p According to the theory of dialectical materialism, material entities (things, objects) are universally interconnected and interdependent. They constantly interact with one another, interpenetrate and, under certain conditions, pass into one another. For this reason theconcepts through which man cognises the surrounding world must be interconnected in a law-governed way. They iTiusl t5e^ flexible to the point where they can ’change into one another. Without this they cannot reflecl rtiaTity. This is wny we must study 178 categories not separately, not alongside one another, but in their natural interconnection and interdependence, as the necessary links of one logical system in which each category has its own definite place.

p The problem of categories was thoroughly studied by Hegel. As distinct from his predecessors, Hegel put categories on an historical footing, presented them in motion and development, in their dialectical interconnection and interdependence. True, Hegel did this within the confines of idealism, applying his theory to the development of pure thought, the Absolute Idea, that existed somewhere outside and independently of man and the material world. The fallacy of the point of departure in developing the system of categories inevitably influenced the result. Hegel’s idealistic approach to categories gave rise to a multitude of artificial constructions that distorted reality. Even so, Hegel succeeded in developing a system of categories reproducing quite a number of deep universal laws and connections and the essence of dialectics.

p It was Marxist philosophy, however, that supplied a consistently materialist and scientific solution to the problem of the interconnection of categories. Marx thoroughly developed it for political economy in his Capital and Lenin applied it to philosophy in his Philosophical Notebooks.

p Lenin viewed categories as the universal forms for reflecting reality and stages in the development of social knowledge and practice. He deduced 179 their interconnection from the laws governing being and knowledge and considered that their relationship reflected the relationship of the universal aspects and connections of reality, expressing thereby the necessary development of knowledge from lower to higher stages.

p The appearance of every new category is conditioned by development of knowledge. It emerges because knowledge penetrates ever deeper into the world of phenomena, thus exposing new universal aspects and connections which no longer correspond to existing categories and require new categories in which to be expressed and recorded. Once it has emerged, a new category enters into necessary relations or connections with existing categories, and thus takes its specific place in the totality of knowledge, the place provided by the continuous course of cognition. If categories are arranged in sequence of emergence in the process of the development of knowledge and social practice, we can determine their necessary interrelationship and interconnection.

p Let us briefly consider the sequence by which man comprehended the universal aspects and connections of his environment, and also the passage of cognition from one category to another.

p In contrast to animals, man begins to distinguish himself from his environment and to comprehend his specific being, which differs from that of the outside world. Having comprehended his being and the being of the outside world, man also comprehends his separateness, his certain isolation, just like the separateness and isolation of 180 the objects of the outside world. People developed the concept separate (a separate object, phenomenon or thing) to express this separateness of being.

p Alongside comprehension of his isolation and certain degree of independence, man becomes aware of his connection with the outside world and the interconnection of objects in his environment. As a living creature, man needs food, drink, shelter, means of defence, and so on. The satisfaction of these and other needs presupposes man’s intrinsic connection with the outside world and the use of certain natural objects.

p The interconnection of objects, however, presupposes their interaction and, consequently, a certain change in them, i.e. motion. Since interconnection is inherently tied up with motion, man, having comprehended the interconnection of objects, had to comprehend that these objects change, i.e. they are in motion.

p As cognition passed from the separate to the interconnection, interaction and motion of separate objects and bodies, man comprehended other universal aspects and connections of reality, specifically the individual and the general.

p Man perceived each separate object he encountered for the first time in his practical activities as the only one of its kind, as something he had not seen before, i.e. the individual. As he discovered other objects that satisfied his particular need, he passed over (both practically and mentally) from one (single) object to several objects, to “the many”. Comparison of these many objects 181 with one another, both practically and mentally, revealed their identity (similarity) which underlay the formation of general notions and then general concepts.

p Quality and quantity are cognised at the same stage. When man perceives a separate object as the single and the only one of its kind, and seeks to comprehend what it is like, he reflects it from the point of view of quality. Inasmuch as the object in this case is considered as such, in itself, irrespective of other objects, its quantitative characteristic is indiscernible and, in fact, merges with quality. However, as cognition passes from one object to many and as their identity ( similarity) and differences are established by comparison, the quantitative aspect begins to emerge. Each property of an object bifurcates, as it were, i.e. alongside what it really is, it reveals its magnitude, the extent to which it manifests itself and spreads-in short, it reveals its quantity.

