PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW
Translated from the Russian by Stanislav
Ponomarenko
Designed by Stas Morozov
O., PassiepOB B., ToMaiiieBCKHft 3-
AKTVAJIBHfclE nPOEJIEMH BHEIIIHEIl nOJIHTHKII CCCP
Hfi __COPYRIGHT__ © HsflaTejibCTBO «Ilporpecc», 198111102---845 B 014(01)---81 43 81
~0802010100 [2] CONTENTS Page I SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WORLD TODAY ............... 5 1. The Great October Revolution and the Upheaval in the System of International Relations............. 5 2. New International Realities and the Foreign Policy Strategy of Socialism ... 18 3. The 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses: A Programme of Peace Effort . . 28 II. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING A NUCLEAR WORLD WAR......... 37 1. The Question of War and Peace Today 4o 2. The AVorld Strategic Situation .... 48 3. The Universal Problem of Removing the Danger of AVar.......... 53 4. The Precarious Balance of Terror ... 60 5. The Struggle to Curb the Arms Race and for Military Detente........68 III. FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION .............87 1. The Soviet Conception of Peaceful Coexistence ............88 2. Realistic Trends in Western Foreign Policy: a Prerequisite for Detente ... 95 3. Peaceful Coexistence in Practice .... 103 4. AVorking Towards Security and Cooperation in Europe After Helsinki . . .112 5. Detente and Anti-Detente......121 IV. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEWLY LIBERATED COUNTRIES........141 L Political Co-operation........143 2. Economic Co-operation.......156 V. FRIENDSHIP AND ALL-ROUND CO-- OPERATION AVITH THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES .............166 1. The New Type of International Relations 167 3 2. Mutual Economic Assistance.....176 3. Co-ordination of Foreign Policy . . . .184 VI. AGAINST PEKING'S HEGEMONISTIC POLICY COURSE.............193 1. Peking's Ideology and Policy: a Threat to Peace.............194 2. For the Normalisation of Soviet-Chinese Relations ............207 CONCLUSION..............213 [4] __ALPHA_LVL1__ I. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICYFor over 60 years the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been a major driving force in the development of international relations. A look at history shows us that the role of socialist foreign policy has been steadily increasing. Is this an accidental phenomenon or a natural process? What are the factors behind this trend? Will they continue to affect world developments today, when new forces are stepping into the world arena and international life is becoming ever more complicated, intricate and dynamic? What are the main channels through which the foreign policy of socialist countries affects the contemporary world?
To answer these questions we have to consider, firstly, the social nature of the Soviet state and its foreign policy, and secondly, the specific features of the system of international relations in view of the realities of human society at its present stage of development.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Great October RevolutionThe triumph of the socialist revolution in Russia in October 1917 ushered in a new era in the historical destinies of the peoples living 5 within its boundaries, as well as of many nations outside them. At the same time it entailed a complete reshaping of the former system of international relations. Moreover, the October Revolution influenced international relations immediately and directly while it affected the internal development of individual countires in different ways and at different times. A change in the character and social content of international relations was the most important aspect of this influence, which is still very much in evidence.
The October Revolution gave rise to a state which differed in principle from any other state involved in international relations. Power in this slate was no longer in the hands of the exploiter classes, the age-old advocates of the expansion and oppression which had characterised international life in previous times, but in the hands of the working class striving to liberate the masses of the working people from all exploitation, from social and national oppression.
The emergence of this state, the embodiment of a new socio-economic system---socialism, meant that the main class contradiction of our time, the contradiction between labour and capital, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, was now carried over into the sphere of international relations. This contradiction formed the basis of relations between the Soviet socialist state and all the other, capitalist states. Moreover, it perceptibly affected other components of the system of international relations, including relations between capitalist countries themselves, and also between the imperialist home countries and their vast colonial possessions.
As a result, the new system of international 6 relations was no longer exclusively influenced by the natural laws of capitalist development; laws governing the development of the new social system began to affect it, if only to a certain degree and in certain ways. This system, notwithstanding some specific features inherent in international relations, reflected the character of a new historical age, the age of transition from capitalism to socialism.
An analysis of the influence of socialism on the system of international relations reveals that this influence had two aspects: the objective (the emergence, existence and consolidation of the new social system, which steadily changed the correlation of world forces) and the subjective (the foreign policy of the socialist state). These two aspects were and are closely interconnected. Here the following natural progression is observed: the greater the successes of the socialist state in building socialism and communism, the greater the potential and efficacy of its international activity. A successful socialist foreign policy in turn ensures the most favourable conditions for greater achievements in building the new social system and for a further change in the correlation of world forces in favour of socialism.
Immediately after its emergence the Soviet state announced new principles of international relations. The Decree on Peace, signed by Lenin, was its first official document. The subsequent practical activity of Soviet diplomacy convincingly showed the whole world that a new revolutionary and creative force had arisen in world politics.
Today concepts, such as socialist foreign policy and socialist diplomacy sound quite natural. Sixty years ago, however, things were very 7 different. The triumph of the socialist revolution in one country (Russia) posed a fundamentally new problem---the problem of the foreign policy to be pursued by a socialist state encircled by hostile capitalist countries. The complexity of the problem stemmed from the sharp qualitative change in the actual position of the working class which had become a ruling class. This made it extremely difficult for its vanguard, the Communist Party, to go over, as Georgi Chicherin, one of the first leaders of Soviet diplomacy, put it, "from the old views of an underground revolutionary party to the political realism of a government in office".^^1^^
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the question of the foreign policy of a socialist state encircled by capitalist countries had not been theoretically elaborated by Marx and Engels because they thought it unlikely that the proletarian revolution might triumph in one country. In advancing the thesis that peace would be an international principle of the new society, they proceeded from the proposition that the "national ruler will be everywhere the same---Labour!"~^^2^^ In 1917, however, all the peoples in the world, except in Russia, remained under the rule of capital.
In the first months after the October Revolution the Communists were noticeably swayed by Leftist views based on the idea that the _-_-_
~^^1^^ G. V. Chicherin, Articles and Speeches on International Politics, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1961, p. 277 (in Russian).
~^^2^^ "First Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the FrancoPrussian War'', The General Council of the First International. 1870--1871, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, p. 328.
8 internationalist tasks of the Soviet state boiled down to a revolutionary war against the capitalist countries and to pressing for world revolution. The ``Leftists'' ignored the real situation, did not understand the specifics of the foreign policy tasks of the proletariat that had come topowor in one country, jeopardised the very existence of Soviet power, and thereby rejected in principle the possibility and expediency of any other relations with the capitalist world, except a "revolutionary war''.At the Seventh Communist Party Congress, convened specially to discuss the problem of peace with Germany, Nikolai Bukharin said that "there could be no peaceful co-habitation between us, between the Soviet Republic and international capital" and that "war against international capital is the one and only possibleand necessary prospect for the future".^^1^^ Trotsky maintained that "deals with the imperialists are inadmissible for the revolutionary class".^^2^^
These concepts promulgated by the "Left Communists" and Trotsky virtually excluded any foreign policy action on the part of the socialist state. Their position proved to be risky and speculative in practice; it not only exposed their inability to objectively assess the real situation and seek new forms of class struggle, but could also be perilous for both the revolution in Russia and the world revolution.
The basic principles of the strategy and tactics of the foreign policy of the proletariat which had emerged victorious in one country, were elaborated by Lenin, who headed the first _-_-_
~^^1^^ Seventh Extraordinary RCP(B) Congress. March 1918, Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1962, pp. 26, 35 (in Russian).
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 71.
9 Soviet government. Lenin's foreign policy programme was based on a sober analysis of the objective reality and on a comprehensive account of the correlation of world forces.The appearance of the first socialist state on the international scene meant not only a qualitatively new stage in the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie on a global scale, but also the emergence of as yet unknown forms of this struggle. It became even more important to choose the right forms of struggle in the context of foreign policy in view of the fact that in that domain the victorious working class was confronted by a particularly strong, experienced and perfidious adversary---world imperialism. "That giant,'' Lenin wrote, "must be fought. And one must know how to fight him.'' He also emphasised that the socialist revolution in other countries "must be helped. And we have to know how to help it.''^^1^^
Proletarian internationalism and the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems became the main principles of the practical foreign policy of socialism. Lenin, who personally guided Soviet domestic and foreign policy, not only urged that "new ways of solving our international problems"^^2^^ be sought, but also brilliantly showed how to actually solve them in the extremely difficult conditions of the first years of Soviet power, in the conditions of fierce class struggle, civil war, foreign military intervention, _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "A Painful But Necessary Lesson'', Collected Works, Vol. 27, pp. 64--65.
~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin, "Speech Delivered at a Non-Party Conference of Workers and Red Army Men of Presnya District, Moscow, January 24, 1920'', Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 302.
10 economic and diplomatic blockade, and economic dislocation.Lenin believed that the principal (both in national and international terms) task of the victorious socialist revolution was to organise economic construction in the reality of the new system. Therefore, ensuring most favourable, i.e., peaceful, conditions for economic rehabilitation and development (which at that time was the essence of socialist construction in Soviet Russia) became a prime objective of Soviet foreign policy. The new social system did not need war to triumph. War contradicts the very nature of socialism which removes power and influence from the advocates of militarism and aggression. Peace, on the contrary, is essential for socialism's rapid economic and social progress. The emergence of the socialist state could not completely remove the threat of future world wars, yet it markedly changed the atmosphere in which the popular masses were struggling for peace. The development of the socialist stale and its peace policy became a chief obstacle on the road leading to a new world war.
The need to work for peace, a central strategic trend in Soviet foreign policy, was dictated by the vital interests of Russia, worn out and ravaged by the years of imperialist war. The foreign policy of a socialist stale, aimed al ensuring conditions for the peaceful work of ils people, brings peace to other peoples as well. This is why it fully accords with the vital interests of the whole of mankind.
Soviet foreign policy combines class and universal humane principles, which explains its profound and powerful impact on international relations.
The peaceful nalure of the foreign policy 11 objectives set forth by the Soviet state was secured in government decrees and legislative acts, such as the Decree on Peace, a number of subsequent government decrees, and the first Soviet Constitution (1918)---the Fundamental Law of the R.S.F.S.R. The latter set the task of building at all costs "a democratic world of the working people without annexations and contributions, on the basis of free self-determination of nations''.
On the eve of the adoption of the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1924, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee addressed an Appeal to All Peoples and Governments of the World in which it declared that the Union formed on the basis of fraternal co-operation between the constituent Soviet Republics had set itself the task of preserving peace with all peoples. The Appeal said: "A natural ally of oppressed peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is seeking peaceful and friendly relations and economic co-operation with all peoples.''
Of immense importance in this context was the unity of theory and practice. The history of diplomacy abounds in peace declarations and good intentions. Moreover, peace slogans were frequently used to cover up an aggressive policy. Lenin's Decree on Peace and subsequent foreign policy documents, however, were immediately backed up by action. The principled position and serious intentions of the young Soviet state in (he international field were proved by such actions as the publication of secret treaties concluded by the former tsarist government, the renunciation of all preferential rights and privileges wrenched from weaker partners, the granting of independence to a number of the national peripheral areas of tsarist Russia and the 12 expropriation of foreign property. All countries, including the imperialist powers which had hitherto been supreme rulers in world politics, had to reckon with this fact.
The Decree on Peace had a very strong anticolonial bias, it defined annexation as "any joining of a small or weak nationality to a big or powerful state without the clearly and voluntarily expressed consent or wish of that nationality'', and made a special provision saying that this definition related not only to Europe, but also to "far-away overseas countries".^^1^^
The principles of equality of nations, respect for their interests, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries found their expression in the practical political course of the Soviet state toward both the oppressed peoples of the former tsarist empire and toward other peoples, primarily its southern neighbours: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and China.
In its relations with the countries of the East the Soviet government not only declared full equality, but also renounced all legal rights and privileges, and all property acquired as a result of the oppressive policies of the tsarist government and the Russian bourgeoisie.
Besides, the Soviet government, despite its limited resources and economic potential at that time, accorded material assistance to some Eastern countries, including arms deliveries and military specialists sent to help them in their national liberation struggle. Such assistance was particularly prominent in Soviet Russia's relations with Turkey and China.
And last but not least, the Soviet state consistently upheld the interests of oppressed _-_-_
~^^1^^ Foreign Policy Documents of the U.S.S.R., Vol. I, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1957, p. 12 (in Russian).
13 peopies at international conferences and in the course of diplomatic negotiations.Soviet support for the national liberation aspirations of the peoples of the East was of immense importance to them. Apart from giving them direct and appreciable material advantages, it substantially facilitated the struggle for their rights and liberation from imperialist dependence.
Friendly relations with the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries and solidarity willi their liberation struggle were features that made the foreign policy of socialism fundamentally different from that of imperialism and promoted the ideas of the October Revolution throughout the world. As Jawaharlal Nehru noted, "Almost contemporaneously with [the] October Revolution under the leadership of the great Lenin we in India started a new phase of our struggle for freedom .. . Even though we pursued a different path in our struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi we admired Lenin and were influenced by his example.''^^1^^
Yet in the first years of the existence of the young Soviet state its foreign policy had only limited opportunities to influence international relations in a practical way. This stemmed from the existing correlation of world forces, which was unfavourable for the Soviet state. Although the moral and political advantage of socialism over capitalism was obvious from the very beginning, the Soviet Republic's economic and military potential was much lower than that of the imperialist powers. Soviet foreign policy could not be effectively backed up materially. Yet it _-_-_
~^^1^^ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1961, p. 573.
14 managed to score indisputable successes even in the early years. These successes were ensured,, on the one hand, by support from progressive forces in other countries, and on the other, by sharp contradictions between individual capitalist countries, as well as between individual groups inside the ruling class of each country. Soviet foreign policy made use of these contradictions and actively promoted the cause of peace.Being fully aware of its limited opportunities in the international arena, the Soviet state, nevertheless, consistently assumed a constructive approach both to specific issues of its bilateral relations with particular countries and to general problems of international relations. The Soviet government persistently included in the priority list of international problems many key issues, such as disarmament.
Thereby the Soviet state not only showed the world that its policy was truly peaceful, but also laid down a new foundation for the international co-operation of countries with different social systems and prepared the ground for future concrete steps in this field.
Realism in evaluating the nature of international relations, flexibility and readiness to make compromises were the strongest points of Leninist foreign policy. Being fully aware of the polarity of the socio-economic systems and of the main class objectives of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the capitalist countries, on the other, Soviet foreign policy showed that the U.S.S.R. was ready to co-operate with them in seeking solutions to particular international problems. Examples of this approach could be found not only in the develoment of Soviet bilateral relations with individual bourgeois countries, but 15 also in the fact that the Soviet Union participated in various multilateral agreements (for instance, the Kellogg-Briand Pact^^1^^).
Soviet foreign policy was especially active in its anti-aggression struggle in the first half of the 1930s, when a hot spot appeared in the Far East as a result of the Japanese intervention in China and peace in Europe was greatly endangered following the establishment of a fascist regime in Germany. Seeking to strengthen peace, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to participate in joint actions to ensure collective security, to take collective measures to restrain the aggressor and, on this basis, to extend cooperation with the capitalist countries. In December 1933 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party adopted a resolution stating that the Soviet Union would join the League of Nations and offering to conclude a regional agreement between European countries that would provide for joint measures to repulse the aggression. Once it had joined (in 1934) the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was active in using that forum to condemn the aggressive designs of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It supported a motion submitted by the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, for European states to conclude a multilateral collective security agreement (the Eastern Pact). In 1935, the U.S.S.R. signed mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia.
_-_-_~^^1^^ The Kellogg-Briand Pact (or the Treaty of Paris) prohibiting war as an instrument of national policy, was signed by the U.S.A., France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and other countries on 27 August 1927. The U.S.S.R. not only signed this treaty and was the first to ratify it, but also reached an agreement with a number of neighbouring countries that the pact should become effective ahead of time.
16The role of Soviet foreign policy was further increased in the course of World War 11, which showed the might of tiie Soviet state, its determination and ability to give a shattering rebuff to any aggression and any attempt to weaken socialism by means of war. The courageous and selfless way in which the Soviet Army fought and its liberating mission coupled with the Soviet policy aimed at setting up and strengthening an anti-Hitler coalition were fully in keeping witli the national interests of the U.S.S.R. and helped to create prerequisites for lasting peace.
The heroic feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War (1941--45) and their decisive contribution to the crushing defeat of nazism had won them immense moral and political prestige and recognition among the public in the West. U.S. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to acknowledge the Soviet Union's outstanding contribution to the rout of nazi Germany and emphasised the selflessness and heroism of the Soviet people during World War 11.
After World War II the impact of Soviet foreign policy on international relations became more perceptible. The U.S.S.R. played an active role in setting up the United Nations Organisation and in a just postwar settlement. Yet its attempts to preserve and expand liie wartime cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition did not yield positive results, although ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was becoming an ever more urgent question.
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2-10290 17 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. New International Realities andThe increased role of socialist foreign policy in the system of international relations and changes in its functions and potential largely stem from deep social .shifts in I he contemporary world. International relations were bound to he affected by the economic and political successes of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, by the tightly knil community of socialist conntries, by the upsurge of the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa and the emergence on the international scene of scores of newly free countries, by the intense struggles waged by the working class in the main centres of the capitalist world, by I he spread of the ideas of socialism, by the growing activity of popular peace movements, and by Ihe new stage in the general crisis of capitalism.
At the same time, the technological revolution which began in the mid-20lh century has acquired immense importance. Its results, which are most spectacular in Ihe military field, have greatly affected international relations. And this is not only because nuclear arms and delivery vehicles are becoming an ever more important component of the correlation of world forces, which is the objective basis for the development of international relations. The main point is that the tremendous striking potential of the new weapon alters not only the character of military operations, but also the possible social consequences of war. All previous wars (even when they assumed a global scale and resulted in millions of deaths) were, as a rule, accompanied by 18 a stepped-up revolutionary process and, in the final analysis, contributed to social prog-
Today, however, a new world war with the use of nuclear weapons (if, of course, it is not prevented) would bring about unprecedented, and in many respects irreversible, destruction of the productive forces, the death of hundreds of millions of people, and grave genetic consequences for future generations.
True, wars in the past were also preceded by the gloomiest prognoses of their consequences, and apocalyptic visions of the end of human civilisation were not a rarity. But the previous forecasts substantially differ from those of today. In the past they were made by novelists, publicists and philosophers motivated more by emotion than knowledge, whereas now warning of the catastrophic consequences of a future war comes from the most authoritative representatives of the exact sciences who prove their point with concrete figures and facts.
The development and improvement, in the course of the technological revolution, of new types of weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, and cardinal shifts in the alignment and correlation of social forces, on the other, underlie a fundamentally new approach to the problem of war and peace. Preventing a world thermonuclear catastrophe has become a task of paramount importance for all peoples, a primary condition for the survival of mankind.
Today the attitude taken to this problem has become an important criterion for assessing historical personalities, political parties, governments and social systems. The development of __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 capitalism in its imporialisl stage lias engendered a nuclear lineal, with imperialism being its chief scnii'ce, whereas socialism and other progressive forces open up a real prospect for averting t!:is I iiivat.
Given the arms race and the aggressive foreign policy of I lie U.S. ruling quarters in the postwar years, it \vas of vital importance for an effective peace effort to put an end to the American nuclear monopoly. Clearly, effective material mean:; were required to curb the aggression and to stop the aggressive imperialist politicians who, counting on their impunity, could drag mankind into the abyss of a new world war.
In that situation the Soviet Union developed, in a short time, its own atomic weapon (1949), and then also a more powerful thermonuclear device (1953). By the second half of the 1950s it had also developed the most advanced and effective delivery vehicles---missiles of various ranges. The first ever artificial Earth satellite launched by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957 was a vivid demonstration of its successes in the major fields of scientific and technical progress.
As a resull of subsequent drastic changes in the alignment and correlation of world forces and the consolidation of the anti-imperialist movement which found in the Soviet armed forces a powerful means of deterring the aggressors, world wars were no longer inevitable.
The fundamentally new aspects of the content and significance of the problem of war and peace called for a thorough analysis of the new situation, for new theoretical conclusions and for a corresponding foreign policy strategy to be pursued by the socialist countries. These tasks were 20 coped with by the 20fh (195(5) and subsequent congresses of the CPSU.
The CPSU's conclusions concerning fundamental international is=ues have found an enthusiastic response throughout the world. They were further developer! in the documents of the 1957, 1960, and 10(59 International Meetings of Communist and Workers' Partie:-;, in the theoretical and practical activity of other Marxist-- Leninist parlies, and in Ihc foreign policy pursued by the socialist community countries.
The new social implications of Ihe problem of war and peace have resulted in international relations playing a greatly increased role in social development.
__NOTE__ Next paragraph fixed; faint printing in original.The course (hat inlernal social processes take in individual countries and the very existence of these countries largely depend on whether a new world war with the use of nuclear missiles can be averted. This in turn directly depends on the development of international relations, the problem of war and peace being solved primarily in the course of struggle between countries of the two different social systems. As distinct from the past, when millions of people were only drawn into world politics in the course of war, today the very threat of world nuclear holocaust gives peoples around the globe an interest in seeing that international relations develop in such a way as to exclude this mortal danger.
Never before have the fat" of millions of people. Ihe direction and results of the class struggle inside particular countries so greatly depended on the alignment and correlation of world forces, on the slate of international relations, and on Ihe way major iniernalional issues are being settled.
21Within Llio now historical context it became especially evident that it would be extremely dangerous to continue the Cold War unleashed by the aggressive imperialist circles, that it was objectively necessary to reject the traditional military methods of settling international disputes, and Iliat it was possible to organise broad international co-operation in matters related to averting war.
When socialism made its appearance in the international arena, its foreign policy began to exert an ever greater influence both on the system of international relations and on the future course of social progress. In the second half of the 20th century this influence has reached a qualitatively new level and become a natural tendency. There are three factors behind it:
(1) There has been a sharp increase in the role played by international relations both in the fate of mankind at large and in that of every individual, because it is in this sphere that the problem of averting a nuclear world war is being solved.
(2) The functions and potential of socialist foreign policy have markedly changed. Now it is able to work more effectively toward curbing aggressor. Alongside safeguarding the state interests and security of the U.S.S.R., it upholds the interests of other countries and facilitates their struggle for social progress. It should be noted that this influence is exerted by creating peaceful external conditions conducive to social processes freely developing inside these countries, rather than through iuterference in their internal affairs.
(?>) By its very nature socialist foreign policy is based on Irue humanism and love of peace which have deep moral roots in socialist society 22 and fully con Form to the theory of scientific socialism.
Profound changes in the international situation, the need to aver! a thermonuclear world war, the impact of technological progress, and modern trends in the world economy have all, without changing the social nature of capitalist and socialist states, resulted in their mutual interest, in maintaining peace and extending international co-operation, and made it imperative to restructure inter-stale relations along the lines of peaceful coexistence.
The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. has won recognition throughout the world. It has been given its due not only by Communists, but also by some outstanding Western state figures and politicians. President Urho K. Kekkonen of Finland, for example, noted that the Soviet Union ''after the severe trials of (lie Second World War began consistently to strive for strengthening peaceful coexistence and establishing truly international cultural, trade and scientific relations''.~^^1^^
Fred Warner Ncal, a prominent American political scientist, wrote in the early 1960s: "The Sputniks and Soviet ICBMs and rockets brought home to us that we had misread Soviet capabilities. There is reason now for serious consideration of the possibility that we have also misread Soviet, intentions as far as military aggression is concerned.''~^^2^^
Fidel Castro, referring to the U.S.S.R.'s role in defending small countries, said: "Had it not _-_-_
~^^1^^ TJ. K. Kekkonon. Finland and the. Soviet Union. Good-Ncighbourliness. Co-operation. Mutual Understanding, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 8t (in Russian).
^^2^^ Fred Warner \eal. U.K. Foreign Policy and the Soi'ift Union. Outer for Uie Study of Democratic Instiliilidiis, Santa Barbara, California, 1901, p. 7.
23 been for Hie Soviet. Union, in conditions of a shortage of raw material- resources nnd of an energy crisis the capitalist powers would have unhesitatingly launched a partition of the world. Had it, not heen for tho Soviet Union, it would have heen impossible even to conceive of the measure of idependenre now enjoyed by small states, the successful struggle of the peoples for the return of their natural riches under their control, or the fact that their voice now resounds impressively in the concert of nations.''^^1^^The CPSU's foreign policy strategy is characterised by an inherent combination of the principles of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. The policy of peaceful coexistence aims to curb the aggressive forces of imperialism and remove the threat of world nuclear war and fully conforms to the interests of the popular masses struggling for national independence, democracy and social progress. At the same time consolidation of the international solidarity of the working class and communist parties, of all anti-imperialist forces is an important condition for success in the struggle for peaceful coexistence, international security and cooperation.
The questions of the socio-hislorical role of socialist foreign policy, of the specifics of the world class struggle, rind of the correlation of inter-state relations and (he world revolutionary process are of fundamental importance. They have acquired added significance today as social processes deepen and expand and positive trends emerge in international relations. On the one hand, the successes of detente are a direct result _-_-_
~^^1^^ Our Frir-nils Speak. Novnsfi Props Agency Publishing TTonsp. Moscow, 1976, p. 34
24 of the change in the correlation of world forces in favour of socialism, of all forces of social progress. On the other hand, the turn from the Cold War 'o delenle. the decreasing danger of nuclear war and the extension of mutually advantageous international co-operation are not only promoting social nrogress throughout the world, but are also becoming essential prerequisites for its attainment.The continunlion and extension of detente and the restructuring of international relations on the nrincinles of peaceful coexistence are also in the interests of the working people of the capitalist world. Of course, the successes of the anti-monopoly slruo-He, the greater number of allies won over to its side by the working class and the increased influence of the Communists are primarily the result of internal causes, such as the exacerbation of contradictions within capitalist society. Yet external factors are also playing an ever increasing role and not only because the progress of detente brings with it a diminished threat of war with all its fatal consequences. Tn the context of detente social processes get rid of the deforming impact of the Cold War, favourable conditions are created for weakening the position of the most reactionary militaristic circle" nnr! the possibility of " exporting counter-revolulioTi" is limited. Tt is in this context that positive changes occurred in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and new trends in the internal nolicy of France, Italy and some other capitalist coivilries became more discernible. Of course, this does not and cannot happen automatically, and the forces of reaction and militarism are far from laving down their arms.
Detente i« in tho interests of the national liberation struggle waged by the peoples of Asia, 25 Africa and Latin America, of all the developing countries. This is because detente offers fewer opportunities for llie imperialists and old and new colonialists to preserve their privileges by means of military intervention. At the same time it increases the opportunities for the developing countries to exploit their natural resources in their own interests, to choose their own path of development and to play a more active role in international affairs.
Therefore detente, being largely a result of the successful development of the world revolutionary process, in (urn creates more favourable conditions for freely waging the class struggle and for contemporary progressive and revolutionary forces to achieve new victories.
But the historical significance of the positive changes in (he international arena is far greater. Given the present level productive forces have; reached, the deepening of detente is a necessary condition for solving problems confronting the whole of humanity.
Of course, no restructuring of international relations can change and even less abolish the laws of social development. The class struggle in politics, economics, and ideology will go on as long as classes exist. The historically inevitable confrontation between socialism and capitalism will continue to permeate the sphere of international relations as well. In calling for detente and a reshaping of inter-stale relations the Communists do not intend to remove thereby all class contradictions. By this they mean only to search for ways and forms of interrelationship between countries of the two different systems which correspond to the interests of the whole of mankind.
The increased role of socialist foreign policy 26 in world development imposes special responsibility on the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties. In the field of domestic policy the class struggle gradually disappears as socialism progresses further, whereas in the field of foreign policy the situation is quite different. The party in power in a socialist stale has to deal not only with allied or neutral forces, but also with class-- hostile forces, with a powerful and experienced adversary, with a close-knit and intricate entanglement of class, national and at times group interests in the policies of other countries. In many cases it is impossible not only to control such interests but even to pinpoint, analyse and take them into account.
Despite its inherently conservative forms, foreign policy is undergoing rapid changes today. It reflects, directly or indirectly, impetuous social changes in the contemporary world and the revolution in science and technology. A sober and accurate account of these changes, a thorough analysis of the real situation together with every possible effort to actively influence it are acquiring ever greater importance. A creative and theoretically substantiated approach is necessary to establish an effective foreign policy, whereas dogmatism and subjectivism are particularly irrelevant here and are fraught with harmful consequences.
27 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. The 24th, 25thSo. the foreign policy of tho Soviet Communist Pnrty and rrovernment is an inseparable and ever more important part of international relations today. Tf i? natural therefore that CPSTT copgre<;cp-- have become landmarks in their development. This a]co holds good for the 24th. 25th ,""d ?fith Pnrty Congresses. Their importance for international politics stem" hoth from the ^pecifics of world developments in the 1970s arid fr^m the ^rogrammo of foreign policy activi'ioj. adopted at the congresses. This is a programme <-f further action toward preserving peace and on-Miring the essential right of each man, the right to live.
The development of international relations in the first half of t^e 1070s was markedly influenced hy the Pence Programme adopted by Hie 2'il.h CPSTT Congress. Essentially, it strove to bring ahoi;t n swing from the Cold War to the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, from e\nlosive tensions in international relations to detente and mutually beneficial co-opernKon. International developments have frllv borne out the vitality of the Leninist principles of socialist foreign policy, and the efficacy of that policy pursued hy the Soviet stale.
As lias been noted earlier, the swing from the Cold War to detente was primarily connected with changes in the correlation of world forces. Yet it look a lot of time and effort to make the ruling circles in the West acknowledge l'ie now realities and correspondingly adapt their political 28 thinking and action. They came to realise, if. only gradually, that it was ineffectual and dangerous to continue the Gold War and thai, they had lo abandon tho former methods of balancing on (lie brink of war and the policy of confrontation and adopt the course of settling disputes through negotiations and international co-operation. The political realism displayed hy leading politicians in a number of capitalist countries became, in the early 1970s, an important factor leading lo positive changes in international relations. As a result, considerable progress was achieved, in the development of relations between the socialist and capitalist countries, in their efforts lo relax international tension, to establish the principles of peaceful coexistence and to diminish (he danger of a new world war.
The 25th C.PSU Congress confirmed ihat the Party would continue its foreign policy and that the U.S.S.R. was ready to carry on the policy of detente with redoubled energy, which was of paramount importance.
