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p But let us be tractable. Let us concede the improbable—that “power” is actually in the hands of our contemporary revolutionaries. What will such success lead them to?

p Let us listen to our author. "The immediate and prime task of the victorious provisional government consists in coming to the assistance of the popular revolution. The state power which has been seized must be used in order everywhere to revolutionise the popular masses and to organise their power; this is a task in the fulfilment of which the revolutionaries stand on firm ground. There the provisional government does not create anything but only frees the forces which exist in the people and are even in a state of very high tension.... In this the provisional government does not need either to use coercion on the popular masses or even to teach them. It only gives them purely external help."  [309•* 

p That is what Mr. Tikhomirov says when he discusses the role of the "provisional government which is forced to seize power".

p He is convinced that this "purely external" help for the people will’lead to the "foundation of the socialist organisation of Russia”. If we recall his ancestry we will see that such an assurance is by no means surprising on his part and that it was handed down to him by the laws of heredity. Bakunin “begot” Tkachov, and Tkachov begot Tikhomirov and his brothers. And if the nearest literary forbears of our author were of the conviction that "the people is always ready" for the social revolution, it is quite natural that their descendant should believe in such readiness of the people at least at "the time we are passing through”. We must be surprised not at Mr. Tikhomirov, who, ashamed to acknowledge his extraction openly, nevertheless piously keeps the traditions of his spiritual fathers. It is those readers we must be surprised at, who, having renounced the theories of Bakunin and Tkachov, imagine that Mr. Tikhomirov is presenting them with something newer, more serious and practicable. For such readers criticism is but an empty word and consistency an absolutely empty concept!

p People, who have really and irrevocably broken with the fantasies of Bakunin and Tkachov, will see Mr. Tikhomirov’s confidence as absolutely unjustified. They will understand that the socialist revolution presupposes a whole series of measures for the socialist organisation of production. And that reason alone is enough to prevent the "purely external" help of the revolutionary government from being considered sufficient to guarantee a successful outcome of such a revolution. Besides, the socialist organisation of production presupposes two conditions without the 310 “presence” of which it cannot be undertaken. The first of these conditions is objective and lies in the economic relations in the country. The other is purely subjective and concerns the producers themselves: the objective economic possibility of the transition to socialism is not enough by itself, the working class must understand and be aware of that possibility. These two conditions are closely connected with one another. Economic relations influence people’s economic concepts. These concepts influence people’s mode of activity, the social and, consequently, the economic relations. And since we now "do not believe" in any "hand of God" or in inborn ideas, it only remains for us to assume that "the order of ideas is determined by the order of things" and that people’s views of economic circumstances are determined by the qualities of those circumstances. These qualities also determine the tendencies of the various classes—conservative in one period of history, revolutionary in another. A certain class rises against the reality surrounding it, enters into antagonism with it only in the event of reality being "divided against itself”, of some contradictions being revealed in it. The character, the course and the outcome of the struggle which has started against that reality is determined by the character of these contradictions. In the capitalist countries, one of the chief economic contradictions is the antagonism between the social character of production, on the one hand, and the individual appropriation by the employers of its instruments, means, and consequently its products, on the other. As it is absolutely impossible to renounce the social organisation of production, the only means of solving this contradiction is to bring juridical standards into conformity with economic facts, to hand over the instruments and objects of labour to the ownership of society, for the latter to distribute the products according to the requirements of the working people. This contradiction, as also the urgent need for its solution, increasingly impresses itself upon the consciousness of the people who suffer from it. The working class becomes more and more inclined to and ready for the socialist revolution. We have already repeated time and again the truth proved by Marx that the antagonism referred to above inevitably arises at a definite stage in the development of commodity production. But commodity production, like everything else in the world, has not only an end, but a beginning, too. It not only prepares for a new social system thanks to its inherent contradictions, but there was a time when it was new itself, it arose out of antagonisms in its predecessor. We know that commodity production was preceded by natural economy and primitive collectivism. The principal cause leading to antagonism in the primitive communities was their inherent limitation which did not permit the application of communist principle to the relations 311 between communities. These relations led to the development of exchange, the products of social labour became commodities and in this new quality they exerted a disintegrating influence on the interior organisation of the community itself. The stage in the disintegration of primitive collectivism which is known as the village commune is characterised, as we know, by the contradiction that in it corn-growing on communal land is carried out by individual householders. This leads to the development of private property, to a new intensification of commodity production and at the same time to the birth of the contradictions inherent in this kind of production, i.e., to the exploitation of labour by capital. Thus commodity production nears its end because of the contradiction between the social organisation of production and the individual mode of appropriation. It develops, on the contrary, because of the contradiction between the individual character of the economy and the social character of the appropriation of one of the chief means of production—the land. We now ask Mr. Tikhomirov: which stage in the development of commodity production is Russia now passing through? Which of the contradictions we have pointed out is typical of her economic relations now? If the first, then there is no sense in contrasting Russia with the West, and, therefore, in emphasising the peculiar features of the Russian “social-revolutionary” programmes. If the second, by what means will the revolutionary government prevent commodity production from developing further? By what means will it solve the contradictions inherent in our village commune?

