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2. Imperialism and Developing Countries:
New Aspects of Trade Policies
 

The Struggle of Socialist and Developing Countries for
a Progressive Restructuring of International Economic
Relations

p The advent of political independence by a large group of new states whose peoples freed themselves from colonial oppression has marked an important stage in the progress of mankind. The appearance of that powerful revolutionary force has strengthened the anti-imperialist struggle and has perceptibly weakened the position of imperialism.

p A comprehensive characterization of that process is found in the CPSU Central Committee’s Report to the 25th Party Congress.

p “Glancing at the picture of the modern world one cannot help noticing the important fact that the influence of states that had only recently been colonies or semi-colonies has grown considerably.

p “It may definitely be said about the majority of them that they are defending their political and economic rights in a struggle against imperialism with mounting energy, striving to consolidate their independence and to raise the social, economic and cultural level of their peoples.”  [212•1 

p The new balance of forces on the world stage, the increased power of the socialist community of nations, the successes of the national liberation movement, and the need for widening international economic exchange on the basis of genuine equality and mutual advantage pose new tasks in international economic cooperation. As these progressive processes gain in strength the disharmonies that exist between the new tendencies in developing world economic relations and the old norms that developed at a time when imperialism fully prevailed on the world market, are becoming increasingly evident.

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p This produces an inherent need for decisive measures to achieve a progressive restructuring of international economic cooperation and create a more healthy climate for world trade that would accord with the spirit of the times. It is that need, which had already matured in the early postwar years, and became especially strong in the early 1960s when the colonial system was finally dismantled, that has brought the world to the threshold of a qualitatively new stage in the development of external economic policies. Their central concern is to formulate and then implement progressive norms of international cooperation. This was especially important for developing countries possessing backward economies marked by a one-sided orientation on external markets, and unable because of their unequal position within the international capitalist division of labour, to make effective use of the advantages of external economic exchange.

p While these problems emerged first in the field of world trade, they acquired a broader content and eventually came to relate to a much wider set of issues as they were considered in various international organizations. Today, in fact, they bear on the entire complex of world economic relations, including various aspects of relations between capitalist states and developing countries. Faced with pressure from progressive forces capitalist countries have agreed to at least discuss problems that are vital to developing countries, such as the export of capital, the activities of international monopolies, the transfer of technology, the development of maritime shipping, the industrialization of new states, the diversification of their economies, the reform of the world monetary system, and the stabilization of export revenues in developing countries, not to mention foreign trade itself.

p The problem of external economic relations between developing countries and capitalist countries is of particular interest to the present study. It is in such a context that the general background against which the struggle of the developing states for achieving equal external conditions for their economic development is taking place should be considered. The first major step along that course was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, held in 1964. At the time it 214 represented an unprecedented large international economic forum whose decisions marked the beginning of the present stage of discussions and solutions bearing on the entire complex of problems. For the first time it drew the attention of world public opinion to the need for a decisive modernization of the obsolete conditions governing international economic activities. An influential majority of socialist and developing countries condemned the relevant policies of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

p A major outcome was the adoption of principles governing international trade relations and trade policies contributing to development.  [214•1  For the first time in the history of international relations basic progressive norms of international economic relations were recorded in a single document. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of such basic propositions as the unequivocal validity of the principles of sovereign equality of states, the right of peoples to self-determination, and non-interference into the internal affairs of other countries. They also included a condemnation of discrimination based on differences in social systems and a confirmation of the sovereign right of each country to freely trade with other countries and to freely dispose of their natural resources in the interest of the economic development and welfare of their peoples. An important role was also played by that Conference’s decisions on organizational matters, which subsequently led to the creation of UNCTAD—the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This serves as the General Assembly’s highest body in these matters.

p The activities of UNCTAD whose representative and democratic character and orientation on solving practical problems by discussing them in a wide political context have made it a unique forum within the system of United Nations organizations in many respects, subsequently laid the basis for further advances in the struggle of progressive forces to reorganize international economic relations. Moreover, the discussions taking place within UNCTAD have contributed to a more concrete formulation of complex and occasionally very novel problems in this area, 215 and have clarified the positions of various groups of countries in the course of attempts to find mutually acceptable solutions.

