Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1978/MASW225/20070906/099.tx" Emacs-Time-stamp: "2010-01-21 11:00:54" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.09.06) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ [BEGIN] __TITLE__ MAN AND SEA WARFARE __TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-09-06T09:38:05-0700 __TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov" __SUBTITLE__ (The Training
of Soviet Navy
Personnel)

Progress Publishers,
Moscow 1978

[1]

Translated by Yuri Sviridov

Designed by Gennadi Saukov

BoHua. OxeaH. HejioneK

__COPYRIGHT__ © BoeHHsnai 1974r.
© MsnaienbCTBo ,,Ilporpecc" 1978r., c H3MCHCHHHMH
© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1978.
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

11203--370

B----------------105--78

014(01)-78

[2] CONTENTS Chapter I. Moral, Political and Psychological Training of Soviet Navy Personnel: Basic Goals and Techniques......... 5 1. The Significance and Substance of Moral, Political and Psychological Training................... 7 2. The Content of Moral, Political and Psychological Training....... 18 Chapter II. Ideological Work Among Navy Personnel ....................... 38 1. The Study of Marxism-Leninism by Naval Officers............. 39 2. Political Sessions............. 43 3. Party Education.............. 46 4. Agitation and Propaganda Work ... 49 5. Cultural and Educational Activities ...................... 59 Chapter III. The Moral, Political and Psychological Training of Naval Personnel on a Day-to-Day Basis................ 65 1. The Impact of Naval Service and Daily Life on Naval Personnel..... 65 2. The Moulding of Fine Moral, Political and Psychological Qualities Through Combat Training....... 79 3. The Sea Habit as an Important [3] Factor of the Moral and Psychological Training of Naval Personnel. . . 103 4. The Role of the Commander in Improving the Moral and Psychological Training of His Men...... Ill Chapter IV. Prolonged Cruises as the Best School for Moral, Political and Psychological Training of Naval Personnel......... 121 1. Pre-Cruise Training of Naval Personnel .................... 121 2. Party and Political Work During a Cruise.................... 130 3. Moral and Psychological Training of Naval Personnel and Increasing Combat Activity During a Prolonged Cruise............... 147 4. The Psychological and Physiological Potential of Naval Personnel and Ways of Improving It During a Prolonged Cruise............ 153 5. The Organisation of Leisure Activities for the Crew During a Prolonged Cruise............... 170 Chapter V. The Moral and Psychological Training of Soviet Navy Pilots, of the Marine Corps, the Personnel of Shore-Based Artillery and Missile Units, and the Personell of the Shore Establishment . . 179 1. Naval Aviation............... 179 2. The Marine Corps............. 190 3. The Shore-Based Missile and Artillery Forces................. 198 4. The Navy's Shore Establishment... 202 Chapter VI. The Moral and Political Aspects of Troop Control in a Combat Situation . . 207 [4] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter I __ALPHA_LVL1__ Moral, Political and Psychological Training
of Soviet Navy Personnel:
Basic Goals and Techniques

The implementation of the basic provisions of the CPSU's Peace Programme and the further strengthening of world socialism have combined to bring about positive changes in the international situation exemplified recently by the continuing relaxation of world tensions, as a result of which the danger of a world nuclear war has receded. This positive trend has been made possible by the changing balance of political forces in the world in favour of socialism due to the impressive economic performance of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community and their improved defence potentials. Their close unity and concerted efforts for peace have been contributing factors. At the same time many sober-minded politicians in the West are aware that modern weapons of mass destruction make war an extremely dangerous and potentially fatal political instrument.

However, aggressive forces are still at work in different parts of the world. These forces have been resisting the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and trying to set the clock back to the times of the cold war. Far from giving up their attempts to reverse the present-day positive trends in world development they are whipping up the arms race and blocking efforts to eliminate the existing hotbeds of international tension. Since the end of the Second World War the imperialists have unleashed more than thirty wars and military conflicts. The Peking leaders have in effect made common cause with the [5] imperialist reactionaries who are trying to wreck detente. To further their great-power ends the Peking leaders are doing their worst to sabotage detente, prevent disarmament, sow the seeds of distrust and enmity among nations and even to provoke a new world war, as Leonid Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th Congress of the CPSU. In this situation the Soviet Union's political and government leaders attach great importance to strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces, which are safeguarding the constructive efforts of the Soviet people in building communism and which form a reliable bulwark of world peace. The Soviet people have always been mindful of the great Lenin's behest to the effect that "the first precept of our policy, the first lesson ... which must be learned by all workers and peasants, is to be on the alert".^^1^^ Applied to the Soviet Armed Forces this means that they must constantly keep their fighting efficiency and combat preparedness at a high level. The work of Soviet commanders, political departments, Party and Komsomol organisations in the Armed Forces is geared to the achievement of this all-important goal. Their efforts are directed towards the all-round training of military personnel to ensure that they maintain a high level of combat preparedness and that they are able to act boldly and decisively, should an aggressor unleash a war. The ability and psychological readiness of military personnel to do their duty is directly contingent upon their ideological commitment, their awareness of their patriotic duty to defend their country as well as on their psychological and moral readiness for bold action in the complicated conditions of modern warfare. It is precisely in the most complex situations that the powerful moral fibre inculcated in every Soviet serviceman in the course of his ideological and political education should manifest itself. Therefore, the development and realisation of the concepts underlying the moral, political and psychological training of Armed Forces personnel _-_-_

~^^1^^ V.L Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 148.

6 represent a potent means of augmenting the fighting efficiency and combat preparedness of the Soviet Army and Navy.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Significance and Substance
of Moral, Political
and Psychological Training

By disclosing the laws governing social development, Marxism-Leninism has provided a seminal doctrine on war and the army and on the factors ensuring victory in a war. Among the basic components of these factors the human element, the role of the individual and of popular masses, their potentialities and qualities hold a special place.

In examining the crucial question of the relationship between material and moral factors in a country's defence capability and in winning a war, most bourgeois and revisionist ideologues keep these factors either separate or even in opposition to one another. They elevate either the former or the latter into an absolute. The very formula ``either---or'' upon which these ideologues base their arguments negates the existence of relationships, correlations and dialectics which results in one-sided assessments.

Marxism-Leninism rejects the counterposing of material and moral factors. At the same time it attributes great importance to the moral factor, to the conscious element, to man's creative endeavour holding that material and moral factors are interrelated and interdependent. As Leonid Brezhnev put it in his address to the graduates of military academies, "Soviet military science rejects with every justification the academic arguments put forward in some countries as to which is the more important in modern warfare: the weapons or the men behind them.'' He added: "...Success is secured by people equipped with up-to-date weaponry and using it with proficiency.''^^1^^ The late Marshal Grechko wrote _-_-_

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Vol.1, Moscow, 1970, pp. 254--55 (in Russian).

7 on that score in his The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, "Sometimes the military might of an army or navy is claimed to be a matter of their weapons and hardware. This view is unsound for the simple reason that weapons and equipment in themselves do not decide the success of combat action. It depends on the men who operate them. It is universally acknowledged that man remains the decisive force in war. Neither- a missile nor a combat aircraft nor a tank can inspire greater terror in the enemy than a soldier with high morale and consummate combat skill, who is capable of getting the most out of his weapons and equipment and able to hit the enemy where it hurts most and defeat him.

``Thus, apart from equipping the troops with weapons and hardware and improving them, the moral and political qualities of the troops and their level of combat preparedness and training are a crucial component of the might of his country's Armed Forces. The better these components the higher the fighting strength of the country's Army and Navy and the more reliable their combat efficiency and preparedness. Neither of these components can be weakened without prejudicing the military might. Only if these components are combined do they result in a strong amalgam which expresses the qualitative aspect of the Armed Forces and the defence potential of out Soviet state.''^^1^^

Clearly, the fighting efficiency of troops can only be augmented by improving simultaneously their fighting equipment and their morale. Special efforts have to be made to improve both the weapons and equipment of every army unit and warship and to enhance the moral and psychological condition of the personnel. Work in both directions should be conducted on a sound scientific basis employing the most effective methods and techniques.

_-_-_

~^^1^^ A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1977, pp. 225--26.

8

On the eve of the Russian revolution of 1905--1907 Lenin wrote that war puts the capabilities of the belligerents to an acid test. But, of course, it is the people, who epitomise the strength and weaknesses of a particular socio-economic system, that are subjected to the harshest test in wartime. How they stand up to the test decides the outcome of a war in the final analysis. War determines quickly and objectively just how well men are able to meet its challenge and inflicts merciless punishment on them should they be found wanting. The price people have paid for oversights and faults in the training of military personnel has always been blood, suffering, heavy losses, lost battles and even lost wars. It is also axiomatic that the more poweful the weapons in war, the harsher the privations and trials brought on by war and the higher the price a country has to pay for deficiencies and shortcomings in preparing its people for war. It is small wonder, therefore, that problems of military education and of strengthening the moral fibre of armed forces personnel have acquired special significance today. Underestimation of the importance of these factors may have disastrous consequences in wartime. Modern warfare makes far more exacting demands on military personnel than at any time before and it is far more difficult today to meet these exacting demands. Therefore troop training is to be conducted at a qualitatively new level both in terms of substance and methods employed. Thus, the need to constantly enhance the role of the moral and political factors in moulding the psychological make-up of military personnel and the associated need to intensify their moral and political education constitute two major demands on today's army and navy.

The transition of the world's advanced countries from capitalism to imperialism at the end of the 19th century exacerbated political antagonisms and rivalry among them. The expansionism of the imperialist powers and the advent of new weapons (mines, torpedoes, rapid-fire rifles, aircraft, etc.) forced countries to maintain large 9 standing armies and navies. Gone were the days when wars could be fought by mercenaries while the popular masses stood on the sidelines. As Lenin put it in his article "The Fall of Port Arthur" in 1905: "Wars today are fought by peoples.''^^1^^

The new military hardware called for better educated and better trained fighting men capable of getting the most out of its performance characteristics. The old system of keeping a tight rein on the soldiers and sailors proved inadequate under the new conditions. For, as Lenin put it, "success in modern warfare is impossible without intelligent soldiers and sailors who possess initiative".^^2^^

The further aggravation of political and class contradictions in the world brought about by the emergence of the first state of workers and peasants in human history, coupled with the progress of the international communist and workers' movement, exposed the political essence of war and conferred added importance on the political aspects of the moral factor. On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin wrote, "You cannot lead the people into a predatory war... and expect them to be enthusiastic.''^^3^^ In May 1920 he said, "The conviction that the war is in a just cause and the realisation that their lives must be laid down for the welfare of their brothers strengthen the morale of the fighting men and enable them to endure incredible hardships.... The realisation by the masses of the causes and aims of the war is of tremendous importance and ensures victory.''^^4^^

Recent wars have shown that the role of the political parameters of the moral condition of military personnel grows in proportion to the severity of class and political contradictions between the belligerents. The experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941--1945) and of other just _-_-_

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 8, p. 50.

^^2^^ Ibid., p. 51.

~^^3^^ Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 363.

~^^4^^ Ibid., VoL 31, p. 137.

10 wars against reactionary and aggressive forces fully bears this out.

Developing Lenin's ideas on the political essence of war and on the moral factor in war the Soviet Communist Party attaches prime importance to the moral and political education of military personnel in order to mould them in the spirit of boundless devotion to their socialist Motherland and to the cause of the Communist Party, to make them politically mature and ideologically tempered. This has always helped the Soviet Armed Forces to fight the country's enemies with unparalleled courage and determination, which in the final count makes the difference between victory and defeat.

In his analysis of how people behave in combat Lenin repeatedly emphasised the impact of the various factors of combat situations on the psychology of the fighting men. He wrote, "War itself is always dangerous. There is not a moment in time of war when you are not surrounded by danger.''^^1^^ Therefore, Lenin concluded, "Like every crisis in the life of individuals or in the history of nations, war oppresses and breaks some, steels and enlightens others.''^^2^^ Warfare "is an undertaking that is... arduous and very risky...".^^3^^

Nowadays the impact of combat factors on human psyche is far greater than it has been at any time before. As the late Marshal Grechko put it, "In modern war the psychological and emotional make-up of officers and men will be subject to the influence of numerous factors. In the first instance, they will be under the influence of an intense urge to fight and will be fully conscious of the need to carry out their mission quickly and efficiently. At the same time no one can rule out the possibility that in a nuclear warfare environment some of the troops will show signs of psychological shock, fear and insecurity albeit temporarily. The fighting man _-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 33, pp. 98--99.

^^2^^ Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 22

~^^3^^ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 423.

11 should therefore be prepared morally, politically and psychologically to be able to quickly overcome the impact of negative factors in any situation. The conscious elements of his moral fibre should always gain the upper hand. That is why every effort should be made to help military personnel develop adequate moral, political and psychological qualities. Work to achieve this should be conducted in a purposeful, systematic and steadfast manner.''^^1^^

The moral, political and psychological training of military personnel is geared to strengthening their moral fibre, which is essential if they are to carry out their missions successfully in any situation likely to develop in a modern war. This training is therefore closely bound up with the overall system of training and education of military personnel as the latter is geared to the achievement of the same goal. Mindful of this close connection we should not lose sight of the existing distinctions between the two basic aspects of military training. We should also be aware of the new elements that moral, political and psychological training introduces into the traditional methods of combat training.

The ultimate goal of moral, political and psychological training as conducted in the Soviet Army and Navy requires officers and noncoms to see to it that their work of training their men is efficient enough to meet the demands made by the complex conditions of modern warfare. These dictate the need to search for new and better methods of improving the ideological, political and combat training of military personnel. Moral, political and psychological training does not and cannot replace the existing system of combat training and political education of military personnel and it does not represent any independent, isolated form of the latter. Rather, it is a form of improving the combat training and political education of military personnel on _-_-_

^^1^^ A. A. Grechko, Standing Guard Over Peace and Communist Construction, Moscow, 1971, pp. 69--70 (in Russian).

12 the basis of a scientifically sound and Party-motivated understanding of the role of the moral factor in modem warfare. In other words, moral, political and psychological training is a major avenue in improving the combat training of military personnel to enable them to carry out their missions in any situation likely to arise in a possible war.

The introduction of concepts of moral, political and psychological training into the existing system of combat training in the Soviet Armed Forces helps to keep commanders from placing undue emphasis on purely technical, operational and tactical aspects of their work. These concepts which reveal the full complexity of the tasks involved in training personnel for combat duty, give the lie to the view held by some that preparing a person for withstanding the trials of modern warfare is a simple matter. Aware of this, Soviet officers and noncoms give their attention to the full range of problems involved in the training of their subordinates. Commanders are taught to approach these problems from Party and scientific standpoints and concentrate on the ultimate goal, which is to train fighting men to be ideologically committed and utterly devoted to their socialist Motherland and the cause of communism. Moral, political and psychological training, when properly conducted, helps the commanders to display a fully competent approach to the training of their men. Officers and noncoms are encouraged to develop imaginative and creative techniques in order to train their men on a sound scientific basis.

On the whole, the record of the application of moral, political and psychological training methods in the Soviet Armed Forces has confirmed their positive impact on improving the fighting efficiency and combat preparedness of land, air and naval forces.

Traditionally, seas and oceans have played an important role in the history of most countries. Apart from providing transport links between countries and 13 continents, they are also a major source of food, industrial raw materials and, more recently, of energy. Seas and oceans have had an appreciable impact on the economic development of many countries, where cities tend to be located in coastal areas. The commercial exploitation of the rich resources of the World Ocean is one of the pressing problems facing mankind.

Furthermore, from times immemorial seas and oceans have often been the scene and object of armed struggle. Indeed, in the five and a half millennia of recorded history wars have nearly always involved navies. Admittedly it was land armies that played the prime role since they clinched final victory. On the other hand, many of the wars could not have been waged without navies taking part. At different periods of world history Holland, Spain, Britain, France, Japan and the United States based their war strategy on the achievement of naval superiority.

History indicates that navies have a special role to play in the life of countries which are washed by seas and oceans. The Soviet Union is the world's largest continental country, but it is also a great maritime power. Soviet history shows how important it is for a country the size of the Soviet Union to have a powerful navy.

The role and significance of the different fighting services within the structure of a country's armed forces are not static, but are influenced by changing social and historical conditions. Thus, the advent of aviation gave rise to the Air Force. The evolution of the art of war has led to a redefinition of the role of the Navy in today's world. Marshal Grechko pointed out, "A salient feature of modern navies is the fact that they are now capable of conducting sustained operations all over the World Ocean. Gone are the days when navies could operate in coastal waters only. The theatre of naval operations is now increasingly shifting to the open sea.... In today's conditions naval forces 14 can exert tremendous influence on the entire course of a modern war.''^^1^^

In a modern war, should it be unleashed by an aggressor, naval operations would assume an unprecedented scale and their outcome would be of vast strategic importance. Not surprisingly, the aggressive imperialist quarters are attributing prime importance to the Navy. Accordingly, these quarters are replacing their landoriented strategy with an ocean-oriented one. This implies the transfer of their principal strategic nuclear potential from the land to the ocean, the theatre of naval operations, and the conversion of the Navy into the main fighting service. The share of naval strategic nuclear arms in the overall military potentials of the imperialist countries is constantly growing. The explanation here is the continuing search for new opportunities to achieve military superiority over the socialist countries. Military experts in the West take the view that the deployment of the ICBMs in the open sea by installing them on patrolling surface vessels and submarines will make it possible to ward off to a certain extent retaliatory nuclear strikes against the continental part of the aggressor state.

The increased significance of the Navy today is also attributable to the expanding exploration and exploitation of the mineral and natural wealth of the World Ocean.

The Soviet Communist Party and government have been making every effort to ensure that the Soviet Navy is fully capable of safeguarding the national interests and security of the Soviet Union on the seas and oceans. The Soviet Navy possesses formidable power. The advent of missiles and nuclear propulsion have revolutionised the trend in shipbuilding programmes, increasing the proportion of nuclear-powered submarines carrying nucleartipped missiles. At the moment such submarines which _-_-_

^^1^^ The Okean Naval Exercises by the USSR Navy, April-May 1970, Moscow, 1970, p. 8 (in Russian).

15 are equipped with various types of missiles and selfhoming torpedoes, and packed with sophisticated navigational aids, control and communication equipment constitute the main striking force of the Soviet Navy capable of accomplishing key combat missions. These submarines can hit enemy targets from well out both at sea and on the coast or deep in the enemy heartland.

All-weather jet aircraft of the naval aviation equipped with air-to-surface missiles are capable of striking at enemy warships in remote parts of the ocean, as well as at enemy ports and bases. The Soviet Navy also has advanced surface vessels, shore-based missile artillery forces, a marine corps, and diversified logistical support. The Soviet Navy is ready to go into action at a moment's notice. That this is so has been repeatedly proved in the course of regular manoeuvres and exercises.

This gives an idea of the sort of qualitative changes that have occurred in the Soviet Navy since the Second World War. Its combat capability has grown immeasurably. The Soviet Navy has extended its operational range beyond home waters and inland seas and is now represented in all oceans. As Admiral S. G. Gorshkov put it, "The creation of an ocean fleet worthy of the world's first socialist country, is the embodiment of the will of the Communist Party and of the Soviet people to see their country a great sea power, as well as a great continental power.'' The domination of the World Ocean by the imperialist navies has been ended once and for all. Soviet warships are now present in different parts of the World Ocean, where the national interests of the Soviet Union and the cause of international security demand it.

The personnel of the Soviet Navy are well trained and utterly devoted to their socialist Motherland. The men of the Soviet Navy have earned the respect and affection of the Soviet people by their excellent service and efficient military work. The Soviet navyman has come to symbolise courage, valour and boundless devotion to his country. Today's generation of Soviet navymen have 16 shown their prowess during prolonged cruises taking them across the world's seas and oceans. They work with dedication to gain complete proficiency in the handling of the weapons and fighting equipment at their disposal. The men of the Soviet Navy are successfully coping with the missions assigned to them, carrying aloft with honour and dignity the naval flag of the Soviet Union across the world's seas and oceans, demonstrating their high moral, political and psychological qualities, excellent combat skill and high standards of seamanship.

In pursuance of the relevant decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and the instructions issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Navy, naval commanders, political organs. Party and Komsomol organisations are working with dedication to further improve the political education and combat training of personnel, to tighten up military discipline and keep the level of vigilance and combat preparedness high. In this work they are guided by the ideas, concepts and expert recommendations relating to the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet military personnel generally. Naval officers, from a ship's commander to a petty officer, are taking account of the specific environment of naval service and the missions assigned to it, the specific methods of operation employed and the demands made on naval personnel today.

In recent years Soviet military periodicals and other publications have carried a good deal of material on different aspects of moral, political and psychological training in the light of modern requirements. Voyenizdat Publishers (the military publishing house), Moscow, have put out a series of books and pamphlets on the subject, including Marshal Grechko's Standing Guard Over Peace and Communist Construction and The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev's A Potent Weapon of the Party, and Major General S. K. llyin's Tlie Moral Factor in Modem Warfare. Other notable publications are A Major Factor of Combat Preparedness, The Soldier and War, Tlte Psychology' of a __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2-128 17 Military Collective, and Military Psychology, all of which have been written by groups of authors. These books deal with general aspects of the moral, political and psychological training given to Soviet Armed Forces personnel. For all its common features, military work carried out by the personnel of the various arms and services is not without its special features involving as it does specific difficulties and problems. Hence the need for a concrete and in-depth examination of every aspect of the training procedures and methods employed in different arms and services.

In this book the authors attempt a systematic exposition of the special features of moral, political and psychological training given to Soviet naval personnel. They also analyse the experience gained in this matter to date.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. The Content of Moral, Political
and Psychological Training

The requirements imposed by modern warfare determine the approach to and the concepts and methods employed in the training of Armed Forces personnel in peacetime and as such constitute the supreme criterion of the efficiency and success of such training. A military man is expected at all times to be guided in his service life by the strict and exacting requirements imposed by the needs of modern warfare on the personnel of the Army and Navy.

In his lecture "War and Revolution'', given in May 1917, Lenin emphasised the class character of any war, when he said, "All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed.''^^1^^

Politics determine the class content of a war and its _-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 400.

18 character (which can be either progressive or reactionary), as well as its aims, methods of waging it and the attitude to the enemy. The character of the political objective has a decisive influence on waging a war, Lenin went on. No weapons can change the political essence of war. War has been and remains the continuation of state and class policies by forcible means. The character of the given war depends on its political aims (there are just wars, wars of liberation or aggressive and reactionary wars).

The political essence of a war, should one be unleashed by an aggressor, the sharpness of the ideological struggle during it and the methods of warfare will require the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces to display fully developed political awareness, total ideological commitment, staunchness, utter devotion to the ideals of communism, and total faith in the just cause they are fighting for. Marshal Grechko emphasised, "Commitment to communist ideals, a high level of political awareness and consciousness, loyalty to the people and to the cause of the Leninist Party provide a source of inconquerable power and creative inspiration for our servicemen. Ideological commitment and political maturity form the foundation upon which the qualities essential for every fighting man rest.''^^1^^ The content of the moral and political education of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy is set out in the relevant documents of the Communist Party, the ordersof-the-day and directives issued by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. In the course of moral and political education the officers and men of the Soviet Navy develop a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook, profound communist convictions as well as communist principles of behaviour. The moral and political education equips the personnel of the Soviet _-_-_

^^1^^ A. A Grechko, Standing Guard Over Peace and Communist Construction, p. 65 (in Russian).

__PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 Navy with communist ideology, a profound awareness of the country's national interests, an intimate understanding of the policies of the Soviet Communist Party and government and of the essence and aims of war in defence of their socialist Motherland. This training helps each Soviet navyman to see the interests of his state as his own and enables him to develop ideals and principles which strengthen his motivation. This training also helps him to develop moral principles of behaviour in the spirit of communist ideals. The moral and political qualities of Soviet navymen fully reflect the ideological conviction of every officer and man of the Soviet Armed Forces, their unshakable faith in the unassailable validity of Marxism-Leninism, of the policy of the Communist Party, their conviction in the inevitable triumph of communism, the ideal to which mankind aspires. The essence of these qualities, which represent an organic unity between the politics and morals of the working class as reflected in the consciousness of Soviet navymen, determines the content of the training of Soviet naval personnel.

In the bitter confrontation of the opposite ideologies-communist and bourgeois-the significance of political knowledge and communist morality for the personnel of the Soviet Navy grows. The need for intensified moral and political training today is dictated by a number of other objective factors, including the specific nature of service in different parts of the World Ocean.

In elaborating Lenin's teaching on the moulding of the new man, the builder and defender of communism, the Soviet Communist Party always emphasises that the moral and political qualities of Soviet people are moulded by the entire socialist way of life. These qualities evolve in the first place in the course of a purposeful and persistent ideological and educational work carried on by the Party at all levels and in all its organisations. As Leonid Brezhnev stressed, "Party and political work among the Armed Forces personnel, their ideological steeling have always been and remain a 20 potent weapon of our Party. The strength of this weapon has been tested on the battlefield and it continues to scare our enemies.''^^1^^

The Soviet Navy has gained a wealth of experience in the moral and political education of naval personnel. The officers and men of the Soviet Navy have demonstrated their skill and proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment during prolonged cruises on board surface ships and submarines, and in their successful operations during recent naval exercises and manoeuvres.

The commander of a naval ship organises and supervises the moral and political education for the benefit of his men. The commander sees to it that this education is conducted in a purposeful way and that it meets the requirements of the moment. The commander's deputy for political work who is the immediate organiser of Party and political work among the crew has a special part to play. He designs a suitable plan covering the basic aspects of moral and political education for every section of the ship's complement. The paramount goal of his work is to spell out to every crewman the various aspects of the policy of the CPSU and Soviet government as well as the mission assigned to the Soviet Navy and ways of keeping the combat preparedness of their ship at the required level. The plans of Party and political work follow the ideological, organisational and educational principles underlying the associated work to help the personnel develop fine moral and political qualities with full account being taken of the nature of a particular cruise and available opportunities. A welldesigned plan of moral and political education is a guarantee of purposeful work on the moulding of high moral and political qualities among the personnel and provides a basis for efficient work by officers and all _-_-_

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, On the Communist Education of the Working People. Speeches and Articles, Moscow, 1974, p. 79 (in Russian).

21 Communists and Komsomol activists among the crew.

Of tremendous importance in the political and moral education of naval personnel is the work carried out by Party organisations of the Soviet Navy. The Programme of the CPSU emphasises, "Party leadership of the Armed Forces and the increasing role and influence of the Party organisations in the Army and Navy are the bedrock of military development.''^^1^^

The commanders and political departments of the Soviet Navy are working with dedication to strengthen the Party organisations in the Navy and to increase their influence on every aspect of the combat training and political education of naval personnel. In recent years the Party organisations have increased their strength, improved their work and succeeded in ensuring a high level of combat training and political education and military discipline among the naval personnel, thereby contributing to the accomplishment of missions assigned to naval vessels and units.

The dramatic change in the character of modern warfare, coupled with the need to maintain a high level of combat preparedness in the Navy, impose even more exacting demands on the development of high moral, fighting and psychological qualities among naval personnel. These demands are derivative of the vastly increased scope and tempo of naval operations, their high dynamism and intensity for sustained periods. Other factors include a lack of sufficient information about the enemy in a fluid combat situation, the possibility of the enemy using totally new weapons and tactics and striking unexpected blows, the use of electronic interference and counter-measures and the increased capability of naval vessels to operate on their own for sustained periods.

The combat experience gained to date, the entire record of military training in time of peace as well as the findings of military experts indicate that most flaws and drawbacks in the moral, combat and psychological _-_-_

^^1^^ The Road to Communism, Moscow, 1962, p. 558.

22 training of naval personnel are of two kinds: decreased ability to quickly evaluate the combat situation, to adopt correct decisions and handle weapons and equipment with confident competence. Secondly, there is drooping morale and falling standards of behaviour and discipline in complex combat environment. At times even when he tries his best to act with usual proficiency, a crewman fails to do everything he wishes to, with the result that his overall performance is lower than it usually is. This drop in the quality of performance is the result of deteriorating mental, sensory and motor characteristics. The man loses his ability to think straight, display his full resourcefulness and mental flexibility, all of which results in an incorrect evaluation of the situation. He finds it difficult to keep his head and to process the incoming information. He may even develop mental blocks. Sensory disturbances take the form of reduced powers of observation, attention and the decreased ability to exercise reasonable caution. The man fails to notice obvious things. He is not always able to take instrument readings correctly and may even fall prey to illusions and hallucination. The motor disturbances that occur frequently include tremor (trembling hands and legs), voice change, faulty coordination of movement, bad errors in elementary procedures (the man may get hold of the wrong switch or fail to turn the right instrument on or off), haste or, conversely, sluggishness. These and other disturbances are a fairly common occurrence.

Mental, sensory and motor impairment results in mistakes, oversights, and slips in the handling of weapons and equipment in combat situations.

Here is an example to illustrate the point. On September 6, 1941 at 02:45 hours the C-32 submarine surfaced to re-charge her storage batteries. Suddenly the outlines of a nazi ship emerged from the darkness. The submarine commander decided to attack without delay and without crash diving. The "quarters! " command was sounded. As the commander put his eyes to the 23 night sights he saw to his horror that his submarine was diving and water was quickly rising to the top of the conning tower. He rushed back inside the submarine and no sooner had he managed to seal the conning tower hatch, than the whole of the submarine was under water. The planned attack failed and several men on bridge duty were drowned. The tragedy was caused by the duty officer in the control room, who, on hearing the ``quarters'' signal, automatically proceeded to order crash diving, although on that particular occasion he received no command to this effect.

Inadequate moral and psychological training of navymen may also show itself in deteriorating behaviour in a combat or other critical situation. The characteristic signs of this are inadvertent violations of approved standards of behaviour. Some of the crewmen may fall prey to the instinct of self-preservation, may fail to obey orders to the full and may generally violate military discipline in other ways. The more psychologically unstable of the crewmen may panic and believe rumours. Compared to the normal pattern of behaviour the crewmen's sense of purpose may decrease and their persistence, level of activity, initiative, self-control and presence of mind may worsen and instead they may show indecision, doubt, lack of confidence and even fatalism. Caution is replaced by fear. When this happens we normally say that the man has failed to withstand the difficulties and has "broken up''. This me"ans that the engagement, with the sense of grave responsibility it imposes on the crewmen, and enemy action during the engagement have combined to destroy the crewman's psychological stability and will to win.

The basic cause of these unfavourable consequences is inadequate moral and political education of the crewman. Because of this he fails to overcome his psychological reactions to danger and this in turn dramatises the psychological conflict within him between his sense of duty and the instinct of self-- preservation, and, as a result, begins to impair his normal 24 behavioral pattern. Thus psychological overreaction to danger, failure to keep one's cool in the face of danger, coupled with insufficient moral and political education of the given individual, reduces his performance and affects his behaviour. To be sure, less acute psychological reaction which is achieved through preliminary training can help the individual to overcome the undesirable consequences to a certain extent. But no psychological training, however skilfully conducted, can compensate for serious drawbacks in the moral and political education of the individual.

Different degrees of psychological tension may affect the individual's actions and behavioral pattern differently. Until his psychological tension is below a certain threshold of intensity the individual crewman is alert and capable of acting quickly and without mistakes. He is able to think straight and react to any twist in the situation quickly and with a cool head. But once the threshold of intensity of psychological tension has been exceeded the man is subject to overstress and his performance deteriorates. The higher the level of psychological stress the worse the performance.

A reduced level of performance of a crewman is in direct proportion to the intensity of psychological stress (see Fig. 1). Initially, as a result of overstrain (the section of the curve a labelled 1) the man makes only slight mistakes and his mental processes are somewhat retarded. His attention wanders, his memory slips and he loses the ability to think straight. As the level of psychological overstrain goes up the man starts making mistakes in the performance of quite customary and wellpracticed complex actions (section 2 of the curve) and later---in the performance of simple, elementary actions (section 3 of the curve): he gets hold of the wrong switch or switches an instrument wrongly. If the level of psychological overstrain is increased further the man breaks down completely and is unable to withstand the psychological overstress at all.

The diagram on page 26 indicates the varying levels of __PARAGRAPH_PAUSE__ 25 Performance norm 234 Intensity of °i psychological stress Fig. 1 099-1.jpg [26] __PARAGRAPH_CONT__ resistance of the different components of human psychological powers to psychological overstrain. The individual's behaviour is the most stable component as indicated by curve J; less stable is his professional performance, as indicated by curve a. Complex work habits dominated by the mental component (curve b) are the first casualty of psychological overstrain. The more simple, elementary motor habits are more resistant to the impact of psychological overstrain (curve~c).

In the light of the pattern indicated by the above diagram the primary goal of psychological training is to raise the ceiling of crewmen's resistance to psychological overstrain (to help them withstand great overloads with due regard for their individual psychological resilience), to reduce the level of psychological strain actually experienced in a combat situation and to train personnel in methods of self-control. This can be accomplished by making all factors and circumstances typical of a combat situation familiar and customary to the personnel and also by reducing as far as possible the differences in the nature of naval service in peacetime and in wartime. It is essential to train naval personnel in techniques of overcoming psychological strain typical of combat situations and to keep them in a psychological state which helps in putting them in the required psychological fighting trim quickly and reliably. It is also essential to prepare the naval personnel well in advance for encountering the new and unexpected developments with a cool head, to help them get their bearings in a confusing and fluid situation, and to adapt their actions to changing combat missions and situations.

Psychological training is intended to strengthen the naval personnel's confidence in the weapons and equipment at their disposal, to strengthen their faith in their fellow crewmen and commanders, to strengthen their faith in victory. It is equally important in this context to help them form a realistic idea of the possible ways in which an aggressor may start war, of its special features and requirements; to familiarise naval personnel 27 with the factors of combat situations and the psychological difficulties they create and to accustom them to these difficulties; to develop willpower and will to win (sense of purpose, a high level of activity, vigour, persistence, courage, staunchness, ability to act on one's own, initiative, daring, etc. in proper balance), to improve emotional and volitional stability, selfcontrol and presence of mind in critical situations; to develop greater powers of perception, attention, good memory, imagination and particularly navyman's mentality: its scope and efficiency, logical and clear thinking, critical attitude, resourcefulness. Of great importance too is the development and strengthening of "psychological reliability'', i.e. resistance to strain and overstrain in emergency situations, to danger, increased responsibility, and sudden twists in the situation; psychological stability and tolerance---resistance to alarm and pessimism and to ill-considered hasty conclusions; the gaining of experience in switching over from a period of expectation to resolute and energetic actions, the development of the ability to fully mobilise one's powers and potential; the development of psychological and physiological stability in the specific conditions incident to the maintenance of constant combat readiness of the ship at sea; the development and maintenance of a sense of psychological combat preparedness for instant action.

These general guidelines for moral and psychological training of naval personnel are adapted to fit the needs of the various categories of navymen with due account being taken of their particular specialities, jobs and of the conditions of their service. Of special importance is the psychological training given to the commanders of naval ships who are the top commanding officers in the navy. A ship's commander is required to have particularly well-developed volitional qualities, such as an undeflectable sense of purpose and persistence in accomplishing the combat mission assigned to him. His actions must be directed towards the ultimate goal of victory 28 and he is required to transmit his determination to defeat the enemy to his subordinates. At the same time the commander is required to display a high level of activity and dynamism. He cannot afford to be a passive observer of events or become reconciled to the conditions which the enemy action has imposed on him. The ship's commander should at all times keep a firm grip on the course of events, channelling them in the desired direction, hold the initiative and be in full control of the situation. Even such qualities as boldness and audacity, courage and sangfroid should be displayed by the commander differently than in the case of the rest of the crew. The ship's commander should not only be able to overcome difficulties and dangers with stoicism, but he should also possess a special kind of courage to assume full responsibility for the decisions he makes, for the outcome of a battle or mission and for the actions of his subordinates.

The commander's courage is essentially an ability to assume full responsibility for the outcome of the battle at the critical moment, in a situation that does not suffer any delay. This quality is of special importance for the ship's commander. The commander should not be reproached for failure to accomplish the object of a combat mission due to an unfavourable combat situation, but he should justly be reproached if he wavered and, hesitating to assume full responsibility, remained passive and allowed a good opportunity to slip.

Initiative and ability to act on his own, strict selfdiscipline and an exacting attitude to what he and his subordinates do are all essential to the ship's commander. If the commander fails to keep his cool, to display boldness and audacity at the right moment and, equally, if he fails to act prudently, he will fail in his main job of overcoming the difficulties and dangers which are incident to modern naval warfare. If for any reason the ship's commander is unable to keep in touch with his superior, he must take his own decision, which is his own responsibility, taking account of the overall 29 object of his mission and of the actions of other units. Initiative and sudden and energetic action, boldness and speed in carrying out a manoeuvre, complete secrecy of the preparations for the contemplated course of action, are the best guarantee of success in accomplishing the assigned battle mission.

The ship's commander should be highly intelligent for he should be able to read the situation correctly and adjust his actions accordingly, taking full account of the conflicting operational and tactical concepts, plans and decisions adopted by the opposing sides. This is a sort of a war of the minds which goes on continually during a naval battle. And he will come out on top who through good tactical thinking succeeds in outwitting the enemy.

The complexity of the situation and the need for taking full account of the many different factors influencing decision making, the vast expanses of the operations theatre, the formidable weaponry at the disposal of the various arms and services of the Navy require of naval officers in general and of ship commanders in particular encyclopaedic knowledge, analytical thinking and high competence. The ship's commander cannot afford, however complicated the situation, to lose his bearings, he should be able to quickly grasp the situation, sift away that which is irrelevant or of secondary importance and concentrate on the crucial factor and once he has done that he should keep to the course of action that'holds out the best promise of success.

The rapidity, flexibility and wide scope of modern naval warfare, the abrupt and unpredictable changes in the combat situation require the ship's commander to be able to respond quickly and correctly to any twist in the situation, to display quick and flexible tactical thinking and be able to foresee the course of events, display military intuition, a good sense of time and space and rhythm of the naval engagement. Since the first naval battles were fought, the rapidity and tempo of naval engagements have increased a hundred-fold while human 30 mental processes have generally continued to proceed at much the same rate. Therefore the demands on quick thinking by naval commanders have increased immeasurably and this characteristic should be developed accordingly. A correct and efficient use of the potential of naval forces for rapid and flexible manoeuvring require above all quick and flexible thinking by those who control these forces as the famous Soviet Admiral Golovko emphasised in his memoirs. In other words, to be able to act quickly the naval commander should think quickly and, equally, to act boldly he has to think boldly.

Recent experience shows that modern naval strategy is advancing by leaps and bounds. In this situation what looks like the best tactic may be quickly seen through by the enemy and if the ship's commander continues to cling to it blindly it may blow back in his face. Only a creative approach to the accomplishment of each and every battle mission, the employment of methods and techniques that fit the given situation and continual perfection of tactics can guarantee success. New tactics unexpected for the enemy always assure the best results. It is not for nothing that experienced military men say that in war one should do what the enemy considers impossible.

