a) The Concept of Cause and Effect

p In contrast to mechanistic materialists, who looked for the cause of changes in a phenomenon outside of it. in another phenomenon, dialectical materialists believe that the cause of any change and development in a phenomenon lies primarily within the phenomenon itself, being the interaction of its aspects or elements. Engels wrote that “reciprocal action is the true causa finalis of things".  [199•2 

p For example, the cause of the emergence, existence and development of a state is the interaction (struggle) of antagonistic classes, whereas the cause of a social revolution is the interaction of advanced productive forces and backward 200 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1978/MLP519/20070711/299.tx" relations of production. The cause of metal corrosion is the chemical interaction of metals with gases in the atmosphere and water and with substances dissolved in it.

Thus, cause is the interaction ot phenomena or the aspects ot one and the same phenomenon underlying corresponding changes. Effect is the changes occurring in phenomena or the aspects ot a phenomenon as a result ot their interaction.

b) A Critique of Idealist and Metaphysical Views
of Causality

p The notion of cause appeared during the initial stages of the development of philosophy. The views of the ancient philosophers were, however, vague and uncertain. They did not distinguish between cause and the first principle, matter constituting the basis of existing things and phenomena. Thus, for instance, ancient Greek philosophers first believed water (Thales), then air (Anaximenes) and fire (Heraclitus) to be cause. Later, however, cause was thought to be eternal, immutable atoms with a different form, position and order which produced different bodies upon collision. Still later, all factors underlying the emergence of separate things were considered to be cause. Plato listed them as formless matter, a definite idea, a mathematical relation, and the idea of “supreme good" which he believed to be a motive force. Aristotle saw four reasons (causes) behind the emergence of things: material, productive, formal, and purposive.

p Aristotle’s understanding of causality was not developed upon for a long time. Medieval philosophy did not add anything to Aristotle’s definition of these categories. Using his ideas of formal and purposive causes, medieval philosophy was preoccupied in substantiating the existence of God and his creation of the sensuous world.

p Bacon made one step forward in studying causality. Although he recognised Aristotle’s four causes, he thought one cause to be decisive-the formal cause which, he believed, was inside a thing, rather than outside it, as Aristotle had maintained. This cause was the law governing the existence of things.

p In contrast to Bacon, Hobbes rejected formal and purposive causes and recognised only two causes in reality-productive (acting) and material. The productive cause, he held, was the totality of the properties of an active body causing corresponding changes in a passive body, while the material cause was the totality of the properties of a passive body. Defining cause, Bacon emphasised that it belonged to the realm of the internal, to the nature of a thing, whereas Hobbes placed cause within the context of the external and connected it with accidents-fickle and inessential properties. He reduced it, in fact, to the action of one body upon another.

p Spinoza understood the limitations of this view of causality and attempted to go further. He considered it necessary to look for the causes of the existence and development of things within the things themselves, which prompted him to 202 advance the concept causa sui (the cause of itself). True, Spinoza believed that only the world as a whole, infinite and absolute nature could contain the cause of its existence in itself. As to finite things, the causes of their existence lay not inside but outside them in other finite things.

p The idea that nature contained the cause of its existence in itself and had no need of any external force lying beyond it, was rather progressive and played a substantial role in fighting against idealism and religion. It was, however, inadequate for overcoming the metaphysical concept of causality, which reduced the cause-and-effect connection to the action of one body on another. So it was not by chance that Spinoza’s causa sui did not change the concept of cause that existed at the time. Natural scientists and philosophers alike continued to believe cause to be the action of some external force on a particular thing. Newton, the 18th-century French materialist, and some other thinkers adhered to this definition of cause.

p Reducing the cause of the existence and development of a thing to the action of another thing engenders a number of difficulties in knowledge. Indeed, to cognise a thing means to cognise its cause. If, however, the cause of the given thing is concealed in another thing, in order to cognise the former we have to cognise the latter. But cognising this second thing presupposes revealing its cause, which is hidden in a third thing. It follows that we have first to cognise the third thing. But the same will happen again in this case, too. 203 Thus, cognising any given thing on the basis of the above definition of cause will inevitably lead us to infinity and we shall have to cognise an infinite multitude of other things, which is, of course, impossible. Spinoza understood this, and concluded that single things could not be adequately cognised.

p True, the 18th-century philosophers and natural scientists who advanced this metaphysical principle of causality did not notice its inherent contradiction. Guided by this method, they had no doubt that it was possible to cognise the thing under study. Moreover, they thought it to be adequate for obtaining an exhaustive knowledge of the Universe, for explaining any phenomenon that had taken place in the past, and for forecasting any event in the future. The level of development physics had reached at that time allowed scientists to calculate the body’s coordinates and velocity at any moment of time in the future on the basis of the known force acting upon it, its coordinates and the velocity of its motion at a given moment in time. Though this understanding of the cause-and-effect connection is more or less acceptable for explaining a simple mechanical movement, where changes in the state of an isolated system are not connected with changes in its quality, it is absolutely unacceptable for explaining other, more complex forms of motion, the emergence of which is connected with certain qualitative factors caused not so much by the action of external forces, as by the inner interactions in an object.

