138
3. The Dialectical Way of Knowledge
 

[introduction.]

Basing itself on practice, cognition is constantly moving from live contemplation to abstract thinking, and from there back to practice, as a criterion for the truth of the knowledge obtained.  [138•1 

a) Live Contemplation

p Live contemplation is a sensuous reflection of reality. It is effected through a direct perception by man’s sense organs of the things and phenomena of the outside world. As distinct from passive contemplation, live contemplation presupposes active action on the object or knowledge, its purposetui transformation during this process.

p Live contemplation is connected with sensation and perception as forms of the reflection of reality.

p Sensation is a visual image ot an object directly acting upon the sense organs. The action of an object on a sense organ irritates some nerve cells, this irritation being transmitted through centripetal 139 nerves to the cortex, some area of which is excited by it. The resultant centre of excitation underlies the realisation of the above action and the reflec; tion of a certain property of the acting obiect as^ a corresponding image-colour, smell, sound, taste, shape, softness, hardness, and so on. Sensation is thus “a result of the action of matter on our senseorgans".  [139•1  It is “a transformation of the energy of external excitation into the fact of consciousness".  [139•2 

p A sensation reflects only particular aspects or properties of an object, rather than the object as a whole. Since an object usually acts on the senseorgans through its many aspects, several different and inherently interconnected sensations emerge, rather than a single one, and add up to a more or less integral image of the acting object. This integral image is perception. So, perception is an integral image that is formed in the human brain as a result ot the action ot an object on our senseorgans.

p As soon as an object ceases to act, perception disappears. The nerve connections underlying the perception do not disappear, however, and last for a certain time. As a result, .later on man can reproduce in his consciousness the imaae of the object that acted on his sense-organs in the past. Tfo’s image is called notion or representation.

p Notion is not so rich and clear in content as perception-it reproduces only some of the 140 properties inherent in the object that acted on the sense-organs. Nevertheless, it has some advantages over perception. The latter is always tied up with a particular object, it limits the cognitive activities of consciousness to the narrow confines of a given concrete case. In contrast, notion does not entail such a direct connection with the object; it makes it possible to cognise the latter in its absence, expanding thereby the scope of the cognitive activities of consciousness. Moreover, being the image of a concrete object or phenomenon, perception is always individual, single. jSIotion, on the other hand, rnav alsn hp gpnpraL It may retain only what is repeated in a number of similar objects or phenomena. For example, besides the notion of a specific tree or man, we may have the notion of tree or man in general. Thus, as distinct from perception which binds consciousness to the single, the individual, notion breaks these narrow confines and allows consciousness to single out the general and use it in the relevant thinking processes.

p The reflection of reality through notions extends beyond live contemplation confined to sensations and perceptions. The reflection of objective reality through sensations, perceptions and notions is known as sense knowledge. Live contemplation is not, therpforp, identical to, but narrower than, sense knowledge.

Having discussed the mam forms of sense knowledge we can define its specific features, the main one being that it links us directly to the outside world, Sensations and perceptions are the 141 result of a direct action by the objects of the outside world on the sense-organs. Besides, sense knowledge is visual, the surrounding world being reflected through visual images. Lastly, sense knowledge reflects only what is on the surface of phenomena, only the outward aspects of objects, which are, as a rule, changeable and fortuitous. Man, however, is interested in the stable and necessary aspects and connections and in the laws governing the action and development of material entities, for his practical activity is based on that which is inevitably repeated under relevant conditions and is necessary. These laws and that which is necessary are, however, concealed from direct perception, making up the inner content of phenomena. All this points to the inadequacy of sense knowledge and to the necessity of advancing to some new, more perfect forms, capable of reflecting the internal, the necessary, the laws manifesting themselves in the surrounding world. The forms of abstract thinking are such new forms of cognising objective reality.

b) Abstract Thinking

p Before discussing the specific features of abstract thinking, we should define thinking in general and show what it is as a special social phenomenon.

p Thinking is the isolation in consciousness ot certain aspects or properties of the object under study, and their combination in specific groups in order to obtain new knowledge.

