USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SOVIET COMMITTEE

FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

AND CO-OPERATION

Introduction by A.P.Sheetikov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian by Galina Sdobnikova Designed by Yevgeny Doron

Group of authors: P. P. Cherkasov, G. L. Karpova, B. M. Khalosha, I. A. Koloskov, Y. A. Kostko, P. A. Novikov, N. A. Pankov, G. A. Ponomaryov, I. S. Sergeyev, N. V. Shelyubskaya, Y. I. Yudanov, Y. V. Zhukova, M. S. Ziborova, headed by Professor D. M. Proektor, Dr. Sc. (Hist.)

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CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER ONE

Prerequisites for a Security System in Europe (by I. A. Koloskov)

Changes in the Balance of Forces in Favour

of Socialism

The Socialist States' Constructive Foreign

Policy

Development of Realistic Tendencies in

Western Political Strategy

Factors and Forces Holding Back the

Detente

CHAPTER TWO European Security

in the Socialist Countries' Policy (by D. M. Proektor)

Lenin's Principles for the Programme of Setting Up a European Security System The Socialist Countries' Consistent Efforts to Ensure European Security Materialising the Detente

48 48

56 69

«HayKa», 1976

«FIporpecc», c HSMeneHHaMH, 1978

English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers 1978

Printed in the Union ot Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER THREE

European Security and the Policy of Western States (by

B. M. Khalosha)

88

10303-917 014(01)-78

75-78

Western Europe and the USA: Policy Evolution

-

88

Major Trends in Western Policy on European Detente

96

CHAPTER FOUR

The All-European Conference and Its Problems (by M. S. Ziborova) 109 The Socialist Countries' Struggle for the All-European Conference

109

The Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe

120

CHAPTER FIVE

Public Opinion in the Struggle for European Security and Co-- operation (by N. A. Pankov)

139 The Rise of the Public Movement for European Security and Co-operation 139 Fresh Public Initiatives 145

CHAPTER SIX

Military Detente in Europe (by Y. A. Kostko)

161

The Drive for Military Detente-an Important Part of the Efforts to Materialise European Security

161

Formation of the Western Concept of Troop and Arms Cuts in Central Europe

170

Force Reduction Talks. The Military Balance Problem in Central Europe

185

CHAPTER SEVEN

Economic Co-operation (by Y. /. Yudanov)

195

Fundamental Principles of Economic Cooperation

195

Fresh Opportunities in Foreign Trade

205

The Forms of Industrial-Economic Co-- operation

215

CHAPTER EIGHT

Scientific and Technical Co-operation (by C. L. Katpova, N. V. She-

lyubskaya)

234

The Premises for Scientific and Technical Co-operation

234

The Lines and Forms of Scientific and Technical Co-operation

238

The Organisational Machinery of Scientific and Technical Co-operation

246

CHAPTER NINE

Co-operation in the Humanitarian Fields (by 1. S. Sergeyev)

252

General Socio-Political and Legal Aspects 252 The Terms and Possible Ways of Successful Co-operation

264

CHAPTER TEN Co-operation in

Protecting and Improving the Environment

(by P. A. Novikov)

278

Ecology and European Security

278

Premises for Environmental Co-operation 282 System of International Co-operation for Environmental Protection

286

The Significance and Tasks of European Co-operation

298

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Problem of Deepening the European Detente (by P. P. Chet-

kasov, D. M. Proektor)

306

Trends Determining Continued Detente

306

Characteristic Features of West European Conceptions of Detente Perspectives

311

US Prognostications

330

Concerning the Future in the Context of Present Realities

340

CONCLUSION

347

SUPPLEMENT Chronology of

Name Index Subject Index

Main Developments in European Security

(by G. A. Ponomaryov, Y. V. Zhukova) 354

395 393

INTRODUCTION

On November 7, 1977, the Soviet people marked the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, an outstanding event in Soviet history. In his report, "The Great October Revolution and Human Progress", General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev gave an all-round analysis of the regularities of communist construction, the development of socialist democracy, the ways to ensure lasting peace on our planet and summed up the collective experience of world socialism.

Telescoping centuries in to 60 years, the Soviet country has developed into a highly advanced power, has moved into the forefront of scientific and technical progress and become a strong and reliable bulwark of peace.

The Soviet people have built a developed socialist society, which spells out as a dynamically growing, well-balanced economy, a steady improvement in the people's wellbeing and culture, socio-political and ideological unity of all classes and social sections, inviolable friendship of all nations and nationalities, real democracy and true humanism. The Soviet people's historic achievements have been written into the new Constitution of the USSR.

Right after the Great October Socialist Revolution sixty years ago, Lenin's Decree on Peace-a call issued by the first

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workers' and peasants' state on the whole of mankindreverberated across the world. A great deal has changed since then, but the peoples of all continents have retained their urge for peace and their respect for the consistent Leninist peace policy followed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and the whole Soviet people. The main task of international relations is to ensure lasting peace, and the USSR and other socialist countries have geared their foreign-policy programmes to this supreme goal.

L. I. Brezhnev said in his report on the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: "The Soviet Union is confidently pursuing a policy of peace. We actively and perseveringly urge that the contest between socialism and capitalism be decided not on the field of battle, not on munitions conveyers, but in the sphere of peaceful labour. ... By steadfastly pursuing this policy, we are giving practical expression to one of the main watchwords of the October Revolution and carrying out one of Lenin's most important behests: Peace to the peoples!"*

The new Soviet Constitution gave juridical form to the Soviet Union's commitment to work for peace and co-- operation among nations, reflecting the peaceful nature of its foreign policy.

The principles of relations among states formulated at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were recorded in the Constitution in explicit terms. The Peace Programme elaborated by the 24th Congress of the CPSU put forward the historic task of effecting a radical turn towards detente and peace in Europe and working for the convocation of a European conference and its successful outcome.

On the strength of the historical record to date it is now possible to draw some conclusions about what has been achieved and to map out further ways of consolidating peace

and security. The record has proved beyond any doubt that the Peace Programme is, a concentrated expression of the most fundamental objective requirements of international affairs, the socialist states' basic intentions and long-term goals in the sphere of foreign policy. It is a powerful ideological instrument in the hands of all those who are genuinely interested in detente and co-operation among nations, formulating concrete tasks whose solution is to help achieve the final goal.

Life has shown the Peace Programme to be a timely and realistic document. Although lasting and universal peace is still very much a thing of the future, there is now every reason to believe that it can and will be achieved.

The transition from the cold war and the explosive confrontation between the two worlds to detente has largely resulted from the changes in the world balance of forces. But it has taken a great deal of effort to persuade Western statesmen and politicians that brinkmanship and confrontation have to give way to negotiations and peaceful co-- operation between states with different social systems.

The realisation of the Peace Programme has brought out in strong relief the vigour, purpose and consistency of the foreign policy followed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and has led to important positive changes in the whole system of international relations.

The European peoples have made the most headway towards goodneighbourly relations, mutual understanding, interest and respect for each other. L. I. Brezhnev said: "We prize this achievement, and consider it to be our duty to safeguard and consolidate it in every way."^:;'

These features of the Soviet Union's peace policy stood out very clearly in the light of its efforts to ensure the convocation and successful completion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was held 30 years after the signing of the Potsdam Agreement, marking the

New Times, N. 45, 1977, p. 11.

New Times, N. 45, 1977, p. 11.

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end of the Second World War. Its 35 participants-33 European states, the USA and Canada-collectively reaffirmed that the "from positions of strength" policy and the cold war were dangerous and futile, and opened up fresh possibilities for establishing lasting peace and mutually advantageous co-operation in Europe.

The European Conference, which ended in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, was an unprecedented event and was of paramount importance for Europe and the whole world. Europe has never known a political conference on such a scale or dealing with questions of such vast importance for all states. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said at the Conference: "The results of the long negotiations are such that there are neither victors nor vanquished, winners or losers. This is a triumph of reason. Everyone has gained: the countries of East and West, the peoples of socialist and capitalist states, whether parties to alliances or neutral, big or small. It is a gain for all who cherish peace and security on our planet."*

The results achieved were well worth the effort. The participating states collectively reaffirmed the inviolability of the existing frontiers, formulated a code of principles of interstate relations, which fully agrees both with the letter and spirit of peaceful coexistence, and, in the final count, created favourable conditions for maintaining and strengthening peace. They mapped out the prospects of peaceful co-- operation in areas like economics, science and technology, culture, information and the development of human contacts.

The Conference laid down ten cardinal principles for mutual relations between the participating states, which will enable them to solve the basic problems of European peace. These are sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers,- territorial integrity of states; peace-

ful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs,- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among states; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. Implementation of these principles in Europe should help to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence in each country's free, independent and peaceful development.

The declaration of principles reflects the common political resolve of the states taking part in the Conference to prevent any armed collision in Europe, their explicit choice of peaceful coexistence, the only alternative to which is a slide towards a nuclear holocaust.

These principles carry so much weight particularly because they are in complete accord with the UN Charter and reaffirm various rules which are of binding legal force and are written into earlier bilateral treaties between European states with different social systems.

The qualitatively new element introduced by the ten principles is that they have brought together all the European states concerned in a common effort to strengthen the detente and peace, so enabling them to make real headway towards European security.

All the newly agreed principles are of paramount importance and have to be implemented equally scrupulously. But this is not to diminish the special importance for the cause of lasting peace and security in Europe attaching to the frontier-inviolability principle.

It is common knowledge that most European wars involved frontier changes, and the question has to be analysed against that historical background, which keeps giving reminders of the past and invites the inevitable conclusion that European security is impossible unless the frontier problem, the oldest and most acute political problem, is solved once and for all.

The pledge to refrain, now and in the future, from any

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Moscow, 1975, p. 582.

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encroachments on the existing frontiers of European states, as juridically entrenched in various bilateral treaties between the USSR and some other socialist states and the FRG, has now been written into the Final Act of the Conference and has thus become binding for all European states.

The principles of interstate relations are a very important element in the drive to materialise the detente. They bring the European states closer to one another, binding them together with various mutual commitments, interests and guarantees of security and co-operation. They also determine the concrete steps that have to be taken to turn the results of the Conference into a tangible reality and make the detente a continuous and all-round process, which will make it possible to restructure European relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The Helsinki Conference was the first step in the endeavour to restructure international relations in Europe, which has to be consistently implemented as a continuous, multifaceted and profound process. Since the Conference, international detente has increasingly filled out with concrete material content. The effort to make peace in Europe truly lasting in effect means materialising the detente. The 1977-78 Belgrade meeting was a major landmark along this way.

One very important thing here, as L. I. Brezhnev put it, is to create the material fabric of peaceful coexistence in Europe, which would serve to strengthen the ties among the European states and enhance their concern for lasting peace. This means various forms of mutually advantageous cooperation, like trade, co-operation in production and scientific and technical ties.

The Conference laid the necessary groundwork for broader co-operation among the European states. Since the growing economic interdependence between the countries of the world calls for their long-term and all-round economic development and for steady economic relations, the Conference pointed out the main channels for deepening the co-operation and offered concrete recommendations for different areas.

including trade, industry, science, technology and protection of the environment.

The Helsinki accords are of an integral nature. The period between Helsinki and Belgrade showed, however, that far from respecting its integrity, some Western countries seek to give priority to definite sections of the Final Act, to regard their implementation as something of a yardstick for measuring trust and good faith, to make the implementation of other sections of the Act contingent on their observance, and use some of the Final Act provisions for tactical political purposes, aiming at securing unilateral advantages and stirring up "psychological warfare". This approach is out of harmony with the cause of peace and detente, with the spirit of the Final Act, which has to be seen as an integral whole. This is how the socialist countries have always seen it, working to deepen the detente and develop all-round co-operation with states of the other system.

This applies, in particular, to economic co-operation.

Socialist foreign-policy strategy has always been based on the assumption that economic co-operation is a central element of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and as peaceful coexistence is an integral part of the European security programme, co-operation has also become its basic ingredient, particularly in view of the current scientific and technical revolution.

The USSR seeks to implement the Final Act provisions on economic co-operation in a constructive spirit. Thus, it has proposed the holding of all-European congresses or interstate conferences to deal with co-operation in areas like protection of the environment, transport and the power industry.

One highly indicative result of the Conference is that cooperation can now be extended to areas once tabooed by the cold war. The basket of measures for co-operation in the humanitarian and other spheres, including human contacts, information and exchanges in culture and education, have opened up fresh prospects for stronger peace, mutual under-

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standing and spiritual cross-fertilisation among nations. The Final Act also says that such co-operation should go forward in complete accordance with the fundamental principles regulating relations between states, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs in particular.

The Soviet Union has done a lot to develop contacts with Western countries in the sphere of culture, information, scientific exchange, tourism and the publishing business.

In 1976, the Soviet Union maintained cultural links with almost 120 countries, and, in accordance with the Final Act, it has been taking fresh steps to exchange more books, films and works of art.

According to UNESCO, the USSR leads the world in the publishing of translated literature, which also helps to expand and deepen the detente and make it more and more viable.

The outcome of the Conference is of global as well as European importance, for it can give a fresh impulse and add prestige to the unfolding tendency of world-wide detente in the spirit of the UN Charter. All the newly proclaimed principles for mutual relations between states without exception can be extended to the whole world, particularly since the Helsinki participants voiced their intention to conduct their relations with all the other countries in the spirit of these principles.

The results of the Conference have created new prerequisites for the normalisation of relations between the USSR and the USA, serving to promote the strategic arms limitation talks and considerably reducing the danger of a global armed conflict.

The Conference has convincingly shown that the detente has to develop in depth and scope and gather momentum without any letups or interruptions. The most important task facing Europe after the Conference is to sustain and continue the detente on the continent and make sure that its full tide sweeps away all the remnants of the cold war and is never reversed.

The importance of genuine peace in Europe for the future of the whole of mankind stands out very clearly. At the same time, the champions of European peace are fully aware of the difficulties they will yet have to overcome.

Present-day Europe has largely taken shape in the course of the successful socialist and communist construction in a number of European countries and their persistent struggle for peace in the international arena.

At the same time, Europe's new features are the result of the mounting class struggle waged by the working people in the capitalist countries under working-class leadership, and the struggle of broad social circles for lasting peace.

One important specific feature of the present day is that the changes in Europe have been going forward against the background of the deepening general crisis of capitalism, political and moral, as well as economic. L. I. Brezhnev emphasised at the Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties: "Today, it is more clear than ever that imperialism can no longer dictate Europe's destinies."*

Europe's international political development has always been extremely complicated, with an intricate pattern of contradictory cross-influences. At every stage of its development, Europe has always been something of a battleground for opposite tendencies.

Europe is one of the chief centres of world civilisation and progress in every sphere of human activity; it was the scene of the first industrial revolution, most of the world's outstanding discoveries and the first ever socialist industrialisation campaign. Present-day Europe is a leading centre of the scientific and technical revolution and has some of the world's most advanced technology. It accounts for about 47 per cent of the world's national income and for about 55 per cent of the world's industrial production.

Europe leads the world in trade: in the early 1970s, its share in the world's exports came to 54 per cent. Europe's

* Moscow News. Supplement to Issue No. 27, 1976.

2---1787

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foreign trade has also been growing much more rapidly than that of other areas: since the second half of the 1950s, Eastern Europe's foreign trade has been growing 30 per cent faster, and Western Europe's-20 per cent faster than world trade as a whole.

In the social plane, Europe has been the centre of the greatest class battles and revolutions. The socio-economic formations were dominant in Europe in their historically most consummate form. Europe cradled scientific socialism, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and saw the world's first socialist revolution, the rise of the first working people's state and the emergence of the world socialist system.

The world communist movement-the most revolutionary force of our day-has more than 50 million members, and more than half of them are to be found in East and West European countries.

The European working class, numbering almost 200 million, is the most advanced, experienced, well-organised and battle-hardened contingent of the international working-class movement.

Europe is also a leading centre of world culture. The Europeans have made an all-embracing contribution to mankind's spiritual store. At the same time, the great, original and endlessly diverse European national cultures and traditions are tied in with the cultural values created by other peoples, for European culture has assimilated the achievements of all the other civilisations and has generously given to others of its own riches.

But this is only one aspect of European development whose past and present have yet another aspect to them, for no other continent has known as many wars-small-scale and large-scale, including world-wide-as Europe has.

For more than thirty years now Europe has lived in peace. But this is an armed peace and the arms race is still very much with us. The cold war, which started together with the scientific and technical revolution, confronted Europe with an unprecedented danger, when the two systems, each

in command of vast stockpiles of weapons, faced each other across the continent.

The socialist countries had to meet the cold war challenge of the imperialists, who had built up a powerful military machine in Western Europe. The result was an equilibrium of military power, and the whole system of European relations was based on a confrontation of the military-political groupings, which could provide but a flimsy foundation for lasting peace.

In these conditions, the European socialist countries came to the conclusion that international relations in Europe had to be restructured on radical lines, for peace in Europe is pivotal to peace the world over. "The Europe that has more than once been the breeding ground of aggressive wars, which brought about colossal destruction and the death of millions of people, must forever recede into the past. We want its place to be taken by a new continent-a continent of peace, mutual confidence and mutually advantageous cooperation among all states."*

Now as never before the conditions and prerequisites for this are shaping out very favourably. International relations here are entering a new stage of development, whose specific feature is the growing recognition and practical implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems.

It is no longer possible to dispute the historical fact that it was the socialist states that had given European detente the decisive impulse and come up with the decisive initiatives in this area.

The decades of persistent and heroic effort on the part of the Soviet people and the other fraternal socialist peoples have yielded outstanding results.

World socialism has taken up solid positions in the economy and politics of the contemporary world. The successful peace offensive is above all due to the achievements of com-

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 150.

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munist construction in the Soviet Union, which have steadily boosted its international prestige, and to the ever stronger unity of the socialist community countries and all the revolutionary forces of our day. As an integral part of Europe, the socialist countries have exercised a very palpable influence on the state of affairs in Europe. It is no longer possible to solve any at all important problem of general European concern without reckoning with their positions and interests. The evolution of international relations in Europe towards East-West detente and co-operation is largely due to the constructive, consistent policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Over the postwar period, the socialist countries' proposals for turning Europe into a continent of lasting peace and mutually advantageous co-operation met with live interest in European public circles and later on among European governments as well, lying at the very core of Europe's political affairs in the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. This goes to confirm V. I. Lenin's idea that in our policy we can depend on "a peaceful attitude, not only on the part of the workers and peasants .. . but also on the part of a huge section of the reasonable bourgeoisie and the governments".*

The socialist countries' proposals also reckon with the objective need for greater international division of labour on an all-European scale, which has become particularly pronounced under the scientific and technical revolution.

Way back in the past, when international imperialism was still trying to keep the Soviet Republic walled off from the rest of the world in political and economic terms, Lenin foresaw that there was "a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force is world general economic relations, which compel them to make contact with us."**

Historical development, particularly since the Second World War, has shown that Lenin was quite right. East-West trade in Europe has constantly increased. The scientific and technical revolution has given the international division of labour a new dimension, helping to deepen and speed up the economic approximation of the European nations. In these conditions, any attempts to slow down or restrict East-West co-operation should be seen as reactionary not only from a political, but also from an economic standpoint, for they cut across the objective progressive tendencies of the present flay.

Political, economic and cultural co-operation in Europe on the basis of the understandings worked out by the European Conference could spread even wider if the political detente written into the Conference decisions is reinforced with a military detente.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government believe that the most important task now is to go on moving towards general and complete disarmament, work to relax the military confrontation in Europe and seek to overcome Europe's division into opposite military blocs.

It will not be easy to defuse Europe's powder keg or, rather, atomic silo. The main thing, however, is to start moving in this direction, to take concrete steps to maintain and multiply the growing feelings of trust in East-West relations.

The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples, approved by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, says that among the priority tasks now is the need:

- To do everything to stop the dangerous and growing arms race and move towards a reduction of weapon stockpiles and towards disarmament. For this purpose:

a) to make an all-out effort to complete the drafting of a new Soviet-US agreement on strategic arms limitation and reduction and ensure the signing of international treaties on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, the

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 139. ** Ibid., p. 155.

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prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, a ban on the development of new mass destruction weapons and weapons systems, and also a ban on any tampering with the environment for military or other hostile purposes;

b) to invigorate the talks on armed forces and arms reductions in Central Europe, and once an agreement on the first few concrete steps is reached, to continue the military detente in that part of Europe;

c) to achieve systematic cutbacks in the states' military expenditure; and

d) to work towards convening a World Disarmament Conference as soon as possible.

- To do one's best to deepen the international detente and implement it in concrete forms of international co-- operation.

- To work for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

The effort to stop the arms race and bring about disarmament is a major line of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government's foreign policy. The Soviet Union has regularly come out with concrete and consistent proposals to that effect, regarding general and complete disarmament as its final goal in this area. At the same time, the Soviet Union has been doing its best to achieve progress on every lap of the way leading to that supreme goal.

The Soviet Union has steadily worked to establish the principle of non-resort to the threat or use of force in the settlement of disputes as a law of international life. This principle is written into a number of treaties between the Soviet Union and other countries, and also into the Final Act of the European Conference.

The Soviet Union has proposed a number of practical measures aimed at curbing the arms race, settling explosive situations, and deepening and expanding the international detente. The Soviet delegation at the Belgrade meeting submitted an important package of measures for strengthening military detente in Europe.

The Soviet Union's initiatives had influenced the 32nd UN General Assembly. In accordance with a draft presented by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the deepening and strengthening of international detente, which is a new landmark in the life of the international community.

Europe has entered a fundamentally new epoch, which differs from anything it has ever known. L. I. Brezhnev emphasised at the Berlin Conference of European Communists: "The European `house' has become crowded and is highly inflammable. There is no, nor will there be, a fire brigade able to extinguish the flames if the fire ever breaks out.

``For Europe and its people, peace has become a truly vital need."*

The Soviet Union's relations with some capitalist states are fairly complicated, for the latter's influential circles still persist in their cold war attitude and refuse to follow a consistent policy of co-operation. The reactionary and militarist circles seek to obstruct the policy of detente and vigorous cooperation, undermine the results of the European Conference, revive the tensions in interstate relations and go back to confrontation. They have tried to whip up the arms race and inflate the arms budgets. The mass media they control spread mistrust and hostility for the socialist countries, claiming that the detente is in the interests only of the socialist countries, and seek to refurbish the old myth about a "Soviet threat". These motley forces have been working against the detente in different ways, but all their exertions boil down to an attempt further to intensify the unprecedented arms race.

The US plans to manufacture the neutron bomb, cynically advertised as a clean, humane and purely defensive weapon, and to deploy it in Western Europe are in flagrant contradiction with the interests of peace. Millions of men and women all over the world have come out forcefully against this barbarous mass destruction weapon.

* For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976, Moscow, 1976, p. 12.

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The Soviet Union, which takes a resolute stand against the development of any new mass destruction weapons, has fully supported the protest campaign. At the same time, if the bomb is to be produced in the West, the Soviet Union will not remain a passive onlooker, but will have to meet the challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people, their friends and allies. The Soviet Union does not want to do this and proposes that an agreement on mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb should be reached.

The Soviet Union's principled line on this problem was again clearly formulated in the message of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government to the peoples, parliaments and governments of all countries adopted at the ceremonial meeting at the Kremlin to mark the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The message said: "We call upon the peoples, parliaments and governments of all countries to do everything to stop the arms race, ban the development of new means of mass destruction and begin a reduction of armaments and armed forces, begin disarmament!...

``The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet Government and our entire people will continue working with determination to strengthen peace and peaceful coexistence, end the arms race and reduce armaments until general and complete disarmament under strict international control is achieved."*

The Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties formulated broad and concrete goals for all those who want to see peace and progress in Europe, pointing out ways to deepen the detente with the help of effective disarmament measures and steps to strengthen European security.

Public opinion has had an ever more important say in the endeavour to establish the new principles of relations among the nations of the continent. Present-day reality shows very well that public initiative serves to supplement and back up the governments' efforts to ensure European security.

* New Times, N. 46, 1977, p. 5.

``The Final Act of the all-European Conference has laid a fine basis for safeguarding peace and security in Europe," L. I. Brezhnev said at the Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. "Not only government efforts, but popular action is needed to achieve this aim, to make detente irreversible and peace truly lasting."*

The European security and co-operation movement, which reflects the peaceful aspirations of European opinion, has now become a prominent feature of the European socio-political scene. European opinion did a great deal to ensure the successful outcome of the European Conference. In 1973, the movement held a World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow and later on two assemblies for European Security and Co-- operation (Belgium, 1972 and 1975). The First Assembly came out in resolute support of the European Conference, and from that time on all the members of the European security and cooperation movement did their best to create a favourable political atmosphere for that Conference. In its Declaration the Second Assembly called on all governments, parliaments, political parties and government bodies to meet the public call for an all-out effort to expand the detente and ensure Europe's peaceful future.

The outcome of the European Conference has helped further to invigorate the activities of peace-loving European opinion, which now has an even greater say in the shaping of the European states' policy.

L.I.Brezhnev said in Helsinki: "The understandings we have reached give the peoples more possibilities for influencing so-called 'big polities'."** That was one of the most important results of the Conference.

The work of national committees for European security and co-operation, the Soviet Committee in particular, is an expression of the profound public concern for the establishment of lasting peace and co-operation.

* For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, p. 25. ** L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 582.

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CHAPTER ONE

PREREQUISITES

FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

The European security movement has set itself the task of helping to turn Europe into a zone of peace and co-- operation without foreign troops or military bases, and to ensure scrupulous observance of all the treaties and agreements aimed to stop or limit the arms race. It has been working to reduce armed forces and armaments, primarily in areas where the military confrontation is particularly dangerous, to prevent the establishment of new military blocs or groupings, to achieve a simultaneous disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and, as a first step, of their military organisations.

A satisfactory thing to note is that many provisions of the Final Act of the European Conference have begun to take effect in the practice of international relations. The detente, its materialisation, the growing trust and mutual understanding among the nations are on the way to become the chief and decisive tendency of the present day.

The deeper and more diverse the relations among all European states, the deeper the realisation among the nations that these should be further developed and the greater the hope that peace will become a natural way of life for all European nations. This is why the Soviet Union attaches so much importance to the scrupulous observance of the provisions contained in all the sections of the Final Act.

The development of international relations in Europe has entered a new stage, marking the beginning of a radical change in the system of European relations and further development of bilateral and multilateral co-operation. Europe's public forces have to consolidate this process, make the European detente irreversible and realise mankind's ageold dream of peace in Europe.

A. Sheetikov,

Chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation

CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN FAVOUR OF SOCIALISM

The goal of setting up an all-European system of security and co-operation, as formulated by the socialist countries, is perfectly attainable, for there is now a whole range of prerequisites and factors which are conducive to cardinal changes in the international political situation and to a policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The chief objective factor here is the ongoing change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism, both in Europe and the world over.

The positions of socialism and all the other revolutionary and democratic forces have been vastly strengthened and enlarged, while the class and political bridgeheads of the imperialists have narrowed down, their power and influence in the world and especially in Europe have markedly dwindled. Deep social transformations have occurred in the countries that have fallen away from the capitalist system in Europe: the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established in these countries in the form of People's Democracies, and the new community of socialist countries has become the backbone of a world socialist system. In Asia there has also been a wide breach of the imperialist front.

The emergence and subsequent all-round strengthening of the socialist community, the world socialist system,

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

was the decisive expression of the change in the balance of international class forces in favour of socialism. It meant a qualitatively new stage in the development of Europe and the whole of present-day society, and marked a further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and an extension and strengthening of the world revolutionary process. The socialist countries' political and economic successes, their revolutionary transformations and their growing strength and solidarity have, undoubtedly, played the crucial role in the endeavour to establish and entrench this situation in Europe. Here are some of the major aspects of the change (see Table 1).

The bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance signed at the end of the Second World War and in the early postwar years between the USSR and the European People's Democracies, and also among the People's Democracies themselves, played an important role in the change in the balance of forces at the initial stage of the development of the socialist system in Europe. These treaties and their practical implementation helped to ensure the solidarity of the USSR and the other socialist countries, to guarantee their security and protect their revolutionary gains; they were an instrument of constructive co-operation in the effort to build socialism and protect the peace, and an element of the new European security system.

In 1949, the socialist community countries established, on the basis of these treaties and in accordance with their political goals, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which has effectively operated ever since. These bilateral treaties also provided the groundwork for the Warsaw Treaty, a multilateral treaty of friendship, co-- operation and mutual assistance signed in Warsaw by the socialist community countries in response to the establishment of the North Atlantic bloc. That was another major landmark in the strengthening and development of the socialist community, in helping its member-countries to protect their socialist gains and in the work to strengthen European and world security and oppose the imperialist forces of war and aggression.

The Warsaw Treaty was signed at a time when the danger of war was on the increase and after the Western powers had turned down the socialist countries' proposal to establish a collective security system and had set up their own military grouping. The Warsaw Treaty members did not regard their defence organisation as a closed grouping, declaring that the Treaty would be invalidated if an all-- European collective security treaty was concluded. Since then, the Warsaw Treaty has repeatedly reaffirmed its desire to or-

Table 1

Change in the World Balance of Forces

(per cent)

Indicator

Year

The whole world

Socialist countries

Developed capitalist countries

Developing countries

Territory

84*)

_

16.5

83.5*)

---

25.9

24.0

50.1

Population

7.8

92.2*)

---

7.8

92.2*)

---

32.6

14.8**)

47.2

Industrial

220.6

production

growth (1950 =

= 100)

Industrial

growth rates,

annual average

for 1951-1974

6.9

10.1

5.2

7.7

Share of world

90*)

---

industrial pro-

duction

^40

^53

*) The whole capitalist world.

**) The major imperialist powers and their colonies.

Sources: The Soviet Economy in 1973. Statistical Yeairiooh, Moscow, 1974 (in Russian); The 24th Congress of the CPSU and Urgent Problems of World Politics, Moscow, 1974 (in Russian); The USSR in Figures in 1974, Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).

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ganise an all-European system based on the collective efforts of all the European countries.

The international reactionary forces tried hard to hold back, stop and reverse the progressive and historically inevitable strengthening of the socialist community and the whole world socialist system.

In 1946-1947, the Western powers' subversive policy aimed against the socialist countries developed a particularly sharp prong during the preparation and signing of the peace treaties with the European countries that had taken part in the Second World War on Germany's side. Later on, they came up with the Truman Doctrine, which provided for military aid to Turkey and Greece and support for the reactionary forces the world over through military and economic ``aid''. The well-informed US political observer Walter Lippmann wrote that in proclaiming the Truman Doctrine the USA targeted its policy on Greece and Turkey not because they really wanted its assistance, but because they provided the USA with a strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Marshall Plan, which in the final count was spearheaded against the socialist countries. In the 1960s, that gave way to the more flexible policy of bridge-building, aimed to encourage and provoke nationalist feelings and action in the socialist community countries.

The signing of new bilateral treaties between the USSR and the other socialist community countries in place of those dating back to 1945-1948, whose term was running out and which had to be renewed in view of the changing conditions, was another important landmark on the way to overcome these obstacles, ensure greater political solidarity and strengthen the socialist community.

In June 1964, the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation with the GDR, which continued and elaborated the 1955 Treaty on Mutual Relations between the two countries. Subsequently, the Soviet Union signed new treaties of friendship, mutual assistance

and co-operation with Poland (April 1965), Bulgaria (May 1967), Hungary (September 1967), Czechoslovakia (May 1970) and Rumania (June 1970).

In October 1975, the USSR and the GDR signed yet another Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance to replace the 1964 Treaty, and this marked a new stage in the development of their fraternal co-operation.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU gave a high assessment of the Soviet Union's bilateral treaties with other socialist community countries. In the Report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, L.I.Brezhnev said: "Close and diverse co-operation, friendship and cordiality are characteristic of our relations with the Warsaw Treaty countries. . .. These documents constitute a comprehensive system of mutual allied commitments of a new, socialist type."*

All these treaties emphasised that the parties would go on strengthening the socialist countries' unity and solidarity, and provided for joint measures to protect peace and the security of all the nations, to promote international detente, to strengthen peace in Europe and develop economic, scientific, technical, production and cultural co-operation on a bilateral basis and within the CMEA framework.

By virtue of the socialist countries' political solidarity, the socialist community has increasingly stood out as the decisive force of present-day international development.

The socialist countries' growing economic might is one of the major factors helping to tilt the world balance of forces in favour of socialism.

Owing to high and sustained economic growth rates, the socialist countries' share in world industrial production has constantly increased. In 1950, their share in world production (as estimated by the Central Statistical Board under the USSR Council of Ministers) was about 20 per cent, and by 1972, it had gone up to about 39 per cent, almost doubling over 22 years.

24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 14.

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In economic growth rates, the CMEA countries have surpassed the capitalist countries: from 1951 to 1973, their total industrial production increased 8.4-fold,* and that of the developed capitalist countries, less than fourfold.

The CMEA countries have now become the world's major industrial area. In 1973, they extracted 448 million tons of oil, 260,000 million cubic metres of natural gas and 783 million tons of coal (in terms of conventional fuel), and produced 178 million tons of steel, 124 million tons of pig iron and 163 million tons of cement. In all these major economic indicators, the CMEA countries are well ahead of the EEC countries. On the whole, they now account for about onethird of the world's industrial production.**

In some key areas of scientific and technical progress the Soviet Union and the advanced socialist countries have taken up leading positions. Consider the USSR's achievements in the nuclear power industry, notably the development of the latest types of reactors and controlled thermonuclear synthesis, in space exploration and the peaceful uses of outer space.

All these are signs of the growing economic potential of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole and, consequently, of further changes in the balance of economic forces in favour of socialism, which has been gaining ground in the economic competition with capitalism.

The development of the international communist and working-class movement has also exerted a growing influence on the balance of forces in Europe and the whole world in favour of socialism.

The objective change in the world balance of forces also manifests itself in the radical progressive alterations that have occurred in the developing world over the past three decades: the colonial empires have collapsed and more than

80 new independent states have emerged, many of which have already made considerable headway along the road of progressive social change. This means the rise of a new international force, which operates in alliance with and with the support of world socialism and has a growing anti-imperialist potential.

The progressive historical development of the three mainstreams of the present-day world revolutionary process-the world socialist system, the international working-class and communist movement, and the national liberation movementhas thus entailed a radical change in the balance and configuration of the international class forces.

The Soviet-US strategic nuclear parity, which took shape in the early 1970s, is an important factor behind the changes in the international political situation and has had a tangible effect on present-day international relations, in Europe in particular.

For more than two decades from the late 1940s, the imperialist countries, the USA above all, sought to secure military superiority over the USSR and the other socialist community countries in order to ``contain'' the forces of socialism. At first they gambled on their monopoly in atomic weapons, then on a quantitative and later on a qualitative superiority in this area, on the advantages of a system of strategic bases located close to the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries, and so on.

But the balance of military forces steadily tilted against US imperialism and its allies, and at last they had to admit the fact openly and officially. The US President's foreign-policy Report to the Congress in February 1970 said: "The past 25 years have also seen an important change in the relative balance of strategic power. From 1945 to 1949, we were the only nation in the world possessing an arsenal of atomic weapons. From 1950 to 1966, we possessed an overwhelming superiority in strategic weapons. From 1967 to 1969, we retained a significant superiority. Today, the Soviet Union possesses a powerful and sophisticated strategic force. ... As

3-1787

* N. V. Fadeyev, Council tor Mutual Economic Assistance, Moscow, 1974, p. 342 (in Russian).

** The Soviet Economy in 1973. Statistical Yearbook, Moscow, 1974, p. 176 (in Russian).

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a result of these developments, an inescapable reality of the 1970s is the Soviet Union's possession of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, exceeding ours in numbers and capability."*

The balance-of-forces changes in favour of socialism were decisive in shaping the prerequisites for European detente, because responsible Western politicians saw for themselves that the cold war was futile and the continued confrontation with socialism dangerous.

problems relating to West Berlin, the successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the achievement of many agreements and understandings between the USSR and the USA on various important European and global problems, and so on.

All these significant international events and agreements, which derive from a whole complex of objective and subjective factors and are a manifestation of the ongoing process of political detente in Europe and the world, amount to a new and increasingly important prerequisite for neutralising militarist policy in Europe, for a steady advance towards a much healthier situation on the continent and towards lasting peace and security.

Addressing the European Conference in Helsinki, L. I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union, soberly assessing the correlation and dynamics of the various political forces in Europe and in the world, firmly believes that the powerful currents of detente and co-operation on the basis of equality, which in recent years have increasingly determined the course of European and world politics, will gain, thanks to the Conference and its results, new strength and greater scope."*

The USSR and the other socialist community countries are deeply interested in preventing another world war, a task of extreme importance for the whole of mankind, and socialist foreign policy will always regard it as its chief strategic goal. The foreign-policy struggle to attain this long-term goal has now acquired unprecedented importance.

Now that a world war would mean a thermonuclear holocaust for the whole of mankind, its prevention is a task of paramount international importance and meets not only the socialist community countries' national and international interests, but also the fundamental interests of all the nations. This provides an objective basis for various agreements between socialist and capitalist countries on the limitation of

THE SOCIALIST STATES' CONSTRUCTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

The well-co-ordinated foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries is a major factor helping bring about a radical improvement in the international situation in Europe and turn it into a continent of peace.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, working together with the leaders of the fraternal socialist countries, have made a scientific and objective assessment of the present balance of forces and have creatively elaborated a constructive foreign policy, following a steady line for reducing the danger of war in Europe and the world and eventually eliminating that danger altogether and turning Europe into a continent of lasting peace and international co-operation.

These efforts have led to the signing and implementation of a number of treaties and agreements between the USSR and other socialist community countries, on the one hand, and the FRG, on the other, and also between the socialist countries and France, to the settlement of some complicated

* US Foreign Policy tor the 1970s. A New Strategy lor Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 18, 1970, pp. 10, 119.

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, pp. 578-79.

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the arms race, armed forces reductions, prevention of war, and so on.

Former US President Richard Nixon once said in Jackson that the USSR and the USA were negotiating not because they agreed in their philosophical views, but because the two countries recognised the stark fact that if one of their leaders, whoever he may be, ever resorted to a nuclear war, he would in effect be committing national suicide: he would destroy his own country. Another US President, Gerald Ford, reaffirmed his predecessor's stand. He said in August 1974: "To the Soviet Union, I pledge continuity in our commitment to the course of the past three years ... for in a thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations."* Similar ideas are voiced by spokesmen of the Carter Administration.

The USSR's and the socialist community's struggle to strengthen peaceful interstate relations serves to create the most favourable conditions for the establishment of an allEuropean security and co-operation system and for lasting peace in Europe. There is no doubt at all that the end of the war in Vietnam as a result of the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle and the all-round support given them by the socialist countries has made it easier to fight for stronger peace in Europe and has weakened the opponents of European detente."""' A political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967 and satisfaction of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine could prove to be a fresh step in this direction. The socialist countries' policy aimed to resolve this fundamental problem extends the opportunities for strengthening European peace.

The socialist countries' European policy is very important and effective, for it helps to weaken the positions of the most reactionary imperialist forces not only in Europe, but

also in other parts of the world, strengthens international security the world over, as well as in Europe, is aimed to support all the forces of peace, democracy and socialism, and enjoys the latter's constant and growing all-round support. L.I.Brezhnev said: "Throughout our country's history we have had occasion time and again to appreciate how important for us is our alliance with the international working class and with the communist movement, how important is the support given by upright, progressive people across the world for our peace-loving policy. We highly appreciate this support."*

The socialist countries' foreign policy takes account of all the multiplex tendencies in the imperialist states' policy, ranging from reactionary, bellicose and adventurist to realistic, aimed to maintain peaceful relations and co-operation with states of the other social system. In their creative effort to elaborate and carry out their foreign policy, they do not rule out, but, on the contrary, assume the need for inevitable compromises where these are compatible with their basic principles and activity. Here is what Lenin said about the class nature and social importance of this kind of compromise: "The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare that it is impossible to renounce all compromises, but to be able, through all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose."**

The CPSU, the Soviet Government and the socialist countries have openly proclaimed the class goals of their foreign policy and maintained that class struggle between the socialist and the capitalist systems in ideology, the economy and politics is inevitable. But they have also done their best to prevent the class struggle between the two social systems from developing into a headlong arms race fraught with grave international conflicts and wars between states. They

* The Department of State Bulletin, September 2, 1974, p. 334. ** Pravda, May 17, 1975.

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 79. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 305.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

see this as a sine qua non of a broader establishment of the policy of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states.

greater international co-operation in every sphere of business contacts.

However, this process, which results from a whole complex of objective and subjective factors, means that the capitalist West has fewer possibilities for conducting a "from positions of strength" policy, to say nothing of the use of armed force in its relations with the socialist countries, and also that its more realistically-minded circles have adopted a more cautious and restrained stand and have come to appreciate the need for settling acute international issues by way of constructive negotiations rather than war.

France was one of the first Western countries whose ruling circles took the road of international - detente with the socialist countries. That was due not only to the change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism-a factor operating for all the Western countries-but also to several other local long-term factors: a sharp aggravation of social contradictions in the country, a considerable strengthening of the left-wing forces and the ruling circles' need to reckon with their demands, the accession to power of the more realistically-minded circles led by de Gaulle and his followers, France's geographical and historical specific features and its contradictions with the USA and some other Western countries.

In the 1960s, France was the first Western power to review its attitude to the Soviet Union and draw the conclusion that there was no truth in the assertion about the "threat of a Soviet military attack" on Western Europe. De Gaulle wrote in his Memoirs of Hope that somewhere around 1958 he had realised that "the overall situation changed as compared with that which had prevailed at the time of NATO's establishment. It seemed incredible that the Soviet side was

set out to conquer the West___But if there was no state

of war, peace had to be consolidated, sooner or later."*

DEVELOPMENT OF REALISTIC TENDENCIES IN WESTERN POLITICAL STRATEGY

The positive prerequisites for the solution of the European security and co-operation problem also derive from the fact that many capitalist countries have a long-term interest in political and business co-operation with the socialist countries, from the realistic tendencies in their policy. L.I.Brezhnev said on December 21, 1972: "Elements of realism in the policy of many capitalist countries are becoming ever more pronounced as the might and influence of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries increase, as our peaceable policy becomes more active, and as other important progressive processes successfully unfold in the modern world."*

This objectively based multilateral interest and the efforts to realise it help improve the international situation in Europe and fulfil the historic tasks of setting up European security and co-operation system.

Life has made it abundantly clear that the desire of the West European and US ruling circles to normalise and improve the international situation in Europe and the world is a major prerequisite for the solution of these tasks. Apart from the factors mentioned above, this desire is also due, first, to their political interest in preventing war, for if unleashed by the reactionary forces it is bound to develop into a nuclear-missile war, primarily in Europe; and second, to their desire to create favourable political conditions for

L. I. Brezhnev_j Following Lenin's Course, p. 88.

* Charles de Gaulle, Memoires d'espoit. 1958-1962, Vol. 1, Paris, 1970, pp. 212-13.

r

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

Taking an objective view of the European situation, the French President withdrew the country from NATO's military organisation and adopted a long-term line for rapprochement and co-operation with the USSR, a line he described as ``new''.

The political realism of de Gaulle, his successors and their Western allies, naturally, has a class purpose, is aimed at specific class goals and has some negative aspects and tendencies. It is equally true, however, that this realism has played and continues to play a positive role in the effort to consolidate the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between European socialist and capitalist states and to organise all-European political and business co-operation.

Since the late 1960s, when the Brandt-Scheel Government came to office in the FRG, the realistic tendency has begun to take root in the FRG's political strategy as well.

While retaining their anti-communist ideology and their main line for co-operation with NATO and the EEC, the FRG's ruling circles have nevertheless geared their foreign policy to normalisation and better relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. Having first taken root in the foreign-policy strategy of France, the FRG and other West European countries, the realistic tendency also began to gain weight in US policy.

The more realistically-minded representatives of Western ruling circles are increasingly concerned about reducing the danger of war in Europe and the world not only because they fear the unprecedented and irreparable damage and devastation that may occur, but also because they want to limit the arms race.

Life shows that besides enhancing the danger of war, the continuing arms race and the growing military outlays also tend to exacerbate many internal contradictions and social difficulties in the capitalist countries, limit the material possibilities for overcoming these and induce the working people to intensify their pressure on the government circles in demanding cuts in arms budgets in order to satisfy their

social needs. All this serves to strengthen the realistic elements in the Western countries' relations with the socialist world.

All these realistic features in Western foreign-policy strategy, naturally, do not indicate any change in the social nature of imperialism,"" but only go to show that it has been losing ground, that the leaders of the capitalist countries have had to operate in a new setting, to adjust to this new setting and use new and more flexible methods to protect their class interests in the contest with socialism. The growing interest in recent years among broad circles in the West in extending and developing all-round political ties with the socialist countries, reducing the danger of war and limiting the arms race and military expenditures is a new and important international factor, which helps to deepen the detente.

Some Western opponents of the international detente maintain that the development of international economic ties is of advantage solely to the USSR and other socialist states, while the West has nothing to gain.

The socialist countries have never made a secret of their economic and political interest in developing business links with the capitalist countries. But at the same time, they know very well, both from past experience and from an analysis of the present-day realities, that the West is also interested in developing trade, economic and other practical ties with the socialist world, despite its disapproval of the latter's ideology and social system.

The anti-communist policy followed by the more reactionary circles in the capitalist West is still the main obstacle in the way of business-like relations between countries with different social systems. In some periods (in the early years of the Soviet Republic and at the height of the cold war),

* See For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976, p. 28.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

these negative attitudes determined the whole state of affairs in this area, so that the development of economic ties between states of the two systems was artificially held in check and remained at a low level.* But the objective tendency for the development of these ties, caused by the growth of the productive forces and the international division of labour, continued to make headway despite the unfavourable international political climate. In the 1970s, when the international political detente set in, that tendency gradually gained in scope and importance as an immediate factor in the extension of economic ties, and a material prerequisite and basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence in Europe and the world.

In 1974, the industrial capitalist countries accounted for 31 per cent of the USSR's foreign trade, three-quarters of that falling to Western Europe. The USSR's trade with the West European countries increased from 3,674 million rubles in 1970 to 9,623 million rubles in 1974,** and that was the result of the political and economic interest displayed not only by the Soviet Union, but also by the Western countries. A point to note is that in 1973 more than seven-eighths of the USSR's foreign trade with the industrial capitalist countries went to the West European countries or countries with a strong economic and military-political foothold in Western Europe (the USA and Canada) and directly involved in the establishment of a security and co-operation system.

The dialectics of the development of business contacts between the USSR and the West amounts to this: having emerged for objective economic reasons as a fairly indepen-

dent process, the development of business contacts is stimulated by the international detente and, for its part, has been doing more and more to stabilise that detente and make it irreversible.

Some prominent spokesmen for the capitalist world considering East-West trade gave an indication of a growing desire on the part of capitalist circles to expand trade with the socialist countries. They emphasised the need to enliven economic relations with the socialist countries, correctly regarding these not only as an instrument for solving economic problems, but also as a major material condition for the policy of peaceful coexistence, for better political relations with the socialist countries.

Take Samuel Pisar's book, Coexistence and Commerce, which was published in the USA in 1970 and had a marked effect on Western businessmen.*

All that is an expression of the objective economic realities of the present-day capitalist world. The growth of the productive forces and the international division of labour, accelerated by the scientific and technical revolution, tends to sharpen the edge of the problem of external economic relations, with the socialist countries in particular.

Here are some other circumstances enhancing the influence of these fundamental and long-term economic reasons behind the interest displayed by Western Europe and the USA in the development of business and political relations with socialism in the mid-1970s: the grave energy crisis, which has exacerbated many of capitalism's problems, the worst spurt

* Thus, in 1946-1950, at the height of the cold war, the USSR's foreign trade with all the developed capitalist countries was reduced both in absolute and relative terms: its total trade increased from 1,280 million rubles to 2,925 million rubles, while that with the capitalist countries dropped from 491 million rubles to 440 million rubles (The Economy in 1922-1972. Statistical Handbook, Moscow, 1972, p. 491, in Russian). ** Pravda. April 9, 1975.

* Samuel Pisar said that although the Soviet Union and the USA had different social systems, under the present conditions peaceful coexistence was the only sensible choice. Mutually advantageous trade was the only way to lasting peace, for it united, instead of disuniting the nations, bringing them together on the basis of long-term prospects for peaceful coexistence. Trade, said Pisar, was an instrument of peace, and it was a good thing that men were beginning to realise that preference had to be given to the instruments of peace rather than of war (see S. Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce, New York, 1970).

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

of price inflation the postwar capitalist world has ever known, the vast balance-of-payments deficit in most West European countries and the USA, the monetary crisis, the mounting competition and the growing unemployment.

The more far-sighted West European and US leaders believe that they can best solve their internal, purely economic problems in accordance with their class interests not through sharp military-political confrontation with socialism, but within the framework of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they believe, economic links can serve as a material instrument for strengthening the peaceful political relations with the socialist countries.

All these positive circumstances have helped the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community to achieve a marked improvement in the international situation in Europe and the world.

another complicated and dialectically contradictory factor. This trend stems from the uneven development of capitalism, the West European countries' growing economic and military potential, their mounting contradictions with the USA, their leaders' desire for greater independence from Washington, and some other circumstances.

The trend towards West European integration manifests itself against the background of the contest and coexistence between the two systems, and has a very sharp class and political edge.

Thus, the Common Market-a trade and economic association-is gradually developing into a political alliance. A Common Market Summit in Paris in early October 1972, which adopted a "calendar plan" for the establishment of an economic and monetary union, also issued some recommendations saying that the target goal for the end of the present decade was to "transform the sum total of the relations between the member-states into a European union",* possibly a confederation. The projected political union, which is already being partially created, is to be fitted into the NATO framework with the unconditional aim of ensuring "European security" primarily with the help of US nuclear guarantees, the US military presence in Europe and the West European armed forces themselves.

Of course, the official documents of Common Market conferences on the community's future political shape have never said anything about an all-European security system, the urgent problems of disarmament or the gradual effort to overcome Europe's division into military groupings. Any analysis of the problems of how to organise "Western Europe's defences" hinges on the assumption that such defences are part and parcel of the North Atlantic military system, NATO's European component.

Of course, if the political and military integration pro-

FACTORS AND FORCES HOLDING BACK THE DETENTE

Alongside the positive prerequisites for international detente and an all-European security and co-operation system, there are also some factors working in the opposite direction and putting obstacles in the way of the positive international political processes.

This applies, above all, to the militarist tendency which manifests itself in Western policy in the material preparation for war against the socialist countries, the continued arms drive, and especially the qualitative improvement in armaments and armed forces. The arms drive increasingly cuts across the trend towards international detente and allEuropean co-operation (for details see Chapter Three).

The trend towards political and military integration in Western Europe and the establishment of an autonomous West European military-political grouping within NATO is

* Le Monde, October 22-23, 1972.

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PREREQUISITES FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE

cesses are intensified, a great deal will depend on the policies followed by the countries involved, but fundamentally, the establishment of an autonomous West European militarypolitical grouping would go against the grain of European detente and the movement towards an all-European security system. At the same time, the possible intensification of integration processes in the militarist sphere would be no substitute for the NATO mechanism, but would go forward within it to echelon the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance and hamper the advance to stronger security in Europe.

The trend for detente and all-European co-operation on the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and the capitalist countries has taken ever stronger effect in Europe, and as this positive and dominant trend continues to gather momentum, it can serve to erode the policy of Europe's deeper division and East-West military confrontation. An important point here is that Western Europe's democratic opinion, the working class and its communist and workers' parties above all, have been fighting with ever greater strength to channel West European integration along different lines and give it a democratic, anti-bloc tenor.

All that, as well as greater realism among responsible political circles in the West, may help to frustrate the negative plans for a sophisticated military-political integration structure under the EEC. Still, the existence of these projects and of influential forces working for their implementation may well present a grave problem for a long time to come, standing in the way of an all-European security and cooperation system.

The fairly influential conservative circles voicing the interests of the military-industrial complexes of the various countries, which have the greatest stake in the arms race and international tension, are among the forces seeking to obstruct the European and international detente. Then there are also the most conservative political parties, right-wing and neofascist organisations, which take the stand of extreme anti-

communism and deny the possibility of constructive relations with the socialist countries, and so on.

All these present a considerable potential threat to the cause of improving the international atmosphere in Europe.

A policy line followed by some political circles in the West and aimed to weaken the socialist community in the course of detente and the drive to expand business contacts with the socialist countries by ``disintegrating'' their alliance and undermining their solidarity with each other and with the Soviet Union is another negative factor in the way of the detente and the movement towards an all-European security system. These circles seek to weaken the proletarian internationalist ties between the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries and among these countries themselves, to enliven the bourgeois-nationalist elements and prevent any further successes for the communist ideology.

All these circumstances make up the negative tendency of present-day international developments in Europe and the world, aimed to perpetuate the international tensions and prevent further detente.

So, the interplay between the two main tendencies of international political development determines the setting for the socialist community's struggle for European peace and security.

I

CHAPTER TWO

EUROPEAN SECURITY

IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' POLICY

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

spheres. The extension of economic, scientific and cultural contacts is closely tied in with the political foundation of European security. It depends on the course and depth of the political detente and, at the same time, has an all-round influence en the latter, helping to lay the material groundwork for European peace. It has a profound influence on the political detente and, for its part, depends on its course and results.

The socialist countries proceed from the idea that the European relations that took shape during the cold war have to be restructured on radical lines. The process could be gradual, continuous and dynamic, with several stages, and is bound to involve a contest between different tendencies. It will be successful insofar as it serves to limit and overcome the influence of the forces that obstruct the detente, use anti-communism and anti-Sovietism to whip up international tensions and seek to intensify the arms race.

The socialist countries bear in mind that the political line for European detente has to be carried out in the context of the struggle between the two social systems, crisis upheavals, class battles and social conflicts in the capitalist world, and a sharp polarisation of the forces of progress and reaction. At the same time, it is being carried out against the background of dynamic social development in the socialist world. The socialist countries always remember that the main watershed between the opposite socio-economic systems and their military organisations runs across Europe, something that makes any conflicts here particularly dangerous.

In their concept of European security the socialist countries are thus shifting the accent to the continued deepening of detente, to disarmament, to the normalisation of the international climate, to the restructuring of the entire system of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. This approach mirrors the paramount role played by existing socialism in strengthening European security as a system of relations between states guaranteeing

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LENIN'S PRINCIPLES

FOR THE PROGRAMME

OF SETTING UP A EUROPEAN

SECURITY SYSTEM

The establishment of a European security system is one of the major lines of the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, and an organic element of the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples worked out by the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

What is the substance of the socialist countries' approach to the problems of European security? What are their principles for a system of lasting European peace?

The socialist countries' policy of strengthening European security and co-operation is based on a broad summing-up of past experience and on present-day realities, and is aimed to establish a system of international relations which would bar the way to another war in Europe and ensure peaceful and mutually advantageous co-operation among all states.

This policy centres on the major demands of our day: the need to work for a slowdown and then for an end to the arms race, move towards deeper political detente, relax the military confrontation in Europe, work to overcome Europe's division into opposite military blocs, and promote broad co-operation in the economy, science, technology, trade, protection of the environment and the humanitarian

f

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

lasting peace, co-operation among all nations, and the sovereignty and complete independence of every nation. At the 18th Congress of the YCL Leonid Brezhnev said: "Today detente is neither a theory, nor a slogan, nor wishful thinking. It has a record of many fine achievements, perfectly concrete and tangible. In Europe it is the basis of relations among states and has embraced different aspects of their life."*

All these complicated processes and circumstances have a deep and manifold effect on the policy of European detente and call for special political foresight and skilful statesmanship in its implementation.

The socialist countries' policy of European peace is based on Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The socialist states regard this principle as an objective necessity of present-Jay international relations. Their main point of departure here is that all the European nations want lasting peace, that there is no alternative to the peaceful settlement of European problems, and that disputes between countries should be solved only by peaceful means and not by force of arms.

Lenin emphasised that peaceful coexistence between states with different socio-economic systems was inevitable. Back in 1920 he pointed out that the Soviet state wanted peaceful cohabitation with all the other nations and an alliance with all the other countries, and believed that the bourgeoisie's policy in respect of the first socialist state was an obstacle to international co-operation.** He emphasised that the idea was to establish peaceful co-operation between different states to cover broad spheres of mutual relations, the economy above all. He said at the Eleventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets that the Republic had already made a start in its trade with the capitalist countries: "We must now exert all our efforts to continue this development without interrup-

tion. We must make it our primary concern, giving it all our attention."* At the same time, Lenin pointed out the importance of economic co-operation on an all-European scale.

Under the impact of the inner logic of socio-political development, Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence have _met with ever wider and fuller international political recognition, and the ruling circles of many capitalist states have now come to appreciate their importance, regarding their realisation as the alternative for European relations in the new historical conditions.

The problem of war and peace has a special place in the concept of peaceful coexistence. Lenin described it as pivotal to any country's policy, a question of life and death for millions upon millions of people.**

The policy aimed to set up a European security system is to establish a system of relations which will rule out war altogether.

The change in the world and European balance of forces, the detente and the struggle for European peace being waged by the democratic forces of different countries make it more and more difficult for the reactionaries to achieve their goals with the help of military means. Engels wrote at the end of the 19th century that militarism, which dominated Europe, "bears within itself the seed of its own destruction".***

Militarism, Engels believed, would fall under the excessive burden of military expenditure and the drafting of broad masses into European armies, who would eventually refuse to fight for the sake of unjust, predatory goals. Under the scientific and technical revolution there is also another factor, the great destructive capacity of modern armaments, which has made war in Europe inconceivable. Lenin said in

* Ptavda. April 26, 1978. **. See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 365.

* Ibid., Vol. 33 p. 154. ** Ibid., p. 55. *** Engels, Anti-Diihiing, Moscow, 1975, p. 196.

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1918: "Modern machinery tend? to make war more and more destructive. But there will come a time when war will become so destructive as to be altogether impossible."""

Both world wars started in Europe, and did it untold damage. At the same time, their outcome had a powerful influence on class, social, political and military relations in the world. The aggressors who started the two wars failed to achieve any of their predatory goals, but this cost Europe more than 50 million lives. The scientific and technical revolution has raised the problem of war and peace in Europe to a totally new plane: war now is absolutely unthinkable.

The question of preventing war has become a crucial factor of European and world importance. Under the detente the European states can realise the peaceful coexistence principle by jointly working to prevent war, ensure general security and make their co-operation ever more effective. Lasting peace in Europe is bound to do a great deal for European and world civilisation.

The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries have repeatedly emphasised that everyone in Europe needs peace, and this means the European masses, the working people above all. L. I. Brezhnev said in Helsinki that the results of the European Conference would also affect the people's everyday lives. "They will contribute to improving the life of people, providing them with work and expanding educational opportunities. They are concerned with care for health, in short, with many things affecting individuals, families, youth and different groups of society."** The realisation of the peaceful coexistence principles helps gear the European detente to the interests of all the European countries and peoples, all the democratic forces and press back the most reactionary, right-wing and neo-fascist elements. It helps to consolidate progressive political trends and promote social development.

* N. K. Krupskaya, About Lenin, Moscow, 1960, pp. 40-41 (in Russian).

** L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 582.

Present-day international development is marked with many deep-rooted changes and transformations, taking place in every sphere of life. European detente-an ingredient of this development-has gone forward, on the one hand, under the influence of the sum total of the contradictions between states belonging to different social systems and, on the other, the requirements stemming from common interests and the need for co-operation. The complex dialectical interplay and interpenetration of all the multiform tendencies make the restructuring of European relations on peaceful lines a complex and multifaceted problem.

Under the impact of the changing conditions, bourgeois political analysts have come up with a host of theories and ``models'' for European and world development. Some say that Europe is bound to play a lesser role in a future `` multipolar'' world, while others think its importance as an independent entity will increase; some believe that the detente has very narrow horizons, while others are more optimistic.

Despite some sensible ideas put forward by these bourgeois analysts, their views and doctrines are essentially limited, for in philosophical and political terms these are usually based on the idea that under the deepening general crisis of the capitalist system, the class, social and political foundations of capitalism should be strengthened to the detriment of socialism.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine makes it possible to give an all-round analysis of present-day international development and a deep assessment of the possibilities and prospects of detente under the contest between capitalism and socialism, the chief contradiction of our day. The principle of proletarian internationalism, dialectically tied in with the peaceful coexistence principle, determines many aspects and possibilities of the policy of peace and international detente, helping to take into account the all-round interests of the socialist countries, all the democratic forces and all the peoples of Europe and the world.

The class aspect of the policy of European detente is

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contingent on the actual class, political, economic and social contrasts between the two social systems. Peaceful coexistence has not toned down these contradictions or eliminated the class struggle. The contest of views and ideas is bound to continue, but this should never amount to "psychological warfare" or involve ideological or political subversion of the cold war type, which is incompatible with peaceful coexistence.

Quite obviously, from a class point of view the struggle for peace, security and co-operation in Europe is extremely complicated. The line dividing the forces of progress and reaction in the matter of European security and co-operation is very sinuous, and special importance in these conditions attaches to the working people's internationalist solidarity, to joint action by all the progressive forces in the struggle for European peace and security.

A major task facing the various national contingents of the working class in the plane of proletarian internationalism is to give each other mutual assistance in the endeavour to protect peace, democracy and socialism by vigorous action on a national and an international scale, and its realisation is of great importance for peace and security in Europe. Socialism has exercised an ever growing influence on the solution of all the problems of European detente. The new society's powerful material and technical basis and the socialist countries' unity are a major factor working for the implementation of the peace programme for Europe. The Soviet Union's growing economic and political might serves steadily to enhance the influence of its peace policy on international relations and helps create favourable prerequisites for a new system of relations in Europe.

L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: "First of all about Europe. Here the changes towards detente and a more durable peace are, it seems, especially tangible. And, of course, this is not accidental. It is in Europe that socialism's positions and the impact of the agreed policy of the socialist states are the strongest. The 24th Congress set the objective of assuring European security through recogni-

(r

i

tion of the territorial and political realities that resulted from the Second World War. And that was the direction in which our Central Committee worked."*

If the political line for European security is to succeed, the European communist movement has to take vigorous action and strengthen its unity and solidarity. Every communist party, working in accordance with its country's specific conditions, is responsible to the working people of its own country for the peace policy it follows, and also to other nations for the shaping of the new international relations in Europe in accordance with present-day imperatives.

The movement of European public forces for peace and security is also very important. European detente is impossible without the masses' broad involvement, for they have the greatest stake in peace and co-operation. In the 1970s, the activity of the European social forces has been an important trend in the struggle for peace and international security.

The socialist countries believe that despite the difficulties arising on the long and hard way to European detente, it is necessary and unquestionably possible to establish a new structure of international relations in Europe on the basis of peaceful coexistence principles. The results of the European Conference have confirmed this conviction. "The accords reached as a result of the Conference are well in line with Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence, international co-operation, peace and the freedom of the nations, which the Soviet state has championed along the whole of its historical way."**

* Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 21.

** "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe", Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, Pzavda, August 7, 1975.

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THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' CONSISTENT EFFORTS TO ENSURE EUROPEAN SECURITY

The historical record, for the 1960s and 1970s above all, shows very well that the foreign-policy line followed by the USSR and the other socialist community countries, the CPSU's vigorous efforts to realise the Peace Programme are of paramount importance for switching European international relations to the road of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Consistency and continuity are two of the characteristic features of this line.

For many decades now, the struggle for European peace and security has been a major ingredient of the socialist countries' Leninist foreign policy, stemming from the very nature of their social system. History has shown that the Soviet Union's efforts to implement Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism have been consistent at every stage of its struggle for European peace.

The facts have also dispelled the numerous myths circulated by bourgeois propagandists, who have time and again tried to cast doubt on the sincerity of the socialist countries' political programme for European detente.

The Soviet Union's sixty-year history of struggle for European security presents an integral, comprehensive picture of its tireless endeavour to turn the European continent into an area of lasting peace.

The Soviet Union began its drive for European security when it was still the world's only socialist state, and when the hostile imperialist states around it saw its destruction as their strategic foreign-policy goal. In those conditions, the Soviet Union did its best to impress the need for collective security in Europe on the Europeans in order to achieve at least some improvement in European relations.

The well-known Decree on Peace-the young state's first

international political document-proclaimed that all governments and peoples were responsible for ensuring peace, and declared wars of conquest to be the gravest crime against mankind. The new society's peace creed was formulated with regard for the future of Europe, which was still in the throes of the First World War. Lenin emphasised that the question of war and peace had been "the keystone of all policy in all the countries of the globe since 1914. It is a question of life and death for millions upon millions of people.. .. In this question, too, our October Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in world history."*

From the very beginning, the Soviet state suggested a set of basic principles for a new relationship in Europe. Lenin believed that an overall arms reduction and peaceful solution of international problems on the basis of the equality of states and repudiation of any attempts to dictate were the chief premises for stronger peace and security. At the 1922 Genoa Conference, the Soviet Government put forward a proposal to work out a contractual basis for the peaceful settlement of disputes, recognising the need for a review of the Versailles Treaty and other inequitable treaties, and to set up a collective organisation that would involve all the countries. Regular all-European conferences and co-operation in normalising Europe's economic affairs were suggested as a concrete measure that would help to achieve mutually acceptable decisions. It was in Genoa that the Soviet Union through its People's Commissar G. V. Chicherin first voiced the idea of European security, international co-operation, disarmament and the use of new political methods to ensure peace, and also the concept of a European and an international security system.

In an interview with the newspaper Le Temps in the 1920s, G. V. Chicherin thus described the substance of Lenin's peace policy: "Lenin mapped out the line we are now following and will continue to follow. Peace is the piv-

* V. I, Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 55.

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otal idea of our policy, the idea we have constantly spoken about. We want peace for our own country and want to promote universal peace.... We tell our people that the Soviet Republic spells out as peace. We want peace not only to develop our productive forces, but also to ensure the development of world production, of which our production is an integral part. We advocated these ideas at Genoa, and we owe them to Lenin's genius."*

As it became ever more evident that the Versailles system was nonviable and that the forces of reaction, militarism, revenge and war were gaining strength, European detente came to the fore as an ever more urgent problem.

European peace was fast becoming a major problem of international relations. In Europe the deepening general crisis of capitalism had a particularly sharp edge, for the developments in Europe tended to bring the contradictions of world imperialism into focus: the dividing line between the two worlds ran across the continent, and the shock forces of anti-communism and counter-revolution spearheaded both against the first socialist state and the progressive forces in the capitalist countries themselves were ranged in Europe. In the early 1930s, the storm in Europe was already beginning to brew.

At a disarmament conference in February 1933, the Soviet delegation tabled a draft declaration on the definition of aggressor, containing an exhaustive characteristic of the substance of aggression and a set of measures for cutting it short. The proposals were based on this principle: "All states have equal rights to independence, security and protection of their own territory."** The Soviet Union proposed a declaration on the inviolability of the existing and recognised borders of any state, big or small, and denial of the right

to any state to interfere in the affairs, development, legislation or administration of any other state.*

But the draft declaration, which met with public support in different countries, was turned down on Britain's initiative. Nevertheless, over the subsequent few years, the Soviet Union signed a number of conventions with European states on the strength of its definition of aggression in order to prevent any breaches of the peace.

