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p Now that you have an idea of the history of the Sandinista movement and of the Somoza dictatorship and its backers, and also of what the opposition in Nicaragua seeks to achieve, let us return to August 1978.

p The successful Carlos Fonseca Armador raid stirred up the entire country. A nationwide strike followed on 25 August, paralysing industry, transport, and trade. The only demand made was that Somoza go at once.

p On 27 August barricades were erected in Nicaragua’s third largest city of Matagalpa. When the punitive National Guard force that the dictator dispatched to this city fired on the demonstration, Sandinistas repulsed the attack, and the insurgent populace seized control of virtually the entire city.

p On 29 August Somoza ordered Matagalpa bombed. For several days the insurgents held the city, but on 3 September, after another massive bombing raid, Somoza forces captured the ruined city and took massive reprisals against the unarmed population. Somoza thought thereby to frighten the people, but the reverse occurred, the wholesale massacres in Matagalpa serving as the last straw. A spontaneous uprising erupted.

There follows an excerpt from a Sandinista communique: "The spontaneous uprising swept every department in the country. At this juncture we had to decide whether to lead the people into an open battle against Somozaism, or pending a more auspicious situation, more arms and better organisation to ensure overall victory, leave the people in the lurch in their struggle against the tyranny. On 9 September, we 61 called upon the people and the FSLN armed detachments to rise up and rally around the slogan of ’Death to Somozaism!’. Thus 9 September ushered in a new phase in the armed uprising.”

Panorama, 9-16 September

9 September

p The nationwide general strike continues. Armed uprisings flare up in Leon, 90 kilometres west of the capital, in Esteli, north of Managua, in Chinandega, which has a population of 30,000, and in Diriamba, 40 kilometres from Managua.

At 6 a.m. in line with a unified plan, Sandinistas attack National Guard posts in Managua, Leon, Chinandega, and Esteli. Scores of soldiers are killed, and large quantities of arms and munitions are captured.

10 September

p At 8 a.m. Sandinistas launch armed operations against the National Guard in the Managua, Masaya, and Carazo Departments. Sandinistas control many districts in Masaya, Esteli, Chinandega, and Chichigalpa.

p Somoza aircraft bomb urban neighbourhoods and at tree level strafe houses and streets, inflicting numerous civilian casualties.

Carlos Tunnerman, one of the Group of Twelve and former Rector of Nicaragua’s National University, agrees to a Sandinista proposal to form a provisional government. The National Guard seal off Leon and Chinandega. There is general confusion in Managua. In a broadcast, Somoza declares he is in full control.

11 September

p The National Guard intensify repressions in Masaya, and Esteli, where a 30-day martial law and curfew go into force from 11 September. Fires rage in the bombed cities. In Diriamba the uprising gathers momentum. Sandinistas occupy the Los Manos National Guard outpost in Northern Nicaragua, near the border with Honduras.

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Life in Managua is at a complete standstill. National Guard patrols the streets, gunning down all young persons caught out of doors.

The testimony of Managua refugee Jose Santo Cordero— as related to me in Costa Rica on 3 February 1979:

p “About crimes committed in Nicaragua that have victimised friends, acquaintances, and relatives: one young man, a distant relative of my wife’s nicknamed Pulga, who lived in Managua’s Rigiero neighbourhood, was detained on a baseball diamond on 11 September last, and tossed into a National Guard jeep, that we call the BEGAT. He was beaten up, tortured, and died of wounds. His dead body, the face beaten to a pulp, was tossed out into the yard. The three other young men, whose names I do not know, who were detained with him, were also tortured to death.

p “In San Isidro, another district in Managua, a girl and her brother, both children of a National Guard sergeant, and their uncle were tortured by the National Guardsmen. These three neighbours of ours were going to Vera Cruz. The girl’s brother was in his first year at high school. At four o’clock in the afternoon, a BEGAT jeep passed by, National Guardsmen seized him, tossed him into the vehicle, and drove him off to a place called Concepcion. Another two young men were also seized with the boy and his sister. In Concepcion the three boys were pushed out of the jeep and submachine guns were fired at them. Two were killed, but as it was dark when they reached the place—it was about 6 p.m. and dusk had fallen—they missed the third. As for the girl, they drove further on, gang-raped, and killed her.