p The qualitative and quantitative characteristics thus revealed do not at first show their interdependence. They seem to be neutral with respect to each other. As the knowledge of various phenomena becomes deeper, however, people learn that separate qualitative aspects are interconnected, just like separate quantitative characteristics. Simultaneously, they reveal an intrinsic connection fop‘f’wppn nullify Bnd nnfltitity They notice that a strictly definite quality corresponds to a definite quantity, and vice versa.

p The knowledge of interconnection between the categories of quality and quantity enables people 182 to comprehend that changes in one phenomenon cause certain changes in another. That which engenders something else and underlies its emergence is a cause; that which is engendered and emerges is an effect. People’s cognition of the interconnection between separate qualitative and quantitative aspects thus brings them to the revelation of causality and also to the need for forming the categories of cause and effect.

p People find that cause and effect are so connected that the appearance of a cause inevitably leads to the appearance of an effect, while the absence of a cause results in the absence of an effect. To put it differently, people discover that the connection between a cause and its effect is of a necessary nature. Necessity is taken first as a property of the cause-and-effect connection. As knowledge develops, however, the content of the concept of necessity becomes more specific and extensive. People begin to consider as necessary not only causal connections, but also any connections inevitably occurring under certain conditions, and not only connections, but also aspects and properties that are necessarily inherent in the material entity being studied.

p Necessary connections discovered in the course of the development of knowledge are often formed in science as laws, i.e. they are comprehended through the category of law, which expresses and reflects general, stable and necessary connections and relations.

p The transition to the categories of content and form proceeds in parallel with the development 183 of knowledge from causality to necessity and law. This is because cognition does not confine itself to exposing one separate cause-and-effect connection. Practice which calls for ever deeper and more complete knowledge of the objects of the outside world, causes cognition to proceed from one cause-and-effect connection to another and from explanation of one property of the material entity to another. This necessitates a new category, namely that of content, which constitutes the totality of all interactions and consequent changes in the given material entity. But by cognising interactions and consequent changes in a material entity, we realise and gradually reproduce in our minds first the external, and then the internal ways of combining the elements of content, a relatively stable structure within which all the interactions and changes inherent in the material entity take place, i.e. form.

p The separation of the necessary and the accidental during the development of knowledge and the discovery of separate laws that manifest themselves in the whole under study, do not constitute adequate knowledge, for they relate to separate aspects and connections. However many aspects and connections of the object under study have been cognised and explained, their sum total cannot supply us with a truly complete knowledge of it, because it is merely a mechanical sum of separate aspects. A material entity, however, is not simply a sum total of its inherent properties, but rather their integral whole, their dialectical unity. This makes it necessary to unite connections in 184 one integral whole and to deduce them from one principle.

p The reproduction of all the necessary aspects and laws of the whole under study in their natural interconnection and interdependence constitutes the knowledge of essence.

p The comprehension of essence begins from finding the basis-the basic (most essential) aspects and relations. These underlie the formation, functioning and direction of the changes and development of all other aspects of a particular material entity. For this reason, taking them as a point of departure, we can gradually reproduce in our minds the interconnection existing between its other aspects, too, and find out the place, role and importance of each.

p True, in order to achieve this the basic aspects (relations) and the material entity itself must be studied as they emerge and develop. This, in its turn, makes it necessary to find the source of development, the motive force driving the material entity forward and underlying its transition from one stage of development to another. This source of development is contradiction, the unity and “struggle” of opposite aspects and trends.

p Having revealed the contradictions inherent in the basis and traced their development and the consequent change in the other aspects of the whole under study, we inevitably note that development is effected through the negation of certain qualitative states by others, the retention of all the positive in the negated states, and the 185 repetition of past experience on a new, higher basis.

p Thus, the essence of phenomena is rngnised through discovering their basis, revealing its contradictory aspects, tracing their struggle and the consequent development of the given phenomenon through the negation of one qualitative characteristic by another.

The above pattern in the development of knowledge from one category to another can be traced in the development of science. Inasmuch as categories are necessary stages in the development of social cognition, the transition from one category to another is inevitably observed in any field of knowledge.