The decision on the need to work for collective security, adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in December 1933, was of great importance, for it was a qualitative step towards European peace. Socialist political thinking came up with the idea of building a peace structure on a new foundation, an idea which has proved to be very viable. The USSR's foreign policy refused to follow the traditional way of bloc politics and military coalitions, when one force confronts another and Europe's future is shaped by the general staffs who study which of the sides has the advantage. The Soviet Union believed that the problems of European peace had to be tackled on a different plane, where political relations would always be equitable, aimed at a common peaceful goal, and ensure mutual guarantees for European peace.

The Central Committee's decision deemed it expedient for the USSR to join the League of Nations and for the European states to sign a regional pact on mutual defence against aggression. The Soviet Union formulated the idea that peace was indivisible for an armed conflict in any part of the world could always develop into a world war. This meant that collective efforts on a world-wide or regional scale were the best way to ensure international security. Having proclaimed that peace was indivisible, a formula which has since become famous. Soviet diplomacy put forward a set of concrete measures for ensuring collective security, formulating, in particular, the idea of sanctions against those

* I. Gorokhov, L. Zamyatin, I. Zemskov, G. V. Chicherin, Diplomat oi the Leninist School, Moscow, 1974, p. 13 (in Russian).

** M. M. Litvinov, USSR Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1935, p. 300 (in Russian).

* Ibid., pp. 300, 301,

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who broke the peace, a gradation of these sanctions, and also the concept of regional mutual assistance pacts. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs said at a meeting of the Disarmament Conference's General Commission in May 1934: "We should neither establish any universal pacts that would not be open to everyone, nor any regional pacts that would not involve all the parties concerned over security in the given area."*

So, the Soviet concept of European security hinged on universality, equality and collectivism.

In late 1933, the USSR and France started talks on a collective security system in Europe. But Germany and Poland rejected that idea, and Britain, which followed a political line of collusion with Germany at the USSR's expense and wanted to give Hitler a free hand in the East, did its utmost to frustrate the proposed step, which could have raised an important barrier in the way of nazi Germany's growing aggressive preparations.**

In the light of past experience, after the four decades since the events that preceded the Second World War, it has become quite obvious that the USSR's proposal for a collective security system was the best alternative in the face of the grave European political crisis that loomed ahead.

Despite Britain's negative stand, the Soviet Union continued its line for a multilateral agreement on collective security in Europe, simultaneously signing some bilateral treaties on mutual assistance, which were open to other states. Its treaties with France and Czechoslovakia (May 1935) were an important success for Soviet foreign policy.

But the capitalist countries' political strategy was at odds with the objective requirements of Europe's historical development. Their short-sighted foreign policy, particularly that of Britain, which sought to solve the problem of the

fight against socialism by way of a deal with Hitler, resulted in the Munich agreement, which climaxed the Western countries' political efforts and made possible the world war centring in Europe. The Munich agreement, whose political substance was a deal with fascism against socialism and the cause of universal peace, was the fatal alternative to the idea of collective security.

The 1930s made it abundantly clear that the imperialist countries' anti-socialist policy, aimed to play off some states against others, divide the peace-loving forces and encourage fascism and its aggressive tendencies, had a disastrous effect on Europe. The record of the 1930s shows that refusal to take joint action for European peace is fraught with deep political crises and military catastrophes.

At that time, the balance of forces in Europe and the world had yet to create adequate prerequisites for the possibility of realising the Soviet ideas of international peace.

Still, the USSR's struggle for European peace and security yielded tangible results. The policy of aggression and connivance at it was exposed in the eyes of the masses, and this helped to consolidate the progressive and democratic forces in many countries and paved the way for the subsequent development of the Resistance movement. The Soviet Union's efforts also helped to lay the groundwork for the international relations which later made it possible to establish the anti-Hitler coalition. It also proved possible to postpone the aggression against the Soviet Union for two years.

During the Second World War the Soviet Union's fight against fascism was combined with efforts to ensure a peaceful postwar set-up for Europe. It began working for regional European security as early as 1941, signing treaties with Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia and Poland. Its programme, set out at the Crimean Conference, said that fascism and nazism had to be wiped out, and a democratic, independent and peace-loving state had to be established in Germany. The Declaration on Liberated

* Ibid., p. 311.

** See Y. N. Rakhmaninov, G. V. Uranov, Europe-. Security and Cooperation, Moscow, 1974, pp. 75, 76 (in Russian).

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Europe emphasised that the "establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples ... to create democratic institutions of their own choice".*

At the Potsdam Conference the Soviet Union tabled some important proposals for Europe's postwar restructuring on genuinely peaceful lines. Germany's political life had to be restructured on a democratic basis, fascism and militarism had to be eradicated forever, and measures had to be taken to ensure its complete disarmament, to decentralise the economy and cut down to size the monopolies, which had been largely responsible for unleashing the war. Then there was also the San Francisco Conference, which adopted the UN Charter, whose Chapter 8 established the status of regional arrangements, so creating a foundation for a collective European security system in international law.

After the war there was a very important change in the structure of international relations. The USA's and Britain's policy of alliance with the Soviet Union as the chief and decisive force in the war against fascism and an ally that had borne the main brunt of the war gave way to hostility. The West started a cold war spearheaded against the upswing of the working-class, communist and general democratic movements and the national liberation struggle, that is, the processes which threatened to rock the foundation of the whole imperialist system. It was spearheaded against the Soviet Union and the decisive change in the world balance of forces in favour of socialism that had occurred as a result of the war. The hopes of the international reactionary forces that socialism would be weakened or destroyed in the course of the war had not come true. On the contrary, the war had sapped the political and economic

foundations of capitalism itself: its world positions had shrunk and the West European and Japanese monopolies had lost much of their power and influence. The colonial system of imperialism was crumbling, and capitalism was entering a new phase of its general crisis. The USA adopted a policy of "rolling back" communism and staked its all on the monopoly in atomic weapons and the means of their delivery, believing itself to be invulnerable. Europe was to play a paramount role in these plans.

In 1947, the imperialists launched the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, whose central task was to rehabilitate Western Europe and turn it into a major stronghold of their global political and military strategy. Their line was to split Germany and turn its Western part into a bridgehead in the fight against the USSR and all the socialist forces, so that for a long time to come Germany was to present a key problem in the relations between the two systems in Europe, and the peace settlement to finalise the results of the Second World War was put off, as it eventually turned out, for something like three decades. NATO's establishment in 1949, which worsened the situation in Europe to an extreme, the growing network of US bases, the elaboration of integral strategic concepts for the bloc, and the programmes of US military aid, meant an effort to consolidate the new configuration of forces within the Western camp, directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The emergence of the socialist system and the radical change in the European and world balance of forces in favour of peace, democracy and socialism enabled the socialist countries to begin a new stage in the struggle for European security. Their major goals now were to consolidate the results of the victory over fascism and make permanent the postwar set-up in Europe. The system of mutual treaties built up by the European socialist countries by the end of the 1940s was of great importance for the solution of that task.

* The Tehran, Yalta & Potsdam Conferences, Documents, Moscow, 1969, p. 136.

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The struggle for peace in postwar Europe went forward against a qualitatively new background, for socialism's possibilities, as compared with the 1930s, had multiplied many times over.

The socialist countries' co-operation became a major factor of peace in Europe. They did their best to offset the Western powers' dangerous plans aimed to restore the FRG's military-industrial potential and revive German militarism. The Soviet Union formulated its programme for a German settlement, based on its draft peace treaty.

At the same time, the socialist countries kept urging the establishment of a security system for the whole continent. They put forward a number of far-reaching proposals, which amounted to a new concept of peaceful Europe, based on the joint efforts of all states. At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France held on the initiative of the USSR in the winter of 1954, the USSR submitted a draft All-European Treaty on Collective Security, which provided for joint measures by the European countries to ensure peace. In the summer of 1954, the Soviet Union also formulated the idea of an all-- European conference on collective security in Europe.

But the Western powers rejected that proposal. Moreover, in the autumn of 1954, they signed the so-called Paris Agreements, which provided for the FRG's entry into NATO and enabled it to set up its own armed forces. The representatives of the European socialist countries meeting in Moscow in late November 1954 said in this context: "Genuine security in Europe can be ensured only if a collective security system is established in place of the closed military groupings of some European states aimed against others."""

The second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s saw some major changes in the world situation: as the struggle and competition between the two systems gathered momen-

turn and the balance of forces changed in favour of socialism, the general crisis of the capitalist system entered a new phase. The Soviet Union was making rapid headway in the military-technical sphere, the USA's "from positions of strength" policy was in crisis and the "roll-back communism" doctrine went on the rocks. US military-political circles had to switch from the "massive retaliation" doctrine to "flexible response". Nevertheless, the problem of war and peace was still the central problem of the day and its solution provided the key for mankind's future. Peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states was now more important than ever, and the USSR's struggle for European peace and security was of particularly vital importance.

At that time, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries worked very hard to implement their programme for European detente. The 20th Congress of the CPSU reemphasised the need to set up a collective security system in Europe. In 1958, the Warsaw Treaty countries called on the NATO countries to sign a non-aggression pact for a term of 25 years, and to renounce the threat or use of force in their relatiohs with each other.

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries made a substantial contribution to the peaceful settlement of the German question. The socialist countries countered the Western powers' attempts to turn the FRG into their main shock force in Europe by remilitarising it and bringing it into NATO with their own programme for the German people's peaceful democratic development, urging the need to sign a peace treaty, eliminate the relicts of the Second World War and normalise the situation in West Berlin, which had been turned into NATO's forward base. In November 1958, the Soviet Union proposed that West Berlin should be made an independent administrative entity and demilitarised, and in January 1959 it presented a draft peace treaty with Germany.

The steps taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries up to the mid-1960s in order to bring about a solu-

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* For details see International Relations After the Second World War, Vol. 2, Sections 3 and 5, Moscow, 1963 (in Russian).

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tion of the German problem showed that they had mapped out the most realistic ways to normalise the situation in Central Europe, eliminate the vestiges of the Second World War and complete the peace settlement. The Western powers worked against this line and sought to maintain the chief sources of confrontation with the European socialist countries, giving all-round support to the FRG's most reactionary, revanchist forces.

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March and April 1966 proclaimed the need to begin negotiating on the whole package of European security questions, including the problems of a peace settlement for Germany. Later that summer, the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee meeting in Bucharest adopted a Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe, a document of paramount, strategic importance, setting out in detail the main lines for realising the measures aimed to strengthen European security as formulated by the socialist countries. The participants in the meeting declared that they wanted to see a simultaneous disbandment of the two opposite military blocs and, as a first step, of their military organisations, proclaimed their readiness to carry out partial measures for military detente in Europe and called for an all-European Conference on Security and Co-operation. In putting forward the package of European problems the socialist countries also emphasised that the results of the Second World War had to be consolidated and the cold war brought to an end.

The Karlovy Vary Conference of 24 European Communist and Workers' Parties in 1967 further spelled out the programme of action for the establishment of a European security system along these lines, urging recognition of the existing European realities, inviolability of the existing frontiers, the Oder-Neisse borderline and that between the two German states in particular, renunciation of the FRG's claims to represent the whole of Germany, recognition of the Munich agreement as invalid from the beginning, and the solution of some other important European problems open-

ing the way to lasting peace. It endorsed the need for an all-European Conference on Security and Co-operation.

The programme for European peace was further elaborated at Warsaw Treaty conferences in Sofia (1968), Budapest (1969), Moscow, Prague (1969) and some other summit party and government meetings.

The main document, adopted by the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 17, 1969, emphasised: "Attainment of lasting security on this continent is a problem which holds a paramount place in the minds and aspirations of the European peoples."*

The treaties and agreements signed between East and West European countries in the early 1970s largely laid the groundwork for the international structure that marked a major step away from the cold war, doing a great deal to change the political atmosphere in Europe.

France was the first Western country to remodel its relations with the Soviet Union. The well-known Principles of Co-operation between the USSR and France, signed in Paris on October 30, 1971, emphasised that "the policy of accord and co-operation between the USSR and France shall be continued further; it is called upon to become a permanent policy in their relations and a permanent factor of international life".** The Treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG, signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970, was another important step towards detente. It drew a line to the long period of exacerbation in the relations between the two countries and voiced their desire to promote normalisation of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations between all the European states in the light of the actual situation in the area. The parties pledged to settle their disputes "exclusively by peaceful means", and to refrain from the threat or use of force in matters bearing on

* International Meeting ol Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 33. ** New Times, No. 45, 1971, p. 24.

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European and international security. The two powers, said the Treaty, were in agreement on this matter, believed that "peace in Europe can be maintained only if no one encroaches on the present frontiers", and declared that now and in the future they would make no territorial claims on any country.*

The treaties signed by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR with the FRG, the GDR's universal recognition as an equal sovereign state, the four-power agreement on West Berlin and similar other political acts provided the fundamental components for a restructuring of the security system in Central Europe. That served to finalise the results of the Second World War on a bilateral basis and ensure fresh recognition of the frontier-inviolability principle.

The historic importance of these treaties and agreements as a prerequisite for further improvement in the international situation was, above all, that they helped consolidate the existing political and territorial realities, completed the postwar settlement in Europe, which the West had delayed for almost three decades, created favourable conditions for a new system of international relations in Europe and lifted many barriers obstructing the way towards this goal. They also helped reduce the mistrust among the European states, which had accumulated during the long years of the cold war, and laid the necessary political groundwork for business-like co-operation.

So, it was the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that took the initiative in raising the fundamental problems in the establishment of an international security system for postwar Europe and in working out an appropriate programme of action.

In the early 1970s, the long years of vigorous and purposeful effort by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to ensure European peace yielded the greatest results. There was a marked improvement in the international situa-

tion on the continent, and the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems came to play a much more decisive role in European relations. Finally, the all-European Conference drew some collective conclusions from past experience and marked the culminating point in the long struggle for European security.

In fact, it ushered in a new stage of relations in Europe. But after the conference detente was halted by the counteroffensive of the forces that found it inacceptable beyond extremely narrow boundaries. This was seen distinctly at the Belgrade meeting that ended in early March 1978. At that meeting the adversaries of detente had recourse to methods of psychological warfare. Positive results were achieved largely through the efforts of the Soviet Union, supported by the other socialist countries and all the nations interested in consolidating European security. The meeting reaffirmed the tendency towards the further deepening of detente.

This was convincingly demonstrated by the development of Soviet-FRG relations, which are of paramount significance to the cause of peace. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG on May 4-7, 1978 marked a new stage in the development of political detente, in the creation of the conditions for spreading it to the military sphere. Speaking on FRG television on May 6, 1978 Leonid Brezhnev declared: "Let us fittingly continue the historic development begun with the signing of the 1970 Moscow Treaty. Let us promote and enrich the fine traditions of co-operation in the interests of the peoples of our two countries, in the name of the further consolidation of peace and expansion of fruitful co-operation in Europe and the whole world!"*

* New Times, No. 34, 1970, p. 4.

* Pravda, May 7, 1978.

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MATERIALISING THE DETENTE

The effort to materialise the detente has become the main line in the practical activity aimed to transform the cold-- warengendered system of European international relations into an international political structure that would guarantee lasting and irreversible peace on the continent.

At the same time, it can help create the decisive prerequisites for a security system based on a growing number of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, containing a wide range of concrete commitments in the spirit of the Helsinki recommendations. In the course of this restructuring, it will be possible to use more varied and differentiated methods to ensure European security in order to cover an ever wider spectrum of European relations and possible situations. So, the way to implement the programme for stronger peace and security in Europe is to materialise the detente.

The socialist countries believe that international relations in Europe have to be restructured in the course of a multilateral effort by all the European states to ensure lasting peace. A. A. Gromyko said at the first round of the European Conference: "Ensuring security and developing cooperation in Europe is a collective endeavour."*

The Conference's Final Act presented a broad platform of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral action to be taken by the states, pivoting all these efforts on the principles of interstate relations formulated by the Conference in concrete and detailed form on the strength of the well-known rules of international law and the provisions of the UN Charter. The Conference's ten principles laid the groundwork for the materialisation of detente in the political sphere. They established that all the European states, the USA and Canada are in agreements as regards the commitments follow-

ing from these principles. Realisation of these principles will help lay a broad foundation for European detente, spelling the emergence of a qualitatively new factor in the structure of European relations. This helps create a setting for the formation and strengthening of a broader and more ramified network of bilateral and multilateral ties based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Politically and economically, this network serves to cement the relations between the European states with various mutual commitments, concerns, guarantees and common interests in the matter of ensuring security and co-operation, which are equally vital for one and all. So, the effort to materialise the detente is aimed, first and foremost, to entrench these principles in international relations, put them into practice and turn them into a law of international life.

The socialist countries believe that in the effort to materialise the detente the struggle for European peace should be combined with detente on a broader scale, with a drive to strengthen international security across the world. In other words, European security should never be regarded as an isolated goal to be achieved within the framework of one continent, but should always be seen in a global context. The Final Act of the European Conference emphasises "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole".* That conclusion was formulated both with a view to Europe's outstanding role in the system of world economic, political, cultural and other ties, and the influence of global international relations on Europe.

The European security system can in a sense provide an example for other parts of the world. Since the international political processes going forward in the world have an ever greater influence on one another, it is particularly important to take an objective account of the activities of the forces outside Europe that exercise a direct or indirect effect on

Pravda, July 4, 1973.

* New Times, No. 32, 1975, p. 27.

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the course of European detente, which is subject to the powerful impulses of the changes in the whole international situation. "At present, when the alignment of forces is so much more intricate, the foreign policies of some countries follow more tortuous paths, and are relatively more independent, which makes them more difficult to assess."*

The world's growing ``polycentrism'' has had a profound influence on European detente. Owing to its numerous and varied contacts with other parts of the world, Europe is assimilating many non-European tendencies and is itself a major factor of class, economic, political, social and other processes in the world.

The co-operation between Europe and other parts of the world has many channels, but from the standpoint of European security, the chief of these now runs between the USSR and the USA. The relations between the two powers have had a strong effect on European relations, on the process of European detente. Realising the importance of the situation in Europe for the future of the whole world, the Soviet Union aims its vigorous and purposeful foreign policy to normalise relations with the USA, notably, in order to ensure a peaceful future for Europe. The talks between Soviet and US leaders held from 1972 to 1975 in contact with other countries concerned and with due respect for their interests enabled the two powers to arrive at some important political decisions, which have had a serious and multifaceted effect on the course of European detente, stimulating it both directly and indirectly, promoting the solution of concrete problems and helping to create the necessary international political climate.

The two powers' joint efforts did a great deal for the solution of the problem of West Berlin, which had long been regarded as one of the most complicated European problems and a major obstacle on the way to European detente. Co-

ordinated Soviet-US action considerably helped bring about the convocation of the European Conference and start the negotiations on armed forces and arms cuts in Central Europe, which should give an impetus to military detente in Europe.

The series of Soviet-US agreements aimed to reduce the danger of war and curb the arms race is very important for Europe's security and will help back up the European political detente with military detente. The interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests, the two countries' documented pledge to work together to eliminate the danger of war, limit and eventually stop the arms race, strengthen the detente and spread it across the world, and various other Soviet-US documents have had a direct effect on European affairs.

The possibilities for materialising the detente to some extent also depend on the changes within the Atlantic system: in some areas, these serve to stimulate the materialisation, and in others, to obstruct it. The detente has complicated Atlantic mutual relations and intensified the contradictions within the NATO military alliance, differentiating to a certain degree its members' relations with the socialist countries.

The more complicated development of the Atlantic system and the mounting contradictions within it have had a tangible influence on European detente. In present-day conditions, Atlantic co-operation and rivalry make a much more intricate pattern than at earlier stages in the postwar development of US-West European relations.* As US domination has gradually given way to more or less equal partnership, the West European countries' relations with the European socialist countries have increasingly shifted to a different plane, in

* D. G. Tomashevsky, Lenin's Ideas and Present-Day International Relations, Moscow, 1971, p. 99 (in Russian).

* O. Bykov, "Tangled Knot of Interimperialist Relations", Kommunist, No. 14, 1974, p. 99.

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the political sphere above all. Since the early 1970s, the new balance between the common and conflicting tendencies within the Atlantic system has had an ever greater effect on European affairs. The new tendencies have superimposed themselves on the process of detente and given rise to a growing realisation in the West that US and West European relations with the socialist countries have to be diversified and put on a more flexible footing.

The relations between the USA and the EEC countries, especially since the war in Vietnam and the Middle East crisis, have been increasingly influenced by the latter's growing apprehension about being involved in non-- European conflicts. While following the line for Atlantic solidarity, the West European countries have begun to take more independent action to ensure regional security. Western Europe's growing independence from the USA, with a review of the terms of their ``partnership'', has given greater latitude both to the former and the latter in their relations with the socialist countries.

As a result, in the 1970s, the West European countries' views on European security and their political lines in this area have been differentiated and have become more flexible and comprehensive, covering a fairly wide spectrum, from tough Atlanticism to co-operation with the socialist countries in various fields. The USA's attitude to European security is still essentially Atlanticist, but there is also a growing urge, on the one hand, to alter the forms of its mutual relations with Western Europe and, on the other, to go on to a policy of negotiations and detente with the Soviet Union.

The Atlantic unity, which stems above all from the common military-strategic concepts, the USA's nuclear umbrella in the first place, is now coupled with some distinctions in the assessment of the political functions of Atlanticism in general. The West European countries, who want to see a further movement away from the tough Atlantic guidelines in order to enjoy greater latitude for political

manoeuvres vis-a-vis the socialist countries in the process of European detente, have shown a growing desire for greater political and, to some extent, military independence.*

Most of the major West European states, while stepping up their activities in the sphere of integration, have also shown a marked tendency to approximate their views on some problems of European security, particularly as regards Western Europe's future as a stronger and more independent imperialist centre and, at the same time, the need to perpetuate the USA's military guarantees.

Thus, the materialisation of European detente is closely tied in with the development of relations in a broader framework and will, apparently, be increasingly subject to the influence of the changes in the ever more intricate pattern of these relations. The main thing here, however, is that the success of European detente can also do a great deal of good outside Europe by setting an example for the whole world.

The central task in the efforts to materialise the detente is to supplement the political detente with a military detente. L. I. Brezhnev emphasised at Helsinki that the main task now is to stop the arms race and achieve tangible results in disarmament.** Military detente has many components, but its fundamental aim is to limit and gradually cut back the states' armed forces and armaments.

Military detente is one of the most complicated elements in the establishment of a new structure of European relations. It is the political factor that plays the decisive role in the connection between political and military detente: if the military confrontation is to be markedly relaxed and armaments reduced, the states concerned first have to attain a modicum of political mutual understanding and reduce the overall tension. When the political problems of European peace are being successfully tackled, any serious lag in the

* See Socialist Diplomacy, Preface by A. A. Gromyko, Moscow, 1973, pp. 299, 300 (in Russian). ** Ptavda, August 1, 1975.

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sphere of military detente can narrow down the framework of European security and hold back its development to a considerable extent. At the same time, progress in military detente can have the opposite effect: it can do a great deal further to stimulate the political detente.

Military detente is such a complicated affair because its problems lie at the very core of the states' security, and also because some forces in Europe have stubbornly worked against it.

The official Atlantic view is that there is no contradiction between political detente and the buildup of military strength, that this is a twofold process of guaranteeing secu- I rity. The NATO principle is that the policy of detente should I go forward hand in hand with an ever more intensive arms drive.

If one's goal, however, is to establish genuine peace and a lasting security system, one cannot recognise NATO's concept as constructive, for it counts upon armed strength, upon the ``deterrence'' doctrine, according to which the threat of mutual destruction is the only way to ensure peace. Nevertheless, Western policy still attaches the utmost importance to the strength aspect.

In accordance with that concept. Western Europe has been turned into a major armed bastion, which global imperialist political strategy regards as a central factor of the USA's and NATO's military-political influence in Europe and the surrounding areas, as the chief military-political bridgehead in the fight against socialism, the most important element in the system aimed to ensure a balance of armed strength with socialism, and an instrument for influencing the social processes in the European capitalist countries.

The imperialists' ``deterrence'' concept has a role to play both in domestic and foreign policy, providing an excuse for the existence of blocs. Maintaining the necessary " deterrence effect" calls for constant improvements in armaments, for under the scientific and technical revolution it is impossible to maintain a "balance of fear" for any consider

able period without any changes in the quantity and especially the quality of the weapons. Sooner or later, one of the contestants is bound to run ahead of the other, and the ``balance'' is almost certain to be upset. Consequently, a peace hinging on a "balance of fear" is doomed to an arms race; it is essentially unbalanced and is fraught with conflict, especially whenever the ``balance'' is upset.

The ``deterrence'' concept also helps cement the relations among the NATO states on the basis of armed strength. One of its most important tasks is to justify the swelling arms budgets and the growing economic and political role of the military-industrial complexes. It is being used as an instrument of ``deterrence'' against social, revolutionary movements and the national liberation struggle.

Thus, this concept is of considerable political, military and economic importance and has a social, psychological and other aspects. In the broad prospect, it cannot serve as a guarantee of lasting peace embodying the principles of the peaceful coexistence of all states.

In order to justify their all-out arms drive, the imperialist circles have imputed to the Soviet Union's military policy and strategy a number of false stereotyped goals, accusing it of ``aggressiveness'', of a desire to use military means to "put political pressure''.

Accusing the Soviet Union of "military totalitarianism", militarisation, etc., the critics of socialism have for decades considered this question out of the historical context, concentrating on short stretches of history and distorting the overall picture out of all recognition. In the course of the life-- anddeath battles the Soviet Union has had to fight, it paid a high price for peace by building up a powerful military potential, but it is prepared to wind down this military might as soon as the external conditions will allow.

Western politicians have increasingly used the crucial question-the balance of military strength between East and Westas an instrument of "big politics" and various manipulations of public opinion. The development and deployment in Wes-

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tern Europe of all sorts of new types of weapons envisaged in the various NATO programmes will only upset the equilibrium that Western politicians say is the cardinal condition of peace and stability.

Those who accuse Soviet military policy and strategy of aggressive designs grossly distort the Soviet Union's military goals. It is impossible to understand these goals without regard for the aggregate experience of socialist development, primarily the historical experience of the Soviet Union, which built a new social system in a hostile environment, defending it against repeated armed attacks. That is why the idea of defending the Motherland is reflected in the Soviet Constitution. In his speech at the ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on November 2, 1977, L. I. Brezhnev said: "We were the first. And things were not easy for us. We had to stand firm in face of a hostile encirclement. We had to break the shackles of centuries-old backwardness. We had to overcome the enormous force of historical inertia and learn to live in accordance with new principles-the principles of collectivism.

``And today, as we sum up the main results of six decades of struggle and labour, we can say with pride: We have held our ground; we had stood firm and won."*

The Party's leading role is a fundamental and immutable principle of military construction in the Soviet Union, and this rules out any voluntarism in the military-strategic area. Contrary to Western allegations, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and the armed forces, by which the Soviet Union has scrupulously abided, rules out any discrepancy between the Party's and the state's foreign-policy line, on the one hand, and military strategy and construction, on the other. This construction is of an entirely defensive nature.

These days force is no longer almighty, and the course of international development depends on the whole ag-

gregate of economic, political, class, social, military and other factors. The socialist countries believe that the detente is incompatible with a buildup of military strength, with the arms race, which is at odds with the tasks of setting up a European security system. L. I. Brezhnev said at the World Congress of Peace Forces: "It goes without saying that the further extension of the arms race by the aggressive circles of imperialism, on the one hand, and the relaxation of international tension that has set in, on the other, are two processes running in opposite directions. The two cannot develop endlessly along what might be called parallel lines."'^^1^^'' Progress in military detente to supplement the political detente could eventually eliminate this contradiction.

It was emphasised earlier on that the Soviet Union has always seen co-operation as an integral part of the effort to ensure security and materialise the detente. Broad and mutually advantageous exchanges in the economy, science, technology, the protection of the environment and the humanitarian field could become a major factor in the peaceful relations between European socialist and capitalist countries and a means of stabilising the peace.

The interplay between the political aspects of security and the various forms of all-European co-operation amounts to this: the political detente largely determines the possibilities, the general outlines and, to some extent, the forms and tendencies of co-operation, and the latter goes a long way to promote the detente and develop the security system. Large-scale international co-operation, as A. A. Gromyko pointed out at the European Conference, "is something of a material basis for European security".**

In putting forward their broad programme for European co-operation, the socialist countries proceed from the objective need of Europe's development under the scientific and technical revolution, which calls for a further deepening of

New Times, No. 45, 1977, p. 4.

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 319. ** Pravda, July 4, 1973.

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the international division of labour and a steady increase in technical and power facilities. They also proceed from the fact that many interests of the European countries are identical, something that is of particular importance for economic co-operation, making it possible to elaborate large-scale and long-term projects for the whole continent in transport, the power industry and protection of the environment, creating conditions for some progress in the solution of the fuel and energy problem, and so on.

Without going deeper into these problems (for details see following chapters), let us only emphasise that the objective requirements of Europe's economic development call for more vigorous trade, economic, scientific and technical ties between East and West European countries, the use of new forms in particular. The fact that over the past decade trade between socialist and capitalist countries grew faster than their industrial production shows that even before the detente had gathered momentum Europeans sought to benefit from the international division of labour.*

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe opened fresh prospects for mutually advantageous co-- operation between states belonging to different social systems. Having taken due account of their mutual interests, the participating states agreed to adopt some new forms of co-- operation which would have been inconceivable during the cold war: in the humanitarian fields, including human contacts, information, cultural exchanges, and so on. The Conference recognised the need for long-term and large-scale co-- operation and emphasised the importance of full equality and the most-favoured-nation treatment in mutual trade and economic co-operation.

In their striving for European peace, the socialist countries maintain that any accords on this question should meet the interests of all the European nations, and that one should not contrast some European countries or areas to other countries or areas. This equally applies to European secu* Modern Europe's Problems, Moscow, 1974, p. 94 (in Russian).

rity, the successful and rational use of European resources and other spheres of co-operation. L. I. Brezhnev said in Helsinki: "We note with deep satisfaction that the provisions drawn up by the Conference with respect to the main problems of strengthening peace in Europe serve the interests of nations, serve the interests of all people regardless of their occupation, nationality and age: industrial and agricultural workers, intellectuals, each person individually and all people together."*

The socialist countries' main concern in Europe is to ensure that European detente has a favourable influence on the life of all the European nations. In full accordance with this approach, the Final Act of the European Conference calls on the Europeans to remember their common history and recognise the existence of common elements in their traditions and values, while bearing in mind the whole spectrum of different and specific views and attitudes.

This approach is an essential condition for the materialisation of the detente, but various forces in the imperialist countries have come out against it, attacking the idea that the mistrust should be overcome, insisting on Europe's division into two parts, and seeking to prove theoretically that the division is inevitable aiid is bound to last forever.

A point to emphasise here is that the old Western doctrines according to which, say, the Western part of the continent is always opposed to the Eastern part, and "the real" Europe is said to lie only round the Mediterranean, "the cradle of European civilisation", hamper the establishment of a genuinely peaceful structure of European relations. This should not be seen as purely historical theoretical studies, for doctrines of this kind have been known in the West for centuries, and under imperialism have often been used to attain patently aggressive military and political class goals. In the 1930s, in particular, they were used as ideological justification for nazi Germany's aggression against the USSR.

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 582.

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Now that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence, such doctrines, advocated by the most conservative Western circles, are modified on more comprehensive and flexible lines, with many new ingredients. Sometimes, the "rich West" is contrasted with the "poor East" in economic terms (economic ``asymmetry''), and this goes to substantiate the doctrine of limited or even impossible co-operation in the economy, science and technology. According to another doctrine, detente and co-operation are ruled out in view of Western hatred for socialism and so-called Eastern aggressiveness. The latter is often used to prove that the confrontation and the armed race are unavoidable and that there are some "insurmountable difficulties" in the way of European peace. Then there is also the "European myth", a concept according to which four European powers---Britain, France, the FRG and Italy-"which have lost their erstwhile supremacy" should unite to restore their old greatness, in the moral and psychological plane, at any rate. The doctrine of "Western Europe's cultural unity" within the framework of ``Atlantic'' or ``Mediterranean'' culture says that the "cultural inequalities" between the East and the West rule out any hope of mutual understandings, to say nothing of co-- operation.

Falling back on these East-West confrontation concepts, the more conservative spokesmen for some lines of bourgeois political thinking fail to see any ground for joint action to ensure security for the whole of Europe, and spell out collective security only as joint action by the European capitalist countries either within the Common Market or the NATO framework, but always with an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist edge. It was they who attacked the results of the European Conference, emphasising the need to strengthen "little Europe" in every way and couple the detente with the arms race, urging the use of these results to the detriment of socialism.

But Europe's security is indivisible and cannot be ensured so long as any part of the continent is contrasted with the

other. It goes without saying that the many faces of Europe in every sphere of human activity, material and spiritual culture within the confines of a small continent-the product of almost three millennia-cannot and should not be reduced, let alone wiped out. The socialist countries want Europe to retain all its variety and call for a broad and equitable exchange of genuine values.

The socialist countries maintain that to ensure Europe's peaceful development the Europeans have to establish a system of relations which would enable them to balance out the interests of all the member-states and settle any arising disputes on the basis of mutually acceptable accords, without detriment to any party or any attempt to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

It was largely owing to this approach that the European Conference managed to balance out the participants' interests on these lines.

The Soviet Union has always believed that if peace in Europe is to be maintained, the policy of every European country should be free of any urge to endanger the security and the equality of any other country by laying claim to unilateral political or military advantages. Lenin's principle of reciprocity in international agreements, which Soviet diplomats formulated back at the Genoa Conference in 1922, lies at the root of the socialist countries' approach to this important problem. This line shows respect for the interests of all other states, does not create any unilateral political or military advantages or provide for the threat, let alone the use, of force. It is based on the inviolability of European frontiers and every state's sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

The more conservative and reactionary circles of the capitalist world are still bent on negating this approach and gaining an advantage over socialism, in the military sphere in particular. They seek to guarantee their own security at the expense of the socialist countries and also to get the edge on them in the course of negotiations on, say, armed forces

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and armament reductions in Central Europe. This is very much at odds with the idea of a peace resting on a collective foundation.

The record of the past few decades shows that the various right-wing forces, the military-industrial complex, the militarist circles and all those who seek to perpetuate Europe's division, ensure security solely for Western Europe and strengthen NATO often find it logically necessary to portray the socialist countries as a "dangerous enemy" with a "vast military superiority". This helps them to continue the confrontation with the socialist countries and is often used to justify the fight against the left-wing forces in the capitalist countries, the high level of military spending, the more intensive political and military integration, and so on.

One thing to bear in mind, however, is that Europe's future, the outcome of the contest between war and peace, has largely come to depend on how well every European state understands the intentions of other states. The socialist countries' political intentions have to be seen in the true light, without any deliberate distortions or attempts to misinform public opinion in order to whip up feelings of hostility or substantiate certain parliamentary attitudes or demands. L. I. Brezhnev said at the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow: "The long years of cold war have left their imprint on the minds not only of professional politicians; they have resulted in prejudice, suspicion, and deficient knowledge-even a reluctance to acquire knowledgeof the real position held by others and their possibilities. Certainly, it is not easy to turn over a new leaf. But this has to be done; it is essential to learn to co-operate."* He went on to emphasise that now, as never before, there was a need for another approach, other methods and, perhaps, a new and different mentality. Europe's future largely depends on whether this is brought about.

Those who do not want to see the detente in Europe mate-

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 327.

rialise often allege an "asymmetry of power" in Europe, saying that the very presence of one of the two `` superpowers'' on the continent creates a "constant threat" to Western Europe and that to ``counter-balance'' that presence and ensure equal security all-round, the West Europeans have to go on strengthening their military-political organisation within the Atlanticist and the EEC framework rather than agree to establish an all-European peace system.

That approach is plainly unacceptable. The objective fact that the Soviet Union is a great power covering both a part of Europe and Asia does not mean that it is a threat to other nations simply because it is there, for everything here depends on its actual policies. And the facts show that the political line followed by the Soviet Union and other socialist states is an expression of the most consistent and highly principled peace policy.

Socialism has nothing to do with ``superpower'' diplomacy. The Soviet Union is the chief initiator of European detente, co-operation, lasting and irreversible peace, of many treaties and agreements both with the USA and West European countries, of the European Conference, and so on, and this rules out even the theoretical possibility of its pursuing a European ``superpower'' policy.

A peace system built up through joint, universal efforts would create the best conditions for realising the noninfringement of security principle and equal security for all.

Is there any alternative to the Helsinki recommendations?

According to some of the numerous Western estimates and forecasts that have positively snowballed since the Conference, there are certain "intermediate versions" of European relations, lying somewhere in between the two `` extremes'' : detente on a multilateral basis, which does not suit many bourgeois observers, and a return to the cold war.

According to other ``recommendations'', there is no point at all in realising the Helsinki results, for these are said to be biased in favour of the East.

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In the broad perspective, however, there is no realistic alternative to the Helsinki recommendations, based on a careful and all-embracing balance between the various goals and interests and pointing out the only way for any foreseeable future. Any other version would serve to slow down the materialisation of the detente and would mean a movement back to confrontation, a relapse into the cold war and a blind-alley arms race. From now on, the most realistic model for Europe is the one worked out in Helsinki as a result of a thorough analysis of all the data on Europe's development in the final quarter of the 20th century. This approach is fundamentally different from the methods of the cold war, which implies a desire to contrast rather than harmonise the states' interests.

The attempts to cast doubt on the results of the European Conference reveal the substance of the tactics followed by the forces which in the years ahead are bound to seek to play down any achievements in this area in order to strengthen capitalism to the detriment of socialism.

The Conference's accords reflect the overall equilibrium of forces of the two social systems, and to maintain this equilibrium of political interests and decisions without any attempts to get an unfair advantage in the course of the restructuring of European relations is to ensure a good prospect for the drive to materialise the detente.

The socialist countries' policy of European detente is geared to the long term and has become a permanent factor of present-day reality. It is neither an improvisation nor a tactical move motivated by short-term political or economic considerations. The socialist countries have elaborated their line for European security on the strength of an all-round assessment of the various objective long-term factors, and do not intend to stop at any particular stage along that way, however important that stage might be, for detente is a dynamic process.

The socialist countries' political line for European security is marked with a broad and comprehensive approach. It

stems from the understanding that all the complex processes making up the detente in Europe are tied in with each other, and provides for vigorous action not in any one direction or sphere of international affairs, but along the whole sociopolitical front.

L. I. Brezhnev said in the CPSU Central Committee's Report to the 25th Congress: "In short, much persevering effort has still to be made to achieve truly lasting peace in Europe and to make the detente irreversible. The Soviet Union will apply these efforts in close co-ordination with the fraternal socialist states, with all the peace-loving and realistic forces in Europe. Before us, comrades, is the great aim of making lasting peace the natural way of life for all the European peoples."*

The concrete, tangible results achieved along the way towards a reliable security system in Europe are due to the socialist countries' foreign policy and bear out its effectiveness. The further strengthening of the socialist community, its unity and solidarity and its foreign-policy initiative are a major prerequisite of improvement in Europe's political climate and open up broad prospects for peaceful development.

Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress ol the CPSU. p. 24.

CHAPTER THREE

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE POLICY OF WESTERN STATES

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND WESTERN STATES

During the first two postwar decades. Western circles which did not see any class or political advantages in international detente found it profitable to maintain an atmosphere of constant tension and tough military-political confrontation in Europe, for it enabled them to follow a policy aimed against the Soviet Union, the other European socialist states and the left-wing forces in their own countries, and to reinforce "internal political stability" and US control over the West European countries. That is why the repeated proposals for detente and a collective security system in Europe, which the Soviet Union kept putting before the Western countries in the 1950s, while not raising any official objections, were in fact repeatedly turned down.

In contrast to the search for an alternative to the dangerous military confrontation between the two blocs in Europe, the West advocated a concept based on the all-round strengthening and consolidation of NATO as the only foundation of Western security. L. I. Brezhnev emphasised in 1976 that the success of the international detente "alerted and activated the forces of reaction and militarism, who would like to plunge Europe and the entire world back into the cold war and the time of nuclear brinkmanship. It has alarmed those who wax fat on the production of the tools of death and destruction, who cannot envisage any other political career except to launch `crusades' against the socialist countries, against Communists, or those who openly call 'to prepare for a new war', looking to benefit by sowing strife between other countries and peoples."*

The more conservative and aggressive circles both in the USA and some West European countries assumed that the movement towards European detente could markedly weaken and undermine their positions. Their point of departure in this matter was that detente was bound to stimulate tendencies for a movement away from Atlanticist policy, which was a source of political and military dividends not only for the

WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA: POLICY EVOLUTION

The Western powers' policy in respect of the socialist countries' course for a European security system, detente and co-operation has evolved along complicated lines from the almost automatic negative attitude, which was typical of most West European states, the USA and Canada in the 1950s and, to some extent, in the 1960s, to virtual recognition in the early 1970s of the need for some measure of joint action with the socialist countries to strengthen European security and co-operation. Naturally, this is not to say that individual Western states did not hold markedly different positions. Some of them, like France, began moving towards a realistic stand on European security as early as the 1960s, gravitating towards joint action with the socialist countries.

The evolution of Western policy on European security hinges on the change in the balance of world political and military forces in favour of socialism, the changes in the configuration of forces within the imperialist camp itself, which have entailed a review of Western policy in respect of the socialist countries, and also the changes in the development of class, social relations in the various capitalist countries. The change of emphasis in the formulation of Western goals in the matter of European security also had an effect on this evolution.

Moscow News, Supplement to Issue No. 27, 1976.

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US ruling circles_/ but also for influential circles in some West European countries. The USA feared that detente would serve to enhance Western Europe's independence and so make it more difficult to implement the various US-devised political and military measures. Thus, the well-known US journalist Walter Lippmann admitted in the early 1950s that the ruling circles in the USA and other Western countries believed that "if the tension is relaxed, the great projects of NATO and of European unity to which we are committed will collapse."*

Any initiative on the part of the socialist countries calling for a change in the nature of East-West relations, for detente or a convocation of an all-European security conference was said to be premature. But the historic changes going forward in Europe and the world gradually eroded the Western powers' bluntly negative stand, and considerable socio-- political forces in Western Europe were beginning to shake off the cold war fetters and realise the need for detente. Thus, a NATO Council Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance, approved at a NATO session in December 1967, said that "the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence' has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West".**

The sharpening contradictions between the USA and the West European countries against the background of the altered balance of forces in the world were also of considerable importance. Somewhere in the mid-1960s, the ruling circles of some West European countries began to realise that under the nuclear-missile equilibrium between the USSR and the USA, the US nuclear guarantees to these countries were no longer absolute, and that if a nuclear conflict did break out, the US Government, would, probably, give priority to its own interests rather than to those of its allies. French military theorist Pierre M. Gallois wrote: "In face

of an adversary armed with mass-destruction weapons, military alliances have become extremely precarious. As it is most unlikely that a government would risk self-annihilation in a bid to protect its own supreme interests, one can hardly expect it to run such a risk for the sake of another country, albeit an ally."* Military theorists in other West European countries thought along the same lines.

The West European countries' growing scepticism as regards the USA's readiness to fulfil its security commitments to Western Europe under any circumstances urged them to negotiate and reach agreements with the Warsaw Treaty countries on various problems of European security. The USA's desire to gear the West European countries to its global imperialist strategy for the support of its aggression in Vietnam, Israel's action in the Middle East, and so on, which had particularly intensified in the mid-1960s, could well serve to embroil the USA's European allies in USinitiated conflicts across the world that could then spread to Europe.

Western Europe regarded such a prospect with increasing distaste and, although the leading West European powers continued to hinge their security on the alliance with the USA, they also showed an ever greater interest in a search for a measure of understanding with the socialist countries. That interest was also rooted in their desire to extend economic ties with the socialist countries, to settle various outstanding political issues and win greater independence from the USA in foreign policy.

A programme put forward by the Warsaw Treaty countries at their Bucharest summit meeting in July 1966, which contained a clear-cut proposal for a European conference on security and co-operation, gave a further impulse to the realistic tendencies in respect of European security taking shape in the policy of some West European states. The War-

* The Washington Post, December 1, 1953, p. 17. ** Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVI, London, 1967-1968, p. 22425.

Le Monde diplomatique, April 1963, p. 10.

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saw Treaty countries' collective initiative provided convincing proof of the socialist community's growing role in these matters, its stronger influence on the whole course of political events in Europe. It helped to rally the peace-loving forces round the idea of an all-European conference, and gave fresh incentive to the more realistically-minded circles in the West. Owing to these new tendencies for greater independence among some NATO members, the opponents of detente in the USA and Western Europe had to work hard to substantiate the thesis that the European security problems had to be tackled, first and foremost, "through NATO channels". That way they sought to ``harmonise'' the NATO members' attitudes to East-West relations, induce them to take a common stand on European security and the all-European conference above all, and prevent their taking any steps to develop relations with the socialist countries without prior consultation with NATO's governing agencies and, consequently, with the USA.

And although the communique issued by the NATO Council's Brussels session in the summer of 1966 still noted that the NATO ministers had decided that any initiative for the convocation of a European security conference was `` premature'', the United States and its allies were finding it more and more difficult to contain the West European countries' growing desire for a real search for a peaceful solution of European problems and European detente.

The Canadian, Italian and Belgian Foreign Ministers soon followed in the wake of France, whose leaders had been the first to extend their political contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and called for a review of Western political attitudes to the socialist countries. A strategic survey issued by the London Institute for Strategic Studies said that other West European countries were following in France's footsteps and "developing their own national policies towards the East", and that it appeared that "the time might be approaching for some serious discussion both between the great powers and between the European

powers on the modification of the twenty-year confrontation in Europe" .*

The NATO leadership, which had once been against any attempts to establish bilateral contacts between capitalist and socialist countries, now had to recognise the possibility of "freer and more friendly reciprocal exchanges between countries of different social and economic systems" and "better political, economic, social, scientific and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and with other countries in Eastern Europe".""'^^1^^"

The US ruling circles were beginning to get worried about the new situation gradually taking shape in Europe, where trade, economic, political, cultural and scientific ties between states belonging to different social systems were on the increase, and where some states were taking a more sober view of European security.

The Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, issued a report recommending some measures aimed at European detente. He urged a "search for progress towards a more stable relationship (with the socialist countries.-Author] in which the underlying political issues can be solved".***

The idea of ensuring effective security in Europe by way of detente with the East was gradually making a breach in the bluntly negative Western stand.

But the conservative political circles in various Western countries did their utmost to slow down, if not to stop altogether, progress in this direction.

A document, drafted by the Washington meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in April 1969, said: "The Allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful nego-

* Strategic Survey. 1966. The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1967, p. 2.

** The New York Times, December 17, 1966.

*** Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVI, London, 1967-1968, p. 22425.

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tiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues and to study how a useful process of negotiation could best be initiated, in due course, and to draw up a report for the next meeting of Ministers. It is clear that any negotiations must be well prepared in advance, and that all governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve a political settlement in Europe should take part." * At the same time, the Western powers again made it quite clear that "during an era of negotiation the defence posture of the Alliance should not be relaxed".**

The new European realities and the socialist countries' opportune initiative urging collective measures to strengthen peace compelled the West to adapt to the new situation, manoeuvre and change its tactics. The old, totally negative stand on these questions had become a political liability, so that the United States began to look for a more flexible approach, duly concerted with its allies, to the problems of European detente in order to draw some political advantage from European detente.

An indicative point to note here is that the Rome session of the NATO Council in May 1970 for the first time announced the Western countries' readiness "to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments. One of the main purposes of such contacts would be to explore when it will be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences on European security and co-operation."***

The pattern of political manoeuvre was becoming ever more complicated, involving a gradual and for some countries a most painful reappraisal of the whole complex of relations with the socialist countries. The problem of an allEuropean conference, in particular, increasingly brought into focus the struggle among the various trends in the matter of a new policy towards the East.

* The Department ot State Bulletin, April 28, 1969, p. 355.

The West increasingly aimed at ``bartering'' detente for political advantages which would enable the capitalist countries to get the edge on the socialist countries in the general contest between the two social systems. Thus, one of their earliest ``conditions'' for the convocation of an all-European conference was that the problem of West Berlin had to be solved their way. Those who reasoned along these lines maintained that the solution of the West Berlin question was a touchstone of the Soviet Union's readiness for a genuine relaxation of tensions in Europe.

In actual fact, however, there was no need for any ``test''. When the West began to move towards a more realistic approach to the West Berlin problem, the Soviet Union's constructive policy on that difficult problem helped achieve a solution that satisfied every party concerned. Other important international problems were solved in the same way, and the package of questions on whose solutions the Western powers made contingent their agreement to a more vigorous detente was steadily shrinking. The West European powers and the USA found it ever harder to justify their negative stand. There gradually emerged an influential group of West European states calling for an all-European conference in 1972. First it was the French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, who came out in support of the idea, and then the Foreign Minister of Denmark Knud Andersen and Norway's Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen. Italy's Foreign Minister Aldo Moro said that the convocation of the conference was a task of the immediate future.*

As a result, a NATO session in December 1971 had to endorse the idea of multilateral negotiations to prepare for an all-European conference.**

NATO was finding it ever harder to maintain a `` collective'' bloc stand. The growing acceptance of the idea of a conference by Western opinion, and the fear of a division among

Ibid. *** WATO Letter, June 1970, p. 23.

* See International Yearbook, 1972, Politics and Economics, Moscow, 1972, p. 160 (in Russian). ** See The Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1972, p. 2.

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NATO's West European partners on the question eventually induced the Western countries to take a more constructive stand. In May 1972, the West European states and the USA declared that "in the light of these favourable developments, ministers agreed to enter into multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a conference on security and co-operation (CSCE) in Europe"/^^1^^'

That was another success for the peace policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The changes in Western policy on European security showed that the cold war policy was no longer tenable and, at the same time, were a reflection of the imperialist countries' growing overall adjustment to present-day realities and the changes in the international arena. The London Times wrote in this context: "At governmental level there has been a long journey from various proposals for detente in the fifties to the .. . definite, though safeguarded, acceptance by NATO in the 1970s of the Eastern proposal for a conference on European security."""''^^1^^' There is no doubt at all that the socialist countries' foreign policy efforts, as well as objective factors like the altered balance of forces between the two systems and also within the imperialist camp itself, did a great deal to bring about the evolution of Western attitudes to European detente. The incipient co-operation between the USSR and other socialist countries, on the one hand, and the leading West European countries and the USA, on the other, was also very important.

MAJOR TRENDS IN WESTERN POLICY ON EUROPEAN DETENTE

At the turn of the 1960s, responsible circles in the leading Western countries could no longer shut their eyes to the new conditions taking shape in Europe. They had to adjust to

* Survey of Current Affairs, No. 6, June 1972, p. 246. ** The Times, March 20, 1973, p. 14.

these conditions, but still sought to channel the processes of European detente along lines that would enable them to use these to further their own interests.

As the positions of US and West European governments evolved, their political programmes on European detente--- a subject of fierce controversy-began to take a more definite shape. From around the late 1960s on, these programmes were elaborated along two lines: first, the ruling circles of every individual Western country were studying the possibilities of ensuring their own foreign-policy interests in the conditions of an East-West detente; and second, they were looking for more acceptable ways to further the Western countries' common imperialist interests and goals in these conditions.

These efforts resulted in various security concepts, analysing the Western countries' possible gains and losses in the course of a detente and carefully weighing the alternatives.

The models of European development and European security systems being elaborated in various US and West European research centres reflected, to a greater or lesser extent, the prevailing state concepts or helped to mould new state policy lines. Their authors mostly believed that the existing political structure in Europe would remain intact for at least another decade, and that West European integration would become a major prerequisite for any future changes in that structure. They also maintained that the strength factor was bound to be the chief indicator and regulator of any possible international political changes in Europe/^^1^^"

In the 1970s, the concepts of European security now prevailing in the West were more or less rounded off to fit the new situation. Whatever the distinctions resulting from the specific state and national interests of the individual countries, these concepts were increasingly put forward as a common Western concept.

Atlanticism, a close political and military alliance between

* For details see Chapter Ten.

7---1787

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Western Europe and the USA, still topped (and continues to top) the list of Western political and military priorities with respect to European security. Despite the sharpening US-West European contradictions and the loosening ``trans-Atlantic'' bonds. West European leaders still regard their militarypolitical alliance with the USA as a prerequisite for strengthening European capitalism and the foundation of West European security in the foreseeable future. Although the USA's European allies have largely lost their faith in the absolute nature of the US nuclear guarantees, they still regard these as the only real factor of a "military equilibrium" with the Warsaw Treaty countries. The European Identity Declaration approved by the EEC Foreign Ministers and published in late 1973 said: "Those of them [the Nine.---Author] who are members of the Atlantic Alliance consider that in present circumstances there is no alternative to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the United States and the presence of North American forces in Europe."'"'^^1^^'

The Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted in Ottawa in June 1974 by the NATO Foreign Ministers also emphasised that "the contribution to the security of the entire Alliance provided by the nuclear forces of the United States based in the United States as well as in Europe and by the presence of North American forces in Europe remains indispensable".**

There are also some other factors behind Western Europe's interest in a military alliance with the United States, the advantages of sharing the burden of military expenditure in particular. The United States shoulders more than 70 per cent of NATO's total military expenditure.*** And although in the 1970s the West Europeans' share in NATO's military outlays has increased, they still contribute far less than the United States.

Besides, as the internal political contradictions in the capitalist countries have aggravated, the class struggle intensified, and the social difficulties worsened, military alliances have also come to play a more important role in the membercountries' domestic affairs as an instrument used by the ruling classes against the democratic progressive forces in the West European countries.

The United States, for its part, wants to maintain and strengthen its military-political alliance with Western Europe as a necessary condition for achieving its long-term imperialist goals and ensuring stability in the global confrontation with socialism. It is very important for the USA to use Western Europe, the capitalist world's second largest centre of political, economic and military power, in order to stop the balance of forces' tilting further against it, especially in Europe, where the two systems stand face to face. Maintaining a broad political and military presence in Western Europe, the United States has thus had at its command a powerful and lasting instrument for influencing its allies' policy across a wide spectrum of questions, European security in particular.

There are also some other political and military prerequisites behind the USA's deep interest in maintaining and strengthening the military-political alliance with Western Europe.

As the bulwark of capitalism, the United States has had to distribute its forces among many different areas of strategic, political and economic interests: Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and other parts of the world. It lacks the potential to maintain an advantageous balance of forces in Europe and is badly in need of its European allies' support.

Finally, the United States has been using its bloc policy in Europe to orient a sizable share of the socialist community's strength and resources upon its allies.

All these circumstances, which determine the mutual interest of Western Europe and the USA in maintaining and strengthening the bloc structure and their desire to tackle the

* The Times, December 15, 1973.

** The Department oi State Bulletin, July 8, 1974, p. 43. ** The Military Balance 1969-1970, London, 1969, p. 57.

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tasks of European detente on a bloc basis, have stood in the way of a solution of the European security problem, making it very hard to achieve the target goal, the gradual elimination of the two opposing European military groupings.

As the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals on European security carried ever more weight and won ever greater support among the realistically-minded forces in a number of West European countries, influential circles in the United States and their European supporters sought to formulate on behalf of the West some broad alternatives to these proposals in order to neutralise the West European circles that were coming out in ever more vigorous support of the socialist countries' course, and to channel the debate on European security along lines best suiting the Atlantic Alliance.

One of the Western powers' earliest counter-proposals to the socialist countries' programme was to carry out a " mutual and balanced force reduction", which was presented as a "peace initiative" and a significant contribution "to the lessening of tension and to further reducing "the danger of war".* The proposal, portrayed as "a concrete answer" to the socialist countries' programme, was to help the West take over the initiative and reduce the European security programme to a fairly narrow range of military problems to be tackled, in the first place, on a bloc basis.

In other words, the West sought to play down the international political importance of the European security problem itself, reduce it to a dialogue on force cuts between the two blocs, gain some advantages in the process and ``fit'' NATO into the framework of European detente, regulating the latter to suit the alliance.

All this goes to show that the Western stand on European security was elaborated both by way of defence (as a forced response to the socialist countries' proposals) and attack (as an urge to put up for discussion problems from which the West had to gain in the first place).

The US and West European urge to go over to the offen-

* NATO Letter, July-August 1968, p. 29.

sive in the matter of European security primarily manifested itself in an attempt to formulate problems which would enable the West to get a political, ideological and propaganda edge on the socialist countries. Thus, the West called for "a change in the political structure of European relations", laying special emphasis on the "free movement of men, ideas and information". It saw this arbitrary "free movement" without regard for the state's internal laws as a major ingredient of the overall strategy aimed to ``erode'' the socialist community, so that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as any other state wishing to maintain its sovereignty, was bound to reject it.

L. I. Brezhnev gave an exhaustive answer to that proposal: "One often hears that the West attaches importance to cooperation in the cultural domain and, especially, to exchange of ideas, extension of information, and to contacts between nations. Permit us to declare here in all earnest: we, too, are in favour of this if, of course, such co-operation is conducted with due respect for the sovereignty, the laws and the customs of each country, and if it promotes mutual spiritual enrichment of the peoples, greater trust between them, and the ideas of peace and good-neighbourliness."*

The development of relations between the two socio-- economic systems, the significant changes in European public opinion and the policy of many West European governments towards a recognition of the peaceful coexistence principle, which first began to show in the mid-1960s, paved the way for better mutual understanding and increasingly compelled the Western ruling circles to reckon with the new objective tendencies in European political affairs.

And although some circles in the Western countries have repeatedly tried to give a biased reading to some principles of European security, they had fewer and fewer opportunities for doing so, chiefly because of the socialist countries' firm but flexible stand on the whole range of European se-

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, pp. 90-91.

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curity problems, and also in view of the fact that, as has already been said, the unfolding detente brought the West and the socialist countries ever closer together on a fairly wide range of cardinal security problems, like prevention of war, relaxation of tension, establishment of guarantees against conflicts, co-operation in the economy, science, technology, culture, protection of the environment, and so on.

As a result, the European Conference enabled them to work out mutually acceptable solutions for many important questions of European security, which were written into the Final Act.

But the new equilibrium, however, has not checked the imperialists' military buildup. NATO has kept up its feverish efforts to elaborate military plans going against the grain of European detente and co-operation, and has periodically trotted out the hackneyed myth about a "Soviet threat" to the West. In defiance of common sense, the socialist countries are said to be ``responsible'' for various political events in other countries and for civil and national liberation wars.

NATO obviously wants to see the unprecedented arms race spiral upwards, and has taken further measures to integrate its members' armed forces, their navies in particular, to step up the sweeping preparation of theatres of war in Western Europe, and so on. In the 1970s, NATO's Eurogroup, set up back in 1968, began to play a more important role in the system of NATO's military preparations.* In 1970, the Eurogroup adopted a European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP), which provided for greater military outlays on the part of NATO's European members.**

Initially, the Eurogroup laid emphasis on greater "financial participation", but since the late 1970s, it has increasingly sought to elaborate its own military programmes.

From the standpoint of European security, the tendency to set up a relatively independent armed force in Western Europe, obviously, contains some destructive elements. It could well serve to intensify Europe's division and is plainly at cross-purposes with the idea of overcoming this division. It is essentially aimed to narrow down the channels of allEuropean co-operation.

As was pointed out earlier, the Western attitude to European detente largely derives from the specific positions of the individual countries.

France was one of the first Western states to come out in vigorous support of European detente, which was largely due to its line envisaging plans for a gradual reduction of the influence of the military-political alliances in Europe and for a more important role of the states' national policy, that of France above all. It was one of the first Western countries to take the road of expanding its economic and political relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. While regarding the political relations within NATO and the US military guarantees as the basis of West European security and staking a great deal on West European integration, France has also decided that co-operation with the Soviet Union is one of the most important and long-term elements of European security.

The development of bilateral Soviet-French co-operation, bilateral summit meetings above all, has served to enhance the positive tendencies in France's policy in respect of European detente and security. France's withdrawal from NATO's military organisation and its more independent (as compared with other NATO members) foreign-policy line have also helped to nurture these tendencies. In 1970, France supported the idea of an all-European conference and criticised its artificial hinging on progress in the talks on armed forces and arms cuts in Central Europe. But France's own refusal to take

* The Eurogroup comprises Britain, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Turkey. Through the Eurogroup the United States has sought to effect an increase in the West European ``contribution'' to NATO's military preparations.

** In five years their military expenditure was to go up by $1,000 million. The actual increase in 1973 was $4,500 million. In December 1973, the Eurogroup decided in favour of a fresh $2,000- million increase in 1974.

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part in these talks was a negative aspect of its position. During the third round of the all-European Conference in Helsinki, President Giscard d'Estaing said that France "had its reservations about any arrangement aimed to create in Europe a zone controlled from outside, where the armed forces would be subjected to certain restrictions".* The French Government's stand on this issue has met with considerable criticism among the country's social and political circles.

Britain's attitude to European, security, like that of some other Western countries and the USA, is largely contingent on a "dual concept": the need for an arms buildup coupled with detente. Britain's position was reaffirmed at the European Conference by the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who said that "detente will be maintained only by the continued assertion of vigilance, vigilance based on strength".*^^5^^*

Britain's European policy is geared to the objective of strengthening its positions in Western Europe and exerting a greater influence on European affairs and its allies, and it maintains that before any steps are taken towards European security, there has to be a drive for political consolidation in the EEC, a process in which Britain could play a major role. Britain has also worked for a concerted buildup of Western Europe's military potential, for joint action in this area within the framework of Western Europe, more vigorous activity on the part of the Eurogroup, and also stronger positions in the Mediterranean. Since it wants to maintain its "special relationship" with the United States, it has vigorously supported all of the USA's terms for detente.

As the European Conference gathered momentum, Britain came to adopt a more flexible stand on many issues, particularly as a result of the Anglo-Soviet summit talks held in Moscow in 1975, which ushered in a new stage in the relations between the two countries. The joint Anglo-Soviet document said that the parties would abide by the peaceful

coexistence principle and had come to an understanding concerning the two states' responsibility for the further development of international detente.*

The FRG's posture on European security has two aspects to it. On the one hand, the FRG has followed a general line for normalising relations with the socialist countries. When the Willy Brandt coalition government came to office in the autumn of 1969, possibilities were opened for changes in the country's foreign-policy line towards a relaxation of tensions in Europe. These changes reflected the new awareness among the more realistically-minded circles in the FRG that any attempt to solve European political problems by force of arms was extremely dangerous. The signing of the Moscow Treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG on August 12, 1970, which contained, among other things, a provision on the nonuse of force between the two countries, was an important landmark along this way. The FRG's recognition of the existing European frontiers, i.e., the European political and territorial realities, as these took shape as a result of the Second World War and Europe's postwar development, did a great deal to relax international political tensions in Central Europe, help establish relations of peace and co-operation between the socialist countries and the FRG, and promoted the detente as a whole.

On the other hand, the FRG's European security concept, like those of its partners, provides for a further NATO buildup as a basis of detente, for West European integration, in the military-political plane in particular, and for an effort to maintain the FRG's own military potential at a high level.

The smaller countries of Western and Central Europe have on the whole exerted a positive influence on European detente.

The bloc framework of relations in Europe serves markedly to limit their role in international affairs, while the movement towards European detente, on the contrary, enhances their role, serves to strengthen their positions vis-a-vis their * Pravda, February 18, 1975.

* Le Monde, August 1, 1975. ** The Daily Telegraph, July 31, 1975, p. 4.

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stronger partners and helps them to follow a more independent foreign-policy line. That is why they have devoted greater attention than some other European capitalist countries to the idea of lessening the influence of military blocs in Europe. At the same time, the smaller states fear that in the course of detente the bigger West European states will have greater freedom of action, and this, they believe, could narrow down their own foreign-policy possibilities.

Economic factors have also served to enhance the smaller states' interest in furthering European detente. As they are in need of various raw materials and their economic development has been largely one-sided, these countries are particularly interested in a broad international exchange and want to see the necessary political prerequisites for this created in Europe, lasting security above all. So, it was the smaller European countries, both NATO members-Denmark, Belgium and Norway-and neutrals-Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and other countries-who were among the first Western countries to come out in support of the idea of detente.

The USA's attitude to European security shows that for some time in the past it feared any radical changes in Europe's political climate and took a fairly restrained stand on this question. The US leaders for a long time believed that any radical changes towards European detente would make it more difficult for the USA to maintain its political sway in Western Europe and would strengthen the socialist countries' positions. As a ``counter-argument'' to detente, US diplomats insisted that the security proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were chiefly meant to ``isolate'' the United States and Canada from Western Europe and ``split'' the North Atlantic Alliance.* Even after the

1969-1970 period, when most West European states came to reappraise their attitude to the idea as a whole, the United States continued to show a marked lack of enthusiasm about it. Thus, it put forward in NATO a set of prior conditions for a convocation of an all-European conference.""

But pressure of circumstance and the movement of some West European allies towards European detente gradually induced the United States to review its tactics and make a more realistic assessment of its possibilities in Europe and the meaning of detente. The changes in the USA's posture began to show in 1972, especially after the summit talks with the USSR on a wide spectrum of international problems. From that time on, the USA's attitude to European security became much more positive and constructive.

Notably, the USA displayed this attitude during the third Soviet-US summit meeting in Moscow in the summer of 1974, where the United States joined the Soviet Union in a call for more vigorous efforts towards European detente. During the Vladivostok meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and US President Gerald Ford on November 23 and 24, 1974, the two parties confirmed their resolve to go on developing their relations along the lines that had been written into the joint decisions and treaties and agreements.**

The Carter Administration's revision of the Vladivostok understandings on limiting the strategic arms race and its tactic of dragging out the relevant talks are evidence of the growing conservative tendencies in the policy of detente pursued by the USA.

pest Declaration of June 1970, made it quite clear that the USA and Canada could take part in the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe (Pravda, June 23, 1970).

* The conditions followed in this sequence: "thorough preparation" of the conference; "successful completion" of the talks on West Berlin; the need to tie in, ``parallelise'' the preparations for the European conference and the start of preparations for the talks on armed forces and armaments reduction in Central Europe, etc. ** Pravda. November 25, 1974.

* It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries repeatedly issued official statements saying that as a party to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the United States bore a share of the responsibility for a peaceful settlement in Europe. That was why various Warsaw Treaty documents, notably, the Buda-

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Canada's position has also evolved largely under the influence of these processes. Another important thing here was Canada's desire to adopt a stand within NATO that would be more independent of the USA, to lessen its overall political and economic dependence on the USA and create conditions for broader mutually advantageous trade and cultural exchanges with the socialist countries.

An analysis of Western policy in respect of European security invites some conclusions:

First, the major changes in world development in the 1960s and 1970s, the change in the balance of forces between capitalism and socialism, the socialist countries' growing influence on Europe's political development, the deepening scientific and technical revolution, the invalidation of the Western propaganda myth about possible "communist aggression" and other factors gradually induced the more realisticallyminded West European and US leaders to alter their negative attitude to the socialist countries' idea of European detente and a security system for the whole of Europe..

Second, Western policy in this matter has evolved from sheer disregard and restraint to a recognition of the-need for detente and co-operation with the socialist countries in some important areas. Owing to the socialist community countries' persistent diplomatic efforts, their flexibility and the realism displayed by some Western states, the European security debate came to centre on a set of basic and universal principles, which have gone well beyond the bloc framework and can serve as a foundation of an all-European security and co-operation system.

Third, under the grave crisis of the capitalist system, the opponents of detente and the advocates of the arms race have not only done nothing to restrain their actions but, on the contrary, have stepped up their efforts to obstruct the course of international development, which is not to their liking. Europe's future now largely depends on how these negative tendencies are overcome.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE FOR THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE

The convocation and successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was an outstanding historic event, a major landmark on the way to European security.