p It is on the basis of ideas that first crystallized within UNGTAD’s various bodies that it subsequently became possible to develop many United Nations programmes embodying complex solutions to the problems of the new states’ economic development with the help of international measures. The next major step in that direction was the announcement in October 1970 of the Second United Nations Development Decade.  [215•1  While the corresponding programme contained a number of contradictory elements it also represented a further development of UNCTAD’s fundamental principles.

p In subsequent years the role of the United Nations became especially active in formulating a wide range of problems relating to a progressive reconstruction of the entire system of international economic relations.

p A number of important documents were adopted, including the programme of action for achieving a "new economic order”, approved by the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in May 1974,  [215•2  the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State,  [215•3  and the resolution of the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly concerning development and international economic cooperation.  [215•4 

p Among these programme-oriented documents those that were most consistent in expressing progressive strivings reflected a growing recognition of the importance of normalizing international economic cooperation for the more rapid socio-economic progress of newly-emerged countries, and also these countries’ concern with the negative influence of the growing instability of the world capitalist system on their own economies. They were also intended to formalize at the level of international law the struggle of developing countries, which now extended to all external economic relations, for a full re-establishment of their sovereignty over their natural resources, against neo-colonialism, and against the oppressive power of international monopolies in 216 world trade. In the words of United Nations experts it is not surprising that "confronted . . . with a world industrial and trading structure embodying oligopolistic and monopolistic practices, perpetrated to an important extent by transnational corporations of developed countries and supported directly and indirectly by governments . . . developing countries should now be seeking the establishment of a new international economic order".  [216•1 

p It is important to stress that a more decisive protection of their national interests by developing states was made possible by the socialist countries’ comprehensive support of the newlyemerged countries’ just aspirations. Such decisive measures of developing countries as the nationalization of international monopolies’ property, the re-establishment of control over their natural resources, and the implementation of independent price policies were made possible only by the changing balance of power on the world stage and imperialism’s loss of its former monopoly in supplying other countries with advanced equipment and technology—and incidentally arms—in a situation in which reliance on direct military intervention to "punish the unruly" had in fact ceased to be possible. At an earlier time this would have been unthinkable.

p A stronger unity of the new states, spurred by their common external economic interests, also contributed substantially to these developments. Its organizational basis originated in the establishment of the Group of 77 developing countries at the Geneva Conference in 1964. These countries seek to speak as a single group at international economic forums by first agreeing to a common platform on each major issue. That was the case in 1968, for example, just before UNGTAD’s Second Session, at which the developing countries presented the so-called Charter of Algeria; at UNCTAD’s Third Session in 1972, where the position of the new states was based on the Declaration of Lima; at that organization’s 1976 Session, which was preceded by the adoption of the Manila Declaration; and at its Fifth Session in 1979, which considered the Arusha programme of the Group of 77 (which now in fact includes over 110 countries).

p While recognizing the growing strength of this tendency 217 towards integrated actions by developing countries, whose most effective actions are directed against neo-colonialism and the oppressive power of TNCs, one should not neglect the factors that operate in the opposite direction. There are elements of inconsistency in the position of the Group of 77 that are attributable to such factors as differing interests on particular issues, which are largely explained by the economic dependence of a number of newly-liberated countries on former colonial powers; the political heterogeneity of the developing countries’ group, which produces a tendency towards compromises; and in some cases an insufficiently clear conception of ways in which socio- economic problems may be solved. In particular, this often leads to an overemphasis on external financial resources, and especially private foreign capital in economic development of young countries and to a failure to recognize, when asserting claims on developed countries, the fundamental differences that exist in their socio-economic structures and sources of wealth. It is also expressed in regressive tendencies to divide the world on the basis of a simplified and apolitical conception of "a rich North and a poor South”.

p The contradictory character of the group of developing states in relation to external economic problems reflects the differentiation and polarization of class forces that is taking place in these countries and the selection by individual countries of different approaches to their socio-economic development. Some differences among them arise from recent changes in the structure of world prices, as sharp increases in the prices of fuels and of some types of raw materials produced a deterioration of the external trade position of many developing countries importing these products. As a result internal groups of "rich and poor countries" are beginning to emerge within the developing world itself.

p The specific features that characterize the position of developing countries are seen in the United Nations programme for "a new international economic order" that was adopted at their initiative. It should be emphasized that its main elements are generally progressive, anti-imperialist and democratic, and this is of the greatest importance. Nevertheless this should not hide a certain inconsistency and contradictory character that attaches 218 to a number of propositions within that programme for it represents a compromise between differing positions held by individual developing countries.