The Congress put forward a programme for further peace action characterised by sober political realism. Having accumulated the experience of previous years, the programme was based on the concrete situation in the mid-1970s and concentrated the forces of peace on a group of first-priority issues, whoso solution, though not easy, was quite possible.
A great deal of attention was given at the Congress to curbing the arms race and to taking initial steps to reduce the accumulated stockpiles of arms, i.e. to start disarmament. This is only natural because today the continuation of the arms race poses a serious threat to universal peace and may cancel out the fruits of political detente. Work towards stopping the arms race, 29 towards disarmament was and remains a chief /rend in Soviet foreign policy. Ju seeking universal and complete disarmament, the USSR is doing its utmost to mako headway on separate lengths of the road leading lo this goal.
Specifically, the (Congress resolved lo "do everything to complete the preparation a new Soviet-US agreement on limiting and reducing strategic armaments, and conclude international treaties on universal and complete termination of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons, on banning development of new types and systems of mass annihilation weapons and also banning modification of the natural environment for military and other hostile purposes''.~^^1^^
The proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R. acquire added urgency as new types of lethal weapons and military hardware are being developed more rapidly than negotiations aimed at reducing armaments are taking place. Any further delay in such negotiations is dangerous.
The Congress emphasised that liquidating the remaining hotbeds of war, primarily the conclusion of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, was an important problem that warranted concerted efforts by peace-loving states. The Soviet Union's constructive attitude towards the political settlement of the Middle East conflict was once again confirmed by the Congress.
Prominence in the Congress documents was given to a range of measures to deepen detente and lend it concrete forms of peaceful, mutually advantageous co-operation between states with _-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 31.
30 different social systems. The Soviet Union, as was emphasised al the Congress, intends patiently and consistently lo search for new ways of extending such co-operation. The Congress formulated the long-range objective of Soviet European policy as striving to make "lasting peace the natural way of life for all the European peoples''.^^1^^An important role in translating detente into reality is attached, alongside the development of multilateral co-operation, to bilateral relations which, as experience has shown, still offer great opportunities. In keeping with the principles of peaceful coexistence the Soviet Union is seeking to develop long-term mutually beneficial political, economic, scientific and cultural co-operation with the United States, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan, and other capitalist countries. The Congress stressed the U.S.S.R.'s firm intention of trying to improve Soviet-American relations in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the existing agreements and obligations.
The Congress stressed the importance and urgency of global problems, such as the raw-- material or energy problem, eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, protection of the environment, space exploration, and utilisation of the World Ocean resources. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to participate in solving these problems which in the long term will have an ever greater impact on the life of each nation, on the whole system of international relations.
The burning issues of further work for peace, _-_-_
~^^1^^ Documents and lli'solutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 24.
31 the freedom and independence ol peoples include Finding ways lo ensure security in Asia on the basis ol' joint efforts undertaken by Uie countries oi' thai continent. The urgency ol' this problom slems i'roin the important and profound changes that have occurred in Asia over the past years, and also from some unresolved disputes that might lead to international conflict. Leonid Brezhnev has formulated the Soviet approach to the problem of international relations in Asia as follows: "The Soviet Union intends lo continue its active participation in I he search for ways of consolidating peace and security on the Asian continent, and of developing equal co-operation there as well. We shall work for this through bilateral contacts, and also on a multilateral basis."^^1^^ The Congress once again emphasised that the U.S.S.R. was ready to study attentively any proposals prompted by concern for lasting peace and security in Asia.Following the general policy of the 24th CPSLJ Congress, the 25th Congress proposed that an international treaty on the non-use of force in relations between states be signed. Its participants would pledge to refrain from using any weapon, including nuclear, in settling their disputes.
The complete elimination of the remnants of colonial oppression, of the infringements of the equality and independence of peoples, and of all centres of colonialism and racism is another pressing international problem. Its urgency stems from the stubborn reluctance of the South African regime to satisfy the lawful demands and aspirations of the indigenous population, from the _-_-_
^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 19.
32 aggressive actions of South African troops and white mercenaries supported by the imperialist circles and Maoisl leaders against Angola. The 25th CPSU Congress formulated the Soviet Union's position in III is way: non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples, respect for the right of each people and of each country to choose its own path of development, and support for the peoples fighting for their freedom.The basic principles of relations between the Soviet state and Eastern countries, formulated by Lenin, had to a certain extent anticipated the profound changes in international relations following the emergence of scores of independent young countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These principles lie at the bottom of today's anti-imperialist alliance between world socialism and national liberation movements.
Socialism, its economic and military might and its foreign policy ensure that the developing countries can depend upon protection from imperialist allempls to restore its political domination by force of arms.
The existence of the system of world socialism is of great importance for the economic development of the newly liberated countries. The abolition of the Western monopoly on trade with economically underdeveloped countries ( including the monopoly on arms deliveries) and the possibility of obtaining credit, industrial equipment and scientific and technological assistance from the socialist countries on mutually advantageous terms facilitate industrialisation and social progress in Asian, African, and Latin American countries.
Reliance on socialist states helps national liberation movements and enhances the role of __PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-01290 33 the formerly oppressed peoples not only in shaping their own destinies, but also in solving many key international issues.
The young countries in turn often support socialist countries in their attitude to many international problems and act as active opponents of policies of aggression. Imperialism has had to back down on many occasions faced with the concerted action of socialism and national liberation movement. As the 25th CPSU Congress noted: "It is quite clear now that with the prossent correlation of world class forces, the liberated countries are quite able lo resist imperialist diktat and achieve just --that is, equal---- economic relations. It is also clear that their already considerable contribution to the common struggle for peace and the security of the peoples is quite likely to become still more substantial.''~^^1^^
Efforts to remove all artificial barriers and discrimination in international trade and lo put an end to all forms of inequality, diktat and exploitation in world economic relations are becoming ever more important in the sphere of international relations today and in the immediate future. In keeping with the fundamental interests of peoples, with the interests of peace and progress, the Soviet Union is ready to make a constructive contribution to reshaping international economic relations.
In full conformity with the alignment of world forces and using the rich experience of recent years, the 25th CPSU Congress emphasised the prime importance of consolidating the unity of the fraternal socialist states and their all-- _-_-_
^^1^^ Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, pp. 16--17.
34 round co-operation in building the new society, of increasing their active common contribution to strengthening international peace.The conditions conducive to translating the principles of proletarian internationalism into the reality of inter-slate relations between the socialist countries were created by a number of factors, such as their uniform socio-economic and political system, the community of basic interests and objectives, the leading role of communist and workers' parties, the common ideology and goals, and the universally acknowledged authority of the CPSU and Soviet state.
The 26th CPSU Congress dealt in detail with international politics. The Central Committee's Report thoroughly analysed recent world developments, the results of Soviet foreign policy and the current international situation. The five years since the 25th Party Congress were marked by a steppcd-up confrontation between two trends in world politics. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and all the fraternal socialist countries have been pursuing a course towards curbing the arras race, promoting peace and detente and safeguarding the peoples' sovereign rights and freedoms. On the other, the imperialist and reactionary forces have been pushing a policy towards undermining detente, stepping up the arms race, intimidating other countries, interfering in their internal affairs, and suppressing the liberation struggle.
The 26th CPSU Congress is of outstanding international significance because it has marked a new stage in the Soviet Union's persevering and consistent effort to deepen detente, to curb the arms race and consolidate peace. The Congress has put forward a series of new important proposals and initiatives which develop the __PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 Programmo of Peace, adapting it to the most pressing international issues.
In view of today's priorities and profound changes in the entire socio-political sel-np of the world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., adopted in 11177, includes, as distinct from previous Soviet constitutions, a special chapter dealing with foreign policy. It defines the essence, basic goals and directions of the foreign policy of the socialist slate and the principles of its relations with other stales. Article 28 says: 'The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace arid stands for strengthening of the security of nations and broad international co-operation.
``The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is aimed at ensuring international conditions favourable for building communism in the U.S.S.R., safeguarding the stale interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.
``In the U.S.S.R. war propaganda is banned.''
The next Article dealing with the principles of the U.S.S.R.'s relations with other countries, enumerates ten principles of inter-slate relations secured in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Thus the Soviet Union has so far become the first and only country which has made its political commitment undertaken in Helsinki a part of its Constitution.
36 __ALPHA_LVL1__ II. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTINGIn all ages war has left indelible imprints on social development. In our day, however, mankind faces a military threat unheard of in the past. And this threat has indeed become global, because the development of entirely new methods of warfare has turned the whole globe into a potential war theatre. If not averted, a new world war will bring humanity unprecedented calamities. The use of monstrous weapons of mass destruction would cause tremendous casualties and reduce the biggest industrial and cultural centres of the world to ashes.
Today's situation is exceptional not only because nuclear weapons exist. The revolution in war technology has unfolded against the background of far-reaching changes throughout the world, involving both internal developments in individual countries and their inter-state relations.
The world revolutionary process is under way, the struggle for social and national emancipation is gaining momentum, and the general crisis of capitalism is growing more acute. Relations between countries of the two world systems have become the pivol of inlernational life. Intense political struggle and military 37 confrontation clash with peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial co-operation.
An increasingly contradictory combination of rivalry and partnership is taking shape within the imperialist camp. Peking's hegcmonist course seriously complicates the alignment of world forces. Antagonisms between the industrial capitalist states and the developing countries are growing sharper. Socio-economic and political differentiation between the former colonial countries is becoming more pronounced. At the same time their combined share in international relations is growing.
An unprecedentedly destructive potential is being created against the background of a number of profound changes in the world economy. Progress in science and technology has extended opportunities for effective international division of labour and for equitable and mutually advantageous co-operation. At the same time selfseeking monopoly interests hamper the development of international economic relations. Tt is becoming increasingly imperative to reshape the latter to correspond to existing realities. Some pressing problems are on the agenda, such as providing ademiate food for the population and energy and raw materials for industry, protection of the environment, exploration of the World Ocean and space.
The dynamic development of the world and the increasing variety of problems awaiting solution give rise to instability and conflict situations, when the aggressive imperialist circles and Chinese leaders gamhle on confrontation. This is a great threat to universal peace because contemporary international relations are an integral, global system. Crilical tensions originating in a particular region may spread to other 38 countries, aggravate the whole world situation and increase the danger of military conflagration.
In the first half of (lie 20lh century imperialism plunged mankind into (lie abyss of two world wars. Their toll was tens of millions of human lives and tremendous material losses. Imperialism's current policy of aggression backed up by the gigantic arsenals of new kinds of weapons threatens mankind with even more catastrophic consequences. The Chinese leaders pursue the same policies in their bid for hegemony by provoking a head-on collision between the major powers of the two world systems.
The menace of military catastrophe that, looms over the whole of mankind makes it imperative for the peoples of the world to avert it. The question of war and peace has become a major and many-faceted issue of historical development, an all-embracing and crucial question of world politics, a question that stems from the natural development of today's world.
The scale of the war threat is without precedent today. Yet never before have there been such powerful forces that have the ability to avert a nuclear world war. The fraternal socialist countries, international working class, national liberation movements, all progressive and peace forces put up a barrier in the path of war. The peoples of all countries without exception have a stake in warding off the war threat. Realistic bourgeois leaders, too, see no reasonable alternative to lasting peace and international co-- operation.
Against this background the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are striving to ensure conditions for peaceful coexistence and for building up the material and technical basis of socialism and communism. The persistent struggle for 39 peace, for averting an all-out nuclear war is not only a first-priority task of progressive movements, but also a common platform of action for the broad popular masses and various public organisations. In its approach to the question of war and peace the foreign policy of socialism expresses both class and general democratic (i.e., universal in their essence) interests. As Lenin said, "democracy is mosl clearly manifested in the fundamental question of war and peace".^^1^^
The real content of the question of war and peace, as a major global question of our time, is largely determined by the current specific international and political conditions which differ essentially from those prevailing in the past. This burning question has a special historical, socio-political and ideological content which it has acquired only in recent decades. Similarly novel are the ways leading to a practical solution of the question of war and peace in the interests of humanity.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Question of War and Peace TodayThe new content of the question of war and peace today calls for new kinds of approaches to its solution. The global danger of war makes it imperative for all countries, despite their different ideologies and social systems, to unite their efforts on a worldwide scale on the only reasonable common platform of preventing the _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Work of the AllRussia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars Delivered at. the First Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, February 2, 1920'', Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 319.
40 cataclysmic disaster that threatens the whole of mankind.A radical turn in international relations after the Great October Socialist Revolution meant drastic changes in the actual question of war and peace. Some fundamentally new aspects to it appeared, including (1) the emergence of the question of war and peace between countries with opposite social systems: (2) a different interrelationship between war and revolution: (3) different conditions of, and opportunities for, work to eradicate wars once and for all from the life of human society.
Tn the new historical setting the question of war and peace is no longer delcrmined exclusively by the policy of imperialism. For the first time in history a state has emerged whose socio-economic nature is incompatible with war.
The very first foreign policy act of the socialist state offered an alternative to the imperialist policy of aggression and diktat. Lenin's Decree on Peace urged all the belligerent parties and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace. The Decree outlined possible practical ways of implementing the proposal of the Soviet government, emphasised the special role of the working class in "saving mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences'', and expressed determination "to conclude peace successfully, and at the same time emancipate the labouring and exploited masses of our population from all forms of slavery and all forms of exploitation''.~^^1^^ Lenin's peace programme contained the following provisions: non-admission of any and _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. T. Lenin. "Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'', Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 252.
41 all territorial annexations; reestablishment of tho political independence of those peoples who had lost it in the course of war; discontinuance of the exploitation of colonies and dependent countries; and so on.The new correlation of war and peace was closely connected with the new relationship between war and revolution. Lenin believed that "revolutions arc not made to order, they cannot be timed for any particular moment; they mature in a process of historical development and break out at a moment determined by a whole complex of internal and external causes''.~^^1^^
Lenin resolutely opposed the ``Left'' Communists and subjected to withering criticism their thesis that "peace psychology" was allegedly ``inactive'', as if brandishing a paper sword was ``activity''. "Any peace. . .,'' he said, "will open channels for our influence a hundred times wider.''~^^2^^ Lenin rejected the idea of exporting revolution and noted that " communism cannot he imposed by force".^^3^^
On the other hand, the revolutionary class is compelled to resort to force because of the resistance put up by the bourgeoisie overthrown inside tho country and the intervention of outside imperialist forces seeking to export counterrevolution. The Civil War in Russia and the armed struggle of the Soviet people against the resistance of the exploiter classes and foreign invaders took on an explicit social meaning. The _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. T. Lrnin, "Report Delivered at, a Moscow Gubernia Conference of Factory Committees'', Collected Work.-:, Vol. 27, p. 547.
~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin. "Ninth Congress of the RCP(B)'', Tbid., Vol. 30, p. 453.
~^^3^^ V. T. Lenin, "Eighth Congress of the RCP(B)'', Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 175.
42 war to defend the socialist Motherland became just and historically progressive.The correlation of peace and revolution also acquired quite a different meaning. The cessation of war and reestnblishment of peace became a necessary condition for consolidating the world's first socialist country--Soviet Russia. Peace opened most favourable prospects for building socialism in tho U.S.S.R. and by virtue of this for the further development of the world revolutionary process. The socialist state's peace policy became an important factor in the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the working class' struggle for socialism. At the same time the struggle of the international working class and all revolutionary forces for peace meant, in the new historical setting, not, only action to counter the aggressive designs of imperialism, but also action to support the world's only socialist country.
The emergence on the international scene of one socialist country encircled by capitalist states could not yet avert the danger of new world wars. But the setting in which the popular masses worked for pence had markedly changed after the October Revolution. The steady consolidation of the socialist state and its peace policy considerably enhanced the growth of world forces opposing the imperialist policy of war.
At that time, however, the anti-war, anti-- imperialist forces were still unable to prevent the imperialists from unleashing the Second World War. They failed to forestall a new global armed conflict.
The Second World War was not a simple copy of World War T Tn its initial stage it was a continuation of the struggle of the imperialist powers for world domination, but later on it 43 assumed an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist character. However, tho hostility of both imperialist groupings towards the Soviet Union did not remove deep-scaled contradictions between the fascisl bloc and tho bourgeois-democratic countries and did not result in setting up a single imperialist camp. The imperialists saw in the Soviet Union (heir chief political opponent. But nazi Germany and militarist Japan thought of it as their direct military opponent, whereas the United Stale*, Britain, and France considered the U.S.S.R. their temporary ally in the war against their imperialist competitors. The main difference, however, between World War I and World War 11 was (hat in the latter the Soviet Union played a leading role in the struggle against war and fascism. The resistance of other peoples to the nazi aggression during the war was a continuation of the prewar policy of the working class and other progressive forces.
Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union gave World War 11 a new content. It then became an armed confrontation between socialism and all anti-fascist forces, on the one hand, and the strike force of imperialism, i.e., fascism, on the other. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union became a central, decisive period in World War 11, making it an anti-fascist, liberating fight. The United Slates, Britain, and several other capitalist countries were the socialist state's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.
The alignment of class and political forces in World War IT essentially differed from that in World War 1. The interests of the working class during World War T were fundamentally different from those of the ruling classes because the workers called for a revolutionary withdrawal from the war and wanted defeat for their 44 governments. During World War II, however, in the conditions of a just and liberating war the working people demanded active participation in the anti-fascist, struggle and strove for its victory. In this sense their interests coincided with the policy of the ruling circles of the bourgeois-democratic countries. Their eagerness to get the upper hand over their imperialist rivals was in keeping with the interests of social progress on a global scale because victory over nazi Germany would be conducive to the survival and consolidation of the Soviet Union as a bulwark of the world revolutionary process and would undermine the positions of the world reactionary forces and strengthen the democratic forces.
The Soviet Union's struggle against the nazi invaders and its decisive role in the rout of Hitler's Germany and militarist Japan in many ways affected the socio-political results of the war. In the postwar period the balance of power tipped decisively in favour of the progressive, revolutionary forces; social revolutions took place in a number of European and Asian countries; the world socialist system was formed; the positions of the communist and workers' parties consolidated and the class struggle in bourgeois countries intensified; the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries acquired an unprecedented scale.
The historical experience of our epoch shows, however, that for all the interconnection between a world war and the world revolutionary process these two social phenomena are different in origin and character. It is not war but people's creative endeavour in the course of building the new society that is the objective basis of success for real, i.e., existing socialism. The 45 accelcrated rate of social and national liberation following World War II was accompanied by the stupendous loss of life and the untold sufferings of the working masses that had occurred and by devastating economic dislocation in many countries. Imperialism, responsible for World War II, had imposed this trend in the world revolutionary process on the working class.
Drastic changes in the postwar period profoundly affected the content of the question of war and peace. For the first time in history objective conditions began to form not only for putting up active resistance to the imperialist policy of aggression, but also for excluding war from inter-state relations and, first and foremost, preventing a new world war.
In the postwar period the world socialist system staunchly defended universal peace. The economic and defence potential of the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries, their international prestige and active and co-ordinated foreign policy have become a decisive factor of peace.
The working class and its organisations, above all Marxist-Leninist parties, were at the head of the struggle against the imperialist policy of war.
The struggle of the colonial and dependent countries for their national liberation also took on an anti-imperialist character. The disintegration of the colonial system under the blows of the national liberation movements substantially weakened the positions of imperialism.
Many developing countries began to play an increasingly active role in international politics, turning from a reserve base of imperialism into an important and independent factor of the struggle for peace and social progress.
46The political weight of various public peace organisations also grew markedly. The determined and co-ordinated mass peace actions helped to expose the imperialist instigators of war.
The new correlation of world forces, as \vell as the menacing danger of a world nuclear war, began to compel some of the ruling quarters in the imperialist world to appraise the prevailing international situation more soberly and realistically. The rulers of the bourgeois world were confronted with the indisputable fact that aggression against the socialist countries would result in more crushing defeats and even in the total collapse of capitalism.
The profound socio-political changes in the postwar world were a concentrated expression of the main content of our time. They had drastically reduced imperialism's opportunities to resolve its historical dispute with socialism by force of arms. The development of this general tendency in world politics was not, however, straightforward or uniform.
Real possibilities for averting a world nuclear war were not exclusively created on the basis of a changing correlation of forces in the postwar world. This process was closely tied in with the development of the productive forces, with the scientific and technological revolution and the resultant improvements in military hardware. This in turn affected the dynamics of the correlation of military forces, which is an important component of the general correlation of the world forces of socialism and capitalism.
The postwar years saw tremendous changes in the productive forces, the basis of any society. Progress in science and technology opened 47 up huge opportunities 1'or satisfying mankind's requirements over more fully, but imperialism stood in the way.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. The World Strategic SituationThe development of nuclear arms and missiles caused an upheaval in the military field. It was a qualitative leap in the development of material means of warfare, the importance of which is unparalleled in history. The unprecedented capability of mass destruction called for a radical revision of modes of warfare.
Nuclear arms have an enormous destructive force. One thermonuclear charge alone may he several times more powerful than all the explosives used not only during World War II, but also during the entire history of the human race. Indeed, the development of nuclear arms and missiles has destroyed the traditional view of the frontline and the rear.
It is no longer possible to confine a confrontation between main opposing powers to a theatre of war. A military conflagration is likely to swiftly extend beyond the confines of the initial conflict area. It is impossible to ensure an effective shield against an oncoming nuclear strike, therefore its targets will include riot so much the opposing armed forces as the territory of many countries, their population, industry, cities and towns, agriculture, and communications. The entire globe would become a theatre of war in the event weapons of mass destruction are used.
In just the initial stages of a nuclear conflict the loss of life would total hundreds of millions of people (rather than tens of millions, as 48 during the First and Second World Wars), these casualties bring chiefly among the civilian population. This toll would greatly increase later on because many people would bo exposed to lethal doses of radiation or perish of hunger and disease. The destruction of material objects of value would be incalculable. Va.st territories would become lifeless deserts contaminated by radioactive fallout.
Of course, (lie apocalyptic danger threatening the entire world cannot of i I self preclude the possibility of a nuclear war as fin unthinkable form of struggle. The danger of an all-out nuclear conflict lies in the policy of the aggressive circles seeking to exacerbate the historical confrontation between the two systems and to this end developing ever more lethal weapons. Unless these circles are stopped in time, then Will push mankind into the abyss oj a destructive irorld war.
Immediately after World War II imperialism put its stakes on the use of new means of warfare. The development of the atomic bomb by the United Stales and the American nuclear monopoly during the first postwar years sharply enhanced military-power tendencies in the foreign policy of the U.S. ruling circles. At that time American lenders openly called for a maximum use of their nuclear monopoly to ensureU.S. domination in (lie world, bring pressure to bear on the U.S.S.R. and all revolutionary forces. Meanwhile, trigger-happy politicians and strategic planners blankly insisted on an attack against I he Soviet Union in order to ``replay'' World War II, i.e., to eradicate socialism.
But these plans came up against insurmountable obstacles. The profound socio-political changes in the postwar world had drastically __PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-01290 49 reduced imperialism's opportunities to resolve its historical dispute with socialism by force of arms. Even its nuclear monopoly could not guarantee imperialism overwhelming superiority. In the global balance of power the new weapon was from the start appreciably offset by other indicators of Soviet defence capacity, to say nothing of some important deterrents acting in favour of peace and socialism in the socio-- political development.
The "technological breakthrough" was, however, a tangible catalyst to imperialism's aggressiveness. This only intensified its confrontation with socialism in every field. Falling back on nuclear blackmail and other military-power aspects of this confrontation, the leaders of the United States and other imperialist countries launched a political and ideological offensive. They resorted to an economic blockade against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries in an attempt to hamper their postwar rehabilitation programmes and imposed the Cold War on the world. This made a now world war a serious danger, in the course of which imperialism, confident in its impunity, would use its weapon of mass destruction.
In this setting, a further rapid change in the correlation of forces in favour of socialism became an important objective prerequisite for reducing and eventually eliminating the danger of a world nuclear war. The most urgent task was to strengthen the defence capability of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
It was a vitally important task for the Soviet Union and world socialism to develop in the shortest period new types of weapon and arms systems capable of neutralising the military might of a potential aggressor. The new kinds 50 of weapons that were being deployed in the United Stales had to be counterbalanced by a similar Soviet capacity which could be depended upon to avert the danger of a new war. And the Soviet Union did develop its own nuclear missiles. Ending the U.S. nuclear monopoly was a powerful means of containing the aggressive forces of imperialism and effectively helped to reduce the war danger.
All these factors resulted in a new world strategic silnation. Its main feature lay in the fact that it was no longer possible to launch a paralysing nuclear-missile attack. A'o matter how a nuclear war started, the aggressor would never avoid a devastating retaliatory strike. Even if the worst came to the worst for the opposite side, it would still be able to cause the instigator of the conflict damage that would deprive it of any chance of emerging victorious in the common sense of the word. Whatever the difference in the structure of the opposing strategic forces, they were dynamically balanced, which meant that neither side could attain decisive superiority.
But this was not the only historical achievement 011 the part of real socialism. By employing every effort it succeeded not only in meeting the scientific and technological challenge of imperialism, and thereby in stopping the world's dangerous slip into the abyss of war, but also in creating a global equilibrium of military forces and in laying a foundation for curbing the arms race and for disarmament.
The Soviet Union is persistently seeking to preserve the existing strategic balance which is a major condition for international stability and military detente. As Leonid Brezhnev has said, ''. . . we arc not seeking military superiority over __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 the West, we do not need it. All we need is reliable security. And the security of both sides will no doubt be greater with the arms race curbed, war preparations curtailed and the political climate of international intercourse made healthier.''~^^1^^
The strategic situation which grew increasingly unfavourable for unleashing an all-out war, was bound to affect military and political conceptions in the capitalist world. Realising that military adventures were fraught with extremely dangerous consequences for imperialism itself, realistic Western politicians began to question their ability to attain their goals through headon confrontation.
At the same time the current world strategic balance is clearly not to the liking of the most aggressive groups in the imperialist camp. Their military doctrines have always been geared to the most diverse use of force---from the threat of force to overt military intervention. The new situation has drastically reduced the sphere of such actions.
It is practically impossible to change the existing world balance of strategic forces. Of course, spurts in the arms race may for a time destabilise the existing balance of forces and result in temporary one-sided advantages in a particular military field. Yet they cannot cancel out the fact that the aggressor will never be able to deliver a nuclear strike and at the same time avoid a crushing retaliatory blow.
The fact that the U.S. nuclear monopoly and strategic invulnerability does not exist any longer is irreversible and has fundamentally changed the entire world situation. When one side _-_-_
~^^1^^ Moscow News, No. 3, January 1979, p. 4.
52 upsets the strategic balance the other is able, on the basis of its economic, scientific and technological potential, to reduce to zero the former's advantages by an additional build-up of its own power. The equilibrium is thus restored, albeit at the cost of greater material expenditure and with a lesser degree of mutual security.Even if the global strategic balance of forces is maintained, the prospects for consolidating universal peace can hardly be called bright. International security cannot rest on the balance of terror.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. The Universal Problem of RemovingThe question of war and peace has acquired a new content which calls for the socialist countries to pursue a new foreign policy strategy and for the international communist and working-class movement to follow a new general policy.
Work towards averting a new world war began immediately after World War II. But the thesis that world wars are inevitable under imperialism was not questioned at that time, therefore the forces of peace usually referred to the possibility and probability of a temporary respite, of preserving international peace temporarily.
The thesis that world wars were inevitable in the age of imperialism was formulated by Lenin at a time when, on the one hand, capitalism was a single, all-embracing world system, and, on the other, socio-political forces which had nothing to gain from war and came out 53 against it, wore still weak and poorly organised. Todny, however, when the world situation has changed and there' are real forces that can frustrate (lie aggressive designs of imperialism, a new world war is no longer fatally inevitable.
The 20th CPSU Congress came to the important Iheorelical and political conclusion thai in the present international situation it, is really possible to avert a new world war. The Congress emphasised that if aggressive imperialist policy is resolutely opposed by world socialism, the international workers' movement, and all the anti-imperialist and peace forces a new world war can well be prevented.
The development of Lenin's ideas on war, peace and revolution has opened up broad prospects for working in different but interconnected directions, namely for averting the danger of war, for ensuring peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and for enhancing the revolutionary transition of various countries to socialism. The new propositions advanced by the CPSU on basic problems of our time have found a lively response throughout the world and have been supported and developed by Marxist-Leninist parties in theory and practice. This has found its most vivid expression in the documents and resolutions adopted by the International Conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1.957 and 1960. They reaffirmed the conclusion that today wars are no longer fatally inevitable.
This conclusion was fiercely opposed by Maoist leaders in China who acted in fact as apologists of a new world war. In their effort to prove that hundreds of millions of people and even whole nations should be sacrificed for the sake of socialism's victory all over the world, the 54 Maoists are singing the praises of war as a decisive vehicle of revolutionary change.
The ideological and political positions of Maoism have nothing in common with MarxismLeninism and arc hostile to its spirit. There is no, nor can there be any, automatic or inevitable growing over of war into revolution and vice versa. The development of a revolutionary situation and the triumph of socialism are primarily the result of mature objective conditions within a particular socio-economic system as a whole, and also of the development of inner contradictions and the subjective factor in particular countries. In the past it was mainly the situation within the imperialist camp that underlay the maturing of objective requisites for a socialist revolution, whereas now it is the growing might and influence of world socialism.
War is an offshoot of imperialism and is engendered by the policy of the ruling exploiter class. It is in keeping with the vital interests of the working class and the broad popular masses in general to prevent the bourgeoisie from dragging them into armed conflict, to achieve their social emancipation without war which brings them tremendous hardships and privation. This was true in the past, and is even more so today. The death of hundreds of millions of people, primarily the working people, and universal destruction are :i price loo high to pay for the eradication of capitalism, already doomed by history. Unprecedented destruction of the productive forces and a mortal threat to the very survival of human life over a vast territory as a result of the use of weapons of mass destruction would inflict terrible damage on social progress as such.
Gone are the days when the Chinese apology 55 of war as a decisive means of policy-making was largely explained in the outside world by the theoretical immaturity and practical inexperience of its sponsors. The war cries of the Chinese leaders were often taken for a sign of their `` super-revolutionary'' spirit. They themselves did their best to play the role of zealous supporters of resolute anti-imperialist struggle, of those who were ready to make any sacrifice in order to "extremely quickly build on the ruins of defunct imperialism a civilisation which would be a thousand times higher than that under the capitalist system'', to build a "truly beautiful society''.