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p The solution of any mathematical problem may serve as an elementary example of thinking activity. Let us assume that we have to find out the number of pairs of shoes to be produced in a country in the next year, given a population of 200 million and the fact that every person wears out three pairs of shoes annually. Besides, the average annual population growth is 15 per thousand. When solving this problem, we single out certain thoughts, place them within the relevant system of connections (relations) and obtain new knowledge. Thus, we focus our attention on the total number of people living in the country (200 million), then on the annual growth rate. By connecting these two factors, we figure out the number of people that would live in the country in the following year (203 million). We tie up this new knowledge with the known annual per capita requirement of footwear and obtain a figure indicating the total footwear requirement for the entire population in the coming year. Thus, by isolating separate thoughts and tying them up in relevant combinations to obtain the knowledge we lack, we are thinking, and in the process we solve the problem.

p Thinking emerged together with consciousness on the basis of man’s labour activity. It was visual, and even obiect-oriented, in the initial stages in _the development of the humq m™ Tn effecting certain thinking operations, the people of that time isolated and combined into new groups visual images, such as sensations, perceptions, notions that emerged in the course of the practical 143 transformation of the surrounding world, as well as the objects and phenomena encountered in everyday life. Later on, as production developed, man began to abstract from the sensuous, concrete and visual, and to isolate the general from the individual. On this basis he developpdr fjrst- gpnpral notions, and then concepts—the ideal non-visual images reflecting the general, essential properties and connections of the objects and phenomena of the surrounding world.

p The emergence of concepts gave rise to abstract thinking. The latter is the isolation and combination of concepts in order to obtain new knowledge.

p Concepj_is a qualitatively new form of the reflection of reality, differing markedly from the forms of sense knowledge discussed above. As distinct from the latter, concept is devoid of visuality. It is impossible to visualise, for instance, a chemical element, valency, patriot;cm p.Qurage, democracy, etc. All these ideal images are thoughts expressing the understanding of a particular phenomenon. Moreover, sense images-sensation, perception, notion-reflect the external properties and connections of the objects and phenomena of the surrounding world, whereas concepts reflect the inner, essential properties inherent in them.

p Concepts interact with each other in the thinking process and make up other forms of the reflection of reality, such as judgements and inferences.

p Judgement is the simplest form of thinking. It reflects, through a definite interconnection 144 between concepts or notions, the presence or absence of connections between objects and their properties. The following thoughts, for instance, are judgements: “man is a social being”, “capitalism begets unemployment”, “the proletariat in capitalist society is not the owner of the means of production”. The first thought states that man and society are interconnected; the second states the connection between capitalism and unemployment; the third thought states that there is no connection between the proletariat and the ownership of the means of production in capitalist society.

p Inference is a form of thinking representing a connection between judgements and engendering a new judgement that contains a new thought. The following reasoning may serve as an example of inference: “All the citizens of the Soviet Union enjoy the right to work and rest. Ivanov is a citizen of the Soviet Union. Ivanov enjoys the right to work and rest”. The first two judgements are connected in such a way that a new judgement, containing a new thought, may be inferred.

p By combining relevant concepts into judgements, and these into inferences, man is thinking, thus reproducing in his consciousness the necessary aspects and connections of reality and the essence of the object under study through a system of ideal images. The ability to penetrate the essence of a certain field of reality under study and the isolation of its inherent aspects and connections is a major feature of abstract thinking, distinguishing it from sense knowledge.

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Another specific feature is the indirectness of reflection. Abstract thinking involves concepts, judgements and inferences, and is not directly linked with the object under study. It deals with sense data about this object, obtained at the sense stage of cognition. It is these data that serve as a mediating link separating abstract thinking from reality and at the same time connecting them.

c) The Interconnection
Between Sense and Rational Knowledge

p Man cognises the surrounding world by way of live contemplation and abstract thinking, but what is the role played by each of these ways? Sensualists believed that sense experience was most important in cognition. Abstract thinking, they maintained, is subsidiary, adding virtually nothing to the knowledge obtained in the process of sense cognition. In their view, the human mind does not contain anything new to add to sense data. Rationalists (from the Latin raifo-reason) held the opposite view. They believed that abstract thinking, reason, rather than the senses were paramount. The senses, they said, distort reality, mislead us, therefore they should not be relied upon in the process of cognising the truth. Reason is the only unbiased judge and the sole way of cognising the truth.