p The fundamental principles underlying that problem were noted at the GPSU 26th Congress. It was observed that "in the mid-seventies the former colonial countries raised the question of a new international economic order. Restructuring international economic relations on a democratic foundation, along lines of equality, is natural from the point of view of history. Much can and must be done in this respect. And, certainly, the issue must not be reduced, as this is sometimes done, simply to distinctions between "rich North" and "poor South".  [218•1  Without considering its details (which have been examined in the proceedings of an international group of Marxist research scientists),  [218•2  let us simply note that it "provides only for a reform of the capitalist system of international economic relations. ..

p “The total detachment of the programme for a new international economic order from the economic situation in the developing countries is an important omission.”  [218•3 

p While recognizing these contradictory traits within the common position of individual countries one should not lose sight of its most important characteristic, namely, its anti-imperialist direction. The Central Committee Report to the CPSU’s 25th Congress notes that "the foreign policy of the developing countries has become visibly more active. This is seen in many trends— the political course of the non-alignment movement, and the activity of the Organization of African Unity and of the various economic associations formed by the developing countries. It is quite clear now that with the present correlation of world class forces, the liberated countries are quite able to resist imperialist diktat and achieve just—that is, equal—economic relations.”  [218•4 

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p But one should also not underestimate the opposing policies of imperialist circles and international monopolies. Although they are no longer able to impede the tendency towards the unity of developing countries, they seek to weaken this unity in all possible ways and to take advantage of existing differences in serving their own interests, and also to adapt their tactical approach in relations with the developing states in the light of new conditions. As noted at the CPSU’s 26th Congress, "The imperialists are displeased with the fact that the newly-free countries are consolidating their independence. In a thousand ways they are trying to bind these countries to themselves in order to deal more freely with their natural riches, and to use their territory for their strategic designs. In so doing, they make extensive use of the old colonialist method of divide and rule.  [219•1  And while developed capitalist countries frequently persist in openly impeding the implementation of progressive recommendations, adopted by a majority of members of the United Nations, in ways that lead to their increasing isolation, they also rely on increasingly refined and modernized methods in protecting their external economic interests. As they recognize that an exclusively negative position in these matters is both unpopular and ineffective they find it necessary to at least state their readiness to engage in constructive discussions on a number of problems, which in itself constitutes an important achievement of progressive forces, even agree to certain, if limited, concessions to developing countries.

p The need for a more flexible approach to the developing states’ demands is also recognized by bourgeois researchers, who note both the increasing vulnerability of capitalism’s current "power centres”, which greatly depend on supplies of raw materials from developing countries, and the far-reaching political consequences that could result from an intensification of the corresponding struggle. The emergence of new conceptions in trade policy is illustrated by the report of a group of prominent U.S., 220 Japancse, and Common Market economists entitled "Commodities: The Global Outlook. The Choice: Conflict or Cooperation”. Its authors recognize that "policies should be designed to reduce confrontation and encourage development of mutually advantageous relations. The present situation is dangerous because it is highly charged politically and because positions on the issue tend to polarize. . . Future actions should be designed to meet the changing world conditions.”  [220•1 

p Under such a "new approach" neo-colonialism applies its principal efforts to encourage capitalist relations in developing countries. In particular it seeks to achieve this through a largescale introduction of foreign capital into the developing states’ economies, so that their role within the world capitalist economy derive from a subordinate position within integrated technological production cycles controlled by international monopolies, where their role is confined to serve as sources of supply for vitally needed types of raw materials. It also seeks to weaken the common position of developing countries both by relying on the most reactionary regimes and by taking advantage of the differing interests of some developing states in relation to particular aspects of their external economic policies. It is in the context of such tactics that developed capitalist states also seek to transfer discussions of vital aspects of their economic relations with developing countries from the wide forums of the United Nations to separate consultative meetings with limited participants. This is illustrated by the joint meeting of representatives of leading industrial countries and a number of new states, held in December 1975, in Paris, concerning problems of raw material supplies and economic cooperation. In a number of respects that conference sought to anticipate the initiatives that were envisaged within the Fourth Session of UNCTAD in May 1976, and to reduce the interest of developing countries in that forum by encouraging expectations that concessions would be made within the framework of the Paris meeting. In fact, however, its further activities proved to be fruitless.

p It becomes clear in the light of these contradictory tendencies, both why developing countries are thus able to force 221 imperialism to offer certain concessions in its trade policy, and why such forced concessions have been of a limited character.