The falsity of such slogans is obvious. The Maoists needed them to cover up their tactics of splitting the international communist movement and undermining the unity of the socialist countries, rather than to combat imperialism. They opposed their "theory of war" to the Leninist policy of the Soviet government, aimed at averting the danger of world war and ensuring international security.
The Chinese leaders' policy is in sharp contradiction to the objective laws of the development of the anti-imperialist class struggle on the international scene and to the need to unite and consolidate all revolutionary forces. This conflict acquires still greater dimensions because in their attempts to exploit the contradictions between the two world systems the Maoists consider the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community of nations as their chief enemy, whereas the reactionary imperialist forces are treated as their actual allies in the struggle against world socialism. It is quite natural, therefore, that the Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet, anti-- socialist attitudes are converging with the views of 56 the most aggressive imperialist circles seeking to stir up tensions and prepare for war.
It would be wrong to say that the views of capitalist leaders on the question of war and peace have remained unchanged. It was becoming ever more evident for the more far-sighted Western politicians that given the existing correlation of world forces the realisation of the imperialist designs by force of arms could turn into a grave danger for their sponsors. At the same time, however, the militarist circles did not give up their aggressive intentions and began searching for new ways of implementing them in the changed situation.
Up to the 1960s U.S. war preparations proceeded under the aegis of the "massive retaliation" strategy. The aggressive essence of this strategy stemmed from the imperialist "position of strength" policy and the policy of deterrence. The massive retaliation strategy was based on the assessment of the correlation and alignment of forces which made U.S. military and political leaders believe that the United States had a military advantage over the Soviet Union. This risky and highly speculative assessment convinced the U.S. ruling circles that the United States was capable of launching a massive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and its allies with the minimum risk of retaliation.
Substantial changes in the world military and strategic situation compelled the American ruling quarters to give up their massive retaliation strategy. It gave way to a "flexible response" doctrine which substantially expanded the range of military means of effecting imperialist policies and provided for various scales and levels of direct and indirect uses of military force, both nuclear and conventional. Yet the U.S. 57 capacity to start and wage an all-out nuclear war remained its main and decisive component, just as it was in the later modifications of the flexible response strategy.
No military-strategic, let alone any militaryleolmological modifications, however, can reslore imperialism's lost ability to decide at its own discretion whether there should or should not be war. Given the present correlation of forces, military power is becoming less potent as a means of resolving the historical dispute between the two social systems.
The absence of a reasonable alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence increasingly persuaded bourgeois leaders that averting an all-out nuclear war was in the interests of both capitalist and socialist countries.
Yet even in the new situation the traditional militarist thinking still restricts the development of realistic trends in the foreign policy of bourgeois countries. The imperialist circles continue to elaborate various doctrines and conceptions which still centre on the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war.
The socialist world takes a different approach to the question of war and peace. The stern reality of a possible military confrontation imposed by imperialism on the U.S.S.R., compelled the latter to take corresponding measures to bolster its defence potential.
The defence capability built up by the Soviet Union enables it to repulse any aggressor no matter what means and ways of warfare he may choose. In the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist community countries the punishment will be inevitable and devastating.
The level and purpose of Soviet military 58 might stem from the U.S.S.R.'s war doctrine. Us essence lies in that it docs not seek military superiority. It lias never been the intention of the Soviet Union to threaten any state or group of states. The Soviet war doctrine is purely defensive. This has been reaffirmed in the C.PSU's resolutions and the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
Despite the resistance of the militarist forces, the Soviet Union has consistently been paving the way for a better international climate and for the removal of the danger of war.
A positive shift in Soviet-American relations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was a major factor in the prevention of a global armed conflict because the future of universal peace largely depends on the state of these relations. As a result of Soviet-American summit meetings fundamental documents were signed which made Ihe principles of peaceful coexistence a foundation of inter-state relations. These documents included primarily the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. In accordance with the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the two parties undertook to strive to exclude the risk of an armed conflict, especially a nuclear one, both between them and between each of the parties and other countries. Also of major importance were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-- Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), and other Soviet-American agreements aimed at restraining the arms race and further reducing the war danger.
Multilateral and bilateral agreements and negotiations and the strengthening of 59 European security and co-operation helped to work out and establish in the sphere of international relations a code, as it were, of honest,, equitable and mutually beneficial international relations. The Helsinki meeting was an event of great historical importance and the Final Act adopted there put up serious moral, political and legal obstacles to military adventures.
The policies of neutral and non-aligned countries also contributed to a healthier atmosphere in the world. The broad popular masses, the world peace movement and all other progressive public movements and organisations effectively hel|ied to oppose the forces of aggression.
Opportunities for active work against the war danger have greatly increased with international detente. Realistic tendencies in the policy of bourgeois countries have become more pronounced. Objective prerequisites began to emerge for excluding the possibility of a new world war from the life of mankind.
Yet the universal task of averting a nuclear catastrophe cannot be solved once and for all unless the military confrontation is overcome and the mammoth arms stockpiles are gradually limited and reduced.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. The Precarious Balance of TerrorThe situation obtaining on the basis of a strategic balance was a step forward towards reducing the danger of a world nuclear war. By the early 1970s the international situation became more stable than it had been during the period of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. The levelling up of the strategic forces made it more 60 difficult for the imperialist circles to pursue their aggressive policy.
Yet the balance of terror is far from being an ideal formula of inter-stale relations between the two world systems and cannot safeguard international peace because a number of factors have a destabilising effect on it. Besides, the balance itself has some elements of inner instability.
To begin with, a strategic balance is dynamic, rather than static. The arsenals of weapons of mass destruction are continuously replenished and renewed. Scientific and technological progress opens up fresh opportunities for developing new systems of nuclear-missile weaponry. But because the opposite parlies have different economic, scientific and technical indicators the development of such systems cannot be simultaneous and symmetrical. They also employ different criteria in defining lime limils within which arms and military hardware become morally obsolete and need modernisation. The time schedules set for new weapons system to pass through the research and development, mass production and deployment stages are also different.
These structural differences are profound enough to raise considerable objective difficulties in maintaining a stable strategic balance. Yet they are further exacerbated by the imperialist quarters who use progress in military technology to back up their military-political conceptions designed to ensure superiority in competilion with the opposile party. In this case it is not merely modernisation, it is an attempt to develop qualitatively new weapons systems. This escalation in the development of material means of warfare can only disrupt the balanced 61 corrclation of strategic forces and thereby aggravate I lie international situation.
Given the rapid rales of progress in military technology, stabilising the level of strategic forces confronting each other is a difficult task in itself. It becomes, however, oven more difficult when one side seeks unilateral advantages in the nuclear arms race. It is easier to restrain this race in its early stages. The loss of good opportunities markedly complicates the task at later stages in the competition to stockpile and modernise arms. Military technology outstrips the process of restraining the arms race.
On the eve of the strategic arms limitation talks, for instance, there was a situation in which it was really possible to mutually ban the development of MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). Yet the American side chose to go ahead with its programme of deploying MIRV missiles, which raised the arms race to a higher level and greatly hampered the talks on subsequent agreements to limit strategic offensive arms.
Events took quite a different course as regards Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. They were limited substantially at the early stage of their deployment, thereby practically excluding a highly destabilising element from the nuclear force equation and creating conditions favourable for limiting strategic offensive arms.
Of special danger for a stable strategic equilibrium are projects that may lead to technological breakthroughs and the development of qualitatively new types of weapons of mass destruction. This would lead to additional components being introduced into the existing equation of nuclear-missile forces, which in turn would necessitate substantial reconsideration of our 62 present concept of strategic balance. This again would cause destabilising shifts in the international situation.
The ``action---counter-action'' factor also brings instability into the balance of strategic forces. The development and deployment of a particular weapons system by one side as a rule entails counter-measures taken by the other side seeking to develop either similar or new systems to restore the balance.
The arms race is not, of course, confined to ``action---counter-action''. In building up its strategic forces each of the two parties is guided by its own political and military objectives and also depends on available material resources. The overall structure of one opposing force is not a mirror-like reflection of the other. Despite some similarities, each force has its own specific features.
Yet the ``action---counter-action'' factor does play a significant role in the dynamics of strategic forces. A new stage in the arms build-up by one side introduces destabilising corrections in the other side's development programme of strategic forces. More often than not the latter takes ``play-safe'' counter-measures, which is quite understandable in view of numerous variable factors, which arc hard to predict, and the long periods needed to develop modern weapons. Frequently in such cases military planners make allowance for the worst contingency in the very remote future. Short-range international and domestic objectives also have to be reckoned with.
But the main problem is different. The maintaining of the closed ``action---counter-action'' cycle is whipped up by the influential imperialist circles, especially those connected with the 63 military-industrial complex and with a stake in continuing and speeding up the arms race. By committing themselves to a certain ``action'', they cause a reaction which they pass off as the opposite side's ``action'' and undertake, under the pretext of ``counter-action'', a new ``action'', but this lime on a higher level of military competition. This is how events developed as regards, for instance, missiles equipped with MIRVs. The American side started the race. The Soviet side took the necessary counter-measures to preserve the strategic balance. Then, allegedly to `` counter-act'' these measures, the American side began working on programmes of developing a new generation of strategic weapons---the mobile intercontinental ballistic missile MX and the long-range cruise missiles.
The endless spiralling of the "action --- counter-action" process not only speeds up the stockpiling of lethal weapons and squanders vast material resoiirces on non-productive goals, but also undermines the basis of strategic balance. The delicate process of balancing forces which are unequal in many respects is further complicated by attempts to win the arms race and by consequent measures essential to prevent any deflection of the existing balance.
The instability of the strategic balance is not caused exclusively by military-technological factors. It stems from the very nature of balance.
Mutual balancing of the strategic forces only eases the confrontation and confines it within certain limits, but it is far from stopping it. While strategic balance introduces stability in inter-state relations between the two opposing systems, it still offers wide scope for (heir military competition. If not restrained, such competition may become more intensive and take a 64 more dangerous course leading to the development of new weapons of mass destruction. This is Dound to have a negative effect on international co-operation and universal security.
The root cause of the military competition, including that involving strategic armaments, eventually boils down to the historical competition between the two world systems, in the course of which imperialism opposed its aggressive policy to socialism's peace policy. The imperialist policy of aggression remains the main motive force of the arms race. It now converges with the militarist course of the Chinese leaders.
At the same time the arms race ilsclf is proceeding so rapidly and on such a vast scale that it has developed an immense force of inertia. The large arms industry working on a long-term basis, coupled with the swelling appetite of the giant war machine, tends to backfire on the policy of bourgeois countries. Engendered by politics, arms themselves engender politics.
The relaxation of international tension and the measures aimed at arms limitation lessened the danger of war. But the new spiral in the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers, above all the United States, has again revitalised the dangerous trend toward sliding back to the Cold War, to stepping up the arms race and fanning military conflicts.
Falling back on the long-bankrupt position-- ofstrength policy and stepping up their war preparations, the leading quarters in the U.S. and in iNATO are seeking to put the blame for the aggravation of the international situation on the Soviet Union by raising hullaballoo about the alleged "Soviet military threat''. Such irresponsible and clearly provocative actions are designed to draw the Soviet Union and other socialist __PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-01290 65 countries into a more serious confrontation.
The extreme danger of this course is evident. It not only threatens the Soviet Union and its allies, hut also may result in a catastrophe for the whole of humankind. In fact, the very future of the world, the future of civilisation is at stake. The grim reality makes it imperative for all the countries, governments and political parties to give absolute priority to ensuring the essential right of man, the right to live. One's position as regards this central problem is a chief indicator showing whether or not one's policy is in keeping with the vital interests of the broad popular masses throughout the world.
In this dangerous situation the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government are deterring the onslaught of the aggressive forces and showing the truly Leninist self-restraint, firmness and consistency, having withstood all the attempts to push them away from their general course toward promoting peace and international co-operation and safeguarding the peoples' freedom and independence. Soviet foreign policy, which is class-oriented, has once again demonstrated that it fully conforms with the vital interests of all the peoples as regards the crucial issue of war and peace. It has shown not only the inherently peaceful nature of socialism---the most advanced social system---but also the objective need in our nuclear age to preserve peace which is the most essential condition for normal international development and for the very survival of the present generation and generations to come.
Being aware of its supreme historical responsibility and being deeply concerned with the future of the world, the 2(5th CPSU Congress has once again affirmed the general line of Soviet 66 foreign policy, which is to safeguard peace, extend and deepen detente and curb the arms race. Moreover, the Congress has put forward a constructive programme of concrete measures to achieve these noble goals. This realistic programme is based on the belief that the global problem of averting a world nuclear conflict can only be resolved through joint action by all countries and peoples. If the war danger, looming large today, is removed, there will be no losers and the entire humankind will be the winner.
Refuting the alleged "Soviet military threat'', Leonid Brezhnev stated: "A war danger does exist for the United States, as it does for all the other countries of the world. But the source of the danger is not the Soviet Union, nor any mythical Soviet superiority, but is the arms race and the tension that still prevails in the world. We are prepared to combat this true, and not imaginary, danger hand in hand with the United States, with the countries of Europe, with all countries in the world. To try and outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war, is dangerous madness.''~^^1^^
This is the Soviet approach to the most acute problem of today. This approach is dictated by our sincere concern for the future rather than by some transient short-lived considerations; it is dictated by our readiness not to seek one-sided advantages but to look for ways and means of reconciling the interests of all parties concerned on the single reasonable basis which excludes _-_-_
~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of Ihe Parly in Home and Foreign Policy, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 40.
__PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 the possibility of mutual annihilation. This is a vivid nianifuslation of active socialist humanism and of state wisdom in world politics. __ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. The Struggle to Curb the Arms RaceInternational relations have reached a point at which an unusual situation exists. On the one hand, real opportunities for a military detente have expanded, on the other, militarist circles are pushing the arms race forward.
In the Cold War period imperialism gave birth to a closed cycle: tense confrontation intensified arms stockpiling and the latter made hostility still more acute. This interaction of tensions and the arms race increased the danger of a nuclear world war. The swing to detente opened up promising prospects in the field of disarmament, and the first steps to limit armaments helped to further improve the international political climate. Military competition began to lose one of its chief stimuli, namely tensions in relations between countries with different social systems.
Yet the arms race is gaining momentum, rather than slowing down. Weapons of mass destruction are being improved qualitatively on the basis of the latest breakthroughs in science and technology, while their quantity is steadily increasing. The number of countries involved in the arms build-up competition is expanding. In the wake of the big powers many medium and oven small countries, including developing countries, have chosen to amass considerable military arsenals.
68The burden of armaments weighs ever more heavily on peoples. Unproductive military expenditure deprives them of a sizable share of the wealth created by their persevering labour and hinders the solution of many pressing global problems. Most importantly, the unbridled arms race increases the danger of a nuclear war.
It seems impossible to stop the flow of armaments, and the militarist circles do everything to confirm this impression. They resort to all manner of false theories and refer to the natural laws of the scientific and technological revolution. Their aim is to justify tbe stockpiling of arms and present it as a fatally inevitable course in international relations.
In reality, however, there is no unavoidable fatality either in the development of the material means of warfare or in the major tendencies in today's world politics.
It goes without saying that the giant armsproducing mechanism has gained momentum and developed a force of inertia that has to be reckoned with. It is impossible to bring it to a full-stop at once. It is not easy to slow down and discontinue large-scale and long-term modern arms systems development programmes oven at their early R&D stages, to say nothing of their deployment, stage. This is because the opposing armed forces have different structures and do not develop new weapons systems simultaneously. All this should, of course, be taken into account when submitting concrete proposals for arms limitation and disarmament. But these are not the difficulties that have so far prevented mankind from stopping the flywheel of military preparations.
Obstacles to halting the arms race are put up primarily by the imperialist circles, above 69 all the military-industrial complex that reaps colossal profits from arms production. Such obstacles arc also erected by the most reactionary political groupings who act in the spirit of the Cold War and cling to their imprudent plans to win the historical competition between the two opposing social systems by force of arms. The arms race is also stepped up by Western strategic planners who slill hope to gain tangible military advantages. The Chinese leaders, ready to provoke a new world war in order to achieve their great-power objectives, are siding with the opponents of disarmament.
The attempts of the militarist circles to tip the balance of armed forces in their favour damage the cause of arms limitation greatly. A gradual decrease in the level of military confrontation, which would surely strengthen both the security of the parties involved and universal peace, calls for drawing up a carefully weighed balance of the participants' interests. But this is extremely hard to do when the basic principle of any serious measures to limit and reduce armaments (the existing balance of strategic forces) is called in question.
Scientific and technological progress in the military field is by no means an irresistible force. In the long run it can be controlled politically. Practical experience in checking the arms race shows clearly that, given mutual political will, even the most complicated military-- technological parameters can be controlled. This is, of course, not a simple thing to do, but in the context of the present global strategic balance there is no type of weapon which cannot be effectively limited and physically reduced on a mutual and equitable basis. Much, however, depends on how accurately the policy of a particular 70 country reflects current realities and to what extent it reckons with the pressing need for a sharp turn from competition in the military field to halting the arms race and to disarmament.
The Soviet Union's attitude towards curbing the arms race is very explicit. It stems from an analysis of the correlation of forces, the present political and strategic situations, trends in their development and prospects for the future, and material and technological factors in developing means of warfare. This attitude is dictated by the need to take into account the interests of individual countries as well as those of universal peace.
In implementing the directives of CPSU congresses on disarmament, the Soviet state put forward a programme containing concrete proposals on major aspects of curbing the arms race. It is designed to facilitate a continuous advance from positions which have already been secured at various levels and in various spheres of limiting and reducing armaments and to ensure a steady decrease in the level of military confrontation, a physical reduction and stage-- bystage liquidation of the means of warfare.
The Soviet Union's approach to military detente is constructive because it offers better prospects for negotiations and agreements. The Soviet-sponsored programme is designed to put in motion the mechanism of drawing up mutually acceptable measures to limit and cut down armaments. This programme offers no exclusive advantages to the U.S.S.R. and its allies. It seeks to reach agreements which would be strictly to the parties' mutual advantage and would not impair the security of either of them.
The Soviet proposals are based on a compromise which is the only possible approach to a 71 mutual reduction in the level of military confrontation. Mutually balanced compromises can alone lay the foundation for any effective agreements designed to limit and, especially, reduce the immense stockpiles of arms. Joint efforts to curtail the arms race strengthen the type of international security which is developing today and takes into account the interests of all, and is not directed against any country. All peoples and mankind in general can only gain by this approach.
The Soviet Union is resolved to press for the most radical measures to curtail the arm.s race, up to and including universal and complete disarmament. Tt intends to make the nuclear powers agree to destroy all their stockpiles of these weapons of mass destruction. The member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have on many occasions declared their readiness to start simultaneously liquidating the opposing militarypolitical groupings or, to hegin with, dissolving their military organisations. Tf the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is not ready immediately to begin translating these cardinal objectives into reality, they may be attained gradually, step by step, but advance towards a complete removal of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe should be steady and consistent. The most important thing is not to stand still, and especially not to take retrogressive steps, but rather to strive persistently for effective measures to limit armaments.
It is imperative to ensure a decisive turn in the work to halt the arms race, and take practical measures in order to liquidate, step by step, the material means of warfare. By reducing the level of military confrontation, these measures may substantially help to avoid situations which 72 may lead to dangerous aggravation of relations between individual countries, above all between those which have at their disposal the most powerful weapons (primarily nuclear) and large armed forces. Those countries must display constant restraint in international affairs, be always ready to start negotiations and avoid their relations with other states developing into a conflict.
Tn the late 1960s, the Soviet Union came out with an initiative which started the process of limiting the most awesome means of warfare--- strategic arms (SALT). Following the conclusion of the SALT-1 agreement, the Soviet-- American SALT-2 treaty was signed in Vienna, which was a major step towards restraining the arms race. The SALT-2 agreement wont much further than the SALT-1 in terms of both quantitative and qualitative limitations of strategic arms. It was based on the principle of equality and equal security adequately reflecting the existing strategic parity between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The treaty is equally necessary for both parties, and indeed for the whole of mankind.
The Soviet Union did not consider the Vienna agreement as the final stage in restraining the nuclear arms race. Once the treaty entered into force, work was to be started on a SALT-3 treaty and then not only on the further limitation of now typos of strategic arms, but also on their mutual reduction. The participants in that process were to include, in addition to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., other countries possessing strategic arms. A steady advance towards limiting strategic arms (which is extremely important of itself) would have a favourable effect on other talks concerning concrete problems of disarmament.
73The U.S.S.R. and its allies are convinced that it is now high time to take action on the problem of completely banning the further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces by countries with a large military potential, and create thereby conditions for their subsequent physical reduction. The Warsaw Treaty countries submitted a concrete proposal, namely to work out a mutually acceptable programme of action which would include the following measures to be implemented within a certain limited period: to stop producing all types of nuclear arms; to discontinue the production of and to ban all other types of weapons of mass destruction; to halt the development of new types of conventional arms with a great destructive power; to renounce the growth of their armies and conventional armaments---this to bo done by the countries which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and also by countries which are linked to them by defence treaties.
Understandably, it is not a simple matter to reach agreement on all these points. But the snowballing arms race makes it ever more imperative to mutually search for ways and means of resolving this most burning issue of our time. To achieve this common goal, it is possible and necessary to begin with stopping nuclear arms production and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are completely liquidated. Above all, it is necessary to stop the production line which constantly manufactures nuclear warheads, bombs and shells which add to the already mammoth stockpiles of weapons with their monstrous destructive power.
The Soviet Union has on many occasions declared its readiness to start, with other 74 countries, talks on the concrete aspects of this cardinal problem. If all countries, primarily the nuclear powers, assumed a responsible approach and took part in such negotiations, a corresponding agreement would be quite possible.
It would be an important measure in the field of military detente to renounce the use of force or its threat in international relations with the use of both nuclear and conventional arms. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries have repeatedly and unambiguously declared their readiness to refrain, on a mutual basis, from being the first to use both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
The questions related to nuclear armaments include ensuring guarantees for the security of non-nuclear countries and undertaking not to place nuclear arms on the territory of those states which do not have them at present. The Soviet Union has clearly stated that it will never use nuclear weapons against those countries which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and their deployment on their territory. The U.S.S.R. is ready to conclude corresponding agreements with all interested states. It has called upon all the other nuclear powers to act accordingly. It would be of great importance for universal peace to conclude an international convention on strengthening the security of non-nuclear powers.
Equally important is the problem of the nonplacement of nuclear armaments on the territory of countries where such weapons are not deployed at present. The solution of this problem largely depends on the position of non-nuclear countries. But it is extremely important for the nuclear powers to undertake not to place nuclear arms on the territory of the latter countries.
75The war danger would be further reduced if an agreement is reached to ban ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the World Ocean. On a wider scale, it is possible to set up nuclear-free zones including both individual countries and large geographical regions or even continents.
It remains vitally important to work persistently towards upholding the nuclear non-- proliferation treaty and especially towards making other countries capable of producing such weapons adhere to it. A further spread of nuclear arms is fraught with grave consequences for international peace.
The Soviet Union enthusiastically supports the peaceful uses of atomic energy, yet it resolutely objects to such uses being made a pretext for covering up the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Tt is nhvays ready to co-- operate with all countries interested in setting up a secure international system of guarantees and control.
The complete and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests would be of great importance. To meet the wishes of some countries, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to participate in searching for a generally acceptable formula of control. Moreover, it agreed with the United States and Great Britain to refrain for a certain period from underground nuclear tests even before they are joined by the other nuclear powers. Tn order to expedite the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the Soviet Union proposed that, alongside the banning for a certain period of all nuclear weapon tests, a moratorium be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Negotiations between the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and Great Britain 76 must lead to a treaty banning all the nuclear weapon tests being signed.
After the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, it became imperative to reach an agreement on the full banning and liquidation of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has long been pressing for this. Because there are countries which are not ready radically and simultaneously to ban and destroy all chemical means of warfare, the U.S.S.R. has agreed to begin by signing a convention banning the most dangerous and lethal types of chemical weapons.
Much headway has been made in drafting a treaty banning another type of weapon of mass destruction---the radiological weapon, which affects living organisms through radiation caused by a non-explosive decay of radioactive material. Preliminary Soviet-American consultations have produced the basic provisions of an agreement banning radiological weapon. If further work on this agreement is not delayed intentionally, it could be drafted and signed very quickly.
The struggle against the arms race calls for timely and resolute measures to prevent the development of new formidable weapon systems and the qualitative improvement of existing ones. The Soviet Union has proposed that an international treaty be concluded which would ban the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.
New international efforts are required to liquidate foreign military bases on the territory of other countries and to withdraw foreign troops from that territory. Specifically, the limitation and subsequent curtailment of military 77 activities in the Indian Ocean would serve to strengthen international security. The liquidation of the existing foreign bases in the region and a ban on building new ones should be a contributing factor.
Another vital problem is the limitation of tho international arms trade. It is quite possible to solve it in the context of detente, the consolidation of universal peace and liquidation of tho existing centres of war conflict.
Cutting military budgets is a promising road leading to a halt to the arms race. The resources thus saved could be used for creative purposes in the interests of all peoples. The permanent members of the UN Security Council could start working on concrete, mutually acceptable measures to cut their military budgets and earmark the funds thus saved for their economic and social development and for resolving global problems.
In order to facilitate the solution of this problem, the Soviet Union has proposed that countries with large economic and military potentials, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, agree on a concrete proportion of cuts in their respective military budgets in absolute figures, rather than in per cent. Simultaneousy, they could fix concrete sums to be allocated by each country cutting down its military spendings for increasing aid to the developing countries. In this case it would be appropriate to set up a UN mechanism for distributing these funds among the recipient countries.
Strengthening universal peace is inseparable from ensuring European security. The situation in Europe is not merely a regional phenomenon---it is a central component of the global 78 situation. It is in Europe that the main forces of the opposing military-political blocs stand face to face. Europe is oversaturated with arms, while the continuing competition in the military field further increases tho stockpiles of lethal weapons on its territory.
The all-European process of consolidating security and co-operation has laid a solid foundation for peaceful relations between the European countries. The Helsinki accords have opened the way to overcoming military confrontation in Europe.
Yet the roots that political detente has taken in Europe will not be viable without practical measures in the field of military detente. Stepping up the arms race inevitably leads to obstacles in reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe.
Meanwhile, by the late 1970s the necessary requisites for a sharp turn to military detente had taken shape. The global balance of the opposing forces, the amelioration of the international climate, the development of peaceful cooperation, the advances towards restraining the arms race, especially the conclusion of the SALT-2 treaty, the constructive initiatives of the U.S.S.R. and its allies in the field of disarmament, all were factors that laid a solid foundation for talks arid agreements aimed at augmenting political detente with effective measures in the military field.
To preserve the balance of military forces in Europe, the Soviet Union refrained from building up its military might in that region. Moreover, it has, with its Warsaw Treaty allies, advanced a comprehensive programme of measures to strengthen peace in Europe. The programme embraces all major aspects of military detente 79 on the continent, such as cutting nuclear and conventional armaments and measures to promote mutual trust.
In October 1979, in its bid to prevent a new spiral of the arms race and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union expressed, as a gesture of goodwill, its readiness to unilaterally reduce, from the present level, the number of medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in its western regions, if no additional U.S. missiles targeted on the U.S.S.K. were deployed in Western Europe. Simultaneously the Soviet government proposed that talks on reducing such nuclear-missile systems deployed in Europe be started immediately.
Earlier the U.S.S.K. had put forward the idea that both Soviet and American warships carrying nuclear arms should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union supported Finland's plan for making Northern Europe a nuclear-free zone.
The Warsaw Treaty countries have urged the participants in the European Conference to pledge not to be the first to use both nuclear and conventional arms against each other. In other words, they have called for a sort of non-- aggression pact between the European socialist countries, on the one hand, and the European capitalist states, the U.S.A., and Canada, on the other.
Again in October 1979, to stimulate a further reduction in the level of conventional arms and armed forces in Central Europe, the Soviet Union, after consultations with its Warsaw Treaty allies, decided unilaterally to withdraw up to 20,000 Soviet troops, a thousand tanks and also a certain amount of other military hardware from the territory of the German Democratic 80 Republic to the territory of the U.S.S.R. This initiative undertaken by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries was to provide a fresh impetus to the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, which had reached an impasse because of the Western powers' intransigent stand. The U.S.S.R. and its allies have repeatedly expressed their readiness to continue their work with other countries of searching for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of a consensus that the security of neither of the parties should be imperilled.
Measures to promote mutual trust would markedly facilitate military detente in Europe. The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed that agreements be concluded with Western powers concerning the procedure of advance notification of military excercises; a temporary halt to exercises involving more than 40,000--50,000 men; and the timely notification not only of military exercises, but also of movements of ground forces involving more than 20,000 men. All other proposals made by the socialist countries earlier concerning notification of major Air Force and Navy exercises have remained valid.
Ignoring the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and its allies, NATO leaders have preferred to spiral military confrontation, rather than mutually to reduce the already high level. Moreover, their actions show that they wish to tip the existing balance of military forces in their favour and to get one-sided advantages.
This is clearly indicated by the NATO Council decision to produce and deploy in Western Europe new American medium-range nuclear missiles which are in fact a strategic weapon. In addition to the existing stockpiles of U.S. __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6-01290 81 and NATO nuclear arms in Western Europe, there are plans to deploy some (500 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles in West Germany, Britain, and some other European countries.
The NATO circles are trying to explain their decision by alleging that the plans to go ahead with building up the bloc's nuclear capability were adopted in response to the development of Soviet medium-range missiles. This allegation is groundless. The Soviet Union is modernising its medium-range missiles which have been in service for decades. This natural modernisation was caused by, besides routine military-technological needs, the updating of the U.S. forward-based nuclear missiles stationed in Europe, and also of the British and French nuclear missiles. Moreover, in the last decade the number of medium-range nuclear-arms carriers in the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile or a single aircraft. On the contrary, the number of medium-range missile launchers and the yield of their nuclear charges have even been reduced.
The deployment of the Tomahawk and Pershing-2 missiles in Europe, on the other hand, means introducing a qualitatively new component into the nuclear equation, rather than carrying out simple modernisation. In addition to the existing U.S. forward-based missiles and the corresponding British and French missiles capable of reaching the territory of the U.S.S.R., the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe would result in substantial changes in the strategic situation on the continent (and elsewhere for that matter) in favour of NATO. European countries becoming a launching pad for U.S. nuclear missiles place the Soviet Union at a 82 disadvantage vis-\`a-vis the United Stales since in that case the Jailor's strategic armaments will be increased.