In the historical aspect, the Conference was an exceptionally important and, in a sense, unique event. The various European forums of the past usually served the interests of one country or a small group of countries, relegating the other countries, the smaller ones above all, to secondary roles. The Conference's exceptional importance also derives from the fact that it involved virtually all the European states (except Albania), and also the USA and Canada as states that had taken part in the Second World War, bearing a share of the responsibility for Europe's peaceful development. The consensus principle, keynoting the Conference, guaranteed genuine equality among its participants, assuring every participant of an equal opportunity to influence the course of the debate and the nature of the decisions taken.

Speaking at a Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, L. I. Brezhnev said: "The principles of peaceful coexistence have become the leading trend in relations among states. This was most completely reflected in the successful European Conference in which the USA and

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Canada participated. It is a tremendous political victory for the forces of peace."*

Western observers often compare the Conference with the 1815 Congress of Vienna or even the imperialist Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, but this is a most inapt comparison, for the European Conference is fundamentally different from any international meeting of the past. It was not aimed to recarve the map of Europe, divide the continent into spheres of influence, suppress one group of European states for the benefit of another, or achieve any of the other goals set before many ``peace'' conferences of the past, which doomed the peace respites these conferences achieved to be short-lived, stoked the feelings of revenge and often carried within themselves the seed of fresh armed collisions.

The Soviet Union's efforts to bring about the convocation of the Conference were a major ingredient of the drive to realise the Peace Programme formulated by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

The convocation of the Conference in the summer of 1973 was a logical outcome of the long years of struggle on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to implement that idea of struggle which brought out the strongest points of Soviet foreign policy. A scientific analysis of the international situation and scientific forecasting of European development made it possible to elaborate a programme for the whole of Europe meeting the interests of all the European nations. Because Soviet foreign policy is dynamic and purposeful, it helped muster ever wider public support for the idea of the Conference. Because it is flexible and constructive, it helped establish mutual understanding and promote co-operation with the realistically-minded capitalist governments.

The USSR and the other socialist community countries' struggle for an all-European Conference had three stages.

Stage One lasted from 1966 to 1969, when the socialist countries elaborated concrete proposals for the convocation of the Conference. Their Bucharest declaration on stronger peace and security in Europe (July 6, 1966) and their Budapest address (March 17, 1969) contained a package of measures for ensuring European security and developing peaceful co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe, and called on the Western countries to discuss the various security and co-operation problems at an all-European Conference.

Even at that time, the idea met with considerable support in the West. Western politicians realised that it offered a possibility of favourable development. France's President de Gaulle, for instance, said in October 1966: "This continent from end to end should itself organise detente, accord and co-operation.. . . Nothing solid or valuable can be done for Europe until its peoples of the West and its peoples of the East come to an accord."*

The socialist countries' proposal, naturally, also met with a broad response in the Western working-class movement, public opinion and intellectual circles, entailing a reappraisal of many outdated attitudes. Various counter-projects were elaborated first among the scientific and then among neargovernment circles, although officially the ruling circles of most Western countries still maintained a negative stand.

After a while, some Western states began issuing positive official replies to the Budapest address.

In a memorandum of May 5, 1969, Finland's Government, in particular, approved the proposal for holding an all-- European Conference and said it was ready to take part in preparing and holding it.

In October 1969, the socialist countries elaborated and put before the states concerned a draft agenda for the Conference, so giving a fresh impulse to the idea. One of the two items on the agenda dealt with the need to ensure European secu-

* For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, p. 6.

* L'annee politique, economique, sociale et diplomatique en France 1966, Paris, 1967, pp. 418, 419.

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rity and renounce the threat or use of force in the mutual relations between states in Europe, and the second item, with the need to expand trade, economic, scientific and technical ties on an equitable basis, aimed to develop political co-- operation among European states.

At the first stage, the idea of a conference assumed tangible shape as a concrete international problem being debated in the Western countries' foreign-policy departments.

In the 1970-1972 period, the changes in Western foreign policy mentioned above manifested themselves, in particular, in a change of heart with respect to the idea of a conference. From around the end of 1969 on, some West European countries began to realise that an all-European Conference could bring them some advantages besides detente with the East: it could help adjust the system of military-political ties to the new situation, serve to enhance their role and influence in world and European politics, point out ways to establish more independent relations between the USA and Western Europe, and so on. They also believed that the Conference could help them overcome the limitations of their integration policy, and use some of the new possibilities offered by detente to solve their domestic economic and social problems.

The concrete positions of some Western states, naturally, derived not only from their desire for all-European detente, but also from the specific foreign-policy goals of every individual country.

In supporting the socialist countries' idea, France hoped that the Conference would help it enhance its political and economic influence not only in European, but also in world affairs. France's non-participation in NATO's military organisation enabled it to take a more independent stand in the debate within NATO on matters connected with the Conference. In May 1970, France came out in support of the Soviet proposal for the Conference, and at the NATO Council's Lisbon session in June 1971 it presented a detailed plan for its preparation.

The FRG altered its attitude to the Conference once the

SPD/FDP Government took office, and that was a manifestation of the West German ruling circles' turn to realism, to normalisation of relations with the socialist countries. Another thing to note here is the FRG's particular urge for "a gradual and progressive rapprochement between the two German states" in an improved climate in Central Europe.

Britain continued to show fairly little initiative with respect to the Conference even after France and the FRG decided to support the socialist countries' proposal. Under the Conservative Heath Government, Britain concentrated on the formulation of various prior conditions, which served to delay the Conference, and in the course of its preparation sought to channel it along anti-Soviet lines. The positive changes in Britain's attitude to the Conference were due to the installation in power of the Labour Government and the change in the US posture on European detente.

The smaller states of capitalist Europe were quicker off the mark than the leading West European states in taking a positive approach to the Conference. They did a great deal to help prepare the Conference, and Austria, Switzerland and Denmark offered their capitals as its place of venue.

These countries saw that an end to the confrontation and the establishment of stable security and better conditions for economic and cultural co-operation in Europe would open up fresh possibilities for their foreign policy.

``With a view to the government's forthcoming work for the convocation of a European Conference," Norway's Foreign Minister Svenn Stray said in the Storting on April 22, 1971, "we, Norwegians, will seek to prevent the formulation of any new conditions or reservations that could obstruct the start of its preparation."*

From the very beginning, Finland played a special role in preparing the forum, co-ordinating the individual countries' efforts and organising the meeting itself. In February 1970, Finland's Government appointed a special ambassador to

* Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Euiopa. Hrsg. von H.-A. Yacobsen, Cologne, 1973, p. 298.

8---1787

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hold negotiations in the various capitals in order to achieve progress in the debate on European security. From March 1970 to November 1971, he visited the capitals of all the states concerned (some of these more than once), a total of 53 cities. Later on, Finland's Government put in a great deal of effort into the actual convocation of the Conference. It is common knowledge that Finland's capital was the venue of the multilateral preparatory consultations, the opening and the final stage of the Conference. Helsinki has now become synonymous with that historic forum.

For a long time, even after the 1969-1970 period, the United States took a sceptical view of the Conference, fearing that it would serve to strengthen the socialist countries and "erode Western unity''.

After the 1972 summit talks with the USSR on a wide range of international problems, as mentioned above, the United States altered its stand in respect of the Conference. A point to emphasise is that later on, in 1973-1975, the United States supported the Soviet Union's initiative and made a vigorous effort to ensure the convocation, successful progress and completion of the Conference.

The fight to convene the Conference was not only protracted, but also very difficult. The realistic tendency advocated by the more far-sighted political forces within the ruling circles of the leading Western countries had to make its way against those who maintained that there was no alternative to confrontation.

The advocates of the negative tendency, backed by influential circles in the Western countries who did not want to see any progress towards detente, did their utmost to frustrate the effort to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, setting themselves against the Conference and launching a noisy propaganda campaign about its alleged danger for the West.

In view of these negative factors, the Conference was delayed for quite a long while, and Western observers made pessimistic forecasts about its possible outcome. An indica-

tive point here was that the numerous situation analyses and political games on the problems of the Conference staged in various Western research institutions and political departments in 1966-1969 mostly resulted in the conclusion that the Conference could not be held at all or would have negative consequences.'"^^5^^'

During Stage Two-1970-1972-the USSR and other socialist countries concentrated on the establishment of practical prerequisites for the concrete preparation of the Conference. Thus, they invigorated their bilateral relations with the Western states. In the course of the Soviet-US talks in Moscow in the summer of 1972, the two parties approximated their views on the need for the Conference, something that gave a strong impulse to its concrete preparation. The matter also featured prominently at the Crimea meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and Federal Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt in September 1971. The Communique on the meeting said: "The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic intend in the nearest future to consult with each other, with their allies and other European states in order to speed up the convocation of such a conference."**

The Conference was also discussed during L. I. Brezhnev's meetings with France's President Georges Pompidou and other leading Western politicians.

By way of concrete preparation for the Conference, the countries concerned held various bilateral consultations, and

* Thus, in the course of a six months' long political game organised by the international relations department of the University of Amsterdam, its participants studied documents, consulted embassy officials, held debates, made various analyses, and finally arrived at the conclusion that the Conference could not be held: the states' goals, they claimed, were so incompatible that it would even be impossible to agree on an agenda. A political game involving some well-known German politologists was staged in Hamburg in November 1969, and the conclusions drawn there were roughly similar.

** Soviet Foreign Policy and International Relations, Collected Documents, 1971, Moscow, 1972, p. 112 (in Russian).

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also multilateral meetings (even though on a bloc basis) to specify the range of participants, the date, the agenda, and so on. In June 1970, the Warsaw Treaty countries proposed an agenda for the Conference and its composition: all the European states, including the GDR and the FRG on an equal footing with each other and with other European states, and also the USA and Canada.*

In the course of Stage Two, the socialist countries' consistent foreign policy scored an impressive victory: all the Western countries now came to realise the urgent need for an all-European conference. The network of treaties and agreements signed in 1970-1972 created some important prerequisites for the solution of security and co-operation problems on the scale of the whole continent.

In that period, the Western states established a ramified mechanism for co-ordinating their foreign policies in matters connected with the Conference. NATO, in a way, was the coordinating centre. In December 1971, when it became clear that almost one-half of all the NATO members were prepared to take part in the Conference, a special working group was established in Brussels to co-ordinate the states' policies in this area. That was when NATO first presented itself as the pace-maker in the process of detente, which in effect meant that the NATO leaders wanted to secure control over the process and keep it in check.

The EEC worked parallel to NATO to co-ordinate its members' foreign-policy line with a view to their specific interests. EEC heads of state and foreign ministers kept debating the problems of the Conference within the framework of their political co-operation, and a special committee on the Conference and a number of working groups were set up. In 1970-1972, more and more Western experts were coming to realise that the Conference could take place after all.

Although multilateral consultations involving all the states

concerned had yet to be started. Stage Two saw the establishment of the necessary prerequisites.

Stage Three (November 1972-June 1973) covers the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki.

The improvement in the political climate in Europe, the broad public support for the idea of a conference, the movement for its convocation and the elimination of many obstacles in the course of intergovernmental negotiations helped usher in the final stage, involving multilateral consultations among all the states concerned. To show that all the participants thought highly of Finland's role in the preparation of the Conference, they started their consultations at ambassadorial level in Helsinki on November 22, 1972. These were atttended by 32 European countries, the USA and Canada.

Many of the measures taken in connection with the Conference were new to the diplomatic scene. The form of the multilateral consultations in Helsinki was itself unusual. The more than six months' long session of the ambassadors accredited in Finland's capital was periodically recessed to enable the ambassadors to report to their governments on the course of the negotiations; there were also many new elements in the work of the experts expressly sent to Helsinki, and the numerous official and unofficial meetings and conversations between diplomats, which enabled them to probe each other's positions and specify the problems on which they could come to a common understanding.

The multilateral consultations in Helsinki were a stage on the way to overcoming the serious difficulties, which were only natural, for it was for the first time in history that spokesmen for so many states had come together to specify the issues on which they could agree and to ensure the success of the unprecedented conference. These were states with different socio-political systems, and the relations between them had for decades been soured by the cold war and its aftermath. Eight of the participants in the consultations were countries building socialism, and seven of these were members of the defensive Warsaw Treaty Organisation, 15 countries were

* Soviet Foreign Policy and European Security, Moscow, 1972, pp. 104-06 (in Russian).

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members of NATO and 11 were capitalist countries not involved in any military groupings. Hence the numerous difficulties of the preliminary consultations, exacerbated by the attempts on the part of some Western circles to obstruct the Conference and gain unilateral advantages from it.

The Washington Post wrote on January 17, 1973: "The countries of the Atlantic Alliance are attempting to use the proposed European security conference to poke some big holes in the Iron Curtain." And The Times insisted that the socialist countries should "lower some of their ideological fortifications".""

The anti-socialist bias of some Western proposals was so glaring that even the delegations of some capitalist countries argued against these. The French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann said: "If we want to use the Conference to change or undermine any regimes, we will merely worsen the tension. Every country should be enabled to assert its national specifics."**

The work of the preparatory consultations was complicated by the attempt of some Western countries to put forward "the military aspects of security" as the Conference's central problem, and to tie in the preparation of the Conference with the preparation of the talks on troop and arms cuts in Europe. They did that despite the fact that on the eve of the Helsinki consultations, in view of the extreme complexity of the problem, the parties involved had agreed to refer it to a special body.

The representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Helsinki put in a great deal of effort in combating the attempts to distort the socialist foreign-policy line. They worked hard to explain the socialist countries' goals in connection with the Conference, and to rebuff the attempts to turn the Conference to anti-socialist purposes, making a

substantial positive contribution to the drafting of the final document of the multilateral consultations.

In the final count, realism won out. The thesis that it was impossible to agree so long as one group of participants aimed to gain unilateral advantages over the rest met with universal support. In the course of their six months' long debate, the participants came to this unanimous decision: the convocation of an all-European conference was a vital need.

The organisational preparation of the Conference was now over: the parties had specified its agenda, structure, composition, date and venue, rules of procedure, the tasks to be set before the working commissions that were to draft the decisions, etc. The results of the multilateral consultations were written into the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations for the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe, unanimously approved on July 8, 1973.

This document contained seven recommendations. Recommendation No. 1 said that the Conference was to be held in three stages: a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the participating states; the work of the specialised committees and subcommittees to prepare the final recommendations; and adoption of the Conference's final documents in formal session.

Recommendation No. 2, the most extensive one, dealt with the agenda and the concrete instructions to the working organs of the Conference at its second stage. It said that the Conference was to concentrate on these problems: questions relating to security in Europe,- co-operation in the field of the economy, science and technology; co-operation in humanitarian and other fields; and a follow-up to the Conference.

Recommendation No. 3 said that all the European states, the USA and Canada had the right to take part in the Conference, and that the UN Secretary-General was to be invited to attend its opening as a guest of honour.

In accordance with Recommendation No. 4, the first stage of the Conference was to open at 11.30 a.m. on July 3, 1973, and the dates of the opening of the second and third stages to be specified in the course of its further work.

* The Washington Post, January 17, 1973, p. A 14; The Times, July 7, 1973.

** Der Spiegel, No. 10, March 5, 1973, p. 24.

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Recommendation No. 5 said that the first and third stages were to be held in Helsinki, and the second, in Geneva.

Recommendations Nos. 6 and 7 provided, respectively, for the rules of procedure and financial arrangements.

In summing up the results of the consultations, their participants emphasised the business-like atmosphere, the constructive co-operation, the readiness for reasonable give-- andtake, which enabled them to overcome the existing difficulties and reach universally acceptable decisions. Head of the West German delegation Guido Brunner said: "It is surprising that despite some differences in the states' interests they have managed to achieve such a considerable degree of harmony and such considerable results."""

The first steps towards a broad East-West understanding proved to be successful.

The multilateral consultations went to enrich diplomatic practice. As a flexible form of negotiations, they proved to be very convenient and effective in debating unprecedented international problems like the convocation of Europe's first ever equitable forum involving all the European states and also the USA and Canada.

Having approved the Final Recommendations in June 1973, the participating states completed the preparations for the European Conference.

The participants' task at that stage was to work out general guidelines for the Conference, ascertain the states' fundamental positions and create a constructive atmosphere conducive to the new-type intercourse among the European states. All the ministers set out their governments' views and approved the Final Recommendations, and many of them introduced proposals on various procedural matters and on the substance of the problems to be discussed.

The universal recognition of the need for joint work at the Conference for the sake of peaceful development in Europe was a major success scored by the participants at that stage.*

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko said: "What kind of Europe do we want to see in the future? First of all, a Europe of peace, a continent where aggression has been ruled out for good from the life of the nations. We want to see trust and mutual understanding overcome the continent's division into military-political groupings. The relations among all the European states should develop on the lines of peaceful and mutually advantageous co-operation,"**

Naturally, the task was not only to proclaim the striving for peace in Europe, but first and foremost to elaborate concrete ways and means for ensuring peaceful development and co-operation. Two tendencies reflecting the two different political strategies in the solution of that problem took shape in the course of Stage One.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, supported by a number of West European states, emphasised the urgent need to lay a political foundation that would enable the European states to enter upon the stage of constructive co-- operation. A. A. Gromyko said at the Conference: "Jointly to determine the foundations for European security and co-- operation, for mutual relations between states in Europe, and to write these into joint documents is to set up long-term guideposts for peaceful development in Europe. Therein, we

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

On July 3, 1973, the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe opened at the Finlandia Palace in Helsinki. Stage One-a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of 33 European states, the USA and Canada-lasted until July 7, 1973.

* Europa-Archiv, Folge 13, 1973, p. 444.

* See, for instance. World Marxist Review, No. 9, 1975, pp. 2-3. ** Pravda, July 4, 1973.

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believe, lies the chief political substance of the decisions of the European Conference."""

To attain this goal the parties had to agree the principles for the establishment of a security system, and also show their resolve to put these into effect.

Soviet foreign policy devoted priority attention to the problem, putting forward a draft on the Conference's main final document: a General Declaration on the Foundations of European Security and the Principles of Relations Between States in Europe, formulated with a view to the Helsinki Final Recommendations and the positions of the other parties concerned.

The Soviet delegation maintained that the Conference also had to elaborate a set of measures to ensure the efficacy of the proclaimed principles of interstate relations, covering the settlement of disputes between European states solely by peaceful means, including negotiation, mediation or other means to be chosen and agreed by the parties.

Socialist diplomacy combined special attention to that central political question with a profound analysis of other problems. At Stage One, the socialist countries presented draft decisions on every item on the agenda. The German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic drafted a joint declaration on the development of co-- operation in the economy, trade, science and technology, and also protection of the environment; the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria came out with a joint draft entitled Basic Guidelines for the Development of Cultural Co-operation, Contacts and Exchanges of Information; the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic presented a draft Resolution Concerning the Advisory Committee on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The leading Western powers, on the other hand, concentrated on the third item of the agenda, saying it was the basis of European detente and the main condition for strength-

ening European security. The Foreign Ministers of the FRG, France and Britain, the US Secretary of State and spokesmen for other Western countries keynoted their speeches with this formula: "No detente without human contacts.''

During Stage One, the Western participants presented some proposals on the issues under debate: two proposals relating to item one of the agenda, four proposals on co-operation in the economy, science and technology and protection of the environment, and 15 proposals on humanitarian issues, including the development of cultural and other contacts.

This approach to the problem showed a definite shift of emphasis. There was no doubt at all that an improvement in the European political atmosphere and broader contacts between nations were bound to entail broader contacts in all the other areas, including culture, the arts, education, tourism, and so on. But the problems of political detente were essentially pivotal to European security, for it was only after the military danger in Europe was eliminated and an atmosphere of trust and respect for the sovereign rights of all states created that genuine prerequisites for broader contacts in the field of culture, exchange of information, and so on could be established/^^1^^''

Stage One of the Conference enabled the participants to acquaint themselves in detail with each other's positions on a wide range of security problems. The next step now was to tackle a whole package of tasks: to compare all the viewpoints, bring out the common elements, determine the possible lines of approximation and find ways to balance out the various interests in order to make possible a joint contribution to stronger peace in Europe without detriment to any

* Some of the Foreign Ministers, meeting in Helsinki, put forward for discussion questions not connected or connected only tenuously with the problems facing the Conference. Despite the understanding reached in late 1972 that any questions relating to troop and arms cuts were to be discussed at the special talks in Vienna, some states insisted that the Conference should also discuss that complicated problem, and the Austrian Foreign Minister called for a debate on the Middle East.

Pravda, July 4, 1973.

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participant whatsoever. These objectively difficult tasks were further complicated by the participants' differing approaches to their solutions and constituted the substance of the next stage of the Conference.

Stage Two took place in Geneva.

A Co-ordinating Committee consisting of the heads of all the delegations started work on August 29, 1973. The main work went forward in three committees and 12 subcommittees, which were in session for nearly two years from September 18, 1973, working very intensively.

At first, the committees approximated the participants' positions as regards the ways of ascertaining the viewpoints of non-participating states.""

In view of the protracted general debates and discussions on procedural matters, it was only in January 1974 that the working organs got down to editing the actual texts.

The work at Stage Two was particularly complicated. The outcome of the Conference, its contribution to the drive to change the nature of interstate relations in Europe and the headway towards stronger security and co-operation depended on the participants' goodwill and their ability to agree on the final decisions and their implementation.

At Stage Two of the Conference, the struggle between the socialist and capitalist foreign-policy concepts was even more pronounced than at Stage One, manifesting itself in the course of the debate on virtually every problem in every committee and subcommittee. As these met in closed session and the world social forces had no direct control over them, spokesmen for some Western countries kept trying to secure unilateral advantages at the expense of the socialist community.

The participants had to make sure that every organ of the Conference functioned successfully, but particular importance attached to the work of the First Committee, which was to draft the Conference's chief political document and formulate the principles of interstate relations.

Every one of these principles was obviously very important for Europe's peaceful future, but the frontier-- inviolability principle carried especial weight, for many of the wars in Europe had been sparked off by the urge to revise the existing frontiers.

In early April 1974, after long days of debate, the participants adopted this formula: "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demands for, or acts of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.''

Many delegations welcomed the entrenchment of the frontier-inviolability principle. Head of the Swiss delegation Rudolf Bindschedler told a Pravda correspondent: "As a traditionally neutral country, Switzerland has from the very beginning of the debate on the frontier-inviolability principle shared the Soviet Union's stand. The question was perfectly clear, and it is a pity that some delegates kept clinging to artificial reservations, slowing down the progress."""

The other security subcommittees also faced various difficulties. The study of the Swiss draft on the peaceful settlement of disputes enabled the participants to single out a group of questions where they could approximate their positions. The debate in the subcommittee dealing with the possibility of adopting some "confidence-building measures" was also very complicated.

What made it more difficult was that some Western states insisted on the adoption of "confidence-building measures"

* The non-European Mediterranean states that wanted to set out their views before the Conference were invited to formulate these in the committees on security and economic co-operation. In OctoberDecember 1973, the Conference heard the spokesmen of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Tunisia.

* Pravda. April 23, 1974.

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which were at odds with the basic principle of the Conference, that of reaching an understanding without detriment to the security of any party. They aimed to establish control over the socialist countries' armed forces and armaments on a large territory. In the final count, however, the participants reached a mutually acceptable compromise on that issue.

The Second Committee and its subcommittees had fewer difficulties to face than the other organs of Stage Two. Having discussed the problems of developing economic, scientific and technical co-operation, the participants arrived at the unanimous decision that equitable co-operation among the European states, regardless of their political system, should become a permanent factor of European politics; it could and should be used to improve the conditions for economic and social progress in Europe and elsewhere, in the developing world in particular. Economic, scientific and technical co-operation was to help consolidate the political detente in Europe, reduce the possibility of conflict and accelerate the establishment of a more effective European security and co-operation system.

The prospect of large-scale and long-term economic cooperation attracted considerable attention in the debate on economic problems. The socialist countries' declared interest in the development of such co-operation, continent-wide projects in various fields in particular, gave a strong impulse to the search for new forms and possibilities of co-operation.

Despite the strong desire to deepen the economic ties in Europe, the participants met with some difficulties in drafting a decision in this area. In the Second Committee spokesmen for some Western states also sought to compel the socialist countries to surrender their positions, attacking, in particular, the socialist countries' state monopoly of foreign trade and describing it as an obstacle in the way of economic cooperation. The question of eliminating trade discrimination and applying the most-favoured-nation principle on a wide scale was also solved with considerable difficulty.

The Third Committee and its organs met with the most formidable difficulties. The debates here were most acute.

and the participants worked very hard to bring their efforts ' to completion. Some Western countries sought to lay deliberate emphasis on the basket of humanitarian problems for a very definite class purpose, namely, to make it as easy as possible for the capitalist countries to wage a tough struggle against the socialist countries along every channel of ideological influence. As at earlier stages, the bulk of the Western states' drafts and proposals related to that particular basket. Some of these even called for changes in the socialist countries' internal legislation.

The socialist countries, backed up by some Western countries, countered these proposals with the demand that cooperation in the humanitarian sphere should be established and developed with full respect for the principles regulating the relations between states. That meant consistent compliance with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Western observers themselves were often puzzled by the anti-socialist edge of some Western proposals. Representative of the French Centre for ForeignPolicy Studies Walter Schiitze said: "What would they have said in West Germany if the Soviet Government sent a protest to the Federal Government over the sentences passed on the extremists and insisted that the basic rights of the Federal Republic's citizens were being restricted."*

Speaking in Annapolis on June 5, 1974, the then US President Richard Nixon put this very explicitly: "Eloquent speeches are now being made, or appeals are now being made for the United States through its foreign policy to transform the internal as well as the international behaviour of other countries, and especially that of the Soviet Union. ... We would not welcome the intervention of other countries in our domestic affairs and we cannot expect them to be co-operative when we seek to intervene directly in theirs.'"^^5^^'*

* Internationale Politik, 1973. Hans Rissen. Institut fur Politik und Wirtschaft, October 1973, p. 48. ** The New York Times, June 6, 1974, p. 16.

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In the course of the Conference, a number of West European states---Denmark, Norway, Austria and others-came out in support of the proposal to establish an organ that would operate between conferences.

The Final Recommendations of the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki charged the Co-ordinating Committee with a detailed analysis of the question of a follow-up to the Conference. From January 1974 on, the problem was discussed in the Co-ordinating Committee and in a special working group.

In the almost two years of the Conference's work in Geneva, its 35 participants dealt with the four baskets of problems as described above, holding something like 2,500 meetings of the Coordinating Committee, various other committees, subcommittees and special working groups, and examined about 4,700 drafts and proposals. The fact that the Conference was the first ever attempt to draft a joint programme of security and co-operation in Europe involving states that were diametrically opposed in class terms served to enhance the intrinsic difficulties of working out universally acceptable decisions, which were due to the complexity of the problems under debate. What made it even more difficult was that throughout Stage Two the opponents of detente and peaceful coexistence were working, openly or in secret, against the Conference.

In the FRG the right-wing forces headed by the former leader of the CDU/CSU opposition party, Strauss, waged a campaign to get the government to renounce its policy of abiding by the well-known treaties with the USSR and Poland.*

Some official Western spokesmen at the Conference were also influenced by the moves along various lines to pervert

The Western states' gradual swing away from their attempts to secure unilateral advantages to a realistic stand on basket three helped to approximate the participants' positions in that area.

An important step towards the completion of the Third Committee's work was taken in late July 1974, when the Co-ordinating Committee achieved a comprehensive understanding to the effect that co-operation in culture, education, information and human contacts had to go forward in full accord with the principles regulating the relations between the participating states, notably, the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time, the participants also agreed the text of the preamble to the document on humanitarian issues, notably, the provision that the participating states were to respect each other's right to establish their own laws and administrative rules.

As the problems on the agenda were being solved, the participants showed a growing interest in item 4, the follow-up to the Conference.

Both before and during the Conference, socialist foreign policy urged the need for continuity in its work. The Communique of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States of April 18,1974 said: "We regard this Conference not as a goal in itself, but as a starting point of the historic work to build new relations between all the states of the European continent. Relying on the principles that will be worked out by the Conference and to which 35 states will lend their authority, the European countries will be able to establish and develop large-scale co-operation to the great material and spiritual advantage of every participating country.... Creation of a permanent organ of the states-participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be in keeping with this goal."^:i

* At every stage of the Conference, Strauss' followers grossly distorted the socialist countries' policy and worked against the Conference, calling it a "Magna Charta" of Europe's enslavement ( Bayernkurier, February 1, 1975, p. 5).

9---1787

* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 17, 1974, p. 12.

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participants' flexible and constructive approach enabled them to bring the difficult Stage Two to successful completion.

Many observers and participants pointed out the constructive role of the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist states, and also the neutral countries' vigorous efforts. The discussion of the problems relating to the Conference at meetings between heads of state and government did a great deal to ensure the success of Stage Two.

The Soviet-US summit meetings in July and November 1974 and the two powers' readiness to act together with the other participants to find universally acceptable solutions were very important in this respect, and the detailed discussion of the Conference problems in the course of official visits to the USSR by the heads of government of Britain, France, the FRG and other countries, and also during L. I. Brezhnev's meetings with Western leaders gave fresh impulses to the work of Stage Two and helped to bring it to successful completion. Thus, the Soviet-French Communique on the visit to the USSR by the then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac emphasised the Conference's role as the chief element of European detente, and the two countries' readiness to do their best and step up their efforts to ensure the Conference's complete success as soon as possible/'"

During the final phase of Stage Two, a special working group under the Co-ordinating Committee drew up a set of recommendations for the holding of Stage Three, which were later approved by the participating states' governments.

In view of the vast importance of the Conference decisions for the establishment of a new system of international relations in Europe, the Soviet Union, backed by other socialist countries, proposed that the final stage should be held at a summit level, which would give due weight to the Conference and its decisions and help map out effective ways for putting these into effect.

the socialist countries' foreign policy and discredit the Conference. They attempted to go beyond the framework of the Helsinki understandings, to have the items on the agenda discussed under a different order of priority, put forward new questions and problems which were irrelevant to the Conference or which could not be solved at the Conference for intrinsic reasons, infringe upon the socialist countries' interests in the drafting of the final documents and secure some advantages in return for an agreement to the proposed date for its completion. Those who championed these countertendencies often used delaying tactics and dragged their feet on various issues. Head of the GDR delegation Ambassador Siegfried Bock said in June 1974: "What has to be criticised is the inadequate pace of work. If in the nine months of work in Geneva it has proved impossible to prepare the final documents, the blame for that does not lie with the socialist countries, which have constantly urged faster progress in all the working organs.""'

In a speech in the Polish Seym on July 21, 1974, L. I. Brezhnev said: "Those who attempt, so to speak, to raise the stakes and put forward problems which as yet, under the present degree of trust between states, cannot be solved 'are unrealistic and short-sighted. The solution to these problems could be found later on, in the course of further international detente. And the attempts to fuel the debate by trumping up various cavilling questions and to drown out in trifling inessentials the major fundamental matters which are now actually close to solution are totally unreasonable. All this serves to drag out the Conference for no reason at all, something that plays into the hands of the cold war forces."**

A point to note in analysing the work of Stage Two as a whole is that despite the influence of various, often contradictory or even negative, forces on the policy of individual states, an atmosphere of goodwill eventually prevailed. The

* Neues Deutschland, June 15, 1974. ** Pravda, July 22, 1974.

Pravda, March 25, 1975.

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Stage Two ended on July 21, 1975, having drafted a set of documents approved by all the participants.

The first European Conference culminated in a meeting of the heads of government of the 33 European states, the USA and Canada in Helsinki on July 30-August 1, 1975 (Stage Three).

The Finlandia Palace, where Stage One of the Conference had taken place earlier on, was now the venue of an unprecedented meeting between the leaders of the participating states.

The Soviet delegation was led by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev; the US delegation by President Gerald Ford; that of France by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing; Britain's by Prime Minister Harold Wilson; the FRG's by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; Finland's by President Urho Kekkonen, etc.

The delegation heads summed up the results of the more than two years of Conference work, made a broad assessment of the major international problems and determined immediate and long-term goals in the drive for European peace. They all agreed, in particular, on one crucial point: that Europe had to be turned into a continent of equitable co-operation among states with different social systems.

On August 1, 1975, the participants signed the Final Act of the Conference, proclaiming their common political will to improve and invigorate their mutual relations, to promote European peace, security, justice and co-operation, to work for effective implementation of all the Conference decisions and to expand, deepen and strengthen the detente.

The Final Act was the Conference's synoptical political document, crowning the thorough and protracted discussions and covering all the items discussed at the Conference on which the participants had reached agreement.

Great importance attaches to the participants' conclusions on European security, primarily their conviction that the detente had to be made a continuous, ever more viable and all-

round process, and that the implementation of the Conference results would be a major contribution to this process.

The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States is pivotal to the Final Act. It is a code of rules by which the participating states are scrupulously to abide in their relations with each other, regardless of their political, economic and social systems, geography, or economic levels. These are the principles: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, non-resort to the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers (a principle of paramount importance for Europe's future), territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-- intervention in each other's internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, co-operation among states, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. Implementation of these principles could help establish a solid basis for excluding aggression from the life of the European peoples, creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and restructuring the whole system of international relations on peaceful lines.

Many leaders of the participating countries gave a high assessment of the Declaration of Principles. Finland's President Urho Kekkonen said: "We note with satisfaction that although the Declaration of Principles derives from the goals and principles of the United Nations, it goes beyond the UN Charter, for it applies these principles to the concrete conditions on this continent."*

A special section of the Final Act deals with economic, scientific and technical co-operation.

The Conference arrived at the conclusion that in view of their growing economic interdependence, the states have to take ever more effective joint action to solve the world's major economic problems, and this is bound to have a bene-

* Pravda, August 1, 1975.

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ficial effect on the atmosphere in Europe and the world. It devoted much attention to the expansion of international trade as one of the main areas of co-operation. The Final Act provisions on industrial co-operation, notably long-term and large-scale co-operation on the mutual interest principle, are very important. The Conference specified the most promising areas for long-term projects of this kind.

The Conference attached much importance to scientific and technical co-operation, and pointed out ways to improve it in various fields where it could be particularly effective. The participants also devoted much attention, as reflected in the Final Act, to the protection and improvement of the environment, specifying their common goals, the areas for joint action and the forms and methods of co-operation.

At every stage of the Conference, the participants discussed the question of security in the Mediterranean area in the context of European security. They proclaimed their intention to develop good-neighbour relations and mutually advantageous co-operation with the non-European Mediterranean states, to structure their relations with these states in accordance with the rules set out in the Declaration of Principles, and to develop the contacts and dialogue with these countries initiated by the Conference.

A large section of the Final Act deals with co-operation in the humanitarian and other fields in the interests of stronger peace and mutual understanding among nations and the spiritual enrichment of the individual. Having emphasised that such co-operation was to be carried on in full accordance with the principles regulating the relations among states, the participants envisaged broad exchanges in the field of culture, education and science, broader sports ties, further development of contacts among state institutions, government and public bodies, and so on.

Many problems considered in the document "On Co-- operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields" had never before been dealt with in international negotiations. The very fact that these problems could now be tackled and eventually

solved by the European Conference implied a degree of confidence among its participants. Contrary to what bourgeois propagandists say, the socialist countries have constantly kept these problems in sight. General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Gustav Husak told the Conference: "We maintain that if the individual's all-round development is to be attained, all nations should have the broadest possible access to mankind's genuine cultural values."*

Towards the end of the Final Act, the participants set out their views on a follow-up to the Conference, proclaiming their intention to put the Conference decisions into full effect and to continue-on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis-the multilateral process set in motion by the Conference, and also specifying the machinery they are to use in this endeavour.

The signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975 rounded off the work of the Conference, which was a major event in modern history capable of affecting the whole state of affairs in Europe and the world.

The results and significance of the Conference are manyfold. L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: "In many ways, the results of the Conference are projected into the future. Perspectives for peaceful co-operation have been outlined in a large number of fields-the economy, science, technology, culture, information, and development of contacts between people. Some other measures, too, have been defined to promote confidence between states, covering also the military aspects."""*

The Conference was an unprecedented, historic forum. It differs from all the conferences of the past in that its results go to benefit all nations.

The 35 participating states with different social systems discussed a wide range of vital problems and, having dove-

* Prauda, August 1, 1975. ** Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 23.

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tailed their different views and interests, adopted a set of mutually acceptable decisions. They proved that co-operation in Europe was possible and that their governments were ready to take this road.

Mutual give-and-take within the class, political and ideological limits each of the parties was prepared to allow finally enabled them to attain a universally acceptable understanding. The Conference summarised the results of the Second World War and the postwar period, laying the foundation for a qualitatively higher level of all-European co-operation. It has made it possible to put paid to the cold war, lay the groundwork for European stability and pave the way for deeper detente in every area.

The realisation of the principles of interstate relations proclaimed by the Conference will help establish a political basis for the solution of the cardinal European problems in a spirit of peace and co-operation. On the whole, the allEuropean forum was an obvious success for all those who cherish peace and security on the globe/^^1^^"

The Conference has been described as a turning point, a new chapter in European history, for it summed up, the political experience of the past, drew the necessary conclusions and mapped out guidelines for the future. It made considerable headway in the effort to get the principles of peaceful coexistence firmly rooted in the practice of international relations.

The Conference raised the principles of sovereignty and equality to a new height, making a major contribution to the real equality of all the European states. President of the French Republic Valery Giscard d'Estaing told the Conference: "From the very beginning of its work, everything was arranged so as to put the participating states on a footing of complete equality and enable each state to speak on its own

behalf, regardless of whether it is big or small, or whether it is or is not a member of any alliance. This is what has enabled us for the first time under such important circumstances to benefit from the contribution of neutral or non-aligned countries."*

The Conference served to accelerate the movement towards more democratic international relations, enabling the peoples to have a greater say in politics. The convocation and successful outcome of the Conference were largely due to the ever more vigorous efforts of the social forces and their growing influence on international relations.

The Conference's experience could prove to be very useful outside Europe in view of the situation now taking shape in other parts of the world. The Conference shows that the most knotty problems could well be discussed and solved at the Conference table with a view to the interests of all the participants, and that the relations among states could develop on the basis of jointly elaborated principles. European practice could serve as a model for security and co-operation systems in other parts of the world. The resources released in the course of economic, scientific, technical and other cooperation in Europe could go to help countries on other continents develop and prosper.

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim emphasised: "This gathering will prove to have been of historic significance not only for Europe but also, I hope, for all mankind."**

All this is quite true, but if the Conference is to have its full impact on the state of affairs in Europe and the world, the states will have to ensure consistent implementation of its decisions. The leaders of many states assured the Conference that they were prepared to carry out its decisions in full. L. I. Brezhnev said: "The document we are signing is a broad but clear-cut platform of action for the states on unilateral.

* A. Gromyko, "Peace Programme in Action", Kommunist, No. 14, 1975, p. 14.

* Le Monde, August 1, 1975. ** Moscow News. August 9, 1975.

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CHAPTER FIVE

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

bilateral and multilateral lines for years or even decades ahead."*

The participants' proclaimed loyalty to the Final Act principles has yet to stand the test of practice, showing that they are proof against the attacks of the reactionary forces in the Western countries, which have been working against the detente and the implementation of the Conference decisions. The world-wide popularity of the Conference and its decisions makes it hard for these forces to obstruct the processes set in motion by the Conference.

Here is how L. I. Brezhnev described the importance of the Conference on its first anniversary: "The Conference is an event of vast importance. Its main achievement, in our opinion, is that it has voiced all the participating countries' will for peace.''^^1^^""

THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC MOVEMENT FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

The events of the first half of the 1970s show that the peace front has continued to expand and strengthen and that national and international efforts are being further consolidated in the interests of mutual understanding and co-- operation among all the forces fighting against imperialist aggression and reaction, for peace, international security and national independence. European opinion has every reason to face the future with a degree of optimism, for there are now some very real possibilities for consolidating the positive changes in Europe and laying a solid groundwork for a lasting security system, for good-neighbour relations and fruitful all-round co-operation among all the European nations.

The international detente and the considerable progress made towards stronger peace over the past few years are chiefly due to the consistent peace policy followed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist community states. Thus, the fact that the peaceful coexistence principle has become a tangible force of international development is one of the more important results of the peace policy. That conclusion was first formulated at the 24th Congress of the CPSU,* and the course of world events since then has proved it to be true. The Peace Programme put forward by the 24th Congress has met with recognition among those who want to see aggression, force and arbitrary rule eliminated from international relations and these relations arranged on lines that

* See 24th Congress of the CPSU, pp. 29-30.

* Pravda, August 1, 1975. ** Ibid., July 30, 1976.

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On June 8, 1971, a meeting in Moscow, representing the Soviet trade unions, women's and youth organisations, cooperatives, scientific and technical bodies, creative unions and the USSR Parliamentary group, set up a Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation, charging it with the task of helping mobilise all the public forces for the fight for detente, against the arms race, for a ban on nuclear, chemical and other mass-destruction weapons, co-ordinating their struggle for stronger security and all-round co-operation and for the establishment of the peaceful coexistence principles in the relations between states with different social systems and mustering support for government efforts to convene an allEuropean conference.*

The first Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security and Co-operation, held in Brussels in June 1972, showed the growing influence of public opinion on the solution of urgent international problems. L. I. Brezhnev's message of greetings to the Assembly emphasised that the situation in Europe had become much healthier and that "the social movements of different political orientation and all the peace-loving forces had done much to bring about that turn of events. ... If the cold war debris is to be cleared away once and for all, and the militarist, revanchist and conservative forces opposing the detente are to be isolated, public opinion has to put in a consistent and purposeful effort. It has to come out in favour of stronger mutual trust among nations and all-round peaceful co-operation among the European states."""* The Assembly brought together representatives of the working people, political parties and trade unions, well-known scientists and writers, workers in culture and clergymen from various European countries, and also spokesmen for some international organisations. They unanimously adopted a Formal Statement and the final re-

would agree with the ideals of peace, genuine security and¹ broad mutually advantageous co-operation.

L. I. Brezhnev said on April 14, 1970, in connection with the programme for European security and co-operation: "Such a programme provides for a non-resort to the threat or use of force, recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe that took shape after the Second World War, development of mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific and technical, and cultural ties among all the European states regardless of any distinctions in social system."""

Strengthening European security is a pivotal social, as well as political, problem and the broad social forces have to do their best to help statesmen and career diplomats tackle it. Granting the importance of interstate treaties and agreements, one may safely say that the stronger the public support for these treaties and agreements, the more weight these carry. Vigorous public efforts help create a peaceful climate in Europe.

The European nations do not want to see the horrors of another world war and have been doing their best to establish a lasting security and co-operation system on the continent.

The socialist countries' proposals for European security and co-operation and their call for an all-European conference met with warm support among broad public circles in Europe. There were many meetings and forums attended by parliamentarians, scientists, businessmen, trade unionists, workers in culture and representatives of the women's and youth movements. In the course of 1970 and 1971, committees for European security were set up in France, Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Finland and other European countries, the Soviet Union among these. Well-known public figures, politicians, representatives of trade union, women's and youth organisations, scientists and writers were invited to sit on these committees.

* L. I. Brezhnev, Lenin's Course, Speeches and Articles. Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 540 (in Russian).

* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 5, 1972, p. 4. ** Ptavda, June 3, 1972.

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ports of the commissions on the political and social aspects of European security, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, and cultural co-operation.

The Brussels Assembly was a real forum of European peoples, which ushered in a new stage of their struggle, a well-organised all-European movement for an effective security system on the continent. The Assembly devoted particular attention to the preparation and holding of an allEuropean conference, for the idea of such a conference, as the head of the Soviet delegation, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. P. Sheetikov emphasised, had "already taken fairly practicalshape".* He said: "In our opinion, government efforts here alone, however important, are still insufficient. European public circles bear enormous responsibility for the correct, timely and efficient use of the newly opened possibilities for strengthening the peace, mutual understanding and co-operation. Naturally, that is not to say that they should substitute for the diplomats' and prime ministers' efforts. What they have to do is to overcome the various differences in ideological and even political views and try to find a common approach to the question of how the Europeans could go about strengthening the peace and security on their continent."*^^5^^'''

The work of the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation set up by the Brussels Assembly is proof of the public's growing role in the peace drive. The Assembly adopted a declaration in support of the call for an all-European conference on security and co-operation. "The Assembly has examined the concrete and urgent problems whose solution will determine our future and unreservedly supports the idea of the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation, with all states concerned participating on an equal footing."***

At that time, European governments were still debating the idea of a conference in preliminary, mostly bilateral discussions. But only five months later, in November 1972, they launched their multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki, an event which had become possible, to quote Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, owing to the profound changes in international relations unprecedented in modern history.*

The public's role in these changes can hardly be exaggerated. Within another six months (from July 3 to 7, 1973), Stage One of the Conference had opened in Helsinki. In accordance with a prior understanding, it was held on the level of Foreign Ministers.

That understanding had been reached in late May 1973, when the second session of the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation, attended by spokesmen for various public movements from 25 European countries, met in Brussels.

Having analysed the international situation, the session assessed the forthcoming opening of the Conference as a great success, and its final communique said that it was a "result of diplomatic initiative and of persistent efforts on the part of public forces"."""" But for these efforts and the vast scale of the public movement for lasting peace and security in Europe, the Conference would not, apparently, have been held as early as it was, and its first results could not have been so fruitful. That was fresh proof of the public's undeniable influence on "big politics", which General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev spoke of at the Helsinki Conference.""'^^1^^"*

The public forces of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries, which had initiated the Conference,

* Pravda, December 7, 1972.

** Soviet Committee tot European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 11, 1973, p. 5. *** Izvestia, August 1, 1975.

'* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 6, 1972, p. 7.

** Ibid., p. 6. *** Ibid., p. 9.

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out in solid unity for a continent of peace, security and cooperation, no adventurist groups will ever succeed in undermining the detente."*

Peace-loving public opinion has repeatedly urged the need for vigorous struggle against the reactionary and adventurist elements seeking to hamper the international detente and bring back the cold war.

When the multilateral preparatory consultations started in Helsinki, no one in Europe or elsewhere expected to see all the problems relating to the establishment of a lasting peace and security system in Europe solved quickly and without any hitches, for everyone knew that although Europe had for almost three decades been living in peace, the long years of the cold war and the consequent mutual mistrust and preconceptions had left too deep an imprint on Europe's political complexion to have it altered at one go.

Knowing this all too well, the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation adopted at its Brussels session in December 1972 a statement urging European opinion to make a sustained effort "to uphold and develop the steps that have been undertaken and to overcome the existing obstacles. It is for this reason that the International Committee has elaborated a plan of action.''

played a most important role in helping bring about its convocation and successful holding, for under the socio-political system in these countries, these forces operate in organic unity with their governments and all state institutions.

Public action in these countries was more effective than in the capitalist countries, where the public forces had to work for the same goal-the convocation of an all-European Conference-in face of resistance, unwillingness or sheer inertness on the part of the ruling circles, as/ say, in Britain. The broad campaign launched by the British Committee for European Security and Co-operation, the trade unions and cooperative, anti-war and religious bodies (totalling almost 4.5 million members) in support of the Conference idea helped to alter the British Government's official stand.

Speaking in Paris a few days before the opening of Stage One, L. I. Brezhnev gave a high assessment of that historic event: "The main point is that the participants in the Conference are to get a glimpse of our continent's future, map out the ways for the development of mutual relations among the states concerned in the conditions of peaceful co-- operation. This is a truly historic task."*

The initial phases of the Conference showed that,- given the goodwill and a desire for peace, the participating countries could jointly elaborate historic decisions crucial to the future of the European nations. If they did, the public forces could play a particularly important role in strengthening the peace and security in Europe, especially in view of the fact that some forces in the world were still set against the relaxation of tensions. Following the completion of Stage One, Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek told the World Marxist Review-. "One of the most effective guarantees that the positive changes will not be reversed is, I think, consistent and firm public support of the detente tendency. If large sections of the European population come

FRESH PUBLIC INITIATIVES

Despite the intrigues against the peace, the process of international detente successfully developed. In the course of the run-up to the World Congress of Peace Forces, many public organisations stepped up their activities. The International Committee for European Security and Co-operation was now working more effectively and on a larger scale, involving more and more political and public organisations, like

* World Marxist Review, No. 9, 1973, p. 22. 10-1787

* L. I. Brezhnev, On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, Speeches and Articles, Moscow, 1973, p. 540 (in Russian).

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the prominent French trade union leader, Secretary-General of the French General Confederation of Labour Georges Seguy that the World Federation of Trade Unions was true to its principles and took part in every effort aimed to relax tensions in Europe and establish the broadest possible cooperation with all the trade union forces in order to promote these efforts,* The very fact that the Congress, attended by the representatives of 200 million European working people, met under the slogan of struggle for unity in the world trade union movement on a principled class basis which implied, above all, the working people's unity in the struggle for peace, for complete elimination of the danger of another war, and for security and co-operation, meant a fresh stride towards a more consolidated international working-class movement and more vigorous activity by all the public forces in the endeavour to ensure the success of the European Conference. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev's message of greetings to the 8th World Congress of Trade Unions emphasised that "solidarity and cohesion is the source of the working-class victories and achievements and the pledge of fresh successes in the struggle against imperialism and the monopolies. In the course of this struggle, more and more objective prerequisites are being created for greater unity of action by all the trade unions on the basis of protection of the working people's class interests."**

A Conference of the Women's Organisations in European Countries on Questions of Co-operation and Security on the Continent (Helsinki, August 1973), the first conference of its kind, called on the initiative of Finland's women's organisations and attended by 170 delegates from 26 European countries, was another major contribution to the cause. It urged early and successful completion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-opera-

*Tntd, October 18, 1973. ** Pravda, October 16, 1973.

10*

the Socialist Party of Belgium, and public circles in the FRG, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Denmark and Austria. National committees for security and co-operation were set up in the Netherlands, Ireland and other countries. The security and co-operation movement in Belgium, France and Britain mustered the support of prominent politicians, representatives of public and scientific circles, parliamentarians and workers in culture, literature and the arts. Thus, former Belgian Ministers Albert De Smaele and Jean Terfve, winner of the International Lenin Prize "For the Promotion of Peace Among Nations" Canon Raymond Goor and prominent Christian trade union leader Robert De Gendt took a vigorous part in the work of the International Committee's secretariat. Trade unionists and representatives of co-operatives, women's and youth organisations have also done a great deal for the movement.

Since the start of the Conference on Security and Co-- operation, some major forums bringing together workers, women and the young have taken place in Europe. The 10th World Festival of Youth and Students in Berlin in August 1973, held under the slogan "For Anti-imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship", gathered 25,000 delegates from 140 countries of every continent, voicing different political and religious views. They adopted an address "To the Youth and Students of the World", expressing a readiness "in close cooperation with one another" to continue their struggle "for peace, so that imperialist aggression, war and the arms race will cease, so that peace and security in Europe and in the other regions of the world will be ensured, so that the world will advance on the path of peaceful coexistence, so that the right of the peoples to decide their destiny themselves will be recognised, so that a peaceful and just solution of international conflicts will be guaranteed".*

The 8th World Congress of Trade Unions held in Varna (Bulgaria) in October 1973 confirmed the idea formulated by

* Pravda, August 7, 1973.

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The main purpose of the Commission on Culture was to involve prominent workers in culture in the activities of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-- operation and establish contacts with various cultural bodies in the European countries in order to take common action for European security.

In accordance with a recommendation drawn up by the Brussels Assembly and the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation, the Commission drafted a set of proposals for a convention on culture and co-- operation, showing the interconnections between the problems of security and cultural co-operation. The convention specially emphasised that under the present scientific and technical progress, peace is the most vital condition for cultural development, and cultural co-operation is a factor of peace.

More than 130 Soviet journalists and foreign newsmen from Europe, the USA and Canada accredited in Moscow met for a round table discussion on "The Mass Media's Role in European Detente and the Effort to Realise the Principles of Security and Co-operation", organised by the Novosti Press Agency and the Information Commission of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Despite some difference of opinion, all the participants agreed that the mass media had to make an everyday effort for peace, security and co-operation in Europe.

The Commission on the Social Aspects of European Security, established in October 1972, set to work to spread the decisions of the Brussels Assembly, develop international cooperation and promote scientific research into the social aspects of European security. The representatives of the AilUnion Central Council of Trade Unions presented a document on the trade unions' tasks in protecting the environment and took part in a European trade union seminar on the subject held in Prague in the spring of 1973. The seminar recommended that the WFTU leadership should set up a special commission on the environment. The seminar and the duly established WFTU commission helped to focus the

tion also did much in this area. During the run-up to the Conference, the bulk of its practical work was concentrated in several commissions: on the political aspects of European security, economic, scientific and technical co-operation, culture, information and the social aspects of European security. The Political Aspects Commission was first charged with popularising the idea and goals of the European Conference and, once it opened, helped to make it more effective and successful. A large number of scientists and writers on international affairs took part in the work.

The Commission's members took an active part in the bilateral and multilateral meetings, conferences and symposia, which helped to ensure a fruitful exchange of opinion among European scientists and public figures. The Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation, whose task was to spread the idea of Europe-wide economic, scientific and technical co-operation, held a number of multilateral and bilateral meetings among scientists and businessmen to discuss such co-operation.

The Commission's activists took part in a conference entitled New Initiatives in East-West Co-operation, held in Vienna in November 1974.

The Conference was attended by businessmen, spokesmen for public organisations, scientists and economists from Europe and the USA, and also representatives of the International Committee and national committees for European security and co-operation. Its communique said that the Conference had worked in accordance with two major principles:

- that substantial progress on the way to overcome the obstacles to mutual trust among countries with different political, economic and social systems could best bring out the advantages of peaceful life;

- and that forms of joint action had to be found in order to make the utmost use of the world's natural resources.*

* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 18, 1974, p. 7.

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attention of Europe's trade unions on this important problem.

The contacts between the Soviet and International Committees for European Security and Co-operation yielded good results. The Soviet Committee's representatives took an active part in the International Committee's sessions. The second session in Brussels on May 25-27, 1973 was particularly fruitful, primarily because it represented a very wide spectrum of public opinion and went forward in a constructive and business-like atmosphere.

The International Committee's plenary meeting in Brussels on April 5-7, 1974 did a great deal to boost the security and co-operation movement's prestige. It gathered together representatives of national committees and groups from virtually all the European countries, who discussed the measures they could take together to bring about the earliest and successful completion of the European Conference.

The International Committee called on all governments, parliaments and other organs of power, on all political forces, trade unions, major public organisations and every section of public opinion

- to work towards a quick conclusion of Stage Two of the Conference;

- to create a positive atmosphere of trust, both moral and political, around the Conference;

- to urge that the final phase of the Conference should be held at the highest possible level;

- to consider the European Conference not as the final goal, but as a component in the process demanding further efforts on the part of all the states and peoples of Europe.*

By way of preparation for the World Congress of Peace Forces, the representatives of 40 international and 81 national organisations from 60 countries-spokesmen for political parties, trade unions, women's, youth and other public organisa-

tions, parliamentarians, workers in culture, scientists, churchmen and also spokesmen for the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organisation for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation and many other international bodies-held an International Consultative Meeting in Moscow, on March 16-18, 1973. They came out unanimously for the convocation in Moscow of a World Congress of Peace Forces to determine, "with the observance of the full equality of all, the priority goals of the common struggle for peace and map out ways for more vigorous public participation in this struggle"."' The preparatory and co-ordinating national committees set up for the purpose in more than 100 countries, notably, the International Preparatory Committee, the Soviet Committee for the World Congress of Peace Forces, and also the International and Soviet Committees for European Security and Co-operation, worked to prepare the World Congress of Peace Forces,** which met in Moscow in October 1973 and was attended by more than 3,500 delegates from 143 countries and spokesmen for 120 international and more than 1,100 national organisations and movements. It was the broadest forum of public movements ever held in history. It marked an important stage in the peoples' struggle to maintain and strengthen the peace, and did much to improve mutual understanding and co-operation among public organisations, voicing a wide spectrum of political and other views. The participants discussed the question of what the peace forces had to do and were able to do with the sway of public opinion behind them in the struggle for peace and decided that they had to take vigorous and co-ordinated action to help mankind move towards peace and security.***

* Ibid., Nos. 12-13, 1973, pp. 9-10.

** See M. Zimyanin, "More Vigorous and Concerted Action by the Peace Forces: New Stage", Kommunist, No. 18, 1973, p. 18. *** Izvestia, November 3, 1973.

* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 17, 1974, p. 16.

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The delegates and the whole of world opinion were deeply impressed by L. I. Brezhnev's speech, containing a comprehensive analysis of the international situation and detailed answers to the problems facing the modern world. He said: "The principles of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems are winning ever broader recognition. They are becoming more and more specific in content, and are gradually becoming a generally accepted standard of international relations." Characterising the main tendency in the development of present-day international relations, L. I. Brezhnev noted the present swing away from the cold war to detente, from military confrontation to stronger security and peaceful co-operation.*

In analysing the state of affairs in Europe, L. I. Brezhnev said: "Significant changes have come about of late in the relations of the socialist countries with the West European countries.... All this has unquestionably improved the situation in Europe, the continent where both world wars broke out. And the European Security Conference is a concentrated expression of the positive changes that have taken place here."** Peace in Europe, he said, "has, in fact, become an imperative necessity, and the utmost development of diverse peaceful co-operation among the European states, the only really sensible solution. A contributing factor is that an ever more active and important role in European life is being played by the socialist countries, which are profoundly and sincerely devoted to the cause of peace and international co-operation, while in the Western part of the continent there is a growing appreciation of the political realities, and the circles favouring these goals are winning ever more influence."***

Having expressed his confidence in the eventual success of the European Conference, L. I. Brezhnev listed the principles

for mutual relations among European states. He also pointed out the importance of military detente on the continent and the Soviet Union's responsible, constructive and realistic approach to the Vienna talks on force reductions in Central Europe.* He specially emphasised the role of the masses, their organisations and political parties in the effort to solve the problems of war and peace. "One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparalleled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression, and an unbending will for peace."**

The Congress showed that broad public forces wanted to work together for peace, international security, disarmament and national independence. Having pointed out the successes in European detente, the Congress urged the need to deepen and expand this process, establish a reliable security system and reach an agreement on a cutback of foreign and national armed forces in Central Europe. The Congress emphasised that, given a solid foundation of political and military security, equal economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation among all the European nations could make considerable headway.

About 300 men and women took part and 104 spoke in the Congress' Commission on European Security and Cooperation. The Commission's fruitful work resulted in a final report, which emphasised that the considerable progress achieved over the preceding years on the way to European detente was a component part of the general, world-wide tendency towards an improvement of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence among independent and equal states. The Commission's final report said that the establishment of lasting peace in Europe was a crucial factor of international security. On the other hand, the tensions and

* Ibid., pp. 313-15.

** L. I. Brezhnev, Out Course: Peace and Socialism, Moscow, 1974, p. 164.

* See L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 301. ** Ibid., pp. 301, 302. *** Ibid., pp. 311-12.

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conflicts in other parts of the world could be detrimental to European security.*

The World Congress of Peace Forces adopted some important documents.** First, there was an Appeal to all men and women "to unite their efforts to ensure that a just and enduring peace should prevail on earth".*** Noting the improvement in the international political climate and saying that there was now real hope of saving the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of a nuclear holocaust, the document pointed out that much had already been achieved, but a lot more still remained to be done, for there were many hotbeds of tension in the world which were fraught with danger for the whole of mankind. The Appeal emphasised that national and international organisations had to co-ordinate their efforts to muster public opinion as an effective instrument of peace.

The platform for co-operation among the peace forces elaborated by the Congress was also reflected in the Communique, another important document containing an assessment of the recent changes in international affairs and noting the more important role of the peace forces and the opportunities these have for drawing on the support of public opinion. In view of all that, the Congress decided that "it is necessary to take vigorous and concerted action, leaving aside all that divides us, to help foster the progress now under way towards peace and security". The final part of the Communique said: "The efforts of governments alone are insufficient to create a system of international relations in which war would be impossible and all the peoples and states could enjoy to the fullest the benefits of peace and the fruits of modern civilisation and the scientific and technical revolution. Everyone on earth has a stake in this. Time does not wait."****

The Congress reaffirmed the steadily growing role of public movements and organisations, primarily those voicing the working people's views and aspirations in the struggle for a healthier international situation and for social progress. It showed that the broad public forces were prepared to take vigorous and concerted action for a just and democratic peace, for international security, disarmament, national independence and co-operation among all nations.*

By way of a follow-up to the World Congress of Peace Forces, various international and national organisations held numerous bilateral and multilateral conferences, symposia, meetings and other measures aimed to ensure peace and security the world over.

The Second Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security and Co-operation, held in Belgium on April 26-29, 1975, was an important event in European life. Symbolically, the Assembly met on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the Second World War, a great day in mankind's history.

All the speakers at the Assembly noted the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the victory over fascism.

The Assembly was attended by the representatives of 29 European states and 48 international organisations, the United Nations and UNESCO among these. One characteristic feature to note here is that virtually all of Europe's real political forces and social movements-Catholics, Radicals, Socialists, Communists, trade unionists and spokesmen for women's and youth organisations-took a vigorous part in the Assembly.

Its main goal, as formulated by the participants, was to give a correct assessment of the meaning and significance of the European Conference, create a favourable atmosphere for its successful completion, help implement its decisions and further promote the detente. The Assembly focussed its attention on the Conference's prospects, and virtually all the

* See M. Zimyanin, op. cit., p. 24.

* See Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, Nos. 14-15, 1973, pp. 17-20.

** Izvestia, November 3, 1973.

*** World Congress of Peace Forces, Documents, Moscow, 1973, p. 20. **** Ibid., pp. 4, 18-19.

I

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political to military detente and set up a reliable security and co-operation system in Europe,

Women's organisations have done a great deal for security and co-operation, both in Europe and the world.

It will be remembered that on the initiative of the Women's International Democratic Federation and some other international women's organisations, the 27th UN General Assembly designated 1975 as International Women's Year (IWY). This amounted to recognition, on the one hand, of the women's role in society, their growing contribution to the struggle for peace and security and, on the other, of the need to do away with any remaining discrimination.

The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries (USFS), a Soviet mass organisation, and the societies for friendship with the Soviet Union in the European countries have actively worked to strengthen European security and co-operation.

In September 1975, the USFS Presidium adopted a special address "To All the Soviet Union's Friends Abroad", calling on the associations, societies, institutes of friendship and cultural ties with the USSR, all the organisations interested in co-operation with the Soviet Union, and all men of goodwill to take practical steps to implement the Helsinki understandings. The European societies for friendship with the Soviet Union have held hundreds of symposia, colloquia and meetings, and have sent off many letters to parliaments, party leaders and government officials urging full implementation of the Helsinki decisions.

International Women's Year centred on a World Congress, held in Berlin, the capital of the GDR, on October 20-24, 1975.

The Congress discussed the problems of the equal involvement of men and women in economic and social affairs, and woman's role in the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. Much was also said about the need to ensure security and co-operation in Europe.

speakers came out in favour of its earliest and successful completion at a summit level.

Head of the Soviet delegation. Chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation, A. P. Sheetikov, said: "The successful completion of the European Conference in the nearest future will be of particular importance for the effort to create an atmosphere of mutual trust in Europe and make the detente irreversible. On the whole, we hope, the Conference will help consolidate the peace forces on the continent, strengthen security and establish a lasting and allembracing system of economic, scientific, cultural and other interstate ties."*

The Assembly devoted much attention to other problems facing the Europeans. Its Second Committee, for instance, looked into ways of restructuring international relations in Europe on radical lines in order to ensure peace and security through a collective effort by all the European nations and supplement the political detente with a military detente.

The Third and Fourth committees dealt with the prospects of long-term continent-wide economic and cultural co-- operation, the problems of improving mutual understanding among nations and tying in European security and co-operation with peace the world over.

The Assembly's unanimously adopted Declaration set fresh targets and formulated concrete plans for joint action for European security and co-operation. The participants called on "all governments, all parliaments, all political parties, all non-governmental organisations, to respond to our appeal and work on a national and international level for the broadening of detente and a peaceful future for Europe".** On the whole, the outcome of the Second Assembly provided new graphic proof of the European peoples' desire to seek new ways to deepen the detente, go over from

^Soviet Committee tor European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 20, 1975, p. 17. ** New Times, No. 19, 1975, p. 21.

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The Soviet Veterans' Committee (SVC) from the very beginning focussed its attention on European security and cooperation, regarding it as crucial to the cause of peace and security on the globe. Thus, it has maintained bilateral contacts with other veterans' organisations and movements bringing together anti-fascist Resistance fighters and victims and prisoners of fascism, has taken part in the International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR) and the international committees of former prisoners of fascist concentration camps, and has also established links with the World Veterans' Federation (FMAC).

The SVC took part in the two Brussels assemblies for security and co-operation.

It also helped hold the Rome meeting of European veterans of war, Resistance fighters and victims of war for security, cooperation and friendship. The meeting laid the groundwork for subsequent co-operation among European and international veterans' organisations, and helped further consolidate the veteran ranks in the fight for peace and security.

The SVC attaches paramount importance to the problem of supplementing the political detente with a military detente. It took an active part in the preparation and holding of a European Veterans' Disarmament Symposium in November 1975, which devoted special attention to European security.

After the successful completion of the Helsinki Conference, the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation, working to fulfil the decisions of the Second Assembly, adopted a Programme of Action by Europe's Public Forces in Support of the Results of the European Conference and for Their Implementation.*

The Programme provided for a wide range of measures aimed to make sure that the Helsinki understandings were implemented and observed.

The international and national committees have devoted

particular attention to the important problem of supplementing the political detente with a military detente. In April 1976, a session of the International Committee, voicing the common view of various political and social circles of European opinion, formulated a Declaration entitled "The Political Detente Should Be Supplemented with Effective Measures in Disarmament``/''''' saying that the European security movement now had to concentrate, among other things, on helping turn Europe into a zone of peace and co-operation without foreign troops or military bases and ensure scrupulous observance of all the treaties and agreements aimed to limit or end the arms race.

The Declaration also called on the European public forces to fight for troop and arms cuts, especially in areas where the military confrontation is particularly dangerous, to prevent the establishment of any new military blocs or military groupings, and work for a simultaneous disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and, as a first step, of their military organisations. These policy-making documents issued by the International Committee have served as a broad foundation for the drive to consolidate the public forces in support of the results of the Helsinki Conference and their implementation.

Since the First Assembly, the European security movement has travelled a long way from the shaping of its organisational framework to political maturity, it has grown, dynamically developed and has become an ever more influential social force.

L. I. Brezhnev's speech at a ceremonial meeting of the Polish Seym on July 21, 1974 to mark the 30th anniversary of the Polish People's Republic is a source of inspiration for every participant of the European security movement. He said: "We are convinced that everything possible should be done for the complete success of the European Conference. Much can be done in this respect by the public at large,

* Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation. Information Bulletin, No. 21, 1975, p. 3.

* Ibid., No. 24, 1976, p. 16.

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CHAPTER SIX

MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE

including the actively operating European security and cooperation movement. We are firmly convinced that it is a matter of honour for all peace champions in Europe to energetically come out for continuing and making irreversible the changes that have started on the continent."*

European opinion has been doing more and more in the search for ways to lasting peace and the solution of security and co-operation problems on the continent. L. I. Brezhnev's Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU said: "A great role and responsibility devolve on the mass public movement to consolidate peace. The past five years saw such milestones in the growth of this movement as the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow, the Brussels Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security, and the World Congress of Women in Berlin."** Public opinion is right in believing that it is impossible to ensure European security without the public forces' active participation in the effort to solve the outstanding problems of international politics.

