current problems
B. G. KUZNETSOV
__TITLE__ PhilosophyPROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW
Translated from the Russian by Ye. D. Khakina and V. L. Sulima
CONTENTS
B. F. KysneijoB
(WUIOCOOHfl OHTHMHSMA Ha
Part One
EPISTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
Cognoscemus!................
7
Optimism, Being, Motion............
27
Initial Conditions..............
37
The ``Is'' and the "Ought to Be".........
42
Optimism and Immortality...........
53
Labour and Freedom.............
60
The Problem of Old Age............
66
Part Two
SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
Why the Year 2000?.............
74
The Age of Einstein.............
94
The Atom.................
114
Quantum Electronics.............
130
Molecular Biology..............
142
Cybernetics.................
158
``Know-How" and "Know Where"........
178
De Rerum Natura..............
199
High-Energy Physics.............
231
Space...................
240
Post-Atomic Civilisation............
248
Part Three
ECONOMIC CONCEPTION OF OPTIMISM
Integral Goals of Science............
269
Science and Economic Dynamics .........
284
Inter-Branch Information............
300
Forecasts of Understanding and Forecasts of Reason
309
Econometry of Optimism............
323
First printing 1977 © Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1977
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
K
10502---639
143-77
014(01)-77
PART ONE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
COGNOSCEMUS!
Old Russian legends often feature a knight who pauses before a sign at a crossroads, reading "If you go right.. . If you go left. . .", with one side of the inscription threatening misfortune and the other promising success. Today mankind is at a similar crossroads. One "side of the sign" portends atomic war and destruction of civilisation. This "side of the sign" involves a lot of documents, research papers, and novels (among them a novel by Nevil Shute, written in 1957, about the destruction of mankind as a result of an atomic war in 1962-63). The other ``side'', the optimistic one, predicts an unprecedented flourishing of culture and welfare, a substantial lengthening of life, stamping out of diseases, an unparalleled rise of intellectual and moral standards. It should be noted that here, too, the laconic legend is substituted for an incredible mass of information. Optimistic prognostication includes a host of genres, philosophical and sociological generalisations alternating with economic curves, technological diagrams, physical formulas.... But there is one peculiarity that distinguishes modern optimistic prognosis not only from the legendary portent, but from former numberless attempts to predict the future of mankind. Modern prognosis in its optimistic and pessimistic aspects is formulated in the way which is called open condition in English grammar. It is not unequivocal, there is no fatalism about it: the events predicted will happen if mankind will right now start making provisions for them by taking the necessary measures to create initial conditions for certain developments. Forecasting becomes the starting point of planning
«
PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
intended to realise initial conditions ensuring an optimal prognosis, an optimal course of further development. For this reason, the modern epoch is different from the past particularly by the fact that Man is thinking more about the future and that Man's thinking has become unprecedentedly prognostic. Now, as never before, have ideas about the future and the integral destiny of the world become a necessary element in man's purposive activity. The concept of planning is merging with that of ideal and accordingly the concept of optimism, which is a synthesis of the ``is'' and the "ought to be", their correlation coefficient, passes from emotion to will, tending not only to will but to knowledge, to the establishment of the ``is'' and discovery in this ``is'' of that which leads to the "ought to be''.
Optimism, however, by no means loses its emotional nature, the sensation of optimistic joy never disappearing. Quite the reverse, the emotional content of optimism becomes deeper, richer and more complex. It involves not only expectation of better things to come, but conviction of their causality. The establishment of such causality, or, in other words, the development of science, becomes inseparable from emotional uplift.
Science meets emotions halfway. The very science that called into being atomic energy, quantum electronics, molecular biology, is becoming incomparably more emotional than it was in the past. Non-classical science has, in fact, brought mankind to the crossroads: "If you go right ... If you go left ... ". Non-classical science---the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and all that they gave rise to---clearly and distinctly demonstrates the unity of scientific, moral and esthetic ideals. The value of cognition, i.e., its impact on man's life, its economic, social, cultural, moral, esthetic effect, is becoming a necessary element of the development of knowledge. In this sense, the atomic age witnesses a fusion of the criteria of truth and value. A synthetic world-outlook, wherein truth is inseparable from moral and esthetic ideals, is becoming a necessary precondition of scientific, social and economic progress.
The philosophy of optimism begins with optimism attributed to philosophy itself, with the assertion of its im-
PART ONE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
9
mortality, revealing those invariants whose existence is the other side of preservation, in this case, the preservation of a fundamentally general flow of cognition, a single picture of the evolutionary world and Man in it, with the assertion of the value of such a picture.
The very possibility of a historically developing philosophy has been debated since ancient times. "The existence theorem" of the history of philosophy was not simple. Philosophy must be truth, but truth is single and if it is to remain such, it cannot change. Thus the concepts of philosophy and history seemed to exclude each other. Indeed, within the framework of dogmatic philosophy each school saw a certain evolution behind it, a history of errors through which truth was making its way to be finally attained within the given system, leaving to the future only details to be elaborated and arguments to be accumulated. Kant's philosophy remained dogmatic in that it denied meaning to those questions that were answered by the content of the historically developing concepts of the world. Hegel's philosophy included history, but excluded prediction. Self-knowledge of the absolute spirit concludes the radical transformation of cognition and its object. True dialectical philosophy must regard knowledge as a historically developing reflection of the infinitely developing being, incorporate not only its own history, but also its further evolution, infinite in principle, its prospects, its ``futurology''.
Does that mean that philosophy has no invariant, immutable content? No, it does not. The very concept of change loses its meaning without the statement of the historically invariant subject of change that is identical to itself. What are the invariants of philosophy?
First and foremost, these are conflicts of being, knowledge and value. The conflicts of being are: the inseparability of discreteness and continuity, the inseparability of the local ``here-now-being'' and the infinite "beyond-- herenow-being". The conflict of knowledge is the inseparability of the empirical and rational cognition of the world. The conflict of value is an axiological conflict of the ``is'' and the "ought to be", to be discussed further on. Philosophy and science solve these conflicts, at the same time preserv-
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11ing them to address them to the future, seeing in the invariance of these conflicts their immortality. But in respect of philosophy optimism does not limit itself to such a conviction. Optimism discovers the sources of philosophical conflicts in the objective conflicts of the world, and the means of solving these philosophical problems, in the knowledge of the objective world which is inseparable from its transformation. In the transformation of the world lies the value of philosophy. Conviction in the immortality and value of philosophy is based on the certainty of the immortality and value of the world, the possibility of its cognition and transformation, the possibility of Man's ideals being objectified as a result of cognition and transformation of the world. Thus, optimism directed at philosophy follows from optimism directed at its object, the world. The value of knowledge follows from the knowledge of value. The underlying idea of modern optimism linked with modern science, with the prediction of its economic, ecological, social, moral and esthetic effect, is the existence of a certain ordering, an objective ratio, an objective value in the world itself. It is the knowledge of this rational structure of the world to be comprehended by reason, the knowledge of its objective value, that is the foundation of the value of knowledge, the source of the effectiveness of science, of the transformation of the world, of the realisation of man's ideals.
Epistemological optimism following from the assertion of an ordering of the world and its comprehensibility, has become a condition of and a factor in the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. This role is now played by dynamic epistemological optimism---the idea of infinite knowledge, not restricted by any absolute limits of transformation, clarification and particularisation of true concepts of the world, and the transformation of the fundamental concepts themselves.
Already classical science and classical philosophy supplied a clear and profound motivation for epistemological optimism. Hegel put forth decisive theoretical arguments against agnosticism, and 18th and 19th century science, in fact, applied epistemological principles which excluded agnostic pessimism. By the end of the 19th century there
existed a dialectical philosophy of science, which generalised not only its results, but also its dynamics, motion and transformations. However, in classical science, the transformation of fundamental principles was only sporadic; it was rarely repeated within the life-span of a single generation, and conclusions concerning the unlimited and entirely unrestricted development of science could be drawn only at a very high level of abstraction.
Non-classical science follows a different course of development. In it a revision of fundamental principles becomes not only a permanent background, but a condition, and a component of the continuous progress in comprehending the world and transforming the entire civilisation on the basis of the new concepts.
In non-classical science, each big concrete step in fundamental research proves that scientific progress is unlimited, that knowledge is unbounded. The absence of such limits ceased to be an abstract problem removed from the actual content and tempo of scientific progress. Infinite progress became, in Hegel's philosophy, true infinity, reflected in each finite link, thus acquiring a local meaning. It is not a question of whether scientific progress will end in a billion years, but of something quite different: whether science has any problems principally insoluble or, on the other hand, there exist problems which are connected with the modern development of science, with its actual tendencies, its local steps and local episodes. An analogy with the local demonstration of the limitlessness and infinite world space may not be inappropriate here. In its time the problem of the infinity and finity of the world did not allow a solution on the basis of local statements concerning a given point of space. However, in 1854 Riemann perceived that the problem could be solved locally: if space surrounding us is curved positively, it is finite; if the curve is zero or negative, space is infinite. This analogy does not lay claim to anything more than a simple explanation of the modern situation, in which the style of science, the permanent and essentially continuous change of its ideals makes the presumption of infinite progress and epistemological optimism a direct outcome of the development of science and often a condition and stimulus
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13of such development. Non-classical science neither created nor discovered epistemological optimism, but formulated it explicitly and clearly. Moreover, non-classical science transformed epistemological optimism into a component of scientific and technical, economic and social optimism.
Let us consider the relatively partial and narrow form of epistemological pessimism propounded in 1872 by Du Bois-Reymond in his speech "On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature". In this speech Du Bois-Reymond uttered his pessimistic formula: "Ignoramus!" (We do not know), and further, "Ignorabimus!" (We will never know), we will never know the nature of things, rerum natura. "What is the nature of the atom? What is the nature of perception?" asks Du Bois-Reymond. There is but one answer to these questions: we do not know and we will never know. This conception follows from a certain notion of the nature of knowledge. Du Bois-Reymond identifies the progress of science with the establishment of the mechanical basis of phenomena: positions, velocities, and accelerations of bodies, i.e., their behaviour, and forces which, in their turn, are determined by the positions and velocities of the bodies. Thus, the field of research is limited to the two problems formulated by Newton in his Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy)---determination of the position of bodies by forces and determination of forces by the position of bodies. The subsequent development of science added to these problems determination of forces by velocity, as forces proved to be dependent on the motion of bodies. Such a definition yields a mechanistic picture of the world where there is nothing but moving bodies and their interaction, forces. But motion and interaction of particles cannot explain what is a particle.
Classical science and classical philosophy (in so far as it generalised the dynamics of science) found a way out of this pessimistic cul-de-sac. Already in the 19th century the goals of cognition were no longer reduced to the detection of motion and interaction of bodies as the ultimate explanation of rerum natura. Non-classical science went further. Not only did it revise, restrict and generally reject the notion of cognition as reduction of processes of nature
to the behaviour of simple elements, but ascribed to these elements an infinitely complex nature. The particle possesses a contradictory corpuscular and wave nature. This basic statement of quantum mechanics is only the beginning of further transition to an ever more complex notion of the world. Characteristic of non-classical science of today are attempts to construct elementary particles out of particles of considerably greater mass or present the very existence of particles as a result of their interaction. Whatever the destiny of concrete hypotheses may be, the general tendency of non-classical physics is to present the particle as an infinitely complex reflection of the infinitely complex world.
This tendency transcends the picture of the world in which the existence of a particle is reduced to its behaviour. It can be shown that herein lies the conflict of classical science; raising it to an absolute brought Du BoisReymond to his "/gnorabimus".
The train of Du Bois-Reymond's thinking is this. He examines the mechanistic explanation of the world in its ideal form---Laplace's supreme reason that knows the position and velocities of all particles in the Universe and can predict all of its future up to the day when the cross crowns Agia-Sophia. But, asks Du Bois-Reymond, will it bring science closer to answering the question: "What is a particle?''
That is the age-old problem of the classical mechanistic conception of the world. Descartes expressed this conception in almost perfect form, thereby approaching its limits. He singled out the body from the environment, ascribing to it only behaviour, only motion: it is this behaviour, this motion, that determines the body's existence, individualises and distinguishes it from surrounding space. But what is it that moves, what is the subject of motion, or, if we are to consider the problem in its atomistic aspect, what is an atom? Descartes, Newton and all classical science relegated such questions from the sphere of natural science, from physics to metaphysics. It was Spinoza who denied the existence of any reality other than spatial, any world other than a physical world, subject, in principle, to scientific explanation. But science in the proper sense of
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15the word, that is, science based on experiment and mathematical analysis, did not consider the problem of subject in statements like a body is moving, and however closely the picture of the world might approach Laplace's ideal, the problem of subject could not be solved, and answers to questions like "What is a particle?", "How does it differ from the space it occupies?", "How is a body to be distinguished from position?", could not be found within the mechanistic conception of the world.
Of a similar kind is the problem of the reasons for this or that behaviour of a body. Classical field theory demonstrated how forces change, how they are affected by spatial arrangement of sources, by their motion, by changes in other forces (effect of changes of electrical forces and vice versa), yet, it did not come closer to answering the question, what is force. Neither was the ether theory an answer to this question; it dealt with the motion of ether, reducing gravitational and electrical forces to ethereal impulses, but the direct impulse explained the substance of force just as little, as did action at a distance.
A second reason for "Ignorabimus" is the impassibility to obtain a definition of consciousness or even the primary psychic act---sensation, however detailed the knowledge might be about the motion of atoms making up the brain. Suppose a picture of molecular motions in the brain is unfolding itself before our eyes. Are we any closer to the definition of sensation or consciousness as distinct from motion of matter? We are not crossing this threshold, and, so far as one can see, we shall never cross it. Here, as in the case of atoms and forces, no amount of detailed information about atomic motion involved in psychical acts will reveal the substantial distinction between sensation and motion. In the opinion of Du Bois-Reymond here again we deal not only with "Ignoramus!" but with " Ignorabimus!" as well.
Most critics of Du Bois-Reymond rejected the limits of knowledge on the plea that describing the behaviour of atoms is, as a matter of fact, explaining their nature, and the description of the behaviour of brain atoms presents an ideal explanation of the physical life, beginning with sensations. This was criticism from a mechanistic stand-
point, as manifestations of a thing in its behaviour were taken to be its essence.
The proposition that rerum natura, substance, the essence of things can be reduced to movements of atoms was incompatible with epistemology which had developed from generalisations based upon evolution of science, its progress and transformation. The greatest 19th-century discoveries in natural science demonstrated that Laplace's supreme reason far from cognising the existence of atoms as distinct from space, would not have been able to cognise motion itself, as the latter embodies the contradiction between reducibility and non-reducibility of higher forms of motion to elementary movements of atoms. Even if Laplace's supreme reason had known the positions and velocities of all particles of the Universe, as Du BoisReymond puts it, it would not have been able to understand the essence of the atom or the essence of thinking. Nor, by reducing the picture of the world to movements of atoms would it have been able to explain a number of laws of the world that are most obviously within the limits of knowledge. Laplace's supreme reason knowing the positions and velocities of atoms, would not have been able to understand the political and military reasons that led to such events as the replacement of the crescent by the cross on the Hagia Sophia, had it solved all the differential equations describing the motion of particles making up the crescent, the cross and the organisms of men involved in that replacement. But that is not all. Laplace's supreme reason with its mechanics of atoms would not have been able to comprehend the essence of entropy, the essence of irreversible thermodynamic processes or the simple fact that heat is not transferred from a cold body to a hot one. There is no entropy in atomic mechanics; it appears only in statistic ensembles of molecules to demonstrate the non-reducibility of more complex forms of motion, such as heat, to a simpler form, mechanics of the atom. Dialectics as theory of knowledge changes the very definition of cognition. Knowledge is unlimited not because it is capable of embracing at any given moment the whole of the infinite complexity of substance, reducing it to the motion of atoms. Knowledge is unlimited and infinite not in the sense of actual infinity,
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17but in a different sense: it is potentially infinite and the absence of absolute limits stands for this kind of infinity. Infinite knowledge reveals the inseparability of forms of motion from more elementary ones and likewise their nonreducibility to more elementary forms. In this sense, "the limits of knowledge" turned out to be limits of specific laws that are replaced by other laws characteristic of other forms of motion. These specific limits proved to be transitions from comparatively simple laws to more complex ones, from elementary processes to ever more concrete and contradictory ones.
Nineteenth century science interpreted elementary processes as motion of atoms subject to Newtonian laws. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, science faced an unexpectedly new limit, which also proved to be relative and transitory, but was no longer a specific but a general limit of the type of cognition that reduced the picture of the world to atomic movements subject to Newtonian mechanics. This general limit revealed itself in facts which contradicted Newtonian mechanics, the postulate of the independence of mass from motion and field continuity. In classical science, complex processes were not reduced to elementary ones, but the very existence of elementary processes was never doubted. Neither were the classical laws governing these elementary processes. Now these laws were found to be mere approximations. Specific limits were the basis for the classification of science, whereas general limits were the basis for its periodisation. The classical era in science was over. A new epoch began. Not only did Newtonian mechanics---the theory of elementary processes in the classical picture of the world---prove to be inexact, but the very concept of elementary processes became rather relative. Processes and objects that are supposedly elementary in nature according to the modern view of the world, turn out to be the most complex and mediate, and require for their explanation references to the infinitely complex structure of the world as a whole.
Geoffrey F. Chew identified one of the characteristic features of non-classical science as "the crisis of the elementary concept". He had a concrete concept in view, the
existence of a certain type of particles dependent on their interaction; but "the crisis of elementariness" and denial of reducibility to elementary, simple processes and objects, essentially characterises non-classical science as a whole, whatever the destiny of concrete physical concepts.
In fact, an ``elementary'' particle appears to be the most complex physical object, the ever growing complexity of physical conceptions being a most general epistemological feature. The modern concept of knowledge is distinguishable from the concept of cognition resulting in absolute "Ignorabimus" or absolute comprehension of the world (but absolute and complete in both cases). The former concept is as different from the latter ultimate picture as modern dynamics differs from Aristotelian cosmology in which the "natural movement" of bodies ended in the "natural places" of these bodies.
The dynamic optimism of cognition, the concept of its fundamentally infinite nature, the paramount significance of differential criteria---the speed and acceleration of science---which replace the illusion of the realised and completed epistemological ideal, are, as we shall attempt to demonstrate, the source of the dynamic effect of contemporary non-classical science on civilisation, and the basis of dynamic scientific, technological and economic optimism.
Non-classical science rejects not only restricted and ultimate conceptions but norms and methods of cognition given once and for all. Non-classical science questioned not only fundamental physical principles, but geometrical and logical principles as well. The theory of relativity lent physical content to non-Euclidean geometry. Quantum mechanics provided physical interpretations for logical norms, thereby making them mobile and dependent on the experiment. Knowledge liberated itself from all absolute limits. It liberated itself from ontological absolutes---absolute space, absolute time and elementary "bricks of the Universe", autonomous in their existence. It likewise liberated itself from epistemological limitations--- the fiction of complete knowledge and absolute mathematical and logical norms claiming an a priori character. But is infinite cognition an optimistic prognosis?