p “On the next day the lad who had escaped death by a fluke called on the relatives of the dead girl and boy and their uncle, and told them that the three had been killed. The parents hunted high ^and low for the bodies of their children. They found their boy’s body, but the girl’s body was found only two days later at the mortuary. When the mother came and asked the lid of the coffin to be lifted, she saw that the girl’s arms had been lopped off and her breasts cut 63 off. The dead girl lay there in the coffin horror imprinted in her glazed open eyes.

p “It is really impossible to give all the names, there are so very many of them. How many times National Guardsmen would break into a house and order everyone inside to come out. Those who didn’t obey were dragged out, stood up against a wall, and shot dead. It made no matter, men, women, or children. At best they might tell those over 15 to stand to one side and those younger to the other. However, should a 12- or 13-year-old appear older, he would also be ranked with the adults and shot, with no explanation afforded.

“So you can well imagine our plight. Our people, every man jack of us, are prepared to fight and will fight to the bitter end, until the Somoza dictatorship is completely destroyed, until the gang of criminals they call National Guard is exterminated. But we don’t have enough arms or help.”

12 September

p More than 300 mercenaries arrive from El Salvador and Guatemala. Rumours are afoot in Managua that Somoza’s cousin, Luis Pallais Debayle will soon take over.

p Comandante Cero (Eden Pastora Gomez) tells a France Presse News Agency correspondent that 1,100 guerillas in twelve FSLN regional organisations are fighting in the anti-Somoza revolution.

p Bitter fighting between Sandinistas and National Guardsmen continues in Leon, Chinandego, Esteli, and Masaya, in which last town more than 200 civilians are killed.

p From his Tiscapa Bunker Somoza declares that in a contingency he will ask GONDECA, the Central American Defence Council, to send troops to Nicaragua. In Washington, a US government spokesman warns that if necessary, aircraft will be sent to Managua to evacuate US citizens there.

The OAS, the Organisation of American States, issues a news letter reporting that it has initiated an analysis of the Nicaraguan situation to solve the crisis into which the country has been plunged.

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13 September

p Armed clashes between Sandinistas and National Guardsmen occur near the Costa Rican border. Reports from Managua say a two-hour battle was fought in Cardenas, a town at the southern tip of Lake Nicaragua, some three kilometres from the Costa Rican border.

p Banks in several Central American countries refuse to accept Nicaraguan currency.

p Several US newspapers advertise for mercenaries to fight for Somoza in Nicaragua.

p From today on, the state of seige is extended to the entire country.

In a nationally televised broadcast, Somoza publicly admits that between 9 and 13 September some 700 officers and men "deserted from the National Guard over these five days".

14 September

p The Prensa Latina News Agency reports that Somoza is getting arms from Israel.

p Panama and Venezuela send airplanes and helicopters to Costa Rica to ward against possible Nicaraguan aggression against that country.

p Somoza announces a call-up of National Guard reservists.

p The situation in the various cities and towns as of 10 a.m. is as follows:

p Managua—sporadic rifle and submachine-gun fire.

p Diriamba—some 100 Sandinista guerillas attack the local National Guard garrison.

p Rivas—fires break out all over the city. Sandinistas exchange fire with National Guardsmen before retreating to the downtown section.

p Masaya—no armed clashes.

p Esteli—insurgents still hold the downtown section and most public buildings.

p Chinandega—the situation is vague, with Sandinistas and other opposition civilian forces still controlling most of the city.

Leon—the entire downtown section is ablaze. Somoza 65
 
This “opponent” of Somoza is only five
 

 
Somoza’s National Guard was an army of occupation in its own country
 

 
On Somoza’s orders bodies were not buried They were left lying in the streets, and then petrol was poured over them and they were burned
 

 
The officers of Somoza’s National Guard were well-fed executioners trained at American military academies
 

 
“Life in Nicaragua has returned to normal,” Somoza announced after putting down the uprising in September 1978 People walk along the streets carrying white flags
 

 
A town after a raid by Somoza’s bombers
 

 
National Guardsmen were a bulwark of American imperialism and of Somoza’s regime in Nicaragua
 

 
Training in a Sandinista camp
 

 
In a Sandinista camp. Comandante Felix conducts a political class
 

 
Instruction in marksmanship
 

 
Women go into battle side by side with men
 

 
A lunch break
 

 
“Why did I join the Sandinistas’ Because as a schoolteacher, I am deeply concerned about the future of our country’s children"
 

 
Teachers, factory workers, peasants, college students and others, in short, the whole people, are represented in the Sandinistas
 

 
Nora Astoria is one of Nicaragua’s heroines
 

 
Their uniforms were captured from Somoza, which means they are American-made
 
airforce planes bomb and machine-gun the San Felipe, Subtiava, Zaragoza, and San Juan residential neighbourhoods.

