atom in the next two or three
years, it would be six or seven years before they could actually
create a bomb. ``No one seemed too alarmed at the prospect
because it appeared that in seven years we should be far ahead
of the Soviets in this field,"^^1^^ Byrnes writes. From this the
Secretary of State drew far-reaching conclusions: although as yet the
USA had ``only a twig'', rather than a big stick, it would be able
_-_-_
~^^1^^ James F. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime, p. 284.
487
to ``emphasize firmness" in dealings with the Soviet government
as its military might increased.^^1^^
The American diplomats going home on the Presidential ship
had lively discussions about the future course of foreign policy.
``We were aware and deeply concerned about possible conflicts
between the United States and the Soviet Union,'' Charles
Bohlen recalls. ``We discussed the atomic bomb and how we might
use the security and power it gave us to establish a sound
relationship with the Soviet Union. .. We recognized the fact that
the Soviet Union would not respond to anything except measures
endangering the country and the Soviet system. We speculated
about methods we might use, considering everything from a flat
ultimatum to the Soviets to withdraw to their frontiers down to
various degrees of pressure."^^2^^
It would probably be difficult to be more frank about what
was on the minds of the men who shaped American foreign policy
in those days. Such were the ``ideas'' they toyed with aboard the
cruiser Augusta as it took the US delegates home from a
conference of the three powers that had lately been Allies. Soon
these same ideas were embodied in a militant anti-Soviet course.
The volte face of the Western powers was completed in
September of 1945, when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in
London, in accordance with the Potsdam decisions. It was at
this time that John Foster Dulles, a champion of the cold war,
became involved in the making of American foreign policy. Here
is how he himself describes what happened at the conference in
London: ``At the moment our postwar policy of 'no appeasement'
[that is, of no cooperation with the Soviet Union---Author] was
born; and, on the whole, it has been adhered to ever since. . .
Our action at the London meeting has had momentous
consequences---as we realized it would have. It marked the end of
an epoch, the epoch of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam. . . The fact
that I was at London with Secretary Byrnes as a Republican
and with powerful Republican backing enabled me to play an
important part in the momentous decision to end the policy of
seeking to get agreement with the Russians."^^3^^ It cannot be said
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Ibid., pp. 349, 352.
~^^2^^ Charles Bohlen, Op. cit., pp. 237--38.
~^^3^^ John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, The Macmillan Company, New
York, 1957, pp. 30, 127.
488
that Dulles was guilty of immodesty here, or that he
overestimated his role; he did indeed make an important contribution to
the exacerbation of international tensions.
Addressing a meeting held in the Kremlin to mark the 30th
anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic
War, Leonid Brezhnev said: ``The smoke had barely cleared
on the battlefields when we found ourselves faced with the cold
war which was unleashed by the most aggressive imperialist
groups. Torrents of slander against the socialist countries,
provocation, atomic blackmail, attempts at economic blockade
encouraged by the hope that advantage could be gained from the
USSR's temporary economic weakness after the war---the
imperialist leaders used all of these tactics to prevent the
consolidation of socialism and its growing influence around the
world.
``But the forces of reaction which launched the cold war failed
to achieve their aims. They were unable to suppress or to
weaken socialism.''
The imperialists were greatly mistaken in thinking that
possession of the bomb had opened a broad and unobstructed road
for establishing world domination for America. The Soviet
Union soon broke the USA's nuclear monopoly, and the socialist
community rapidly grew stronger. These circumstances and
others, brought about a fundamental change in the world
situation. After many years of vain attempts to dictate their will to
the planet, the groups ruling the USA were forced to turn their
unworkable doctrines over to the collectors of historical
curiosities.
The Potsdam decisions might well have become the
foundations for productive post-war cooperation among the major
powers of the anti-Hitler coalition. But fate had decided otherwise.
Only a few of the decisions were actually carried out---and that
only at the earliest stage. The fact remains, however, that in the
course of the Potsdam Conference and of other important
meetings of the three Allies, it was demonstrated in practice that
states with different social systems can engage in effective
political and military cooperation in peacetime too.
[489]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Lessons of the Coalition
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Experience in Cooperation Between Two Systems
In the preceding chapters, the reader has become acquainted
with a number of episodes in the establishment, development,
and decline of the anti-Hitler coalition. It is clear from the
facts presented that the members of that military alliance
experienced various difficulties. Their views were often in conflict,
and they were faced with knotty problems as events unfolded.
At the same time, it is impossible not to see that there was also
a high degree of agreement among the members of the
coalition.
It must be remembered that the anti-Hitler coalition
comprised states with different social systems. This fundamental
difference inevitably affected both relations within the coalition
during the war and its fate in the peace that followed.
The anti-Hitler coalition, which took shape at the very
beginning of the Great Patriotic War fought by the Soviet people
against Nazi Germany, represented a major success for Soviet
diplomacy and a victory for the Leninist foreign policy of the
socialist state. Reactionary groups in the West made great efforts
to isolate the Soviet Union, to deprive it of friends and allies,
and to force it to fight single-handed against a heavily armed
aggressor. This was the hidden aim of the policy of ``
appeasement" which the rulers of the bourgeois democracies pursued
towards Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s.
There are some in the West who even now are perplexed:
how did Hitler manage to wrap the canny politicians of
London, Paris, and Washington around his little finger? Why was
it that neither Britain nor France nor the United States would
accept the suggestions urgently pressed by the Soviet
government, which were aimed at nipping Hitler's schemes in the bud?