The ship's commander works in conditions that are anything but conducive to clear and unhurried thinking. More often than not he has to think out his plan of action under extreme psychological stress, nervous tension and mental and physical fatigue. It would seem that in these highly unsettling conditions a man will hardly find it possible to think clearly. However, the ship's commander has to do a lot of thinking and the quality of his split-second decisions may mean the difference between success and failure. Not surprisingly, presence of mind, a cool head, sangfroid, strong nerves and clear thinking are all features distinguishing the naval officer.

A correct assessment of the battlefield situation and 31 due consideration by the ship's commander and every naval officer of the moral factor are indispensable to good decisions and successful handling of the battlefield situation. In particular, the ship's commander should continually assess and take into account the political and moral condition of his subordinates and equally that of the enemy: their discipline or lack of it, combat experience and standard of training, prevalent moods, the degree of tiredness and other relevant factors.

During preparations for and in the course of a naval engagement an experienced ship's commander tries to exploit every available means to damage the enemy's morale, to keep him off balance psychologically, he should do everything in his power to create and maintain a lack of confidence in the enemy, to induce him to lose faith, doubt his opportunities and the correctness of the actions he adopts or contemplates, to stir up hesitation, alarm, confusion and even fear. In foreseeing the possibility of the enemy trying to act likewise with respect to his own crew an experienced commander prepares himself and his subordinates for efficient actions to counter the enemy's efforts, to do everything in his power to maintain his subordinates' confidence and ideological commitment, stability and resistance to the enemy's propaganda and psychological warfare techniques.

All these requirements which we have examined separately actually manifest themselves at one and the same time. These requirements are essential for the allround training of each naval officer. The men of the Soviet Navy subscribe to what Hero of the Soviet Union Gadjiev, a famed submarine commander, said: "The submarine commander should possess sangfroid and a cool head to an even greater degree than any other naval commander: he should have the fertile imagination of a novelist and a clear sense of reality, he should be as efficient as a model businessman, should have the patience and self-control of an inveterate angler, a clever scout and an experienced hunter.''

32

The moral, political and psychological training of Navy personnel constitutes a single and integrated process the dominant component of which is the moulding of fine moral and political qualities and the psychological preparedness to defend their country at any moment and to remain loyal to the communist ideals to the last drop of blood.

The importance for naval personnel to be psychologically and ideologically committed is appreciated by the ruling quarters of the imperialist countries as well. However, they are finding it more and more difficult to win the allegiance of their soldiers and sailors for the defence of the interests of the bourgeoisie in a situation marked by a deep crisis of the bourgeois society and on-going progressive changes in the world. As Leonid Brezhnev stated at the Internationa] Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969, "Imperialism cannot expect to succeed if it openly speaks of its true aims. It is compelled to create a system of ideological myths to disguise its true intentions and lull the vigilance of the peoples."^^1^^ These words sum up the essence of the approach by the military leadership of the imperialist armies and navies to the ideological and psychological conditioning of the military personnel based on lies, deception, falsification, distortion of the facts, inculcation of false ideas and pandering to base instincts and aspirations. The apologists of the bourgeoisie have gained a wealth of historical experience to draw upon in misleading and hoodwinking the popular masses. Besides they have at their disposal a powerful propaganda machine, recruitment services, research organisations, the mass media, political power and unlimited funds.

Anti-communism and anti-Sovietism form the basis of the ideological brainwashing of the population in general and of the military personnel in the imperialist _-_-_

~^^1^^ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 163.

__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3-128 33 countries in particular. Even in conditions of detente the reactionary forces, far from relaxing their anti-Soviet propaganda, in some cases have stepped it up and intensify their efforts to stir up the anti-communist psychosis. In some instances the frank and rabid anticommunist propaganda designed for consumption by semi-literate and politically backward individuals is replaced by subtle propaganda methods which have a pseudo-scientific air about them and are camouflaged by a semblance on objectivity and backed up by tendentiously selected and interpreted ``facts''.

Anti-communism and anti-Sovietism form the theoretical basis of war preparations by the imperialists, they are an obstacle placed in the path of progressive ideas and views, penetrating through to the army and navy personnel in the imperialist countries. Under cover of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, the reactionary forces are seeking to justify in the eyes of world public opinion their own military actions against peace-loving peoples. The myth of "Soviet military threat'', "of dangerous activity" of the Soviet Navy on the seas and oceans is exploited by the military of certain imperialist powers to justify their own actions which create tension in some parts of the world.

False information on the existing state of affairs in socialist countries and within the world communist and workers' movement is one of the many tools of anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda conducted among the navy personnel of imperialist powers. The officers and men of the imperialist navies are continually urged to prepare for war in defence of Western '.`democracy''. They are being told that they should allow no let up in mastering new weapons and tactics because "the Russians possess up-to-date weapons and equipment, a huge army and a rapidly expanding navy''. They are being urged to become trained specialists and to serve diligently and efficiently so as to be ready to put down disturbances and unrest at home which "are fomented and organised by Communists and their fellow 34 travellers''. The policy of anti-communism is designed to convince every sailor and every naval officer and rating of the "red danger" threatening him personally. According to a U.S. marine when he was undergoing training his drill sergeant kept repeating,'' Tin teaching you to kill Communists not only because I get paid for it. I want you to understand the terrible danger presented by Communists to each one of you personally. Consider this: if we don't kill Reds in Vietnam today, tomorrow they will come here to America and start killing off all of us, your mothers, wives and children. Do you want that to happen?' And we were expected to respond to this exhortation by yelling 'No! ' at the top of our lungs.''

A typical trend in the ideological and psychological conditioning of the navy personnel of imperialist powers is education in the spirit of bourgeois ethics and morality which mould an individual to conform to its basic principle of "homo homini lupus est''. Each commandment and each standard of bourgeois morality is permeated with the spirit of cruelty, misanthropy, hypocrisy and pious cant. Bourgeois morality extols extreme individualism, pursuit of profit by any means, the cult of violence, and it panders to base instincts. The education of navy personnel in the spirit of bourgeois morality is facilitated by the very atmosphere of naval service where each naval officer and rating sees his tour of duty as a means of making money. In line with the theoretical propositions expounded by the Freudians who claim that human behaviour is dominated by instincts, the stimulation of base instincts and the glorification of money as the supreme and ultimate ambition because money supposedly has no smell is the dominant component of the education and psychological conditioning of navy personnel and of keeping them under control. Zealous service is encouraged by fat pay, bonuses, fringe benefits, while stiff fines are a means of punishment. Combat training is also designed to encourage competition, the display of private initiative and enterprise.

35

The ideological and psychological conditioning of the navy personnel of the imperialist powers is facilitated in large part by the existing system of military ethics, by religious fanaticism and brainwashing, by fomenting chauvinism, jingoism and nationalism and by blind drill. Recommendations made by hired psychologists and experts on human behaviour are used extensively. All this is geared to the effort to convert young navymen into mindless automatons, into egoists blindly following their base instincts and inclinations, into slaves who do not even suspect that they are slaves. The ideological and psychological conditioning is designed to cloud the class consciousness of navy personnel, to confuse their minds and distract them from political problems, to replace political and class issues by problems of psychology and behaviorism. Not surprisingly in some imperialist countries the concept of moral and political as well as psychological training of armed forces personnel is totally absent. It is all reduced to the concept of psychological conditioning.

This then sums up the reactionary essence and methods of odeological indoctrination and psychological conditioning of the armed forces personnel in imperialist powers. But it is not only a matter of their reactionary essence. This system does yield definite results which please the ruling exploiting classes of the imperialist countries. It does consolidate the reactionary militaristic elements among the naval personnel of the imperialist countries and induces part of the personnel to serve the bourgeoisie loyally. At the same time many naval officers and ratings are trying to get things in perspective and tend to take a realistic view of the world and to assess the events in their own way. They are not prepared to let their superiors convert them into obedient robots who would kill, rape and burn without asking questions. The essential failure of the ideological and psychological conditioning of armed forces personnel in imperialist countries has been graphically revealed in the course of recent wars of aggression unleashed by 36 the imperialists when it was put to a critical test on the battlefield.

As they prepare to accomplish the combat missions assigned to them the officers and men of the Soviet Navy are making a careful study of their potential opponents and are taking into account both their strengths and weaknesses as revealed in their system of training.

[37] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter II __ALPHA_LVL1__ Ideological Work
Among Navy Personnel __ALPHA_LVL2__ [introduction.]

Ideological work, that potent weapon of the Communist Party, plays a crucial role in helping the Soviet Navy accomplish its assigned mission.

The Soviet Navy has developed a neat and welldesigned system of ideological work among Navy personnel both on ships and on land. This work rests on a sound scientific basis.

The main principles of ideological work in the Soviet Navy include:

---consistent and in-depth study by Navy personnel of all the component parts of Marxism-Leninism, of the present-day activity of the Communist Party to advance full-scale communist construction in the Soviet Union;

---the study of the history of the Communist Party and Party development in the Soviet Armed Forces in order to draw on the wealth of experience it contains;

---the moulding among Navy personnel of the ability to apply Marxist-Leninist teaching to the present-day sharp ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism and to the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution in the military field.

The soundness of these principles of ideological work have been fully borne out by the practice of its organisation which has proved its effectiveness. These principles fully meet the specific conditions of Navy service in the expanses of the World Ocean in conditions imposing considerable physical and psychological stresses and strains.

38

The forms and methods of ideological education employed to train Navy personnel have developed into a complete system comprising:

---the study of Marxism-Leninism by naval officers;~

---the political education of midshipmen and ensigns;~

---the political education of ratings, soldiers and NCOs;~

---Party education;~

---agitation and propaganda work;~

---cultural and educational work.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Study of Marxism-Leninism
by Naval Officers

A basic principle underlying the training of Soviet naval officers is the combination of their professional military training with ideological and political education. The Soviet naval officer is not only a naval specialist fully versed in every facet of his profession, but he is also a political instructor and a dedicated propagandist of the policies of the Soviet Communist Party and government, guided his day-to-day work by the directives and instructions issued by the Party.

In conditions marked by rapid progress in naval strategy and revolutionary change of many familiar concepts and views the naval officer cannot very well do without a good and thorough knowledge of philosophy, politics and science which help him gain an insight into the character and practice of Soviet Armed Forces development, and enable him to see clearly the role and place of the modern Navy operating world-wide. This knowledge also helps the Soviet naval officer to conduct the military training and political education of his subordinates on a sound scientific basis, to find the most efficient ways of ensuring a high level of combat preparedness of his ship, unit and the entire Navy.

A good knowledge of Marxism-Leninism safeguards naval commanders and political officers as well as engineers and technicians from the folly of subjectivism 39 and from elevating into an absolute outmoded methods and concepts and helps them combat conservative views and hidebound ways. A good knowledge of MarxismLeninism helps the naval officer carry on his practical day-to-day work on a sound scientific basis, to display initiative, ability to act on his own and to assume responsibility for the results of his work.

A good knowledge of Marxism-Leninism enables a naval commander, political officer or any other naval specialist to get his bearings quickly in a complex combat situation and inspire confidence in his subordinates.

Favourable conditions have been created on every Soviet naval vessel for efficient ideological education of naval officers. This education is conducted on the basis of well-designed programmes on Marxism-Leninism. These programmes are based on sound scientific principles and they are implemented by experienced and knowledgeable political officers. As a rule, Soviet naval officers have a high level of general education. A sufficient amount of classroom time is allotted for Marxist-Leninist education every year.

Marxist-Leninist study groups are set up on all naval vessels and in all Navy units stationed on land, and their student lists as well as group leaders are announced by appropriate commanders in the orderof-the-day.

In line with the specific instructions issued by the country's Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy on the in-depth study of every facet of Marxism-- Leninism the political departments and Party organisations in the Soviet Navy during their preparations for every new academic year help naval officers choose the most suitable study programme depending on the specific conditions of their work.

The main principle underlying the organisation of Marxist-Leninist training for the benefit of naval officers is an in-depth and consistent study of every 40 facet of Marxism-Leninism, of Lenin's theoretical heritage, of the topical problems of the theory and policies of the CPSU, of communist construction and armed defence of the Motherland. The study of these sciences is conducted together with the study of military theory and practical naval training. In the course of their everyday political education the naval officers are guided by the decisions of Party congresses and decisions adopted by the plenary meetings of the Central Committee relating to the construction of communist society and the organisation of its armed defence.

The basic method of Marxist-Leninist education of naval officers is an independent study based on a good grasp of Lenin's proposition to the effect that "the truth about any important question cannot be found unless a certain amount of independent work is done, and anyone who is afraid of work cannot possibly arrive at the truth''.^^1^^ This fundamental proposition of Lenin's helps the Soviet naval officers of today to approach correctly the organisation of their work on mastering Marxist-Leninist ideology and their naval professions and keep abreast of the latest advances in weapons and equipment.

An efficient and correct organisation of independent work on mastering Marxism-Leninism among naval officers is of special importance in the case of naval ships which carry out their mission in the course of long-term cruises across the world's seas and oceans far away from base.

A traditional form of Marxist-Leninist education of naval officers is to hold theoretical conferences at naval bases in the time between long-term cruises. These conferences are of special significance as they make it possible to involve experts in the discussion of a given topic and this helps the officers form a common MarxistLeninist approach to a particular problem of our time.

_-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, pp. 149--50.

41

The topics usually discussed at such theoretical conferences include inter alia: "Lenin on the Defence of the Socialist Motherland and on the Principles of Soviet Military Work'', "Lenin on the Scientific Approach to Military Leadership and Requirements for Military Cadres'', "The Growing Role of the CPSU in Guiding Communist Construction and in Its Armed Defence''. Top naval commanders and scholars usually take an active part in such theoretical conferences. These conferences help naval personnel to gain a sound theoretical grounding in the topics discussed.

An indispensable condition of a successful mastering by naval officers of Marxism-Leninism, of an in-depth study of the decisions of Party congresses and other Party documents is the holding of regular lectures, consultations and other measures in advance of seminars and theoretical conferences. Other contributing factors include continual refresher courses for lecturers and leaders of Marxist-Leninist study groups and the participation of top staff officers and other superior naval commanders in the seminars.

All naval officers attending Marxism-Leninism study groups participate in public, political and propaganda work. The entire experience of the Communist Party bears out the need for this form of work. Active participation in ideological work within local Party organisations is the duty of every Party member and of every candidate for Party membership. Constant political and public activity of the naval officer is a guarantee of his rapid evolution as a commander and educator of his subordinates.

The political education of midshipmen and ensigns is an important part of the political and ideological work of naval commanders and political officers. This education is modelled on the Marxist-Leninist education of naval officers. Study sessions are conducted in separate groups set up on every naval vessel and take the form of lectures, independent work and seminars.

42 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. Political Sessions

Political sessions are a major form of political education for ratings and NCOs. This form of political education originated in the years of the Civil War (1917--1920) at the initiative of the personnel of the Red Army and Navy in the form of "the political hour''. This form of political education has since been improved and perfected. Its organisation changed depending on the conditions of the Soviet Navy, on the level of the political awareness and education of Navy personnel and the availability of the necessary propaganda cadres and equally on the quality of the material and technical basis. At all periods, however, it remained an important means of steeling naval personnel ideologically.

Of great importance for improving the effectiveness of political sessions was the decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee in 1967 "On Measures tc Improve Party and Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy''. This decision enjoined the officers of the Soviet Army and Navy to see to it that political education embraced every soldier and sailor without exception.

The political education of Soviet sailors is designed to ensure that each of them see clearly his own place and role in the work of the entire Soviet people to carry into effect the plans mapped by the Party, that he see clearly the need for the continual strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces consistent with their constant combat preparedness.

Emphasising the need for improving the ideological and political education of Navy personnel today, Admiral Gorshkov called attention to the specific character of the missions and life of the Soviet Navy operating away from base on the world's seas and oceans. He specifically pointed to the fact that the Soviet Navy personnel are today in the forefront of those working for communism. Deeply aware of the role of political education of Navy personnel, the Navy commanders, political officers and Party organisations of the 43 Soviet Navy work daily to keep it at a high level.

The political study programmes are designed to educate politically competent sailors and cover questions the study of which strengthens their scientific world outlook. These programmes contribute to moulding among Navy personnel a high level of political awareness and lofty moral principles which are so essential to achieve success in modern warfare.

Political sessions in the Soviet Navy are conducted throughout the year. Study groups are composed of ratings and NCOs on every naval vessel.

The ship's commander and his deputy for political work are responsible for the organisation of political education and its high ideological level. They select and appoint group leaders and assign them specific tasks, help them prepare for political sessions. They also supervise the progress of political education. The deputy ship's commander for political work takes personal charge of one of the groups of political education. The leader of each group has an assistant selected from among the politically competent Party or Komsomol members who enjoy prestige and authority among the men. The assistant helps the group leader conduct political sessions and holds individual sessions with those who have fallen behind or missed sessions. He also prepares audiovisual aids and rooms where political sessions are held.

Group leaders undergo regular refresher training to keep abreast of the latest methods and ideas on how best to conduct political sessions. In line with the relevant instructions issued by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy three-day assemblies prior to the start of each training period are held with the leaders of political education groups and afterwards---one or two four-hour seminars every month.

During these assemblies and seminars lectures on Marxist-Leninist theory are delivered and the content and methods of conducting political sessions are discussed. The participants are briefed on the new 44 methods. Ship commanders and political officers report on the current tasks in the combat training and political education and a lively exchange of experience takes place.

In recent years the lecture-cum-seminar method has become predominant within the system of political education in the Soviet Navy. The study of each theme begins with a lecture by the more experienced and able of the commanders, political officers and naval engineers. Often members of several political education groups are brought together for such a lecture and it is delivered in such a way as to enable the audience to take notes.

To help those attending political education sessions make their own independent home work more effective consultations are given and special films and slides are shown. Well-designed and graphic visual aids are used. The audience are helped to develop efficient reading and precis-making skills when working with source material.

A well-arranged lecture and fruitful independent work are two basic elements essential to achieving a high theoretical standard of political education sessions. A third component is the seminar. A seminar enables those attending it to consolidate the knowledge gained and back it up with the necessary arguments and conclusions and relate it to the life and activity of the ship and the entire Navy.

Seminars are designed to help achieve the ultimate aim of the study of the given material. To this end the seminar leader clearly defines the basic questions underlying a logical sequence of reasoning which forms that focus on which the attention of those attending the seminar are concentrated. Normally these questions are made known to the audience prior to the seminar to enable them to concentrate on these questions during independent work.

A successful seminar calls for a precise schedule and strict discipline. The seminar leader conducts the proceedings, stimulates attention, interest and active 45 participation of the audience and assesses ideological and political level of the reports and contributions.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. Party Education

Party education of the crews of naval ships and the personnel of shore-based units, just as the political education of the entire naval personnel helps officers and men to strengthen their communist views, heighten their class consciousness, develop high moral standards and mobilise themselves for successful accomplishment of missions assigned to the Soviet Navy by the Communist Party.

An in-depth study by Party and Komsomol activists of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, of Lenin's teaching on the Party, war and military science and of the decisions of successive Party congresses and resolutions adopted by the plenary meetings of the CC CPSU forms the basis of Party education in the Soviet Navy. The need to conduct Party education follows from the recognition that the strength of the Communist Party lies in the high level of ideological commitment, activity and self-denying work by each of its members, in the awareness of every Party member of his duty to be a conscious political fighter and always be a worthy member of the Party founded by Lenin. The rising ideological and theoretical level of Party education stimulates Party and Komsomol members in their efforts to attain a high level of combat training.

That is why the CPSU has invariably emphasised the need to keep on improving the system of Party education, to eliminate perfunctory attitudes and formalism in order to enhance the impact on the level of consciousness and activity displayed by Party members.

The Party education of the Communists in the Soviet Navy is conducted in strict accordance with the relevant instructions issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU. The goals, substance and emphasis are also determined by the directives issued by the Minister of 46 Defence and by the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The political departments and Party organisations of naval vessels and shore-based units are called upon to ensure an efficient organisation and conduct of Party education sessions. It is their duty to see to it that these sessions are always relevant and to supervise the selfeducation of Party members. The basic principle of Party education is continuity and consistency in the study of every facet of Marxism-Leninism.

The system of Party education adopted in the Soviet Navy comprises three stages: primary, secondary and higher. The primary stage takes the form of one-year evening Party schools for Communists and Komsomols among sailors, NCOs and midshipmen. They study the ABC of political science and acquire elementary skills of educational work among the ratings.

The study programme of the primary stage covers the history of the CPSU, Lenin's leadership of the Party, the early stages of socialist construction in the USSR and the Party's decisions relating to the application of Lenin's ideological heritage to present-day conditions.

The secondary stage takes the form of two-year evening Party schools for officers and midshipmen. These offer secondary political education in MarxismLeninism. This calls not only for intensive work but also for an efficient organisation of the study process. The progress of active Party and Komsomol members is periodically reviewed at conferences and assemblies attended by commanders and political officers and at regular conferences of methodology councils.

The higher stage of Party education is designed for Party members among the naval officer corps as well as for Party and non-Party activists with a sufficiently broad political outlook and experience of applying Marxism-Leninism to practical work and capable of studying the Marxist-Leninist theory on their own.

The principal form of study at the higher stage is attendance of evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, 47 which with the exception of departments offering the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism provide higher political education. Such universities are maintained at naval bases where they are attached to officers' clubs. These universities are attended by officers and also by secretaries of Party and Komsomol organisations.

In recent years in view of the more exacting demands being made on the standard of combat training and political education, the curricula of these universities have been upgraded and amended. In accordance with the "Statute of Evening Universities of Marxism-- Leninism" the so-called general faculties have been expanded. They are of great help in improving the quality of political education for Party activists.

Of late the Party and political work faculties and the faculties teaching the fundamentals of military education have undergone significant changes. Apart from studying the basic components of Marxism-Leninism their students study the rudiments of military education and psychology, the moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel and methods of Party propaganda and agitation.

Evening universities of Marxism-Leninism are usually staffed with experienced instructors. Almost every fourth instructor holds an academic degree in his particular field. The high academic qualifications of lecturers and instructors help the students to continue their exploration of Marxist-Leninist theory, and improve their own Party and political work on board naval vessels and on shore while continuing their normal duties.

Improvement of the standard of education at the evening universities and Party schools is facilitated by scientific and methodology councils, by consultation and methodology centres. The high academic standard of lecturers, seminar leaders and advisers makes it possible to maintain a required level of Party education during long-term cruises. Libraries attached to naval bases, advice-and-consultation and methodology centres also contribute to the same effort.

48

The system of Party education for the benefit of the crews of naval vessels and personnel of shore-based naval units is being continually improved. The current scientific and technological revolution has induced Party members in the Navy to concentrate their attention on an in-depth study of the various aspects of military and political guidance of troops, the techniques of moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel in the light of new developments. The prediction of Mikhail Frunze, the outstanding Soviet military leader of Civil War fame, to the effect that "Party and political work ... will remain the basis of Soviet military development'',^^1^^ and in some situations "will have the decisive importance"^^2^^ has come true.

The object of Party education is to enable commanders at all levels to get to know their men well in the concrete circumstances of naval service, and to steel them ideologically to ensure that they are fully capable of repulsing any aggression against the socialist Motherland.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. Agitation and Propaganda Work

Agitation and propaganda are among the principal ideological weapons in the arsenal of the Soviet Communist Party. Lenin, its founder, repeatedly emphasised the importance of this work. As a method of educating the masses in the spirit of revolutionary ideals, this work has always been and remains a potent weapon in the hands of the Party.

Groups and seminars of Marxist-Leninist education of officers, evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, lectures and other forms of work with propagandists constitute the predominant type of propaganda work _-_-_

^^1^^ M. V. Frunze, Collected Works, Moscow, 1965, p. 250 (in Russian).

^^2^^ Ibid., p. 488.

__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__ 4-128 49 carried on in the Soviet Navy. The priority use of agitational forms and methods may be occasioned by the specific conditions under which naval vessels and shorebased units operate. During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against nazi Germany efficient agitation among the troops was essential to mobilise them for an all-out effort to beat the enemy. This agitation was conducted and directed by commanders and political officers and by a whole army of rank-and-file agitators. In the postwar period during exercises, manoeuvres and cruises, the importance of relevant and effective agitation is as great as ever.

The basic object of mass political agitation is to contribute to the implementation of the policies and the decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet government. In the Soviet Army and Navy mass political agitation is called upon to mobilise the personnel to keep improving the standard of combat training and political education, to strengthen discipline, to maintain vigilance and combat preparedness at a high level. Agitation and propaganda work is designed to instil in the personnel profound conviction in communist ideals, Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism, uncompromising hatred for the enemies of communism, to strengthen their ideological staunchness and resistance to bourgeois influence in whatever form. An uncompromising struggle is being daily waged against hostile ideology and the aggressive essence and schemes of imperialism are unmasked.

The basic methods of agitation and propaganda work conducted in the Soviet Navy include:

---printed agitation and propaganda through books, pamphlets, leaflets, magazines and newspapers;

---oral agitation and propaganda through lectures, periodic reports, talks and consultations;

---poster agitation.

The specific ways of using these methods are decided by the naval commanders depending on many different factors and primarily the nature of the missions assigned to the naval vessel or unit in question. The concrete 50 conditions of life and work of naval personnel determine the specific forms of agitation to be conducted among them. In this work the Leninist principles of the organisation of agitation and propaganda work are strictly followed. These principles include: a class-oriented approach to the assessment of facts and developments, events of public life, the Party and principled approach, a sound scientific basis, and organic unity with the reality and practice of communist construction.

In this day and age with its high dynamism and massive scale of events and ideological confrontation between whole groups of countries the role of Party propaganda and agitation is greater than ever before. This has been emphasised by the 25th Congress of the CPSU which set the task of making the propaganda of communist ideals and concrete tasks of communist construction more active, purposeful and well-directed.

The combat record and day-to-day activities of the Soviet Navy in peacetime indicate that where the level of agitation and propaganda work is high and where the personnel is continually informed about political developments, the level of moral, political and psychological stability of the personnel is always higher and so are their discipline, vigilance and combat preparedness.

The resolutions adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU have repeatedly urged Party organisations to get leading commanders to take an active part in the propaganda and agitation work. Every officer and especially every Party member is expected to propagandise among his subordinates Lenin's behests, the great achievements scored by the Soviet Union since the October Revolution of 1917, to explain the historic role of the CPSU in the country's development and to fight bourgeois ideology and the survivals of the past in the mentality and behaviour of his subordinates. If a naval officer fails to propagandise the great ideas of communism with sufficient involvement and if he fails to mobilise his subordinates for new successes in combat training and political education he will fail in his main 51 duty as a military leader. Aware of this, the majority of naval commanders, political officers and Party members systematically meet their subordinates to talk with them on the topical questions of life and work of the country and its Armed Forces.

In organising agitation and propaganda work aboard their ships the commanders and political officers are guided by Lenin's instructions, by the relevant decisions of the CC CPSU and by directives issued by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. The deputy commander for political v/ork who is directly responsible for agitation and propaganda work among the personnel enlists the help of many Communists and Komsomols. He selects and educates propagandists and agitators trying to use the most effective .forms and methods of agitation and propaganda work.

Regular lectures and reports at meetings attended by personnel on topical questions relating to the life of the country and its Armed Forces and having a direct bearing on the service and training of the personnel concerned constitute a common form of propaganda and agitation work. The lecture should be ideologically and theoretically faultless, true to the fact and convincing, emotional and skilfully presented if it is to have a profound impact. Each lecture and each report is designed to help the audience to understand the policy of the Party correctly, to assess events at home and abroad objectively and see better their duty as servicemen to the country and the Communist Party.

Political information sessions are another form of agitation and propaganda work among naval personnel. These 30-minute sessions are held twice a week and attended by ratings, NCOs and midshipmen. Political information sessions for naval officers are held twice a month and focus on topical events at home and abroad. The Central Committee of the CPSU emphasises that Soviet people should be provided with political 52 information that is timely, accurate, ideologically correct, flexible and graphic.

It is the duty of the deputy commander for political work to inform well in advance the officers conducting political information sessions for the benefit of the personnel of the subjects to be discussed. He also sees to it that the officers have a good grasp of the subject of the political information session to be held and advise them on how best present the material, on how to concentrate on that which is most essential and what concrete examples drawn from the life of the ship, unit and element to select.

Many naval ships and units have special plans for propagandising Lenin's ideological heritage among the personnel. The so-called Lenin lectures constitute a popular form of this work. Lenin lectures usually cover such topics as "Lenin on the Leadership of the Communist Party'', "Lenin on Patriotism and Internationalism'', "Lenin on the Defence of the Socialist Motherland'', "Lenin on Soviet Military Discipline'', "Lenin on Revolutionary Vigilance'', etc. These plans also envisage lectures on individual works by Lenin such as "The Letter to Workers and Peasants on the Victory over Kolchak'', "The Letter to American Workers'', "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues'', "On Cultural and National Autonomy''. The Lenin lectures are a permanent feature of ideological work conducted among the personnel of the Soviet Navy.

Meetings are a traditional, time-honoured form of political and military education of ratings, NCOs, midshipmen and officers. The participation of naval personnel in discussions at meetings helps them to increase their political activity and acquire a sense of involvement and personal responsibility for the destiny of the common cause and brings them together into a close-knit military collective. Meetings are a good vehicle for educating personnel in the spirit of collectivism and they also provide a good opportunity for sharing experience. Meetings may either be held for officers, petty 53 officers and ratings separately or for all categories of naval personnel together depending on the agenda.

The agenda is suggested by the commander and his deputy for political work in consultation with the Secretary of the local Party Committee, the Komsomol Committee, and the activists. The agenda covers both general and local issues. These may include the decisions adopted by the Party Congress or by the latest plenary meeting of the CC CPSU, and their relevance to the tasks facing the Navy, a review of the results of combat training and political education at the end of a regular training period, a discussion of how the principles of communist morality are observed by the personnel concerned, a review of the fulfilment of socialist pledges, etc. The agenda is specified in the monthly plan of Party and political work which is drawn up by the deputy commander for political work.

It stands to reason that preparations for a meeting largely depend on its agenda. If, say, the agenda is devoted to the progress of fulfilment of socialist pledges, the deputy commander for political work together with Party and Komsomol activists meets the men to find out first-hand how they are coping with their socialist pledges and what difficulties and problems they encounter, and what help they may need. He may invite some of the men to speak at the meeting, share their experience and tell the audience how the fulfilment of pledges is being supervised and how the experience of the best among the men is made known to all the others. A well-prepared meeting is usually a complete success. General meetings of naval personnel devoted to the adoption of socialist pledges and the results of their fulfilment as part of the preparations for the 25th Congress of the CPSU were marked with a high level of activity displayed by all those attending. The crews of many naval vessels and the personnel of shore-based units put out special issues of wall newspapers, drew up diagrams and other means of poster propaganda. The decisions adopted by those meetings were concrete and 54 expressed the feeling of the entire personnel. As a rule the commanders and their deputies for political work periodically report back to their men on the progress of the implementation of the decisions adopted at the general meetings.

The personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy follow closely events at home and abroad. To help them keep themselves up-to-date on the latest developments, special question-and-answer sessions are arranged in off-duty hours. These deal with a wide range of topics including political events, legal matters, everyday routine, etc. These sessions are usually prepared well in advance and the personnel are informed of the subjects to be discussed and th^ose best equipped to answer all questions that may arise are selected.

Not infrequently, tasks are set to a naval vessel whose fulfilment demands quick and total mobilisation of the entire crew. Whenever this happens brief meetings of the crew are of great importance. During the war against nazi Germany such meetings were held on a regular basis to inform the fighting men of the latest decisions adopted by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, to tell them about the latest victories scored by the Red Army or to announce important battle missions lying ahead. Such brief meetings were also held to present orders and medals to those who had distinguished themselves on the battlefield, to give information of those who worked on the home front forging the weapons of victory, or to pay tribute to those who had fallen in battle. Such meetings boosted the spirit of the sailors and soldiers and filled them with determination to make the nazi invaders pay dearly for their crimes.

Meetings as a form of mass agitation work are still widely used. They are usually more effective when the brevity of speeches is combined with the speakers' skill to hold the attention of the audience. A good choice of the agenda of a meeting, careful preparations by the speakers, a brief and graphic draft of the decisions to be 55 adopted and a skilful use of poster propaganda are components of an effective meeting.

An agitation or propaganda measure is justified only if it has a beneficial effect on the views and aspirations of those it has been designed to affect. This applies to what are known as thematic evenings and youth debating sessions. The agenda of such evenings and debating sessions whether it is devoted to revolutionary and military traditions, the combat alliance of the armies of the socialist countries, etc., is noted for an in-depth approach to each subject discussed. These evenings and sessions are usually held in an atmosphere which stimulates active participation of the audience. Some of the more typical subjects discussed at such evenings and debating sessions include "Our Contemporary'', "The Meaning of Happiness'', "Friendship and Comradeship''. Experienced commanders and political officers know well the interests and aspirations of the younger servicemen and often not only suggest subjects for discussion at debating sessions, but also chair them. Those taking part may express any opinions and most controversial views and the chairman helps each participant adopt a correct class-motivated approach to the matter under discussion.

The system of communist education in the Soviet Navy embraces every officer and rating. A conversation, a friendly chat with an individual member of the crew is a most effective approach because, as a rule, an agitator knows the man's educational level, life experience, his weaknesses and strong points. In a friendly conversation either with a group or an individual questions often come up which the person concerned may hesitate to bring up before a large audience.

Agitators are soldiers of the political front who actively help the Communist Party to implement its policies. They should be thoroughly proficient in their service duties, have unassailable integrity, be well informed about a wide range of matters and should have a good leadership potential. It is a major duty of commanders, political officers as well as of Party 56 organisations to select carefully candidates for agitation work and to train them accordingly. Agitators are usually picked from among the personnel of platoons and elements of similar size, in certain cases from among the members of individual crews and personnel manning individual battle stations and sections of the ship. As a rule agitators are efficient and worthy Party and Komsomol members, both officers and men. Candidates are considered and approved by bureaus of Party and Komsomol organisations. Selection of officers and men for agitation and propaganda work is made on the basis of their general education level, political awareness and leadership potential.

To help agitators perform their duties more efficiently, special seminars, briefing sessions and schools are organised to help them learn the art of public speaking and public relations.

Wall newspapers, satirical newspapers, placards and other forms of poster propaganda are a great help to agitators in their work. The editors of ship's wall newspapers periodically report back to the rest of the crew.

Efficient and relevant agitation and propaganda work is unthinkable without national and local newspapers and magazines. Political officers, propagandists and agitators should take a constant interest in what newspapers and magazines the ratings read. Efficient work with periodicals, new books and magazines presupposes a good knowledge of the reading habits of the personnel, and includes collective reading sessions, discussion of the more topical and interesting articles, arranging consultations, debating sessions and readers' conferences.

Feature and documentary films, newsreels, popular science films and Moscow radio and TV broadcasts, as well as local sound and TV programmes are all used freely by agitators and propagandists. In many shorebased units and on board most naval vessels, it is standard practice for members of the crew to get 57 together for a listening-in session to hear the latest news. When the personnel are busy on duty while important news is broadcast, it is tape-recorded and later played back during rest periods.

Closed circuit radio broadcasts are a standard feature of everyday routine in the Soviet Navy. These programmes are created by a panel of editors (usually 7-10 members) chosen from among the personnel. The programmes are planned for a month ahead and are subject to approval by the deputy commander for political work. Typical broadcasts cover such topics as "The Heroism of Soviet Soldiers and Sailors During the Great Patriotic War'', "People in the News'', "A Calendar of Major Political and Military Events'', etc. Radio programmes often include such standing features as "This Week'', "The News of the World'', "Battle Stations Report'', "The Trend-Setters'', "Excellent Sailors and Specialists on the Factors Contributing to Their Success'', etc. Newspaper and magazine articles, chapters from books of the greatest interest to the ratings are often read over the ship's radio, along with letters from parents, friends and former workmates from back home, etc.

Also popular are broadcast programmes marking redletter events and other historic dates. Special TV viewing sessions are held at many shore-based units followed by discussions of the more interesting programmes.

Both shore-based units and naval vessels make wide use of posters, photo displays, diagrams and other forms of poster propaganda. Their subjects and design depend on the mission assigned to and the specific conditions of the unit or naval ship concerned. A high level of ideological commitment, simplicity of design, expressiveness and relevance are indispensable to effective poster agitation for the naval personnel.

Commanders, their deputies for political work and Party organisations try to involve all officers in agitation and propaganda activities. They also train them in the more effective ways of conducting this work. The 58 officers of many naval units attend special seminars dealing with such aspects of Party and political work, as "Political Information Sessions and How to Make Them More Effective'', "Conducting Personnel Meetings.'', "Effective Forms of Agitation and Propaganda'', "Activists as True Helpers of the Commander'', "How to Work with Individual Sailors'', etc. Senior commanders, political officers and members of Party committees and bureaus help officers to conduct their agitation and propaganda work.

Lecturer groups, agitation and propaganda teams are a popular form of agitation and propaganda work on a voluntary basis. These teams are set up by Party committees and bureaus from among the more experienced officers, staff officers, those in charge of services, engineers and technicians. Voluntary propagandists work in close contact with the commanders and political officers, and use their plans and recommendations as guidelines.

Commanders, political deaprtments and Party organisations work steadfastly to improve the theoretical and professional standard of the propagandists and agitators, to enhance their role in the education of the personnel of naval vessels and shore-based units.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. Cultural and Educational Activities

Cultural and educational work is designed to disseminate scientific knowledge among the naval personnel as well as information about the latest achievements in the realm of culture and the arts. As an integral part of ideological work conducted in the Soviet Navy, these activities contribute to improving the cultural level of the personnel and indirectly make for greater fighting efficiency of naval vessels and shore-based units.

Lenin saw a close link between cultural and educational work and the policy of the Party as the point of departure in organising the former. He wrote, "...along 59 the whole line of our educational work we have to abandon the old standpoint that education should be non-political; we cannot conduct educational work in isolation from politics.''^^1^^

Lenin's proposition on the need to develop in every way the creative potential of the masses and stimulate them to display initiative and ability for independent action in furthering cultural progress underlies the organisation of cultural and educational activities in the Soviet Navy.

In conformity with Lenin's relevant instructions, the CPSU attaches prime importance to ensuring that only politically mature and competent people run every aspect of cultural and educational work. The intimate connection of cultural and educational work with Party policy offers excellent opportunities for developing qualities in the navymen which are essential for making them efficient defenders of their country.

Lenin's teaching and the CPSU decisions relating to cultural and educational work define the fundamental principles underlying this work today. These include: commitment to the Party and communist ideals, an undeflectable sense of purpose, a close connection with the practice of communist construction, independent action and initiative, selective approach to work among the masses, with the regard for the age, educational level and nationality of the people involved.

The objects and tasks of cultural and educational work as a component of the system of communist education of the working people are defined in strict conformity with the above-mentioned principles. The basic goals of this work include propaganda of communist ideology, dissemination of scientific knowledge, explanation and popularisation of the scientific, materialist world outlook, dissemination of the more successful production methods and work experience, and last but not least, aesthetic education.

_-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 364.