The testimony of a Leon refugee, Eddi Torez, as related to me on 3 February 1979 in Costa Rica:

p “On 14 September last, Sornoza’s National Guard criminally bombed Leon residential neighbourhoods. I was living at the time in the San Juan neighbourhood, between 9th Street and 8th Avenue, in my sister’s house, where also staying were her son and a friend of mine whose own house, or rather shanty of old corrugated tin and plywood offered no protection from the strafing and bombing.

p “The bombing continued the next day, with aircraft pounding residential neighbourhoods from 6 o’clock in the morning without letup until darkness at 7 o’clock in the evening. We were also shelled by North American Sherman tanks and strafed by helicopters. Three friends of mine were killed. One, his name was Adrian, took no part in the uprising, but as he was young, and as the dictator’s butchers were killing all young people, they seized him and shot him dead too. Another friend of mine, Oralio, was killed by a patrol. They threw his dead body out into the yard of his parents’ house and as they did not allow them to bury him at the cemetery, his grave had to be dug in the yard. A third friend, his name was Manuel, was also seized by Somoza soldiers. One of them pulled out a pistol, put the muzzle to Manuel’s nose and shot it off. Then they kicked him to death. This all happened on 14 September.

p “Nearly the entire population of Leon, some 95,000, were for the Sandinistas. They helped to dig trenches and put up barricades. By 15 September—the city had been in the hands of the insurgents for several days—Leon had neither water, gas, nor electricity. Somoza’s National Guard killed and slew undiscriminatingly—even Red Gross nurses. I saw all this with my own eyes.

p “On the 16th, CONDEGA units, units of a US-created army made up of detachments from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras entered the city. With them were some others in uniform, only not Latin Americans, but Chinese and 66 Vietnamese, who several years earlier had fled from Vietnam with the North Americans. Our comrades overheard conversations between CONDECA officers and the pilots who had bombed Leon. They spoke English, which makes it absolutely certain that the aircraft were piloted by Yankees.

“I don’t know whether any of my family are alive. I have been here in Costa Rica since 28 September. Myself, I’m a worker from a slaughter house.”

15 September

p Plutarco Hernandez, a Sandinista leader, says 500 mercenaries from among Cuban counter-revolutionaries trained in Miami have come in from Guatemala and El Salvador. Although Pedro Diego Landa, War Minister of Honduras, has stated that the sending of Central American troops to Nicaragua is out of the question, the very fact of a CONDECA troop presence in Nicaragua, which is confirmed by numerous eyewitness accounts, exposes the Honduras Minister’s statement as a lie.

p Channel 7 of Costa Rican television presents documentary sequences from Nicaragua, clearly showing that National Guardsmen are armed with Belgian rifles and Israeli submachine guns.

With air, armour, and artillery support, more than 2,000 National Guardsmen launch an offensive against Sandinistaheld neighbourhoods in Leon. There are many civilian casualties.

The testimony of Leon refugee Benessa Torres, as related to me on 3 February 1979 in Costa Rica:

p “I lived in Leon’s San Luis neighbourhood, my family in the Benita Dolores neighbourhood. A trained nurse by profession, during the uprising I looked after the wounded and rendered first aid. In the daytime I had my hospital job to do, after that I would rush home to tend the wounded in the Sandinista field hospital near my home. The hospital where I worked was in a neighbourhood controlled by Somoza’s National Guard, and each day I had to sneak back into Sandinista liberated areas. That was a nightmare. My best girl friend 67 was killed before my very eyes. Somoza’s guardsmen grabbed her—her name was Maricsa—gang-raped her, killed her and left her dead body to lie on the road. At the hospital where I was working, I filched medicines and antibiotics for the wounded Sandinistas.

p “Many fled from the neighbourhood held by the National Guard, where they lived in casuchas shaiitytowns, in houses, if you can call them that, made of crates, plywood, and scraps of tar paper and took cover in brick houses from the bullets and bombs. Whenever National Guard bandits captured a neighbourhood, they burst into homes, dragged out everyone, and killed them.