p Hegel was the first to see the limitations and contradictory nature of the metaphysical view of causality. Showing that the metaphysical approach to the cause-and-effect connection of phenomena inevitably leads to bad infinity (i.e. a mechanical repetition of one and the same properties without any progress in their development), Hegel rejected the above concept of causality and offered a new solution. In his opinion, cause and effect were in dialectical interaction. A cause, being an active substance, acts upon a passive substance, thus giving rise to changes in it, which makes it the effect. The latter, however, exerts a known counteraction and thus turns from the passive substance into an active one which begins to act as a cause in relation to the first substance.

p Thus, owing to their interaction, cause and effect turn into each other, exchange places and act in relation to each other as cause and effect simultaneously. By taking the interaction of cause and effect as his point of departure, Hegel was one of the first to discover their dialectical interconnection.

p Some bourgeois philosophers and scientists still hold a mechanistic view of causality, which explains their mistakes. There are modern physicists who attempt to explain certain phenomena in the behaviour of “elementary” particles on the basis of this view. As a result, they arrive at the conclusion that the principle of causality cannot be applied to phenomena occurring in the microworld. This view is shared, for instance, by 205 the US physicist Percy W. Bridgman. The law of cause and effect, he says, does not operate in the realm of elementary particles. Such assertions are based on the fact that, in quantum mechanics, it is impossible to simultaneously determine both the position and the velocity of a microparticle and to predict its behaviour. But the possibility of an unambiguous prediction of an object’s behaviour and the principle of causality are not one and the same thing. The content of the principle of causality is recognition of the fact that cause underlies every phenomenon. Prediction of the behaviour of an object, on the other hand, is the result of knowledge of the cause-and-effect connection, of a sufficiently exact fixation of the initial state of the object and the nature of its interaction with the environment. Quantum mechanics, however, does not produce either the first or the second result at the present stage of its development. For this reason it expresses causality in the microworld in the form of probability.

This does not imply, however, that there is no causality in the microworld at all. It is there, although it manifests itself in a form different from that of mechanical motion. Causality manifests itself in different ways depending on the field of reality. For living matter, for instance, one form is characteristic, for society’s life-another, for cognitive activity-yet another. The mechanistic view of causality does not take account of this multitude of forms and deals with only one- mechanical. It is, therefore, unsuitable for expressing the causality of phenomena in other forms of motion.

c) The Interconnection Between Cause and Effect

p As distinct from metaphysical materialism, which rejects the interpassage of cause and effect, dialectical materialism holds that they can change places. That which at one time and in one relation is a cause, is an effect at another time and in another relation, and vice versa. The struggle between antagonistic classes, for example, is the cause of the emergence of a state. Once established, however, the state itself begins to exert an influence on the class struggle. It defends some classes and suppresses others, thereby causing changes in this struggle. The state now acts as a cause in relation to these changes, while the latter act as an effect in relation to the state.

p Different causes may underlie one and the same effect. For example, a higher productivity of labour may be caused by improved means of labour, higher skills of workers, a better organisation of labour, and so on.

p As a rule, joint action by a plurality of causes, instead of one, is behind every effect. This is because no interaction is isolated from other interactions-it is intrinsically connected with them, affects and is affected by them. As a result, the emergence of a phenomenon is affected not by one but by a plurality of interactions. It is the effect of a multitude of different causes.

p Although every phenomenon is engendered by several causes, their roles differ. Some causes are necessary, and the phenomenon cannot come about without them, while others, though they are 207 involved in the phenomenon’s appearance, are not so important-the effect would come about even in their absence.

p Those causes without which the effect cannot materialise are called basic, whereas those whose absence does not exclude the appearance of the effect are called non-basic.

p For example, the basic cause of the economic crises inherent in capitalist society is the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private form of appropriation. An economic crisis cannot develop without this cause. On the other hand, non-basic causes may include phenomena, such as currency devaluation, the bankruptcy of a certain enterprise or a bank, or a lower demand for a certain category of goods. An economic crisis may develop without any of these phenomena.

p Besides basic and non-basic causes, there are internal and external ones. The interaction of the aspects of one and the same object causing certain changes is called an internal cause. The interaction of different objects underlying corresponding changes in them is called an external cause. The interaction of people in producing material goods, for instance, is the internal cause of the development of production, whereas the impact of the geographical environment on production is its external cause.

Internal causes are decisive for the emergence and development of a material entity. External causes affect its development only through internal causes.