p But what is a true answer to this problem? Which of the two ways of cognition is decisive? Neither sense knowledge, nor abstract thinking, if 146 taken separately, are capable of ensuring cognition of the essence of an object. Sense knowledge is confined to noting that which lies on the surface of phenomena, but is unable to fathom their essence. Abstract thinking, on the other hand, can penetrate the essence of phenomena, but it does not possess the data about the object necessary for reproducing its essence in the mind. These data are provided by sense knowledge. It is obvious, therefore, that sense knowledge and abstract thinking should not be counterposed. The essence of phenomena can be cognised only by their joint efforts.

p The interconnection between the sensuous and the rational in knowledge is expressed not only in jhat they supplement and presuppose one another, but also in that they interpenetrate one anotEer. Live contemplation involves thinking activity in the process of which concrete visual images, notions in particular, are being used.

p By perceiving certain properties of the object under study, man brings them within the scope of his concepts and thus becomes aware of them. But to bring a particular case within the range of a general concept and, on this basis, draw a conclusion that contains new knowledge concerning the object of thought, is merely to make a deduction, which is a form of thought. Moreover, by making a point of the object’s properties thus revealed, man compares it with other objects known to him and establishes the extent to which it is similar to or different from them. This process also takes the form of inference.

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p Thus sense knowledge that reflects the object under study through sensations, perceptions and notions, is intrinsically tied up with thinking, including it as one of its necessary aspects.

p Abstract thinking is not absolutely free of visual images either. Although it deals with abstract concepts, it must keep within its range the concrete object whose essence it has to reveal and express in a system of abstract concepts.

To sum up, sense knowledge and abstract thinking are intrinsically interconnected and interdependent, penetrating and changing into one another as they function and develop.

d) Empirical and Theoretical Knowledge

p When the process of cognition is viewed as the inter-penetration of the sensuous and the rational, of live contemplation and abstract thinking, the necessity arises for distinguishing between empirical and theoretical levels of knowledge.

p Empirical knowledge deals with phenomena, with that which lies on the surface of an object, i.e. with its external aspects and connections. The sensuous forms of reflecting reality-sensations, perceptions, notions-play a major role here. The concepts, judgements and inferences used at this level of knowledge are closely linked with sense data, their processing in the mind: fixation, analysis, grouping, and the establishment of the general and specific properties of the objects under study.

p Empirical knowledge describes the behaviour of the object under study, takes note of the 148 changes it undergoes, and makes general statements on the basis of the data thus obtained. True, these statements are of little value for science and practical experience, inasmuch as they merely state what is observed experimentally, being unable to explain why it happens and whether it necessarily happens under given conditions. The latter can be established only by theoretical knowledge.

p Although theoretical knowledge develops on the basis of empirical knowledge, it does not confine itself to the superficial study of phenomena but penetrates their nature, exposing the causes behind these phenomena. Basing itself on empirical data, it seeks to reveal the necessary aspects and connections of the object under study and the laws governing its functioning and development, thus providing an explanation for the phenomena observed. So the task facing theoretical knowledge is “to resolve the visible, merely external movement into the true intrinsic movement. ..".  [148•1 

Theoretical knowledge uses concepts, judgements and inferences to reproduce in the mind the essence oi the object under study through their interconnection.