p “On 15 September, when I was making my way home to later visit the wounded Sandinistas, I saw my 16-year-old brother Antonio killed with another boy whose name was Emilio Roberto. This happened in our neighbour’s house, where we all lodged because our home was also a casucha. An hour after I came home, the National Guard occupied our street; Guardsmen burst into the neighbour’s house where we had found refuge, and ordered everybody out, men and women. There weren’t any grown-up men there, only boys of 15 and 16 years of age. The women and children cried, wept, and begged the soldiers not to kill them.

p “The National Guardsmen dragged my brother and the other boy, Emilio Roberto, out into the yard, told them to make the sign of the cross, and then shot both of them in the head. Mother didn’t know that Antonio had been killed. She heard the shots, but that was a time when shots were fired very often, and she didn’t know that it was these shots that had killed our Antonio, and the other boy, Emilio Roberto. But when our neighbour cried, ’Rosa, they’ve killed your boy!’, mother rushed out into the yard and found Antonio still breathing, A National Guardsmen yelled, ’We’re gonna finnish off your bastards! Scram, you old hag, or you’ll get a bullet too!’ They dragged mother away and before her eyes fired another shot into Antonio. Then they went away, and we buried brother in our neighbour’s little courtyard. "Somoza has many butchers like that. I want to give the names of some of them. For instance, Pablo Aguiler, one of 68 the ringleaders tormenting and torturing people, and also Antonio Espinales, Clicho Donas and Augostin Obando, all from Somoza’s National Guard.

“We are now in Costa Rica, a land that has given us shelter, but we have every faith that we will return home to Nicaragua. Only to a free Nicaragua, without the hangman Somoza and his running dogs of the National Guard, which the USA has trained and armed.”

16 September

p Leon’s National University is fully destroyed in a Somoza air raid. Leon is bombed incessantly ten hours running.

p In Masaya, the National Guard capture the Monimbo neighbourhood and massacre civilians. Women are gang-raped and National Guard bandits gun down everyone encountered.

Guatemala’s guerilla leaders publish an appeal to the nation stating that on that day guerillas had attempted to carry out the verdict against Brigadier Edmundo Meneses Cantarero, Nicaragua’s Ambassador in Guatemala. More specifically, they say, "Meneses Gantarero enjoyed special privileges amongst Guatemala’s authorities and army commanders. Exploiting his ambassadorial position in Guatemala as smokescreen, he actually discharged the duties of coordinator between the Guatemalan Army and the Nicaraguan National Guard, and also between Somoza and Guatemala’s reactionary government. He coordinated political repression for all of Central America, and the operations undertaken by the governments of this area against popular revolutionary movements. He drafted plans for a United Central American Army (CONDEGA)”. (General Cantarero died of wounds several days after the assassination attempt.—Auth.)

17 September

p There is bitter fighting in Penas Blancas. The National Guard declares it is in control of Chinandega and Esteli. Central American news media report a letter, dated 10 August 1978, in which representatives of American religious communities visiting Nicaragua ask President Carter to suspend all 69 aid to Somoza. There follows an excerpt from the US Senate Record for 22 September 1978:

p “.. .We spoke firsthand with poor people who testified that their homes and means of livelihood had been confiscated by Guardia (National Guard—Auth.) officials for personal gain. We saw arbitrary taxes imposed on the highways (the so-called ’Colonel’s tax’) and observed tax legislation passed by the Congress in the absence of a true quorum, establishing massive sales and business taxes that our Jesuit analysts in Nicaragua assured us are intended only to liquidate the national debt and not serve the poor in any form or fashion. . ..

”. . .The people believe that the Guardia had not only a license to kill, but orders to kill, in order to physically smash any public opposition to the regime. We believe there is truth in that view.. . .”

18 September

p The Organisation of American States resolves to convene on 21 September a consultative conference to discuss Nicaragua. Paraguay casts its vote against, Trinidad and Tobago abstains. The OAS institutes an inquiry in Costa Rica to elucidate circumstances attending overflights of Costa Rica by Nicaragua aircraft.

Somoza dispatches 1,200 National Guardsmen to Penas Blancas.

19 September

Insurgents continue to hold Esteli. National Guardsmen pillage captured cities and towns.

20 September

p Somoza declares he has "no intentions of designating a successor”. Venezuelan Air Force planes leave Costa Rica for home.

p Esteli’s fall and its rapture by the National Guard is reported this morning.

p The USA announces plans to study "reports of brutalities" in Nicaragua.