60

Cultural and educational work in the Soviet Navy is conducted through a system of measures aimed at ensuring the communist and aesthetic education of the naval personnel with a view to moulding high moral, political and fighting qualities among them. Not only has the advent of naval vessels capable of operating for long periods away from base required different forms and methods of cultural and educational work but it has also offered new opportunities. Cultural and educational work is now geared to solving a psychological problem as it helps the sailors to relax and relieve the inevitable psychological tension and break the monotony.

On shore the principal foci of culture and education are usually the officers' clubs, clubs attached to naval bases, libraries, museums, clubs and rooms of combat glory, etc. During long-term cruises cultural and educational work is conducted by the ship's club, the Lenin cabins and libraries.

Rest periods are taken advantage of to conduct cultural and educational work among the personnel through introducing them to the literary masterpieces, good music, works of fine art, through presenting plays and showing films.

We will mention only some forms of cultural and educational work which are especially relevant for the Navy personnel. Amateur talent activities are extremely popular and constitute a major form of cultural and educational work among the naval personnel. These activities play a particularly important role in the Navy. Amateur talent activities help in keeping the collective together, help cultivate good taste and extend the cultural horizons of the participants. Amateur talent activities are a great help to the commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organisations in educating the personnel. At the same time a good song, a dance, a good joke are common features of the sailors' leisure time and put them in good cheer.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people songs full of revolutionary spirit and faith in victory 61 were equally popular with the men of the Soviet Army and Navy helping them to deal the enemy crushing blows.

Films are popular with naval personnel. Watching films is at once a way to relax and add to one's knowledge and experience, for cinema is a universal vehicle of culture incorporating literature, theatre and music.

The deputy commander for political work and the club manager are responsible for organising film shows in their units and ships. Party and Komsomol organisations also keep this service under constant supervision.

Naval units and vessels receive films from bases and well-stocked film storage and distribution centres. Film distribution centres usually send to the political departments and naval vessels lists of available films. A special magazine is published to help those responsible for film projection servicing make the right choice. The magazine provides advanced information on the more interesting films and carries a calendar of memorable events and red-letter dates with a recommended list of films to be shown to mark the appropriate occasions.

To increase the impact of each film on the audience they are told in advance about the subject and message of the film to be shown and after the showing a discussion is held.

Film evenings and film festivals are increasingly popular, with naval personnel. Film festivals are usually held to mark historic events and red-letter dates in the life of the country and its Armed Forces or they are held to highlight specific tasks facing the naval personnel in their combat training. Here are some of the more typical themes of film festivals: "The Communist Party as the Organiser and Inspirer of the Great October Socialist Revolution'', "Lenin, the Founder of the Soviet State'', "The Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War'', "The Friendship of the Peoples of the Socialist Community'', "We Are Building Communism'', etc.

Film festivals devoted to subjects relating to military 62 education have been found useful. To sharpen the vigilance of the personnel it could be useful to show them films which emphasise the importance of high level of vigilance in the face of enemy intrigues and scheming.

Great importance is attached to encouraging bookreading and good reading habits among the naval personnel. Relevant decisions of the CC CPSU on the conduct of ideological work call for converting libraries into centres of mass propaganda of political, general and professional knowledge.

The ship's library is the place where members of the crew can relax over a good book and add to their knowledge and experience. It should be well stocked with literature on political, military and artistic subjects as well as with works of fiction. The ship's library should be built around a nucleus of well-chosen books. The basic stock of books should be periodically added to with the latest publications on all the essential subjects so that the library is able to cater to the particular interests of the members of the crew in accordance with the tasks and missions facing the ship. Care should also be taken to meet the needs of those members of the crew who take a course of Marxism-Leninism and political science and also the interests of the crew arising from the ship's operation in a particular part of the world.

The plans of an efficient library service should cover the need for keeping the crew informed of the latest books on social and political subjects, military science and the best of the books of fiction. To keep the personnel informed of the latest literature readers' conferences are held as well as literary evenings, group discussions, boolc exhibitions and selection of literature on the current problems of Marxist-Leninist education and the study of political subjects. In addition to measures designed for group participation it is also important to conduct library work on an individual basis. The knowledge of individual reading requirements is essential.

63

Library councils composed of the more active readers from among the crew play an important part in efforts to improve the library service on board ship. The councils work out and implement measures to keep the personnel informed of the latest books and help in establishing mobile libraries.

[64] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter III __ALPHA_LVL1__ The Moral, Political
and Psychological Training
of Naval Personnel
on a Day-to-Day Basis __ALPHA_LVL2__ [introduction.]

The officers and men of the Soviet Navy lead busy lives as they carry out the tasks and missions assigned to them by the Soviet Communist Party and government. They are undergoing daily combat training, naval vessels make long-term cruises, naval aircraft patrol the skies over the seas and oceans, ships and fighting equipment are maintained and overhauled, staffs, naval establishments and research institutes are working intensively on their particular tasks. In the course of this intense and varied activity the officers and men of the Soviet Navy are developing high moral, political and combat qualities. The impact of the day-to-day activity is direct and concrete, and this impact is the greater the longer the influence of its factors and conditions: Marx and Engels wrote that consciousness is nothing else than conscious being and the being of men is their actual life-process.^^1^^ Ideologically committed, staunch, conscientious and strong personalities are moulded by life itself. High moral and combat qualities of the Soviet naval personnel are moulded by the entire way of life in the Soviet Navy.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. The Impact of Naval Service
and Daily Life on Naval Personnel

The intense life of each Soviet naval vessel, unit, staff, headquarters and establisment from dawn till dusk is _-_-_

^^1^^ Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 36.

__PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5-128 65 packed with an infinite number of events. For all their variety and differences there are not a few factors which are common to and characteristic of the daily activities and form the framework of the entire naval routine. In the course of their intense activities the officers and men of the Soviet Navy are subject to a number of recurrent influences shaping definite views, opinions, convictions, interests, ideals, traits and abilities which help them become efficient navymen. In this process political, moral, combat, military, technical and naval factors are of prime importance.

The leading role of the CPSU, communist ideology, Soviet morality, social and economic structure of Soviet society and its development exert the decisive influence on the shaping of naval service and life in the Soviet Navy. Indeed, each naval collective is part and parcel of Soviet society and it lives the life of the Soviet people. The political essence of Soviet Navy service is the defence of the Soviet system, socialist gains and the ideals of communism. The Soviet Constitution defines in precise terms the object and task of the Soviet Navy: the defence of the socialist Motherland is the sacred duty of each Soviet citizen.

This ultimate goal of the Soviet naval service creates the powerful political and moral background to the everyday activity of each officer and man of the Soviet Navy and determines the evolution of his political and moral qualities. In the course of their service in the Navy each rating and officer consolidates his communist convictions and views and the ability to combine his personal interests with those of the society as a whole. He further develops his respect for the laws and moral principles of Soviet society and better realises the need to work for the happiness of the people. He acquires greater interest in work for the benefit of the community, as well as a feeling of patriotism, duty and responsibility, conscious discipline, integrity and conscientiousness. His attitudes in general become more active.

66

All this is typical and characteristic for the personnel of the Soviet Navy. This does not mean of course that all this happens of itself or in the same way everywhere. Much depends on the work of the commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organisations. The experience of the best of them who have achieved excellent results in the moral, political and psychological training of the personnel makes it possible to identify the following typical trends in the efficient and correct guidance of the everyday activities of the naval personnel.

The spirit of lofty ideological commitment and political awareness should permeate the day-to-day routine of the Soviet Navy. Soviet people everywhere during service in the Armed Forces or in civilian life are united by their common concern for the good of their country and the progress of communist construction. They are united by their identical class interests and by the absence of antagonistic contradictions whether they are the rank and tile or commanders. When the common ideological and class platform is appreciated and understood by all navymen as the basis of their lives then the naval collective acquires monolythic strength, and undesirable social and psychological phenomena are absent-the collective is able to educate all its members in the proper way.

Considerable attention is given to the all-important task of developing a sense of responsibility for constant combat readiness among the ratings, NCOs, midshipmen, and officers This is a major part of military education and all work towards the accomplishment of this goal is based on the development of a conscious, class-- motivated and Party-oriented approach to everything among the naval personnel. The typical example of this work is provided by the Northern Naval Command where the crew of a submarine are given regular lectures and reports on topics such as "Lenin on the Personal Responsibility for One's Assigned Service Duty'', "The 25th Congress of the CPSU on the Growing 67 Responsibility of Armed Forces Personnel for the Defence of the Socialist Motherland''. Talks are given on the essence and meaning of personal responsibility for combat preparedness, on the role of responsibility and fulfilment of one's Party and service duties. Questions of personal responsibility are systematically discussed at Party and Komsomol general meetings, bureau meetings and meetings and conferences attended by all the personnel. Exhibitions, photo displays and posters are used at all the battle stations and in quarters which highlight Lenin's instructions on personal responsibility for one's assigned duty and on the responsibility of the crew arising from the prescriptions of the naval service manuals and statute. Every Soviet sailor is taught to see public interests as his own. The requirements of the Oath of Allegiance and naval statute on the proper and efficient fulfilment by every officer and man of his service duties are constantly emphasised.

The political and moral impact of daily life in the Soviet Navy is greatest when the day-to-day activities of the naval personnel are modelled on the best aspects and features of the life of Soviet society in general, the intense work on building communism and moulding the new man. Soviet naval personnel are educated on the basis of the best examples of honourable and conscientious service to the country and the people, on the basis of practical deeds contributing to the strengthening of communist ideology and morality and the material basis of communism. As Anton Makarenko, a well-known Soviet educator and writer, put it, "real education is one based on educational principles of the whole of society''. In other words, the everyday activities of each Soviet naval vessel should be based on the best features of Soviet society such as a high level of civic commitment, rectitude, integrity, respect for one's comrades combined with an exacting attitude to oneself and others, etc. The creation of the most favourable atmosphere for the education of naval personnel in a proper spirit is facilitated by a high level of activity of all 68 public organisations, including Party and Komsomol organisations, the editorial boards of the ship wall newspapers, agitators, rationalisers, etc. Versatility of the collective's life is very important. Properly organised service and rest periods, an exacting attitude and consideration for the needs of one and all, combat training and sport activities, amateur talent activities, the ship's choir-all these factors should be skilfully balanced. The entire crew should be involved in active efforts to improve the level of combat efficiency and preparedness, to tighten up discipline, to establish communist morality both in service and non-service life; initiative, high level of activity, creativity, responsibility and the ability to act on one's own in non-service environments should be encouraged. Properly organised and efficient socialist emulation and struggle against passivity, indifference and apathy are essential.

The impact and character of everyday activity largely depend on the prestige and authority of the ship's Party and Komsomol organisations. Primary Party cells play the decisive role in efforts to implement the Party's policy, to educate the Party members, to keep the Party and the masses together. Communists have always been in the van of the struggle for implementing the Party's defence policy. In the intense activities of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Communists are always mindful of and implement the wise Party dictum to the effect that Party members enjoy no special privileges except one-to lead the way and to go where the-going is toughest. It is not for nothing that Party members are always in the front ranks setting the example for others to follow. Their own work is the yardstick of a high sense of commitment to principle, exacting attitude and rectitude.

The impact of progressive ideas and action in both service and public life of Party and Komsomol activists largely depends on their ability to not only preach but to practise what they preach.

The moral atmosphere in a naval collective is influenced to a great extent by the specific circumstances 69 of its life and service as a military unit. These circumstances manifest themselves through the specific tasks and missions assigned to the particular naval collective. They are also a derivative of the actual conditions, available means, service organisation, military discipline, one-man management and unconditional obedience to orders and instructions in strict accordance with the naval statute and the relationships prescribed by it.

Naval service, particularly on board ship, has always been a model of efficiency, precise organisation and castiron discipline. Nor can it be otherwise. Strict order and discipline prescribed by the naval regulation presupposes an efficient and precise organisation of combat training and political education, a system of watch duties, the strict observance of prescribed principles of relationships between the commander and his subordinates, between senior and junior ranks, as well as the observance by each member of the ship's crew of standards of behaviour prescribed by the regulations, and care and responsibility in handling the equipment and weapon entrusted to him. All this creates a stimulating atmosphere on board ship for efficient military training and discipline enabling both the commanders and their subordinates to fulfil their respective duties efficiently. Those ships which feature the best standards of organisation, where the commander shows an exacting attitude to himself and to his subordinates the members of the crew carry out his orders undeviatingly, act with resolve, overcome their shortcomings and show a high sense of discipline in discharging their service duties. Conversely lack of order and organisation, poor discipline, negligence and carelessness, slipshod ways, etc., inflict great damage on the work to mould the moral, political and psychological qualities which are indispensable for navymen.

Under the impact of the circumstances of their daily military service life the officers and men of the Soviet Navy acquire combat skills, knowledge of military science, develop definite views, convictions, ideals, 70 interests, inclinations and needs and they also develop their volitional and emotional qualities so essential to navymen. They develop a specific naval mentality and become professionals in the best sense of the word and display increasing aptitude as tacticians, commanders, organisers, technicians, instructors, etc. All this is typical of the entire Navy personnel and of every surface ship and submarine. However the efficiency and success of military education vary from ship to ship and depend on the level of organisation, order, discipline and combat preparedness.

Lenin's instruction on the need for stringent military discipline is a law of Soviet naval service. As Soviet Admiral Gorshkov emphasised, "military discipline and personal responsibility for the job in hand are the basis of the constant preparedness of the men of the Soviet Navy to defend their socialist country''.^^1^^

The concept of military discipline has taken on a new, contemporary dimension and today covers such aspects as time discipline, watch duty discipline and technical discipline. During a long-term cruise in the ocean failure by a single member of the crew to show a high sense of discipline may result in the failure of his entire ship to fulfil the mission and even result in disaster. Cast-iron military discipline is manifested in maintaining a high level of constant readiness to use weapons and equipment at short notice, in the strict observance of every prescription of the service regulations and instructions in the course of day-to-day naval activities; it is manifested in the high level of personal responsibility shown by every crewman for the successful fulfilment of the tasks facing not only him individually but the crew as a whole.

High sense of discipline as a part of the make-up of the Soviet navymen is a derivative of his moral habits _-_-_

~^^1^^ S. G. Gorshkov, "The 23rd Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of the Navymen'', Morskoi Sbornik (Collection of Materials on the Naval Problems), 1966, No. 5 (in Russian).

71 and behavioral pattern, it is a derivative of his attitude to the observance of moral principles, laws, regulations and orders issued by his commander. As the Soviet educator Makarenko put it, "in our Soviet society a properly disciplined person is one who no matter what the circumstances is able to adopt a course of action and a pattern of behaviour which brings maximum benefit to society and who is firm enough to keep to this line of behaviour to the end''.

The entire system of political and military education in the Soviet Navy is geared to efforts to inculcate in every officer and man a high sense of discipline. This discipline-moulding process is conducted during the training and practical activities involved in the fulfilment of service duties by the entire naval personnel. The advanced experience of many successful commanders and political officers indicates that in organising work on tightening up conscious military discipline they pay particular attention to explaining to the personnel the tasks facing Soviet society building communism and the tasks and missions facing the Soviet Navy in its prime duty to defend the socialist Motherland and thus maintain the level of combat preparedness of each ship, each battle station and of each man at the highest level possible. To this end regular and large-scale campaigns are conducted to popularise Lenin's statements on matters of military discipline; regular lectures, reports and talks are given using Lenin's speeches and statements on the relevant subjects as well as reminiscences of veteran Bolsheviks about Lenin. The officers and men of the Soviet Navy are continually reminded of the essentials of the Oath of Allegiance, the terms of service regulations. They are told about the time-honoured naval traditions and customs. This work is aimed at inculcating in the Soviet naval personnel a conviction that without cast-iron discipline they will not be able to fulfil their service duties in the proper fashion. A high level of discipline is essential to victory in war and high level of combat preparedness in peacetime. Discipline 72 and efficient organisation imply genuine freedom for each officer and man for the simple reason that they will not be able to cope with their individual duties unless there is strict discipline and order. The interests of the collective should be put first and always be above the interests of an individual. A high level of discipline helps a naval collective to maintain high standards of rectitude and efficiency. True discipline is such when every officer and man observes it in a conscious and customary way without painfully overcoming an inner reluctance to do so, when every officer and man feels satisfaction in being what he should be---an efficient and disciplined navyman.

The system of inducing every officer and man to show a high level of discipline on the basis of strict observance of relevant naval regulations is a major means of tightening up military discipline among the crews of naval vessels. This system, by enhancing the ideological motivation for good behaviour and discipline, induces every officer and man to show a high level of discipline and gives them an incentive to carry out their service duties conscientiously and in a proper fashion. This system covers a constant and in-depth study of the naval regulations and Oath of Allegiance, of the norms and standards of bahaviour expected from every serviceman under a variety of situations, constant emphasis on these regulations during briefings for the crew and during training sessions and conversations. Every officer and man of the Soviet Navy is kept mindful of his personal responsibility for the strict observance of the standards of behaviour and discipline prescribed by the appropriate naval regulations.

A high level of military discipline can be achieved only when all commanders and officers constantly supervise the behaviour of their subordinates. This supervision is ensured by precise planning, service organisation in strict accordance with the naval regulations, strict regimentation of the behaviour and actions of the personnel (stipulated in day-to-day schedules and 73 timetables on board ship, operating instructions, regulations governing the conduct of watch and other duties), by the strict allocation of duties among the crew members, the appointment of those responsible for the fulfilment of these duties, by making NCOs and midshipmen directly responsible for the conduct of their subordinates and by an exacting attitude to the precise and efficient fulfilment of duties by every man on board and by constant checking on performance.

The experience gained by naval vessels and units to date has proved the effectiveness of special training sessions designed to improve the standards of service organisation in accordance with the prescriptions of the relevant naval regulations.

The issuance of orders and instructions in a precise and well-defined way helps those who receive them to acquire a habit of fulfilling them properly. The naval officer issuing orders to his subordinates should always specify who will be ultimately responsible for the fulfilment of the order, set a realistic deadline and see to it that the deadline is met as well as that the order is carried out to the letter and efficiently. The issuance of too many orders and instructions and failure to check on their fulfilment militate against high standards of discipline and precise fulfilment of the orders by the subordinates.

The disciplinary statute of the Soviet Armed Forces emphasises encouragement, which brings the best results when the commanders commend or reward the actions of a deserving serviceman in good time and properly, when they encourage or reward him as he deserves and when they do so with a proper degree of publicity in an appropriately formal ceremony and when they explain to the rest of the crew why one of them is being praised and for what.

Penalties and other forms of punishment are designed to discourage those who commit actions running counter to the legal and moral principles of military discipline. The penalties are all the more effective as a deterrent 74 when they are just and understood by the entire crew, when they are justified from the military and moral standpoints, when the imposition of penalties is given wide publicity and when subsequently, if the offending crewman corrects his behaviour, they are remitted.

Disciplinary practice is a matter of striking a correct balance between punishment and encouragement. Undue emphasis on extreme measures, limited and insufficient participation of NCOs in disciplinary practice and the substitution of senior officers for junior ones for the purpose of enforcement of disciplinary measures do more harm than good in strengthening military discipline. A systematic analysis of disciplinary practice contributes to improving service organisation and order as prescribed by the relevant regulation. In advance of such analysis and review sessions special diagrams and tables are prepared indicating which of the crew violated military discipline and when, and the punishment imposed and also the effect that punishment has had. Comparisons are made between the behaviour of the offending members of the crew in the previous period and after the imposition of the penalty, between the disciplinary records of different units, etc.

A constant attention and an equally exacting attitude to everyone by all commanders and men in charge is crucial to strengthening discipline and establishing a model order on board ship. The ship's commander and his subordinates often carry out their respective duties side by side and they usually spend rest periods together. This sometimes creates an atmosphere in which some commanders tend to relax existing regulations on strict subordination and maintenance of prescribed order which results in a less exacting attitude and oversimplified interpretation of some of the naval regulations. It is therefore essential to see to it that the prescribed standards of behaviour and subordination as well as service requirements are fully observed. Abrupt fluctuations in the level of exactingness shown by the commander to his subordinates are often put down by them 75 to the commander's unbalanced and unpredictable nature. When that happens the meaning and educational impact of the commander's work are reduced and distorted. Failure by some of the officers and petty officers to show an equally exacting attitude to every member of the crew, without bias or favour and particularly a liberal attitude on their part discredit the very idea of a strict discipline and service order on board a naval ship.

The commander's own example and the conduct of the Party and Komsomol activists among the crew have a great influence on the behaviour of the rest of the crew, especially during prolonged cruises and flights when the men have to work as a team for long periods.

The forms and methods of strengthening discipline and maintaining service order as prescribed by the regulations depend to a certain extent on the specific conditions under which a naval vessel has to operate and on her missions. For instance, the explanation of the political, moral and legal implications of military discipline to the crews of naval vessels during prolonged cruises in international waters takes on special importance. In this context emphasis should be laid on public relations and in particular on relations with the civilian population of the coutries being visited, on the explanation of the class and national special features of these countries. The crew should be briefed on the specific aspects of their duties under the specific conditions. A strictly individual approach should be adopted in working among the crewmen. Naval officers should show a patient, tactful and considerate attitude to their subordinates. They should be able to understand their mentality and foresee the consequences of all the decisions they make and of the orders they issue.

The technical aspects of day-to-day naval routine also exert a definite influence on the moulding of moral, political and psychological qualities among members of the crew. Traditionally, the Navy has been one of the most technologically advanced and heavily equipped 76 armed services. The navymen of today have to work as a team manning a complex and sophisticated machine that a naval vessel or aircraft is, together with which they form a single ``man-machine'' interface. The ship is also their home. Day and night each navyman finds himself in a specific technological environment. One part of this environment is represented by the weapons, equipment and maintenance procedures; the other-by the manning personnel, specialists with their particular interests, hobbies, personal plans, reading habits and the way they spend their leisure time. This inevitably leaves an imprint on the minds of navymen stimulating them to develop particular interests and abilities (technical mentality, professional sense of attention, memory, etc.). These help the navymen to acquire specialist knowledge, skills and habits.

The everyday influence of these factors is taken into account by the officers supervising the moral, political and psychological training of navymen with a view to developing in them a sense of discipline, organisation, clock-work precision in the execution of duties, a conscientious attitude to the job in hand, respect for naval regulations and instructions. Innovating, rationalising and technical ingenuity activities, technical study groups, dissemination of knowledge of military technology, technical quizzes also help to achieve this end.

The maritime factors, including the daily naval routine either on board ship or on shore, the daily battle against the elements, long-term cruises and flights with their specific difficulties and atmosphere, the specific moral climate prevailing on board ship, naval history, traditions and customs, also exert an appreciable impact on the development of the naval mentality and character of seamen. Konstantin Ushinsky, a famous Russian educator of the 19th century, put it well when he wrote, "Once the character of a sailor moulded by the entire naval history where storms and battles were a daily 77 occurrence takes shape it is easily transmitted from one man to another, from one generation of sailors to another. A young sailor upon joining the crew of a naval vessel finds himself in the company of seasoned experienced sailors and quickly falls under their influence absorbing much of their character that has been moulded by generations of seamen. This character before long conquers ... the unstable and susceptible nature of a young recruit and finds in his soul fresh and fertile soil for further development. In this way the naval lore develops and a typical naval personality is moulded and thus yet another navyman becomes a custodian of naval traditions.''

The impact of maritime factors on the Soviet navyman of today is even greater since it has taken on a new dimension now that the Soviet Navy can operate world-wide. On a given naval ship this influence is greatest when the crew systematically participate in long-term cruises. This influence is greater when the moral and psychological training of navymen is properly organised and conducted, when the navymen go in for typically naval sports, when they are systematically told of the proud combat record of the Soviet Navy, of the undying revolutionary, combat and naval traditions.

These then are some of the basic factors influencing the life and work of Soviet navymen, their moral, political and psychological make-up. These factors take on added importance and new aspects during prolonged cruises in international waters on which more later (Chapters). The typical factors-of daily naval service have the greatest impact on naval officers, for whom service in the Navy is a life-time occupation. Therefore, careful control and regulation of the impact of these factors on naval cadets acquire special importance if only because the young are particularly responsive to training and are the Navy's future.

78 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. The Moulding of Fine Moral,
Political and Psychological Qualities
Through Combat Training

The rapid progress of military science and technology has imposed exacting demands on the training of naval personnel. Without a well-designed and efficient system of training victory in modern war is unthinkable. Lenin wrote in this connection, "Even the best of armies, even people most sincerely devoted to the revolutionary cause will be immediately exterminated by the enemy, if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food and trained.''^^1^^

Combat skills essential to naval personnel for accomplishing their assigned missions have definite moral and psychological implications. Indeed, a navyman's own realisation that he is superior to his opponent fills him with confidence and adds to his strength. A navyman thoroughly proficient in his combat duties can act with confidence in any combat situation while a poorly trained one is nervous, loses his head, takes rash and ill-considered decisions. Awareness of one's own inadequacy fills one with alarm, anxiety, apathy and fear.

Combat skill exerts a beneficial moral and psychological impact on one's teammates. Thus, a high level of professional training displayed by a commander, his confident and resolute actions transmit themselves to his subordinates and make them psychologically stable in battle. A high level of combat skill displayed by his subordinates in turn enables their commander to act boldly and effectively. One's confidence in the high combat skill of one's fellow crewmen gives him added strength.

Moral and political education given during combat training sessions and exercises. Each training session and exercise should be used to the full to improve the moral _-_-_

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 76.

79 and political condition of participating personnel. One of the basic aims of moral and political education of navymen during combat training sessions is to develop a science-based communist world outlook, an acute sense of duty and responsibility for the defence of the socialist Homeland and all other socialist countries.

Studying the nature of a possible war as part of combat training sessions, the Soviet navymen form definite views and convictions which are so essential if they are to become efficient defenders of their country. Soviet navymen learn to analyse the course of events with realism and a cool head, to sort out the background to particular developments and see their interdependence and interconnection. Combat training sessions must be designed in such a way as to help the participating personnel to see the great political and national importance of naval service and the responsibility devolving on every one of them for the defence of his country.

Combat training is considered successful in the moral and political sense if it helps the participating naval personnel to acquire a profound sense of duty and responsibility. In the course of combat training the navymen acquire affection for naval service, for their particular jobs, and they grow attached to their particular ship and are proud of her. The Soviet navymen of today are expected to know more and to perform better than ever before. Acquiring a high level of combat skill takes a lot of hard work. Not everybody has what it takes in equal measure. As they work steadily to gain complete proficiency in the handling of their weapons and equipment, Soviet navymen develop an undeflectable sense of purpose, persistence as well as a critical attitude to themselves, they become more disciplined, better organised and they achieve clock-work precision in the performance of their respective duties. In addition they develop the all-important ability to work as a team.

Flawless and efficient fulfilment of plans on a daily, weekly and monthly basis, precise organisation of training sessions, careful preparations for them, a high 80 level of discipline during training sessions and an exacting attitude to all on the part of supervising officers, constant analysis of the standard of performance displayed by every man and a well-designed and organised individual work and study are factors contributing to effective educational work on board any naval vessel. The collective character of combat training makes it possible to bring the crew of a naval vessel closer together, to create a healthy moral, political and psychological atmosphere among the men, and to improve morale and camaraderie.

Collectivism as a moral quality manifests itself in the desire of each member of the crew to see his crewmates well trained and disciplined. The naval officers conducting combat training sessions, Party and Komsomol organisations always ask experienced and efficient members of the crew to help their less experienced young fellow crewmen to catch up with the rest of the team. This also helps to bring members of the crew closer together and instil in every man a sense of collectivism and camaraderie. It is a feature of the Soviet Navy that its officers and men help one another not only because they are supposed to do so but because they want to help each other in keeping with a fine naval tradition. As always Communists lead the way.

Commanders and staffs should assess the results of combat training sessions in such a way as to stimulate the desire of the trainees to keep on improving their performance rather than rest on their laurels. If the commanders and staffs do so they help create a stimulating atmosphere in which members of the personnel show a high level of activity and persistence in working harder to acquire complete proficiency in their particular duties and jobs.

Combat training sessions strengthen the faith of the participating navymen in the superiority of the socialist system and its armed forces, in the superior qualities of Soviet weapons and equipment over those of capitalist countries. The acquisition of complete proficiency in the __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6-128 81 handling of weapons and equipment and the achievement on this basis of excellent results and a high level of performance are an important positive factor in the superior morale of Soviet navymen and in the high combat preparedness of the Navy. The harder the combat training of Soviet navymen the better they are able to repulse a potential aggressor's surprise attack, the greater their confidence in their ability to win in any situation.

Some young navymen may show lack of confidence in the potential performance characteristics of the weapons and equipment they see on board ship. To strengthen their confidence it is essential to give them practical demonstrations of what these weapons and equipment can do, and experienced specialists and officers must show to the young recruits the full extent of the reliability and survivability of the ship and her weapons and equipment. This can be achieved both through oral explanations and through practical exercises in methods of counteracting the enemy, as well as through simulation of critical situations when the whole crew have to work as a team to keep their ship afloat and in good repair, through exercises in techniques of individual and collective defence and in ways of ensuring concealment of actions. The confidence of every crewman becomes stronger as he sees for himself the results of practical demonstrations and exercises in eliminating the consequences of a nuclear attack by a potential enemy, as he sees the results of training sessions in simulated critical situations involving damage to the ship or escaping from a sunken submarine, etc.

Party and political work contributes to making the moral and political education combat training more purposeful and effective. Regular group discussions of the tasks and missions lying ahead, of the progress and results of combat training at Party and Komsomol meetings, practical demonstrations by best specialists, the holding of technical quizzes and competitions in specific specialities and jobs, helping laggers to catch up 82 with the rest of the team, individual and group conversations, the use of moral inducements and encouragement and other measures all contribute to the achievement of the all-important goal: efficient performance by every member of the crew in the fulfilment of his assigned duty.

Socialist emulation in the course of combat training session helps the participating navymen to acquire complete proficiency in the handling of their weapons and equipment and achieve top-notch performance in working towards the goals of combat training and maintaining a high level of combat preparedness. In recent years the officers and men of the Soviet Navy have come out with a patriotic initiative to ensure flawless and efficient performance by everyone and to help each navyman become an expert at his particular job.

This campaign was initiated by the crew of the 50 Years of the USSR nuclear-powered submarine. This initiative was taken up by the entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces and was later duly approved by the Ministry of Defence and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The basic methods of psychological training of Soviet navymen. Practice sessions covering tactical, fire, specialist and physical training offer excellent opportunities for efficient psychological training of the Navy personnel. These training sessions, exercises and manoeuvres are so planned as to prepare the participating navymen for difficulties and dangers of possible combat situations. The experience they gain in the course of exercises helps them overcome extreme levels of psychological stress and keep their head in a critical situation.

A well-thought out and designed organisation of psychological training is a guarantee of its effectiveness. Success can only be achieved provided each officer supervising training sessions knows exactly what he should do. Experience indicates that psychological training should be based on the following principles:

83

--- careful elaboration of a programme of psychological training;

--- detailed break-down of the programme in accordance with the assigned goals and missions and the introduction of additional (psychological) goals for training sessions, exercises and manoeuvres;

--- carefull selection and frequent employment of methods ensuring a powerful psychological impact on the personnel participating in training sessions and exercises;

---the creation and improvement of the available facilities (training grounds, simulation equipment, fields, firing ranges);

--- the preparation of training manuals and aids;

--- the training of the officers in charge in methods of psychological conditioning;

--- assessment of the level of psychological training of personnel during check-ups and critiques.

A programme of psychological training covers a range of psychological characteristics which the participating personnel should acquire to be fully prepared for the accomplishment of the combat missions assigned to them. Emphasis is normally laid on points common to all navymen and also on specific characteristics to be acquired by the group of navymen in question ( depending on their service, job, rank, previous experience, etc.).

The general points of a psychological training programme to be fulfilled in the course of combat training include:

---strengthening of justified inner confidence of the personnel in their superiority over potential enemy in weapons, organisation and training. The development of complete confidence in their weapons, in their teammates, commanders and in themselves and in their ability to accomplish their assigned missions;

--- the formation of realistic and clear ideas among the personnel of their level of combat preparedness, of the character of possible naval warfare on the seas and oceans;

84

--- the study of the moral and psychological make-up of a potential enemy;

--- the development of psychological readiness in every man and in every naval collective as a whole to overcome the hardships and difficulties of war should it be unleashed by an aggressor;

---the ability to act with determination and resolve and to make sacrifices, including the ultimate selfsacrifice;

---the development of resistance to extreme psychological stress, to the difficulties of modern warfare and the formation of prolonged psychological endurance;

--- lessening excessive inner psychological tension in the course of combat training;

---the inculcation of a sense of purpose, stimulation of high level of activity, persistence, organisation, resoluteness and clock-work precision in actions and movements;

---the development of self-control, sangfroid, presence of mind, optimism, resistance to the negative impact of temporary setbacks and stimulation of the inconquerable determination to fulfil the assigned mission;

---the continual development of psychological stability of personnel in face of surprise factors, the development of a correct reaction to any twist in the situation, of the ability for flexible and energetic actions in a critical situation;

--- the development of the ability for clear thinking, ingenuity and prompt action by all members of the crew;

---the development of psychological qualities which are important professionally such as perception, attention, good memory, imagination, effective speech habits;

---the development of collectivist qualities such as a feeling of friendship, camaraderie and readiness to help others;

---the adaptation of the personnel to naval service away from home in various conditions in any part of the world.

Each naval vessel, each naval unit, staff and political 85 department adjusts its own programme of psychological training to fit the needs of the personnel in question taking into account their age and experience, rank, job and speciality and the nature of their duties and service, etc.

The psychological training of Navy personnel varies depending on the specific missions assigned to particular arms and services. Different categories of navymen deal with different weapons and equipment and find themselves in different circumstances. Accordingly they undergo psychological training in different ways both collectively and individually.

There is a preliminary psychological training course covering a full range of goals set before navymen and brief psychological training sessions held just before they begin accomplishing their assigned mission. The ultimate goal of psychological training of any kind is the development of a sense of readiness among the personnel to carry out their mission in the complex conditions of modern naval warfare.

Psychological training is conducted by methods designed to accustom naval personnel to accomplishing their mission under conditions which must be as realistic as possible. This is achieved by a convincing simulation of combat situations and by exposing participating personnel to the factors of a realistic combat situation where both their professional and psychological qualities are put to test. Only under such conditions surrounding their training can participating naval personnel learn to overcome fear and gain confidence in their ability to win.

The realistic simulation of combat situations during training sessions and exercises is attained by the selection of an appropriate place, time and condition, by simulating as realistically as possible enemy attacks and using live ammunition. To this end training sessions and exercises are held at sea, at night and in bad weather with weapons and equipment being widely used to simulate a realistic combat situation. During the 86 exercises all the requirements of the statute and manuals are strictly observed and their feasibility is demonstrated in practice.

Additional difficulties exerting a strong psychological impact on participating personnel are created by introducing the element of surprise, by conducting an exercise and training sessions at top speed, by introducing many unpredictable twists in the situation, dangers and risk and by making every participating navyman show a high sense of responsibility for his actions in counteracting the enemy. These difficulties are further exacerbated by assigning extremely complex missions and by conducting exercises for prolonged periods all of which imposes extreme psychological and physical strain on the personnel.

To develop the ability to spring into resolute and energetic action at any moment, and pass over from anticipation to action under unfavourable conditions, to develop reflexes and lightning response to any twist in the situation, general alarms are sounded and combat missions assigned at any time by day or by night and unexpected spot checks of combat readiness are held; enemy surprise attacks under the most unfavourable conditions are simulated; unexpected twists in the situation are prepared in total secrecy, and introduced without announcement; situations are created allowing no time for preparation and calling for prompt response; and a high tempo is maintained similar to the one in a real combat situation or again, the tempo changes abruptly, etc.

Ingenuity, resourcefulness and ability for an imaginative response to any twist in the situation, psychological resistance to unexpected events are developed ( particularly among naval officers) by introducing confusion and new elements in the situation. To this end conflicting reports on the situation are circulated, the theatre of operations is shifted about, difficulties are created making it impossible to act in a well-accustomed and routine way, the approved plan of the training exercise is 87 deliberately changed, and unusual and unexpected missions are assigned.

The necessity to operate under conditions involving high risk, dangers and a high sense of responsibility deliberately created during training sessions and exercises help the participating navymen to develop courage, capacity for bold and flexible action as well as psychological stability and staunchness. What is involved is not only a matter of danger to health and life but also a matter of maintaining weapons and equipment in serviceable order, and of failing to win good marks for combat training and lose prestige in the eyes of commanding officers and teammates. The simulation of realistic combat environment during training sessions, particularly during control sessions, by definition involves elements of danger, risk and responsibility, above all in the case of those who organise and supervise training sessions. If a naval officer takes the line of least resistance and tends to oversimplify things he betrays his own inadequate moral and psychological training. If he is unable to show the required sense of responsibility and capacity to act efficiently in conditions involving high risk and dangers in peacetime he will fail completely should he find himself in real war.

Elements of danger and risk are created by regular training exercises on the high seas and in the air, often in bad weather, by conducting training sessions at night, in distant areas, by deliberately introducing situations where weapons and equipment are put out of action, by simulating fires, holes, by holding exercises which involve increased risk and danger (emergency diving in the case of submarine, low-level flights in the case of aircraft, amphibious landings on wild beaches, etc.), by holding exercises in the use of individual defence facilities. The introduction of elements of high risk in training sessions calls for precise efficient organisation and strict observance of safety precautions.

A situation calling for the adoption of decisions on one's own, for independent action is created by 88 simulating the disruption of contact with superior commanders and with cooperating friendly forces, by making junior commanders deputies for senior commanders, by noninterference of the officers, in charge, by introducing unexpected twists in the situation, by allowing minimal time to prepare for the accomplishment of complex combat missions, by assigning ever more complex tasks and problems in quick succession and by introducing stiff standards and criteria for concealment of actions and by banning the use of available communications equipment.

Increasingly more difficult tasks and assignments are introduced in quick succession in the course of repeated training sessions without allowing a respite, at a high tempo and maintaining extreme levels of psychological stress on the participants throughout the entire training session and during other forms of combat training, by prolonging the duration of training sessions and exercises until the participants are stretched to the limit physically and psychologically, by holding training sessions after normal working hours, at night, at the end of a cruise or immediately after it.

To begin with, personnel are placed under simple and familiar enough conditions. Later, these are made more difficult to resemble those likely to be encountered in real war. Every skill and the performance of every action are checked and rechecked.

A special system of performance evaluation which differentiates the actions of each member of the crew both in terms of quality of performance and in terms of complexity of action helps make operating conditions increasingly more difficult. Thus, good organisation and proper sequence of actions under simple tactical conditions against a relatively passive enemy does not merit anything higher than a satisfactory mark. The same standard of performance in a less favourable tacticar situation wins a good mark while an excellent mark is awarded to those who act efficiently and with confidence under extreme conditions.