p The seizure of power by the revolutionaires may have two outcomes.

p Either the provisional government will in fact confine itself to "purely external" help to the people and, not teaching them anything, not coercing them to anything, will allow them to set up their own economic relations.

p Or, not relying on the wisdom of the people, it will keep in its hands the power it has seized and itself set about organising socialist production.

p In the pamphlet Socialism and the Political Struggle , we have already spoken of each of these outcomes. All we need to do now is to repeat and elaborate the thoughts we expressed then.

p Mr. Tikhomirov has freed us from the necessity of discussing in detail the second of the cases assumed. He does not even wish to hear of "the despotism of a communist government”. He demands that the provisional government should give the people "purely external help”, that it should "organise the people temporarily and only inasmuch as their" (the people’s) "self-government can be realised in those conditions”. Obscure 312 as this last phrase is, if it has any sense it means a resolute renunciation of any attempt to implant socialism by means of decrees of the secret society which has "seized power”. Finally, our author declares outright that the provisional government must use power, "of course, not to create a socialist system”. That, of course, is another big piece of nonsense, for it is ridiculous for a socialist government—even if only a provisional one—not to use its power to create a socialist system. However that may be, it is obvious that Mr. Tikhomirov is seriously convinced that the provisional government will not need to "create anything but only to free the forces which already exist in the people”. Let us see what such “freeing” can lead to.

p Our author did not explain how long this period will last during which the provisional government will "organise the power of the popular masses”. Neither did he tell us what this organisation means when translated from his party’s mystic "way of speaking" into literary Russian. He did not say a word about the way in which, after seizing power, the "Narodnaya Volya party" government will be replaced by a government "elected by the people, controlled by them and replaceable”. Hence it remains for us to choose the most probable of all possible guesses. The Eastern countries have distinguished themselves so far only by court revolutions or popular movements in which there were very few conscious political actions. To have any at all graphical idea of the probable course of the Russian revolution, we must willynilly presume that, despite all its exceptionalism, it will nevertheless take place at least partly after the manner of the West. But in the West it generally developed as follows. The provisional government placed in power by the coup d’etat continued to support the revolution against the efforts of reaction, convened a constituent assembly and placed the country’s future in its hands. Having drawn up the new constitution, the constituent assembly set up a permanent government conforming to the most compelling demands of the whole country or certain of the classes. It goes without saying that the new government was permanent only until there was a new revolution or a new reshaping of the country’s constitutional structure.

