p With the world swiftly drifting to war, the British and the French governments made yet another attempt at colluding with the Nazis. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson arrived at the conclusion that, just as in advance of Munich, Chamberlain had to get down to business himself once again. On Henderson’s initiative the British Premier sent a message to Hitler on August 22 which clearly revealed the hypocrisy of Ghamberlainean diplomacy. While pretending that the British government proposed to fulfil its obligations to Poland, Chamberlain pointed out that he was ready to enter into negotiations both to consider the issues in dispute between Germany and Poland, and to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest of Britain and Ger- many. ^^211^^

p The action undertaken by the British government was an unequivocal indication that, for the sake of a "general settlement" with Germany, it was ready for another Munich 271 situation, this time at the expense of Poland. W. Bullitt, having read Chamberlain’s message, arrived at a far from casual conclusion that "it sounded to me like the preparation for a new Munich".^^212^^ As he informed the U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy, of the substance of his message, on the following day, Chamberlain himself confessed that Britain’s policy on Poland was the same as it was on Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich. ^^213^^

p Instead of affording assistance to Poland, in co-operation with the USSR, the British government drastically intensified pressure on her to make her surrender to Germany without waiting for a war to break out.

p The United States also decided to do its bit towards yet another Munich, because it did not hope that Britain and France could hold out in case of war. On August 23, Kennedy urged in a message to the U.S. government that some pressure should be brought to bear on Poland urgently. "I see no other possibility”,^^214^^ he concluded. Joseph Kennedy, therefore, did not even suggest that Britain, France and the U.S. should exercise any pressure on Germany, that is, the aggressor, and found Poland’s surrender to be the only "way out".

p On August 23, Roosevelt addressed a message to the Italian king, and on August 24 to the Nazi Chancellor and the President of Poland, calling on them to work towards a peaceful settlement of the disputes that had developed.

p With the arrival in London of the British Ambassador to Germany, Henderson, who was, like Chamberlain, a committed partisan of an accommodation with Germany, there was yet more speculation about another shameful deal with the Fiihrer in the making. Bullitt, for instance, cabled to the Department of State that, according to his information, the British Premier had agreed with his ambassador in Berlin about "preparing a careful betrayal of Poland using a variation of the technique that they employed so successfully on Czechoslovakia." ^^215^^

p Describing the situation as it shaped up, I. M. Maisky pointed out on August 26 that "there is certainly some Munich mood in the air”. The British government, Roosevelt, the Pope, the Belgian king, to mention just a few, he wrote, are feverishly groping for some ground on which to “compromise” on the Polish issue.^^216^^ It was likewise noted in the Diaries of Oliver Harvey (Assistant to Halifax) on 272 August 27 that "another attempt at a Munich and selling out on the Poles" were in preparation. "Horace Wilson and A. A. Butler are working like beavers for this”, he stressed.^^217^^

p As one can see from the minutes of British Cabinet meetings, which have now become available to historians, Halifax declared at one of them thai the capture of Danzig, of itself was not yet providing a casus belli for Britain.^^218^^ That meant that Britain did not intend to come to Poland’s aid if the war began over Danzig. Chamberlain still believed, as late as August 26, that it was possible to reach an accommodation with Hitler. Setting out the Fuhrer’s position as he saw it, the British Premier said at a Cabinet meeting: "The basic idea was that if Britain would leave Herr Hitler alone in his sphere (Eastern Europe), he would leave us alone".^^219^^ London was prepared for a new deal with the Fiihrer on the same terms.

p On the following day, August 27 Chamberlain and Halifax informed Hitler again—through their unofficial mediator, the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus, who plied between London and Berlin, that they "desired a settlement with Germany". ^^22^^°

p Meanwhile, the Nazis were about through with their preparations for war. On August 23, the Danzig Nazis declared their Fiihrer Vorster to be the head of municipal authorities. That was a premeditated act of provocation designed to invite the retaliation by the Polish government which was to serve as a pretext for Germany’s "defensive measures" against Poland, that is, for the launching of hostilities.

p Under those circumstances, the British government signed a mutual assistance agreement with Poland on August 25. Yet, it did not so much as suspect that so belated an agreement could save Poland from defeat. On the very next day Henderson said at the British Cabinet Meeting that "the real value of our guarantee to Poland was to enable Poland to come to a negotiated settlement with Germa- ny". ^^221^^ However, even this evaluation proved exaggerated.

p The British government made further attempts to come to terms with the Nazis. On August 28, Chamberlain sent another message to Hitler, urging him to settle the GermanPolish conflict so as to get down to drafting a “broad” Anglo-German agreement. He expressly pointed out that he had a "sincere desire to reach agreement".^^222^^

p The full meaning of that message was revealed, for instance, in a dispatch Hitler sent to Mussolini who was in close contact with the British government in those days. "II Duce" wrote thai Chamberlain’s message contained "the pre-requisites and elements of what Germany would find as a favourable solution of all the problems of interest to her".^^223^^

p Although it became known in London by that time that the Nazi Reich had concentraled a large number of divisions to strike at Poland in a matter of days, it was agreed at a British Cabinet meeting on August 30 that "these military concentrations afforded no valid argument against further negotiations with the German government". ^^224^^ On the same day, Chamberlain admitted in talking to Kennedy that he was "more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans”, considering that it was the Poles that had to yield ground. The British Premier declared that "what really needs to be done is to work out the whole European economic political problem" which he was " willing to do with Hitler".^^225^^

p The French government proceeded along the same lines. Daladier reminded the Fiihrer in a message: "No Frenchman has done more than 1 did for strengthening not only peace between our counlries, but sincere co-operation".^^226^^

However, Hitler did not propose to change his plans. The only reason why he kept up contact with the British government and even offered to conclude an Anglo-German al- liance, ^^227^^ was because he wanted the impending armed conflict between Germany and Poland to be localised. He had no intention of concluding any agreement with Britain at all. Back on August 22 the German government issued an instruction about the line to take on various soundings for the possibility of opening negotiations: entering any negotiations was strictly forbidden.^^228^^