The suspension of the process of limiting strategic arms, the most awesome means of warfare, has slowed down the advance towards military detente. The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2) concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in June 1!)79, was a result of the thoroughly weighed balance of the interests of the two strongest nuclear powers and at the same time it was in keeping with the interests of the security of all peoples. Its ratification and implementation would open up new opportunities for considerable quantitative reductions and qualitative limitation of nuclear-missile armaments.
Yet, immediately following the signing of the SALT-2 treaty, influential circles in the U.S. launched a campaign to discredit it. They did all they could to hamper the ratification of this important document. President Carter's Administration passed a decision to postpone indefinitely its debate in the Senate.
The United States has taken a similar stand on other aspects of restraining the arms race. It impeded and in some cases blocked negotiations on some disarmament issues that were under way at that time.
Such a negative turn of events is not accidental. By the late 1970s, the United States and other NATO countries had clearly embarked on a foreign policy aimed at stiffer military opposition to the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries and at tipping the existing balance of military forces in their favour.
The NATO Council session in May 1978 in Washington approved a large-scale programme __PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83 of arms build-up for a period lasting until the end of this century. In December 1979, the NATO Council was bullied by the United States into adopting a decision to deploy new American nuclear missiles systems in Western Europe. Simultaneously President Carter announced a five-year programme of stepped-up military preparations in the United States.
While refusing to engage in open negotiations on the basis of equality, the United States and other NATO countries have simultaneously declared their intention of conducting talks on a quite different basis, namely from a position of strength. This approach is unrealistic and quite obviously lacks any prospects. It is impossible to engage in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union by resorting to pressure and threats. It is impossible to reach any agreement in a situation when the West is seeking military superiority.
The position-of-strength policy has long proved to be bankrupt. Yet its revival poses a grave threat not only to individual countries or groups of countries but also to universal peace and the security of all peoples.
The global proportions of the danger of nuclear war make it imperative to mobilise all forces interested in stopping the arms race and improving the international climate. Energetic and ever more persistent efforts are required to block the road to the opponents of detente.
The aggravation of the international situation in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s makes it, of course, more difficult to resolve the outstanding problem of reducing military confrontation. But it is precisely because the international climate has deteriorated and the 84 danger of a head-on confrontation has increased that military detente has become so imperative.
At the same time there exist important objective requisites for a decisive turn from sharp competition in the military field to substantial cuts in arms and armed forces, to real disarmament. Military detente remains an attainable goal.
It goes without saying that progress towards military detente requires a generally improved political climate and calls for an end to perilous militarist tendencies in the policy of the United States and other imperialist countries. On the other hand, political detente in turn needs to be buttressed by measures to reduce military confrontation. Any serious move towards military detente would have a beneficial effect on political interrelations. Never before has it been so important for the political and military aspects of detente to be closely interconnected and mutually complementary.
The wisdom and will of peoples are mighty factors in the development of the world today. The turn from the Cold War to peaceful coexistence eventually proved possible because those were the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Sliding back to the grim period of confrontation runs counter to these aspirations. The world public and broad popular masses are unanimous in their determination to preserve whatever positive gains have been made so far by their joint and strenuous efforts.
The position of the Soviet Union is immune to frivolous temporary vacillations. As Leonid Brezhnev has said, "To the `doctrine' of military hysteria and a frantic arms race we oppose the doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and security on earth. We are true to the Peace 85 Programme . . . For this reason now, in the eighties, just as before, in the seventies, we stand for strengthening and not destroying detente. We stand for reducing and not increasing armaments. We stand for rapprochement and understanding between peoples and not for artificial alienation and enmity.''~^^1^^
The course of world development makes international co-operalion and military detente tangible. Positive changes in the contemporary world have struck deep roots. For this reason it is possible and necessary lo pave the road to lasting international security and real disarmament.
_-_-_~^^1^^ L. I. Rrezlmcv, Onr Course fs Peaceful Construction, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. Moscow, 1980, p. 14,
[86] __ALPHA_LVL1__ III. FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCEWork towards establishing the principles of peaceful coexistence, ensuring a lasting peace and lessening and eliminating in the long term the danger of a new world war has been a chief criterion of Soviet policy towards the capitalist states. Its role in the development of international relations is increasing. Developments in the 1970s bave shown that peaceful coexistence has ceased to be an objective necessity and has become a practical reality involving an ever increasing number of countries and problems. In the past, peaceful coexistence was rather the result of the unilateral policy of the socialist states, which at times found a response, albeit temporary, on the part of individual bourgeois countries. Today, however, it is a process deeply rooted in objective causes. In the past, relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries affected primarily the future of the Soviet Union and its immediate partners. Today, however, the future of all mankind hinges on the realisation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
The motives, scope, efficiency and historical significance of the Soviet Union's efforts to promote the peaceful coexistence of states with 87 diffcrcnt social systems are determined by presenl realities, by Hie interplay of various objective and subjective factors.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Soviet ConceptionThe new social aspects of tlie peaceful coexistence of countries of the two different systems stem from two interconnected groups of factors. One group includes profound changes in the alignment and correlation of world social forces, tbe other involves processes within Ihe productive forces, the current scientific and technical revolution and its military-technological consequences.
The changes in the alignment and correlation of world forces are characterised primarily by the absolute and relative strengthening of the positions of world socialism and the growth of its economic, scientific, technological and military potential.
The level of political awareness and effective involvement of the popular masses appreciably affects relations between countries of the opposite systems. Anti-war sentiments have markedly increased following the development of weapons of mass destruction and the awareness that such weapons pose a serious threat to the very existence of entire countries and peoples. The struggle of the international working class and of all democratic forces against the threat of nuclear war, against militarism and the arms race has become a serious political factor and the ruling quarters in the capitalist world have to reckon with it.
88The formerly oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa arc now active participants in international relations. The emergence of new sovereign countries has become an important factor in the alignment of world forces. Although the emergence and activity of the newly free countries of Asia and Africa give rise to new international problems and make international relations more complicated, objectively they further weaken capitalism's world positions.
The profound changes in the correlation of world forces have substantially altered the conditions of and the outlook for relations between the socialist and capitalist countries and created more favourable objective prerequisites for their peaceful coexistence. These relations increasingly affect the entire course of international development. The factors that made the peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and socialist countries possible in the past have been augmented by new developments making that coexistence an objective necessity of human progress.
In the past, conflicts and wars were an alternative to peaceful coexistence. The brunt of such conflicts was borne primarily by their immediate participants. The First and Second World Wars, though they caused huge human and material losses, to a certain extent strengthened the material and political positions of individual countries. Tn today's world, however, Ihe outcome of a nuclear world war would be quite different---it would imperil the very existence of entire countries and nations and would be a staggering calamity for the whole of humanity. For this reason, the preservation and consolidation of peace, i.e., peaceful coexistence, acquires a global dimension.
Tt is mostly the progressive forces that are 89 concerned with the prevention of a nuclear world war today. So, however, are the capitalist countries, although to a lesser extent, because such a war would put an end to the very existence of capitalism.
A certain community of objective interests of the socialist and capitalist countries concerning this crucial problem of our time introduces an essentially new element in their interrelations and is a major political requisite for peaceful coexistence.
Its economic prerequisites, loo, are growing stronger. Scientific and technical progress lends an international dimension to economic activities. Tt enhances the international division of labour, expands foreign trade and international economic contacts and increases the interdependence of the economies of different countries.
In the past, the internationalisation of economic activities was observed primarily in relations between countries with similar socio-- economic systems, whereas now it is already discernible in relations between countries with opposite regimes.
The Western countries are increasingly interested in establishing business contacts with the socialist states because, on the one hand, the economic potential of socialism is growing and, on the other, crisis phenomena, and energy, raw-material and monetary problems of the capitalist world are growing more acute.
There is another factor to be considered. The present level of the productive forces and scientific and technical progress gives rise to problems which cannot be effectively resolved on a national level and call for the concerted efforts and co-operation of various countries irrespective of their social system. These problems include 90 space exploration, raw-material and energy problems, environmental protection, the use of the World Ocean, the population explosion, and disease and hunger control.
And last, but not least, the scientific and technological revolution calls for a broad exchange of information irrespective of national and state boundaries, makes it possible to spread knowledge about other countries and facilitates contacts between peoples.
Essential changes in the objective conditions of inter-slate relations in the context of two world systems and I be emergence of prerequisites favourable for peaceful coexistence do not of themselves guarantee an overhaul of existing relations. Practical realisation of the corresponding objective prerequisites and, consequently, the future course of international relations largely depend on the subjective factor, on the awareness of the changed situation and on the active involvement of social forces, such as classes, states, political parties and governments, and on their foreign policy.
The Soviet Union's approach to relations between the two opposing social systems and its work towards detente are based on Lenin's conception of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In their socio-bistorical content, relations between the socialist and capitalist countries are part of the worldwide class struggle. But this struggle is not waged by classes---it is waged by states through their foreign policy, by means of employing specific methods in a specific international setting. Relations between the socialist and capitalist countries are characterised not only by conflicts and disputes, but also by some common interests. It is quite possible and necessary to exclude wars and 91 armed conflicts and an unbridled arms race from their relations and to enhance their co-operation in resolving specific problems. This task becomes particularly vital today, when the peaceful coexistence of states of the two different systems is the only real and reasonable alternative to a world nuclear catastrophe, it is an objective prerequisite for humanity's further progress.
The CPSU and the world communist movement emphasise in their policy-making documents that they consider peaceful coexistence as their long-term general strategy, rather than a transient tactical slogan. Moreover, Communists firmly believe that today peaceful coexistence is in keeping with the objective interests of the capitalist countries, being the only reasonable policy for bourgeois governments as well.
The CPSU has not only shown that the peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist countries is necessary, but also formulated its conception of the concrete content of this notion in today's world.
``Peaceful coexistence" the CPSU Programme says, "implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries; consideration for each other's interests; non-- interference in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every people to solve all the problems of their country by themselves; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.''~^^1^^
_-_-_~^^1^^ The Road to Communism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1962, p. 506.
92Renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes cannot be based on the goodwill oj one party only. It involves a realistic approach on the part of all countries, a certain level of mutual understanding and trust, and the need to take account of each other's interests. This is the only approach that can effectively ensure particular agreements being reached between socialist and capitalist countries. This approach fully accords with the interests of all countries, big or small.
Of great theoretical and practical importance is the point on non-interference in internal affairs and recognition of the right of every people lo solve all the problems of their country by themselves. The concept of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems is based on the recognition of this difference, on the recognition of the right of every people to organise their life as they see fit, without any outside interference. Guided by this principle, the Soviet Union is against any ``export'' of revolution. Similarly, it resolutely opposes all attempts by the imperialist powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries and rebuffs their encroachments on the revolutionary gains of other peoples.
Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries is another essential element of peaceful coexistence. It is closely tied in with the principles of equality and non-- interference in internal affairs and seeks to exclude from practical international relations all violations of sovereignty and encroachments on the territory of other countries, which have caused and continue to cause military conflicts that may have extremely dangerous consequences.
Promoting economic, scientific and cultural 93 co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit in order to strengthen mutual understanding and trust among countries and peoples is also a component of the policy of peaceful coexistence. In the past, such co-- operation between capitalist and socialist countries was rather limited, and virtually non-existent in the Cold War years. This was only to the detriment of both parties.
Today, economic, scientific and technological co-operation between socialist and capitalist countries is important not only in its own right, but also because it promotes peace and makes peaceful relations between countries of the two systems more stable.
Upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence, the CPSU opposes both the distortion of this concept by the right-wing opportunists who ignore the class essence of states and of their foreign policy and the principal difference between the socialist and the capitalist countries, and the Leftist attacks on the policy of peaceful coexistence. By asserting that peaceful coexistence is tantamount to "aiding capitalism" and "freezing the socio-political status quo'', the ``Left'' distortionists of Marxism-Leninism forget that any revolution is primarily a result of inner developments and ignore the fact that economic competition between socialism and capitalism is their chief battlefield today.
The Marxist-Leninist approach to the problem of peaceful coexistence is characterised by historical optimism and confidence in the might of the world socialist community and its increasing ability to influence international politics in the interests of peace and social progress. This was borne out by the large-scale Soviet peace offensive in the 1970s.
94At the same time the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence is characterised by sober realism. The Soviet Union Lakes into account the concrete alignment of world forces, the potential of other countries and the imperialist attempts to adapt to the situation, and is aware of the need to work hard towards attaining its foreign policy objectives.
The Soviet Union combines a constructive approach to vital international problems with a firm rebuff to all aggressive designs, a readiness to expand mutually beneficial co-operation with Western countries in all fields with the ideological struggle.
This policy pursued by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries towards the capitalist states has become an important factor facilitating a turn from confrontation in the inter-state relations of countries of the two different systems to practical realisation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. Realistic TrendsThe role of the subjective factor affecting foreign policy strategy and practice is increasing today. As we have shown earlier, the Soviet Union and its class allies had been consistently supporting the idea of peaceful coexistence for a number of years, whereas the capitalist countries had for long been held back by the inertia of the Cold War. Although the more farsighted representatives of Western ruling circles had spoken in favour of peaceful coexistence before, the official policy of most of the 95 capitalist countries for many years remained unchanged and its reviewing was a painstaking and protracted process. Although in the early 1970s realistic views had definitely prevailed within the ruling quarters of the West, the foreign policy of many capitalist countries remains inconsistent and contradictory.
This policy is still affected by the aggressive schemes of the most reactionary forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie. These forces still hope to hold back the revolutionary process and weaken the socialist community. They still want to somehow revive John Foster Dulles's doctrine of rolling back communism, to recover imperialism's lost positions and to suppress by force of arms the revolutionary liberation struggle.
The aggressive actions of the imperialist reactionary forces compel the popular masses fighting for their national and social emancipation to take up arms when no other way is left for them to safeguard their interests and accomplish their objectives. The Soviet Union, together with all progressive forces, supports the peoples' struggle for freedom and independence. The aggressive policies of imperialism, on the other hand, give rise to military danger, lead to local wars that heighten tensions between capitalist and socialist countries and pose a threat to universal peace. This is a chief obstacle to overcoming the Cold War and reshaping world relations on the lines of peaceful coexistence.
The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, for example, for many years poisoned the international atmosphere and prevented better relations between capitalist and socialist countries, above all the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of the aggressive policies pursued by the Israeli invaders, relying on American political, 96 financial and military assistance, the Middle East conflict still harbours a danger of military escalation.
The arms race and the material and political interests of the big arms-manufacturing monopolies and the reactionary militarists put up serious obstacles to normalising relations between countries of the two systems. The U.S. military-industrial complex, as developments in the second half of the 1970s have once again shown, is a chief opponent of the relaxation of international tension, of peaceful coexistence. Through A'ATO, it influences the policy of the European member-countries. The improvement of the bloc's mechanism, involving tremendous expenses, is designed to involve even more closely the participating countries and neutralise the resistance of those circles which are beginning to question the need for its existence. In order to galvanise the ''Soviet threat" thesis certain NATO leaders and the Western press time and again fan a vociferous campaign about the alleged "disturbance of the balance of power" in the world, caused by a build-up of Soviet military potential in various regions.
In their struggle against world socialism and the liberation movements the imperialist reactionary forces resort to other means that are far from contributing to peaceful coexistence. They rely primarily on inciting nationalism, setting one socialist country against another and sowing discord among the anti-imperialist forces. There were even plans to use better relations with the socialist countries to ``erode'' the community of socialist countries. This was in fact the backbone of the ill-fated doctrine of building bridges to the socialist countries, which was put forward in the mid-1960s.
__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7-01290 97Lastly, no one should underestimate the ideological and psychological after-effects of the Cold War, the specific residue it has left in the human mind, the platitudes and prejudices that hinder a sober analysis of reality, an awareness of the new conditions and new tasks, and a search for new ways and forms of relations between capitalist and socialist countries.
On the other hand, the ruling quarters in capitalist countries cannot shut their eyes to the reality which contradicts ever more strikingly their outdated foreign policy strategy. In the past, the Western stand on the policy of peaceful coexistence hinged primarily on the interplay of certain short-level, tactical interests of various bourgeois groupings, whereas now the situation is quite different.
The economic, political and military potential of the Soviet Union and the growing might of the world peace forces make realistic Western leaders understand that there is no future in the idea of a nuclear world war to attain political goals. Moreover, they have come to realise that opportunities for unleashing local wars have also shrunk because they cannot yield tangible results and may have perilous consequences. This forced realisation does not, of course, lead automatically to the establishment of relations of peaceful coexistence. Yet it mirrors the inner struggle within the Western ruling circles concerning their attitude to the socialist world and clears the road for realistic tendencies in their foreign policy.
A growing number of influential political leaders in the capitalist world are coming to the conclusion that peaceful coexistence is the only reasonable principle of relations between countries with different social systems, a 98 principle imposed by today's realities. Characteristically, General do Gaulle said as far back as 1960 that the existence of opposite regimes "should not hamper peaceful coexistence, otherwise nothing in the final analysis can save mankind".^^1^^ Later on similar views were expressed in other European countries as well and affected their foreign policy. "We must all learn to live together,'' said the then British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. ".. .Whether we like it or not . . . we must find a way of living together.''~^^2^^
It was very important that the American ruling quarters who for years believed in their absolute military supremacy and discarded all opportunities for normalising Soviet-American relations, revised these former foreign policy concepts. World developments in the 1950s-60s exposed the insolvency of the position-of-strength concepts that had been advanced in the Cold War years.
Many political scientists in the West spoke profusely about the comprehension of world realities and criticised the thesis of American unlimited supremacy. Marshall D. Shulman, for example, wrote of "the evident paradox of our [American---Ed.] unprecedentedly large military power and our declining political influence in the world, a paradox which points up the limitations of arms as a source of effective power".^^3^^
The bankruptcy of the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam and the unprecedented upsurge of mass anti-war movement compelled the American administration to reconsider many objectives of its foreign policy strategy. Henry _-_-_
~^^1^^ Le Monde, 21 April 1960.
~^^2^^ The Times, 28 April 1960.
~^^3^^ Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 607.
__PRINTERS_P_99_COMMENT__ 7* 99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1981/PSFPT213/20070914/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.09.14) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ Kissinger wrote: "Vietnam is more than a failure of policy. It is really a very critical failure of the American philosophy of international relations.''~^^1^^ The conduct and outcome of the Vietnam war further exacerbated the differences in (lie United Slates on foreign policy issues.The U.S. ruling circles could not fail to lake account of the trend towards detente, which was ever more clearly observed in the policy of some of the United States' West European allies. Senator Frank Church made a characteristic comment. Having admitted that the name of the game in modern Europe was not dissent or Cold War, but rather the normalisation of East-West relations, he warned: "If we are not going lo play, we will discover that the game will go on without us, and we shall soon become spectators in Europe rather than participants . . . The United States should lead its allies in their reach eastward across the 101 he . . . Bnt whether or not we choose to lead them, they will press on, believing, as more Europeans do every clay, that in Europe at least, the cold war is over.''~^^2^^
In the new atmosphere the continuation of the Cold War was detrimental to the interests of the United States. A search for a modus vivendi with the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, was ever more present in the theoretical works of U.S. political scientists and subsequently in American official policy. The former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman wrote: "We are the only two countries that have the capacity to destroy each other and, incidentally, the better part of the _-_-_
~^^1^^ No More Vietnams? The War and the Fnlnrc of American Foreign Policy. Ed. by Richard M. Pfoffer, Harper & Row, New York, 1968, p. 13.
~^^2^^ Foreign Affairs, October 1966, pp. 54--55.
100 world as well, in the doing. This gives both of us an incalculably heavy responsibility to find a way lo get along on this small planet in spite ol our differences."~^^1^^The words "peaceful coexistence" crop up ever more frequently in the jargon of American foreign policy ideologues. As early as 1964, for example, George Kennan made the following observation: ''. . The West has no choice but to accept the quest for peaceful coexistence as the basis for policy toward the countries of the Communist world.''^^2^^ T,il\e some other American foreign policy theorists. Kennan reinforces this conclusion by saying that the leading powers of the two systems have some common interests in the context of international relations. He wrote in 1972: ''. . .There are today no political issues between the Soviet Union and the United States which could conceivably be susceptible of solution by war. even if the state of weaponry had not made any major military conflict between the two powers unthinkable.''^^3^^ Tn expounding the Western view of peaceful coexistence, Shulman for bis part departs from the "bridge building" doctrine and bluntly postulates that any attempt to convert the Soviet Union into a capitalist slatp is senseless. He calls anachronistic the thesis that military supremacy would allegedly yield fruit, political if not military.^^4^^
True, when bourgeois ideologues include the concept of neaceful coexistence in their _-_-_
~^^1^^ W. Avovell Harriman. America and Russia in a Chnnsirii; World. Floubleday & Company, Inc., Garden C.ilv, Now York. 1971. p. XIX.
~^^2^^ r.onrsjc F. Komian. On Healing willi the Communist Wnrhl. Harper & Row. Now York. 1964. p. 21.
~^^3^^ Ford an Affairs. Olobor 1972. p. 220.
~^^4^^ Ibid., October 197M pp. 50, 52.
101 thinking they mostly seek to lend it their own meaning and adapt it to the system of political ideas which are near and dear to them.^^1^^Yet the awareness that many foreign policy concepts proved untenable in the new atmosphere became widespread in the United States.
The practical policies of the early 1970s reflected a change in the attitude of the U.S. ruling quarters towards relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their readiness to pass from confrontation to negotiations.
At the same time new trends in the attitude towards the socialist countries can also be seen in the foreign policy of most bourgeois countries. The former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt had every reason to say that "the essential feature of the present-day situation is the fact that the realisation of the need to strengthen peace, irrespective of socio-political antagonisms, is growing stronger and that against this background the political frontlines have, in a way, been set in motion. The world is in a dynamic stage of development based on the striving of peoples for a better system of coexisting with each other".^^2^^
The active peace policy consistently pursued by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries largely facilitates the adoption of a _-_-_
~^^1^^ Specifically, some bourgeois political scientists try to equate the peaceful coexistence of capitalist, and socialist states and the convergence of the two systems. Of late, the unrealistic demand is being frequently voiced in the West that the social status quo should be guaranteed in the capitalist world as a condition of peaceful coexistence.
~^^2^^ Mirovaya ekonomika i mczhdnnarodniyc otnoshenlya, No. 10, October 1973, p. 10.
102 realistic stand by the Western ruling circles and weakens the positions of Cold War advocates.The revision of the old political strategy of the West towards the socialist countries, a strategy based on the ``might-is-right'' princiole. and the acceptance of the idea of the peaceful coexistence of capitalist and socialist countries took place in a process of fierce struggle. It did not mean at all that Western political leaders had reconciled themselves to the new social system. Tn their foreign policy they continued to be guided by the class interests of the bourgeoisie. But what was important, they approached these interests differently, this approach being more in keeping with the objective situation, the real correlation of world forces and the need to avert a new world war.
The prevalence of realistic trends in Western foreign policy was an essential element in the process of detente. And a retreat from realism, relapses into the position-of-strength policy and the fanning of militarist tendencies have now, in the early 1980s, become a serious obstacle to peaceful coexistence and have markedly slowed down the process of detente.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. Peaceful Coexistence in PracticePeaceful coexistence has borne fruit both in the sphere of socialist-capitalist relations and in the general process of international detente.
In the first half of the 1970s relations between countries of the two systems became unprecedentedly dynamic and intensive. Within a relatively short time many disputes, once -- Considered unsolvable, wore settled, scores of 103 trealies, agreements and understandings were reached, economic exchanges and scientific and technical co-operalion were expanded drastically, political consultations became a regular feature, and new forms and fields of relations emerged.
Detente in Europe holds a central place in Soviet foreign policy. This is only natural, the European continent being a zone where the productive forces are highly developed, the population concentration is very dense, the positions of socialism are especially strong, and the main contradictions of our time are particularly evident.
Europe, the site of frequent bloody armed conflicts in the past, became the main venue of Cold War policies after World War IT. Tt is here that the two opposing military groupings--- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisationstand face to face. It is here that hnge armies and arsenals, including nuclear arms, are concentrated. At the same time changes in the alignment and correlation of world forces and the results of the scientific and technical revolution have an increasing impact on the situation in Europe. It is especially evident here that the Cold War policy is bankrupt, that it is dangerous to continue it, that it, is in the longterm interest of all the European slates to avert war, and that their peaceful coexistence is objectively necessary.
As a result, it has become really possible to pass over to a new stage in the development of relations between the socialist and capitalist conntries, a stasje of seeking practical solutions to the problems of peaceful coexistence and of creating a system of mutually beneficial co-- operation in Europe.
104WiLli all that in mind, the Soviet Union and oilier socialist countries put forward the idea of relaxing international tension and strengthening security and co-operation in Europe. Their concerted efforts in the name of detente combined the basic principles of Leninist foreign policy, namely proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Detente, as the Marxists-Leninists see it, is not an attempt to change the social nature of the capitalist and socialist countries---it is rather a search for the kinds of relations which conform to the vital interests of all peoples.
The initiative of the Soviet Union and its allies was supported by the world peace forces and found a positive response within Western ruling quarters, compelled to reckon with the realities of life in the twentieth century.
In this way in the early 197OK detente became a major trend in inter-state relations beiireen the tiro systems in Europe. It found its expression primarily in bilateral relations between socialist and capitalist countries.
The development of Soviet-French relations brought about the first tangible results showing the viability of the principle of peaceful coexistence in the last third of this century. A turn for the better in Soviet-French relations began in the mid-1960s and was secured in the Joint Soviet-French Declaration (30 .Tune 1966), the Principles of Co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and France (30 October 1971), and the Protocol on Political Consultations (13 October 1970).
The opponents of friendly Soviet-French relations often asserted that the turn in those relations was merely an expression of General de Gaulle's personal foreign policy views and would therefore be shortlived. Yet time has 105 passed since then and the activities of General de Gaulle's successors, George Pompidou and Valery Giscard d'Estaing. have given the lie to such assertions. Despite important changes in the internal situation in France, Soviet-French contacts continue to he stahle and tend to expand. This shows that close co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and France not only accords with the interests of both peoples but also indicates that the French ruling circles, too, have a long-term interest in such contacts. Regular Soviet-French summit meetings greatly contribute to a steady and comprehensive advance in the development of co-operation between the two countries.
Franco-Soviet relations have become an important factor in European and world politics. These two countries have made an outstanding joint contribution to creating prerequisites for drastic improvements in relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
The development of relations between the TT.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, on the onp hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, has also shown a trend towards realising the principle of peaceful coexistence.
The 1970 Treaty between the TT S.S.R. and the F.R.G. marked a fundamental shift in Soviet-West German relations.
The treaties between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G.. between Poland and the F.R.G.. between Czechoslovakia and the F.R.G., and also the Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. have secured the inviolability of the borders of all the European countries concerned and opened up fresh opportunities for developing bilateral contacts between 106 the European socialist countries and West Germany.
Summit meetings firmly fixed the turn in relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany, countries which had previously been diametrically opposed on virtually all major international issues. This turn was of great importance for further progress towards detente and fruitful co-operation between West European and East European countries.
Here, too, developments have confirmed the positive nature of Soviet-West German relations. An agreement was reached to hold regular consultations on major problems of bilateral relations and also on some international issues of interest to both parties.
The West Berlin Quadripartite Agreement (September 1971) and a number of other agreements between the governments of the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. and the West Berlin Senate have resulted in relaxing tensions that had often aggravated the situation in Europe and the world at large. Tn the wake of these agreements leading capitalist countries have officially recognised the G.D.R.
An appreciable contribution to European detente was made by the development of goodneighbourly relations and co-operation between the TT.S.S.R. and Finland on the basis of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of fi April 1948. In the Cold War atmosphere of the past these relations were an exception rather than the rule, with many observers in the West inclined to explain this bv Finland's specific geopolitical position. In the setting of international detente, however, they add nicely to the general picture and are convincing proof that the idea of 107 peaceful coexistence on which they repose is viable and universal.
There have also heen positive changes in the relations of I he Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the Scandinavian countries. A now element has appeared---it was agreed to hold regular political consultations on various levels both on international issues and problems of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union also extended mutually beneficial co-operation in various fields with Great Britain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, and other European countries. The demise of the military-fascist regimes in Portugal (1974), Greece (1974), and Spain (1975) opened the road to their co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
The improvement of Soviet-American relations was of prime importance for extending and deepening detente and for the entire spectrum of current international relations. This stems from the high economic, scientific and technological levels of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A., their huge military potential, and the role each power plays among its allies and in the world at large. Whether or not a world nuclear war will be prevented depends essentially upon the state and development of the Soviet-American relations.
The year 1972 was a turning point in Soviet-American relations. A summit meeting in Moscow culminated in signing a document of historic significance, the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. Following the protracted period of the Cold War and tense confrontation between the two biggest powers, a foundation was laid for developing their relations on the basis of 108 peaceful coexistence, the principle of equality and equal security, mutual respect for each other's interests, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Consistent implementation of Ihese fundamental principles in the practical policies of both countries opened the road to normalising Soviet-American relations and improved the general international situation.
Soviet-American joint efforts to restrain the arms race and reduce the danger of nuclear war conform to the vital interests of the Soviet and American peoples, and those of the whole of humanity. The most important and crucial guideline for Soviet-American relations is to ensure safeguards against the flare-up of a nuclear conflict and of war in general.
In the period from 1972 to 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States took some concrete steps towards curbing the arms race and reducing the danger of war. They signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), and the permanent Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The realisation of these agreements marked the beginning of the transition from tense Soviet-U.S. confrontation to settling disputes through negotiations and opened up promising prospects for strengthening universal peace.
. .
Of great importance were the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This document was to enhance efforts not only to limit strategicoffensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, but also to reduce them subsequently. On this basis agreement was reached at Vladivostok 109 concerning the conclusion in 1975 by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. ol a long-lorm agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-2) on the principle of equality and oqual security.
The first half of the 1970s saw promising changes in other areas of Soviet-American relations, too. A number of agreements were signed on co-operation in various Holds of science and technology, public health, protection of the environment, space exploration, peaceful uses of atomic energy, cultural contacts, and so forth. Opportunities arose for developing SovietAmerican trade and economic co-operation.
Constructive exchanges of views between Soviet and American leaders 011 some pressing international issues were essentially important both for better Soviet-American relations and for stabilising the international situation. In the postwar decades, tension in Soviet-American relations had a detrimental effect upon the entire international situation, whereas the improvement of these relations opened the road to positive shifts in world developments. In the early 1970s the Soviet Union and the United States reached understanding on such problems as ensuring security in Europe, overcoming crisis situations in the Middle East, South-East Asia, and other regions. This had a beneficial effect on the development of peaceful international relations.