e) Practice as the Criterion of Truth

p Different philosophers gave different solutions to the problem of a criterion of truth. Some declared clarity of thought to be such a criterion (Descartes), others-sensuousness, the direct 149 perception of a particular phenomenon (Feuerbach), yet others-universality (the Machist Bogdanov) or utility (Dewey). None of these factors, however, can break the confines of our subjective judgement, and they are therefore unable to distinguish between truth and falsity. Indeed, clarity of thought, for instance, shows that the subject understands a certain phenomenon, but it does not necessarily mean that the latter corresponds to reality. An erroneous view can also be clear. A direct perception of a particular phenomenon may also be erroneous, distorted. An object, for instance, seen at a great distance seems to be smaller than at close quarters. In reality, however, it is the same. Moreover, recognition of the truth of a certain proposition by many people does not exclude the possibility of it being false either, in so far as many people may be mistaken. Many people, for instance, believe in the existence of the devil, hell, and paradise. The use of utility or belief as a means of verifying truth will lead us to the same conclusions. A false statement may be useful for _certain people. .The idea, for instance, that the capitalist state expresses the interests of all classes is useful for the bourgeoisie. This, however, contradicts reality, inasmuch as the bourgeois state expresses the interests of the exploiting classes, the bourgeoisie in particular, and is spearheaded against the working people.

p How, then, is it possible to establish whether an Idea is true or talse? The truth of our knowledge must be established through practice. Practice alone can give a final answer to the question of 150 what is false and what is true. Marxists were the first to advance and develop the idea that practice is the criterion of truth. Marx wrote: “The question whether objective (gegenstandliclie) truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.”  [150•1 

Indeed, in order to establish the truth of an idea it is necessary to perform certain practical actions based on this idea. If the results are as expected, the idea is true, otherwise it is false. To establish, for instance, the truth of the statement that heat may be converted into mechanical motion, we build a steam engine which operates on the principle of conversion of thermal into mechanical energy. The operation of the engine shows that the above statement is true and corresponds to reality.

f) Objective Truth. The Interconnection
Between Absolute and Relative Truths

p Knowledge obtained in the process of empirical and theoretical cognition becomes true only after it has been confirmed in practice. But what is true knowledge? How does it differ from false knowledge?

p The knowledge that cnrresnpnds to reality and reflects it is true knowledge.

p True knowledge that^corresponds to reality “does not depend either on a human being or on 151 humanity...".  [151•1  People cannot arbitrarily, at their will, change the content of true propositions. The proposition, for instance, that electric energy may be converted into heat and mechanical motion, while the latter two may be converted into electricity, cannot be changed by people, because this proposition is true, and reflects reality.

p For this reason, objective truth may be defined as follows. Objective truth is the content of our knowledge, which reflects reality and therefore does not depend either on a human being or on humanity^

p  

p This definition does not imply, however, that truth cannot change at all, that it is external, as the metaphysicists maintained.

p Although people cannot change the content of truth at will, this content invariably undergoes changes in the process of the development of social knowledge and practice. These changes stem primarily from the fact that the process of cognition does not stand still-it is continuously developing on the basis of social experience. During this process people penetrate ever deeper into the surrounding world, discover ever new aspects and connections of it, thereby clarifying, supplementing and enriching their knowledge and making it correspond more fully to reality.

p In 1858 the German physicist Julius Plucker, for instance, passed electric current through a tube containing a rarefied gas and discovered so-called cathode rays. Some time later (1869), Johann 152 Hittorf established that these rays travelled in a straight line, deflected in a magnetic field, could be absorbed by solid bodies, etc. Still later (1879), the British physicist William Crookes put forward the idea that cathode rays were a flux of tiny particles detached from the cathode and travelling at immense speed. According to Crookes, these particles had a negative charge and were part of all atoms. John Thompson experimentally confirmed the idea advanced by Crookes (1897). The Irish physicist George Johnstone Stoney suggested that the particles be called electrons.

p The above example shows how gurjmowledge of the electron continuously chaqgpd

p more accurate and fuller in the process of the development of knowledge. This is a rather vivid demonstration that objective Iruth is relatmeTafid that its content depends on the level of ment of social knowledge and practice.

p Objective truth cannot remain yijr>iangp^ because the reality reflected by it does not stand still, but is changing and developing all the time. But if the object of reflection changes and passes from one qualitative state into another, if some of its properties and connections disappear and new ones emerge, our knowledge of this object cannot remain unchanged. In order to be true, this knowledge must necessarily change, it must be supplemented by new knowledge and brought in line with changed reality. Our knowledge of the Russian proletariat, for instance, could not remain unchanged after it had carried out a socialist revolution, established its dictatorship and built 153 socialism. To make it correspond to reality we have to supplement this knowledge by new data pertaining to the social position of the working class and its place and role in socialist society.

