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p The philosophical question of how objective knowledge is achieved, and from what it follows that physical statements are not purely subjective constructions and that nature exists independently of experience and of the theory that has grown from it long occupied an important place in classical physics.

p From the standpoint of classical science the answer to this problem did not appear very complex. For eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists it seemed obvious to accept the objective reality of the external world, reflected in physical theories. It was customary to explain observed phenomena in terms of a mechanical model. The concepts in which the measurable properties of physical bodies and their motions then known were expressed were not very far removed in level of abstractness from those developed in everyday experience. Materialism and mechanistic views prevailed in classical physics and were shared by its representatives, though frequently not philosophically consciously.

p As physics moved from the macroscopic objects perceived in everyday experience deeper into spheres of phenomena cognition of which called for non-classical theories and their abstractions, unknown to classical physics, in addition to very sophisticated experimental equipment, the problem of the objective and the subjective became more and more complex in physics. In modern physics this problem took on 371 a form that differs essentially from that in which it appeared in the physics developed under the aegis of Newton and Maxwell. From the end of the nineteenth century, paradoxical situations began to arise in which the observed data did not fit into theoretical schemes and conceptions existing at that time. The theory of relativity and quantum mechanics emerged and developed, and became established as non-classical theories, i.e. as theories with a mathematical apparatus (formalism) unknown to classical physics, and basic concepts and principles quite different to classical ones.

p The physics of our day develops through the transition of some fundamental theories into others that are deeper and more general and differ qualitatively from the initial ones. This kind of development is inextricably bound up with the disappearance of certain basic concepts essential to the initial theory, and the formation of new basic ones (without which the new system of knowledge cannot be regarded as a theory). The disappearance of the former and appearance of the latter is a single process in which the former (if they figure in it as a kind of absolute concept, or invariant) are relativised in a way and become aspects of new absolute concepts, or invariants, in a deeper theory. Instead of the classical concepts of absolute length and absolute duration, for example, in the theory of relativity, corresponding relativistic concepts representing aspects of the most important invariant of the theory of relativity became established, i. e. the interval, which ‘combines’ length and duration in a special manner.

p When fundamental physical theories are characterised epistemologically by increasing degree of generality, i. e. classical mechanics and electrodynamics—the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics—quantum field theory (the theory of elementary particles), one is justified in saying that the relativisation of the old absolute (invariant) concepts and introduction of new absolute (invariant) ones in the course of the generalising of a theory and its transition into a new one signify a progressive movement from ’ subjectivism’ to objective knowledge, and ever deeper, more complete cognition of the objectively real in which the onesidedness and subjective constructions of individual physical theories internally connected with it become blurred as it were. On the other hand, the theories, by preserving 372 their content that corresponds to objective reality, become more and more integrated in this progressing motion.

p In our view this is the philosophical significance of the idea of invariance as regards the relation between the objective and the subjective in modern physics. Thus, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics have concretely demonstrated that certain of the fundamental concepts of classical mechanics, and this science as a whole, are approximate (although these concepts are absolute within the limits of their applicability). The uncertainty relation, for example, which established the limits of applicability of the classical particle concept, took into account, let us say, that electrons possess wave properties in addition to corpuscular ones; beyond these limits the classical concept of a particle has no objective meaning.

p In modern physics Lenin’s ideas of the relationship between matter and consciousness, and between the objective and the subjective, play a most important role. Matter and consciousness, the objective and the subjective preserve their absolute oppositeness only within the limits of the basic question of philosophy.^^1^^

p Lenin thus linked a materialist solution of the basic question of philosophy inseparably with the dialectics of cognition, with how knowledge is formed from ignorance, how it becomes deeper and deeper, and more complete, reflecting the external world that exists independently of man. In physical science, especially in non-classical physics, this finds very clear, marked expression.