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In the course of combat training sessions, the participating naval personnel receive psychological training in several different fields. Firstly, as has been mentioned, it is important to strengthen confidence, and faith of officers and men in the reliability and effectiveness of their weapons and equipment. But other things are just as important including the formation of realistic ideas among them of possible ways a new war may be started by the potential aggressor. As they study the documents of the Soviet Communist Party and government relating to military matters, as they study Soviet military doctrine and the nature and distinguishing features of modern warfare, with special emphasis on naval warfare, and read extensively on the experience of the Great Patriotic War and on war history the officers and men of the Soviet Navy form realistic ideas on how a possible new war may be unleashed by a potential aggressor.

A careful study of a potential enemy, his policies and moral make-up, of his national and psychological characteristics, his strategy, tactics, weapons and intentions helps in devising methods of dealing with him. An intimate understanding of the nature of modern warfare helps Soviet navymen to judge their own performance from a realistic and critical standpoint. A simplistic idea of what might happen in the event of war and of the problems it will create and of ways of solving them is the source of crude oversimplification and uncritical attitude to combat training which inevitably lead to oversights and complacency.

As they study naval regulations, manuals and instructions, master their weapons and equipment, and study those of the enemy, Soviet navymen form realistic ideas of the nature of possible wars on land and at sea. To make these ideas more specific, a wide range of visual aids, including posters, drawings and film strips, are used and officers provide detailed explanations during training sessions. Ideas and impressions based on personal participation in cruises, flights and gunnery sessions, are usually the most vivid and lasting. The more realistic the 90 simulated battle conditions are during training sessions, the more realistic and valuable are these ideas. On the contrary, oversimplification and primitive approach breed mistaken ideas of a potential enemy.

A particularly responsible and careful approach should be made to the formation of the correct ideas of the nature of modern warfare among naval officers. Indeed, successful naval operations will depend to a great extent on how the officers individually and collectively visualise the start of a modern war and the requirements it will make on the planning and methods of combat training, the level of combat preparedness and the approach to the assessment of the quality of performance of their men, the improvement of weapons and equipment, the quality of tactics and much else. Historical experience indicates that over the past hundred years prevailing ideas of the nature of war before it broke out were often proved wrong in its opening stages. The possibility of a failure in correctly foreseeing the nature of war is all the greater today on account of the vastly increased destructive capacity of modern weapons. Hence the importance for naval officers to make a detailed study of manuals and instructions, to conduct group exercises, war games, manoeuvres, and to attend conferences of military experts at which the latest developments in the military field are discussed.

But it is equally wrong to form exaggerated ideas of the nature of modern warfare and exaggerate its psychological impact on men. The formation of balanced and correct ideas of war and the strengthening of one's own confidence in oneself call for a realistic objective assessment of the relative strength or weakness of a potential enemy. Lenin wrote, "The most dangerous thing in a war... is to underrate the enemy.''^^1^^ Indeed, an unsuspected weakness in an enemy may well prove to be _-_-_

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 173.

91 his strength while his known strength may turn out to be his weakness.

A major goal of psychological training of Soviet navymen is introducing them to the factors of battle situations as they are. Psychological and physiological investigations indicate that any new factor which is outside one's previous experience sets off a vigorous exploratory reaction or creates a centre of excitement which inhibits all other mental processes. Any new element that crops up unexpectedly in a combat situation will have an adverse impact on the navymen involved, create a diversion, increase tension and prevent them from acting with confident efficiency. The impact of unexpected unfavourable factors is particularly damaging psychologically in the opening stages of war and so action should be taken to offset this impact and help the navymen keep their balance. A major goal of psychological training for navymen is to ensure that they experience during combat training sessions everything they might hear and see in a real naval action. It is essential to place them in a simulated combat situation exposing them to the initial impact of a real naval encounter well in advance. The famous Russian naval strategist Admiral Makarov put it well when he wrote, "A man will be prepared to risk his life if he knows what he is facing, but when he doesn't he may take fright even at the sound of bilge water if he has not been previously told that bilge water is normal. Get your men accustomed to the sound of bilge water and they will fight real holes in the side to the last.''

To this end it is essential during training and exercises to simulate real combat environments. Each navyman must get himself accustomed to explosions going off too close, to a shuddering hull, to severe list and trim, he must learn to ignore aircraft buzzing the ship at zero level and other unpleasant occurrences likely to be encountered in a real naval action. Of particular value in terms of psychological impact on the participating personnel is the simulation of real combat factors in the 92 course of exercises and combat training sessions. These factors are reproduced at naval ranges equipped with special gear to simulate the explosions of mines, depth charges and aerial bombs, to set up different kinds of interference, torpedo noise, to irradiate submarines with sonar impulses, etc. Wide use is also made of tape recordings, film strips, photographs, scale models and mock-ups, drawings, etc.

Scientific experiments have confirmed that as participating naval personnel get used to combat factors their instinctive reaction to them diminishes, it no longer affects their psychology adversely and as a result their performance improves.

One other method of psychological training, and perhaps one of the most important, is modelling psychological difficulties impeding the accomplishment of combat missions and training personnel in ways of overcoming them. Purely external effects simulating a combat environment very often fail to produce the desired psychological impact on participating personnel and merely arouse their curiosity and even cause jocular animation (as does for instance the simulation of a blaze by setting alight a piece of tow doused in oil). Besides, the simulation of external factors and conditions of a combat situation does not cover all the difficulties likely to be encountered by naval personnel in a real combat environment. It is essential therefore that during an exercise each officer and sailor should go through a realistic experience of the tension and difficulties of a naval action, of fighting to win, and learn how to overcome these difficulties.

The evidence of scientific experiments and analysis of the experience gained to date in moral and psychological training bear out the effectiveness of well-designed modelling of cognitive, emotional and volitional difficulties in the course of combat training sessions and exercises. The cognitive difficulties are those involved in gathering sufficient data on the combat situation, their evaluation and making sense of what is happening, 93 understanding what the enemy is up to and making good decisions in complex and fluid situations. Emotional difficulties include hesitation, anxiety, doubts, fears, apprehensions and lack of confidence. The volitional difficulties spring from the need to overcome the adverse impact of the first two sets of difficulties but mainly from the enemy's strong counteraction, from the need to maintain a high level of combat activity, display initiative, capacity for independent and bold action.

Psychological difficulties arising in the course of accomplishing combat missions may be modelled separately and together. These difficulties are greatest when combat training sessions are packed with elements of surprise, unexpected twists in the situation, when they are conducted at a high tempo in conditions full of uncertainty, new elements, factors involving high risk and dangers, calling for a high sense of responsibility on the part of participating personnel, when the enemy counteracts fiercely, when the participating personnel have to work flat out for prolonged periods performing operations of maximum complexity.

Emphasis is laid in the Soviet Navy on the simulation of a complex combat situation involving a great variety of targets, frequent twists in the situation, unexpected appearance of new dangers and difficulties. Cognitive difficulties mount when the smooth flow of target designation and vital information is often disrupted or when the enemy uses decoy targets or when the participating personnel are fed inaccurate and conflicting data.

The simulation of enemy interference and jamming is a standard method of making a confusing combat environment more difficult and thus increasing the impact of psychological difficulties impeding the accomplishment of combat missions. Interference and jamming should be used on a regular basis at combat training sessions so that the participating personnel get used to them and take them for granted. A wide range of electronic interference should be used varying in intensity and character.

94

A simulated combat environment is made more difficult when present in the operational zone are both friendly and enemy targets and objects without clearly defined boundaries between them. Faced with such a situation every officer and rating must be able to identify quickly and faultlessly where the enemy is and where a friend. They also have to practise in conditions where some of the sighted objects fail to respond to an input request and when identification aids malfunction.

One other useful method of psychological training of naval personnel is the unexpected introduction of ``malfunctions'' and ``damage'' to fighting equipment, technical systems or the ship's hull in the course of combat training sessions. Malfunctions should be varied and multiplied. They should also be introduced suddenly, in rapid succession and in different combinations often together with such emergencies as fires, partial flooding, etc. To ensure that emergencies when they occur in real combat situations do not have a traumatic demoralising effect on the ship's crew training sessions aimed at maintaining the ship's combat ruggedness should be conducted on a systematic basis, day and night, at base and out at sea, in conditions requiring the crew to take risks, to show sangfroid, self-control, staying power, resourcefulness and resolve. Regular training sessions held at fire-fighting ranges and training stations are of considerable value for the ship's crew. During these sessions the participating personnel learn to keep their heads in emergencies and to repair the damage quickly, while continuing to accomplish the assigned combat mission with minor damage to the ship and her equipment, and learn to get the most out of such opportunities as remain.

Cognitive, emotional and volitional constraints of the ship's crew increase when the sea and air situations are deliberately made more difficult to follow. To this end the intensity of illumination of radar scopes is increased by putting on the lights in the room, by opening portholes and doors, the illumination of plotting boards, 95 diagrams and tables is reduced by dimming overhead lights and lowering tension in the mains, information exchanges are made more difficult by disrupting lines of communication, or by deliberately providing bad connections and poor hearing levels, by putting thick covers over microphones and by setting up a loud background noise, etc.

Experience indicates the effectiveness of specialised training sessions aimed at testing the endurance and staying power of participating personnel during intensive operations for prolonged periods. Even minor difficulties make heavy claims on the men's abilities and faculties when time allowed for the accomplishment of assignments is severely limited or when they have to work at a neck-breaking pace for prolonged periods.

Emphasis should be put during combat training sessions on getting naval personnel, and particularly specialists, accustomed to maximum difficulties and maximum complexities of combat situations until these specialists stretched to the limit of their physical and mental powers are just capable of performing somehow. Regular training sessions involving maximum difficulties and complexities induce participating Navy personnel to mobilise themselves, to keep a cool head, to withstand maximum loads and thus to stretch their powers just a little bit more each time. Such training sessions should be conducted not only for the benefit of experienced specialists but also for their younger counterparts. The standard rule to be observed is this: each training session should be made slightly more difficult than the preceding one. At the same time training sessions should involve not only emergencies and extra difficult situations but also standard, typical and foreseeable critical situations. Often combat environments are simulated in which participating personnel have to work through several alternative courses of action before finding the correct solution.

The simulation of a battle of minds and skill with the enemy, of the clash of concepts and intentions, ruse and 96 counter-ruse, is a must if combat training sessions are to be made as realistic as possible in terms of the psychological impact they exert on the participating personnel. To this end the simulated enemy must always be presented as powerful, clever, cunning, ruthless and punishing severely for any oversight or mistake. On no account must the simulated enemy be made to look foolish. It is not for nothing that the Soviet people have a saying: "Whoever thinks that the enemy is a fool ought to have his own head examined.'' The Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov in one of his books about the last war describes victory metaphorically as a stick with the opposing sides holding the opposite ends. Victory will go to the side which succeeds in wrestling the whole of the stick from the hands of the opponent after a tough and fierce struggle. Combat training sessions must involve situations full of uncompromising struggle for victory. To train the participating personnel in effective ways of winning victory, it is important to get them to display a high level of combat activity, capacity for energetic and bold action consistent with an imaginative approach to the accomplishment of assigned missions. Simulated combat environments must be made to look as realistic as possible or as circumstances allow.

Every effort should therefore be made to eliminate a simplistic approach to the design of combat training sessions and to avoid undue emphasis on harmless simulation of battle conditions. Unfortunately this does happen. In some cases a simplistic approach is attributable to the vague ideas some of the commanders may have of the nature of real combat environments and the associated psychological difficulties. For instance, the experience of the last war indicates that submarine sonarmen are often seriously hampered in their work by depth charges exploding in close proximity and yet today sonarmen are not always placed in situations during combat training sessions involving the use of depth charges. The reason here is that some commanders hesitate to expose the men to what they believe to be __PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7-128 97 unnecessary risks. Another example. As a rule modern fighting ships have commanding officer's battle stations inside conning towers and even in quarters deep in the ship's hull. A commander who has been trained to work from an open bridge is bound to be uncomfortable and psychologically tense while working at what to him is an inconvenient command station. He can still operate more or less efficiently but he longs to come out into the open to get back to the familiar world of the bridge, otherwise he finds it difficult to estimate distances by eye and assess the combat situation quickly. As a result such a commander experiences excessive inner tension. And yet he has to get used to his new command station and learn to act in any situation as efficiently as he would from the familiar bridge.

Another reason why some commanders tend to oversimplify things and take the line of least resistance is their desire to act in routine well-familiar way in accordance with a stereotyped pattern. Attempts to solve problems in simple conditions employing wellfamiliar techniques and methods do more harm than good as the commanders who are tempted to do so fail to teach their subordinates to act quickly, confidently and efficiently when faced with a really complex combat situation.

Unless personnel are placed in situations involving complex problems and dangers it is impossible to steel them psychologically and to turn them into efficient soldiers. One can hardly hope to condition officers and ratings psychologically as required if they know in advance what the enemy is up to, if the simulated enemy acts in a primitive way or is passive. A good combat environment is normally created at ``bilateral'' training sessions when the actions of the defending side are not restricted or planned, when the defender is allowed to look for a way to victory imaginatively, relying on his ingenuity and resource. Even when one of the opposing sides has to contend with overwhelming odds and finds itself at a disadvantage, when the attacking side 98 administers painful blows and holds the initiative the combat training session is still useful as the defenders are able to learn to keep their heads and find ingenious ways of beating off the attacker.

During group exercises, tactical briefing sessions and war games for command and staff personnel it is essential to create a complex and highly fluid combat situation and make it more difficult by feeding scanty and sometimes even inaccurate information, by allowing minimal time for the performance of operations or by overwhelming the participants with massive information flows so that they get snowed under. It is recommended to train naval officers in ways of solving the problems that crop up in unfavourable conditions when their subordinates are severely under strength, when they have to contend with high background noise levels, when the sounds of battle are realistically simulated and made worse by violent pitch and roll, etc.

Such exercises help the participating officers to learn to take advantage of favourable moments for attacking, to beat down strong enemy resistance, to respond flexibly to any twist in the situation, to mislead and outwit the enemy, to keep him off balance, to cause him to hesitate and doubt the wisdom of his own actions, etc., in other words to learn to capture operational and tactical initiative and hold it.

Psychological training also presupposes the development in participating specialists of professionally important cognitive psychological qualities, such as acute perception, a good memory, close attention, fertile imagination, effective thinking, etc. In working towards this goal those supervising psychological training sessions must take into account all the qualities and powers of each specialist and what he needs to be really efficient. Thus excellent visual perception is a must for any naval specialist but to a varying degree. For some of them the lower absolute threshold of perception is more important while for others the lower recognition (contrasting) threshold is, for still others adaptation

99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1978/MASW225/20070906/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2007.09.11) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ speed and heightened sensitivity to darkness area is a must as well as sensitivity to particular colours, and integrity of perception. It is important to know exactly which qualities must be developed and improved in which specialists.

Every effort should be made to avoid simplistic ideas of the required qualities. On no account should they be reduced to simpler psychophysiological qualities such as muscle response speed, muscle coordination, a good eyesight and hearing, mechanical memory, etc. The evidence of scientific experiments indicates the great role of well-developed thinking, imagination, conceptualisation ability, attention and perception in mastering today's naval specialities. Practically each specialist needs to develop a specific type of thinking whether technical, maritime or tactical.

It stands to reason that specialists as they acquire and develop specific qualities so essential to them to be efficient at their jobs must be given every chance to practise and use these qualities on a regular basis. This constitutes an important component of the moral and psychological training they undergo. Thus a really skilful sonarman is one who can not only recognise and distinguish between different underwater sounds and noises but who is also able to analyse them, to identify quickly what they mean, to compare and correlate them, bring them into a system, generalise and make sense of them. In other words, a skilful sonarman must possess specific modes of thinking. The training of sonarmen is effective if the trainees are constantly placed in situations where they have to perform specific mental operations until they achieve peak efficiency.

Officers and ratings develop their professional qualities in the course of training sessions and exercises using special trainers and simulators. The same technical facilities may also be used to test how successfully they cope with their jobs.

Simulation techniques employed in recreating actual combat situations, hewever perfect they may be, fail to 100 simulate such situations in every detail. Therefore it is essential to use additional techniques to train the participating personnel psychologically. One such technique is to perform special emotional and volitional exercises designed to simulate a combat situation which would place the participants under psychological stress and compel them to hesitate, experience apprehension, anxiety and even fear, which would induce them to try to overcome the adverse psychological factors and thus make them more stable emotionally and volitionally. Makarenko, a well-known Soviet educator and writer, put it well when he said, "It is impossible to train a person to be brave unless he is placed in circumstances where he would be able to display his courage, whether it takes the form of self-restraint, an ability to speak his mind openly, to make sacrifices, to be patient or bold.'' Indeed, a person who has gone through all sorts of tight spots is more likely to emerge victorious from a difficult situation than someone who has not been faced with any serious adversity.

Emotional and volitional exercises may be divided into two groups: those of a general nature and those designed to prepare navymen to face specific problems and difficulties. The first group of exercises are normally used to develop emotional and volitional stability in general, the second group-to train them in ways of dealing with specific difficulties.

The first group of exercises include sailing in boats in a fresh breeze, walking across deck while secured by a lifeline, climbing masts and radio relay lines, scuba diving, diving from a height of four to ten metres, running along a beam suspended several metres above the water, climbing and descending vertical ropes 12--15 metres long, climbing horizontal ropes suspended at 4-10 metres above the water, etc. The second group of exercises are used to train different specialists such as young divers, airmen and marines in ways of dealing with emergencies they are likely to encounter in the course of duty (e.g. submerging, parachuting or rough landing, respectively).

101

Emotional-volitional exercises bring good results when held on a regular basis and when they are diversified. This is particularly important for specialists who spend most of their time on a daily basis inside conning towers, in cabins and elsewhere inside the ship.

Sport activities are also used for the same purpose. Swimming, running, skiing, rowing and sailing develop determination, endurance and self-control; boxing, wrestling, water-skiing, slalom and diving develop courage and resolution; volleyball, football, rugby, icehockey and basketball develop a sense of initiative, ingenuity, resourcefulness and determination. Competitive games are another useful technique. These games develop in the participants a sense of responsibility to the teammates as well as determination, the ability not to despair and hope for the best even if the fortunes of the game have turned against them, and will to win no matter what the circumstances.

Special exercises are also used to develop self-control, determination and courage. These include long vaulting over the vaulting horse, vaulting over the horse with the spring board being placed at a great distance from the apparatus, falling headlong landing on arms, on water, or falling backwards on a mat, pillows or hay, jumping on a trampoline, exercises on the wheel, jumping through a window 80 x 80 cm set at a height of not less than 115 cm, etc.

Autogenic training may be a useful contributing factor to the psychological training of officers and some categories of ratings. This method of psychological selftraining or psychological gymnastics is aimed at developing the ability to control one's psychic and psychophysiological processes. This method is based on verbal autosuggestion. The effect of this form of psychological training is enhanced through systematic training sessions following definite methods.

Psychological training is conducted for the benefit of groups of officers and ratings and on an individual basis. The goals and methods of psychological training should 102 be selected on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the mental, emotional and volitional qualities of the given officer or rating which helps to identify gaps and drawbacks in his training.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. The Sea Habit as an Important
Factor of the Moral and Psychological Training
of Naval Personnel

Maritime training is a specific component of the overall training of navymen designed to equip them with a certain fund of knowledge, habits and skills which are essential for efficient action and life at sea with its daily battle against the elements. Maritime training is supplemented by the development of specific moral and psychological qualities that make up the personality of the sailor. A navyman is morally and psychologically ready for action at sea if service on board ship, in naval aviation and in the marine corps with its hardships and difficulties is a labour of love for him and not a burden, if it helps him to be alert, wide awake and ready for action rather than dampens his enthusiasm.

The opportunities for successful moral and psychological training inherent in the practice of maritime service can be enhanced by a well-designed and purposeful system of techniques aimed at developing qualities essential to an efficient navyman. Above all this is a matter of cultivating love for and attachment to naval sendee, getting the men to accustom themselves to the dangers and hazards lying in wait for them out at sea and at the same time the development of courage, staunchness, bravery, determination and capacity for prompt and energetic action. An efficient navyman is expected to take in his stride the non-too-easy conditions of life and service on board ship, to withstand pitch and roll without getting seasick, to develop certain psychological qualities essential to an efficient control of a ship, a 103 launch, a boat, etc. In other words he must possess qualities and skills which come under the general concept of "maritime practice''.

Attachment to naval service is a derivative of the realisation by every naval officer and rating that it is essential to the defence of his socialist country. The study of the history of the Russian and Soviet navies and of the role of the Soviet Navy in today's world contributes to cultivating attachment and dedication to naval service among Soviet navymen.

The constant attention and concern of the people for the further progress of the Soviet Navy coupled with the fine record of the Soviet navymen fill them with pride that they serve in the Navy and inspire them to add to the glorious record of the Soviet Navy.

This feeling of pride increases as Soviet navymen make long-term cruises in international waters. During these cruises Soviet naval vessels often call at foreign ports where the crewmen meet local people and get to know their customs and traditions. They see for themselves the tremendous prestige enjoyed by the Soviet Union throughout the world. Each member of the ship's crew takes pride in his country and her navy and acquires an added sense of responsibility to the people for the trust placed in him.

A person's attitude to naval service is directly dependent on his attitude to the sea in general. The sea is the world of brave and strong personalities. It is therefore essential to emphasise the role of the sea in human history, the record of sea navigation, naval traditions, marine and oceanographic research, geography, literature on the sea, the work of seascape painters, etc.

Getting navymen accustomed to the hazards and dangers of naval service is an important component of maritime training given to young recruits. There are young men who had the misfortune of coming close to drowning in their childhood and for this reason dread water in general, let alone the sea. Such young men have to overcome a tremendous psychological barrier before 104 they get rid of their preconceived notions about the sea and naval service. Exaggerated ideas of the dangers and hazards of naval service are conceived by some young men when they are assigned to submarines or to service in naval aviation. On the other hand, there are young men who clearly display a cavalier attitude to naval service and underestimate its difficulties and hazards.

Young navymen should be helped to get used to the dangers and hazards of their service in a tactful strictly individualised way and should be tought to approach them soberly. It is useful in this context to give them practical demonstrations of the survivability and safety characteristics of naval vessels, aircraft and landing craft. The development of the capacity to react to potential dangers calmly has become appreciably more difficult now that the Soviet Navy can operate world-wide, often in remote areas thousands of miles away from home. One can act with confidence and calm in coastal navigation but on the eve of a long-term cruise a young navyman may show anxiety as he realises that his ship would have to operate a long way from home in the deep ocean. Soviet warships and naval aviation are also operating in the Arctic regions covered with a massive ice shield and this too takes some getting used to.

In the case of submarine crews operation at different depths, including maximum depths exerts a specific psychological impact on the submarine men. Diving to great depths, especially to maximum depths, sets off an intense psychological reaction and places the crew under additional psychological strain which increases the possibility of their faulty performance and oversights. It is therefore essential for submarine commanders to operate at different depths on a regular basis in order to accustom the crewmen to react calmly to the maximum depth.

Finally, maritime service requires getting naval personnel used to efficient performance in any weather. It is essential to ensure that no storms and cyclons however violent, no lists and trims however severe, should be 105 allowed to cause an excessive psychological reaction from the crewmen so that they are able to perform with peak efficiency regardless of the unfavourable circumstances.

Boat sailing and rowing sessions are a useful aid in getting Navy personnel accustomed to life at sea. The Russian Admiral Butakov was perfectly right when he described these sessions as one of the best methods of helping young sailors to put themselves to the test, to steel themselves psychologically and prepare themselves to deal with whatever contingencies may develop in the course of naval service. At the same time boat sailing sessions are an excellent way of finding out who is capable of what.

Needless to say, each navyman must be an expert swimmer. Those who can't swim whether they are on board ship, in a boat or an aircraft flying over the sea can't help dreading the prospect of finding themselves in the water. To get navymen accustomed to the dangers and hazards of naval service it is essential to encourage them to go in for skin diving, scuba diving and various aquatic games.

No navyman, however experienced, can afford to ignore the dangers and hazards of naval service. These are always there. Any negligence, any underestimation of the inherent dangers and hazards may breed complacency and the sea will lose no time in inflicting its punishment. A sober attitude to the dangers and hazards of naval service, a calm reaction to them, the exercise of reasonable caution, discipline, the strict observance of the Navy regulations, manuals and instructions are all signs of good seamanship.

Maritime training includes the development in navymen of a good resistance to seasickness. A ship sailing through rough seas, or an aircraft flying through turbulent air inevitably encounters a violent pitching and rolling and rambling on the course. Pitching and rolling subjects the ship's crew to four diffirent kinds of acceleration linear, centrifugal, 106 angular and complementary (coriolis). Multiple accelerations in several different plains at once have particularly unpleasant effect on the ship's crew. Violent pitching is not the most pleasant thing in the world either.

Few people can claim that pitching and rolling has no unpleasant effects upon them. There is ample statistical evidence indicating that 90 per cent of fresh recruits serving on board ship and 80 per cent of those serving in naval aviation succumb to seasickness and airsickness. Some people believe that they are resistant to pitching and rolling just because they do not feel nausea and continue to enjoy hearty appetites. However, the effects of seasickness are not only a matter of a good appetite and resistance to nausea. Symptoms of seasickness also include headache, giddiness, wandering attention, partial loss of one's powers of observation, memory and clear thinking, to speak nothing of the frequently encountered cases of apathy and indifference. In other words, there are obvious symptoms of seasickness and there are those which are not immediately apparent. Seasickness in any form wears a person down to a greater or lesser extent. It causes increased physical exertion, quick tiring and generally affects adversely an individual's standard of performance. A person prone to seasickness is unfit for naval service.

Seasickness is attributable to both physiological and psychological causes. Alternating accelerations during violent pitching and rolling invariably irritate a person's vestibular apparatus and cause unusual sensations as his stomach and other internal organs shift around and his muscular and bone systems work in unusual ways. Different people are susceptible to these unpleasant effects to a varying extent. A general feeling of weariness, depression, gastric and intestinal diseases increase a person's susceptibility to seasickness. A full or conversely an empty stomach, a loud noise for prolonged periods, violent vibration, very hot or cold weather have similar effects. Those members of the ship's crew who have to keep watch indoors generally become seasick 107 more quickly and more often than those on watch duty in the open air.

Looking at a constantly shifting pattern of objects forming part of the ship's superstructure, the rapidly changing picture of rough seas during a storm and a dazzling pattern of sunlight beams each has a psychologically negative impact on the watcher. There are persons who believe that they will inevitably succumb to seasickness and sure enough they experience the first symptoms of seasickness as soon as they step on board ship or aircraft or as they see other people suffering from the unpleasant effects of seasickness and even the moment they see the ship on which they are going to sail even in perfectly calm waters. Resistance to sea- or airsickness is lessened by fear of the occilations, ignorance of effective ways of controlling sea- and airsickness, by inactivity, undue concentration on one's internal sensations and by the onset of symptoms of seaor airsickness as well as by a hightened impressionability, lack of confidence and a nervous atmosphere aboard ship. Although persons without previous experience of sailing or flying are naturally the first casualty of sea- or airsickness, some experienced sailors and pilots also succumb to sea- and airsickness after a considerable break in sailing or flying.

Measures to control sea- and airsickness are of two kinds: preventive and those conducted during an actual cruise or flight. Preventive measures include various sports and physical fitness activities designed to improve the general fitness of sailors and pilots and to train their vestibular apparatus. Useful exercises may include rotations and abrupt turns of the head while standing or walking, as well as jumping on the trampoline, exercises on the revolving wheel, on a horizontal rope or the horizontal bar.

Psychological measures to combat seasickness are aimed at accustoming sailors to the daily routine on board ship, developing a calm reaction to the difficulties and hazards of naval service and at strengthening 108 confidence in their own ability to overcome them. It is advisable, for instance, to explain to young sailors on the eve of their first voyage that anyone can get used to the motions and to recommend effective techniques for neutralising the unpleasant effects of seasickness if it does come on. If the ship in question has undergone repairs, or laid out for a long time, or if she did put out to sea but steamed in calm waters, special measures should be adopted such as prolonged boat or launch outings in a fresh breeze or in a moderate storm. Also training sessions involving the use of stabilisers can be conducted. It would also be useful to make a voyage during which the ship carries out manoeuvres involving abrupt changes of course. In this way those members of the crew who are particularly susceptible to seasickness can easily be identified. They must at once be transferred temporarily to quarters situated in the ship's middle section. They should also be exempt from galley duties and from duty in other parts of the ship where strong smell of food, heated oil or heated electric appliances is present.

During the cruise, circumstances allowing, it is essential to steer a course ensuring minimal pitch and roll, as well as to use stabilisers, particularly during meals, to air the rooms as often as possible, maintain a moderate temperature and high standards of cleanliness inside the rooms (especially in the toilets).

The ship's commander can do a lot to boost the spirits of the younger members of the crew by talking with them and congratulating them on their first voyage. A calm and friendly atmosphere on board ship, the cheerful and smart appearance of the officers, their frequent visits to the crew's accommodations, action stations, broadcasting stirring and sprightly light music all contribute to the effort to cushion the impact of seasickness on the younger members of the crew.

Apart from that measures should also be taken on an individual basis. The officers should advise the younger members of the crew on the best ways of neutralising 109 the effects of seasickness, they should show an exacting attitude to the more experienced members of the crew and help the younger ones, they should also attach the latter to the more experienced seasoned sailors.

Other measures may also be used on an individual basis. The officers may recommend the younger members of the crew to try and avoid thinking about seasickness, to keep themselves busy with their duties as far as possible, to come out on deck in the fresh breeze and sprays of the waves, to move to the middle section of the ship, to avoid looking at the waves and the clouds and try and look in the distance or at the horizon, to periodically close their eyes, to wear sunglasses in brilliant sunshine, to cut down on smoking and to try and not be drawn into discussions of seasickness, to abstain from fat food, from overeating and equally from going about with an empty stomach. Tightening of belts can also be a help as well as taking anti-seasickness drugs, high-acidity or salty food and mouthwashing. But of course the sailor's own willpower, his self-control, 'staying power and capacity for self-suggection are a dicisive factor in neutralising the unpleasant effects of seasickness.

During prolonged and exhausting pitch and roll it is essential to organise interesting and stimulating activities involving the participation of the entire crew. For instance, preparations to mark an approaching public holiday or some other festive occasion, a technical quiz or sports competition. The crewmen should be told that during prolonged periods of violent pitch and roll some of them may develop a sour mood and irritability and that if this happens they should try and show a more considerate and friendly attitude to one another. It is a good plan to commend publicly either through the ship's wall newspaper or in radio broadcasts those members of the crew who have distinguished themselves by good behaviour and good seamanship.

To be merely resistant to seasickness is not enough, however. A good sailor must accustom himself to the motions, however violent they may be. He must be able 110 to move about confidently during pitch, and roll and maintain a high standard of performance in the execution of his duties. Prolonged periods of stormy weather make heavy demands on a sailor's physical endurance and often make it impossible for him to have a good rest. A good sailor must therefore adjust himself well to the specific conditions of life and service aboard ship.

A ship's specialist is expected to possess fully developed psychological qualities required for the execution of his particular duties. To be fully proficient in handling a ship, a launch or a boat, a sailor should be able to estimate distances by the eye quickly and accurately and to possess other qualities such as welldeveloped visual, motor, auditory and other forms of perception, which enable him to estimate distances, speeds, angular values, relative shift, inertia, manoeuvring capabilities, size of objects and other parameters. Other essential qualities include good powers of observation, concentration, attention, a good memory, imagination, effective thinking, speech habits (naval terminology, the language of commands, etc.). Similar but at the same time rather specific qualities are essential for navigators, officers in charge of the electromechanical departments, officers heading the forecastle and aftercastle mooring gangs, navy pilots, etc. Efforts towards the achievement of this goal can be made more effective by establishing exactly which categories of naval personnel need which qualities, as well as by a more careful choice of methods and techniques for developing these qualities and by developing effective ways of assessing the progress of each member of the crew in improving his standard of performance.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. The Role of the Commander in Improving
the Moral and Psychological Training
of His Men

The commander, being the leader of his men, plays the decisive role in the accomplishment of missions 111 assigned to his ship or naval unit, as the case may be. This has always been so throughout naval history. Today the commander's role has taken on an added dimension. This fully applies to the conduct of moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel. The commander's own sense of purpose, his energy, style of leadership and his own character traits have a direct bearing on the progress and quality of this training.

The commander's sense of purpose as a leader of fighting men is contingent on how well he himself meets the prime requirement imposed on each and every member of the Soviet Armed Forces---to maintain a high level of constant combat preparedness. The meeting of this crucial requirement determines the way service routine aboard ship is organised and maintained, which mostly depends upon the quality of her commander, on how well his men have been trained for efficient action under extreme conditions.

The day-to-day routine aboard a naval ship is organised efficiently and properly if her commander has instilled in his men an undeflectable sense of purpose, persistence, courage, bravery, sangfroid, and the ability to take the challenge of the hazards and difficulties of naval service. The commander's style of leadership is of tremendous importance for ensuring the efficient performance of his men. Lenin's style of leadership has provided a model to be copied by every Soviet official and leader of men wherever he may be called upon to work. Lenin's style of leadership was always characterised by a principled, Party-motivated approach to the job in hand, by efficiency and the ability to organise the efforts of others, by a high sense of responsibility, by the capacity to set oneself high standards and expect others to do likewise, an uncompromising struggle against shortcomings and slackers.

Today it is more important than ever before to ensure that the commander's style of leadership is always based on sound scientific principles. This means that the commander is expected to be able to find methods, ways and 112 means of ensuring maximum efficiency in full conformity with the objective trends. To improve the scientific standard of their guidance of the moral, political and psychological training of their men, tthe commander and his officers should always submit theoretical and practical aspects of their work to a thorough critical analysis and always see to it that they themselves act up to the scientific principles underlying their work as leaders of fighting men.

To improve their style of leadership, Soviet naval commanders study Lenin's style of leadership and compare their own methods and techniques with those that were typical of Lenin's and urge their subordinates to model themselves on Lenin's example. To do so is of particular importance today. Indeed, a commander's style of leadership is often copied by his subordinates and is a crucial factor in creating a favourable moral atmosphere aboard ship. A good commander is one who succeeds in striking a happy balance between the principle of one-man leadership and the cooperation of his subordinates. A good commander is able to guide his men in a way which promotes a healthy moral atmosphere aboard ship. He is able to build his relations with his subordinates in such a way as to ensure that they are always solidly behind him. The report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress stressed in this connection that "the organisation and education of people occupy a prominent place in the work of our leading cadres. Even if a leader is vested with the powers stemming from one-man authority, he cannot depend solely on the force of orders".^^1^^

A successful commander is one able to strike a balance between administrative and educational methods of work. There is no question that strictly administrative methods of leadership are necessary in the Armed Forces, but it is also true that undue emphasis on such _-_-_

~^^1^^ L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Moscow, 1972, p. 436.

113 methods may do more harm than good in certain circumstances. A style of leadership based on the exercise of purely administrative powers has justifiably earned the notoriety of "the boss's tyranny" or "the autocratic style''. A commander using such methods treats his men in a high-handed fashion and even stoops to rudeness when talking to his subordinates. Such a commander usually spurns their opinion and even slights their dignity in the mistaken belief that they are all irresponsible and that but for him "things would be in a frightful mess''. Other typical signs of a commander's despotism include his belief in his own infallibility, ascribing to himself the credit for success achieved by the joint efforts of the entire crew, an arrogant attitude and even a superiority complex towards his subordinates, disdain for advice and suggestions made by his subordinates, an uncritical attitude to his own actions and decisions, and a striving to win a praise of a superior officer at all costs. All this is evidence of ideological and moral inadequacy of such a commander. Autocratic style of leadership runs counter to the moral and ideological principles of socialist society and does great harm to the moral and political education of naval personnel. A commander who behaves like a petty tyrant alienates his subordinates and creates, whether he wants it or not, an atmosphere of insincerity among members of the crew. At best his subordinates withdraw into passivity and refrain from displaying initiative and at worst they become fawning toadies willing to indulge his every whim and "trim their sail" to keep on the right side of their commander.

Lenin showed no mercy towards officials who adopted autocratic ways treating the rank and file in an arrogant and high-handed fashion. He rightly described such people as willful career-seekers who looked upon their official position as a means of climbing the ladder of success. The interests of efficient moral and political education of Soviet Navy personnel require that an uncompromising struggle be waged against all 114 manifestations of an autocratic style of leadership.

A much to.» liberal attitude is the other extreme. Making up to the subordinates, a lenient and all-forgiving attitude towards them, lack of a principled style of leadership far from adding to the commander's authority and popularity detract from both and eventually lead to his failure as a combat leader. A liberal style of leadership is rooted in inadequate ideological and moral training of the leader. Some of the younger officers at the start of their naval careers are often guilty of liberalism. The relationships between the commander and his subordinates based on liberalism often result in an atmosphere of mutual guarantee in which the leader is not exacting and the subordinates resort to eyewash. The results are inevitably detrimental for the developing of the necessary moral and political qualities of the subordinates.

The daily routine on board ship or in a naval subunit exerts a powerful impact on the moral, political and psychological training of the personnel involved. This impact is greater on the officers, on the development in them of a high sense of responsibility, efficiency, initiative and capacity for independent action.

In adopting a decision affecting the life and service of his men the commander must be able to foresee its moral and psychological impact on them.

Undue centralisation while creating a semblance of firm leadership and good order in reality induces the subordinates, including commanders of lower ranks, to be passive, robs them of initiative and confidence all of which results in a lowering of their sense of responsibility. On the other hand undue emphasis on petty patronage, mothering the subordinates, playing the wetnurse to them equally does great harm. A ship or a unit whose commander seeks to take over the duties of his subordinates, to stifle their initiative and capacity for independent action is likely to be an easy victim of an enemy weaker in other respects than the given ship or unit in battle.

115

The tendency of some officers to issue too many orders does not help matters much either. It so happens sometimes that an uninterrupted flood of orders and directives pours forth from a commander or a headquarters with absolute insistence on immediate execution. More often than not this is evidence of lack of planning, it shows that some development or other has caught the commander and his staff napping. Not infrequently subsequent orders cancel out those that came before them and this induces the subordinates not to hurry as they expect from previous experience, and rightly so, that the next order will make it unnecessary to carry out the previous one.

The commander should always keep the progress of his subordinate officers under his constant review. Even though the officers' progress is subject to regimentation by relevant documents and regulations, the commander can do a lot to ensure that his officers graduate from one stage of their careers to the next in a proper fashion and on time. Officers react instantly to the commander's action in praising or punishing one of them and draw their own conclusions. The commander is solely responsible for the moral consequences of his decisions and actions and must see to it that whatever he does in praise or punishment of a particular officer should always contribute to that officer's acquisition of the necessary moral, political and professional qualities.

The commander's concern for maintaining normal relationships among his subordinates and between himself and his men is a major component of his work to improve the moral atmosphere aboard ship. In this work the commander should see to it that these relationships are indeed contributing to a congenial atmosphere rather than merely creating a semblance of such an atmosphere.