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p On 21 September the National Guard crushed the last pockets of popular resistance, thus completing Operation Omega. The list of casualties, overwhelmingly civilian, includes some 5,000 killed and more than 7,000 wounded. In this punitive operation, Somoza employed a force of 6,200 National Guardsmen, supplemented by North American mercenaries, Cuban and Vietnamese counter-revolutionaries, and several hundred more mercenaries from Central America.

p In Leon, Nicaragua’s second largest, 231-year-old city, more than 2,400 people were killed and it lies in ruins. The textile town of Masaya has also been almost completely destroyed by National Guardsmen. The punitive squads that have occupied the meat and dairy centre of Chinandega are looting and shooting indiscriminately.

p In a France Presse interview, Leon Archbishop Manuel Salazar Espinoza stated, "I shall stay here in this, my city, until I die. Words fail to describe what government troops have been doing with respect to the peaceful population here.”

p In Leon’s San Juan district, one sees everywhere the newly dug graves of the victims of National Guard brutality. A France Presse dispatch says National Guardsmen burst into homes to drag out and shoot all male inhabitants of 14 and over.

p On 15 September the Washington Post featured a story headed "He Was Crying: ’Don’t Kill Me, Don’t Kill Me!’ ”. It says in part, "At least 14 young men were killed last Friday afternoon on a two-block stretch of Santiago Arguello Avenue here (in Leon—Auth.}. All of them, according to family members and neighbours, were executed by submachine guns at point-blank range by the Nicaraguan National Guard and all of them begged for mercy.. ..

p “The eyewitnesses’ story of the executions is supported by physical evidence on the scene and by countless similar reports, primarily here in Leon, of National Guard atrocities duiing nearly four weeks of civil war. . . .

p “President Anastasio Somoza, asked last night by NBC Television about alleged indiscriminate killings, replied: ’In any civil strife in any country when . . . you have to go after insurgents, some people get hurt without cause.’ Asked if he 71 was satisfied with the National Guard’s peifonnance, he said, ’Yes’. . . .”

p This time the dictator managed to stay in the saddle. In etfect. after 16 September it was clear that the National Guard had been able to crush the armed uprising. Why did Nicaragua’s people fail to topple the much-hated regime in September 1978?

p In an analysis of the uprising, any unbiased observer will necessarily conclude that the overwhelming majority of the population were against the Somoza dictatorship. However, the Sandinistas were not under one unified command. Their three different factions operated in isolation, without a common plan. Decisions were taken on the spot. Coordination was absent, not only between forces fighting in various parts of the country, but even within the limits of one or another area.

Indicative in this respect are facts provided by Trinchera (Trench), the organ of the GPP (Prolonged Popular War), one of three factions of the FSLN, for November 1978. There follows its account of operations conducted by Sandinistas of all three factions in Chinandega between 9 and 16 September.

“9 September

p “6:35 a.m. A group of armed men throw up a barricade near the Isabel Lizano and Commercial Schools. When a National Guard whippet tank moves up, the insurgents retreat to the eastern quarter.

p “Near Colonia Market another group of insurgents seize a truck and making it the strongpoint of their barricade, exchange fire with National Guardsmen.

“In La Cruz neighbourhood in the northern sector, leachr’i of GPP and Piolctarios gioups assemble detachments (my emphasis lieie and further—Auth.), and send them ofl to build barricades Troop movements near the city and fleeing < ivilians in cars piled high with personal effects are seen this night. All signs indicate that the uprising has begun.

72

“Sunday, 10 September

p “Between 6 and 7 a.m., we attack the El Picacho Airport and fight in the Colonia Venerio sector. One of our comrades directs the erection of barricades in the San Lorenzo area and agrees on joint action with Proletaries who planned to dig in by the bridge near the entrance to the city.

p “On the fringe of the eastern sector of the Calvario Norte district, Terceristas erect a barricade around an overturned truck. Our men throw up similar barricades in the Libre sector.

p “At 7 p.m., our GPP comrade directs residents putting up barricades. Terceristas also erect barricades in the southwestern sector of Calvario district.

p “In La Cruz district, one of our groups contacts Terceristas leader and agrees to form a unit armed with home-made grenades and contact bombs. In this district we instruct the population assisting us how to choose positions, take up defences and dig trenches. We recruit a unit and put one of our men at its head.

“While in the Calvario district, we contact people in charge of Terceristas and Proletaries groups to confer to coordinate action. We discuss how to straddle roads into the city, hut fail to reach an agreed decision.