2---01545
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19In his History of Scientific Literature in New Languages Leonardo Olschki says: "For those used to look into the root of things, Galileo unravelled an insoluble world mystery and a science infinitely stretching in time and space, whose infinity was to arouse a feeling and awareness of man's solitude and helplessness."* Such a note--- a perception of solitude and helplessness---sounded in the complex emotional effect of the 17th century scientific revolution (just as in the still more complex emotional effect of modern non-classical science). This note could be heard, for instance, in Pascal. However, the total emotional effect of scientific transformations liberating knowledge from limits and absolutes, is different, and v largely opposite, it is optimistic.
In this book the epithet ``optimistic'' does not have an emotional meaning, at any rate not entirely emotional. It is associated with the goals of science, denoting a correlation between the forecast and the goal that science sets itself at the given moment. The goals of science will be dealt with in another essay. Now we would like to make these points. The goal of classical science was often taken to be the ideal of complete knowledge. Indeed, the unattainability of this ideal considered as the absolute limit of science was the reason for the pessimistic `` Ignorabimus'' complementing the local statement of "Ignoramus". Now, the goals of science are based on its differential criteria. Science does not seek to achieve ultimate truth, but the most rapid and most efficient progress towards truth. We shall see later that this feature of non-classical science determines its economic effect. But let us not digress from the problem of epistemological optimism opposed both to "Ignoramus" and "Ignorabimus". As far as ``Ignoramus'" is concerned, the statement of unresolved problems now is inseparable from the positive statement of "Cognoscimus"---"we know". This "Cognoscimus" has a differential meaning not only in terms of information obtained, but also in terms of new theoretical and experimental methods of obtaining further information, its
speedier acquisition, and the emergence of new problems and stimuli for scientific creativity. "Ignoramus" is now inseparable not only from "Cognoscimus", but likewise from "Cognoscemus"---"we will know''.
From the contemporary standpoint, the classical illusion of complete knowledge seems a pessimistic conception, a negative statement: explanation cannot go further, without losing its meaning. Here we encounter an extremely curious ``castling'' of the concepts of pessimism and optimism.
Its essence is as follows.
For dogmatic explanation (in more general terms, for the understanding of science) the source of optimism is the achievement of an ultimate explanation or the hope of such an achievement. For dynamic explanation (for the reason of science) the prospect of an ultimate solution putting an end to all questions of ``why'' and ``wherefore'', terminating the inquisitive, restless line of scientific development, will be a pessimistic one, a pessimistic prognosis. Contrariwise, restlessness, incompletion, and the prospect of an infinite series of new questions are a source of optimism.
Why are the terms ``understanding'' and ``reason'' of science appropriate here? The traditional distinction between understanding and reason ascribes to understanding the knowledge of the finite, to reason, that of the infinite. The actual progress of science is impossible unless there exists a synthesis of laws of understanding explaining a given phenomenon, and reason's presumption of further and potentially infinite knowledge of the world. Although in the non-classical epoch the inquisitive `` reason'' accompanying the ``understanding'', accompanying the soothing, positive melody of scientific progress is becoming loud and clear, it fails to drown out the positive melody, becoming, as it does, one with it. Today every partial answer is at the same time a question addressed to the entire chain of scientific explanations. We will cite here Einstein's answer to the question posed by the Michelson experiment. His answer involved very general principles, the nature of space and time, that which seemed initial and not subject to further analysis, that which
2*
* L. Olschki, Geschichte der neusprachlichen wissenschaftlichen Litcratur, Bd. 3, Halle (Saale), 1927 pp. 118-19.
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21Kant considered to be a priori. But Einstein's conception denied an a priori nature of space and time; it even denied the a priori status of geometric axioms. These axioms themselves are mediated, and the physical explanation of the world's geometry disappears in the distance, in the infinite series of increasingly new physical statements of fact. In the theory of relativity, the infinity of cognition is present in each concrete, local finite link, in the explanation of experimental results. We are unwittingly brought back to Riemann's idea of the local reflection of infinite space.
The fact of this reflection creates in science a continuous line of questions directed at the future, unresolved conflicts, prognoses and expectations, already discussed above. This line is ever more apparent in contemporary, non-classical science. In its very essence, it is closely related to the emotional component of science and, in particular, to optimism in its psychological aspect, to a certain set of moods and feelings.
This optimism, related to the inquisitive and infinityseeking component of scientific creativity, is in no way rectilinear and monochromatic; it is tinged with regret for the classical values being destroyed. This regret, however, is not tragic (as it was with Lorentz who wished he had died before classical physics was wrecked), but rather lyrical and resigned. This optimism also includes satisfaction engendered by the indestructibility of the classical values.
To show with greater clarity and concreteness the connection between modern optimism and the dynamics of science, the inevitable transformation of the most fundamental conceptions, we will deal in greater detail with the history of the most general and stable absolutes of classical science. These embrace absolute space existing independently of the bodies immersed in it and having invariable geometrical properties defying further analysis; absolute time flowing irrespective of physical processes; the invariable "bricks of the Universe" devoid of inner structure; and finally, universal laws of being applicable to all domains, to all series of phenomena.
All these absolutes acted as limits of knowledge. Absolute space and absolute time explain the flow of physical
processes, though they themselves do not depend on anything, thus breaking off the essentially continuous causal analysis.
Derivation of extension from extensionless substance (Leibniz) or the Kantian conception of space and time as a priori subjective forms of knowledge, also break the chain of physical causes proper; in fact here again a metaphysical wall is built blocking scientific, causal and physical knowledge.
The next absolute are the "bricks of the Universe". Classical atomistics either ascribed to atoms absolute homogeneity, or operating with complex and qualitatively different particles, saw the ideal of scientific explanation in homogeneous, simple, genuinely elementary atoms. Classical atomistics never lost hope to attain this ideal which was, in classical times, an optimistic prospect, predicting absolute, complete knowledge.
It is natural that the unextended, point-like atom of Boscovich or Wolff should have no inner structure. Neither was it to be found in the extended, ``final'', non-- quality, homogeneous atom which completed or sought to complete the scientific, causal spatial and temporal analysis. Such an analysis, passing from the larger links in the hierarchy of discrete parts of matter to smaller ones, referred, in explaining the properties of the system, to its inner structure, to the existence of smaller systems; the qualitative properties of the particle were explained by the location and motion of sub-particles. The last link of the hierarchy could be a non-quality particle consisting of homogeneous substance. The spatial and temporal causal analysis thus came to an end.
The eternal laws of being were the end, the limit, the exhaustion of such an analysis. Cognition, in principle, included in its schemes an infinite number of phenomena subject to these laws, but the laws themselves remained independent of this content. And when attempts were made to derive them from something else, to make them mediate and secondary with regard to more general and fundamental principles, classical thought went into metaphysical regions, deserting the field of causal investigation. Whatever the explanation of eternal laws within the
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23framework of classical philosophy, whether they appealed to convention or providence, scientific analysis ended right here. When classical science contrasted itself to metaphysics, eternal laws were viewed as a result of induction, as a conclusion from observations; such, at least, was Newton's position. But this precisely means that the question of Why? is divorced from eternal laws.
The absolutes of classical science---the invariance of absolute space and absolute time, the homogeneity and invariance of atoms, the homogeneity, universality and invariance of the eternal laws of existence that seemed to be embodied in Newtonian axioms of motion were the basis of the ``Victorian'' static optimism, the peaceful and joyful , belief that if science has not yet come into a haven of knowledge accomplished in its essence, it will soon do so. This "feeling of haven" is just as characteristic of `` Victorian'' optimism as the sensation of departure from the haven to enter the boundless open sea of science is characteristic of contemporary epistemological optimism.
With regard to optimism permeated with the "feeling of haven" the term ``Victorian'' is more appropriate than the term ``classical''. Classical science and the peculiarities of 19th century culture and social psychology that depended on its contents and style were not at all unitary. The ``inquisitive'' and dynamic tradition projected into the future---the essential component of the development of science---was never interrupted. But this trend, to draw a remote analogy, did not occupy the front benches in the parliament of science, and rather was in opposition, which manifested itself in the assertion of contradictions, antinomies, and the logical incompleteness of contemporary science. Such assertions were, in particular, the basis of the relativist critique of Newtonian mechanics in the 19th century. They were sometimes called ``catastrophes'' (e.g., the "ultra-violet catastrophe" from which physics was saved by the idea of the quantum emission of radiation). The 20th century put an end to the so-called ``Victorian'' illusions of constant prosperity prevalent during the long years of Queen Victoria's reign. ``Victorian'' optimism in science was based not so much on the absence as on the ignorance of contradictions and inconsistencies in the classical absolutes.
The basic fact is that in the classical period the critique of absolutes involved a very high level of abstraction. When one meditated on the infinity of the Universe (such meditations, as Riemann rightly noted, had but little bearing on the main problems of experimental investigation of nature), one ran into paradoxes of infinite forces acting on each body in the gravitational field of the infinite Universe, of the night sky filled with an infinite multitude of stars.
The genesis of non-classical science is based on a different situation: paradoxes arose out of experiments, science could not develop and later could not find application without explicit formulation of paradoxes, without what Einstein called flight from paradoxes, i.e., without transferring the aura of paradoxicalness from experimental results to the general axioms of science, or re-evaluating these axioms. The infinite variability of the axioms, the fundamental infinity of scientific progress became a characteristic feature of each major local episode in the development of science. We will again recur to the analogy with Riemann's problem of the infinity and finity of space which is solved by local definitions and local experiments.
What is the destiny of classical absolutes in modern science?
For absolute space and absolute time, the most dramatic moment was the identification of the spatial and temporal curve with the gravitational field---the emergence of the general theory of relativity. The geometric properties of space, the axioms of world geometry no longer give reason for attributing to them an a priori or conventional character. They acquire physcial meaning and become empirically knowable subject to experimental testing, i.e., " external confirmation''.
The absolute elementariness of the "bricks of the Universe" also became problematic and relative. Nowadays it figures in physics as just another name for transition to a higher level of complexity. The elementary particles of modern physics possess both wave and corpuscular properties, which gives rise to a number of conflicts extremely paradoxical from the classical point of view, and primarily, the indeterminacy of either the position or the im-
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25pulse of the particle, depending on the conditions, the macrocosm and choice of macroscopic instrument. The particle's complexity is not reduced to classical complexity, i.e., to the presence of an inner structure, the presence of subparticles. Its complexity, on the contrary, is representative of the complexity of the Universe, its structure being one of external interactions into the still more paradoxical interaction of the particle with itself. Above, mention has already been made of conceptions characteristic of modern physics, explaining the particle's existence in terms of its interaction with other particles of the Universe. The elementary particle is not the concluding link of the causal analysis but transition to a more complex one dealing with paradoxical statements and transforming them into natural conclusions from the paradoxical general conception of the world. Thus was realised Lenin's idea of the inexhaustibility of the electron, expressed at the beginning of the century.* Likewise was realised his idea of the transition from the electromagnetic picture of the world to an infinitely more complex picture/^^1^^"*
Non-classical science relativated and restricted yet another reason for the ``Victorian'' "feeling of haven"---the idea of invariable and eternal laws. This feeling was nurtured by the idea of a homogeneous world, of identical laws governing the microcosm and the macrocosm. The infinite Universe that once frightened Kepler (he wrote about his fright to Galileo) and Pascal (this will be discussed further on), becomes not so frightening when man learns that the infinite spaces and the ultra-microscopic regions are governed by the same customary laws and forms of being.
There has always existed a notion of infinite divisibility of matter and infinite transition to structures of an ever greater scope. But this infinite hierarchy consists of homogeneous structures. "These electrons may be worlds where there are the same five continents...", wrote Valery Bryusov. On the other hand, our galaxy may seem microscopic to a researcher in a megaworld, watching us through a microscope whose size is measured in billions
* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 262. ** Ibid., p. 280.
upon billions of light years. This rather dull picture conveys the idea of homogeneous laws of being. The existence of such laws is the natural limit of cognition. Non-- classical science does not know such laws. It deals with specific laws of the macrocosm and microcosm. Their specificity was known already in the 19th century. The daws of thermodynamics are macroscopic laws, they do not apply in the microcosm, and the mechanics of molecules is ignored in describing macroscopic fluxes of heat. In non-classical science it is all the more complicated; transitions to macroscopic laws are not based on mere ignoring statistics, but on rather paradoxical statements. The cardinal problem of our time is that of the relation between the specific laws of the ultra-microscopic world (they may be laws of annihilation and creation of elementary particles), the laws of the macrocosm and megaworld (the specific character of the latter may be illustrated by the mechanism of gravitational collapse).
There exists yet another form of the limitation of cognition and of epistemological pessimism. It does not hide under a statistically optimistic illusion of complete knowledge, but involves the boundary between subjective perceptions and the objective world. Does man's cognition break through this boundary, does it attain objective truth? What is postulated here is not complete, exhaustive knowledge of substance, or even an incipient authentic knowledge of substance. This is the most difficult form of agnosticism to overcome, the most fundamental and the most tormenting for human thought. It is directed against the basic presumption of knowledge---against the credible existence of a knowable world. It tortured Descartes until the Ulm inspiration of 1619 opened before him the way to knowledge that he thought credible. What can guarantee the reliability of sensory impressions, the credibility of that which registens in the consciousness through the sense organs? Is that not a dream? Does that which we see and feel by touch exist? Are not perhaps our ideas of the objective causes for our sensations illusory?
Hardly can anyone be found who would really doubt the existence of the external world. Solipsism is only an extreme (indeed the only consistent) form of agnosticism.
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27It is not the existence of the external world that is usually questioned, but the possibility of credible proof of its existence. Descartes found such proof, leaving, as it seemed to him, the ground of sensualism to take, as criterion of credible proof, doubt itself, consciousness itself (Cogito, ergo sum), searching in the external world that which in its clarity equals this cogito. He found it in pure extension and by liberating bodies from all predicates but extension. Descartes pictured a world which he recognised as credible.
And yet cognition searches for credibility of sensual impressions, for in their absence it cannot guarantee reliable conclusions. And here human thought faces the shadow of a more general and terrible "Ignorabimus" than that threatened by Du Bois-Reymond.
But this shadow, too, is only a phantom. The history of philosophy, science and technology provides decisive arguments in favour of credibility of objective existence. It is just these arguments that are contained in the history and the conclusions drawn by the genesis and transformation of the concepts of the world and methods of its change.
Agnosticism in relation to the existence of the external world results from the concept of cognition as a number of self-generating images and statements of fact, consciousness playing a passive role. And it is precisely for this reason that consciousness cannot penetrate the impermeable membrane of sensations, and can say nothing of whether or not anything exists on the other side of this membrane. But the actual facts are quite different. Consciousness functions actively on the basis of impressions, it arrives at conclusions not contained in these impressions. Consciousness is then objectified, Man acts on Nature and tests his conclusions that are not directly rooted in empirical facts. He does this in experiments and in industry. The coincidence of observable phenomena with theoretical calculations imparts a credible character to these phenomena. Man himself gets involved in this causal chain, he no longer doubts the subordination of the phenomena to certain causes. He discovers these causes, as the observable result was predetermined by the arrangement of
material processes realised in an experiment or in industry.
The epistemological effect of science is demonstrated even more distinctly when experimental results do not coincide with those derived from theory, i.e., in the case of paradoxical results, so characteristic of the genesis and development of non-classical science. This situation abrogates both epistemological empiricism (together with the sensual agnosticism deriving therefrom) and epistemological apriorism. The paradoxical result was by no means invented by us. It destroys that which was invented. Neither is it imposed on us empirically, since the genesis and development of non-classical theory consists in constructing new conceptions that possess "inner perfection" and logical harmony, connections with a wide range of observations and the ratio of the world as a whole. These conceptions likewise stand the test of "external confirmation" permitting unequivocal derivation of the observable paradoxical results which thus lose their paradoxicalness.
Neither empiricism, nor apriorism can avoid epistemological pessimism, an epistemological deadlock. Reality of that which is achieved by science is proved by an unequivocal relation of observable phenomena with the ratio of the world. This relation cannot be the result of mistaken feelings nor can it be a subjective construction of reason itself.
That is why non-classical science, with its paradoxical experimental results that, within the life-span of a single generation, rapidly attain "inner perfection" in a new theory, does the identical as classical science, but it does so with such rapidity that it results not only in the conviction in the credibility of existence but also in an optimistic sensation of continuously "departing from the haven". Such a psychological attitude is characteristic of sharp and decisive turns in science, when science actually leaves the haven. For non-classical science, such turns are the essence of its everyday life, its constant and continuous development, constantly changing its fundamental principles or preparing their change.
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29OPTIMISM, BEING, MOTION
ical conception of a particle containing a field, of a particle which participates in the interaction of other partticks, or possibly even in the universal interaction of all elements of the Universe. The existence of a particle, as has just been noted, includes its relation to the ordered whole possessing an objective ratio, which is not chaos but cosmos. The interaction of all cosmic elements includes universal existence into the particle's existence. Modern physics does not know particles isolated in space.
Nor does it know of particles isolated in time, particles without a past or a future. If we were to find a rational physical meaning in the transformation of ratio into a guarantee of being, long known to philosophy, it would appear that not only the instantaneous structure of the world is rational, but also its evolution. Each element of being must possess something to connect it with the spatial and temporal whole, each element of being is not only a real result of the past, but a realistic forecast for the future.
Here we will consider in greater detail the modern physical equivalents of abstract conflicts of being. We will deal with the totality of world points, i.e., the spatial and temporal positions of the particle, the assertion of its localisation at the given moment of time at a given point of space. What is the nature of the particle's motion that includes these four-dimensional world points; what is the four-dimensional world line of the particle? Is it a physical or purely geometrical image? Is a world line physically meaningful?
Mere transition from one spatial localisation to another, from given spatial coordinates to others, alongside the transition from one value of the temporal coordinate to another, does not yet constitute physical existence proper. Suppose that the world line is endowed with this kind of existence, that it cannot be reduced to a succession of fourdimensional localisations, that it is filled with events not reducible to such a succession. Suppose, for instance, that transmutational acts occur in world points, with particles of one kind being transformed into particles of another kind, with the new particle again reverting to the original type. It is irrelevant here whether there are
Thus, the paradoxical results of science work against epistemological pessimism, against unknowable substance, unknowable being. This epistemological function of the non-classical^experiment is realised through the "flight from miracle", the explanation of the paradox, its inclusion in a unitary picture of the world, in the ratio of the Universe. Knowledge of the world is cognition of the universal ratio, but not an abstract ratio, as is, for instance, the purely geometrical scheme of world lines, but a concrete ratio where individual elements retain their individuality, thus demonstrating their non-reducibility to the geometrical scheme, their physical existence. For this reason epistemological optimism is successively linked with the evolution of rationalism, which consistently encompasses the heterogeneous, contradictory, developing existence, and its sensual accompaniment, the "external confirmation" of rationalist schemes.