p Positivism (regardless of whether it is a matter of Mach’s views or of neopositivism) for which, as we know, the existence of a physical world independent of experience was, at best, a pseudo-problem, by-passed the problematics of the origin and source of physical knowledge, and at the same time, the problematics of its development. Mach criticised Newton’s theory of space and time from an idealist standpoint adhering to the purest philosophical relativism on this issue, and rejected Einstein’s theory of relativity. Later positivists, including such eminent philosophers as Carnap and Reichenbach, accepted the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, but for them physical theories were only a logical means of systematising the observed. Thus, Reichenbach ignored the real dialectical unity of the particle and wave properties of matter, which was 373 unknown to classical physics and which is considered in Bohr’s conception of complementarity developed by Fock and others. By introducing certain assupmtions about ’ particle’ and ‘wave’, which (in his own words) are ’neither true nor false’, he put forward a theory of equivalent descriptions in his philosophical argument on quantum mechanics. According to this theory, in certain conditions the corpuscular and wave interpretations ’both are admissible, and they say the same thing, merely using different languages’.^^2^^

As for the objective and the subjective in modern physics, it is important to bear in mind that Einstein, Bohr, Born, and its other architects held the same anti-positivist position as regards cognition in physics, in spite of the difference of their philosophical views. Einstein, for example, always stressed that in their theories physicists are dealing with nature, which exists independently of the mind cognising it. While doing justice to classical physics and holding Newton in high esteem, he considered the theory of relativity a new step in the development of knowledge in physics, expressing the idea, moreover, that the modern theory of relativity (i.e. theory of gravitation) should only be regarded as a certain limiting case of a more profound theory (not yet created). These considerations of the founder of the theory of relativity speak for themselves. One can find similar statements on this point in the works of Bohr, Born, and other great physicists of our time, who have opposed positivism and subjectivism in science.

p Spokesmen of the ’philosophy of science’ and scientists of the non-socialist world have become distinctly suspicious of positivism of late. Without going into the reasons for it, let us note that mounting attention is being paid in modern bourgeois philosophy to the development of scientific cognition; the study of this development is gradually becoming the basis for comprehending the structure of science, its theories that have taken shape, and the logical problems of established science. Unlike positivism, the subjectmatter of which was the logic of already existing knowledge, the most recent trends in the bourgeois philosophy of science aim at identifying the forms and methods that make it possible to bring out the developing content of scientific knowledge. In short, if the logic of the scientific revolutions, 374 above all in physics, i.e. the logic of the transition from one fundamental theory to another, deeper one, was outside the purview of positivists, philosophical problems of this kind of revolution are being brought to the fore in the post- positivist approach. Karl Popper has made the first steps in this direction. His ideas, however, including his principle of ‘falsifiability’, strictly speaking, only formulated the relevant questions (leaving aside his latest publications). For him, study of the development patterns of scientific knowledge and the study of its logical structure were different, though mutually related, problems.

p Imre Lakatos, taking Popper’s ideas as his starting point, concludes that the logic of science can only be the theory of its development. He scrupulously analyses the matters involved in the fact that every empirical disproof of a theory (‘falsifiability’ in Popper’s terminology) poses a problem of refining and progressively altering a theory. Lakatos tries to clarify the rational reference points in the development of knowledge during a scientific revolution.

p Thomas Kuhn analyses the problem of revolutions in science differently than Popper and Lakatos. In his view there is a period in science of the predominance of established principles that guarantee its ‘normal’ functioning, and a period of crisis when new ‘paradigms’, i.e. sets of new principles and new scientific methods and approaches are taking shape. Unlike Lakatos, Kuhn suggests that the change of paradigms cannot be explained rationally or logically, and tries to justify his position.

p We shall not discuss the views of Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn, and of other Western philosophers close to them, about the development of scientific knowledge, but simply note that these philosophers have not solved the problems of development of scientific knowledge in its most essential features. Popper, for instance, in his argument about the contradiction between the theoretical and the empirical, did not find ways of resolving it. Kuhn denied regularities in the transition between ‘paradigms’. The methodology of Lakatos’ ’research programmes’ (in his interpretation they play the role of Kuhn’s paradigms) in fact lacks constructiveness.

p From the Marxist standpoint the negative aspects of all these and other views of Western opponents of positivism on the development of science are quite understandable; 375 they ignore materialist dialectics, above all the dialectics of the connection between the objective and the subjective, when they analyse the development of scientific knowledge. The understanding of cognition as the reflection of nature in human thought, an understanding that must not be regarded without motion, or free of contradictions, but in an eternal process of movement and of the rise and resolution of contradictions, is that which opens up a philosophical perspective for dealing with matters concerning scientific revolutions and the development of science.^^3^^ Modern bourgeois philosophers do not see this.