Today, however, the situation has changed. The sudden ill-turn in U.S. foreign policy in the second half of the 1970s (of which we will speak later on) blocked existing opportunities and jeopardised the fruits of detente.
The socialist countries of Europe adopted the Bucharest Declaration (1966), the 110 Budapest Appeal (1969), and a number of other official documents in which they resolved, jointly with other states, to seek ways and means of strengthening European security and turning Europe into a continent of lasting peace and fruitful co-operation.
The Soviet Union's preparations for and participation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were an important aspect of its work towards securing and consolidating detente in the period of July 1973-- August 1975. The participants in that unprecedented forum (33 European countries, the United States and Canada) jointly confirmed the inviolability of existing borders, established a code of principles governing inter-state relations in conformity with the idea of peaceful coexistence and outlined future areas of cooperation.
The results of the Helsinki Conference showed that realistic trends in the policy of leading Eastern and Western countries had borne fruit. The Final Act adopted at the Conference is an example of a reasonable compromise reached on the basis of an accurate balance of interests of all the participating countries.
The Politburo of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers described the results of the Helsinki Conference as the sum total of accords reached by an account and consensus of the viewpoints and interests of all, and stated: "These accords, without obliterating the differences in ideology and social systems, are in keeping with the interests of all the peoples on our continent. There are no victors or vanquished, no winners or losers. The Conference is a 111 triumph of reason, a gain for all who cherish peace arid security on our planet.''~^^1^^
The success of the Conference authoritatively confirmed the expediency and possibility of further developing inter-state relations in Europe on the basis of peaceful coexistence and extended mutually advantageous co-operation irrespective of Ihe existing political, economic and social systems.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. Working TowardsThe signing of the Final Act by the heads of sta'.e of 35 countries marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of detente. Yet it was f.ir from easy to implement (lie Helsinki accords and generally improve the political climate in Europe, because certain quarters in the Wee-t took the signing of the Einal Act for an alarm signal and launched a vigorous campaign against it.
Characterising the Soviet Union's attitude to the Final Act, Leonid Brezhnev said: " Occupying a central place in European politics today is the task of implementing to the full the accords reached by 35 states in Helsinki a year and a half ago. We regard the Final Act of the European Conference as a code of international obligations aimed at ensuring a lasting peace. To be sure, all of its provisions must be implemented, and that is our daily task. The _-_-_
~^^1^^ In Ihe Name of Peace, Security and Co-operation. On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Held in Helsinki on ;i<) July I A ugus! 1975, Moscow, 1975, p. 10 (in Russian).
112 Central Committee attaches much political importance to this work. Many of our ministries and agencies are involved in it.``It is quite understandable that at present much has been accomplished in some fields, while in others the necessary measures are being carried out gradually or are only being drafted. Much depends here on the overall state of political relations between stales, on the level of detente. By poisoning the international atmosphere the opponents of detente are only impeding this work."~^^1^^
The Soviet Union's fundamental policy towards the Helsinki Conference found a concrete expression in its practical bilateral co-operation with the Western participants in the forum. In developing this co-operation in conformity with the ten principles agreed upon in Helsinki, the U.S.S.R. sought to make it stable and comprehensive. Experience has shown that constructive development of relations based on peaceful coexistence and co-operation between countries with different social systems does not boil down to bilateral contacts but extends further, contributing to international stability.
Soviet-French relations remained exceptionally good. During French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's official visit to the U.S.S.R. (14--18 October 1975) the two countries signed the Declaration on the Further Development of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and France. In that document the parties confirmed tht-ir determination " steadfastly to pursue a policy of accord and co-- operation and to do everything in their power to _-_-_
~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Speech in the City of Tula on January 18, 1977, Moscow, 1977, p. 27.
113 affirm in international relations the policy of detente, to impart concrete material content to detente, specifically by enhancing their joint contribution to the solution of basic international problems and to prevention of crisis situations.''~^^1^^ In addition, the Soviet Union and France signed agreements on co-operation in the fields of civil aviation and aircraft industry, energy, and tourism, and later on an Agreement on the Prevention of the Accidental or Non-Authorised Use of Nuclear Weapons (17 July 1976).Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France on 1 July 1977 confirmed the vitality of the Helsinki spirit. In their joint declaration the Soviet Union and France expressed the belief that "steady progress in bilateral relations between states in every field indicated in the Final Act is one of the principal means of ensuring the realisation of that long-term action programme".^^2^^ The parties noted that their co-operation could be further expanded.
The Joint Statement of the Soviet Union and France on the Relaxation of International Tension, the first bilateral document dealing specifically with that problem, emphasised the need to continue and intensify efforts to promote international detente by, among other things, participating in "vigorous initiatives towards disarmament" and by "fostering mutual understanding among people by developing contacts between them and expanding mutual acquaintance with the culture and life of the peoples." ^^3^^ A Soviet-French summit meeting in April 1979 in Moscow served to promote friendship _-_-_
~^^1^^ New Times, No. 43, 1975.
~^^2^^ Ibid., No. 27, 1977.
~^^3^^ Ibid.
114 and co-operation between the two countries. Attention was devoted mainly to examining the most topical problems of our time from the standpoint of further steps to avert the threat of war, consolidating the policy of detente in Europe and throughout the world, the necessity of ending the arms race and of disarmament, eliminating centres of tension, strengthening international security and trust among states.The talks culminated in the Programme for the Further Development of Go-operation Between the Soviet Union and France for Detente and Peace, in which the parlies declared once again their determination to act, in their relations with oilier stales and in their mutual relations, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act on the non-use of force or threat of force, on the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for independence, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs.
The Soviet Union continued developing its relations with (he Federal Republic of Germany in the spirit of Helsinki. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to West Germany in May 1978 was an event of major significance. The high-level talks between Leonid Bre/hnev and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, concluded with the signature of the Joint Declaration on advancing the cause of detente, good-neighbourly relations and strengthening of peace, and also the Agreement on Developing Long-Term Co-operation in the Economic and Industrial Field.
In the Joint Declaration the parties drew the conclusion, on the basis of the developments in the past decades, that "detente is necessary, possible and useful''. The two leaders declared that they saw "no reasonable __PRINTERS_P_115_COMMENT__ 8* 115 alternalive to peaceful co-operalion of stales despite divergencies in certain basic views and differences of political, economic and social systems''.~^^1^^ They undertook to make use of their political and economic opportunities independently, jointly and on a multilateral basis to expand and deepen the process of detente and make it consistent and stable.
The varied and mutually beneficial co-- operation between the U.S.S.R. and Finland also continued lo develop. During the visit to Finland of the Soviet Premier (March 1977) and his talks with Finnish President Urho Kekkonen the two sides declared that promising results had been achieved in implementing the Final Act. They reaffirmed their intension to actively promote the further development of the positive processes begun or enhanced following the Helsinki Conference.
In the period following the signing of the Final Act an exchange of visits by Soviet and Western political leaders on various levels continued. The mechanism of political consultations established by previous agreements with a number of countries also continued to function. Quite a few concrete bilateral agreements were signed.
In the Joint Soviet-Swedish Communique signed during Swedish Premier Olof Palme's official visit to the USSR in April 1976, the parties declared their readiness to strictly observe and implement in all fields of their relations the principles of inter-state relations set forth in the Helsinki accords and to fully observe all the provisions of the Final Act. The parties held a constructive exchange of views on the _-_-_
^^1^^ New Times, No. 20, 1978. 116
116 problems of European co-operation in such fields as environmental protection, transport and power generation. They also signed an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation.The Soviet-British Communique signed during Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's visit to Great Britain in March 1976 reaffirmed the intention of the two parties, "acting together or concurrently in co-operation with other states, to continue their efforts to strengthen international peace and security and to work for the further relaxation of tensions both within Europe and throughout the world''.~^^1^^
In the post-Helsinki period the Soviet Union established and developed relations of peaceful coexistence with Portugal, Spain, and Greece, countries which became more active in world politics after the demise of dictatorial regimes there.
On 3 October 1975 a Soviet-Portuguese declaration was signed in which the U.S.S.R. and the Portuguese Republic agreed to steadfastly adhere to the principles of inter-state relations as expressed in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The two countries also signed an agreement on cooperation in science and culture and an agreement on long-term economic, scientific and technical co-operation.
In February 1977, in a joint announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Spain the two parties declared that they would develop their relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, in accordance with the UN Charter and in the spirit of the accords reached at the Helsinki Conference. As a result of the Spanish _-_-_
~^^1^^ Moscow News, Supplement to No. 15, 1976.
117 Foreign Minister's visit lo the U.S.S.R. in January 1979 Hie two countries considered il necessary to make fnrlher resolute efforts lo (insure dynamic and full implementation of all the provisions of Hie Final Act.The Soviet Union sought to improve its relations with Turkey. Tn June 1978 the Soviet and Turkish Premiers signed a political document on (lie principles of good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, opening up fresh prospects for Soviet-Turkish co-operation.
A persistent search for new ways and concrete forms of mutually beneficial economic and scientific and technical co-operation hetween stales with different social systems is an important part of the Soviet Union's efforts aimed at deepening detente in Europe. The Soviet Union's long-term economic agreements with Finland, France, West Germany, and some other countries are of special relevance here. Alongside bilateral economic co-operation, the Soviet Union expands its multilateral contacts. Of no little significance in this respect could he the initiative of the socialist countries to reach agreement hetween the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the European Economic Community (EEC) as to the basis of their relations. This initiative, however, still awaits an effective positive response.
The Soviet Union is also implementing the Final Act's provisions concerning broader cultural and other links and contacts between peoples and a broader exchange of information, in doing so, it believes that, in the context of detente, development of such links and contacts is quite natural, provided, of course, that the partics concerned strictly observe 1he principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty of each other 118 and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
The Soviet Union maintains cultural links with almost 120 countries. In 1978 Soviet theatres featured 129 plays by Western playwrights (in addition to classical works). In 1976 some 1,500 books by foreign authors were published in the USSR, with the total number of copies running well above 60,000,000. Millions of Soviet tourists go abroad each year and millions of foreign visitors come to the USSR.
The Berlin Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe (June 1976) confirmed the Soviet Union's consistent policy of detente. With other participants, the CPSU spoke in favour of further steps to make detente a continuous, increasingly viable, manyfaceted and universal process.
The beneficial effects of detente in Europe were further confirmed by the activities of other socio-political movements and organisations.
The great value of the Final Act was recognised by the 13th Congress of the Socialist International (November 1976, Geneva), which was attended by representatives from over 50 Social-Democratic parties from Europe and other continents. The Congress' final resolution said: "The Congress of the Socialist International welcomes the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and believes that the Final Act signed by all the participants in the Helsinki Conference has become an important stage in promoting East-West relations and strengthening security in Europe.''~^^1^^ The Congress urged the Socialist parties to pool their efforts in implementing the Final Act.
_-_-_~^^1^^ D'Helsinki a Belgrade. Comite international pour la srciirite ft la cooperation enropfenne, Bruxelles, p. 69.
119Many prominent members of parliament, leaders of trade union, women's and yrmlli organisations, and clergymen spoke in Ilie same vein.
Guided by the common drive to consolidate peace and serurilv. neace forces were organised on a national and international level 1o promote detente and 1o give a timely rebuff to its opponents. The role of the mass peace movement is increasing.
The movement for European security and co-operation, launched during; the Assemblies of Representatives of Public, Opinion for European Security and Co-oneration (Brussels. 1072: Liege. 197M, continued its work on a national and international level. The International Committee for European Security and Co-oneration formed by this movement, held regular discussions on how the Final Act, is being implemented and actively promoted the extension and deepening of detente in Europe. The public forces united around the International Commillee are seeking to implement the Final Act's provisions, ensure further progress for detente and supplement political detente with measures to limit the arms race.
Significantly, some Western leaders reaffirmed their loyalty to the cause of relaxing international tensions, realising that it, is dictated primarily bv the real international situation and by the vital interests of their respective countries. Take, for instance, numerous declarations and statements by Helmut Schmidt, Valery Giscard d`Estaing, Bruno Kreisky, Urho Kekkonen. and others. Detente was recognised as important and necessary bv manv international or^ nnisations and in inlernational law. O-i 10 December 1077 'he UN General Assembly 120 adopled a Declaration on the Deepening and Strengthening of Detente, drafted by the Soviet Union. In conclusion, detente is playing an increasingly important role in international relations. This, however, is no cause for a one-sided and over-optimistic appraisal of the present stage in world politics. The second half of the 1970s saw other trends that ran counter to detente.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. Detente and Anti-DetenteIn the second half of the 1970s the process of detente slowed down markedly. Moreover, anti-detente trends gained the upper hand in the policy of some Western countries, the United Slates especially. It is important to pinpoint the causes of this about-face in order to search for ways of overcoming the difficulties that have arisen.
The post-Helsinki slow-down in detente may 1o some extent be explained by changes in the content of this process and by the complexity of actually putting detente into practice at the new stage.
Formerly, detente involved mainly the normalisation of East-West inter-state relations, the liquidation of largely artificial barriers put up in the Cold War period, and the development of basic principles to govern such relations in keeping with existing realities. Yet the solution of even these seemingly obvious tasks had consumed a lot of time and required serious political decisions, diplomatic effort and goodwill. Tt, took, for example, some ten years to prepare for and conduct the Helsinki Conference.
121Today, however, detente has entered a qualitatively new stage which gives top priority to more complex problems, such as slopping the perilous, wasteful and, in the final analysis, senseless arms race; implementing detente in the fields of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural co-operation; spreading detente lo other continents.
To solve these complex and essentially new problems, states must display perseverence and consistency, they must renounce outdated `` traditional'' foreign policy concepts and methods and be eager to "learn lo co-operale''.
The materialisation of detente after Helsinki was further complicated by the exacerbation of economic difficulties and aggravation of the socio-political situation in some; Western countries in the mid-l!)7()s, by the continuing tension in the Middle East, by local conflicts in Asia and Africa, and by some yet unresolved problems facing the developing countries.
It seems, however, that the chief causes of today's difficulties arc rooted in the activities of certain forces which for some reason or other, overtly or covertly, intentionally or unintentionally, oppose detente; they arc rooted in the stcpped-up activities of the opponents of peaceful coexistence.
With detente gaining momentum and becoming a reality which opened up the prospect of reshaping inter-state relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, certain influential quarters in the West wishing lo preserve the status quo, increased their activity. An international alliance, so to speak, was formed between the foes of peace and detente. It included the military-- industrial complex, imperialist reactionary forces and colonialists, as well as the Peking leaders.
122Stepping up the arms race, as wo have already explicitly emphasised in the preceding chapter, is incompatible with a policy of ensuring peaceful, good-neighbourly relations between states and extending fruitful and mutually beneficial international co-operation.
The arms race not only revitalises the atmosphere of mistrust and enmity among nations, hut what is important, it, gives rise to a danger of distorting the international stability of a delicate balance of strategic forces a fact fraught with a growing threat of war.
The continuation and deepening of detente also comes up against difficulties stemming from repeated attempts to solve foreign policy problems by resorting lo ``traditional'' military-- power methods, which contradict its very essence and may lead to periodic aggravations of the international situation both on a local and global scale.
Also counter to detente run the efforts to intensify NATO's activities and to modernise its military machine under cover of the concept of the "two pillars" of the Atlantic Alliance---- detente and military power. Plans are under way to expand NATO, and the attempts to closely unite all the leading capitalist powers under the banner of ``Atlantism'' are growing morn persistent.
Detente is also seriously hampered by the activities of those reactionary forces which had hoped, in vain, that the relaxation of international tension would erode the socialist system and consolidate the social status quo in the West.
The Right-wing circles in the West, above all in the United Slates, attack detente to cater for their narrow political ambitions. The strains 123 of inner political struggle in turn often have a negative impact on official foreign policy, impairing and delaying the implementation of agreements that have already been reached. For example, despite the fact that the agreement in principle concerning the terms of the SALT-2 treaty was reached as far back as 1974 during the Soviet-American summit at Vladivostok, the treaty was signed as late as June 1979 and has so far not been ratified.
An unseemly role in the efforts to undermine detente is being played by the major Western press organs and other mass media which in many cases incite distrust and enmity towards the socialist countries.
In a number of Western countries attempts are being made to discredit the theory and practice of peaceful coexistence, with real difficulties in the process of detente being intertwined with anti-communist and anti-Soviet demagogy reminiscent of the ('old War times.
Significantly, operation "anti-detcnl,c" grew into a broad and organised campaign soon after the successful completion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It seems that the opponents of peaceful coexistence were gravely alarmed by its success.
There were many aspects to the anti-detente campaign. It included allegations that detente was ``fruitless'' and that people "were tired" of it, that the Soviet Union was the only country to benefit, that the socialist countries "were not honouring'' the obligations undertaken in Helsinki. It also included vigorous propaganda campaigns centred on the alleged "violations of human rights" in the socialist countries and attempts to interfere, in defiance of the spirit and letter of the Final Act, in their internal affairs. 124 This has been accompanied by fanning distrust and enmity towards the socialist countries and demands for new concessions from them as "payment for detente'', such as free circulation of people and ideas.
The Belgrade Meeting (4 October 1977-9 March 1978) of Representatives of the Foreign Ministers of the countries participating in the Helsinki Conference was very indicative. Neither the nature of the problems discussed, nor the level of the meeting promised any major political results comparable with the outcome of the Helsinki Conference. Yet there existed favourable opportunities to bring the meeting to a constructive conclusion, to adopt a number of concrete recommendations on some major issues of security and co-operation in Europe, contributing to extending and deepening detente.
Of relevance here were also the results of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States, held in November 1976 in Bucharest. Its participants put forward some new initiatives. Specifically, they urged all countries not to take action that could load to expanding the existing or setting up new closed groupings and militarypolitical alliances. They also called upon the participants in the Helsinki Conference to conclude a treaty on not being the first to use nuclear armaments against each other. The implementation of this proposal would significantly reduce the threat of nuclear war and improve the international political climate.
In Belgrade the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries contributed to securing military detente in Europe. Their proposals included concrete measures to avert war on the European continent. In addition to the proposals 125 mentioned above, they moved to agree not to conduct military exorcises involving over r)(J,000-(50,()00 men, to extend the military measures to ensure trust, as set out in the Final Act, to countries in the Southern Mediterranean. The Soviet side tabled a motion that discussions should be held on the entire range of issues related to military detente, and also on other constructive proposals in this field at special consultative meetings oi' all the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Also important for the cause of delenle in Europe was the Soviet proposal to agree on the mutual renunciation of the production of the N-bomb.
In the economic field, the Soviet delegation proposed that the convocation of international conferences on the protection of the environment, on the energy problem, and on transport should be speeded up. The Polish delegation urged that the removal of existing trade barriers should be accelerated.
The socialist countries submitted a number of new proposals on humanitarian co-operation.
But the position and activity of the NATO countries at the meeting were Car from being constructive. They opposed the stand taken by the socialist countries with a dual approach. While declaring their willingness to proceed with detente, they strove to step up the arms race and waged co-ordinated propaganda and ideological campaigns against the socialist countries, accusing them groundlessly of aggressiveness and violations of human rights.
Although the Belgrade meeting dealt with a relatively modest and limited scope of problems, the Western mass media covered it much more extensively than they had done the European 126 Conference and tlie Final Act. Moreover, they systematically distorted both the character of the problems discussed and the essence of the diplomatic moves and counter-moves during the meeting.
The Belgrade meeting played an important role in the propaganda campaign launched after Helsinki by certain quarters in the NATO countries who hoped to use the forum to slow down the improvement in international relations and to discredit the policy of the socialist countries. This led to an atmosphere of confrontation at the meeting. Some Western delegations, especially the American, sought to bring out points that set its participants apart, rather than those that brought, or at least should have brought, them closer together. They also tried to impose on others their own values, criteria and norms as the only acceptable ones. The U.S. delegation tried to substitute the empty "human rights" rhetoric for a serious discussion and made an attempt to grant itself the ``right'' to dictate what laws and regulations other countries should have, trying to legalise interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries.
These actions were aimed at undermining the process of co-operation begun in Helsinki. Commenting on the policy chosen by the Western countries in Belgrade, the French Le Monde had to admit that they had made no efforts towards a rapprochement. "They seem to be ready,'' the newspaper wrote, "to easily accept a fiasco and are only concerned with how to put the blame entirely on the Soviet Union."~^^1^^ As a result, the meeting was but a modest success. _-_-_
~^^1^^ Le Monde, 28 February 1978. 127
127 Still its final document contained some positive elements: the participating countries reafh'rmed their will to go ahead with the policy of detente, emphasised once again the political importance and role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and expressed the resolution of their governments to implement all the provisions of the Final Act.So, the attempt to thwart the process begun in Helsinki had failed. The Belgrade meeting was a useful example of political realism. 11 clearly showed the jatility of bullying tfie socialist countries into submission in order to wrest from them unilateral advantages.
The extremely uneven development of Soviet-American relations following the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the U.S.A. had a particularly negative effect on the progress oi' detente. Shifts in American domestic policies and in the international situation resulted in a sharp clash between different and often opposite trends in U.S. foreign policy.
On the one hand, some sections in the U.S. ruling quarters continued to support realistic positions based on the real correlation and alignment of world forces, the positive changes in international relations and the drive of the world public towards further improvement in the political climate. On the other, there were growing tendencies in American foreign policy pushing the world back to the Cold War years, to military confrontation. A series of U.S. actions were aimed at stepping up the arms race, hindering the solution of urgent international problems and interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.
The contradictions in American foreign policy were largely caused by the intensified 128 internal struggle around some key international problems, particularly the problem of detente. The most reactionary forces seeking to undermine detente considerably increased their pressure on (he realistic-minded circles. This gave rise to coin petition between various political leaders and groupings trying to surpass each other "in "playing iirm" in international politics. More often than not they subordinated important international issues to their self-seeking and short-term interests.
The complicated tangle of contradictory trends primarily affected U.S.-Soviet relations. Paying lip-service to the need to improve these relations, the U.S. administration obstructed their constructive development and shifted the blame for lack of progress onto the Soviet side.
Washington look actions which could only be interpreted as intended to worsen its relations with Moscow. American foreign policy was clearly geared towards renouncing the obligation undertaken by the American and Soviet sides in their joint documents to do everything possible to avoid confrontation.
On Washington's initiative, some NATO counli'ics embarked upon an armed intervention in /aire, tho Somali-Ethiopian conflict was fomented, and a new anti-Cuba campaign launched. Tlie United States unilaterally backed down in the political understanding with the Soviet Union on the Middle East and patronised separate deals to tho detriment of the interests of the Arab peoples. As developments have shown, the Camp David tripartite deal between the U.S.A., Israel, and Egypt has not improved the Middle East situation. All attempts to by-pass the key issues of a just settlement only added fuel to the explosive situation in the region.
__PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9-01290 129The Pentagon vigorously stepped up its military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean using the events in Iran and Afghanistan as a pretext. The capture in Teheran of the U.S. diplomatic staff (which the Soviet Union, as everybody knows, did not condone) and the events in Afghanistan were used by Washington as an excuse for stirring up dangerous tension in Soviet-American relations.
The anti-Soviet bent also became more pronounced in American policy towards China. The establishment of normal relations between the United States and China could have been a positive development if it had not concealed designs which had nothing in common with the objectives of peaceful international co-operation. Certain circles in the U.S. and the leaders in China pinned anti-Soviet hopes on the normalisation of Sino-Ainerican relations.
In March 1977 the American side revised the Vladivostok accords on the SALT-2 treaty. It came out with new proposals unacceptable to the Soviet Union because they grossly contradicted the principle of equality and equal security. They only indicated that the United States sought to obtain unilateral advantages, and therefore could not serve as a basis for further action on the SALT-2 treaty.
At the same time the United States began stepping up its military preparations. Under the guise of a hue and cry about the "Soviet threat'', plans were made for future increase in the military potential of the United States and its West European allies. From the 1977 fiscal year onwards, U.S. military expenditures have risen steadily.
The Washington session of the NATO Council in May 1978 adopted a long-term (for over 130 a decade) additional programme of building up armaments, which envisaged a 3 per cent annual increase in military spending by all NATO countries.
The Brussels session of the NATO Council held in December 1979 approved the production and deployment in Western Europe of new American nuclear arms systems, thus also bringing the world closer to a new spiral of the arms race.
The multi-billion injections into the military programmes of the United Slates and other NATO countries were not merely to modernise existing armaments and armed forces. They were made to bring these armaments up to a much higher level and to secure at least onesided advantages at the expense of the other side, if not decisive supremacy. This is evinced by the emphasis the Pentagon has placed on developing new generations of nuclear and conventional arms.
The Soviet-American negotiations on finalising the new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT-2) were hampered by the attempts of the American side to artificially include other questions having no bearing on limiting strategic armaments. Some influential American quarters who do not accept the existing U.S.-Soviet strategic parity and seek military supremacy are creating an unhealthy atmosphere around the SALT-2 treaty.
The negotiating parties succeeded in narrowing their differences on some major issues that had remained unsettled and in finalising a mutually acceptable text of the treaty. Progress in the talks (which was important of itself) opened the road to another top-level Soviet-American meeting which took place in Vienna in June __PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__ 9* 131 1979. During that meeting the Soviet and American leaders signed the SALT-2 Treaty. Subsequent developments, however, show lliat advantage was not taken of the opportunity to establish not merely normal but really good relations between these two powers in the inlerests of their peoples. Anti-Soviet tendencies have again prevailed in the policy of the U.S. administration. As a result, tension in Soviet-- American relations was not relaxed, it lias, on the contrary, even increased recently.
The way in which Soviet-Japanese relations have developed is also indicative. The establishment of friendly Soviet-Japanese relations is fully in the interests of both countries. Spreading detente to Asia and the Pacific Ocean would make it possible for both countries to concentrate on developing peaceful, mutually beneficial political and economic co-operation. The development of friendly relations is necessitated both by political factors and by the economic needs of both countries. Historically, their economies are mutually supplementable. Geography also has a role to play---their proximity makes all forms of Soviet-Japanese co-operation especially significant.
Despite all these favourable prerequisites, Soviet-Japanese relations still face many difficulties. In some areas these difficulties are even exacerbated by Japan taking some antagonistic diplomatic and political actions towards the Soviet Union. They include especially the incorporation of the controversial article dealing with the struggle against ``liegemonism'' into the text of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 12 August 1978. This article is in full accordance with Peking's policy and is explicitly anti-Soviet. Chinese officials emphasise 132 that they consider this provision an important treaty law providing legal grounds for drawing Japan into China's anti-Soviet strategy. China's armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was clear evidence of how serious the consequences of its aggressive designs may he. The aggression was launched immediately after Deng Xiaoping's visits to WashingIon and Tokyo. Its perpetrators wore clearly confident that neither Japan nor the United States would stand in the way.
The propaganda hullabaloo around the socalled problem of the "northern territories'', i.e., Japan's groundless and illegal claims on the four islands in the Kurile chain, is also doing great harm to the development of good-- neighbourly Soviet-Japanese relations. All kinds of inventions about the "Soviet threat in the Far Fjast" are now being used to fan anti-Soviet sentiments in Japan.
All this was bound to seriously damage Soviet-Japanese relations and to hamper their further fruitful development.
It should be emphasised that the Soviet Union took no actions antagonistic to Japan. It did not sign any agreement directed against Japan. The Soviet press did not launch an anti-- Japanese campaign, as the Japanese mass media did against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet government has frequently reaffirmed its desire to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with Japan.
Broad opportunities in the field of bilateral Soviet-Japanese relations still remain unused. The absense of relevant inter-state agreements introduces an element of instability into the general atmosphere of Soviet-Japanese relations.
Signing a peace treaty could be very instrumental. But Japan is still not ready for it, 133 although the Soviet Union proposed on many occasions that negotiations be started that would lead to its signing. The treaty would allow the two countries to secure in international law the achievements made so far in Soviet-Japanese relations. It would be conducive to overcoming a certain lack of trust in their relations and would set up a basis for the stable development of comprehensive and mutually advantageous cooperation.
Addressing Japanese TV viewers on 7 November 1977, Leonid Brezhnev expressed the Soviet Union's readiness to take whatever steps it could to start a constructive dialogue with Japan. He said: "We want to be good neighbours of the Japanese people so that nothing would mar our relations, so that our relations would be characterised by trust, goodwill and cooperation.''~^^1^^
The development of sucb relations would fully conform to the interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples and could also become an important factor in strengthening peace and security in Asia. But here, too, the general deterioration of the international situation as a result of the sharp turn in American foreign policy late in the 1070s and early in the 1980s prevents the available opportunities from being used.
The bugbear of the "Soviet military threat" was once again resurrected from the Cold War phrase-book; wide currency was given to the groundless allegations of "disturbing the strategic balance" in Europe and the world at large, of the ``vulnerability'' and ``defcncolessncss'' of the West European countries; loud appeals _-_-_
^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 192.
134 were made to ensure Western military supremacy, although Soviet leaders have many a time exposed the insolvency of such plans.Certain quarters in the West allege that detente and the popular struggles for national liberation and social progress are incompatible and use this as another pretext for unseemly anti-Soviet and anti-detente speculations.
In a bid lo discredit the socialist countries' policy of support for the popular liberation and independence struggle (this topic will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), reactionary forces are trying to use the thesis that "detente is indivisible''.
But what were the true causes behind the stepped-up activity of the opponents of detente in the second half ot the 1970s? It seems that it was not simply a feeling of nostalgia for the good old days when military-political confrontation was considered an effective means of restraining world socialism. Attacks on detente and attempts to kindle ``disillusionment'' seem to reflect the real disillusionment of certain quarters in the West with the possibility of using the relaxation of international tension exclusively in their own interests and of exacting one-sided concessions from the socialist countries. The reactionary circles' plans to make use of detente to ``freeze'' the social status quo were also frustrated. In reality, however, the relaxation of tension in intcr-stato relations did not (and could not) stop the class struggle in the world of capital. This was borne out by the acute social struggles in the developed capitalist countries, the anti-fascist revolution in Portugal, the downfall of the military dictatorship in Greece, the democratic changes in Spain, and 135 the successful national liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The deterioration in the economic and sociopolitical situation and the growingly strong positions of left forces are seen by the reactionary quarters in the West as a direct threat to their positions and privileges. They sought to achieve their aims by staging a vigorous human rights campaign. The demands for the "peaceful coexistence of ideologies" and the attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries using some isolated provisions of the Final Act as a pretext inhibited efforts to solve the key issues of peace and security. They were aimed at slinking confidence in the sincerity of Soviet foreign policy.