p Let us now imagine that after seizing power the "Narodnaya Volya party" will remain faithful to Mr. Tikhomirov’s promises and, not coercing the Russian people to anything, will convene a constituent assembly of representatives of the people. Let us assume that the elections will take place in the most favourable conditions for the revolutionaries, and only after "providing the guarantee of the people’s economic independence”, i.e., after the expropriation of the big landowners and employers. Let us even assume that the provisional government will institute electoral 313 qualifications according to estate and class and grant political franchise only to peasants, artisans and proletarians working by hand or brain. Finally, let us suppose that the provisional government will manage to maintain, and the constituent assembly to consolidate, the people’s "political independence”. This will be all the more difficult the sooner the revolutionary situation foretold by Mr. Tikhomirov arises; from Mr. Tikhomirov, too, we learn that even with a powerless bourgeoisie self-government by the people is possible only if the people are sufficiently disappointed in the autocracy of the tsars. Hence it follows that if by the time of the revolutionary outbreak this disappointment is not intense enough, there will not be any self-government by the people and the revolution which has taken place may lead to a political monster similar to the ancient Chinese or Peruvian empires, i.e., to a renewal of tsarist despotism with a communist lining. But refraining from pessimism, we will take into consideration the fact that Russia "can hardly wait" and assume that in view of such urgency our country will hasten to put an end to autocracy. We are so accommodating that we are ready to admit the best possible outcome to be the most probable one and to concede that the purest kind of "government by the people”, i.e., direct popular legislation, will be established in our country. All we ask is whether it can be “expected” that the self- governing people will immediately lay the "foundation of the socialist organisation of Russia".

p We have long known that

p ... Wo die Begriffe fehlen ,

p Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein , ^^212^^

p but we ask our reader to ponder the meaning of the words socialist organisation of production and, in order to make it more palpable, to imagine the decisions that the self-governing Russian people will probably come to on this matter.

p The representative assembly will be obliged to appeal to the judgement of the people on all important legislative questions.

p It will ask the people whether they approve and endorse the expropriation of big proprietors which the provisional government has carried out. And of course the people will answer in the affirmative. The land, the mines, the works and the factories will be declared state property.

p But a change in the owner does not mean a change in the organisation of production. The question of expropriation will lead to that of the exploitation of the confiscated properties.

p The self-governing people will have to organise on a new basis the whole of their economy, the production and the distribution of all their products.

314

p What form of organisation will the people deem necessary? Will the majority of our peasantry pronounce in favour of communism?

p Even Mr. Tikhomirov does not “expect” that. Being in or not far from their present stage of development, the people would not wish or even be able to establish a communist economy.

p Even as far as corn-growing is concerned, the people would probably maintain the present organisation of production. After socialisation, the land would still be cultivated by individual households. We already know what that contradiction leads to. It creates inequality, promotes the development of commodity production and consequently of the new contradictions inseparable from it. The history of the disintegration of the village commune and of the appearance of the various social classes would be repeated in a new form and on a wider scale. Our Narodniks and Narodnaya Volya members generally see the cause of the disintegration of the commune in the hostile attitude adopted to it by the estate and “class” state. But after all that has been said on this subject in the preceding chapter, we need not stop to refute, or rather to explain the real meaning of that conclusion. Modern science leaves not the slightest doubt as to inequality arising in primitive communities before those communities themselves organise into a state. Far from being the original cause for inequality appearing, the state itself is historically its product.  Subsequently the state naturally begins to influence economic relations, to destroy primitive communism. But he who wishes to strike at the root of inequality (and without that desire one cannot be a socialist) must direct his attention mainly to its radical, not its derivative cause. It would be very inconsistent on the part of such a one to wish to do away with the kind of state which intensifies inequality and to leave untouched the economic relations which create the inequality itself and the “class” state, too. And that would be the very kind of inconsistency that a provisional socialist government would suffer from which did not set itself the aim either of " teaching" the people, or of "coercing it" to adopt socialist organisation. By leaving that organisation to producers who are absolutely unprepared for it and confining itself to giving the people "purely external" help it would at best be chopping down the trunk and leaving untouched the roots which support it. The former members of such a government would display great naivete if they showed astonisment at a new healthier and stronger trunk growing in the place of the old rotten one.