The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples, adopted by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, reflects the broad prospects opening up for public action in the drive for peace, security and co-operation, setting out in concise form the most vital problems of the present day and the peoples' aspirations.

In an interview with Piavda on the anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Conference's Final Act, L. I. Brezhnev said: "The main thing, in our opinion, is that the Conference was able to voice the peace urge of the peoples of all the participating countries."'^^50^^""

And the peoples' will, public opinion is something that can no longer be dismissed, regardless of whether some circles in the West like it or not.

THE DRIVE FOR MILITARY DETENTE--- AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE EFFORTS TO MATERIALISE EUROPEAN SECURITY

A military detente in Europe, the socialist countries believe, has to supplement the political detente. At the same time, it is a major ingredient of the policy aimed to set up a security system in Europe.

The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples, formulated by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, emphasises the need to "work for the termination of the expanding arms race, which is endangering peace, and for transition to reducing the accumulated stockpiles of arms, to disarmament. For this purpose . . . launch new efforts to activate negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Following agreement on the first concrete steps in this direction, continue to promote military detente in the region in subsequent years".""

The successful completion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe created a favourable setting for the practical solution of this important task. The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, written into the Conference's Final Act, serves to lay a solid groundwork for peaceful coexistence in Europe, making it possible to rule out aggression and the use of any kind of

* Pravda, June 22, 1974.

** Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 30. *** Ptavda, July 30, 1976.

* Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress ot the CPSU, p. 31. 11---1787

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force from European international relations. It has enabled the Europeans to take a step nearer to the achievement of one of the main goals of Soviet foreign policy, as proclaimed in the Peace Programme, that of outlawing war and making its outbreak impossible.

The socialist countries have always maintained that for Europe, the scene of two devastating world wars, the problem of preventing another war is of vast importance. It is perfectly clear that a nuclear-missile war in Europe would be an unprecedented calamity. The drive for a military detente in Europe is dialectically tied in with the drive for international security. The USSR's and the other socialist community countries' postwar foreign-policy practice provides convincing proof of their consistent struggle against war, aggression, militarism and the arms race, for peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world.

Since 1946, the Soviet Union has put forward numerous proposals for international security, and also for a military detente in Europe, closely tying these in with the task of setting up a collective security system.

A summary of these proposals clearly shows the Soviet Union's readiness to consider and tackle any concrete measures, from partial to all-embracing:

- in the military-political field: from non-resort to force, measures to reduce the danger of accidental armed conflicts, and the signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to a wind-down of the military organisations and of the two blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty) and the signing of a collective security treaty;

---in nuclear weapons: from non-proliferation, a ban on tests, the establishment of nuclear-free zones and curbs on the nuclear arms race to a ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament;

- in conventional weapons: from a dismantling of foreign military bases, a withdrawal of foreign troops and cuts in national armed forces and military budgets to general and complete disarmament.

Naturally, the accent in these matters has shifted from one measure to another depending on the conditions, the possibilities and the imperatives of the day, but the Soviet Union has always consistently worked for a military detente and disarmament, notably in Europe.

In view of the danger to mankind latent in nuclear weapons, the socialist countries have centred their struggle for international security on the need to ban and destroy all nuclear weapons, and also all other types of mass-- destruction weapons. On June 19, 1946, the Soviet Union presented at the UN Atomic Energy Commission a draft international convention under which the contracting parties were to promise not to resort to atomic weapons, to ban their production and stockpiling and destroy all existing stockpiles within three months. Since then, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has become a strong nuclear power, it has repeatedly come out with similar proposals aimed to prohibit and destroy all nuclear weapons. As the Western countries, the USA above all, have stubbornly refused to agree to this, the socialist countries have resorted to a flexible strategy and put forward various proposals for partial measures in the area.

As regards Europe, the socialist community countries have repeatedly formulated proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the continent. Thus, from 1957 to 1963, Poland made several concrete proposals for turning Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG) into a nuclear-free zone, and Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia have called for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The Soviet Union and Finland have made similar proposals in respect of Northern Europe.

In their struggle for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, the socialist countries saw it as an ingredient of their broad programme for limiting the arms race, for disarmament and the prevention of another war. The programme devoted much attention to a cutback of conventional weapons. Thus, at the very first UN General Assem-

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bly in December 1946, the Soviet Union formulated the idea of general arms reductions. In 1948, it tabled a concrete proposal for a one-third cutback in the armed forces and armaments of the Security Council'!; permanent members.

Since the bulk of the armed forces was concentrated in Europe, many of the socialist countries' proposals for troop and arms cuts were tied in with the struggle for a military detente and collective security in Europe. Thus, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France (January 25-February 18, 1954), the Soviet delegation presented a draft General European Treaty of Collective Security, which provided for the establishment of a security system in two stages: at the first stage, the participants were to pledge peaceful settlement of all disputes and non-resort to military force, and promise not to build up their armed forces on foreign territory in Europe; and at the second stage, they were to sign a collective security treaty and simultaneously disband the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The Western countries did not argue against the idea itself, but in effect adopted a negative stand. The Soviet Union's draft General European Treaty was coupled with a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the GDR and the FRG and, as a first step, a 50 per cent cut in troop contingents.

In November 1956, the Soviet Union put forward a broad programme for troop and arms cuts, with a special section "On the Establishment in Europe of a Zone of Arms Limitation and Inspection". The document emphasised the need to set up a special zone covering the territory of the two parts of Germany and states bordering on these with specified ceilings on the number of US, Soviet, British and French armed forces, and a ban on the siting of nuclear weapons in the zone. It was also proposed to reduce by one-third in 1957 the Soviet, US, British and French armed forces stationed in the GDR and the FRG, markedly reduce the number of foreign troops in other countries (NATO and Warsaw Treaty members) and eliminate the military bases on foreign ter-

ritory; to carry out, in the course of two years, marked overall cuts in the armed forces of the USSR, the USA and the People's Republic of China, ban nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons tests, and also reduce military spending.

That draft, however, was also wasted owing to the Western countries' attitude, although the Soviet Union had made some changes and additions in it to meet their wishes.

In May 1958, the socialist countries put forward a proposal to sign a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, and in July 1958 the Soviet Union submitted a draft Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation among European States.

Then there were also the well-known Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament placed before the 14th UN General Assembly in 1959, and the detailed draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, an all-embracing programme for nuclear and general disarmament submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva in 1962.

In 1964, the Soviet Government issued a memorandum on measures for the further relaxation of international tensions and limitation of the arms race, which emphasised that overall cuts in the armed forces of all states, European states in particular, were among the more important goals of the Soviet Government's policy. The memorandum said that "the concentration in Central Europe of massive foreign troop contingents and arms is a formidable obstacle on the way to healthier relations among states". "The Soviet Union," it said, "is prepared to cut back its troop contingents stationed on the territory of the GDR and other European states if the Western countries do the same in the FRG and other countries. This could be carried out by way of mutual example."""

While putting forward such proposals, the Soviet Union has repeatedly set the West examples of that kind. In the

* Fitly Years oi the USSR's Struggle for Disarmament, Moscow, 1967, p. 583 (in Russian).

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1950s, for instance, it carried out several substantial cutbacks in its armed forces. In the 1960s, it repeatedly reduced its military expenditures (by 600 million rubles in 1964 and 500 million rubles in 1965). The other socialist countries followed suit (in 1964, Bulgaria reduced its military spending by 10 per cent, Rumania by 12 per cent and Czechoslovakia by 3.4 per cent). That helped promote the European military detente.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said in its Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament: "In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Soviet Union proposed mutual force reductions on a large number of occasions; Western powers were uninterested."*

The Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe, adopted at the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee in July 1966, set out a broad package of measures aimed to reduce military tensions and ensure Europe's stable and peaceful development. Maintaining that a simultaneous disbandment of the existing military alliances was the radical way leading to a military detente in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty states expressed their readiness to agree, by way of first step, to the elimination of NATO's and the Warsaw Treaty's military organisations, and proposed some partial measures for a military detente in Europe, like a wind-down of foreign military bases, a withdrawal of all foreign troops to within national frontiers, a reduction, within agreed limits and by agreed deadlines, of the armed forces of the two German states, measures aimed to eliminate the danger of a nuclear conflict, and so on.

The socialist countries' proposals formulated in the Bucharest Declaration opened up a fresh chapter in the effort to build a lasting security system in Europe.

In a statement entitled "For Peace and Security in Europe", the European Communist and Workers' Parties' Conference on Security in Europe (Karlovy Vary, 1967) presented a set of concrete proposals for a collective security system to supplement the Bucharest Declaration, containing some new elements in the military-political plane, like the call for a treaty on non-resort to the threat or use of force among the European states, for a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. The Conference called on all the peace forces "to rally and launch broad campaigns in their countries and on a continental scale to expand direct action for collective security".*

A French journal wrote that the Karlovy Vary Conference had "offered fresh possibilities for peaceful coexistence and fruitful co-operation to all the European states.... It is possible that an agreement on European security may one day replace the dangerous competition between the military blocs and that a demilitarised zone in Central Europe may put an end to the ruinous arms race."^::"^::"

While realising that a military detente hinges on politics, the socialist countries have never maintained that a military detente should follow the political detente in strict succession, for the two processes are dialectically interconnected: the political detente creates the necessary premises for an effective military detente, and the latter not only goes to supplement the former, but also helps deepen and strengthen it. The political and military aspects of security are complementary. So, the socialist countries always make a point of coupling political and military measures in their proposals.

The Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU formulated the concept of military detente in Europe in the most comprehensive terms, considering its

* SlPRl Yearbook ot World Armaments and Disarmament. 1969/70, Stockholm, 1970, p. 401.

* World Marxist Review, No. 6, June 1967, p. 3. ** Le Monde diplomatique. May 1967, p. 6.

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two aspects-political and military-both in a regional and global context. The Programme, for instance, urged the need to renounce the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes, and to make this a law of international affairs; to proceed from a final recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of the Second World War, effect a radical turn to detente and peace on the continent, and do the utmost to ensure collective security in Europe. The Soviet Union reaffirmed the Warsaw Treaty countries' jointly voiced readiness to effect a simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO or, as a first step, of their military organisations.

In the early 1970s, the struggle to end the arms race, reduce military tensions and strengthen international and European security in accordance with the Peace Programme developed along several lines.

In September 1973, the Soviet Union proposed that the Security Council's five permanent members should reduce their military spending by 10 per cent, and the General Assembly adopted the Soviet proposal, although two delegations (China and Albania) voted against it and 38 delegations abstained (notably, Britain, France, the FRG and the USA).

In its continued fight for a ban on nuclear weapons and for complete nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Government regards the agreements to e:nd nuclear weapons tests and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as important but partial steps towards this goal. In its proposal for practical ways and means of ending the arms race submitted to the special UN General Assembly session on disarmament in the summer of 1978 the Soviet Union stressed that urgent international action had to be taken to prevent the manufacture and deployment of neutron weapons.

The proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries on disarmament were mirrored in the final documents of that session.

In the latter field, the socialist countries believe that the first question that has to be considered here is that of troop and arms cuts in Central Europe, where these are most heavily concentrated.

Thus, ever since the Second World War, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have vigorously worked for military detente in Europe, tying it in with global military detente and the need for general and complete disarmament. In the long years of persistent effort, the socialist countries showed a well-substantiated, constructive approach and sought to achieve an effective solution of the problems of a military detente in Europe. The successes of the political detente created the necessary prerequisites for the adoption of concrete measures to help reduce the military tension, primarily in the matter of cutting back armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe helped lay the political groundwork for constructive steps in the sphere of military detente. It worked out a set of measures aimed to rule out the threat or use of force and build up mutual confidence, emphasising the need for effective action in disarmament as a whole. Summing up the results of the Conference, the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, the Presidium, of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers emphasised: "The main thing now is to supplement the political detente with a military detente, and one of the priority tasks here is to find a way to reduce armed forces and armaments in Central Europe without detriment to the security of any country but, on the contrary, for the benefit of all."*

The solution of this problem could play a very important role in the drive to materialise the European detente.

* Piavda, August 7, 1975.

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FORMATION OF THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF TROOP AND ARMS CUTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The successful development of the international and European detente presented the Western countries with the complicated tasks of adjusting their political and military strategy to the new tendencies. On the one hand, the positive development of East-West relations tended to give some Western circles hope of the possibility of applying the "bridge-- building" policy, which, to quote one of its authors, William Griffith, "has aimed, through purposeful use of all instruments of detente, to stimulate change in the communist world. ... We must never forget that our interest in European detente is to change the status quo in Europe."* Specifying the true goals of that strategy, a former director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Karl Birnbaum, said that "the policy of 'peaceful engagement' was really only a more sophisticated form of the old roll-back strategy aiming at the same end result: `liberation'".**

On the other hand, however, some political circles in the West believed that the detente could have a negative effect on the Western countries. They feared, in particular, that it could harm NATO, bringing into question the need to maintain that organisation in its old form or, at least, hindering the arms race. "Many maintain that .detente hurts NATO. This is true to some extent: detente does weaken the desire of the West European and American peoples and legislators to appropriate money for defence."*** Such apprehensions were

most pronounced in the 1960s, when NATO was adopting the "flexible response" doctrine, which implied the need to restructure the armed forces, involving an increase in military outlays, on the part of the West European allies above all.

What made it more complicated was that NATO's twentyyear term was due to run out in 1969, when its members would have the right to withdraw from the alliance, and no one knew whether France, which had just withdrawn from NATO's military organisation, would take that step and whether any other countries would follow suit.

Former US permanent representative at the NATO Council Cleveland recalled: "By the autumn of 1966 the hopes for detente were a clear and present danger to the existence of NATO."* Urgent, ``fire-brigade'' measures had to be taken.

A NATO Council session in December 1966 decided to review NATO's policy and formulate new tasks for the future.

A specially appointed Study of Future Tasks Group elaborated a set of tasks and put these before the alliance as the Harmel Report, which was approved by a NATO session in December 1967. The Report said that the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence had "changed the nature of the confrontation with the West".** It contained many general professions of NATO's desire for detente and peace. At the same time, it warned that independent action by NATO members to improve relations with the socialist countries could split the alliance, and called for a concerted policy.

The Report's main message was that the problems of defence and detente should not be isolated from each other, but regarded as two sides of one process. The Report offered a new strategy which came to be known as the "two-pillar doctrine of defence-cum-detente". NATO's paramount task.

* William E. Griffith, Moscow, Bonn, and European Security, Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970, pp. 17, 21.

** Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace in Europe. East-West Relations 1966-1968 and the Prospects for a European Settlement, London, 1970, p. 23. *** William Griffith, op. cit., p. 18.

* Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, New York, Evanston and London, 1970, p. 138.

** Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVI, 1967-1968, p. 22425.

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the Report went on, was to maintain its military capabilities and collective defence, which were a "stabilising factor in world politics" and a "necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions", so that military security and a policy of detente were "not contradictory but complementary". The substance of the Report, Harlan Cleveland wrote, was that it "provided the first full rationale for a major effort by NATO in the arms control field, suggesting more intensive consultation on Western disarmament positions, thinking of arms control as the other side of the coin of NATO force planning"/^^5^^'

The new ``two-pillar'' doctrine was meant to help NATO get the better of the detente and continue the arms drive. The USA's main goal, Cleveland pointed out, was to "keep NATO's deterrent credible enough . . . keeping the major allies . . . from melting their defences in the warmth of detente".** Many Western politicians came to regard the Harmel Report as an antidote to the detente of the late 1960s.

Upon the adoption of the new political strategy, NATO developed a set of concrete measures for putting it into effect. As the official circles in the NATO member-states and the bloc's leadership analysed the problems of a European military detente, they realised that the thing for them to do next was to focus their attention on two main questions. It was necessary, first, to single out from the whole complex of problems that of force reductions in Central Europe and concentrate on it; and second, to try to use this for political advantage in the struggle against socialism.

The NATO countries took a fairly long time to develop a force reduction concept for Europe, making gradual headway in accordance with the major tendencies of their domestic and foreign policy. The overall change in the balance of forces between the two systems, the whole complex of relations within the Atlantic system, and also the gradual international detente left an imprint on that concept.

* Harlan Cleveland, op. cit, p. 145. ** Ibid., pp. 139-40.

The Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, adopted by the NATO Council's Reykjavik meeting on June 24-25, 1968, was a most important landmark along that way. The NATO Foreign Ministers expressed their countries' desire "to make progress in the field of disarmament and arms control", came out in favour of measures for "balanced and mutual force reductions" in Central Europe and directed their permanent representatives at the Council to follow up on their Declaration.*

Western propaganda made great play with the Declaration, seeking to present it as NATO's concrete contribution to the effort to relax tensions and reduce the risk of another war, and used it to back up the idea that the NATO countries had initiated the force reduction talks. Western chronology dates back the force reduction problem no farther than to the 1968 Reykjavik Declaration, ignoring all the socialist countries' disarmament proposals, notably, those for troop and arms cuts in Europe.

To get an idea of the NATO countries' real stand on force reductions in Europe, one has to analyse the reasons behind the formation of the MBFR proposal and bring out the goals it was meant to further.

First of all, the Declaration was connected with the remodelling of NATO's armed forces that was being started.

At the NATO Council's Brussels session on December 13-14, 1967, the USA's long-sustained advocacy of the "flexible response" doctrine culminated in its adoption by the alliance. In that context, the NATO members discussed a draft five-year plan for NATO's military buildup, under which they were to reorganise their armed forces in accordance with the new doctrine. The draft specified the overall number of troops and arms necessary to underpin the "flexible response" strategy, and set each partner a specific task. But the discussion of the plan brought out considerable differ-

* NATO Letter, July-August 1968, p. 29.

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ences among the allies, and it was only two years later, in December 1969, that the plan was finally adopted.

The reason here was that the new doctrine implied a marked increase in conventional forces and, consequently, in arms budgets, and that was something the allies were unwilling-and unable-to accept. Under the influence of economic and social difficulties and the more vigorous public action against the mounting military expenditures and for disarmament, the governments of some NATO countries now faced the need to scale down their military efforts.

When the Labour Government took office in Britain in 1964, the country's economy was in a state of stagnation. So, it promised to review the country's military policy in order to balance it out with the economic potentialities and foreignpolicy goals. Thus, there was talk of the need to reduce the British Rhine Army stationed in the FRG.

The "grand coalition" government in the FRG, formed in late 1966, declared in its very first statement that it would "strive to seek peace in Europe" and would devote particular attention to arms control. That statement was to some extent due to the economic difficulties that began to manifest themselves in the FRG in the mid-1960s. In view of these difficulties, the government declared in 1967 that the following year it would reduce its arms expenditure (from DM21,394 million in 1967 to DM19,310 million in 1968).*

In the United States the question of cuts in US troops in Europe had been under debate from around the mid-1950s, and in 1966 and 1967 developed a particularly sharp edge. On February 7, 1966, Senator Stephen M. Young declared that the United States should withdraw "at least 75 per cent of the men of our Armed Forces" from Europe.** On August 31, 1966, the Democratic leader in the Senate Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution calling for considerable cuts in US

troops in Europe. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former US Ambassador in France James M. Gavin said in February 1967 that the US troops in Europe "could be reduced to a corps".*

To look for a solution of the problem, President Johnson sent to Europe the former US High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy, who managed to convince Britain to put off the proposed reduction of the Rhine Army, and the FRG to reduce the projected cuts in arms expenditure. Simultaneously, the parties reached a compromised agreement providing for substantial compensation by the FRG of the USA's and Britain's currency outlays on the maintenance of their troops in Europe. As a result, US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara agreed to halve the projected cuts, and it was announced that the USA was to pull out from Europe 35,000 troops, switching these to a double-base system (that is, leaving their arms and ammunition in Europe).

At that time, Belgium also raised the question of reducing the number of its troops stationed in the FRG.

NATO's Defence Planning Committee, meeting on December 12, 1967, agreed to the withdrawal from the FRG of 5,000 British, 36,000 US and 12,000 Belgian troops. But few of the participants were happy about that compromise decision. On January 10, 1968, Mansfield said that he would continue the campaign for larger cuts in the number of US troops in Europe, while NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General Lyman Lemnitzer threatened to resign if the USA or other NATO countries whittled down their European forces.

The question of the US presence was still a burning one, and congressional pressure mounted. H. Cleveland wrote: "In the 1960s, given the congressional pressures at their backs, none of our three Presidents was able to make the promise to maintain the numbers of our troops in Europe for a given period ahead."**

* SIPRI Yearbook ot World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70. p. 269. ** Congressional Record, Vol. 112, Part 2, Washington, 1966, p. 2198.

* The New York Times, February 22, 1967. ** Harlan Cleveland, op. tit, p. 110.

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Thus, upon the adoption in December 1967 of the " flexible response" doctrine, which implied a buildup of conventional forces, NATO was faced with the complicated problem of checking the tendency for their reduction and carrying out the five-year military reorganisation programme.

At the same time, the socialist countries' concrete programme for European security, their proposal to hold a conference on these matters had met by 1968 with ever broader support among Western public forces, which urged their governments to give concrete answers. The evasive formulas NATO kept adopting in 1966 and 1967 could no longer be seen as justified.

In the search for a solution, NATO finally arrived at the idea of "mutual and balanced force reductions". This was first discussed at the time of McCloy's mission to Europe in 1967, when NATO agencies began studying the idea in depth. Thus, Willy Brandt, then Foreign Minister in the "grand coalition" government in the FRG, advocated the idea in some of his articles.* In Britain, the Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey** and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Brown""*"" repeatedly voiced the idea in their speeches in the course of 1967, and a government White Paper issued in 1967 put it down as the official posture.

At the NATO Council's Reykjavik session in June 1968, Willy Brandt gave a report on mutual force reductions. He had taken an active part in the formulation of that proposal, and the main points he made in his report were incorporated in the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions adopted by the session, a document of unquestionable importance which was at the root of NATO's subsequent policy.

What were the chief goals of the MBFR proposal?

First, by putting forward the principle of "mutual reductions", that is, reductions agreed with the socialist countries and carried out simultaneously, the NATO leadership and the governments of its member-countries were enabled to turn down any demands for unilateral cuts in national armed forces or military expenditure, since such a step would have been not only ``unreasonable'' in view of the possibility of ``mutual'' cuts, but could have even hampered the latter. Item 4 said: "Since the security of the NATO countries and the prospects for mutual force reductions would be weakened by NATO reductions alone, Ministers affirmed the proposition that the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing.''

The proposal was meant to prevent or at least delay any unilateral withdrawal of US troops from Europe, which appeared to be inevitable, and also to prevent any unilateral troop cuts by other NATO countries. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute pointed out: "NATO nations, no doubt partly because they were aware of the pressure in the United States for reducing the number of US troops in Europe, have been proposing a consideration of mutual force reductions.''^^51^^'

Second, the "balanced reductions" principle enabled the NATO countries to lay down any conditions they liked, even those the socialist countries found unacceptable, and so to control the whole course of the possible negotiations and the reductions themselves. Christoph Bertram, Assistant Director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote about the NATO proposal: "By linking American reductions to reciprocal reductions in the East, it offers at least some objective standard for limiting American troop

* Willy Brandt, "German Policy Towards the East", Foreign Affairs, 1967, 46/3, pp. 476-86.

** Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 742, House of Commons Official Report, London, 1967, pp. 283, 289. *** Ibid., p. 289.

* SlPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70, p. 65.

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withdrawals (as well as eventual West European reductions). "*

Third, the MBFR Declaration, presented as a counterproposal to the socialist countries' programme for European security, made it possible for NATO not only to reduce the matter to a narrow, concrete issue, to take over the initiative, but also to ``channelise'' and regulate the course and intensiveness of European detente.

``If the issue of MBFR was used politically, it was for more or less tactical purposes: to avoid unilateral reductions in the West, particularly by the United States, and to counter the Soviet initiative for a Conference on European Security by a concrete security proposal."*""

Fourth, the formation of a common force reduction concept for all the NATO countries made it necessary for them to agree on a common stand and so could help consolidate NATO. Curt Gasteyger wrote: "In the eyes of its European sponsors the proposal for MBFR served a triple purpose: first, it was a means to prevent the United States from withdrawing unilaterally some of its forces stationed on the continent; .. .second, it constituted an idea around which all NATO states could rally; . . .and third, it could be presented to the Warsaw Pact countries as a positive proof of NATO's willingness to enter into East-West negotiations on security issues proper."***

Fifth, by putting forward the MBFR problem as the centrepiece of East-West negotiations on European security, the NATO countries sought to switch public attention from the political to the military sphere, insisting that European detente was, first and foremost, a military problem, reaffirming the

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``two-pillar doctrine of defence-cum-detente", and seeking to continue the "from positions of strength" policy.

Sixth, the initiators of the idea believed that a concrete proposal in such a crucial area should give NATO a considerable propaganda edge over the socialist countries and help it pass off for a defensive organisation working for peace and detente.

Having suggested MBFR as a possible topic for Europewide negotiations, the NATO countries at the same time took a very cautious stand on the matter, fearing that if the idea was plugged too hard, they would find it difficult to go ahead with their arms drive.

As the call for a European Conference met with ever broader support, NATO had to devote its Council's Rome session in May 1970 to the East-West relations problem. The session issued a special Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, containing a more definite proposal for all " interested states to hold exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the Central Region".*

The Declaration said that differences stemming from geographical and other factors had to be taken into account. That was well in line with the Western propaganda thesis that the "strength bias was in favour of the Soviet Union", which was said to have superiority over NATO in conventional weapons and geographic location.

Throughout 1968 and 1969, the Western countries kept advocating the MBFR proposal as a substitute for a European conference or as a prior condition for its convocation, seeking to thwart the socialist countries' proposals.

For a long time after putting forward the MBFR idea as a tactical tool, the NATO countries did not know what to do next. They differed on procedural matters as well as on the substance of the problem, and could not decide whether

* NATO Letter, June 1970, p. 24.

* Christoph Bertram, Mutual Force Reductions in Europe. The Political Aspects, London, 1972, p. 27.

** Ibid., p. 2.

*** Curt Gasteyger, The Chances and Pitfalls of MBFR, 3rd International Colloquium on European Security and Co-operation, Bucharest, June 15-17, 1971, p. 1.

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it was worth their while to try livening up the talks on the matter.

The Soviet Union's concrete proposals for practical negotiations on mutual troop and arms cuts in Central Europe put forward in 1971 and 1972 set a limit to the NATO countries' political manoeuvring and forced them to get off the fence.

``When NATO first proposed to enter into discussions about troop reductions in Europe with the Warsaw Pact, East-West negotiations on MBFR seemed a long way off. This changed early in 1971, when the Soviet Union declared its readiness to discuss the subject.. .. This change of approach, whereby MBFR is no longer a tactical tool but an item of prospective East-West negotiation, has not been greeted with unrestrained enthusiasm in Western chancelleries and cabinets.""'

The Lisbon Ministerial Council Meeting in June 1971 also showed a marked lack of enthusiasm over the matter. Although the Communique said that the Ministers "welcomed the response of Soviet leaders" and "expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations", they put in so many reservations that it was obvious they did not want to see more rapid progress.**

US foreign affairs specialist Robert E. Hunter wrote in connection with the Lisbon session: "While responding favourably, NATO added enough qualifications to ensure that the process would get under way slowly."*'"^^51^^* The capitalist press gave a similar assessment. In an article entitled "Lisbon Dallying", the newspaper L'Humanite tried to get to the bottom of NATO's attitude. It said: "So as not to expose their alliance as an instrument of the cold war and the arms race.

the Ministers gathered in Lisbon could not ignore the goodwill evidently manifested by the Russians. . . . But if one looks at the substance, rather than the form of the final Communique issued in Lisbon, one has to state that the members of the Atlantic Alliance find repugnant any fresh progress towards detente. 'Exploratory contacts', then a meeting of Deputy Ministers in Brussels, and then, possibly'at a favourable moment'---'exploratory talks' once again-that is all the Atlantic Ministers have deigned to envisage. Their procrastination makes it possible to measure the degree of their sincerity when they have to speak favourably of disarmament."*

Meanwhile, the Western countries continued the massive buildup of their military potential. The NATO Council's Brussels session in December 1971 looked into the implementation of the Allied Defence for the Seventies programme and adopted the second five-year plan for the development of NATO's armed forces in 1972-1976.

Assessing the work of the session, the French newspaper L'Echo wrote: "So, for two days now the Atlantic countries have been trying to pave the way for the future both in the matter of defence and a rapprochement with the East. On the first point, they have reaffirmed this tendency: the thing now is not to relax, but to strengthen the defences in qualitative terms."**

On September 3, 1971, the USSR, France, the USA and Britain signed their four-power agreement on West Berlin. So, it appeared, the main Western condition for the convocation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had been met. The NATO countries could no longer drag their feet on the Conference and the force reduction talks. Bertram writes: "Subsequent Soviet and Warsaw Pact declarations have changed the situation. By taking up NATO's repeated proposals, the Soviet Union not only declared itself in

* Christoph Bertram, op. cit., pp. 1, 2-3.

** Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVIII, 1971-1972, p. 24661. *** Robert E. Hunter, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Next Step in Detente?", International Conciliation, No. 587, March 1972, p. 42.

* L'Humanite, June 5, 1971. '•* L'Echo, December 10, 1971.

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favour of negotiated reductions, but also challenged the Alliance to stand by its declarations and communiques.'"^^1^^"

In November 1972, the multilateral consultations for the preparation of the European Conference started in Helsinki, and on January 31, 1973, the preparatory consultations for the talks on troop and arms cuts in Europe opened in Vienna. From January 31 to June 28, 1973, the participants in these consultations settled the various procedural questions and agreed to open the negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe and measures connected with these in Vienna on October 30, 1973.

Thus, in the course of 1968-1970, the NATO countries saw the force reduction proposals chiefly as a tactical instrument and, apparently, did not go very deeply into the substance of the problem. It was largely an instrument of propaganda and political manoeuvring. The various "reduction models" (NATO models, FRG models, and so on) floated in the Western press in 1970 were more in the nature of feelers than concrete proposals, and served, in the first place, to substantiate the Western propaganda thesis about the "Warsaw Treaty countries' marked superiority in conventional forces", which was used to help ensure and justify NATO's arms drive.

In 1971, however, the NATO countries began to realise that the question of mutual force reductions was becoming a real topic of East-West negotiations, and got down to studying the problem in earnest.

It soon became clear, on the one hand, that a number of objective factors urged a positive solution to the problem, and, on the other, there was some disagreement and even an actual clash of opinion over the possible political and military consequences of such a step.

The long period of in-depth research into the problem at the headquarters of the NATO countries' armed forces and the NATO headquarters at Evere laid bare the tangled knot

of contradictions among the partners and, at the same time, helped bring out the balance between the main factors working for and against the practical approach to the problem.

Some factors were essentially conducive to force reductions, while others, on the contrary, served to slow down the process, and the resultant of the two sets of factors was what eventually determined the NATO countries' stand at the Vienna talks.

Thus, it became quite obvious that the question of military expenditures was among the more important factors inducing the political and military circles of the NATO countries to hold talks on force reductions in Europe. All these countries had to devote ever greater attention to social and economic problems, and there was a large body of opposition to the arms race and the mounting military expenditures in every country. The problem of military expenditures and the need to reduce these for various internal political, economic and social reasons was the main factor motivating the government circles in some Western countries in their movement towards negotiations on force reductions, and large sections of public opinion in their action towards that end.

The change in the balance between the various types of armed forces within the bloc going forward largely under the influence of the Nixon Doctrine also had a marked effect on the NATO countries' stand on force reductions. The Nixon Doctrine, former US Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird once explained, means that "we cannot and should not do everything ourselves", and that "other nations must assume greater responsibility than they had in the past in prodiving for security and economic development"/^^1^^'

The Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of "realistic deterrence" called for a restructuring of the armed forces, the general-purpose forces above all. At that time, the USA also had

Christoph Bertram, op. cit., p. 2.

* Final Report to the Congress of Secretary of Defence Melvin R. Laird, Washington, January 8, 1973, pp. 29-30.

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to end its military action in Vietnam, and this, too, impelled reduction. At the same time, the USA urged its European allies to build up and modernise their conventional forces, this demand fitting ill into the drive for reduction.

Some Western countries took steps to restructure recruitment methods and aimed to go over to the volunteer-army principle, largely under the influence of the war in Vietnam, and these measures were also at odds with the tasks deriving from the force reduction problem. The worsening of the sociopolitical contradictions in some Western countries also tended to work against the solution of these tasks.

The pros and cons of a further switch from conscription to voluntary enlistment were discussed in the NATO countries for a long time. Following the example of Britain, which had ended conscription back in 1960, the USA decided in 1970 to switch all its armed forces to voluntary recruitment. It soon turned out, however, that the new system had its shortcomings, which prevented its blanket introduction. It proved to be difficult, for instance, to recruit the required number of volunteers and ensure high training standards. Volunteers were also more expensive than conscripts.

All these were obstacles in the way to a practical solution of the reduction problem.

The USA's military presence in Europe was yet another key factor behind the formation of the NATO countries' position on force cuts. For many years, it had spawned complicated political relations among the Western allies.

These factors played an important, though not immediately obvious role in the formation of the NATO posture on force cuts in Europe, holding back the Western countries' progress towards a positive stand.

The broad reorganisation of the armed forces to provide for greater "burden sharing", voluntary recruitment, greater troop mobility, and so on, was bound to take a fairly long time. Since the process had yet to be completed, the NATO countries found it difficult to take meaningful practical steps towards force reductions. NATO's ``two-tier'' programme put

forward at the Vienna talks had been formulated under the influence of all these factors, which served to make it extremely limited. NATO's delaying tactics were, apparently, due to a desire to win time in order to complete the restructuring of the armed forces.

FORCE REDUCTION TALKS. THE MILITARY BALANCE PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The postures adopted by the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO states at the Vienna talks embodied their differing political concepts of military detente in Europe, of troop and arms cuts in particular.

The NATO allies moved into the talks in not so serried ranks. Their national positions were for various reasons inherently contradictory, and they disagreed among themselves on the substance of the problem. The main thing, however, was that none of them was prepared to venture upon truly meaningful and effective military detente in Europe by reducing armed forces and armaments.

Although the general proposals presented by the NATO countries in Vienna had been thrashed out behind closed doors, a careful analysis of the existing material shows that they had had to overcome many difficulties and contradictions. Ian Smart wrote: "It cannot be overemphasised that, in the end, the ability of NATO governments to negotiate a substantial MBFR agreement with the Soviet Government and its allies ... will depend upon their ability to agree amongst themselves not only about technical military details but also about such doctrinal issues as the role of US nuclear weapons in Europe, the future status of the US nuclear guarantee, the development of West European nuclear forces, the proper balance between US and European conventional forces

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and the correct choice of strategic and tactical concepts for the European theatre.""^^1^^'

It will be recalled that these problems had been under constant debate among the allies from the time of NATO's establishment, primarily owing to the differences in the approach to these problems between the USA and its West European partners. These problems moved in and out of the limelight depending on what was the latest approach to force reductions.

Since "for 23 years, NATO governments have failed, in one way or another, to agree upon the scale and form of the military forces to be deployed in defence of Western Europe", they not only found it hard to work out a common stand on the problem, but had to look for approaches that would have the least effect on their relations.**

In the course of 1972 and especially 1973, numerous debates and conferences were held in the NATO countries and agencies in an attempt to agree a common stand for the proposed negotiations.

As the NATO countries sought to thrash out a position all of them could accept, they ran into fresh problems. In the technical field, this was due to the fact that the Western countries' armed forces markedly differed from each other in type of weapons, logistical arrangements, recruitment methods, and so on. France's refusal to take part in allied consultations also tended to create some difficulties. Then there were various important problems (still a subject of controversy), like the role and possible use of US nuclear weapons in Europe, the future status of the US nuclear guarantees, the role of the French and British nuclear forces, the strategic and tactical principles of Europe's defence, and so on.

A US military journal wrote in December 1972: "Where MBFR is concerned, no reduction formula which is both ne-

gotiable and which conforms to NATO's objective of undiminished security has yet been worked up. The search for such a formula goes on, but the problems are extremely com-

1

/ / »•„

plex. "

Throughout 1973, the NATO countries held regular conferences at different levels parallel to the Vienna preparatory consultations, which had started on January 31, to work out concrete proposals. On August 13, 1973, Newsweek reported that the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands had come up with a joint proposal calling for a 14-per cent cutback of Soviet and US ground forces in Central Europe, a 7-per cent cutback of other foreign forces stationed in the FRG ( British, Belgian, Dutch and Canadian), and also a 7-per cent reduction in the armies of Central European countries (the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia).**

The talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe and measures connected with these opened in Vienna on October 30, 1973.

In the course of preparatory consultations, the parties had agreed that the talks would involve 11 states: the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and the USA, Britain, Canada, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, on the other. The reduction measures were to cover the territories of the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was planned to cut back both national forces and those of the USA, Britain, Canada and the USSR stationed on the territory of these countries. These 11 states, designated as the direct participants in the talks, were to have the right to take part in the adoption of decisions on the substance of the reduction problems, and all decisions were to be taken on the consensus principle by these 11 states. Eight otherxcountries which had taken part in the preliminary con-

* Ian Smart, MBFR Assailed: A Critical View of the Proposed Negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe, Cornell University, Occasional Papers, No. 3, 1972, p. 19. ** Ibid., p. 9.

* Army, December 1972, p. 12. ** Newsweek, August 13, 1973, p. 9.

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sultations (Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Turkey) were to have special status enabling them to contribute to the debate without taking part in the actual decision-making; what they could do, for instance, was to circulate various documents on the issues under debate.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries wanted to make the negotiations open to any European state wishing to take part, including neutral states, because they did not see the force reduction problems as a prerogative of the European military-political alliances.*

Since the Western countries objected to wider participation, the socialist countries reserved the right to raise the question later on.

The talks were to deal with mutual troop and arms cuts in Central Europe and measures connected with these. The participants in the consultations made it abundantly clear that any measure to be adopted in the course of the talks had to be elaborated and carried out without detriment to the security of any party.

The socialist countries' proposals, presented at the talks on November 8, 1973, fully agreed with the propositions negotiated in the course of the preparatory consultations. These proposals provided for a cutback, under a scrupulously coordinated timetable, of foreign and national troops and armaments. The cutback was to cover ground and air forces and their armaments, including nuclear weapons. The cutback was to be carried out in three stages with a view to reducing, in the course of 1975-1977, the troops and arms on either side by about 17 per cent.

In proposing equal reductions, the socialist countries maintained that these would not give either side any unilateral military advantages or upset the military balance in Cen-

tral Europe. The socialist countries' point of departure here was that a sort of equilibrium had historically taken shape in this area between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty armed forces, and that this had ensured stability and security for a long time. Their plan made it possible to strengthen the security of all the parties concerned by way of equal reductions on either side.

In their initial draft, the NATO countries proposed a tworound reduction of ground forces alone: during round one, the parties were to reach and carry out an agreement on cuts in the ground forces solely of the USSR and the USA stationed in Central Europe, while round two was to involve cuts in the ground forces of the other participants. The draft did not say which Western states were to reduce their forces and by how much, nor did it suggest any timetable for the reductions, simply setting the date for the start of the second-round negotiations. At the same time, the NATO countries demanded that the socialist countries should accept the proposition to establish an "equal ceiling" for NATO's and the Warsaw Treaty's ground forces.

Analysing the Western countries' proposals, one is bound to note that these were well thought out both in military-- political and propaganda terms. The NATO countries wanted the Soviet troops to be reduced through a withdrawal of combatant units and all their armaments, tanks included, while the USA was to be allowed to reduce its forces selectively and leave behind in Europe all the armaments of the units withdrawn.

That line would have in effect enabled the USA to modernise its forces in Europe, to reduce these by withdrawing some rear-line units, so increasing rather than reducing their fighting capacity. Under the NATO project, the Soviet Union was to have withdrawn much larger troop contingents than the USA, which would have given the Western countries unilateral advantages. The Western concept of asymmetrical reductions rested on the assumption that there were marked objective disproportions in the balance of military forces in

* See Y. Tomilin, "The Results of the Vienna Consultations", International Affairs, September 1973, pp. 78-80.

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MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE

Central Europe: in numerical strength, fighting capacity and geography.

The NATO draft was unacceptable, for it raised the unwarranted question of ``disproportions'' and the need to " balance out the forces" solely for one type of troops and arms, without regard for the overall picture.

Since the structure of the armed forces on either side has developed historically and along very different lines, it is obvious that drawing comparisons on the basis of separate components is not only more or less meaningless, but could even be misleading. The NATO countries, for instance, are known to have devoted much attention to the air force, and then to tactical nuclear weapons. In view of these structural differences, the only correct way to assess the balance between the two forces is to consider all the components of the armed forces and armaments in the aggregate.

Considering that an objective analysis of the balance between the two forces in Central Europe shows (and many Western specialists have recognised this) that they are roughly in equilibrium, it becomes even more obvious that the Western countries' proposals are less than objective.

Even Western specialists and competent analysts differ in their assessment of the military balance in Central Europe. A team of specialists from the Brookings Institution writes: "Looking at the matter from NATO's standpoint, the reader may be surprised to learn that there are still widespread disagreements on the existing balance of opposing forces in Europe.'"^^1^^' The US Department of Defence tends to take a relatively hopeful view of NATO prospects, NATO has tended towards a conservative view of Soviet capabilities and the London Institute for Strategic Studies falls somewhere in the middle.**

In actual fact, the spectrum of alternative estimates is even

wider. In the USA itself, competent organs, to say nothing of individual specialists and various agencies, including government agencies, differ in their assessments. Thus, a foreign-policy report for 1972 presented by the State Department said that "NATO maintains fewer troops in Central Europe than do the Warsaw Pact states"/^^1^^" and former Secretary of State William Rogers said at the International Press Club in New York on April 23, 1973 that "in Central Europe ... NATO has available roughly the same number of forces as the Warsaw Pact".""* Former President Richard Nixon spoke in a similar vein: "NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact."^:;"^i:'^::' In 1973, he again spoke of a roughly equal balance in conventional armed forces. And Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer said in his detailed analysis of the military balance in Europe that the Warsaw Pact had a considerable advantage in the number of ground divisions, but in terms of men in combatant units the two sides were matched almost evenly.****

Since the divisions on the two sides markedly differ in numerical strength and armaments, it is impossible to estimate the real balance between the two forces by comparing the number of divisions, which can even be misleading. US researcher Alain Enthoven says: "Because of great differeences, in size and structure, the number of divisions is a poor measure of NATO and Warsaw Pact capability."***** But if

* United States Foreign Policy 1972. A Report of the Secretary of State, Washington, 1973, p. 285.

** Press Release. The Embassy of the United States of America, Moscow, April 24, 1973, p. 4.

*** US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 25, 1971, p. 35.

**** See Thomas Moorer, United States Military Posture for 1974, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 28, 1973, Washington, 1973, p. 57.

***** Alain Enthoven, Review of a Systems Analysis, Washington, 1968, p. 13.

* T. Stanley, D. Whipp, Detente Diplomacy-. United States and European Security in the 1970s, New York, 1970, p. 54.

** See J. Newhouse, M. Croan, E. Fried, T. Stanley, US Troops in Europe: Issues, Cost and Choices, Washington, 1971, p. 52.

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one considers the overall numerical strength of the armed forces rather than the number of divisions, an analysis of various data published in the West, like the Military Balance of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, shows that the two forces are almost equal. True, the advocates of the idea about the Warsaw Treaty's "marked superiority" manipulate various figures any way they choose, confining their estimates solely to combatant units or to ground forces, or arbitrarily designating the Central European region.

It is common knowledge that the socialist and capitalist countries differ widely over the role and uses of the various arms of the services and armaments. Thus, as the USA has developed its helicopter fleet, largely on the basis of its Vietnam experience, it has intensively introduced new types of armoured helicopters equipped with air-to-ground missiles for striking at enemy tanks or other ground targets. These helicopters, a sort of flying tank, are an important ingredient of NATO's strike capability. In the decade from 1961 to 1970, the number of US helicopters trebled (from 4,047 to 12,014). Western press reports show that there are several types of aircraft meant to provide close support for ground forces, that is, which could be used against tanks and other targets on the battlefield.

As a result, the superiority one side has over the other in any one type of armed forces, service or hardware is offset by the other side's superiority in other indicators, so that the overall balance is roughly equal.

All this makes it clear that the NATO thesis about the Warsaw Treaty's "marked superiority" is lopsided and biased.

Finally, there is the so-called geographical factor, which has often been used as an argument in support of `` asymmetrical'' force reductions in favour of the West. Official NATO documents (like the Declaration of the NATO Council's Rome session of May 26-27, 1970) have repeatedly mentioned this factor. One of the ``models'' urging the need for ``disproportionate'' reductions under a one-to-six ratio said

that if one unit of US troops was to be withdrawn 3,000 miles, the Soviet Union had to ``maintain'' the balance by withdrawing six units, for the distance here is only 500 miles.

But a broader and more objective look at the geographical factor shows a different picture.

First, NATO's military command has some advantages in mobilisation and strategic troop movement owing to extensive transport facilities, a ramified network of airfields, the nature of Western Europe's communications system, NATO's air-transport fleet, and so on.

Second, the Soviet Union has a very long land-based borderline and has had to maintain massive contingents for its defence not only in the West, but also in the East and South of the country. So, if the Soviet Union has to move its troops to the West, say, from across the Urals or Lake Baikal, the distance here will in a sense be greater than that from New York to London.

A realistic approach to force reductions in Central Europe will show that the only possible way to go about this is gradually to reduce the number of troops while maintaining the historically shaped overall balance. Parity cuts would be well in line with the chief condition written into a number of documents, that of non-infliction of damage on any country taking part in military detente.

Thus, military detente serves to supplement the political detente. Its general goal is to set up a system of relations that would ensure lasting peace for Europe. This goal could best be served by a security system based on a balance of mutual interests, trust and co-operation, rather than a balance of military strength, which is bound to entail an arms race and could lead to armed conflict. The considerable headway in international detente that has now been achieved makes it possible to adopt measures for a gradual cutback of armed forces, for military detente in Europe, which since the European Conference has become the crucial ingredient of the drive to materialise the detente.

13---1787

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

CHAPTER SEVEN

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

A decision by the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", said: "The chief imperative of our day is to slow down and then to stop the arms race, move forward along the way leading to general and complete disarmament; relax the military confrontation on European soil and seek to overcome Europe's division into opposite military blocs."*

L. I. Brezhnev said at the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1976: "For Europe and its people, peace has become a truly vital need. That is why we Communists, who are partisans of the most humane, the most life-asserting world outlook, believe that it is now more important than ever to pave the road to military detente and to stop the arms race."**

Acting on their desire to ensure a fundamental normalisation of international relations and take fresh steps to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war, the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee, meeting in November 1976, adopted a Declaration, For the Further Advancement of Detente and for the Consolidation of Security and Development of Co-operation in Europe, which says that by pledging non-first use of nuclear weapons against each other, the signatories to the Final Act would take a step nearer these goals.

The Soviet Union's peace strategy derives from a clear understanding of the fact that to ensure effective military detente, the states have to stop the arms race and carry out consistent and systematic cutbacks of weapons stockpiles.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

By breaching the cold war front, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have created the conditions for broader economic co-operation in various fields among European states belonging to the two social systems.

Economic co-operation, as pointed out above, is one of the main lines of the socialist states' foreign-policy activity. In the early 1970s, when the socialist countries began their consistent drive to realise the Peace Programme, such co-operation scored considerable successes. L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: "The improved international climate has created a favourable atmosphere for invigorating economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation. Soviet economic and scientific-technical ties with the capitalist countries have expanded considerably and changed in quality during the period under review. ... In all this . . . we see a materialisation of detente, an important area of our Party's general work to develop peaceful ties among the peoples."""

The results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have created prerequisites for much broader and more vigorous co-operation among the European states in various fields of economic activity. The socialist countries be-

* Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, p. 26.

13*

* Pravda, August 7,1975.

** For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, p. 12.

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ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

lieve that economic co-operation on the scale of the whole continent and with due respect for every country's laws and traditions and the principles regulating the relations among states will help strengthen the foundation of peace and security.

The West European countries' efficient and large-scale industrial production is largely oriented upon the world market, and any industrial specialisation in these conditions can be successful only provided foreign markets are taken into account.

Vigorous development of foreign economic ties tends to create a favourable setting for many of these countries to overcome the relatively narrow framework of their domestic market. A country's size, which has the decisive influence on the scale and efficiency of production, is no longer all that important if it can sell its products on foreign markets. Hence the desire for all-round economic relations with other countries. Western Europe's bonds with the world market are much closer than those of other capitalist states.

Seven small countries (Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) top the list of the capitalist countries most integrated into the world system of economic ties. Foreign trade for them is roughly 2-2.5 times more important than it is for the bigger European states. Finland, Austria, Ireland and Iceland are also high on that list.

The bigger West European countries have also rapidly become much more dependent in their economic development on foreign economic ties. West German economists say that their economy has developed so rapidly owing, among other things, to the considerable growth of foreign trade. A collective study by a team of Soviet economists says that "intensive foreign expansion is an important element in the economic strategy of the French monopolies as a factor stimulating economic growth" .*

Over the past decade, Italy has also become much more dependent on foreign economic exchange. The production capacities in some sectors of Italian industry far exceed the country's domestic needs. Italy has sought to develop lines of production for which the conditions in the country are favourable and to import various goods whose domestic production is inadequate.""

Britain is the only big West European country to have lost some of its positions in international trade.** Its weakening foreign economic position and the need to restructure the production apparatus are seen as closely interconnected problems.***

On the whole, foreign economic factors play a more important role in Western Europe's economic development than in that of the two other centres of the modern capitalist world (the USA and Japan). Western Europe's foreign trade per head of the population is more than 2.5 times the figure for the USA and Japan. The gap in the share of exports in the gross national product is as wide. The marked changes taking place in the world over the past few years have tended to change the patterns of world trade, with a constant increase in Western Europe's share.****

The main factors behind the present changes in international trade largely derive from the possibility individual countries have to adjust to the new forms of the international division of labour. Many industrial West European countries have secured a fairly strong foothold on the world market

* For details see Italy, Moscow, 1973, p. 85 (in Russian). ** Britain's share in world capitalist exports went down from 8.4 per cent in 1965 to 6.6 per cent in 1972, while the FRG's share increased from 11 to 12.7 per cent, that of France from 6.2 to 7.1 per cent and Italy from 4.4 to 5.1 per cent (see World Economics and International Relations, No. 8, Supplement, 1973, p. 59). *** For details see Great Britain, Moscow, 1972, p. 169 (in Russian). **** Western Europe's share in the capitalist world's total exports increased from 46.7 per cent in 1964 to 50.9 per cent in 1972 (see World Economics and International Relations, No. 8, 1974, p. 12; Supplement, p. 59).

* France, Moscow, 1973, p. 149 (in Russian).

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by specialising in the export of definite lines of products, like various types of high-quality engineering and electricalengineering products, electronic devices, instruments, chemical products, Pharmaceuticals and special steels. Many big and small West European countries have taken the road of specialisation and have derived considerable benefits from the new-type international exchange.

The higher the level of commodity specialisation in a country's exports, the more trading partners it tends to have. Its economic level has the decisive influence not only on the volume of its foreign economic ties, but also on their scope. Every major specialised line of production is chiefly oriented upon foreign markets, and the larger the latter, the better chance the exporting country has to expand its production facilities. The higher the level of international industrial specialisation, the greater the need for broad export markets.

In view of all that, any limitations on international economic ties are the main obstacle to the economic development of many big and small industrial West European countries. The emergence of regional trade and economic blocs in Western Europe tends to narrow down the possibilities of trade on the basis of the international division of labour, for the bloc partners have fewer opportunities for expanding their export markets and, consequently, for organising efficient large-scale production. Their interests lie, therefore, in broad international trade without any regional or group restrictions. The West European countries are primarily interested in broader economic co-operation on the scale of the whole continent.

The growth of the productive forces and the ongoing scientific and technical revolution serve further to internationalise economic life and objectively call for the development of international economic, scientific and technical ties. Any constraints on these ties could slow down the growth of social production and serve to lower its technical level. Hence the ever more important role of international econom-

ic co-operation between capitalist and socialist countries. This co-operation, based on the mutual advantage principle, helps develop the scientific, technical and economic potential of each of the partners, save material and manpower resources, improve the organisation of production and raise labour productivity.

The sustained economic growth of the East and West European countries, which already account for more than half the world's industrial production, helps consolidate the basis for expanding intra-European ties, so creating objective possibilities for economic co-operation between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe.

Various economico-mathematical models showing the possible intensiveness of trade between two countries or regions are of considerable interest in this context.

Thus, according to a model proposed by the Austrian economist, Professor K. Rothschild, the optimal volume of a country's (or region's) export to another country (or region) should approximately reflect the latter's share in world imports. In other words, the tendencies taking shape in world commodity movements reflect the objective economic prerequisites for the international division of labour more accurately than the export orientation of a given country (or region)*

If this model is used to estimate the optimal volume of East-West trade in Europe, a fairly definite picture will emerge. In the 1960s and 1970s, the European socialist countries' share in world imports was around 10-11 per cent,** while their share in the West European countries' total exports, though constantly growing, was roughly half that figure.

According to a model developed by the Dutch economist Professor Jan Tinbergen, the optimal volume of a country's (or region's) exports to another country (or region) depends

* Monatsberichte des Osterreichischen Instituts tut Wirtschaitsforschung. No. 5, 1966, pp. 172-80. ** OECD Trade by Commodities, Paris, 1960-1972.

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on the size (level) of the two countries' gross national product (or gross national income) and the distance in kilometres between them. Estimates under this model are much more complicated, for East and West European countries use different methods of calculating their gross national product (or national income).

Estimates made with the use of the standard methodology adopted in the socialist countries show that in the early 1970s Europe created about 47 per cent of the world's national income, and the CMEA countries, in particular, 25 per cent. For industrial production, the figures were about 55 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively.*

The latent possibilities in the development of economic relations between East and West European countries have yet to be put to full use.**

At the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution, any underestimation of the advantages inherent in the international division of labour could serve to slow down the growth of social production even in countries with a highly developed economy. There is now a favourable setting for the manifestation of the objective tendency for spreading the international division of labour, especially in the relations between East and West European countries. Their geography, the traditional ties between them and the high economic level of most European countries are conducive to its manifestation.

In view of a whole range of objective factors, the West European countries are much more interested in the development of business contacts with the socialist countries than the present level of mutual economic co-operation would in-

dicate. Here are some of these factors, those of particular importance for Western Europe:

- access to new export markets in the socialist countries' rapidly growing economic complex;

- access to new energy and raw material sources;

- favourable possibilities for increasing the scale of West European production through participation in giant projects in the socialist countries (like the Volga or Kama motor works in the USSR);

- the anxiety caused by US and Japanese competition on the world market, and the West Europeans' desire for geographical diversification;

- the possible uses of the socialist countries' scientific and technical achievements, notably, the Soviet Union's achievements in basic research, which have won special recognition in Western Europe.

Some West German economists believe, for instance, that economic co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe has been yielding ever greater benefits to both groups of countries, and there is no reason to fear that the East European partners could use it to derive unilateral advantages from Western Europe's economic potentialities. They regard trade with the East European countries as a complex phenomenon, and list quite a few arguments in favour of much more intensive relations. First of all, trade with the East European countries has the mutual advantages of foreign trade in general. More vigorous economic relations with the East European countries open up new export markets and sources of raw materials for the West European economy. Trade with Eastern Europe has developed at a steady pace, something that may help stabilise the Western countries' economic development.* Another important point is that trade with the East European countries could promote the European detente.

*•• European Economic Co-operation, Moscow, 1973, p. 38 (in Russian).

** According to UN Economic Commission for Europe, the CMEA countries' share in the West European countries' total trade is to go up to 7.5 per cent by 1980 (see International Affairs, No. 7, 1973, p. 96).

* In 1972, for instance, the FRG's exports to Western Europe increased by 8 per cent, and to the socialist countries by 37 per cent.

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ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The energy crisis that has plagued the West over the past few years is also bound to affect the economic relations between European socialist and capitalist countries. As the domestic production of energy resources lags behind the growing energy consumption, affecting the West European countries' growth rate and state of the economy, they have to look for new sources of energy supply. And the European socialist countries are known to have vast energy resources.

Still, some Westerners have expressed doubt about the prospects of economic co-operation in Europe. The opponents of international detente, the spokesmen of the military-- industrial complexes and the more reactionary circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie have insisted that the socialist countries would be the only ones to gain from broader co-operation on a continental scale. They say that the socialist countries would have greater access to advanced Western machinery and technology in exchange for raw materials and semifinished products. Some writers on economic affairs also say that economic co-operation here has a fairly limited basis owing to the "asymmetrical economic structures" of Eastern and Western Europe.* In other words, they accentuate the differences in economic development levels and the nature of the industrial structures in the two parts of Europe. This standpoint, however, has no substance to it and is at odds with reality.

In comparing the general economic level of East and West European countries, one will easily find that `` asymmetry'' is an artificial problem. Take the gross national product per head of the population, a synthetic indicator. In 1970, this indicator (estimated according to Western methodology) was somewhat higher in Hungary ($2,340), the GDR ($2,155) and Czechoslovakia ($2,207) than, say, in Austria

($1,850) or Italy ($1,648).* Another indicator, characterising a country's industrial structure, that is, the share of engineering and chemistry in total industrial production (the modern synthetic criterion of a country's economic profile), runs to 40-42 per cent both in the West European countries and the leading East European countries (Table 2).

Table 2

The Structure of Employment and Output in Manufacturing in Eastern and Western Europe

(1967-1969), per cent

Industry

Eastern Europe

Western Europe

Employment

Output

Employment

Output

1. Engineering . . . 2. Metallurgical . . . 3. Chemical .....

39.7 6.5 6.4 29.5 10.5 7.4

29.9 9.3 8.3 18.5 19.1 14.9

38.1 6.8 8.0 28.4 10.3 8.4

30.7 8.3 11.2 18.1 18.7 13.0

4. Textile and light . 5. Food .....

6. The rest .....

Total ......

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Economic Surrey of Europe in 1971, Part 1; The European Economy from the 1950s to the 1970s, UN, New York, 1972, pp. 43, 52.

Of course, there is some ``asymmetry'' in the foreign trade between Eastern and Western Europe, but this cannot last long, for there is no asymmetry in the industrial structures of the two parts of Europe. There is no reason why this ``asymmetry'' should not be overcome, for it depends, among other things, on the trading partners' desire to develop economic co-operation. A point to note here is that over the past few years, the structure of the socialist countries' exports has been increasingly brought into line with the structure of their industrial production, and East-West trade in Europe

* Some of them allege the existence of a so-called technological gap between East and West European countries (P. Sager, Die technologische Lucke zwischen Ost und West, Bern, 1971).

* H. Hedberg, Japan: Europas Markt von morgen, Hamburg, 1972, p. 246.

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has been gradually shifting to the sphere of finished products, including machinery and complete equipment.

Some economists argue that since East-West trade in Europe is ``complementary'' (involving an exchange of raw materials and intermediate products for finished products), the basis for all-European economic co-operation is not broad enough."" But recent statistical research speaks to the contrary.

Thus, the foreign trade figures for the eight leading West European countries (for 1961-1967), as estimated by the Austrian economist Dr. Jan Stankovsky, show that the success of their export to the socialist countries depends on the same factors that determine the general principles of international trade.

Moreover, a statistical analysis of the development of world trade as a whole, and East-West trade in Europe in particular, shows a very definite tendency. From 1955 to 1970, the total exports of the West European countries, the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia almost quadrupled (1955=100, 1970=376.2), and their exports to the CMEA countries ( without Cuba and Mongolia) increased more than fivefold (1970=509.8). Consequently, the development of Western trade with the socialist countries is a major factor in the growth of world trade as a whole.

The growth of the productive forces and the ongoing scientific and technical revolution serve to intensify the international division of labour, having become the chief objective factors, the fulcrum of the whole system of European economic co-operation. The traditional economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe and the special position of some West European countries (their specialisation) in the international division of labour system stipulate the objective need for the development of these tendencies.

FRESH OPPORTUNITIES IN FOREIGN TRADE

European co-operation largely derives from and depends on the level and multiplicity of the economic ties between European capitalist and socialist countries. One could, perhaps, single out three main forms of all-European economic co-operation: a) foreign trade; b) economic, production, scientific and technical co-operation on the principles of the international division of labour; c) joint efforts to master and protect the environment. The latter is still at the initial stages, but has a promising future.

The West European region has an important place in the whole system of trade links between socialist and developed capitalist countries, accounting for the bulk of the trade between them.

Over the past decade, however, Western Europe's share in the total trade between the European socialist countries and the developed capitalist countries has gradually shrunk, chiefly owing to the more vigorous economic co-operation between the socialist countries and other regions of the capitalist world, especially Japan (whose share increased from 3.2 to 8.3 per cent for exports and from 4.4 to 9 per cent for imports) and over the past few years also the USA and Canada. Various new forms of co-operation, like more intensive use of economic co-operation in the working of natural resources in the socialist countries, have had a marked effect on the volume and nature of the socialist countries' economic relations with other regions of the capitalist world.

The slight decline in Western Europe's share is also due to the development of integration processes in the area. The establishment of closed trade-economic groupings (the Common Market and EFTA) brought about a "diversion of trade", which means that many lines of goods once imported from third countries are now being imported from other member-countries, because import duties within the groupings have been lifted.

* Probleme des Ost-West Handels, Bonn-Brussels-New York, 1971, pp. 101-02.

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Various export quotas or even outright bans on exports from West European to socialist countries (like the 1963 West German embargo on the export of gas pipes to the USSR) have also had a negative effect on the dynamics of trade between Eastern and Western Europe.

Aggregate data for the whole of Western Europe show that in the 1960s its exports to the socialist countries grew much faster (1971=469.5) than its total exports (1971 = 385.6). But its imports from the socialist countries (1971 = 385.8) grew somewhat slower than its total imports (1971 = 389.6).* The trends in the development of West European exports to and imports from the socialist countries did not coincide, it appears, in view of the element of discrimination, although various other factors also had a role to play.

The development of trade between individual West European countries and socialist European countries did not run an even course.

An analysis of statistical data for 1960-1972 invites some conclusions on the development of economic relations between East and West European countries. First of all, trade between them more than trebled, and the share of exports to the socialist countries increased for most West European states. Another indisputable conclusion is that in the 1960s the share of the big West European countries in the total trade between Eastern and Western Europe increased from 60 to 62.8 per cent, notably, owing to the marked extension of other forms of economic co-operation.

Among the bigger West European countries, the FRG and Italy most vigorously developed their economic ties with the socialist countries, whose share in their exports was much larger than the average for the whole of Western Europe. The two countries took an active part in the development of other forms of economic co-operation, something that undoubtedly had an effect on the overall volume of their trade with the socialist countries.

Over the past few years, France's economic ties with the socialist countries have markedly increased, but slpce the initial level was fairly low, the present-day level has yet to top the European average. Britain's trade with the socialist countries has developed at a moderate pace.

The importance of economic ties with the socialist countries differs for the various groups of small West European countries. One group is largely made up of neutral countries and countries which are not members of any militarypolitical grouping (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland) whose economic co-operation with the socialist countries is markedly above the average for Western Europe. In 1972, these four countries accounted for more than one-fifth of all East-West trade in Europe (21.6 per cent). Of course, this figure covers foreign trade alone, but it also reflects the overall level of economic co-operation. The neutrality principle observed by many small West European countries appears to be well justified in the present conditions. By virtue of their economic specialisation, the small industrial countries, which are deeply integrated in the system of world economic ties, are interested in multifaceted and smoothly functioning international ties, and any disruption here tends to have a painful effect on these countries, limiting their possibilities for genuine international co-operation and undermining the basis for the fruitful use of all the advantages of the present-day international division of labour.

Another group is made up of Common Market countries, like Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, with a relatively low-lower than the West European average-level of economic ties with the socialist states. Since these countries are most deeply integrated in the world system of economic ties, their relatively modest trade with the socialist countries shows that they had made inadequate use of the advantages of the international division of labour.

The volume of East-West trade in Europe largely depends on its commodity structure (see Table 3).

* Wittschaftsberichte Kreditanstalt-Bankverein, No. 6, 1972, p. 24.

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Table 3

changes in international trade: the increase in the share of manufactures. A point to note here, however, is that trade in machinery and equipment has become the most dynamic ingredient of world trade. The socialist countries, for their part, have recently purchased large amounts of equipment in the West European countries, but the share of machinery and equipment in the latter's overall imports from the socialist countries is still relatively small, although in the 1960s it tended to increase for some West European countries. The increase differed from one group of countries to another, and this shows that there is still much room for progress in this area.

Thus, French and West German scientists and experts meeting for an international economic seminar at Strasbourg in July 1971 to discuss the development of East-West economic ties in Europe explicitly spoke of the need to import more machinery and industrial equipment from the socialist countries. According to the General Director of the French Exporters' Association Roger Gorse, such possibilities could show up as the result of a more careful study of the socialist countries' export proposals. The point is that the sales departments of many large industrial companies in Western Europe often have a very hazy idea about the activities of the purchases department, and vice versa. Since East-West trade in Europe could be further expanded largely on a product-pay-back basis, Gorse believes, there is a need for coordinated efforts by the export and import departments of industrial companies, and by industry and government foreign trade agencies.*

A point to note in this context is that the socialist countries have some varied and unique equipment for export. The Soviet Union, for instance, offers many types of heavy equipment, which some West European countries do not produce and have had to import, like unique vertical lathes and equipment for large construction sites. Sweden's Minister of Com-

CMEA European Members' Trade with West European Countries: Commodity Structure

(per cent)

Exports

Imports

1957- 1959

1968- 1970

1957- 1959

1968- 1970

1 Foodstuffs ..........

22.6 23.1 23.3 8.6 9.9 9.7 2.8

17.7 17.6 17.8 10.6 9.3 19.2 7.8

15.1 15.4 0.1

21.0 29.9 15.6 2.9

7.3

6.3 0.7 12.5 39.1 33.3 0.8

2. Raw materials" (without fuel) .... 3 Fuel ~ . . . . ....

4. Ferrous and non-ferrous metals . . . 5. Engineering products ........

6. Other manufactures ....... •

Total ................

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: European Economiclflo-operation, Moscow, 1973, p. 99 (in Russian).

The table shows that over the decade the export-import structure of East-West trade in Europe gradually improved. The share of raw materials and intermediate products in the socialist countries' imports from Western Europe markedly diminished: at the beginning of the 1960s, this group of commodities accounted for 51.6 per cent of their total import, and by the late 1960s its share dropped to 26.8 per cent. On the other hand, engineering and other sectors of manufacturing came to play a much more important role (their share increasing from 45.5 to 72.4 per cent).

Notable changes also took place in the structure of the CMEA countries' exports to Western Europe. Whereas previously raw materials and intermediate products made up the bulk of their exports to Western Europe (about 77.6 per cent), and by the late 1960s their share had dropped to onehalf (about 53.7 per cent), with a marked increase in the role of the manufacturing industries (from 19.6 per cent to 28.5 per cent).

The changing pattern of trade between the European capitalist and socialist countries reflects the general structural

* Probleme des Ost-West Handels, p. 94.

14---1787

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merce Kjell-Olof Feldt told Parliament that it was time the Soviet Union and Sweden "traded in new kinds of goods"."'