Experience shows that as a rule a subordinate's real attitude towards his duty as a serviceman is largely determined by his feelings towards his commander. If a navyman resents his commander or otherwise disapproves of him, it is difficult to induce him to obey his 116 commander as he should, and so to such a subordinate service in the Navy may prove a traumatic experience both morally and psychologically. Such a man often fails to achieve high standards of performance in the execution of his assigned duties.

Much is being done in the Soviet Navy to establish and maintain a congenial atmosphere in relations between commanders and their men, an atmosphere in which they treat one another with due respect and in a comradely spirit while at the same time showing an exacting and principled attitude to one another in accordance with the naval regulations. Soviet naval commanders employ a variety of methods to maintain such relationships. In this they are helped by the Party and Komsomol organisations and by political officers. Special attention is given to improving the relationships between the commander and his officers, and among the officers themselves. These relationships take shape in the course of their collective efforts to accomplish assigned missions, during conferences and meetings and in the course of social contacts off duty.

In building his relations with his subordinates, the commanders should always bear in mind that the interests of the Navy require that every encouragement should be given to those who display initiative, who do not hesitate to search for new and better ways of doing things, who are capable of bold and ingenious solutions to problems. Needless to say, a clear distinction should be drawn between an officer who approaches his duties in an imaginative way and is capable of independent action and one who simply lacks discipline. However difficult it may be for the commander to draw this distinction, to do so he must. The fact is that many people with creative minds may resent strict discipline or have some other negative traits. The wisdom of the commander consists in his ability to get the most out of the positive potential of his subordinates, and to help those of them who fall down on their jobs to overcome their drawbacks as soon as possible.

117

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always valued highly those who are capable of keeping their fingers on the pulse of the new, who look to the future and find new effective ways of solving new problems.

A sense of the new in a commander and his subordinate officers is very much at a premium today. The Soviet Navy needs officers and men with creative minds capable of looking for new and more effective ways of maintaining a high level of fighting efficiency and combat preparedness.

The study of military science and R & D activities in the Soviet Navy has assumed a mass character. Many naval vessels and units have resident councils of the military scientific societies, schools of advanced experience and departments of military pedagogics and psychology operating on a voluntary basis. Officers who participate in prolonged cruises conduct research into individual problems. Not only does the ship's commander encourage his officers to carry on scientific work, but he tries to help them in every way.

The officers' messroom has an important part to play in creating a stimulating moral atmosphere and good relationships among the ship's officers. In the course of close daily comacts, relaxed discussions and arguments, the personality of each of the participants reveals itself clearly and they get to know one another better. Mutual influence here is inevitable. The friendly atmosphere that generally prevails in the officers' messroom helps each of them to assess his own performance by relating it to that of his fellow officers. It enables him to see his own drawbacks and weak points more clearly and to borrow positive experience from the others. A relaxed exchange of opinions on tactical matters, on the more successful ways of training and educating subordinates, on ways of maintaining the daily routine aboard ship and a cast-iron military discipline enables the officers to extend their horizons and arrive at a concensus on all the questions discussed. The officers' messroom has a special role to play during prolonged cruises. Indeed, whereas at 118 base the naval officer is in daily contact with his family, visits the officers' club where he meets many different people, during a prolonged cruise in the ocean there is no such opportunity. And so the officers' messroom is the one place where he can relax and unwind himself in between watch-keeping sessions and chat with his fellow officers.

A salutary moral atmosphere among the officers heavily depends on whether the ship's commander is able to establish good rapport with his subordinates while at the same time maintaining his absolute authority as commander. His constant concern for the aesthetic education of his officers, his own active participation in group discussions of books, articles, etc., and in colloquias, is of great importance in creating a congenial atmosphere.

The commander's right to train and educate his subordinates, to give orders to them and lead them into battle, a right granted to him by the Communist Party and government imposes upon him tremendous responsibility for ensuring that he sets an example for others to follow in everything he does. As Mikhail Kalinin, an outstanding Soviet political and government leader, once put it, "anyone who aspires to teach and educate others must himself have a clear conscience''.

The commander's personality manifests itself in the decisions he makes, in all his actions, in his style of leadership and in the way he treats his subordinates. The latter follow his behaviour closely, trying to discern his ambitions, his views and convictions, interests, to understand his motives and to assess his abilities. All aspects of the commander's personality are under constant and critical review by his subordinates who react to them in their own way.

The impact of the commander's personality on his subordinates is largely dependent on the prestige he enjoys in the eyes of his subordinates, on how close he is to them. Prestige and authority are the result of the interplay of objective and subjective factors. The former 119 include the commander's status as an absolute leader of his men, as an official with clearly defined powers. The subjective factors are his personal qualities, character traits, style of leadership, professional and cultural standard, life style and conduct. The commander's authority is essentially a matter of voluntary recognition by his men of his merits, and this does not necessary go with either rank or post. It has to be won by hard work, efficient performance and tactful behaviour. The commander's prestige and authority must be all-- embracing and cover political, moral and professional spheres. Good naval commanders are noted for their capacity for self-control and for a sober and critical assessment of their own actions and conduct. A balanced development of all personality qualities is all-important. In the conditions naval commanders have to operate this requirement is not always met. The dangers and hazards of life and service at sea, the difficult missions assigned to them, the realisation of personal responsibility, the need to take snap decisions and respond to any twist in the situation without delay combine to develop in naval commanders resoluteness, firmness, confidence and absolute insistence on immediate execution of the orders they issue. These qualities so valuable and indeed indispensable from a purely military and naval point of view, if transferred to the sphere of human relationships, may do more harm than good. If exercised indiscriminately they may breed insensitivity, neglect for the feelings of others and refusal to reckon with their opinion. A commander may be totally dedicated to the cause he serves, to his duty, but if he is unable to overcome negative character traits, he may alienate his subordinates and create an unhealthy atmosphere among the crew. The evolution of a commander's personality will reach its positive goal provided he allows no let-up in his study of Marxism-Leninism, is self-critical and aware of the dangers of complacency and conceit and does everything to avoid them.

120 __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter IV __ALPHA_LVL1__ Prolonged Cruises as the Best School
for Moral, Political and Psychological
Training of Naval Personnel __ALPHA_LVL2__ [introduction.]

Prolonged cruises across the world's seas and oceans, always packed with intensive combat training and political education, the daily battle against the hazards and difficulties of naval service, are an effective means of moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel. The commanders and political officers use every opportunity to develop in their subordinates, from rating to officer, the required qualities and combat skills. The best results are achieved when this training follows a well-designed plan and is conducted by imaginative and effective methods both prior to and during a cruise.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. Pre-Cruise Training
of Naval Personnel

There are two kinds of moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel: general training given during the entire course of basic training and education of naval personnel (that was covered in the previous chapters) and pre-cruise training conducted on the eve of a particular cruise. The latter type of training is designed in such a way as to prepare the ship's crew for the special conditions of the projected cruise. Members of the crew are informed about the route and the specific tasks, about foreseeable problems and difficulties, etc. Crew composition and the individual requirements and experience of participating officers and ratings are taken 121 into account. The basic objectives of this type of training are:

---to raise the standard of ideological commitment to communist ideals among members of the crew through an in-depth study of the military and political situation in the area of the cruise;

--to ensure that every member of the crew is alive to the importance of the cruise as a highly responsible government assignment;

---to strengthen confidence among the crew in the reliability of the weapons and equipment at their command, and demonstrate the ability of every crew member to withstand the trials and difficulties lying ahead;

---to foster relationships, views and opinions among the crew members favourable for the successful accomplishment of the projected cruise;

---to improve morale and combat qualities, and psychological condition both on an individual basis and among the entire crew;

---to help the crew acquire experience of operating under the specific conditions of the projected cruise (maintenance of weapons and equipment at the required level of combat readiness in the climatic and hydrological conditions of the cruise, underway watch routine, the organisation of day-to-day routine aboard ship during the cruise);

--- to test the emotional and volitional stability of the crew in the face of expected hazards and difficulties attending the projected cruise;

---to impress upon the officers, midshipmen and petty officers the need to keep up intensive work among their subordinates during the cruise and make adjustments to fit the specific objectives and environment of the projected cruise.

The experience gained by the crew of a naval vessel X provides a good example of how these objectives are accomplished. Upon receipt of an order to get ready for a long-term cniise, the ship's commander and his officers 122 worked out a detailed plan which covered combat training, maintenance and operating procedures, supply delivery schedule, and a five-day pre-cruise rest for the entire crew. Further, a plan of Party and. political work to conduct before the cruise was drawn up and approved. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in each of the elements.

The commander and his mate, his deputy for political work, the secretaries of the ship's Party and Komsomol organisations working in close cooperation later reviewed the work progress and made adjustments as necessary. Here is a list of the key points on which the ship's commander focussed his attention during the preparations for the cruise:

--- the study by the entire crew of the special features of the projected cruise in the assigned part of the World Ocean;

---keeping the crew fully informed about the military and strategic situation in the area of the cruise and about the tactics employed by naval and air forces of certain capitalist countries;

---underway watch procedures in conditions marked by elevated temperatures inside the ship;

---the simulation of emergencies involving equipment malfunctions and breakdowns;

---the holding of unexpected emergency training sessions involving high risk situations and hazards (during one sucri> session members of the crew had to make their way into a room in the ship's stern in complete darkness to put out a fire there. Their only means of access to the room was by climbing storm ladders and horizontal ropes suspended at a considerable height);

---the introduction into the training sessions of unexpected and powerful irritants simulating the actual conditions of the projected cruise.

The cruise was attended by many difficulties which required the crew to work at full stretch and that in turn helped to put their moral, political and psychological qualities to an acid test. The assigned mission was 123 successfully accomplished and the crew demonstrated the fine qualities of man and ship.

To help naval personnel develop fine moral and political qualities, intensive and well-designed Party and political work is usually conducted among the crew as part of preparations for a prolonged cruise. The Party and political work conducted among the crew of a submarine X on the eve of putting out to sea on a prolonged cruise followed a typical pattern, including the following:

---a thorough study of the experience gained by the crews of other ships in Party and political work during preparations for a prolonged cruise;

---a conference on the subject of the role of the officer in successful preparation for a cruise;

---a seminar attended by the commanders of elements on "The Content, Forms and Methods of Work Employed by a Junior Commander in Guiding the Ideological and Political Education of His Subordinates During a Cruise'';

---theoretical discussion on "Special Features of Work on the Moulding of Fine Moral and Combat Qualities Among the Crew in the Difficult Conditions of a Cruise'';

---a lecture on "The 25th Congress of the CPSU on Strengthening the Country's Defence Capability and Improving the Combat Preparedness of the Soviet Armed`Forces'';

---discussions for the ship's officers on "Educating Your Subordinates by Display of Personal Example'', "Why It Is Important to Know and Respond Quickly to the Needs and Requests of Subordinates'', "Use Every Mile of Cruise to Improve Your Specialist Know-How, Your Knowledge of Tactics and Proficiency'';

---conferences on "Efficient Organisation of Routine During a Cruise as a Guarantee of the Successful Accomplishment of the Assigned Mission'', "Political Education During the Cruise''.

As part of the preparations lectures, reports and discussions were held specifically for ratings and petty 124 officers. These centred around themes connected with Lenin, as well as topical problems of communist construction in the USSR, current international situation, etc. The Komsomol organisation held an evening devoted to "Lenin in Our Life" as well as an arm-chair excursion to places associated with Lenin using redords and documentary films.

To make political education sessions and agitation and propaganda work during the cruise more effective and graphic, a series of diapositive film strips dealing with relevant subjects were shown: "Military Work Is Both Necessary and Honourable'', "The Defence of the Homeland-the Sacred Duty of Every Soviet Soldier'', "The Soviet Army---an Army Born of the Friendship of the Soviet Peoples'', "From Socialism to Communism'', "The Great October Socialist Revolution---the Dawn of a New Era'', "The Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces''. The films shown during the cruise included: "Serving the Soviet Union'', "The Overthrow of Autocracy in Russia'', "Lenin in October'', "In the Line of Duty'', and others.

Some of the subjects of political education sessions conducted during the preparation for the cruise included: "The Soviet Navy and Its Role in Ensuring the Security of the USSR'', "To Withstand Stoically the Difficulties and Hardships of a Cruise'', "The Achievements of the Soviet People in Carrying into Effect the Latest Five-Year Development Plan''. Those attending political education sessions were given lectures on the economic and political situation in the Asian and African countries and on the international situation in general.

The foregoing shows that the moral, political and psychological training conducted in preparation for a cruise usually covers all forms and methods of combat training and Party and political work. The effectiveness of this training is largely dependent on the high standard, ideological relevance and content of all political and educational measures and of combat training 125 sessions incorporating elements that exert a positive moral, political and psychological impact on the crew.

When the crew are convinced of the necessity of the cruise they are about to make as an essential contribution to strengthening the country's defence capacity, to protect her national interests in the World Ocean they are psychologically ready for the cruise. This conviction induces every member of the crew to show a greater sense of personal responsibility for the defence of his country and that exerts a tremendous influence on his behaviour and performance in any situation, however complex or difficult that may develop during the cruise.

The explanatory and educational work on an individual basis during the preparations for a cruise is of great importance. This work calls for the exercise by the instructors of pedagogical tact, for an intimate knowledge of the psychological make-up of the given rating or petty officer and of correct means of influencing him in a desired way. A political officer of one of the submarines noticed that a young rating Abutalib Aliyev was in a bad mood just before putting out to sea. At first sight the reason seemed to be clear: having been born and bred in Kazakhstan, a country of vast dry steppes and mountains, Abutalib was not accustomed to life and service at sea and suffered from seasickness. As he was not the only one who had a problem getting used to naval service, the political officer took the usual steps on the basis of previous experience. When these failed to produce the desired effect, the political officer probed further. Aliyev's psychological condition continued to deteriorate so much so that he became withdrawn, aloof and irritable. At the same time he continued to carry out his duty as conscientiously and diligently as always, and during short cruises kept sea watch quite well and in general worked hard. The political officer could not understand what had happened, but it was important to find out the reason as the ship was due to put out to sea for a long cruise. The situation cleared up when the political officer learned that Aliyev, while at a naval 126 training centre, used to promise to his fellow trainees that he would eventually make a good sailor. He was repeatedly commended for successful service and hard work. Aliyev wrote to his parents about this in his letters. But when Aliyev joined the crew of the ship he discovered that he was prone to seasickness. His fellow crewmen reacted to his weakness in a strange way. They began to make fun of him, to tease him and accused him of boasting and bragging. This only spurred Aliyev on to prove to his fellow ratings that he was as good a sailor as any one of them, while at the same time it depressed him psychologically. The political officer enlisted the efforts of some of the activists to change the unhealthy atmosphere among the young ratings. Speaking at a precruise Komsomol meeting Aliyev admitted that he was aware of his poor resistance to seasickness, but he was sure that he would be able to overcome this weakness. And he assured his comrades that he would do everything in his power to become a real sailor. And indeed, he was as good as his promise. Abutalib returned from a long-term cruise as a rated specialist with excellent results in combat traomomg and political education.

Every specialist should be trained psychologically in such a way as to ensure that all his mental and nervous processes-perception, sensations, powers of attention, memory, imagination, concepts, thinking and speechshowed practically no deviation from the norm, however difficult the conditions of the cruise. To attain this goal it is recommended to introduce into all training sessions and exercises elements requiring independent action, a high level of activity, resourcefulness and ingenuity on the part of the participants. On many naval vessels during standard training sessions, including those designed to train personnel in effective ways of keeping the ship afloat and combat-fit, and during other practical exercises, a situation is often created requiring the crew to use not only all their knowledge and skills, but also to exercise their imagination, resourcefulness and ingenuity, to be able to respond flexibly to any turn in the 127 situation, to piece together the actual picture on the basis of scrappy and scanty information, and to adopt the correct decision. The emotional and volition training of specialists is facilitated by simulating a situation which prefigures the expected difficulties and problems and by introducing factors and tasks requiring a greater mental effort of the participants, by skilfully simulating the clever actions of the enemy, by the use of powerful irritants, the simulation of high-risk situations calling for snap decisions and quick and flexible response, by the use of varied simulation techniques, etc.

The moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel requires of the commanders and political officers to follow closely the day-to-day routine on board ship, to use flexibly the available ways and means of influencing the personnel in the desired way, and, which is most important, to be able to foresee the possible individual and group reactions to these influences. That this is so has been proved time and again by the experiences of many naval vessels.

Here is a typical example. The officer in charge of the electromechanical equipment of a missile-carrying submarine quickly acquired the reputation of an advanced and forward-looking officer. He was a hard worker himself and knew how to organise efficiently the combat training of his subordinates. His reward was the excellent performance of his men in accomplishing combat missions and the good marks they got in political edication. But all these successes were marred by their inadequate performance in fighting for the ship's survivability. The officer did everything in his power to improve the state of affairs. Additional training sessions were held, but even so when his men took exams they got good marks in everything except for their performance in maintaining the ship's survivability. It continued to be their weakest point. On investigation, it turned out that the officer in question had been overzealous in his efforts to turn his men into an efficient team. The officer was fully aware of the importance of simulating 128 situations during training sessions that would be as close to the actual combat situations as possible, but he made the wrong conclusion, and proceeded to simulate emergencies so complex and so difficult that his men despaired of their ability to stop water coming in, no matter how hard they tried. So his men gave up trying to beat the problem, feeling that it was no use. That incident provided an ideal example of a mistake in approach by the commander of an element as a result of which instead of creating favourable psychological prerequisites for the accomplishment of combat missions the training proved counterproductive. When the same officer adopted a gradual approach whereby the difficulties were increased step by step, his men quickly mastered efficient techniques of keeping the ship afloat in the teeth of partial or full flooding.

The creation during preparations for a cruise of an intense atmosphere dominating combat training and political education sessions with a view to accustoming the participating personnel to the dangers and difficulties lying ahead requires in the first instance a careful consideration for a systematic and consistent procedure, gradual increase of the difficulties and problems and, secondly, the need to impose sensible stresses and loads on the physical and psychological powers of the personnel. Experienced commanders and political officers are careful to take every step to ensure that the men are not subjected to excessive work loads which are not justified by the exigencies of the situation. The elimination of causes of unnecessary and inefficient effort creates favourable conditions for an efficient businesslike psychological atmosphere among the crew and stimulates confident, vigorous and optimistic psychological states and boosts the spirit of the personnel. A rational use of the available working time combined with a good rest during the preparation for a cruise is crucial to creating a stimulating healthy moral, political and psychological atmosphere during the cruise.

It is generally recognised that the psychological state 129 and mood of a man are largely a derivative of his physical fitness. Therefore great attention is given to physical fitness and mass sport activities during the preparations for a long cruise. These activities help to keep the personnel in good trim for months ahead. Emphasis is placed on those exercises which are essential to improving their capacity for work and resistance to seasickness, and to improving other qualities so essential for a good sailor.

The moral, political and psychological training of the crew in advance of a cruise is aimed at moulding common aspirations, ambitions, relationships, views and opinions, moods and psychological state which keep the crew united for successful accomplishment of assigned missions. The complex composition of a ship's crew with its many different elements and sub-elements, formal and informal social groups, companies and other associations of crewmen call for holding conferences, briefing sessions, methodological conferences, for meaningful and stimulating social activities. Particular attention should be paid to ways of strengthening the cohesion of a ship's crew when they are getting ready for a prolonged endurance cruise.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. Party and Political Work
During a Cruise

Efficient and well-designed Party and political work during a cruise plays an important part in helping the crew to accomplish their assigned missions and to ensure the trouble-free functioning of the ship. Party and political work takes on added importance during a long-term cruise as this is often attended by psychological phenomena which are not normally experienced among naval personnel while at base. The fact is that a prolonged cruise takes place in an atmosphere which makes the fulfilment of routine duties at action stations more difficult, complicates the progress of combat training, dayto-day routine, rest and leisure activities of the crew. 130 The prolonged separation from home base, loss of contact with families, limited space, the depressing monotony of daily routine, the same faces, heavy work loads and physical exertion, the rapidly changing weather conditions in the ocean, these and other factors of a prolonged cruise affect different members of the crew differently. They give rise to uncommon thoughts, opinions, views and relationships, and are reflected in the sentiments, moods and psychological state of the crew. These psychological phenomena affect the behaviour and performance of officers and men. A vigorous optimistic mood stimulates a high level of performance and capacity for work, and conversely a depressed mood breeds lack of confidence, pessimism, indifference and even apathy. Much depends on how these phenomena are taken into account by those who organise and conduct Party and political work among the crew.

A prolonged cruise imposes a number of special demands on Party and political work. We will mention some of them.

In the first place it is the need to strengthen the commitment to communist ideals and emphasise the class essence of all forms and. methods of work among the personnel. This requirement is dictated by the special features of a prolonged cruise, and by great significance of the missions assigned to the ship making such a cruise. The everyday routine aboard ship takes on added political significance during a cruise. To ensure that each officer and rating sees clearly his own personal contribution to the accomplishment of assigned missions, it is necessary to maintain a high level of ideological work and emphasise ideological implications of any undertaking, however mundane and routine.

It is necessary to make Party and political work among the personnel fully relevant to the everyday routine of the ship's crew and to emphasise the theoretical justification of any practical assignment or task tackled by the crew during a cruise. Every member of the crew, from a rating to the cammander, has his own __PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__ 9* 131 particular duty to fulfil. The overall success of the crew depends on the successful performance of each member of the crew, on the smooth coordination and effective cooperation of the entire crew. A well-designed and relevant Party and political work helps to pool the efforts of the individual members of the crew and gear them to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Under the impact of efficient Party and political work all events, however insignificant or unimportant they may seem, during a cruise are assessed from principled Party positions. This helps to create favourable atmosphere for enhancing the communist consciousness of the personnel, to invigorate their spiritual and creative powers.

The need to make Party and political work during a cruise as efficient as possible is necessitated by the fact that the crew are separated for prolonged periods from home base,by alack of information customary for base conditions, and by high expenditure of moral and physical energy, by a quickly changing pattern of weather conditions so typical of the ocean. It is often necessary during a prolonged cruise not only to inform the crew about a particular event or a change in the conditions of the crew, but also to find out the opinion of each member on an important issue, to find out the attitude of the majority of the crew and to mobilise them for tackling a difficult task that has come up unexpectedly. In these conditions efficient forms of Party and political work are of special importance as these are aimed at boosting the combat efficiency of the personnel, at mobilising their moral forces.

Constant improvement of every form and method of Party and political work in the light of the concrete conditions of a particular cruise. This is necessitated by a new approach to the solution of tasks in combat training and political education during an ocean cruise, by changes in the performance and technological characteristics of ships, weapons and equipment, by continual improvements in the tactics of naval warfare today, by 132 changes in the conditions of prolonged cruises, their growing intensity, duration and cruising range. Today all types of naval ships belonging to different naval commands spend most of their time cruising in the ocean. During these cruises they carry out the entire plan of combat training and political education and Party and Komsomol work.

Increased attention to the psychological impact of all forms of Party and political work. Objective and subjective factors of a prolonged cruise arc reflected in the sentiments and moods of the personnel and exert a more powerful impact on the minds of officers and men than they do on the same people while at base. Not infrequently it so happens that during a prolonged ocean cruise events that at first sight seem insignificant may deeply affect the crew. Therefore when conducting Party and political work during a cruise, it is essential to take into account the impact of particular measures and events on the moods and psychological states of the members of the crew. For this reason it is essential to employ those forms and methods which affect the feelings and sentiments of the crew in the first instance. Experience indicates that during a prolonged cruise meetings devoted to major events in the life of the country and its Armed Forces, to the international situation, exert a powerful influence on the emotions of those attending, as do well-prepared broadcasts and reports on successes scored by the Soviet people in different areas of communist construction.

Improving the scientific content of Party and political work so as to convert it in'o a practical activity resting on a sound scientific footing. During a prolonged cruise it is essential to make a detailed study not only of the actual conditions prevailing on board ship, but also to try and foresee trends in the possible evolution of individual and social psychological factors, which manifest themselves with particular force under complex and hazardous conditions. The scientific and technological revolution that has affected the Navy, prolonged cruises 133 away from home base have combined to change the character of naval service radically. In these conditions marked by complex situations, by the novelty of circumstances it is essential to tackle problems that arise in an imaginative way, to quickly decide upon the right course of action, to conduct oneself in a correct way, to give a class-motivated assessment to events and make correct conclusions.

The commander and political officer are expected to be able to foresee and predict the negative impact of circumstances on the behaviour and performance of their men, so as to prevent or localise it. Of great importance is work on moulding desired and scientifically justified qualities and personality traits both on an individual and collective basis. This work should be conducted with the due account being taken of the prolonged impact of specific conditions of an ocean cruise. Party and political work conducted on a sound scientific basis makes it possible to take into account not only the impact of external circumstances on the behaviour and performance of personnel under complex conditions, but also to create well in advance the necessary psychological and social conditions ensuring the overall success of the crew in question.

Close attention to matters bearing on combat preparedness is an all-important requirement for those organising and conducting Party and political work. Combat preparedness of a naval vessel during an ocean cruise is commonly taken to mean a condition of her crew, weapons and equipment enabling the crew to engage the enemy quickly and under all conditions no matter what the situation and accomplish their assigned mission successfully. A high level of combat preparedness is maintained with the help of special measures aimed at instilling an acute sense of responsibility in every member of the ship's crew for maintaining his battle station in a condition required by relevant instructions, for placing weapons and equipment in full combat readiness in a short time, for establishing a smooth 134 pattern of cooperation between different action stations and interchangeability in combat conditions, based on cross training, clock-work precision in the performance of assigned duties during emergencies, battle alarms, exercises, and maintaining a high level of vigilance during centry duty and underway watch.

Many forms of Party and political work contribute to ensuring a high level of combat preparedness of a naval vessel. During a prolonged cruise the most effective of them are those which ensure a quick and flexible response to any twist in the situation and any change in the performance of the crew. Party information sessions, oral propaganda and PA broadcasts are among the most effective forms of Party and political work during a cruise.

The transfer of the centre of Party and political work from the ship's combat department to the duty shift. The assignment of a ship's crew to duty shifts is a distinguishing characteristic of the day-to-day routine aboard any naval vessel. While the ship is at base this special feature does not significantly change the organisation of political and educational work, combat training and everyday life of the crew. While the ship is at base provision is made for special work aimed at training the crew in standard procedures in preparation for a cruise. During this training the element is the focal point of Party and political work. During a prolonged cruise the situation is different. The centre of gravity of Party and political work moves over to the duty shift. All combat departments and services uniting the personnel on the professional principle play a subordinate role, the accomplishment of the basic objectives of a cruise is ensured by each duty shift. During a prolonged cruise the duty shift takes on a new and special role. From a purely organisational unit it becomes an element in its own right with its own routine and a large measure of independence as a part of the ship's crew. The centre of Party and political work is therefore transferred to the duty shift. Each duty shift sets up its own Komsomol 135 group that plays an important part in cementing this combat organism which as a crew in miniature takes charge of the whole ship the moment it takes over from the previous duty shift.

Party and political work during a prolonged cruise is conducted in a variety of forms using different methods. This work affects every facet of the daily routine aboard ship and has a number of typical important aspects.

As always, emphasis is laid on work aimed at improving the ideological, political and military education of the personnel. The prime task of the ideoological work conducted on a permanent basis under all conditions is to help the men develop a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and fine ideological and political qualities and communist morality.

The importance of efficient ideological work during prolonged ocean cruises which proceed in an atmosphere marked by a heightened sense of responsibility and high intensity of both physical and moral exertion can hardly be overestimated. The Navy regulations state in this connection that the more complex and difficult the situation, the more active the political work.

During a prolonged cruise as well as at base, the principal forms and methods of ideological, political and military education of naval personnel include the study of Marxism-Leninism by officers, political education of midshipmen ratings and petty officers. Other forms include political information sessions, theoretical seminars, lectures, reports and talks.

Film showings followed by group discussions, collective reading sessions of Lenin's works, discussions uf books, etc.. have a powerful educational impact on the participating personnel. A salient feature of this work is its relevance to current problems and issues. The subjects and themes are characterised by a clear sense of purpose and reflect the special features of a particular ocean cruise.

Self-education is gaining in popularity among officers studying Marxism-Leninism. Apart from attending 136 seminars and lectures, many officers write abstracts and papers dealing with specific questions of Marxist-- Leninist theory covered by the curriculum. Joint discussions of abstracts and papers have also become widespread in recent years.

Political education sessions for ratings and petty officers are usually conducted in duty shifts. Their duration is subject to circumstances.

The success in political education of the naval personnel conducted during a prolonged cruise is usually contingent on the previous work done at base. It is largely dependent on the efficient planning of sessions, on the choice of literature, visual and technical aids to propaganda. On the basis of an intimate knowledge of the situation prevailing in the area of the cruise, the subjects of political education sessions are worked out and suitable methods and procedures adopted. Briefing sessions and seminars are held for the leaders of study groups, as part of preparations for a prolonged cruise.

This work is also continued during the cruise itself. The conduct of political education sessions while at sea is made more difficult by the actual conditions of the cruise. There is the noise inside the ship's rooms and compartments, especially inside submarines, there is oppressive microclimate, cramped space, pitch and roll and, as a result, greater fatigue of the man. In the circumstances it is essential to work out a suitable method well in advance, to determine a realistic amount of theoretical material to be covered and carefully consider what visual aids, technical equipment, documentary and feature films will best serve the purpose.

A prolonged cruise makes exacting demands on those who conduct political education sessions. The ability of the leader of a political education seminar to present the material succinctly, to back up his arguments with good examples which bear out theoretical conclusions is very much at a premium The relevance of the material covered to the day-to-day routine of the ship's crew is of importance.

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During a long cruise political information is highly significant. Political information sessions should be conducted daily, circumstances allowing. The methods to boused are subject to the concrete prevailing conditions. On some occasions duty shift assemblies are best, on others political information can be provided through the ship's public address system, on still others hot news bulletins may be distributed to the personnel manning action stations, etc. If the situation allows, the most important events in the life of the country and international news are announced during the morning parade of the ship's crew.

During a prolonged cruise talks gain in importance. Indeed, even if the personnel are told about major events, it is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of a relaxed and friendly conversation led by an agitator or a propagandist who spells out the implications of a particular event in plain, easy-to-understand terms. Such conversations enable the participating ratings to express their opinions and attitude to a particular event and help the agitator or propagandist to get to know the participants better and find out from them their needs and interests. All this contributes to efforts to work out a consensus among the crew, to arrive at common views and attitudes all of which makes for greater cohesion and camaraderie among the crew.

Work on ideological, political and military education is conducted with due regard for the special features of assigned missions. Here is a typical example.

The crew of a naval vessel X was ordered to hold a torpedo practice session during a long cruise in advance of putting out to sea. A well-designed plan of training was worked out according to which training sessions were held with emphasis on following prescribed maintenance procedures for the equipment and torpedo launchers. The coming torpedo practice session was discussed in detail at Party and Komsomol meeiings. All this took place while the crew were still awaiting a specific order. Such an order arrived only towards the 138 end of the cruise when the ship's navigator had already charted the course back for home base. The element of surprise was thus achieved. Besides, prevailing conditions were anything but favourable: the hydrologic conditions of the sea made target search and acquisition difficult. The ship was proceeding through rough seas and the target was carefully guarded. To make things worse the crew was visibly tired after several months of intense cruising. The men had never before had to carry out torpedo practice under such unfavourable conditions. The situation was discussed at an open Party meeting during which the commander dwelt on specific difficulties and problems.

The decision adopted was based on concrete suggestions made by those attending the meeting. The officer in charge of the torpedo department helped the department's Komsomols to hold a meeting. The secretary of the ship's Party bureau organised the production and distribution of relevant combat leaflets. Agitators conducted several talks with the personnel of the department. In the meantime special programmes were broadcast over the ship's radio on the progress of preparations for the torpedo firing session. Chief petty officer Kolos spoke in one of them and assured the crew that the sonarmen would do their utmost to do a good job of detecting the target at an extreme range. A special issue of the ship's wall newspaper was entirely devoted to the projected torpedo firing session. Thorough preparations set the stage for a successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. All the torpedoes hit the target.

The ship's commander, officers, Party and Komsomol organisations must show constant concern to ensure a fail-safe functioning of the equipment and vigilant keeping of undenvay watch during a prolonged cruise. Party and political work must also be geared to the achievement of the same goal.

Party and Komsomol meetings, political education sessions and seminars also deal with matters essential to a trouble-free cruise. Matters relating to efficient keeping 139 of underway watch, maintenance procedures for the combat materiel and power equipment are dealt with at all agitation and propaganda sessions. They are also reflected in socialist emulation and cultural and educational activities. Efficient keeping of underway watch is largely dependent on the physical fitness and capacity for work of the personnel, on their ability to use their energies sensibly, on the standard of discipline, and the organisation of the overall routine aboard ship. Therefore Party and political work on ensuring a trouble-free cruising covers every facet of the life and service of the ship's crew.

Party and political work is conducted by various methods and in different forms, including the discussion of assigned missions in combat training at Party and Komsomol meetings, socialist emulation drives, reports by Party members and Komsomols on specific aspects of their work, meetings of officers, midshipmen and petty officers, methodological conferences of officers in charge of action stations and departments, group and team meetings, provision of help to lagging members of the crew on an individual basis, progress reports in the ship's wall newspaper and broadcasts over the ship's radio, dissemination of advanced experience, talks emphasising the intimate connection between combat preparedness and fighting efficiency of the crew and their performance during training sessions. The special features of a prolonged cruise make it possible to develop emulation both between individual specialists and between groups of specialists, teams and the personnel of different departments of the ship.

A plotting board is usually prominently displayed to enable the crew to follow the progress of socialist emulation in combat training on a daily basis, Every day marks are awarded for the performance during the keeping of underway watch, for the fulfilment of procedures and standards in combat training, for the quality of maintenance of combat materiel in proper combat readiness, for 140 the progress of combat cross-training and acquisition of a related speciality, etc.

This plotting board enables each member of the ship's crew to know how his performance during combat duty has been assessed and what drawbacks and flaws have been detected in his work. The performance of each member of the crew is discussed in the ship's wall newspaper, in broadcasts over the ship's radio, and during the conversations agitators hold with those manning action stations and departments. The ship's commander often addresses the crew and commends those who have distinguished themselves.

The Party and Komsomol group organisers, officer on duty and element commanders assist the ship commander in deciding on the marks which should be awarded.

During a prolonged cruise socialist emulation is organised to improve the performance by the crew in their particular jobs. Here is a typical example. The crew of the cruiser Admiral Fokin was to carry out a missile firing session in the ocean. The personnel of the ship's missile and artillery department joined a socialist emulation drive for the right to do the job as only one of the missile teams was to carry out missile firings. The question was which was it to be. The various teams went into hard training. Each specialist was eager to achieve a high standard of performance, better in fact than that prescribed by regulations. The officers of the missile department together with Party members and Komsomol activists organised technical evenings and competitions to find out the best specialists and then made their experience known to all the others. The progress of the socialist emulation was covered in the ship's newspaper, over the radio and during oral propaganda sessions. When the time arrived all teams displayed excellent skill and proved their complete proficiency in the handling of their weapons and equipment. Officer Mikitevich and his subordinates came out on top and thus won the right to carry out the projected missile firing. They were awarded an excellent mark for their performance.

141

A socialist emulation drive during a prolonged cruise is wider in scope and has a greater depth than in other conditions. Socialist emulation also affects the day-- today routine, the intellectual and cultural pursuits of the crew, their leisure activities and daily life. Competitions and contests to identify the best specialists, the best wall newspaper or battle leaflet, the best amateur talent group, etc. are widespread. Sports competitions are a standard feature of life in the Soviet Navy.

Socialist emulation during a prolonged cruise based as it is on a high sense of responsibility, principled exactingness and mutual assistance helps to bring the ship's crew closer together into a closely-knit team.

A major aspect of Party and political work during a cruise is the efforts to mobilise the crew for work to gain complete proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment and for improving skill and know-how in their particular jobs. Specialist training of naval personnel is systematically discussed at Party and Komsomol conferences and is covered in newspapers and broadcasts.

The Party and Komsomol organisations play a particularly important part in efforts to foster rated specialists and ratings with excellent results in combat training and political education, and to ensure that Party members and Komsomols always lead the way in this all-important activity. The movement initiated by the crew of the nuclear-powered submarine 50 Years of the USSR aimed at gaining top proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment has since involved the entire sea-going personnel of the Soviet Navy.

During a prolonged cruise the ship's crew tend to evince a greater desire to become rated specialists, to acquire a second and related specialities and to cut down the time allowed for bringing into full combat readiness their weapons and equipment; more members of the crew join the movement of rationalisers and inventors and the number of ratings with excellent results in combat training and political education grow.

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Efficient organisation and a firm discipline are essential to the successful performance of the ship's crew. During a prolonged cruise the discipline and absolute obedience of each member of the crew have a direct bearing on the combat preparedness and fighting efficiency of the ship. This makes extra demands on the effectiveness of Party and political work aimed at instilling in every member of the crew a high sense of discipline and responsibility. The creation of an atmosphere marked by mutual exactingness and principled attitude is essential to an efficient performance by the ship's crew during a prolonged cruise.

A prolonged cruise sets limits to the extent many everyday needs and requirements of the crew can be met as compared with the situation at base. This may affect the mood of the crew. Constant concern for food rations, everyday routine and rest and leisure of the crew is among the prime duties of the ship's commander and political officers during a prolonged cruise. Regular meals and good food coupled with adequate rest keep the crew fit and in a good mood and thus enable them to devote their energies to improving their performance and keeping underway watch efficiently. Recommendations have been made for the variety of food products and standard menus and for the best ways of keeping and using food supplies depending on the climatic conditions prevailing in the areas where Soviet naval vessels cruise. Special training facilities are maintained to train cooks and bakers. Experienced instructors supervise practical demonstration sessions to show the crew different methods of cooking different foods.

The organisation of efficient control over the activities of bodies in charge of food supplies and distribution is one of the prime duties of those who guide Party and political work aimed at improving the everyday life of naval personnel and meeting their needs to their satisfaction.

At the same time the organisation of relevant interesting and stimulating cultural activities and of adequate 143 rest periods is of tremendous importance, of which more in Section 5.

Party and political work conducted during a prolonged cruise is usually planned before the ship puts out to sea. This work covers many different aspects, including a careful consideration of the available opportunities for efficient Party and Komsomol activities during the cruise to enable the Party and Komsomol organisations to maintain their authority and influence on the crew, the organising of a correct and efficient deployment of Party and Komsomol activists at the crucial stages of the cruise, ensuring a close connection between Party and political measures and the life and work of the crew, ensuring the relevance of Party and political work to the missions set for the cruise, explaining the ideological and political implications of every event taking place aboard ship during the cruise. Care should be taken to forecast and take into account the impact of expected events and conditions prevailing at every stage of the cruise, to give careful consideration to the influence of the geographical, hydrometeorological and climatic conditions on the substance* forms and methods of the work to be done.