p We repeat, if government by the people were really established in our country, when asked whether they needed land and whether it should be confiscated from the landlords, the self- 315 governing people would answer that they did need it and that it should be confiscated. But if asked whether they needed the "foundation of the socialist organisation”, they would first answer that they did not understand the meaning of that question, and then, having understood it with great difficulty, they would answer: No, we don’t need that. And as the expropriation of the big landowners is by no means equivalent to the "foundation of the socialist organisation”, there would not be any socialism as a result of the seizure of power by the revolutionaries.  [315•*  The outcome would be what Mr. Tikhomirov involuntarily prophesied when he said that the provisional government would use its power "by no means to create a socialist system”. We would be faced with the same village commune as now. The total difference would be that, having about three times as much land as at present, the commune would perhaps disintegrate more slowly and consequently more slowly clear the ground for higher forms of social life.

p What about the further independent development of the village commune? Well, its development consists in disintegrating! Whoever disputes, this must prove the opposite; he must show us, if not historical examples of a village commune becoming a communist one, at least of the tendency to such a transition, existing not in the heads of our Narodniks but in the very organisation of the commune and in all the dynamics of its agricultural economy. We know where, how and why the primitive communist communes were changed into communities of individual householders. But we do not know why and how our Russian village commune will accomplish the transition into a communist one. Liking an occasional conversation with the Narodniks, we naturally could not remain unaware that two or three of our communes had organised collective cultivation of the fields. The village of Grekovka, which has distinguished itself by this good action, was once spoken of by absolutely all the "friends of the people" and its example was thought to solve the whole social problem in Russia. But if the peasants in that famous village were ever persecuted for communist tendencies it would not be difficult for their counsel to prove that the prosecutor knew nothing at all about communist doctrines. Collective cultivation of the soil is only a little nearer to communism than collective work in the form of corvee or the "collective ploughing" introduced under Nicholas I with the help of bayonets and birch-rods. However stupid the “unforgettable” tsar was, even he never thought that collective ploughing could give rise to an independent movement towards communism in the village communes. The main stress in this question is not on the 316 manner in which the householders work—individually or collectively—but on the fact whether there are separate household economies and whether they tend to unite in one communist whole. The village of Grekovka has shown no such tendency. Its householders continue to be owners of their products, which they turn into commodities. And once they do not abolish the commodity quality of their products, it can be mathematically proved that the strongest tendency in this commune is towards capitalism and by no means towards communism.

p Collective cultivation of the soil is a very good and useful thing; but it would be strange to think that it can be the main road from the present village commune to the ideals of communism. It can play, if anything, only the role of a small “by-road” leading on to a main road which goes in a completely different direction. It would have rendered great service in the West, where its role would have amounted to giving the peasants the habit of collective work and thus decreasing their resistance to the communist revolution, in which the initiative would have fallen to the proletariat in town and country. But that would have exhausted its advantages. In every historical, as well as mechanical movement, part of the motive force is expended in overcoming resistance. To decrease the resistance means to free a corresponding portion of the force tied down by it and to accelerate the movement. If you pave a main street, if you lubricate an engine, you decrease the labour of the horse drawing a cart and cut down fuel consumption. But not a single mechanic will imagine that the engine will be set in motion just because you have decreased the friction in its parts, no carter will ever dream of unharnessing his horse as soon as he reaches a well-paved road. Any man who imagined or did any such thing would be declared insane by everybody. And there would not be the slightest mistake in the verdict. In order to cause movement we need an active, not a passive force, positive, not negative conditions. The same with the village commune. Collective tilling of the soil is good provided there is an active force which causes and accelerates its transition to a higher form of social life. In the West the proletariat would play that role, beginning the communist revolution in a completely different sphere, the sphere of large-scale production and agriculture, in works and factories and on big farms. The force of the proletariat would be created and directed by absolutely definite economic relations existing outside and independently of the commune. But where would we get that force from here in our peasant state, set up by the revolution of the Narodnaya Volya party? From among the peasants themselves? It seems to "Mr. Tikhomirov, we know, that history has some kind of independent "movement towards socialism”. He may think that such 317 an independent “movement” will appear among the peasants as well. But we will leave Mr. Tikhomirov and talk to less credulous readers. They will agree, at least, that the economic tendencies of every class are determined by the character of the economic conditions in which it lives. Our peasants live in conditions of commodity production, and in commodity production the product dominates the producer and dictates its laws to him. And the laws of commodity production are such that they promote first and foremost the development of capitalism and capitalist, by no means communist, tendencies. Where, then, will our peasant get a tendency towards communism from?