Soviet industrial equipment, with its wide product-mix, has met with a high assessment in Western Europe/'''"" In the early 1970s, Soviet blast-furnace and steel-casting equipment was installed at many enterprises in West European countries (Finland, France, Luxemburg, Sweden and others). Here is the opinion of a team of specialists from the Swedish firm Avesta (the Johnson Concern), the major producer of stainless steel in Western Europe (about 195,000 tons a year): "Our enterprise has bought some Soviet equipment for the production of stainless steel, and we pay it the highest tribute." And the heads of the Luxemburg company Columeta declared: "The Soviet equipment we have purchased for our plant, the furnace-cooling installations, in particular, are most reliable."*** The Finnish joint-stock company Outokumpu, dealing in non-ferrous metallurgy, has also purchased Soviet instruments and equipment and has been using advanced Soviet technology.

In their balanced efforts to implement the Comprehensive Programme of Economic Integration, the socialist countries have devoted special attention to specialisation and co-- operation of production. The tendencies in world trade show that international competition in the marketing of end-products has shifted from the sphere of prices and production costs to the sphere of the technical level of the products, their range and quality, delivery schedules, after-sale services, and so on.

The problem of improving the structure of the socialist countries' exports to Western Europe is, of course, extremely complicated and depends on many factors.

The socialist countries' exports to Western Europe could, perhaps, be divided into three groups. Group one comprises fuels and raw materials (oil, gas, electric power, ores and other important raw materials and intermediate products), which are sold through well-established channels and do not require the use of modern marketing methods quite so much as other groups of products.

Group two comprises finished products which do not require after-sale services (chemicals, textiles, timber, tinned foods, and so on).

And group three consists of finished products requiring after-sale services (like industrial equipment, machine-tools, cars and domestic electrical appliances). Tariff levels rise from group one to group three, and this enables the exporter to make more flexible use of the various terms of trade.

An analysis of statistical data on the changes in the structure of the socialist countries' exports to Western Europe shows, for instance, that in the 1960s the export of grouptwo products developed most dynamically. Their share in the socialist countries' total exports to Western Europe increased from 9.7 per cent to 19.2 per cent. Their marketing does not involve any considerable outlays, but tends to make the overall exports more profitable and enables the exporter to receive more foreign currency.

The socialist countries' sales on the West European market depend on many factors, primarily the range and quantity of their products, delivery schedules, quality, prices, marketing system, efficient advertising, and so on.

Mixed companies, set up since the early 1970s in France, Britain, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Norway, Italy and many other West European countries, have been doing a great deal to establish a modern sales and marketing system, helping expand the sales of East European manufactures in Western Europe.

Thus, several Franco-Soviet companies operate in France: Aktif-Avto (to market Soviet farming machinery and roadbuilding equipment), Rusbois (timber), Sogo (chemicals) and

M»

* International Affairs, No. 7, 1973, p. 106.-

** Sweden, for instance, has bought a number of first-class Sovietmade 35,000-ton vessels: Rigoletto, La Traviata, Aida and Madame Butterfly. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union sold three bulk-- carriers to Norway for its merchant marine, a number of bulk-carriers and hydrofoil ships to the FRG, etc. *** Piavda, April 6, 1973; September 23, 1973.

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Stanko-France (machine-tools and forging and pressing equipment).

The Franco-Czechoslovakian company Stim France, set up in November 1967 under an agreement between the French Compagnie francaise de ferrailes and the Czechoslovakian foreign trade outfit Stroj import, has been helping sell Czechoslovakian machine-tools on the French market (and provide technical services and spare parts for the delivered machinetools).

Hungarian foreign trade agencies maintain a vast network of mixed companies in other countries (in early 1974, there were about 60, the bulk of these being concentrated in Western Europe). Goldsol in France and HungarotexItaliana in Italy are among the biggest of these.

Mixed companies are an important channel for boosting the sales of East European finished products on the West European markets. The involvement of local shareholders in such companies serves markedly to reduce the volume of investments and the risk for the exporting country, and to ensure the closest possible and most effective contacts between the exporter and the consumer. This form of marketing, however, involves considerable initial outlays, which can be recouped only when the volume of sales is large enough. According to the Western press, Japanese companies, for instance, have rarely sought to establish broad networks of mixed marketing companies in Western Europe, although Japan's sales of finished products in Western Europe are fairly large, especially when it comes to passenger cars and household electrical goods.

Another major problem of present-day marketing and a crucial component of success on the export market is to find a solid agent. One thing an exporter has to bear in mind when choosing an agent is that the latter has to be fairly well known on the local market as a company selling similar products. The principle of clustering, under which a new department store is built, wherever possible, in the vicinity of other big commercial centres in order to make use of the

existing infrastructure, has proved its worth in many spheres of production, trade and the services. Thus, almost all firms exporting cars to Western Europe make wide use of this principle.

In Sweden the Soviet foreign trade company Stankoimport has been selling its products through Alfa-Laval, one of Sweden's major engineering firms, and this has helped to raise the export of Soviet machine-tools to Sweden to a fairly high level. In early 1973, more than 1,200 Soviet machine-- toolscomplex automatic or semi-automatic systems-were in operation at Swedish enterprises.

In the early 1970s, many West European firms and associations were allowed to open their permanent offices in the socialist countries* (in 1973, there were more than 80 of these).

The development of a broad network of East European agent firms in Western Europe and the establishment of West European agent companies in the socialist countries leads to closer contacts between the trading partners and helps intensify trade and improve its structure.

The nature of the credit relations between East and West European countries has had a marked influence on the volume of trade between them. Since much of the industrial equipment in world trading practice is sold on credit, its terms and volume are sometimes of paramount importance for the choice of trading partner.

Italy, the FRG, Britain and other countries have extended 10-15-year bank credits to the Soviet Union on mutually advantageous terms. Under these credits, Soviet foreign trade agencies have purchased, in addition to the usual range of imports, a number of large complete installations for automobile, chemical, oil, power engineering, textile, pulp-- andpaper, food and other enterprises in order to boost the production of some lines of goods. Thus, the Soviet Union pur-

* Bulletin economique pout TEurope. Vol. 24, No. 1, New York, 1973.

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chased from Italy's Fiat machinery and equipment for the manufacture of passenger cars at the Volga Motor Works in Togliatti.

As the Soviet Union's economic co-operation with the industrial capitalist countries has developed. Soviet organisations have also concluded a whole range of big mutually advantageous deals with capitalist firms and banks. The substance of these operations is that capitalist countries wishing to receive various lines of goods from the Soviet Union have agreed to provide Soviet organisations (under long-term bank credits) with machinery, equipment and the necessary materials, on the understanding that these are to be subsequently paid off through the export of manufactures and raw materials additionally produced in the Soviet Union.

The activities of East European banks in Western Europe have also helped to develop European trade. For many years now. Soviet banks like the Merchant Bank for Northern Europe in Paris, the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd. in London and the merchant bank Voskhod Handelsbank AG in Zurich have successfully operated in Western Europe. Another Soviet bank, the Ost-West Handelsbank AG, was recently launched in Frankfort on the Main as a jointstock company. Soviet banks also operate in Vienna and Luxemburg.

At the same time, however, there are many problems hindering the all-round development of East-West trade in Europe. Discrimination against the socialist countries is one of these. Thus, there are various tariffs, permits and quotas on imports from the socialist states. Permits and quotas, undoubtedly, serve to restrict trade between European capitalist and socialist countries, for they hold back the export of products which the socialist countries are prepared to supply in large quantities and create an element of uncertainty in respect of the terms of access to the Western markets. Import quotas on goods from the socialist countries may even remain unused, for these countries, tied down by the quotas and uncertain whether these could be increased, may not

wish to make additional outlays in order to adjust their products to the demands of the potential buyer.

The discriminatory measures applied by some West European countries against the socialist states also tend to have a negative psychological effect on the businessmen who are interested in business contacts with the socialist countries.

Long-term trade agreements have done much to develop East-West trade in Europe. At present, there are more than 80 such agreements between Western and CMEA countries.

Mixed commissions and working groups also help make fuller use of the possibilities latent in co-operation and further to expand the economic and scientific and technical ties. One of their chief tasks is to find ways of expanding trade in machinery and equipment. They seek to bring out the types of machinery and equipment produced in the socialist countries that could be marketed in the West European countries, and explore the forms and methods of trade in various groups of machinery and technical products on every market. The socialist and the West European countries have exchanged information on building projects they are planning to fit out with foreign equipment. Such mixed working groups help lay the groundwork for co-operation in the manufacture of some lines of machinery and equipment and their export to third countries.

As a major form of East-West co-operation in Europe, foreign trade is, undoubtedly, a promising and mutually advantageous area for both groups of countries.

THE FORMS OF

INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

The state of European economic co-operation depends not only on the general level of East-West trade on the continent, but also on other forms of economic ties which go beyond the framework of simple commodity exchanges. L. I. Brezhnev

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

said at the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in October 1973: "Trade has linked peoples and countries from time immemorial. The same is true of our day. But today it is unprofitable and unreasonable to confine economic co-operation solely to trade. Broad international division of labour is the only basis for keeping pace with the times and abreast of the requirements and potentialities of the scientific and technological revolution. This, I should say, is now axiomatic. Hence the need for mutually beneficial, long-term and large-scale economic co-operation, both bilateral and multilateral."*

The earliest agreements on various forms of economic cooperation between East and West European countries were signed in the early 1960s. In 1973, the Executive Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Europe estimated that there were already about 600 such agreements in force/^^1^^'"'

West European economists have devoted much attention to the various forms of industrial-economic co-operation between European socialist and capitalist countries, differing in their views on what co-operation actually is and on the spheres of economic activity it covers. The UN Economic Commission for Europe says that "industrial co-operation in an East-West context denotes the economic relationships and activities arising from . . . contracts extending over a number of years between partners belonging to different economic systems which go beyond the straightforward sale or purchase of goods and services to include a set of complementary or reciprocally matching operations (in production, in the development and transfer of technology, in marketing, etc.)". The Commission specified several major forms of industrial co-operation:

- licencing with payment in resultant products. Such licencing may be coupled with transfer of technology and some types of subproducts;

- supply of complete plants or production lines with payment (full or partial) in resultant products. Equipment could also be made available for the working of various natural resources;

- co-production and sale of end-products on the basis of intrasectoral division of labour between the partners. Such co-operation could sometimes be confined to joint scientific and technical projects or an exchange of experience in the engineering of new products for manufacture;

- subcontracting, under which one of the partners turns out and delivers a given product using the other partner's documents or technology,-

- joint ventures in trade or production, which involve coinvestment, joint management and a sharing of the risk and the profits;

- and finally, joint tendering or construction of projects with the participation of partners from third countries lying outside Europe (Third World countries above all).*

Two West German economists from the Hamburg Institute for International Economics (HWWA), Klaus Bolz and Peter Plotz, maintain that it is, perhaps, hard to find a comprehensive definition for industrial-economic co-operation between Western Europe and the socialist countries. In practice, they say, it is altogether impossible to distinguish trade operations between partners under co-operation agreements and trade operations under trade agreements. Nevertheless, they believe, it is possible to specify at least three main forms of co-operation: co-operation in the scientific and technical field (scientific and technical co-operation, exchange of licences and know-how); production co-operation (subcontracting

* Having analysed 202 agreements on East-West industrial co-- operation (that is, about one-third of the total), the UN Economic Commission for Europe classified about 28.2 per cent of the samples as belonging to the first form of industrial co-operation, 11.9 per cent to the second, 37.1 per cent to the third, 7.9 per cent to the fourth, 10.9 per cent to the fifth and 2.4 per cent to the sixth (Analytical Report on Industrial Co-operation among ECE Countries, pp. 2-3, 7-14).

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, pp. 312-13. ** See Analytical Report on Industrial Co-operation among ECE Countries, United Nations, Geneva, 1973, p. 3.

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agreements for the delivery of products, joint production, and co-partnership in production in third countries); and cooperation in the building of industrial and other projects (in third countries, in particular).""

East European economists have also suggested various definitions of industrial-economic co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe. The Hungarian researcher Eva Sarosi maintains, for instance, that industrial co-operation spells out as long-term relations between juridically and economically independent partners in one industry or in allied industries. Under this definition, the industrial co-operation concept does not cover co-operation in science (at the level of universities, research institutes, etc.), the infrastructure, the power industry, agriculture or other areas. Sarosi has singled out these forms of industrial co-operation between enterprises : deliveries of complete equipment with technical documentation in exchange for resultant products,- reciprocal deliveries of completing components,- production on the basis of jointly developed technologies and products; deliveries of complete products to third countries; and joint building of enterprises in third countries.**

According to the Soviet economist Y. Kormnov, the concept of industrial-economic co-operation covers production, trade and scientific and technical co-operation, with strong and lasting ties between the partners. He specifies several major forms: agreements for the delivery on credit of machinery, equipment and licences with payments (full or partial) in resultant products turned out by the newly built or reconstructed enterprises; agreements for the manufacture of separate components or assembly units for the

partner; exchange of units or components for joint production; sale of products in third countries through joint agencies.*

An analysis of the various definitions of industrial co-- operation shows that, whatever the distinctions, all of these have some aspects in common. In every instance, it is a matter of long-term and purposeful co-operation between European socialist and capitalist countries, based on the principles of mutual advantage and covering various spheres of economic, scientific and technical activity. It is easy to see, however, that economists differ as to the spheres of economic activity it covers.

We think it possible to classify three main spheres (or forms) of industrial-economic co-operation: economic co-- operation involving joint construction of industrial or other projects, the working of natural resources, the development of the infrastructure, various branches of agriculture, and so on • production co-operation involving production-programme sharing between individual enterprises; scientific and technical co-operation at every level (between individual enterprises, research institutes, state agencies, and so on).

The vigorous development of new forms of economic ties is primarily due to objective factors: the growth of the productive forces and greater international division of labour. Co-operation enables the partners to make fuller use of the lowest production costs factor, which means that the division of labour between the partners enables them to turn out their products under more favourable conditions from the standpoint of production costs. There is a greater need for an exchange of advanced technology and products, a stronger tendency towards stability in the two partners' economic development (many Western economists regard industrial-- economic co-operation as an effective anti-inflationary instrument, for the prices of the products being exchanged are fixed for

* See K. Bolz, P. Plotz, Kooperationserfahrungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit den sozialistischen La.nd.etn Osteutopas, Hamburg, 1973, pp. 11-18.

** Eva Sarosi, Zur itidustriellen Kooperation zwischen Qste.treich und Ungarn, Vienna, 1972, pp. 4, 8.

* kll-European Economic Co-operation, Moscow, 1973, pp. 131, 134 (in Russian).

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a definite period ahead).* Industrial-economic co-operation serves to intensify specialisation, enables the partners to develop large-scale production and helps them save considerable amounts of foreign currency and cut administrative and transport costs.

Of course, there are still many difficulties and unresolved problems in this area hampering the fuller use of the advantages of industrial-economic co-operation between European capitalist and socialist countries. First of all, there is inadequate information about the socialist countries' production capabilities and requirements. The financing of co-- operation agreements has to be improved. In some West European countries government agencies that underwrite export credits sometimes refuse to provide guarantees and insurance for product-pay-back credits. Some countries have yet to establish special trade and tariff treatment for products being shipped across borders within the framework of cooperation, and to relax customs formalities. The states will also have to elaborate international juridical norms to regulate the operations going forward within the framework of industrial co-operation.

Alongside the real difficulties which exist in industrial-- economic co-operation, there are also some artificial complications. Attempts are sometimes being made, for instance, to give priority to one form of co-operation or another. But on the whole, the need to develop industrial-economic co-- operation has won broad support across the European continent.

In the early 1970s, mutually advantageous long-term and large-scale economic co-operation began to play a special role in the economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe. Among the numerous forms being widely used in practice, it is possible to single out some of the more important ones, which have exerted a decisive influence on the volume and nature of economic ties between the two parts of the continent:

- economic co-operation involving joint development, working or transportation of natural resources in the socialist countries (natural gas, electric power, ores or other minerals), with the West European share being paid off through deliveries of the raw materials, intermediate products or energy obtained;

- economic co-operation involving joint construction in the socialist countries of industrial projects for the output of primary products (metal-working, chemical, petrochemical, pulp-and-paper and other enterprises), with the West European share being paid off (in part or in full) through deliveries of the intermediate or end products obtained;

- economic co-operation involving joint construction in the socialist and the capitalist countries of large manufacturing enterprises (automobile, oil-refining, metallurgical and other enterprises), with the West European share sometimes being paid off through joint construction of industrial complexes or other projects in the West European countries.

Under the first head come a number of product-pay-back agreements on the delivery of Soviet natural gas to some West European coutries and on reciprocal deliveries of pipes for gas pipelines. By 1973, the Soviet Union had signed such agreements with five West European countries: Italy, the FRG, Austria, France and Finland. It was decided to build a special transit system of gas mainlines for the export of Soviet natural gas to Western Europe.

The USSR's agreement with Italy provides for the delivery of more than 120,000 million cubic metres of Soviet natural gas over a period of 20 years. The USSR-Italy gas pipeline was commissioned in June 1974. Under the first two productpay-back agreements with the FRG (1970 and 1972), the Soviet Union is to deliver to that country about 120,000 million cubic metres of natural gas over a period of 20 years, and the FRG, for its part, has delivered on credit consignments of large-diameter pipes, machinery and equipment for the building of gas mainlines. The USSR-FRG gas pipeline has also been put in operation. By 2000 the FRG will have

* See Analytical Report..., pp. 15-17.

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ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

received a total of nearly 200,000 million cubic metres of natural gas.

Under a Soviet-Finnish protocol the Soviet Union is to supply Finland with natural gas over a period of 20 years, delivering up to 3,000 million cubic metres a year along a gas pipeline opened in January 1974. The annual delivery of Soviet natural gas to Austria comes to about 1,500 million cubic metres. Under two product-pay-back agreements with France, the Soviet Union has been supplying it (since 1976) with considerable quantities of natural gas (2,500 million cubic metres a year, and from 1980 on, 4,000 million cubic metres) in exchange for French pipes and gas equipment.

The industry of most West European countries is heavily dependent on natural gas not only as a source of energy, but also as an important raw material for the chemical industry.

Product-pay-back deals for the exchange of natural gas for various gas equipment have provided a good basis for long-term comprehensive programmes of economic co-- operation envisaging joint efforts in the production of other modern types of energy. Thus, the USSR and the FRG have been considering plans for the joint construction in the Soviet Union of atomic electric-power stations with subsequent deliveries to the FRG through a special system of high-voltage lines of a part of the resultant electric power.

Joint construction of power stations by East and West European countries dates back more than a decade and has proved to be successful.

Joint development in Eastern Europe of other natural resources and minerals, which are of interest to the West European countries, is another promising line under this form of co-operation. The West German Minister of Economics Hans Friderichs said: "The Federal Government is particularly interested, in any measures involving the development of energy resources, be it the delivery of natural gas, oil or

electric power, or, say, the relocation of energy-intensive lines of production to sources of energy.""

The Soviet Union has signed an agreement with a number of Finnish companies on the joint building of the Kostomuksha ore-concentration combine in Northern Karelia with a design capacity of more than eight million tons of ironore pellets, which is to provide Finland with a solid base for the development of its budding metallurgical industry. Talks are now in progress with some other West European states on the joint working of some deposits of non-ferrous metals on Soviet territory.

The second form of economic co-operation involves joint construction in the socialist countries of enterprises for the output of primary products. Such co-operation usually follows this pattern: some West European firm builds a large industrial project in the socialist partner-country on the basis of its own processing technology, and the credits are subsequently paid off through deliveries of resultant products to this or some other West European firm.

Thus, under a contract between the Tekhmashimport Trading Association and the West German Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH, the latter was to provide the Soviet Union with complete equipment for a high-pressure polyethylene plant. On that basis, the Soviet Union signed a contract with another West German firm, Bohumer Chemie und Handelskontor GmbH, under which the latter is to receive tens of millions of rubles worth of polyethylene from the new enterprise.

The Soviet and French governments have agreed in principle on co-operation in the building of a number of large industrial complexes on the basis of French equipment to be provided on credit, with payment in resultant products; these are industrial complexes for the extraction of sulphur and helium from natural gas, cellulose plants, an industrial com-

* Pravda, October 29,1973.

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plex for the production of children's foods, tinned foods, fruit juices and dietary foods, and also packaging for these, copper and nickel plants, and enterprises for the processing of synthetic fibre.

The biggest ever contract between the USSR and France, signed in late 1973, provided for the joint construction in the USSR of a 900-million-franc petrochemical complex, with the deliveries of French equipment to be paid off in a resultant product. In December 1974, the two partners signed a protocol on talks between the Metallurgimport Trading Association and the French firm Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann on co-operation in the building of a large aluminium complex in Eastern Siberia from 1975 to 1979.

A Soviet-French Communique of March 24, 1975 said that "the two parties attach special importance to large-scale and long-term projects, on a product-pay-back basis in particular. A major contribution to the development of mutually advantageous economic and industrial co-operation is to be made by the successful completion of the talks between the interested organisations and firms of the two countries on matters of co-operation in the building of large industrial complexes, notably, for the production of alumina and aluminium, chemical enterprises, atomic power stations and section-3 of the Orenburg industrial-gas complex."*

In the autumn of 1973, the Soviet Union signed a longterm product-pay-back agreement with the Italian firm Montedison on the building of seven large enterprises for the Soviet chemical industry. Soviet organisations have also held or are to hold talks with other Italian firms for the signing of similar long-term agreements.

In mid-1974. Soviet foreign trade agencies signed the first product-pay-back contract with Constructors John Brown, a large British engineering firm, under which the latter was to design and provide £20 million worth of equipment for a

high-density polyethylene plant with an annual output of 200,000 tons. It is to be one of the largest plants in the world. The design work and equipment is to be paid for in resultant products.

In the early 1970s, all the major West European countries were involved in large-scale and long-term product-pay-back co-operation with the socialist countries. Large-scale projects are the key to the intensive development of economic ties between East and West European countries.

Finally, the third form of economic co-operation involves joint construction in the socialist countries of large manufacturing complexes. By way of pay-back here, the socialist countries sometimes take part in the building of industrial or other projects in the West European countries.

Under the agreement on the development of economic, technical and industrial co-operation between the USSR and France, the two partners elaborated a ten-year programme for economic and industrial co-operation, providing, in particular, for the construction in the Soviet Union and in France of industrial complexes like the Kama Motor Works and the metallurgical combine in the Mediterranean town of Fosse sur Mer. This form of joint work will enable the two countries to make fuller use of their technical, production and raw material potentialities.

The French automobile company, Renault, has co-operated with the Moscow Compact Car Factory in modernising production (developing new technological processes for the manufacture of some components and assembly units for passenger cars). On the other hand, Tekhmashinexport is to take part in the expansion and modernisation of the oil refineries at Ambesa owned by the French firm Elf-Erap. A large part of the necessary equipment (whose cost may run to 60 million francs of the 420-million-franc total cost of the refineries) is to be purchased from the Soviet Union. Pointing to the importance of the contract, the French business newspaper L'Echo emphasised that for the first time in history a highly developed West European country was to puris---1787

Pravda, March 25, 1975.

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chase such large quantities of Soviet equipment for the building of oil refineries.

On the initiative and with the vigorous support of a SovietFinnish intergovernmental commission, the Soviet Union has given Finland technical assistance in the project to build up an atomic power industry in Finland and expand its ferrous metallurgy. It is to provide the atomic reactors, turbogenerators and fuel for two new 440,000 kw atomic power plants near Loviisa. It also helped Finland to build the Rautaruukki metallurgical combine at Raahe fitted out with Soviet equipment.

Finnish firms, for their part, have played an active role in the construction of the Pyaozero timber station in the Karelian Autonomous Republic, which is soon to produce about 700,000 cubic metres of commercial timber. Joint work is being carried on to expand and reconstruct the Svyatogorsk pulp-and-paper mill in Leningrad Region. In early September 1975, a ceremony was held to mark the commissioning of section one of the Svyatogorsk mill and lay the foundation stone for section two. A. N. Kosygin said in that context that "many forms of co-operation first used in Soviet-Finnish relations have stood the test of life and, in the present conditions of detente, are being increasingly established in their own right in the relations between countries with different socio-economic systems".*

The ten-year agreement on economic, scientific, technical and industrial co-operation between the USSR and Austria, signed on February 1, 1973, shows that this type of economic co-operation is very promising. A Soviet-Austrian Communique said that "the parties have come out in favour of a search for new forms of trade and economic co-operation, like the participation of Austrian firms and organisations in the building of industrial enterprises on Soviet territory and the participation of Soviet organisations in the building of industrial enteprises on Austrian territory, which could pro-

vide an additional source of increases in the volume of mutual goods deliveries".*

Since the early 1970s, the socialist countries have taken an ever more prominent part in the building of non-- industrial projects in some West European countries. Polish firms, for instance, built an hotel in Liineburg (FRG) and Graz (Austria), and restored the Isar gates in Munich (FRG). Rumanian building companies have built roads near Munich, and so on. Apparently, the socialist countries could do much more in this area.

The past record shows that the socialist countries can give West European countries technical assistance in building many industrial, power and other projects, and are prepared markedly to extend such assistance, primarily in the metallurgical, oil-refining, electric-power and other industries, and also in the fuel and energy sector.

The product-mix in industry, especially in industries like engineering and chemistry, is so extensive that no country in the world could hope to ensure on its own efficient mass production of the whole range of goods being produced in the world. Historically, however, several modern national industrial complexes have taken shape in Eastern and Western Europe. One negative consequence of this development pattern is that there are many relatively low-capacity sectors of production in the individual European countries duplicating each other and operating on parallel lines. "One can hardly claim that this structure of the European economy is an inevitable historical regularity: more likely, it is a consequence of the long years of political tension on the European continent."**

Broader production co-operation between East and West European countries could do much to moderate the negative

* Ibid., July 6, 1973.

** For details see All-European Economic Co-operation, pp. 41-43 (in Russian).

* Ptavda, September 2, 1975.

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effects of that development pattern. The line for fuller use of the possibilities latent in the international division of labour helps create the conditions in individual European countries for the gradual shaping of a more rational economic structure. Such co-operation tends to have a twofold effect: it serves to reduce production costs owing to the rational division of labour, and boosts trade between countries by encouraging reciprocal exchanges of different parts of one and the same product manufactured by the different partners.

The need for broad co-operation in production on the principles of the international division of labour has met with ever greater recognition.

The president of the FRG's Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce Otto Wolff von Amerongen told the newspaper Sotsialisticheskaya Industria that the production costs of some Soviet products were much lower and that this opened up real possibilities for co-operation. Von Amerongen specially emphasised that the West Germans were interested in long-term plans for economic co-operation with the USSR in areas like the chemical, machine-tool, metallurgical and power industries.

On the eve of the Eighth Session of the Soviet-French Standing Mixed Commission (Grande Commission) in July 1973, the then French Minister of Economy and Finance Valery Giscard d'Estaing said: "In some industrial sectors which appear to be suitable for joint activity our two countries are already completing the stage of examination of economic and technical data and resolutely moving towards the implementation of a number of projects."*

In drawing up a programme for Soviet-Finnish trade and economic co-operation and production co-operation and specialisation in November 1972, the parties proceeded from the premise that the Soviet Union's long-term economic plans and the long-term programmes for the activity of the major Finnish firms and enterprises enabled the partners to co-

ordinate their plans for years ahead, exachange more and more industrial products and expand their production co-operation and specialisation.

Most co-operation agreements between Western firms and socialist enterprises have been signed since the early 1970s.* Although the period of co-operation in this area is still fairly short and the agreements themselves are extremely varied, it is possible to single out several types of agreements which are gaining ever more ground. First of all, there are the subcontracting agreements on the permanent delivery of intermediate products or completing components, and sometimes also end-products from East European to West European enterprises. This is sometimes done in accordance with the recipient's specifications and with his technical assistance.

Thus, the Swedish firm Mecman handed over to a Hungarian plant at Eger the manufacture of one type of cylinder, gradually winding down its manufacture at its own enterprises and meeting its requirements through imports from Hungary.

The firm provided its Hungarian partner with a credit, the necessary documentation, equipment and some completing components, and by now the Eger plant has mastered the production of several agreed types of cylinders for its own needs, for Mecman (notably, by way of repayment of the credit), and also for export to third countries.

Agreements for bilateral deliveries involving specialisation and co-operation in turning out components of various types and gauges are also spreading. Thus, an agreement with the French firm CIT-Alcatel provides for reciprocal exchanges of products for the output of programme-controlled industrial machine-tools, with the Soviet partner supplying the machine-tool bodies and the French partner, the control programmes. A similar agreement has been signed with the Swedish firm SAAB-Scania. Together with Siemens AG, Soviet outfits are to design territorial automated control sys-

* Pravda, July 10,1973.

Ibid., April 6, 1973.

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terns, and with AEG-Telefunken there is co-operation in cable production. Agreements with West German chemical firms provide for joint development of polymers.

The Soviet-Finnish commission for economic co-operation, meeting in Helsinki on November 23, 1972, adopted a longterm programme for the development of trade and economic co-operation, production co-operation and specialisation. The programme devotes particular attention to production cooperation and specialisation in engineering, specifying 13 branches of engineering where the two partners are to establish ties in production co-operation and specialisation (like the manufacture of technically advanced electric locomotives for Finland's state railroads).

Poland and Finland have been co-operating in shipbuilding and the manufacture of equipment for the pulp-- andpaper industry. Czechoslovakia's CKD enterprises have been working together with a French firm in the development of multipurpose diesel engines. Poland and the FRG have been co-operating in the output of machine-tools, tape recorders, motors and refrigerators.

An analysis of production co-operation agreements shows that the bulk of these apply to different branches of engineering."' This is due to a number of circumstances, primarily the technological specifics of engineering, where the production process can be broken down into separate operation's to be carried out by the various partners. The bulk of all technical innovations (about 50-60 per cent of all newly registered patents) occur in engineering.

Enterprises specialising in long-term batch or mass production are more eager to enter into production co-operation

than those turning out complex products under individual orders, so that production co-operation is not as widespread in branches specialising in unique complete heavy equipment, but is very popular in mass-production industries (turning out cars, electric motors, machine-tools, and

so on).

Production co-operation involving co-partnership in the building of industrial projects in third countries is also very promising. Thus, the Metallurgimport Trading Association, which has taken part in the building of the metallurgical combine at Fosse sur Mer in the south of France, has cooperated with Otto Wolff, a big West German company, which is one of the suppliers of equipment for the combine. Soviet organisations and West German firms have taken steps towards the construction of industrial projects in the developing countries.

Under an agreement on production co-operation between the French firms Brissonneau and Lotz, and the Hungarian Ganz-Mavag production association, the partners have produced a single design and manufactured a consignment of locomotives (about 100 units) for Brazil. An international consortium involving enterprises from two European socialist and two capitalist countries is to build a thermal-power centre in India, with Hungarian and Austrian enterprises providing the equipment, and Polish and West German enterprises, the building materials.

An analysis of production co-operation agreements between some socialist countries and West European companies reveals some specific features.

Of the two major industries-engineering and chemistrymost deeply involved in production co-operation, the considerable production possibilities latent in the latter are still being used very inadequately. Meanwhile, in the chemical industry there are fewer distinctions in the technology of production and the final formula of the product (the chemical formulas of most end-products are the same for Eastern and Western Europe, whereas in engineering the distinctions

* According to the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 22.3 per cent of the 202 sampled industrial co-operation agreements related to general engineering, 17.3 per cent to transport engineering, 16.3 per cent to electrical engineering and electronics, 8.4 per cent to the machine-tool industry and 19.3 per cent to the chemical industry ( Analytical Report..., p. 5).

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in design, size and other technical characteristics are very marked).*

Production co-operation in the joint manufacture of some products proves to be effective when the partners have maintained other economic ties (trade, exchange of experience, exchange of licences, etc.) for a fairly long time (about fiveeight years). The main thing in making such co-operation an economic success is to find a solid partner.

In the first half of the 1970s, the share of reciprocal deliveries under industrial co-operation in the overall volume of economic co-operation was still fairly small, and many legal, commercial and financial problems have yet to be solved on either side. But even in these conditions, production co-operation is beginning to yield definite benefits for the partners. For the West European countries, it tends to open up new markets, helps diversify their sources of materials and enables them to make more efficient use of their production and marketing machinery. For the socialist countries, it facilitates the export of intermediate and finished products, helps put out new and modern products relatively faster and at lower cost and ensures more efficient use of production capacities.

The principle of an all-European security system based on close co-operation among the European states, as formulated by the socialist countries, offers fresh possibilities for more, intensive external economic activity on the part of all the European countries and contains genuine guarantees for their political and economic independence. L. I. Brezhnev told the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1976: "Over recent years, in the course of strengthening detente, countries in both Eastern and Western Europe have gained much experience in this kind of co-operation. For example, the Soviet Union's trade with the European capitalist countries has more than trebled over the last five

years. Co-operation in building large-scale projects on a mutually advantageous foundation is becoming more important."*

Elimination of the difficulties and obstacles in the way of economic co-operation could help improve the prospects for peaceful coexistence in Europe and the world. Economic gain is not the only benefit from economic co-operation, for it also provides an effective instrument in the effort to normalise the international political situation. The development of European economic co-operation means that the detente is being filled out with concrete material content, and the materialisation of the detente is bound to ensure truly lasting and irreversible peace in Europe.

* Eva Sarosi, Zur industtiellen Kooperation zwischen Osterreich und Ungarn, pp. 30-35.

* For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, pp. 12-13.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

There is no substance to the view current in the West that the socialist countries' interest in international scientific and technical co-operation is due to a shortage of means and possibilities for independent development in this area.

The USSR and the other East European socialist countries have a powerful and constantly growing scientific potential, which enables them to take part in the international scientific and technical division of labour on a mutually advantageous basis. The CMEA countries have about 1.6 million research workers, that is, one-third of the world's total. The USSR leads the world in the number of research workers, and the figure for the other CMEA countries is about onequarter of the Soviet figure.

The growing outlays on scientific development serve to open up fresh possibilities for science in the socialist countries. In the share of the national income going into science, the USSR and some other CMEA countries are high up on the world list. Since the early 1970s, the USSR has annually set aside for scientific research more than 4 per cent of its national income, Czechoslovakia 3.2 per cent, Hungary 2.8 per cent, the GDR 2.4 per cent, Poland 2.3 per cent and Bulgaria 2.5 per cent, and the trend here is for these appropriations to increase. The Soviet Union also leads the world in the number of invention claims filed and is close to the top in the number of author's certificates issued. The CMEA countries also have extensive experimental facilities.

Considering that Western Europe's scientific and technical level is also very high, it follows that Europe has a powerful scientific and technical potential. Its efficiency, however, could be further enhanced through a joint and well-co-ordinated effort in science and technology on the scale of the whole continent.

The complementary elements in the scientific and technical structure of Eastern and Western Europe help create a favourable setting for such co-operation. With their diverse and outstanding achievements in every sphere of science and technology, the socialist countries have a large body of

THE PREMISES FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Scientific and technical co-operation is as important for European peace as economic co-operation in general.

All countries have a vital stake in the world's scientific and technical achievements, for science has increasingly acted as a direct productive force. No matter how high a state's scientific and technical potential, it will find it hard, working on its own, to carry on efficient research right across the whole spectrum of science or to improve technology in every sector of production. In the present conditions, broad international co-operation is the most efficient way to develop science. Hence the objective need for international ties in science and technology. Scientific and technical co-operation is becoming a major factor in the development of economic relations between states.

The socialist countries have championed the idea of broad international co-operation in science and technology for the sake of the utmost use of scientific and technical achievements. The premises for scientific and technical ties between East and West European countries are particularly favourable owing to their geographical proximity, long-standing traditions of economic relations, the high level of science and technology in some areas both in East and West European countries, and their dynamic development.

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theoretical research to fall back upon, in the major lines of scientific and technical progress in particular. The West European countries' experimental and production facilities, their business links on the world market and the East European countries' powerful scientific potential could be made to work together with considerable effect, creating a solid basis for the joint solution of the most complicated problems in different fields of science.

Scientific and technical co-operation, as it was mentioned in the preceding chapter, takes different forms: the transfer of scientific and technical knowledge through commercial channels (the buying and selling of the results of scientific research and development in the form of patents, licences, know-how and engineering) and non-commercial channels (exchanges of scientific and technical publications, international contacts between scientists and engineers, free technical assistance, international fairs and exhibitions, and so on).

Scientific and technical co-operation also implies joint research projects both on a multilateral and bilateral basis. The latter cover participation by scientists and specialists from one country in the work of another country's research centres, in contracting to elaborate various topics for the host country's needs, joint research, and so on.

Scientific and technical co-operation between socialist and capitalist countries has intensively developed since the 1960s; and since the early 1970s, it has assumed various concrete forms. The Soviet Union's outstanding successes in basic research, its great scientific potential and powerful material base for unique experiments are very attractive to scientific centres in Western Europe, where industrial-purpose fundamental research often lags behind development. Industrial firms are often not all that willing to deal with problems which are not expected to yield any direct commercial effect and, accordingly, do not always devote adequate attention to long-term basic research. Industrial-purpose basic research is always short of scientific personnel, for most specialists

prefer to stay on at colleges and universities and engage in other problems.

Co-operation with the USSR enables Western organisations and enterprises to obtain worked-up ideas and channel more funds into their development. Thus, France's urge to make headway in space exploration with smaller outlays was what largely promoted its readiness to co-operate with the USSR in space research.

Questionnaires circulated among West European businessmen show that their urge for co-operation with the USSR in research and development is mainly due to a desire to benefit from the Soviet Union's large scientific potential.

An analysis of scientific and technical ties between socialist and developed capitalist countries in Europe in the first half of the 1970s helped to bring out two trends. On the one hand, there is an increase in the number of contacts, an ever more intensive exchange of scientists and specialists, more vigorous participation in international congresses, conferences, and so on. On the other hand, there is an important qualitative change in the nature of scientific and technical ties: in the 1960s, these were purely exploratory, whereas the 1970s have seen the establishment of systematic, long-term cooperation under intergovernmental agreements.

The record of Soviet-French scientific and technical ties is a case in point. In 1973, the USSR and France signed a ten-year programme for scientific and technical co-operation, the first ever programme of its kind in the history of EastWest relations. By now, the USSR and France have elaborated the main elements of their common scientific and technical policy. The Soviet Union has also signed a ten-year programme of co-operation with Britain, which could put the economic, scientific, technical and industrial ties between the two countries on a planned and long-term footing. Similar programmes have also been drawn up with other capitalist countries.

Another thing to note here is that over the past decade the development of political detente in Europe and the world

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has undoubtedly largely helped to strengthen the scientific and technical ties between the European socialist and capitalist countries.

With the USSR's major scientific and technical achievements in areas like engineering and metallurgy in mind, the Western countries have shown a lively interest in Soviet experience and technological processes. In metallurgy, this applies to the new methods and technologies of vacuum and electro-slag smelting for the production of high-quality metal, the new technology for the continuous pouring of steel and the production of special alloys, the ultrasonic treatment of metals, and so on. In the machine-tool industry, there are the lathes for electrospark machining, electrochemical and ultrasonic .treatment of metals, the extra-large hydraulic presses, etc.

The rapid growth of co-operation in practical-purpose research and development has been coupled with more intensive scientific and technical co-operation aimed to improve the human condition: besides protection of the environment, this covers medicine, safety on the roads, the consumer industries, agriculture, and so on.

The scientific and technical infrastructure ( standardisation, metrology, scientific and technical data, patenting and licencing) is one of the areas where all-European co-- operation has made the least headway, but where the need for it is particularly urgent. A joint effort along these lines could help adapt the scientific and technical infrastructures of the various European countries to each other and promote the development not only of scientific and technical, but also of production and trade ties between them.

As it was pointed out above, Franco-Soviet relations offer an example of fruitful scientific and technical co-operation between countries with different socio-economic systems. Franco-Soviet co-operation covers the largest number of areas (a list of the most important of these would run to about 20), including space research, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and health.

The socialist countries' co-operation with the FRG has been most active in chemistry, engineering and the power industry, and with Italy, in the car industry, electronic com-

THE LINES AND FORMS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The scientific and technical ties between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe are extensive enough both in the field of theoretical and applied research and development, covering the major spheres of science and technology.

Here is a general outline of the chief spheres of cooperation.

First, there are the problems affecting the whole of Europe or even the entire world, which no individual country can solve on its own. Among these are protection of the environment, exploration and use of the resources of the continents, the World Ocean and the Antarctic, space exploration, health, weather forecasting, thermonuclear energy, and so on. Some progress has already been made in these areas. Thus, the Soviet Union has successfully co-operated with Norway and Sweden in the protection of the environment. In May 1974, a similar agreement was signed with Britain. The Soviet Union and France have been working together in space research, and so on.

Then there are various concrete scientific and technical problems, which have to be tackled with a view to the participants' interests. Thus, the USSR and France have been working together on the methods of scientific and technical prognostications, automated data processing, the use of mathematical methods and computers in economic research, planning, administration, and so on.

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puters and petrochemistry. Their scientific and technical ties with other West European countries, big and small, have also been expanding in many directions.

The forms of East-West scientific and technical co-operation have also become more varied, covering trade in patents, licences, instruments, and advanced, especially complete equipment; exchanges of scientific and technical data and specialists; exploration of each other's scientific and production achievements through international contacts between scientists and specialists; co-ordination of research and exchange of the results of research; fairs and exhibitions; the training of personnel, and other forms.

In the early 1970s, new forms of scientific and technical ties began to take shape alongside the old ones. Among these new forms, partially mentioned in Chapter Seven, are joint scientific research and technical development (as an independent form of co-operation); scientific and technical co-- operation within the framework of production co-operation, industrial and other construction, and the functioning of mixed production enterprises,- consultations, engineering-type projects, lease of machinery and equipment, and so on.

Exchanges of scientific and technical data based on trade in patents and licences are a rapidly developing form of scientific and technical co-operation between European socialist and capitalist countries.

After the Second World War and up to the late 1950s, trade in licences between socialist and capitalist countries was only sporadic, with the socialist countries importing licences worth no more than a few tens of millions of dollars. In the subsequent period, the number of licence contracts constantly increased, and more and more socialist countries joined in the licence trade. In 1960-1966, they signed about 400 licence contracts with the capitalist countries, many of these in Europe.

Over the past few years, the socialist countries have been buying most licences in engineering (top-of-the-list volume).

pig iron and steel production, and the chemical industry. They have also bought more licences for manufacturing consumer goods. Trade in patents and licences has been growing faster than trade as a whole-about as fast as trade in manufactures.

The socialist countries, including once technically backward countries like Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, have not only been buying, but also selling more licences and technical know-how to the West. In their licence trade with some industrial Western countries, the East European countries have a positive balance.

The export of technology from the socialist to the West European countries can be markedly expanded in industries like metallurgy, electrical engineering, the manufacture of Pharmaceuticals, medical and precision equipment, mining equipment, etc.

The capitalist countries are in effect just beginning to explore Eastern Europe's scientific and technical achievements, but the inventions and discoveries made in the socialist countries have already won considerable recognition. Equipment made under Soviet licences is to be found at many enterprises in France, the FRG, Denmark, Sweden and other countries. Many foreign firms have been using the Soviet evaporation-cooling system for blast-furnaces, installations for continuous and semi-continuous pouring of metal in a magnetic field, progressive welding methods, and technological and technical innovations in various other sectors of production. The Soviet Union has sold licences to more than 20 countries of the world.

From 1966 to 1973, the Soviet Union mastered more than 40 technological processes and started to manufacture 80 types of machinery, equipment and materials under licences imported from the capitalist countries.

Yugoslavia has intensively imported foreign licences. Up to 1971, it had bought 425 licences for producer and consumer goods. It has also sought to sell its own licences. From

16-1787

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1954 to 1964, it earned about $50 million for these.

Hungary is also active in this field. In 1968-1970, it bought $2,192,000 worth of licences, and in 1971, it sold $1,040,000 worth of licences to other countries. In 1966-1973, Hungary sold more than 300 licences to the West and had a positive balance in its patent and licence trade with Britain, Switzerland and the FRG.

Over the past few years, Czechoslovakia has also bought more foreign licences, with a fivefold increase in outlays for this purpose from 1965 to 1972. In 1971, it also sold more licences to the West (to the FRG, the USA and Japan, in the first place), concentrating on the chemical, pharmaceutical, textile and tanning industries, and also on basic research.

Other East European countries have also traded in licences. Under a licence bought from the West German firm Man, Rumania has started producing marine diesel engines. Poland has sold the West licences for swaging and steel-wire drawing.

In 1974 and 1975, Poland planned to buy about 80 licences. Britain is Poland's major partner owing to their longstanding scientific and technical ties. Over the past few years, Poland has also bought more licences from the FRG, Italy and France, notably, for its motor and car industry.""

But despite the positive changes in the licence trade, a great deal has yet to be done in this area.

Joint R & D in various fields of science and technology is another new and rapidly developing form of scientific and technical co-operation. It has even given rise to a new type of patenting, with patents owned by two or more countries. The patented results of joint research are sometimes sold to third countries.

Specialisation and co-operation in R & D enables the partners to finance only a part of the project and so save time and money. They also profit by using the other partner's productive capacities and skilled personnel. R & D speciali-

sation and co-operation contracts in the capitalist countries are most popular in areas like the aerospace industry, radioelectronics, nuclear research and computer production.

The socialist countries have also been moving in this direction. Under the CMEA countries' Comprehensive Programme, they have signed more than 70 multilateral agreements and contracts on problems requiring joint research. More than 1,500 research institutes in the CMEA countries have been working under these agreements to carry out cooperation programmes covering about 2,000 topics. In accordance with these agreements, the CMEA countries have established on a multilateral basis 43 co-ordination centres, seven international economic and scientific bodies, 12 international agencies, two international teams of scientists, an international laboratory, a science-production association, four international economic associations, dealing, among other things, with questions of scientific and technical cooperation, and an international experimental-control station. Apart from that, 2,170 research and design organisations in the socialist countries have been working on about 2,500 bilateral projects.

Co-operation between socialist and West European countries in the field of R & D has also made fresh headway. In 1972, for instance, 40 per cent of Rumania's co-operation agreements with the European capitalist countries related to joint R & D, and for the USSR, the figure is more than 50 per cent (the highest figure for all the socialist countries).

Joint research on a given topic is one of the more widespread forms of R & D co-operation, especially in the chemical industry. The USSR leads the East European countries in the number of agreements in this field with West European countries.

The contract between the Italian chemical firm Montedison and the State Committee for Science and Technology under the USSR Council of Ministers is a typical example. It provides for an exchange of information on the results of R & D and their practical use. The two partners, in particu-

* See Analytical Report.. ., p. 109.

16*

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lar, are to exchange documentation for materials and technology in chemistry, petrochemistry, dyes, paints, varnishes and Pharmaceuticals. The contract also provides for an exchange of lectures and the establishment of a joint commission to deal with common problems.

The contract between the USSR Ministry of Public Health and West German Siemens AG on joint research in the field of medical equipment is another example. The contract provides for the development of new medical equipment and the elaboration of relevant methods of treatment. Research is also to be done in computer diagnostics, and new contracts are to be signed for an exchange of information on the results of medical research, notably, in dentistry.

The agreement between Hungary and Austria on the joint manufacture of interurban long-distance coaches led to another agreement on co-operation in the design of a new minibus under which Austria is to develop the chassis, and Hungary, the body of the bus.

There is also specialisation at separate stages of R & D. Scientific research, for instance, is often done by one partner, and the development for production, by the other partner. Some Western firms may also develop inventions and ideas supplied by the socialist countries to the commercial stage, often taking further steps to ensure the marketing and modify the design of the product (where it is a product rather than a technology) to suit the demands of potential customers. A point to note is that Hungary has set up a national brokerage service to help engineer the country's unused inventions. It carries on a systematic search among the country's industrial and research centres for inventions which make practical sense, and helps organise co-operation for their development and marketing.

Scientific and technical co-operation of this kind leads up to producer co-operation. Joint R & D and technical contacts between the partner-countries' research institutes, centres and laboratories help make it clear that producer co-operation could be very effective. Thus, intensive co-operation within

the framework of a Soviet-French working group. Household and Everyday Appliances, led to the signing in 1972 of a contract between Saunier Duval and the Soviet association Gazoapparat on the joint design and manufacture of computer-controlled household boilers. Successes in the joint development of various technological processes and equipment encourage the partners to sign contracts for their co-- production. Thus, a contract between the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the West German firm Gildemeister AG provides for the possibility of the joint design of a multipurpose tool train, with subsequent co-operation in its manufacture. R & D co-operation is one of the ways to raise economic efficiency and boost economic development rates.

These new forms of scientific and technical co-operation have a number of advantages for all the partners concerned as compared with mere imports of advanced machinery or licences, for the partners can transfer larger bodies of technical data and have a greater stake in the efficient use of the latest machinery. They can also save foreign currency by paying for the material deliveries and the scientific and technical knowledge they buy in resultant products.

The tendency to combine co-operation and licence agreements began to shape in the 1960s and has a very promising future. Producer co-operation coupled with scientific and technical co-operation is best suited to the requirements of present-day scientific and technical progress.

The FRG leads the capitalist world in the number and volume of co-operation contracts with the socialist countries. France occupies a special place in the scientific and technical ties between the two systems, and its co-operation with the socialist countries in this field has assumed various forms. As the partners have gained experience and branched out into new economic fields, the volume and importance of scientific and technical co-operation in ever more complex forms has constantly increased.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

THE ORGANISATIONAL MACHINERY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Organisationally, the scientific and technical co-operation between states belonging to the two systems has developed along two channels: on an intergovernmental basis and by way of direct contacts between various organisations and enterprises in the partner-countries (in the USSR, mainly on an interdepartmental basis).

The Soviet Union has signed long-term (ten-year) intergovernmental agreements on economic, scientific, technical and industrial co-operation with France, Finland, Austria, the FRG, Britain, Italy and Belgium.

Mixed intergovernmental commissions are the backbone of the organisational machinery of scientific and technical co-operation.

Intergovernmental commissions are also an important instrument for transferring information on the possibilities of co-operation. Sectoral working groups operating within these commissions determine the problems that are of interest to both parties and organise scientific and technical co-operation on the basis of appropriate enterprises, firms and other bodies in the two countries. Joint work on concrete technical problems helps raise the partners' industrial level, and enables them to develop various branches of industry and agriculture faster and at a lower cost, and to accelerate scientific and technical progress. Sectoral working groups have been doing more and more to develop new technology and equipment. The states' chambers of commerce have also done a great deal to establish scientific and technical ties. Some socialist countries have set up various other bodies at or below government level to promote East-West ties in this field.

Joint work by East European research institutes with Western firms and research centres within the framework of sec-

toral working groups serves not only to increase the scientific and technical exchanges between them, but also to expand trade in equipment. In the course of the work of sectoral groups, the potential buyers of East European machinery are able to get a better idea of its specifications and to see it in operation. Thus, the USSR Ministry of Geology and the French firm Sercel, working together within the framework of a Soviet-French group, developed the SSTs-3/SN-338 digital multichannel seismographic system, with the Soviet specialists contributing a number of assembly units, notably, a fundamentally new system for the automatic regulation of instant-impulse amplification. The new equipment, now being manufactured in France, is widely used in geophysical research and is exported to third countries. In the course of its co-operation with the USSR in the manufacture of generator rotors, Creusot-Loire bought a Soviet installation for the electroslag welding of blooms.

Besides intergovernmental agreements, which serve to lay a good groundwork for co-operation, there are also agreements between national academies of sciences, and between East European organisations or departments and Western firms or research bodies.

At the end of 1973, the socialist countries had more than 100 long-term agreements with capitalist firms and research

bodies.

The USSR's scientific and technical co-operation with the developed capitalist countries has constantly expanded. With France, for instance, the USSR has developed concrete technical problems in these areas: the car industry (with Renault and Peugeot), chemistry (Pechiney-Saint-Gobain), polymers (Rhone-Poulenc) and isoprene (the French Petroleum Institute). The two countries have also traded in licences on a fairly large scale. The USSR has agreements on different forms of scientific and technical co-operation with Siemens AG, BASF, AEG-Telefunken and other West German firms. Considerable headway has also been made in scientific and technical co-operation between the Soviet Union and Italy,

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largely on the basis of direct ties between Soviet ministries and departments and Italian industrial firms. The Soviet Union's contacts in this field with other West European countries have also developed.

Research carried out by mixed enterprises is another new form of co-operation. The rules of mixed enterprises provide for joint ownership and management of the invested capital and a sharing of the risk and the profits. Such enterprises (with emphasis on marketing) have been set up in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary. Yugoslavia also has some mixed enterprises covering the full cycle: R & D, production and marketing (in 1972, there were 31 such enterprises in metallurgy and 13 in chemistry).* Hungary has set up a mixed enterprise for R & D in the pharmaceutical industry.

In the early 1970s, bilateral co-operation was the main type of scientific and technical ties between European socialist and capitalist countries, while multilateral co-operation played a much less important role. The latter, however, is an important and promising form of relations and is now being practised on a growing scale.

The 1965 agreement on co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy between the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Power, the Netherlands' Reactor Centre and the Belgian Atomic Power Commissariat is one example of multilateral scientific and technical co-operation in Europe between states with different social systems. In 1974, several European socialist and capitalist countries staged an international scientific experiment, Tropex-74, aimed to help develop reliable methods of weather forecasting. The Soviet Union did a great deal to further the experiment, providing two aircraft, 14 ships and the Meteor artificial satellites.

Agreements between individual countries and international organisations are another form of co-operation. In 1967, for instance, the Soviet Union signed an agreement on scientific

and technical co-operation with the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). Among the capitalist countries, Finland was the first to enter upon the road of multilateral co-operation with the socialist countries. In the spring of

1973, it signed an agreement with the CMEA on co-- operation in various fields of the economy, science and technology. Under the agreement, the partners have set up a commission which is to help establish and develop broad ties between them, and have determined the main lines of co-- operation in science, technology, standardisation and statistics.

An important thing to note here is that the CMEA Charter and the Comprehensive Programme of socialist economic integration provide for the possibility of the CMEA's co-- operation with third countries. Its readiness to develop mutually advantageous ties with other countries regardless of their social or state system will be seen, for instance, from its agreements of 1975 on economic, scientific and technical cooperation with Iraq and Mexico.

The multilateral scientific and technical co-operation between European socialist and capitalist countries has developed within the framework of general-purpose world and European organisations, and specialised bodies working in science and technology. It is not always, however, that the activity of international organisations yields practical results.

Nevertheless, the socialist countries have expanded and strengthened their ties with many international bodies. In

1974, the CMEA maintained relations in various forms with more than 20 intergovernmental and non-governmental international economic, scientific and technical organisations. The bulk of the multilateral co-operation between European socialist and capitalist countries has gone forward within the framework of the United Nations and its specialised agencies -UNESCO, UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research), UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organisation) and UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). But UNESCO, UNIDO and UNCTAD have mainly concen-

* Analytical Report on Industrial Co-operation among ECE Countries, pp. 13-14.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

trated on the transfer of technology to the developing countries, devoting less attention to scientific and technical cooperation between capitalist and socialist countries.

The more intensive international economic ties tend to enhance the importance of specialised institutions in the field of science and technology, broaden their terms of reference and induce them to branch out into new areas. The socialist countries' growing role in these bodies makes it possible for them to play a more effective part in the effort to promote European scientific and technical co-operation.

The development of scientific and technical ties between capitalist and socialist countries is a protracted process. International scientific and technical co-operation is one of the more complicated types of international economic relations. Improvement and development of its forms, methods and organisational machinery are bound to help expand the scientific and technical co-operation between the socialist and the capitalist countries.

Scientific and technical exchanges cannot be improved without progress in other spheres of international economic co-operation. Consequently, co-operation in the fields of law, credit and monetary ties, and other forms of international economic ties has to keep pace with the requirements of the rapidly growing scientific and technical exchanges. It is very important, in particular, to tackle the problems of the scientific and technical infrastructure. Co-operation in this area, aimed to make the scientific and technical infrastructures of the individual European countries more interoperable, will help develop not only scientific and technical, but also production and trade relations.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe devoted much attention to international contacts in science and technology, reaffirmed the European nations' desire to develop these contacts and emphasised the latter's political importance as an instrument for strengthening peace and security. The Conference emphasised the importance of longterm co-operation through joint efforts to carry out large-

scale projects that would be of common interest for all the European countries. These projects could help accelerate the partners' economic development. Such co-operation should cover the field of energy resources, notably oil, natural gas, coal and the extraction and processing of other mineral raw materials; the sharing of electric power (in order to ensure the most rational use of electric-power capacities), and the search for new sources of energy.

Joint efforts in this new and important area could eventually have an all-round beneficial effect on the detente and co-operation in Europe.

CHAPTER NINE

CO-OPERATION

IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

``We think that cultural exchanges and the information media should serve human ideals, the cause of peace, that they should promote international trust and friendship.""'

The successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe paved the way for much broader and more vigorous co-operation among the European states on a wide range of problems, including humanitarian questions like human contacts and exchanges in the field of culture, education and information.**

The participating states voiced their resolve to co-operate among themselves in the humanitarian fields, regardless of their political, economic or social systems, in order to improve the conditions, strengthen the existing forms and find new ways and means in the area of human contacts and exchanges in the sphere of culture, information and education.

The section of the Final Act dealing with co-operation in humanitarian and other fields contains a set of important recommendations.

Since the signing of the Final Act, the Soviet Union has formulated a number of concrete proposals aimed at materialising the detente, and has taken real steps to develop ties and contacts in different areas of international co-operation.

In the sphere of human contacts, for instance, the participating countries agreed that they would seek to facilitate the holding of meetings and trips to other countries by delegations, groups and individuals by way of further development of contacts between state institutions and non-governmental and public organisations. The participants offer a set of recommendations on how to go on improving contacts on a professional and family basis, promote tourism, youth meetings, international sports, and so on.

The states have developed their goodwill in this area along

GENERAL

SOCIO-POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS

For many years, politicians, statesmen, diplomats, economists, philosophers and military men looked around for practical ways to work out and implement a set of principles for relations between European states with different systems and concrete solutions for the problems of military detente in Europe and all-European co-operation in the economy, science, technology and the protection of the environment.

Co-operation in the humanitarian fields had a place apart. In the conditions of the cold war, broader contacts between individuals, any all-European accords on the exchange of oral, printed, radio or TV information involving states with different social systems, or joint efforts in the fields of education and culture appeared to be inconceivable.

By now, however, the situation has changed owing to the consistent drive to implement the Peace Programme proclaimed by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the constructive summit meetings between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and the heads of leading capitalist states like the USA, France, the FRG and Britain, and .also other joint foreign-policy measures undertaken by the -Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

L. I. Brezhnev said at the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties: "In order to create an atmosphere of trust among states, so necessary for a lasting peace, peoples must get to know and understand each other better. This is the starting point from which we approach all cultural exchanges and human contacts.

* For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in Europe, pp. 14, 16.

** See Section "On Co-operation in the Humanitarian and Other Fields", Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act.

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several lines. They have held more conferences, seminars, colloquia and meetings involving state officials and spokesmen for public organisations.

They could also work to develop collective and individual tourism, say, by encouraging co-operation between national tourist agencies in mapping out special routes running across several countries, with emphasis on various aspects of the European cultural heritage and the European peoples' work and everyday life.

The Soviet Union has taken important steps to develop tourist ties with other countries. "During the last five years the volume of foreign tourism in the Soviet Union and of Soviet tourism abroad increased by more than 50 per cent. In 1976, over 4 million visitors from other countries came to the Soviet Union, while 3 million Soviet citizens made trips abroad."*

It would obviously be very useful and desirable to draw up joint programmes of exchanges and develop contacts among the young, like international students' seminars and forums, European sports contests, exhibition performances by sports teams and individual sportsmen, and so on. Against this background, the states have to consider, in a spirit of goodwill and humaneness, the numerous questions bearing on individual trips to other countries for various professional, family or other personal motives.

Of course, in elaborating and signing concrete agreements in international law on the basis of the Conference's recommendations, the signatory states have to solve some new and difficult problems. Thus, foreigners are allowed to enter some capitalist countries only if they have "adequate means of livelihood", and to stay on for permanent settlement only if they can make "an economic contribution to the country's development". In other instances, immigration laws are politically biased, which is, naturally, at odds with the spirit of

detente and the Final Act. The US Immigration and Nationality Act, for instance, says that members of communist and workers' parties cannot enter the country except where their entry "meets the interests of the United States". The socialist countries have no legislation to that effect, and repudiate any socio-political restrictions on persons entering these countries.

The Final Act also contains some important recommendations on information. The signatory states aim to facilitate the freer and wider spread of every form of information, encourage co-operation in this area and an exchange of information with other countries, and improve the conditions for journalistic work.

It will not be easy to find concrete ways of solving all these problems, for the European states will first have to specify the exact areas where information exchanges among them would be of common interest. They have still to assess and agree the various concrete proposals in greater detail. It is obvious, however, that the line for improving the spread of information, as laid down by the Conference, helps pave the way for further progress in this area.

The Conference's concrete recommendations for all-- European ties and cultural co-operation are very promising and fruitful, opening up broad possibilities for measures aimed to help the European nations get a better idea of each other's achievements in different spheres of culture, with due respect for each nation's aesthetic heritage, cultural specifics and latest achievements.

The Soviet Union's efforts to develop cultural ties have already yielded positive results. The Soviet Union maintains such ties with more than 120 countries. "A reflection of the general positive changes in the international arena is the fact that the scope of these relations through the Ministry of Culture alone has increased by more than 150 per cent in the past ten years."^:;"

* From Helsinki to Belgrade. Documents and Material, Moscow, 1977, p. 313.

* From Helsinki to Belgrade. Documents and Material, p. 295.

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It is high time to set up a data storage and presentation system on Europe's cultural values and generally recognised masterpieces of art, to compile European catalogues of culture and science documentaries, books and encyclopaedias portraying the everyday life, history and culture of every European country.

Some West European countries still have to do a great deal in improving the population's access to culture. Among the many problems facing the Europeans in this area are the high prices of books and cultural entertainment, the inadequate supply of works of art, especially books from other countries, and the reluctance to translate books published in the socialist countries and also those written in the less widespread languages.

The states will have to create economic and social conditions that would help ensure free access to the treasures of national and world culture for all Europeans, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religious faith, national or social origins, property status or other attributes. They will have to find mutually acceptable ways of ensuring that every European country publishes more books from other European countries, and improve the channels for international contacts between authors and publishers under the existing copyright conventions.

Since the Helsinki Conference, Soviet publishers have been putting out many more translations. Thus, in 1971, about 67 million copies of books by foreign authors were published in the Soviet Union, and in 1976, the figure was 97 million, with much larger editions of books by US, Austrian, English, French and other authors.

The European countries will also have to decide how best to expand exchanges in works of fiction and libraries, put out larger editions, buy and sell more books on acceptable terms, organise more book fairs, and so on.

The European countries face a very important task, that of fostering greater interest and respect among the European nations for their neighbours' cultural values, ensuring full and

effective implementation of international agreements on the spread of cultural values and promoting broader cultural cooperation in Europe with due respect for the achievements of technical progress.

The Final Act of the European Conference points out that joint action by state institutions, non-governmental bodies and individuals working in education and science could do a great deal for international co-operation and mutual understanding in Europe.

In this field the Conference recommended a broad programme for co-operation on the scale of the whole continent, exchanges and contacts in areas that are of common interest or invite joint international action.

Naturally, the European countries' joint efforts should be primarily aimed to help bring up the young in a spirit of high moral ideals and offer them the necessary aesthetic guidance and physical training. There are many problems here as well.

Through an exchange of experience in the sphere of teaching methods, prognostication, planning and organisation, it is important to work out concrete recommendations and forms that would be aimed to foster the young in a spirit of peace, friendship and respect for other nations, and encourage them to work for international security, social justice, and against all forms of subjugation, exploitation and oppression. Much attention here should, apparently, be devoted to the fight againsl depravity and drug addiction among the young.

There are different ways of achieving these noble goals. Steps should, apparently, be taken to encourage the study of foreign languages and civilisations in order to help the European peoples gain a deeper knowledge of each other's national cultures. Then there is also the question of helping schools and institutions of higher learning to balance out the study of foreign languages, with greater emphasis on languages like Russian and other East and North European languages, alongside English, French, German and Spanish.

``As regards the world languages, the number studying French in our system of secondary and higher education is

17---1787

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3.2 million, German 13.6 million, and English around 12.5 million. The scale of the study of Russian in the industrial capitalist countries is much more modest."*

There could also be regular exchanges of teaching matter, textbooks and teaching aids. With that aim in view, the European countries should take concerted action to have the textbooks purged of any ideas advocating militarism, violence, racial or national superiority, hostility and hatred for other nations, and also to ensure an objective portrayal of other nations' history and culture. On that basis, steps could eventually be taken towards an understanding on establishing the equivalence of education certificates, academic degrees and titles, and on their mutual recognition.

The European countries will also have to deal with the question of expanding the exchange of students, trainees, teachers and scientists on mutually acceptable terms, and introducing grants for foreign scientists to enable them to do research work at institutions of higher learning in other countries. European universities could eventually carry on vigorous exchanges of scientific data in agreed areas, notably, in the natural, historical, pedagogical, medical and other humanitarian sciences, and also protection of the environment.

On the whole, the problem of European co-operation in education has many facets to it, embracing, among other things, questions like the contribution of national minorities and regional cultures to the common cause of co-operation in the field of education,- the need to provide refresher training for Europe's adult population to meet the requirements of scientific and technical progress; the need to create the material conditions for teaching foreign languages to adults, "foreign workers" and their families in particular, and so on.

Such are the main lines for the development of humanitarian co-operation in Europe, as laid down by the Final Act. The signatory countries, therefore, have to take joint practical measures to implement these recommendations.

But before going on to examine the purely practical aspects and terms of humanitarian exchanges, one has to consider the fundamental socio-political and legal propositions on which the edifice of European humanitarian co-operation should be based.

In other words, one has to picture the sum total of the general factors which could-and are bound to-influence the "material fill-out" of the forms and lines of co-operation in the field of human contacts, information, culture and education as recommended by the Conference.

The going here is, naturally, bound to be hard. Everyone has now recognised that co-operation on the scale of the whole continent, in the humanitarian fields in particular, is an integral part of detente. It is an indisputable fact, a sine qua non of the endeavour to help the peoples assimilate all the scientific and cultural values, the best revolutionary traditions and the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution; it is a necessary and objective condition of the individual's spiritual enrichment.

It goes without saying that broader humanitarian exchanges in Europe, between states with different social systems above all, will involve more intensive human contacts and more vigorous circulation of ever greater volumes of ideas and information. It also goes without saying that each of the two social systems will aim to use these to demonstrate its own advantages.

Hence the question: will the introduction of class and social aspects into international understandings contradict the idea of all-European co-operation in the humanitarian fields?

Of course, it will not. The whole world is well aware of the stand taken by the CPSU and the Soviet Government with respect to the dialectics of international co-operation and ideological struggle under detente. The struggle between the principles of socialism and capitalism, the peaceful competition between the two systems, with the states' objective socio-economic and cultural gains acting as its criterion, do not by any means rule out co-operation between them, es-

* From Helsinki to Belgrade, Documents and Material, p. 288.

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pecially in areas which serve to provide the general setting for peaceful coexistence.

The Soviet Union's attitude has been explicitly formulated in the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and L. I. Brezhnev's speeches. L. I. Brezhnev said in the report "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics": "The CPSU has always assumed, and still assumes, that the class struggle between the two systems-the capitalist and the socialist-in the economic and political, and also, of course, the ideological domains, will continue. That is to be expected since the world outlook and the class aims of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable. But we shall strive to shift this historically inevitable struggle onto a path free from the perils of war, of dangerous conflicts and an uncontrolled arms race. This will be a tremendous gain for world peace, for the interests of all peoples, of all states."""