The basis of epistemological optimism is the real, objective ratio of the world. Epistemological optimism mainly consists in asserting this ratio. An optimistical evaluation of knowledge is primarily an assertion of reality, of the physical reality of its object and, consequently, its results. "Everything that is, is optimistic". In this phrase optimism does not characterise the evaluation but its object. This is not a stylistic error, but the concept of optimism extended to an objective situation which guarantees, or at least promises with a certain degree of probability the realisation of the optimistic forecast.
``Everything that is, is optimistic" is not a phrase of the Hegelian type, though this statement of fact is really close to its prototype. Indeed, "everything that is, is reasonable" includes in the definition of reality a certain structure apprehended by reason, a certain ratio; and this assertion reveails in each element of reality something that connects it with the ordered whole. As a matter of fact our contemporary associates Hegel's formula with the most rationalist (or even rationalistic, but with a strong isensual, empirical and even experimental accompaniment) images. Our contemporary will probably remember the quantum-mechan-
30
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physical grounds for such a hypothesis or not; we are dealing here with an artificially constructed illustration of a certain actual conflict.
Now a question arises: Is physical existence inherent in transmutational acts which are to guarantee the existence of the world line? Transmutation of the particle, transformation of one type of particle into another consists in the transition to a different mass, a different charge, to predicates which signify a definite world line, a certain behaviour of the particle in definite fields. Transmutation loses its physical meaning unless an eventual world line is forecast. The local event and the macroscopic whole, in this case, the world line embodied in it, are inseparably connected components of existence.
Let us compare this conclusion, a natural and almost self-obvious generalisation of modern non-classical science, with its historical prototypes. In fact, differential calculus, or rather the differential conception of motion, in essence, already contained the idea of an integral macroscopic process. We include in the ``now'', in the existence of a certain particle at the given moment, its speed, the limiting relation of its eventual motion with respect to time. For this, the predicted shift and the time necessary for it, are restricted to a point and an instant. Their limiting relation is the velocity of the particle. But that is not all. We forecast the acceleration of the particle and, again by restricting the forthcoming motion to a point, we can estimate the energy, mass and charge of the particle.
The inclusion of the spatial and temporal, macroscopic ratio in the local, individual being, the inclusion of the ``prognosis''---not a subjective forecast, but an objective, macroscopic process---is even more apparent in the integral principles of mechanics. The principle of least action requires that the actual world line of the particle be characterised by the minimal value of a certain integral. Thus that which is happening now and here, at the given moment and in the given place, depends on the kind of world line that connects each given world point not only with other spatial points, but with other moments, with other world points, with the past and the future. The local event depends on the integral result, on the character of the
PART ONE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
31
entire evolution moving from the past into the future. Actual motion is distinguished by the maximum or minimum value of the integral characterising the past as well as the future. Thus, the ``prognosis'' separates, as it were, the event on the real world line from events that may be imagined on other world lines, but do not possess existence in actual fact. The ``prognosis'' obviously becomes a property of existence and, unless we want to ascribe to Nature a conscientious goal, we must interpret ``prognosis' in an objective sense and allow the existence in Nature of a certain situation for which a prognosis without the quotes is feasible.
However, we must go further. The contemporary conception of a local event and the further behaviour of the particle conditioned by the local events is far from the classical ideal of unequivocal and exact dependence. In general, by determining the local event, the spatial and temporal coordinates of the particle, that is, by localising the particle in space and time we can only determine the probability of its velocity, i.e., "the prognostic" component of the local existence. This probability can be greater or smaller, "more optimistic" or "less optimistic" from the point of view of the realisation of the macroscopic law that defines the given world line, the given `` forecast'' and the forthcoming motion of the particle.
Is it legitimate to transfer the purely subjective conceptions into a region that knows neither prognostication nor evaluation, whether optimistic or pessimistic, of the forthcoming realisation of a goal set in advance? Of course, it would never occur to anybody to approximate this transference with teleological conceptions introducing conscious goals into Nature. We are dealing here with purely objective events and processes. But is it not an arbitrary and purely verbal operation to attribute ``prognostic'' and ``optimistic'' predicates, using quotes, to objective events, or even to consider quasi-prognostic, quasi-expedient and quasi-optimistic evaluations, not restricted by quotes? Is there a real connection, not arbitrarily inferred but objective, immanent and fundamental, between that which happens in Nature minus Man, and forecasts and optimistic and pessimistic evaluations (without either the "quasi"
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33prefix or quotes), that occur in Man's consciousness and nowhere else?
The legitimate transference and re-examination of concepts---their objectification, their application to objective events---follows from the real process of the objectification of Man's subjective conceptions from the realisation of his goals, from the existence of Man's purposive activity that is based on objective processes, suitably arranged on objective delimitations of processes in Nature, on their selection that conforms to Man's goals, on the choice of such initial situations whose combination predetermines the realisation of Man's aims. The seemingly simple statement, "There are objective processes in Nature, a certain combination of which may result in the attainment of a con-v scious goal", comprises a multitude of extremely diverse natural-scientific statements no longer presenting a picture of "Nature minus Man", but a picture of Nature as a totality of objects of Man's activity.
However, let us return to "Nature minus Man" and in the light of the above-said let us again pose the question: Is there in Nature, where there is no Man, not only ``more'' and ``less'' but also ``better'' and ``worse''?
The concept of optimism is not applicable to purely spatial, three-dimensional objects. Optimistic evaluations are applicable to processes, to something possessing a future, a better future. Consequently, the search for something ``better'' in Nature, the search for objective equivalents of optimism should first of all be directed to the most general description of temporal changes, the law of conservation of energy.
Of course, this law characterises the behaviour of the Universe and its elements with respect to time. But do we deal here with changes with respect to time? Has the law of conservation of energy anything to do with dynam: ic optimism which does not limit itself to a satisfied assertion of the immutability of existence?
And second: at first glance, the law of conservation of energy would seem to have nothing to do with ``better'' or ``worse'', but only with ``more'' and ``less''. The law of conservation establishes a quantitative commensurability of different forms of energy. Thus energy becomes homo-
geneous, as it were; it can be greater or smaller, but, in transitions from one form into another, both increase and decrease, ``more'' and ``less'' are excluded. But this is a comparatively simple version of the law of conservation of energy; Engels called it law of conservation in the negative: the law negates quantitative changes during qualitative transitions."" The qualitative and positive content of the law of conservation of energy consists in the proposition that energy, though it cannot be quantitatively created or destroyed, passes into qualitatively different forms.** Consequently it is heterogeneous, qualitatively non-identical. This is a very transparent illustration of the fundamental relation of identity, homogeneity, qualitative commensurability, on the one hand, and non-identity, heterogeneity, qualitative difference, on the other. Either pole without the other loses its meaning, purely quantitative conservation being a meaningless concept without a qualitative distinction, without two or more incoincident qualitative forms between which a quantitative identity is established.
That is by no means a purely logical construction. Physicists have long since been speaking about the future disappearance of distinctions between forms of energy, the transformation of all energy into thermal energy, the thermal death of the Universe. In a Universe that has gone through a similar evolution, the conservation of energy assumes no longer a negative, but a perfectly trivial zero meaning: energy does not increase or decrease in the transition from one form into another, because such transitions do not exist. The law of conservation of energy loses its physical meaning.
The prospect of thermal death is one of the destruction of cosmos, of its transformation into chaos. Can this prospect be called pessimistic? Intuitively an affirmative answer suggests itself: a prognosis forecasting the destruction of the world seems pessimistic, even if thermal death occurs far beyond the life-span of mankind, even in case thermal death does not eliminate local oases including our galaxy. We shall try to examine the sources of such an
* F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, Moscow, 1975, p. 18. ** Ibid.
3-01545
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35intuitive application of the concepts of pessimism and optimism.
The concept of Sadi Carnot that heat can pass from a hot body to a cold one, but cannot pass in the reverse direction, became the basis for the idea of the irreversible evolution of the world. In any process of heat transfer the difference in temperature decreases. If the difference in temperature can be increased in the given local system, it can only be done at the expense of a compensating and excessive levelling out in the environment or in other systems, in the world in general. Thus, a levelling out of temperature threatens the world. However, the transition of heat into mechanical energy is impossible unless there exist temperature gradients. When mechanical energy passes into heat (and this happens more or less constantly), in the total balance of nature the possibility of a reverse transition becomes increasingly smaller since temperature gradients are consistently levelled out. What the future holds in store for the Universe is transformation of all energy into heat, levelling out of heat distribution, the disappearance of temperature gradients, the disappearance of energy transformations, the conservation only of molecular motion equally disorderly and chaotic everywhere, without macroscopic gradients or macroscopic structure.... That is what thermal death which we have discussed above means.
Philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Engels," and 19th century statistical physics advanced rather convincing arguments against thermal death. Modern science, the theory of relativity and relativistic cosmology and, to no lesser extent, quantum mechanics, forces us to interpret the thermodynamics of the Universe from new standpoints that assumedly eliminate the inevitability of thermal death, although they still do not offer any concrete and unequivocal conception of the cosmic mechanism of forming temperature gradients, contrasted to thermal death.
The measure of the disorder of molecular motions, the measure of the levelling out of heat, of the obliteration
of temperature gradients is called entropy. The same magnitude, but with a minus sign, i.e., the measure of macroscopic ordering, the measure of non-uniformity in the distribution of heat, the measure of the differences in temperature---temperature gradients---is called negentropy (negative entropy).
Nowadays the concepts of entropy and negentropy have assumed an extremely generalised character. In the theory of information and in modern theory of probability, entropy is the measure of indeterminacy, the proximity of the probability values of different events. If all events have the same probability---the forecast is least determinate, entropy is at its maximum. If the probability of one event is equal to unity, and that of others is zero, the indeterminacy disappears turning into determinacy with minimal entropy and maximal negentropy. As a result of the experiment there disappears the existent indeterminacy measured by entropy. The disappearance of indeterminacy is information; it is measured in terms of entropy that has disappeared.
Thus, entropy is a measure of macroscopic equilibrium, homogeneity, structurelessness, a measure of chaos in micro-processes, their liberation from macroscopic ordering. Negentropy is a measure of such ordering, a quantitative measure of the subordination of micro-events to the macroscopic, and ultimately, to the cosmic ratio.
Let us view Nature in its negentropy aspect and examine the local processes of the increase of negentropy and decrease of entropy due to the growth of the latter in the environment, in the inclusive system. It is such local processes that transform chaos into space. The very concept of space assumes thereby a dynamic meaning; space not only exists at the given moment, it is developing, it is being created, and the created space (that which Spinoza called "natura naturata"} turns out to be a creating space (Spinoza's "natura naturans"}. The local gradient that has appeared, the negentropy, the ordering of existence cause, or at any rate may cause, other processes bringing about another gradient, another ordering; from this viewpoint the world moves not towards derationalisation, not towards the reign of entropy, but towards structure, order-
3*
* F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1974, pp. 35-39, 284-85.
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37ing, ratio. And, apparently, this process of rationalisation, of ordering of increased structuralness of the world, is not limited by the fatal climax of thermal death.
Why does the picture of the formation of local negentropy cause an optimistic reaction in man?
It is precisely because negentropic processes represent the basis for Man's purposive activity, and here, in the analysis of such processes, the objective forecast becomes the source of subjective perception of the future, of subjective evaluation of the future---its optimistic evaluation. Such a relation of quasi-expedient processes with expedient processes, ``optimism'' in Nature and optimism with no quotes, prevents the similarity of ``optimism'' and optimism with no quotes bearing an arbitrary character. Th^s similarity is based on a real and quite fundamental relation of elemental (but regulating, negentropic, structureforming) processes in Nature and purposive processes in technology, in Man's labour, in his activity.
It may seem that the growth of entropy, the changes and complexity of macroscopic ordering of existence conform, as it were, to optimistic forecasts, while the laws of conservation and symmetry can only serve as the basis for static optimism: "so it was and so it will be". But the dynamic and static forms of optimism, divorced from each other, lose their meaning. If Man were not sure that the processes of change are subordinated to a certain permanent law expressed in the invariability or invariance of some correlation, in the conservation of a certain value, in symmetry, in identity, then optimism would cease to bear the character of scientific prognosis. Conservation loses its qualitative, positive, physical meaning without changing certain correlations, but change, too, in the absence of laws of conservation, invariance, symmetry, iloses in its turn its regular character. In the absence of macroscopic processes, i.e., identical, uniform, ordered movements of micro-particles, the very differences in the behaviour of particles lose their meaning. The concept of acceleration loses its meaning in the absence of the concept of inertia; the study and reproduction of motion would be impossible if identities of velocities were not stated. The conception of invariance, conservation, ordering, determinateness of
existence is an essential component of optimism, without which optimism would be impossible.
The unity of identity and non-identity is the basis of optimism. A picture of complete disorder, complete negentropy, complete absence of macroscopic processes, in other words, a picture of chaos may induce a pessimistic evaluation and a pessimistic mood. Yet, a similar evaluation and similar mood may be induced by a picture of complete identity of individual acts, i.e., a picture of the world reduced to the macroscopic aspect alone, void of a micro-structure, a view of nature as of something reminiscent of a battle scene in War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy ("Die erste Kolonne marschiert. . .").
The concepts of entropy and negentropy allow to demonstrate quite clearly the relation, moreover, the unity, of the two above-mentioned pessimistic conceptions. Maximum entropy, complete absence of macroscopic gradients, excludes microscopic acts, rendering them meaningless. But at the same time maximum negentropy and maximum entropy exclude the possibility of predicting actual processes; a temperature gradient without entropical molecular motion, is by no means a physical reality, but a fiction which cannot arouse any optimistic reaction.
An optimistic reaction is aroused by a macroscopic gradient which determines the regular transformation of heat, this transformation is real, including entropic uncertainty of the motion of selected molecules. That gradient like any manifestation of the growing real negentropy of the world, which does not exclude the opposite pole, means (on the strength of its regularity!) a certain identity, invariance, conservation.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
The basis for optimism is a regular, determined evolution of existence. But, on the other hand, optimism is founded on the conviction that this regular evolution coincides with Man's goals determining his conscious activity. Thus, the philosophy of optimism must proceed from a certain synthesis: (1) knowledge which reveals the determined
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39evolution of existence, and (2) Man's activity. This fundamental conflict passes through the entire history of philosophy. In the present book dealing with epistemological optimism, optimism of science, this conflict assumes the form of a question: does science possess a goal?
The conception of goal is the transition from forecasting to planning, from asserting objective processes to arranging them in such a way as to bring about the realisation of the ideal image that appeared earlier. Is science an expedient activity? Does the goal, i.e., the situation formulated beforehand in consciousness, determine its ways, its structure and the evolution of its content?
The basic and firm concept of science as the tsearch for the unknown contradicts it, as it were. Under the influence of immanent stimuli science seeks the unknown proceeding from the contradictions; it seeks not to get off the path of purely causal analysis, ignoring the pragmatic idola referred to by Francis Bacon.
And nevertheless science is purposeful activity.
This is to be inferred not only and even not so much from the applied function of science, as from the epistemological considerations themselves, from the role of experiment in science, from the general epistemological premise: adequate knowledge of Nature, knowledge of substance and the objective substratum of phenomena, conviction in the existence and knowability of such a substratum stem from the impact transforming the objective world.
Let us consider closer the impact the goals of science exert on the evolution of its content. Evolution should be emphasised here: content itself does not depend on the character, direction or driving forces of the evolution, though they bring influence to bear upon the effectiveness of science (we shall touch upon this point further on). As for optimism---the correlation between the goals of Man's activity and the forecast of objective processes---the degree of this correlation, the value which could be termed a measure of optimism, depends on the goals of science, on the objective regularities revealed by iscience, on the content of science.
Which side, element, part of the objective processes
proves to be the most plastic, where does Man get involved in the play of elemental forces and to a certain measure submit them to himself?
Here again mention must be made of the concept of negentropy, ordering of the world, the concept of the world as a whole, to emphasise the heterogeneity of the world, the autonomy of selected series of phenomena and at the same time the dependence of smaller, included, systems on bigger inclusive systems, and vice versa.
Nature as a multitude of such inclusive and included systems confronts Man. In Nature events occur and processes take place independent of Man, which also occurred and proceeded in a similar fashion long before Man appeared on the Earth. When studying Nature, Man finds in it transitions from one system to another. The zones of transition, the zones of difference and connection between systems prove to be the most plastic; it is here that primarily begin the expedient processes of transformation of Nature, production, civilisation, labour. The inclusive system transmits to the included system a certain stock of negentropy ensuring the possibility of further expending this stock and the increase in entropy. These are zones where Man's reason brings most tangible influence on the structure of being. Once V. I. Vernadsky introduced the concept of the Earth's noosphere, a sphere which unlike the lithosphere, the hydrosphere and the atmosphere bears distinct marks of reason. Now it is time to generalise this concept. Man's reason and labour found noozones in the deepest entrails of the Earth, in the peri-terrestrial space, far away from our planet, in the atomic nucleus, and in the living cell. The concept of ``noozone'' will be the central in this book, and the analysis of noozones, its main content. In the noozones of the radiation spectrum, of the hierarchy of the discrete microcosmic elements, of the macrocosmos, of ontogeny and phylogeny, in the noozones of the world, the correlation of Man's goals and objective processes finds its realisation to serve as a basis and measure of optimism. But not to anticipate things, we will give here a general outline of those features of the objective processes, through which Man's purposive influence on these processes is realised. These are the initial
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41conditions of Nature's processes subject to differential laws. In mechanics of the microworld subject to essential conditions and restrictions one can unambiguously determine the motion of the particle on the basis of differential laws of motion. Equations of analytical mechanics, however, are not sufficient per se for an unequivocal picture of motion with specified force fields. The orbits of planets are determined not only by a combination of inertia and gravitation; a planet's motion is determined by the initial conditions, initial positions and impulses, "the initial cast" which Newton attributed to God, and Kant, to a previous cosmological evolution. These conditions do not come under expedient influence, but on the Earth the initial conditions are purposefully modified to an ever greater extent; this is one of the most important definitions of civilisation. Nobody can abrogate the law forcing water molecules to move, driven by the force of weight, from a higher to a lower point. But the difference of potentials---negentropy forcing the water molecules to move uniformly, as a general rule, is modified in the construction of a dam.