p Is that clear? No? Let us go from discussion to comparison. The Don Cossacks now have as much land as our peasants would have after the popular (of the Narodnaya Volya party) revolution. They have about thirty dessiatines per person. This land belongs not to individuals, not even to individual communes, but to the whole of the "glorious troop”. The question is: Do the Don Cossacks show any tendency to introduce communist economy? As far as I know, not communist, but bourgeois tendencies are becoming stronger and stronger among them. Perhaps this will be put down to the "corrupting influence of the state"? But there was a time when that influence was almost non-existent; why did they not then accomplish the transition to communism? Perhaps, their military way of life prevented them? Just imagine the Cossacks, freed altogether from military service, devoting themselves entirely to peaceful occupations. What would happen in such a case? We will tell you: an intense disintegration of the remaining traces of primitive communism among the Cossacks would set in, then the reign of the Cossack bourgeoisie would be nearer....

p Abundance of land did not save the Cossacks from the appearance of inequality and the resulting exploitation of the poor by the rich. Quite the contrary, abundance of land in itself encouraged the appearance of inequality.  [317•*  The late Professor Belyayev, despite his pronounced Slavophile tendency, perfectly understood the significance of abundance of land in the history of the rise of the classes. "Naturally, there was plenty of land in ancient Russia, far more than was needed at the time, and anybody who wished could occupy without any hindrance enormous expanses of wild fields and woods which belonged to nobody, naturally, all those who could afford it did so."  [317•**  But not everybody had equal means, and that is why not all occupied the same quantity of land; 318 some did not even occupy any at all, having no means whatsoever to clear and cultivate it. Hence, inequality in income and dependence of the poor upon the rich. Neither is there any doubt that in some cases "the free occupation and cultivation of the land was not long in leading to the concept of landed property”. This side of the matter has been well set forth by M. Kovalevsky in his book on communal land tenure.^^213^^ Until recent times the right freely to occupy untilled lands existed in the region of the Don Cossacks—and perhaps still exists today in the Kuban territory; that was precisely what allowed the rich to become richer, that is what sowed into that virgin soil the first seeds of the class struggle.

p But the state, transformed by the revolution, would prevent such a turn of affairs in our country, another reader will say.

p It is difficult to say beforehand what a people’s state would do in one particular case or another, but, having an idea of the economic conditions under which the majority of citizens live, it is not difficult to foresee the general direction that the economic policy of such a state would take. According to Mr. Tikhomirov’s own “expectations” the revolutionary state established would be mainly a state of peasants. Being both unwilling and unable to lay "the foundation of the socialist organisation" in his own commune, the peasant would also be both unable and unwilling to set up such an organisation within the broader limits of the state. The economic policy of the people’s state would be just as little communist as that of the individual peasant communes out of which it would be formed. It goes without saying that the state would endeavour to eliminate abuses which could arise as a result of the distribution of social lands to individual persons or groups for cultivation. But it would never bring itself to take away stocks and instruments belonging to the better-off householders. Similarly, it would consider as perfectly just and natural to limit the right of landed property only by the owner’s labour and means, which, naturally, would be his private property. If in fact the peasant has any definite ideals for the social structure, there is no doubt that the freedom by which everybody can occupy free land wherever his "axe, plough, and scythe can go" has a great part in them. The "popular revolution" would provide, at least partly, the possibility to put those ideals into practice; but that would lead, as we know, to inequality between the agriculturists. Once that impulse given, the inequality could, of course, reach its natural extreme and reduce to nil" all the results of the "popular revolution".