p The enormous significance of the dialectics of the objective and the subjective in the philosophical problematics of physical knowledge stands out clearly in dealing with the problem of the relationship between the abstract- logical and visualisable, or mathematical apparatus ( formalism) of a theory and the data observed in experiment described in terms of our everyday language, a problem which is essential to contemporary physics. This is also the problem of a mental picture of the concepts and theories of contemporary physics. The line of materialism on this issue implies acceptance of the dialectical unity of sensory cognition and abstract thinking that reflects objective reality. The combination in a single whole of the mathematical formalism of a physical theory and of experimental data expressed in the concepts of classical physics corresponds to the line of dialectical materialism. Born was wrong when he said that, according to dialectical materialism, it would be sufficient to limit oneself to ’the objective world of formulas with no relation to perception (Anschauung)’.^^4^^

p As for a mental picture, Einstein had an idea of considerable philosophical significance for physics. Its essence is that the abstract-logical in a physical theory by itself does not yet say anything about the objectively real; only in connection with the mental picture does the abstract- logical (mathematical) reflect the objectively real and become an object of verification by experiment.^^6^^ This profoundly dialectical idea renounces from the very beginning the conventionalist, positivist scheme for dealing with the problem.

p Bohr’s idea which we have already mentioned is of great importance in this regard:_ ’However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the 376 account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms.^>B When one ponders over this idea of Bohr’s, its materialist nature comes out quite definitely. Quantum mechanics, for instance, like other non-classical theories, grew out off experiment and was confirmed by it, which means, however,, that it cannot help using classical, visualisable conceptssince its validity is checked by experimental means that aremacroscopic objects, and the readings of the means or instruments from which conclusions are drawn about atomicobjects and phenomena are perceived by a person. Nature,, with which science is concerned, is matter in motion, and! matter cannot be cognised if it does not act on the human; sense organs (either directly or indirectly, through the instruments). What would man know about the atomic world existing independently of his consciousness if it did not make itself felt through macro-phenomena perceived by him that are connected in a regular way with micro-phenomena?

p Various fundamental physical theories (the theory of relativity, say, or quantum mechanics) make use of experimental data described in the language of classical concepts, and the theories themselves (let us note) differ in their content. One may ask in what form the experimental data described by classical concepts are included into the nonclassical theory. The problem lies not in the description of the data (that problem is solved) but in their comprehension in terms of certain concepts connected with certain physical statements covered by a certain fundamental theory.

p On this score physicists are not unanimous. Many of them do not bother about the question just stated, assuming that it is sufficient to use the observed data and the theory’s mathematical apparatus to find observable data not yet known, i.e. that there are no new basic physical concepts in non-classical theory. This semi-unconscious point of view, incidentally, is not very far, in fact, from positivism, according to which a physical theory is only a logical means of systematising the observed.

p In the case of the theory of relativity, according to Heisenberg, the new situation with concepts can best be described in mathematical language. Physicists, he says, could either try to adjust their language to the mathematical formalism of the new theory (which happens in the theory of relativity) or make do with the language of classical concepts, knowing that it has only limited applicability (as 377 happens in quantum theory).’^^7^^ Heisenberg consequently does not even pose the question of the new basic physical concepts in a new fundamental theory, i.e. concepts such that their content is determined by the basic physical laws of the new fundamental theory, and interprets the change in the basic classical concepts in such a way as to obscure this change itself.

p The change in the fundamental concepts when a new theory is born from an old fundamental one does not mean adaptation of the old fundamental concepts to the new mathematical formalism or their restriction to a certain sphere of applicability, but signifies the rise of new fundamental concepts differing qualitatively from the old ones and the building at the same time of a new fundamental physical theory. The theory of relativity, for instance, was born at the junction of classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics, as a result of resolving the contradiction between Galileo’s principle of relativity and the principle that the velocity of light In vacua is independent of the motion of the source. The new axiomatics and the new basic concepts that formed the conceptual basis of Einstein’s theory of relativity were also a result of this. From this angle the concepts of relative space, time, and simultaneity in Einstein’s theory are not the classical concepts adjusted to the mathematical formalism of the theory, but fundamentally new physical concepts reflecting real space and time in their deep, internal interconnection (the practice of physical observation and experiment witnesses to the validity of this).