The anti-Soviet campaign in the West reached its climax in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In response to the Afghan government's request, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Soviet-Afghan Treaty signed earlier, introduced into Afghanistan a limited contingent of troops to repel outside aggression. The West then began a new vociferous campaign seeking to prove that the "balance of power in the world had been disturbed" and that the " Soviet military threat" had to be thwarted. Naturally, all this was bound to have a negative effect on East-West relations and jeopardise the positive results of detente.
The attempts to portray the solidarity of the socialist countries with the popular struggles for freedom and independence as incompatible with detente and to fan anti-Sovietism and anti-- communism are intended to discredit the achievements of existing socialism and make it easier to use repressive methods against the forces of progress. It is indicative that some Western 136 politicians speak of the ``inadmissibility'' of Communists participating in West European governments and openly refer in this connection to economic sanctions and other threats. Such actions are essentially incompatible with the Final Act.
The Chinese leaders join hands with the most reactionary imperialist forces in their struggle against detente and international cooperation. By grossly distorting the facts, the Peking leaders oppose the socialist countries' work for detente to the objectives of the anti-- imperialist struggle, to the interests of the world revolutionary process. They try to impress bourgeois politicians by assertions that detente is a " cunning tactical move" on the part of the Soviet Union to "hill Weslern vigilance''.
On the other hand, the wish of certain Western countries to play the "Chinese card" and I heir eagerness to come to terms with Peking on an anti-Soviet platform only whets its hegemonist and aggressive appetite, as was evidenced by the Chinese attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in February 1979.
The intrigues of the foes of peace can hardly cancel out the positive fruits of detente, which stand on a firm objective basis. Yet they may have dangerous results. Any delay in the progress of detente, and even more so its reversal and a return to Cold War, may not only lead to a, senseless squandering of material resources for the arms race, but may also seriously exacerbate the international situation. To be sure, the criticism of detente is accompanied by appeals to stand ``firm'' in relations with socialist countries, to strengthen NATO, to build up armaments, and to ensure Western supremacy.
But all this has already been tried in the 137 past. Imperialism once liad a temporary unclear monopoly, followed a "hard line" in its Soviet, policy and often tried to put pressure to boar on socialist countries by resorting to ``cold'' and ``hot'' wars. And the result? The military-- industrial monopolies made new profits and consolidated their economic positions. But for the popular masses such a policy meant sky-rocketing arms expenditure, truncated democratic freedoms and the ever-present threat of nuclear catastrophe.
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a seclion of the ruling element in the West began to display instability, political vacillations, disparity between word and deed, eagerness to play to the right-wing faction and make concessions to the militarist forces. Responsible West European political leaders were riot always ready to unreservedly follow American policy and often wisely declared that there was no alternative to detente. Yet their declarations were riot always backed up by action.
In conclusion, recent developments have shown, on the one hand, that Ihe policy of detente rests on a firm objective basis and has become a leading trend in international intercourse. On the other, these developments have left no doubt that the opponents of detente, though unable to remove the objective prerequisites for it, have not laid down their arms.
Obstacles in the development of detente and attempts to make it an object of ``normal'' diplomatic bargaining are bound to impair the effective solution of many controversial problems facing both individual countries and humanity at large. Further attempts to undermine detente are fraught with extreme]]/ grave consequences for the cause of peace and progress, fl /.s becoming today especially evident that all countries, 138 whatever the circumstances, should measure up their actions to the needs of detente.
The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which met in session in Warsaw in May 1980, demonstrated that the Soviet Union and its allies continue to adhere to the policy of detente and are taking concrete steps to deepen it. Having noted that the international situation had deteriorated and the threat to peace increased, the participants spoke in favour of a continuing exchange of views on pressing European and world problems between the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and emphasised the need to maintain and develop political, economic, scientific, technical and other peaceful contacts. The Warsaw Treaty member-states voiced their determination "jointly with all peace-loving countries and social forces to work for and ensure the relaxation of international tension" and expressed readiness "to extend and deepen relations with all countries in Europe and elsewhere, expanding the ways of co-operation that have been tested and laying down new ones".^^1^^ The Warsaw Declaration points the way towards excluding the possibility of a new war and sets forth concrete proposals to this end. The Warsaw Treaty countries expressed readiness to start a dialogue and engage in contacts with all interested parties on the essence of their proposals. They also said they were prepared to attentively and constructively consider all relevant suggestions put forward by other countries.
The extension and deepening of detente, a patient search for peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues, the promotion of the _-_-_
^^1^^ See Pravda, 16 May 1980. 139
139 atmosphere of mutual understanding and Irusl in international relations, the broadening of equitable and mutually beneficial co-operation are becoming ever pressing tasks for political leaders, governments, parliaments, and all social forces who are aware of their responsibility before their people, before the future of mankind. [140] __ALPHA_LVL1__ IV. THE SOVIET UNIONExtending relations with newly liberated countries is another major area of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. These relations are important because of their historic role in liberating (lie developing nations from colonialist and neocolonialist oppression and in strengthening their political and economic independence. The community or similarity of the international inleresls of the socialist and newly free countries makes them increasingly eager to develop allround co-operation and mutual contacts. The Soviet Union resolutely supports the peoples who are standing up against imperialism, colonialism and aggression.
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia aroused the oppressed peoples of the East and gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation movement. Solidarity with their struggle is an important feature of Soviet foreign policy.
Lenin realised that those peoples had an important role to play in the world revolutionary process. He wrote: "We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe 141 it is our duty and in our interest to do this, for otherwise socialism in Europe will not be secure.''~^^1^^ He was confident that oppressed peoples would inevitably engage in active politics and on this basis predicted that they would play an increasing role in world developments.
Lenin's principles were set forth in the Decree on Peace, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Appeal to All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East, and many other documents. Specifically, in December 1919 the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets adopted a special resolution greeting all classes, peoples and races fighting imperialist oppression and exploitation, and expressing the readiness of the Russian workers and peasants to render them both moral and material support.
The Soviet state renounced the unequal treaties between the former tsarist government and dependent countries, and nullified the secret accords on partitioning Iran and Turkey. For the first time in history, a great power concluded equitable treaties with underdeveloped countries. Such treaties were signed in 1921 with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and later with Mongolia and China.
The common struggle strengthened friendly lies between the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern countries headed by bourgeois leaders who understood that development of their national statehood and consolidation of their independence were only possible along the lines of anti-imperialist struggle. The establishment of relations based on the equality of nations, respect for their interests, _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism'', Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 67.
142 non-inlerference in their domestic affairs, and disinterested assistance is a part of the world revolutionary process. __ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. Political Co-operationThe CPSU regards the alliance with the former colonial and semi-colonial peoples as a cornerstone of its international activity. It emphasises that this alliance rests on the common vital interests of the world socialist system and the world national liberation movement. The collapse of the imperialist colonial system, the emergence of new sovereign states and their independent foreign and domestic policy are inconceivable without the alliance of the international working class and the national liberation movement, an alliance foretold and upheld by Lenin. This alliance is growing stronger today, in the context of inter-state relations between the developing nations and the socialist community countries.
The alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement stimulates the revolutionary process, strengthens the positions of the peace forces and facilitates the solution of key inlernalional issues in the interests of mankind. This is borne out by the solidarity of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who are fighting for national liberation, for strengthening their political and economic independence and for social progress. The CPSU has always paid close attention to the national liberation movement. The principles of relations with Eastern countries were set forth by the 23rd, 24th, 25th 143 and 26th CPSU Congresses. The Communist Party has invariably reaffirmed its solidarity with the peoples fighting for their national and social liberation and laid special emphasis on extending co-operation witli the socialist-oriented countries. "No one should have any doubts,'' Leonid Brezhnev has emphasised, "that the CPSU will consistently continue the policy of promoting cooperation between the USSR and the newly free countries, and consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement.''~^^1^^
ft is only natural that the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are waging their national liberation struggle with Soviet assistance. In the Soviet Union they find a mighty ally. Its political, economic, diplomatic and military assistance is. an important factor in repulsing imperialist attacks and frustrating all designs to export counter-revolution. This is evinced by the outcome of numerous international crises provoked by the aggressive policies of the colonialists and their attempts to stifle the national liberation movement and regain their former supremacy.
The peoples were able to survive all flare-ups and conflicts provoked by the imperialists thanks to the effective and flexible policy of the U.S.S.I?, and other socialist countries making skilful use of their material and moral resources to drive back the aggressor.
The countries and peoples, once imperialist colonies and semi-colonies, inevitably cease to be imperialism's distant rear-guard and almosl inexhaustible reserve base, and become an antiimperialist force.
_-_-_~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU. .., p. 27.
144The Soviet Uiuon oitcn found itself at loggerneuds with major Western powers because it deiended Uie cause oi national liberation and independence, lake, lor instance, its position during Hie Suez eonilict in lUOu'. When Uie perpetrators oi tne tripartite aggression against i^gypt relumed to heed the ceaselire call by the UiN Lrenurai Assemniy Emergency Session, the Soviet government demanded tnat Britain, France, and isruei stop all military operations immediately, iue boviet Unions ueniand was iirm and resoiuie, wlncii nad a decisive impact on tne luture course ol events, compelling the aggressors to withdraw, ihe U.S.S.K. continues to work actively towards liquidating the consequences ol the i^o/ Israeli aggression and consistently supports uie just deniauus ol tne Arab peoples, calling for a comprehensive peaceiui settlement in the Middle East.
ine soviet Union invariably and eilectively supports tne developing countries in their just demands to abrogate tne inequitable treaties imposed by the former metropolitan countries on a manner ol newly emerged states, to liquidate foreign military bases on their territory, and to slop ail loreign iiileiierence in tlieir political and economic life.
Also important is the support extended by the boviet Union and otiier socialist countries to tne developing states in international organisations, ahove ail the United Nations, and co-- operation in using the good oilices ol such organisations in the interests of mankind. Ihe U.S.S.K. succeeded in incorporating in the UiN Charter provisions aimed at developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle ol equal rights and sell-determination of peoples, promoting arid encouraging respect for __PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__ 10--01290 145 human rights and for fundamental freedoms as well as to achieve state independence hy the peoples of oppressed countries. On the initiative of the Soviet Union or with its active support and participation, the United ^Nations adopted important documents and resolutions, such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), and the Programme- of Final Eradication of Colonialism (1`JV'U). It also passed resolutions recognising the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle, censuring the activities of the multinational corporations, and declaring colonialism and racialism crimes against humanity. The Soviet Union persistently calls for full and unconditional implementation of the UN resolutions on abolishing the remaining colonial and racist regimes.
A prominent place in Soviet foreign policy is occupied by Southern Africa, the world's largest enclave of colonialism and racialism surviving because of overt and covert support from the very same Western powers that are so vociferous about the human rights issue. These powers shut their eyes to the intolerable hardships of millions of people in South Africa and Namibia and connive at the shameful actions of the racists, covering up their monstrous crimes. Addressing the 32nd Session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "We do not seek any privileges in Africa, or concessions, or bases; we do not impose our world outlook on the Africans. Our objectives in Africa are independence, freedom and peace for the peoples.''
The socialist countries also worked tirelessly towards ensuring independence for the people of Zimbabwe. When in 1905 the white minority regime usurped power and unilaterally declared 146 Rhodesia's ``independence'', the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries flatly refused to recognise it. In 19(38, on the initiative of the socialist countries, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution invoking comprehensive sanctions against the illegal regime that had launched a campaign of terror against the black majority. In 19bO Zimbabwe became independent. The Soviet Union upholds tne view that the sooner colonialism, racialism and apartheid are done away with, the better will be the prospects for the policy of detente and international co-- operation.
By strengthening the anti-imperialist front, the U.S.S.K. extends to young sovereign states broad political and diplomatic support. It is invariably one of the Jirst to oi'iicially recognise states emerging as a result of the overthrow of colonial, feudal-monarchical or puppet pro-- imperiulist regimes.
The Soviet Union's solidarity with the Angolese and Ethiopian patriots who fought against imperialism and its hirelings will go down in liis Lory as an example of the inLernaLioualism and consistency of a socialist country in performing its duty towards the liberation movement.
The collapse of the last colonial empire, precipitated by the April (1974) Revolution in Portugal, brought radical changes in the overall situation in Africa and helped to tip the balance of forces there in favour of freedom and social progress. Unwilling to tolerate that turn of events, international reaction---imperialism and Maoism---grossly interfered in Angola's internal affairs. This interference look the form of aggression hy South Africa, arms supplies to local counler-revoluLionary bands in order to start a __PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__ 10* 147 civil war in Angola, and oilier military actions against the newly independent state and its legitimate government. The U.S. administration was ready to launch a large-scale intervention campaign, making Angola a "second Vietnam''. The only reason lor backing down was American Congress's grave tear that the plans would culminate in a catastrophe similar to that in Vietnam, still 1'resh in its memory. In the prevailing situation, the socialist countries alone could render the Angolese people the assistance that would guarantee their freedom. And this assistance was rendered. The Soviet supplies of weapons, munitions, foodstuffs and other material necessary to repel the aggression and outside interference, the participation in action of heroic comhal troops from revolutionary Cuba, the solidarity, support and assistance of all the socialist community made it possible for the Augolese people to defend their independence and revolutionary gains. The subsequent Soviet-Aiigolese agreements on co-operation in various fields became a reliable guarantee of the independence of the young African state.
The Ethiopian revolution which overthrew the absolute monarchy there, dealt a fresh blow to the forces of reaction and imperialism. The people of one of the largest African countries began implementing a programme of socio-- economic and political changes. Together with the other progressive African slates, revolutionary Ethiopia is now in the front ranks of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racialism. The imperialist circles, reactionary forces in some neighbouring countries, nationalist and separatists allied themselves in order to throttle revolutionary Ethiopia. This is what underpinned developments in the Horn of Africa in the late 148 __NOTE__ Print quality on this page very poor. 1970s. Tho drive of international imperialism backed by the Fractionary forces was onco again halted by tho growing: um'tv of tho notional liboration movement find world socialism. Tho Soviet Union and other socialist countries extended n helping hnnd to the froodonvlovinf Ethiopian poonlo. The assistance was rendered on the request of the Ethiopian government and in full i-onformity with UN principles. On R Anril 1978, T/ipntonnnt-Colonol Mengistn Hnile Mnriam, Chairman of the Provisional Militnrv Administrative Council nnd the Council of Ministers of Socialist Ethiopia, on behalf of Ihe country's loaders and poonlo, expressed "deep gratitude to tho Soviet people CC CPSU. Soviet government, and T.oonid Brezhnev personally for (he resolute snnporl and infornnlionalist assistance to the Ethiopian revolution".^^1^^
Tho Treatv of Eriendshin and Co-oporntinn Rotvoon tlm Soviet Union nnd Son'nlist Ethiopia, signed in November 1978 in Moscow, is "n ^xamnle of the Soviet police of infer^ntionnl <? olidan'tv with the peoples fVhtip" for freedom rrd progress being implemented in practice.
The treatv fnllv accords with the interests of thp peoples of both countries and with the nirns nnd purposes of the UN Charter, nnd is not directed against :)PV third conntrv.
May 1979 mnrTcoi"! tho ROth anniversary of t^e establishment of diplomatic relations between fl'o U.S.R.P. nnd Afghanistan. Eor all these vonrs fhpir relations of friendship. pood-npi«hhoii''lir>'iss nnd co-operntion hnd been steadily dovnlonin" nnd pvpandino on tbo principles of ominliiv npd mntnnl respect laid down ip the Soviot-AfrrVip trentio- of 19?1 ri"d 19P.1 The Anril (1978A _-_-_
~^^1^^ Pravda, 1 April 1978.
149 Resolnlion in Afghanistan created nunlitalivolv now, favourable conditions for further consolidating and extending such relations. The Troafy of Friendship. Ciood-Neiehbourlinoss and Co-- operation Between the U.S S R. and the Democratic Rennhlic of Afghanistan, signed in December 1078. was a" important slen forward in strengthening the all-round bilateral ties. The treaty is, moreover, instrumental in consolidating peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.The people of Afghanistan are engaged in a strenuous struggle to defend the gains of the revolution, to expose and thwart the schemes of imperialism, on)side reaction and local collaborators, and to repel the outside aggression perpetrated hv hiroliufs and mercenaries trained and armed by the United States, China, and Pakistan.
Imperialism and its allies bad in fact launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan. In that situation, Afghan leaders reneatedly requested aid from the Soviet Union. The imminent armed intervention and dangerous actions and plans of the outside reactionary forces exposed Afghanistan to a real danger of losing its independence and becoming an imperialist military bridge-head on the Soviet border. In these circumstances the Soviet Union could not fail 1o heed friendly Afghanistan's request for aid and dispatched there a limited contingent, of Iroops. Their only mission is to help the Afghans repel the outside aggression. Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that this contingent will be completely withdrawn as soon as the causes that compelled the Afghan government to turn to the Soviet Union for aid have been removed.
``Acting otherwise.'' Leonid Brezhnev has said, "would haye meant leaving Afghanistan 150 prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance in Chile, where the people's freedom was drowned in blood. Acting otherwise would have meant passively watching the creation on our southern border of a source of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state.''^^1^^ These considerations alone underlay the decision (which was not simple to take) to render Afghanistan assistance, including the military.
Developments in the second half of the 1070s show that this policy is dictated by the world outlook of the Soviet people who reject both the exploitation of man by man and the oppression of one nation by another. This policy is closely linked with the very nature of Soviet society which embraces over 100 nations and ethnic groups living like one family.
By tho end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with 7P> young independent countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Caribbean, whereas in 1060 their number was 20. The number of various bilateral treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and newly sovereign states has also increased appreciably.
The further comprehensive development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the majority of the developing nations is based on their common approach to many international issues and to the national liberation movement. The Soviet Union is not alienated from any developing country by conflicts inherited from the colonial past, which, as a rule, aggravate relations between newly free countries and the _-_-_
^^1^^ Moscow News, 20 January 1980, 151
151 former colonial powers. Tin's, coupled with Ihe Soviet Union's consistent anli-colonialisl policy, ensures mutual understanding on the major aspects of their friendly bilateral relations.The form and content of such relations have been improved and enriched in recent years. The sides co-ordinate their position? in the course of meetings at various levels and reach accords to support each other's foreign policy stand or action. Between 107B and 1070 alone. Soviet government officials held over 100 meetings with representatives from Asian. African, and Latin American countries. There is a lively exchange of party and government delegations with the socialist-oriented countries.
Top-level meetings are of special relevance for creating and consolidating the climate of trust, mutual understanding and co-operation. During such talks the sides tackle cardinal issues of their bilateral relations, co-ordinate their positions on international problems and conclude various bilateral treaties and agreements.
The treaties with India, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen, signed in the 1970s, were the culmination of the Soviet Union's rich experience in dealing with countries upholding their independence and the democratic principles of inter-state relations, and secured the obligation to extend them further and take joint action to safeguard peace and repulse the forces of aggression and colonialism.
Soviet-Indian ties are a graphic, example of developing and improving the principles, forms and methods of friendly relations. These relations occupy an important place in the system of international intercourse because they involve countries that play an active and prominent role 152 in world politics. The Soviet Union's stand is thai the international political climate, particularly in Asia, largely depends on the successful and stable development of Soviet-Indian relations. They are conclusive evidence that a socialist country and a country emerged as a result of national liberation struggle have common interests.
For over three decades now, the Soviet Union's relations with India have been based on friendshin and close co-operation. The SovietIndian Treatv of Peace. Friendshin and Co-- operalion (1071) has broil srlit their relations up to a minlitatively new level. It became o solid political and le<ral foundation supporting their nres"nt and future equitable co-operation. The U.S.S.R. and India maintain regular political contacts, including top-level meetings which are of paramount importance for consistently consolidating friendship, mutual understanding and ro-operation. The results of high-level talks invariably show that Soviet-Indian relations are Immnne to contingency vacillations.
Soviet leader* have stressed that close co-- oneration with India is a permanent part of the Soviet Union's policy. The Soviet people display understanding and solidarity with India's peacefi'l foreign policy and with the courageous efforts of its progressive forces to cope with the difficult socio-economic tasks confronting the country. Soviet-Indian friendship is an example of relations between countries with different socio-- economic systems developing constructively on the princinles of peaceful coexistence.
India adopts a constructive position in the United Nations and other international organisations and conferences and supports many Soviet peace initiatives, including the proposals on 153 disarmament and curbing tho arms race. The two countries expressed readiness to continue cooperating to seek solutions to the key issues of disarmament. They reiterated their positive attiInde to the idea of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Following China's armed aggression against Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. and India demanded an immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam. They spoke in favour of making Asia a continent of lasting peace, with all countries adhering to universally recognised principles of inter-state relations.
The Soviet Union and India attach great importance to furthering their mutually advantageous and all-round co-operation. They signed a long-term (from 10 to 15 years) programme for economic, trade, scientific and technical co-- operation, providing for a further expansion of co-- operation in major areas of heavy industry and agriculture. It also outlined some new fields of economic, scientific, technical, trade, and cultural co-operation.
The newly liberated countries' efforts to foil the attempts to impose a pro-imperialist policy developed into neutralism known as the policy of non-alignment. In its foreign policy activities the Soviet Union has always attached great importance to its relations with the non-aligned countries, which make up more than half the world. The non-aligned movement arose in the late 1940s and the early 1950s and now embraces many countries with different socio-political systems, including some socialist states, and also, as observers, individual European capitalist nations. But newly independent, countries constitute the overwhelming majority. Whatever Ihcir differences and political colours these countries 154 invariably show their adherence to the cause of peace whenever a major international issue crops up. The non-aligned nations consistently condemn interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples, and censure the policy of diktat aimed primarily against militarily and economically weak countries.
The Soviet Union views the non-aligned countries as allies in il« peace effort, therefore its policy is to expand and improve relations with them. The increased influence of the newly free nations on world developments is an important factor in contemporary international life.
The Fifth Non-Aligned Nations' Summit Conference, held in 1976 in Colombo, showed that new positive shifts had occurred in the movement. It was attended hv hearls of state and government from over 80 non-aligned countries, including newly admitted Angola, Guinea-- Bissau, tho Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, and also the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Representatives from 22 other countries and a number of liberation movements also attended as observers or guests.
The participants expressed their resolve to fight imperialism, colonialism and neo-- colonialism, and work towards further consolidation and unity of the forces promoting peace, national independence and social progress. Despite some essential differences and contradictions, a result of the great socio-political differences between the non-aligned countries, which cause sharp collisions at their international conferences, the participants reaffirmed the importance of co-- operation between the non-aligned movement and the world progressive forces.
This is not to the liking of either the 155 imperialists or the Cliinesc loaders who have in recent years stepped up their subversive operations against the movement in a bid to turn it against the socialist community. The Maoists' attacks on Cuba doubled during Ihe preparatory stage of the Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Havana. Peking's ideological and political back-stage activities are aimed at weakening and splitting the non-aligned movement as such, this tallying perfectly with the imperialist strategy. By distorting the aims and purposes of the movement, Peking tries to prove that the nonaligned countries oppose both the imperialist and the socialist states equally. In an attempt to fan the contradictions within the non-aligned movement, on the eve of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1978, Peking publicly called the membership of Cuba and Vietnam into question, thereby completely siding with U.S. ruling element.
The convening of the Sixth Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Havana in 1979 was fiendishly attacked by its foes. Yet the Conference was unprecedentedly representative, with delegates from over 100 countries and national liberation movements participating. The forum showed the futility of all reactionary attempts to sidetrack the non-aligned movement and push it astray from its anti-imperialist course.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. Economic Co-operationThe newly liberated countries wage their antiimperialist struggle primarily against the domination of foreign capital in their economy and in order to establish government control over 156 their natural resources and economic activity. The Soviet Union supports the newly independent states in their legitimate strivings and their resolve to end imperialist exploitation completely and become masters of their own national resources. Soviet economic and scientific-technical co-operation with those countries helps resolve the major issues of social and national liberation revolutions and is meant to support their efforts to reshape their political and economic relations with the industrialised capitalist countries on an equitable and democratic footing.
Soviet foreign economic policy is planned and implemented with regard for the interests of the developing countries striving to build up truly independent national economies. Co-operation is mainly geared towards expanding their production capacities. The emphasis on industry and power generation (these two account for 75 per cent of the total economic turnover) opens up broad opportunities for making use of the latest scientific and technological breakthroughs. This in turn helps create a material and technical basis for overcoming the grim consequences of the colonial past and laying the foundation for a modern economy.
Many Asian and African countries set up or develop, witli Soviet assistance, entire industries, especially within the slate sector, the consolidation of which makes it possible to resist pressure from the imperialist monopolies, make effective use of the planning principle and promote nationalisation. Soviet co-operation with the developing world differs fundamentally from the aid rendered to it by the imperialist powers, which have always sought to sacrifice the economic development of the newly liberated countries to the interests of the multinational corporations. 157 It is not for nothing that they make investments primarily in Ihe private sector. This leads to preserving lop-sided, one-crop economies and their dependence on capitalist monopoly.
The imperialist monopolies also infiltrate the economy of the developing world on a multinational basis through integration groupings. In 1978, the EEC Council ol Ministers discussed a programme ol action to promote the multinationals' business activities on foreign territory. The programme provides for measures to protect the monopolies from the "risk of revolutions and nationalisations''. In a bid to minimise the risk of sustaining losses due to changing conditions in developing countries, the monopolies impose contracts and agreements binding them to preserve the social and economic status quo, virtually forfeiting thereby all economic reforms in Ihe interests of their people.
The economic relations of the U.S.S.K. with Asian, African, and Latin American countries are based on equality and mutual benelit. The material and financial resources sent by the Soviet Union to the developing countries come under their complete control. The easy terms of payment for Soviet deliveries and credits ( normally by supplying traditional exports) are of considerable advantage to the developing countries. Long-term trade agreements fix the volume and list of export commodities, ensuring their slable and continuous flow for a number of years, which stimulates growth of production in the developing countries. Their involvement, with the U.S.S.R. and olher socialist states, in the international division of labour oilers them a good chance of engaging in an equitable commodity exchange. All enterprises built with Soviet assistance in a developing country become 158 its exclusive property, with the Soviet Union participating neither in profit making nor in proiit sharing. In recent years, the Soviet Union, as requested by the developing countries, began assisting them in building export-oriented industries. This has allowed the developing countries to export their product to the U.S.S.R., and thus receive still greater benefit.
But economic co-operation is not a one-way street---it is also prohtable for the Soviet Union. While rendering the developing countries allround assistance in building up their independent economies, the Soviet Union receives from them various products necessary for its own national economy. Imports from the developing world make it possible for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to meet their economic requirements in a number of commodities, which earlier they had to purchase through the mediation of imperialist companies.
The Soviet Union does not attach any political strings to its economic assistance. Take, for instance, Soviet credits and their terms of payment. These easy-term credits are granted without any infringement upon the rights or dignity of the recipient country. Payments are made through deliveries of raw materials, farm produce and other traditional exports, or through deliveries of commodities produced by the newly built enterprises on a payment-in-kind basis.
The Soviet Union has concluded agreements on economic and technical co-operation with most of the developing countries. Its co-operation with India, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and a number of other countries has become stable and is developing on the basis of long-term agreements. In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S.S.R. signed trade agreements with Singapore, 159 Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, thus stabilising tiieir trade contacts and creating favourable condrtions for their further progress. Trade turnover with that group of countries increased almost 30 per cent in i'J// alone, having reached some $oOO million. Soviet exports to these countries include raw materials, machine tools, equipment, instruments and consumer goods. The U.S.S.R. s industrial potential mai\es it possible to annually extend the list and volume of exported engineering products. The share of these in overall Soviet deliveries accounts for 24 per cent in indouesia and 17 per cent in Thailand. They include passenger cars, tractors, scooters, and textile equipment. South-East Asian countries import from the U.S.S.R. metal-cutting lathes, welding machines, pumps, diesei generators, bearings, chemical fertilisers, glass, rolled aluminium, cameras, and watches. Cotton accounts for a large share of Soviet exports (up to 40 per cent of their value).
Regular Soviet imports from South-East Asian countries provide better employment opportunities for the indigenous population, help them counter the multinationals' diktat and maintain trade relations with the developed countries on better terms.
Soviet-Iranian economic relations provide a sharp contrast to imperialist policy. The imperialist diktat in Iran's economy under the Shah brought the country to the brink of a catastrophe. The International Oil Consortium had pumped out of Iran over 2,500,000,000 tons of oil over the 25 years following the demise of Mossadegh's regime. In 1977, for example, Iran produced 270,400,000 tons of oil, of which 243,000,000 was exported, primarily to the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Israel, and South Africa. The 160 rapacious exploitation of Iran's natural wealth was coupled with (lie transfer of virtually all Iranian pelro-dollars to (lie coffers of the multinational corporations, primarily as payment for the expensive military hardware bought to Iho value of $20 billion over the last live years of the Shah regime alone.
Soviet-Iranian co-operation differs in principle. Following the October Revolution, the newly born Soviet state abrogated all discriminatory treaties concluded by tsarist Russia with dependent and semi-colonial countries, and replaced them with new, equitable agreements. In accordance with the Treaty of 1921, Soviet Russia waived all Iran's debts and voluntarily ceded to its government the numerous enterprises and ore, oil and road concessions owned by the tsarist regime. The value of the transfer totalled an immense figure by the then standards---close to (i()() million roubles.
By the late 1970s, the U.S.S.R. and Iran had established broad and mutually beneficial economic and trade relations. Their economic and technical co-operation also reached a high level. Iran is one of the U.S.S.R.'s biggest trade and economic partners among the developing countries. The U.S.S.H. in turn is one of (he leading importers of Iranian products (excluding oil).
The Soviet Union has never sought monopoly concessions, superprofits or property in Iran, which distinguishes it favourably from Iran's Western economic partners.
Soviet technical assistance to Iran and their economic co-operation yield tangible results. In the 1970s, various Soviet organisations participated in building 147 projects and had completed work on 88 of them by 1979. Assistance in 161 capital construction is largely financed by oasylenu Soviet credits. The Iron and Steel Works at Esfahan has become (lie largest project built jointly by the Soviet Union and Iran. In 1977, the works, employing 10,000 people, produced almost 100 per cent of Iran's pig iron and some 75 per cent of its steel. In April 1980, the third steel-casting converter was commissioned at Esfahan, thereby bringing the plant's annual output up to 1,900,000 tons. In addition, the Soviet Union assisted Iran in building a mechanical-engineering plant at Arak, grain elevators with a total capacity of 380,000 tons, a hydropower station on the Araks River, and the 487-- km-long northern stretch of the Trans-Iranian Gas Pipeline.