p Further. The peasant state would naturally leave untouched not only trade, but also, to a great extent, industrial capital. Mr. Tikhomirov himself apparently admits this when he presumes 319 that the people’s revolution would only render powerless "the already weak nobility and bourgeoisie”. "To render powerless" does not mean to destroy. Need we say what results the existence of trade and industrial capital would lead to? Mr. Tikhomirov assumes that these results would be prevented by that same people’s government. But we will draw his attention to the fact that not all that seems dangerous to the socialist is so in the eyes of the peasant, and consequently of a peasant government. Whereas Mr. Tikhomirov and we are opposed generally to "private business capital”, the peasant waxes indignant only over certain applications of the capitalist principle, he has no objection to its substance. He fully acknowledges the possibility of private business enrichment. That being the case, the "people’s" government will not have any objection to it either. Its radicalism will at best engage in the struggle against the big capital of the manufacturer, but the government will not even think of setting a limit to exploitation by the “master” in general. Hence this is already a second factor leading to the disappearance of the "relative equality" established by the revolution. Mr. Tikhomirov thinks that this factor will be rendered powerless by the "removal of the land from the domain of exploitation”. But we already know that the land will not be altogether “removed” from it; the people’s government will tolerate both inequality in the distribution of land and the possibility of hiring a labourer from among the ruined householders. Peasant “ideals” are easily reconciled with hired labour. Besides, anybody who understands the matter knows that only so-called petty-bourgeois socialism hopes to help the people by "rendering powerless" the bourgeoisie or "removing from the domain of exploitation" this or that particular means of production. And the only reason why it hopes to do so is because the “people” in whom it is interested are the petty bourgeoisie, who stand only to gain if the big bourgeoisie is "rendered powerless”. It is a distinctive feature of petty-bourgeois socialism that its reform plans leave commodity production untouched. This is the origin of its complete theoretical and practical powerlessness. The truly revolutionary working-class movement of the present has nothing in common with the cowardly fantasies of the petty bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, "Russian socialism as expressed"... in Mr. Tikhomirov’s article is much nearer in this case to the socialism of the petty bourgeoisie than to that of the working class. Like the former, it does not carry its revolutionary projects as far as the elimination of commodity production. It leaves that care to the future, post-revolution "history of the Russian state”. Completely ignoring the significance of economic evolution in the analysis of its revolutionary premises, it places exaggerated hopes in it as soon as it is concerned with results of the upheaval which it 320 recommends. It calls lor revolution where it is unthinkable without preliminary evolution and appeals to evolution where it is impossible without a radical economic revolution. It wants to bemainly revolutionary hut it falls into half-measures and inconsistency as far as the substance is concerned.  [320•*  We will soon see where it borrowed this typical trait, which reduces to nil all its revolutionary phrases.

p In his efforts to convince his readers that a people’s government will be able to paralyse the harmful consequences of the impending half-measure economic revolution, Mr. Tikhomirov represents the probable course of Russia’s future social development as follows:

p “The government, responsible for the course of affairs in the country, has an interest in the country’s prosperity, for its own popularity depends upon it, and the government will no doubt be obliged to take measures to increase labour productivity and, among other things, to organise large-scale production.... Largescale production is too obviously advantageous and necessary, in many cases it is even inevitable. The popular masses can understand that easily. Moreover" (and this is particularly interesting, we will remark), "private undertaking, slowed down in the domain of capitalist production, will try in all respects" (just imagine, what an idyll! ) "to make clear to the people the advantage and convenience of social production.... We will not even mention the socialist intelligensia’s influence on the people.... Why can there not thus be gradually effected a transition of the village commune into an association, an organisation of exchange among the communes and associations of communes , an association of several communes for some production or other, until the socialist system, developing little by little and increasingly ousting private economy, finally extends to all the functions of the country.” Then, "the advent of the socialist revolution, in some countries of Europe if not in the whole of it,... will place Russia in the almost unconditional necessity to organise her international exchange on the same" (i.e., socialist) "principles and hence will almost impose upon us socialist organisation in the sphere of home exchange " (pp. 258-59). That is how this question "is viewed" by Mr. Tikhomirov. Before examining its substance we shall make two incidental remarks.