In the socialist countries, the Party and state concepts for peaceful coexistence and detente start from the assumption that every society has its own class structure, ethics, ways of life, usages and notions. The Soviet people are convinced of the advantages and superiority of their socialist institutions over capitalist institutions, and the detente, humanitarian cooperation in particular, provides the best opportunities for showing the European nations the indisputable advantages of the socialist system in every sphere of life.

L. I. Brezhnev said in Alma Ata in 1973: "We are convinced of the correctness of our path, of our Marxist-Leninist ideology, and we do not doubt that the expansion of contacts, exchanges of cultural values and information, development of ties between the public of various countries-all this being natural in the conditions of detente-will help greatly to spread the truth about socialism and win more and more supporters to the side of the ideas of scientific communism."**

Some forces, however, seek to use the favourable opportunities inherent in the detente for purposes of ideological subversion, hampering the efforts to present an objective and all-round picture of the various aspects of life in the European countries.

They hope to jump on the bandwagon of the humanitarian exchanges under the European accord and pull off subversive ideological acts aimed to denigrate the order and way of life in other countries, undermine their societies and internal relations through misinformation, ``black'' or ``grey'' propaganda, and so on.

The right-wing circles have already stepped up the activities of various "non-governmental bodies", like Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, seeking to adapt these to the detente and enable them to spearhead the subversive ideological activity against the USSR and the other European socialist countries. The enemies of detente hope to go on using with impunity these relicts of the cold war even after the European states have reached comprehensive understandings on co-operation, on the plea that information processes in capitalist society are ``ungovernable'', referring to the "faults of the pluralist system", and so on.

Such preparations could harm the course of detente, the whole emergent system of all-European co-operation, and also the internal political relations in every European state.

The misinformation and incitement practised by these outfits, their reliance on anonymous or ghost sources of information, and their twisting of the facts could only serve to mislead public opinion and undermine the trust setting in among the European nations.

The propaganda of the extremist forms and methods of struggle against co-operation between countries with different systems, the support given to various ultra-Left groups and the efforts to justify their activities, the encouragement offered to nationalist organisations, and so on, are a threat to interstate relations in Europe, as well as to law and order in the European countries themselves. That is why any ideologi-

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, pp. 94-95. ** Ibid.

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cal subversions, attempts to thrust hostile notions, usages and ideas on other nations, blackmail, deception and juggling of the facts should be completely eliminated from the humanitarian exchanges among the European countries.

All these considerations lead up to the problem of the sociopolitical parameters of humanitarian co-operation in Europe.

Up until recently, the Western press had plugged the idea that the Marxist-Leninist class concept about the inevitability of ideological struggle even under the detente did not leave any room for joint action by countries with different social systems, so barring the way to co-operation.

The Conference showed that the idea was utterly untenable. It laid down a set of fundamental principles for co-- operation in the humanitarian fields, which were accepted by all the participating states and, consequently, carry weight for the whole of Europe.

The participating states took the only correct road in their search for the fundamental principles of co-operation: they pointed to the end goals of humanitarian co-operation, formulating these in politically explicit, unambiguous terms, which cannot admit of different readings or give rise to any doubts among European opinion.

The participants specified these concrete goals, which are perfectly clear to all: stronger peace and mutual understanding among nations, and the spiritual enrichment of the individual, without regard to race, sex, language or religion/^^1^^'

It was precisely because these goals were so explicit and common to all that the participating states had decided to cooperate among themselves regardless of their political, economic or social systems in order to improve the conditions for humanitarian exchanges, develop and strengthen the exist-

ing forms of co-operation, and look for new ways and means that could help achieve these goals.""

In other words, European humanitarian co-operation in the long term does not have to be confined to any particular forms or time schedules. It is not weighed down by any general propositions which could invite different or ambiguous readings. Finally, the very formulation of the goals of humanitarian co-operation (peace, mutual understanding and spiritual enrichment) obviates the possibility that the humanitarian exchanges channels will be used for ideological subversion.

In the course of concrete discussions, the participating states could spell out in greater detail the above formulas written into the Preamble of the Section "On Co-operation in the Humanitarian and Other Fields", specifying, for instance, the practices which the states should seek to live down in the first place.

Under any circumstances, however, such detailing or specification should do nothing to distort the basic idea of the Preamble, that of peace, mutual relations among nations and the individual's spiritual enrichment.

Another general consideration following from the content of the Final Act and the procedure of its adoption is that the Conference's documents on humanitarian exchanges are in effect moral and political recommendations being offered to the participating states and do not entail any automatic obligations or bind the states to carry these out in any definite form, for they are not to be regarded as rules of international law (neither on the strength of their juridical structure nor the adoption procedures).

* During Stage Two of the Conference, some people in the West insisted that the states first had to agree on how to improve the means of "the movement of men and ideas", and then go on to decide which goals these could correspond to. This argument shows poor logic, for it is always the means that derive from the goal. The loftier and more explicit the goal, the greater should be the scale and efficiency of the means.

* See Section "On Co-operation in the Humanitarian and Other Fields", Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act.

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The task here, apparently, is to make fresh unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts, as the Final Act enjoins the states to do, to implement the propositions formulated by the participating states.

When it comes to unilateral implementation or monitoring of the basic propositions of the Final Act, individual states could, naturally, take this initiative wherever the conditions were appropriate, so demonstrating their goodwill and readiness to act in the spirit of the Helsinki accords. At the same time, every unilateral measure of this kind will contain within itself a presumption of reciprocity, that is, an implication that the partners are invited to similar acts of goodwill.

It is for the future to show how such "chain reactions" started off by unilateral goodwill initiatives on the part of individual states will develop.

The fulfilment of the Helsinki recommendations will mainly take the well-tried legal form of bilateral or multilateral agreements in international law developing concrete lines of humanitarian co-operation.

Of course, this short survey of some political and legal aspects of all-European co-operation in the sphere of human contacts, information, culture and education does not cover all the numerous concrete problems and different approaches to their possible solution. Moreover, it is often a matter not only of technical differences, but also of serious difficulties and methodological disparities. The only way to overcome these is for the states to make a painstaking practical effort on the basis of the explicit Final Act recommendations.

THE TERMS AND POSSIBLE WAYS OF SUCCESSFUL CO-OPERATION

In signing the Final Act, the participating states recorded their will to co-operate among themselves in a broad range of vitally important areas, humanitarian exchanges in particu-

lar. Consequently, the task now is to show goodwill and take consistent steps towards the practical fulfilment of the accords, with scrupulous respect for the principles of mutual relations between states and the Final Act recommendations on the ways of co-operation in various fields.

There is nothing fundamentally new about the question of humanitarian co-operation in Europe. Lasting cultural and other humanitarian ties emerged at different periods among the European states (regardless of their socio-economic systems) and have strengthened in the course of the detente. In terms of international law, these ties are based on conventions, bilateral or multilateral agreements, the principles of bilateral co-operation in the field of culture, recommendations of international forums, decisions of specialised international bodies, and so on.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, elaborated in accordance with the UN Charter, are the most important documents containing the initial, fundamental propositions relating to human contacts and exchanges in the field of education, culture and information. The human rights pacts provide for the necessary political, social, economic and legal conditions for ensuring broader humanitarian exchanges, enabling every individual to realise his right to education, information, freedom of movement, and so on. The pacts were signed and ratified by many European states, the socialist states above all (the Soviet Union signing in 1973), and came into effect in the period from January to March 1976. The earliest possible ratification of the pacts by all the European states could at once create a legal basis for the solution of many concrete problems of humanitarian cooperation.

The European conferences on co-operation in the field of culture and education held since the turn of the decade have done a great deal for humanitarian exchanges in Europe. The Second Conference of the Ministers of Higher Education of the European Countries (Bucharest, 1973) and the Inter-

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

governmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe (Helsinki, 1972) were particularly important, working out many useful recommendations that could be taken as a point of departure for future comprehensive decisions embracing the whole continent.

Various international conventions and UN, and especially UNESCO, documents, whose recommendations have already been incorporated in many bilateral agreements and have yielded positive results, could be of great importance for the elaboration of a humanitarian co-operation system for the whole of Europe.*

Some universally applicable propositions could also be borrowed from bilateral agreements between European states, especially between states with different socio-economic systems. In this sphere, co-operation has also made considerable headway and could serve as a point of departure for certain all-European accords.**

The documents and appeals adopted by various congresses and forums of progressive European forces and democratic public organisations also contain some important and useful suggestions. In working out recommendations for humanitarian co-operation on the scale of the whole continent, one

has to heed the voice of public opinion, whose recommendations contain many useful and constructive elements.*

Thus, the all-European work for the further improvement of human contacts and broader exchanges in the field of information, culture and education does not have to be started from scratch. Considerable material has already accumulated in this sphere and should be used as a springboard for future all-European accords.

It was the existing sound political and legal basis and rich practice that enabled the European Conference to recommend the development and strengthening of the existing forms of co-operation as one of the main ways of realising the Helsinki accords.

The main task now is to select, summarise and spread to the whole of Europe the useful and positive elements that have already proved their worth in the course of bilateral or multilateral relations. This will require a good deal of effort, for these elements have to be not only singled out and recommended for use, but recorded in appropriate agreements in order to ensure their practical realisation. UNESCO, which has a long record of practical work in organising international co-operation in the fields of education, science and culture, and also other specialised UN agencies, could do much to help the participating states towards that end.

Naturally, the practical implementation of the Helsinki accords cannot be limited to an effort to reduce to a " common denominator" the existing forms and content of allEuropean humanitarian co-operation. The second and, apparently, no less important part of the problem is to find universally acceptable new forms of co-operation and fill these out with appropriate content, and also to elaborate new ways and means in accordance with the common goals of the humanitarian exchanges.

If the required level of all-European humanitarian co-

* See, for instance, the Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation (November 4, 1966), the Convention Concerning the International Exchange of Publications (December 14, 1960), the Universal (Geneva) Copyright Convention (September 6, 1952), the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property ( November 17, 1970), etc.

*'" See, for instance, the cultural agreement between the USSR and Italy of February 9, 1960, the Agreement on Cultural Co-operation Between the USSR and the Netherlands of July 14, 1967, the Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Co-operation Between the USSR and Austria of March 22, 1968, the General Agreement on Exchanges Between the USSR and Canada of October 20, 1971, the Principles of Co-operation Between the USSR and France of October 30, 1971, the General Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Contacts,' Exchanges and Co-operation of June 19, 1973, etc.

* See Section "On Co-operation in the Field of Education and Culture", World Congress ot Peace Forces in Moscow. Final Resolution.

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CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

operation is to be achieved, the states will have gradually to increase their efforts in this direction.

It is common knowledge that the cold war has not only influenced interstate relations in Europe, but has also left behind it in Western minds an unfortunate legacy, causing recurrent relapses into mistrust and doubt about the necessity and usefulness of any efforts in the field of detente and a biased attitude to the measures that could be taken towards all-European co-operation. One cannot fail to see that Western reactionary circles, the enemies of detente, seek to instigate these attitudes, especially with respect to the constructive initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Consequently, one of the most important tasks of co-- operation is to dispel the mistrust and neutralise the forces coming out against all-European co-operation. This process is neither easy nor simple, especially when it comes to humanitarian exchanges, where it will take some time to bring the practice of humanitarian ties into strict correspondence with the goals laid down by the Conference. Obviously, this stage cannot be skipped. It has to be lived through and left behind to eliminate the residual mistrust, crush the resistance of the enemies of detente and put down their attempts to use the humanitarian channels for subversive purposes. To make this process as smooth as possible, the states will, apparently, have to abide by some conditions.

First, they will have to build up their constructive efforts in humanitarian co-operation in a gradual, realistic and balanced way. In other words, in the humanitarian fields, as well as in other fields of co-operation, there is hardly any sense in putting forward any proposals or formulating demands that would not be in line with the present stage of the detente. The measures suggested for European security and economic and scientific co-operation are quite commensurate with the present stage of the detente, but when it comes to humanitarian ties, the Western capitalist press has often urged "immediate and total freedom of every type of information", "human contacts unrestrained in any way", and so on.

Such maximalist demands are obviously artificial or premature, and, when couched in terms of a deliberate ultimatum, could create the impression of attempts at indirect encroachment on the internal affairs of other states.

In signing the Helsinki Final Act, the high representatives of 35 states took this fully into account, voicing their agreement to elaborate co-ordinated measures to ensure freer movement and contacts, a freer and wider spread of every form of information and wider exchanges in the field of culture and education, but nothing beyond that. In other words, the development of humanitarian exchanges is seen as a gradual process involving quantitative accumulations rather than an instant, abrupt transition to a new quality.

Second, in taking steps towards rapprochement and cooperation in Europe at the present stage of the detente, the states will also have to agree on universal guarantees against any encroachments or unfriendly acts in the political or ideological sphere. Such guarantees should be mutually acceptable and serve to protect, wherever necessary, the interests of states with either system.

In view of all that, the European states not only formulated the goals of humanitarian co-operation, but also raised certain barriers against activities aimed to undermine their socio-political foundations in the course of humanitarian exchanges.

In the course of the European Conference, some Western circles were not very eager, to put it mildly, to consider the direct need for such guarantees in international law and the moral and political plane. Voicing their point of view. Western periodicals reasoned that as it was, everyone was very well aware of what the humanitarian exchanges should not be directed against. So, the argument went, was there any point in recording any guarantees in international legal documents, especially since it was very difficult to list all the concrete activities in the field of human contacts and exchanges of information and cultural values that could be designated as subversive.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

It is, naturally, impossible to list all the undesirable activities. The participants in the Conference, however, chose a different and simpler alternative to the unrealistic projects of the opponents of detente. They eventually came to a general understanding that humanitarian co-operation was to be carried out with due respect for the principles regulating the relations among them, as formulated in the Final Act, that is, the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, and so on. This means that in the course of humanitarian exchanges they are to respect each other's right freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, and to lay down their own laws and administrative rules. The signatory states are also to respect each other's sovereign equality and specifics, refrain from any direct or indirect interference in each other's internal affairs and build their relations with due respect for the human rights and basic freedoms.

The Soviet Union firmly abides by these principles, and L. I. Brezhnev once again categorically emphasised this at the October 1977 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee saying that the Soviet Union's point of departure is that under the detente the development of such ties and contacts is quite natural, provided, of course, that the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs are strictly observed.

Such universal guarantees, which are already being widely applied in international law, are contained in many universal acts of international law,* and also in bilateral agreements.""*

* See, for instance, Constitution of UNESCO, Article 1, Item 3; the Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation adopted by the 14th session of the UNESCO General Conference on November 4, 1966, Article 11, Item 2; Resolution No. 2 of the World Conference of Ministers of Culture (Venice, 1970), Clause 1; General Recommendation (Clause 1,1) of the European Conference of Ministers of Culture in Helsinki in 1972, etc. ** See, for instance, the above-mentioned cultural agreements be-

On that basis, countries with different socio-economic systems have already achieved considerable results in humanitarian co-operation, and there is every reason to believe that this well-tried and reliable practice should eventually provide a sound earnest of humanitarian co-operation on the scale of the whole continent.

The enemies of the detente have sought to torpedo this solution of the problem, for it tends markedly to narrow down their possibilities for carrying on subversive activity along the humanitarian .channels. They seek to prove that such guarantees are suspect, for they would "put a freeze" on the national legislation in some countries and stand in the way of implementation of the accords achieved. They claim that the capitalist countries have the only genuine democratic legislation assuring their citizens of broad civil rights, while the legal systems of the socialist states are nothing but codes of prohibitory and punitive rules. So, the argument goes, before co-operating, the capitalist countries have to induce the socialist countries to ``adjust'' their legislation to Western standards.

There is hardly any need to argue against this view of the principles of all-European co-operation, for it was refuted by the Helsinki decisions.

Speaking of the need to observe state laws and rules when exchanging ideas and information, L. I. Brezhnev said at the World Congress of Peace Forces: "For example, we have a law banning the propaganda of war in any form. There is legislation prohibiting the dissemination of the ideas of racial or national strife and hatred, and of ideas which degrade the national dignity of any people. There are laws to prevent immoral behaviour, laws against the moral corruption

tween the USSR and Italy of February 9, I960, Article 14; between the USSR and the Netherlands of July 14, 1967, Article 4; between the USSR and Austria of March 22, 1968, Article 1; between the USSR and Canada of October 20, 1971, Articles 1, 8 and 18; the General Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Contacts, Exchanges and Co-operation of June 19, 1973, Articles 1 and 2, etc.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

of society. Are we expected, perhaps, to repudiate these laws in the name of free exchange of ideas and information? Or are we to be persuaded that this would serve the cause of detente and closer international ties?

``We are being told: 'Either change your way of life or be prepared for cold war.' But what if we should reciprocate? What if we should demand modification of bourgeois laws and usages that go against our ideas of justice and democracy as a condition for normal interstate relations ?"*

The machinery through which all-European humanitarian co-operation could mesh with the states' legal systems and legislation will, apparently, be different. Following the example of the Helsinki Conference, future all-European forums will, probably, frame their decisions on humanitarian exchanges as recommendations specifying the desired parameters of co-operation rather than universally binding acts in international law. Such recommendations could provide the basis for subsequent bilateral or multilateral agreements on concrete questions of practical co-operation.

At the same time, individual states could also adopt various internal measures by way of implementing the allEuropean recommendations for the humanitarian fields.

The new Constitution of the USSR is vivid proof of the Soviet state's peaceful policy, the humanistic and democratic nature of socialist society and the individual's broad rights and freedoms. It gives juridical substantiation to the Leninist principles of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, its objective of preventing aggressive wars and ensuring general and complete disarmament and consistent peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. The democratic spirit of the Soviet political and social system makes it possible fully to realise the principles and understandings written into the Final Act.

The debate on humanitarian problems which began at Stage Two of the European Conference revealed so many rest-

rictions, bans, reservations and references to internal security in the legislation of Western countries that even the Western press could not help mentioning it.

Journal de Geneve wrote: "It has quickly become apparent, notably with respect to human contacts, that the West is not as `virgin' as one would have liked to believe. When talking of national legislations, the representatives of the East had no difficulty in laying bare their discriminatory and anti-humanitarian propositions."*

That is why in the effort to achieve practical all-European understandings in the humanitarian fields there is hardly any point in debating the pluses and minuses of the parties' legislation, urging immediate changes in the laws of other states, or trying to interfere in their internal affairs.

Another point to note here is that any attempt on the part of a signatory state to assume the functions of control over the implementation by other signatory states of the Final Act propositions on humanitarian exchanges should be seen as illegitimate. Thus, it was pointed in a representation of the Soviet Embassy to the US State Department that the establishment of a Congressional committee to monitor the fulfilment of the Helsinki understandings in the humanitarian fields, on which the Administration was represented, was an attempt on the part of the USA to assume the right to give an arbitrary and one-sided reading to the Final Act and, on that basis, to judge about its implementation by other participating states. This is against the principle of non-- interference in other states' internal affairs, a fundamental principle of international law recorded in the Final Act.

Significantly, an effort to define the concrete parameters of humanitarian exchanges without regard to the state of the individual countries' legislation and the confidence of every participating state that no one is going to use the humanitarian channels to interfere in its internal affairs or disrupt its legal system will enable every state to take sovereign

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 324.

* See Antoine Bosshard, in: Journal de Geneve, November 30, 1973.

18---1787

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CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

action, showing full confidence in its partners, to expand the measures it takes (in legislation, in particular) in the field of human contacts and exchanges of information, culture and education.

Third, a desirable condition of humanitarian exchanges is their reciprocity, parity and equivalence.

An analysis of the various flows of information in Europe will show that the smaller European countries are virtually deluged with information from the bigger and technically advanced Western countries/^^5^^' Far from being concerned about ensuring equality among the European nations in the information field, the Western news monopolies advocating the "free spread of information" have sought to use their powerful mass media to ensure their hegemony and thrust their political opinions on the population. Information imperialism and expansion are a grave threat facing the European peoples.

Speaking of these problems, Finland's President Urho Kekkonen emphasised that the so-called free spread of information always tended to correspond to a definite set of values and did not always serve to broaden the range of the information being relayed. "There are indications that a quantitative increase only in the flow of words and images across national frontiers could lead to bias and preconception in place of the ignorance, rather than to understanding."**

As a result, broad sections of the population have had inadequate access to basic social information and lack the knowledge to work out for themselves their own idea of society and act accordingly, as democracy implies. Dominant models of behaviour are being imposed on the population

and, instead of genuine public opinion, there is the opinion of the small privileged groups that own the mass media.

The humanitarian exchanges between European countries with different social systems are still very lopsided.

Take the quantitative aspect of the TV exchanges between European socialist and capitalist countries. In the first half of 1976, for instance, the Intervision network received 117 programmes from Eurovision, and the latter only 30. As for TV news, Intervision has been receiving 66 per cent of the Eurovision total, and the latter only 10 per cent. In the socialist countries the share of original programmes from the West constitutes 10 per cent of total TV time, and for the Western countries the figure is only 2 per cent.

According to UNESCO, the USSR has been publishing nine times more translations than Britain, and four times more than the USA.

The share of Western films shown in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria comes to about 15-16 per cent, whereas in the capitalist countries, the share of films from the socialist countries rarely comes to 5 per cent of the total volume. Many of the films bought from the socialist countries never even reach film audiences. In 1974, only 58 of the 143 full-length films bought from the Soviet Union by the West European countries were put on the screen.

So, the humanitarian exchanges in Europe are obviously ill-balanced. Something will, apparently, have to be done about this, because the West Europeans tend to get a distorted idea of the socialist way of life.

Urho Kekkonen said that the best way to help achieve these goals is perhaps to seek to balance out to the utmost the information exchanges among the European states, to do away with the existing inequalities and ensure equal cultural exchanges. Information about life in other countries could serve as a criterion. Over the past few years, for instance, Finland's mass media have been carrying more documentary reports about the Soviet Union, and research has shown that these have met with considerable interest among

* The USA's TV corporations have been exporting about 200,000 hours of TV programmes a year, so that in some West European countries the share of US programmes ranges from one-third to two-thirds of total TV time.

** Urho Kekkonen, Speech at an International TV Experts' Seminar at Tampere, Kansan Uutiset, May 22, 1973.

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CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

the Finnish population, eliminating many prejudices born of ignorance.*

Finally, another important condition for the all-round expansion of humanitarian exchanges in Europe is that the states should be responsible not only for balancing out these exchanges, but also for the very nature, the message of the information being spread from their territory, regardless of who owns the information sources.

In other words, some Western circles would do well to ponder how to comply with the spirit and letter of the Final Act and not only to refrain from using the official channels to carry on activities aimed to violate the sovereignty and internal order of other states, but also to put a stop to the subversive activity of various ``non-governmental'' bodies. It is for the state to decide whether to allow the existence on its territory of one ``independent'' organisation or another, but it has to bear the responsibility for any subversive activity being mounted from its territory. International practice offers various precedents for condemnation of any subversive activity being mounted from the territory of one state or another.

Thus, the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Helsinki in June 1972, recommended that all states should adopt, wherever necessary, due measures to prevent the spread of ideas advocating hatred for other nations, violence, racism or war.

So, a pledge on the part of the states to prevent any subversive ideological activities to be mounted from their territory is legitimate and valid.

As for the concrete machinery for limiting or ending the subversive activities of ``non-governmental'' bodies in the international arena, the European states have a wide range of instruments at their disposal that could be used for that purpose, including controls, bans, and financial and other instruments.

All-European co-operation in the humanitarian fields is a vitally necessary and at the same time highly complicated and delicate matter. To elaborate and implement concrete recommendations for various aspects of co-operation, and also to adopt general accords on the terms of broader human contacts and exchanges in the field of information, culture and education, the states will have to make some concessions. But these concessions, L. I. Brezhnev emphasised, will be fully justified, serving to promote peace without erasing the distinctions in ideology and social system/^^1^^"

The Soviet Union has expressed its full readiness to implement the Helsinki accords, and will expect the other participating states to do likewise.^^55^^'*

The events taking place in the world since the signing of the Final Act show very well that the atmosphere of international relations can be markedly improved over a fairly short period. Owing to the Soviet Union's broad initiatives, countries with different social systems have also expanded their co-operation in the humanitarian fields. Naturally, progress in some areas is greater than in other areas, where the necessary measures are just being developed or gradually implemented.

If the humanitarian exchanges are to be expanded, the political detente has to be supplemented with a military detente and the nuclear arms race has to be curbed. This calls for purposeful efforts on the part of every nation and for broad and constructive co-operation among them.

* Pravda, August 1, 1975. L. I. Brezhnev's Speech at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

** Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress ol the CPSU, pp. 22, 23.

* Urho Kekkonen, op. cit.

CHAPTER TEN

CO-OPERATION IN PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

is characterised by the emergence of a number of qualitatively new problems which had simply not been there before, or had been merely latent.

One of the essential features of the present stage of the man-nature relationship is, evidently, that in this final third of the 20th century man has been introducing global changes into natural conditions on the Earth. Some new aspects have also appeared in the man-nature relationship in the individual countries, notably, the industrialised countries, the European countries in particular. Everyone has heard of the worsening quality of the environment in these countries. In general terms, these are, first, attainment of high and frequently critical levels of pollution of the environment (water, air, soil) with the residual products of production and consumption which are harmful to human health and fatal to nature; second, the excessive growth of consumption and the irrational use of many types of natural resources and energy, which has entailed a steady growth in the volume of industrial and household waste as an additional source for upsetting the ecological balance; third, the aggravation of ``old'' problems in the use of nature, like the worsening of some landscapes, the destruction of unique and valuable natural objects, the reduction in the size of the population or the threat of extinction of wild animal or plant life, and so on.

The aggravated relationship between man and his natural environment at the present historical stage has a direct bearing on the physical conditions for the existence of the present and future generations of Europeans, the perspective for the further growth of material production and the progress of civilisation, and the state of fundamental biospheric balances which ensure life.

The factors which go to upset the ecological balance on an international scale can, evidently, be eliminated only through joint, collective efforts by the states, through international co-operation. But many countries have to pool their efforts not only to make good the harm already inflicted on nature. Some problems of this kind can be tackled quite sa-

ECOLOGY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Preservation and improvement of the environment and the rational use of resources of the biosphere is a key objective of European co-operation.

One may well ask whether the problem of the environment-which has always been present in the history of man and society-is really so urgent and important as to be included among the objects and factors of international relations in general, and of European affairs, in particular. There is only one answer, and it is that the problem has undergone such a change in the past few decades of tempestuous growth of the productive forces in the European states, whipped up by the unprecedented scale of scientific and technical progress, that it now has a qualitatively new content, and this requires, indeed inexorably dictates, a new attitude to the environment as such, and to the ways and means of maintaining favourable ecological conditions on the continent. Indeed, it is the qualitatively new content of the problem that has made it one of the most meaningful today.

The present ecological situation is not just a quantitative growth to dangerous proportions of the problems arising from the maintenance of the natural conditions which man faced over the past century or even some 20 or 30 years ago. It

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

tisfactorily through concerted and co-ordinated national measures to protect nature.

One lesson which has to be learnt from the current complex ecological situation in Europe is, apparently, that control and management of natural systems should be aimed not only to eliminate the unfavourable consequences of intrusion into natural processes, as has most frequently been in the past, but also to use scientific knowledge and foresight to rule out the very possibility of such consequences arising in the immediate or distant future. That is why the specific feature and novelty of the relationship between society and nature also consists in the fact that in the present conditions control and maintenance on a long-term and systematic basis of the balance in the biosphere as a whole and in its major structural subdivisions-on the continents, subcontinents, oceans and seas, etc.-become objectively a task that can be tackled in practical terms.

The fact that the ecological problem has become a global problem facing the whole of mankind means the emergence of a new reality in international affairs which springs from the unity and indivisibility of the Earth's ecosphere. A whole group of specific ties have been objectively taking shape among the states, and these are necessarily included in the overall system of international relations.

As the problem of the environment is internationalised, the concept of "ecological security" is included in international relations, and this is a concept reflecting the legitimate urge on the part of every country to safeguard itself from any harm to the natural environment and human health which could be inflicted through ``anti-ecological'' acts by other countries. In the present conditions, some types of economic activity on a relatively large scale in this or that country affecting the natural environment acquire international importance.

A number of new requirements connected with ecological matters have appeared, and these could be designated as requirements of international ecological ethics. This is a code

which will not take shape automatically, but calls for joint efforts in restructuring and improving relations among states, especially states with different social systems.

The ongoing detente and consolidation of security in Europe open up favourable perspectives for co-operation in protecting the environment. Such co-operation also opens up broad horizons for efforts aimed to consolidate the positive changes in international relations, eliminate the additional potential sources of conflict and discord which are latent in some ecological problems, and formulate the principles of ecological ethics governing the behaviour of states in environmental matters which are of international significance.

The socialist countries attach much importance to broad co-operation among the European countries in environmental protection. L. I. Brezhnev told the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in October 1973: "But peace is not only a question of security. It is also the most important prerequisite for solving the most crucial problems of modern civilisation. And here the very future of humanity is involved -yes, the future of the entire world, which it is no longer possible to ignore when tackling the problems of the present day."*

The CPSU and the Soviet Government want to see more and better international co-operation in protecting the environment. The 24th Congress of the CPSU came out in favour of such co-operation, and the USSR's active participation in international programmes for co-operation in protecting the environment was reaffirmed by the 25th Congress. Emphasising the importance of this problem and of a number of new global problems facing mankind. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said in the Report to the Party Congress: "In the future they will exercise an increasingly perceptible influence on the life of each nation and on the entire system of international relations. The So-

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 325.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

viet Union, like other socialist countries, cannot hold aloof from the solution of these problems which affect the interests of all mankind."*

In the context of European affairs, it is now ever more obvious that the arrangement and deepening of European cooperation in protecting the environment should have a big and useful role to play in tackling national and international ecological problems on the continent, while helping make the detente irreversible. Profound comprehension of the relation between political detente and environmental protection has, undoubtedly, done a great deal to make co-- operation in this sphere an object of negotiations between states even at the early stages of the consultations on convening the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

subdivisions-are united in a system of numerous ecological bonds.

The zonal distinctions which occur along the longitudes and latitudes do not in any sense negate the conclusion that there is a definite community of natural and ecological conditions within the framework of the European continent, nor do they, in particular, give any grounds for dividing Europe into parts which are independent or isolated from each other (Eastern, Central, Western, etc.) from the standpoint of these conditions.

Europe is characterised by a historically rooted high density of ``location'' of states in consequence of which many physico-geographic areas and regions within the continental complex are frequently intersected by the frontiers of several states. The integrity of the natural environment in these areas and regions quite obviously depends to a crucial extent on the existence and effectiveness of co-operation among the countries and pursuit by them of a common and concerted ecological policy in line with the community and coherence of their natural conditions.

Another feature of the European continent is that a sizable part of its natural components and resources constitutes a "common asset" of several European countries and peoples. These, quite apart from the air of the continent, are the major river systems, the European seas and the seas washing its coasts. Because these components of nature do not fall within the jurisdiction of individual states, the preservation of their ecological conditions and any measures to transform these conditions require the establishment of a reliable mechanism of international regulation and ecological protection.

Europe is a region of the world with a high level of territorial concentration of industry, agriculture and transport, density of population and urbanisation. By the early 1970s, it accounted for 20.8 per cent of the world's population, and for 44.6 per cent of the world's gross national product. Europe also accounts for a large share of the world output of

PREMISES FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL

CO-OPERATION

There is a number of factors in virtue of which environmental co-operation among states on the scale of the whole European region should be regarded as an objective phenomenon, as a logical derivative of the historical, economic and ecological conditions which have taken shape on the European continent.

There is, first, the existence in Europe of a definite community and coherence of natural and geographical factors: the hydrothermic regime, the circulation of the main air masses and other climate-forming conditions, the main types of plant and animal life, etc. From the. standpoint of these factors, Europe is a single continental complex whose constituent parts-separate natural and geographical belts and zones, large landscape units and natural-economy territorial

Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress ot the CPSU, p. 67.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

wheat, coal, artificial fibres, sawn timber, paper pulp, synthetic resins and plastics, cement and electric power. Europe accounts for 53.2 per cent of the world's exports, and for more than 60 per cent of the exports of manufactured goods (without foodstuffs).*

Taken as a whole, that is, together with the USSR's natural resources, Europe has considerable mineral resources (see Table 4).

Table 4*)

Raw Material Endowment of the Countries Taking Part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

(per cent, 1971)

Reserves of Energy Resources*)

(coal, oil in thous. million tons, gas in thous. million cu m)

Table 5

Groups of countries

Coal

Oil

Gas

Socialist countries of Eu-

184.2(40)**)

10.7(12)

18.2(35;

Capitalist countries of Europe .......

88.3(20)

1.7(2)

5.1(9)

All European countries USA and Canada All CSCE countries

272.5(60) 114.6(25) 387.1(85;

12.5(14) 6.3(7) 18.8(21;

23.3(44; 9.2(17; 32.5(61)

«) 1973 data for oil and gas, earlier years for coal estimates. *•) Bracketed figures show share of world reserves (per cent).

where the worsening of the ecological situation has gone very far, as it has in the FRG, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands, for the continent as a whole the state of the environment should, evidently, be regarded as being less precarious than it is in the United States and Japan. This applies above all to the socialist part of Europe, as will be seen from the estimates made by Soviet scientists A. M. Ryabchikov and Y. G. Saushkin* (Table 6).

Groups of countries

Bauxites

Copper

Tin

Iron

Lead

Zinc

Socialist countries of

Europe ......

Capitalist countries

of Europe ....

All European countries USA and Canada . .

61 7

44 85

25 0.2

80 73

61 113

65 125

All CSCE countries .

*) In these data, the self-sufficiency indicator for each group of countries is obtained by dividing its share of the world output of ores by its share of the world consumption of metal.

Europe, taken as a whole, is also fairly well endowed with energy resources, especially coal and natural gas (see Table 5).

On the European continent, one will find most of the main known types of environmental disturbances: pollution of the chief components of the environment with residual products of production and consumption, precarious state of the balance of water and timber resources, destruction of soils, degradation of landscape, excessive noise levels, accumulation of vast masses of solid waste from industry and consumption in the cities, etc. Although there are countries in Europe

Table 6

Industrial Production Level and Environmental Pollution

(per cent of world level)

Groups of countries

Industrial production

Environmental pollution

Europe .......

52.2

including: CMEA and the other East European countries .... Western Europe . USA ..... •

33 19.2 24.6

15 20 31

Janan .......

5.6

* "Contemporary Problems in the Study of the Environment" Moscow University Herald, Geography, No. 3,1973.

* According to the UN data.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

However, the existing level of pollution and other disturbances of the environment, together with the above-mentioned geographical and economic indicators, give ground for regarding the European continent as an area of the world with special conditions in terms of preserving the quality of the environment.

This is expressed above all in the ecological interdependence of a large number of countries on the continent. What is especially characteristic of Europe is that economic activity in one country has an effect on ecological conditions in other countries, and that national ecological problems freely and easily develop into international and all-European problems. Thus, the prevalence of Western, Atlantic transfers of air on the European continent results in additional pollution of the atmosphere in Scandinavia, of which the sources are industrial enterprises in the Ruhr and Britain. In the same way, some quantities of pollutants from West European countries find their way into the air basin of the East European countries.

For all these reasons, the requirements with regard to the level and intensity of co-operation among countries on the European continent are especially high.

The system of co-operation now being shaped in the world has been acquiring a fairly clear-cut structure. Among its component elements are these:

- the United Nations, the central institution, notably its United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

- specialised UN agencies (UNESCO, WHO, WMO, FAO, ITU, etc.) and the IAEA;

- UN regional economic commissions engaged in research into various technico-economic aspects of the problem of improving the quality of the natural environment and reproduction of natural resources;

- intergovernmental subregional programmes of co-- operation (for instance, within the CMEA framework, a number of interstate organisations and groupings in the Western countries) ;

- interstate multilateral agreements;

- bilateral intergovernmental agreements;

- international non-governmental organisations ( International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, International Council of Scientific Unions and dozens of specialised scientific and public bodies).

The main thing that leaps to the eye when analysing the structure and character of the system of co-operation in Europe is co-operation chiefly on a subregional level, which has in some instances acquired considerable depth amounting to integration-type ties. For the time being, co-operation on a continental level is less intensive than co-operation within the framework of programmes involving only the socialist or only the capitalist countries. Still, the fact that Europe has a large number of common ecological problems and that there is an extensive zone of mutual interests in establishing active division of labour is a convincing argument in favour of giving all-European co-operation much greater scope and depth.

The socialist countries of Europe have long been co-- operating with each other-in various forms and at various levelson environmental problems. Their overall task of developing

SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

International co-operation in environmental protection is now being intensively shaped and involves most countries of the world. A notable feature of this process is the shift of emphasis from the non-governmental level of co-operation to the intergovernmental level, and the sharp enhancement of the role of multilateral programmes for interstate co-- operation.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

co-operation in protecting nature and improving the environment was formulated by the CMEA Secretariat as follows: to achieve "a stable equilibrium between natural conditions and requirements of society".* This means, in other words, a constant maintenance of the equilibrium between the natural environment and society in which there is a growth of material production with ever greater efficiency, rapid scientific and technical progress, rising living standards and ever fuller satisfaction of the citizens' spiritual requirements.

At the early stages, the division of labour in environmental protection was based on comprehensive bilateral agreements on scientific and technical co-operation between individual socialist countries, their economic administration agencies, research and other institutions. At present, bilateral agreements have not become less meaningful in tackling the concrete problems in preserving the environment. However, the dominant role in co-operation has now been shifting to multilateral programmes and agreements, with the CMEA being ever more active in providing its members with the organisational facilities for formulating and implementing such programmes and agreements.

In historical terms, the CMEA's effort in environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources has developed either on the basis of specialised working groups set up for the individual problems, or sectoral standing commissions. Since 1962, the CMEA has had a special agencythe Conference of Heads of CMEA Water Conservation Bodies-which has made a study of the principles and methods of protecting waters against pollution in order to meet the growing requirements of the population and the economy in water of the required quality.

The CMEA's standing commissions deal with special problems in preserving the environment which arise with the development of various types of production. Thus, some

sectoral problems in water conservation are being tackled by standing commissions set up for the coal and chemical industries, ferrous metallurgy, electric power, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the oil and gas industry, pulp-and-paper, etc.

A highly important stage in deepening multilateral cooperation among the socialist countries and in taking a more comprehensive approach to the problem of the environment and natural resources was marked by the signing in April 1971 of an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation on the comprehensive problem "Elaboration of Measures for Protection of Nature". It involved seven European countries which are members of the CMEA.* The signing of this agreement inaugurated the switch to higher forms of co-operation, from the co-ordination of works to co-operation, including joint projects.

Another important step in intensifying co-operation among the CMEA countries in environmental protection was the adoption by the 25th session of the CMEA in 1971 of the Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Co-operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration by the CMEA Member-Countries. The Programme sets the "Elaboration of Measures for Protection of Nature" problem apart as an independent and important line of co-operation among the member-countries in the scientific and technical fields.

By the end of 1974, the CMEA countries had made considerable progress in studying many scientific and technical aspects of the environmental problem and had obtained a

* The agreement established the procedures and principles for multilateral co-operation, a programme of measures and organisational forms of co-operation, the procedures for the transfer of the results of the work, financing of projects and other provisions. The programme consisted of major problems grouped under six heads, each of which consisted of a number of topics (a total of 39 topics). Co-ordination centres were set up in the member-countries for each problem; councils of representatives operated as working organs.

19---1787

* Economic Commission tor Europe. ECE Symposium on Problems Relating to Environment. United Nations. New York, 1971, p. 320.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

number of useful practical results. They formulated and unified methods for determining and analysing atmospheric pollutants, developed some types of control and measuring instruments for identifying and controlling environmental pollution, drew up recommendations for eliminating some types of pollution, etc. Work was successfully completed on joint research into several interesting and topical scientific problems. Thus, a study was made of the state of health and hygienic control of the population depending on the state of atmospheric air pollution (project leader: Humboldt-- Universitat Hygiene-Institut, GDR); the effect of a metallurgical plant discharge on the living conditions of the population (State Institute of Hygiene, Poland); pollution of the atmospheric air in modern cities by carcinogenic hydrocarbon and exhaust chemical agents depending on the type of industry and the influence of pollution on the health of the population (National Institute of Public Health, Hungary); a hygienic evaluation was made of the contamination of air in cities by engine emissions, health improvement measures established and the basic principles formulated for methods to study the influence of atmospheric pollution on the incidence of disease among the population (N. A. Semashko Institute of General and Communal Hygiene, USSR), etc.*

The CMEA's effort in the protection of nature was given an impetus with the establishment within the framework of the CMEA's committee for scientific and technical co-- operation in 1973 of a specialised agency for protection and improvement of the environment (on the level of deputy ministers of the national ministries concerned), which is to act as coordinator on the numerous programmes being put through in the CMEA, to ensure a comprehensive approach to the problem as a whole, to promote joint practical measures in eliminating and preventing disturbances in the environment in the CMEA countries.

In October 1974, the CMEA Executive Committee approved a full-scale programme for co-operation among the CMEA countries and Yugoslavia until 1980 in protecting and improving the environment and the attendant rational use of natural resources. The programme provides for multilateral scientific and technical co-operation on 11 major problems, including 155 concrete topics. This new programme is to have an outstanding role to play in helping the socialist community countries tackle their common and national ecological problems. It covers all the more essential aspects of the ecological problems: socio-economic, organisational, legal and pedagogical aspects of environmental protection; hygienic aspects of environmental protection; protection of ecosystems ( biogeocenoses) and landscape; protection of the atmosphere against pollution by noxious substances; meteorological aspects of atmospheric pollution; combating noise and vibrations; protection of waters against pollution; decontamination and utilisation of household, industrial, agricultural and other waste; ensuring radiation security; elaboration of the main lines of planning of cities, their suburban zones and systems of settlement with an eye to environmental protection and improvement; protection of the subsoil and rational use of natural resources connected with the environmental protection and improvement. Work in realising this programme is being carried on in 16 CMEA agencies.

While developing their co-operation within the CMEA framework, the socialist countries actively seek to improve and strengthen contacts and ties with other systems of international co-operation in environmental protection, notably with UNEP and other international UN agencies, including the Economic Commission for Europe. In this respect the socialist countries of Europe pin great hopes on all-European co-operation, because, as has been said, the task of environmental protection is continental, and its urgency is beyond doubt.

The capitalist countries of Europe have been co-operating on various environmental problems on the basis of several

* See V. A. Prokudin, "Environment Protection: Co-operation of the CMEA Countries", International Affairs, No. 11, 1974.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

intergovernmental organisations, which in itself is evidence of a fairly complex and contradictory situation in which this co-operation takes shape and proceeds.

Indeed, the capitalist countries do not have a single universal intergovernmental organisation to consider comprehensively, that is, in a broad political, socio-economic, scientific and technical context, intricate and multifaceted problems like rationalising the use of nature or pursuit of an agreed policy in this field in the light of the new requirements. Meanwhile, co-ordination of national policies in putting through nature-protection measures now tends to acquire primary importance for these countries chiefly from the standpoint of maintaining the balance of economic forces that has taken shape between them. This balance could be upset if each country were to pursue its own nature-protection policy which in some way differs from those of the others.

Accordingly, in their multilateral co-operation the capitalist countries concentrate not on the strictly ecological or scientific and technical aspects of the problem, notably, the elaboration of practical measures for environmental protection and improvement, but on ``harmonising'' their national policies in this field, that is, the political, commercial and economic consequences of the ecological problem and national measures connected with environmental protection.

The European Council was one of the first international organisations in the West to take an interest in environmental matters. It specialises on the traditional lines of environmental protection policy, formulation of general principles underlying the attitude of man and governments to the natural wealth, with emphasis on improvement and protection of the landscape, including protected zones and rest zones, protection of wild life, notably, regulation of hunting and fishing.

Among the methods used by the European Council are information and enlightenment of broad sections of the population on environmental protection, formulation of principles determining citizens' rights and duties with respect to nature.

and also general legislative fundamentals for the use of nature by which the governments of the member-states should be guided in framing their national environmental protection laws: diverse charters and declarations, which have, however, been of a general, declarative and recommendatory character not binding on member-countries in any practical way.

In the early 1970s, the European Council tried to establish itself as the chief international centre in Western Europe in implementing environmental co-operation, to extend the range of its interests to contemporary ecological problems and help member-countries adopt concrete measures for protecting the environment. However, the attempt did not succeed. A special ministerial conference of the member-states held in Vienna in March 1973 refused to invest the organisation with extensive functions to deal with contemporary ecological problems and left it to continue its old activity.

Since 1969, the military-political NATO grouping has begun to devote attention to environmental problems, with the initiative coming from the United States.

NATO's environmental activity is closely tied in with the political attitudes of those forces in the organisation which seek to consolidate Atlanticism and also with the US policy aimed to induce other NATO countries to adopt the attributes of US environmental policy. The discrepancy of interests between the West European countries (notably the Common Market countries, which feared NATO interference in their economic relations) and the US approach laid a deep imprint on the course and character of environmental co-operation in that body.

The Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society, which is NATO's working organ responsible for putting through programmes for environmental co-operation (alongside the elaboration of various other matters), has adopted a method of co-operation which consists in assigning individual topics (projects) to individual countries acting as responsible performers.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

Following in NATO's footsteps, interest in environmental problems was displayed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a large economic grouping of developed capitalist countries. Since 1970 it has had an Environment Committee of the OECD to co-ordinate the activity of four specialised working and four research groups on problems like control of water resources, air pollution, quality of the urban environment, contamination of the environment with pesticides, engine emission, fuel-burning installations, the pulp-and-paper industry and solid waste. The OECD has given special attention to the study of `` transnational'' ecological problems, above all the migration of pollution across national frontiers.

The OECD has obtained some results on various aspects of the environmental problem, but its efforts to put through much broader measures, like unifying national policies on the environment, introduction of common ecological standards, and so on, have not succeeded for the time being because of serious differences on these matters in the body itself. The idea of deepening co-operation within the OECD has met with the coolest reception from some Common Market countries, whose tactical approach is that the basic legal, economic, foreign trade and other aspects of environmental policy should first be settled and ``harmonised'' within the EEC framework, to enable it to act in a common front in negotiating these matters with their NATO and OECD partners.

That is what explains the Common Market's stepped-up environmental activity over the past few years. Following the adoption in 1972 of their first, fairly limited and modest programme for environmental co-operation, the EEC countries framed and adopted another and broader programme in 1973. It sets out the aims of the EEC's environmental policy and the principles of co-operation, and covers quite an extensive range of aspects of environmental protection and reproduction of natural resources. It provides for numerous and fairly active methods of work, like research, exchange of information,

establishment of common rules and standards, and joint operational measures. This is a reflection of the EEC countries' urge to secure a higher degree of "ecological policy" integration than will be found in other intergovernmental organisations in the West, and also to take a common stand on international co-operation programmes involving third countries. The new programme for EEC environmental cooperation ranges over a fairly extensive spectrum of diverse aspects of environmental problems.

The members of the Nordic Council, a subregional international organisation of the Scandinavian countries, also have a programme for environmental co-operation since 1972. Their Convention on joint measures for environmental protection has established, for the first time in international law practice, procedures governing legal responsibility for damage inflicted on the natural conditions of the states participating in the Convention.

Apart from these international co-operation programmes of the West European countries, there are special limited multilateral programmes of intergovernmental co-operation to prevent the degradation of the natural environment on the Rhine and the North Sea.

The scale and effectiveness of Western co-operation in environmental protection are very heavily influenced by the fact that such co-operation is largely geared to the narrow interests of the leading monopoly groups of the participating countries, in consequence of which it has produced serious contradictions both within each of these organisations and in the relations between them. Initially, each Western intergovernmental organisation sought to assume responsibility for organising co-operation on a large range of diverse aspects of ecological problems, but there is now a trend for them to demarcate their competence, and this has led to some specialisation, while simultaneously entrenching the fragmentary approach to the ecological problem.

In the past few years, various aspects of international environmental co-operation on a European scale have loomed

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

increasingly large in the activity of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Even in the early 1950s, the Commission was engaged in framing a number of programmes for combating contamination of water and the use of water resources. Since that period, its chief working organs have begun one by one to devote attention to individual aspects of the environmental problem falling within their orbit.

By now, virtually all the main ``sectoral'' working organs of the Commission are engaged in dealing with the technical and economic aspects of the environmental problem, and nearly 20 working groups and groups of experts specialising on narrow individual topics have been operating under their guidance.

The environmental problem is among the priority lines of the ECE activity (alongside of trade, scientific and technical co-operation and economic prognostication). In the early 1970s, the Commission set up its principal subsidiary body, the Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental Problems. It "exchanges experience and information on environmental problems of common concern,- surveys and assesses the state of the environment in the ECE countries; considers national policies, institutions and legislation and the international implications of environmental policies, with emphasis on socio-economic questions."*

At its second session, which was held at the very height of Stage Two of the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe, the Senior Advisers adopted a short-term programme of work for 1974 and 1975. A report issued by a special conference called to formulate a long-term programme says that important decisions are to be taken on environmental problems on a global and European level which will have a serious impact on any future programme of the Commission's work.

Thus, by the mid-1970s, the ECE had extended the scope

of its activity on environmental problems and had, in addition, switched from the purely sectoral to a more comprehensive approach in studying these problems.

Apart from co-operation within the framework of the ECE the countries of Europe are involved-either on a universal or group basis-in a number of special regional programmes of co-operation on environmental protection which are being put through by various other UN agencies (WHO, UNESCO, ILO, FAO, and others), or on the basis of multilateral intergovernmental agreements (for instance, on the Baltic Sea, on the Danube), regulating individual aspects of protecting major environmental objects in Europe.

Thus, the World Health Organisation, which has engaged for many years in the study of the sanitary and hygienic aspects of environmental pollution, has worked out for Europe a special long-term programme of research for the 1971-1980 period. It is being implemented and co-ordinated by the European Regional Office (EURO) of the WHO in Copenhagen, and includes the study of general problems of environmental hygiene and the combating of pollution (with an eye to the physiopathological, epidemiological and methodological aspects) and also problems in water and air pollution, the processing and elimination of solid waste, and noise and radioactive pollution. The WHO's Regional Office has devoted much attention to training the necessary specialists and helping them improve their skills. It has been putting through its measures in this field in close interaction with national governmental departments for public health or for environmental policy.

Consequently, together with the subregional and other multilateral programmes one could on the whole note definite achievements in the past few years in shaping a fairly ramified system for co-operation among the European countries. Does this mean that this system wholly and entirely meets the tasks now arising from the need for a rational division of labour in tackling intricate complex and chiefly general regional problems in environmental protection and improve-

The Europa Year Book 1976, Vol. I, p. 17.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

ment, protection of nature and its resources in the interests of the present and future generations of Europeans?

We find an unequivocal answer to this question in the fact that the development of European co-operation in this field was a question which commanded the consensus at the very early stages in the preparation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Behind the picture of diverse international programmes for environmental co-operation involving the European countries at the beginning of 1975, a picture which appears fairly impressive at first sight, one will clearly discern some of its weak points and imperfections. For one thing, it is a picture which bears some traces of the cold war period and bloc political structures.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND TASKS OF EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION

Subregional co-operation programmes are undoubtedly a useful, objectively conditioned and necessary level and scale in the division of labour, but it is equally obvious that subregional co-operation can be made very much more effective if duplication and parallel efforts in the activity of various organisations, especially in research into the same aspects of the common problem, are removed. The growing number of ecological problems which are common to the whole region require serious efforts in consolidating European-wide organisational structures that would help in their satisfactory solution.

The improvement of the political situation on the continent of Europe has made it possible to consider the rational restructuring and the raising of the level of every type of co-- operation on a continental basis, including ecological co-operation. This suggests that environmental co-operation, invested with a new content, new goals and scale, could help extend contacts which are so necessary for doing away with the existing divisions among the numerous subregional co-opera-

tion programmes. This applies above all to the possibility of doing away with the apartness in co-operation between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe.

The ongoing detente in Europe has already done much in this sense. In particular, it has had the decisive role to play in the development and deepening of bilateral co-- operation between European countries with different social systems. Thus, the Soviet Union now has a number of special agreements on environmental co-operation and programmes of co-operation within the framework of broader agreements on scientific and technical co-operation with a large number of capitalist countries, among them Finland, France, the United States, Norway, Britain, Sweden, Canada and Belgium.

A striking example of the beneficial effect of the detente is provided by the beginnings of co-operation in preserving the ecological conditions and natural resources of the Baltic Sea. The need for such co-operation had been felt long ago, but until recently it could not be developed, because of the unsettled state of a number of important political problems on the European continent. The first and very important step was the convocation of an international conference at Gdansk in September 1973, at which seven Baltic countries-the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Sweden, Finland, the FRG and Denmarksigned a Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic and the Belts. Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin put a high value on the agreement and noted in his speech at a reception in honour of the Danish Prime Minister in Moscow that this was only the beginning. He added: "All the coastal countries, apparently, also have an interest in solving problems like protection of the marine environment, ensuring the security of navigation, joint research, and many others. All of this would help turn the Baltic Sea area into a zone of lasting peace and broad co-operation among the Baltic countries."*

The second stage in the co-operation of the Baltic countries

• Ptavda, October 16, 1973.

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PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

in environmental protection was the signing in Helsinki on March 22, 1974 of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Baltic, which for the first time in international practice envisages measures to prevent the pollution of marine environment by all the sources of pollution : the drainage by rivers of unpurified industrial and communal effluents, wrecks of sea-going vessels carrying oil and other substances harmful to marine flora and fauna, the dumping in the sea of toxic production waste, and so on.

The Baltic offers an example of the great importance of organising co-operation for the studying and tackling in practice by joint efforts of ecological problems which are of a global or European scale. This is, undoubtedly, a very promising and also necessary line of European co-operation which has still to be duly developed.

In making an assessment of the mechanism and content of interstate environmental co-operation on the European continent in the first half of the 1970s as a whole, one must note the fact that they did not cover various aspects of this key problem, while the level of co-operation achieved on many aspects was clearly inadequate. This applies to aspects of the overall environmental problem which are of vibrant interest, like the arrangement of basic ecological research; monitoring of the state and dynamics of the basic parameters of the environment on the European continent; protection of living nature and establishment of reserves, protected areas and national parks; establishment of international tourist zones; organisation of efficient division of labour in the design and engineering of waste-free or low-waste hardware and technology; comprehensive measures for improving the human habitat and rural areas; measures for the development, rational use and renewal of water, biological, fuel and mineral resources; elaboration and realisation of large-scale international projects for the rational transformation of nature, and so on.

Since the start of the 1970s, as the initiative of the socialist community countries for setting up a security system in Eu-

rope and developing European co-operation has met with ever broader response, the idea of strengthening European co-operation in environmental protection and improvement has also made headway. Apart from everything else, the question of improving the quality and raising the level of European co-operation in this field has been made meaningful by the growing importance of this problem for the perspectives of development of the whole aggregation of relations among the states in Europe.

Indeed, the differences among the European countries in the acuteness of the ecological situation naturally produce a different approach to matters like the balance between economic and administrative measures in environmental policy; the ``toughness'' of standards and rules governing the quality of various components of the environment, and so on. In view of the close connection between each of these questions and social, economic and other interests, it appears to be important for the countries on the continent to reach an understanding on a common strategy, the chief principles for environmental protection and co-operation in this field, consistently to consolidate the international law principles for regulating relations among states arising in connection with some aspects of the use of nature.

At the first stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the GDR and Hungary introduced a draft document on the development of co-operation in the field of the economy, trade, science and technology, and also in environmental protection. The basic propositions of this joint draft of the socialist countries were written into the Final Act of the Conference.

The section of this document bearing on the environment clearly says that the main purposes of co-operation for which the European countries should strive consist in studying environmental problems and their manifestations at various geographical levels on the continent and in promoting the development of the comprehensive scientific approach to these problems; enhancement of the efficiency of national

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

PROTECTING AND IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

and international measures for protecting the environment; and adoption of the necessary measures for approximating the organisational forms of environmental activity.

The document established eight chief objectives of environmental co-operation, adding that the list could be extended. Each objective as a rule provides for the elaboration of several topics (a total of 24). The chief of these are: prevention of air pollution; protection of waters from pollution and the use of fresh water resources (including protection of the water of international rivers and lakes); protection of the marine environment (with special indications to prevent the pollution of the Mediterranean); the use of lands and soils; protection of nature and reserves; improvement of environmental conditions in populated areas; basic reserach, monitoring, prognostication and evaluation of changes in the environment; legal and administrative measures.

To carry on their co-operation the participating countries determined the main organisational forms and methods, including exchanges of scientific and technical information, documents and the results of research; organisation of conferences, meetings of experts and symposia, exchange of scientific workers, specialists and trainees; joint elaboration and implementation of programmes and projects for studying and solving various environmental problems.

The participating countries did not try to "tie in" this programme with any of the existing international organisations or to some single mechanism of co-operation, but established that it would be implemented both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis, including the regional and the subregional, with full use of the existing forms and organisational structures of co-operation.

Apart from the above-listed main provisions of the Final Act bearing on co-operation in environmental protection, it contains some other proposals and points spelling out the objectives, forms and organisational structures of co-- operation. On the whole, this programme for joint action by the European countries, the United States and Canada for envi-

ronmental protection and improvement on the European continent should be regarded as a document of high political significance laying the foundations for all-round and effective action by the states in tackling this vital problem.

In assessing the role of the new stage in the development of European environmental co-operation, one has to note its world-wide significance as well. Indeed, the solution of these problems must also be of interest to countries on other continents, and not only in the sense that the results of joint efforts to solve ecological problems in Europe could also be applied elsewhere. Its significance for the whole of mankind lies in the fact that it should produce scientific notions and practical experience required for tackling ecological problems of a global, world-wide scale.

The formulation of a large-scale interstate programme for co-operation in protecting the biosphere by the CSCE countries is a tremendous achievement for the whole of mankind, a big success for the peace forces on the globe and a major step in materialising the detente, which opens up favourable perspectives for tackling the most acute contemporary ecological problems on a European level.

Having made a fitting contribution to the convocation and successful completion of the historic Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Soviet Union is also in the forefront advocating the earliest transition to the concrete measures in realising the understandings written into the Final Act, including the understandings to develop environmental co-operation. That is the context in which one should consider the proposal put forward by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, when he said that "there would be positive results, for instance, from the holding of European congresses or interstate conferences on matters of co-operation in protecting the environment, and developing transport and energetics".* Let us recall

* Pravda, December 10, 1975.

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that this proposal was reiterated at the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe held in Berlin on June 29-30, 1976.

It is quite safe to assert today that the new Soviet initiative has become one of the meaningful questions of European affairs. Evidence of this comes from its serious discussion by the political circles and the public of many CSCE countries.

On the USSR's initiative this question has been brought up for discussion in the UN Economic Commission for Europe. In the course of the discussion at the ECE session in April 1976, many countries expressed a lively interest in the idea of holding European congresses, and the resolution adopted by the Commission creates a good basis for practical action in realising the idea.

Still, one must also note that in the West some influential forces, while not openly opposing the new Soviet initiative, have tried under various pretexts to delay the transition from the fundamental Helsinki understandings to elaborating and implementing in practice concrete projects for largescale co-operation, including environmental co-operation in Europe.

However, there can be no reasonable ground for the delays and the ``wait-and-see'' attitude in tackling matters which bear on the vital interests of the present and future generations on the European continent. Concerning, in particular, European environmental co-operation, the growing number of ecological problems which are common to many countries on the continent, and the existence of many organisational and various other practical matters of co-operation suggest the earliest convocation, without delay, of a representative European forum, preferably on an intergovernmental level, to discuss concrete measures to raise the co-operation to a higher plane. Thus, such a forum could specify and map out, in the light of the overall programme for environmental co-- operation contained in the Final Act, and with an eye to the most burning ecological problems, the priority lines of co-operation on which the states should concentrate their efforts in the

first place, and make such co-operation an irreversible and constantly deepening process.

The environment problem's new content and global dimension imperatively demands that each state should make a concrete and tangible contribution to the humane cause of preserving the invaluable natural heritage of our unique planet.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PROBLEM OF DEEPENING THE EUROPEAN DETENTE

THE PROBLEM OF DEEPENING THE EUROPEAN DETENTE

to be so profound as in the present epoch. The course of history had reached a point at which irreversible relations of peace and co-operation became possible in Europe, which had for centuries served as a field for dangerous interplay of political forces, so that the cold war could become Europe's last war.

The starting point in the sustained deepening of detente is the successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which formulated a package of measures that in the aggregate determine the development of a fundamental restructuring of the international relations system that had taken shape in Europe in the cold war period. It inaugurated the swing from bilateral efforts in ensuring peace towards multilateral efforts, and the shaping of the pillars of a security system resting on a collective foundation. Since the Conference, the methods for ensuring security in Europe could in the long term become much more diverse and differentiated, something that would bear on a much broader spectrum of European relations and possible situations. A qualitative leap has been made in understanding the substance and ways of ensuring European security. All of this meets the requirements of the materialisation of the detente and the conditions of international political development which have taken shape in the 1970s.

What are the premises that could play a determining role in Europe's subsequent international political development?

The same premises, which determined the shift in international relations in the early 1970s and which were dealt with above (see Chapter One), will evidently variously continue to exert an influence. Filled with new content in various historical conditions, they will, probably, continue to exert the definitive influence on Europe's international political development.

Of course, the balance of forces between the two social systems will be of overriding significance among the longterm factors of world development.

The subsequent change in the balance of forces in favour

20*

TRENDS DETERMINING CONTINUED DETENTE

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inaugurated a new stage in the relaxation of tensions. Its recommendations, which look to the future, constitute a broad and clear-cut platform for action by the states for years, and perhaps decades, to come. In Helsinki, L. I. Brezhnev said: "What has been achieved, however, is not the limit. Today it is the maximum possible, but tomorrow it should become the starting point for a further advance along the lines charted by the Conference."*

If peace in Europe is to become irreversible, the detente should be regarded and implemented as a process requiring constant advance, with ever increasing materialisation. Because materialisation of the detente "is the crux of the matter, the substance of all that should make peace in Europe truly durable and unshakeable".**

This requires an effort to consolidate and multiply the development which had taken clear outline in the first half of the 1970s, as Europe gradually began to move into a new phase of its history. Never before had the swing away from ages of conflict development, interstate rivalries, territorial disputes and sanguinary wars to lasting peace promised

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 581. ** Ibid., p. 580.

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of socialism on the global and European scale, covering a complex of economic, political and other aspects, constitutes the basic factor exerting a positive influence on international relations in Europe and helping materialise the detente. The existence of two different socio-economic systems in Europe is the chief and fundamental basis of the structure of international relations on the continent. National states, both those which belong to various systems and military-political alliances and neutral states, will continue to develop in the future as well. The deepening of the detente will objectively go to create ever more favourable conditions for more vigorous action by the forces of social progress and their development.

An important factor exerting an influence on the European detente is the new balance of interests of the states of Europe, the United States and Canada, achieved at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The attainment of an overall balanced approach is one of the chief conditions for stabilising the detente, while any upsetting of the balance and attempts to secure unilateral advantages are essential elements in slowing it down.

The foreign policy pursued by the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries, their unity and cohesion will continue to be a factor helping deepen the detente. The consistent peace policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aimed at establishing a European security system on the basis of the Helsinki principles and recommendations helps further to fill the process of detente with concrete material content.

Considerable importance also attaches to aspects of military development. The struggle to end the arms race and to secure a military detente now comes to the forefront. The agreements reached in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s on a partial limitation of the arms race marked the first few steps running against the previously uncontrolled process, and these could, evidently, be multiplied. The limitation of the arms race, a trend which has acquired objective

significance, can yield ever more noticeable results helping to consolidate peace.

A substantial influence on the future of the detente is exerted by the relation between the realistic and the negative trends-in terms of the tasks of peaceful coexistence-in the foreign-policy line of the leading Western countries.

The global aspect of international relations in Europe is also an important factor determining the perspective of the European detente. It exerts an influence through the further change in the balance of forces within the system of imperialism, through the nature of the relations between the USSR and the United States, and also through their relations with other countries on various continents. There is a probability of continued change in the balance of forces within the capitalist system, with the increasing formation of centres of imperialist rivalry and co-operation, and with a relatively greater role for the West European centre and differentiation within it. These processes go to complicate relations within the capitalist system, while exerting an influence on the development of the European international political situation, including the state of the detente.

Of course, the trend towards the adaptation to the new conditions in Europe and the world does not rid European capitalism of its inherent and deepening contradictions. The processes of the general crisis, together with crisis phenomena of varying intensity in the different spheres of the national economies, continue to be an invariable trend in the development of West European capitalism.* The growth of the class struggle in the West European countries is bound to continue, with action by various contingents of the working-class movement against the system of state-monopoly capitalism and struggle for the vital rights and interests of the masses. The developing integration of capitalism has gone hand in hand with action by the working people in various

* See N. N. Inozemtsev, "Capitalism in the 1970s: Aggravation of Contradictions", Pravda, August 20, 1974.

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311

and deepening of co-operation in Europe over the development of the opposite trends.

The materialisation of the detente and its investment with concrete content is bound to proceed in acute struggle between the forces promoting and hampering implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and this will be an expression of the struggle between the two social systems, between the different class forces in the world arena. The detente will depend on the degree to which the multilateral consideration of the interests of the European countries, the United States and Canada is maintained, as achieved at the European Conference. The ensuring of mutual interests depends in the first place on the realisation in practical political action of the ten principles of relations between states as formulated in Helsinki.

All these probable premises and conditions will largely determine the course of change in the system of international relations existing in Europe, its orientation and parameters, and opportunities for shaping a new system of European relations.

West European countries against oppression by the monopolies, with social conflicts and further consolidation of the working people's international co-operation. The struggle for peace will continue to be inseparable from the anti-imperialist struggle.

All these processes are bound to have a substantial effect on the policy of the West European countries with respect to the further course of the European detente and their relations with the socialist countries.

Finally, the scientific and technical revolution has had an ever more extensive effect on European international political relations and the detente. The deepening of the international division of labour, the growing requirements in energy resources, the development of communications and means of transport, the need for continental co-ordination of activity in various fields, including environmental protection, and the ever broader perspectives for production co-operation, all of these factors can stimulate the approximation and co-- operation and contain the confrontation. The scientific and technical revolution can, on the whole, exert a positive effect on the development of relations among states on a European basis.

The intricate pattern of interaction among these factors, the growing activity of some and the waning of others at various stages of Europe's forthcoming development will, probably, produce a variegated picture of the succession of periods of upswing and decline of the political detente.

However, an oversimplified assessment of the significance, orientation of action and possible political results of the functioning of the various factors would be wrong. In the concrete situation, the influence of each of these and their influence together could lead to dialectically contradictory results. The resultant of these diverse trends and urges will be complicated and its orientation, variable, depending on a great number of concrete data.

But ultimately one should, probably, most of all reckon with the growing prevalence of the trends towards detente

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF WEST EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF DETENTE PERSPECTIVES

The positive changes in international relations and the success of the European detente have invigorated prognostication thinking in the West. At numerous scientific centres, researchers have got down to studying the prospects facing Europe, above all the capitalist countries, in the light of the perspectives of the East-West detente.

The growth of this activity became evident in the second half of the 1960s, when the course of European development brought forward security problems, and also after the social-

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1st countries put forward their concrete proposals on matters of detente in Europe in their well-known Bucharest Declaration.