Maintaining and expanding Soviet-Iranian cooperation is in Iran's national interests.
The Soviet Union works towards normalising international trade and economic relations, liquidating all forms of political and social discrimination, and establishing equitable inter-state relations on the basis of strict observance of the principle of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. This stand is crucial for the present stage of the developing countries' struggle for economic independence. In 1974, on the initiative of those countries, the UN General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on reshaping international economic relations. They proposed a programme of reforms involving international trade, the monetary system, and scientific-technical and economic co-operation. The programme was called "A New International Economic Order''. It is aimed primarily at ending the economic inequality of the developing countries within the capitalist, world economic system, creating a preferential regime for them 162 in world commodity exchange, arid improving their financial position.
The programme is clearly anti-imperialist, therefore it was only natural that the socialist countries actively supported it when it was discussed at, special sessions of the UN General Assembly and UNCTAD. During the debate, Soviet representatives pointed to the root causes of the developing countries' economic backwardness and low living standards. The main cause is that many developing countries are to this day being exploited by monopoly capital.
Addressing the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "The Soviet Union arid the other socialist community countries believe that a consistent reshaping of the system of international economic relations, carrying the heavy burden of the past, is one of the main ways of resolving the problems [ confronting the developing countries---Ed.]. All vestiges of colonialism arid all forms of inequality must be completely removed from this system.
``Practically, this means that in the economic sphere, too, relations between states with different social systems must be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and equitable co-operation.''
The socialist countries, participating in the Fifth UNCTAD Conference in 1979, released a joint statement which said that the orientation of the foreign economic policy of the socialist countries determines a natural and historical connection between the demands of the socialist and developing countries. The statement emphasised that the developing nations may continue to count in the future on support from the socialist community and use its experience in tackling economic and social problems and in effecting __PRINTERS_P_163_COMMENT__ 11* 163 progressive social reforms. They may rely on the socialist countries' assistance in their struggle against the multinational corporations.
When discussing the range of problems involving the reorganisation of international economic relations, it is important to resolutely expose the plans of the imperialist reactionary forces and the Peking leaders to split the socialist and developing countries and divert the national liberation movement from anti-imperialist struggle by resorting to the ill-fated theories of ``rich'' and ``poor'' countries, "backward South" and " developed North'', "world village" and "world city''. The Maoists have completely sided with the most reactionary bourgeois ideologues who attempt to relieve imperialism and colonialism of their historical responsibility for the backwardness of the oppressed peoples. Peking's betrayal of the vital interests of the national liberation movement can bo clearly seen in its evaluation of the place and role of the so-called Second World countries. Completely distorting the essence of contemporary neocolonialism, Peking's leaders try to prove that the altitude of the former colonial powers to the developing nations has radically changed as now only the United States, and especially the Soviet Union, "control and oppress" countries on three continents. In this the Maoists' views fully converge with those of the most reactionary imperialist circles seeking to turn the clock back in international relations. The Soviet Union unmasked these designs in a government statement on reshaping international economic relations, which said: "The attempts to engage, without any foundation, the world of socialism in the scheme to divide countries into rich and poor, thereby putting the socialist countries on an equal footing with the 164 imperialist powers as regards the historical responsibility lor the economic backwardness of the developing countries, for the consequences of colonial oppression and for the neocoloriialist exploitation of these countries, also serve the aim of establishing the policy of exploitation.''^^1^^
The assistance rendered by the socialist countries to the developing nations is the helping hand of their friends and allies in their struggle against the common enemy---imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism. //' il had not been lor the Soviet Union, socialism and its reliable support, imperialism irould have nipped in the bad all and any attempts by the newly free countries to attain true national independence.
Relations between the Soviet Union and the developing countries show that the alliance of socialism and (he national liberation movement is the chief objective condition for strengthening the independence of young sovereign states, for liquidating the remnants of colonialism, and for repelling imperialist attempts to reinstate the old ways and regain their lost positions in the formerly dependent countries by force of arms and by neocolonialist methods. This alliance is an important factor in the struggle against imperialist aggression and to avert a new world war.
_-_-_~^^1^^ Pravda, 5 October 1976.
[165] __ALPHA_LVL1__ V. FRIENDSHIPThe Peace Programme, adopted at the 24th and further extended at the 25th CPSU Congresses, sets on I a main objective of Soviet foreign policy. This is lo strengthen the unity of the fraternal socialisl countries, develop their comprehensive co-operation and increase their joint contribution to a more stable peace.
Article 30 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. says: "The U.S.S.R., as part of the world system of socialism and of the socialist community, promotes and strengthens friendship, co-- operation, and comradely mutual assistance with other socialist countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism, and takes an active part in socialist economic integration and the socialist international division of labour.'' The Soviet Union's place within the family of socialist countries and the essence of the international relations of a new type, i.e., the relations of socialist internationalism, are thereby secured constitutionally.
The role, place and relevance of relations between the socialist countries in the world today stem from the important role played by the socialist system in international developments. World socialism and the forces fighting against 166 imperialism and for reshaping society along socialist lines determine the course of contemporary human history. The course of the world revolutionary process mas bound to result in imperialism losing its historical initiative.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The New TypeWorld socialism has become an important, factor in fundamentally reshaping the system of international relations. Its impact on world developments is largely dependent on the kind of lies that exist between socialist countries and on the extent of their unity and cohesion. Soviet foreign policy is aimed at strengthening this unity which is based on the objective fundamental principles and natural laws of socialist international relations.
The essential features of relations between socialist states can be comprehended in the context of Lenin's theory of socialist revolution and of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Lenin repeatedly emphasised that during the transitional period the once prevailing common laws of social development undergo changes and new such laws emerge. The future of a revolution depends above all on the knowledge and correct use of such common laws, on the content and form of the political, economic and any other activity of socialist society and the parly which is at its head.
The whole range of socialist international relations are relations of the transitional period spanning the entire historical period of advancing from capitalism to communism. Given the 167 variety of form and duration of the transitional period for different countries, it is easy to see thai the establishment and development of socialist international relations is a complex process, that digressions from the ``ideal'' are quite possible, and that certain structural connections may well become weakened or severed.
The establishment of international relations of the new type is connected with the emergence and development of the world socialist system and the operation of natural laws which have given rise to it and which have turned the socialist countries from a simple sum total of states into a system of stales---the world socialist system.
Analysis of the basic factors and trends in world development today, with the world socialist system playing a leading part, makes it possible to find answers to questions such as how relations within the socialist community affect the development of each socialist country and the socialist system as a whole and what impact they have on relations between socialist and capitalist and developing countries. The character and intensity of international intercourse are quite obviously dependent on which countries are involved: those making np one social system or those with different systems.
The community of socialist countries is an integral whole, therefore to withstand the uncompromising and fierce struggle with world imperialism it has to develop and function as a system. But the objective community of socialism, which is the criterion for determining whether or nol a particular country is part of the socialist system, is no automatic guarantee that it adheres to socialist principles in its foreign policy and, by virtue of this, does nol automatically 168 inelude (he country in question in the system of socialist international relations.
The planned development of the inherently socialist features of international relations within the socialist community plays an increasingly important role today. The purposeful activity of the riding communist and workers' parlies and governments is based on the need to accelerate and consolidate the development of each element in the socialist community system by optimising relevant economic, administrative and other structures, and also to reach qualitatively new levels in relations between individual countries. The present development of individual socialist, countries and of the whole socialist community is closely tied in with the scientific and technical revolution, which affects all social processes. Opening up new opportunities for each country, progress in science and technology promotes world socialism's still greater cohesion because these opportunities can only be fully realised if aJl relevant processes are planned and directed on the scale of the whole community.
Common laws are the chief objective basis of socialist international relations. They are connected with the common features of the socialist social order and with the internationalist essence of socialism. The objective basis for the unity of world socialism is also developing and growing stronger. This objective basis is characterised by the same economic foundations and the domination of social ownership of the means of production. The socialist nations are united by the same goals: building socialism and communism, defending the revolutionary gains and ensuring the security and independence of each socialist stale.
The objective unity of the socialist countries 169 is an expression of the general tendency towards internationalising production and society's life, tliis tendency having first emerged under capitalism. Tinder socialism, however, it acquires new scope and dimension because it is no longer confronted with the common laws of imperialism and is no longer required to overcome their deforming and restraining influences. Objective internationalisation spreads to all aspects of society's life while still under capitalism, laying the ground for the socialist stage in the development of this tendency. Lenin wrote that "already under capitalism, all economic, political, and spiritual life is becoming more and more international. Socialism will make it completely international.''~^^1^^
The policy of the Soviet Union and all socialist international relations are based on Ihe principles of socialist internationalism and the correct correlation of the national and the international. These principles underlie the mutual trust and close co-operation which are the expression of the objective requirements of world socialism's further progress and consolidation. Simultaneously, they guarantee the national interests of each socialist country.
The communist parties believe that the socialist, states must increasingly rely on the international socialist division of labour and 1heir co-operation, which excludes all and any infringements of their national interests, ensures growth in each country and strengthens Ihe might of the world socialist, system as a whole.
Marx, Engels, and Lenin regarded internationalism as the prime basis of Ihe proletarian _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. "Theses on thp National Onestion'', Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 246.
170 revolutionary struggle. For this struggle to succeed, it is necessary to observe the principles of international solidarity and proletarian internationalism in relations between national proletarian forces, coordinate their struggle and organise joint action. Lenin emphasised: "We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists.''^^1^^Proletarian internationalism remains the main source of might and the earnest of success of the international working-class movement. This principle, which is the basis of relations between countries where the proletariat holds power, i.e., between the socialist countries, is known as socialist internationalism.
The CPSU's work towards establishing this principle in the international relations of world socialism is based on the Leninist ideas on the national question in socialist revolution and in socialist foreign policy. Leninism, while stressing the importance of the national aspect, invariably ties it in with the international objectives of the working class.
As early as the years of World War I, Lenin wrote that the socialist movement "creates new and superior forms of human society, in which the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of each nationality will, for the first time, be met through international unity . . .''~^^2^^ This theoretical proposition was fully borne out after the triumph of the socialist Revolution in Russia. It laid down the main foundation for ensuring the all-round _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. T. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine Apropos of the Victories Over Denikin'', Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 293.
~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin, "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International'', Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 38--39.
171 devclopmcnt of each nation and simultaneously extending and deepening co-operation and inniual assistance and facilitating the convergence of all nations.The development of nations and their co-- operation has now become an international issue. An unprecedented inter-nation and inter slate entity, the socialist community, has taken shape.
The correlation of the national and the international and their correct combination in the policy of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries has been and remains a very important aspect of socialist international relations. Specific national features and interests can only be taken into account correctly if they are understood as an expression of the general laws of social development. The road to this understanding is found by each Parly independently, on the basis of the general laws of social development. It is not, of course, an easy job to translate this dialectical connection into real policies. This is a creative process making high demands of the ruling parlies. A correct combination of the national and the international calls for unity in principle as regards the fundamental issues of the world socialist system and the anti-imperialist struggle, on the one band, and variety in method and form as regards the building of socialism in individual countries in keeping with the general laws of the transition to socialism, on the other.
The Soviet, Union's policy towards I be socialist countries is subordinated to strengthening their unity on the principles of socialist internationalism. Truly internationalist relations have struck deep roots within the socialist community, spreading to all fields of life. These relations arc developed and consolidated by the working 172 peopie in the socialist countries alongside the ruling communist and workers' parlies and governments. Millions of people feel sincere friendship towards each oilier, show a comradely interest in each other's achievements, and realise that they have a common future. This brings all people williin the socialist community closer together, making it stronger.
The correspondence of the national interests of socialist countries with the interests of world socialism does not mean, however, that the nalional and Ihe international tasks of each socialist country in each case coincide automatically. Difference of opinion and interest in some cases is possible and even inevitable. Differences do crop up between socialist countries. In developing their relations it is therefore necessary to overcome both objective and subjective difficulties, weed out all remaining nationalist trends, and approach inter-stale relations between socialist, countries creatively and in the spirit of socialist internationalism.
The OPSU (irmly believes that concrete historical and national conditions should be recognised and taken into account. This is an important aspect of its internationalist strategy and tactics. From the very outset, the development of Ihe world socialist, system was characterised not only by the community of the economic, social and political structures of individual socialist countries, but also by some distinctions and specific features. They involved the level of the productive forces, the structure of the national economy, the socialisation of production, the class composition of the population, the level of political maturity, the state of class development and inter-class relationship, national distinctions, cultural traditions, the mode of life, and political traditions existing in a concrete historical 173 sotting. The world system of .socialism includes both small and large countries, wbich are at different stages of social development.
But the building of socialism in each country is inseparable from the development of the whole world socialist system. Equally inseparable are tlie national and international tasks of each communist and workers' parly. In the context of international socialist relations, this approach is an effective weapon in countering imperialist attempts to artificially fan the contradictions between socialist countries and ensures that their co-operation and convergence steadily develop.
The integral link between international issues arid problems of the class struggle and the revolutionary movement is a characteristic feature of the theory and practice of Leninism in the field of international relations. The CPSU's theoretical and practical activities involve studying the international situation, determining and analysing the most important trends in its development. Bui central in such activities is the work towards closer union and further development of the socialist community.
The consolidation and improvement of the intcrnalional relations of the new type depend on how thoroughly the ruling parties in the socialist countries know the objective laws of building socialism and developing the world socialist system and plan, on this basis, their policy. The practical policies of world socialism show that subjective factors not only greatly accelerate revolutionary processes, but also prove a decisive element in such processes. The direction, level and quality of conscious activity are not automatic derivatives of the objective conditions. Socialism creates objective requisites which must be 174 used creatively to cxlend relations between so cialist countries and consolidate their unity.
Soviet foreign policy is planned and effected on the basis of a thorough study of problems confronting Hie socialist community and the world at largo and a comprehensive analysis of all factors affecting not only current developments, but also events in a longer perspective.
Relations between socialist countries are governed by social laws which are simultaneously the requisites for and the result of the operation of social forces. For this reason the activity of the fraternal parlies and the countries they head is determined by social laws and at the same time is itself the necessary condition for the operation of laws governing the development of the world socialisl system. Socialist international relations can only develop through the conscious party activity which is in keeping with the requirements of socialism. The choice of variants, rates and dynamics of the new-type relations depend on how skilful these parties are in using the available opportunities. This is why the achievements and impact of world socialism depend primarily on the level of maturity of these parties and the corresponding level of co-operation between socialisl countries.
CPSU resolutions contain a scientific appraisal of the historical experience of the world socialist system and indicate routes towards strengthening friendship and co-operation between socialist countries. The CPSU realistically approaches all difficulties arising in the course of building socialist society and establishing the new, socialist type of inter-state relations, thoroughly analyses these difficulties and shows ways of overcoming them. Given the correct policy of the Marxist-Leninist parties, this can be 175 done easily because I lie socialist countries have the same social sysleni and their peoples have (lie same fundamental interests and objectives.
The f.l'SU believes that ils internationalist duly is lo further strengthen the might of the world socialist system. As Leonid Hre/hnev has said, ''today we require unity, co-operation and joint action chiefly in order lo accomplish more quickly and effectively the tasks of developing socialist society and building communism. Moreover, we require unity, cohesion and co-- operation lo achieve maximum effect in safeguarding and consolidating the peace that is so vital for all the peoples, to further the international detente, and to effectively repulse all aggressive sallies by the imperialists, all attempts lo encroach on the interests of socialism.
``This is why the Soviet Union has always been, and always will be, an active champion ol unity and co-operation among all the socialist countries.''^^1^^
The increasing role of socialist foreign policy in world politics today enhances the responsibility of the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties and sets them special tasks. To make their foreign policy effective they have to realistically approach and evaluate the rapidly changing international situation, make use of if, actively affect if and, in a way, adapt their policies lo it.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. Mutual Economic AssistanceSocialist economic integration has become an important aspect of the all-round convergence of the socialist nations.
_-_-_~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, "The Fiftieth Anniversary of tho Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'', Following Lenin's Course, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 81.
176An integral planned socialist world economy is being gradually shaped in the process of material production and increasing interaction of national economies. This provides the basis for the formation of a historical community of fraternal socialist nations and countries. The socialist world becomes internationalised, a process which is based, as Lenin said, on "a tendency towards the creation of a single world economy, regulated by the proletariat of all nations as an integral whole and according to a common plan. This tendency has already revealed itself quite clearly under capitalism and is bound to be further developed and consummated under socialism.''^^1^^
The exploitation of one country by another is alien to socialist international economic relations based on the principle of socialist internationalism.
The CPSU and other fraternal parties believe that at this stage of world socialism's development socialist integration is the basis for the further convergence of socialist nations and for their individual all-round progress. This has resulted in the creation of an international integration mechanism of a new type, which ensures the economic growth of each individual socialist country and of the socialist community as a whole.
1979 marked the 30th anniversary of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which laid down the foundation for socialist integration and has been extending and deepening it to this day. On 25 January 1949, a TASS communication reported on the results of _-_-_
^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'', Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 147.
__PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12--01290 177 the economic conference of representatives from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.H. Thai day is now recognised as CMEA's foundation day.The setting up of (his organisation was necessitated by the need for greater economic and technical mutual assistance on the basis of multilateral co-operation. In the first postwar years, economic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies were bilateral. But the emergence of the new type of the international division of labour gave rise to new tasks and problems common to all socialist countries. They called for concerted measures to build up their socialist economies. A co-ordinated economic policy was also imperative to withstand imperialist, pressure.
The selling up of CM EA was an important step towards pooling the socialist countries' efforts to create and develop the material and technical base of socialism and increase the socialist community's economic potential.
CMEA has become a major component of the world economic system. Its member-countries have increased their economic potential many times over since 1949. In 1978, for instance, the CMEA countries' industrial output was 1,000 per cent higher than in 1948. These countries account for as little as 19 per cent of the world's territory and 10 per cent of its population, yet their position in the world economy is immeasurably greater. When CMEA was set up, they were producing 18 per cent of the world industrial output, whereas .HO years later their share was over 30 per cent. By the late 1970s, the CMEA countries accounted for more than half the world's trial increase in industrial output. CMEA's volume of industrial production is larger than that of any of the most extensive 178 capilalist economic complexes, including in the United Stales and Western Europe. The gross national income of the socialist community countries, the chief indicator of economic growth, is steadily rising. Uclween 1918 and 1978, it increased ten-fold. Its share in the world national income grew from !."> to 2.1 per cent during that period.
Over those years the CMEA countries' growth rates surpassed those in the capitalist world by ''>()(} per cent in industrial output and 200 per cent in national income.
CMEA's versatile activity at all stages created the prerequisites for deepening and extending the existing forms of economic co-operation and for bringing out new forms. Eor the first time in the history of international economic relations, national economic development plans were co-ordinated within the Council's framework. The co-ordination of five-year plans on the basis of production specialisation and co-operation and the expansion of scientific and technical co-- operation have become increasingly important areas of CMEA's activities. The labour of socialist producers acquires a social nature not only on a national, but also on an international scale.
The common tasks of economic co-operation at its new stage have found their concrete expression in the fundamental principles of the international socialist division of labour. These principles underlie a longer term programme of economic co-operation between CMEA countries.
CMEA has accumulated rich experience in co-ordinating live-year economic development plans and in international production co-- operation and specialisation on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The CMEA countries have decided to __PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__ 12* 179 sot up n number of international organisalions and agencies to ensure broader co-operation in various economic Fields.
CMEA's membership has also grown. 171 1050 il was joined by the German Democratic Republic, in 19(12 by Mongolia, in 1972 by Tuba, and in 1978 by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. So, by the early 1980s, CMEA included ten socialist countries in Europe, Asia, and America whose population totalled 430 million.
In 19(14, CMEA signed a co-operation agreement with Yugoslavia, which now regularly participates in the work of many CMEA bodies. Representatives from the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Laos, Angola, and Ethiopia are also present as observers. In 1973, CMEA and Finland signed'an agreement which was \\idely commented upon in Europe as an important precedent in relations between countries with different social systems. Similar agreements were signed with Iraq and Mexico.
The development of the productive forces makes it imperative to ensure a higher level of economic integration within the socialist community and to extend and deepen economic ties. In the coming few years this pivotal issue will greatly affect the dynamics and scale of development in each socialist country. Socialist integration offers good opportunities for increasing mass production capacities, thus raising economic efficiency. In the context of the scientific and technical revolution, the immense socialist market is a favourable prerequisite for developing all branches of modern large-scale production.
The 23rd CMEA special lop-level session, held in April 1909 in Moscow, decided to draw up a Comprehensive Programme for Further Extension and Improvement of Co-operation and 180 Development of Socialist Economic Integration. This Programme marked the beginning of moving from separate integration measures to comprehensive long-term forms of integration. It rharled a long-term perspective for the economic development of world socialism. The 25th CMEA Session (1971) adopted this Programme, thus ushering in a new stage in the CMEA countries' co-operation and development. The Programme offers them necessary foreign economic requisites for ensuring high and stable economic development rates. It lays down a foundation for inIroducing progressive forms of internalional production concentration. It provides for setting up multilateral economic associations and R&D centres, and also large sectoral and inter-sectoral production and technical complexes.
The furl her improvement of socialist integration calls for ensuring higher production concentration and specialisation in processing industries, above all in engineering, for improving technical standards, quality, mass production, and variety of output, and for its lower cost. Joint steps arc being taken to expand Ihe production and export of raw materials and fuel and to make (heir use and transportation more efficient.
The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme calls for a highly competent approach to many economic problems, the ability to find the most rational solutions that will be in keeping with the interests of not only the country in question, but also of its partners. It also requires that the latest results of the scientific and technical revolution and the most profitable and technologically advanced types of production be consistently introduced. In recent years, the exchange of scientific material was the main field 181 of scientific co-operation, whereas now emphasis is laid on jointly finding Ihe most effective solutions to scientific and technical problems.
The Comprehensive Programme improves the form and content of the socialist countries' join! planning activity. It is greatly expanded by coordinating current five-year and longer-term economic development plans. Many new elements were introduced in this join! undertaking in Ihe second half of (lie 1970s. For Ihe firs I time ever, the CMEA member-countries drew up a co-- ordinated plan of multilateral integration measures for Ihe period 1970--1980. The plan provides for jointly building a number of large industrial complexes.
The Comprehensive Programme makes the national economies of the participating countries mutually complementary, which is of tangible benefit to individual countries. This is evinced by the fact that between 1950 and 1978 the volume of trade between the CMEA countries increased 22-fold, having surpassed even the fastest-growing rates of production. During the 1970s, the socialist countries doubled their production capacities, and their trade turnover increased more than 200 per cent.
The CMEA countries have scored good results in the international socialist division of labour, above all in production specialisation and cooperation. By the early 1980s, over one hundred multilateral and almost a thousand bilateral agreements co-ordinated their activities in this field. In the engineering industry alone, over 80 mullilateral agreements on production specialisation and co-operation have been signed, involving over 8,000 brands of industrial output.
More than 3,000 research and development organisations take part in CMEA's scientific and 182 technical co-operation. Some (>0 co-ordinating centres have been set up to monitor activities on major scientific and technical problems. In accordance with the 1 ntercosmos Programme, citizens from the fraternal socialist countries have been participating in joint space flights together with Soviet cosmonauts as from 1978.
The CPSU and other fraternal communist and workers' parlies have been continually improving their work in promoting integration. The 25lh CPSU Congress, for example, pointed to Ihe need to draw up long-term joint programmes of cooperation. Their aim is to jointly meet the rapidly growing requirements in energy, fuel and basic raw materials, to more fully satisfy the demand for foodstuffs and consumer goods, to raise the level of engineering and speed up the development of transport.
The Soviet proposals concerning the longterm joinl programmes of co-operation found a positive response among the other CMEA members. Following a thorough discussion of all relevant questions at recent CMEA sessions, the participants voiced their support for such programmes. The 32nd (1978) and the 33rd (1979) CMEA sessions approved five long-term joint programmes of co-operation in the field of energy, fuel and raw materials; agriculture and the food industry; engineering; consumer goods; and transport. These programmes provide for close to 340 comprehensive measures, including the solution of scientific and technological problems.
The long-term joinl programmes offer a socialist way of solving outstanding economic problems affecting the whole of humanity.
The CMEA member-countries are also drafting bilateral programmes of production co-- operation for the current decade. This activity has 183 taken a particularly large proportions between llio U.S.S.R, on the one hand, and Poland, (he GDR, and other socialist countries, on (lie oilier. They have developed dependable and effective mechanisms for snob bilateral lies in the form of commissions on scientific, technical and economic co-operation. Al their sessions, they work out and monitor long-term programmes of production specialisation and co-operation in key industries, and also study the available opportunities for expanding commodity exchange and deepening their economic, scientific and technical co-operation.
Bringing the economies of the socialist countries up to a uniform standard is as pertinent a question as ever. But today this problem is being solved at a higher level within the CMEA's framework. This is facilitated by production co-- operation and by bridging the gap between the economic management systems of individual conn tries. The Comprehensive Programme offers new opportunities in this field, too.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. Co-ordination of Foreign PolicyThe supreme goal of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is to strengthen international peace and security.
With a firm belief that socialism and peace are inseparable, the socialist community countries are working towards implementing the foreign policy programmes formulated by their ruling parties' congresses in the 1970s. The common foreign policy objectives open up broad opportunities for co-ordinating the socialist countries' actions in world politics.
184The unity of such actions is a most important feature of socialist international relations. This unity is based on the natural laws governing the development of world socialism and underlying the socialist countries' economic, political and ideological convergence. In international relations, this takes the form of ever improving and deepening co-ordination of the socialist community's foreign policy. The ability of socialism lo act in the international arena as an integral and coherent community, rather than a conglomerate of countries, constitutes its major advantage.
Just as all other forms of co-operation between the socialist countries, so the co-ordination of their foreign policy is based on the principles of internationalism, equality, independence and national sovereignly, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, comradely mutual assistance and class solidarity in the common struggle for the common goals.
The co-ordination of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is governed, alongside the general laws of socialism, by a number of objective factors stemming from their international objectives, the attainment of which requires joint action. These objectives include strengthening the security of the socialist community, defending the socialist gains, safeguarding international peace and security, repelling imperialist aggression, relaxing international tensions and extending and deepening the sphere of action of the principles of peaceful coexistence. All this ensures the attainment of the main objective of socialist foreign policy, namely working towards an international situation most favourable for building socialism and communism in the socialist countries. Foreign policy actions are also 185 coordinalod to support the national liberation movement.
The Soviet Union was mosl active in shaping a dependable mechanism which would co-- ordinate the socialist countries' foreign policy moves. This mechanism, which helps plan the socialist, community's collective policy, is without precedent in the history of international relations. It has no rigidly centralised forms. Based ontirely on the full independence of each socialist country, the co-ordination mechanism enables the participating nations to lake concerted action allowing for the interests of each country and of the community at large, and also for the political and theoretical contribution of each fraternal parly.
The elaboration of the common socialist foreign policy course is part of the general development of the world socialist system. The triumph of socialist, revolutions in a number of countries necessitated their close co-operation in foreign policy. Initially, this co-operation took the form of a military-political defensive alliance to protect Ihe socialist gains from imperialist encroachments. A ramified system of bilateral treaties secured the allied relations between the socialist, countries in the second half of Ihe 1940s and the early 1950s. Al that lime the Soviel, Union had similar treaties will) all the socialist countries. The system of obligations undertaken in keeping with Ihe treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance which were in force within the socialist community, expressed a vital need for the peoples of the socialist world to unite in a fraternal alliance. The setting up of NATO, an imperialist military bloc, posed a growing threat to the socialist community and increased the need for multilateral military-political co-operation. To counter this threat 186 the socialist countries set up a multilateral defensive organisation with military and political powers, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
It was formed on 1'i May 1955 and included Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviel Union, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. In the second half of the 1950s it was joined by the German Democratic Republic. In the early 1900s, the Albanian leaders ceased participation in (he Warsaw Treaty Organisation and formally withdrew from it in the late 19(>0s.
The effective mechanism of co-ordinating the socialist countries' foreign policy was developed gradually on the basis of extended bilateral relations and the common position in a complex and rapidly changing international situation. The Soviet Union participates in improving the co-- ordinating mechanisms of the socialist community, being convinced that foreign policy co-ordination is an important factor in consolidating the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. Interstate socialist relations increasingly affect social development in each socialist country. The coordinated foreign policy of the socialist community guarantees the strongest impact of its combined power on international processes and tendencies. The socialist countries can pursue a common foreign policy course because the external policy of each socialist state is based on the common fundamental interests and objectives of the socialist community as a whole. This sharply improves the efficacy of its international moves.
The Warsaw Treaty holds a special place within the system of political and military cooperation between the socialist countries. For 187 over 25 years the Treaty has been fulfilling ils chief mission, which is to protect the socialist community and ensure its security. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is the main co-ordinating centre /or the foreign policy activities oj ike socialist countries.
The participating countries hold regular consultations on all major international issues involving their common interests. In doing so, they are invariably guided by their concern lo strengthen international peace and security. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said: "We are not ashamed to refer to the foreign policy of the socialist states as a policy conducted on the basis of concord. We are proud of it because its strongest point is that on all major issues it is elaborated and effected jointly.''
The Warsaw Treaty Organisation has become an effective mechanism of the political, economic and military interaction of the participating countries. Party and government leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries take part in the work of the Political Consultative Committee, the organisation's highest body, which considers and resolves, in the interests of the socialist nations, all major problems concerning their policy and security. By taking collective measures, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has repeatedly succeeded in averting the threat of a new war, extinguishing the hotbeds of conflict, and resolutely supporting peoples that were the victims of aggression. The political and defensive alliance of the Warsaw Treaty countries has also become a solid foundation for more active measures lo promote detente and extend peaceful relations between countries with different social systems. The socialist states have proved, both in word and deed, that they are dependable partners of 188 any country which sincerely wishes to co-- operate in the name of detente and peace.