p Our author pins great hopes on the influence of the Russian socialist intelligentsia and the West European working-class revolution. We also recognise the significance of that influence but think that it cannot be unconditional. First of all, where did Mr. Tikhomirov get the idea that after the peasant revolution 321 not only a socialist intelligentsia, but any “intelligentsia” at all in the present sense of the word will "be born unhindered"? At present, our socialist intelligentsia, like any other, come mainly from among the official, landlord, merchant and ecclesiastical walks of life, that is, from the higher sections of society, who see education as a means for making a career. While producing careerists, our universities also, by the way, create revolutionaries. But both careerists and revolutionaries are a product of the existence of the bureaucratic state and the higher classes. This is so far beyond doubt that the consciousness of their “bourgeois” origin impelled our revolutionaries, on the one hand, to speak of their "duty to the people" and, on the other, systematically to contrast themselves with the people. The "socialist intelligentsia" are conscious that they form nothing more than one of the branches of the common trunk of the official-ridden “class” state. Mr. Tikhomirov wants to fell that trunk but at the same time he hopes that the branch which is dear to him, far from withering, will be born “unhindered”. That reminds one of the well-known anecdote about the Ukrainian who, having chopped down the bough he was sitting on, was surprised at his own fall. Or perhaps Mr. Tikhomirov thinks that after the "popular revolution" the socialist intelligentsia will be "born unhindered" from the peasantry itself? In that case we fear he is mistaken.

p What does the meaning of the revolution he is “expecting” amount to? To an agrarian upheaval, to the expropriation of the big landowners, to the possibility to give the peasants allotments three times as large as the present ones, to the abolition of oppressing taxation. Does Mr. Tikhomirov presume that such an increase in allotments will convince the peasants that higher education is a necessity, that it will compel them, themselves , to send their children to university and their government to support and institute higher educational establishments?

p The large quantity of land will so much simplify the peasant’s position, will so greatly increase the importance of extra working hands in his family that the peasantry will see neither the necessity nor any possibility of spending much money and time on higher education.

p Universities are necessary for a state of officials, of bourgeoisie and of gentry, and they will eventually be necessary for the proletariat, who, without higher scientific education, will be unable to cope with the productive forces which will have come under their command; but in the reign of the peasant communes universities will be a luxury having little attraction for practical-minded householders. But let us grant that the peasants can " easily understand" the significance of higher education. Let us remember, besides, that after the "popular revolution" both 322 the bourgeoisie and the gentry will remain; let us assume that both of them will be "rendered powerless" to the extent necessary for them to be able to send their children to higher schools without harming the people economically. Why does Mr. Tikhomirov think that those schools will be nurseries of socialist intelligentsia? In Switzerland we happen to see, on the one hand, a well-to-do peasantry and, on the other, a fairly “powerless”, i.e., petty, bourgeoisie. Do many socialists come from the Swiss schools, where, in fact, the number of peasants’ children is not at all negligible?

p Yet isn’t it “easy” for the Swiss peasants "to understand" the advantage of the socialist organisation of production?

p Of course it is, but still they don’t understand it! They don’t want to hear of socialism and this is not helped by their survivals of communal land tenure and their famous collective dairies!

p The advantages of socialist way of life are so apparent that they would seem "easy to understand" for everybody. But only the socialists of the Utopian period could fail to know that understanding of socialism can be achieved only combined with actual economic necessity. And in a peasant state such a necessity can be present only as a rare coincidence.