p Questions on this plane have been very thoroughly considered by scientists who are conscious adherents of dialectical materialism and by Marxist philosophers.^^8^^ As for Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn, who should not by-pass the dialectics of the development of basic physical concepts, it would seem, in their studies of ’scientific revolutions’, they actually left this dialectics out of their purview—they do not even use the term ’change of a classical concept’. In Kuhn’s view, the transition from, say, the physics of Newton and Maxwell to the special and general theory of relativity has no rational explanation, whereas these problems have been solved in the research of Soviet scientists in terms of dialectical materialism and its theory of knowledge and logic (which was discussed, in particular, above).^^9^^

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p Let us now consider more concrete aspects of these problems. The concept of relativity figures quite often in physics. Abstracting from it in classical mechanics and Einstein’s theory, let us analyse it in quantum mechanics, which we consider the pinnacle of its development in physics. The point at issue is relativity with respect to the means of observation; this concept is found implicitly in Bohr’s work; explicitly, as a relevant principle, it was formulated by Fock.^^10^^

p This principle requires objects and phenomena on an atomic scale to be described in terms of the concept of relativity with respect to the means of observation. Assume an electron beam to pass through a crystal lattice by which one can observe the diffraction pattern produced by electrons. With respect to this means of observation, the wave aspect of electron motion is manifested, i.e. the concept of the wave properties of the electron has no meaning outside this relation. Suppose the positions of electrons hitting a photographic plate to be determined as certain dark points in the emulsion; with respect to this means of observation the particle aspect of electron motion manifests itself, i.e. outside this relation the concept of the electron’s corpuscular properties is meaningless. Thus, the idea of relativity with respect to the means of observation makes the particle-wave nature of electrons literally visible.

p If one remembers that the means of observation or instruments are a kind of extension of the human sense organs and at the same time (as we have seen from study of atomic objects) that they belong, on a certain plane, to* the observed physical system, it follows that no sharp line can be drawn between the objective and the subjective in experimental research, and that there is no absolute difference between the cognised object and the cognising subject, the observed system and the measuring instrument. The difference between the objective and the subjective during an experiment (observation, measurement) is not absolute, not extreme, but relative, fluid in a way.

p The question of the relation between the objective and the subjective in physical cognition should thus not be separated from that of relativity with respect to the means of observation. In classical physics this problem was not so much solved as posed; no bridge had been built so to say to 379 connect the objective and the subjective in the experimental research.

p Such a bridge began to be built in Einstein’s theory, but the problem of the relationship between the objective and the subjective in physical knowledge has been resolved most fully in quantum mechanics and its concept of ’relativity with respect to the means of observation’. It was Bohr who stressed that one must not draw a sharp line in experiment between the observed system and the experimental set-up. He analysed many aspects of this problem and emphasised the idea that description of the effect of the measuring instrument is a sine qua non in quantum physics for the determination of the phenomenon itself. On this plane his own illustration from everyday experience, already referred to above, is of interest. ’When the stick is held loosely,’ he said, ’we feel it as an external object; when it is held firmly, the sense of an alien body is lost and the sensation of content is localised directly at the point where the stick is in contact with the body being investigated.’^^11^^

At the same time, this difference between the objective and the subjective in experiment, between the cognised object and the cognising subject, is not purely and simply a relative one; it contains an element of the absolute. The source of the experience is objectively real. An understanding of this difference as purely relative became the philosophical basis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the idea of uncontrollability in principle, the idea that the wave function is just a record of the observer’s information, and so on, were lauded by modern positivism and other contemporary idealist trends. These ideas tried to delete the dialectics of physical cognition; in the long run they all suggest that in physics there are no new basic concepts in the new fundamental theory apart from the basic concepts of classical physics, and that there cannot be.

p The problems discussed above have something in common with what we shall call here the question of the activity of human consciousness; it has acquired a new philosophical nuance in modern physics.