Most bourgeois researchers in the West strove to study the possible alternatives for the socialist countries' conception and to suggest perspectives for Europe's future that could benefit the capitalist system. Realising that the attractive power of the detente policy pursued by the socialist countries lay in its objective character and its conformity with the meaningful requirements of the epoch, many bourgeois specialists tried for a long time to prove that this conception had a "secret meaning" which was allegedly capable of harming Western security. The authors of many published studies failed to rise to an understanding of European tasks and frequently confined themselves to considering "little Europe", taking the view that European security mainly meant security for the Western, that is, the capitalist part of the continent.

On the other hand, present-day bourgeois conceptions of Europe's future reflect the growing differentiation of political thinking on the lines of coalescing either with the forces of progress or reaction, or running an intermediate course. These trends are quite clearly established: the extreme conservative, with its emphasis on the military aspects of security only; the non-military solution of European detente problems; more intensive integration of Western Europe as the only way to security; a European approach to security, etc.

Making use of diverse methods, Western futurologists have produced single and multialternative prognostications and models for the development of international relations in Europe. Together with long-term forecasts, they have begun to devote attention to medium-term forecasts until 1980 or 1985, to meet the immediate practical requirements of various government establishments in the West European countries. An analysis of the conceptions set out in these forecasts shows that the scientific centres are directly geared to the tasks of the practical policies pursued by the ruling circles of their countries. This is evidence above all of the class ap-

proach taken by the various bourgeois authors to present-day European international problems and ways of solving them.

Without setting the task of analysing in detail all the lines of bourgeois prognostication on European security, let us briefly consider the most characteristic conceptions in the form in which they have taken shape in the leading Western countries.

Forecasts for the Europe of the 1970s and prospects for detente were first outlined by the Paris Foreign-Policy Studies Centre, which at the end of 1967 published the results of its analysis under the title "European Security Models".* These were followed by West German, British, American, Italian and other models, and the number of such publications has been steadily growing. Works have appeared with a critical analysis of the Western models.""*

The difference in methods and approaches is the main difficulty in any comparative analysis of prognostications on Europe. The first obvious distinction lies in the concept of Europe, which some confine to the framework of Western Europe or even to the EEC countries, while others include the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Consequently, from the standpoint of re-

* "Modeles de securite europeenne" (Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere, Paris), Politique etrangere. No. 6, 1967, pp. 519-41.

** Let us note three publications by Soviet researchers into this question: V. Razmerov, "Western Models for the Europe of the 1970s", International Affairs, No. 6, 1969; I. Koloskov, "European Security: Realities and Illusions", World Economics and International Relations, No. 10, 1969; A. Kokeyev, "West European Models of European Security", World Economics and International Relations, No. 6, 1972. Two analyses of Western models have been published in the GDR: one by S. Schwarz, "Stanley-Report-USA-Modell zum Problem der europaischen Sicherheit", Dokumentation der Zeit, No. 11, 1971, pp. 16-19; and the other by the Polish specialist A. D. Rotfeld, "Westliche Modelle fiir die Entwicklung Europas in den 70-er Jahren", Dokumentation der Zeit, No. 9, 1971, pp. 23-28. In the West there is an article by the French scientist P. Hassner, "duels avenirs pour quelles Europes? Contradiction, confrontation, convergence ou combinaison des methodes d`approche''. Revue Irancaise de science politique. No. 3, 1972, pp. 582-99.

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gional problems. Western prognostications can be classified as European and West European studies.

Most Western prognostications can also be divided into static or dynamic, depending on whether they deal with situations or processes.

Finally, another point of difference is the means proposed for attaining the desired goals. Some prefer the idea of regional disarmament, others integration or disintegration, and still others propose the institutionalisation of European co-operation through the establishment of a special body for discussing and solving European problems.

For all the diversity of Western prognostications of Europe's development, they all have very definite purposes, which are to analyse the capitalist class interests in the new situation of incipient detente and to map out ways for realising these; to help shape public opinion on Europe's future development; and finally, to help government circles in planning their European policy.

In contrast to most subsequent prognostications of this kind, the French models produced by the Foreign-Policy Studies Center (J. Vernant, project co-ordinator) do not offer alternatives, but a kind of three-stage plan of action for solving European problems and arranging European co-- operation. The names of three French models-Detente-- EntenteCo-operation-repeat de Gaulle's well-known foreign-policy triptych. Their content also shows their close connection with the foreign-policy line of the Fifth Republic under President de Gaulle.

Another feature of the French models,, which makes them different from the British or West German projects, is their European character, although the concrete measures they recommend are connected mainly with Central Europe. These models proclaim the need for detente and all-European cooperation. The French researchers flatly rejected the possibility of any changes in the territorial status quo in Europe and also took a sceptical view of the idea of "Germany's reunification", which they believed to be unrealistic.

Among the practical measures recommended in the French models is the proposal to establish contacts between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and exchange declarations on the non-use of force. Another proposal is the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe and the institution of a standing conference of the representatives of the two blocs to monitor fulfilment of undertaken commitments. The Cooperation Model envisages an "institutionalisation of relations set up within the framework of the earlier model and establishment of a new political system in Europe"."" This new system, the French specialists suggest, would be characterised by the complete disappearance of the two military blocs and the formation of a so-called Central European Union whose territory would be declared a nuclear-free zone, from which all foreign troops (that is, the troops of the United States, Britain, France and the USSR) would be withdrawn. The great powers would "undertake guarantees for ensuring security in Central Europe''.

On the whole, these French models contained a number of positive elements, but the class limitations of their authors prevented them from taking a truly objective view of many problems in line with the interests of Europe. This applies above all to the problem of the so-called political status quo. The French researchers called on the socialist countries "to abandon the demands ... for recognition of the status quo".** While urging the "elimination of the division of Europe into the two opposing military blocs" and arrangement of European co-operation, the authors of the French models advocated a "social synthesis" and ``convergence'' of the two opposite systems under detente, thus aiming directly to undermine the socialist community.

The fact that these models ignore the GDR, a key political reality in the postwar world, is a concrete example of their subjectivism. Within a few years, Western theoreticians and

* Politique ettangere. No. 6, 1967, p. 535. ** Ibid., p. 534.

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politicians were forced to give up their illusions about nonrecognition of the GDR.

In 1972, the Paris Foreign-Policy Studies Centre published a new prognostication project, based on the earlier models, but taking account of the situation which had taken shape in Europe in the early 1970s.* The authors of this study analyse three aspects-political, economic and military-of probable development of international relations in Europe.

Once again it is not just Western Europe, but the whole of the European continent that is the object of study. The political section of the prognostication, written by J. Vernant, envisages an approximation of socialist and capitalist Europe: "One can assume that the tendency for the rapprochement of the two parts of Europe, which has been in evidence over the past few years, will be reinforced in the coming decade."** He believes that this would be promoted by factors like the change in Soviet-American relations, the normalisation of relations between the GDR and the FRG, the admission of the two German states into the United Nations, and, finally, the objective need for the countries of Western and Eastern Europe to develop economic, scientific and technical co-- operation. Vernant said that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would have a big part to play in overcoming the division of Europe into opposed blocs. He added that the Conference could be an important step in " reconstituting a Europe open upon itself''.

Vernant emphasised that "the normalisation of the relations between the two German states would not mean an end to the four-power responsibility concerning Germany".*** This continued responsibility of the four victorious powers would be expressed in the presence of their military contingents in Berlin, and also of a "minimum of armed forces"

on either side of the inter-German border. He added: " Consequently, the nucleus of a politico-juridical-military system set up in the postwar period [in Central Europe.-P.C/z.] will exist in the coming decade as well."*

The economic section of the prognostication, written by M. Levi, implies considerable invigoration of economic cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe, characterised by a substitution of more modern and developed forms of co-operation, allowing mutual exchanges of equipment, technology, etc., for traditional trade.

Some French researchers regard European economic cooperation above all as a convenient opportunity for weakening the socialist system while helping the West settle its economic difficulties. A typical example of this kind of approach is offered by the work published in 1973 by Philippe Barret and Andre Farhi, entitled "Elements for European Scenarios". They analyse the detente solely from the standpoint of Western Europe's integration, and for that reason believe the " opening to the East" to be no more than a "very favourable factor". They are not concerned with European problems.*"'

Their study reveals an urge to discover in the European detente opportunities for exerting an influence on the socialist community so as to weaken it. They say: "The East-West rapprochement will strengthen the centrifugal tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe."*** They frankly advise Western politicians on how to use the political and especially the economic rapprochement with the socialist countries of Europe to encourage and revive nationalistic and revisionist trends in them. They do not deem it necessary to conceal the fact that the strategic goal of their line would be to try to pull over the individual socialist countries into the sphere of the economic and then of the political influence of imperialism.

* J. Vernant, M. Levi, J. Klein, "I/Europe 1972-1980", Politiqua etrangere, No. 4, 1972, pp. 443-78.

** J. Vernant, "I/Europe 1972-1980. Donnees et perspectives politiques", Politique etrangere. No. 4, 1972, pp. 451-52. *** Ibid., p. 453.

* ibid., pp. 453.

** See Philippe Barret, Andre Farhi, "Elements pour des 'scenarios europeens'", Prospectives, No. 1, June 1973, p. 35. *** Ibid., p. 33.

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They add: "The economic exchanges with the West will increasingly become for the East European countries a means of limiting their dependence on the USSR even at the price of establishing a new dependence on the West."*

We find that the recipes proposed by Barret and Farhi in their model do not in any sense meet the task of establishing an atmosphere of trust, peace and co-operation in Europe, and are, in fact, aimed to maintain the division of the European continent and to spread mutual mistrust.

A convergence project for the future Europe was produced by Pierre Hassner and Jacqueline Portier of the National Fund for the Political Sciences of the Centre for the Study of International Relations. At an annual conference of the directors and representatives of the European institutes of international relations held in Varna in October 1972, they presented a report entitled "Europe in the 1970s". They proposed four alternatives for a European structure by the end of the 1970s. The first provides for the maintenance in Europe of "total military, ideological, economic, social and political bipolarity (the authors mean the predominant influence of the United States and the USSR on the continent.-?. Ch.}"'.** They call this the "Europe of monolithic blocs", which they believe to be obsolete and extremely undesirable. According to their second model, which they believe to be unfeasible over the next decade, there is to be a total elimination of the opposed military blocs and establishment in their place of a "Europe of states" based on a collective security system/^^1^^''"""" The third alternative proposes the dissolution of the military blocs with the maintenance of "bipolarity in most of the other areas", above all, the ideological and political.**** The authors believe that this perspective has some, though insignificant, chances

of being realised. Finally, the fourth model provides for the elimination of Europe's bipolar structure, the overcoming of the ideological, economic and other barriers, the free circulation of capital, ideas and people in the presence of the military alliances whose defence functions are to be substantially relaxed. The authors believe this to be the most desirable and feasible model.

With the extension and deepening of the detente on the European continent, bourgeois ideologists and politicians attach growing importance to the tactics of "peaceful interference" in the life of the peoples of the socialist community in the hope of doing in the new historical conditions what they had failed to do in the cold war period, namely, elimination of the socialist gains in the East European countries. Evidence of this growing attention to ``peaceful'' means for undermining the socialist community on the part of Western politicians came from the acute and protracted discussion at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of the "exchange of ideas, people and information''.

In this context the fourth model presented by Hassner and Portier is typical for the relevant bourgeois studies.

While most French international affairs specialists regard the political and economic aspects of the detente in Europe as encouraging and fully attainable, they give a very restrained assessment of the possibilities of military detente. Jean Klein, specialist in military matters at the Paris Foreign-Policy Studies Centre, says that "it is highly improbable that in the next decade it will be possible to set up a regional security system capable of offering a substitute for the existing alliances".*

The key aspect of his conception is an erroneous interpretation of the meaning and significance of the swing in SovietAmerican relations from confrontation to detente, and especially of the significance of the strategic arms limitation talks

* Philipp Barret, Andre Farhi, op cit., p. 33. ** See Pierre Hassner, Jacqueline Portier, L'Europe des annees 70 (Conference annuelle des instituts europeens de relations Internationales, Varna, Bulgaria), October 4-5, 1972, p. 33.

*** Ibid., p. 34. **** Ibid.

* JT. Klein, ``L'Europe 1972-1980. Donnees et perspectives militaires", Politique etiangere. No. 4, 1972, p. 478.

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between the USSR and the United States for the other countries, above all those on the continent of Europe. He says: "Although the security of Europe does not now appear to be actually menaced, the stabilisation of the Soviet-American strategic equilibrium could have a destabilising effect in Europe, where there is fear of the consequences of a withdrawal of the US troops and of SALT-type arrangements.""' The author takes a sharply negative view of the talks on arms and troop cuts in Central Europe, which, he believes, are under the control and influence of the United States and the USSR, and are in fact connected with SALT.** On the whole, he says, "despite the normalisation of relations between the European states and the development of co-operation between the two parts of Europe, the system of existing alliances will continue to be a guarantee of security on the continent".***

The well-known French military theoretician General Beaufre has also produced a negative prognostication of the perspectives for setting up a security system in Europe. He believes that the decisive factor in Europe's development over the next decade will be Soviet-American relations, their development or freezing. That is why he proposes two alternatives for the future development of Europe. The first, which he believes to be the most probable, is based on the hypothesis of "a continuation of the Soviet-American rapprochement"."""'"^^1^^"* If Europe is ``calm'', and the United States and the USSR are in good relations with each other, a system of security may be "established, probably conjugating action by NATO and by the Warsaw Pact. But such a situation will be highly unfavourable for the constitution of a federal Europe.''

With the other alternative, that is, with a negative development of relations between the USSR and the United States, there would be a "deeper division of Europe", which for its part would signify a resumption of the cold war.* It is true that Beaufre regards this alternative as being less probable than the previous one. Let us note that he clearly prefers the establishment of a closed West European grouping to the construction of a European system of security and co-- operation.

To complete the survey of French conceptions of Europe's future, let us note that they are a reflection of the various approaches to be found in the Fifth Republic, all of which can be reduced to two basic conceptions, namely, those of a ``big'' and a ``little'' Europe. The advocates of the first conception (and their stand is expressed in the projects of the Foreign-Policy Studies Centre and the Centre for the Study of International Relations) believe that it is objectively necessary to arrange European co-operation with a parallel development and deepening of West European integration; the advocates of a ``little'' Europe (and their standpoint is clearly reflected in the prognostications produced by General Beaufre, Barret and Farhi) prefer co-operation within the framework of Western Europe alone, and as a rule want a supranational Western Europe, which ran counter to the official line of the Gaullist leadership of the Fifth Republic.

Soon after the publication of the first few French models of a future Europe, West German specialists at the German Foreign-Policy Society in Bonn produced their own prognostications, whch differed substantially from the first and most of the subsequent French models.

A comparative analysis of the French and West German models shows that their distinctions were largely determined by the different approaches of France and the FRG to many international problems. France is known to have constantly favoured recognition of the final character of the postwar

* J. Klein, op. cit., p. 473. ** Ibid., p. 477-78. *** Ibid., pp. 475-76.

**** General Beaufre, "Perspectives strategiques des annees 1970", Strategic, No. 23, July^September 1970, pp. 8, 21.

* Ibid., pp. 13-14.

21---1787

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frontiers in Europe, notably, the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the FRG Government had actively opposed until the early 1970s. The FRG's Christian Democratic leadership, up until its removal from office in 1969, took a cool attitude to the convocation of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe, while France was one of the first Western countries to support the idea and actively helped prepare it.

The divergence of French and West German interests was also evident in Western Europe, notably, in the European Economic Community, where things frequently developed into open clashes between French and West German diplomacy (for instance, over the ultimate goals of West European integration, on the formulation of a common agricultural policy, enlargement of the community, etc.).

The real and frequently serious contradictions between France and the FRG were necessarily reflected in the international political prognostications produced by these countries' national research centres.

The West German models published by the German Foreign-Policy Society in 1968 consisted of a list of alternatives (six independent alternatives for Europe's development)."" In contrast to most French specialists, the West German authors did not regard the problem of European detente and the establishment of a security system as Europe's key task, for they did not believe that this problem should serve as a starting point for the solution of political problems on the continent.

Of the six alternatives for a future Europe, the West German prognosticators preferred two: "Europe of regional groupings" and "European nucleus". In accordance with the first, regional groupings should be taking shape on the European continent in the course of the 1970s, including an AngloScandinavian, West European, East European (GDR and Poland) and South European, with co-operation arranged among them. The importance of NATO and the Warsaw Trea-

ty is to be reduced. Accordingly, the influence of the United States and the USSR on European affairs is also to decline. The positions of the West European countries in NATO are to be strengthened.

A comparison of this alternative with the "European nucleus" model helps clarify the Foreign-Policy Society's stand. The second alternative envisages the EEC's all-round development, as West European integration comes to embrace the foreign policy and defence of the EEC countries. The countries outside the community co-operate with it actively and in diverse forms. The military blocs lose their importance, but US and Soviet troops remain in Europe in reduced numbers.

A key consequence of the realisation of the "European nucleus" model, its authors believe, could be the establishment of a ``European'' federation or confederation, which would help turn Western Europe into an equal partner of the United States and the USSR.

A consideration of the two models ``preferred'' by the Bonn specialists shows their close connection with the policy conducted by the FRG leadership at the time. Priority of West European problems over European problems, enlargement of the Common Market, the urge to unify the foreign policy and defence of the EEC countries with the subsequent establishment of a "supranational Europe", and partnership with the United States, all these propositions contained in the "European nucleus" model were being actively put through by the "grand coalition" government, in which the CDU had the leading role to play. At the same time, the idea of a gradual arrangement of contacts with the GDR, undoubtedly, reflected the views of the SPD, which initiated the "new Ostpolitik''.

The evolution in the FRG's domestic and foreign policy, which was to be observed with the installation in office in 1969 of the SPD-FDP coalition, was reflected in the subsequent West German prognostications, among them one by the well-known West German politologist Gerda Zellentin, enti-

* "Alternativen fur Europa. Modelle moglicher Entwicklungen in den siebziger Jahren", Eutopa-Axchiv, No. 23, 1968, pp. 851-52.

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tied Europe 1985. Social and Political Evolution in Europe* In contrast to earlier West German models, this dealt above all with European problems. The author asserted that over the coming 15 years "armed conflicts on the continent are excluded to the same extent as any fundamental changes in the political systems of the East and the West".** She believed that the European Conference, resulting in the establishment of a "truly effective" organ for security and co-operation, should have a big part to play in converting Europe into an area of peace and co-operation. The European Conference itself was to become a standing forum, a "new type of organisation including all the regional and subregional institutions existing in Europe".*""""

Zellentin attaches much importance to the development of economic co-operation between the two parts of Europe. She says: "Growing exchanges between large states with different structures make the European system stable with respect to any violent conflicts."**** Her approach to European problems, which is positive in some instances, has not prevented her from taking a conservative and anti-socialist attitude on a number of major problems, which is clearly evident when she seeks to prognosticate the so-called internal evolution of the European socialist countries. She is captive to bourgeois-idealistic conceptions and shows a lack of understanding of the objective regularities underlying the development of the socialist community, and so expresses artificial and untenable conceptions concerning some "internal weakening" of the socialist community.

Her study devotes much attention to West European problems. Considering the possible line of development of the integration process in Western Europe, Zellentin assumed a geographical enlargement of the EEC and a strengthening of

its institutions.* She did not rule out the possible establishment in Western Europe of a united nuclear force, believing at the same time that this would in any case remain under US control. She asserted: "A nuclear conception for the European countries, which would be their very own, appears to be ruled out."**

On the whole, West German international political prognostications are characterised by a growing interest in European problems and heightened attention to the so-called German question, the perspectives for relations between the FRG and the GDR, including the possibility of some kind of political and ideological unhinging of the socialist system in the GDR, possibilities for doing which, some ideologists of West German foreign policy believe, should be extended in the perspective of European co-operation.

The conceptions produced by most British analysts are similar in orientation to the West German ones, and this is expressed above all in British prognostications of the perspectives of Western Europe's evolution.

One book put out in 1969 by the London Institute for Strategic Studies under the editorship of its then director A. Buchan says that no European security system can be established at all. "We have constructed our models around the countries of Western Europe, and only then have we examined the effect of each model on Western Europe's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the developing world."^:;'^:;"^::"

* Zellentin envisages three stages in the EEC's forthcoming development; 1975-1980-establishment of a Central European Bank and a European Centre for Economic and Political Decisions; 1980-1985-- completion of the shaping of the European economic and monetary union and the establishment of an organ to co-ordinate foreign and defence policy; post-1985-European elections and the establishment of a European government. ** G. Zellentin, op. cit, p. 145.

*** Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices. Models of Western Europe in the 1970s. A. Buchan (Ed.), London, 1969, p. 16.

* G. Zellentin, Europa 1985. Gesellschaftliche und politische Entwicklungen in Gesamteuropa, Bonn, 1972. ** Ibid., p. 12. *** Ibid., p. 164. •*** Ibid., p. 30.

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The names of the various alternatives revealed the substance of British prognostications. The first model is called Evolutionary Europe and suggests that the West European countries seek independence and complete sovereignty. But their interests do not coincide and are largely contradictory. The model is based on the assumption that as the military threat facing the West European countries declines and the Soviet-American strategic equilibrium is maintained, the West European countries can prefer nationalism to solidarity, and this would, naturally, rule out any " unification of Europe" into a federation or confederation. Relations between Western and Eastern Europe would present a more variegated picture than they do today, because the West European countries would not be pursuing a common line with respect to the East European countries.

The second model is called Atlanticised Europe, and it could be realised with a worsening of Soviet-American relations and of the whole situation in the world. The natural way to ensure security for the West European countries in that kind of situation would be for them to draw closer to the United States, and this would result in a considerable increase in US influence in Western Europe and NATO. Western Europe would have to abandon the idea of establishing national nuclear forces. Relations with the USSR and the European socialist countries would be hostile.

The third model, entitled Europe des Etats, could be realised in the absence of any dangerous political crises in EastWest relations and the elimination of the military threats. The West European countries' desire to be free of the US economic and technological sway in Western Europe could give impulse to the realisation of this model. Simultaneously, closer co-operation between Western Europe and the USSR would have to be arranged. Under this model NATO would remain, but some of its present functions would be dropped. National nuclear forces would develop in Western Europe.

The fourth model, Fragmented Europe, envisages the disappearance of NATO, the West European countries' repudiation

of a close alliance with the United States, and their development of national nuclear forces. In the economic sphere, these countries would also emphasise their sovereignty.

The Partnership Europe, the fifth model, is based on the need for the West European countries to engage in close cooperation with the United States on an equal footing. To become a fitting partner for the United States and to play a more considerable role in world affairs. Western Europe would have to become an independent, powerful and wellknit community, a peculiar United States of Europe, with one government and one parliament. Such a Western Europe, an equal partner of the United States, would have its own nuclear weapons, and could develop co-operation with the USSR and other socialist countries on an "equitable basis" as well, that is, from a position of roughly equal strength. In the event of any growth of contradictions in Western Europe, this model could well become the model of a " disintegrated Europe". They also prognosticate resistance on the part of the USA and the USSR to the establishment of a Partnership Europe.

The sixth model is called Independent Federal Europe and is "most artificial". Its basic ideas are Western Europe's urge to be completely independent of the United States and the USSR, and to have its own nuclear force, to develop the integration process up to the point where a European federation is established with its own President, Council of Ministers and a bicameral parliament.

The main condition for the realisation of this model could be a strong growth of anti-Americanism in Western Europe accompanied by mounting apprehension of a "Soviet threat". The establishment of close relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which the British experts believe to be highly improbable, would considerably increase the chances for realising the idea of Independent Federal Europe.

Of these six models the British authors prefer the Partnership Europe, which they believe to be the most feasible, for it happily combines two goals for which the West European

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countries should strive: the establishment of a "strong and united Europe" (through the enlargement of the EEC and the establishment of a "supranational Europe" with a federal government and parliament) and development of close cooperation with the United States. Characteristically, this model makes no provision for the possibility of co-operation between the Partnership Europe and the Soviet Union. Onesided orientation upon the West and complete ignoring of European problems are among the distinctive features of this "favourite model" of the London Institute for Strategic Studies.

Another British author, Neville Brown, takes a similar approach to European problems.* Like many other authors he confines European security to "security for Western Europe''.

The author believes that "nuclear deterrence" is the crucial factor for maintaining security in the world and in Europe, a situation which could not change in the future. He is sure that in military terms the ``bipolar'' structure will be maintained for a long time. The starting point for Brown's assessment of Europe's perspectives is the idea of maintaining the status quo. He sees no real possibilities for establishing a European security and co-operation system, and ignores the important changes that have been taking place on the continent of Europe. In contrast to Brown, who does not anticipate the elimination of the ``bipolar'' structure of international relations in Europe, another British analyst, Roger Morgan, predicts substantial changes in the structure. This author predicts an inevitable decline of US and Soviet influence in Europe, where, he claims, there will be a consolidation both of Western and Eastern Europe in political, military and economic terms.**

He claims that this will be promoted, first, by the involvement of the United States and the USSR in tackling their growing internal problems, and second, by the growth of new centres of power in the world arena (China and Japan). One immediate result of the reduced attention on the part of the United States and the USSR to European problems could be the growing independence of Western Europe, which it could successfully use in further developing the integration process that would gradually embrace the sphere of foreign and defence policy. In the EEC the centripetal tendencies would ultimately gain the upper hand over the centrifugal, while supranational motives would prevail over the national, which are likely to be less sharp in the later than in the early 1970s, as interdependence becomes more marked among the countries of the community.*

The author believes that Western Europe will launch upon a policy of developing co-operation with the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which will be effected chiefly by the EEC and the CMEA. As a result, Morgan reaches the conclusion that while the fundamental differences between the two parts of Europe will be gradually obliterated in the process of detente, they will not disappear altogether in any sense. Morgan's conceptions, all the clearly unacceptable propositions apart (the idea of the "two superpowers", the reading of "cultural exchanges" between East and West, etc.), are a definite stride forward in British studies of the European security problem. On the whole, the British conceptions of European security considered above reveal the same limitation of the problem to the framework of Western Europe, which we find in many other Western prognostications.

British analysts, following in the wake of London's official policy, have tried for their part to provide its theoretical justification. Thus, Britain's intention to throw in its lot with Western Europe by joining the EEC was substantiated in detail in British prognostications produced long before its official admission to the Common Market. » Ibid., p. 10.

* Neville Brown, European Security 1972-1980. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1972.

** See Roger Morgan, Inter-European Relations in the 1970s. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Conference annuelle des instituts europeens de relations internationales, Varna (Bulgaria), October 4-5, 1972, p. 15.

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British prognostications contain a great many arguments in favour of deepening the integration process in Western Europe, which should lead to the establishment of a " supranational Europe", back up the idea of Western Europe's cooperation with the United States, the need to set up a united nuclear force on the basis of the British-French atomic potential, etc. All of this is variously expressed in the foreignpolicy line conducted by British ruling circles.

West relations, the German question, the problem of reducing the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, etc.

Its conclusion was that under the detente, signs of which appeared in the second half of the 1960s, on the one hand, and the growing contradictions between the United States and Western Europe, on the other, "there was.. . a major need for the United States to reexamine its policy towards Europe, both Eastern and Western, and to consider afresh Europe's place in our global strategy".*

The report contained a number of constructive elements, among them the attempt to define the common interests of the East and the West in the changing situation. It urged the need to develop trade ties and pointed to the difficulties in this field arising from US policy: the high tariffs on goods imported from the socialist countries, withholding of credits from businessmen wishing to trade with the East, etc. "The Panel considers passage of the East-West Trade Bill and repeal of all inconsistent legislation a matter of major priority."**

Among the measures proposed by the Panel to enliven the East-West trade contacts was that the UN Economic Commission for Europe should be turned into an agency for the development of European trade ties.

Some aspects of the prognostication offer examples of miscalculation by capitalist analysts. Thus, one of the chief ideas of the report, to the effect that "Europe will be divided more sharply in the next five years than in the last five",*"^^01^^" has proved to be untenable. The developments, which have taken place on the European continent over the five years after the publication of the report, are so extensive and varied that •there is hardly any need to argue the failure of this forecast. The reason for the miscalculation lay in the clear underestimation of the major changes which had been taking place

US PROGNOSTICATIONS

Up until the early 1970s, official US policy mostly took a circumspect and cautious attitude to the problem of European security as a whole. This was due to Washington's deep involvement in the war in Indochina. Besides, Us ruling circles saw more minuses than pluses for their interests in any discussion or solution of European problems (a weakening of NATO and of US influence within the bloc and in Western Europe in general, strengthening of the socialist countries' positions in Europe, etc.).

The Republican victory at the 1968 elections and the installation of the Nixon Administration led to some review of the foreign-policy line.* The change of priorities in US foreign policy was expressed in the fact that European problems and relations with the USSR came to the forefront.

The incipient trend was reflected in a report published in February 1969.** Among those who took part in writing the report were prominent scientists, politicians and wellknown businessmen, including Henry Kissinger, Theodore C. Sorensen, Thomas K. Finletter, James S. McDonnel, John J. McCloy and Thomas C. Schelling. The report considered a broad range of questions, including various aspects of East-

* See The Nixon Doctrine, Moscow, 1972 (in Russian). ** Toward the Reconciliation of Europe. New Approaches for the US, the UN, and NATO. A Report of a National Policy Panel Established by the United Nations Association ot the USA, New York, 1969.

* Ibid., p. 9.

** Ibid., p. 26.

*** Ibid., p. 32.

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in the system of international relations and of the objective factors underlying the detente in Europe.

One of the basic ideas of the report was the need to build up NATO and its military organisation, with emphasis on the maintenance of US troops in Europe and increases in military spending and armed forces by NATO's West European members. One way for involving the USA's allies more broadly in NATO, the authors of the report believe, lay in enhancing the role of the ``Eurogroup''.

All these propositions clearly revealed apprehension of NATO's weakening as the situation in Europe was normalised, and fear that the West European powers could prefer their ``own'' European interests to those of "Atlantic solidarity''.

Considering the problem of the "division of Germany", which the US experts believed to be the key issue in European security, they wrote: "In return for Western acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier of Germany, the East would accept the division of Germany as provisional."*

The course of history has given an evaluation to these forecasts. Today, following the conclusion of the four-power agreement on West Berlin in September 1971, the signing of the treaty on the principles of relations between the GDR and the FRG in December 1972, and the admission of the two German states to UN membership at the 28th UN General Assembly on September 18, 1973, together with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, such ideas appear archaic. But it took years of intense efforts to refute such untenable ideas, overcoming step by step resistance on the part of Western reactionary circles to recognition of the results of the Second World War, and to secure recognition for the GDR in international law.

The report gave an impetus to research in the United States

into the European security problem. There was a contradictory response among US political writers to the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries for holding a conference on security and co-operation in Europe, which aroused extensive interest all over the world. One book published in 1970 by the former Assistant Secretary of Defence* provides clear evidence of the restraint and mistrust among US ruling circles with respect to the idea of European detente, notably a conference on security and co-operation in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The author admitted that considerable progress had been reached in solving the European security problem, but warned against "excessive optimism", adding that if the West was too hasty in accepting the outward expressions of detente this would undermine its strength and solidarity, which were a necessary condition for arranging co-operation with the socialist countries of Europe. He also insisted that the United States and the West as a whole should not allow the detente in Europe to be directed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and the initiative should be taken in this matter to channel the detente to meet Western interests.

Stanley put forward a number of proposals which, he believed, the NATO countries should advocate, including the need to make the start of the negotiations with the socialist countries directly contingent on a co-ordination of the Western countries' position, and on efforts to overcome their differences, as this would help them secure massive concessions from the East.

Stanley put forward the plan for a four-stage reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces in Europe. It was to affect only the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, leaving the air forces and nuclear weapons at the existing levels. In this context, he suggested that the USSR

Toward the Reconciliation of Europe----p. 30.

* T. Stanley, A Conference on European Security? Problems, Prospects and Pitfalls, Washington, 1970.

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allegedly hoped to see a unilateral reduction of NATO's troops without any concessions on its own part. That was yet another idea which, like many others, was exploded by life itself. The fact of the Vienna negotiations, in which the Warsaw Treaty countries have put forward a clear-cut programme for troop and arms cuts in Central Europe based on the principle of equality and non-infliction of harm to anyone's security shows such claims to be groundless.

At the same time, Stanley advocated all-round development of trade, cultural, scientific and technical contacts between the East and the West. He felt that the economic boycott of the socialist countries and hopes of restoring capitalist regimes in them through intervention or internal counter-revolution were unwarranted and futile.

But while being forced to recognise the realities, Stanley called for a fight against socialism, but with the use of more subtle and refined methods. He believed that US strategic aims with respect to Europe could be attained not by isolating the socialist countries, but, on the contrary, by developing all-round contacts with them. He proposed that a direct connection should be established between the development of East-West economic co-operation and the extension of exchanges of ideas, people and information. He saw no reason to conceal the true meaning of such ``cultural'' exchanges, amounting to an effort ideologically to unhinge the socialist system in the socialist countries of Europe. Stanley declared that a conference on security and co-operation in Europe could exert indirect pressure on the East for "widening the chinks in its doors''.

However, US theoreticians put the problems of the Atlantic alliance and West European integration at the top of their list of security priorities. This is clearly seen, for instance, in the work of the well-known international relations specialist Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,* in which he mainly analyses the

possible influence of Nixon's foreign-policy doctrine on the European detente.

One of his basic ideas is that the emergence and strengthening of new power centres in the international arena will be useful for the United States, because these could be aimed against the USSR. An integrated Western Europe, he believes, could become one such centre. He gives a detailed analysis of the possible consequences of the European detente for the development of West European integration and suggests the need for accelerating military integration in Western Europe. He writes: "Western Europe must undertake a phased development of capabilities under European control commensurate with whatever arrangement emerges from the thickening web of East-West security negotiations.""" Like Stanley, he is sure that any possible reduction in NATO's military potential in Europe should not in any way lead to a ``qualitative'' weakening of the bloc. He recommends an urgent modernisation of the NATO armed forces, their buildup with mobile units equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and their deployment along the Eastern borders. While plugging the idea of Western Europe's military integration, he keeps suggesting that such integration should be Atlantic. He proposes, in particular, that the use of British and French nuclear forces should be in the hands of NATO's nuclear planning committee, which could frame a strategic doctrine providing for every case involving the use of nuclear forces under national control.

Pfaltzgraff's ideas amount to a conception of an "armed peace" which has little in common with the establishment of a system of European security and co-operation, about which, incidentally, he says nothing at all. His views are, undoubtedly, a reflection of the attitudes of some US circles which fear European co-operation and a weakening of US positions in Western Europe.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance, the problem of relations

* R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "NATO and European Security: Prospects for the 1970s", Orbis, Philadelphia, No. 1, 1971, pp. 154-77.

* Orbis, No. 1, 1971, p. 177.

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between the United States and Western Europe has a place apart in US foreign-policy studies, and is a reflection of the primary importance attached in US ruling circles to building up the US-led NATO bloc, which is regarded as the chief guarantor of security in Europe.

Henry Kissinger was one of the leading US international relations theorists working on the problem of Atlantic relations. He was among the first to reappraise the Western views on the role and activity of the NATO bloc from the standpoint of global and European security. He consistently advocated the idea that in the realities of the 1960s, NATO's future crucially depended on the ability of US leaders to take account of the economic and political changes that had taken place in the other bloc countries. The United States, he believed, had to abandon its role of ``trustee'' and accept equitable co-operation among all NATO countries. "If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of policy everywhere, including Europe, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be too great. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe [Western.-P. Ch.] a blessing rather than an irritant."*

Kissinger was highly concerned that NATO, based exclusively on the idea of a "Soviet menace", could subsequently, as tensions continued to relax and that fundamental idea turned out to be untenable, be deprived of the very rationale of its existence. Back in 1965 he warned: "Defence against a military threat will soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them. The need, in short, is to go from alliance to community."**

We find this theorist of US foreign policy concerned over the possibility of NATO's weakening in the political arena

in the process of detente. He is equally worried about the probable decline of US influence in Western Europe. Hence his search for compromises acceptable for the United States and its West European allies and capable of giving NATO a fresh impetus.

The meaning of Kissinger's proposals for normalising relations between the United States and Western Europe and modernising NATO is that by allowing the West European countries to solve their common problems (above all, the problem of ways and forms of developing integration) their participation in NATO activity at every level could be markedly extended.

Kissinger proposed a return to de Gaulle's well-known idea, which he expressed in September 1958, about setting up an Atlantic triumvirate (USA, Britain and France) for working out NATO policy. Kissinger wrote: "The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic."*

Kissinger's conception, undoubtedly, contained some considerable concessions to the West European allies. On the other hand, while giving them a greater say in NATO affairs, the United States would not relax its control over NATO activity. The point was to make this control more exact and less ``offensive'' for the junior partners. But while proposing various ways for improving NATO and converting the `` alliance'' into a ``community'', etc., Kissinger was quite sure that NATO had to be maintained even under the detente. He believed that the best way to ensure security in Europe was to build up NATO.

* Kissinger saw this political organ as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council consisting of five permanent members (USA, Britain, France, FRG and Italy) and one non-permanent member representing the small countries. The Executive was to formulate the common goals of Atlantic policy and determine the framework for independent action by each bloc member where their interests diverged. The Executive would exercise political guidance of the bloc and also formulate its strategic doctrine Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 245).

22-1787

* Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, New York-- LondonToronto, 1965, pp. 232-33. ** Ibid., p. 10.

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The US theoretical conceptions of European security considered above reveal recognition of the changed relations and the arrangement of forces in the world and in Europe, and this, their authors believe, urges the need for a reappraisal, in the light of the existing realities, of US foreign policy, including its European security aspects. While looking to US global interests, US politologists are forced to reckon in every way with the various world factors and trends in formulating their European prognostications.

Characteristically, most international political prognostications regard armed force as the main instrument for ensuring security. While accepting the need for European co-operation, some US theoreticians recommend that West European politicians should step up military integration, and that some of them should set up in Western Europe autonomous strategic auclear forces closely co-ordinated with the US nuclear force. But the primary problem is that of consolidating NATO, co-ordinating Western positions in talks with the East and the "forces parity" as the chief factor of security. Various proposals put forward by US theoreticians concerning Europe have been adopted by US diplomacy, like the idea of a "New Atlantic Charter" which was officially proclaimed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in April 1973. All of this shows very well that US scientific prognostications on European security problems have a profound class character, and express the urge to have a system of international relations on the old continent in a form that would best meet the longterm interests of US imperialism.

The European security models considered above show that in the West there is a diversity of views concerning the future of Europe from the standpoint of stabilising peaceful relations. But a comparative analysis shows that they also have a number of common features on the key problems. There are at least three such key features: recognition of the immutability of the existing political European structure until the end of the 1970s; identification of West European integration as the crucial factor guaranteeing security; identi-

fication of the factor of force, above all, armed force, as the main condition for ensuring security in Western Europe and regulating any possible international political changes. There is almost complete unanimity in prognostications on the further development of integration in Western Europe, its greater participation in solving various international problems and changes in relations between Western Europe and the United States. All of this is a reflection of the intricate processes connected with the conversion of Western Europe into a new imperialist power centre, with the formation and self-assertion of this centre. The trend towards a co-- ordination of foreign policy by the West European countries, which are members of the EEC, in evidence over the past few years has been necessarily reflected in the international political prognostications elaborated in Western Europe's research centres.

For understandable reasons, Western prognosticators do not proclaim their class or their party affiliation, but their class approach to contemporary international problems and ways of solving them is glaring. It is expressed, above all, in the direct connection between Western prognostications and the foreign-policy line conducted by their countries' ruling circles. This was evident with the models produced by the Paris Foreign-Policy Studies Centre, whose very names reiterated de Gaulle's well-known formulas; the models produced by the German Foreign-Policy Society structured under the direct influence of the foreign policy of the "grand coalition"; the studies carried out by A. Buchan, reflecting the attitude of the then government of Britain, etc.

Now and again we find the reverse, when the prognosticators are engaged, overtly or covertly, in polemicising with the official government lines. In that case the authors, as a rule, express the views of the other wing of the ruling class which disagrees with the policy pursued by the government and wants its own alternative accepted. This is exemplified by the French specialists Beaufre, Barret, Farhi and others, who contradicted the official line of the Fifth Republic's lead-

22*

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ership not only on the need and possibility of European cooperation, but also on West European integration, whose aim, according to Beaufre, should be the formation of a `` federation'' and not of a confederation, as the Gaullist leadership of the Fifth Republic had constantly insisted.

A characteristic feature of bourgeois prognostications is their underestimation of the role of the social factor in influencing the political life of the future Europe. Meanwhile, the postwar history of international relations shows very well that the domestic political and social climate in the capitalist countries exerts an influence on their foreign policy.

More prognostications are bound to appear in the West as the situation on the European continent improves under the direct influence of the socialist countries' constructive foreign policy. Their study is of undoubted interest, because it helps to make a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the Western countries' attitude to the European security problem.

ing of the materialisation of the detente through the implementation of the security principles worked out in Helsinki, which consolidate Europe's peaceful status.

The irreversibility of the detente is directly dependent on the extent to which the understandings reached in Helsinki are filled out with concrete material content. This is a longterm task whose solution could cover a whole historical period.

The shaping of the new European relations system is a long process in which individual structural elements are accumulated as they take shape on the basis of broader mutual interests of the European countries in the process of detente. The structural elements of the security system cover relations in the sphere of politics, economics, diverse forms of co-operation in various fields, etc., and also in the field of military relations. At the various stages of this process the accumulation and combination of these elements are bound to be complicated and contradictory, with this or that set of them alternating with each other.

The European security system can take shape as a growing network of mutual ties, interests and guarantees among states in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, with these ties gradually including an ever greater number of diverse structural elements of their relations. Consequently, in contrast to the past, when the security of states or alliances in Europe was determined primarily and mainly on the basis of the armed force factor and contained within itself an explicit element of confrontation and contest, an understanding of the security system of the future should, apparently, be based on recognition of the multiplicity of its constituent elements and on its continental character.

In the long-term perspective, the changes of the 1970s may be regarded as the initial stage in the development towards an ever more fundamental transformation of the existing European international political structure. The European Conference has worked out an extensive political basis for this process. The Final Act of the Conference emphasised the need to "exert efforts to make detente both a continuing

CONCERNING THE FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT REALITIES

The European detente policy formulated by the socialist countries is essentially oriented not only upon the present, but also upon the future. It contains a broad perspective both in the scope of the problems it covers and in time. In Helsinki L. I. Brezhnev said: "This is, at the same time, an insight into the future in terms of the realities of today and the ageold experience of the European nations."*

The socialist countries' long-term goal is to shape a sound peaceful structure in Europe, and to set up a European security system. Attainment of this goal calls for a steady deepen-

L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 578.

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and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope"/^^1^^'

The subsequent course of Europe's international political development after the European Conference, depending on all the factors characterised above, can, of course, run along different lines: a further deepening of the detente through common efforts by all the states involved and a gradual formation of an ever more developed and effective security system, or a stabilisation of the detente, or growth of influence of the forces wishing to stop the detente, to reverse its development, up to the point of resuming the cold war. All three trends will probably continue to interact in the future. But the main tendencies which have now appeared and the leading premises indicate that the first of these alternatives, that is, a deepening and materialisation of the detente, should objectively prevail.

Progress in materialising the detente could lead to a deepening of political trust among states resting on the observance of the principles of security and on co-operation. All of this becomes an important factor of stability, helps eliminate the political and psychological aftermath of the cold war and enhances the soundness and scope of mutual ties, which are especially necessary in view of the fact that the bloc structure has been completely preserved.

The continued relaxation of general tension will largely depend on military detente. The damping down of the cold war cannot but reduce the support on which the military components of the bloc structure rest. At the final stage of the process, premises could arise for a fundamental transformation of the structure of European relations, for consolidating the new security system and somewhat relaxing the military functions of the opposed blocs.

But all the above naturally suggests that at each of the possible stages in the establishment of a European security system impulses of varying force will inevitably occur in a

direction opposite to the detente, and that will slow down or divert the formation of a new system of relations in Europe.

In the long-term plane, these are above all the turns towards a further growth of armed force and militarisation of relations in Europe. These are imperialist doctrines which hold that European peace can be secured only through `` deterrence'' and an "equilibrium of fear". These are the processes of military integration in Western Europe.

Throughout the whole period of development and deepening of the scientific and technical revolution, the militarypolitical circles of the most developed capitalist states displayed a characteristic urge to use the advantages yielded by the main achievements in military technology to promote the global policy and strategy of imperialism both at the current historical stage and in the long term.

One should, apparently, expect that in the near future these two lines will continue to develop in the West: further improvement of armed force and its limitation. The former is connected with the realisation of military programmes, short-term and long-term, with an adaptation of the structure of the armed forces to the changing conditions. The latter trend covers a complex of measures for military detente.

Both trends will, apparently, be reflected in the methods used by the capitalist states and NATO as a whole to ensure European security. As the detente gains in depth, the latter could, through the force of circumstances, be gradually strengthened.

It is quite possible that with the transition to multilateral forms of detente and co-operation the simple view characteristic of the cold war period, with resolute emphasis on the threat of armed force and the "equilibrium of fear", could gradually give way to more diverse and differentiated approaches.

The deepening of the detente could clearly bring out the contradiction between the tasks set by the imperialist circles for armed ``deterrence'' and its real potentialities; between

Pravda. August 2, 1975.

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the political aims of extending co-operation and the consequences of exclusive reliance on force, which tends to stimulate confrontation in the first place.

The atmosphere of detente increasingly reveals that the Atlantic doctrine of constantly maintaining an "equilibrium of fear" under the scientific and technical revolution is an extremely dangerous and simultaneously dynamic phenomenon, which by its very substance ceaselessly stimulates competition in the manufacture of new instruments of warfare. Reliance on a constant improvement of armed force does not meet the contemporary requirements of peace and the cause of maintaining and reliably ensuring international security. Attempts by the most aggressive imperialist forces to use the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution to secure military superiority over socialism so as to resort to threats and political pressure on the socialist countries are latent with tremendous danger for Europe in view of the current revolution in military science.

In the long term, a growth of reactionary trends in the policy of the capitalist countries under the impact of a further aggravation of diverse crisis phenomena within the capitalist system, and also in response to any possible "shifts to the left" in the pattern of class forces in the capitalist countries could slow down the process of the fundamental restructuring of international relations in Europe. How much realism the Western powers will have in their foreign policies will largely depend on the extent to which their assessments of the socialist countries' policy and intentions correspond to the objective reality. Depending on this, the foreign-policy lines of the Western governments could be modified in the formulation of the European detente policy.

One should reckon with the possibility of deliberate deformations and creation of false ``models'', chiefly for internal political reasons. The more acute the crisis situations in the capitalist world, the more probable the appearance of such deliberately distorted models. In such conditions, the growing influence of the military-

industrial complexes on the formulation of foreign-policy decisions, especially on the key problems of war and peace, could seriously retard the growth of realistic trends. In this context, special importance will attach to measures for containing the arms race and for achieving disarmament in Europe.

When considering these and similar possibilities, and taking account of the fact that no kind of scheme can encompass the whole diversity of life, we have in mind that even the most general trends of this kind can never exist in a "pure form". There is bound to be interaction and intricate interpenetration of the most diverse elements constituting these trends. Under the impact of what has been described above there could be temporary swings one way or another, up to a point. However, the highroad runs towards the establishment of a stable security system.

It is quite obvious that now and in the future relations between states belonging to the two social systems within the framework of the European security line will continue to be clearly expressed class relations. This means that in the process of detente the differences which spring from the social system and the fundamentals of economic life, politics and ideology will exist as an expression of the basic contradiction of the epoch.

In the closing quarter of the twentieth century the main trends in international political development are creating a situation in which the need for a further consolidation of European security is prevailing over confrontation and the cold war. In present-day interstate relations the only policy that dovetails with the dictates of the times is one that helps to achieve rapprochement on the basis of common interests in the relations between states with different systems and, at the same time, blocks everything that may lead to military rivalry and conflicts.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this is that the question of the security of all the European states must be resolved not by furthering the arms race and confrontation between

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION

THE PROBLEM OF DEEPENING THE EUROPEAN DETENTE

347

military blocs on the basis of reciprocal intimidation but by consolidating and steadily expanding the detente, by restructuring the entire system of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

As the proof of detente, disarmament is the best and highest form of safeguarding international security. Leonid Brezhnev has said: "Our initiatives have only one aim, that of achieving security by curbing the arms race and through disarmament."* This is the most effective way of ensuring European security. No other way can provide dependable safeguards.

Founded initially and mainly on intimidation, on an equilibrium of military strength, which may be regarded only as the initial and simplified way of ensuring peace, European security can gradually evolve towards increasingly more effective and dependable foundations of peaceful coexistence. In the long term the factor of force may gradually and increasingly give way to the imperatives of co-operation on the basis of universal political principles of security worked out by the UN, enlarged upon at Helsinki, and reaffirmed by experience. Combined with disarmament measures, this process can lead to the creation of a more effective general system of security.

The arms race on the ``action-counteraction'' pattern can evidently be limited by agreements, which may eventually move military strength in European politics to the background. The progress achieved in the 1960s and the 1970s on the road to military detente may be regarded as the initial phase of a long and difficult process of gradually limiting military capabilities, of giving military strength a different dimention in European politics. The European mentality has to abandon the philosophy of strength, evolved in the course of many centuries of class society politics, in favour of a philosophy of peace as the inevitable form of political relations. Difficulties do not make this development a Utopia if it is considered in the broad perspective. The consistent policy of peace pursued by

the socialist countries, the elements of realism in Western foreign policy, the peaceful trends in the policies of the nonaligned countries, the powerful combined influence of the democratic forces, and the continuing period of peace, which new generations will come to regard as a normal state, are all constant values that may determine this restructuring in Europe.

Of course, radical changes cannot be expected in European relations within a short span of time. The most important thing is the peace-oriented trend so vital for Europe.

By recognising an approximate equilibrium of strength, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO nations can achieve a general reduction in the level of armaments. Renunciation of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the limitation and termination of the nuclear arms race, and other measures of this kind can eventually limit the political and military role of nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe.

Although the diversity of life cannot be fitted into patterns, and actual life frequently upsets forecasts, there nonetheless are grouns for optimistic assessments of the future.

* Pravda, May 30, 1977.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The changes, which took place in the international situation in the first half of the 1970s, are among the processes of social development which are capable of determining the destiny of mankind for a long time. In historical terms, the start of the new stage in international political development was marked by the emergence from a profound crisis, known as the cold war, the overcoming of many seemingly insuperable barriers and the taking of major strides towards peace and co-operation among states and nations which were totally divided by these barriers in the past. Above all, of course, everything that has been achieved signifies advance away from the brink of the nuclear disaster.

A highly important result of this development is, apparently, the virtually world-wide awareness of the need for detente, and the growing conviction that in everything that pertains to war and peace there is ultimately only one acceptable policy, viz. peaceful coexistence.

Historical experience teaches a great deal. It should never be underestimated, let alone forgotten. Now and again, even the lessons of distant periods become meaningful. From the present historical vantage point removed from the two greatest crises of our time-the Second World War and the height of the cold war-one can see with especial clarity how futile

and dangerous are the attempts by international reaction to reverse the law-governed class, social processes in the world. Deep-going social changes continue on the globe. The balance of forces has been changing in favour of peace.

These key trends in the recent period have been working a change in the face of the world. It is under their impact that the capitalist countries found themselves faced with the need increasingly to recognise that peaceful coexistence is inescapable. The architects of the cold war failed to attain a single one of their goals, and none of their forecasts was justified. Historical experience has not borne out their strategy aimed at ``containing'' and "rolling back" socialism.

It is this historical experience that has to be reckoned with most profoundly and comprehensively by our contemporaries and made the basis of policy for the future. The only alternative for mankind is relations of peace and co-operation, detente and disarmament. There is no other way.

All of this most resolutely applies to Europe, a continent where the whole course of history has produced a web of unusually dense power lines of diverse interests, influences and contradictions, whose threads closely link this continent with the rest of the world. Today, as over the past centuries, anything that happens in Europe has an influence on the situation in the other parts of the globe and, conversely, events everywhere outside Europe are reflected in European

affairs.

Everything we have said in this book serves to emphasise the contemporary importance of the problem of establishing lasting peace in Europe and to characterise the significance of the efforts being made in this area by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We wished to stress this clear-cut, simple, but very profound idea: there is no alternative to peace in Europe.

In his speech at the Conference on Security and Co-- operation in Europe, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev declared: "The soil of Europe was drenched with blood in the years of the two world wars. The

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

top political and state leaders of 33 European states, the USA and Canada have assembled in Helsinki to contribute by joint effort to making Europe a continent which would experience no more military calamities. The right to peace must be secured for all the peoples of Europe. We stand, of course, for securing that right for all the other peoples of our planet as well."*

The Soviet Union regards the contemporary problems of European security not only as a necessary political summingup of the results of the Second World War. It also regards them as comprehension of the future in the context of the realities of the present day and of the European nations' centuries of experience.

The broad international significance of the detente in Europe lies in the fact that it paves in concrete terms the way for reshaping the system of interstate relations, a way which is fit not only for Europe, but also for other parts of the world, indeed, for a radical restructuring of the world system of such relations. Consequently, it has a very important role to play as a peculiar school, a laboratory of international relations.

The development of the detente after the Conference is bound to face difficulties. The greatest obstacles and difficulties are engendered by the NATO countries' continued arms drive and the buildup of their military potential. The policy of reactionary imperialist circles aimed to maintain political tensions in Europe, retard co-operation and give the ongoing integration processes in Western Europe and anti-socialist orientation continues to be latent with potential dangers.

However, the conclusions which may be drawn from the historical experience of contemporary international relations and the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe indicate that there is no alternative to the detente, that the European dialogue has tvery prospect for being continued and invigorated, and that it is highly important

and necessary radically to restructure international relations in Europe and elsewhere on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence among the socialist and the capitalist countries.

The real processes in contemporary international life, above all, the pattern and dynamic of the changes in the balance of class forces, show that the necessary potentialities are there for making fresh advances in the struggle to strengthen the international detente and make it irreversible.

In the extraordinarily complex developments of our time it is important to see and take account of cardinal long-term trends. One of them is that the detente and disarmament have become vital to all European nations. Another is the steady devaluation of military-aggressive methods of politics. The struggle against militarism has become a key task in Europe. Still another trend shows that for Europe peaceful coexistence has become the sole acceptable principle of interstate relations, a principle that must become increasingly universal.

There is a need for a long-term strategy of peace based on areas of concurrence of the interests and policies of all or most countries. It must counter the strategy of the forces of aggression and war. Efforts must be made to continue developing the common elements that draw peoples together instead of disuniting them, that help to deepen detente instead of freezing the cold war at a somewhat lower level. Efforts must be made to secure a more consistent and fuller realisation of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which is to be regarded as an integral and indivisible complex and, at the same time, as the most up-to-date model of international security, whose implementation must be the objective of all nations.

A common desire of European public opinion is to see Europe a continent of peace. Peace founded on confrontation and reciprocal intimidation is hardly consistent with that image of Europe. Such a future would spell out poor prospects for the continent. A policy alleging that peace and security can only be ensured by a mutual threat of destruction is in

* L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, p. 578.

CONCLUSION-

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conflict with the vital interests of the European nations. This policy can only perpetuate Europe's division and stimulate an endless arms race, the growth of military spending, and the preservation of political tension; it harbours a colossal danger of conflicts.

European public opinion is coming round to the conviction that new prospects must be found for ensuring European peace based not on fear but on confidence, not on growing stockpiles of armaments but on political and military detente. European security is indivisible. It cannot be reliably safeguarded by setting one part of the continent off against the other. In the age of the scientific and technological revolution the best alternative to blocs is a system of collective European security.

The formation of a new structure of European relations is a long process, a process occupying an entire epoch marked by a struggle between forces advocating and opposing progress of detente. But as a product of the cold war confrontation will most probably diminish gradually under the impact of the objective need for peaceful coexistence, of a realistic policy, and strong pressure from public opinion. At the same time, security based on collective efforts, on detente, may gradually grow into the predominant system of European relations! Europe has entered a period demanding further changes and further initiatives.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

March 29-

The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the

April 8

Soviet Union was held in Moscow. The Report of the

CPSU Central Committee to the Congress outlined, in particular, the following foreign policy objectives "To initiate talks on European security; discuss the proposals of socialist and other European countries for a relaxation of military tension and a reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous relations between all European countries; convene an appropriate international conference for this purpose.''

March 30

The French Government officially notified the USA of

its decision to withdraw its troops from NATO's military organisation by July 1, 1966, and also demanded that US headquarters should be withdrawn and some US army and air force bases transferred from France by April 1, 1967.

April 21

A Soviet Government Statement in support of the

GDR's request for admission to the United Nations was published.

April 21-23 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in Italy at the invitation of the Italian Government. During the visit an agreement on economic, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries was signed.

May 4

A protocol on Fiat's participation in building up an

industrial complex of enterprises for the manufacture of passenger cars in the Soviet Union was signed in Turin, Italy.

June 20-July 1 The President of the French Republic, Charles de Gaulle, was on an official visit in the USSR at the in-

23---1787

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vitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government.

July 4-6

A conference of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consul-

tative Committee was held in Bucharest. It adopted a Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe and a Statement in connection with the US aggression in Vietnam.

July 5

Canada restored its diplomatic, commercial and cul-

tural relations with Bulgaria, which had been.broken off in 1945.

July 16-19

Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britain was on

a visit in Moscow.

July 28-30

French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville

was on an official visit in the Hungarian People's Republic.

October 10-15 A Bulgarian government delegation led by Chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers Todor Zhivkov visited France.

October 28

A protocol on the Franco-Soviet economic agreement

was signed in Paris.

November 9-13 Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin was in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

November

A conference of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty

14-17

countries' armed forces was held in Budapest.

November

A government delegation of Finland, led by Prime

15-19

Minister Paasio, was in the Soviet Union on an official

visit at the invitation of the USSR Government.

December 1-9 A USSR government delegation, led by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, was in France on an official visit.

December 20-27 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin was in Turkey on an official visit at the invitation of the Government of the Turkish Republic.

January 29

The Soviet Government issued a statement on the situa-

tion in the FRG, on the activity of neo-fascist and militaristic forces in the FRG.

January 31

Diplomatic relations were established between Ruma-

nia and the FRG.

February 4

An agreement on economic co-operation between Ru-

mania and France was signed in Paris.

February 6-13 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin was in Britain on an official visit at the invitation of the government.

February 9 The Soviet Government published its Note to the Government of the FRG in connection with the revival of nazism and militarism in the FRG.

February 24 An agreement between the governments of the USSR and Great Britain on ties in the fields of science, education and culture for 1967-1969 was signed in London.

March 14-21 The Federal Chancellor of Austria Dr. Josef Klaus was in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

April 6-10

A Polish government delegation was in Rome on an

official visit.

April 20-27

Talks between USSR Minister for Foreign Trade

N. S. Patolichev and Britain's President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay were held in London. A Communique was signed.

April 24-26 A conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties on Security in Europe was held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. It adopted a Statement, "For Peace and Security in Europe", and other documents.

May 12-16

Italy's Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani was in the

Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

June 16 and Talks were held in Paris between the President of

July 1

France de Gaulle and Chairman of the USSR Council

of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, who stopped over in the French capital.

July 3-8

Prime Minister of France Georges Pompidou and

Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville were in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

July 11-12

A conference of the leaders of the communist and

workers' parties and heads of government of the socialist countries was held in Budapest.

July 19-26

Talks were held in Paris between France's Minister

of the Economy and Finance Michel Debre and USSR Minister for Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev.

83*

1967 January 10-14

The first session of the Soviet-French Commission for Scientific, Technical and Economic Co-operation was held in Moscow.

The first session of the Soviet-French Standing Mixed Commission was held in Paris to consider scientific, technical and economic co-operation and trade ties. The Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain signed a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

January 26-31

January 27

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July 20

A Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce was opened

in Paris.

August 3

A trade and payments agreement was signed in

Prague between the governments of Czechoslovakia and the FRG.

August 3-7

Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the FRG

Willy Brandt was in Rumania on an official visit. An agreement on technico-economic co-operation between Rumania and the FRG was signed.

September 5 A Bulgarian-Danish Communique on the stay in Bulgaria of the Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag was published in Sofia. Agreements on economic, industrial and technical co-operation and on abolition of visas were signed.

September 6-12 President of France General Charles de Gaulle was in Poland on an official visit.

September 18 Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Willi Stoph sent the FRG Chancellor Kiesinger a letter proposing talks between the governments of the two German states for the purpose of normalising relations between them.

November 26- Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson was in

December 1 Moscow on an official visit

December 8 The Soviet Government made a statement to the FRG Government in connection with the stepped up activity of militaristic and neo-nazi forces in West Germany. Statements on this matter were also made to the governments of the United States, Britain and France.

December 9 As a result of negotiations, a protocol on trade between the Soviet Union and Norway for the 1968-1970 period was signed in Moscow.

January 22-24 Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britain was in

Moscow on an official visit. January 30 Yugoslavia and the FRG announced resumption of

diplomatic relations.

March 25-30 Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic Jeno Fock was in France on an

official visit. March 27

An agreement between the USSR and the Republic of

Cyprus on mutual goods deliveries from 1968 to 1972

was signed in Nicosia. April 9-10

A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was

held in Moscow. It adopted a resolution "On Current

Problems in the International Situation and the CPSU's Struggle for the Unity of the World Communist Movement''.

April 9-11

A conference of progressive, anti-imperialist forces of

the Mediterranean area was held in Rome.

May 14-18

President Charles de Gaulle of France was on an of-

ficial visit in Rumania.

May 20-25

President of the Austrian Republic Franz Jonas was

on an official visit in the USSR.

June 10-13

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish

People's Republic Jozef Cyrankiewicz was on an official visit in Denmark.

June 12

The UN General Assembly passed a resolution approv-

ing the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

July 1

The signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons began in Moscow, Washington and London.

July 11-13

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Ko-

sygin was on an official visit in Sweden.

July 17

A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was

held in Moscow. It adopted a resolution "On the Results of the Meeting in Warsaw of Delegations of the Socialist Countries' Communist and Workers' Parties''.

October 30-31 A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was held in Moscow. It adopted a resolution "On the Foreign-Policy Activity of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee''.

November 1 A protocol on mutual goods deliveries for 1969 was signed by the USSR and Finland in Helsinki.

December

A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was

12-13

held in Moscow. Its resolution, "On the USSR's Inter-

national Policy and the CPSU's Struggle for the Unity of the Communist Movement", said: "Attaching much importance to the strengthening of European security, the plenary meeting deems it an important task to struggle to implement the principles set out in the documents of the Warsaw and Bucharest meetings of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and heads of government of the Warsaw Treaty Countries.''

February 17-22 Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

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March 17

A conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political

Consultative Committee was held in Budapest. It adopted an Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty States to All European Countries.

May 5

The Government of Finland sent the Soviet Govern-

ment an aide-memoire concerning the convocation of a conference on European security matters, expressing its readiness to act as organiser of the conference.

May 26

An agreement on trade and economic co-operation

from 1970 to 1974 was signed in Moscow by the USSR and France.

May 27-31

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian

People's Republic Jeno Fock was on an official visit in Austria.

June 11

The Soviet Government published its aide-memoire to

the Government of Finland, saying that Finland's proposal to start preparation of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe through consultations with the governments concerned and to hold multilateral meetings at a definite stage had the Soviet Union's support.

June 21-24 The World Peace Assembly was held in Berlin. It was attended by representatives of 101 countries and 50 international bodies.

August 26

A trade and payments agreement for the 1971-1975

period was signed in Helsinki by the USSR and Finland.

October 9-13 French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann was on an official visit in the USSR.

October 24 A trade agreement was signed at Copenhagen between the USSR and Denmark for the 1970-1975 period.

October 30-31 A conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Foreign Ministers was held in Prague. It adopted a Statement noting the favourable response on the part of most European states to the initiative for holding a European conference.

November 17- Meetings of the delegations of the USSR and the UnitDecember 22 ed States were held in Helsinki for a preliminary discussion of matters relating to the containment of the strategic arms race.

November 24 The USSR and the United States ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

December 23 The US House of Representatives and the Senate passed a bill relaxing control over US exports to the

USSR and other socialist countries with effect until June 30, 1971.

January 30- February 18

In Moscow a Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, and a delegation of the FRG, led by the Secretary of State Egon Bahr, held an exchange of views on matters relating to the intention of the parties to conclude an agreement repudiating the use of force between the FRG and the USSR. The delegations continued their exchange of views from March 3 to 21, and from May 12 to 22. Agreements on deliveries of Soviet natural gas to the FRG and on deliveries of large-diameter pipes to the USSR were signed in Essen.

An agreement was signed in Washington between the USSR and the United States on exchanges in science, technology, education, culture and other fields for 1970 and 1971.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force.

For the first time in the history of the two German states a meeting was held at Erfurt, GDR, between the heads of government of these states: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR Willi Stoph and Federal Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt. They held a second meeting at Kassel (FRG) on May 21, 1970.

An exchange of views was started in West Berlin between representatives of the four powers-USSR, United States, Britain and France-pertaining to West Berlin. It was attended by the USSR Ambassador in the GDR, and the ambassadors of the United States, Britain and France in the FRG, who are simultaneously representatives of the military administration of the three powers in West Berlin.

Strategic arms limitation talks were held in Vienna between delegations of the USSR and the United States. USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in France.

Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was on an official visit in France.

Prime Minister of Sweden Olof Palme was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

February 1 February 10

March 5 March 19

March 26

April 16- August 14 June 1-5

June 15-19 June 16-19

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June 21-22

Julys July 17-20

A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Foreign Ministers in Budapest adopted a memorandum concerning the convocation of a European conference. A long-term agreement was signed in Stockholm on trade between the USSR and Sweden from 1971 to 1975. President Urho Kekkonen of Finland was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. On July 20, in the course of the visit, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries signed in Moscow a protocol once again extending the term of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-- operation and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and Finland of April 6, 1948 (for 20 years). Talks were held in Moscow between the USSR and the FRG, which were conducted on behalf of their governments by the USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and the FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. As a result of their talks, the text of a treaty between the USSR and the FRG was drafted, and initialled on August 7.

A long-term trade and payments agreement was signed in Vienna between the USSR and Austria for the 1971- 1975 period.

FRG Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt was on an official visit in Moscow.

The USSR and the FRG signed a treaty in Moscow. A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee was held in Moscow. It noted that the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was an important step towards detente and expressed the firm intention to take active measures for realising in the immediate future the proposal to convene a European conference which had been winning ever broader support.

Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was on an official visit in Austria.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov was on an official visit in Norway, Iceland and Denmark. President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito paid an official visit to Belgium and Luxemburg.

President Georges Pompidou of France was on an official visit in the Soviet" Union. A Soviet-French Protocol and a Declaration were signed on October 13.

October 20-23 President Tito of Yugoslavia was on an official visit in the Netherlands.

October 26-29 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in Britain.

October 30

A meeting was held in Frankfort on the Main between

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel.

November 2- In Helsinki delegations of the USSR and the United

December 18 States continued their strategic arms limitation talks.

November 3-14 Negotiations between delegations of Poland and the FRG, headed by their Foreign Ministers Stefan Jedrychowski and Walter Scheel, were held in Warsaw on the conclusion of a treaty on the foundations for normalising relations between the two countries.

November

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an of-

10-16

ficial visit in Italy.