Let us take another example with regard to entropy and negentropy in the initial, true thermodynamic meaning. The motion of molecules is chaotic; the chaos of these motions increases; heat passes from a hot body to a cold one, the structural organisation of heat distribution diminishes. None of this can be altered. But the initial negentropy, the initial conditions, the initial temperature gradients are modified. When burning coal under a boiler, forcing the steam to pass into the cylinder and then into the condenser, Man approximates, in time and space, the poles of the natural gradient, just as in case of a dam the high water and low water marks are brought closer.
To cite another example. The ontogeny of living beings is encoded in each embryo and is determined by initial negentropy, the initial structure of the embryo. Yet, the destinies of organisms also depend on the chaotic, generally speaking, external influences that are somewhat ordered on the whole and result in regular progress of phylogeny. Man's purposeful activity is aimed at all initial conditions: the hereditary code (artificial mutations are in the initial stage, they are often spontaneous and contradict
Man's aims), environment (for instance, agronomy) and the mechanism of environmental influences (artificial selection).
This somewhat simplified scheme illustrates the connection between the initial conditions of negentropy in Nature with Man's purposive intervention in it. It is these initial conditions that Man's purposive activity is aimed at, presenting as they do, the most plastic component of world harmony, of the macroscopic structure of the world. The transformation of this component, the transformation and increase in world negentropy is the physical determination of all concrete goals of labour and concrete indices of progress. Naturally, Man establishes a close relationship between the physical content of his activity and the objective processes of the structuring in the world, and of the increase in negentropy, processes which are the immediate objects of this activity, and includes these processes in his optimistic evaluation.
But the structure of the world, its ratio is a component of existence. It is not worth repeating the arguments of modern science in favour of the dependence of the existence of particles on their interaction, and the philosophical propositions concerning the embodiment of the whole in individual existence. Neither is it worth recalling once again the illusory whole, while individual existence is ignored, the geometric character of the unfilled world lines. Let us rather remember other concepts, removed from physics (but not too far removed).
19th century literature features an immortal image of illusory existence that lost one of its components. It is St. Petersburg, a phantom city, flashing through Dostoyevsky's novels, where "everybody is apart", where no idea, activity or organisation unites people. This illusory, granulated existence is complemented by an illusory ``uneventful'' Universe, of which the devil speaks to Ivan Karamazov, and illusory universal harmony ignoring individual existence, individual destinies. Ivan Karamazov speaks to Alyosha about such an ``Euclidean'' and ``non-Euclidean'' harmony. Dostoyevsky's pessimism is directed here at a world in which the link is broken between the whole and the individual, between the macroscopic ratio and its mi-
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43croscopic content. This, however, is not a moral, but rather an ontological evaluation: The world without such a relationship possesses only illusory being; it is a phantom. Pessimism is inseparable from the assertion of nonbeing. But the relation to the whole is manifested in the inclusion in individual existence of ``prognostic'' predicates, in the inclusion in the world point of the eventual world line of the particle, its velocity, acceleration, energy, mass, charge, in its relation with world negentropy in that which serves as a basis for optimism. Dostoyevsky's pessimistic phantoms are negative statements of the connection between existence and optimism. Everything that is, is optimistic.
THE ``IS'' AND THE "OUGHT TO BE"
Philosophy of optimism transcends the purely passive perception of the world. Passive knowledge does not guarantee authenticity of its results, the reality of its advance to truth; only blended with action does passive knowledge acquire confidence in the existence and unlimited knowability of the world---that which has the right to be termed epistemological optimism.
The transition from knowledge to action was always a stumbling block for classical philosophy, for its predecessors. Ancient philosophy---at least those of its representatives that fully retained the antique harmony of perception, thinking and will---did not concern itself with this kind of transition, but it became a fundamental problem in the Middle Ages to remain one in the philosophy of the Renaissance and modern times. Since the appearance of Marx's theses on Feuerbach, when philosophy set itself the task not only to interpret the world but to transform it, the relation of knowledge to action, of science to morality, underwent a radical change. In non-classical science the new relationship between these polarised realms became apparent: both in terms of the ``is'' as an object of knowledge, and in terms of the "ought to be" as the content of norms, goals and ideals. Accordingly, optimism---a correlation of the ``is'' and the "ought to be"---has assumed a new meaning and new importance.
In his article "La Morale et la Science", Henri Poincare says that morality and science, the "ought to be" and the ``is'' cannot be united through the logical deduction of one from the other, since science is concerned with the Indicative Mood and morality, with the Imperative Mood* Indeed, declarative statements of the type: "such an object exists", "such a process occurs", "such an event happened", as well as others of the more complicated type: "the cause of the event was..." (all these being in the Indicative Mood), cannot be obtained from statement in the Imperative Mood of the type "one should act in such a way...", and vice versa. This logical independence of scientific and moral statements seems absolute, but is it actually so? In 1951 Albert Einstein wrote to Maurice Solovine:
``That which we call science has exclusively one aim, to establish that which is. The determination of that which ought to be is something quite independent of it and cannot be attained in a methodical way. Science can only formulate propositions about morality in a logical connection and furnish means for the realisation of moral aims, but the determination of the aims themselves is beyond its domain."**
In essence, already here the independence of the ``is'' and the "ought to be" and of the Indicative and the Imperative moods, of science and morality does not appear to be so absolute. The "ought to be" is determined independently only to a certain degree. In the Imperative Mood only the aim itself cannot be derived from the Indicative Mood, from the statement of the ``is''. And the ways of realising the "ought to be" and the logical structure of its definitions depend on science. In his talk with the Irish writer Arthur Murphy, Einstein said that science possesses moral foundations that are not connected with the content of scientific propositions, but with their dynamics, their change, their evolution. Moral self-- consciousness stimulates scientific progress. "It is here that the moral side of our nature comes in---that mysterious inner con-
* H. Poincare, Dernieres Pensees, Paris, 1913, p. 225. ** A. Einstein, Lettres a Maurice Solovine. Paris. 1956, p. 105.
PART ONE. EPISTKMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
45 44PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
secration which Spinoza so often emphasised under the name of amor intellectualis. You see then, Einstein goes on, "that I think you are right in speaking of the moral foundations of science. But you cannot turn it around and speak of the scientific foundations of morality."*
It is to be noted, however, that in spite of his skeptical attitude to the possibility of a scientific explanation of morality, Einstein nevertheless came to the conclusion that science in its turn, affects the morals of mankind. "This popular interest in scientific theory brings into play," he said in the same talk, "higher spiritual faculties, and anything that does so must be of high importance in the moral betterment of humanity.''^^5^^'"*
If science is understood as the content of certain statements, as something stable and divorced from the process of its evolution, transformation and change, and if morality is understood as the content of certain norms abstracted from their genesis and realisation, then science and morality are indeed independent of each other. However, as soon as we destroy the immobility of the statements, on the one hand, and of the norms, on the other, as soon as science and morality emerge in their concrete varying essence, their independence of one another becomes arbitrary and relative.
In the concluding chapter of her book Histoire du principe de relativite, M. A. Tonnelat says that morality like philosophy, like art, cannot add anything to the inner harmony of scientific theory. They cannot make it more perfect, just as the most sophisticated analysis cannot make a Mozart symphony more perfect.*** This holds for the content of scientific theory. As far as changes in content are concerned, science draws inspiration in art, morality, philosophy.**** Their isolation gives way to their dynamic relationship. The closer the link between the ``perfection'' of the positive content of theory and its openness, the
more relative is the isolation of science from other genres of Man's spiritual life.
Hence the changes in the relationship between science and morality during the transition from classical to nonclassical science. In classical science, the positive and allegedly terminative content of scientific propositions, could to a considerable extent be divorced from its negative accompaniment, from contradictions, from the ``inquisitive' line of scientific progress. At present positive content is practically inseparable from dynamics; the understanding of science cannot be separated from its reason. Likewise the character of morality changes as the emphasis is shifted from norms to ways of realisation; not only the norms of good but their development, their implementation, the transformation of the "ought to be" into the ``is'' becomes essential in the self-consciousness of mankind. The optimism that grows out of contemporary science is inseparable from moral self-consciousness. We wish to recall the criticism of rigid canons of morality in dialectical philosophy, in art, and in culture. We shall restrict ourselves to a few fragmentary reminiscences.
A rather accomplished form of stable moral canons is the classical categorical imperative: your acts must be examples of universal norms, every act may become a universal norm. The inclusion of the individual act in the general norm does not change the latter. Such stable morality is historically linked with stable culture, stable or slowly changing conditions and norms of social life, with a stationary or quasi-stationary economy. In the Middle Ages, morality was embodied in traditional norms, the good was that which was sanctified by tradition, moral norms regulated the economy, and guaranteed, to a certain degree, its traditional character: typical of medieval concepts were "fair price", "fair profit", "fair per cent". Optimistic prediction consisted in forecasting customary and therefore ``fair'' norms and conditions. They are compatible only with such conservative optimism: "so it was, and so it will be". Sometimes a quasi-dynamic conception was put forward: very high standards, unrealisable in the absolute sense, indicated an endless path to moral perfection. But this does not imply any real moral ideal. At times
197* A. Einstein, Forum, No. S3, 1930, p. 373. ** Ibid.
::"** M.-A. Tonnelat, Histoire du principe de relativite, Paris,
:;-.'.<•«•*
487.
Ibid., pp. 488-89.
46PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
PART ONE. EflSTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
47the traditional conceptions of good painted the moral world in a single colour, without hues, in the image of a uniform or homogeneous physical world without nonexistence, as it appeared in Cartesian physics. The good seemed to be uniformity of existence imbued with " continuous hosannah". We have already mentioned this term; it appears in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov spoken by the devil who brings the thoughts of his interlocutor to their logical conclusion, thoughts which seem unbearable to Ivan Karamazov and to Dostoyevsky himself, whose interpreter, in the final analysis, is "the certain kind of Russian gentleman, with not much grey in his hair"---Ivan's infernal guest. The devil says to Ivan: "Without criticism, it would be nothing but one ' hosannah'. But nothing but `hosannah' is not enough for life. The `hosannah' must be tried in the crucible of doubt. . . ."*
The earthbound and emphatically common devil of Dostoyevsky says something extremely fundamental, something very similar to the remark of his much more imposing and philosophically educated colleague from Faust. Mephistopheles identifies himself to Faust as "part of that Power which would the Evil ever do, and ever does the Good". "Would the Evil do" means: destroys ``hosannah''. "Does the Good" means: transforms the good, from a stationary, rigid canon, into something historically realisable and developing.
Like Karamazov's devil, Mephistopheles expresses certain thoughts and personifies a certain aspect of the mentality of his permanent fellow-traveller and interlocutor and, in the final analysis, his creator as well. Faust departs from science, because the elusiveness of thought identifying existence and making it uniform, does not satisfy him. In the lines of Faust there can be detected Goethe's antiNewtonian, sensualistic and emotional tendency. Science as the sum of ultimate and eternal results, as the kingdom of pure thought, unencumbered by contradictions, impressions and emotions---is the ``hosannah'' to knowledge. In the same manner, the philosophy of the identified uniform
good is the ``hosannah'' to morality. Well, Faust departs from reason, from science, from the good to conclude a bargain with the spirit of evil. But the reason, science and good that he rejects are homogeneous and immobile Wagnerian ideals. They seem to Faust lifeless and elusive. Faust wishes sin and evil, and he pursues it not so much under the guidance of the spirit of evil, as with the latter's technical support. This dialogue, however, is the unending argument between good and evil. It will stop when Faust demands of the moment: "Ah, linger on, thou art so fair!" This is absolute victory, the identity of each successive moment with the foregoing one, the cessation of existence, death. This is the absolute victory of the good. But Faust overcomes death in work, in creation, i.e., in a process that cannot be terminated. The finale of Faust is the apotheosis of the good that does not exclude evil, but battles against it, the apotheosis of the dynamic moral ideal.
In his analysis of Feuerbach's philosophy, Engels contrasts the conception of the historical evolution of good and evil and their istruggle, the conception of the reality of evil, to the conception of Man's natural morality. Man is not only good, says Engels, he is evil as well. "But it does not occur to Feuerbach to investigate the historical role of moral evil," writes Engels/^^1^^" In this respect Feuerbach departs backwards from Hegel. "He appears just as shallow, in comparison with Hegel, in his treatment of the antithesis of good and evil."**
Indeed the problem of good and evil, as posed by Hegel, is a way out from the static moral ideal, a transition to a dynamic moral ideal, to the struggle between good and evil, and thereby to human existence which distinguishes Man from Nature, contrasts him to Nature, and leads him to purposive arrangement of Nature's elements. Hegel is opposed to Rousseau's ideas, to the conception that Man is good by nature and must therefore remain true to Nature. "Man's coming out of his natural existence is the
* F. M. Dostoyevsky, Collected Works, in ten volumes, Vol. 10, Moscow, 1958, pp. 169-70 (in Russian).
* Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, in three volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1972, p. 357. ** Ibid.
48PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
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49differentiation of Man as a self-conscious creature from the outer world."*
But this is not sufficient. When Man is contrasted to Nature, and only Nature, he is isolated. Man, in Hegel's opinion, thus becomes "the only man" and in this sense he does not rise above Nature, its struggle of everybody against everybody. Man's egotistical activity is curbed by the framework of the law. "Man remains a slave of the law until he gives up his natural position.""''* Man ceases to be a Slave to the law within the framework of social solidarity, transforming the very laws, transforming his social existence. Herein, as Marx showed, lies the dynamic moral ideal.
A man who has rebelled against static existence and static morality faces two ways: one to a dynamic moral ideal, the other is the Stirner way to "the Ego and His Property". The second is an illusory way of liberation, leading to slavery. The Nietzschean rebellion against moral canons paves the way to the vindication of tyranny.
Nietzsche spoke against static canons, saying that the good and the just are a danger for the future. "They say and feel in their heart: 'We already know what is kindness and justice, we already know them; woe to them who are searching here.' Whatever harm the evil ones might cause, the harm of the good ones is the most harmful harm. O my brethren! Somebody once looked into their hearts and said: 'They are Pharisees.' "***
Nietzsche's rejection of good is an absolutised rejection of static moral canons, directed against any moral canons, including dynamic canons, which is a vindication of the disintegration of the social fabric. This vindication leads to that which is called ``anomy'', "deviant behaviour", etc., and of that which embraces all forms of aggresisive individualism and isolation of Man from the social structure, beginning with drug addiction (including intoxication with hysteria in speech-making) and ending with crimes (among them state-organised crimes). This vindication
presents a very wide range beginning with theoreticians who never intend to put their ideas into practice, to Smerdyakov's words: "Everything is permitted." It must be said that Smerdyakov's grinning at Ivan Karamazov does not threaten the theoretician who has turned away from traditional moral canons, but it threatens the theoretician who has turned away from any canons including dynamic ones.
What practical activity conforms to dynamic moral principles?
It is necessary here to return to Nature as a basis of individual isolation and evil, i.e., to Hegel's conception. Man remains a slave of Nature until he purposively arranges its processes. But where does Nature provide a possibility for such purposive arrangement?
Nature, as Hegel understood it, did not provide such possibilities. Nature is a stable other-being of the developing spirit. It is governed by laws which predetermine in an absolute manner individual processes and are independent of application. But Nature, as presented by 19th century classical science (and to a igreater extent by 20th century non-classical science), opens up a possibility of a purposive interference in its processes and, which is very important, interference in increasingly fundamental processes.
The Universe as a totality of purely mechanical objects and processes is subject to the Laplace determinism, equations of motion predetermining the position of each particle at each given moment. But, as has been stated in the previous essay, equations ileave Man initial conditions, which he arranges in his interests. Man builds dams and constructs water wheels to create initial conditions for the motion of water. Manipulating the initial conditions, he arrives at an expedient combination of determinate processes. In the age of steam engines his expedient activity determined not only mechanical processes, but also transitions of heat into mechanical work. Modern technology deals with a purposive rearrangement of nuclear processes, micro-processes become the beginning of macroscopic chain reactions---a model of the effect of individual events on large-scale systems embracing them. This model corresponds to Man's position in modern production, when
4-01545
* Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke, Vol. 6. Berlin, 1840, p. 58.
** Ibid., p. 59. *** F. Nietzsche, Werke, Bd. VI, Stuttgart, 1921, pp. 309-10.
50PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
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radical transformations of the technological process within the shop, enterprise, industry and economy as a whole are increasingly becoming the content of labour.
The behaviour of an individual in the feudal society was determined by tradition founded on religion---the immutable civita del---"God's city". Then scholasticism sought to provide traditions and dogmas, and moral canons in particular, with a logical foundation essential for the theocratic authority of the church. The Rennaissance liberated Man from traditional scholastic moral canons, but Man became a victim of the secular tyranny of absolute monarchies and oligarchic republics. Later the authoritative regulations of Man's behaviour were replaced by the elemental power of statistic laws ignoring individual interests and destinies. And finally, in our times Man's destiny is freeing itself to an ever greater degree from the elemental laws that ignore it, and dynamically developing moral principles are becoming canons of individual behaviour.
Such ``moralisatiori'' of Man's behaviour does not necessarily mean that it is traditional, immobile, invariable. Traditionalism was the result of old moralistic requirements that claimed an a priori character. Now `` moralisation'' means something quite different, namely, freedom of Man's behaviour. Freedom in Spinoza's sense---- behaviour does not follow from external influence, but from Man's nature, his inner essence, i.e., from something inherent in Man that distinguishes Man from Nature and singles him out in Nature. This is a sensation of relationship between the individual and the society and the world. But it is this sensation nurtured by the study of the world that stimulates the development of such study. At present it is driving the study of the world along the non-classical path. Non-classical science, as has repeatedly been stated in this book, considers each element of the Universe as a reflection of the whole, including that which Geoffrey Chew termed the crisis of elementariness, and sees in an elementary particle, in any ``elementary'' object an infinitely complex focus of the infinitely complex space.
But the ``moralising'' function of modern science is inseparable from the goals Man sets himself in his activity
of transforming the world and from the conception of the realisation of such goals.
Thus, alongside the epistemological component the concept of optimism embraces that which has always been related to the realm of will, to the domain of goals and their realisation. This realm comprises moral principles that have already been discussed in this essay, and all Man's activity in realising his aims---industry, work, civilisation as a whole, which will be treated later on.
There is, however, another side to Man's spiritual life that cannot be reduced to intellect or will. That is the world of emotions. Optimism, as interpreted in this book, is not reduced to emotions. This concept has here an ontological, epistemological, moral and, as we shall see further, an economic meaning. But it is natural that any definition of optimism should retain emotional content. The evolution of optimism includes, to a considerable extent, the changing attitude of the intellect to the will and to the world of feelings, to Man's emotional life.
How does the above-mentioned attitude change under the influence of modern science, what new aspects does it add to the problem of Logos and Eros?
The answer to this question illustrates the function of non-classical science that has been repeatedly pointed out: it renders the historical evolution of classical science and classical rationalism more obvious. In this case non-- classical retrospection affords a clearer view of the connection between optimism and rationalism.