p That these concessions arc forced is amply evident and is recognized by many Western researchers, including Oscar Schachter, who is an American specialist in international law. He notes that they are "attributable . . . not to a sudden spread of altruism, but to a widely felt necessity. . .”.  [221•1 

p These changes in imperialism’s tactical approach to developing countries should not be separated from the wider context of world capitalism’s external economic policy. In our own opinion the forced concessions to new states express only one aspect of the deepening crisis of the entire system of modern capitalism’s international economic relations and of its growing inconsistency with the objective needs of a further internationalization of production. In view of these requirements one may interpret the search for a new structure, new forms, and new norms governing world economic relations as an adaptation of imperialism’s overall external economic structure to new conditions of international economic exchange and to an altered distribution of forces on the world’s stage.

p It would be difficult to deny that there is an increasing disharmony between the established system of world economic relations and the new conditions both from the point of view of the interests of developing countries and those of the developed capitalist powers themselves. A rapid mental survey of the postwar history of international economic relations makes this readily apparent.

p In particular one may recall that the currently operating system was formed as an organized consolidation of the specific distribution of power within world capitalism’s economic and political order that existed during the initial postwar years. It is not a coincidence that the two pillars on which it rested, namely the IMF in the monetary field and GATT in international trade, reflected, above all, the dominant positions of the United States in these two spheres, the hegemony of the American dollar, and the leading position of the United States in industrial and agricultural exports as well as in capital exports.

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p This is why the norms that govern the functioning of these organizations, which at first merely seemed to serve the development of international economic relations, are in fact designed to encourage the development only in ways that are advantageous to the United States.

p In subsequent decades this situation has undergone fundamental changes. The completion of the political decolonization of a large group of developing countries and the first stages of their economic decolonization have produced new problems to which the norms of international economic relations now must adapt. These concern the legitimate needs of the newly-emerged states’ independent development. At the same time the balance of power among the developed capitalist powers themselves has been altered. This refers primarily to the U.S.—Western Europe— Japan triangle. That development has clearly not favoured the United States. Following the demise of the Bretton-Woods system the role of the American dollar as the capitalist world’s leading reserve currency has greatly weakened, while in the field of trade such countries as Japan and West Germany, not to mention the Common Market, have joined the United States as leading exporters. In particular, the exports of the Common Market exceed those of the United States by three times and reflect the declining share of the United States in capitalist industrial production. (While it continues to be quite substantial the U.S. share declined from 49 percent in 1963 and 57 percent in 1950 to 40-41 percent in the 1970s.)

p The resulting need for a restructuring of existing trade and monetary systems became increasingly apparent not only to the United States’ imperialist partners and rivals but to the United States itself. This also concerns the need to adapt the existing monetary and trade systems to a new structure of relations with developing countries and a new and increasingly complex situation in matters of fuel and raw materials. Naturally, different Western powers hold different views of desired methods and approaches to such a restructuring, depending on their own interests, which are by no means always identical. But in spite of substantial divergences in concrete economic objectives there remains a common need to maintain the functioning of a system of economic relations that accords with a further 223 internationalization of production activities, the increased economic interdependence of the states, and a stable mode of economic growth.

p Today the objective need is becoming a political and economic imperative that is increasingly recognized in the business circles and governments of developed capitalist powers. It is true, of course, that those forces that continue to find obsolete "rules of the game" convenient, remain influential. This is illustrated by the position of a senior official of the U.S. Treasury Department, G. C. Hufbauer, who defends the earlier world trading system because it "now facilitates the annual exchange of $1 trillion worth of goods".  [223•1  Increasingly, however, different voices are heard. These agree with Andrew Shonfield, Director of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, in recognizing that the principles underlying the international economic relations of the Western capitalist world during the postwar period are increasingly inappropriate to changing conditions.  [223•2 

p It should be stressed that this does not primarily refer to reforms of individual institutions within the existing system, such as, for example, of the IMF and GATT. Such reforms are gradually taking place, and in particular one cannot deny that a certain democratization is taking place in the work of GATT as the number of developing countries in that organization has increased and as its membership has come to include several socialist countries. Far more important is the fact that the Western powers must now simultaneously resolve an entire complex of highly-complicated long-term problems in the field of international economic relations.