Foreign policy is co-ordinated in various ways. Alongside; sessions of the Political Consultative Commilt.ee, whoso participants work out and adopt joint foreign policy programmes, summit meetings are also of great importance. The exchange of party and government delegations between socialist countries helps to elaborate a common foreign policy strategy and adopt concrete action programmes. The now traditional Crimean meetings of leaders of the socialist community's communist and workers' parties arc of particular relevance. They exchange information on their parties' life and activity and on the tasks o[ building socialism and communism, discuss their political, economic and ideological co-- operation and outstanding international issues. These meetings facilitate the elaboration of a joint policy lino in world politics and the co-ordination of joint efforts to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community and the international communist movement.
Contacts between leaders of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist community are friendly, business-like and efficient. Characteristically, the socialist countries are co-ordinating their foreign policy through collective discussion of practically all essentially important world issues which are of common interest to them. This method helps them to take more effective decisions, forestalls possible errors and enhances mutual understanding.
The depth, scale and intensity of the socialist countries' foreign policy co-ordinating effort, the level of their unity in international affairs and, consequently, the efficiency of their foreign policy action are unprecedented in world history 189 and contemporary international relations. Socialism has not, only introduced new forms and principles in international intercourse, but has also demonstrated the new potential oj its policy which corresponds to people's interests and aspirations.
As the largest socialist country with the most powerful economic, political and military potential, the Soviet Union makes a decisive contribution to accomplishing the historic mission of world socialism. The U.S.S.R. plays a key role in solving problems vitally important for world socialism and mankind in general, such as the question of war and peace, the prevention of a nuclear war, and the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
The CPSLJ believes that the way to further changes in the relation of world forces in favour of socialism lies in the all-sided consolidation of world socialism. The fraternal parlies emphasise the role played by the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process. In the second half of the l!)70s, their party congresses adopted resolutions urging that ties bo strengthened with the Soviet Union which, they believe, is the bulwark of socialist internationalism.
The political relations of the socialist countries in practice lead to the conclusion that the unity of the socialist countries is a most important requisite for consolidating and maintaining the entire system of socialist international relations and for augmenting the community's might. The common foreign policy course incorporates the short- and long-term objectives of each socialist country and the general objectives of the community as a whole and is instrumental in strengthening universal peace. "All of our peaceful initiatives,'' Leonid Brezhnev said, "accord with 190 the common political line of the fraternal socialist countries in the international arena. Wo are working together to promote these initiatives. The proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and its friends are supported by dozens of countries at the United Nations, by the popular masses on all continents.''^^1^^
The co-ordinated policy of the socialist countries also helps safeguard the international interests and consolidate world positions of individual socialist countries. Soviet foreign policy is an important factor in their joint action which brings about new successes for the cause of peace and socialism. For example, imperialism's major postwar attempt to crush by force of arms a socialist state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and stifle I he national liberation revolution in South-East Asia ended in a fiasco. The resolute and extensive assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was also important for the victory of the Vietnamese people over the Chinese aggressors who have colluded with imperialism. The international status and prestige of Cuba, the first socialist state in the Western hemisphere, have also been consolidated. The socialist community's work towards European security was crowned by a historic success ---the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki. The requisite conditions for a lasting peace and goodneighbourly co-operation both in Europe and elsewhere were created in the 1970s. The tangible results of the European peoples' liberation struggle during and after World War II were secured by the universal recognition of the _-_-_
~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Speech in the City of Tula on January AS', 7977, Novosli Press Agency Publisliing House, Moscow, 1977, p. 20.
191 sovcroignty of the Gorman Democratic Republic and llie recognition in inlernaUon;il law of I lie inviolability of the western borders of the G.D.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia.The 1!)7()s saw a Inrn towards detente and the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations. That was facilitated by many factors, above all by the objective change in the correlation of world forces in favour of socialism. But this change alone could not automatically lead to positive shifts in world developments. Of immense importance here was the co-ordinated, active and flexible; policy of the socialist countries. The combination of objective and subjective factors alone could give rise to the new developments characterising the positive shifts in international relations in the interest of peace, socialism and the whole of mankind.
The role of socialist foreign policy in international intercourse today stems from the essential fact that it is increasingly becoming a structure-making factor within the world system of international relations. By transforming the latter's structure, socialist foreign policy brings the attainment of its final objective closer. This is the complete triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international intercourse.
__NOTE__ Previously the page number in this context was explicit. [192] __ALPHA_LVL1__ VI. AGAINST PEKING'S HEGEMONISTICChina's aggression against Vietnam in 1979 has lucidly exposed the cynical and irresponsible attitude of Peking's leaders to the world's future and their criminal yearning for adventurist sallies which, if unchecked, could lead to a universal catastrophe.
The direct aggression against a socialist country was a practical expression of Maoist policy, which has been tragic for the Chinese people, gruesome for the neighbouring countries and ominous for the rest of the world. That aggression could be a harbinger of new military adventures. The foreign policy course pursued by Peking's rulers, their hostile attitude to world socialism, their betrayal of the interests and aspirations of the developing countries, their stand on major international issues, and, most importantly, their main foreign policy goal, which is provoking a new world war, add urgency to the need uncompromisingly and resolutely to oppose Peking's foreign policy ideology and practical action.
The country, whose rulers call it socialist, pursues an expansionist, aggressive and, essentially, imperialist policy. These are the facts. The present leaders in Peking have themselves unwittingly exposed the aggressiveness of their great-power, hegemonistic policies.
__PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__ 1/2 13--01290 193 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. Peking's Ideology and Policy:Peking's ideology and policy bring about a clanger of war and block the road to detente, lasting peace, social progress and national liberation. The Chinese rulers have actually sided with the world reactionary forces. This makes it all the more necessary to oppose this course consistently and perseveringly. The CPSU's policy is aimed at exposing the ideology and policy of Peking's leaders, which jeopardise the interests of the international community.
At the same time the Soviet Communist Party is making every effort to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations. "If Soviet-Chinese relations are still frozen,'' Leonid Brezhnev stated, "the reason for this has nothing to do with our position. The Soviet Union has never sought, nor does it now seek any confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We follow the course set by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, and would like to build our ties with that country on a good-neighbour basis. Our proposals for normalising relations with China remain open, and our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed.''~^^1^^
The CPSU opposes Peking's aggressive policy and ideology, which is essentially petty-bourgeois, counter-revolutionary and hostile to scientific socialism, because it wants not only to safeguard the security of the socialist countries and to ensure international peace, but also to safeguard _-_-_
~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU..., p. 19.
194 the accomplishments of the Chinese Revolution in keeping with the principle of socialist internationalism. This principle, though trampled underfoot by the Maoists, still underlies the attitude of the peoples of the socialist community toward the great and long-suffering people of China.Analysis of China's present-day foreign policy gives rise to questions as to the genesis of Maoist ``ideas''. What quaint turn of events could have given birth to such ideology and policy? What lies behind the Maoist phraseology which abounds in absolutely irrelevant Marxist terms? What were the root causes of Maoism?
In expounding the ideas of internationalism, Lenin made high demands on the politically conscious vanguard of the working class in each nation and country. To be an internationalist, he emphasised, "one must not think only of one's own nation, but place above it the interests of all nations''.~^^1^^ He went on to stress that true internationalism demands that the interests of the revolutionary struggle in one country should be subordinated to this struggle's worldwide objectives. Most of the ruling parties in the socialist world translate these criteria formulated by Lenin into practice.
This approach alone can guarantee thai contradictions inevitably arising in inter-state relations between socialist countries will be overcome. The fraternal parties are aware of this, as they are of the possibility of removing such contradictions on a constructive basis. "The presentday socialist world,'' Leonid Brezhnev said, "with its successes and prospects, with all its problems, is still a young and growing social _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up'', Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 347.
__PRINTERS_P_195_COMMENT__ 13* 195 organism, where not everything has settled and where much still bears the marks of earlier historical epochs. The socialist world is forging ahead and is continuously improving. Its development naturally runs through struggle between the new and the old, through the resolution of internal contradictions.''^^1^^ Recognising the existence of contradictions in the development of world socialism, the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries firmly believe that these contradictions can be easily resolved on the basis of socialist internationalism, by way of comradely discussion and voluntary fraternal cooperation.Marxism-Leninism is against any idealisation or dressing-up of social phenomena or smoothing over of contradictions. The recognition of the possibility, and even inevitability, of contradictions in the development of the world socialist system and in inter-state socialist relations is an integral part of a scientific analysis of world socialism. Such contradictions and differences are not antagonistic, therefore they can be jointly resolved in the interests of eacli socialist country on the basis of a truly socialist policy.
But in the event that the leadership of a particular socialist country abandons Marxism-- Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism (as was the case in the People's Republic of China), nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in politics may give rise to acute contradictions, that eventually become antagonistic. On the home front, this leads to deformities within the socialist system and the danger of losing virtually all socialist gains.
_-_-_~^^1^^ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, pp. 18--19.
196Any manifestation of nationalism is incompatible with proletarian, socialist internationalism and is completely alien to it. Marxists will never tolerate chauvinism or nationalism.
The nationalist tendencies and deviations that dominate the Communist Party of China and form part of its ideology and policy, are a result of the present historical situation. This is the period of a worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism, the period in which two world systems exist and struggle. But the specifics of this struggle are not the sole reason for nationalist tendencies.
In the socialist context, such tendencies also arise when socialism in a particular country is immature. China's low level of socio-economic maturity was not offset by a high level of political awareness. On the contrary, it was aggravated by the ideological and political immaturity of the ruling party.
By removing the social roots of nationalism and chauvinism, which are integral components of capitalism, socialist revolutions create conditions for doing away with such tendencies. But these conditions do not have an automatic effect. This depends on the policy of a socialist country's ruling party. The objective development of many socialist countries was conducive to the retention of nationalist tendencies. This was particularly true of countries which were backward before the socialist revolution. And, as Lenin wrote, "the more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, i.e. 197 to national egoism and national narrow-- mindedness.''^^1^^ This fully applies to China today.
Peking's great-power, anti-Soviet and antisocialist policy is the result of the interaction and interconnection of Chinese socialism's objective and subjective immaturity. The low-level brand of socialism in China gave rise to a groat many negative socio-economic and political phenomena and processes. This was not compensated for by the CPC's purposeful activity. On the contrary, this was one of the reasons why the Maoist leaders have taken an openly greatpower stand.
Maoist foreign policy betrays the Chinese leaders' hegemonist designs and anti-Soviet ism which have culminated in armed invasions, hostility towards the socialist community, aggressiveness towards China's neighbours, territorial claims, unprincipled collusion with any anti-- socialist forces, and many other unseemly features. In a bid to achieve their chauvinist aims the Maoists are attempting to impose their ideology on all peoples. The unremitting power struggle within the party and government bureaucracy and the military leadership further destabilises China's home and foreign policy and promotes adventurism. The fact that China's internal socio-economic problems remain unsolved and that in many cases they cannot be solved in the context oj deformed socialist social structures makes it imperative jor the Chinese leaders to search jor an external enemy, whose presence would ``justify'' the sacrifices and hardships affecting the broad popular masses. This feature is inherent _-_-_
~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'', Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 150.
198 in all military-bureaucratic and other terrorist dictatorships. In the Maoist policy and propaganda, it has found its expression in the fact that, following the period of self-imposed isolation during the "cultural revolution'', Maoism has re-entered the international political scene under the banner of irreconcilable hostility towards the Soviet Union, its enemy No.~1.China's example has once again confirmed that the subjective factor plays an important role in foreign policy and international relations. A party policy based on socialist internationalism makes it possible to overcome all difficulties hindering the development of socialist international relations, whereas a policy arising from general immaturity makes such difficulties insurmountable, engenders artificial contradictions and conflicts, ceases to be a socialist foreign policy, and plays to imperialism's tune.
Having slid into anti-Sovietism, the Maoists have betrayed the cause of revolution and reversed their own past decisions. It will be recalled that the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China considered it its first priority task "to continue to consolidate and strengthen our eternal, unbreakable fraternal friendship with the great Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.''^^1^^ But that was in the past. Resolutions passed at the subsequent three CPC congresses were increasingly hostile to the U.S.S.R. The rulers in China today direct their policies against most of the socialist countries and converge with the world's blatant reactionary forces. These policies, completely alien to the _-_-_
~^^1^^ Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Vol. I, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956, p. 131.
199 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1981/PSFPT213/20070914/213.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.09.14) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ socialist principles and ideals, have in fact become a reserve of imperialism in its struggle against socialism. All foreign policy moves by Peking are aimed primarily at weakening world socialism and undermining its positions.Most importantly, Peking's anti-Soviclism does not involve the Soviet Union alone. It is the most striking expression of the global antisocialist bent of the Maoist policy. It was, therefore, only logical for the Maoists to converge and collude with the imperialist quarters.
Now, in the early 1980s, the Chinese leaders join forces wilh the most reactionary imperialist circles in their attacks on the socialist countries, going out of their way to aggravate the international situation, revive the Cold War spirit and provoke a new world war. Expansionism is the main vehicle for realising Peking's great-power ambitions. Its real foreign policy actions give the lie to China's stubborn assertions that it "will never become a superpower'' and will never "seek hegemony''. The present Chinese leaders step up their war preparations, conduct nuclear arms tests in the atmosphere despite worldwide public protests, and maintain the world's biggest army. China's continuously growing military expenditure exceeds 40 per cent of the national budget. And this is an extremely poolcountry!
Maoist propaganda spares no effort to prove (he ``futility'' and ``uselessness'' of any disarmament measures. The activities of the Chinese delegation at the United Nations are a graphic illustration of the patently negative and provocative nature of the Chinese leaders' stand on all major international issues. Since 1971, when the rights of the People's Republic of China were restored at the United Nations, it has not tabled 200 a single constructive proposal or come forward with a positive initiative. It uses this high rostrum chiefly for slandering and attacking the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
The Chinese delegation sought to use the 11)78 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament as a platform for anti-- Soviet propaganda. Addressing the Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua attempted to prove that China needed to step up arms stockpiling under the pretext of "limiting Soviet expansion''. As for disarmament, he maintained, it is absolutely senseless to cherish the hope that will never come true. Maoist foreign policy today is based on the directives of the llth CPC Congress held in the summer of 1977. It proclaimed the continuation of the policy line which had already greatly harmed the international communist and working-class movement and impeded the national liberation movements and all other forces seeking to cast off neocolonialist shackles. It is very indicative that the Congress issued a directive to give priority to struggle against the Soviet Union, regarding the United States a "lesser danger" and even a temporary ally. Thus, struggle against the Soviet Union has become China's official policy line.
The llth Party Congress favoured the policy which runs counter to the vital interests of the Chinese people. Hua Guofeng's report slandered the Soviet Union and distorted the Soviet-- Chinese relations over the period preceding the Congress. Mao's successor once again tried to scare the Chinese people with a mythical "Soviet threat''. The Congress declared war preparations a major joreign policy objective.
In the post-Mao period, the Chinese leaders have in fact been continuing to hank on war as __PRINTERS_P_201_COMMENT__ 14-01290 201 a chief instrument of their foreign policy. That is a principal manifestation of the continuity of the Maoist policy and ideology. The Peking leaders have not departed an inch from their grealpower and chauvinist course; hostile to (lie interests of peace and socialism, and have even tightened it. Having declared struggle against the Soviet Union their chief objective, the Chinese leaders have sided with those who still cling to the idea of unleashing war on the socialist countries.
The "three worlds theory" has become the core of today's Maoist foreign policy doctrine. It was a natural stage in Peking's slide to counter-revolutionary positions. In accordance with Mao's quotations, back in 1974 Chinese parly theorists divided the contemporary world into "three worlds''. The first included the U.S.S.H. and the U.S.A., the second, the developed capitalist and other countries, and the third, the developing countries including China. It was stressed that the countries making up the ``second'' and the "third worlds" oppose the "hegemony of the superpowers''. Deng Xiaoping, a co-author of this ``theory'', addressing the UN General Assembly in 1974, declared it an official doctrine of the People's Republic of China and simultaneously staled that the world socialist system had ceased to exist.
In 1977, a latter-day version of the "three worlds theory" appeared; this shows that the Maoists are claiming the role of leader and chief ideologist in a proposed anti-Soviet, and anti-- socialist coalition. The "three worlds" concept is based on the thesis that all countries should form a "united front" of action against the Soviet Union. This front, as Peking's theorists see it, should also include the United Stales.
202All theoretical interpretations of the "three worlds" doctrine arc meant to shore up ideologically the unquenchable hegemonist claims of the present-day leadership in Peking. These are far-reaching claims indeed. They are advanced in the hope of setting up a new "Sino-centric system of international relations'', even at the cost of sacrificing half the population of the world.
Detente and positive shifts in the present structure of international relations, the fruits of the persistent struggles of the peace forces, run counter to the Maoist plans. This is why Peking lashes out against detente, seeking to discredit and undermine it by whatever practical action it can think of.
Peking's hostility toward detente was most vividly expressed by its reaction to and role in the events in Afghanistan. Having almost surpassed the U.S. administration in high-pitched anti-Soviet hysteria, the Chinese leaders are trying to outdo their American colleagues in the scale of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan through insurgents trained and armed with American and Chinese assistance.
The criminal gambling on a now world war is another clear indication of Peking's collusion with imperialism in international affairs. The fear of the growing international revolutionary forces and hostility towards existing socialism unite the Maoists with Western anti-communists. Insofar as Maoism has become a variety of the most rabid anti-communism, the struggle against the anti-socialist, misanthropic ideology oj China's leaders has become an integral component of the struggle against the ideology oj imperialism and world reaction.
Co-operation and interaction between world __PRINTERS_P_203_COMMENT__ 14* 203 imperialism and Maoist China have bocomo especially pronounced in the late 1070s and the early 1980s. They are directed against Llie socialist community, the national liberation movement, and the world progressives. Imperialist foreign policy strategists and politicians maintain that the confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and China (provoked by the Maoist policy) is the chief conflict in today's international relations. They pin their hopes on the long-term nature of this conflict, forecasting that it will last at least until the end of this century.
Maoist anti-socialist, anti-Soviet policies provide the basis for drawing up a new imperialist strategy seeking to exploit the new developments in the interests of the world bourgeoisie. China's inclusion within the sphere of the international policy of capitalism is not only a component of the U.S. foreign policy strategy, but also an element of the foreign policy of Japan, West European, and other capitalist countries.
U.S. ruling quarters treat China mainly in the context of American global policies. They seek primarily to use to their own advantage the anti-Soviet bent in Peking's foreign policy. These converging tendencies in U.S. and Chinese politics greatly affect Soviet- American relations. U.S. foreign policy ideologists are bidding to blend together the "Chinese factor" and their conception of confronting the Soviet Union. Carter's Administration watched Maoists' foreign policy moves closely and attempted to play up the "Chinese card" with the explicit purpose of exerting political pressure on the Soviet Union and wrenching military and political advantages.
Similar views are voiced by some West European political leaders too. Peking's enmity towards world socialism yields dividends in its 204 political game not only with the United States, but also with other capitalist countries. But the lalter's is in many cases a much more restrained position than that of the United States. Realistic politicians in Western Europe are well aware I hat the Chinese leaders seek to turn their Western partners into instruments of their hegemonist policies, which arc a far cry from the interests of both West European peoples and their ruling element. For this reason many West European countries, though willing to develop advantageous economic relations with China, are reluctant to overemphasise their political ties. In formulating their China policy, these countries have to bear in mind the eventuality that reckless political gambling with Maoism on an anti-Soviet platform is fraught with many dangers because it only spurs adventurist tendencies in Peking's foreign policy.
Characteristically, the convergence of Maoism and imperialism does not merely involve the ideological and political fields, turning China into imperialism's ally in its struggle against socialism, but also spills over to the military sphere. This tallies perfectly with general tendencies in imperialist strategic policies. The normalisation of U.S.-Chinese relations, announced late in 1978, was hardly held back by difficulties in settling the Taiwan issue (these were clearly exaggerated and were nothing more than a tactical subterfuge). Washington's decision to normalise its relations with the People's Republic of China was prompted by strategic considerations, namely by the opportunity to use the Maoist course on a global scale.
Peking's all-out support for U.S. military presence in Asia and the Pacific is striking evidence of the military-political convergence of the 205 Maoists and the imperialists. Not content with (hat, Iho U.S. administration is preparing to lake new stops wliich will divide, as it were, the spheres of action for American and Chinese military might. Naturally, U.S. military planners assign China the role of an additional lever for exerting military pressure upon the U.S.S.R.
In recent years some people have begun talking of China's tacit participation in NATO. Peking's explicitly pro-NATO propaganda is taken by Western strategists as a weighty supplement to the bloc's political and military activity.
But the most dangerous tendency in NATO's policy towards Maoist China is that its membercountries extend it broad military assistance and participate in modernising Peking's armed forces. Numerous military contracts and agreements are known to have been signed between China and NATO countries.
The ideology and policy based on the "Chinese factor" are fed by hatred for the Soviet Union and for the world revolutionary movement at large. World reaction has now acquired an ally it badly needed to light both. And despite the fact that this ally cannot be trusted and that the Maoist-imperialist anti-Soviet and anti-- revolutionary alliance is (and will always be) torn by contradictions, real politics still offer considerable opportunities For attempting to realise the concurrent designs of the imperialists and the Maoists against the forces of peace and socialism. The materialisation of Peking's slogan of forming a "united front" against the Soviet Union with U.S. participation would be nothing less than the formation of a counter-revolutionary alliance. This would result not only in qualitative shifts in the alignment of world forces, but might also lead to a new world war.
206All (his makes it extremely relevant for (lie Soviet Union to oppose Maoism and its foreign policy persistently and uncompromisingly. The qualitative changes in Peking's international activities have resulted in a situation where the Chinese problem is no longer confined to national boundaries and increasingly affects the vital interests of international peace and security, posing the main threat to humanity. Maoist policy today has practically the same objectives and uses the same methods as those pursued by the imperialists. In its struggle against existing socialism, Maoism has entered a new stage of escalation and now directs its blows against the territorial integrity and internal stability of the socialist community countries. This has put Maoism on the same level as the extreme imperialist reaction engaged in that struggle since (he October Revolution. Moreover, Maoist ideological attacks and sallies have given way to political, economic and even military struggle. This is why the Soviet Union is against neutrality and conciliation towards Maoism, the ideological and theoretical basis of Peking's anti-- socialist policy.
__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. For the NormalisationThe Soviet Union consistently seeks normalisation in its relations with China. Wishing to preserve its friendship with the great Chinese people, the U.S.S.R. put forward numerous proposals to develop inter-state relations and contacts at a high government level. The Soviet 207 government repeatedly urged Peking to conclude agreements normalising Soviol-Cliinese relations. Its proposals included mutual obligations on the non-use of force, on banning preparations for war against, each other, on stopping the propaganda of such a war, on non-aggression, and many oilier important items. Specifically, in 19(5!) and 11)70 the Soviet Union proposed a mutual obligation not to attack each other by signing a special act staling in no uncertain terms that the two parties would not resort to force of arms against each other and refrain from using any types of weapon. A draft non-aggression treaty handed over to the Chinese government said that the two parties undertook not to attack each other and not to use; any weapon against each other on land, sea or in the air, and also not to threaten such an attack.
In recent years the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed that mutual trade be expanded on the basis of long-term agreements. The Soviet side also came out with initiatives to establish scientific co-operation, to continue contacts in the field of public health, to re-establish ties between friendship societies, and to settle many other problems pertaining to mutual relations. But all Soviet proposals have been either rejected or ignored by the Chinese side.
On the eve of the All-China National People's Congress session in February 1978, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet sent its Standing Committee an address reiterating readiness to put an end to the abnormal relations between the two countries and halt the dangerous process of their further exacerbation. The Presidium proposed that a joint Statement of the Principles of Mutual Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. be worked out and that 208 a meeting of representatives of the two parties he organised at a sufficiently high level to discuss that matter. But this Soviet initiative was rejected.
All Soviet initiatives find only one reaction in Peking---the mythical "Soviet threat" is whipped up and the country's militarisation boosted. The Maoists need the slanderous lie about the "threat from the north" to distract the people's attention jrom continuous failures in their home and foreign policy, from the unseemly power struggle in Peking's upper echelon, and from the direst economic position of the popular masses.
This was also the aim of China's decision (April 1979) not to prolong the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. concluded in 1950. The present-day rulers in China consider it an obstacle to their struggle against world socialism. Following this decision, the Soviet government issued a statement which said that all responsibility for the termination of the Treaty rested with the Chinese side and that the Soviet Union would draw the appropriate conclusions. The statement noted that there were no objective reasons for the peoples of the two countries to be alienated, let alone confront each other, that no attempts by the opponents of ChineseSoviet friendship could cancel out everything positive accumulated over the years of fraternal co-operation.
In the teeth of Peking's hostile acts, the Soviet Union continued to urge China to normalise its relations with the U.S.S.R. As a result, the two parties agreed to hold negotiations between government delegations in Moscow in September 1979. During the talks, the Soviet 209 delegallon snbiriillccl a draft Declaration (if the I ciples of Mutual Relations Between (lie U.S.S.R. and Iho P.R.C. and explained its position. The Soviet side clearly emphasised thai normalising inter-slate relations called for a solid legal foundation in the form of principles which would he agreed upon and fixed in a corresponding document and which bolh sides would abide by in settling their disputes and in normalising and developing their relations. For this reason alone the establishment of such principles had to be a central issue in all efforts to normalise SovielChincse relations.
In practical international relations, the principles of peaceful coexistence include primarily full equality of all parties, respect for independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, nonuse of force or threat of force, and mutual benefit. All this is inseparable from the obligation of both parties to give up all claims on any special rights or hegemony in Asia or elsewhere and not to recognise anyone else's claims on such special right or hegemony. This also implies that both the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. will undertake to do everything possible to prevent situations which may result in a dangerous deterioration of their relations.
The Soviet-proposed principles fully conform with the universally accepted norms of international law and with the UN Charier. They do not set any preliminary conditions or demands. Neither party is at a disadvantage. These principles are not directed against any third parly. Moreover, their implementation would be conducive to ensuring international peace and security in Asia and the world at large.
These Soviet-Chinese negotiations were to be 210 continued at a later agrced-upon dale in Peking, but early in 1980 the Chinese side, using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext, declared that it refused to continue bilateral talks on normalising relations.
The so-called territorial problem occupies an extremely important place in Peking's anti-- Soviet policy. The Chinese leaders' unfounded claims on Soviet border territory totalling some 33,500 sq km are augmented by their obstructionist tactics at the Soviet-Chinese border negotiations started in October 1969 and stalemated by Peking. The Chinese negotiating team demanded, as a preliminary condition, that the Soviet Union recognise all Soviet territory which Peking claims to be "disputed zones" and end Soviet control over that territory. An ultimatum was tabled that the Chinese side could start direct discussions on issues involved in the subject of the talks only after its preliminary conditions had been fulfilled.
The Soviet Union's stand on the border issue was unambiguous and clear from the very beginning of the negotiations. It is still ready to engage in business-like and concrete negotiations, but without any preliminary conditions. The Soviet state lays no claims on any foreign territory. In this sense there are no "disputed zones" for the Soviet Union. It has never had any economic or territorial claims on China. The U.S.S.R. is ready to make the necessary clarifications concerning certain areas of the SovietChinese border on an equitable and acceptable basis. All problems artificially created by Peking could be settled if both sides expressed equal interest in their solution.
The Maoist approach to territorial issues is essentially akin to the expansionist appetites of 211 the Chinese emperors who unceremoniously considered all neighbouring countries their vassals. Instead of settling the border problems on the basis of mutual interest, Peking's rulers issue absurd territorial claims. Many Chinese publications refer to Mao's notorious ``register'' and contain oft-repeated claims on as much as 1,500,000 sq km of Soviet territory.
In the course of the border talks the Soviet side submitted a number of concrete proposals which took the interests of both parties inlo account. If they had been considered and implemented, the talks would have long been led on I of the impasse into which they have been led by the Maoist tactics. The Soviet government is in favour of establishing truly normal relations between China and the U.S.S.R. and of settling al! their disputes on the principles of good-- ncighbourlincss and co-operation. The 25th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the principled position of the Soviet Union towards China and the intention to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations.
A turn for the better in such relations would not only be beneficial to both peoples, it would also contribute to strengthening international peace and security and promote the interests of world socialism.
Of course, given the situation obtaining in the early 1980s, it would be nai've to pin hopes on such a turn of events in the near future. The Maoists do not intend to give up their extremis! anti-Soviet and anti-socialist foreign policy objectives. This is evinced by their continuing liegemonist course, hostility to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, plans for further militarisation and collusion with imperialism, aggression against Vietnam, and unseemly role in the anti-Afghan actions. Forces inside China 212 opposing the Maoist rule are not yet fully aware of their mission and are still in search of ways and means of ridding their country from that rule, catastrophic for the whole nation. In this situation, the Soviet Union firmly adheres to its peace policy, sternly rebuffs all instigatory concoctions by the Chinese leaders, and shows concern for safeguarding the interests of the Soviet people, their friends, international peace and security.
__ALPHA_LVL1__ CONCLUSION __NOTE__ First time in memory that a LVL1 did not start on a new page like all previous LVL1's in a book.Soviet foreign policy shows that socialism stands for peace, respect for the sovereignty of all nations and equal international co-operation; it supports all peoples struggling for their freedom and independence. The Soviet Union pursues its foreign policy in close contact with the fraternal socialist countries, relying on support from the independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and co-operating with all peace-loving states and social forces in the capitalist world. The U.S.S.R. believes that it is extremely important to promote solidarity with all peoples fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for peace, security and detente, for halting the arms race.
Internationalism is the underlying principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This policy integrally combines the interests of the Soviet people and those of the international revolutionary movement. The consistency of that course has been reaffirmed by the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress on international problems and by its new initiatives and proposals which have been met with interest and approval 213 by the progressives throughout the world. These initiatives and proposals are a major contribution to rallying the peace forces and making them more active. Soviet foreign policy arose from the proletarian revolution and has a class and internationalist nature. It serves not only the interests of the Soviet people, but also those of all peaceloving nations. It fully and consistently expresses the striving for peace by the main revolutionary forces of our time.
The Soviet people have built a society of mature socialism, which is a dependable guarantee of success in the struggle for the ideals near and dear to the whole of humanity. The LJ.S.S.R. and its allies make a decisive contribution to the preservation and consolidation of peace. Socialist foreign policy is an effective restraining force for those who are prone to play with fire, even in tin's nuclear age. Its supreme mission has always been safeguarding the right to live.
[214] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END]REQUEST TO READERS
Progress Publishers would be glad lo have your opinion of Ibis book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have tor future publications.
Please send all your comments to 17, /ubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.
[215]