Rationalism is the philosophy of optimism to the degree it includes the sensualist component, to the degree it combines the macroscopic order with the autonomy of microobjects, logic with its emotional accompaniment, to the degree it is a philosophy of being. As was pointed out in the first essay of this book, being is characterised by objective ordering, negentropy, objective ratio. This thesis is totally unrelated to Aristotelian entelechy, the idea of an intelligent demiurge of the world or of the "world soul". There simply exist in the world real macroscopic systems which make the world comprehensible to reason, but they existed before and independently of it. It is this comprehensibility of the world that Einstein considered its main
4*
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63riddle (the most incomprehensible thing about the world is the fact that it is comprehensible), and indeed it reflects the infinitely complex hierarchy of structures of the Universe.
Logic, reason---all that which is united by the conception of Logos, finds an objective basis in the knowledge and transformation of Nature. Man's moral ideals likewise find a basis. And what about his emotions, his feelings---all that which Herbert Marcuse refers to Eros? What is the relation of this Eros to Spinoza's amor intellectualis, to that emotional uplift that accompanies the knowledge of truth, the comprehension of the world?
Amor intellectualis has assumed a very full-blooded and complex character in non-classical science. Now it is not reduced to a permanently elated, bright, but essentially one-coloured state of the intellect in ,search of a world substance---it includes a multi-coloured spectrum of bright and gloomy moods, satisfaction, disappointments, new inspirations, esthetic impressions, sorrow, joy, sympathy, doubts, newly acquired confidence, hopes, their ruin, appearance of new hopes, all this bright emotional life being coupled with an uninterrupted connection with society and Nature. Science has hardly ever provided so few grounds as now to confront Eros and Logos, and never has this confrontation been so superficial, so far from reality and nevertheless (and may be, for this very reason) -so frequent.
The evolution of science has always been connected with emotions, with an emotional uplift, which made it a human science that would not be able to develop without such a connection. Lenin said that "there has never been, nor can there be, any human search for truth without human emotions".*
Lenin emphasised: without emotion there can be no search for truth. Unlike truth itself, its content, the results of the search, emotions cannot be separated from the search for truth, from the development and modification of truth, from the transition to a more exact, concrete and
fundamental truth, from the transformation of the picture of the world.
If absolute truth is an infinite series of increasingly precise reflections of existence, an infinite series of relative truths, a stream of ever new increments to a credible knowledge of the world, then every result of scientific research, every accomplished, positive stage in the picture of the world approaching its inexhaustible original, possesses, in addition to its positive content, dynamic value, unresolved questions, new stimuli for further development, for further search, for further specification and concretisation. In non-classical science the dynamic value of its results is becoming obvious and immediately tangible. Consequently, scientific results likewise possess, if not emotional criteria of truth, obvious emotional stimuli, an obvious emotional accompaniment.
The genuine and very intensive emotional content of modern knowledge is quite essential for resolving, not only logically, but also psychologically, one of the eternal problems of philosophy, that of death and immortality of man. We shall presently deal with this problem. Immortality will be viewed as a local characteristic of the existence and consciousness of man, just as infinite space in cosmology serves as the characterisation of local processes, of the real physical situation in "here and now", as the characterisation of the "here and now'' content, of the intensity of physical processes occurring here and now.
OPTIMISM AND IMMORTALITY
Optimism is confronted with the pessimistic shadows of death, death of the world: Nature bereft of one of its components of existence, its ratio, its macroscopic structure, or another pole---the individual existence of autonomous elements, becomes a phantom. Then there is death of knowledge, exhaustibility of knowledge and, finally, death of Man.
Does Epicurus' formula drive away this last pessimistic shadow? Let us recall it. In his letter to Menoeceus Epi-
' * V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 260.
54PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
PART ONE. EPISTEMOI.OGICAI. OPTIMISM
55curus says that Man never meets death: "So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so Jong as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist."*
Why has not this logically irreproachable formula saved mankind from fear of death?
We wish to call attention to the negative and static character of the formula. Everything good and evil, according to Epicurus, is included in sensation, and death is the absence of sensations. Far from being optimistic, this formula is essentially only un-pessimistic. The pessimistic perception of life, the perception of its perishability and the fear of non-existence are not confronted here by an active and positive optimistic perception that could not only logically discredit the fear of death but also reniove it from consciousness. Epicurus' philosophy as a whole is negative and static. Happiness lies in the absence of futile aspirations. Such harmony of life corresponds to the static ideal of cosmic harmony. An optimistic perception that could free Man from the fear of non-existence is the perception of the fulness of existence. Thus we go back to the initial definition of optimism.
In his philosophy of nature Epicurus seeks to affirm existence by filling Nature with spontaneous deviations of atoms. But these deviations remain purely local events, never changing the macroscopic world. Spontaneous atomic deviations retain freedom in Nature and are contrasted to fatalism, "the power of the physicists", the autocracy of macroscopic laws. But this is local and negative freedom; individual deviation does not become the starting point of a chain reaction, it is not in confrontation with the power of macroscopic laws and far from changing them, it only restricts this power.
In Epicurus' philosophy Man is liberated from fear of future non-existence. In his local existence, he must not think of that which seems threatening to this local existence. Death does not in fact threaten Man; he lives now, in the restricted time limits of his existence. Non-existence does not frighten him because it is beyond the limits of
local individual existence: where there is death, we are not there, we do not exist there. The given ``we'' and ``exist'' do not extend to the infinite future. Solitude in infinite space and time that filled the soul of Pascal with such chilling horror, seemed a refuge for the ancient philosopher who is loath to think about the infinite time that had flowed before him or the infinite time to flow after him. For him they are equivalent. Epicurus wonders: why does Man fear the future infinite existence and is indifferent to the past infinite existence? Epicurus rejects both as alien to Man. Man is confined to the ``here'' of the limits of the Earth, and to the ``now'' that encompasses his short life. But this is a logical refutation of the fear of death. Apparently even in ancient times it was not psychologically active, it was not realised in Man's psychology. The contemporaries of Epicurus must have felt not so much liberation from the fear of death as the transformation of this fear into the quiet reconciled sadness that permeates the Odyssey.
For Pascal the conception of infinite space and infinite time, the imagined crossing of the boundaries of local existence transformed life into an instant; infinity transforms finite existence into zero, into nothing. But in the final analysis, it is exteriorisation of Man's life that destroys fear of death in modern philosophy. In the optimistic conceptions of the Renaissance and the Baroque, infinity does not lie beyond the limits of individual, local and finite existence. 17th century science considers a point as the beginning of an eventual, fundamentally infinite line, and an instant, as the beginning of an infinite process. For modern Man future and past are not equivalent, time is not symmetrical, the future is an arena where personality is exteriorised, an arena filled with the results of Man's activity. This is an active perception, it is local existence, filled with eventual existence. Epicurus does not recognise a future without some sensual content; death is the absence of perceptions, and therefore it does not exist, death is alien to Man, for he does not meet it. For modern optimistic philosophy the future complements the present and becomes a component of his existence to such a degree that Man cannot exclude himself from the future. If the
Cyril Bailey, Epicurus, The Extant Remains, Oxford, 1926, p. 85.
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57content of human existence is knowledge and activity directed at the future, at infinity, then that content is not discontinued by death. A new conception of immortality arises: Man perceives infinite activity and cognition as immortality of his personality. The static optimism of Epicurus is based on the negation of immortality, life being restricted by the limits of individual life which includes neither prognostication nor retrospection: individual life is closed and isolated from the world that is infinite in space and in time. Modern dynamic optimism (it is not only logically but psychologically opposed to the fear of death) does not isolate individual life but fills it with retrospection and prognostication, extends the creative component of individual life, includes retrospection in it and, which is most important, prognosis, uniting prognosis, the future, the unrestricted, infinite future with the aim of individual existence.
This tendency, as has already been said, is apparent in the philosophy of the Renaissance. For Giordano Bruno the individual was a reflection of the infinite whole. In the 17th century, Spinoza added a very important new element to this optimistic conception. He tsays: "And therefore he [the free man---Ed.] thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life."* Freedom becomes a necessary component of existence, and it is freedom that liberates Man from the fear of death. For Spinoza the infinite world is not a threat to the mortal: the content of mortal life reflects an infinite process.
The behaviour of Man, like that of every particle, is not the compulsory result of external influences, but the revealing of an internal, immanent essence, and that is what Spinoza understands by freedom. The immanent essence itself reflects the harmony of the whole, the cosmic harmony of the infinite world. Spinoza does not recognise the reverse process---the action of the finite, the individual, the limited, the mortal on the surrounding infinite world. The idea not only of infinite knowledge of the world but also of the infinite transformation of the world
goes beyond the framework of 17th century philosophy and, further, beyond the framework of the classical philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Now we will discuss the role of non-classical philosophy in developing a new, active revolutionary and positive conception of freedom.
Spinoza's "free man" is not opposed to Nature. Spinoza's world---a causal, determined world---includes Man, and the Man is free only because his fully determined behaviour follows from an immanent essence, reflecting the causal world as a whole. Non-classical science also pictures a causal world but this world is governed by the specific laws of the microcosm, which result in the violation of macroscopic laws. But unlike Epicurus' atomistics, the microscopic process brings about macroscopic consequences. The image of the macroscopic chain reaction triggered off by a microscopic process is just as legitimate as an analogy for the modern conception of the individual's freedom, as were spontaneous atomic deviations viewed by Epicurus and Lucretius as analogy and physical guarantee of Man's freedom from fatalism, from "the power of the physicists". Here too, as in Epicurus, it is not just an analogy: modern non-classical science with its practically continuous radical transformation of the foundations of Man's activity creates the possibility of individual existence affecting macroscopic existence as a whole. That is transition to the most important basis of Man's optimistic philosophy, to his expedient activity, his purposive transformation of the world.
The transformation of the world transforms Man's consciousness, psychologically eliminating, not just logically discrediting, the fear of death alongside the fear of infinity, of the infinite spatial and temporal vacuum surrounding the "here and now". Let us return to that which was said at the end of the previous essay---to the local conception of immortality and the local removal of the fear of death. Physics, astrophysics and cosmology allow today not only to concretise Riemann's idea of infinity as a local metrical definition, but to impart to it a greater ability to serve as an analogy, i.e., to be applied in other fields, to explain correlations that are different in their nature. As
B. Spinoza's Ethics, London, 1922, p. 187.
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PHILOSOPHY OF OPTIMISM
an analogy applied to the problem of immortality, Riemann's conception can explain something essential.
First of all it should be pointed out that Riemann contrasts infinity as a local metric property to unrestrictedness as a property of extension. Unrestrictedness is postulated in all cases, whereas infinity is inherent in space that has a permanent zero or negative curvature. If we ascribe to space the same positive curvature at each point, then space is finite: by unlimitedly prolonging the shortest lines in such space we obtain a sphere.
An essential premise of Riemann's conception is this: infinity and finity become ilocal definitions when we unlimitedly prolong the local geometric correlations, ascribing unrestrictedness to them. Unrestrictedness itself assumes the nature of a local property. We ascribe the ability of unlimited expansion to that which is centred here and now.
If this scheme is to be used as an analogy explaining the problem of death and immortality, then immortality corresponds to unlimitedness. The definition of life, the definition of its given ``here-now'' embraces fundamental negation of absolute limits, limits of knowledge and limits of the transformation of the world. Thus. epistemologicaJ optimism (it is not only epistemological, including as it does the prospect of unlimited transformation of the world) becomes the basis of actual elimination of the darkest and seemingly most fundamental and inevitable spectres of non-existence.
When each local element, each "here and now" of human existence is complemented by merging with something broader and fundamentally unlimited, then Feuerbach's words are realised: "Each second you drink the cup of immortality which replenishes itself like the goblet of Oberon." This somewhat romantic image of unexpected approximation of the geometric conception of Oberon's goblet with the lines from Riemann's famous ispeech is characteristic of modern non-classical thought. Its generalisations, including the most fundamental ones, persist, as it were, throughout the evolution of science and civilisation as a whole, which is inseparable from the former. Each creative act involves, as its necessary content, the
PART ONE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
59overstepping the local limits, the transition to a fundamentally unlimited whole, "Oberon's goblet". Part Two of this book will deal with some specific links of modern scientific and technological progress characterised by similar ex teriorisation, extension, appealing to the most fundamental principles and changing them. Such appealing and such transition correspond to the inner perfection of scientific conceptions. Modern scientific and technological progress is distinguished by the fact that this criterion comes to be used in applied research, too. Not only episodic, paradoxical results of experiments separated from each other by big intervals, but also the practically continuous series of applied results are connected with the fundamental tendencies of the changing picture of the world. This reinforces the dynamics of modern life and fills the consciousness of people with aspirations broadening the "here and now". Modern optimism is contained in similar aspirations that bear an active character and correspond to an extension and generalisation of that which was termed noozones.
Fear of death is not a perception of forthcoming nonexistence. There can be no such perception, and in this respect Epicurus' formula is irreproachable. Fear of death is a perception of mortality, a perception of the transient, insignificant character of the "here and now" as compared with the surrounding vacuum. Fear of death assumes this character, when it develops into a pessimistic evaluation of existence, a pessimistic philosophy, as was, for instance, in Pascal. It assumes this form when it is eliminated by Man's active intervention in universal processes, in Nature and history.
Classical science, as was already pointed out at the beginning of this essay, coped with the annihilation of the "here and now", by examining it in motion. The present is a zero duration limit between the no-longer existent past and the not-yet existent future. But the differential calculus and the differential conception of motion ascribed speed and acceleration to the ``now'' object of zero duration. In the 17th century differential predicates replaced "the world soul" (in part they specified, transformed and deprived it of its mystical form), which in the previous cen-
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61tury, Bruno, embodied in finite objects, saving them from annihilation in face of infinity. Hence the connection of 17th century dynamics with optimistic tendencies in Galileo's world-outlook.
Now all this is being repeated on a different level, in terms of the active transformation of the world, in terms of motion encoded as goal in the "here and now". The realisation of the goal, the exteriorisation of the "here and now" endows it with existence liberating consciousness from the pessimistic, in its proper sense, and hopeless horror of the inevitable non-being. But, unlike Epicurus' formula, which encloses Man's interests within his individual existence (rather, unlike the effect Epicurus ascribed to his formula), exteriorisation does not free consciousness, from sadness. Consciousness transforming the world, is filled with the general, with that which is immortal, with that which is projected into the future. But individual life is not reduced to the realisation of the general, it is unique. The sadness caused by its cessation contains the realisation of uniqueness and sovereignty of individual existence.
ject. Naturally, it is easy to deduce therefrom Hegel's freedom as cognised necessity.
Experimental knowledge of the world unites criteria of freedom and necessity. The experiment proceeds from the necessity of the predicted result, from prognosis, from visualising of the inevitable effect of changes that are consciously introduced into the natural processes. But these changes are free in the sense that they are to liberate the essence from the inessential, to reveal the progress of phenomena expressing the essence, to penetrate the latter, i.e., to demonstrate the freedom reigning in the Universe, freedom in the Spinozian sense, the freedom of revealing the essence.
That which in experiment features as forecast becomes a goal in production labour. If a given experiment repeats a similar one that was undertaken earlier and brought about a credible result, then it does not mean that the experiment resolves a knowable, or a purely knowable task; it means that the processes occurring in the same given conditions do not possess a knowable value, but an immediate one, and they are to be evaluated not as an example proving certain common regularities, but by their content, irrespective of their commonness. The value of the result will not increase, if a multitude of similar experiments are added to the experiment. If, on the other hand, a multitude of identical production acts are added to a production act, the value of the result will increase proportionally to the number of such acts. In the first case the result was information about a common regularity, whose value does not increase with repetition. In the second case repetition increases the sum of expediently arranged elements of Nature. In actual fact an absolutely exact repetition of an experiment is practically unattainable, and production acts do not lose a certain cognitive value.
Anyhow, production labour is distinct from experiment by a higher credibility of the result that is known beforehand. If optimism implies a correlation of prognosis and aim, and goal of labour is realised in the process of labour with high credibility, then it may be said that optimism is a highly credible realisation of labour; a characteristic definition of production labour.
LABOUR AND FREEDOM
Labour became an epistemological and general philosophical conception only in the works of Karl Marx, in the second half of the 19th century. The conception of freedom, on the other hand, already discussed in medieval philosophical literature, became a fundamental philosophic conception in the works of Spinoza. But the meaning of this conception changed after the concept of labour entered into the range of basic categories of the teaching about being and knowledge.
In Spinoza the problem of freedom is closely connected with that of essence. If the behaviour of a subject is determined by its essence (just as the nature of the geometric image determines its properties), and not by external impulses, such behaviour embodies the freedom of the sub-
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(>•}
of a stable ideal structure in the spirit of the Aristotelian system of natural places also proved meaningless. Nobody expressed this sensation with such force as Pascal. We have repeatedly mentioned this pessimistic note and now we wish to quote it in the form it assumed in Pascal's Pensees.
``I know not," writes Pascal, "who put me into this world, nor what the world is, nor what I myself am; I am in terrible ignorance of everything; I do not know what my body is, nor my sense, nor my soul, not even that part of me which thinks what I say, which reflects on all and on itself, and knows itself no more than the rest."*
Pascal mourns the finiteness of human existence in time, inevitable death and the finiteness of human existence in infinite space and infinite time: "I see," he continues, "those frightful expanses of the Universe which surround me, and I find myself tied to one corner of this vast expanse, without knowing why I am put in this place rather than another, nor why the short time which is given to me to live, is assigned to me at this point rather than at another point of the whole eternity which was before me or which shall come after me. I see nothing but infinities on all sides which surround me, as an atom and as a shadow which endures only for an instant and returns no more. All I know is that I must soon die, but what I know least is this very death which I cannot escape."**
It was already mentioned in the previous essay that Pascal's is not so much fear of death as fear of the infinity of space and time, fear of the infinite Universe unconcerned with Man and his infinitely short life and infinitely small sensual experience. His is a feeling of being lost in infinity and of the insignificance of life in the face of infinity. The feeling derives not only from the infinity of time that runs on after Man's death, but also from the infinity of past time. 17th century pessimism feared both. This was, and we reiterate again, not even fear, but a gnawing feeling of the impossibility of comprehending in-
The concept of freedom changes accordingly. The initial meaning of this concept was ontological. Freedom is contrasted to necessity, it characterises essential necessity, the dependence of the subject's behaviour on his nature, on his immanent definitions. Then freedom becomes an epistemological concept as well, a cognised necessity, and finally it becomes active freedom, freedom of acting on the world, of purposive influence exerted on the progress of processes in Nature; this influence is real, it brings about results, previously presented as goals, with a high probability, and for all intents and purposes---with a high credibility.
Now we can outline the evolution of optimism in its dependence on the activity of reason that not only reveals the order of ratio in the Universe, negentropy, but also introduces them into nature.