On the one hand, this refers to the problem of democratic changes in the very climate and norms of world economic relations, as advocated today by all progressive forces and the alliance of socialist countries with national liberation movements. No matter how unattractive such a prospect may be to imperialism it can no longer simply ignore these demands. On the other hand, it refers to developing states’ concrete problems in improving their external economic relations. This, too, is reflected 224 in the concept of a "New International Economic Order”. Finally, this refers to the problems of adapting to the new conditions of interimperialist rivalries and to a search for compromises within the group of developed capitalist powers itself in order to strengthen its common positions. But this does not overcome interimperialist and intermonopoly contradictions. The increasing urgency of the situation with fuels and mineral raw materials is making imperialism’s policies in all these areas even more contradictory.

Special Measures Within the Trade Policies of
Imperialist Powers Designed to Favour Developing
Countries

p UNCTAD’s Geneva Conference marked the first major step in meeting the demands of developing countries for specific advantages in their external economic relations with developed states. On the basis of the self-evident fact that the still weak economies of new states are unable to compete on the world market on an equal basis with developed countries, and that a successful development of their external economic relations requires special protective measures, that Conference concluded that such countries should be given special advantages. This was reflected in a resolution concerning the granting of the most-favoured-nation status to developing countries without requiring reciprocal concessions, that is on the basis of the principle of non-reciprocity.  [224•1 

p While all developed capitalist countries either voted against this resolution or abstained when it was accepted, the mere fact of its approval by an overwhelming majority at such a representative forum was an important event that led to wide 225 international repercussions. Eventually developed capitalist states were also forced to recognize the principle of non-reciprocity. The latter was subsequently included in the text of GATT, though in a greatly truncated form. On the whole this was an important victory for developing countries.

p The Conference also listed other measures intended to liberalize developed states’ trade and to provide for a freer access to their markets for products from developing countries. With regard to primary commodities the principle was adopted that " developed countries shall progressively reduce and eliminate barriers and other restrictions that hinder trade and consumption of products from developing countries".  [225•1  In furthering that principle a recommendation was adopted that called on developed capitalist countries to reduce, and whenever possible eliminate, import duties and products that are of special interest to developing states, and in particular to fully eliminate tariff duties on imports of tropical products. At the same time developed countries must not install new trade policy barriers, and in any case must not increase existing ones. Similar measures were recommended with regard to liberalization of trade in manufactured products.

p At the same time, while realizing that the adoption of general propositions concerning liberalization of trade policies does not yet guarantee any actual increase in the competitiveness of their goods on the markets of developed economies, the developing states expressed particular concern for further measures to widen exports of their industrial products. While in the case of raw materials, whose primary importers are industrial powers, the level of tariff protection on many export items of developing countries, is relatively low, in the case of the products of the new states’ emerging industries import barriers are frequently altogether prohibitive. And this is not a matter of the quality of these products, since many of them, especially in the case of products of the light industry, fully meet world standards, but of a discriminatory policy on the part of imperialist powers. It is obvious that if these products were inherently non-competitive, 226 there would be no sense in creating additional barriers to their deliveries to markets.

p The basic reason for such a situation is that in this case the interests of industrial monopolies are directly affected. This is why the proposal of developing countries to establish special tariff preferences in developed countries for the manufactured products of developing states was decisively rejected by developed capitalist countries, and the principle of preferences, proved to be the only one on which there was an overt disagreement at the Geneva Conference.

p At the same time even the adoption of the Geneva recommendations concerning liberalization of the imperialist powers’ foreign trade and also the addition of new articles into GATT concerning measures to encourage the development of trade of the newly-emerged states did not in fact imply a genuine readiness on the part of developed capitalist countries to carry out the corresponding measures. Moreover, in a number of cases the level of tariff duties was even increased, as did neo-protectionist nontariff barriers.  [226•1  As a result the problem of liberalization has become even more urgent.

p In seeking to postpone a solution on matters of substance, Western powers at first sought to oppose resolutions adopted by UNGTAD with what they claimed would be future advantages to developing countries from tariff duties reductions within the framework of GATT as a consequence of the Kennedy Round. While one cannot deny that this major trade policy measure has played a certain role in widening world trade, it is important to stress the extent to which this hinders the interests of developing countries and to which the de facto discrimination of the tariff policies of developed capitalist countries against developing countries has subsequently increased even more. It is not a coincidence that in 1967 even W. White, GATT’s former Director- General, found it necessary to admit that "in a number of cases, the action taken falls short of the expectations of the developing countries”.  [226•2 