p Moreover, objective truth remains such only within certain limits and under definite conditions. Any extrapolation ot or changes in the specific conditions result in true knowledge turning into false. Thus, the proposition that socialist revolution mav be made victorious by peaceful means is not true always and for every country. It is only true for those countries where corresponding conditions have matured, such as: the proletariat has a real possibility to win over the majority of the population, win elections to the country’s legislative bodies, form its government, and begin the socialist transformation of social relations peacefully, provided the bourgeoisie does not put up an armed resistance. This indicates that truth is always concrete.

p To sum up, objective truth is relative; it necessarily changes along with the development of. social knowledge and changes in reflected reality and the conditions of its existence.

p The fact that truth is noFpermanent or external and that it necessarily changes, depending on the level of development of social knowledge, does not, however, exclude its objectivity and independence of a human being and humanity. On the contrary, the changeability of truth is a condition. for ensuring its objectivity, inasmuch as it contritmtes to making our knowledge conform more to reality’

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p The development of our knowledge of thermal radiation is a good example, showing how changes in the truth contribute to greater objectivity. In ancient times people noticed that a flame emits heat rays. At first they thought that thermal radiation was connected with the process of burning alone. Later, however, it was also discovered in incandescent bodies, and still later (the end of the 17th century) it was found in heated bodies. In the 18th century, some scientists (Pierre Prevost, for instance, in 1791) came to the conclusion that thermal radiation is a characteristic feature of all bodies, irrespective of their temperature. It was also established (by Johann H. Lambert in 1779) that heat rays travel and are reflected in the same way as light rays, and that the amount of heat rays emitted by a body is proportional to the increase in its temperature (John Leslie). It was further observed that bodies radiating heat extensively, also absorb it to a greater extent, and vice versa. Lastly, Herschel established in 1800 that heat is distributed unevenly in the different parts of the spectrum-the heat effect is especially pronounced in the part that corresponds to the red colour and diminishes towards the violet colour. This shows that OUr knowledge of he^ r^iafl™ Miangpd as social cognition developed. But this, of course, did riot make it less objective, nor did it refute the truth of the belief shared by the ancients that a tlame emits heat rays. Changes in ourJsnowl edge of thermal radiation made it increasingly true, an increasingly objectiveretlection of real:

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p Lastly, if our knowledge is always relative and invariably changes during the development of social cognition and practice, does this not prove that absolute truth does not and cannot exist? Relativists draw exactly this conclusion. Dialectical materialists, however, do not believe that the relativity of our knowledge indicates that absolute truth is non-existent. In the relative they see an element of the absolute. According to dialectical materialism, objective truth is relative and absolute simultaneously. Inasmuch as it correctly rellects the particular aspects and connections of reality, it is absolute; inasmuch, however, as this reflection is always incomplete and does not and cannot embrace the whole content of an object (which is inexhaustible), it is relative.

p Thus, although our knowledge is always relative, this does not mean that it is not nhjprHvp apH absolute. The existence of absolute truth is necessarily connected with the objectivity of our knowledge. “To acknowledge objective truth,” Lenin wrote, “i.e. truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.”  [155•1 

p

Absolute truth exists through relative truths, through the aspects of relative truth tW i-pfWt reality^ As cognition and social practice develop, the number of these aspects increases. At the same time Absolute truth, being a continuously growing sum of relative truths, is becoming ever fuller,. But it can never be complete, because the world is 156 infinite in its diversity and therefore i The chain making up absolute truth will be supplemented with new links of relative truths, which will bring us closer to an increasingly full (and in this sense absolute) reflection of reality, but without making it possible to exhaust it.

* * *
 

Notes

[138•1]   See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, pp. 170-172,

 [139•1]   See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 57.

 [139•2]   [bid., p. 51,

 [148•1]   K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, p. 313.

 [150•1]   K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 13.

[151•1]   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 122.

 [155•1]   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 133.