p According to Lakatos, there is an important difference between (in his own words) the ‘passivist’ and ‘activist’ theories of knowledge. From the standpoint of the first 380 ‘true knowledge is Nature’s imprint on a perfectly inert mind: mental activity can only result in bias and distortion. The most influential passivist school is classical empiricism’.^^12^^ From the standpoint of the second, he says, ’we cannot read the book of Nature without mental activity, without interpreting it in the light of our expectations or theories’.^^13^^

p Similar expressions can also be found in Heisenberg, though with certain differences relating to what, according to him, modern physics contributes to knowledge. Heisenberg believed that man describes and explains not nature itself but nature as it appears to him because of his way of posing questions and methods of research. Heisenberg highly esteemed the statement of the German physicist and philosopher Carl Weiszacker that ’Nature is earlier than man, but man is earlier than natural science’. ’The first half of that statement,’ we read in Heisenberg’s works, ’justifies classical physics and its ideal of total objectivity. The second half explains why we cannot rid ourselves of the paradoxes of quantum theory and the need to employ classical concepts.’^^14^^

p The authors of these statements, it must be assumed, either did not know or ignored the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. The person cognising nature does not by any means treat it passively in doing so. As we know, the kernel of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism was already contained in Marx’s ’Theses on Feuerbach’. Man has been dealing millions upon millions of times in his historical practice with objects and phenomena of macroscopic dimensions, and with their movement and changes, which occur at relatively low speeds (compared with the velocity of light). Classical physics, the first expression of which was Newton’s physics, was based on this practice, which also confirmed its validity.

p But ’the criterion of practice’, as Lenin wrote, ’can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely.”^^15^^ The relativity of this criterion (as regards the development of physics) is expressed in the fact that the practice of physical observations, experiments, and discoveries (about which classical physics did not and could not know) became the basis of, and confirmation of the validity of, the theory of relativity and quantum theory. Physical knowledge has now become incomparably more complete and rich than the physical knowledge of the eighteenth 381 and nineteenth centuries. Convincing evidence of this is the scientific and technical revolution of our time.

p It is wrong to assert that only classical physics describes nature as objectively real in its pure form and that the rise of quantum physics has confirmed the view that science describes nature affected by our methods of research. For the classical picture of nature does not reflect it fully and is much too coarse and idealised; this was demonstrated in their own way by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, which describe and explain nature more completely than classical theories. But then it is wrong to state that classical physics describes and explains nature without taking into account ourselves.

p When the point is considered more broadly, we have every right to say that the reflection of nature in the observations and abstractions of such-and-such theory idealises, simplifies, and coarsens the reflected object in one way or another. At the same time the progress of knowledge and the development of theory and science as a whole are overcoming these idealisations and simplifications, which are inevitable in individual cognitive acts, in each individual theory, and in its statements and concepts. The development of physics from classical to relativistic physics and quantum theory reflects nature more fully and deeply, without exhausting it. This progress of physical knowledge, which cannot be imagined without ever newer changes of nature by the person cognising it does not, by any means, resemble a one-sided increase in the role of the subjective in science to the detriment of its objective content.

p The objective and the subjective thus cannot be opposed and separated from each other in the course of knowing nature, although Heisenberg, for instance, interprets the difference between them in classical physics as purely absolute, and in quantum physics as purely relative. The one-sidedness of the objective and the subjective is being overcome by the continuous development of scientific theories and science as a whole, which are more and more completely reflecting the material world. ’Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum total, in the tendency, in the source.’^^16^^ These ideas of Lenin are expressed with 382 surprising clarity in the development of physics—from classical theories to contemporary ones.