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p When the major developed capitalist countries finally recognized the ineffectiveness of relying on the Kennedy Round they turned to other means for widening their foreign trade policy instruments in relation to developing countries, and eventually found no other solution except to agree to the granting of preferences. In 1970, after three years of discussions, agreement was reached on a so-called system of general nonreciprocal and nondiscriminatory preferences for manufactured goods from the new states.  [227•1  These generally came into force in 1971. At the same time Western powers were able to greatly downplay the original idea contained in the proposal of developing countries and to follow a limited interpretation of the principles of preferences that was advantageous to themselves.

p In particular the preferential systems of individual countries include various protective reservations "so as to retain some degree of control by preference giving countries over the trade”. This includes the right to reduce or even fully abandon preferences at the country’s own discretion, to establish import quotas, etc.  [227•2  Above all, however, preferences are extended not to all industrial exports but to a relatively limited range of products that is defined by the importing country in each particular case at its own discretion. Nearly all Western countries have excluded from preferential lists such major industrial exports of the new states as textiles, footwear and also most types of processed agricultural and mineral raw materials. Moreover, a preferential status is by no means equivalent to a full abandonment of duties. It merely envisages their partial reduction in combination with relatively rigorous quantitative limitations on preferential imports. In the case of the corresponding Japanese legislation, for example, these must not exceed 10 percent of the overall imports of industrial products.

p It is also characteristic that only some of the developed capitalist countries have implemented their preferential system on 228 schedule (before January 1972). As usual, the United States displayed the least haste and granted preferential treatment only in 1976. The American scheme, however, provides a vivid illustration of the most vulnerable features of preferential systems. First, the U.S. excluded many developing countries from its preferential list on the basis of criteria that can only be interpreted as attempts to ignore the sovereignty of other states. For example, preferences are not granted to "communist countries”, except those that are not "dominated or controlled by international communism" (!); similarly they are not extended to countries that are members of OPEC, or to members of other similar organisations exporting raw materials; also countries nationalizing or establishing control over the property of American citizens and corporations "without prompt, adequate and effective compensation".  [228•1 

p Secondly, preferential concessions are applied to only 54 percent of the total imports of the U.S. from developing countries that are subjected to duties (in relation to the actual volume of trade in 1973). But even that figure appears to be purely nominal, since preferences are automatically cancelled whenever the total imports of each individual type of commodity originating in developing countries exceeds 25 million dollars per year or 50 percent of the U.S. imports of that product. When these reservations are considered preferences may be extended in fact to only 24 percent of the imports that are subject to duties or 17 percent of all U.S. imports from those developing countries to which the system of preferences applies.  [228•2 

p Thus, the implementation of the long-awaited systems of preferences leads to conflicting thoughts. On the one hand, there is no doubt that in spite of the great complexity of the problem and the partial character of preferential measures, developing countries have been able to overcome the intense opposition of imperialist powers in many respects, and to achieve substantial progress in arriving at practical solutions to that important problem. Nor can one deny that these measures have made it possible for developing countries to enjoy some definite advantages 229 with regard to the tariff practices of developed capitalist states. Yet the limited character of the operating preferential schemes does not provide any grounds to developing countries for anticipating a fundamental improvement in their foreign trade positions. According to calculations of UNGTAD specialists, in 1976 such preferences extended to only one-seventh of those imports from developing countries into developed capitalist states to which duties apply, that is to a yearly turnover of 10.5 billion dollars. Even if one assumes that preferences can result in a completely tariffless import of the given products (although that is riot the case), for an average level of duties of less than 10 percent of value this represents a direct gain to developing countries of approximately 1 billion dollars per year (for a total volume of such exports of 257 billion dollars in 1976). According to other calculations increased exports of developing countries made possible by preferences amounted to 1.1 billion dollars (at 1974- 1975 prices).  [229•1  That this system of preferences is complex and inadequate and that its positive aspects are limited is recognized by United Nations documents.  [229•2 

p At the same time, even though these results are less than modest, they should not conceal the main political outcome, namely, the corresponding shifts in the external trade policies of developed capitalist states as they increasingly find it necessary to agree to concessions to developing countries, no matter how limited. This reflects the irreversible character of the process through which the influence of the newly-emerged states in international relations is increasing. It is also shown by the increasing range of demands that the developing states are addressing the developed capitalist powers, and jointly with socialist countries they are working for a progressive restructuring of the entire system of economic relations. In the detailed programme for such a restructuring that was embodied in the decisions in the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly, as well as in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State, much emphasis was placed on problems of further 230 libcralization in the conditions that govern access of the products of developing states to Western markets and on problems relating to a substantial improvement in the system of preferences.