In most cases the plan of Party and political work is drawn up in the light of the missions and tasks to be accomplished at every successive stage of a cruise. Depending on the duration of the cruise this work is planned either for the entire cruise or for each successive period during which the ship's crew tackle immediate tasks. Further work for the rest of the cruise is outlined in general terms.

Experience indicates that a viable and detailed plan can be drawn up for a period of up to three months. If the cruise is longer it is advisable to work out a longterm general outline of a plan for the entire cruise and then to draw up detailed plans for each month taking into account the special features of the situation at every stage of the cruise.

As a rule, a plan of Party and political work for a cruise covers:

144

---work with the officer^:

---political and military education of midshipmen, petty officers and ratings;

---Party organisational work:

---supervision of the activities of the Komsomol organisations and the education of Komsomol activists;

---agitation and propaganda work:

---cultural, education and mass sports activities. Due attention is paid to matters relating to the material and technical supply and to meeting the needs and requirements of the ship's crew. The plan also covers individual and collective work with the crew both in individual departments and action stations and for the ship as a whole. On those naval vessels where there are political officers in individual departments they plan Party and political work independently. On other naval vessels where there arc no political officers the officer in charge of a particular department, acting in close contact with Party members and Komsomols under him. organises Party and political work in keeping with the plan for the whole of the ship's crew, and although no separate plan is drawn up they work out measures that take into account the specific conditions under which they have to operate.

The work on instilling in the ship's crew high moral, political and combat qualities is carried out by the ship's commander and political officers in close contact with the ship's Party and Komsomol organisations. To this end a variety of forms and methods of Party and Komsomol work arc used such as meetings of Communists and Komsomols to discuss major aspects of the ship's routine during a prolonged cruise, individual work. Party and Komsomol assignments, lectures, reports and colloquies. Also popular arc reports by Party members during Party meetings. These reports enable Party organisations to bring together and generalise the advanced experience more efficiently and quickly, to support and make widely known valuable sucsiestions as well as to identify 145 drawbacks and oversights and mobilise the Communists for their early elimination.

Depending on the specific conditions surrounding a prolonged cruise the forms and methods of Party and Komsomol work are modified to fit the situation prevailing at any given point in time. As a rule emphasis is placed on those methods which assure speed, efficiency, relevance and a sense of purpose. At the same time during a prolonged cruise just as at base Party and Komsomol meetings and bureau meetings are held at the prescribed times in accordance with existing regulations. The bulk of the Party and Komsomol work is carried out during duty shift sessions. During the cruise each duty shift has its own Party and Komsomol organisers who work in close contact with the watch officer, the engineer officer of the watch and the officers in charge of command posts and battle stations. It is essential to deploy Party members and Komsomols efficiently, to pick the right men for the right jobs and to brief them in detail on their duties as leaders of their particular Party and Komsomol groups and to explain to the agitators, editors of combat leaflets and the ship's wall newspaper their respective duties.

Party and Komsomol assignments are of special importance during a prolonged cruise as they provide to those who get them scope for a display of initiative and help them involve in active Party and Komsomol work all the Communists and Komsomol members among the ship's crew. While working on their Party and Komsomol assignments they acquire organisational skills, add to their leadership potential and extend their ideological horizons. Such assignments also make it possible to make the work of Party and Komsomol organisations more efficient which, needless to say, is of crucial importance to a successful accomplishment of a prolonged cruise in the ocean amid conditions that are usually anything but favourable.

146 __ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. Moral and Psychological Training
of Naval Personnel and Increasing
Combat Activity During a Prolonged Cruise

Ocean cruises provide good opportunities for improving the moral and psychological status of the ship's crew, for perfecting teamwork between the various departments of the ship. During a prolonged ocean cruise the navymen's tactical skill and seamanship are put to the test along with specific recommendations given by scientific research centres and naval staffs. Instructions, regulations and manuals are adjusted and even modified in the light of the practical experience gained during an ocean cruise. Ocean cruises enable the ship's crew to develop qualities and skills indispensable for modern naval warfare. During a prolonged cruise far away from home base, the ship's crew go through the rigorous training of service at sea and acquire experience in handling the ship and their weapons and equipment.

The ship's crew have an opportunity to add to their know-how, to improve their seamanship and fighting efficiency. During a prolonged cruise they keep a roundthe-clock underway watch, maintain their action stations in state of constant combat readiness, and see to it that their weapons and equipment can go into action at a moment's notice whatever the situation may be. During a cruise, the ship's specialists get accustomed to their particular department and equipment so much that they are able to tell immediately when something or other goes wrong by symptoms and signs that only they can make sense of: a peculiar noise, a slightly different vibration, etc. Know-how and complete proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment strengthen the men's confidence and create the necessary psychological readiness to use their weapons at any time and under any conditions.

A prolonged cruise helps the ship's officers to improve their tactical skill, develop initiative, an imaginative approach to the execution of their duties and 147 psychological qualities essential for successful naval warfare. The officers organise and supervise combat training and political education sessions on board ship and supervise the maintenance and operating procedures for the ship's equipment and mechanisms as well as looking after economy measures. Together with their subordinates they also keep underway watch, gather information on the prevailing situation or perform other no less important duties. The constantly changing situation, the high intensity of an ocean cruise create an atmosphere stimulating initiative and imaginative approach to things.

A prolonged cruise enables the ship's crew to pit themselves against the elements. Navymen keep watch in any weather, during storms, under the blazing sunshine and in cold blizzards. They have to meet the dangers and hazards of life at sea face to face and win. Endurance and sangfroid are the hallmarks of a true navyman. The moulding of these volitional qualities is expedited by prolonged cruises across the world's seas and oceans. The atmosphere of a prolonged cruise docs not allow a crew member to succumb to passing moods. It requires every member of the crew to show persistence and staunchness, to be able to keep a firm grip on himself, to keep a clear head while performing his assigned duties on board ship. The commander, officers and the entire crew of a diesel electric submarine, to take but one example, should display better than average sangfroid and courage during a prolonged cruise involving careful concealment precautions. Such a cruise calls for peak efficiency and split-second precision on the part of the entire crew. The accomplishment of any combat mission in the ocean involves weeks and sometimes months of cruising in the tense atmosphere of anticipating an encounter with the ``enemy'', or looking for the enemy while on full alert.

A prolonged ocean cruise helps every member of the ship's crew to develop staunchness, courage and endurance. But it is a mistake to think that a mere presence on board ship cruising in the ocean is enough. It is essential to make skilful and purposeful use of the 148 favourable opportunities offered by such a cruise to help every member of the crew to steel himself in the daily battle against the elements to become a real seaman. Here is a typical example. Submarine X was steaming surfaced in rough seas at night. Second Lieutenant Beilin, the officer of the watch on that occasion, was told by the radar man that they had detected ``enemy'' radar signals. The lieutenant immediately ordered crash diving. Having sealed the upper hatch of the conning tower, Beilin was the last to climb down into the central control department and, after issuing standard instructions, looked at his commander as if asking for further directions. But the commander was silent letting the watch officer have carte blanche. The depth indicator showed that the specified depth would soon be reached. But there was reason to believe that the submarine would continue tb plunge deeper and deeper. Something had to be done quickly to slow down the rate of diving. But the watch officer hesitated. Several minutes passed before he ordered the planesman to stop her from diving any deeper. But nothing happened. The submarine continued to plunge deeper and deeper. The depth indicator needle was fast approaching the red line. "Full speed ahead! Air bubble into mid-section! " the commander intervened. The submarine's hull shook with vibration. Everybody heard air hissing as it rushed out of the air cylinders and into the regulating tank. Before long the submarine came to rest at the required depth. Second Lieutenant Beilin, a guilty look on his face, breathed a sigh of relief.

A few hours later, when the submarine was proceeding in relatively calm waters, the commander called his officers to a conference. Together they analysed the recent performance of Lieutenant Beilin. The commander in his contribution emphasised not so much Beilin's mistakes, as effective ways of dealing with a similar situation. Other officers shared their experience with their younger colleagues, thereby helping them to see clearly what they should do in similar situations.

149

A skilful use of the hazards and difficulties of a prolonged cruise for training purposes helps to instil in both officers and ratings a high sense of responsibility for the fulfilment of their duties. To be sure, a sense of responsibility for one'sown performance during an ocean cruise becomes more acute almost by itself. But if this objective factor is not properly managed and guided, it may manifest itself only when one is doing a specific job or when faced with an emergency, or a complex situation during watch or battle alerts. Such an idea of the sense of responsibility strips it of its ideological and political basis and if adopted leads to instances of an irresponsible attitude and negligence, especially when a crew member is confronted with a challenge that is outside his normal course of duty.

Storms, difficult hydrological and navigational conditions which are so much a feature of a prolonged ocean cruise help create a suitable environment in which to improve the moral and psychological stability and resistance of naval personnel and increase their fighting efficiency. Exercises and manoeuvres held in the nonetoo-easy conditions of an ocean cruise bring the best results and help the ship's crew to learn to act under conditions not unlike those likely to be encountered in a real naval battle. Here is an example. While repulsing an ``enemy'' air attack the cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov sustained serious ``damage'': several holes in the hull, a crippled steam main, a damaged electric cable and several fires in different parts. Way was off the ship. There were ``casualties'' too. The situation called for immediate action on the part of the crew who were to close down the holes, put out the fires and decontaminate their weapons and equipment. All operations were carried out with gas masks and protective clothing on and during a violent roll. Men had to work at full stretch for several hours before they restored the ship's fighting capacity.

A prolonged cruise is a good test of the endurance and physical fitness of the crew. But the difficulties created 150 by the elements, formidable though they may be, are not always enough to test the combat training of the ship's crew in every respect and so additional difficulties have to be created to make the simulated battle environment resemble "the real thing" as close as possible. By skilfully complicating a simulated combat situation it is possible'to exert an appreciable impact on the psychological stability of naval personnel. During one of its prolonged cruises the fleet headquarters decided to test the combat readiness of the crew of a missile-carrying submarine X by ordering the submarine to fire a missile at a shore-based ``enemy'' target. The unexpected order did not catch the submarine's crew napping. It was not the first time that they had to carry out unexpected orders like that during a prolonged cruise. The commander told his men about the new assignment and issued appropriate orders. Meanwhile the combat situation became more complicated. The tactical background was made more difficult in a rather unusual way. In particular the submarine's radar and sonarmen had to contend with the enemy's electronic interference. Besides, damage was simulated to one of the submarine's vital units. But the men managed to put things right fairly soon and fired the missile on schedule. Despite the extreme range it scored a direct hit.

The morale of a naval ship's crew and their stability in battle are a direct derivative of the moral atmosphere prevailing aboard ship. On board ship, as nowhere else, the members of the crew are heavily dependent upon one another. The safety of the ship during a prolonged cruise in difficult conditions and the successful accomplishment of the assigned combat mission depend directly on the skilful performance by each member of the crew of his particular duties, on the endurance and staying power of one and all.

A healthy moral atmosphere and a good fighting spirit among the crew are stimulated on a daily basis. As they carry out their missions during training sessions and exercises the members of the ship's crew develop 151 suitable common aspirations, ambitions, opinions and views which are so essential for efficient teamwork during a naval action. The fostering and inculcation of fine ideological and political sentiments among the ship's crew is of special importance. Love of the country, of the Communist Party, coupled with a high sense of responsibility for the country's security constitute the basis of the required emotional atmosphere among members of the crew. During a prolonged cruise these sentiments take on added palpability and become a permanent factor. When he finds himself away from home, the Soviet navyman feels the pull of his country and his attachment to his native land more acutely than ever.

The close cooperation, smooth teamwork and complete proficiency displayed by the ship's crew during a prolonged cruise combine to generate a sense of combat excitement and help the men to maintain their constant readiness for action, serve to strengthen their confidence in the performance capabilities of their ship, strengthen their staunchness, courage and fighting spirit. Camaraderie and smooth teamwork are of tremendous importance on board ship.

The highly specific conditions of a prolonged cruise generate among the ship's crew a feeling of attachment to their ship and pride for her successful combat performance. This feeling of attachment develops only when the crew have spent long months in the open ocean battling with the elements and other difficulties. Born of the none-too-easy conditions of a long cruise these feelings and sentiments become so customary and necessary that when a naval vessel spends long periods at base her crew grow tired of waiting and are eager to put out to sea on a long cruise again.

The impact of hazardous and even dangerous circumstances and unexpected obstacles and difficulties on the emotional make-up of a ship's crew follows a recognisable pattern. The crewmen respond quickly to the slightest change occurring on board ship and to the commander's every order or instruction. When the crew are 152 denied adequate information on everything that goes on board ship these changes may create an atmosphere of conjecture, guesswork and rumours which in turn may give rise to lack of confidence, alarm and even fear among some members of the crew.

The creation and maintenance of a healthy moral and psychological climate aboard ship is no easy matter and calls for the undivided attention on the part of all officers, Party members and Komsomol activists. There are no minor points in this matter, no secondary details, especially in the none-too-easy conditions of a prolonged cruise that tax the crew's physical and moral power considerably.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. The Psychological and Physiological
Potential of Naval Personnel
and Ways of Improving It During
a Prolonged Cruise

The responsible tasks facing the crews of Soviet naval vessels during prolonged cruises, the need to maintain constant combat readiness and the daily battle against the elements combine to make heavy demands on their physical and psychological powers. The navymen often have to work at full stretch for prolonged periods which may lead to a deterioration of performance, behaviour, a loss of alertness and to an increase in the incidence of sickness and injuries. Therefore the officers must see to it that their men are never obliged to waste their energy and create suitable conditions to sustain and restore the physical and psychological powers of their men in order to maintain the combat preparedness of their ship at a high level. This all-important task must be tackled on the basis of a scientifically sound moral, psychological and physiological support of the Navy's ocean operations. The officers must be fully versed in effective methods used in this work and learn how to employ them most successfully.

153

The physiological potential of the human organism for doing a particular job within, a prescribed time-table and with a specified quality of performance is generally known as capacity for work. Fatigue is a temporary decline of a person's capacity for work due to functional physiological changes affecting his mental and physical powers: disruption of normal functions of the central nervous system, exhaustion of energy-producing substances in the body, oxygen deficiency, etc. Fatigue reduces a person's capacity for work and makes for a deterioration or even ``deautomatisation'' of certain skills and work habits. Fatigue blunts the person's mental alertness and intellectual ability, dulls his powers of attention and makes him irritable or apathetic.

However, his physiological potential is not the only factor determining a person's performance at a job. The latter also depends on his conscientiousness, willpower, mood and other parameters of his personality. A person's psychological potential corresponding to, but not necessarily identical with, its physiological counterpart---capacity for work---has come to be known as competence, while its temporary deterioration is known as tiredness. Some of the typical signs of tiredness include a feeling of heaviness in the head, limbs, eyes and ears, a general flabbiness, limpness and lethargy. Lenin wrote in this connection, "Weariness and exhaustion produce a certain mood, and sometimes lead to desperation.''^^1^^

The symptoms of tiredness are not always an accurate indication of the degree of a person's fatigue: a fatigued person may not necessarily feel tired and vice versa. It all depends on his awareness, alertness, willpower, on his sense of responsibility, interests, professionalism and experience. These factors help a person to draw on his reserve capacity and what is known as ''compensatory potential" of his organism.

This is why reduction of a person's capacity for work _-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 282.

154 does not necessarily lead to a parallel deterioration of his competence and quality of performance. Needless to say, a person's reserve and compensatory potential are not limitless. A reduction in a person's capacity for work and fatigue at some point inevitably affect his performance.

The dynamic of a person's capacity for work and fatigue, of his competence and tiredness, as well as of his productive activity follows a recognisable pattern, it has its own stages, phases and periods (see Fig. 2). The prework stage is characterised by a rising trend of a person's capacity for work and competence before he sets about his duties under the influence of the preparations he makes for his work, of his consciousness and willpower and under the influence of instructions, briefing sessions and other preparatory measures. But this rising trend is not uniform throughout the pre-work period. This period can be divided into two sub-periods: pre-tuning (1) and readiness (2). If the period is too long a person's capacity for work and competence may show a deterioration even in the period of readiness.

The work stage comprises three phases: a rising trend of performance (running-in), peak performance and declining trend of performance (fatigue). The running-in phase is characterised by a rising trend of performance, at first a rapid rise (the period of "emergency runningin" [3]) followed by a slow trend of rising performance (the period of fine running-in [4]). High spirits, a business-like atmosphere, a high sense of responsibility, skill and experience enable navymen to pass through this phase fairly quickly and achieve a high and stable level of performance at the start.

The peak performance phase is noted for a high and stable level of productivity, competence and capacity for work. During this phase a person's entire potential is used fully. This phase comprises two periods: the optimum (5) followed by complete compensation for tiredness and fatigue (6). The latter is characterised by the onset of a slight feeling of weariness which is offset __PARAGRAPH_PAUSE__ 155 199-1.jpg [156] __PARAGRAPH_CONT__ by an emotional uplift, enthusiasm and later by an effort of the will.

The third phase, that of a declining trend of performance in the course of work, is noted for the increasing impact of rapidly growing tiredness. This stage is marked by episodic instances of mental deterioration and wandering attention followed by a general feeling of tiredness. By an effort of the will a person may succeed in offsetting this deterioration to a certain extent (the period of unstable compensation of tiredness [7]). Later, however, he will find it increasingly more difficult to cope with fatigue. At this stage he begins to make more and more mistakes and errors, they become more serious and eventually the person may even err where he is least expected to do so. As a result, his efficiency declines steadily (8). Towards the end of the work period his spirits often rise, the feeling of the tiredness is not so oppressive and his performance improves somewhat (the period of terminal uplift [91).

The work period is followed by a restoration of the person's expended energy (10). At the start of the cruise he often feels his fatigue more acutely than during the work period. Later, this feeling and the signs of fatigue disappear. This is followed by a period of "super-- restoration of strength" (11)---a favourable prelude to the next work cycle.

These stages and periods are characteristic both of work on carrying out specific tasks and assignments that take a considerable period of time (a cruise, a duty shift) and of a period of uninterrupted work during a relatively short spell (watch duty, a flight, a shift).

The dynamic of a person's capacity for work and competence during a prolonged ocean cruise manifests itself in the form of characteristic periods. At the start of a cruise, the men adapt themselves to the conditions prevailing on board ship, get used to the daily routine, as a icsult of which the "base routine" stereotype of psychological and physiological activity breaks down to be replaced by a new pattern well suited to the 157 conditions of the cruise. At that time psychological problems arise which may affect performance adversely. It so happens sometimes that as soon as the pre-cruise hustle and bustle, the endless succession of jobs are behind them, some members of the ship's crew breathe a sigh of relief and relax during the first 4-12 days of the cruise. In the case of experienced well-trained and strong-willed members of the crew it is far shorter. At the start of a cruise it is important not to wait for the process of adaptation to come to an end by itself but to step up all sorts of mobilising measures. It is common practice in the Soviet Navy to sum up the results of work aboard ship during the first days of a cruise, to award marks for performance to every member of the crew on a daily basis, to inform the crew about the progress of socialist emulation, to carry out tests and check-ups on how well the crew know the instructions, manuals, regulations and day-to-day routine during a cruise.

The second period is the main part of the cruise. It is characterised by peak performance by every member of the crew on account of his peak psychological and physiological characteristics. During this period the members of the crew are in high spirits and eager to work The crewmen show a lively interest in everything, are alert and cheerful. Occasional instances of deterioration of performance and behaviour quickly disappear.

However, as time goes by fatigue may build up and produce certain changes affecting the men's physiological functions. As a result their reflexes may become inhibited, their capacity for work declines and the differentiated inhibition of the central nervous system may be disturbed. For a time these changes may not affect the behaviour and performance of the crew in any appreciable way. By an effort of the will and by using the reserve potential of the organism these instances of slight deterioration of performance may be fully offset. However, the continuing strain of the men's physical and moral powers for prolonged periods may cause 158 significant changes. This marks the start of the third period known as complete compensation of fatigue.

During a prolonged cruise fatigue builds up and in due course shows itself in occasional slips and errors committed by the crew members and in spells of low spirits among some of them. This marks the onset of the fourth period---that of incomplete compensation of fatigue.

Further, deterioration of the performance and behaviour of the ship's crew may become a permanent tendency, affecting many crew members simultaneously. The fifth period, that of fatigue, sets in.

During the prolonged endurance cruise when the ship does not call at ports and her crew are denied even a short rest, as a survey carried out among the merchant seamen has indicated, the majority of the ship's crew are no longer able to have a sound sleep, show signs of apathy and langour. Their thoughts drift back to their families. They keep thinking about a good rest and entertainment, evince little interest in their duties seeing them as an unwelcome burden. The less experienced members of the crew who lack psychological stamina often perform their functions in a perfunctory mindless fashion. Others begin to fear storms and often succumb to seasickness. This marks the start of the sixth period, that of extreme fatigue.

The seventh period which begins when the ship starts the voyage back to home base is marked by rising spirits among the crew and by their improving performance. The foregoing fully applies to surface cruising in the temperate zone. Young sailors as well as those with 7-8 years' experience of repeated prolonged cruises may show signs of changes in performance even earlier. The same is true of those who cruise in the polar regions and in the tropics. Submarine crews may develop adverse psychological and physiological changes even earlier.

To prevent the onset of negative psychological and physiological changes and to keep the combat preparedness of ships and fighting efficiency of their crews at a high level for sustained periods it is essential to know 159 well the causes of fatigue and tiredness that develop at sea and ways of neutralising them.

The main cause is the complex and responsible nature of the mission assigned to naval vessels and aircraft. Like any difficult job. a cruise or a flight makes exacting demands on the crew's physical and psychological powers. This cause cannot be removed for obvious reasons, but it is possible to cushion its impact on the men and reduce the strain on them by improving their moral, political and psychological training, by rationalising procedures and work methods, by applying recommendations made by experts in psychology, by a careful screening of candidates and elimination of those who are unfit to withstand the difficulties attending cruises and flights and by cutting down to a minimum additional and accompanying causes of tiredness and fatigue.

The daily battle against the elements makes heavy claims on the physical and psychological powers of the crew. Again it is impossible to remove this cause completely but it is possible to lessen its impact on the men by instilling in them an attachment and habit to naval service and to the sea. by accustoming them to the sea during repeated cruises, flights, by improving their living and working conditions and by introducing sensible procedures and routine providing for a rational alternation of work and rest.

During a prolonged cruise the monotonous pattern of daily routine aboard ship and the sameness of the surroundings the endless sea, the same deck and superstructure, the same smells and colours and the same familiar faces have a depressing effect on the men. Kven during rest periods the men hear the same noises, experience the same pitch and roll and the same vibration as during training sessions, watch-keeping sessions, exercises, etc. The situation is exactly the same today as yesterday and will be the same tomorrow. It seems this will never end. Ivan Pavlov, a famous Russian physiologist, provided an apt description of this sort of psychological state as "bombardment of one and the same cell in 160 your brain''. On the one hand, the men experience a satiety with endlessly recurrent impressions and, on the other, they suffer from lack of change, from the absence of familiar impressions that are available to other people. Both result in a rather special psychological state marked by a lack of familiar sensation, perception, emotions. The men miss these ordinary blessings terribly and react in an irritable fashion to the dull monotony of everyday routine. This is a sign of psychological hunger, otherwise known as psychic deprivation.

This state takes an acute form in the case of the submarine crews who have to spend long periods under water and thus are unable to see the sky, the sun and even the sea, who cannot follow the alternation of day and night, who cannot smell the smells of nature, who have to live for prolonged periods in a crammed space. The studies conducted by Soviet experts and by their foreign counterparts in laboratory conditions imposing rigorous sensory isolation on the human experimental subjects indicate that the typical symptoms of psychic deprivation include pessimism, apprehension, alarm, depression, lowering of the emotional tone, deterioration of mental abilities, the onset of auditory and ocular illusions, hallucinations, and fidgeting and restiveness. Even though psychic deprivation in the case of Soviet navy men is never allowed to assume extreme forms it docs contribute to increase the psychological stress on them.

The restricted mobility and lack of exercise are a typical factor of service aboard ship in general and aboard submarines in particular. The human organism needs not only food, water and external envigorating influences but also a certain amount of mobility and exercise. A severe reduction in exercise results in functional disturbances technically known as hypokinesia. Normally, a person must do at least 8 to 10 km of walking a day to keep fit. Some members of a ship's crew do 400--800 m of walking a day and thus denied adequate exercise develop symptoms of hypokinesia. In 161 its extreme form hypokinesia upsets both the organism's vegetative and psychological functions. In particular a person suffering from hypokinesia has inhibited reflexes, his attention wanders, he is irritable and his physical strength and endurance decline. Such a person characteristically feels general fatigue, langour, apathy. He is depressed and disinclined to move. It seems a paradox: a person is tired not due to physical exhaustion but because he has not exercised his muscles enough. To overcome the disease he has to move and use his muscles but he would not stir a finger to help himself. The basic preventive measure against hypokinesia among naval personnel is regular physical fitness exercises during the entire cruise.

The separation for long periods from families, relatives and friends may also depress some members of the crew appreciably. Both psychological and physiological factors contribute to this depression. Some of the reasonable measures to cushion the effect of these factors include maintenance of constant contaot between the crew and their families through mail, telegraph, radio and recorded letters, and the elimination of all sources of information breeding doubts about conjugal fidelity. This part of the work of commanders and political officers is of special importance in the Navy and requires detailed planning, pedagogic tact and a special approach.

The limited number of people with whom a member of the crew of a ship comes into daily contact during a cruise and a certain fatigue-induced ``cooling'' in relationships is yet another factor contributing to tiredness. Normally, the stock of amusing experiences, jokes and cock-and-bull stories about what happened to a particular sailor or sailors while on shore are usually exhausted as topics of conversation within a few weeks of leaving base, at the start of a long-term cruise. The members of the crew appreciably lose interest in meeting and talking with their colleagues. This may give rise to irritability and lack of restraint in relationships. It so 162 happens sometimes that persons with no love lost between them have to work in close contact aboard ship and even persons who are psychologically incompatible find themselves working side by side. This in time may give rise to serious complications. Good deal of damage is done if an officer under the influence of fatigue becomes more aloof, reluctant to maintain a close contact with his subordinates, treats them in a formal and dry fashion and may even give vent to his irritation or be unfair to them.

It is the duty of the commander to give his undivided attention to maintaining congenial relationships among his men during a prolonged cruise and to take quick and efficient measures to keep the rectitude of his men and maintain an atmosphere of mutual respect, support, optimism, patience and self-restraint among them.

The rather limited opportunities for rest and leisure during a prolonged cruise are yet another contributing factor to fatigue and weariness developing among the crew. If the men are denied a good rest they fail to restore their strength fully. Every effort should therefore be made to ensure that the men are given every opportunity to have a sound rest and sleep as these are important both psychologically and physiologically. To be sure it is no easy matter to create good opportunities for a sound rest during a prolonged cruise aboard ship. When the seas are rough it is difficult even to lie in bed comfortably, let alone have a sound sleep. Efforts are being made to improve the arrangement and design of bunks and beds on board ship, to improve the microclimate, to optimise the alteration of sleep and rest, to better soundproof the crew's quarters and to introduce modifications in the ship's construction to compensate for the effect of a violent pitch and roll during sailing (stabilisers).

The widely varying hydrometeorological conditions prevailing in different climatic zones, the same diet and living conditions aboard ship combine to exert a tiring effect on the crew.

163

The prevailing climatic and hydrometeorological conditions affect not only the men's physiology but also their psychological state. It is not for nothing that the weather is said to be gloomy, dull, gay or cheerful and the sea is said to be either angry, vicious, cold, friendly, radiant or calm.

A change in weather conditions produces a change in the mood of some people, affecting their powers of concentration, reaction time, spirits and capacity for work. A change of weather is noted by a man, it affects his mental processes and feelings and accentuates his perceptions. Winds, storms, cyclons, typhoons, the northern lights (aurora borealis), the luminescence of the sea, etc. affect different men in different ways. Different people react differently to heat, cold and humidity. They have a strictly individual bioclimatic susceptibility to these factors.

Acclimatisation, that is to say adaptation of a man's organism and psychological make-up to a particular climate, is a complex process which "shakes up" his entire system. Acclimatisation generally takes from one to three years. However, the more radical adaptational changes in a man's organism occur within the first tv/o to eight weeks. These weeks are also the most difficult for the man in question. The duration of acclimatisation and the difficulties experienced by the human organism are dependent on the personality characteristics of the man in question as well as on his age, length of service in the Navy, physical fitness as well as on the surrounding moral and psychological atmosphere and on how abruptly climatic conditions change.

Acclimatisation exhibits a clearly defined pattern during a prolonged cruise when the crew have to cross several climatic zones within a relatively short time. The men have to adapt and readjust to different climatic conditions more or less continuously during the cruise.

A cruise in the polar regions calls for a special type of acclimatisation on account of prevailing lower temperatures, reduced solar radiation, low atmospheric pressure 164 and extreme air humidity all of which produces physiological changes in the human organism. The men's mood, spirits, competence and capacity for work arc also affected by a prolonged separation from base, a feeling of isolation, bad weather, violent storms and other manifestations of the elements, by the constantly howling winds, scant vegetation, the snows and the pack ice, the polar night and day and the limited number of people with whom one has to associate on a daily basis.

Acclimatisation, by no means a passive process of biological adaptation of the human organism, is influenced just as strongly by the social and work factors. By affecting the spirits, moods and attitudes of the men these factors have an appreciable impact on their biological processes. Therefore intensification of the political and educational work aboard ship, a closer watch over the prevailing moods among the crew, closer attention to maintaining a high level of activity and an atmosphere of optimism, the organisation of meaningful, diversified and interesting leisure activities for the members of the crew are of tremendous importance during a cruise in the polar regions.

It is strongly recommended to give constant attention to the men's clothing, illumination and lighting arrangements inside the ship, to the strict observance of the prescribed schedule of work and rest, to reducing the duration of monotonous and tiring jobs and training sessions, to ensuring adequate and regular meals and maintaining favourable temperatures inside the ship's rooms (in the polar regions room temperatures should be within 23--24°C\ higher than during cruising in the temperate /one). It is also useful to subject members of the crew to quartz irradiation to offset the inevitable ultraviolet deficiency, to harden the men to the cold and to equip them with pale-yellow and green-tinted glasses and goggles when they have to work in the open air in winter.

The overcoming of the difficulties imposed by cruising in the polar regions calls for the development of 165 stable moral, political and psychological qualities, of staunchness, endurance and proficiency and for a tight control over and management of the social and psychological phenomena among the crew.

Acclimatisation to the tropical conditions is also a difficult process due to the effects of high temperatures for prolonged periods in the absence of night-time cooling, the intense solar radiation, increased thermal loads on the men during duty sessions near heated machinery and equipment and inside the ship's rooms. In the tropical zone the ambient air is often found to have a reduced oxygen content, the atmospheric pressure is low and air humidity high. These unfavourable factors produce physiological changes in the human organism which reduce a man's capacity for work.

Experience indicates that it is best to be lightly clad when working on the upper deck during sailing in the tropical zones (a lightly clad man does not perspire as heavily as someone who is not so clad and dehydration is slower). It is also best to wear a white cap and light shoes. To help the men to get accustomed to high temperatures more quickly it is essential to use air conditioners to maintain a temperature of +24<J C inside the rooms during the first ten days of the cruise, raising it to +26o C during the next ten days and to +28o during the third ten days of the cruise. It is also useful to introduce a special tropical schedule allowing for a longer day-time rest period and transferring most of the jobs and training sessions to the late afternoon hours.

While cruising in the tropics it is essential to introduce rational arrangements for water consumption. Drinking water should be served chilled to 12--16° C. It should be carbonated and have an increased salt content. The men should be given sour and acerbic fruit juices in adequate quantities, strong hot tea, green tea, kvass (a traditional Russian soft drink), coconut milk and other beverages. The main meals should be taken in the evening.

Thus the physiological and psychological implications of the hydroirrteorological factors throw light on some 166 of the causes of physiological and psychological changes occurring in the human organism and help to work out practical measures to neutralise the deleterious effect of negative factors.

The importance of satisfactory accommodation and living conditions on board ships has grown with the increase in the length and duration of cruises made by the naval ships across the world's seas and oceans. The more satisfactory these conditions, the greater the capacity for work and the endurance of the crew. Provision for adequate accommodation and living conditions aboard a naval vessel is made by her designers as early as the drawing-board stage. Modifications are introduced later during the actual construction or modernisation (refit) of the vessel. Even so the ship's officers can do a lot to improve the accommodation and living conditions of their men.

The microclimate inside the ship is among its significant operating characteristics, which include air composition, its temperature and humidity, noise and vibration levels, radiating heat (coming from heated machinery and surfaces), electromagnetic fields and radioactivity. Any disturbance of the optimum parameters of these conditions produces a deterioration of, or at best, puts an undue strain on the men's sense organs, attention, memory, mental processes, reflexes and precision of movements.

A normal air composition can be maintained inside the ship's rooms in a variety of ways. Some of the more effective of these include maintenance of the ventilation equipment in good repair, normal air circulation inside the rooms, proper operation of available air purification facilities and enrichment of the air with oxygen, a close watch over the conditions of the steam and other heating systems and sealing of rooms, minimum wet cleaning during periods of increased air humidity, etc.

To combat increased noise and vibration levels which have an adverse effect on the men, care is taken to ensure proper adjustment of all moving parts of the 167 machinery, adequate and timely lubrication procedures, to maintain shock-absorbers and silencers, and to ensure proper sound-proofing and sealing arrangements. Vibration-absorbing sealings of rubber '.if plastic are used, undue clearances and play are eliminated and the condition of welding seams and fastenings is, kept under constant observation. The irritating effect of undue noise is cushioned by eliminating high frequency components. Protective materials can also be used, such as super-fine glass fibres, ear plugs can be introduced into the outer auditory canal and sound-proof caps are worn over the ears. I o reduce the effect of vibration on the men rubber mats or thick-soled shoes of rubber may be used.

An attractive design and configurations of service and living rooms, and of the machinery, equipment and tools are of great importance for creating satisfactory living conditions aboard ship. Adequate illumination and pleasing colour schemes have a positive effect on the men's capacity for work and their efficient performance. Lighting arrangements at work places and elsewhere should be adequate in intensity, uniform and stable.

The paint colours of rooms, equipment and the degree of illumination affect the keenness of eye. powers of observation and concentration of attention. A green colour hightens the auditory perception while a red colour reduces it. A yellow colour is best for the eye keenness. Light-painted rooms appear to be morespacious. By using ``warm'' (red, yellow and green) and ``cold'' (the blue part of the spectrum) colour schemes where appropriate while cruising above the Arctic Circle or in the tropics it is possible to influence the psychological state of the crew favourably. There is evidence to believe that yellow, yellow-green and brownish colours have an adverse impact on the men during pitch and roll. Colour also lias a general effect on a man: red, orange ana yellow colours excite; blue, violet and black colours inhibit and oppress; green and pastel colourscalm and put a man in an easy mood. The different 168 effects that different colours have on men should be taken into account when deciding on the painting arrangements for the ship's service and living quarters.

While colour schemes should be varied where appropriate, motley, variegated colour schemes should be avoided. It is preferable within a single room to try and obtain colour harmony by using different colours of more or less the same spectrum. It is also useful to use contrasting colour schemes for adjoining rooms. At all events it is a good plan to use bright colours for those rooms and parts of the ship which are important for her survivability and the safety of the crew these should be painted a bright yellow, red, orange or alternating black and white or yellow and black stripes.

Recent ideas on the dynamic of light and colour environments on board naval vessels are of some interest. The light and colour ``climate'' and its variations are an effective weapon in combatting monotony and are a useful aid in helping submarine crews to maintain suitable internal "biological clock" rhythms and in ifiuencing their psychological states in positive ways. This is generally achieved by using differently tinted lamps in different rooms and by introducing day-time arid nighttime lighting arrangements. By using a special screen displaying a particular colour background it is possible to influence the men in a desired way. This can best be done with the help of slide projection with automatic picture changing every hour. It is essential to project different colour combinations on the required subject, with a particular design, colour scheme and tonality. It is also essential to vary illumination intensity depending on the time of day and night, and to vary the colour scheme and combinations depending on the emotional and psychological states of the crew.

Satisfactory living conditions on board ship are a matter of suitable sleeping arrangements, adequate equipment of rooms where food and provisions are stored or cooked and of good individual hygiene facilities. In designing all Soviet naval vessels every effort is made to 169 create favourable living conditions. But of course a lot depends on the crew. The maintenance of prescribed order and routine aboard ship, the good repair of systems and machinery, the introduction of sensible timetables and procedures-these are the factors directly contributing to the creation of good living conditions aboard ship.

Another important factor is adequate food and feeding arrangements as these are a major means of restoring the men's energy losses and of maintaining a normal metabolism inside the human organism. It is essential to improve both quality, nutrition characteristics and variety of meals and their aesthetic appeal.

Summing up the foregoing it can safely be stated that science-based measures aimed at preventing or offsetting the adverse effect of psychological and physiological factors on the crew can help maintain a high level of combat preparedness and fighting efficiency of the crew for prolonged periods during a long-term cruise.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 5. The Organisation of Leisure
Activities for the Crew During
a Prolonged Cruise

The need for maintaining a high level of efficiency of naval personnel calls for a high cultural level of leisure activities for the crews of naval vessels. The greater the work loads the more satisfying the refreshing should be, the rest and leisure available to the crew.

A good rest is not only a matter of prolonged inactivity or adequate sleep. Proper organisation of rest periods is essential to ensuring a really good and refreshing rest. Besides, during their rest periods the men cannot get away from their feelings, moods and other emotional states. Hence the need for a sound scientific organisation of rest and leisure activities. Let us examine some of the basic principles adopted in the Soviet Navy in this matter.

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The prime principle is that of educating, mobilising and developing the men's psychological and physical potential. The implementation of this principle requires that leisure activities be organised in such a way as to facilitate the intellectual and cultural development of naval personnel, to enhance their alertness, combat readiness and capacity to cope with their assigned missions. Properly organised leisure helps to extend the men's political, military, technical and cultural horizons, to develop useful interests and requirements, to instil feelings of patriotism and attachment to naval service and generally to enhance the moral, political and psychological status of naval personnel.

There are active and passive forms of rest. Normally an adult needs an average of 7 to 8 hours of sound sleep a day-passive rest. The remaining leisure hours should be packed with what is known as active rest.

By no means all kinds of active rest contribute to restoration of strength. The principle of variation and alternation requires that those kinds of active rest should be used which impose no strain on the nerve centres and organs which were actively engaged during work periods. Thus music should be played during rest periods for those members of the crew who had to strain their eyes for prolonged periods while on watch duty, and physical exercises should be used for those who did mostly mental work. The principle of variation and alternation of activities involves the introduction of variety, of new forms and methods of organisation of leisure. To this end every effort should be made to have a sufficiently large fund of different forms and methods and sensible ways of using them should be developed. Unfortunately there are cases when the entire stock of films, music programmes, recordings and games, etc. available on board ship is used up during the initial period of a prolonged cruise so that later when the ship runs into the most difficult spells the same films and music recordings have to be played again and again. Just as the stock of food and provisions has to be sensibly used 171 throughout a cruise to ensure that it lasts to the end of it so recreation facilities available to the crew should be used in a sensible way with special reference to the best and most effective means of keeping the crew in good spirits during the more difficult periods of the cruise.