“Monday, 11 September

“In the San Lorenzo and Libertad neighbourhoods, steps are taken to gather weapons. This night we again contact the Terceristas to say that it is necessary to mount an assault, as the enemy is planning to wear us down. We decide to meet once again at 5 a.m. The enemy opens fire near the bridge, we reply, and Terceristas and Proletdrios come to our help. In the evening, a Terceristas replenishment comes to the support of barricade defenders in the Libre sector. A leadership is set up for the Rosario zone, but the men under it can do little, as their political grounding is weak and there are not enough arms.

73

“Tuesday, 12 September

“We meet the Terceristas at 5 a.m. to discuss the situation, and decide to extend joint operations. GPP fighters operate in the downtown section, the Terceristas undertake to defend the Calvaiio perimeter. One of our groups, together with anarchists and Terceristas, seize the house of Deputy Irma Guerrero, where we capture two machine guns and then advance towards the market. In the evening we discuss the situation with the Terceristas and Proletdrios. At last we contact our comrades responsible for the San Lorenzo area, with whom we have had no contact since the uprising began. It is decided that the Proletaries dynamite the bridge, but we find we have no explosives. The entire night is spent fortifying barricades.

“Wednesday, 13 September

p “Barricades are up virtually all over the San Lorenzo district.

p “A commando has been recruited to prevent all attempts at robbery and looting. Sentinels are posted at food stores. National Guardsmen surround a Tercerista-led group. We rush to their succour, and repulse a National Guard attack.

“At mid-day we confer with tlie three Terceristas responsible for the zone. Representatives of the three factions confer to size up available forces to attack the National Guard.

“Thursday, 14 September

“A three-man leadership representing each faction is set up to plan the garrison’s capture. Another similar three-man group is charged to contact the anarchists and agree on joint action in this operation. It is agreed that our base will be the focal point for conferences of representatives of the three factions.

“Friday, 15 September

p “We organised armed groups in the blocks under our control, We handle communication matters and are now in 74 a position to communicate by radio-telephone with the leadership of each of the three factions.

“The enemy mounts an assault along the riverside. We entrench in the Rosario district, where we link with a Proletaries group forced to retreat from a section they had hitherto held.

“Saturday, 16 September

p “Plans to capture the garrison fall through. Our forces fail to reach the point from which we are to attack the garrison. The enemy calls in the air force.

p “Terceristas are not in our section and we know nothing about them. Our forces now consist of two, GPP and Proletaries, units. According to available information, the enemy has suppressed the uprising in other cities and towns and is moving forces here, to Ghinandega. We are compelled to switch to defensive operations.

p “At mid-day, after conferring with the Proletaries, we decide to escape investment and move out of the city to preserve strength.”

p The above-quoted excerpts from the log published in the Trinchera largely reveal why the Sandinistas failed to topple the Somoza dictatorship in September 1978.

p The Sandinistas struck at the National Guard, in a figure of speech, with a hand whose fingers were spread out. There was no coordination or agreement at all between the different factions. At the outset, the factions were not even in contact with one another. As was said, "One of our groups contacts Terceristas leaders”, or "One of our comrades agreed with the Proletaries on joint action’^^1^^ or "Agreement was reached to confer to draft joint action . . . but no agreed decision was reached”. Note that all these attempts at contact and coordination came not before the uprising began, but when it was in full swing, when fighting was at its height.

p Note that in Ghinandega, only on 14 September was a "three-man leadership representing each faction set up to plan the garrison’s capture”. Time had been lost and a " threeman leadership representing the three factions" could in 75 practice get nowhere in the space of the two days left of the fighting.

p The man writing the log represents the GPP, the newspalper publishing it is also the organ of the GPP, and he keeps saying "our men”, or "our comrades”, or "we attack".

p Hence, when the call rang out to back the spontaneous popular uprising, the Sandinistas were divided into three autonomous factions, each with its own armed groups totally disconnected. Thus, in Chinandega, all three factions had their own leaders, who did not know how many groups the other factions had and how well armed they were.

p Then, the uprising was spontaneous. The Sandinistas had not organised it, had not planned it to occur in September 1978. However in a fait accompli situation, the Sandinistas took the only right decision, exhorting the people to rise up and try to carry out the first part of the programme, that is, topple the Somoza dictatorship, terminate National Guard outrages, and prevent the installation of a Somoza-type government after Somoza had gone.

They failed to carry out these plans in September 1978, partly for reason of what is said above, but mostly because of the backing of circles in the United States, thanks to whom the Somoza clan ruled Nicaragua for so long.