p For example, the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order envisages measures designed to provide to developing countries "improved access to markets in developed countries through the progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and of restrictive business practices".  [230•1  It also envisages the "implementation, improvement and enlargement of the generalized system of preferences for exports of agricultural primary commodities, manufactures, and semimanufactures from developing to developed countries. . .”  [230•2 . The Manila Declaration of the Group of 77 goes even further. It links the problem of liberalizing the conditions of access of the products of developing countries to markets of developed states with the tasks of contributing to the industrial development and diversification of the economies of newly-emerged countries. It also calls for a substantial improvement in the system of preferences by extending to all products exported by developing countries completely tariffless imports unregulated by quotas.  [230•3 

p The demands of developing countries were reflected in UNCTAD’s Fourth Session, which took place in Nairobi in May 1976. That Conference’s resolutions call for a further development of the preferential system. In particular they condemn explicitly attempts of imperialist powers to make use of that system "as an instrument of political or economic coercion or of retaliation against developing countries, including those that have adopted or may adopt, singly or jointly, policies aimed at safeguarding their national resources".  [230•4  This refers primarily to the discriminatory conditions that were attached to the preferential system by the United States.

p At UNGTAD’s Fifth Session developing countries proposed even more far-reaching demands extending to an entire complex of measures aimed at expanding their industrial exports. 231 Moreover, the developing countries did not limit themselves to improvements in the system of preferences. In the Arusha Programme they raised the issue of "control [over] the operations of TNCs”, which are "a dominant factor in world production, marketing and distribution of manufactures and semi- manufactures. . .”  [231•1  In this connection attention must be focussed on combating the so-called restrictive business practices because these practices "notably those of the transnational corporations have adverse effects on the economic development of the developing countries, particularly in the field of production and marketing of manufactures and semi-manufactures".  [231•2  Such a sharp antimonopolistic formulation of the issue led to open countermeasures on the part of Western powers, as a result of which the Conference was not able to agree on a resolution concerning the further development of the preferential system and control over the activities of the TNCs.

p In the Manila Declaration of the Group of 77 the developing countries expressed their deep disappointment with the slow progress of negotiations taking place within the framework of GATT, and stressed that the fundamental principles of trade policies towards newly-emerged states announced at the beginning of the Tokyo Round "have not yet been complied with".  [231•3  Once again they formulated their wish to see a further improvement in the trade policies of developed countries as they relate to the special needs of developing countries. This was stated even more explicitly in the Arusha Programme. Both corresponding documents of the Group of 77 also stressed that effective measures should be adopted for improving the external economic positions of developing countries with regard to a wide range of issues, including the stabilization of export prices and of revenues from exports, conditions of external financing, invisible trade, and technology transfers.

p It may be that not all expectations of developing countries are equally consistent and realistic. This reflects the contradictory and complex character of the heterogeneous conglomerate 232 of developing countries that form the Group of 77 as well as differences in their socio-economic orientation. But there is no doubt concerning the anti-imperialist direction of major elements in the common basis of developing countries with regard to external economic problems. In view of the responsibility of neocolonialism for the backwardness and prolonged exploitation of the developing countries none of their claims on imperialism appear excessive when they are guided by a genuine concern for truly independent forms of development and for the interests of wide layers of the population in these states.

p The newly-emerged countries’ progressive aspirations receive the support of the community of socialist nations, which understands the needs of these states struggling for a national revival and for political and economic independence. That policy, which is based on the fundamental principles, has been stated comprehensively in the Report of the CPSU’s Central Committee to its 25th Congress. It noted, in particular, that "we do not conceal our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades in struggle.” It noted further that "from the rostrum of our Congress we again emphasize that the Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate aspirations of the young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth".  [232•1 

p At the 26th CPSU Congress it was again emphasized that "the CPSU will consistently continue the policy of promoting cooperation between the USSR and the newly-free countries, and consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement.”  [232•2 