November 24 The Government of Finland sent an aide-memoire to the governments of 35 countries proposing preliminary multilateral consultations in Helsinki on the preparation of a European conference.

November

Prime Minister of France Jacques Chaban-Delmas was

26-28

on an official visit in Poland.

December 2 A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee was held in Berlin.

December 6-8 Federal Chancellor of the FRG Brandt was on an official visit in Warsaw. A Treaty on the Foundations for Normalising Relations Between the PPR and the FRG was signed on December 7.

January 25-30 Austrian Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschlager was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

February 11 The signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was signed in Moscow, Washington and London.

March 30-

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the So-

April 9

viet Union was held in Moscow. The CPSU Central

Committee's Report to the Congress and its decisions mapped out the historic Peace Programme, in which Europe has an important place.

March 31-

The first round of negotiations between representa-

April 1

lives of the foreign ministries of Czechoslovakia and the

FRG was held in Prague on the settlement of relations

July 27- August 7

August 5

August 11-13

August 12 August 20

September 21-25

September 21-30

October 6-11 October 6-13

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April 19-23

May 4-7 May 17-28 June 2-9 June 18 June 23

June 29- July3 July 5-12

July 14 September 3

between the two countries. Three other rounds of talks were held in the course of the year. Prime Minister of Finland Ahti Karjalainen was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. A Treaty on the Development of Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation Between the USSR and Finland was signed on April 20.

French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

A long-term trade agreement was signed in Oslo between the USSR and Norway for the 1971-1975 period. The Soviet Government issued a statement on the convocation of a conference of the nuclear powers. Chairman of the State Council of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was on an official visit in Finland. Italy's Foreign Minister Aldo Moro was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

document, "Principles of Co-operation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France", and a Soviet-French Declaration were signed on October 30. During the visit an Agreement on the Development of Economic, Technical and Industrial Co-operation Between the Governments of the USSR and France was also signed on October 27.

October 21- President Tito of Yugoslavia was on an official visit

November 8 in the United States (October 27-November 2), in Canada (November 2-7) and in Britain (November 7-8).

November 2 A protocol on mutual goods deliveries was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Finland for 1972. A protocol on mutual goods deliveries was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Iceland for the 1972- 1975 period.

November 22-23 A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee heard and discussed a report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev "On the International Activity of the CPSU Central Committee since the 24th Congress of the Party''.

November 25-30 FRG Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

November 30- A meeting was held in Warsaw by the Warsaw Treaty

December 1 countries' Foreign Ministers to consider the question of preparation for a European conference.

December 2-5 An official visit was paid to Denmark by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin.

December 5-7 Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin was on an official visit in Norway.

December 9-10 A NATO Council session was held in Brussels. It approved Finland's proposal to hold multilateral consultations in Helsinki for preparing a European conference, but with a number of reservations.

December 16 The UN General Assembly passed a resolution approving the USSR's proposal on convening a World Disarmament Conference.

The UN General Assembly approved a draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

December 17 An agreement was signed in Bonn between the governments of the GDR and the FRG on the transit of civilians and freight between the FRG and West Berlin. For the first time in the practice of relations be-

A treaty on trade and a trade and payments agreement between the USSR and the Benelux countries (for the 1971-1974 period) and other documents were signed in Brussels.

A four-power agreement between the governments of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France on matters relating to West Berlin was signed in West Berlin.

A meeting was held near Oreanda, Crimea, between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and the Federal Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt.

Two agreements were signed in Washington between the Soviet Union and the United States: Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Warfare Between the USSR and the United States, and Agreement on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link Between the USSR and the United States. Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin was on an official visit in Canada. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev was on an official visit in France. A

September 16-18

September 30

October 17-26 October 25-30

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December 20

tween the two German states, the document was framed in international law.

Agreements were signed in Berlin between the Government of the GDR and the West Berlin Senate on the Visits and Travel of Permanent Residents of West Berlin to the GDR, and also on an exchange of territories to solve the problem of enclaves.

munique contained a special section considering the perspectives for favourable developments on the European continent towards a relaxation of tension. The USSR and the United States expressed a readiness to make a contribution to developing genuine detente and relations of peaceful co-operation. Unanimity with respect to the holding of multilateral consultations for preparation of a European conference was noted.

May 26

A transport treaty was signed in Berlin between the

GDR and the FRG, the first state treaty between these two countries. It entered into force on October 17.

May 30-31

A NATO Council session was held in Bonn. Earlier

reservations and conditions put forward with respect to a European conference were formally withdrawn.

May 31-June 1 President Richard Nixon of the United States was on an official visit in Poland.

June 2-5

An Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for

European Security and Co-operation was held in Brussels. It was attended by nearly 700 representatives from 27 countries of the continent.

June 3

The final protocol of the four-power agreement of

September 3, 1971 on matters relating to West Berlin was signed in West Berlin. That same day, the agreement entered into force. The treaties signed in 1970 by the USSR and Poland with the FRG, and in 1971 by the GDR and the FRG and the West Berlin Senate entered into force simultaneously.

June 3-4

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an of-

ficial visit in Bonn.

June 12-15

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an of-

ficial visit in France.

July 5

A long-term agreement on trade and economic co-

operation was signed in Bonn by the USSR and the FRG.

July 5-12

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko paid an official

visit to the Netherlands (July 5-7), Luxemburg (July 7-9) and Belgium (July 9-12).

July 6

An agreement was signed in the Hague on co-opera-

tion between the USSR and the Netherlands in the economic, industrial and technical fields.

July 31

A meeting of leaders of communist and workers' par-

ties of the socialist countries-Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, USSR and Czechoslovakia-was held in the Crimea.

1972 January 25-26

A conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee was held in Prague. It adopted a Communique and a Declaration on Peace, Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Another phase in the strategic arms limitation talks between the USSR and the United States ended in Vienna.

Swedish Foreign Minister Krister Wickman was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

A protocol was signed in Moscow extending the trade agreement between the USSR and Canada, and an understanding was reached on setting up a joint consultative commission for trade between the two countries.

The signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was held in Moscow, Washington and London (the capitals of the depositaries). An Agreement was signed in Moscow Between the USSR and the United States on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields for 1972 and 1973. A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was held in Moscow to discuss a report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, "On the International Situation", a resolution on which was adopted.

An agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the USSR and Norway on economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation. President Richard Nixon of the United States was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. During the visit a number of documents were signed in Moscow, including "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA" (May 29). A joint Soviet-American Com-

February 4

February 8-11 April 7

April 10

April 11 May 19

May 22-30

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September 14 September 15

October 2-6 October 3

Diplomatic relations were established between Poland and the FRG.

A trade agreement was signed in Paris between the Soviet Union and Spain, and a protocol on trade missions of the USSR in Spain and of Spain in the USSR. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Edward Gierek paid an official visit to France.

The Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on May 26, entered into force.

In accordance with the understanding on exchanges of views and consultations between the USSR and the FRG, State Secretary of the Federal Chancellor's Office Egon Bahr was in the Soviet Union and was received by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev.

Three Soviet-American agreements-on trade, on the lend-lease settlement and on mutual extension of credits-were signed in Washington.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy Giulio Andreotti was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. An agreement was signed in Nicosia between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus on mutual goods deliveries from 1973 to 1977.

The governments of the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and France issued a statement saying that they had reached an understanding to support applications for UN membership when these are filed, of the GDR and the FRG; this membership should not affect the rights and responsibilities of the four powers and the corresponding four-power agreements, decisions and practices.

UNESCO's 17th General Conference unanimously admitted the GDR to membership.

The first round of the second stage of the SovietAmerican strategic arms limitation talks was held in Geneva. A Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the USA Regarding the Establishment of a Standing

Consultative Committee in accordance with Article 13 of the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972 was signed on December 21.

November 22 Multilateral consultations opened in Helsinki between representatives of 32 European countries, the United States and Canada on preparation of a European Conference on Security and Co-operation (ended on June 8, 1973).

November 29 The UN General Assembly passed a Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Perpetual Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and also a Resolution on the Convocation of a World Disarmament Conference.

December 21 A Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG was signed in Berlin.

December 23 In Moscow a conversation was held between L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin and A. A. Gromyko, and Finland's President Urho Kekkonen and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa.

December 29 A Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, adopted at an international conference held in London from October 30 to November 13, was open for signing in Moscow, Washington, London and Mexico, the capitals of the depositary countries.

January 11-12 Meetings and conversations were held at Zaslavl (near Minsk) between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and President Georges Pompidou of France, who was on an unofficial visit in the Soviet Union.

January 15-16 A Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was held in Moscow to discuss matters bearing on security in Europe.

January 31- Preparatory consultations were held in Vienna on or-

June 28

ganising negotiations on mutual reductions of armed

forces and armaments in Central Europe.

February 1

An agreement was signed in Vienna on the develop-

ment of economic, scientific, technical and industrial co-operation between the USSR and Austria.

March 21

Agreements were signed in Washington between So-

viet foreign trade organisations and the state

October 8-10

October 18

October 24-29 November 4

November 9

November 21

November 21- December 21

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Export-Import Bank and other US banks on long-term credits for payment of purchases of machinery and equipment worth a total of $225 million.

April 2-6

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Ko-

sygin was on an official visit in Sweden.

April 10-13 Chairman of the State Council of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was on an official visit in the Netherlands.

April 16-19 FRG Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt was on an official visit in Yugoslavia.

April 26-27 A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was held in Moscow to discuss the report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev "On the International Activity of the CPSU Central Committee in Implementing the Decisions of the Party's 24th Congress"! It adopted a resolution, which says, in part: "The CPSU Central Committee starts from the assumption that the premises have taken shape for setting up a sound system of security and co-operation in Europe that could become a living and attractive example of peaceful coexistence. In this context, the plenary meeting attaches fundamental importance to the successful holding of a European conference.''

May 4-9

Henry Kissinger, US President's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs, was in Moscow. Conversations were held between Henry Kissinger and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev.

May 16

An agreement was signed in Moscow on co-operation

between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Finland.

May 18-22

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

L. I. Brezhnev paid a visit to the FRG. Among the documents signed on the visit were: an Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technical Co-operation, and an Agreement on Cultural Co-- operation.

May 21-25

Chairman of the State Council of Rumania Nicolae

Ceausescu was on an official visit in Italy. On May 26, Nicolae Ceausescu visited the Vatican.

May 30

The negotiations, begun in 1971 between Czechoslova-

kia and the FRG on normalising relations between the two countries, ended in Bonn. The text of a treaty was drafted.

June 8

Multilateral consultations were completed in Helsinki

between representatives of 32 states of Europe, the

United States and Canada on the preparation of a European Conference on Security and Co-operation.

June 11

A USSR Consulate General, set up under the Four-

Power Agreement on West Berlin of September 3, 1971, began officially to function in West Berlin.

June 18-25

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

L. I. Brezhnev was on an official visit in the United States. During the visit these documents were signed: Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Agriculture {June 19), Agreement on Co-operation in Studies of the World Ocean (June 19), Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Transportation (June 19), General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Co-operation (June 19), Convention on Taxation (June 20), Agreement on Scientific and Technical Co-operation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (June 21), Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (June 21), Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (June 22) and Protocol on the Extension of Co-operation in Air Communications (June 23).

June 21

The Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the

GDR and the FRG of December 21, 1972 entered into force.

June 25-27

A meeting was held in Paris between General Secre-

tary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and President Georges Pompidou of France.

June 26-30

Chairman of the State Council of Rumania Nicolae

Ceausescu was on an official visit in the FRG.

July 2-5

An official visit was paid to Austria by the Chairman

of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin. On his visit a programme for deepening Soviet-Austrian economic, scientific, technical and industrial co-- operation for a ten-year period was signed.

July 3-7

The first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-

operation in Europe was held at the Foreign Ministers' level in Helsinki.

July 10

A programme for Soviet-French co-operation in the

field of the economy and industry was signed in Moscow for a ten-year period.

July 24-29

Luxemburg Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn was on an

official visit in the Soviet Union.

July 26-28

French Foreign Minister Michel Jbbert was on a visit

in the Soviet Union. A programme for deepening Soviet-French co-operation in the field of science and

24---1787

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technology was signed on July 27 for a ten-year period. August 29

Sittings of the Co-ordination Committee of the second

stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe began in Geneva.

September 2-3 Meetings and conversations were held in Leningrad between Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and President Urho Kekkonen of Finland, who was on an unofficial visit in the Soviet Union.

September 18 The GDR and the FRG were admitted to UN membership.

Sittings of all the working organs of the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe opened in Geneva.

September

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hun-

25-27

garian Socialist Workers' Party Janos Kadar was on

,

an official visit in Finland.

September 25- Another round of the Soviet-American strategic arms November 16 limitation talks was held in Geneva. September 29 In New York the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Ireland-A. A. Gromyko and Garret Fitzgerald-signed a Joint Communique on the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the USSR and Ireland. October 9-13 Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria Todor Zhiv-

kov was on an official visit in Austria.

October 15-25 Prime Minister of Denmark Anker J0rgensen was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. An Agreement on Marine Navigation Between the USSR and Denmark was signed in the course of the visit (October 17).

October 25-31 The World Congress of Peace Forces-the broadest forum in the history of social movements-was held in Moscow. It was attended by almost 3,200 delegates from 143 countries, representing 120 international and over 1,100 national organisations. The question of security and co-operation in Europe was among the important problems of our day discussed at the Congress. October 30

Negotiations on mutual troop and arms cuts in Central

Europe opened in Vienna, involving 17 European countries, the United States and Canada.

October 31- FRG Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter November 3 Scheel was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. November 18-24 Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp was on an official visit in the Soviet Union.

November 19-22 December 2-5

December 4-7 December 7

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Edward Gierek was on an official visit in Belgium.

A. Douglas-Home, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was on an official visit in the USSR.

Chairman of the State Council of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was on an official visit in the United States.' The UN General Assembly approved a resolution "On the Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilisation of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries". The draft resolution had been motioned by the Soviet Union.

A Treaty on Mutual Relations Between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was signed in Prague in the course of an official visit to Czechoslovakia by the Federal Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt and Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (December 11-12).

Hungary and the FRG, and Bulgaria and the FRG established diplomatic relations.

A trade agreement was signed in Dublin between the Soviet Union and Ireland.

December 11

December 21 December 28

February 15-18 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in France.

February 16-18 President Urho Kekkonen of Finland was on an unofficial visit in Moscow. In the course of conversations matters of bilateral relations and meaningful international problems were discussed.

February 18-22 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in Italy.

March 12-13 President Georges Pompidou of France was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. During his meetings at Pitsunda with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, they discussed the further strengthening of the traditional Soviet-French friendship, development of bilateral relations in various fields and a broad range of international problems.

24*

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March 14

A Protocol was signed in Bonn Between the GDR and the FRG on the Establishment of Permanent Representative Missions.

Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli of Norway was on an official visit in the USSR. Bilateral relations and meaningful international problems, including European security, were discussed.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev received Trygve Bratteli, Chairman of the Norwegian Labour Party and Prime Minister of Norway. They discussed the development of bilateral relations and co-operation between the two countries in tackling meaningful international problems in the interests of European security.

A General Agreement Providing for the Participation of a Consortium of West German Firms in Building the Oskol Electrometallurgical Complex in the Kursk area was signed in Moscow.

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in the USSR. Soviet-American relations, strategic arms limitation problems and the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were discussed. USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko had a meeting with US President Richard Nixon at the White House. They held an exchange of views on Soviet-American relations and important international problems. They discussed matters relative to President Nixon's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union.

A session of the Committee on Disarmament was held in Geneva. The following session lasted from July 2 to August 22.

A conference of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee was held in Warsaw. The Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. An agreement was signed in London between the USSR and Britain on the development of economic, scientific, technical and industrial co-operation. 1 Federal Chancellor of Austria Dr. Bruno Kreisky was on an official visit in the USSR at the Soviet Government's invitation.

The USSR and Portugal established diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level.

The FRG Bundestag ratified the Treaty between the FRG and Czechoslovakia. The ratification act was

finally approved by an absolute majority on July 11.

June 24-27

President Tito of Yugoslavia was on an official visit

in the FRG.

June 27-July 3 President Richard Nixon of the United States was on an official visit in the Soviet Union. On his visit these documents were signed: Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Energy (June 28), Agreement on Co-- operation in the Field of Housing and Other Construction (June 28), Agreement on Co-operation in Artificial Heart Research and Development (June 28), Long-Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Co-operation (June 29), Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (July 3), Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (July 3), Joint Statement (July 3) and Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3).

July 11-13

French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues was on

an official visit in the USSR.

July 19

The Treaty on Mutual Relations Between the FRG and

Czechoslovakia entered into force.

July 24-29

Italy's Foreign Minister Aldo Moro was on an official

visit in the USSR. An Agreement Between the USSR and Italy on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technical Co-operation was signed on July 25.

September 12 A trade and payments agreement between the USSR and Finland for the 1976-1980 period was signed in Helsinki.

September

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on a visit

15-16

in Bonn.

September

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the

16-19

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Chairman of

the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian National Front Gustav Husak was on an official visit in Finland.

October 8-13 First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Edward Gierek was on an official visit in the United States.

October 14-17 A Soviet state delegation was in Finland to attend the celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the armistice agreement between the USSR and Finland and the 30th anniversary of the Finland-USSR Society.

October 23-27 US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was in Moscow.

March 18-25

March 19

March 21

March 24-28

April 12

April 16- May 23

April 17-18 April 22-28 May 6

May 28-June

June 9 June 20

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October 28-31 FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was on an

official visit in the USSR.

October 29

New contracts were signed in Moscow for the delivery

of Soviet natural gas to the FRG and the purchase in the FRG of large-diameter pipes and an agreement on long-term credits to the Soviet Union.

October 29- A government delegation of Portugal headed by State November 3 Minister Alvaro Cunhal was in Moscow. November 19 An Agreement was 'signed in Moscow on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and the Belgian-Luxemburg Economic Union.

November

A working meeting was held in the Vladivostok area

23-24

between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Com-

mittee L. I. Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford of the United States.

November

First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Edward

26-29 '

Gierek and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of

Poland Piotr Jaroszewicz were on an official visit in Finland.

December 4-7 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev was on a working visit in France. In the course of the talks at Rambouillet, an agreement was signed between the USSR and France on December 6 on economic co-operation for the 1975-1979 period, and other agreements. Both parties supported the idea of completing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the nearest future.

December 10 A conversation was held at the Kremlin between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and Prime Minister of Finland Kalevi Sorsa, who was in the USSR with a delegation of the Social-- Democratic Party of Finland as its Secretary. Satisfaction was expressed by both parties over the ongoing international detente and the need emphasised for further strengthening the foundations of peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world.

December 19 The USSR and Portugal signed a trade agreement in Moscow.

December

A preparatory meeting for a conference of communist

19-21

and workers' parties of Europe was held in Budapest.

The parties came out for the earliest convocation on a summit level of the final stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

January 2-3 The Foreign Minister of the Portuguese Republic, Mario Scares, was in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

January 31 The 2nd Interparliamentary Conference on Co-- operation and Security in Europe was held in Belgrade. It was attended by MPs from 25 European countries and the United States and Canada. Observers were present from a number of non-European countries and also from the United Nations, UNESCO and other international bodies.

February 13-17 Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson, together with Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan, was on an official visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

March 6

At a plenary meeting of the participants in the talks on

mutual troop and arms cuts in Central Europe in Vienna, the head of the Polish delegation T. Strulak presented, on behalf of the delegations of the USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, a number of new and important considerations designed to promote the successful course of the talks and to accelerate the search for a mutually acceptable solution of the problem of substantial reductions. These considerations took account of the Western countries' stand.

March 10-11 A meeting of the heads of state and government of the EEC countries was held in Dublin. Among the key items on the agenda was the detente in East-West relations, notably the prospects before the final stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

March 19-24 French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was on a visit in the USSR. On March 24, he was received by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev. A Soviet-French Communique issued at the end of the visit noted, in particular, that the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was the central item in their exchange of views on European problems.

April 3

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Ko-

sygin received Iceland's Foreign Minister Einar Agustsson, who was in the USSR on an official visit at the Soviet Government's invitation.

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April 16

A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was

held in Moscow. It took a decision to call the regular 25th Congress of the CPSU on February 24, 1976. It discussed the question "Concerning the International Situation and the Soviet Union's Foreign Policy" and adopted a relevant resolution. April 17

The fifth round of the talks on mutual troop and arms

cuts in Central Europe ended in Vienna.

April 26-29 The Second Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security and Co-operation took place in Brussels and Liege. It was attended by delegates from 29 European countries and 49 international organisations.

May 14-15

A meeting was held in Warsaw of parliamentarians

from the Warsaw Treaty countries on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. It adopted an Appeal, "For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Rapprochement Among the Peoples of Europe''.

May 22

The 4th Session of the Permanent USSR-UK Inter-

Government Commission for Co-operation in the Fields of Applied Sciences, Technology, Trade and Economic Relations ended in Moscow.

May 26

Her Majesty Queen of Denmark Margrethe II and His

Royal Highness Prince Henrik arrived on an official visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

May 31-]une 2 The Presiding Committee of the World Peace Council met in Stockholm to discuss, as its main item, the struggle to end the arms race and for disarmament. June 5-10

Grand-Duke Jean and Grand-Duchess Josephine-Char-

lotte of Luxemburg were on an official visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

June 9-11

The Fifth Session of the Soviet-West German Commis-

sion for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-- operation was held in Bonn.

June 23

The King of Belgium Baudouin and Queen Fabiola ar-

rived on an official visit in Moscow at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

June 26-29

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an of-

ficial visit in Italy at the Italian Government's invitation.

July 2

The Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks

resumed in Geneva.

July 9

L. I. Brezhnev had a conversation with SPD Chairman

Willy Brandt, who was in the Soviet Union from July 2 to 9.

An agreement was signed in Ankara between the Soviet Union and Turkey on the further development of economic and technical co-operation.

July 15

An international scientific symposium, "The Role

Played by Scientists and Their Organisations in the Struggle for Disarmament", organised by the World Federation of Scientific Workers opened in Moscow. Its participants adopted an Appeal to the Scientists of the World.

July 11

The sixth round of the talks on mutual troop and arms

cuts in Central Europe ended in Vienna.

July 21

The second stage of the Conference on Security and

Co-operation in Europe ended in Geneva.

July 30-

The final stage of the Conference on Security and Co-

August 1

operation in Europe went forward in Helsinki. At the

morning sitting on July 31, a speech was delivered by the head of the USSR delegation L. I. Breahnev. The ceremony of signing the Final Act was held on August 1.

August 6

The only basic copy of the Final Act of the Conference

on Security and Co-operation in Europe was handed for safekeeping to the State Archives of Finland in Helsinki.

August 7

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee,

the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers published their document, "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe''.

August 21

At a sitting of the Committee on Disarmament, the

Soviet Union and the United States presented a draft convention prohibiting the military or other hostile use of means for modifying the environment.

September 1 A. N. Kosygin met with President Urho Kekkonen in Svetogorsk, Leningrad Region.

September 9 An enlarged sitting of the Bureau of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation was held in Moscow.

September 11 USSR Permanent Representative at the United Nations Y. A. Malik handed the UN Secretary-General Kurt

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Waldheim a letter from the USSR Foreign Minister on the inclusion on the agenda of the 30th UN General Assembly, as an important and urgent matter, of the question "On Concluding a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests''.

September 22 A Danish parliamentary delegation arrived in the USSR.

September 23 US£R Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko sent UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim a letter on the inclusion on the agenda of the 30th UN General Assembly, as an important and urgent matter, of the question "On the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Mass Destruction Weapons and New Systems of Such Weapons''.

September 26 An Agreement on Co-operation Between the CMEA and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was signed in Vienna.

September 27 President of the Portuguese Republic General Costa Francisco Gomes arrived on an official visit in Warsaw at the invitation of the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Edward Gierek.

October 1-4 President of the Portuguese Republic General Costa Francisco Gomes was on an official visit in the USSR. On October 3, the President was received by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev- On October 3, these Soviet-Portuguese documents were signed: a Soviet-Portuguese Declaration, an Agreement on Co-operation in the Fields of Culture and Science, and an Agreement on Long-Term Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation.

October 14-18 President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France was on an official visit in the |Soviet Union. In the course of the visit, negotiations were held between L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, and Valery Giscard d'Estaing. On October 17, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and President Giscard d'Estaing signed a Declaration on the Further Development of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and France.

October 31

President of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu ended his

visit to Portugal.

November 10 A treaty was signed at Ancona (Italy) between Yugoslavia and Italy on the final settlement of frontier and certain other matters.

November 10-15 Federal President of the FRG Walter Scheel was on an

official visit in the USSR. On November 11, the Federal President was received by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev.

November

The Warsaw Treaty countries' Defence Ministers' Com-

18-19

mittee met in Prague.

November

President Giovanni Leone of Italy was on an official

18-24

visit in the USSR. On November 20, an Agreement on

Economic Co-operation for the 1975-1979 period and other documents were signed.

November 21 A protocol was signed in Prague to the Agreement on the Transportation of Soviet Natural Gas Across the Territory of Czechoslovakia to West European Countries.

November

A World Conference of Representatives of National

21-24

Peace Movements was held in Leningrad. It was at-

tended by delegates from more than 100 countries. November

Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria, First Sec-

24-28

retary of the BCP Central Committee Todor Zhivkov

was on an official visit in the FRG.

November 30 The Steering Committee of the Continuing Liaison Council of the World Congress of Peace Forces ended its meeting in Vienna. It discussed the cohesion of the peace forces and the results of the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. December

A meeting was held in Moscow of the Foreign Ministers

15-16

of Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Rumania, USSR

and Czechoslovakia.

December

A Soviet government delegation, led by Chairman of

26-29

the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, was on

an official visit in Turkey.

December 29 The signing was held simultaneously in Moscow and Washington of the Soviet-American Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters (for the 1976-1980 period).

January 6

GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer ended his visit

to France.

January 6-8 Finland's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa was on an official visit in the USSR.

January 20 The first Soviet-West German Symposium devoted to the role played by parliamentarians in ensuring European security and promoting relations between the USSR and the FRG ended in Bonn. An extraordinary meeting of the Bureau of the Presid-

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J

ing Committee of the World Peace Council was held in Helsinki. On its agenda were matters relating to the organisation of a world-wide campaign for disarmament, for an end to the arms race.

January 20-23 Talks were held in Moscow between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. When considering, in particular, the state of affairs at the talks on troop and arms cuts in Central Europe, both parties had in mind the task of promoting progress at these talks.

January 25-28 Rumanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu paid a visit to Austria.

January 26- A conference of five Balkan countries-Bulgaria, Greece,

February 5 Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia-was held in Athens on multilateral co-operation in the economic and technical field.

The eighth round of the negotiations of 19 states on troop and arms cuts in Central Europe opened in Vienna.

February 17- A session of the Committee on Disarmament was held

April 22

in Geneva.

February 18 A long-term agreement was signed in Budapest on economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-- operation between Hungary and Denmark over the forthcoming ten years.

February 18-20 Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski was on an official visit in France.

February 24- The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the

March 5

Soviet Union was held in Moscow. It was attended by

representatives of 103 communist, workers', nationaldemocratic and socialist parties from 96 countries. The Congress approved a Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples.

March 5

Turkish-Bulgarian negotiations ended in Ankara on

co-operation in the field of transport and communications.

March 12

in Bonn the Bundesrat unanimously ratified the Agree-

ment between the FRG and Poland envisaging further normalisation of Polish-West German relations and development of co-operation.

March 15

Representatives of public organisations from the USSR,

Belgium, Portugal, Switzerland and Finland, and also of the International Committee for European Security held a conference in Helsinki on implementing the decisions of the European Conference.

March 15-22 A delegation of the Belgian (Socialist Party was in Hungary at the invitation of the HSWP Central Committee.

March 22-25 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was in Britain at the invitation of the British Government.

March 26

Talks between delegations of the National Assembly

of the GDR and the National Assembly of France ended in Berlin.

March 26-29 President of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu was in Greece on an official visit.

March 28

A forum for an end to the arms race and for disar-

mament opened in York, Britain.

March 30

An agreement was signed in Bonn between the govern-

ments of the GDR and the FRG in the field of postal and telegraph communications. It entered into force on July 1, 1976.

March 31

At the Kremlin A. N. Kosygin received FRG Minister

of Economics Hans Friderichs, who had arrived in the

January 31

The Second Session of the Soviet-Italian Mixed Commission on Scientific and Technical Co-operation ended in Rome; a protocol was signed on the extension of ties, and a joint Communique adopted. Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski was on an official visit in Denmark.

February 9-12 February 12 February 15 February 16

A protocol on co-operation between Spain and Bulgaria was signed in Madrid.

Rumanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu ended his visit to the Netherlands.

Chairman of the CMEA Executive Committee Gerhard

Weiss, on behalf of the CMEA and the governments of the CMEA countries, called in Luxemburg on the Chairman of the Council of European Communities Gaston Thorn and handed him a letter from the CMEA addressed to the European Economic Community proposing the conclusion of an agreement on the principles of relations between the CMEA and the EEC, and also a draft of the proposed agreement.

February 16-20 Official visits to France and Belgium were paid by Chairman of the Federal Executive Council ( government) of Yugoslavia Dzemal Bijedic.

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USSR to attend the 6th Session of the USSR-FRG Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

April 2-4

A session of the International Committee for European

Security and Co-operation was held in Brussels. A Declaration it adopted devoted much attention to the Vienna talks on troop and arms cuts in Central Europe. Participants in the session emphasised the importance of the early convocation of a World Disarmament Conference.

April 5-9

Prime Minister of Sweden Olof Palme was in the USSR

on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

April 10

The 31st Session of the UN Economic Commission

for Europe ended its work in Geneva. The main item on its agenda was the Soviet proposal on holding European congresses or interstate conferences on co-- operation in the fields of environmental protection, development of transport and energy.

April 12

A Joint Greco-Bulgarian Communique was published on

the visit to Greece by Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov.

April 13

A protocol on mutual assistance and co-operation be-

tween the Turkish Society for Scientific and Technical Research and Rumania's National Council for Science and Technology was initialled in Ankara.

April 14-16 At the invitation of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, an official visit to Bulgaria was paid by the French Foreign Minister.

April 15

On behalf of the Soviet Government, the USSR's Per-

manent Representative at the United Nations Y. A. Malik handed the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim a note on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

April 27-30 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in France at the invitation of the French Government.

May 9-16

A week of struggle for European security and disarma-

ment was staged in the Soviet Union at the call of the World Peace Council.

May 18-22

The Presiding Committee of the World Peace Council

ended a meeting in Athens. Among the questions it discussed and emphasised were European security problems and implementation of the European Conference decisions.

May 22

The Soviet Government issued a statement containing

an analysis of the general situation in Europe, the development of the process of detente and of relations between the USSR and the FRG.

May 28

In Moscow and Washington General Secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford of the United States simultaneously signed the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

May 28-30

Peace Days of Baltic Countries and Norway were held

in Helsinki.

June 2-6

Portuguese Foreign Minister E. Melo Antunes was on

an official visit in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

June 8-12

First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Ed-

ward Gierek was in the FRG at the invitation of the FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. On the results of the talks they signed on June 11 a Joint Statement on the Development of Relations Between Poland and the FRG, and Agreements on Cultural and Economic Co-operation.

June 10

A meeting of the London Club-conference of countries

exporting nuclear technology-was held in London. Members of the London Club are the USSR, the GDR, the USA, Britain, France, the FRG, Canada, Japan, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. They met to study and discuss problems like the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat to the environment in consequence of inadequate control over the disposal of nuclear waste.

June 11

A Communique was published in Bucharest on a visit

by the French Foreign Minister to Rumania. A Communique was published in Belgrade on the results of an official visit to Turkey by President Tito of Yugoslavia.

June 13-16

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary

Gyorgy Lazar paid an official visit to France.

June 19-27

A European Youth and Student Meeting for Lasting

Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress was held in Warsaw. It was attended by more than 1,500 delegates representing youth bodies of different political orientation. A message of greetings was sent to the delegates by L. 1. Brezhnev.

June 26

President of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu ended his

official visit to Turkey.

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June 29-30

A Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of

Europe was held in Berlin. It adopted a document, "For Peace, Security, Co-operation and Social Progress in

July 30

Europe". It was attended by delegations of 29 communist and workers' parties. The CPSU delegation was led by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev.

July 5-8

A delegation of the French Socialist Party was in Mos-

cow to attend a scientific colloquium organised by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the subject, "The Crisis of World Capitalism''.

On July 8, members of the CPSU Central Committee met with the delegation of the French Socialist Party at the CPSU Central Committee. The participants in the meeting expressed the conviction of the need for further efforts by the democratic and peace forces in the struggle to consolidate the international detente, end the arms race and strengthen peace and social progress.

July 7-9

The 30th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance was held in Berlin on the level of heads of government.

parties exchanged views on a number of important international questions.

On behalf of the GDR Government, Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt Nier issued a statement in view of the repeated violations of the GDR state frontier from the territory of the FRG. The statement says that the GDR Government rejects the FRG's attempts to present the frontier between the two German states as being an ``intra-German'' frontier.

The Soviet press carried L. I. Brezhnev's answers to the questions of a Pravda correspondent. L. I. Brezhnev assessed the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki and set forth the fundamental Soviet stand on the international situation.

L. I. Brezhnev had a conversation with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of Czechoslovakia Gustav Husak, who was on a visit in the Soviet Union. They exchanged views on further development of allround Soviet-Czechoslovakian co-operation, and gave much attention to the problems connected with implementation of the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.

A meeting was held in the Crimea between L. I. Brezhnev and General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu. The leaders of the two parties discussed a broad range of questions in the development of Soviet-Rumanian co-operation. They also considered a number of important problems in international affairs and the world communist movement.

The USSR Foreign Ministry published a statement made to the Ambassadors of France, Great Britain and the USA in Moscow. The Statement said that "West Berlin's direct or indirect participation in elections to a 'European Parliament' would signify a gross breach of the Quadripartite Agreement (on West Berlin) and would be incompatible with the urge of the parties written into it to prevent any complications in the area to which the Agreement applies". A friendly meeting was held in the Crimea between L. I. Brezhnev and First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov. They

July 8-10

Belgian Foreign Minister Renaat Van Elslande was on

August 3

an official visit in Hungary.

July 14

The signing was held in Ottawa of a new long-term

Agreement on Economic Co-operation Between the USSR and Canada for a ten-year period.

July 16

A Soviet-French Accord on the Prevention of Acciden-

tal and Unsanctioned Use of Nuclear Weapons was formalised.

July 21

The delegations of 19 countries taking part in the talks

August 4

on mutual troop and arms cuts in Central Europe held their lllth plenary meeting in Vienna. They agreed to recess until September 30.

July 21-22

A meeting was held in Sofia of Deputy Foreign Minis-

ters of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, for an exchange of views on some important questions of security and co-operation in Europe in the light of the results of the European Conference in Helsinki.

August 11

July 28

A friendly meeting was held in the Crimea between

L. I. Brezhnev and First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Edward Gierek. The leaders of the two

25---1787

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expressed satisfaction over the consistent development of Soviet-Bulgarian co-operation and noted that the Helsinki Conference made a serious beginning in restructuring international relations in Europe on the principles of peace, security and co-operation.

August 12

The Disarmament Committee in Geneva ended its

consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of massdestruction weapons and new systems of such weapons, which was put before the United Nations on the Soviet Union's initiative. Technical experts from 11 countries, which are members of the Committee, took part in the discussion.

August 16-27 Under an understanding between the USSR and the USA, reached on the basis of the Communique of July 3, 1974, consultations were held in Geneva to continue consideration of matters relating to a possible joint initiative in the Disarmament Committee for the purpose of concluding an international convention bearing on the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of warfare, as a first step towards the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

August 19

A meeting was held in the Crimea between L. I. Brezh-

nev and General Secretary of the SUPG Central Committee Erich Honecker. The leaders of the two parties emphasised their countries' resolve to continue making a constructive contribution to the cause of peace, security and co-operation in Europe.

August 23

The Third International Congress of Teachers of

Russian Language and Literature opened in Warsaw. A message of greetings to its participants was sent by L. I. Brezhnev.

August 23-26 Austrian Foreign Minister Erich Bielka was on the first official visit in the GDR.

August 26

In the Crimea L. I. Brezhnev met with First Secretary

of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee Janos Kadar. The two leaders expressed the conviction that a most important feature of contemporary international development was the growing cohesion of the socialist community countries. The 26th Pugwash Conference opened at Muhlhausen in the GDR. Prominent scientists from 30 countries dealt with problems of disarmament, security and development.

August 28

An official visit to Bulgaria by Iceland's Foreign Min-

ister Einar Agustsson was announced.

September 3 The summer session of the Disarmament Committee ended in Geneva. Its main result was an accord on the draft International Convention on the prohibition of modifying the environment for military and other hostile purposes. September 8-11 Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund paid an

official visit to Czechoslovakia. September

A World Conference to End the Arms Race, for Disar-

23-26

mament and Detente was held in Helsinki. It was at-

tended by delegations from more than 90 countries and 52 international organisations. It adopted a Declaration and a Message to the UN General Assembly.

September 28 Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko delivered a speech at a plenary meeting of the 31st UN General Assembly in New York. A. A. Gromyko sent the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim a letter on the inclusion on the agenda of the 31st UN General Assembly, as an important and urgent matter, of the question "On Concluding a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations''.

September 30 The Soviet press carried the letter of the USSR Foreign Minister addressed to the UN Secretary-General, the draft World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and a Memorandum of the Soviet Union on ending the arms race and on disarmament.

October 3-5 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in Belgium at the Belgian Government's invitation.

October 5

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

L. I. Brezhnev gave an interview to French television in connection with the opening of a Soviet Union Week in France, in which he dealt with a broad range of international problems.

October 5-6 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko was on an official visit in Denmark at the Danish Government's invitation. A Soviet-Danish Protocol on Consultations was signed.

October 11-14 King of Belgium Baudouin and Queen Fabiola were on an official visit in Rumania.

October 12-14 Danish Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen was on an official visit in Berlin.

25*

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October 15-17 President of the French Republic Valery Giscard d' Estaing was on an unofficial visit in Poland at the invitation of the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Edward Gierek.

October 19-20 The Second Soviet-British Round Table Meeting was held in Moscow. It was arranged by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Royal Institute of International Affairs under an understanding reached as a result of the summit Soviet-British talks in February 1975.

October 20-21 Meetings of the working groups of the USSR-FRG Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation were held in Bonn.

October 21

The 115th plenary meeting of the participants in the

talks on mutual troop and arms cuts in Central Europe was held in Vienna.

October 25 A meeting of the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation ended in Brussels. For the purpose of making a deeper discussion of the problems connected with the implementation of the Helsinki accords and involvement of broad public forces in the movement to back up the political detente with a military detente, the International Committee decided to hold an enlarged session in Brussels in March 1977.

Octobet 25-26 A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was held in Moscow. Its resolution said: "Fully and entirely to approve the activity of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee in realising the socio-- economic programme and foreign-policy line worked out by the 25th Congress of the Party, and the propositions and conclusions set forth in the speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the present plenary meeting.''

October 26-29 Danish Prime Minister Anker Jargensen was in Poland at the Polish Government's invitation.

November 8 The UN General Assembly approved the Soviet proposal to sign a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations.

November

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

15-17

L. I. Brezhnev paid a visit to Yugoslavia. A Soviet-

Yugoslav Communique was signed.

November

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

21-26

L. I. Brezhnev paid a visit to Rumania. A Soviet-Ru-

manian Statement on the Further Development of Cooperation and Fraternal Friendship Between the CPSU and the RCP, the Soviet Union and Rumania was signed.

November 22 The Soviet delegation put forward before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly a draft resolution on the signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

November

A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political

25-26

Consultative Committee was held in Bucharest. The

participants in the meeting signed a Communique and a Declaration, For the Further Advancement of Detente and for the Consolidation of Security and Development of Co-operation in Europe, and produced a Draft Treaty on the Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons by the CSCE Countries Against Each Other on Land, on Sea, in the Air and in Outer Space.

December 2-17 During their meetings with L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of his 70th birthday, the leaders of the communist and workers' parties of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the GDR, Cuba, Poland and Hungary awarded him their countries' highest decorations.

1977 January 14-16

February 10 February 15

March 26-31

The World Forum of Peace Forces, attended by delegates from 115 countries, was held in Moscow. The Soviet and the Spanish governments announced that as of February 9, 1977 they had agreed to establish diplomatic relations at embassy level. The spring session of the Disarmament Committee opened at Geneva. The Soviet delegation put forward a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclar weapons tests.

US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was on a visit in Moscow. Soviet-US talks were held on the signing of an agreement to limit strategic offensive arms, and there was also an exchange of views on other matters of common interest. On March 30, L. I. Brezhnev and A. A. Gromyko met Cyrus Vance to discuss the outcome of the talks.

A. A. Gromyko met Cyrus Vance at Geneva. They discussed questions relating to the proposed agreement to limit strategic offensive arms and also signed (on May 18) a Soviet-US Agreement Concerning Co-opera-

May 18-20

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tion in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes.

May 25-26

The Foreign Ministers' Committee set up under the

Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee met in Moscow. On May 26, L. I. Brezhnev received at the Kremlin the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

June 4-5

The Draft of a new Constitution of the USSR was publi-

shed in the Soviet Union. On June 5, a nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution was started across the country. Article 28, Chapter Four ("Foreign Policy") says: "The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace and stands for strengthening of the security of nations and broad international co-operation.''

June 13

The first round of the consultations between the USSR,

the USA and Britain on talks concerning a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests opened at Geneva.

June 15

The 35 states taking part in the Conference on Security

and Co-operation in Europe met in Belgrade for preparatory consultations to agree the date, duration, agenda and other matters relating to the principal Belgrade meeting to be held in the autumn of 1977.

June 16-17

The Sixth Session of the Ninth Supreme Soviet of the

USSR gathered in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow. By a unanimous vote of the Supreme Soviet, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

June 20-22

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev paid an official visit to France. In the course of the talks with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the two leaders considered a number of pivotal questions bearing on the further development of Soviet-French relations, and also various international problems, notably those of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. L. I. Brezhnev and Valery Giscard d'Estaing signed a Soviet-French Declaration, a Joint Statement on the Relaxation of International Tension, and a Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

July 31

TASS issued a statement on the intensifying arms drive

in the USA, which has set out to develop and deploy

new types of weapons, primarily nuclear weapons, 'such as the neutron bomb. The statement pointed out the danger inherent in this for the arms limitation talks.

August 5

The preparatory stage of the 35-nation meeting ended

in Belgrade. It adopted a resolution on the organisation, in accordance with the Final Act, of a 1977 Belgrade meeting of representatives of the states that took part in the Conference on Security and Co-- operation.

August 6

On the anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki

tragedy, the communist parties of Europe, the USA and Canada protested against the US Admnistration's plans to manufacture the neutron bomb. The communist parties called on all peace forces to work for detente.

August 21

An official report was issued in the Soviet Union say-

ing that the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee had considered the results of L. I. Brezhnev's friendly meetings in Crimea with Erich Honecker, Gustav Husak, Janos Kadar, Edward Gierek, Nicolae Ceausescu, Todor Zhivkov and Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal in July and August. The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee fully approved the results of L. I. Brezhnev's talks.

September 12 The Bureau of the Presiding Committee of the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin urged the staging, from October 1 to 15, of a world-wide campaign of protest against the neutron bomb and all other types of mass destruction weapons.

September 20-27 The 32nd UN General Assembly opened in New York. On September 27, A. A. Gromyko spoke at its plenary meeting.

September 22-23 Talks between A. A. Gromyko and US President James Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were held in Washington.

October 2

The Soviet Union and the USA issued a joint state-

ment on the Middle East.

October 4

The meeting of the 35 states that had taken part in

the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe opened in Belgrade.

October 7

At its Seventh (Special) Session, the USSR Supreme

Soviet unanimously approved the Constitution ( Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Constitution came into force on October 7, 1977.

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October 9-11 Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Owen was on an official visit in Moscow. On October 10, L. I. Brezhnev received him at the Kremlin. A. A. Gromyko and David Owen signed an agreement between the Soviet and British governments on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.

November 2-7 The Soviet people marked the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. On November 2-3, a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet was held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow. L. I. Brezhnev delivered a report, "The Great October Revolution and Human Progress". The meeting adopted a message "To the Soviet People" and a message "To the Peoples, Parliaments and Governments of All Countries". The set of proposals aimed at curbing the arms race in the world set out in these documents is an important step towards the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, an imperative of the present day.

November 21-23 The 83rd session of the CMEA Executive was held in Moscow. The session considered a number of questions, notably, further measures aimed at developing contacts between the CMEA and its member-countries, on the one hand, and the EEC and its member-- countries, on the other.

November 25-27 The autumn session of the International Committee for European Security and Co-operation, attended by 23 national delegations and 12 international non-- governmental agencies, was held in Brussels. The Committee devoted much attention to the Belgrade meeting. In the course of the debate, the participants voiced their support for the new Soviet initiatives. The Committee decided to address a message to the Belgrade meeting.

December 3 The representatives of the socialist countries at the Belgrade meeting submitted to its plenary session a number of documents on human rights.

December 6 Finland marked the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of its independence. A Soviet government delegation led by A. N. Kosygin took part in the festivities.

December 20 The 32nd UN General Assembly ended its work. It

adopted a Declaration on the Deepening and Strengthening of Detente, which reflected the major provisions of the draft document put on the agenda of the Session by the Soviet Government. Representatives of 126 states voted for a resolution on the signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The General Assembly also urged the earliest possible peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

______ i

February 26 March 8

April 24

An international conference was convened in Geneva to discuss ways and means of banning the neutron bomb. The participants in the 1975 European Conference adopted a document in Belgrade declaring their determination to continue strengthening security and co-- operation in Europe.

A conference of the Socialist International on disarmament opened in Helsinki. It was attended by delegations from social-democratic and socialist parties of 20 countries. A delegation of the CPSU Central Committee led by Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, B. N. Ponomaryov, took part in the conference at the invitation of the sponsors.

In addressing the 18th Congress of the Soviet Young Communist League, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Brezhnev proposed a farreaching programme of disarmament measures, including the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production and prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction, the cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments, and the renunciation of any enlargement of armies by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and by countries having military agreements with them.

Leonid Brezhnev paid an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Joint Declaration and the agreement on the promotion and expansion of longterm co-operation between the USSR and the FRG in the economic and industrial fields, signed during his vi-

April 25

May 4-7

26---1787

SUPPLEMENT

Name Index

sit, demonstrated the desire of the two sides to turn the relations between them into a factor of stability and good-neighbourly relations on the international scene. May 23-July 4 The UN General Assembly held a special session on disarmament. The final document adopted at the session enunciated an active programme denning immediate tasks and measures for disarmament, and stated that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was part and parcel of the efforts to halt the arms race.

Andersen, Knud-95

B

Barret, Philippe-317, 321, 339

Beaufre, General-320, 321, 339

Bertram, Christoph-177, 178, 180, 181

Besshard, Antoine-273

Bindschedler, Rudolf-125

Birnbaum, Karl-170

Bock, Siegfried-130

Bolz, Klaus-217

Brandt, Willy-40, 105, 115, 176

Brezhnev, L. I.-12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 31, 35, 37, 38, 52, 75, 78, 80, 84, 101, 107, 115, 130 135, 138-41, 144, 147, 152, 153, 159, 160, 215, 252, 260, 261, 277, 281, 306, 340, 349-52

Broum, George-176

Brown, Neville-328

Brunner, Guido-120

Buchan, A.-325, 339

Bykov, O.-73

Chnoupek, Bohuslav-144 Cleveland, Harlan-171, 172, 175 Croan, M.-190

Engels, Frederick-51 Enthoven, Alain-191 d'Estaing, Valery Giscard-103, 132, 137, 228

Fadeyev, N. V.-32 Farhi, Andre-317, 321, 339 Feldt, Kjell-Olof-210 Finletter, Thomas-330 Ford, Gerald-36, 107, 132 Fridericks, Hans-222 Fried, E.-191

Gallois, Pierre-90

Gasteyger, Curt-182

Gaulle, Charles de -39, 111, 314,

337, 339

Gavin, James-175 Gendt, Robert de-146 Goor, Raymond-146 Gorokhov, I.-58

Cappelen, Andreas-95 Chicherin, G. V.-57 Chirac, Jacques-131

26*

NAME INDEX

NAME INDEX

Gorse, Roger-209 Griffith, William-170 Gromyko, A. A.-70, 74, 79, 121, 136

H

Harmel, Pierre-93, 171, 172 Hassner, Pierre-313, 318, 319 Healey, Denis-176 Heath, Edward-113 Hedberg, H.-203 Hitler, Adolf-60 Humboldt-290 Hunter, Robert E.-180 Husak, Gustav-135

M

Mansfield, Mike-174, 175 Marshall, Alan-63 McCloy, John-175, 176, 330 McDonnel, James-330 McNamara, Robert-175 Moorer, Thomas-191 Morgan, Roger-328, 329 Moro, Aldo-95

N

Newhouse, J.-190 Nixon, Richard-34, 36, 127, 191, 330, 335

Seguy, Georges-147 Semashko, N. A.-290 Sheetikov, A. P.-26, 142, 156 Smaele, Albert de-146 Smart, Jan-185 Sorensen, Theodore C.-330 Stankovsky, Jan-204 Stanley, T.-190, 333-34 Strauss, F. J.-129 Stray, Svenn-113

Vernant, J.-314, 316

W

Waldheim, Kurt-137 Wilson, Harold-104, 132

Terfve, Jean-146 Tinbergen, Jan-199 Tomashevsky, D. G.-71 Tomilin, Y.-188 Truman, Harry S.-63

u

Uranov, G. V.-60

Young, Stephen-174

Inozemtsev, N. N.-309

Pfaltzgraff, R. L.-334, 335 Pisar, Samuel-43 Plotz, Peter-217 Pompidou, Georges-115 Portier, Jacqueline-318, 319 Prokudin, V. A.-290

R

Rakhmaninov, Y. N.-60 Razmekov, V.-313 Rogers, William-191 Rotfeld, A. D.-313 Rothschild, K.-195 Ryabchikov, A. M.-285

Zamyatin, L.-58 Zellentin, Gerda-323, 324 Zemskov, I.-58 Zimyanin, M.-151, 155

Johnson, Lyndon B.-175

E

Karjalainen, Ahti-143 Kekkonen, Urho-132, 133, 274,

Kissinger, Henry-330, 335-38 Klein, Jean-316, 319 Kokeyev, A.-313 Koloskov, I.-313 Kormnov, Y.-218 Kosygin, A. N.-226, 299 Krupskaya, N. K.-51

Laird, Melvin-183 Lemnitzer, Lyman-175 Lenin, V. I.-20, 37, 50, 51, 55-57 Levi, Mario-316, 317 Lippmann, Walter-30, 90 Litvinov, M. M.-58

Sager, P.-202 Sarosi, Eva-218, 232 Saushkin, Y. G.-285 Scheel, Walter-40 Schelling, Thomas C.-330 Schmidt, Helmut-132 Schumann, Maurice-95, 118 Schutze, Walter-127 Schwarz, S.-313

Subject Index

SUBJECT INDEX

Agreements:

-between the socialist counttries and France-222-25, 229, 231, 237-39, 244, 245, 246, 247 -between the socialist countries and the FRG-221-23, 227, 229, 230, 231, 244-46 -between the USSR and the USA-35, 72

-on cultural co-operation-265, 269

-four-power agreement on West Berlin-68, 181, 332 -Munich-61, 66 -Paris (1954)-64 -Potsdam-11

Anti-Hitler coalition-61

Arms race (drive): 37, 41, 44, 46, 49, 72, 75-77, 81, 82, 85, 108, 141, 146, 161-63, 167, 168, 170, 172, 179, 180, 182, 193, 194, 259, 308, 346, 351 -arms (force) reduction (force cuts, arms cuts)-57, 78, 100, 123, 153, 162-66, 168, 169, 170, 172-80, 182-88, 192, 193, 331, 334

-strategic force-33, 34, 168 "Asymmetry of power"-84 Atlantic Alliance: see NATO Atlanticist polky-the Atlantic system, Atlantic framework, Atlanticism-72, 73, 84, 97, 293 Atomic weapons (nuclear)-33, 63, 98, 141, 162-65, 168, 188, 190, 194, 326, 327, 330, 333, 335, 338

B

Balance of forces-99, 190, 191,

192, 193, 309 Banks-213, 214 Border question (frontiers)-66,

68, 105, 193, 322, 332, 335

-inviolability of frontiers-66,

68, 82, 125, 133

Commissions:

-intergovernmental commissions-226, 246

-mixed commissions-228, 230, 246

-UN Atomic Energy Commission-163

-UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)-200, 291, 296, 297, 331

Committees:

-Co-ordinating-124, 128, 129, 131

-Eighteen Nation Disarmament-165 -Environment-294 -Executive Committee of the NATO Council-337 -International (Committee) for European Security and Co-- operation-143, 145, 146, 148-51 -International Preparatory151

-national (committees) for European security and cooperation-140, 144, 146, 148 -NATO's Defence Planning Committee-175

-on the Challenge of Modern Society (NATO's working organ)-293

-Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-- operation-141, 147, 149, 150, 151, 156

-Soviet Committee for the World Congress of Peace Forces-151

-USSR State (Committee) for Science and Technology-245 -USSR State (Committee) for the Use of Atomic Power-248

Communique-128, 131, 148, 154, 180, 181, 224

Conceptions:

-"European myth"-82 -of an "armed peace"-335 -of a ``big'' and a ``little'' Europe-82, 312, 321 -force reduction-172, 178, 189 -of military detente in Europe -167, 185

-of peaceful Europe-64 Co-operation: 205, 210, 215-25, 227-33, 239, 240, 242, 243, 245- 51, 310, 311, 317 -cultural-31, 101, 103, 113, 122, 128, 142, 149, 153, 156,

252, 253, 255-77 -economic-31, 43, 48, 50, 57, 79, 102, 113, 119, 122, 126, 133, 142, 148,153,156,195,196,198, 199, 201, 202-07, 215, 216, 218- 21, 223-26, 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 246, 252, 268, 301, 317, 324 -scientific and technical-31, 48, 102, 119, 122, 126, 133, 134, 142, 148, 153, 218, 226, 234-37, 238, 240, 242-51, 268, 288, 289, 296, 299, 301, 316

Conferences:

-Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties16, 22, 23, 24, 25 -Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France ( JanuaryFebruary 1954)-64, 164 -Common Market Summit in Paris (October 1972)-45 -Crimean (1945)-61 -disarmament (1933)-58, 60 -European Communist and

Workers' Parties (1967)-66, 167 -European Conference of Ministers of Culture (1972)-270 -Final Act of the European Conference-13, 14, 15, 22, 25, 71, 81, 103, 132-35, 138, 161,

253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 262-64,

Cold war-11, 15, 16, 18, 22, 34, 42, 49, 54, 62, 66-68, 79, 84, 85, 90, 96, 117, 130, 136, 141, 145, 152, 180, 195, 252, 261, 267, 272, 298, 307, 319, 321, 342-44, 347

SUBJECT INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX

269, 276, 301, 302-04, 341 -Genoa (1922)-58, 83 -Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe (1972)-266, 276 -international conference at Gdansk (1973)-299 -ministerial conference of the European Council memberstates-293

-New Initiatives in East-West Co-operation-148 -Potsdam (1945)-62, 106 -Second Conference of the Ministers of Higher Education of the European Countries (1973)-265

-on Security and Co-operation in Europe-11, 25, 35, 53, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 106, 109-26, 128-38, 141, 143, 144, 146-48, 150-52, 155-58, 169, 179, 181, 194, 195, 250, 251, 255, 257-59, 262-64, 268-73, 296, 301, 306, 307, 308, 311, 316, 319, 322, 324, 332-34, 342, 343, 350

-set of principles of the Conference in Helsinki-12 -Versailles peace (1919)-100 -Warsaw Treaty-67, 91, 166 -of the Women's Organisations in European Countries on Questions of Co-operation and Security on the Continent-147 -World Conference of Ministers of Culture (1970)-270 -World Conference of trade unions, 8th-146

Conflicts:

-Middle East-36, 73 -nuclear-166

Congresses:

-All-Russia Congress of So-

viets, llth-50

-of Vienna (1815)-110

World Congress held in Berlin

(1975)-157

-World Congress of Peace For-

ces-25, 55, 78, 84, 145, 150-55,

216, 267, 271, 281

Consultations: -bilateral-115

-Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (July 8, 1973)-119-22, 129 -multilateral-116, 117, 120, 143, 145, 182

-multilateral preparatory consultations-114, 116, 117, 118 -preparatory consultations for the talks on troop and arms cuts-182

Conventions:

-Concerning the International Exchange of Publications-266 -on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic and the Belts-299 -on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property-266

-Universal (Geneva) Copyright Convention-266 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA): -29, 31, 32, 200, 204, 208, 235, 243, 249, 287-91, 329 -committee for scientific and technical co-operation-290 -Comprehensive Programme of Economic Integration-210, 249, 289

Crimea meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central

Committee L. I. Brezhnev and Federal Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt-115, 131, 252 Crises:

-energy-43, 202 -monetary-44

D

Decree on Peace (1917)-9, 56

Detente:

-deepening of -41, 48, 75, 132, 136, 167, 308, 344 -materialisation of-69, 72-75, 79, 81, 86, 169, 193, 233, 306- 08, 311, 341-43, 351, 352 -military-66, 72, 75, 79, 153, 156, 157, 161-64, 185, 193, 252, 308, 343

-political-35, 42, 43, 48, 49, 72, 75, 79, 123, 126, 156-59, 161, 167, 169, 193, 237, 282

Declarations:

-on Atlantic Relations-98 -Bucharest Declaration-Ill, 167, 312

-Budapest Declaration-106 -definition of ``aggressor''-58 -European Identity Declaration-98

-General Declaration on the Foundations of European Security and the Principles of Relations Between States in Europe-122

-on Liberated Europe-61-63 -on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions-173, 176-79 -of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States-133, 161

-of Principles of International Cultural Co-operation-266, 270 -on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe-66, 166

Disarmament-57, 75, 153, 155,

162, 163, 165, 168, 172, 173,

174, 181, 194, 314 Doctrines:

-``bridge-building'' policy-30,

-``deterrence''-76, 344

-"flexible response"-171, 173,

-"massive retaliation"-65

-Nixon Doctrine-183, 330, 335

-of "pea9eful coexistence"-90,

171, 260

-"from positions of strength"

policy-39, 65

-"roll-back communism"-63,

65, 170, 348

-strategy of "realistic deter-

rence"-183, 348

-Truman Doctrine-30, 63

-``two-pillar''-171, 172

-"Western Europe's cultural

unity"-81, 202

E

Economic ``asymmetry''-81, 202

EFTA-205

Engineering-236, 240

Eurogroup-102, 104, 332

European Council

European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP)-102

European Economic Community (EEC), Common Market-32, 40, 45, 46, 73, 81, 84, 98, 104, 116, 205, 207, 293, 294, 295, 313, 322, 323, 324, 328, 329, 339

Final Act: See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

SUBJECT INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX

Foreign trade-197, 199, 205-07,

209, 228 Foreign trade agencies-211, 212,

213, 224

K

``Know-how"-217, 236

operation-54, 55, 145, 150, 156

-general democratic-62

-trade-union-140, 141, 146,

147, 150, 155

-women's-140, 141, 146, 150,

155, 158

-youth-140, 141, 146, 150, 155

N

National liberation struggle (movement)-33, 62, 76, 352

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)-39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 63-65, 73, 75, 76, 81, 83, 89, 90, 92-96, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105-07, 112, 116, 117, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170-73, 175-87, 189-93, 293, 294, 315, 320, 322, 323, 326, 330, 331-38, 344, 351

Nordic Council-295

Nuclear Parity-33

Organisations:

-for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity-151

-for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED)-294 -European, for Nuclear Research (CERN)-249

-24th Congress-31, 48, 110,

139, 167, 252, 281

-25th Congress-260, 353

-FDP-113, 323

-Socialist Party of Belgium-

-SPD-113, 323

``Polycentrism"-71

Principles:

-"balanced reductions"-!??, 178, 179

-consensus-109, 187 -of interstate relations-58, 59, 69, 70, 121, 122, 125-28, 133, 134-40, 152, 153, 264, 269, 276, 311

-most-favoured-nation-216 -non-infringement of security -85, 169, 188, 334 -of proletarian internationalism---53, 54, 56

Prognostications for the development of international relations -312-14, 321, 331, 334, 335, 338

Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples (XXV Congress of the CPSU)-21

Protection of the environment205, 328, 239, 252, 278- 305

``Psychological warfare"-53, 54

Public Assembly for European Security and Co-operation-25, 141, 142, 149, 155, 156

R

Research and development

(R & D) -237, 238-45, 248 Resistance movement-61

``Geographical Factor"-192 German question:-63, 325, 331,

-peaceful settlement-64-66 Great October Socialist Revolu-

tion-57

^x

Gross national product-197, 200

H

Harmel Report-172, 173

Leagues:

-of Arab States-151 -of Nations-59

M

Marketing-211, 212, 216, 244

Markets:

-domestic-196, 197

-foreign-196

-world-196, 197, 198, 201, 236

Marshall Plan-30, 63

Military-political confrontation89, 99

Models:

-Atlanticised Europe-326

-economic-mathematical mod-

els-199, 200

-Europe des Etats-326

-"Europe of monolithic

blocks"-318

``Europe of regional group-

ings"-322

-"Europe of states"-318

-"European nucleus"-322, 323

-European security systems-

97, 313, 315, 319

-"Evolutionary Europe"-326

-Fragmented Europe-326

-Independent Federal Euro-

pe-327

-Partnership Europe-327, 328

-"reduction models"-182, 192,

Movements:

-international communist and working-class movement-32, 33, 37, 55, 62, 147, 309, 352 -for European security and co-

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)-287

Infrastructure-213, 218, 219, 239, 250

Integration:

-socialist economic integration-289

-West European-45, 74, 83, 97, 102, 103, 105, 300, 309, 312, 314, 321, 322, 323, 324, 327-30, 334, 335, 351

-women's-140, 141, 146, 150, 155, 158

International competition-210

International Consultative Meeting in Moscow-151

International division of labour -42, 43, 80, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 205, 207, 216, 219, 228, 235, 310

International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow (June 1969)-67

International tension-46, 47, 49, 144, 153, 154, 165, 227, 351

Peace Programme-10, 11, 48, 56,

110, 139, 162, 167, 168, 252 Peaceful coexistence-27, 38, 42,

43-46, 50-56, 65, 69, 70, 81, 101,

136, 139, 141, 146, 152, 153,

161, 167, 260, 311, 343, 346,

347, 351, 352 Peaceful settlement of disputes-

39, 50, 67, 122, 125, 146, 164 Political parties:

-CDU/CSU-129, 323

-CPSU:

-13th Congress-66

-20th Congress-65

SUBJECT INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX

Scientific and technical potential -234, 235, 236

Scientific and technical revolution-43, 51, 52, 76, 79, 108, 154, 198, 200, 204, 216, 259, 310, 345

Second World War-29, 30, 60, 61, 65, 66, 68, 105, 155, 168, 169, 240, 332, 347, 349

Security:

-collective-56, 59, 60, 64, 65, 89, 162, 164, 167, 168 -European-37, 38, 48, 56, 57, 58-63, 65, 66-71, 74, 75, 79, 82, 86-88, 90-94, 95-105, 106, 108- 14, 121-24, 126, 128, 129, 134, 139-43, 145, 146-50, 153, 154, 156-62, 166-70, 178, 232, 268, 281, 282, 301, 308, 312, 319, 320, 325, 328, 329, 330, 333, 334-40, 349, 358, 359 -military guarantees-74, 103 -nuclear guarantees-45, 74, 90, 98, 185, 186

-system of-27, 29, 38, 42, 44- 47, 48, 51, 57, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 75, 78, 86, 87, 89, 108, 137, 139, 140, 142, 153, 157,

161, 162, 166, 193, 232, 301, 307, 308, 320-22, 325, 328, 335, 340-43, 346

-world-29, 37, 68, 71, 139, 153,

162, 163, 168, 256, 345 Soviet-French summit meetings-

103, 115, 131, 252 Soviet-US summit meetings-107,

131, 252 Specialisation-196, 204, 210, 220,

228, 229, 230, 242 ``Superpower'' diplomacy-85 "Supranational Europe"-32l,

323, 328

Talks:

-on armed forces and arms cuts in Central Europe-72, 83, 103, 107, 118, 123, 153, 178, 179-82, 184, 185-90, 320, 333 -on a collective security system in Europe (USSR-France, 1933)-60

-to limit strategic arms-35, 36, 168, 320

-Soviet-Anglo summit-104, 131, 252

-Soviet-US summit-72, 114, 115 -on West Berlin-107

Treaties:

- draft All-European Treaty on Collective Security-64, 164 -draft treaty on general and complete disarmament-165 -of Friendship and Co-- operation among European States165

-of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance-29, 31 -on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests -72

-multilateral treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance-29

-mutual treaties built up by the European socialist countries-63, 64

-nuclear non-proliferation-168 -socialist community countries and the FRG-34, 68, 332 -Versailles Treaty-57

Trade discrimination-126, 214, 215

U

United Nations: 155,157,163,165,

168, 216, 230, 249, 250, 266, 267, 284, 287, 288, 291, 296, 297, 316, 330, 331, 332 -Association of the USA-330, 331

-Charter-14, 265 -Environment programme (UNEP)-287, 291 -World Federation of United Nations Associations-151 UN organisations:

-FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation)-287, 297 -ILO (International Labour Organisation) -297 -ITU (International Telecommunication Union)-287 -UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development)-250 -UNESCO-16, 155, 249, 250, 266, 267, 270, 275, 279, 287 -UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organisation)-249 -UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research)-249 -WHO (World Health Organisation)-287, 297

-WMO (World Meteorological Organisation) -288 USSR Parliamentary group-141

w

War in Vietnam-36, 73, 184, 192

Warsaw Treaty (Pact)-25, 29, 31, 65, 66, 91, 98, 99, 106, 116, 117, 128, 162, 164, 166, 168, 178, 180, 182, 185, 189, 191, 192, 315, 320, 323, 331, 333, 334 -summit meeting in Bucharest, July 1966-91

Women's International Democratic Federation-157

World Federation of Trade Unions-147, 149, 150

World Festival of Youth and Students, 10th-146

World industrial production-31, 200

World revolutionary process-28

World system of economic ties -196, 207

Yalta agreement-106

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.

Please send all your comments to 17, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.

This hook has been produced l>y a team of Soviet students of international affairs and prominent publir figures, and deals with some of the more urgent problems of I'moptati security and co-operation, whose study has now become a major line in political thinking and scientific research.

In his Introduction. Chairman of the Soviet of the 1 'nion of (he USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation A. I', Sheetikov notes the significant changes that have occurred on the European lontinent. particularly emphasising the lolc of Ihc Conference on Seciniu aoil (! ooperation in Europe.

The authors give a detailed analysis of the foreign polity followed by the Soviet Union and other socialist toniiiuiiiit\ countries, which laid the foundation for changes in Kiiropcan affairs, and also of the policies of the West I^;.»?'o|)ean stales, describing both the development of the realistic tendencies and the manoeuvres of the opponents of detente.

They deal with the prospects opening up before the clcicnlc .did the possible ways to se( up a European security system, with special chapters on co-operation in different areas, and the problems of military detente, and also deal with the activity of Europe's public forces. On the whole, this work is abreast of the modern science of international relations and may help understand (he historic changes that have occurred in Europe over the past few years.

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