The 16th-17th centuries saw the first transformation of the very essence of optimism as a conclusion drawn from the scientific conception of the world. In the Middle Ages, as has already been pointed out, optimism drew from science, as the main source, the idea of accomplished perfection of the world, of its static, accomplished, immobile ordering. The unshakeable harmony of the Universe, the unshakeable stability of social institutions and norms induced a sensation of reasonable individual existence. Unofficial ``carnival'' culture drew its optimism from the sensual cognisability of the world, from the variety of its multicoloured and unexpected details. Then there appeared a conception of the world without the Aristotelian static scheme of natural places. This world was infinite in Bruno, and Galileo shifted the emphasis to the infinite complexity of the problem, to the existence of infinitely small elements of the Universe. The transition of the Rennaissance to the Baroque culture was connected with the idea of infinity being instilled in Man's consciousness. It induced a pessimistic sensation of Man being lost in the infinite spaces of the Universe and of the insignificance of his life as compared to the infinite existence of Nature. The meaning of the two poles disappeared: human life in relation to the Universe proved to be an instantaneous, and therefore meaningless flash of consciousness. Infinite being deprived
* Blaise Pascal, Pensees, Paris, 1962, pp. 159-60. ** Ibid.
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65finity, even approaching it. The fundamental tendency peculiar to the 16th and 17th centuries of striving to extend rational thought to infinite nature underlies the pessimistic outlook. This is the tragedy of 17th century rationalism, classical rationalism. The quattrocento saw in art, and in art alone, a means to overcome solitude, the nothingness and mortality of Man. Beauty unites Man with the infinite world, personifying infinite existence in the finite and limited. The cinquecento, in the person of Giordano Bruno, felt heroico furore---an emotional and intellectual striving toward the infinite world, toward its rational and comprehensible essence. In the 17th century yet another pessimistic component was added to the feeling of solitude and death. The above-cited lines of Pascal sound above all, the tragic perception of the incomprehensibility of the infinite world to human reason. But this perception expresses not only a pessimistic judgement, but also striving toward the comprehension of the infinite world.
Already Galileo was thinking about the understanding of the infinite world, about the reflection of the infinite world in Man's finite reason. Galileo's theory of knowledge includes the concept of absolute cognition of the world, cognition of mathematical formulae reflecting in the infinitely small the laws, structure and ordering of the infinite world. Extensively Man cognises an infinitely small portion of the world, but intensively, as Galileo put it, his understanding equals the divine; in other words, Man's reason apprehends infinite spaces of the Universe. To cite Galileo's well-known epistemologicail credo: "Extensively, that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, which are infinite, the human understanding is as nothing even if it understands a thousand propositions; for a thousand in relation to infinity is zero. But taking Man's understanding intensively, in so far as this term denotes understanding some proposition perfectly, I say that the human intellect does understand some of them perfectly, and thus in these it has as much absolute certainty as Nature itself has. Of such are the mathematical sciences ailone; that is geometry and arithmetic, in which the Divine intellect indeed knows infinitely more propositions, since it knows all. But with regard to those few which the human intellect does un-
derstand, I believe that its knowledge equals the Divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no greater sure-
ness.
How do mathematical sciences overcome the limitations of Man's knowledge, achieving as they do supreme authenticity in the knowledge of Nature?
Galileo's conception brings scientific thinking to a new conception about the connection between the finite and the infinite. Differential calculus and the differential conception of motion consider the finite, limited, individual, particular as something potentially possessing infinite being. The ratio of the infinitesimal increment of the way to the infinitesimal increment of time is the velocity of the particle, i.e., its further existence, contained as eventual at the given point. At the given moment the particle is subject to the differential law. The law characterising infinite existence is embodied in the particle, in its behaviour. In his limited life Man cognises infinity, personality oversteps its limits, being objectified. This process becomes the foundation of the new optimism. Man is inspired with an optimistic evaluation of himself and the Universe as a whole, no longer by approximating the static ideal, but by dynamic influence on the world. For the time being we are not concerned with the transformation of the infinite world, but only with its cognition. The optimism of the 17th-18th centuries is an optimism of knowledge. Philosophers only interpret the world. In the finite, Man cognises the reflection of the infinite world.
Marx in all his teaching: ontology, epistemology and sociology, as well as in his economic conceptions, shows that cognition of the world is inseparable from its transformation. Therefore Man's purposive influence on Nature, i.e., labour, becomes the basis of the new, creative and dynamic optimism. Escape from the world into the realm of pure thinking no longer gives back to the world its ratio
* Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems---Ptolemaic and Copernican, Berkeley and Los An?eles, 1962, p. 103.
5-01545
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67and Man his optimism. Man rationalises the world, increasing the negentropy, creating noozonos in the world, and herein lies his freedom.
Herein also lies the starting point of comprehending the objective world. In Pascal's above-cited pessimistic declaration, fear of non-being is intertwined with fear of infinite being, infinite uncognised being. "I am in terrible ignorance about everything...," says Pascal. It is a very eloquent fusion of conceptions: "terrible ignorance", ignorance as a source of fear of non-being and infinite being. Galileo did not know such fear because he saw intensive and absolute credibility of knowledge. The infinitely small credibly reflects the infinitely great. And this epistemological optimism disperses the pessimistic spectres that surrounded Pascal.
'
modern scientific and technological revolution whose importance for an optimistic world outlook is the subject of this book?
Does contemporary science provide a foundation for gerontological optimism? It fills the goblet of Oberon with the nectar of immortality, but does this nectar dry up, or is the active function of man preserved in old age? Docs the traditional concept of old age change under the conditions created by modern science?
Somewhat anticipating the foregoing, we shaill deal with questions considered in the second and third parts of the book, first of all with problems of molecular biology, transformation of the character of labour due to cybernetics and the application of non-classical science as a whole and, finally, of ecology. It is to be assumed that all this will radically change the very content of old age as a physiological and economic and demographical category.
The concept of old age as a period of degradation and final cessation of Man's activity received an exceedingly acute expression, deeply personal and impersonal at the same time, in 1911 in the well-known decision taken by Paul and Laura Lafargue to depart from life when threatened with a decrease in the active participation in life. Even at that time it could not become a general principle, and it did not claim to: old age by itself never ceased actively to influence the world, because such influence is always based on a certain tradition, invariance, continuing tendency, and requires experience, a great store of accumulated impressions and knowledge, which are the prerogative of old age. But non-classical science promises to introduce radical changes to this problem.
They contradict, to a considerable extent, the conception on which I. I. Mechnikov based his Essays in Optimism. In this conception the fear of death is contrasted to the "instinct of death" which is a natural wish for peace after a long and active life. In Mechnikov's view the fear of death results from the fact that people in most cases do not live to develop such a wish; normal life, orthobiosis. must secure longevity and the "instinct of death''.
5*
THE PROBLEM OF OLD AGE
The creation of noozones, the rise in negentropy and the cognition of the world's objective ratio resulting from this expedient activity increasingly become the content of labour. Labour is engaged in a fundamental transformation of natural processes and their expedient arrangement, from changes in the positions of the physical objects to changes in velocities, forms of energy, frequencies of such changes, vibration frequency of field variables, to changes of mass and even rest mass. Accordingly, ever more fundamental and general principles are changing in close connection with the said evolution of the picture of the world. We have already seen that labour and consciousness filled with such dynamic tasks discredit and drive away pessimistic shadows from Man. We spoke of death and the fear of death. Now we propose to touch upon the fatal spectre of the lengthy degradation preceding death and leading to death, a degradation of the physical and spiritual forces of Man. What changes have been wrought here by modern non-classical science and
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69But the "instinct of death" obviously involves a gradual decline of the interest in life, the temperament of intervention in life and the potential for its transformation. The tendencies of modern civilisation permit to predict not the asymptotic approach of such interest, temperament and potential to the zero line, but their increase and the transformation of death not into wished-for peace ("instinct of death"), but into something hostile to Man, into an adversary to be fought down by society considering maximum prolongation of life as an essential object of its labour and intellectual efforts.
How are these tendencies related to the non-classical character of modern science?
In modern gerontology the idea is sometimes expressed that old age degradation is encoded in the molecule structure of living matter. This being the case, science apparently advances to a real possibility of affecting the hereditary code. It should be emphasised that such a possibility involves essentially non-classical processes. For instance, radiation genetics includes the use of radiation stimuli whose nature is revealed in the light of quantum physics. The demarcation of classical and quantum components of molecular biology will be discussed in the essay on Molecular Biology. But it should be pointed out even now that there exists a characteristic relationship between dynamic, transformative, active optimism and non-classical conceptions.
This relationship is seen most distinctly in the elimination of a number of diseases that shorten Man's life and reduce his capacity for work. Even more clearly is it to be seen in analysing the general economic effect of science, in defining the scientific basis for the rise of the consumption level observed at present and projected for the end of this century. Less distinct is the connection of modern science with the rationalisation and amelioration of the ecological conditions. First to be solved now is the negative side of the problem, the need for protecting forests, water reservoirs and the air from pollution. But this is only a part, only the beginning of the radical rationalisation of Man's ecological environment as a condition
of the radical increase in the duration and fulness of life.
The two terms---duration and fulness, extensive and intensive increase in human life---characterise the change in the character and content of labour. As has already been said (and as will be discussed in greater detail in the second and the third parts of this book), the application of non-classical science signifies the transition of labour to new, increasingly dynamic, general and fundamental functions, reconstructing production. Such an evolution of labour is inseparable from the evolution of science in which increasingly more fundamental principles become plastic, variable and dependent on experimental and industrial experience. This evolution is somewhat analogous to the turns in the development of science already dealt with: the changed conception of the ratio of the world, the perception as world harmony not of permanent positions (Aristotle), but of permanent velocities (Galileo's Dialogue), accelerations (Galileo's Discourses), mass (Newton's Principia), rest mass, etc. In the content of labour, an analogous transition into a new invariant, to a new ordering identity, is inseparable from the statement of the violation of the old invariant, the old identity. In modern nonclassical science and in modern production embodying science such transition is becoming practically continuous, this continuity being the source of their specific effect on the character and role of "old age" in modern civilisation.
The words "old age" have been put in quotes not because old age is disappearing---this does not happen---but because the concept of old age, its character and role are radically changing. It is natural that distribution of functions should be between coexisting and collaborating generations, when the ``fathers'' preserve the existing order, and the ``sons'' emerge as the bearers of the new, of that which violates the tradition. The conflicts between ``fathers'' and ``sons'' usually expressed the break between the two components of labour and knowledge, i.e., between maintenance of the tradition and its transformation. Such a break was the basis both of the traditionalism of old age and the nihilism of youth. Real scientific, technical and economic progress was based on both these components: practice and
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71experience prepared the transition to new general conceptions, but at the same time their results could be neither found nor formulated nor applied without having recourse to certain established general categories. In classical science and production embodying these general categories such a recourse could abide by the old conceptions during lengthy periods---hence the illusion of their a priori character, the a priori adherence to the already established, and the nihilistic refutation of the already established. The epistemological basis of these conflicts was the quasi-static character of the scientific conceptions. Within the framework of the dialectical world-outlook, the understanding and generalising of the fundamental shifts in cognition and practical life, did not involve either illu,- sions of an a priori immobile picture of the world, or a break between the new and the old in science and economy resulting from these illusions.
The role of the older generation in the life of society greatly depended on the relationship of these components of knowledge and transformation of the world, that had merged and become complementary. Initially, the practical experience and empiric registration of events and regularities did not constitute stable meaningful series. In those times the preservation of traditions did not become a peculiar distinct function, and old men who had not become chiefs, were left without food, they were killed and sometimes even eaten. Then certain stable empirical knowledge and rules were found and consolidated by tradition and custom. They seemed sacred and their custodians, possessing the greatest life experience, became chiefs. Even later power, influence and active effect on ilife and labour were, to a certain extent, related to age. The transformation of industry into applied natural science, the replacement of tradition by science, comparatively high dynamism, the high tempo of technical progress, essentially changed the social weight of the age groups. But we are interested here in the corresponding effect of non-classical science and the modern scientific and technological revolution.
In non-classical science empirical experience, the external confirmation, "the advancement of reason" are insepa-
rable from logical constructions, inner perfection, "the penetration of reason into itself". Gradual accumulation of empirical data and their subsequent logical generalisation are no longer characteristic of science, the transformation of general constructions more often accompanies experiment and even merges with it. But this philogenetic peculiarity of modern science is characteristic of ontogenesis, of the creative way of a scientist. Also characteristic of it is another peculiarity of modern science: developing a new principle no longer means finding new "external confirmations" of the invariable scheme, they are accompanied by the transformation of this scheme. Consequently, non-- classical science is not characterised by a burst of theoretical thought at the beginning of the creative path, later on to be replaced by a peaceful development of the established principle.
The break between rather invariable general principles on the one hand, and changing empirical data and particular generalisations, on the other, characteristic of classical science, signifies a certain break and a certain illusion of independence of the two components of knowledge---- identity and non-identity. The presumption of identity permits to apply to new phenomena the relatively immobile concepts and norms, established in the past. Such extrapolation seems to be the prerogative of old age. Non-identity, irreducibility, specificity of the new. revolt against the identifying experience crystallised in these norms. It seems to be a prerogative of youth to state the specificity of the new. But already in classical times, taken in historical perspective, such a distribution of functions proves an illusion, a regular illusion, but an illusion, nevertheless. Non-classical science and the experience involved in its application leave no grounds for a similar illusion. The new experience makes it imperative immediately to change, modify, generalise, concretise the general principles. The classical, and rather illusory division of labour between the generations loses its meaning.
In my book about Einstein I made an attempt to consider from this point of view the modern ontogenesis of scientific theory, recalling in this connection the contrasting confrontation of old age and youth in the treatise writ-
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73ten by Longinus at the beginning of our era, that analysed from this standpoint the difference between the Iliad and Odyssey. Longinus ascribed the Iliad with its heat of passion to the young Homer, and the Odyssey permeated with quiet thought to the poet in his old age (the Odyssey, in Longinus' words, suggests the Sun about to set: it preserves its colossal dimensions, but it no longer blazes. ..). If the explosion of constructive thought is associated with the Sun at its zenith, with youthful passion and temperament,^^1^^ and the peaceful development of a new principle, with the Odyssey, with the setting sun, then such an analogy does not hold for contemporary scientific creativity.
Accordingly, production combines the development of technical principles (once it was possible to say "peaceful development".. .) with the revolutionary transformation oi these principles.
On the whole, non-classical science and its application approach those characteristic features of creativity that were associated with the stages of aging. The concept of ``acme'' (this is the term the Greeks used to designate the highest efflorescence of Man's creative powers) changes, it is no longer a peak on the graph, but a curve extended along the time axis. It reaches a maximum comparatively early and retains a maximal value until death or nearly until death. For this reason, the struggle for longevity as a struggle for improving the living conditions (in particular, for ameliorating the ecological environment) and for increasing the efficiency of medicine conforms to the requirements and possibilities of modern science and production. The increasing of average longevity means a radical decrease in the number of disabled, a radical lengthening of maximum creative capacity for work.
Thus, gerontological optimism is closely linked with epistemological, scientific, technical and economic optimism.
However, one should not think that gerontological problems are derived from economic ones. Man, the subject of labour, and his interests are the goal, the starting point that determines the plans for the remoulding of the character, the tools and the objects of labour. Man's interests lie in the extensive and intensive increase in life expec-
tancy, which will lengthen life, filling it maximally with the active transformation of the world. Part Two of the book will treat the objective tendencies of scientific progress, and Part Three, the specific problem of optimism, the relation between the goal of labour, production, science and the objective possibilities created by non-classical science.
PART TWO SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
PART TWO. SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
75economic and social effect of modern scientific trends once they are implemented. Yet, in the absence of such prognoses, it is well-nigh impossible to say what these modern tendencies consist in. We can name a particle, determine its type, and---if we visualise its eventual destiny---its track. Likewise it is only by dint of scientific hypotheses, scientific and technical forecasts and economic projecting that we can ascertain the tendencies of the scientific and technical progress, name them and comprehend their meaning.
The primary and basic goal of modern economic, scientific and technological forecasting is to determine, in making the right decision, the economic value of all possible variants now available. Thus, it should be most emphatically stressed that we are dealing, in fact, not with the year 2000, but with the current year. The following example will illustrate the vital character of such forecasting. Let us assume that in planning a new plant, mine, power station, railway line, port, etc., a depreciation period will necessarily be fixed for a tool, assembly unit or the whole enterprise, for that matter. Under scientific and technological revolution the prospect of moral depreciation may gain priority over the prospect of the physical wear of a tool, or exhaustion of a deposit when planning a mine. Difficult though it may be to predict the appearance of a machine or production process with greater competitive power than the ones currently planned, these estimates, however conjectural, are absolutely indispensable under scientific and technological revolution. Similarly, under scientific and technological revolution these estimates are connected with scientific prognoses, which are even more hypothetical than technological ones for they forecast radical changes, i.e., changes not only in design and technology, but likewise in the ideal physical cycles which are embodied in one way or another in the designs and technological methods currently used.
But that is not all. At present, the value of a scientific principle, design or technological process is measured nol so much by its foreseeable or already identifiable economic effect, its technical level, as by its effect on the rate ol scientific, technological and economic progress. How docs
WHY THE YEAR 2000?
Can this date---the year 2000---be deduced from certain definitions of modern science or from the character of its trends?
'
Before answering this question, it must be emphasised that there exists reverse correlation: the very definition of the modern trends demands that a forecast be made, a picture be drawn of the development of science in the coming decades.
Herein the following analogy will be appropriate. Let us imagine a physical experiment in which new elementary particles are generated. The reaction leading to the emergence of particles takes but little time, say of the order of 10~^^22^^ sec. However, to define what particles are generated, what is their mass, charge and life time, it is necessary to know how each particle will eventually behave, how it will move, how its path will curve in a given magnetic or electric field, how long its track will be before it disintegrates, which will put an end to its existence. Only such knowledge about the further fate of the particle gives physical meaning to the problem of the particle belonging to this or that type, its charge, mass and life time.
The description of modern scientific progress is similar to the determination of the eventual destiny of the particle and the definition of its type. It is very hard now to determine the nature of the tendencies arising in science. It is harder still to define the technical effect of these tendencies---the results they will yield upon their implementation. The hardest task, though, is to determine the
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77a discovery, an invention, a new scheme, a new design, new technology, affect the speed and acceleration of progress? This problem is now of no lesser importance---:and at times of greater importance---than the one concerning their influence on the level of science or economics. Ours is an epoch of differential indices, differential criteria. This point will be dealt with in greater detail in Part Three of this book. Here we merely wish to emphasise the need for forecasting to determine the differential indices.