The socialist countries’ consistent policy of supporting all progressive aspects of the external economic policies of newly-emerged states has contributed substantially towards the positive 233 outcomes of such major international economic forums of recent years as UNCTAD’s Fourth and Fifth sessions. At these conferences socialist countries presented joint declarations emphasizing that they "support the developing countries’ legitimate desire to safeguard their sovereignty over their own resources and economic activity, develop their economies for national ends and escape from neo-colonial exploitation by, inter alia, the establishment of control over the activities of foreign capital and, above all, of transnational corporations. . . It is on the basis of these positions that the socialist countries wish to express their favourable attitude to the Manila Declaraion and Programme of Action and their willingness to support all the provisions of those documents which are anti-monopolistic in nature and reflect the developing countries’ Jawful aspirations to achieve the restructuring of the inequitable economic relations existing within the world capitalist economy.”  [233•1  In a joint declaration of a group of countries representing the socialist community at UNCTAD’s Manila Conference emphasis was also placed on joint activities of both socialist and developing states, for "in view of the degree of economic rapprochement between countries, it would be illusory to believe that the patterns and standards of international trade can be restructured for one group of countries alone while restrictions and discrimination are maintained for another.”  [233•2 

* * *
 

Notes

 [212•1]   L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 16.

 [214•1]   Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 25 March-lG June 1964, Vol. I, United Nations, New York, 1964.

 [215•1]   U.N. Document A/Res/2626 (XXV), 2 November 1970.

[215•2]   U.N. Document A/Res/3202 (S-VI), 1 May 1974.

 [215•3]   U.N. Document A/Res/3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.

 [215•4]   U.N. Document A/Res/3362 (S-VII), 16 September 1975.

 [216•1]   U.N. Document TD/185/Supp. 2, 30 December 1975, p. 16.

 [218•1]   L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the Central Committee of the Cl’SU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, p. 21.

 [218•2]   World Marxist Review, Vol. 22, No. 5, May 1979.

[218•3]   Ibid., p. 25.

 [218•4]   L. I. Brc/hnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 16.

 [219•1]   I,. I. Bnvlmev, Report o[ the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, p. 20.

 [220•1]   Economic Impact, No. 4, 1975, p. 16.

 [221•1]   Oscar Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p. 16.

 [223•1]   The American Economic Review, New York, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 1978, p. 280.

[223•2]   Andrew Shonfield, et al., Ed. op. cit., p. 137.

 [224•1]   In particular the resolution defining the principles governing international trade policy states that within the framework of the mostfavoured-nation principle "developed countries should grant concessions to all developing countries and extend to developing countries all concessions they grant to one another and should not, in granting these or other concessions, require any concessions in return from developing countries" (Proceedings oj the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964, Vol. I, p. 25).

 [225•1]   Proceedings oj the United Nations on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964, Vol. I, p. 24.

 [226•1]   P. I. Khvoinik "Ot Zhenevy k Deli" (From Geneva to Delhi), Mlrovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 12, 1967.

 [226•2]   The New York Times, 16 May 1967, p. 20.

 [227•1]   Actually there does not exist a unified system as such. Instead there are independent systems of preferences granted by individual developed countries that are based on general principles. They differ both with regard to the products to which they relate and to the magnitudes of the tariff concessions that are granted as well as other conditions.

 [227•2]   U.N. Document TD/B/329; TD/BAC.5/36, 12 October 1970, p. 9.

[228•1]   Trade and Development, An UNCTAD Review, Geneva, No. 1, Spring 1979, p. 34.

[228•2]   U.N. Document TD/183, 14 April 1976, p. 37.

 [229•1]   U.N. Document TD/B/G.5/38, 6 November 1975, p. 1.

 [229•2]   Op. cit., p. 44.

 [230•1]   U.N. Document A/Res/3202 (S-VI), p. 6.

[230•2]   Ibid.

[230•3]   U.N. Document TD/195, 12 February 1976.

 [230•4]   U.N. Document TD/Res/96 (IV), 16 June 1976, p. 4.

 [231•1]   U.N. Document TD/236, 28 February 1979, p. 42.

[231•2]   Ibid., p. 45.

 [231•3]   U.N. Document TD/195, 12 February 1976, p. 19.

 [232•1]   L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. XXVth Congress oj the CPSU, pp. 16, 17.

[232•2]   L. I. Brezhnev, Report oj the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, p. 21.

 [233•1]   U.N. Document TD/211, 28 May 1976, p. 3.

 [233•2]   U.N. Document TD/249, 19 April 1979, p. 8.