The forms and methods of organising the crew's rest and leisure activities should be carefully chosen with due regard to the degree of fatigue and tiredness, specific conditions during the given cruise and the required length of work periods. Those forms of rest and leisure that fit the purpose at the start of a cruise may be entirely inappropriate at the end. As members of the crew grow more tired the more relaxing and emotionally coloured forms of rest and leisure should be used.

During rest periods after watch duty aboard ship Party and political activities are usually arranged. Many of these represent a form of active rest quite apart from their direct functional purpose. These activities can take the form of an evening devoted to a particular subject or a discussion with active participation of the audience. The topics for such discussions may include different aspects of the Party policy, the achievements of and plans for the building of communism, political and ethical problems, etc. Appropriate feature films are usually shown at the end of such evenings.

Information sessions during which the men are informed of the latest advances and breakthroughs in military science and technology, and training sessions aimed at improving the men's combat skills and proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment feature prominently within the system of rest and leisure activities maintained aboard Soviet naval vessels. During a cruise the drawbacks and gaps in the training of some members of the crew are revealed quickly and action is taken to close these gaps. During rest periods members of the crew also study and improve their know-how, their knowledge of the materiel and equipment in their charge and improve their knowledge of the maintenance procedures. The men show lively interest in reports on 172 military and technical subjects, on the state of the navies of the imperialist countries, they attend extension courses to become rated specialists, and take part in competitions.

As part of the arrangements to keep naval personnel informed of the latest advances in military technology the so-called oral technical journal sessions are often held during a prolonged cruise. Each ``page''-a brief but informative and lively report on the chosen subject-is prepared by one of the officers or men. The men discuss and comment on the recent breakthroughs in the field of military science and technology, the ways of further improving nuclear propulsion systems, physics, electronics and cybernetics in the military field, etc. Quizzes and informal competitions on specific aspects of military technology are very popular among the Soviet naval personnel.

Some naval vessels have their own radio clubs which broadcast on Sundays on a variety of topics to do with naval service and naval technology, as well as on general maritime subjects ranging from the evolution of diving equipment to the mysteries of the Atlantic Ocean, towing of icebergs and bizarre incidents from the history of seafaring and navigation.

Quizzes are a popular form of relaxation for many Soviet navymen. Quizzes deal with a wide variety of topics. Sometimes quizzes are held as part of competitions between the crews of different ships and between the teams of different departments, services and sections within a single ship. Particularly popular are quizzes on the ship's design and construction, on particular trends in the development of fighting equipment and weapons and quizzes to identify the best specialists. The latter type of quizzes is preceded by a period of careful planning and intensive preparations made during rest periods. As a rule the judges take into account not only how well a particular competitor knows his particular service duties but also how well he keeps underway watch and whether or not he takes part in the ship's social work.

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Feature films shown during a prolonged cruise are usually carefully chosen on the basis of a thorough consideration of the specific conditions surrounding the cruise. As a rule at the start of the cruise films on a variety of topics are best, including two-part films. After two or three weeks of cruises the best films to show are those dealing with revolutionary events, war and military valour, lyrical films and musicals. Films on geography, travelogues and documentary shorts and popular science and sport films are also in demand. Special film evenings and film festivals dealing with specific subjects are also popular. A common form is a film festival which helps the crew to make a tour, as it were, of the country by watching films which feature its many parts. Sometimes there are "guided tours" when some of the men tell the audience of their native region which they later see on the screen.

Soviet navymen are avid readers with rare exceptions. Books dealing with political subjects, books on military history, the memoirs by outstanding military leaders, literature on the navies and armies of capitalist countries as well as books of fiction are all popular with Soviet navymen. While at sea during a prolonged cruise the men particularly appreciate magazines, satirical and comic publications. This should always be taken into account in choosing books for the ship libraries.

During rest periods in between watch duty sessions the men often take part in group discussions of the books they have read, in literary disputes, evenings and collective reading sessions dealing with literature on naval history and on the combat record of the Soviet Navy during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars of the Soviet people. Book exhibitions are often arranged to keep the men abreast of the best publications and books either in print or in press.

Amateur talent concerts are an integral part of the recreation and rest activities in the Soviet Navy. Amateur talent activities not only pass the time but introduce the participating navymen to the best in music 174 and art and thus develop good taste and art appreciation. Practically every Soviet naval vessel has an amateur talent group of her own. As a rule amateur talent concerts and musical and literary evenings are preceded by a period of careful preparations and rehearsals organised by political officers and Komsomol activists even while at base. Amateur talent activities offer great opportunities and scope for every man to display his creativity and initiative. The Komsomol members of a naval vessel once decided to interview each member of the crew and record songs, poetry recitals, jokes, proverbs and sayings and amusing episodes as part of preparations for a series of special broadcasts over the ship's radio. These programmes when they went on the air were a great success with the audience.

Choir singing is a time-honoured tradition in the Soviet Navy. When they go on prolonged cruises the familiar lyrics and tunes of their songs take on special meaning for the members of the crew. Every member of the crew irrespective of rank or post is free to join in choir singing sessions.

``Do it yourself activities and handicrafts are extremely popular with the crews of naval vessels during prolonged cruises. Some members of the crew go in for wood-cutting, fretwork, etching, etc. Others use metal, plastics, bone, paper and other materials to make articles and objects. These activities should be properly organised and geared to specific educational goals. It is advisable to hold exhibitions of the best works on themes announced well in advance. They may include "Nature in Our Life'', "Small but Useful Things You Can Make Yourself, "Your Ship'', "How Good with Your Hands You Are'', "What Could and Should Be Improved" and the like-but they serve a good purpose. Competitions for the best amateur painters, handicraftsmen, poets, etc. should also be organised to stimulate interest in amateur talent activities on the part of the non-participating members of the crew.

Exhibitions of reproductions of paintings by Russian 175 and Soviet artists, of" artistic postcards and stamp collections are very popular with Soviet naval personnel. Thus an exhibition entitled "Our Own Trctyakov Gallery" was held for the benefit of the crew of a submarine belonging to the North Naval Command. The exhibition was a great success.

Music is a powerful morale booster and is indispensable for pleasant relaxation. The beneficial physiological and psychological impact of music on the listener is an established fact. To ensure, however, that music has the desired effect on the men it should be carefully chosen with due regard for the time of day, period of a prolonged cruise, prevailing mood among the crew and the nature of service duties and activities of different members of the crew. Generally speaking, during an eight-hour work cycle music should be broadcast for an hour and a half or two hours. Preferably different kinds of music should be broadcast with accent on patriotic music and songs. Duriag a prolonged cruise it is advisable to organise record request concerts, musical evenings and quizzes.

When several ships carry out joint cruise or when different ships rendezvous in mid-ocean or when they call at ports or approach the shore it is advisable to organise tours of other ships or excursions to places of interest ashore.

Sports competitions are very popular with Soviet navymen. Although facilities and opportunities for sports activities on board ship during a cruise are limited, sports activities are maintained on a daily basis. Physical fitness exercises and competitive games keep the participating men in good trim, and boost their spirits. It is strongly recommended to choose sports activities which flex those groups of muscles that were relatively inactive during duty hours and relax those that were strained. Physical exercises should be continued until the men feel slight tiredness. Undue physical strain should be avoided particularly when microclimatic conditions are not favourable.

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A wide variety of gymnastic apparatus, barbell lifting, weight-lifting, boats, medicine balls are used during sports activities aboard large surface vessels. Swimming, paddling, rope climbing, running along gangways, ladders and across deck, mast-climbing are also popular. For submarine crews the more popular physical exercises include barbell lifting, chest expander stretching, exercises on the horizontal bar to train biceps and abdominal muscles, wall bars and gymnastic sticks, elastic bandages and medicine balls.

Submarine crews while at sea can play table tennis, "ride a bicycle'', "paddle kayak'', with the help of special simulators. Swimming and scuba diving competitions, lifeboat rowing and water skiing are popular when the craft calls at a port.

Sports festivals and competitions which are essential to keep the crew in good trim and in high spirits are a standard feature of prolonged cruises as are cultural and entertainment activities. These include a variety of table games. In addition to th£ traditional standbys such as dominos, chess and drafts, table soccer and table ice hockey are increasingly popular so that even humorous mini-championships are held at which the titles such as Champion of the Barents Sea or Champion of the Mediterranean are contended, with appropriate funny diplomas given to the winners. All this is amuzing and helpful.

Evening parties are also arranged. These often take the form of quizzes and general knowledge contests. The winners are awarded special prizes and mementos. Evening parties are usually preceded by careful preparations with emphasis on the entertaining value of all the events.

There are also colourful festivals which are peculiar to naval service. The Neptune festival held to mark the crossing of the equator is perhaps the most popular of them all. Of course it is not too often that a naval vessel crosses the equator. For this reason ``substitute'' festivals are held to mark the crossing of the Zero and 180° __PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12--128 177 meridians or of an inter-ocean boundary. The "ocean sailors" and "sea wolf festivals held to initiate the younger members of the crew into maritime maturity are memorable events.

Despite their strictly entertaining character preparations for such festivals are usually entrusted to the more experienced officers who enjoy prestige in the eyes of the ratings. The Neptune festival begins with a general assembly of those members of the crew who are off duty. The ship's commander addresses the assembly after which petty officers report to him on the progress of the younger members of the crew.. They are then awarded "Neptune diplomas'', those deserving are congratulated on their exemplary service and given mementos.

The wealth of experience gained by Soviet naval commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organisations in preparation for and holding of entertainment activities during prolonged cruises represents a successful record of moulding fine moral, political and psychological qualities among the Soviet navymen and of adding to the proud combat traditions of the Soviet Navy.

[178] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter V __ALPHA_LVL1__ The Moral and Psychological Training
of Soviet Navy Pilots,
of the Marine Corps, the Personnel
of Shore-Based Artillery
and Missile Units, and the Personnel
of the Shore Establishment __ALPHA_LVL2__ [introduction.]

Today's Soviet Navy has at its disposal a balanced mix of various naval forces including submarines, both nuclear-powered and conventional, surface vessels, naval aviation, a marine corps, and shore artillery and missile batteries. Moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel is based on principles that are generally the same in every area of the Soviet Navy. However, this training for the benefit of Navy pilots, the manning personnel of shore artillery and missile batteries and the marine corps is noted for certain special features. This is particularly true of the moral and psychological training provided in the course of combat training.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 1. Naval Aviation

Naval aviation is one of the main striking forces of the Soviet Navy. It is capable of sustaining combat operations in any part of the World Ocean.

Recording the psychological difficulties experienced during flights at sea A. I. Pokryshkin, a famous World War II ace, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, wrote in his memoirs, "Each time I looked out of the cockpit I saw the dark choppy seas and for a few seconds I could not even hear the steady drone of the engine. I was totally engrossed in watching the turbulent surface of the raging sea below. Only by effort of the will could I 179 force myself to switch attention back to the familiar environment of the cockpit and keep my eyes on the dashboard. But even then I had a lingering impression that the engine did not have the same sound and the indicators on the dashboard were fast approaching critical readings. It took a few minutes for me to completely rid myself of this illusory impression....'' While flying at sea Navy pilots find it more difficult to estimate altitude and speed accurately. Sometimes they even have illusions of hovering. In fine weather when the sea is perfectly calm an inexperienced pilot may mistake the surface of the water for the sky and vice versa. Then the shimmering patches of sunlight or moonlight on the surface may distort visual perception. When flying a helicopter low over the water, the choppy seas may distort the pilot's visual perception and produce illusory impressions. In this situation the pilot may commit elementary errors.

Night flying is even more challenging. A bright star may easily be mistaken for a light or fire on the surface of the sea while the lights aboard ship may be mistaken for the stars. During turning manoeuvres southwards while flying in areas above the Arctic Circle, optic illusions may be produced by abrupt changes in the degree of luminosity of the northern and southern parts of the sky. In particular, Navy pilots get the illusory impression of flying with a severe bank either to starboard or port and even of flying backwards. Experienced pilots strongly recommend on such occasions to keep looking on the lighter part of the horizon. The presence of the thin filmy clouds, the reflections of ice crystals while flying at low level sometimes give rise to the illusory impression of seeing stars both down below and above. At times, these conditions produce the refraction effect as a result of which lights actually situated on shore appear on a vertical plain rather than on the horizontal plain.

When flying in the Arctic regions Navy pilots must also get accustomed to the effect of northern lights 180 (aurora borealis). The rapidly shifting paterns of lights may give rise to an illusory impression of a severe bank either to starboard or port. Pilots flying in the Arctic regions in addition have to contend with abrupt changes of weather, with the disorienting effect produced by watching endless icefields for hours on end and with the constraints on the use of on-board radio equipment and navigation aids.

Taking off and landing on the water or on landing area of sea ships also require special skills and ability to overcome rather special difficulties. It also calls for a special kind of moral and psychological training essential for a competent Navy pilot. During night flying when the horizon is obscure and no landing lights are available it is extremely difficult to estimate by the eye the exact position of the aircraft over the sea. Distances are difficult to estimate on account of optical distortion and the contours of a ship on approach are often blurred. Landing on a naval ship proceeding at over 15 knots per hour is not the easiest thing in the world either, especially with a fair wind. Great emphasis is therefore based on developing Navy pilots' confidence in the reliability of their aircraft and their own ability to get the most out of their performance characteristics in any situation. This confidence is built in the course of an in-depth study of the aircraft's every unit and component during demonstration flights followed by detailed critiques of their results. The personal example set by the more experienced Navy pilots, the transmission of their experience to young pilots, close friendship and cooperation between pilots, engineers, mechanics, technicians and ship's specialists, mutual trust and respect are factors contributing to greater confidence- and competence of Navy pilots.

The crew of carrier-based aircraft undergo special psychological training to be able to perform at peak efficiency during prolonged cruises. This training shares many common features with that given to the crews of surface vessels. Every member of the flying personnel of 181 naval aviation is also expected to be a good sailor and swimmer and to be versed in every aspect of maritime practice.

Special attention should be given to the younger pilots who for obvious reasons lack experience. They are informed of the proud combat record of the unit where they serve, their personalities and character traits are carefully studied by their commanders and instructors before deciding where they should go for combat duty. This decision is made with due account being taken of their capabilities and inclinations. Usually young Navy pilots are included in experienced air crews. Every effort is made to ensure that the very first flights they make on theft own are successful. This is important for confidence building. It is essential to encourage young Navy pilots for their first successes in combat flying. The first solo flights by young pilots are usually marked as memorable and festive occasions. Special express leaflets are issued, and the pilots who have distinguished themselves are awarded special certificates and photographed.

The initial success in acquiring flying proficiency may sometimes produce an irrepressible urge among younger pilots to fly as often as possible and they tend to grow overconfident. It is essential to impress on the younger pilots the importance of observing strict flying discipline. Training flights at sea are followed by an analysis of the special features of this type of flying using practical demonstrations followed by a detailed examination of results.

The training of young Navy pilots in effective ways of dealing with emergency procedures is a major component of psychological training aimed at confidence building. Special training sessions designed to develop automatic prompt response to emergency situations are conducted using special ground trainers and simulators as well as during flying sessions involving sudden engine cut-off and other malfunctions, emergency baling out at sea, the use of survival kits and bailing out by ejector seat.

182

A close attention is given to training Navy pilots in flying combat missions in bad weather. This type of flying calls for special skills and flawless technique of instrument flight, as well as an intimate knowledge of the unusual sensations likely to be experienced and of effective ways of overcoming illusory impressions which are a frequent feature of flying in bad weather. The sort of illusions likely to be encountered is well illustrated by the following episode as related by a veteran Navy pilot. This is his story: "On one occasion when I was young and lacked experience even of solo flying, let alone of flying with a leader, I flew into a dense cloud. Having completely lost sight of the leader I looked out of the cockpit and immediately had optic illusions that followed in quick succession. First, I had the impression that I was spinning, seconds later I was certain that I was flying straight up. Besides, I could hear an unusually powerful drawing sound which must have been an auditory illusion since one glance at the instruments told me that there was nothing wrong with the engine. A few minutes later I completely lost any idea of 'top and bottom'. But for the timely intervention of the flight controller who provided accurate directions it is difficult to say where it all would have ended.''

The psychological training given to Navy pilots as part of their preparations for flying in bad weather includes the study of the full range of illusions likely to be encountered, their causes and effective ways of preventing or overcoming them. Some of the golden rules include a proper position in the seat, the proper position of the arms, legs, and trunk, relaxation of muscles that are needlessly tense, complete concentration on the instrument panel, especially on the gyro horizon, variometer, turn and gliding indicators, the use of revolving head movements and self-inflicted pain.

Training in effective instrument-flying has a definite psychological value as it helps Navy pilots to develop an ability to take correct instrument-readings and respond to them promptly, as well as to develop a habit of 183 instrument-flying. As llusions often arise when the pilot switches attention from the dashboard to a point outside the cockpit and back again, Navy pilots are trained in effective methods of concentrating their attention on the dashboard and distributing attention between target observation and piloting. This is achieved in the course of training sessions inside the cockpit, on ground trainers and during control and demonstration flights.

It is important to help young Navy pilots to trust the instruments more than the evidence of their senses. This is no easy matter and it. requires the development of specific volitional qualities and primarily of the ability to keep a firm grip on oneself at all times, the ability of autosuggestion and will enhancement.

Flying in bad weather young Navy pilots make mistakes and errors that follow a characteristic pattern. Most mistakes are made when pilots come in to land or when they estimate approach distance and landing runs, since every phase of the landing procedures, including coming-down, break-out from the cloud and approach, are sufficiently complex and require complete concentration and prompt response on the part of the pilot. An inexperienced pilot and even an experienced one who has had a long break in bad weather flying is likely to lose height prematurely to an unsafe level. This error is frequently committed during night flying, when pilots break out while approaching a distant guidance radar station. When the pilot sees the landing lights, he is often carried away by watching them and ignores the need to concentrate on the instrument panel, and as a result fails to notice that he has lost altitude prematurely. Another characteristic error springs from the desire to see the airfield as soon as possible which leads to the pilot's switching his attention prematurely from instrumentflying to visual piloting, even when the aircraft is still in the cloud. This error may lead to a loss of spatial orientation which is fraught with dangerous consequences because of the low altitude. A thorough analysis of typical mistakes and of their psychological causes 184 helps young Navy pilots to avoid them when they next fly in bad weather.

The development of the necessary psychological and psychophysiological qualities is of prime importance for Navy pilots. These qualities include special visual and vestibular perceptions and inner sensations, excellent powers of observation, concentration, a sense of orientation in space, quick thinking and lightning-like reflexes. A pilot possessing these qualities is able to handle his plane with confident ease, he ``feels'' the machine. The cultivation of psychological and psychophysiological qualities essential for complete flying proficiency is conducted on a strictly individual basis.

Flying in bad weather involves many difficulties and problems, including flying blind through a cloud, piercing clouds, aerobatic performances while inside a cloud, breaking out, quick changes of speed during instrumentflying (which give rise to a sensation of diving), taking off and landing under minimal and even sub-minimal flying conditions, flying in the rain when the cockpit's windshield may be covered with a film of raindrops that prevents clear vision, and joint flying.

Psychological training given to Navy pilots to help them develop effective piloting habits and skills during flights in bad weather calls for a well-designed and proper sequence of training sessions. To begin with, this training is given during demonstration flights under the supervision of experinced pilots. As the trainee masters a certain level of proficiency acting as the second pilot, he is allowed to fly solo. Later as he acquires confidence the difficulties are increased and the trainee pilot goes back to flying as an apprentice. In the initial stage trainees may be allowed to fly in fine weather with the blinds drawn. Later they graduate to breaking out at a considerable altitude, to relatively long straight flights at a constant speed through the clouds, manoeuvring and aerobatic performances inside the cloud, taking off and landing involving breaking out at low level, target search and acquisition and combat runs in bad weather and 185 finally flights with a leader and the accomplishment of training combat missions.

Commanders and political officers of naval aviation units look upon detailed critiques of flying sessions as an essential component of psychological training given to young Navy pilots. These critiques help younger pilots to gain confidence in their own ability and develop initiative, courage and an imaginative approach to the execution of their assigned training missions.

Air battles over the sea and combat missions against seaborne targets call for special training. Effective combat action against enemy carrier task forces, surface vessels and submarines is noted for a number of special features. It is far more difficult to approach the seaborne target without detection. Seaborne targets are usually very manoeuvrable, relatively small in size and have powerful anti-aircraft weapons. Therefore, effective action at sea requires the Navy pilot to show exceptional courage, dare, resourcefulness and guile.

Psychological training given to naval pilots emphasises the need to develop confidence in the use of target search and detection aids, to ensure unmistakable and quick identification of friendly and enemy naval vessels, a skilful use of missiles, torpedoes and bombs in the face of intense fire and radioelectronic counter-measures employed by the enemy and unfavourable weather conditions. The personnel of the Soviet naval aviation make a detailed study of the performance characteristics of anti-aircraft weapons, likely to be used by the enemy in a possible war. They study possible ways of dealing with enemy aircraft, decoy targets and the effects of exploding bombs, missiles and shells.

Combat operations of naval aviation involve flying at sea for prolonged periods. This puts a considerable strain on the psychological and physiological potentials of the air crews because of the need to maintain an intense activity for extended periods involving constant concentration on the instruments and physical immobility unrelieved by any exercise. All this may bring on the 186 feeling of tiredness and fatigue fairly quickly as well as back ache and a feeling of hunger which interferes with the pilot's concentration on his assigned mission. Because of the monotony of experiences for extended periods all sorts of illusions arise, notably an illusion of banking to starboard or port. The pilot requires considerable stamina, staying power, utmost concentration and a high sense of discipline to maintain efficient performance. Even greater difficulties are encountered during a flight at a high altitude: pressure suits, oxygen masks, excessive pressure inside the cockpit combine to put an extra strain on the pilot. Endurance flights to full range involving in-flight refuelling are also attended by difficulties and problems peculiar to them.

All this calls for specialist training and moral and psychological conditioning. The pilots have to develop complete proficiency, they must have an intimate knowledge of every aspect of the operating conditions, they must have keen perception, confidence, resolve. They must also exercise reasonable caution, must have good powers of concentration and observation and selfcontrol. These qualities are developed during training sessions using simulators and ground trainers.

Flying combat missions at zero level is attended by difficulties stemming from heightened emotional reactions to risk and dangers involved. This is not surprising when one considers great flying speeds close to the sea surface. Pilots involuntarily experience heightened psychological reactions, tensions, some of them even experience increased body temperatures. Flying combat missions at zero level over the sea is made more difficult by the complications attending the use of radio equipment and avionics, the quickly changing pattern of objects within the field of vision of the pilot, the frequent interference because of the low clouds, fog, haze, refraction and because of the restricted space for manoeuvre inevitable during zero level flying. Pilots tend to commit errors more frequently during this type of flying in estimating distances to and between targets, in 187 identifying their shape and size and generally in evaluating the situation. Illusory impressions of the water surface rising when flying straight ahead are not uncommon. Target interception at low level is far more difficult.

These and other difficulties attending flying over the sea call for special training involving the development of effective thinking, volitional and emotional qualities, keen perception and powers of observation and attention. Naval pilots undergo intensive training using ground simulators to develop required emotional and psychological stability. To develop effective techniques of estimating distances by the eye and develop stable habits and skills in estimating distances in general it is useful to train pilots in memorising the si/e of the most common seaborne targets, in effective techniques of spatial orientation, in mental visualising the planned flight, and in developing keen powers of observation. To this end it is essential to use models and mock-ups simulating actual combat situations at sea and to back up these training sessions with the projection of suitable actuality film strips. It is essential to hold regular training sessions which develop effective skills in attention distribution between piloting, visual observation of the situation and the use of bomb and gun sights.

The tactical training of naval pilots is conducted with due account being taken of the combat designation of the aircraft to be used. Some naval pilots train in delivering missile, torpedo and bomb strikes at a variety of targets, others concentrate on aerial battle against enemy bombers, missile-carrying aircraft and fighters, as well as in ways of destroying enemy pilotless offensive weapons, and air support for combat operations. The personnel of the reconnaissance units of naval aviation concentrate on ways of searching and tracking enemy nuclear-powered missile and torpedo submarines, on developing effective techniques for collecting intelligence on the enemy shore-based and submarine warfare facilities. In each case the moral and psychological training of naval 188 aviators is conducted in appropriate tactical environments simulating conditions likely to be encountered in real war.

Many of the measures adopted by political departments and Party organisations in naval aviation units directly contribute to improving the tactical training of flying personnel. Thus a series of reports and discussions for pilots and navigators designed to help them acquire proficiency in operating a new type of aircraft were given. These reports and discussions focussed on the special features of training of the crews of naval bombers under present-day conditions with special reference to advanced bombing techniques, the use of radar bomb sights, of bombing techniques with the aid of radioelectronic equipment in the face of enemy electronic interference, and to safety techniques in executing this type of bombing.

Naval aviators are expected to be fully prepared for action under conditions of massive employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy. The flying personnel study the effects of weapons of mass destruction with special reference to their impact on the operations of naval aviation and develop effective counter-measures and decontamination techniques in the course of accomplishing their assigned combat missions. Soviet naval aviators learn to evaluate the radiological situation and employ effective methods of passing contaminated /ones.

Systematic participation in prolonged flights over the seas and oceans and in naval exercises provides a good chance for giving the flying personnel of Soviet naval aviation excellent psychological training.

Long-term flights over the oceans help the air crews to develop courage, willpower, resourcefulness and staunchness. During such flights they are able to put their knowledge, their know-how and skills to the test as they often operate under conditions which are not unlike those to be encountered in actual war. This enables them to develop effective skills and techniques of overcoming 189 the difficulties attending long combat missions over the sea. As a result the flying personnel of the Soviet Navy's air arm have complete confidence in the superior performance characteristics of Soviet-made aircraft and associated weaponry and are certain of their capability to accomplish their assigned missions.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 2. The Marine Corps

The amphibious landing has fully proved its effectiveness as a form of combat employment of naval forces in close cooperation with ground forces.

The Soviet marines of World War II fame performed memorable exploits, displayed their unparalleled courage and grim determination to fight to the last, as well as their capacity to act swiftly and resolutely. It was not for nothing that the nazi invaders dubbed the Soviet marines "black devils''.

Leonid Sobolev, the well-known Soviet writer who himself was a sailor, wrote this about the marines of the Soviet Navy: "They are immediately recognised at the front by their blue-and-white shirts covering their broad chests. Their hearts are full of flaming hatred for the enemy and of pride for their Red Navy. They are always ready to perform feats of incredible courage having infinite contempt for panic and despair, they are honest, straightforward and totally loyal Bolsheviks and Komsomols, utterly devoted to their country. Red Navymen symbolise genuine camaraderie, combat friendship, readiness to support their comrades on the battlefield, to rescue a wounded comrade even at the price of one's own life and to protect the commander or political officer from an enemy bullet with one's own body. Red Navymen are full of joi de vivre, never lose heart. They symbolise the irresistible will to win, irresistible pressure in the attack and determination and singleness of purpose in fighting for victory. If they go over the top to attack no force on earth can stop them. If they are 190 fighting a defensive action they fight to the last surprising the enemy by a staunchness that to him is incomprehensible. And when Red Navymen fall in battle they do it in a way that strikes terror in the enemy: a Red Navy man will carry as many enemy soldiers into the grave with him as he can. The Red Navymen by their courage and valour contributed their share to victory.''

The Soviet marines of today are worthy successors to the glorious Red Navymen who fought in the Great Patriotic War. The marine force of the Soviet Navy is now equipped with floating tanks and armoured personnel carriers, excellent weaponry and a variety of landing craft capable of carrying large numbers of men and landing parties of considerable size. The Soviet marine force is now a highly mobile component of the Soviet Navy designed to conduct combat operations as part of amphibious assaults as well as in naval base and harbour defence. The men of the Soviet marine force are well trained, ideologically steeled and staunch young men. They are trained in commando tactics, they also learn to be good tankmen, gunners, divers and acquire many other skills.

During the 1970 naval manoeuvres code-named Okean (Ocean), Soviet marines displayed their superior skill in landing and field operations under conditions approaching those of real war. The Soviet Minister of Defence and the C-in-C of the Soviet Navy singled out the marines for special mention in recognition of their impressive performance during a major amphibious landing in the severe conditions of the Arctic region in the teeth of unfavourable hydrometeorological curcumstances.

The men of the Soviet marine corps are today working hard to improve their standard of training and combat skills under conditions simulating actual war. New and better methods and techniques are introduced to improve further the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet marines.

The special features of the psychological training of Soviet marines and the crews of landing craft spring 191 from the rather specific nature of missions assigned to them. Soviet marines are expected to be fully ready to spend prolonged periods aboard landing craft, cruising in unfavourable weather conditions, to carry out an amphibious assault, capture a beachhead, hold it against the enemy and expand it, as well as. to defend naval bases and other naval installations ashore.

As they spend long periods aboard ship marines have to get accustomed to the sea and withstand pitch and roll in the same way the ship crews do, they should accustom themselves to life and service at sea, whether aboard naval vessels or landing craft. Therefore the training of marines follows much the same principles and is conducted by the same methods as that in the case of ship crews.

Upon embarkation, members of the landing party usually take part in meetings and get-togethers with members of the ship's crew. Later in the course of the cruise joint training sessions as well as political and educational activities are conducted. In particular training sessions involve practising effective techniques to maintain the ship's combat ruggcdness, to make preparations for landing on the beach, to rescue those who fall overboard, to launch lifeboats and practise embarkation into lifeboats during a violent pitch and roll. Joint issues of wall newspapers and radio news, combat leaflets and express leaflets are issued and socialist emulation is organised between the marines and the sailors.

Party and political work is aimed at instilling in the marines a feeling of pride for their service, attachment to their regiment or element as the case may be. Special commemoration ceremonies are held in honour of Soviet marines who fell in action during the last war as well as the initiation ceremonies for fresh recruits.

Every sailor knows well that sailing aboard ship is often easier than landing on a wild beach. Special difficulties are experienced when gale force winds churn up the sea, when the sea abounds in underwater stones, rocks and reefs, when below zero temperatures cause 192 icing, to say nothing of the enemy's counter-measures. Combat experience shows that marines often have to wade in icy water, and land on wild beaches without adequate food stores but carrying a maximum amount of weapons and ammunition. Every marine while disembarking realises that difficult though it may be to gain the beach, it will be a hundred times more difficult to get back if the circumstances demand it. He realises that each landing is a gamble.

Landing on a wild beach requires that every member of the landing party is fully aware of what is awaiting him. To this end younger marines are usually attached to their more experienced colleagues who give them practical demonstrations of how to land properly and help them make a detailed study of the available landing facilities, all of which helps them to gain confidence. It is also essential to study the area where the marines will have to operate and in particular the relief of the bottom inshore and parts of the beach to be captured during the amphibious assault.

Younger marines are often taken out on prolonged voyages aboard launches and gunboats. They also undergo training sessions involving lifeboat rowing or lifeboat sailing. They learn how to reach the beach in rough seas, how to get back to the landing craft from the beach, how to jump into water from a landing craft despite a violent pitch and roll, and how to swim with full dress on. Marines also are trained in tying knots, in packing and hoisting techniques and in lifeline and rope throwing. It is also essential to train them in methods of walking on the bottom in the full range of possible depths, both in calm an in rough seas.

The training of marine tank crews in methods of disembarking from landing craft and crossing to the beach calls for a careful study of all the equipment and facilities normally used in the process. They train in diving techniques with survival kits and rescue equipment, in ways of keeping tanks afloat and combat fit. They study the sea-going capacity characteristics of their __PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__ 13--128 193 combat vehicles and undergo training in special pools using submersion chambers. The tankmen train in ways of operating at shallow depths and during passage over short distances. The tank crews gain confidence in their ability to handle their vehicle while floating and in driving it through narrow openings. They also learn how to drop and raise anchor, as well as how to keep their machine combat fit. Gradually the distance from the shore and the duration of passages are increased, training sessions are held in increasingly more unfavourable weather conditions and more complex emergency situations are simulated and joint passages involving several tank crews are practised both when visibility is good and poor.

Members of landing parties often experience psychological stress when they have to approach the shore in shallow water, particularly when the sea is rough and at night, when the mine hazards are increased. Complete radio silence and firing on shore-based targets over the heads of the landing party also put on extreme psychological strain on the participating marines. Therefore special training sessions and exercises are arranged to condition the men to these difficulties and train them in effective methods of acting with competence and confidence.

In modern war any amphibious assault will inevitably come up against stiff enemy resistance the overcoming of which will call for considerable combat skill, courage, determination and ingenuity on the part of the landing force. Marines should know how to negotiate mine fields and barbed wire entanglements and other obstacles, how to suppress enemy weapon emplacements, how to deal with enemy aircraft and tanks and of course should be fully proficieat in hand-to-hand fighting. To this end techniques and methods of psychological training used in the land forces are widely employed.

``Mine phobia" is generally conquered by a careful study of existing types of mines, regular practice in handling mines and related weapons, in mine disposal 194 and making passages in mine fields. Experencc 'shows that practical sessions involving the handling of explosives, practice mines fitted with a small imitation charge which is triggered off if a slip is made are highly effective.

Special attention is paid to practice in cross-training which should be complete. A landing party operating at night must act with complete confidence just as during the day. To achieve this goal regular training sessions must be held in the hours of darkness under increasingly difficult conditions.

Any attempt to overease a simulated combat environment lowers the effectiveness of psychological training of marines. Examples of oversimplification include the conduct of training sessions in the same places which are well familiar to the participating personnel from previous training. Landing craft approach the beaches at great speed without even making any soundings and without sustaining any ``losses'' land the amphibious force. On the beach the men see the familiar targets in the same convenient places. The enemy's section of the shore is well equipped with navigation signposts and markers, etc. Needless to say, a training session held under such easy conditions fails to create any psychological tension, which alone can condition and steel participatifrg personnel.

Soviet marines of today often hold their training sessions in the same areas where Soviet marines had fought in the last war. The commanders and political officers use such training sessions specifically to educate their men in the spirit of continuing fine combat traditions. In addition meetings are arranged with veterans of major amphibious operations carried out during the Great Patriotic War and the marines study their experience.

A positive moral and psychological influence on the marines is exerted by handbooks of instructions and posters prepared by the political departments. Typical subjects include "Preparations for an Amphibious Operation'', "The First Assault by a Landing Party'', "What Every Tankman Shfluld Know'', etc.

195

The training of marines in effective ways of defending naval bases and other naval installations from a land attack, as well as in ways of raiding and seizing enemy bases and installations follows fundamentally the same pattern as used in the training of ground troops. Marines must be prepared morally and psychologically for action under conditions when the enemy employs modern weapons and tactics, they must be fully proficient in anti-aircraft and anti-tank warfare, in overcoming enemy engineered defences and in techniques of urban fighting.

The simulation during field exercises of typical combat environments-the use of explosions, fires and various types of interference---is a good method of psychological training of marines. Marines are able to improve their psychological stability to the whistling of bullets, exploding shells and bombs close by during training sessions involving the use of imitation explosive charges, practice land mines and shooting over the heads of the participating personnel. Stability to fires is strengthened in the course of a careful study of incendiary devices and means likely to be used by the enemy, while practising effective fire fighting techniques, administering first aid to those sustaining bad burns while overcoming flame obstacle courses. Other effective ways of training marines psychologically include buzzing them with combat aircraft and diving over them, driving tanks and combat vehicles over the heads of marines in trenches. Training exercises involving alighting from rapidly moving combat vehicles, jumping on to moving tanks, throwing hand grenades at moving targets are also widely used.

The marines are given a realistic idea of operating in a nuclear environment through a careful study of special literature, visual aids, simulators and during training sessions simulating fires, undermining of mock-up buildings and'defences and operation in a contaminated area.

The physical training of marines is designed to enable them to meet stiff standards imposed by modern warfare. Marines undergo an intensive physical fitness 196 course at the end of which they have to meet exacting standards set by the military pentathlon. They do so fully dressed and with full equipment as they will have to act in real war. The pentathlon includes a 100-metre dash, a 3-kilometre cross-country race, swimming and diving, and a 6-kilometre forced march. Besides, marines have to run an obstacle course, row a six-ore yawl over a distance of 2 kilometres, and throw hand grenades for length of throw and accuracy. In addition, they are trained in sambo wrestling (self-defence without weapons), in hand-to-hand fighting using the butt of the submachine-gun, a sapper's spade or a knife.

Physical fitness training and sports activities effectively contribute to improving the psychological training of marines. The obstacle course usually includes deep and wide pits filled with water or enveloped in flame, high obstacles, narrow and swinging rickety beams to run along, burning beams, etc. This obstacle course is often referred to as "the blazing path''. The psychological stress created by practice on the obstacle course is increased by sudden noise and lighting effects ( explosions, flashes of light, whining sirens, etc.). The obstacle courses are used to practise individual elements of the tactical and special training, including anti-tank warfare, the overcoming of minefields, barbed wire entanglements, planting mines, etc.

Special devices and installations are used to improve the quality of psychological training given to the marines. Examples include what is known as "a tower of courage''. This is a tower 15 metres tall which can be climbed through a ladder mesh. The only way of descending is by working your way down along ropes suspended at different angles using your arms only. Running along the ropes are sliding metal pipes, 35 centimetres long. Practice sessions using the "tower of courage" develop strength, agility, quick reflexes, courage and determination. This tower can be linked by a swinging ladder with another structure used for taking jumps from a height of 3. 4 and 5 metres.

197

It is important to simulate combat environments and difficulties associated with them as realistically as possible, particularly obstacles and problems which landing parties are likely to encounter during amphibious assaults.

A variety of sports activities are used as part of the psychological training programme for marines. The most popular sports with the marines include rugby, free-style wrestling, springboard diving, etc. Daily setting-up exercises and scheduled physical fitness sessions are also organised, including 10--15-minute warming-up exercises before going on watch duty. In their spare time marines often take part in sports competitions and trials of strength, agility and endurance.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 3. The Shore-Based Missile
and Artillery Forces

The Soviet Navy's missile and artillery forces are equipped with up-to-date guided missiles, fully automated fire control and guidance systems, long-range artillery, sophisticated radar systems, etc. Their fire power, operational range and accuracy of hit ensure a reliable protection for the country's coastlines and major military and industrial installations situated in coastal areas from an enemy seaborne attack as well as a reliable destruction of enemy forces well out at sea.

The personnel of the Navy's missile and artillery forces include missile men, artillery men, radar operators, communications specialists, drivers of combat vehicles, etc. The moral and psychological training given to the personnel of the Navy's missile and artillery forces comprises three distinct trends associated with the rather special tasks and conditions under which they have to operate to repulse enemy attack by sea, air and land.