Why did the Western powers reject the Soviet plan for creating
a system of collective security? Why did London and Paris stand
idly by while Nazi Germany brazenly seized more and more
territory in Europe almost without firing a shot, although at the
time Germany was much weaker than either of the Western
490
powers? Why was Hitler able to achieve his ends with such
astounding ease? Indeed, why?
The answer to all these questions is one and the same. Those
who held power in the West at that time were ready to let Hitler
have his way in everything as long as he performed the ``historic
mission" proclaimed in Mein Kampf---to destroy Bolshevism.
At bottom, Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union was
the culmination of many years of effort by world reaction to
eliminate what was then the world's only socialist state, thereby
restoring the unlimited sway of capitalism. The old order made
a desperate attempt to stop history in its forward course, to
block social progress. The Western powers tried everything
imaginable to correct the ``error of history" by which---as they
saw it---a socialist country had been born, to smother Soviet
Russia, to keep Marxism-Leninism from spreading and continue
to hold nations in bondage to capitalism. Fourteen states joined
together to intervene against the new Soviet republic; the
notorious cordon sanitaire was established with the aim of keeping
the ideas of socialist revolution out of Western Europe; the
militarists of China and Japan were set upon the Soviet Union; and,
finally, bourgeois politicians encouraged and abetted Nazi
Germany, which they regarded as their main strike force against
Bolshevism.
The interests of international security and the contribution
the Soviet Union might make to achieving this goal were the
last things London and Paris were concerned with. The Olympian
calm the Western powers maintained as Hitler flagrantly violated
international agreements, their inaction at the time of the
Anschluss of Austria, their betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich---all
this was payment in advance on Hitler's promise to direct Nazi
aggression eastwards, against the Soviet Union. But the policy
of appeasing the aggressor finally turned against its architects.
The fascists' appetites became so peremptory that the Western
powers themselves were faced with mortal danger. The further
course of events---first and foremost the Soviet people's heroic
resistance to the aggressor and the consistent stand of Soviet
diplomacy---led to the formation of the anti-Hitler
coalition.
The creation of a military alliance among the 'three great
powers was also aided in no little degree by processes going on
491
inside the United States and Britain. There was growing
disagreement in those countries between those forces which understood
that the Soviet people's heroic struggle against the fascist
aggressor was at the same time a struggle for the national independence,
the freedom, and the very existence of their own countries, and
the reactionary elements which opposed cooperation with the
Soviet Union in any form. It must not be forgotten that at this
time those who wanted to make a deal with Hitler still had a
strong voice both in the USA and in Britain. It was their support
that Rudolf Hess, the Fiihrer's right hand, was counting on when
he undertook his sensational mission to the British Isles in May
of 1941.
In the end, politicians who took a more realistic view of the
situation gained the upper hand in London and Washington.
The United States and Britain became wartime Allies of the
Soviet Union, and the ``crusade'' against Bolshevism by the
capitalist powers proved abortive. Joint actions by the members
of the anti-Hitler coalition helped to hasten the defeat of the
Axis powers.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence
In the years that have passed since the Second World War,
many works have been written about it. Some of them give a
true account of events, others distort them, still others
deliberately falsify them. There is also a large number of works on the
post-war years. One of the fundamental questions posed in this
second group is whether it was inevitable that once the war was
over the great powers should turn sharply away from the
relationships they had built as Allies.
It is important to avoid a purely emotional approach to
answering this question. The relationship that existed among the
allies in wartime could not, of course, be continued in peacetime
without change. And this is not only because---as history shows---
allies, no matter how close their relations in time of war, often
begin to go their separate ways once victory over the common
enemy has been achieved. The case in hand is more complex
than that: it is a matter of relations among states with differing
social and political systems, with dissimilar class approaches to
492
the problems facing them. What is more, sweeping changes had
taken place all over the world as a result of the war, changes
which the socialist and the capitalist countries regarded in
fundamentally different ways.
Is there any chance for the development of mutually beneficial
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States? Of
course, the fundamental ideological differences between the two
main partners in the anti-Hitler coalition of the Second World
War period still exist today, as does the difference in the approach
these two powers take to the social and political phenomena of
our times. But the Soviet Union, guided by the Leninist principle
of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social
systems, is far from believing that these differences make mutually
beneficial cooperation an impossibility. The same sort of
differences existed at the time of the Second World War, after all,
but they did not prevent the USSR and the USA from
cooperating in the struggle against their common enemy.
At present, the USSR and the USA have no common enemy
in the accustomed and literal sense of the word. There are,
however, other threats facing the peoples of the world. The greatest
of these is the danger of a new world war, a war which would
inevitably be fought with nuclear weapons. The danger is not
at all abstract. It lies concealed in the serious ``local'' conflicts
that have sprung up in various parts of the world since the war
ended. It was just such ``local'' conflicts (Abyssinia, Manchuria,
Spain, etc.) that dragged mankind into the Second World War.
In our times, when states possess weapons of enormous
destructive power, the consequences of travelling down that path once
more would be disastrous.
The arms race spells another grave danger. And there are
other problems, too, that both the Soviet and the American
peoples have an interest in solving: the development of economic
ties, exchange in the realm of science and technology,
environmental protection, etc.
All of this creates the objective conditions for the
normalisation of Soviet-American relations. But there are also influential
groups in 'the USA seeking to hinder development in this
direction.
In revie.wing the lessons derived from the anti-Hitler coalition
and the experience of cooperation among the great powers
493
during the Second World War, it is impossible not to see that they
are still relevant today. The most important of these lessons is
that given good will and a sober, realistic approach to existing
problems it is possible to establish fruitful cooperation---on the
basis of equal rights and security---between states with different
social systems.
__ALPHA_LVL0__
The End.
[END]
[494]
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[495]