p The theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, which Lenin raised to the higher level corresponding to twentieth century science, makes it possible to eliminate idealist speculation from around modern physics and to map out proper ways of tackling its philosophical problems. Western scientists’ disregard of materialist dialectics when analysing these problems proves to be contrary to the science they represent and makes them supporters and adherents of reactionary philosophy and religion. In this sense Heisenberg’s last publications are typical: they contain statements that if it is difficult to find a place for religion in the system of concepts of classical science (according to him, it followed the materialist path), the situation is quite different in modern physics. This happened, he said, in connection with ’an emancipation of our thinking, namely that we have learned from the development of physics in recent decades how problematic the concepts ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are.’^^17^^ He also stated that ’it is difficult for Soviet philosophy to come to terms with the theory of relativity and quantum theory’.^^18^^

p There is no need here for a polemic against Heisenberg on these issues. The development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and modern physics has adequately refuted him and other voluntary or involuntary opponents of dialectical materialism. The philosophy of dialectical materialism is the only true philosophy of modern physics and of all contemporary science. This has been demonstrated concretely by the development of science in the twentieth century. Today the struggle between two major philosophical trends, two major parties in philosophy, materialism and idealism, has become particularly bitter in the philosophical problematics of modern physics and science as a whole. Modern materialism, in other words, dialectical materialism, gains ever new victories in twentieth century science. Science’s ideological source of strength in the USSR and other socialist countries consists in its having valued and assimilated the very great and valuable tradition of its great teachers, Marx, Engels, and Lenin: to be party- committed in philosophy from beginning to end, to support the line of materialism consistently and fully against all types of idealist obscurantism and reactionary ideology.

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p The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, in his vivid, profound speech at the ceremonial session in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 7 October 1975, devoted to the 250th anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said remarkably about the Party commitment of Soviet science: ’I would like to dwell especially on one most important question, the Party commitment of our science. Whatever discipline the Soviet scientists work in, they are always characterised by a typical feature: their high communist consciousness and their Soviet patriotism. The Soviet scientist (if, certainly, it is a truly Soviet scientist) bases his whole scientific activity on the scientific ideology of Marxism-Leninism, is an active champion of communism, fights any reactionary and obscurantist forces. Our scientists subject all their practical activity to the task of realisation of the noble communist ideals.’^^19^^

p REFERENCES

p  ^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. Materialism and Empiric-criticism. Collected Works, Vol. 14 (Progress Publishers, Moscow), p 246.

p  ^^2^^ Hans Reichenbach. The Direction of Time (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956), p 218.

p  ^^3^^ See V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 38, p 195.

p * Max Born. Werner Heisenberg und die Physik unserer Zeit (Vieweg &Sohn, Brunswick, 1961), p 106.

p ? See Albert Einstein. Geometrie und Erfahrung (Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1921), pp 6, 7.

p  ^^6^^ Niels Bohr. Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics. In: P. A. Schilpp (Ed.). Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (Tudor Publishing Co., New York, 1951), p 209.

p  ^^7^^ W. Heisenberg. Development of Concepts in Twentieth Century Physics. Cited in Russian in: Voprosy filosofii, 1975, L

p  ^^8^^ See, for example, the books in the series Dialekticheskii materializm i sovremennoe estestvoznanie (Dialectical Materialism and Modern Science) (Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1962-73). They have a rich bibliography.

p  ^^9^^ See also M. E. Omelyanovsky. Experimental Observation, Theory, and Dialectics in Physics. Voprosy filosofii, 1976, 10.

p  ^^10^^ Among V. A. Fock’s numerous publications on this theme, see his paper on the principle of relativity with respect to the means of observation in modern physics in Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1971, 4.

p  ^^11^^ Niels Bohr. Wirkungsquantum und Naturbeschreibung. Die Naturwissenschafter, 1929, 17, 26: 485.

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p ^la Imre Lakatos. Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In: Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (CUP, Cambridge, 1970), p 104.

p  ^^13^^ Ib id.

p  ^^14^^ Werner Heisenberg. Physik und Philosophic (Hirzel Verlag, Stuttgart, 1959), p 40.

p  ^^1^^? V. I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Collected Works,

p Vol. 14, p 142.  ^^16^^ V. I. Lenin. Philosophical Notebooks. Collected Works, Vol. 38,

p p 208. " Werner Heisenberg. Der Teil und das Ganze (Piper & Co., Munich,

p 1969), p 124.

p  ^^18^^ Werner Heisenberg. Naturwissenschaftliche und religiose Wahrheit. Physikalische Blatter, 1973, 29, 8: 346.

 ^^19^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom (Following Lenin’s Course) (Vol. 5, Politizdat, Moscow, 1976), p 364.