The combat training aimed at successful actions against enemy seaborne and air attacks is largely based on the same pattern as in the case of all missile men, 198 anti-aircraft missile men, artillery men and anti-aircraft artillery crews. The highly responsible missions facing them presuppose well-designed and purposeful efforts aimed at maintaining constant combat readiness enabling them to go into action at short notice, at any time of day and night. The personnel of these forces are trained in effective methods of repulsing sudden and massive enemy attacks by sea and air. The training methods used involve a rapid switch-over from a state of expectation or simple enough conditions to energetic actions under extreme conditions and simulation of emergencies (sudden battle alerts amid complex combat environments, abrupt and frequent transitions from a lull to actions under conditions of maximum intensity and back again, increasing the number of targets to the maximum during a simulated massive enemy air raid, etc.).

Of great importance in this context are training methods designed to prevent "aircraft phobia" among the personnel. To this end they are subjected to simulated enemy air strikes delivered by combat aircraft flying at zero level which dive and fire using blank ammunition. Simulated air strikes are at their most effective as a training device when they are accompanied by shell and bomb bursts close to the positions of the defenders.

The simulation of confusing and critical combat environments during action against enemy seaborne and airborne targets is a useful device to improve their psychological stability and sangfroid. Apart from conventional techniques, special-purpose methods are also used, including:

---the simulation of targets operating from different directions and manoeuvring freely by course and speed;

---the introduction of a large number of different targets;

---interruptions and breaks in the in-coming flow of target designation data, the introduction of faulty or incomplete information on the enemy coming from radar stations;

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---a sharp decrease in illumination intensity at action stations;

---loss (or interruption) of external or internal communications by issuing special commands, cutting off circuits, grounding communication wires, putting mufflers on microphones;

---simulated use by the enemy of anti-radar self-guided missiles, decoy targets and drones causing electronic interference;

---all kinds of target practice and gunnery under complex conditions by day and by night;

---sharp changes in the number of targets, the disappearance of the targets already detected and a sharp increase in the amount of ground clutter.

The missile men are expected to display exceptional sangfroid and presence of mind while operating in combat environments dominated by severe enemy electronic interference or by substantial damage and malfunction to their equipment since any modern war will involve an intense radioelectronic struggle. Therefore missile men must be ready to act with confidence and calm in the teeth of electronic interference which they should learn to regard as normal.

Damage and malfunction to the operating equipment must not put off the manning personnel. To train them in successful techniques of operating under adverse conditions they are introduced to effective ways of tracing and rectifying faults and malfunctions. It is important during exercises and training sessions to simulate all kinds of malfunctions and abnormalities in the operating equipment during a simulated battle. Needless to say all this should be done unexpectedly, when the personnel expect them least and multiple malfunctions should also be introduced. Close attention is paid to training operators in coping with their duties using partially damaged equipment. The fact is that many malfunctions and many kinds of combat damage affect secondary circuits and although they make the job of the operator more difficult, they do not make it impossible. The 200 operators must therefore be trained in successful ways of carrying on under such conditions.

As the constant cooperation of the various services and arms of the Soviet Navy is the basis of its operations, the personnel of the Navy's missile and artillery forces are trained in methods of cooperating with the rest of the Navy's arms and services. Some of the more effective training techniques include systematic practice in identification of friendly and enemy ships and aircraft, the development of powers of observation and professional memory. In the course of practical and training sessions and exercises it is important to simulate combat environments involving a certain number of manoeuvring enemy targets as well as friendly ships and aircraft. The number of both is gradually increased. Also useful in this context are systematic training sessions held in realistic combat environments involving friendly forces with some of them designated as ``enemy'' forces or the simulation on radar scopes of targets against the background of the actual situation, the introduction of malfunctions in the identification equipment.

Special training techniques and measures are employed to train missile men, artillery men, radar operators and communications specialists in successful ways of operating in a nuclear environment. These include signals announcing the start of a nuclear attack by the enemy with all the usual consequences, breaks in and interruption of normal communication flows, power cuts, water supply cuts, jammed doors, fires, intensive operation for 2-5 hours during which the participating personnel have to work at full stretch with protective clothing on, with elevated and rising room temperatures, amid massive ``casualties'', etc.

One of the basic trends in the psychological training of the personnel of the Navy's shore-based missile and artillery forces is training in dealing with enemy attacks by land. The missile and artillery men must always be ready to repulse commando raids which the enemy is likely to resort to. During training sessions to counter __PRINTERS_P_201_COMMENT__ 14--128 201 simulated enemy commando raids it is useful to give false commands and orders and supply false information. In a real war the personnel of the Navy's missile and artillery forces are likely to repulse enemy amphibious assaults. Therefore their training sessions in peacetime emphasise moral and psychological training to accustom them to ground action dominated by the employment of small arms, artillery and mortars, incendiary devices and even tanks. The personnel must also know how to fight a hand-to-hand battle. Their relevant training follows the same pattern as that given to the marines.

__ALPHA_LVL2__ 4. The Navy's Shore Establishment

Timely and adequate logistical support has always been an essential factor in the successful combat performance of naval forces. Today the Navy's shore establishment is a complex and interlocking combat structure consisting of many different activities which together ensure comprehensive and adequate support of naval operations both in the coastal zone and in the remote parts of the ocean, away from home base. The Navy's shore establishment logistical services are equipped with a variety of auxiliary vessels, sophisticated and reliable technical facilities and shore bases. Gone are the days when the Navy's shore establishment was dominated by supply people who looked after food supplies, materiel and boatswain's store outfit. Today the Navy's shore establishment also has its own engineers, technicians and experienced seamen.

As modern naval operations involve extensive theatres of operation in the seas and oceans new and more exacting demands are made on the personnel of the Navy's shore establishment. These new demands are being taken into account by those who supervise the training of the personnel of the Navy's logistical services.

In the course of their work in support of naval operations the crews of auxiliary vessels are called upon to 202 deliver strictly on schedule all the necessary supplies to combat naval forces and to help them restore combat efficiency wherever and whenever the latter has been crippled. The crews of auxiliary vessels will have in a possible war to stay far out at sea for as long as the warships. In a major modern war they will be exposed to even greater dangers and risks because their vessels are more vulnerable to enemy attack than warships. Therefore the crews of such vessels will have to display exceptional courage, staunchness, self-sacrifice and ingenuity. The training given to the crews of auxiliary vessels must be designed in such a way as to help them develop the necessary moral and combat qualities.

The moral and psychological training given to the crews of auxiliary vessels is based on much the same pattern as that given to the crews of fighting ships. Present-day practice of logistical support for prolonged cruises of fighting ships provides good opportunities to the crews of auxiliary vessels to gain a wealth of professional experience, helping them to learn to think big and act with confidence in remote areas of the ocean. In the course of providing adequate logistical support to warships carrying out prolonged cruises the crews of auxiliary vessels improve their standards of seamanship and learn how to take the difficulties of long-term cruises in their stride.

To improve the moral and fighting qualities of the crews of auxiliary vessels, it is important to conduct their training seassions in an environment which is made to resemble the real thing as close as possible. It is essential to get them to accustom themselves to sudden enemy air strikes and to repulse them effectively, to deal with unexpected encounters with enemy submarines, to dispose of minefields and other forms of mine warfare, to sail in convoy and to drill effective methods of operating under a variety of combat environments and to develop effective techniques of ensuring the survivability of their vessels and equipment.

The personnel of the salvage and rescue service are 203 engaged in activities which are highly important for efficient operations by the rest of the Navy's fighting forces. The training given to the personnel of the salvage and rescue service has much in common with that given to the crews of fighting and auxiliary ships. But there are differences, notably emphasis on psychological training to accustom the personnel to act under extreme hydrometeorological conditions under which the help of salvage and rescue ships is generally sought. The personnel of the salvage and rescue service are trained in such a way as to develop speed and bold action, sangfroid, endurance and staunchness, agility, quick thinking, ingenuity and courage. The training programmes emphasise maritime training for the life-savers.

Detailed critiques and analysis of past emergencies and rescue and salvage operations, particularly with officers of the rescue and salvage service taking part, are very useful both from a purely technical, and moral and psychological standpoint. It is a fact that during emergencies and rescue and salvage operations the personnel involved behave in a distinct and unusual way, hence the importance of proper guidance and management techniques on the part of those in charge of such operations. The training given to the officers of the rescue and salvage service emphasises the development of willpower. It is designed to help them become good managers of men, to increase their leadership potential which will enable them to win their men's confidence and to lead them in critical situations, to help them adopt psychologically correct decisions and organise rescue operations quickly and efficiently.

The need to maintain a high level of readiness to put out to sea at short notice to assist warships in distress makes it important for the personnel of the salvage and rescue service to learn to act quickly and efficiently, to explode into energetic actions at maximum intensity and to develop resistance to monotonous and psychologically softening-up factors. As emergencies and similar situations occur rather rarely, special training sessions 204 are conducted to keep the personnel of the rescue and salvage service in the state of constant preparedness.

Frogmen and deep divers are in a class of their own among the specialists manning the Soviet Navy's logistical services. Frogmen and deep divers undergo a very special kind of training which helps them to cope with their special duties. Not everyone is fit to be a diver and careful selection is made of suitable candidates. Apart from purely physical characteristics, adequate psychological and moral qualities are essential. Only a diver possessing a full range of physical, professional, moral and psychological qualities can quickly find a hole in the side of a ship, move about with confidence inside a sunken vessel, put a charge of explosives under the right object or weld a seam at a great depth.

Personnel of the diving service, apart from being given the usual ideological education, undergo special training designed to develop courage and readiness to lay down their lives for the sake of saving others. Educational work among the frogmen and deep divers is conducted by various methods and includes regular meetings between deep divers and submarine crews, with veteran sailors and naval commanders, etc. They also attend lectures and study sessions.

Several years ago the political department of the Baltic Naval Command put out a collection of stories about the heroism displayed by frogmen and deep divers in peacetime complete with the biographies of the heroes who had been decorated with Orders and medals. Many naval bases and museums of naval glory have special displays and stands devoted to the courage and heroism of naval divers.

A diver as no one else must have full confidence in the reliability of his equipment. This confidence is built through practical demonstrations given by experienced veteran divers during which they show how one should act effectively to ensure the survivability of the diving gear and how one should assist his fellows in case of need. Every effort is made to get every diver to gain full 205 proficiency in the handling of his equipment.

A diver's psychological stability is largely dependent on his individual characteristics and personality, on his powers of observation, skills and techniques of operating under water. The water environment makes special demands on man. exerting as it docs a distinct physiological impact on the human body, which in itself changes the psychological processes. Moreover, the water environment affects these processes most directly. Thus, underwater objects appear to be bigger and nearer. Colour perception is also altered: red objects may appear to be black or green to the diver. Illumination intensity changes greatly as the depth of diving increases. The diver cannot always tell with certainty where a particular sound is coming from, etc. These and other difficulties call for special training to help divers develop the necessary psychological qualities.

The training given to the personnel of shore-based naval establishments is also characterised by a number of specific features. This category of naval personnel includes specialists in many different fields who perform vital functions to prepare and keep supplied warships, aircraft, missile and artillery units and the marine corps to enable them to accomplish their missions.

Psychological training given to the personnel of shorebased naval establishments is largely patterned on the methods employed in the training of their counterparts serving with the ground forces and the marine corps. Drivers, warehousemen, engineers, repairmen, technicians, weapons specialists, members of the medical corps and other specialists must be fully proficient in the performance of their duties and be able to repulse enemy air attacks, and deal with enemy commando and sabotage groups, landing parties, etc. They must be thoroughly proficient in decontamination techniques to be employed in the aftermath of enemy nuclear attacks.

[206] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ Chapter VI __ALPHA_LVL1__ The Moral and Political Aspects
of Troop Control
in a Combat Situation

The efficient accomplishment by personnel of combat missions and success in overcoming the problems and difficulties of wartime are largely dependent on the quality of training they have received in time of peace. This is axiomatic. However, it cannot justify any underestimation of the moral, political and psychological training of personnel in a combat situation, particularly during preparations for a combat operation. This type of training given to the troops just before they embark on a specific combat mission is designed to induce every officer and man to be psychologically ready to accomplish the mission, to generate fighting enthusiasm, ensure maximum psychological mobilisation and fierce determination to beat the enemy. This training is an important element of troop control in wartime and is supervised by commanders and political officers.

Those who direct this training must always bear in mind the reflective nature of human psyche-what a particular person would think at a particular moment, his feelings and aspirations, i.e. his psychological state, which depends not only on the psychological training he has already received, but also on the actual situation in which he finds himself. A combat situation may affect the performance and psychological state of troops negatively as well. Therefore each navyman needs encouragement, support and advice of his superiors in the course of accomplishing a combat mission, in other words he needs guidance.

207

Victory is the result of well-directed, concerted efforts by highly trained troops; of the unity of competent operational, tactical, technical, moral, political and psychological decisions made by the officers and the methods they use to implement them. A commander, a staff, a political department, any body providing guidance can cope with the combat mission assigned only when they take into account every moral factor involved in a concrete combat situation and if they are able to get the most out of it.

That is why continual guidance of the troops in a combat situation, constant and effective moral, political and psvchological influence on the troops is crucial to success in battle.

Moral and political influence on the officers and men as a form of guidance and direction is exercised by the ship's commander, by his deputy for political work, by all the officers working in close contact with the ship's Party and Komsomol organisations. It is this guidance that enhances the ship's fighting efficiency and brings out such fine qualities as heroism, courage, self-sacrifice, capacity for energetic action, initiative and utter devotion to the socialist Motherland and the cause of the CPSU. This guidance makes it possible to preclude the onset of or at least weaken the impact of most of the adverse psychological phenomena which may develop among a snip's crew at the start or in the course of a war. Profound ideological content, total commitment to the ideals of the Communist Party, a class-motivated approach coupled with efficiency, flexibility, clarity of purpose, credibility, emotional impact and relevance of moral and political influence -these are all signs of a sound style of leadership ensuring the success of the moral and psychological training given to personnel on the eve or in the course of combat operations. Every facet of Party and political work among the troops in war must be noted for a militant and attacking spirit and must involve all categories of the personnel. It must be easy to understand and accept. It is important, as Lenin 208 put it, "...to combat all signs of weariness, faint-- heartedness and vacillation, to enhearten in every way those who show such signs, strengthen their spirit, consciousness and comradely discipline".^^1^^ The experience of the Great Patriotic War against nazi Germany and the record of large-scale exercises and manoeuvres and of the entire Party and political work among the personnel since the war bear this out.

However, in a combat situation not all forms and methods of moral, political and psychological training of the troops, even if they have proved effective in peacetime, can be used. The fact that in a combat situation everyone involved is intent on his particular combat duties, has little or no spare time, and the sheer dynamism of a combat situation call for highly efficient, time-saving forms and methods. As General of the Army A. A. Yepishev put it in his The G>mmunists of the Army and Navy, "Political work carried out during the Great Patriotic War was at once efficient and constant. Commanders and top political departments made timely provision for political education as part of preparations for and during combat operations. The supervising officers were careful to employ suitable forms and methods in a flexible and imaginative way to always fit the current situation, the assigned mission and troop behaviour and performance. Political departments and staffs maintained constant liaison and exchanged information. Care was taken to deploy Communists in an efficient way and quickly replace those Party and political workers who were knocked out of the ranks. Every effort was made to strengthen the Party and Komsomol organisations to ensure that commanders, political officers and Party activists were at all times the organisers of the troops. They inspired the troops by a daily display of personal courage and gallantry on the battlefield. Last but not least, accurate and timely _-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 42, p. 134.

209 political information was provided on a permanent basis up and down the chain of command.''

Commanders, staffs, political departments and Party organisations are called upon to influence actively every aspect of life and work of the personnel in their charge during a war. Every means of ideological and organisational work should be geared to ensuring the unconditional accomplishment of the combat missions assigned and complete victory over the enemy.

The basic trends in the moral and political education of the troops during a war are directed at getting every officer and man to display utter devotion to his sacred military duty, explaining the just character and aims of the war effort of the socialist camp against the aggressors, at fostering boundless love of the country and implacable hatred towards her enemies. They should be aimed at inducing every officer and man to maintain a high level of revolutionary vigilance and constant combat preparedness, at developing courage and fearlessness, at maintaining a cast-iron discipline, organisation and order, at strengthening the unity, combat alliance and mutual assistance between the armies and navies of the socialist countries.

The political essence of a war does not take long to affect the behaviour and performance of military personnel. During a war every officer and man shows what he is made of much more vividly and definitely than in peacetime and a military collective shows itself more clearly than ever before as a cell of the society it belongs to. An enemy attack on the socialist Motherland quickly generates patriotic fervour, accentuates class consciousness, and one's sense of identification with the rest of the country under enemy attack, it accentuates feelings of national pride and internationalist solidarity, love of the country and implacable hatred towards her enemies. The outbreak of war makes every officer and man in the Soviet Navy ponder the meaning of life in a new way, to see his place in society more clearly and his part in the class struggle. During a war the personnel of the Soviet 210 Navy feel more strongly than ever before their unity and commitment to their ideological, political and military ideals. They display a particularly high level of cohesion, collectivism, camaraderie, friendship and mutual assistance. In war relationships among naval personnel are geared to an efficient performance of their common military duty more immediately than in peacetime. All this taken together creates favourable conditions in which to conduct effective moral and political work among the personnel and makes such work indispensable.

The most important forms of ideological education of naval personnel at the start of a war include the provision of timely and adequate political information to them, inspiring them by the display of personal example by commanders, political officers and all Party members in the Navy, and large-scale political agitation and propaganda activities among the personnel. Of prime importance is the organisation of quick and adequate information measures to keep the naval personnel informed about the latest documents adopted by the CPSU and the Soviet government, about appeals to the country's Armed Forces and the people issued by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, and the announcement of the orders-of-the-day issued by the Supreme Command, by commanding officers and commanders. Parly and political work conducted among the crews of naval vessels is aimed at developing and maintaining opinions, feelings and moods which express endorsement of the policy and decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet government and which stimulate a conscious and patriotic attitude to the sacred military duty. The personnel need up-to-date and continual information on the state of the country and on the progress of military operations on land and at sea. The provision of this information is a direct responsibility of the commanders and their deputies, and of the Communists and Komsomol activists.

Troop control and guidance implies the setting and 211 explanation of combat missions, the maintenance of a high fighting spirit and urge to pass over to determined actions to defeat the enemy, as well as the strengthening of the troops' faith in successful accomplishment of the combat mission and final victory over the enemy. This should be done in such a way as to ensure that the naval personnel involved imbue themselves with the desire to accomplish their combat mission come what may. At the same time care should be taken to prevent any leakage of military secrets.

Meetings, rallies, ceremonial rituals and collective performance of patriotic songs, chanting of Party and combat slogans when conducted at an appropriate time and with due enthusiasm never fail to generate still greater enthusiasm and vigour among the crews.

Another useful device are meetings with veterans, experienced sailors, Navy specialists with a distinguished record of service, and the crews of naval vessels returning to home base after accomplishing a combat mission.

To increase the influence of the Communist Party on every aspect of the life and work of naval personnel, Communist and Komsomol activists are deployed in such a way as to cover every important action station and post. Needless to say, all Communists and Komsomols should set an example for others to follow in the discharge of their duties and they should always be as good as their word.

In the grim years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people there was a mass influx of new members into the Communist Party. Thousands of Soviet navymen guided by the desire to uphold communist ideals in the ranks of the Communist Party handed in their applications for membership in the Party before or during a voyage or flight. This enthusiasm for Party membership was an indication of the high ideological and moral level of the Soviet people, of the indissoluble unity between the Party and the people, of the prestige and authority of the CPSU at the grassroots level. The growing influx of new members into the Party is a major 212 aid in efforts to strengthen Party and Komsomol organisations in the Soviet Navy so make them more efficient in influencing the combat activities of their membership. In accepting new members into the Party the political departments and Party organisations during the Great Patriotic War acted with maximum efficiency and gave priority to those officers and men who had distinguished themselves under trying battlefield conditions. In 1941 the CC CPSU adopted a decision which cut to three months the length of the probation period for candidates for Party membership from among the personnel of the army in the field who distinguished themselves in action (the usual probation period is one year). During the war Party commissions often discussed candidates for Party membership on the spot, on board ship, at airfields, etc. Not infrequently membership cards were presented to the new members just as they were about to set out on a combat mission.

The record to date indicates that agitation and propaganda work if properly conducted will continue to be as effective as ever. Agitators and propagandists must address the ship's crew over the ship's radio and public address system, conduct conversations and talks on an individual and collective basis, inform the crew of the latest political events and developments, take part in radio newsreels and write articles for combat leaflets. To help them to do so efficiently commanders and political officers must brief propagandists and agitators daily and in detail, supply them with information on current events and examples to be followed drawn from the life of the given ship or naval unit and tell them about the difficulties and problems lying ahead, and what the personnel will have to do to accomplish the new combat mission. It will also be necessary to keep agitators and propagandists supplied with fresh newspapers, brochures and other material they may need for discussion during conversations and talks. They should also get individual and group briefings.

Particular attention should be paid to making every 213 instance of patriotism, courage, bravery and exemplary performance of duty displayed by members of a particular ship's crew, naval command, and indeed by personnel of any part of the country's Armed Forces known to the naval personnel quickly and in detail. The heroes of the first battles must be made known to every officer and man who must be told in detail about what they did and how they did it, emphasising the lofty ideological and moral motivation behind their exploits. In a combat situation navymen respond particularly well when told about the heroic past of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, about the distinguished combat record of warships and about the courage and sense of duty displayed by ratings and officers alike, txcerpts from books by Soviet writers about Soviet naval operations in the last war are always greatly appreciated. There is hardly a sailor whose heart won't swell with pride on hearing what Leonid Sobolev said about Soviet navymen in his novel A Sailor's Soul, "One sailor is just a sailor. Two sailors -are worth a platoon. Three sailors a company.... How many are we? Four? ... Right! Battalion, this is my order 'Quick march! ' " The personnel should be told about the fine record of the revolutionary Navy during the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War and about the exploits of Soviet navymen later during the Great Patriotic War when they defended the hero cities of Odessa, Leningrad, Sebastopol and Novorossiisk.

A real combat environment will necessitate a considerable intensification of the work done by commanders, political departments, Party and Komsomol organisations in arousing among the personnel an implacable hatred towards the aggressors, who have encroached on the peaceful endeavour and gains of the peoples of the socialist countries. Using the examples drawn from the past and present, it is important to show the true face of the aggressors and their henchmen in all its ugliness, to expose the rotten essence of bourgeois morality. The impassioned oratory of agitators and propagandists, 214 documentary films and photograph displays invariably produce a strong effect on the minds and sentiments of naval personnel.

Special social measures will have to be adopted to greatly strengthen vigilance among the personnel, to prevent both lackadaisical attitudes and morbid suspiciousness. The experience of past wars indicates that aggressors in launching a sneak attack simultaneously resort to acts of sabotage to destroy lines of communication, power stations, power transmission lines, telephone exchanges, assassinate commanders on their way to their respective units in response to an urgent summons. Naval personnel must be told all about the cunning and perfidiousness of imperialist secret agents, intelligence and sabotage groups in order to be forever vigilant and prepared to give them a fitting rebuff.

In a complex and confusing combat environment the importance of individual work among naval personnel cannot be overemphasised. Lenin wrote on this score, "Conferences and mass meetings v/ere not enough. What was needed was individual agitation. Every man liable to mobilisation should be personally visited. Every one of them should be convinced individually that the ending of the war depended on his courage, his determination and his devotion.''^^1^^

Naval personnel who are hardest pressed in a combat situation are particularly in need of an individualised approach. For the most part these are young sailors or those who are getting ready to carry out a particularly responsible mission. Then there are those who man closed battle stations of surface ships and fresh recruits who have joined a new ship on the eve of a cruise, or they may be fresh reinforcements. Experience shows that particular attention should be paid to keeping up the morale of naval personnel who fight their first battles in the opening stages of a war. Generally they react particularly sensitively to the first bomb and shell _-_-_

^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 322.

215 explosions, enemy air attacks, to the noise of the screws of submarine chasers and to other unnerving events which naval personnel do not normally get much chance to grow accustomed to during peacetime. When exposed to real dangers and high risks they may betray qualities which not only their commanders, but they themselves never suspected they had. That is why it is so important in a combat situation to watch personnel closely, to try to get to know them better to be able to boost their morale at the most difficult moments, to help them overcome momentary weaknesses and hesitation, should they appear.

Personal meetings with the commander and political officers are of especially great value in a combat environment. That is why the Soviet Navy has a long-standing tradition of tours of inspection made by commanders and their deputies for political work. The commander tours the various battle stations on the eve of a major event and, if at all possible, during a naval engagement. When the ship is about to enter a particularly dangerous area of the sea, it is a good plan for the commander to inform his men of the full complexity of the situation, to urge them to take every precaution, to follow instructions relating to concealment and observation. He should urge them to be vigilant and to redouble their efforts to carry out every instruction and order to the letter. The commander should also advise his men on the best way of doing so. During critical moments the commander's kind word of encouragement and advice, his good humour or a timely joke may be a powerful morale booster for his men and a potent confidence builder. Apart from that the commander should display firmness and an undeflectable sense of purpose backed up by the issue of terse and precise orders. On no account must a commander issue contradictory orders as these only confuse his men and undermine their confidence in him. In a critical combat situation the men will take heart from their commander's sangfroid, self-control and a calm voice when giving commands. This is of especial 216 importance on board ship as most members of the crew have no way of following the progress of the battle directly. In such circumstances men become particularly sensitive to everything that in their opinion helps to sort out the situation. The men react particularly acutely and sensitively to the psychological implication of everything that happens- how their mates are behaving, a sudden summons to the commander, the commander's voice and intonation when asking a question or broadcasting an order over the ship's radio. The ship's commander and his deputy for political work will exercise a tremendous impact on the morale of the crew by their own behaviour and actions. Indeed, the crew is aware that only their commander and his deputy for political work know what the true position is. And whatever doubts and apprehensions may prey on his mind, the commander must on no account betray them to his men if he is to avoid undermining their morale. This was what experienced naval commanders of the past always did.

Mere is an example from the last war. On one occasion a Soviet submarine operating in the Baltic Sea proceeded under ice and found herself in a difficult situation when she could not reach clear water. Surfacing was impossible. Nor was it possible for the submarine to return as the storage batteries were running down and the supply of air was giving out. The submarine's crew were following closely what the commander would do next. Aware of this, the commander went into his cabin, picked up a book, and returning to the control room began reading. He was completely immersed in reading, chuckling now and then. Hipping back the pages to re-read passages that amused him most. That did it. The men in the control room were reassured: here was their commander completely at ease and even enjoying a book as if his ship was in no danger at all. That meant that everything was O.K. And indeed the submarine accomplished its mission successfully.

An experienced commander usually relies on a large variety of seemingly simple but effective methods which __PRINTERS_P_217_COMMENT__ 15--128 217 invariably affect the morale and sentiments of the crew in the desired way. An efficient and properly designed organisation of the men's activities helps them to overcome psychological stress and strain. Here is what G. I. Shchedrin, Hero of the Soviet Union, an experienced submariner of World War II fame says: "Complete concentration on the performance of one's duties at one's battle station helps one to retain fairly good spirits. You concentrate on the monitoring of instrument readings and the operation of the various units and components and you have no time to pay attention to anything else. And this makes you feel better. It's a different matter when you have no duties to attend to and your thoughts involuntarily focus on unpleasant things like whether the bomb will hit you or not.''

The commander's ability to keep a firm grip on the morale of his men is all the greater when he takes into account the specific impact of combat environment on the psychological condition of his men. A personal display of sangfroid and composure by the commander, a timely word of encouragement to his men, appeal to their sense of patriotism and military duty, help in neutralising the morale-damaging impact of the first naval engagements on the more impressionable and psychologically less stable of his men.

In directing the actions of his men the commander must pay particular attention to getting every man to fully mobilise his individual potential. This total mobilisation can only be achieved when the men by an effort of the will put the views and moods they had in peacetime behind them and shed their misconceptions about the demands of war and their own potential. The experience of past wars shows that even good navymen failed to display their full potential during the first actions. They explained this away by saying that they did their best. Little did they suspect however that in making this statement they used a peacetime standard in measuring their potential. And so when they found 218 themselves in critical combat environments with their dangers and incredible difficulties they failed to set themselves sufficiently exacting and merciless standard of behaviour which was demanded by the war. Actually it only seemed to them that they were doing their best, what was humanly possible and that they gave up only when faced with a situation that seemed to them to be beyond the possible. And needless to say they defined the limits of the possible using the standards of peacetime. Therefore in order to rise to the occasion, as it were, in a combat situation in order to be able to meet the challenge of war fully, one must shed all peacetime notions and make a bold attempt at the seemingly impossible, to try and endure the unendurable, always guided by the categorical order to oneself---to win or die.

In a real war psychological moods and notions one normally has in peacetime must be thrown overboard without delay and every manifestation of hesitation, lack of determination, in decisiveness must be combatted uncompromisingly. Even during a war that broke out with a sudden enemy attack some people have a hope at the back of their minds that what is happening is not the beginning of a full-scale war, but the result of an accident or a temporary provocation. Here is what Rear Admiral V. N. Yeroshenko, Ret., says in his book of memoirs, "Of course we had no illusions about German nazism. We had followed the progress of Hitler's aggression across Europe. There was hardly anyone among us who did not realise that sooner or later we would have to do battle with Hitler. And still flying in the face of all facts we cherished a hope that our country stood in no immediate danger of attack from nazi Germany yet.''

Some of the more effective measures to be employed in achieving the total mobilisation of naval personnel in a combat situation include the advancement of politically clear and just combat slogans of the type "Ours is a righteous cause, the enemy will be beaten, victory will be ours'', a frank and honest description of the tremendous difficulties of the struggle against the enemy lying __PRINTERS_P_219_COMMENT__ 15* 219 ahead, of the mortal danger hanging over the country and the entire socialist community, indeed over the future of all mankind. It is important to impress it upon every man in vivid and convincing form the idea that victory will require a protracted all-out war effort, that the people will have to endure great hardships and privations, some of them bordering on the impossible, that at times superhuman efforts will have to be made, that everyone will have to set himself mercilessly exacting standards of behaviour and performance, that everyone will have to get himself keyed up for a fierce and merciless battle against the enemy which may require one to make the ultimate sacrifice.

In a critical combat situations effective measures will have to be taken to maintain strict order discipline and organisation, to enforce cast-iron discipline and the commander's total authority. In maintaining a strict order as per regulations every effort will have to be made to combat the mistaken opinion of some who argue that "now that there is a war on regulations can be bent to fit the situation''. It is precisely in wartime that a strict order and cast-iron discipline should be maintained as these help the men to keep their balance and a cool head. For only a commander who is firm and exacting will be able to carry his men with him and the men have confidence that with such a commander leading them they will be able to go through thick and thin. Every effort should be made to ensure that every officer and man is fully engaged at all times and that his actions are under the commander's constant control and guidance. In making exacting demands on his men a good commander is careful to set himself high standards, to keep his own performance under a constant Critical review, to issue relevant and realistic orders. To make exacting demands on his men in a combat situation does not imply of course that a commander should forego the tried and tested method of persuasion, and rely on administration by mere fiat and punishment.

Every navyman will feel and perform better if his 220 combat mission is clear to him, if he thinks out down to the minutest detail every possible alternative course of action in accomplishing his mission, if he evaluates correctly and realistically the difficulties lying ahead and analyses every possible way of overcoming them. Therefore, it is the commander's first duty to define a combat mission in concrete terms to enable his men to see it with the utmost clarity and help them find ways and means of accomplishing it.

Any order should be formulated in precise and crystal-clear terms which preclude an ambivalent interpretation and leave no loophole for those whose duty it is to carry it out, to make it impossible for anyone to deviate one inch from fulfilling the combat mission as assigned. A good order is one which is formulated clearly and in categorical terms, and which defines precisely the end goal which must be attained at all costs. Such an order will help those to whom it is issued to imbue their minds with the need for no other but active, purposeful, persistent and self-- sacrificing efforts.

The process of total mobilisation of all psychological and physical powers of naval personnel for an implacable battle with the enemy is helped by impressing upon every navyman from the opening battles against the enemy the concise and categorical dictums of the type "Carry out the order no matter what! '', "Stand firm and not retreat an inch! " Precise formulation of regulations and rules of behaviour in a combat situation will .help the men to put themselves in the right fighting mood. Such measures as group discussions on subjects of morality, the distribution of handbooks and reminders, the prominent display of posters, slogans and extracts from regulations and orders of the day are also advisable. It will also be necessary to announce and explain without delay martial law regulations and the penalties meted out to offenders.

Meticulous measures will have to be taken from the very beginning of war to ensure tight security and total 221 secrecy, the vigilance, and the faultless guard, patrol, duty and watch services.

It is the duty of the commander to take prompt and resolute action to eliminate all and every manifestation of panic and confusion. This is understandable enough. Indeed, on board ship a bad-as well as good-example is very infectious as the crewmen are united by similar feelings and psychological states as is always the case in a situation where all members of the crew are exposed to the same dangers and subject to the psychological tugo'-war between the instinct of self-preservation and the sense of military duty.

Those guilty of deliberate misbehaviour must be punished without delay and the rest of the crew must be immediately informed of the fact. Every effort must be made to involve all the fighting ships and naval units in the common effort to accomplish assigned combat missions as this also helps to improve the morale of the naval personnel and helps in eliminating the pessimism of those who may argue that their contribution to the common effort will do nothing to bring victory nearer.

Troop control and management in a combat situation should be aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness in employing available weapons and equipment and in getting every officer and man to display his combat skill to the full. It is not enough for a commander, a staff officer, or a political officer to display personal courage. It is their duty to be always as efficient as combat situations may require which may be extremely complex and varied. They must always be ready to assume responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the mission assigned to them.

Action to implement a decision made must be preceded by supporting preparatory measures, including reconnaissance, adequate protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction, efficient counter-measures to neutralise enemy electronic interference, hydrometeorologjcal and material preparations. Some of these measures are to be taken immediately, others are 222 carefulIy planned and implemented throughout the period preceding the start on the accomplishment of a combat mission. In all cases the personnel involved must be thoroughly prepared and trained to guarantee success.

Above all it is important to mobilise the entire naval personnel for accomplishing assigned combat missions efficiently and well. Every effort should be made to prevent undue hurry, reckless action, lack of coordination, confusion, to insist that all the instructions, regulations and other combat documents are followed undeviatingly.

In this connection instructions following from an order issued by a commander or an officer have a definite role to play. Psychologists who have investigated the problem have shown that there are both concrete or specific instructions (for instance, "to display a reaction speed of not less than, say, 35 seconds'', "to detect a terget at a certain range'') and non-specific instructions (for instance, "do this to the best of your ability'', ``don't let us down''). In practice both specific and nonspecific approaches are used by naval officers to orient their men towards a certain course of action. It should be remembered, however, that non-specific instructions are sometimes interpreted by the men as an order to act within the available opportunities which interpretation tends to discourage them from displaying persistence, staunchness and a sufficiently high level of activity. Therefore, in orienting his men towards a certain course of action as part of accomplishing a combat mission, it is important to use precise formulations as far as possible which contribute to the appearance of specific attitudes. One other method of improving the psychological stability of naval personnel is explaining to them the reasons for and the consequences of typical instances of inefficient performance and failure using the experience of past wars. An officer's awareness of his personal responsibility should not be allowed to have a negative influence on the decisions he makes and actions he initiates, for an efficient fulfilment of his military duty 223 to the country is incompatible with any manifestation of passivity, indecisiveness, unjustified wait-and-see attitude, lack of persistence and singleness of purpose in working towards the accomplishment of an assigned mission.

A careful study of the combat experience gained to date also helps to get at the true reasons for the successful accomplishment of a mission. In summing up the results of a combat mission, the naval commander must show utmost objectivity. Whatever the end result, the commander in reporting it must on no account embellish the real state of affairs nor should he belittle his potential possibilities. When meeting with a temporary failure, a commander should not be in a hurry to reverse his earlier decision or replace those of his subordinates who are responsible, for if he does, this may create confusion and lack of confidence among his subordinates. At the same time the commander should do everything in his power to encourage his subordinates to use their resourcefulness to the full in searching for better tactical solutions, for bold and justified answers to problems and to look for latent resources to be committed to deal heavier blows at the enemy.

The study of the combat experience gained to date calls for collection of all relevant materials and data, for their evaluation and for summarising the conclusions to be drawn in the form of regular reports and information bulletins. Combat experience is made more widely known through meetings and group discussions with those who took part in battles, through conferences, as well as through battle leaflets, wall newspapers, information bulletins, etc.

Special training sessions and exercises are a crucial element of the work aimed at improving combat skill and fighting efficiency. Moral and psychological training is conducted in an environment which is as similar to that of the coming operation as possible. During training sessions and exercises prime attention should be paid to the intensive development of such essential qualities as 224 flexibility of thinking, resourcefulness, critical attitude to one's performance, persistence, courage, resolve, determination, etc.

In explaining to their men the root causes and harm of the various manias and phobias (periscope mania, aircraft phobia, parachute phobia, mine phobia, nuclear explosion phobia, etc.) commanders and political officers achieve an improvement of the objectivity and accuracy of incoming reports on the situation and progress of fighting.

In order to prevent attacks and strikes by friendly aircraft and naval vessels by mistake, it is essential to distribute among naval personnel reminders and handbooks, to improve coordination and concerted action. To enable personnel to quickly and correctly identify friendly and enemy aircraft and ships a variety of visual aids and special posters are displayed in the crew's quarters which spell out the identification procedure to be used.

Measures are also taken to enable personnel to study the enemy better, to detect his strength and weaknesses and to capitalise on the latter to achieve success in battle.

It is important at all times to pay due attention to rest and recreation for the personnel even in the course of fighting. A good joke, relaxation, sound sleep, etc. are all crucial to ensuring the restoration of the psychological trim and expended energy, both nervous and physical. The experience gained in organising leisure and recreation in peacetime may come in handy in a combat situation. Officer clubs at naval bases must organise their activities in such a way as to embrace the ship crews and personnel of naval units as completely as possible. To this end they should maintain roving entertainment groups, mobile cinemas, etc. The personnel of the Navy's shore establishment are called upon to keep naval vessels and units supplied with everything necessary to ensure both the accomplishment of combat missions and effective recreational and rest facilities for the naval personnel.

225

So, in a combat situation a good commander is dutybound to show constant concern for the daily needs of his men. The commander should use every available opportunity to help his men accomplish the assigned combat missions and should pay unceasing attention to effective moral, political and psychological training. Effective troop control backed up by well-designed and energetic measures to improve the morale of the men on the basis of fostering high principles and commitment to communist ideals, political consciousness and utter devotion to the socialist Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party are indispensable for victory. Every naval officer should be mindful of Lenin's dictum: "In the final analysis, victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle.''^^1^^

_-_-_

~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 137.

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Marshal of the Soviet Union Vassily Chuikov is a renowned military leader, an active participant in the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars. During the years of struggle against the German fascist invaders, he was Commander of the 62nd Army (in 1943 this became the 8th Guards Army), which played an outstanding role in the defence of Stalingrad and fought from the banks of the Volga right to Berlin.

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BURLATSKY F. The Modem State and Politics

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[231]