The rate of a process, its speed and acceleration, in other words, a derivative of changing value x with respect to time, is determined, as is known, by ratio Ax to the time increment At when the latter is contracted to a moment, approximating zero. This is the way speed is defined, and the operation is repeated to define acceleration. Prognosis constitutes an increment which we must discover in order to give a dynamic description of the given moment in science, technology and economics. It is a tangent, as it were, drawn from the given point to the curve, indicating the direction of the curve.
The curve, generally speaking, does not coincide with the tangent, and remains a curve. But in the absence of a tangent it is impossible to define the local direction of the curve.
Prognosis is a tangent to a most considerable extent and in its most important functions, determining as it does, the direction of development, state of motion, dynamics of the present moment, the dynamic value of decision variants to be chosen now, variants of the initial conditions that have a bearing on the subsequent development of science, technology and economics.
But why are we taking several decades as the A£---- increment of time, why have we singled out for forecasting the remaining quarter of our century, why do we wish to discover the course of science, technology and economics within the coming twenty years or so? How is this date,--- the year 2000, deduced? Cannot the lines characterising modern tendencies be extended isay, over a span of a hundred years, two hundred years or perhaps longer? On the other hand, will not short-term forecasts covering periods of three, five, ten years be more indicative in other cases?
It will be understood that the year 2000 is an arbitrary date. However, it is not entirely arbitrary, since it indicates the order of the magnitude of a term which will see the modern tendencies of the scientific and technological progress realised. Perhaps such realisation will take not thirty but twenty or forty years, yet it involves a definite order of the magnitude of the term. But that is not all. The date 2000 conceals in itself the idea of a single complex of interrelated changes of their common integral realisation timed to a certain date identical for all branches and all ways of progress.
What does this comlpex consist of?
Part Two of the book is to give an answer to this question and the introductory essay of this part confines itself to a most general preliminary answer: The promises of non-classical physics will be realised within a period of time which is measured by several decades and which we provisionally identify with the end of our century.
What are these promises?
Non-classical science promises prognoses for the further development of atomic power, quantum electronics, molecular biology. First, emphasis should be placed on the most characteristic common epistemological feature of the modern stage of science that has called to life the above-mentioned trends of the scientific and technological progress. This feature which determines the character and content of present prognoses, is the relationship between concrete scientific and technological discoveries coupled with the re-evaluation of the most fundamental principles of science and the implementation of the new physical ideas that were formulated in the first half of the century. The beginning of this century was marked by a most radical re-evaluation of the classical foundations of science and, which is probably more important, a rejection of the very presumption of an immobile basis of the developing concepts of the world. It may be inferred from a concrete analysis of modern tendencies of science that this century will, in all probability, end in a full industrial and technological implementation of those new physical ideas whose emergence crowned the beginning of the century. It is to be assumed that within several decades, i.e., a period
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79which, as has already been said, we identify somewhat provisionally, but for good reasons, with the last quarter of the century, a new scientific basis of production and new applied natural science will be brought into existence.
Some explanations are due here. The 17th century saw the emergence of classical science, called so because the basic laws of Nature discovered by Galileo, Descartes and Newton, followed by a succession of great thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries, claimed to be ultimate truths which will forever remain invariable canons of scientific thought just as the architectural and sculptural masterpieces of classical antiquity became canons for artistic creativity.
Classical physics and primarily the laws of mechanics set forth by Newton in Philasophiae naturalis principia mathematica, had certain grounds to claim the status of eternal truths. Beginning with Newton science has developed accepting everything experimentally established and verified, generalising old laws to define them more precisely, rinding new areas for their application to demonstrate how these laws are modified in the new areas. Classical science, however, laid claims to something greater. Most thinkers of the 18th- 19th centuries believed that Newton's laws of mechanics constituted a stable basis of science. Classical science is not just a set of certain axioms (such as the independence of body's mass of its momentum, or the continuity of energy, the possibility of infinitely small increments of energy) but also a conviction that these are really axioms. It is not even a question of subjective conviction. The concepts of classical science essentially do not require any other or contradictory assumptions for their comprehension.
What is non-classical physics? It is sometimes defined in a purely negative way: it is /zon-classical physics generally repudiating the fundamental postulates that classical physics proceeds from. In 1900, Max Planck suggested that energy is emitted in minimal portions called quanta. Several years later Einstein demonstrated that relativity of space, time and motion (these concepts were opposed to Newton's absolute space, time and motion), leads to a correlation between the body's mass and velocity, and conse-
quently the energy of its motion; when speed approaches its limit---300,000 km per second, the mass of the body tends to infinity. Einstein postulated, further, that a body's rest mass m is proportional to its internal energy E; if mass and energy are measured in conventional units, the energy is equal to the rest mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light c. Thus, E = mc^^2^^.
In the 1920s an even more paradoxical non-classical "heory appeared---quantum mechanics. Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg demonstrated that a particle in motion, generally speaking, has no definite position or velocity in space at a given moment. These new correlations inherent in processes far removed from everyday experience had an unexpected impact on the general public. It might have seemed that a body moving at a speed comparable to that of light (considered in the theory of relativity) would evoke no emotions with people not engaged in theoretical physics. In like manner they should not have been concerned about the fate of an electron passing through an opening comparable to the size of an electron. Nor should the general public, obviously, have been impressed by the purely mental, practically unrealisable experiment to demonstrate that passage through an opening changes the electron's velocity, rendering it indeterminate. Nevertheless, the impact was unprecedented. Quantum mechanics as well as the theory of relativity aroused not only widespread interest, but brought about a great change in the mode of thinking about Nature. A similar change in the minds was probably caused by the disappearance of the absolute ``up'' and ``down'' concepts in ancient times when the idea of the Earth being a sphere was accepted. In much the same way minds were confused by the astronomy of the 16th-17th centuries that put an end to the idea of an immobile centre of the Universe. Not only did the concept of the fundamental laws of Nature change, but the very concept of science was changed too. The theory of relativity and later quantum mechanics did not just replace old fundamental laws by new ones. These new laws no longer laid claim to an ultimate solution of the primary problems of existence. In the 19th century, Hermann Helmholtz saw the supreme and ultimate goal of science
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81in reducing the picture of the world to central forces fully subjected to Newton's mechanics. A modern physicist does not intend to substitute this goal by another or by an ultimate aim. These Victorian illusions have been given up for good. Non-classical physics is like a building which not only grows in height, but reaches down in search of an ever deeper but never the last foundation. In this respect, Man's reason not only saw a new Universe, but it saw itself in a new light.
The effect of non-classical physics was not only negative. Mankind felt by intuition that it was entering an epoch of greater dynamism, that science was indubitably bringing about deep, though still vague, changes in the life of people, that not only life itself but scientific concepts, and potentialities of science would undergo a continubus change, and the impact of science on life would continually influence the material and spiritual forces of mankind.
Those who remember the impression first made by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics on public mentality can testify to the optimistic character of this effect. The 1920s saw a radical reassessment of values, with stability, recurrence, constancy losing their Victorian optimistic nimbus. Optimism was ever more associated with transformations. It is but natural that the discrediting of immobility and apotheosis of motion should be only approximate features, requiring elaboration and addition of statements that contradict them. Naturally, the roots of the reassessment of values mentioned earlier were far deeper than the effect of non-classical science. Perhaps, the latter was not even one of the roots, the psychological effect of science merely coincided with the dominant changes in public mentality. That was one of the reasons for the intense interest in new science, so peculiar to the twenties.
In the middle of the century intuitive insight turned into distinct prediction. Now we can, to some extent, determine the effect of non-classical physics, of its basic feature---the incomplete and open character of new concepts of the world and the inevitable revision of the basic principles of science. Now let us consider the effect of non-classical physics at the present time.
Classical physics also caused both the scientific concepts and the impact of science on the material and spiritual forces of humanity to wax dynamic, mobile and changeable. But that was a dynamism of a different, lower calibre, for only specific scientific notions underwent certain changes, while the fundamental principles remained intact, The change of selected scientific concepts brought in its wake first a sporadic, and at the end of the classical period (the beginning of the 20th century), an uninterrupted change in the technological level of production. Beginning with the industrial revolution of the 18th century, industry has turned into an applied natural science. Technological progress sporadically or continuously makes use of the schemes of classical science, treating them as ideal cycles to be attained by industrial technology. The entire history of classical thermodynamics is one of the gradual approach to the ideal Carnot cycle, to the ideal physical scheme of heat flowing from warmer to cooler bodies, with heat transformed into mechanical power in the course of such transition. The ideal physical schemes themselves never remained stable, always being supplemented by new ones. Science discovered new laws governing conservation, entropy, molecular structure, evolution of organic and inorganic nature, with the number of schemes that served as goals for industrial practice ever increasing. The main objective of 18th century power engineering was to conserve mechanical energy in the transformation of the available potential (e.g., water flowing into the buckets of an overshot wheel), or available kinetic energy (water moving the vanes of an undershot wheel) into mechanical rotation of machines whose forerunners were the spinning looms that heralded in the industrial revolution. In the 19th century (or rather in the period from the end of the 18th and nearly through the whole of the 19th century) the main objective of power engineering came to be the conservation of energy in the transformation of heat into mechanical power. Increased efficiency of thermal equipment signified advance towards this objective. At the end of the 19th century, when the transformation of mechanical power into electricity, and the transformation of the latter into mechanical power (which was deduced from the basic equations
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83of electrodynamics and Maxwell's equations) became known to science, it set a new objective to technical progress, with power engineering seeking to carry into effect the following scheme: the movement of the conductor in a magnetic field generates an electric current, and the latter causes the conductor at a considerable distance in the magnetic field to revolve. This scheme, implemented as a centralised system of electric supply, is the main target of electrification.
Below we consider in greater detail electrification as the implementation of classical electrodynamics. But before that we wish to remark on the implementation of classical physics in the whole evolution of power engineering up to the middle of our century.
Classical science deals with discrete particles of matter} viz., macroscopic bodies, molecules and atoms. The energy of all these moving bodies owes its existence on the Earth to solar radiation. The Sun creates all classical sources of energy used in industry. Sunrays make water molecules move upwards, causing wind and air pressure overfall, transforming molecules of organic matter in the absorption of light by chlorophyll, i.e., stocking energy as fuel. Thus classical power engineering remains within the limits of processes occurring in the immutable solar system. In anticipation we should like to point out that new power engineering or the embodiment of non-classical science, is based on processes involving the emergence of atomic nuclei, as well as processes of creation and destruction of galaxies.
Classical power engineering, too, for that matter, was based on processes which have now been given a non-- classical explanation, including processes causing Sun radiation, accumulation of its energy in chlorophyll and even generation and propagation of current in conductors. The word ``based'', however, has a different meaning here: classical power engineering could develop although the non-classical nature of these processes was not yet detected. New power engineering, on the contrary, essentially depends on such discovery.
But let us return to electrification. It comprised the use of classical sources of energy in unified systems of generat-
ing points and consumers of electric power connected by high voltage transmission. Yet, this was only the first stage in electrification, and it caused reverberations in technology, in the raw material basis of industry, in the character of labour, in culture and science.
In technology, the unification of energy generation resulted in wide industrial! application of electrolysis. Production processes and technological methods requiring considerable electricity consumption became more economical as electrification made greater use of water power and cheap local fuel. Artificial nitrogen fertilisers could now be produced on a scale unprecedented in the past, which immediately raised the productivity of agriculture. Further, electrification opened the way to methods of production of light metalls and special steels, requiring high energy consumption. The metal basis of industry changed, bringing about a corresponding change in the raw material basis. Now there arose a need for rare metals and elements, in general, which were known to chemistry but utterly unknown to technology. Dozens of elements of the Mendeleyev Periodic Table became new industrial raw materials.
Electrification changed the character of labour. The flexible electric drive made it possible for machines to replace workers in more complex operations. Electric motors, heavy-duty or small, powered numerous mechanisms which processed machine parts, moving and transferring them from one automated machine tool to another. There appeared servomotors that do not process the parts, but control other motors, resetting operating conditions, varying cutting tool angles, changing the travel of automatic transfer lines, etc. Electropowered production with its automated lines is monitored from a control console with gauges to indicate ispeed, voltage, temperature, raw materials input, product output, as well as push buttons and control levers to operate a complex unit or system of aggregate units.
The general economic effect of electrification amounted to the following:
The application of electric power in production processes, utilisation of new kinds of raw materials and indus-
6*
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trial automation actually became continuous processes. Not a single week passed without a new part, a new arrangement, a new formula, new operations, new parameters appearing in some design bureau, laboratory, or workshop. Accordingly, technical progress advanced continuously, and the growth of social labour productivity likewise became practically uninterrupted.
As is known, continuous changes in values can be presented, certain mathematical subtleties aside, in terms of time derivatives. The first time derivative of a given point is its velocity, the second derivative is acceleration. The economic effect of electrification may be stated as follows: In electrification the first time derivative of labour productivity becomes positive, it is greater than zero and, having a certain velocity, it rises continuously.
In 1920, a plan for the electrification of Soviet Russia was elaborated. It provided for an immediate programme of constructing electric power plants as well as for a farreaching programme of uniting in a single power grid of all power plants in the European part of the country, with an increase in capacity. The plan laid down guidelines for the course and scale of industrial electrification, the use of electric power to mechanise industrial production and in new production processes; it envisaged, on a long-term basis, the electrification of transport and agriculture and mapped out the future development of the main industries to be reconstructed on the basis of electricity. On the whole, it constituted an integral complex of industrial transformations timed to approximately the same date including the creation of a high-tension network linking large power plants, mechanisation of industry, shifts in the character of labour, the development of industrial branches requiring great energy consumption, and changes in the sources of raw materials.
Now it will be easier to understand wherein lies the effect of non-classical physics.
First and foremost, it (lies in the building of a new power basis for production. In this case, the word new stands for something radical, a rather general physical principle. The technological revolution caused by the machine-tools of the 18th century was the general physical principle of
PART TWO. SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
85the Newtonian law of forces, the proportional acceleration of a body subjected to a force with a constant of proportionality equalling the mass of the body. The fundamentals of thermodynamics were the general principle of the revolution brought about by thermal machines in the 18th and 19th centuries. The laws of electrodynamics, Maxwell's equations describing the relationship between the magnetic field and the electrical field and implemented in the transformer, generator and electric motor were the general principles at the root of the revolution caused by electricity. The general principle governing atomic power engineering which defines the ideals and ways of research and the subsequent application of its results, is the relativist relationship between the mass of the nucleus and the energy of the coupling of nuclear particles. None of these formulas, of course, is in any way opposed to the others: if a modern atomic reactor (using a small but already substantial share of energy calculated with the help of Einstein's formula), generates heat, the subsequent calculation of the use of this heat relies on classical thermodynamics and electrodynamics, whereas calculations of mechanical processes in the atomic reactor depend on classical dynamics. Now, however, we do not judge about the evolution of power base by measuring the successive dynamic use of the calorific power of burning fuel in the direct classical meaning of the word, (i.e., combined with oxygen), nor do we regard energy as stored by the Sun in a molecule of organic matter. We now measure the use of the inner energy of the nucleus, stored there when the nucleus was created as a result of processes occurring in very small spatial and temporal domains, that are, however, associated with the cosmic evolution of stars and possibly galaxies.
The stage in scientific and technological progress associated with atomic energy will by no means end in complete utilisation of the relativist energy E = mc^^2^^, in the same way as the consummation of the revolution caused by steam did not mean full utilisation of the calorific power of coal. The revolution produced by steam power was completed when coal became the main component of the energy balance, when industry migrated en masse from rivers
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87and water wheels built on their banks to coal-fields, when there appeared steam-powered means of transport and the classical industrial centres. In a similar fashion, the revolution accomplished by electricity did not end in full utilisation of the classical energy sources. Its completion (certainly very relative, retaining the prospect of further development of power plants, networks, industrial electrical equipment and methods of technological application of electricity) meant the creation of big interregional power grids, wide automation, and electric-power based technology and as a result, continuous technical progress, in other words, a non-zero derivative of the level of technology and productivity of labour with respect to time.
With regard to the revolution brought about by atojnic energy (to continue the analogy with electrification as implementation of classical physics), one may consider a certain complex of interrelated shifts in technology, culture and science, the character of labour and raw materials base, as the content of this paticular period and the transformation of atomic power plants into the predominant source of electric energy production, automation based on electronic computers and controlling machines, and industry free from the threat of depletion of resources, as the completion of the, process described above.
All these results of atomic power engineering (they might also be called resonances, for atomic power engineering only intensifies the inner tendencies of electronics and cybernetics) lead to a continuous acceleration of technological progress. The development of atomic power engineering no longer presents a series of constructions ever closer approaching the ideal physical scheme, it often constitutes a change of the scheme itself. We shall later return to this peculiar feature of atomic power engineering. In analogous fashion, the ``resonance'' processes of application of cybernetics and electronics in technology often change the overall set-up in an entire industry and not only the engineering part of one and the same scheme. Without citing here any examples or giving proof, we shall provisionally formulate the main feature of atomic age economics: the level of technology and the level of labour productivity not only grow but their growth is con-
tinuously accelerated accompanied by an increase in the speed of technological progress and labour productivity. It is not only the first time derivative of labour productivity that becomes positive, but the second derivative is also greater than zero.
This is the main economic effect of atomic energy being converted into the main component of the power balance, of electronics being transformed into the basic means of technology, of work aided by cybernetic mechanisms being changed into the main content of labour.
And what happens next? Can we now map out the outlines of the post-atomic age?
We cannot do that, but what we can do is to indicate with great precision the process which is already now providing for the post-atomic civilisation. A special essay is devoted to this question. We only wish to point out here that we definitely know what the provision for the postatomic civilisation involves, but we are not at all aware of what this provision will result in, what will be the new scientific concepts which will give rise to new post-- atomic power engineering and technology, and a new character of labour.
The way that leads to such new scientific concepts is the study of elementary particles not only of atoms and atomic nuclei, but of those particles which it has so far been impossible and will hardly ever be possible to divide into sub-particles. These include electrons, i.e., particles with a negative electric charge, nucleons, particles contained in atomic nuclei: protons with a positive electric charge, neutrons with no electric charge, and many other particles. The problem is that we can hardly distinguish elementary particles from non-elementary, nor can we so much as point out the factors on which the mass and charge depend, distinguishing one type of elementary particles from another.
There is every reason to believe that these questions can only be solved by an outright rejection of convention concepts, a rejection, possibly, more radical than that of the classical axioms of physics by the relativity theory and quantum mechanics when they were being created,
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It might well be that in a decade or two (or within some such period) the most fundamental principles of science will rapidly start to change. Not only concrete scientific schemes will then undergo a change (this is already happening in our days), but the very ideals of science sought by scientists in working out new scientific schemes will become different. Then, not only the acceleration of technological progress may become continuous, but the acceleration itself will continuously increase and become a real positive third time derivative of the level of technology and the level of Man's power over Nature.