p And what about the present intelligentsia? the reader will ask. Can they not, when they experience the people’s revolution, devote their energies "to the service of the people and to organising their labour and their social relations"?

p Are there many such “intellectuals”? Do they—excuse me for asking—understand much themselves? What will they do against the inexorable logic of commodity production?

p Will their exertions be aided by the West European revolution? It is that revolution we want to talk about now.

p The West European revolution will be mighty, but not almighty. To have a decisive influence on other countries, the socialist countries of the West will need some kind of vehicle for that influence. "International exchange" is a powerful vehicle, but it is not almighty either. The Europeans have brisk trade with China, but one can hardly be confident that the working-class revolution in the West will very soon " impose" "socialist organisation in the sphere of home exchange" on China. Why? Because China’s "social structure" seriously hinders European ideas and institutions in having decisive influence on it. The same can be said of Turkey, Persia, and so on. But what is the "social structure" of the Sublime Porte? First and foremost a peasant state in which there is still not only the village commune, but also the zadruga, which, according to our Narodniks’ scheme, is much closer to socialism. And despite this, despite all the “popular” revolutions 323 in the Turkish Empire, there can be no thought of the European proletariat succeeding without any difficulty in “imposing” socialism on Turkish citizens, even those of Slav origin. Here again a distinction must be made between the active force of circumstances impelling the people towards socialism and the negative conditions which only ease the transition to socialism. The objective logic of the relations inside peasant states by no means “imposes” upon them a "socialist organisation in the sphere of home exchange”; and what is imposed upon them purely from outside cannot be crowned with success. No doubt the European working-class revolution will have a very powerful influence on those countries in which at least some strata of the citizens resemble the European working class by their economic situation, their political education and their habits of thought. Its influence will be rather weak, on the contrary, where there are no such strata. The February Revolution had an echo in nearly all countries which resembled France by their "social structure”. But the wave which it raised’ broke on the threshold of peasant Europe. Beware lest the same happens, too, with the future revolution of the proletariat!

p “The meaning of this fable is" that West is West and Russia is Russia, or, in other words, don’t count on eating somebody else’s loaf, but yourself get up early and start baking your own. However powerful the possible influence of the European revolution may be, we must bother about providing the conditions which would render that influence effective. As for Mr. Tikhomirov’s half-measure peasant and petty-bourgeois revolution, far from creating those conditions, it will destroy even those which actually exist at present.

p In this case, as in all others, all Mr. Tikhomirov’s " expectations" are full of contradictions. The influence of the West on Russia appears possible to him thanks to "international exchange”. From this it follows that the brisker that exchange is, the sooner the West will “impose” upon us a "socialist organisation in the sphere of home exchange”. But the development of our international trade relations presupposes the development of trade, commodity production in our country. And the more commodity production develops, the more the "relative economic equality" resulting from the people’s revolution will be upset, and the more difficult will be "socialist organisation in the sphere of home exchange”, at least for the time being, i.e., until the development of commodity production reaches its logical end. But in that case the "popular revolution" which has been carried out will lose all its meaning.

p Thus, if after the “upheaval” we return to natural economy, we shall have "relative equality”, but then the West will be 324 unable to influence us because of the weakness of international exchange. On the other hand, if commodity production develops in our country, it will be difficult for the West to influence us because our "relative equality" will be seriously upset and Russia will be transformed into a country of petty bourgeoisie. That is the vicious circle in which Mr. Tikhomirov’s expectations from the West are fated to go round and round. That is what it means to be a metaphysician, that is what it means to consider things "one after the other and apart from each other"! ^^214^^

p Mein theuerer Freund, ich rath’euch drum

p Zuerst Collegium logicum.^^215^^

p These are the contradictory hopes pinned on the West by those who suspect the whole of modern European history of being “hazardous” and “unbelievable”! Really, collegium logicum would be very useful for Mr. Tikhomirov!

Having concluded these remarks, let us now go on to the main content of the excerpt quoted above.