Yet, for the time being this third derivative is not a measurable value but only a symbol of the possible economic effect of the fundamental research that is expanding our knowledge of elementary particles. This research probes into very small spatial regions (say, of the radius of an atomic nucleus, i.e., 10~^^13^^ cm) and temporal intervals of the order of 10~^^23^^ sec. This can be achieved with the help of very powerful accelerators of elementary particles. Another additional way is astrophysical research, particularly studies of cosmic rays, that is the flow of high energy particles, coming to the Earth from space.
This is ``disinterested'' research. The quotes, though, do not question the. really disinterested nature of Man's aspiration for solving purely cognitive problems which lead him into cosmic space and the microcosm. Whatever the possible practical results of astrophysical research or of the construction of very powerful particle accelerators, it is not these results, in principle undefinable in advance, that serve as immediate incentives for research. This research is conducted as a macro-economic undertaking primarily pursuing cognitive goals. Man is already aware of the fact that the abstract character of cognitive tasks and the completely undefinable practical results of their fulfilment, conform to the radical character of these results indefinable in advance and, ultimately, to the radical acceleration of economic progress. It is clear that it was due to the exceedingly general, abstract and purely cognitive character of the tasks set at the beginning of the century concerning space, time, motion, ether, mass and
PART TWO. SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
89energy, that the theory of relativity became the source of such a fundamental practical result as atomic power engineering. Now science is confronted with even more general and basic problems. Attempts will be made to solve them independently of their definable practical results. None the less the quotes in ``disinterested'' are not without meaning: the ``interest'', though not to be known or quantitatively defined in advance, is absolutely indubitable and extremely great.
Is it an economic concept? Is it possible to speak about the economic effect of fundamental studies in the theory of elementary particles?
Apparently, it is time now to generalise the "economic effect" concept including in it not only the productivity of social labour, but also the rate of growth of this index, its acceleration and, possibly, even the acceleration rate. As has already been pointed out time derivatives of labour productivity are implied here: the first derivative (rate of growth), the second derivative (acceleration) and the third derivative (rate of acceleration).
Taking into account the time derivatives, including the third derivative, one may consider the fundamental, ``disinterested'' studies (concerning space and time, their finity and infinity, their continuity and discontinuity, the ``elementariness'' of elementary particles, the nature of their mass, charge, etc.) as links in the chain of Man's economic activity, as something enhancing Man's power over Nature, and increasing the sum of material, intellectual, and esthetic values consumed by him.
Only very simple studies, like checking the quality of raw materials and production, machine-tool speed, steam pressure, voltage and so on, maintain the given level of labour productivity. Design and development increase the productivity of labour, lending it a non-zero growth rate. In point of fact, it is scientific research that guarantees acceleration, the most fundamental research holding promise of an increased growth rate of social labour productivity. Nothing can give a greater impetus to accelerated productivity of social labour, and consequently to civilisation as a whole, than ``disinterested'' research which is really disinterested if the level of labour pro-
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91ductivity is implied, involving very great objective `` interest'' in terms of acceleration growth of this universal index of civilisation.
There is rather a distinct relationship between the degree of generality, depth and ``disinterestedness'' of scientific research and the uncertainty of its economic effect. Check measuring, design and development, scientific research proper conducted along fundamentally established guidelines and, finally, fundamental studies bring about a more intensive and at the same time a more uncertain and unexpected effect.
We can take as an adequately accurate and universal ruile the following correlation: the higher the order of the derivative whose value is affected by the result of research, the more indefinite the economic effect of this result," and the more profound this effect.
Correspondingly, economic theory is to include indeterminacy as a fundamental concept. Having become an exact science, it must share the common destiny of exact sciences operating with the fundamental concept of indeterminacy.
The indeterminate effect of fundamental studies is an indeterminacy of another kind than the indeterminate effect of scientific research with predictable (though not unequivocal) results or the indeterminate effect of design and development. It limits the prognosis claiming even the least determinacy. Such prognosis should not go beyond the complex of transformations in power engineering, technology, character of labour and sources of raw materials, which guarantee an accelerated growth rate of labour productivity conforming to the concept of "atomic age". Fundamental research is a peculiar memento mori, an indication of the time limits of such a complex.
Such limited prognosis springs from the radical rejection by non-classical science of any absolutes given once and for all. A fundamental feature of non-classical science is seeing its own limitedness and, moreover, containing certain indications of a possible modification of its own basis. But these indications are not sufficient to be implemented in new schemes and ideal cycles, which might become landmarks of scientific and technological progress,
Their prognostic value lies in the possibility and necessity to limit the prognosis in time. We refer to the possible, absolutely new post-atomic conditions of technological progress to follow the complex of interrelated power and technological transformations, which will be realised within several decades, approximately by the year 2000.
The atomic age comprises the forthcoming three to four decades, a period for which we can outline relatively definite scientific and technological prospects and a relatively definite integral economic effect to be achieved by the development of science. In the first half of the century, new integral principles of science appeared, and scientific thought went beyond that which we call general boundaries, no longer separating one branch from another, but one epoch from another. This impulse, generated in theoretical physics, moved from one branch to another at ever greater speed due to the new mathematical apparatus and new experimental methods. The impulse itself increased in an avalanche-like fashion, retaining to some extent the possibility of predicting the direction of scientific and technological progress. There appeared atomic power, quantum electronics, cybernetics, molecular biology, which will be considered in greater detail in this part of the book. They involve the fundamentals of nonclassical physics either directly (atomic power, quantum electronics) or indirectly (molecular biology), their development now having no serious obstacles on the way to transition to new integral foundations of a scientific world-outlook as a whole.
Hence certain permanent regularities in the evolution of economic indices as functions of scientific and technological progress. If productivity of social labour acquires a non-zero first time derivative, i.e., unfading speed, as a result of technical discoveries proper, new technological designs and constructions; a non-zero second derivative, acceleration as a result of scientific discoveries proper, new physical schemes and ideal cycle^^1^^;; and a non-zero third derivative as a result of changed basic principles of science as a whole, then in the coming decades---- tentatively up to the end of the century---we can proceed
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93
nological basis for modern prognostication embodying non-classical science. The realisation of such prediction requires an increase in that which may be termed the intellectual potential of science. The latter depends on the depth and generality of the fundamental problems whose solution requires the establishment of new relationships between differentiated branches of knowledge, the transference of experimental and mathematical methods from one branch of science to another and an increase in the number of these methods.
These basic tendencies: atomic power, electronics, cybernetics do not entail only expanded production, and accelerated expansion at that, they bring about a very great and rapid expansion of that which might be termed spatil and temporal limits of forecasting. Modern science and modern technology penetrate into the microcosm, creating microscopic noozones---zones of rational and purposive ordering of microprocesses. However, processes beginning on the micron level produce consequences affecting the entire lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere of the Earth, and events taking up a millionth part of a second change the course of age-long processes on the Earth. Thus, our age could be termed an epoch of chain reactions.
An essential or rather fundamental result, vital for Man, of the expanded spatial and temporal scale of the effect brought to bear upon the present scientific and technological developments is their impact on Man's ecology, his environment, flora and fauna, the composition of the atmosphere and water, radiation level, the balance of natural resources indispensable for life and industry. A new criterion for the evaluation of scientific and technological projects has emerged, which supercedes the criteria of cost of an established capacity unit, or production cost, etc., but, from a certain point of view, might be considered an economic criterion, if economics, production and labour are taken to cover the totality of the interactions of Man and Nature. The ecological criterion can be the basis of a positive evaluation: modern science and modern technology can bring about changes, necessary to mankind, in habitation, geophysical conditions, the
from the non-zero second time derivative of productivity of labour, from the acceleration of this index as the main inequality characteristic of the period for which the forecast is made.
All this answers the question "Why the year 2000?" But now we are faced with another question: Why is it that precisely now, in the early 1970s, it has become possible to make a comparatively well-founded prediction for the year 2000?
First of all, already in the sixties atomic power plants became capable of competing with thermal coal-burning plants. A later essay dealing with atomic energy will cite the comparable costs of a kilowatt-hour in atomic and coal-burning plants. The fact that the difference between these costs has lessened creates the possibility of a decades-long transition to a predominantly atomic production of electrical energy. Naturally the rate of the transition depends essentially on the degree to which the near equivalence of these costs is replaced by a difference in favour of the atomic plants. Now, however, we are passing the point of intersection of the curves of kilowatthour costs. There are some reasons to believe that the cost of a kilowatt-hour in atomic plants will decrease more rapidly than the cost of a kilowatt-hour in thermal power stations, permitting to predict a consistent increase in the difference in favour of atomic plants. Anyway, forecasts for the future role of atomic energy are based on the proven possibility of a profitable switch-over to the new power balance structure. One may even count on an accelerated transition, since in the seventies the problem of nuclear reactors that produce more nuclear fuel than they consume, will be solved physically and technically.
A peculiar feature of the early 1970s is that the new electronically based technology came closer to the basic industrial processes. Within the same period cybernetics, on achieving successes of great importance for the future communications, processing, storage of information and control, has approached purely industrial problems. These three basic developments---atomic energetics, electronics and cybernetics---have now reached their economic maturity, as it were. The latter form the scientific and tech-
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95Earth's vegetation, balance of natural resources, and can eliminate destructive cataclysms, making large territories habitable. This criterion can lead to a negative evaluation of the content and scale of scientific and technological undertakings. Anyhow, prediction on a very great spatial and temporal scale is becoming a necessary condition for the correct evaluation of projects and optimistic prognosis, a necessary prerequisite for the realisation of scientific and technological projects.
ideal models, a change in our conception oi physical processes, of the distribution of fields, of the motion and transmutation of particles, and of the transformation oi energy?
The immediate force behind the scientific component of the new revolution was an advance to a novel physical ideal: instead of the static ideal of classical science, research is now confronted by a new, essentially non-- classical, ideal. It can no longer represent the ultimate explanation of reality that leaves the future with nothing more than the task of particularising a conclusively established universal scheme. The ideal physical theory of today is one of maximum approximation to the understanding of the actual harmony of the Universe, one that is maximally in consonance with the sum total of available experimental evidence. This ideal is a changing criterion. It is consistent with the new epistemological credo of science. The idea that "truth is the daughter of its time", first conceived in ancient times, the idea of infinite approximation to the truth, that has been developing through the centuries since its first inception, has been translated into tangible criteria for the choice of scientific theory.
New criteria of scientific theory, new dynamic ideals of creative work in science represent one of the most significant results of the 20th century science. In any reference to the science of the year 2000, we need, first of all, to understand these achievements, the contribution that the science of this century has made to the motive forces and dynamism of progress. "The science of the year 2000" is a symbolic designation of the essence of scientific progress in the 20th century, a symbolic answer to the question: "What epithet will the 20th century claim in the history of science and culture?''
The 18th century was the Age of Reason, the 19th---the Age of Science. Let us take a closer look at the meaning of these two epithets, for they will help us to find an answer to the question concerning an epithet for the 20th century.
During the Renaissance, Reason proclaimed its sovereignty, and in the 17th century it began to claim hegemony. The 17th century, however, was just the dawn of ra-
THE AGE OF EINSTEIN
That period of scientific and technological progress which is the object of prognostication at present is called the atomic age. This age, as was pointed out earlier, is not exclusively characterised by atomic power plants becoming the prime source of power; the concept also covers the repercussive effects, both direct and indirect, of atomic energy. Yet, even this extended conception of the atomic age leaves some of the essential features of late 20th century science out of account. The term "atomic age" conveys the quantitative aspects of atomic power, the level of automation, the degree to which Man relies on electronics---all this will be discussed in detail in other essays--- but it does not reflect the revolutionary dynamism of production and culture that is peculiar to the 20th and the 21st centuries. And it is precisely these areas that hold the key to the new revolution in science and technology. The immediately preceding period, too, was dynamic: since the 18th century, production has been undergoing changes in structure, geographic location, power sources, the level of mechanisation, and manufacturing processes. However---and this was pointed out in the preceding chapter---the 20th century revolution in science and technology is characterised by a novel and greater dynamism: today, change affects not merely industrial structures and processes, but also ideal cycles, ideal models of technological progress.
What is the underlying force of these changes? Why is this century marked by an accelerated rate of change in
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tionalism, a dawn of muted, changing colours. In the following, 18th century, a rationalistic model of the Universe emerged that was in keeping with experimental evidence---Newtonian mechanics. It had a most profound effect on every aspect of European society: Engels spoke of the ties connecting the 18th century science with French Enlightenment and the French Revolution on the one hand, and with the English industrial revolution on the other.* Eighteenth century culture was imbued with the austerity and clarity of the rationalistic spirit. The scientific ideal of the time was to have the entire varicoloured picture of the Universe reduced to a monochrome blueprint of bodies moving in a pattern subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. This was a static ideal of scientific explanation, the boundary line of scientific cognition.
The social ideals of the 18th century, accordingly, were also static. Proceeding from the system of Newton, whom he elevated to the rank of Demiurge of the Universe, Charles Fourier constructed an ideal society in which abstract thought determined not merely a rational organisation of phalansteries, but also a well-ordered Nature, complete with well-behaved ``anti-lions'' and ``anti-sharks'', and a precisely calculated human life span of 144 years. In spite of their phantastic quality, Fourier's constructions were in line with the scientific style of the 18th century, the great Utopian thinker fully meriting the title of a "social Newton''.
The same static quality characterised the criteria of creative work in technology. The industrial revolution---at least its initial phase---consisted in the development of machine-tools that showed the minimal degree of deviation from ideal mechanical patterns: technological creative work, as was pointed out earlier, was patterned after an ideal physical scheme regarded as the limit of technological improvement.
Such was the Age of Reason, which, naturally, can be placed within the chronological limits of the 18th century for the sake of convenience only. The arbitrary quality of chronological limits of centuries, including the year 2000,
* See K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow,
1976, p. 478.
PART TWO. SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
97becomes apparent as soon as the centuries acquire integrative characteristics. With this reservation, the 19th century can well be described as an age of experimental science: scientific progress was no longer restricted to filling the immutable a priori forms with new empirical evidence. Each time the mind was confronted with a fresh experiment, it was forced to accept new logical and mathematical models which were far from being a priori concepts. The reader will recall Laplace's words quoted earlier, that Reason finds it much more difficult to penetrate itself than to advance. Early in the 19th century, intellectual self-penetration, in other words, the development of new logical and mathematical schemes, was a harder task than the mere advancement of knowledge, i.e., supporting existing schemes with fresh empirical evidence. This, of course, was inevitable: in the 19th century, science was continuously discovering new laws of Nature, which recall Shakespeare's "There are more things, in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. . .". The irreversible advance to states of increased entropy--- undreamt of by the sage men of old and discovered by Carnot, the equally undreamt-of new physical phenomenon of the electromagnetic field, and other facts, above and beyond any a priori schemes, undermined step by step the idea of some sort of an ultimate goal for science, i.e., the construction of a uniform system to embrace the totality of particular laws. Doubt, however, gnawed only at the idea of reducing every reality to mechanics: hardly anybody doubted that mechanics itself could be conceived only as Newtonian mechanics. There was even less questioning the absolute truth of Euclidean geometry, although Nature provided no perfect equivalents of the latter. A smooth physical surface could not represent a plane: the surface, it was found out, was made up of molecules. A beam of light could not be representative of a line, for it, too, was out a wave motion. Once free of such straight-line physical equivalents, geometry was able to call to life the most amazingly unexpected constructions---representations of "intellectual self-penetration", divorced from mere `` advancement''. The result was the emergence of multi-- dimensional geometries, multi-dimensional abstract spaces,
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I'ART TWO. SCIENCE IN THE YEAR 2000
99in which the position of a point was defined not by three, but by four or more coordinates. The result was the Lobachevsky geometry in which the sum of the angles of a triangle was less than 180°, and the Riemann geometry, in which the sum of the angles of the triangle was greater than 180°. Those were breakthroughs of Reason free from the straight jacket of physical equivalents, Reason that, as it constructed ever new paradoxical logical and mathematical models, felt amazed at their consistency, their perfect logic, but never paused to think, systematically, of these paradoxical models as forms of a paradoxical reality.
The theory of relativity changed the relation between "intellectual self-penetration" and "intellectual advancement". The special theory of relativity provided physical equivalents for four-dimensional geometry, while the general theory of relativity did the same for non-Euclidean geometry. Thus the concept emerged not just of a paradoxical opinion, view or theory, but of paradoxical reality, a concept that has proved eminently revolutionary, lending a greater dynamism to 20th century science and technology.
Paradoxical reality is seen as the materialisation of the fundamental concepts of science and ideals of scientific explanation in ways that are non-traditional and running counter to tradition: the objectives of scientific creative work change and become fluid as scientific progress gains momentum.
Let us now take a look at that characteristically 20th century synthesis of a changing logical and mathematical apparatus of science and experimentation, which contributes to the greater scientific dynamism.
In creating his relativity theory, Einstein proceeded from two criteria for the choice of a physical theory. Since these criteria, which have been mentioned above, require at this point to be explained in somewhat greater detail, I shall discuss---briefly and in popular terms---some of the concepts of that theory. Up to this point, the relativity theory could be mentioned without any such explanation: the time has come, however, to present the criteria for the choice of physical theory in a more detailed manner.
The criteria under consideration led science toward a fusion of Laplace's "Advancement of Reason" with " Reason's self-penetration". Einstein described the first criterion as external justification represented by the consistency of theory with empirical observation. If a theory is consistent with observable facts, including new, unexpected, paradoxical ones, it follows that by putting forth that theory, Reason advances providing explanation for fresh facts.
The second criterion is the "inner perfection" of a theory: a theory should, preferably, leave no room for ad hoc assumptions, i.e., assumptions adduced to explain a particular fact, but should proceed from the most general initial assumptions. The fundamental importance of Einstein's theory of relativity for science, culture and style of thinking was that it explained certain paradoxical facts from general concepts which spelt transformation of Reason itself and the arrival of new tools of knowledge, of new scientific ideals.
What are these facts? What is their explanation?
The starting point of the theory of relativity is the experiment which shows that the velocity of light propagation is identical in systems moving relative to one another. In relation to such systems, the velocity of light is identical in both cases. This constancy contradicts classical mechanics and, on the face of it some obvious facts, too. It violates the classic rule of velocity addition, which says that if a person walks at a speed of 5 km/hr in a train moving at 70 km/hr, in the direction of travel, his speed relative to the rails is 70+5 = 75 km/hr. Light, however, moves at a constant speed of 300,000 km/sec relative to the train, the rails, and even to an approaching train. It was on this paradoxical fact that Einstein based his theory. He discovered here a very general principle: motion consists in change of distance between a moving body and some other bodies of reference. These other bodies may just as well be said to be in motion while the body seen as moving may, by the same token, be said to be motionless. Bodies move relative to each other: motion unrelated to other bodies---absolute motion---is, in physical terms, meaningless.
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